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WELFARE POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION:
A STUDY IN REGIONAL POLICY-MAKING

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Carol Ruth Nechemias, B.A., M.A.

* * * * * *

The Ohio State University
1976

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I would like to acknowledge the individuals and institutions whose support contributed to this study. Professors Philip Stewart, Randall Ripley, and Loren Waldman, all of The Ohio State University, have offered helpful suggestions and encouragement. This research was made possible by the prior efforts of Professor Philip Stewart who is responsible for the creation of a data bank on Soviet regional politics. To him I owe an intellectual debt for stimulating my interest in the issues raised in this study. I owe special thanks to Professor Loren Waldman for his insightful and critical comments. Computer analysis was conducted primarily at The Ohio State University. A special debt of gratitude is owed to Bill Dixon for his patient work as a computer consultant in the Polimetrics Laboratory of The Ohio State University. Additional computer work was completed at the University of Georgia at Athens and at Arizona State University. Finally, I should like to thank Lori Cass and Sue Wright, secretaries in the Arizona State University Department of Political Science, for their expert job in typing this manuscript. I alone am responsible for any errors in this study.
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Chapter I. Competing Models of the Policy Process

The fundamental task of the five-year plan was to convert the USSR from an agrarian and weak country, dependent upon the caprices of the capitalist countries, into an industrial and powerful country, fully self-reliant and independent of the caprices of world capitalism.  

---J.V. Stalin, Report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, 1933.

The Party's position is that in the period directly ahead, while further developing heavy industry and other branches of the national economy, we can and must step up the rate of improvement of the people's living standard.  


The growth of the people's well-being is the supreme goal of the Party's economic policy. In putting forth a substantial increase in the well-being of the working people as the main task of the Ninth Five-Year Plan, the Central Committee intends that this course will determine not only our activity in the coming five years but also the general orientation . . . for the long-range future.  


The study of public welfare in the Soviet Union relates to a number of broad questions or issues. These issues involve the future of the Soviet political system. Raising living standards figures prominently in discussions of detente, "convergence theory," economic reforms, and regime stability. Hence, research on Soviet welfare policies and their effects is an important task, both for the development of social science theory and for a better understanding of Soviet society.
This research will contribute to the empirical study of welfare policies in the Soviet Union. Competing models of policy-making will be tested. These tests involve the comparison of policy results across the universe of RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic) oblasti (provinces) during the time period from 1959 to 1970. The policies covered include: housing, retail trade, and health care.

There are 57 oblasti in the RSFSR. This number includes the cities of Leningrad and Moscow, which are considered the equivalent of oblasti. The RSFSR, or Russian Republic, is one of the fifteen Union Republics which constitute the USSR. The Russian Republic is by far the largest republic, from both a population and geographic viewpoint. The RSFSR contains slightly over 50% of the Soviet population and stretches across two continents. If it were not part of the USSR, it would be first in territorial size and fourth in population among the nations of the world.

From the literature on Soviet welfare policies, three different models of the welfare policy process can be gleaned. Each model is associated with a particular description of the way in which policy is made: each posits its own set of key explanatory variables. These models can be labelled as follows: 1) level of development; 2) equalization; and 3) political clout.

Literature on Policy Analysis

In recent years political scientists have become increasingly concerned with policy analysis. This has taken the form of comparing the policies of different communities and assessing the relative influence of economic, social, historical, and political influences on the policy choices made. Although different kinds of research have accumulated,
little empirical work has been done within the Soviet context.

Western research on Soviet policy-making has been largely descriptive, marked by an absence of reliance upon principles of scientific inquiry. Case studies of particular events, and lengthy descriptions of particular policies abound. As examples of some of the best pieces of literature in this area, Alfred DiMaio, Jr.'s *Soviet Urban Housing*, Philip Hanson's *The Consumer in Soviet Society*, and Nicholas DeWitt's *Education and Professional Employment in the USSR*, may be cited.5 A noteworthy addition to this literature is Robert Osborn’s *Soviet Social Policies: Welfare, Equality, and Community*.6

In recent years the "behavioral mood," coupled with the increased availability of Soviet data, has lead to a greater concern for the discovery of regularities, precision in the recording of data, and the development of empirical theory. The recent publication of the *Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data* represents a step toward the creation of an aggregate data set relevant to the study of social policies.7

The empirical study of Soviet welfare policy is in its infancy. For the most part, the data gathered in the *Handbook*, and studies which do utilize indicators of welfare, focus either upon the USSR as a whole, or upon the 15 Union Republics. The emphasis is upon the description of changes in aggregate "levels" of welfare, and upon the description of differences in the distribution of welfare services among the Union Republics.8

Empirical studies of welfare in the USSR tend to focus upon economic problems like labor productivity and labor turnover. Levels of welfare are treated as independent variables. These studies typically
include data based upon two or three regions or communities.

An excellent example of the above kind of work is G. Prudenskii's "Time Budgets and Leisure Activities." Aspects of welfare—public catering, preschool institutions, repair shops—are compared for Moscow and for several new industrial centers in Siberia. Prudenskii argues that improvement of the material and cultural life of the working people leads to an increase in productivity.

Other Soviet studies of welfare tend to focus upon economizing: the efficient budgeting and delivery of, for example, educational and medical services. Two volumes of material edited by Fred Ablin, on Soviet education, provide a great many examples of studies bent upon the rational organization of welfare structures.

Of greatest value to this study have been articles found within Western journals and the Soviet press. These sources are too numerous to mention here. A review of relevant literature is presented within each chapter.

The Dependent Variable: Welfare

A distinction must be made between the concept of welfare as it is commonly used by policy-makers and the concept as it has been developed by political scientists. Typically, the term "welfare" is a broad, indiscriminate category, connoting government programs directed toward improving the "quality of life." The concept appears unidimensional, -- lumps together a variety of programs into one issue area.

In the Soviet case, broad welfare categories are typically employed in such phrases as the "standard of living" and the concept of the "social wage." The 1961 Party Program sets as a goal the achievement of a higher standard of living. The Program associates the following
tasks with "the improvement of the well-being of the people": a high level of income and consumption; solution of the housing problem; the reduction of working hours; improved health services; and bettering the position of women through such programs as public catering and day nurseries. Education is mentioned briefly in discussing living standards, but is dealt with in greater detail in another section of the Party Program, which is devoted to the content and development of communist consciousness.

Alexei Kosygin, in presenting the provisions of the Ninth Five-Year Plan, mentions the following programs in discussing how to raise the "living standard of our people": new wage minimums; increases in wages and pensions; larger scholarship grants to students attending institutions of higher education; increases in consumer goods, public catering, and everyday services (repair shops, laundries, etc.); new housing; better tourist facilities; improved utilities; completing the introduction of universal secondary education; and building new hospitals and polyclinics. Obviously, concepts like living standards, or phrases like "the welfare of the working man," as utilized in the everyday language of Soviet politics, denote a wide variety of programs associated with the "quality of life."

The concept of the "social wage" does introduce one important distinction into the welfare realm: personal disposable income is differentiated from "forms of income which Soviet citizens receive in addition to money earnings." Included in the social wage are payments (pensions, paid leaves) and services (education, medical services, housing). Hence, from the viewpoint of the Soviet policy-maker, programs directed toward enhancing the quality of life may be divided
along public consumption/private consumption lines.

For the social scientist, the aforementioned notions of welfare, living standards, or the "social wage" are inadequate. In the first place, policy research in the United States has suggested that the policy process may differ from one welfare program to another, even though the programs are all considered examples of welfare policy. \(^{14}\) As will be discussed later, there is good reason in the Soviet case, to expect the key explanatory variables--the policy process--to differ for specific issue areas.

A second problem with the broad concept of welfare involves the idea that there are levels of components or policy. Randall Ripley et. al. distinguish among policy statements, policy actions and policy results. \(^{15}\) These distinctions aid in the clarification of what one means by "policy," and provide guidance in determining what things to measure at each level of policy.

Policy statements are declarations "of intent on the part of the government to do something." \(^{16}\) For the Soviet Union, these statements can be found in the speeches and writings of Party and State officials as reported in the press, the 1961 Party program, and the standards or guidelines issued by central ministries. These policy statements will be incorporated into a general discussion of the significance of specific programs, and will be utilized to assess achievement in specific areas.

Policy actions involve "what the government actually does." \(^{17}\) Such governmental activities as expenditures, the hiring of staff, and the organization or reorganization of party and state organs are conceived of as policy actions. In this research, the primary measure of
policy actions will be the local budget. Information on the oblast budget consists of total expenditures, which can be sub-divided into two categories—the local economy and socio-educational measures.

Budgetary funds earmarked for the local economy finance enterprises subordinate to the oblast Soviet. For the most part, these enterprises are involved in the production of consumer goods, food processing, and the construction of housing, retail stores, schools, and other facilities. Socio-educational measures involve mainly the financing of educational and medical services.

Data on per capita expenditures will be utilized as a measure of welfare effort or commitment. By comparing per capita expenditure with results already achieved, efforts to catch up—to bring a region up to "average" living standards—can be brought into focus.

Policy results are "what happens in the environment... as a result of the government's policy statements and actions." The policy results utilized in this research attempt to measure important aspects of the "quality of life." These aspects include health, disposable income, and acquisition of skills. Conceptually, policy results involve the end products of governmental actions and environmental influences.

Table 1-1 lists the policy results which will be examined. Following Soviet practice, these policy results—each an indicator of welfare—are grouped into three categories: 1) retail trade; 2) health care; and 3) housing. These categories may include various programs—for example, the provision of medical personnel or hospital beds—that will be thought of as separate issue areas.

Policy statements, actions, and results will be examined in detail in chapters devoted to specific welfare categories. Comparative and
Table 1-1

THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES:

POLICY ACTIONS AND POLICY RESULTS

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<td>III. Housing Fund</td>
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Sources and Notes for Table 1-1. The source for all of the variables is Narodnoe Khozialstvo RSFSR (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Politichesky Literatury, 1959-1964, 1970). All of the variables in the above Table, and in Tables II and III, are part of the Soviet Elite Mobility Project and Research Archive (SEMPRA) at The Ohio State University. The principle investigator is Dr. Philip D. Stewart.
longitudinal factors will be focused upon in these discussions.

The "comparative factor" involves "the comparison of variables against a background of uniformity . . . for the purpose of discovering causal factors that account for variations (in policy results)." Like the American states, the RSFSR oblasti represent an ideal experimental laboratory. Certain background variables are held constant. The oblasti share the same institutional frameworks and a similar cultural milieu. The oblasti are subordinate to the same Union Republic and All Union state institutions, and to the same Communist Party organs at the All-Union level. The oblasti examined here are all predominantly Russian in language and nationality. Hence, the isolation of theoretically significant factors—political and economic variables—is facilitated.

The longitudinal focus means that data will be presented, wherever possible, for each oblast on a year-by-year basis for all RSFSR oblasti. This approach is essential for the study of the impact of policy. It also allows for the asking of questions regarding continuity—and changes—in public policies across regime type. The two relevant regimes are the Khrushchev period, 1959-1964, and the Brezhnev-Kosygin years, 1965-1970. Sensitivity to how well the models of the policy process, discussed below, "fit" the data, for specific issue areas, and for specific time periods, will be at the heart of this research.

**Model I: Level of Development**

The level-of-development model stresses inequality in the distribution of policy actions and results. This inequality operates to the
detriment of the rural population; and to the benefit of urban areas, especially those with important industrial bases. Responsibility for this state of affairs is attributed to the top party elite, who prefer urban life and heavy industry. Achieving high living standards is regarded as a goal all too often sacrificed to the goal of expanding production, while the distribution of welfare outputs is viewed primarily as an adjunct to the goal of rapid industrialization and the building of a strong state. This view of policy-making in the welfare realm is rooted in assessments of the Stalinist period, beginning with the era of five-year plans in 1929.

In Stalin's major addresses the primary goals of the regime involve the creation of a strong nation-state. This priority is most clearly—and graphically—evident in a speech Stalin made to industrial managers in 1931.

... One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered because of her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol Khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords... She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her—because of her backwardness, because of her military backwardness, cultural backwardness, political backwardness, industrial backwardness, agricultural backwardness... Such is the law of the exploiters—to beat the backward and the weak. It is the jungle law of capitalism. You are backward, you are weak—therefore you are wrong; hence you can be beaten and enslaved...

... Do you want our socialist father-land to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this, you must put an end to its backwardness in the shortest possible time... There is no other way.

We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do this, or we shall go under.
For Stalin, building socialism meant converting the USSR from a backward, agrarian country into an industrial giant.

The "hows" and "whys" of rapid industrialization are important. How—that is, what pattern of development was chosen to achieve industrialization—has had a tremendous impact on social policies and living standards. Because there was a tendency to rigidify policy into dogma during the Stalinist era, the underpinnings or foundations of Stalinist policy patterns are significant. It is important to realize that the post-Stalinist leadership inherited a legacy of "laws of socialism," which, if left unchallenged, would greatly restrict the kinds of decisions that could be made.

The Stalinist pattern of industrialization called for the utilization of the country's own resources. In order to finance industrialization, Stalin was frank in stating that such a goal would involve "serious sacrifices" and a "regime of the strictest economy." According to what were eventually labelled "objective economic laws," investment was favored over consumption, and heavy industrial investment over investment in light industry, consumer goods, and agriculture. The agricultural sector was utilized as a source of capital for industrial development; peasants were treated as second class citizens. It should be noted that proposals made in the early 1950's that Soviet society might soon devote more attention to raising living standards and to creating material plenty were dismissed as harmful, erroneous, and "anti-Marxist.

Higher living standards were to be achieved as a by-product of industrialization, or postponed to some indefinite future date. When speaking of material incentives, Stalin generally justified welfare
measures by pointing to their contribution to industrialization. It is typical, for example, that in discussing the need to retain workers in factories, Stalin argued that it was necessary to "further improve the supply of goods and the housing conditions of the workers."\textsuperscript{23}

Western evaluations of welfare policies under Stalin generally assert that material incentives (wages and living conditions) were utilized to re-inforce the regime's priorities. David Cattell, for example, states that:

\begin{quote}
\textit{The role of welfare was primarily to serve the drive for industrialization. Thus, under Stalin welfare meant keeping the population sufficiently fed, healthy, indoctrinated, and educated to perform the tasks of industrialization. . . . Beyond this, the regime had little interest.}\textsuperscript{24}
\end{quote}

Similarly, Alec Nove has described the intent of Soviet leaders with regard to welfare in terms of wishing "to give their people the most that can be spared, or the least that will persuade them to work--such fine distinctions can be left to philosophers."\textsuperscript{25}

In regard to questions of distribution, Stalin began, in 1931, to attack "harmful egalitarianism." Stalin stressed that by equality Marxism meant not the levelling of requirements and everyday life, but the abolition of classes.\textsuperscript{26} Incorporated into the 1936 Constitution was a principle that justified inequality in a socialist society:

"From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."\textsuperscript{27}

Much evidence exists to support Merle Fainsod's conclusion that the drive to industrialize rapidly lead to the repudiation of egalitarianism and mass welfare.\textsuperscript{28} During periods when food and consumer goods were rationed (1928-1936, 1941-1947), priorities were established for workers in specific sectors.\textsuperscript{29} Wage differentiations sharpened between
the highest and lowest paid workers. Workers in light industry, in
the trade sector, and agriculture received less income than workers
in heavy industry, construction, or mining. A Central Committee
decree of 1929 turned the organs of health protection in the direction
of a differentiated approach to medical care, according to which lead­
ing groups of workers were to receive the highest priority. Education
policies favored students from better-off families. Concerning urban-rural differences, collective farmers were
excluded from the state social security system. The distribution net­
work for retail trade was neglected in the countryside; and peasants
had to pay higher prices for consumer goods than did urban residents.
State investment in housing, medical services, schools, and other
amenities for rural villages "constituted only a small fraction of
what the cities received." A distinctly privileged elite emerged. This elite contained lead­
ing party and state personnel, and members of various specialist elites
(managers, high-ranking military officers, top scientists, writers).
Better housing, country dachas, a system of closed stores, special
hospitals, sanatoria, and clinics were made available to those of high
rank and status.

No discussion of Soviet welfare policies would be complete with­
out reference to an important element of the Stalinist regime--mass
terror. Stalin set forth ideological principles which fostered the
image of a Soviet state increasingly threatened by both internal and
external enemies. According to the theme of "capitalist encirclement,"
growing economic crisis within the Western world was leading to an
increased tendency toward adventurist attack on the homeland of
socialism. According to the theme of increased class struggle within the USSR as the country moved toward socialism, moribund classes (supported by bourgeois forces from without) would pose an increasingly desperate resistance to the regime. Within this framework, terror was justified.

For the social welfare realm terror was important as a means of suppressing demands for better living conditions, and as a means for gaining cheap labor. Stalin appealed to nationalism in order to gain support for policies which entailed personal sacrifice and belt tightening. Over the long-run, however, pervasive fear—the unpredictable, seemingly random disappearance of a neighbor or a co-worker—helped ensure a situation in which even minor demands for improvements in living conditions were not likely to be made. Coercion thus played a significant role in keeping the masses involved, at least in terms of overt behavior, in regime goals.

It can also be argued that the terror created a witch-hunt atmosphere that may have provided an emotional outlet for many people. Foreign agents and enemies of the people provided convenient scapegoats for all the failures and shortcomings of Soviet society.

The terror also contributed to the industrialization drive via the labor camp system. Millions of Soviet citizens worked in various labor camps, often on major construction projects involving railroads, hydroelectric dams, and canals. Typically, these projects were carried out in locations where it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to attract free labor. Alexander Solzhenitsyn has argued that the creation of the labor camp system itself was part of the Stalinist strategy to achieve rapid economic development.
To what extent have these policy patterns been perpetuated in the post-Stalinist period? Khrushchev tended to label his political opposition "Stalinist." Such a practice represented a useful political tactic, and was not always based upon policy positions. Nonetheless, members of the Soviet political elite that Khrushchev labelled "metal-eaters" (or "steel-eaters") did indeed espouse an orthodox, e.g. Stalinist position regarding the relative priorities of heavy industry, light industry, and agriculture.

Both Michel Tatu and Jerry Hough have described elements of the Soviet elite in terms which evoke Khrushchevian imagery. Tatu, utilizing Khrushchev's term, speaks of a "steel-eaters" lobby. This lobby includes "all those who cling to the old Stalinist thesis of priority development for heavy industry." Tatu asserts that the steel-eaters cannot dictate policy, but can "sabotage unwelcome policies." He regards this lobby as a permanent institution in Soviet political life, remaining as a power after Khrushchev's ouster.

In a similar fashion, Jerry Hough states that Stalinist priorities and attitudes persist and are defended by a "military/heavy-industrial complex" in Soviet society. As Hough points out, the structure of material and psychological rewards has over time resulted in the flow of a very large number of the most talented people into the 'military/heavy-industrial complex' very broadly defined, and just as obviously these people will long remain a powerful political force.

Both Hough and Tatu believe that while orthodox policy patterns have powerful defenders, the influence of these political forces is gradually eroding.
The persistence of a privileged strata has given rise to models of the Soviet socio-political system which combine class and bureaucratic theory. Milovan Djilas' well-known critique of Soviet-style societies, The New Class, argues that ruling communist parties represent the core of a new class, which enjoys "special privileges and economic preference."^44

A recent article by Hedrick Smith in The Atlantic Monthly describes the perquisites enjoyed by members of the Soviet elite today. These perquisites include imported consumer goods not available to the general public and exceptionally comfortable housing conditions. While the size of this elite is difficult to define, Smith estimates a figure of several million people (counting relatives).^46

In viewing Soviet welfare policy, Robert Osborn argues that welfare policy is still geared toward the reinforcement of investment in industry. According to Osborn, for example, a growing industrial base is the key explanatory variable accounting for the availability of investment funds for housing and for the improvement of living conditions in general. Where resources are scarce, some things must come before others. In the Soviet case, it is argued that a maldistribution of funds and services in the welfare realm follows from the party elite's constant resolve to place a rapidly growing industrial output before all else. ^48

Central authorities have the means to enforce these priorities through the budgetary process and state job placements of specialists. The oblast budget is highly manipulable. Part of the budget is made up of "adjustment revenues," allocations transferred from higher-ranking budgets to lower-ranking budgets. Normally, these adjustment revenues involve the return to the oblast of a certain percentage of
state taxes contributed by the oblast. An opportunity exists for central authorities to redistribute monetary resources from the richer oblasti to the poorer ones.

In addition to manipulating the percentage of taxes returned to the oblast, central authorities also control an alternative means of providing for investment in welfare. Not all governmental spending on housing, preschool institutions, or health clinics is channelled through the local budget. Instead, the central ministries, in funding economic enterprises, allocate directly some funds for housing, recreational facilities, hospitals, and so on. This method of financing enterprises, especially important in the 1930's, helps to ensure that high priority industrial sectors will be able to provide attractive living conditions for their workers.

According to Osborn, these two methods of allocating resources—through the local budget or through ministries and their enterprises—lead to imbalance in the distribution of housing and service structures.

...the impression one gets from both professional and journalistic discussions of local budgets is that they are used by Moscow and the republic governments to reinforce the pattern of investment in industries. That is to say, those cities which are already receiving additional investment in housing, utilities, shops, and so forth because their growing industries are spending money on these things, are also favored in the state budget so as to enable them to build yet more housing and facilities of their own.

Central control is exercised over the distribution of key personnel as well as funds. Graduates of institutions of higher education are assigned jobs upon graduation. Hence, it is possible to distribute key personnel, such as doctors and teachers, on an equitable basis.
Here, the opportunity exists for central party and state organs to pursue manpower policies that would enhance an equitable distribution of skilled personnel across regions.

The level-of-development model represents a particular characterization, albeit a simplified one, of Soviet policy-making in the welfare realm. From this model can be derived the following proposition:

The higher the level of economic development,
the higher the level of policy actions and policy results.

Table 1-2 lists measures of the level of development which will be used. Development refers primarily to industrialization and urbanization. The educational attainments of the populace are also considered an aspect of development, but relevant data are available only for the years 1959 and 1970. Such measures of development are commonly used both in the West and in the Soviet Union. Indeed, in the Soviet case, industrialization is generally taken as the primary attribute of "development."51

Each of the measures taps different aspects of development. Urbanization represents an excellent, though indirect, means of getting at the proportion of the work force engaged in industrial production as opposed to agricultural work. Knowledge about the predominant occupational patterns is important since all of the welfare measures are normed on a per capita basis. If the level-of-development model represents an accurate depiction of reality, oblasti with a high percent of the population engaged in the industrial sector of the economy can be expected to rank high on measures of performance in the welfare realm.
The weighted-industrial-performance index represents a measure of economic growth. The index is made up of yearly growth rates modified by a weight reflecting the value of industrial capital and the size of the industrial labor force in the oblast. Thus, two elements deemed important in the level-of-development model are combined: 1) a growing industrial base; 2) an important industrial base.

The relative-importance-of-industry measure focuses entirely upon the significance of the oblast as a major industrial base. The values are the percentages of total USSR manufacturing contributed by each oblast. These values do not vary over time; they are calculated from the work of Lonsdale and Thompson, for the year 1956.52

The educational measure helps to establish the relative presence (or absence) of highly skilled manpower in the oblasti. The drive to make the Soviet Union a great industrial and military power was accompanied by "massive investments in the expansion of elementary and higher education."53 The acquisition on the part of the populace of the skills crucial to the production process was part and parcel of the industrialization drive. Indeed, Fainsod cites the emphasis on education, especially the training of engineers, technicians, and scientists, as ensuring the success of industrialization.54

Support for the proposition that policy-making for welfare is a function of the level of development will be furnished if the following three conditions are met:

1) variations in policy actions and results exist;

2) the gap between the better-off and the worse-off oblasti persists over time;

3) the measures of development correlate with the measures of welfare, when political factors are controlled.
Table 1-2

LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT

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<td>Sources and Notes for Table 1-2 The source for the percentage urban in each oblast is Narodnoe Khoziasto RSFSR (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskey Literaturi, 1959-1968, 1970). The weighted industrial performance index was developed by Philip Stewart, et al. in order to test models of political mobility. For a full description of these variables, see Stewart, et al., &quot;Political Mobility and the Soviet Political Process: Partial Test of Two Models,&quot; American Political Science Review, Vol. LXVI, Dec., 1972, No. 4, p. 1275, and Appendix A. The source for the education variable is Itogi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleiniya, 1959 and 1970.</td>
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Because "level-of-development" models of the policy process are often regarded as non-political or apolitical, it should be pointed out that the model described above rests upon key political factors. The oblasti cannot be regarded as possessing independent tax bases; they do not spend more because they possess more resources. Not the presence of economic resources, but rather the values predominant among the top party elite appear to represent the key underlying factor.

In summary, the level-of-development model stresses the Stalinist legacy in characterizing the policy process in regard to welfare. Increased investment and production in the heavy industrial sector of the economy are regarded as the top priorities, and the distribution of welfare either is sacrificed to those priorities, or is used to back up and contribute to their achievement.

Model II: Equalization

Instead of viewing welfare as a (sometime) appendage of industrialization, the equalization model stresses the importance of raising living standards as an important societal goal in its own right. Present policy-making is held to be directed toward improving living conditions for everyone, and emphasis is placed upon closing the gap between the better-off and the not-so-well-off groups in Soviet society. Hence, the equalization model characterizes Soviet policy-making in the welfare sphere in terms of serious commitments—commitment to improving living conditions, and commitment to achieving greater equality in the distribution of welfare services.

Adherents of the equalization model typically accept, implicitly or explicitly, the level-of-development model as an accurate description
of reality for the time period from roughly 1929 to 1953. Policy-making today, however, is regarded as fundamentally different from the policy-making process that existed during the Stalinist era.

Change, according to Soviet analyses, has been brought about due to the following reason: the Soviet Union has entered a new stage of development in the building of communism. It is proclaimed that the "material foundations of Communism"--a heavy industrial base--has already been built. The Stalinist period is described as an era in which capital investment in heavy industry overshadowed the goal of raising living standards. This past pattern of priorities is justified on the grounds of "external and internal conditions." Since a heavy industrial base has been created, it is now timely to shift the allocation of resources toward the consumer. The future is viewed in terms of ever upward increments in both the output of heavy industry and of living standards.

At a Central Committee meeting in February, 1964, then First Secretary of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev expressed the above viewpoint as follows:

For the first time in the history of the Soviet regime our Party and government are able to invest great capital resources in branches of production which are directly connected with satisfying the needs of the population. The historical development of our country was such that the working class, the toiling people, after they had taken power into their own hands, were forced to invest all their energy and resources in the development of heavy industry. In order to survive in the struggle with imperialism, and build socialism successfully, we had to have metal, coal, oil, all kinds of machines. In the expression of Vladimir Ilich Lenin, for the sake of building heavy industry we were forced to economize everywhere, even in the schools.

Under the leadership of our Party, our people have created a first-class heavy industry. Now the state
can put powerful resources into the development of chemistry, agriculture, and light industry, in order to produce more consumer goods which directly meet the needs of the people.\textsuperscript{55}

These Khrushchevian perspectives are evident in the 1961 program of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). The program states that "A first-class heavy industry, the basis for the country's technical progress and economic might, has been built up in the Soviet Union."\textsuperscript{56} The present tasks of the Party are said to include the traditional goal of "unflagging attention to the growth of heavy industry" and the improvement of living conditions.\textsuperscript{57} The Party program recognizes that "There is now every possibility to improve rapidly the living standard of the entire population—the workers, peasants, and intellectual."\textsuperscript{58} Improvements in the quality of consumer goods, improvements in housing, greater funding for medical and educational services, and a rise in real income are all specifically promised.

These improvements in welfare are to take place within a context of greater equality. The Party program speaks of reducing disparities between high and low incomes, of closing the gap between living conditions in the countryside and in the city.\textsuperscript{59}

Like Khrushchev, Brezhnev recognizes stages in the historical development of the Soviet Union.

The Party takes the enormous increase in the country's national-economic might into consideration in its economic activity. What does this mean in concrete terms? First of all, it means a substantial increase in our possibilities. Today we are setting and accomplishing tasks that we could only dream about in preceding stages.\textsuperscript{60}

The priorities of the Stalinist period are thus justified, as are changes or re-adjustments in current priorities.
Over time Brezhnev's pronouncements regarding the importance of raising living standards have become increasingly bold. Instead of coupling the development of heavy industry and the importance of raising living standards, as Khrushchev did, Brezhnev—in 1971—finally asserted the primacy of the latter objective. The growth of the people's well-being had become "the supreme goal of the Party's economic policy," the basic objective of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-75).61

Moreover, Brezhnev has taken a strong position on the issue of eliminating differences between town and countryside.

An important feature of the five-year plan is that it envisages intensive new measures for bringing the living standards of the rural and urban populations into even closer approximations. . . 62

Brezhnev describes the political significance of these measures in terms of fostering national unity.

Many Western assessments of Soviet social policy do assert that change has occurred in the making of welfare policies in the post-Stalin era. Indeed, a good number of Western social scientists have accepted the idea that Soviet leaders, or a predominant faction thereof, are seriously committed to raising living standards.

Why have these changes taken place? The growing importance of welfare is generally explained by touching upon one or more of the following issues: 1) the end of scarcity; 2) the fear of popular unrest; 3) the desire to ensure further economic growth and higher levels of labor productivity; and 4) the effects of detente.

While Western analysts do not generally write in terms of stages of development on the road to communism, their assessments of Soviet social policy often share many elements in common with official Soviet
pronouncements. In what might be called the non-Marxist version of "the material bases of communism," students of Soviet politics assert that scarcity is no longer such a dominant feature of Soviet reality.

Alec Nove, for example, argues that more is being done for the Soviet citizen today than in the past. Nove accounts for these changes by noting

that the USSR is now powerful enough economically to permit the diversion of an increasing amount of resources to the satisfaction of the needs of the citizens, without curtailing ambitious plans for the expansion of heavy industry.\(^63\)

Similarly, David Lane states that the USSR has "completed its basic capital investment."\(^64\) He regards the Soviet Union as at a relatively early stage of industrialization, with shifts toward a consumer and sale oriented economy at an initial stage.

In a somewhat different version of the "end of scarcity" argument, some scholars assert that modern societies—whatever their political system—produce one of the "major structural uniformities of modern societies:" the welfare state.\(^65\)

In the past century the welfare state has developed in every urban-industrial country. Although they vary greatly in civil liberties and civil rights, the rich countries vary little in their general strategy for constructing the floor below which no one sinks.\(^66\)

As an urban, industrial society, the Soviet Union can thus be expected to converge with other rich nations in terms of welfare programs.

Elite fear of popular unrest is also offered, by a wide variety of sources, as a fundamental motivating factor behind the Party's resolve to raise living standards. Merle Fainsod links the desire to increase amenities with the need to induce public loyalty.\(^67\) He points
out that in contrast with Stalinism, there has been less emphasis on police surveillance and coercion. Greater attention to living conditions is perceived as a substitute for terror; that is, as a means of "reconciling totalitarianism with the needs of a modern industrial order." Hence, to engage the loyalties of an "awakened and increasingly educated citizenry...in support of Party and state objectives," the post-Stalinist leadership has had to respond to mass aspirations for a better and more secure life.

In the words of Walter Connor, the Soviet Union has moved from "'utopia to pragmatism' as a central legitimating principle." Connor views Soviet citizens as "strongly oriented toward their polity's 'outputs.'" Hence, "Modest but steady improvements in housing, in the availability of consumer durables, in the provision of food..." play a crucial role in generating support for the regime. Indeed, Connor asserts that the Soviet regime's "claim on mass loyalties is rooted, now more than ever before, in their (Party leaders') ability to 'deliver the goods' within a demand structure that they can seek to moderate but cannot transform substantially or suppress."

In a similar analysis, the prominent Soviet dissident, Andrei Amalrik, argues that social and economic accomplishments convert into popular acceptance of the regime. Amalrik notes a "growing yearning for a quiet life and for comfort--even a kind of 'comfort cult'--on all levels of our society, particularly at the top and in the middle." He asserts that workers are angry over inequalities in wealth, the low wages, the austere living conditions, and the lack of essential consumer goods.
According to Amalrik, discontent is neutralized or defused through the "gradual though slow improvement in the standard of living." As in Connor's analysis, the edge of expectancy cuts two ways: Amalrik predicts that "a sharp slowdown, a halt or even a reversal in the improvement of the standard of living would arouse such explosions of anger, mixed with violence, as were never before thought possible."

Jerry Hough also assigns a high degree of importance to the uninterrupted improvement of the standard of living. For Hough, elite fear of consumer frustration has generated, and will generate, socio-political change. This fear is grounded in and periodically reinforced by events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: in particular, the widespread civil disorders in the USSR in 1962 and violence in Poland in 1970.

Soviet leaders do not—publicly at least—assert that attention to public welfare is necessary for the maintenance of political stability. They do, however, suggest in a somewhat nebulous fashion that raising living standards does inspire confidence in the regime. Exemplary of this viewpoint is the following excerpt from a major address by Kosygin:

Raising the people's standard of living and cultural level is indivisibly associated with the further consolidation and development of the socialist way of life. The Soviet people see the great advantages of socialism materializing with increasing effect in the course of communist construction.

For the first time in history, socialism is turning the wealth of society into the wealth for all members of society. Therein lies one of the sources of the labour heroism of Soviet people, their dedication to the ideals of communism, one of the pillars of the indestructible unity of the Party and the people.

Soviet leaders are quite explicit concerning their belief that raising living standards is essential to further economic growth.
Material drawn from speeches by Khrushchev and Brezhnev demonstrate this concern. 

Providing everyday services is no small thing, no matter of secondary importance. The mood of people and the productivity of their labor depend in large measure on the extent of amenities in their daily lives, on the standard of services provided them. (Khrushchev)

... an increase in well-being of the working people is becoming an ever more insistent requirement of our economic development itself and an important economic precondition for rapid production growth. (Brezhnev)

In effect, welfare remains— as in the Stalinist model— an instrument to an end. Only in this case, the boosting, rather than the postponing of higher living standards, is viewed as essential to the achievement of economic goals.

These views can best be understood within the following context. Soviet economic growth rates have gradually declined since 1950. While earlier economic growth heavily emphasized quantitative sources of growth (more capital, more man-hours of labor, new land under cultivation), further economic growth is becoming increasingly dependent upon qualitative improvements (technological progress, higher labor productivity). Hence, the rising importance of welfare, given the popular perception (re-inforced by the studies of Soviet social scientists) that higher living standards lead to increases in labor productivity.

Aside from motivations related to the need to encourage public support and stimulate economic growth, it can be argued that the greater emphasis given to welfare is due to changes in the way in which the Party elite views the world situation. Stalin saw the Soviet Union as weak, backward, and surrounded by enemies. In contrast, Khrushchev
declared that new international conditions had emerged.

The building of communism is no longer proceeding within a capitalist encirclement but in the conditions of the existence of a world socialist system, and increasing balance in favor of the forces of socialism over the forces of imperialism and of the forces of peace over the forces of war.84

Present conditions have opened up the prospect of achieving peaceful coexistence over the entire period within which the social and political problems now dividing the world must be resolved. Matters are reaching a point where even before the total victory of socialism on earth, while capitalism holds on in part of the world, there will be a real chance of eliminating war from the life of society.85

The outlook is confident; considerations of national security not so paramount.

Brezhnev's emphases have, in part, been much the same. In his reports to the 23rd and the 24th Party Congresses, Brezhnev spoke of the increased international influence of the Soviet Union and of the security of Soviet borders. His 1966 address, however, was fundamentally more pessimistic regarding prospects for peace. According to Brezhnev, imperialism had become more aggressive over the time period from 1961 to 1966: the imperialist camp was resorting more often to "insolent and provocative actions," including "military adventures."86

Like Stalin, Brezhnev linked increased aggressiveness with increasing difficulties and contradictions in the world capitalist system. The re-emergence of these ideas was apparently associated with the escalation of the war in Vietnam. Such a view of international relations was hardly conducive to a shift in resources and attention away from heavy industry and military expenditures.

Brezhnev's views, as expressed in his report to the 24th Party Congress in 1971, are more mild. Although he then regarded U.S.
foreign policy as "complicated by . . . frequent zigzags," he nonetheless concluded that "We proceed from the premise that the improvement of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. is possible." More recent analyses have stressed that Soviet-American relations have entered a new stage in which both powers are successfully seeking mutually acceptable solutions to problems. Detente is described as durable, and as continually gaining strength.

Perceptions of international tension are important because of the familiar "guns vs. butter" argument. Or, as Khrushchev put it:

If the international situation were better, and if it became possible to reach an agreement and to shed the burden of armaments, this would multiply the possibilities for a further upsurge of the economy and for raising living standards. . .

. . . it would be desirable to build more enterprises that make products for satisfying man's requirements . . . . to invest more in agriculture, and to expand housing construction . . . life dictates the necessity for spending enormous funds on maintaining our military power at the required level. This reduces and cannot help but reduce the people's possibilities of obtaining direct benefits.

Similarly, Brezhnev stated in 1966 that complications in the international situation had had a negative effect on the economy, and especially on raising the material well-being of the people. More specifically, "The aggressive actions of the U.S. imperialists forced us to channel substantial additional funds into strengthening the country's defense in recent years." Thus, a favorable assessment of the world situation is inextricably linked to perceptions of just how much effort can be devoted to improving living standards.

Clearly, the equalization model has its sources in evaluations of the Khrushchev period. Khrushchev had given a contemporary sense to terms like socialism. Communism was defined in terms of the "abundance
of material and spiritual goods and a happy and secure life for all workers." Victory over capitalism was to come through material production and high living standards, rather than through ultrarevolutionary phrases, asceticism, or a final, cataclysmic war with the capitalist world.

The question of whether or not the Khrushchev and Brezhnev-Kosygin regimes are distinctive—in terms of social policies—will be pursued in greater detail in later chapters. Some overall assessments can, however, be offered. Analyses of social policies undertaken prior to 1971 tend to emphasize continuity. Wolfgang Leonhard, for example, argues that "innovations" carried out under Brezhnev and Kosygin in the years after Khrushchev's ouster merely reflect promises made in the 1961 Party program. Robert Osborn characterizes policy differences in regard to the allocation of resources as a "blurred and shifting picture at best." After 1967, Osborn notes that a moderate shift in favor of consumption did occur.

Later analyses are more likely to cite differences between the two regimes. In part, this is a matter of priorities. As David Cattell points out, the number one priority under Khrushchev was housing; under Brezhnev and Kosygin, consumption. Indeed, it is in the area of consumer welfare that marked differences in public policy do occur. (These differences are discussed in Chapter IV)

Overall assessments of the impact of social policies in the post-Stalinist period are frequently favorable. Looking at specific policy areas, Henry Morton has pointed out that the USSR, from 1959 to 1968, build more housing units than any other country, enabling 37% of the population to move into newly built housing. In the area of health
services, Mark Field has labelled the period of the second half of the sixties one of consolidation of past gains, and of the improvement of medical care to "the hitherto somewhat neglected rural population." In the area of education, Jeremy Azrael notes that the "first decade after Stalin's death was characterized by a rapid spread of incomplete secondary education in the previously unserviced rural backwaters of the country, and by the end of the period such education was in fact almost universally available." In the area of wages, Murray Yanowitch speaks of an "income revolution" in describing the decline in inequality in the distribution of income among workers since 1959. He notes that from the early 1930's to the late 1950's wage inequality tended to increase. Students of Soviet agriculture and economics, like Roy Laird and Alec Nove, point to a number of improvements and reforms enhancing the income and security of peasant households in the post-1954 period. Indeed, Alec Nove asserts that by 1970 the traditional Soviet pattern of development, in which Soviet agriculture subsidized industrialization and urban life, no longer held. Nove estimated that Soviet agriculture was receiving a subsidy from industry of eleven billion rubles in 1970, reversing the flow of investment funds to sectors of the economy, and to groups of citizens who had long lagged behind the levels of technical progress and life styles found in urban areas.

There has been a substantial rise in private consumption since the mid-1950's, a condition, according to Philip Hanson, unseen since the pre-revolutionary period. In September of 1965 an All-Union Ministry responsible for the production of equipment for light and food industries was created for the first time. The Eighth Five-year

On the negative side, Ellen Mickiewicz has suggested that disparities in living conditions are increasing. Utilizing such variables as percentage of total housing space built, televisions per 1,000, and rural movie attendance, Mickiewicz documents the ways in which "life in the country is becoming qualitatively inferior to that of the cities."

The equalization model will be validated if support for $P_2$, in conjunction with support for $P_3$, $P_4$, or $P_5$ is found.

- $P_2$: There are substantial improvements in policy actions and policy results over time.
- $P_3$: Little variation in policy actions and policy results exists.
- $P_4$: Variations in policy results decline over time.
- $P_5$: Where policy results are low, policy actions (expenditures) are high.

It should be noted that improvements in welfare levels are not excluded from the level-of-development model, but are emphasized to a greater extent within the equalization model.

In summary, the equalization model incorporates the view that raising living standards is a more important public goal in the post-Stalin period than ever before. Moreover, greater equity in the distribution of services and opportunities is stressed.
Model III: Political Clout

Unlike the level-of-development and equalization models, political clout—or local political factors—are generally considered to have a marginal impact on the policy process. Conceptually, local political factors can be grouped into two broad categories: 1) mass political participation; and 2) the influence of local decision-makers.

Only one indicator of mass political participation is available—the number of Communist Party members in the oblast. From the Soviet viewpoint, the strength of the local party organization should be a significant factor in the successful achievement of policy objectives. As Leonid Brezhnev stated to the 23rd Party Congress,

The Party's political and organizational work among the masses and the selfless labor of the Soviet people have ensured the further growth of the country's economy and a rise in the well-being of the Soviet people. ..107

In the USSR, policy success is generally attributed to the organizing, teaching, and leading role of the Communist Party.

The Party has traditionally asserted its primacy—its role as the guiding force in Soviet society. The Party is personified as the "brains and conscience" of the nation. 108 As a group exhibiting unity of will and purpose, the Party's task involves the transformation of society, the shaping of new beliefs and values. The individual member of the Party commits himself to an active political life, which, according to Party rules, involves acting as a stimulator of production, transmitting ideas to others, and accepting the assignments of Party leaders. 109

A large Party membership enhances the ability of the local Party leaders to mobilize the population in support of policy objectives.
T. H. Rigby points out that the role of the party is multifaceted, i.e. different roles are performed by different kinds of categories of party members. The burden of overseeing (verifying) the implementation of party directives, and of organizing the masses for the fullfillment of directives, "falls on the primary party organizations, and typically involves the mass of party members."\textsuperscript{110} Hence, the following proposition can be advanced regarding the impact of the local Party organizations:

\[ P_6 \quad \text{The larger the local Party organization, the greater are policy results.} \]

There is one other kind of local political participation, for which data are not available, and which the literature suggests is important. This factor involves participation in local Soviets, especially their standing Commissions (committees). Looking at local government in the post-Stalin period, L.G. Churchward asserts that change has taken place in several areas. There have been: 1) a reduction in the size of the administrative apparatus; 2) an enlargement in the scope of local government activities, especially in the fields of industrial control and social services; and 3) an increase in popular participation in the work of Standing Commissions.\textsuperscript{111}

The Standing Commissions specialize in various policy areas, like budgeting, education, cultural affairs, housing, medical services, and so on. They make investigations, prepare reports, and make recommendations to the Soviet and its Executive Committee. As a result, Soviet local government "depends far less than most Western countries on the skilled specialist and far more on the enthusiasm of masses of amateurs."\textsuperscript{112}
The second group of political factors focuses upon the skills, attitudes, and influence of the authoritative decision-maker in the oblast, the oblast first secondary. Descriptions of the role of the first secretary suggest that his activities may have a marginal, but sometimes substantial, impact on welfare within his region.

It is a cliche that the Communist Party is highly centralized. The obkom first secretary is selected from above rather than elected from below, and is expected to accept the wishes of the leadership as sacrosanct. Nonetheless, as Merle Fainsod points out, some authority must be delegated to lower party organs, although "its exercise must be consistent with the wishes of the high command." In reality, the choices made by the obkom secretary do matter. As Philip Stewart's study of Stalingrad oblast indicates, the local party organization must adapt central directives to local potentialities and resources. According to Jerry Hough, the local party organization provides for regional coordination, makes decisions involving the sacrifice of some items in the plan to achieve others, and resolves disputes among local officials and organizations. It appears that the obkom first secretary can have an impact on welfare in two ways: 1) by heading a party organization which is active, or inactive, on selected welfare issues; and 2) by bargaining for the allocation of budgetary resources and the siting of new industry.

Information about the role local party organs play in tackling welfare problems is fragmentary. For the most part, information comes in the form of articles in the Soviet press. These articles typically praise or criticize particular provinces for exemplary achievement—or exemplary laggardness—in the welfare realm. Where
problems exist, local party organizations are called upon to exercise leadership and close supervision.

Consumer goods have traditionally been produced as a sideline of heavy industrial enterprises, in special shops or sections set up for that purpose. An article in Kommunist points out that there is a great deal of noncompliance. Kursk oblast is singled out as a particularly sorry example: only 19 or 50 enterprises produce consumer goods in special shops. Aside from a shortage of consumer goods, the quality of what is available—washing machines and vacuum cleaners designed in 1945 or 1953—is noted. In order to increase production and ensure improved output quality, province, city, and district (raion) Party and Soviet agencies are called upon to draw up plans, and to supervise the implementation of these plans. In the area of consumer welfare, it is apparent that local party organizations play a crucial role in pressuring industries to produce articles for local consumption.

A Pravda article, entitled "Why is Housing Construction Plan in Irkutsk Disrupted Year After Year?" cites the poor organization of construction operations as the chief reason. The party organizations, however, are criticized for concerning "themselves feebly and superficially with housing construction."

Another article from Pravda states that school construction plans were not being met everywhere in the RSFSR. Sverdlovsk's record is praised, while conditions in Irkutsk, Perm, Saratov, Krasnoyarsk, and other oblasti are deplored. In particular, failure to improve living conditions for rural teachers is cited, despite the policy of upgrading rural education through such measures. The problem is summarized as follows:
The construction organizations take advantage of the absence of control and a lack of exactingness on the part of individual Party and Soviet agencies and continued to slight school construction, to put off the erection of schools, boarding school dormitories and preschool institutions until the end of the year, and to allow poor quality in their work.\textsuperscript{119}

Unfortunately, there is little systematic information regarding the choices made by the obkom secretary in terms of directing Party (and Soviet) attention and energy to particular welfare problems. Moreover, it should be noted that Philip Stewart and Jerry Hough, in their studies of local government, both present evidence that oblast party organs tend to be more concerned with questions of industrial and agricultural production than with welfare issues.\textsuperscript{120} Nonetheless, there is no reason to reject the assessment of the Soviet press that the active interest of local party organizations facilitates the successful implementation of welfare policies.

The above discussion has focused upon what the local party organizations do, or do not do, within the oblast. It is somewhat easier, however, to develop measures of another aspect of the obkom first secretary's role: that of bargaining for resources.

The obkom first secretary is involved in a competitive process to obtain more budgetary funds and to attract new industry to the oblast. In either case, success is likely to enhance living conditions in the oblast. The local budget deals almost entirely with programs related to living conditions: educational, medical, and cultural services, transportation, recreation, the financing of housing construction and the retail trade network. New industry or expanded industry brings, as has been discussed earlier, additional funds for the improvement of living conditions. Hence, the allocation
of budgetary resources and the siting of new industry is crucial for the well-being of the oblast.

Jerry Hough has characterized the Soviet appropriations process as one which resembles the awarding of defense contracts in the United States. It appears that local Party organs almost always support requests made by local plants and ministries for more supplies or funds. Since the center does not have "sufficient funds to finance all projects suggested, seeking funds must always be a competitive process whether the applicants realize it or not." Local Party organs compete for more funds or new factories by presenting their case to the proper Party and state officials at higher levels. As an article in Kommunist illustrates, the decisions of centralized planning organs--GOSPLAN (State Planning Committee) and USSR Ministries--are not always final.

Ministries are not always able correctly to resolve questions of siting new enterprises. Local Party and Soviet agencies participated extensively in the consideration of plans for the siting of industrial enterprises in the Russian Republic. The ministries agreed with the serious criticisms that were made of their plans and revised them. Ministerial planning is said to ignore questions of balanced territorial development. The interests of the oblasti are articulated and protected through the efforts of local agencies. Led by the obkom first secretary, the oblasti participate, at an intermediate stage, in the planning process.

Most disputes involving the oblasti and central ministries are resolved according to "economic rationality;" that is, considerations of such factors as local manpower, natural resources, and transportation are dominant. Some disputes, however, are resolved on the
basis of "political factors." The obkom first secretary, with personal

ties to top Party officials, requests a top member of the Secretariat
to intervene on his behalf. Such an approach to conflict resolution
is criticized within the Soviet press, but represents an effective
recourse for the obkom first secretary with personal connections.
Hough suggests that lower Party officials resort to such requests for
intervention only on matters they deem to be of crucial importance.124

Thus, political factors, such as personal connections between
obkom first secretaries and top Party officials, can sway investment
and budgetary decisions. Indicators of the bargaining power of the
obkom first secretary are listed in Table 1-3. These measures do not
tap the actual exercise of influence. At best, they serve to separate
the potentially influential from the potentially uninfluential.

All measures of political influence are directed toward telling
us where a Soviet politician stands in his own organization. The
measures tap prestige, visibility, and access to top leaders.

The mobility index serves as one indicator of visibility and of
favorable evaluations or attitudes on the part of top Party officials.
Stewart et. al. discuss two major models of mobility in the literature
on Soviet politics.125 One model stresses patron-client relationships.
To be upwardly mobile, the obkom first secretary must be part of the
personal following of a top official. The other model emphasizes
rational-technical factors in promotion decisions. Economic perfor­
mance, or plan fulfillment, is viewed as the overriding criterion for
mobility decisions.

Mobility decisions are made within the Secretariat. Whatever the
basis of those decisions, upward mobility reflects favorable
evaluations on the part of top Party leaders, a situation which should be advantageous to the obkom secretary engaged in lobbying efforts.

Politburo-Secretariat links and cohort ties both capture personal relationships that may be helpful to the obkom first secretary. The measures are based upon having worked in the same place at the same time, prior to attaining the position of obkom first secretary, with members of the Politburo, Secretariat, and other obkom secretaries.

It should be pointed out that turnover rates for obkom first secretaries (as well as other high party and state officials) have declined precipitously in the post-Khrushchev era. The low turnover rates reflect Brezhnev's "stability of cadres" policy and has been interpreted by Western scholars as evidence of the institutionalization or stabilization of collective leadership. In other words, patronage opportunities—crucial to the building of personal power at the center—have been reduced. Moreover, it appears that regional party organizations now have an important say in the appointment of obkom first secretaries. Overall, traditional central/regional elite relationships are changing; these changes may have weakened patron-client ties.

From this discussion of latent political influence, the following propositions can be formulated:

- $P_7$: The higher the mobility, the higher the level of policy actions and policy results.
- $P_8$: The higher the number of Politburo-Secretariat links, the higher the level of policy actions and policy results.
- $P_9$: The higher the number of cohort pairs, the higher the level of policy actions and policy results.
Table 1-3:

**POLITICAL CLOUT**

**Political Participation**

Number of party members per 1000 population.

**Latent Political Influence of Obkom First Secretary**

V21. Mobility Index. A nine-point ordinal measure indicating relative movement out of the position of obkom first secretary. The position of obkom secretary is assigned the position of 5. Movement may be up, down, or lateral (transfer to another oblast). The value utilized in analysis is the obkom first secretary's ultimate mobility, e.g. the value of the position the secretary moves to after leaving a particular oblast. See Appendix A for a complete description.

V22. Politburo-Secretariat Pairs. Instances in which oblast first secretaries worked in the same oblast at the same time as Politburo-Secretariat officials. Excluded are pairings in Leningrad city, Moscow city, and Moscow oblast.

V23. Cohort Pairs. Instances in which two or more obkom first secretaries worked in the same place at the same time. Excluded are pairings in Leningrad city, Moscow city, and Moscow oblast.

**Sources and Notes for Table 1-3.** The data for the strength of the local party organization were made available by Robert Blackwell of Emory University, who calculated the figures from the size of delegations to Party Congresses. The sources for the biographic data containing the mobility index, Politburo-Secretariat pairs, and cohort pairs are multiple and are fully described in Appendix B.
Evidence supporting the political clout model will be found if political variables are correlated with welfare, when level of development is controlled.\textsuperscript{129}

It should be noted that the measures of political influence are theoretically more relevant to the question of policy actions (expenditures) than to policy results (the levels of services provided). Political factors more directly related to the efficient, effective administration of welfare programs are not available.

As was noted before, it is expected that no one model will apply to all issue areas, or even to any one welfare category. The presence of significant industry, for example, is an important factor for housing construction. Roughly one-half of state housing construction is financed through industrial enterprises.\textsuperscript{130} In contrast, the educational and medical systems are financed largely through the local budgets. This budgetary process is unlikely to be so biased toward industrial development.

The impact of the bargaining power of the obkom first secretary should be most evident in regard to the size of the local budget. Distributive issues should be particularly acute in areas which suffered from a lack of investment during the Stalinist period. Housing and consumer goods fit into this category. Some variables are less subject to manipulation by government than are others. It is relatively easy, for example, to build hospitals in rural areas; but not so easy to get doctors to live there.

Thus, it may be difficult to develop one, general model of the policy process. Which model—if any—fits particular issue areas will be the focal point of this investigation.
Footnotes


11. "Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," in

12. Alexsei Kosygin, Directives of the 24th Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the Five-Year Plan of the


17. Ripley, p. 16.

18. Ripley, p. 16.


27. This principle is found in Article XII of the USSR Constitution. The 1936 Constitution, often referred to by Western social scientists as the Stalin constitution, is still in effect today.


35. Ibid.

36. Khrushchev, in his "secret speech" to the 20th Party Congress in 1956, rejected Stalin's formulation of increased internal danger (increased class warfare) as socialism developed in the USSR.


40. Ibid., p. 430.

41. Ibid.

43. Ibid., p. 44.

44. As quoted in Robert Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR, p. 179.


46. Ibid., p. 41.

47. Osborn, p. 228.

48. See Osborn, Chapter 6.

49. Central authorities refers to the RSFSR state institutions and state and party organs at the All-Union level.

50. Osborn, p. 228.


53. Fainsod, p. 117.
54. Ibid.


57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., p. 293.

59. Ibid., p. 294.

60. Leonid Brezhnev, p. 5.

61. Ibid.


64. David Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR, (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 293


66. Ibid., p. 62

67. Fainsod, p. 117, 524-525.

68. Ibid., p. 525

69. Ibid., p. 524


72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., p. 27.


75. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

76. Ibid., p. 33.
77. Ibid.


79. In June 1962 the Khrushchev regime raised prices on such staple foods as meat, milk, and butter by one-third, postponed a rise in the minimum wage, and raised the extraction rate in milling grain into flour (thus degrading the quality of bread and bakery goods). Illegal strikes and widespread disorders resulted. In Dec. 1970 a wave of strikes and riots brought large segments of the Polish industrial economy to a standstill. Troops repeatedly fired on demonstrators; in several towns and cities Party headquarters and State buildings were set on fire. These disturbances lead to the resignation of Party leader Gomulka and the initiation of a more liberal policy toward consumers.


92. Khrushchev, in a 1962 speech at a Central Committee plenum, rejected the view that Communism implied a low level of life and an asceticism that meant that people of "high consciousness" sat at a table with empty plates. For an excerpt from this speech, see Hammer, op. cit., p. 307.


95. Ibid., p. 114.

96. David Cattell, op. cit.


98. Field, p. 74.


103. Hanson, p. 172.


106. High expenditures, where levels of welfare "outputs" are low, would indicate an effort to overcome backwardness. As will be seen later, the measures of welfare, with the exception of budgetary expenditures, are in all likelihood not subject to quick manipulation.

108. The Soviet press and Party documents are replete with statements hailing the role of the Party. The following excerpt, from a speech delivered by Leonid Brezhnev to the 23rd Party Congress, is typical: "Our Leninist Communist Party is the guiding and directing force of Soviet society. It unites in its ranks that most advanced representatives of the working class and of all working people and is guided by the militant revolutionary ideology of the working class of the world—Marxism—Leninism; it is confidently leading the Soviet people forward along the path of the construction of communism, is channeling and organizing the life of socialist society, and is successfully fulfilling the role of teacher, organizer and political leader of the entire Soviet people." A translation of the speech is in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XVIII, no. 13 (1966), pp 3-10.

109. For an official view of the duties of a party member, see "Rules of the CPSU," in David Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR, Appendix B, pp. 517-534.


113. The oblast first secretary is the leading Party official in the oblast. The position will hereafter be referred to as obkom first secretary, or simply obkom secretary. Obkom refers to the oblast party committee.


118. "Why is Housing Construction Plan in Irkutsk Disrupted Year After Year?" PRAVDA, Dec. 24, 1962; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XIV, no. 51, p. 35.


121. Hough, p. 265.

122. Hough, p. 263.


129. The models will be tested simultaneously through multiple regression.

Chapter II. Problems of Evidence

"Paper will put up with anything that is written on it."¹

—J. V. Stalin

How is it possible to use information published by Soviet sources? After all, the USSR has a marked reputation for secrecy, for falsified data, outright lies, re-written history, and faked photographs. This discussion will center around problems of evidence. In particular, attention will be focused on the reliability of quantitative data, source material for statements of policy intent, and "information gaps."

Quantitative Data

During the 1920's and up to about 1936 the Soviet Government published reams of social and economic data.² From 1936 to 1953 this flood of material was reduced to a mere trickle. When reality was unpleasant, it could be falsified, as in the case of the grossly exaggerated figures for the 1952 grain harvest. Embarrassing realities could simply be ignored; hence, data on the class background of university students ceased to be published. Incredible amounts of information were suppressed for security reasons. In order to prevent anyone from calculating the size of the Soviet armed forces, data on the number of peasants and the age and sex distribution of the population went unpublished. Needless to say, there was a good deal of suspicion
directed toward the small amount of material that was released.

Since 1955 there has been a more liberal attitude toward publication. With the appearance of the series Narodnoe Khozyaistvo (National Economy), social and economic data for a variety of territorial units, from the national to the raion (county) and city, have been regularly available. Moreover, several volumes of valuable demographic data from the 1959 and 1970 census have been published. The end result is that "It has become possible, really for the first time, for the Western scholar to use Soviet data in research and to be assured that, generally speaking, the supply will be ample enough to indicate trends."^ As Ellen Mickiewicz points out, not only are there many more data, but "it has been of a much higher quality."^ Several general points can be made about the nature of Soviet data. The best data consist of material utilized in economic planning. The published records of the Central Statistical Administration in Moscow are as accurate as possible, and are the same statistics used by planners. Most of the data in this study—for example, housing space and retail trade turnover—represent standard categories that have long been used in economic planning.

Distortion found in data from Narodnoe Khozyaistvo is more likely to stem from local deception than from the intentions of central decision-makers. At a Central Committee plenum in 1961, Khrushchev complained that local officials were buying butter in shops and re-delivering it to the state as new produce. The managers of enterprises and local Party and State officials wish to claim plan fulfillment, and this may lead to padded or exaggerated reports. To what extent the
output of various products or services is overstated cannot be deter-
mined. However, as Alec Nove points out, if cheating is assumed to
be a constant, there is no evidence one way or the other to suggest
that growth rates will be affected. 6

Within the general category of "output" data, agricultural
figures are considered less reliable than data on industrial produc-
tion. Because of their built-in tendency to inflate production and
growth, Soviet indices are in general disrepute. Western analysts
generally put together their own indices.

Typically, Soviet categories are ill-defined. There is an almost
complete lack of explanatory notes in any of the editions of Narodnoe
Khozyiastvo, national or local. The distinctions made between housing
space and living space, the inclusion of lard, rabbits, and poultry
in the "meat" category, the presence of undefined categories such as
"employee," all make for situations where mis-interpretation or mis-
leading cross-national comparisons might be made.

Data on family income and expenditures generally come from studies
conducted by the Central Statistical Administration (CSA). Each month
the CSA interviews a sample of 62,000 families of wage and salary
workers and collective farmers. More intensive local and national
surveys are periodically carried out. Although extremely detailed
information is collected, very little of it is published. What does
appear is generally unaccompanied by any explanatory notes (other than
the title), and inevitably demonstrates progress on some aspect of con-
sumer welfare.
It should be added that Soviet economists have criticized the CSA samples for not being representative of the entire population. Low and high income groups are not adequately covered. Hence, data on such topics as per capita consumption of meat, or on the closing of the urban/rural income gap, are likely to overstate the amount of progress actually made.

The work of Soviet sociologists provides another source of empirical data. In the 1960's and 1970's, major social science studies have been directed toward a wide variety of welfare-related topics. Many of these studies employ survey research, although the samples are generally restricted to one or more schools, factories, cities, or regions. Nonetheless, used with care, these studies offer valuable evidence on a number of key issues, from questions of social mobility to the incidence of poverty.

To summarize, a variety of social, economic, and demographic indicators can be found in the statistical series Narodnoe Khozyiastvo and in census data. These data are typically broken down along territorial and urban/rural lines. The CSA and Soviet sociologists provide additional sources of statistical evidence; in these sources, however, the data have already been organized into a framework consistent with the purposes of the particular study.

Policy Intent and "Contextual Knowledge"

Information regarding the programmatic intentions of Soviet leaders can be gained from multiple sources. These sources include 1) Party programs; 2) the establishment of "norms"; 3) major speeches at Party Congresses; 4) major speeches before the Supreme Soviet; and
5) the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and/or of the Council of Ministers. This list runs, in descending order, from long-term projections of international and socio-economic trends to day-to-day decisions involving immediate problems.

Party programs are major theoretical documents. There have been three party programs: those of 1903, 1919, and 1961. The primary author of the first two programs was Lenin; of the third, Khrushchev. David Lane explains the instructive nature of the 1961 Party Program as follows:

The New programme of the CPSU was an attempt by Khrushchev to spell out some of the general goals deriving from the communist belief system. It is instructive to study them . . . because they indicate the kinds of expectations generated by the party elite, and their view of social change. The Programme covered a wide range of activities: economic growth and management, the standard of living, the growth of democracy, the role of the state and party, the tasks of international relations, education and science . . . we may use the Programme to illustrate the kind of values the party articulates.7

Some aspects of the 1961 Party Program have been altered or simply ignored since Khrushchev's ouster. Where relevant, these changes will be cited within the text of this study.

The Party program sets rather general goals: satisfying fully the need for pre-school institutions; ending the housing shortage; bringing urban and rural living standards closer together. These visions of the "good society" find concrete expression in the forms of "norms" established by various state ministries.

In many areas the Soviet Union has set standards which can be used to assess societal conditions. For housing, 9 square meters per capita
of living space has been prescribed as constituting minimum sanitary conditions. For medical services, specific numbers of people and types of doctors are supposed to exist in each micro-district. Norms exist for the consumption of various types of clothing and footwear. During the 1960's a per capita income of 50 rubles per month was widely accepted as representing the minimum sum necessary to ensure a modest standard of living for an urban family.

These standards can tell us whether—from the Soviet viewpoint—societal conditions are poor, satisfactory, or good. The norms tell us nothing, however, about current priorities; or about just how much progress the regime expects to achieve. For operative statements of policy intent, statements that lay down the direction and time rates of socio-economic development, it is necessary to look to major speeches given at party congresses and to the five-year plans.

The All-Union Party Congress is a widely publicized affair. It is a forum, an occasion of great ceremony, where important announcements are often made. Sessions are now timed to coincide with the beginning of five-year plans. This reflects the Party's preoccupation with economic growth. As Brezhnev put it, the happy era has come when "questions of the country's economic development occupy the center of attention of the Party." Recent party congresses have followed standard procedures. The major speech is given by the General Secretary of the Communist Party. This speech is called the "Report of the Central Committee." A major purpose of the General Secretary's Report is to communicate: to let lower party officials and the public at large know what the major socio-economic goals are. The "main results" of
the previous five-year plan are summarized, and the "special features" of the next plan are set forth.

If the head of government is different from the head of the Party, the Premier (Chairman of the Council of Ministers) gives the second major speech. This address is devoted entirely to an exposition of economic plans. It contains more detailed information on the new five-year plan.

The public adoption of annual plans occurs in December of each year in the Supreme Soviet. Annual plans assign the specific tasks to be accomplished in the following year, and usually involve adjustments for problems and pitfalls. When goal objectives are deemed unreachable, they are often reduced. This poses a danger for the unwary: later announcements that the plan has been fulfilled, or even overfulfilled, may be based on the reduced rather than the original objectives.

Day-to-day decisions on socio-economic matters are issued as decrees (resolutions) of the Central Committee and/or the Council of Ministers. These decrees carry the force of law. Joint decrees are more likely to embody significant decisions than are decrees issued by the state alone. A decree typically defines a problem and outlines several means of coping with it. Like legislation elsewhere, the decrees vary greatly in their specificity. Some contain detailed plans and a lengthy set of orders; others more closely resemble exhortations, where local party and state officials are urged to do something.
A full discussion of policy intent would involve "contextual knowledge": knowledge about how and why particular decisions are made. In their public speeches Soviet leaders do, of course, give reasons for the policy positions they take; but, as in any political system, public rhetoric may differ from private motivations. From Kremlinological studies inferences can be drawn, albeit cautiously, about "court politics": the interplay of competing policy positions and competing personalities.

Because policy proposals are aired in the Soviet press to a greater extent than ever before, our knowledge about Soviet thinking on a variety of issues has been greatly enhanced. As Jerry Hough has pointed out,

... party policy is less and less incorporated into clear-cut, undebtable 'ideology', with a consequent widening of the areas open to public discussion. In almost every policy sphere, ideology is ambiguous and ill-defined; and in almost every policy sphere, the published debate is now freer and more wide-ranging than it was under Khrushchev.  

Overall, ample source material is available today for a rich discussion of policy intent.

What We Do Not Know

Evidence is sadly lacking in several key areas. To summarize briefly: we know little about Soviet public opinion, about the activities of local party organizations, or about the underlying distributions which are "hidden" by per capita data.

The dearth of public opinion data means that policy results can only be measured objectively. This is only one side of the coin: objective reality does not always square with subjective reality. And
in terms of theoretical significance, subjective evaluations of governmental performance are immensely important. Do Soviet citizens believe that living conditions are improving? Are they "thankful" to the regime for these developments? Does satisfaction with regime performance convert to regime legitimacy? These questions cannot be answered with any degree of authority.

A second area where the absence of evidence is particularly felt involves the role of local party organizations. A good deal of the responsibility for implementing and shaping policy in terms of local conditions rests with the regional parties. A recent study by Joel Moses builds a strong case for the idea that local party organizations utilize their own standards, as well as guidance from Central Committee decrees, to define problems.13

In order to adequately account for the actions of local officials, measures of local party "attentiveness" are needed. Philip Stewart, in his study of Stalingrad (Volgograd) oblast identified two key indicators: the themes at obkom plenary sessions and the personal style of the obkom first secretary.14 Soviet authorities limit access to the best information source on local politics—the regional press.15 Hence, it is extremely difficult to construct a detailed picture of the regional political system.

Finally, per capita data is not always the best kind of data with which to analyze policy. It would be more relevant, for example, to know what percent of a region's population actually live in medical districts which conform to national standards than to know how many doctors there are per 10,000 population. If there is a substantial
rise in housing space, does this benefit a narrow elite or those most in need of better housing? How are scarce consumer goods allocated? These questions touch sensitive issues; and are, for the most part, difficult to answer.
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<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>Minsk, March 1898</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>Brussels/London, July-August 1903</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>London, April-May 1905</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>Stockholm, April-May 1906</td>
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<td>Fifth</td>
<td>London, May-June 1907</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>Petrograd, July-August 1917</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>Petrograd, March 1918</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eighth</td>
<td>Moscow, March 1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth</td>
<td>March-April 1922</td>
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<td>Tenth</td>
<td>March 1921</td>
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Table 2-1. (Continued)

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<td>Twenty-fifth</td>
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Notes: All Congresses after 1919 are in Moscow.
Table 2-2. Five-Year Plans in the Soviet Union

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<th>Number of Plan</th>
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<td>1st</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>1933-37</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>1938-41</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>1946-50</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>1951-55</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>1956-60</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>1961-60</td>
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<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>1966-70</td>
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<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>1971-75</td>
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<td>10th</td>
<td>1976-80</td>
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Notes: The first five-year plan was declared completed in four years and the third was interrupted by the German invasion in 1941. The 10th five-year plan will not be formally adopted until February 1976, at the 25th Party Congress.
Footnotes


4. Ibid.

5. As reported in Nove, p. 271.


9. In addition to domestic affairs, the General Secretary's Report includes sections on the world situation, Soviet foreign policy, and the organization, growth, and role of the party.

10. In recent years the annual plan has been presented by Deputy Premier Nikolai K. Baibakov in the Supreme Soviet.

11. Decrees of the Central Committee are actually decisions of the Politburo, issued in the name of the CC. The Central Committee meets as a body only three or four times a year, and generally considers only one topic at a plenum session. Decisions which have been formally approved by the CC as a whole are called decrees (or resolutions) of the plenum. Technically speaking, decrees of the CC do not constitute "law", but they are binding on those who are formally responsible for law-making. Most decrees issued by the Party alone deal with internal party affairs, ideology, and the mass media.


15. For a full discussion of the methodological problems involved in researching regional Soviet politics, see Joel Moses, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-55.
Chapter III. Housing Policy in the Soviet Union

The uneveness of progress is a striking aspect of the whole Soviet system. Here side by side with a revolutionary hydro-electric scheme and expanding modern industries were half the houses of the city without indoor sanitation or plumbing.

-Laurens van der Post, writing about Irkutsk

... by today's standards it is no longer simply a question of housing space but of separate apartments with all conveniences for every family.²

-Leonid Brezhnev, 1969

During the post-Stalinist period, housing has generally been identified by Soviet leaders as an important domestic problem affecting living conditions in the Soviet Union. For the most part, Soviet housing policy is dual: along urban/rural lines, definitions of problems, goals, measures of performance, and recommendations all tend to differ. So far, party and state activity in regard to housing has been directed primarily toward the urban sector. This study focuses upon urban housing policy and its impact on living standards in Soviet towns and cities.

The Magnitude of the Problem.

Some idea of the seriousness of the Soviet housing problem can be gained through statistics. In the 1920's, the RSFSR set 9 square...
meters of living space per capita as a minimum sanitary housing norm for its urban residents. This amount of space represents a room roughly 10 feet by 10 feet. By 1970, only 2 cities in the RSFSR, Moscow and Leningrad, had reached or exceeded this minimum standard of 9 square meters. 4

In 1960 60% of Soviet urban dwellers lived in communal flats in which they shared kitchen and toilet facilities. 5 Fifty-six percent of urban state housing units had running water, 44% had central heating, 30% had a bath or shower, and 53% were linked to a sewerage system. 6

Compared with Western Europe as a whole, the Soviet urban stock in 1964, measured in total floor space per person, was less than half that for Western Europe. 7 In 1961, there were 1,489 rooms for every 1,000 occupants in Britain, more than twice the Soviet level. 8 Moreover, only 4% of British households had an occupancy ratio above the Soviet average. 9

John Gunther's description of Soviet housing conditions in the mid-1950's translates these statistics into actual conditions.

Every citizen. . . is supposed to have nine square meters of floor space, but most do not have even half of this. . . people are crowded three, four, five or even more to a room, with disastrous social consequences. Young people cannot marry, because they can find no place to live. Scarcely any Soviet family is without a covey of in-laws living on the premises, and it is rare for any family to have its own private bath and kitchen. . . sometimes a single doorway leads to a nest of stalls where a dozen people live. . . One reason why the streets are so thronged at night, even in the winter. . . is that homes are so unbelievably crowded, squalid, and uncomfortable. 10

Janet Chapman has concluded that housing conditions for the average Soviet urban resident in the late 1950's were probably
comparable to those of city tenement dwellers in the United States in the 1890's. 11

For the Soviet public, housing conditions have been central in terms of complaints and of desired goals. A poll conducted in 1960 concerning citizen views of their living standards showed that half the number polled named housing construction as the most important problem. 12 Citizen communications—by word of mouth, letters to the press, complaints to party and government organs—frequently involve housing problems. And, as Donald Barry notes, "When conversation among Soviet citizens turns to material things, the term 'otdelnaia kvartira' (a private or separate apartment) is sure to be the most popular—or unpopular—subject." 13

Sources of the Problem.

The housing crisis did not suddenly emerge in the 1950's. Soviet and Western analyses generally attribute the housing problem to the same set of factors: 1) the inadequate housing structure inherited from the tsarist past; 2) the civil war and post-revolutionary chaos; 3) Stalin's policies during the first three Five-Year Plans (1928-1941); and 4) World War II. 14

When the Bolshevik regime came to power, urban housing was limited. Willard Smith points out that urban living conditions in pre-revolutionary Russia "compared most unfavorably with those prevailing in most countries of Western Europe." 15 Housing before 1917 consisted mainly of wooden, one-family homes, generally lacking in utilities, and frequently roofed with highly inflammable materials like straw or wood.
During the Civil War period from 1918 to 1921, much of the better housing, formerly belonging to members of the nobility and bourgeoisie, was badly damaged. Wooden floors and partitions were burned for fuel. Funds for making repairs and building supplies were not readily available during the NEP period (1921-1928).

With the start of the Five-Year Plans in 1929, the percentage of total state investment going to housing was cut in half, from 22% to 12%. The Stalinist pattern of economic development—rapid industrialization and forced collectivization—led to the rapid expansion of the urban population. Because state investment in housing construction lagged well behind the rate of urban population growth, square meters of per capita living space declined from 5.91 in 1928 to 4.09 in 1940.

The Soviet housing stock was dealt a severe blow during World War II. More than 6 million dwellings providing shelter to 25 million people were burned or destroyed. Including both urban and rural housing, the amount of damaged housing area almost equalled the total amount of dwelling space constructed during the time period from 1918 to 1941.

Overall, the impact of these events meant that "in nearly all the large cities of the Soviet Union, housing conditions were worse in 1956 than in 1926." Living space per capita had declined from 10 to 20% in such major RSFSR cities as Moscow, Leningrad, Kuibyshev, Gorki, Sverdlovsk, and Saratov. For the USSR as a whole, urban living space per capita in 1958 was lower than what it had been in
Moreover, the situation regarding the density of occupancy per room was worse: 3.22 in 1958, 2.7 in 1926.

Statements of Policy Intent.

On important occasions since the mid-1950's, the party elite has recognized the existence of the housing problem, and has placed a high priority on its resolution. The issue has typically been defined in terms of a shortage of housing. The primary goal has thus involved building more dwelling units and expanding as rapidly as possible the total amount of housing space available to Soviet citizens. Related goals have involved the universalization of modern utilities like running water and central heating, and the replacement of communal flats with private apartments. Discussions of policy goals are relatively egalitarian; that is, beneficiaries include the "bulk of the population or "each Soviet family."

In July 1957, a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers stated that housing conditions were intolerable for the bulk of the Soviet population and set the policy goal of eliminating these conditions.

Khrushchev spoke optimistically about reaching a solution to the housing problem in the near future.

We know that we have an acute shortage of housing . . . The program for the development of housing in the USSR . . . sets the task of insuring a considerable increase in available houses, with the aim of ending the housing shortage in the next 10 to 12 years. (November, 1957)

To the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, Khrushchev pointed with pride to the rapid tempo of housing construction: "One is tempted to
say that the construction crane has become our symbol."

The 1961 Party Program singles out the centrality of the housing problem, defines goals, and reflects a Khrushchevian time perspective.

The CPSU sets the task of solving the most acute problem in the improvement of the well-being of the Soviet people—housing problem. In the course of the first decade an end will be put to the housing shortage in the country. Families that are still housed in overcrowded and substandard dwellings will get new flats. At the end of the second decade, every family, including newlyweds, will have a comfortable flat...

An extensive program of public-services construction and of improvements in all towns and workers’ estates will be carried out in the coming period, which will involve completion of their electrification, the necessary gassification... waterworks, sewerage, and measures for the further improvement of sanitary conditions in towns and other populated localities...

Khrushchev’s successors, Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin, have not been so optimistic concerning an immediate solution to the housing shortage. Moreover, in so far as a hierarchy of priorities can be discerned in the welfare realm, it would appear that housing has been demoted from the key to raising living standards to one amongst several major social problems.

It should be emphasized, however, that Brezhnev and Kosygin have continued to view housing conditions as a serious problem. In a speech to the 23rd CPSU Congress in 1966, Brezhnev stated: "We are building a great deal but the housing problem remains extremely acute."

At the same Party Congress Kosygin spoke of housing in the following terms in setting forth the goals of the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1966-1970):
One of the greatest social problems...is the housing problem... The projected program of housing construction for 1966-1970 will allow the improvement of living conditions or the provision of new homes for about 65 million people. However, the housing problem will not be wholly solved.

Five years later at the 24th Party Congress, Brezhnev praised past achievements, and promised still further efforts in the housing realm.

The scope and persistence with which the housing problem is being solved is common knowledge... More than 50,000,000 square meters of housing were built during the five years (1966-1970). This means that the equivalent of more than 50 large cities... was built from scratch... Most of the families that celebrated housewarming moved into individual apartments with up-to-date conveniences.

Housing construction will assume still greater scope... The need for more construction was made clear by Kosygin, who asserted that the problem of providing the whole population with apartments "remains a serious one for the years ahead."

Certain non-egalitarian goals were made explicit at the 24th Party Congress. Brezhnev designated Moscow a "model communist city," a city subject to and deserving of special treatment.

... I should like to refer especially to Moscow. It is cherished by all Soviet people as the capital of our homeland, as our most important center of industry, culture and science, as the symbol of our great socialist power. Extensive work on housing construction, the provision of public services and amenities and improvements in the transport system will continue in Moscow. To make Moscow a model communist city... this is the honorable goal of the entire Soviet people!

Whether such goals represent a desire to perpetuate privilege, or a desire to introduce a new society, appears to be a matter of perspective, or perhaps of rhetoric.
For the most part, statements of policy intent stress the need to build a large quantity of housing. Secondary, but closely related goals have involved the provision of utility services, and the replacement of communal dwelling units with private apartments. Goals have generally been stated in egalitarian terms. Indeed, as one Soviet expert on housing and urban problems put it,

In our country one of the major principles applied in the solution of the housing problem is that of providing approximately equal living conditions, as far as possible, to virtually the entire population. This is one of the goals promoted by the construction of standard apartment houses with apartments of equal comfort.

Measuring Housing.

In order to assess Soviet progress, a brief explanation of how performance will be measured is in order. In the Soviet Union, the most important measures have been living space and housing space (housing fund). These measures are utilized in legal statutes, five-year plans, and a variety of publications.

Living space includes bedrooms and living rooms, but not closets, bathrooms, or kitchens. Housing space (the housing fund) consists of the total amount of floor space within a dwelling. D. L. Broner has suggested that living space can be calculated from housing space by utilizing a correction factor of .7.

Although minimum sanitary norms are set in terms of living space per capita, Soviet housing statistics are usually reported in terms of housing space. Henry Morton believes this practice stems from the fact that housing space figures are larger; and hence, more impressive.
Policy results—the quality of urban housing in the RSFSR oblasti—will be compared in an examination of per capita housing space in the provincial administrative centers. There are 55 of these cities. Their populations range from roughly 60,000 to more than 7 million. From 1959 to 1970, the oblast centers contained between 20 to 25% of all urban residents in the Soviet Union.35

The urban housing space figures are likely to be accurate, especially for cities in which a low percentage of the homes are privately-owned. For the state sector, information on the amount of housing space is calculated from two sources: rents, which are based on the amount of square meters in a dwelling unit; and building plans, which are highly standardized and widely utilized.36

In the RSFSR, 67.5% of the urban housing fund (housing space) was state-owned in 1960. By 1970 this figure had risen to 76.1%.37 For the cities involved in this study, these figures are likely to be even higher since private housing tends to be less dominant in larger cities. Hence, it is likely that the Soviet housing space figures utilized in this study reflect real conditions in society.

The data's reliability might also be supported by the following argument: if you are going to falsify information, why not make conditions look good? In the Soviet case, the housing statistics, while indicating that progress is being made, also demonstrate that urban housing conditions do not meet minimum standards set 50 years ago.
Policy Actions.

What is the Soviet regime doing to provide Soviet citizens with adequate housing? To what extent is Soviet housing policy guided by considerations of egalitarianism? These questions may best be answered by considering several facets of housing policy.

First, decisions regarding the allocation of responsibility for housing construction must be considered. The role played by, respectively, the state, the private citizen, and cooperatives need to be examined. The state's role will be explored in detail; I will focus on budgetary issues. These issues relate to questions regarding the sheer size and distribution of capital investment in housing. Another area of importance involves decisions made by local governments. The All-Union and Union Republic authorities may issue pronouncements and exhortations, and decide what monies go where; but local political factors also contribute to the successful implementation (or the undermining) of housing policy.

Housing constructed in the Soviet Union is divided into three major categories based on ownership: state, coops, and the private sector. Like agriculture, with its private plot-collective farm-state farm structure, the three housing sectors form a hierarchy (from an ideological perspective) of "higher" and "lower" forms.

On the whole, Soviet leaders have accepted, due to the severe housing shortage, the necessity of the private housing sector. During the Khrushchev period (especially from 1960-1964), private housing was often criticized for promoting a "private-property mentality" that was
was inconsistent with the "construction of communism." 38

The Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has, on the other hand, sought to reassure private home builders. Distinctions between private property and the "personal property of citizens in a socialist society" have been made, and local officials have been criticized for treating non-state housing in a shabby manner. In order to alleviate the housing shortage, private and cooperative housing are viewed as necessary but transient (in the long run) features of Soviet society.

State housing is constructed (and administered) by either the local government or by large industrial enterprises and other institutions which maintain housing for their employees. Since the beginning of the period of five-year plans (1929), the state has been responsible for 77.5% of the total amount of living space constructed in Soviet cities. 39

Housing cooperatives are associations of Soviet citizens who join together, and become shareholders in the building of an apartment building. Ownership remains with the coop; the individual member has the privilege of occupying an apartment. 40 For the most part, cooperative building has taken place since 1962, and is responsible for only 2 to 3% of the existing housing space in the urban sector.

The private housing sector consists of individual homes financed by the builder's own funds. State credit, if available, may legally cover as much as half of the building cost and repayment may be spread over 7 years. Prospective homeowners secure only the right to build on a plot of land, not ownership of the land. 41 Although the state has played a predominant role in urban housing construction, the majority
of all housing space constructed (51.3%) in the Soviet Union between 1913 and 1970 came from private builders and coops.\(^4\)

For reasons relating largely to inefficient land use, private home construction has been banned in major RSFSR cities since January 1, 1964. This ban applies to almost all the oblast administrative centers. Since 1962, the Soviet regime has sought to increase rapidly the building of multi-story apartments by coops in urban areas. Coops are expected to replace private home-building in large cities and, eventually, in the urban sector as a whole.

The pattern of housing construction, by owner, varies enormously from large metropolitan areas to the countryside, and from union republic to union republic.\(^4\) In general, the larger the city, the more important the state sector. For the USSR as a whole, 80-90\% of all state and cooperative housing is constructed in urban areas.\(^4\) Since the 1950's, the state's percentage share of total housing construction has been steadily increasing in all the union republics. (see Table 3-1)

For the RSFSR, the percentage of the urban housing fund owned by the state rose from 67.5\% in 1960 to 76.1\% in 1970.\(^4\) The percentage of urban housing space built by the state sector increased from 57.5\% in 1960 to 77.8\% in 1968.\(^4\) Compared with the other Union Republics, the RSFSR ranks in the top three in regard to the importance of the state sector.

Although the reliance on private financing is declining, the private and cooperative sectors have had, and will have, a substantial impact on the total amount of housing available to Soviet citizens.
Communities with disproportionate numbers of financially better-off residents should be more likely than other communities to succeed in alleviating the housing shortage; in other words, regional inequalities in housing conditions can be expected to coincide with regional differences in per capita income.

Table 3-2 offers support for the contention that wealth and housing conditions are positively linked. Retail trade per capita is utilized as a measure of purchasing power. The oblasti that rank high on retail trade per capita also tend to rank high on housing space per capita.

This relationship should be viewed with caution. Data which could help pin down the relationship—the relative contributions of private, cooperative, and state sectors—are not available. Nonetheless, the following points can be made:

1. income differentials exist (see chapter 4);
2. a substantial part of the burden for financing housing construction has been carried by the private sector;
3. providing housing thus becomes, in part, a function of the wealth of the citizenry.

What of the state effort? How willing is the Soviet leadership to allocate investment resources for housing construction? How—through what agencies—are funds distributed? Are funds distributed on the basis of need? Or do funds go to communities which make significant contributions to industrial production? Or perhaps to those areas whose leaders have political pull? Whatever the rhetoric of Soviet leaders, decisions regarding these budgetary issues represent real demonstrations of elite preferences, priorities, and intent.

The percentage of total investment going to housing construction represents an excellent measure of the regime's commitment to resolve
the housing shortage. Both Soviet and Western writers regard the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1957-1960) as a major breakthrough. Ruble investment in housing more than doubled, and the percent of total investment funds committee to housing reached the highest figure in Soviet history.

Housing has, however, received a reduced investment priority over time. From a highpoint of 26% of total capital investment in 1956-60, housing's share has dropped to 17.1% in 1966-70, and to 14.7% in 1971-75. Because the total amount of investment funds has increased, the amount of rubles allocated to housing has actually increased at about 3.8% per year. These increases, however, have been absorbed by a rise in construction costs per square meter.

It is clear that Soviet leaders have chosen to stabilize or level-off state investment in housing. This pattern has lead Willard Smith to assess Soviet actions regarding housing in terms of "big plans, little action." Similarly, Gertrude Schroeder asserts that "the figures shows that only a token installment has been made toward fulfilling Khruschev's promise to eliminate the housing shortage."

The reduced priority of housing in the state budget takes on added significance when goals regarding cooperative and private housing are considered. The Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has called for the expansion of both private and coop housing. Results, however, have been disappointing. The amount of housing space constructed by private builders has declined and coops provided only about 2/3 the amount of housing space expected during the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1966-70). Hence, it is quite likely that Soviet leaders have overestimated the extent to which the state burden can be eased by turning to private
State investment in housing has thus not been as great as it could have—or perhaps should have—been. Decisions on overall budgetary priorities obviously have a strong impact on the amount of progress which can be made. For the Soviet urban resident in Moscow, Novosibirsk, or Murmansk, such grand budgetary decisions may be of less importance than decisions regarding the distribution of funds. How are state investment funds distributed to various regions and communities?

Distribution issues center around two key problems: 1) how state funds are routed to localities; and 2) how much particular areas receive. By examining these issues, tentative answers to why some regions benefit more than others can be provided.

State investment funds for housing are channelled through the regular state budgets and through industrial ministries. In the former case, local Soviets are responsible for housing construction and management; in the latter, factories and various other organizations. Dual routes thus exist—two ways in which housing construction can be founded.

Since the late 1950’s, this dual structure has been an object of public controversy. Debate has focused on two arguments: 1) effective city planning cannot be undertaken without consolidation of all spending (and responsibility) in the local Soviet; and 2) unless state plans begin to emphasize the siting of new industry in small towns, living standards will not rise in these locations.

These policy positions reflect basic features of the Soviet budgetary process. The call for comprehensive planning—or local governmental control—argues for a decreased role for industrial enterprises in the
operation of welfare programs like housing. This position is justified on the basis of rational planning—not on the grounds that abolition of the "enterprise route" would lead to a more egalitarian distribution of welfare spending.

The Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-1960) marked a shift not only on investment priorities, but also the beginning of a trend away from the financing of housing construction through industrial ministries. In general, the older, established centers like Moscow and Leningrad have won this battle for jurisdiction, while in new urban centers the local Soviets play a secondary role to industrial enterprises in providing social amenities.54

The dual structure for building state-owned housing stems from the needs of industrialization during the 1930's. Important industries were allocated monies to be spent on welfare—scarce resources to build an environment capable of attracting and holding workers. The demise of this system can be regarded as a necessary, but not sufficient condition, for a more egalitarian distribution of investment for housing (and other items).

The second argument—that new industry should be sited in small cities and towns—accepts the reality of the Soviet budgetary structure and asserts that living standards can be made more equitable by making the distribution of industry more equitable. The evaluations of Robert Osborn and W. A. Douglas Jackson indicate that a policy of developing small towns industrially has its supporters within the party but has not been implemented to any great extent.55
The importance of industrial spending on housing is two-fold: 1) such funding was, and is, anti-egalitarian; 2) no data on how much industrial spending on housing or other welfare measures are available at the oblast level. Hence, in addition to funds received through the regular state budget, oblasti with significant amounts of industry receive additional—but unknown—amounts of investment funds for housing.

Within the oblast state budget, funds for housing construction are included in the "economic" category. This category includes all kinds of civil construction, from a school to a sports stadium. Most of the money is, however, spent on housing construction. 56

There are extreme differences in per capita economic expenditures among the oblasti. In 1960, for example, the RSFSR oblasti ranged from 9.6 to 105.0 rubles invested per capita. (See Table 3-6) The range between Union Republics was much narrower: from 18.9 for Lithuania to 53.0 for Kazakhstan. 57

There are several possible explanations for such an uneven spending pattern. It has previously been noted that the state housing effort has been focused on the urban sector. Tables 3-7, 3-8, and 3-9 illustrate the disparity between economic expenditures in urban and rural oblasti. There is a strong tendency for the more urban regions—in 70 to 75% of the cases—to score above the median point on economic expenditures per capita. 58

This urban/rural gap does not reflect better housing conditions in the countryside. Housing is generally considered to be worse in rural areas, especially in regard to modern amenities like running
water and utilities. The channelling of state funds to urban areas simply reflects the priorities and preferences of central decision-makers.

Special consideration for one urban center—Moscow—is illustrated in Figure 3-1. Per capita economic expenditures are plotted for Moscow, Leningrad, and for the third most urban oblasti. Obviously, Moscow is an outlier. Indeed, the distance between Moscow and Leningrad is probably underestimated, since it would appear that for the time period from 1959 to 1963 Moscow was likely to receive far more funding through industrial ministries than Leningrad. (See Table 3-5)

Another expectation regarding the local budget involves its relationship to the pattern of investment in industry. Tables 3-10 and 3-11 show that the more industrial provinces were not significantly more likely to score above the median point for economic expenditures per capita than were the less developed oblasti. The argument that industrial development does matter, however, is a persuasive one, grounded both in Soviet and Western sources. The impact of industry will be discussed more fully in the "models" section of this chapter.

The state budget does not distribute investment funds on the basis of need. The concept of "need" can be operationalized as an oblast's ability to help itself by tapping the private and cooperative sectors. In this case, regions falling below the median point on retail trade per capita can be thought of as especially in need of outside infusions of investment funds.

Alternatively, needy oblasti can be viewed in terms of those whose administration centers fall into the lower half on housing space
per capita. Here, it is necessary, given the dearth of data, to consider housing conditions in the oblast center as a surrogate for conditions in the oblast as a whole. In reality, it is likely that the housing space per capita in the administrative center is higher than elsewhere in the province.

Whether need is conceptualized as low private investment potential or below par housing space per capita, the worse off oblasti are not favored by the state budget in the distribution of housing funds. (See Tables 3-12 through 3-15) Indeed, the reverse, although weakly so, is true for regions whose administrative centers score low on housing space per capita.

For oblasti whose citizenry rank low on retail trade per capita, the results are clear. The poorer regions, in contrast with richer ones, are very likely to be below the median point for economic expenditures. Thus, the provinces where private and cooperative housing are least likely to contribute toward the alleviation of the housing shortage are also the least likely to be aided in the state budget.

A broad picture of budgeting for housing construction can be drawn: rich, urban areas receive the most funding per capita. Within this framework, political pull is evident when urbanization is controlled for. This is true for politburo-secretariat ties and ultimate mobility, but not for cohort pairs.

The typical relationship is illustrated in Tables 3-16 and 3-17. Ultimate mobility is utilized as the independent variable. Table 3-16 shows a weak, positive relationship between mobility and economic
expenditures. When urbanization is controlled, ultimate mobility does not matter—that is, for the urban oblasti. (See Tables 3-16 and 3-17) In non-urban regions, however, it appears that political clout does have some effect. Here, oblasti with first secretaries who score high on either polituro-secretariat ties or ultimate mobility are more likely to do well in acquiring funds. Overall, however, it should be stressed that the basic pattern is for urban oblasti to be successful in obtaining funds; and for non-urban regions to fall into the "low" category of economic expenditures per capita.

The fact that cohort pairs does not have any impact on economic expenditures is not surprising. Unlike mobility and politburo-secretariat pairs, both of which tap personal relationships between obkom first secretaries and top party leaders, cohort pairs measures links within the regional party elite. In regard to the allocation of funds, obkom first secretaries are in a competitive situation with one another. They are likely to be reluctant to aid one another on this kind of issue; and given their middle-rank position within the party, are probably incapable of intervening decisively on behalf of a colleague.

In summary, the evidence suggests that the state budget does not redistribute investment funds for housing in a manner that would promote an equalization of housing conditions across oblasti. During the years from 1959 to 1963 the state budget strongly favored urban, wealthy regions.

Spending money, from whatever source—private citizen, factory, or the local Soviet budget—does not automatically translate into better
housing conditions for Soviet citizens. A marginal, perhaps sometimes important role, is played by oblast and lower level party and state officials. Local decision-makers are influential in several ways: 1) on how the economic budget will be spent; 2) on whether or not private and/or cooperative housing will thrive; and 3) on how smoothly housing construction proceeds.

Economic expenditures cover a variety of civil construction projects besides housing. Brezhnev, in a speech in Kharhov in 1970, was critical of the way in which local decision-makers utilized state funds.

It is still not possible to consider the housing problem solved. We must continue to strive to fulfill the planned program, which requires the most efficient utilization of the large sums that the State makes available for housing construction. Unfortunately, everything is not in order here. There is no lack of examples where, in some oblasts and rayons, a large number of administrative buildings, stadiums, clubs and other structures not envisaged by the plan are being built at the cost of living accommodation; there is also unjustified expenditure on various ways of embellishing towns, etc. 60

A certain amount of local leeway exists regarding the utilization of the civil construction budget. The preferences of local decision-makers are likely to affect the mix of housing and other facilities prevalent in particular oblasti.

The attitudes of local decision-makers toward cooperative and/or private housing are also likely to have an impact on the regional distribution of housing. The building of private homes and, especially, coops, is dependent upon the extent of wealth or excess purchasing power available in the community. Another necessary condition involves the willingness of local authorities to respond favorably to the
needs and requests of private home-builders and coops.

Periodically, resolutions of the central government (1948 and 1967), and joint party and state resolutions (1957 and 1971), have called upon local party and state agencies to facilitate private home-building. Cooperative building in cities has been officially encouraged since 1962. Nonetheless, private and cooperative building does not always proceed smoothly, even where financial considerations are minimal.

In recent years articles in the Soviet press have been critical of local bureaucrats for their insulting, scornful, and discriminatory treatment of the private and cooperative housing sectors. The intent of central decision-maker—to expand both sectors—is undercut by a host of activities: grants of unsuitable plots of land; slowness in issuing permits for coops and individual builders; illegal assessments charged to coops for stores located on their ground floor; refusals to provide utilities to privately built homes; unwillingness (or inability) to provide state credit or to sell construction materials to the public. 61

A third, and final area, in which local decision-making is important involves the organization of housing construction. In the RSFSR, about 40% of new living accommodations are occupied in December. 62 There is an enormous rush, generally in the worst weather of the year, to fulfill the annual plan. Constant breakdowns in the delivery of needed supplies, and the fact that construction organizations are judged and rewarded on the basis of the quantity of housing space built (not on whether the walls let in water when it rains) are basic
features of the Soviet economic system. These factors make the fulfillment of plan goals difficult, and also are largely responsible for the notorious shoddiness of Soviet housing.

Local authorities cannot change basic features of the economy. They are, however, responsible for solving breakdowns in the system. Top oblast party officials are especially responsible for economic coordination and for solving supply problems so that important plan goals can be met. The skills of party leaders in effectively coordinating and supervising construction organizations may help to increase both the quantity and quality of housing.

Policy actions are manifestations of public policies, the things government does in pursuance of policy goals. Attention has been focused on such matters as the allocation of responsibility between the private and public sectors, the percentage share of housing in total capital investment, the distribution of funds for housing construction, and local restraints on cooperative and private housing. It is now time to examine the impact these activities have had on society.

**Policy Results**

To what extent has housing policy achieved stated objectives? The basic goal—to expand the amount of housing space per capita—is being met. As Figure 3-2 illustrates, housing space per capita has risen steadily in the oblast administrative centers during the decade of the sixties. The mean value for the oblast centers was 7.9 per capita square meters of housing space in 1960, 10.1 in 1970.
For the RSFSR urban sector as a whole, per capita living space increased from 5.7 in 1958 to 7.7 in 1970. This performance—in terms of the amount of increase in per capita living space—is superior to that of any other union republic except Estonia. Despite this improvement, minimum sanitary housing standards, set in the 1920's, remain beyond the reach of almost all the RSFSR (and Soviet) cities.

Put in other terms, the construction of new housing space has meant an average of 2.4 million housing units completed per year from 1956 to 1970. For the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-75), it appears that about 2.2 million units will be built each year. What this all means can perhaps be best summarized as follows: between 1956 and 1970 more than half the population of the Soviet Union—126.5 million people—moved into new housing units.

Progress toward other housing goals has also been evident. Substantial improvements in regard to amenities and privacy have been made. In urban state housing, the percentage of families living in individual apartments has risen from 40% in 1960 to an expected 75% by 1975. Amenities, as shown in Table 3-18, have also markedly improved.

Clearly, progress has been made: housing space (and living space) per capita has increased; utilities are more available; individual apartments are becoming the norm. What, then, can be said about the distribution of this progress?

Equality and the Distribution of Housing

Overall, it has been established that housing conditions are improving. But are they improving everywhere? Are housing conditions
roughly equal in different localities? If not, is the gap between the worse-off and better-off communities widening or narrowing over time?

For per capita housing space, it is likely that the range of values among the oblast administrative centers is smaller than what one would find if a random sample of towns and cities could be used. The oblast centers are atypically large in population and in industrial importance. Problem areas—cities under 100,000—are poorly represented in this study. Nonetheless, differences among these urban centers do exist.

Table 3-19 provides descriptive data on per capita housing space. The distance between the highest and lowest scores increases over time, 3.1 square meters in 1960 to 5.8 square meters in 1970. The standard deviation increases from .7 to .9.

Figure 3-3 throws more light on the distribution of housing conditions. Housing space per capita for Moscow and for the other administrative centers is plotted. The cities are grouped according to their population. The distance between the worse-off and best-off categories increases over time. The largest cities improve their housing space per capita by 2.7 square meters; the least populous administrative centers, by 1.8 square meters. The middle group's improvement is identical to that of the large cities—2.7 square meters.

The progress made by Moscow is exceptional. The gap between Moscow and the other RSFSR cities is substantial, and has widened over time. Indeed, this is true for major cities in the USSR as a whole. Among the 15 largest cities in the Soviet Union, Moscow ranked 10th
on per capita housing space in 1939, 6th in 1955, and 1st since 1964.70

Unfortunately, other data—on utilities and individual apartments—are not available at the regional level. These measures would be an enormous aid to the evaluation of housing conditions.

In summary, the gap between the least populous and most populous urban centers in the RSFSR has increased during the decade of the sixties. These findings suggest that cities and towns under 100,000 population may be experiencing little or no upgrading of their housing conditions.

The Models and Housing

Literature on housing in Soviet cities and towns strongly associates two conditions with superior housing: 1) a large population; and 2) industrial concentration. Indeed, these two conditions are often treated interchangeably; that is, bigness is equated with industrial importance.

Henry Morton, for example, states that "cities with large industrial concentration are favored with capital investment in housing construction over small cities and towns."71 As proof, Morton points to the substantial increases of living space achieved by 12 of the 15 most populous cities in the USSR.72

Similarly, Robert Osborn asserts that housing investment is "directed heavily into growing industrial centers of over 10,000 (and into the very largest cities, of course, growing or not)."73 For Osborn, these factors of size and industrial importance determine whether or not old and overcrowded housing is replaced with modern apartments.
Soviet discussions of welfare problems recognize that funds are short in small towns with no growing industrial base. The Eighth Five-Year Plan (1966-1970) called for more industrial development in small and medium-sized cities in European Russia.

Andrei Sakharov, in his criticisms of Soviet patterns of allocating "the good life," has also cited population size as crucial.

Moscow and other large cities are privileged when it comes to consumer goods, comforts, everyday life, cultural activity, and so on.\(^4\)

The level-of-development model does provide the best explanation for housing conditions in urban centers. The multiple regression analyses demonstrate the importance of industrialization and population in predicting housing space per capita in RSFSR cities. (See Tables 3-21, 3-22, and 3-23) The key variables are: the size of the city, the industrial-performance index, and the relative importance of industry.\(^5\)

Before I examine the regression analyses in which these variables play a prominent role, I need to discuss measurement problems involving multi-collinearity and the ecological fallacy.

With the exception of housing space per capita, all the variables utilized in this study are at the oblast or regional level. For urbanization, the population of the administrative center can be substituted. Because industry is highly concentrated, the industrial measures are not likely to provide misleading inferences about the industrial importance of the cities in question. The size of the party at the regional level may not necessarily be a good indicator of party strength in one city. Although the other political variables are
to conditions in the cities, it could be argued that information on
city-level leaders should be substituted.

Relationships among the independent variables is a problem only
for party membership and the size of the administrative center. The
correlation between these two measures is typically about .7. Since
the party is generally considered to be strongest in the larger cities,
the measures do operate in the desired direction. The high correla­
tion does, however, pose problems for the interpretation of the regres­
sion analysis.

Tables 3-21 through 3-23 show the pattern of beta coefficients
from 1960 to 1967. The overall impression favors the level-of­
development model. While the regression incorporating the population
of the oblast center should be viewed cautiously, the results are not,
given the literature on Soviet housing, unexpected. The industrial
analyses present clear-cut support for the proposition that housing
is distributed so as to re-inforce industrial production.

All three tables indicate that the level-of-development model is
weak in 1960, emerges by 1962, and remains relatively stable there­
after. Aid in interpreting this pattern can be gained by citing T.
Sosnovy's study of living conditions in 28 large Soviet cities in 1926
and 1956. Sosnovy concluded that:

In the initial period of industrialization of the Soviet
economy, urban housing conditions were worse in those cities
that were drawn into the process of industrialization than
in cities not affected by this process. Housing conditions
in the new cities were worse than in the older rapidly growing
centers. Later on, as average per capita living space declined,
housing conditions in different cities became more nearly
equal. . . .
Thus, the impact of the Stalinist period on urban housing was dual: living space per capita declined and became more equal across urban centers.

It can be speculated that the impact of the massive housing construction program begun after 1956 has been to improve housing conditions everywhere, while at the same time increasing differences between cities and regions. In other words, from a territorial viewpoint, the push to create better housing conditions has been uneven. The improvement of housing conditions has been accompanied by growing inequality.

Conclusion

The Soviet leadership has set as a priority the elimination of the housing shortage. Utilizing such measures as per capita housing space, private apartments, and the provision of utilities, movement has occurred in the desired direction. In Henry Morton's judgment, the Soviet accomplishment is "perhaps unmatched by any other country in history."^77

Brezhnev, in a speech to the 24th Party Congress (1971), described the housing shortage as being tackled with "scope and persistence." These are apt terms. What is perhaps most impressive about the Soviet effort is its staying power: the construction of more than 2.2 million housing units a year since 1957.

The housing shortage has not, however, been resolved, Khruschev's prognosis that the housing problem could be dealt with in a period of 10 to 12 years has been proven wrong. Per capita living space remains below minimum standards for the masses of urban dwellers. On a
variety of measures of housing conditions, the Soviet Union still falls far short of levels reached by most Western and Eastern European countries.78

Success in solving the housing shortage may, indeed, be elusive. Lists for new apartments remain as long as ever. Expectations appear to have risen more rapidly than apartment construction.79 Many people want more space, better quality construction, and a separate apartment for parents or for grown children. Housing thus remains a source of dissatisfaction for many Soviet citizens.

The argument that Soviet leaders have not done enough to raise housing standards has some merit. The percentage share of investment funds committed to housing construction has declined since the late 1950's. As will be discussed in later chapters, however, the percentage share of investment going to other welfare items has increased. From an overall perspective, it could be asserted that a greater balance in moving toward higher living standards is in evidence.

Aside from the investment issue, Soviet leaders can be faulted for failing to take full advantage of the cooperative and private housing sectors. Cooperative housing has operated within a set of guidelines that are considerably more stringent than those in several Eastern European countries. In 1965 officials of the Moscow Office of the Construction Bank suggested that liberalized conditions—decreasing down payments and increasing the period of repayment of the loan—would boost the share of housing built by coops to at least 50% of the total.80
Private housing has suffered from a severe lack of construction materials. In Tambov province in 1966, for example, the retail trade network selling to individual builders received less than half the amount of a variety of required supplies. The production of building materials frequently does not meet the needs of state projects; subsequently, the allocation of materials for private and cooperative housing construction suffers.

In regard to policy actions, it is clear that investment funds are distributed in an inegalitarian manner. Wealthy, urban regions receive the greatest amount of investment funds per capita. If data on the distribution of funds within the oblast were available, they would, in all likelihood, show that populous, industrial cities are disproportionately favored.

An examination of housing space per capita in the RSFSR regional administrative centers demonstrated that disparities in housing conditions increased among the cities during the decade of the sixties. These disparities can best be explained with reference to the level-of-development model. Housing is best in the most populous and most industrial cities.

The level-of-development model is, however, an imperfect description of Soviet housing policy. Housing has received a higher priority than in the past. Nonetheless, scarcity still, and perhaps always, exists. To disperse funds in a truly egalitarian manner would mean to spread them thinly. The end result is a situation in which, as Osborn argues:
One might say that the Marxist principle governing the present socialist period, 'to each according to his work,' has been applied to communities as well as to individuals.
Table 3-1
Percent of Total Housing Space Constructed in the USSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Co-op</th>
<th>Private</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956-59</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-2.
Retail Trade Per Capita and Housing Space Per Capita, 1960-1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Break-points between "high" and "low" categories are the median values for respectively, retail trade and housing space. Percentages add across.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total Capital Investment from Public and Private Sectors (in billions of rubles)</th>
<th>Capital Investment in Housing from Public or Private Sectors (in billions of rubles)</th>
<th>Housing as Percent of Total Investment</th>
<th>Percent of Square Meters of Housing Built by the State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1818-1970</td>
<td>985.6</td>
<td>185.430</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918-Sept. 30, 1923</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.838</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-1932</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>1.351</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(First Five-Year Plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-1937</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>2.526</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Second Five-Year Plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938-July, 1941-1945</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>3.481</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Part of Third Five-Year Plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July, 1941-1945</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>3.090</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1950</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>9.233</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Fourth Five-Year Plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1955</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>17.864</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Fifth Five-Year Plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1960</td>
<td>170.5</td>
<td>39.614</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sixth Five-Year Plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1965</td>
<td>247.6</td>
<td>45.430</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Seventh Five-Year Plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1970</td>
<td>353.8</td>
<td>60.013</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Eighth Five-Year Plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1975</td>
<td>501.0</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ninth Five Year Plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Except for the Nineth Five-Year Plan, all information is taken from Henry W. Morton, "What Have the Soviet Leaders Done about the Housing Crisis?" In Henry W. Morton and Rudolf L. Tokes (editors),
Table 3-3 continued.


Notes: Unfortunately, Soviet data on capital investment in housing includes investment from both the public and private sectors. Thus, the data is somewhat misleading. Although 19.2% of total capital investment for the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-1950) was allocated for housing construction, only 36% of housing built during that time period was constructed by the state. This is the lowest percentage since the beginning of the five-year plans.
### Table 3-4.

**INVESTMENT IN HOUSING CONSTRUCTION IN THE RSFSR AND USSR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>RSFSR</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>RSFSR</th>
<th>USSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>4,898.9</td>
<td>7,536</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5,192</td>
<td>8,209</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>4,782.6</td>
<td>7,714</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>4,584.4</td>
<td>7,394</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>5,019</td>
<td>8,162</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>5,362</td>
<td>8,957</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>5,712</td>
<td>9,643</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>6,040</td>
<td>10,120</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3-5**

Distribution of state floor space in 1960 and 1968, between local Soviets and other organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960 Distribution (percent)</th>
<th>1968 Distribution (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrial enterprises,</td>
<td>Industrial enterprises,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>other organizations</td>
<td>local Soviets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.S.F.S.R.</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sverdlovsk</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnitogorsk</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leningrad</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3-1. Economic Expenditures Per Capita in Moscow, Leningrad, and Urban Oblasti, in Rubles, 1959-1963
Table 3-6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>8.6-100.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>9.6-105.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>10.4-108.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>9.3-112.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>8.7-95.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3-7
Economic Expenditures Per Capita in RSFSR Oblasti, in Rubles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Urban Oblasti</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Mixed Oblasti</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Rural Oblasti</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\bar{X}$</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Range</td>
<td>$\bar{X}$</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Range</td>
<td>$\bar{X}$</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>10.0-100.7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>12.7-33.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>13.7-105.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>13.0-31.3</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>13.6-108.1</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>13.6-33.1</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>13.6-108.1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>10.9-28.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>12.1-95.7</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>10.1-26.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: For each year the oblasti are grouped according to whether they fall into the third most urban oblasti, the third least urban (the rural group), and the third in-between (mixed break points utilized in each year.)
Table 3-8.

Urbanization and Economic Expenditures Per Capita in RSFSR Oblasit, 1959-1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urbanization</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(56)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(55)</td>
<td>(79)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The low category of urbanization includes oblasti up to 54% urban. The low category for economic expenditures ranges up to 17.2 rubles per capita; the high category, 17.3 to 108.1. For both variables, the break point between "high" and "low" is the median score.
Table 3-9.

Urbanization and Economic Expenditures Per Capita in RSFSR Oblasti, 1962-63

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Expenditures Per Capita</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>(59)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=111

Notes: The low category of urbanization includes oblasti up to 54% urban. The low category for economic expenditures ranges up to 17.7 rubles per capita; the high category, from 17.8 to 112.2. For both variables, the break point between "high" and "low" is the median score.
### Table 3-10.

Weighted Industrial Performance Index and Economic Expenditures Per Capita in RSFSR Oblasti 1960-61

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Expenditures Per Capita</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weighted Industrial Performance Index</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=109.

Notes: For the weighted industrial performance index, the low category includes scores up to 4877; the high category, from 4878 to 48437. The low category of economic expenditures ranges from 18.1 to 109.0. For both variables, the break point between high and low categories is the median score.
Table 3-11.

Weighted Industrial Performance Index and Economic Expenditure Per Capita in RSFSR Oblasti, 1962-63

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Expenditures Per Capita</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weighted Industrial Performance Index</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(56)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=111

Notes: For the weighted individual performance index, the low category includes scores up to 5324; the high category ranges from 5325 to 39048. The low category of economic expenditures includes scores between 8-7 rubles and 17.7 rubles; the high category, 17.8 to 112.2. For both variables, the break point between high and low categories is the median score.
Table 3-12.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Expenditures Per Capita</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retail Trade per capita</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(59)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(82)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=162

Notes: The low category of retail trade per capita includes oblasti up to 364.7 rubles; the high category ranges from 364.8 to 1007.9 rubles. The low category for economic expenditures ranges up to 17.2 rubles per capita; the high category, 17.3 to 108.1 For both variables, the break point is the median score.
Table 3-13.
Retail Trade Per Capita and Economic Expenditures per capita in RSFSR Oblasti, 1962-63.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Expenditures per capita</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retail Trade per capita</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(42)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(56)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The low category of retail trade per capita includes oblasti up to 402.1 to 1336.9 rubles. The high category, 402.1 to 1826.9 rubles. The low category for economic expenditures ranges up to 17.7; the high category, from 17.8 to 112.2 rubles. For both variables, the break point is the median point.
Table 3-14.
Housing Space Per Capita and Economic Expenditures Per Capita in RSFSR Oblasti, 1960-61.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Expenditures Per Capita</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Square Meters of Housing Space</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(55)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=97

Notes: For housing, the low category includes the range of scores from 6.0 to 8.0; the high category, from 8.1 to 14.0. For economic expenditures per capita, the low category includes the range of scores from 9.6 rubles to 18.0 rubles; the high category, from 18.1 to 109.0. For both variables, the median point was used to establish the "break" point between "high" and "low".
Table 3-15.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Expenditures Per Capita</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Square Meters of Housing Space</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=103

Notes: For housing, the low category includes scores between 6.7 and 8.5; the high category, between 8.6 and 10.9. For economic expenditures the low category includes scores between 8.7 rubles and 17.7 rubles; the high category includes scores between 17.8 and 112.2. For both variables, the median point was used to establish the "break" point between "high" and "low".
Figure 3-2: Urban Per Capita Housing Space for RSFSR Oblast Administrative Centers, 1960-1970
Table 3.16.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Expenditures</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ultimate Mobility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(55)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=143

Notes: For Tables 3-16 and 3-17, mobility scores of 0-5 are scored low; from 6-9, high. The breakpoint for economic expenditures in Tables 3-16 and 3-17 is the same as in Table 3-12.
Table 3-17.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ultimate Mobility</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban Oblasti</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ultimate Mobility</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Urban Oblasti</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The urban oblasti are 54.1% urban or above; the non-urban oblasti are less than 54.1% urban.
Table 3-18.

Percentage of Housing Stock Supplied with Amenities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Running Water</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewerage</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Heat</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baths or Showers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot Water</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas-Service</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-19.

Per Capita Housing Space for RSFSR Oblast Administrative Center, 1960-1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>6.4-9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>6.6-9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>6.7-10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>6.9-10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>7.2-11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>7.4-11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>7.9-12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>7.9-12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>7.8-13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>7.5-13.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: See Appendix D for a complete description of the break points used in this table.
Figure 3-3. Mean Housing Space Per Capita in Moscow and in RSFSR Oblast Administrative Centers, Grouped According to Size of City, 1960-1970.
Table 3-20.
Per Capita Housing Space in RSFSR Oblast Administrative Centers, 1960-1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population of City</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>+2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>+2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>+1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All cell entries are in square meters of housing space per capita.
Table 3-21.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Oblast Center</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>P/S Ties</th>
<th>Cohort Pairs</th>
<th>Ultimate Mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>-.48</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3-21, continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>Percent of variance explained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3-22.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Weighted Industrial Performance Index</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>P/S Ties</th>
<th>Cohort Pairs</th>
<th>Ultimate Mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3-22, continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>Percent of variances explained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3-23.
Per Capita Housing Space in RSFSR Oblast Administrative Centers, 1960-1967.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Relative Importance of Industry</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>P/S Ties</th>
<th>Cohort Pairs</th>
<th>Ultimate Mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3-23, continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>Percent of Variance Explained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
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Footnotes


4. Estonia and Latvia were the only Union Republics satisfying minimum living space requirements for urban residents.


6. These figures are for the year 1959. The data comes from Smith, op. cit., p. 417. The state sector does not include housing owned by individuals. For the entire urban housing stock, one-third of the units were supplied with water and sewage, one fourth had central heating, and one-fifth had gas. These figures are from B. Svetlichnyi, "Some Problems of the Long Range Development of Cities," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1962, no. 3; translated in *Soviet Sociology*, Vol. I, no. 1 (Summer 1962), p. 62.

7. Hanson, op cit., p. 65.

8. Ibid., p. 66.

9. Ibid.


13. Ibid., p. 2.


20. Ibid., p. 5-6, Table 4.

21. Ibid., p. 4, Table 3.

22. Ibid., p. 5.

23. For the complete text of this resolution, entitled "On Developing Housing Construction in the USSR," see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. IX, no. 31.

24. Khrushchev, as quoted in Barry, op. cit., p. 4.


30. Ibid., p. 6.


33. Svetlichnyi, p. 59.

34. In Morton, p. 190, fn. 19.

35. The RSFSR contained 59.4% of the urban population of the Soviet Union in 1970.

36. See Hanson, p. 65.


38. The amount of housing space contributed by the private sector began to decline after 1959. With the change in the ideological climate after Khruschev's ouster, private housing construction increased briefly (1965), and then began to decline steadily again. Although the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has called for increased private construction (mainly in rural areas and in cities with a population under 100,000), shortages of building materials have severely limited such building.


40. For a discussion of cooperative housing see Smith, p. 412; Barry, pp. 10-12; and Morton, p. 185.

41. For a discussion of the private housing sector, see Barry, pp. 8-10; Morton, pp. 175-182.


43. Data for the union republics can be found in Ellen Mickiewicz, Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data (New York: The Free Press, 1973), Chapter 5.

44. Smigh, p. 413.


46. Mickiewicz, p. 129.

47. See Morton, p. 168; and Svetlichnyi, p. 59.

49. Smith, p. 418-419.

50. This investment pattern is one aspect of Soviet housing policy that lead Smith to title his article "Housing in the Soviet Union—Big Plans, Little Action.


52. Smith, p. 413.


56. See B. Svetlichnyi, p. 66. While Svetlichnyi suggests that only 50 to 55% of capital investments in urban construction should go for housing, he indicates that in practice the bulk of the funds have frequently been utilized for housing construction.

57. Mickiewicz, p. 133-134.

58. I have chosen to use cross-tabulations in the analysis of the budgetary data for two reasons. First, the high correlation between the strength of the local Party organization and urbanization for the years in question make the interpretation of multiple regression analyses problematic. Secondly, as Edward R. Tufte has pointed out ("A Note of Caution in Using Variables That Have Common Elements," Public Opinion Quarterly, Winter, 1969-1970, pp. 622-625), correlations between variables which have elements in common are likely to be artificially biased. While the direction and strength of this bias is difficult to determine, there is a danger that a hypothesis may be accepted on the basis of the mathematical effects of common elements. Many of the variables used in this study are normed according to the oblast population; hence, the possibility of creating statistical artifacts exists.

59. New spending patterns may, of course, have emerged. The emergence over time of inequalities in housing space per capita however, argues against such changes in the appropriations process (See Figure 3-3).
60. Brezhnev, as quoted in Anita Glassl, "Housing Problems in the Soviet Union," Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, no. 603, June 9, 1970, p. 2. In fairness to the "guilty" provinces, it should be noted that the tendency to build and build housing—with no stores, no clubs, no pre-school institutions—is a very common complaint lodged in the Soviet press.


63. Morton, p. 171.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid., p. 163

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., p. 187.

69. A. Protozanov, a Secretary of the Tyumen Province Party Committee, reported that in 1966 major population centers in this province has only two to three square meters of living space per urban resident. See "Cities of the Transurals," CDSP, Vol. XVIII, no. 49, December 28, 1966, p. 30.

70. Mickiewicz, p. 124.


72. Ibid.

73. Osborn, p. 227


75. Correlation coefficients between the population of the oblast administrative center and either industrial measures are typically about .75 for the years 1960 to 1967. The correlation coefficient between the two industrial measures is typically around .90.


77. Morton, p. 188.
78. See Smith, pp. 408-410.
80. Smith, p. 413.
81. See B. Ilyeshin, op. cit.
82. Osborn, p. 229.
Chapter IV. Retail Trade: The Flow of Goods and Services

Sometimes one hears the opinion that Communist abundance of goods will be attained by means of increasing the personal wealth of working people. But . . . do such proprietors . . . correspond to our picture of future man? He has his own summer house, his own car, his own cultural and everyday appliances; in brief, he has a lot of everything and all of it is his own! Such a person is more like a prosperous bourgeois than a toiler of Communist society. The future man, who will be active, keen, drawn to creative toil, art, and sports, will hardly agree to waste time and effort on such an abundant personal household.

-S.G. Strumlin, Red Star, March 31, 1961

. . . to wish to own one's own modern clothing, furniture, cultural and household articles, automobiles, etc., is natural. Since it furthers the development of both the economy and the toilers themselves, this phenomenon is, on the whole, beneficial. At the present-day level of socialist production, however, some of these demands are growing more rapidly than they can be satisfied.

-S. Kovalev, Pravda, Dec. 25, 1970

The status of household or personal consumption has been a major source of frustration for the Soviet citizen. As Gertrude Schroeder puts it, "happiness in the USSR is to be able to buy a new frying pan or a meat grinder or eyeglasses that fit or a bath towel." For Soviet leaders, issues involving the very legitimacy of "consumerism," resource allocation, and disparities in living conditions have all served to fuel political debate and struggle.

The Magnitude of the Problem

The post-Stalinist leadership inherited a consumer sector which was underdeveloped, "stratified," and enveloped in an ideological strait-jacket. The retail trade network was primitive, the service sector nearly
nearly non-existent, and consumer goods industries inefficient and technologically backward. Most consumer durables were produced as a sideline of heavy industrial enterprises. Wage policies fostered inequality in the ability to purchase goods and services. Various ideological principles tended to downgrade the importance of consumer welfare. All of these conditions stemmed from Stalinist policy patterns; in particular, the overriding priority given to heavy or producer-goods industries.

Under Stalin per capita consumption of goods and personal services had stagnated. Little improvement occurred between 1928 and 1950. For the Soviet urban worker, real wages fell and did not regain the 1928 level until sometime between 1952 and 1954. In regard to the most important components of consumption, food products, the quality of the Soviet diet declined. Per capita output of milk and meat did not recover to the 1928 level until 1955. Clothes were typically described as drab, ill-fitting, and primarily grey in color.

The nearly twenty-five years of full-scale socialist construction under Stalin actually widened the gap between the material conditions of Soviet workers relative to that of workers in a variety of Western and Eastern European countries, the United States, Canada, and Australia.

The repudiation of the egalitarian wage policies of the 1920's created the conditions for stratification to emerge in the distribution of goods and services. Beginning in 1931 Stalin denounced wage equalization as "leftist in practice," erroneous, and anti-Marxist. Wage differentiations were increased in order to foster labor stability and to create incentives for the acquisition of skills.
The sharpening of wage differentiations served to re-inforce the industrialization drive. The gap between high-and-low paid wage workers grew. Large inter-industrial wage differentiations were emphasized, with workers in heavy industry, mining, and transportation favored over workers in light industry and the services sector. The average earnings of coal miners, for example, exceeded those of workers in food and textile industries by roughly 100%. Engineering-technical personnel in some consumer goods sectors earned less than the average earnings of workers in steel and nonferrous metallurgy.

In keeping with Stalin's policy of making the countryside pay for industrialization, the earnings of collective farmers can best be described as nominal. In 1953 collective farmers earned less than one-fifth of the amount earned by the average industrial worker. Indirect payments such as pensions and accident and sick pay were not made available to collective farmers until 1965.

Despite their lower earnings, rural residents were subject to another form of discrimination: prices on food-stuffs and manufactured goods sold through village-coops (the rural retail trade network) were higher than those charged in the cities.

A familiar sight in Soviet cities was the farmers who travelled long distances to shop in the cities, their dress setting them apart sharply from urban shoppers. They carried great sacks in which they hauled many months' worth of shopping—often including food-stuffs—back to the railroad stations for the return trip.

Stalin's priorities were summarized, and carried to their ultimate extreme during the 1933 famine, when "the cities were fed while the villages quite literally starved, particularly in the Ukraine."
The Stalinist legacy consisted of more than just inequality and backwardness. Policy had been rigidified into dogma. Of particular consequence for the consumer sector were the following "laws of socialism": 1) the thesis that growth rates for heavy industry were to greatly exceed those for light industry; 2) the thesis that the growth of mass demand (purchasing power) must exceed the growth of production; and 3) the thesis that any serious attempt to narrow income differentials was contrary to the "true" meaning of Marxism. The net effect of these ideological principles was to promote attitudes which involved the dismissal of consumer welfare as a topic worthy of serious consideration.

Policy Intent

From an examination of statements of policy intent, much can be learned about how Soviet leaders perceive consumer problems. Several significant issues can be identified: How important—what priority—should be attached to meeting consumer demand? How are consumer problems defined? What elements of consumption are regarded as most in need of improvements? Should consumer goods be distributed in a relatively egalitarian fashion? Is widespread private ownership of consumer durables desirable in a socialist society? While competing viewpoints exist within the Communist Party, predominant modes of thought can be identified.

Khrushchev sought to legitimate the goal of satisfying consumer demand through the repudiation of J.V. Stalin's "clearly erroneous assertion" that "mass demand . . . exceeds the growth of production at all times." New views were set forth.
A socialist economy is planned economy... we can and must take public demand into account at every step... He (Lenin) repeatedly emphasized the need to ensure rates of development of production that would permit the creation of an abundance of goods for the people. We must be guided by this Leninist directive. Our party fights for the full satisfaction of the people's material spiritual requirements.\textsuperscript{13}

Thus, an end was put to the idea that a shortage of consumer goods was a virtue; and the groundwork for the upgrading of consumer welfare was laid.

Khrushchev predicted that "Within the next decade all Soviet people will be able to acquire a sufficiency of consumer goods, and in the following decade the demand for them will be met in full."\textsuperscript{14} Typically, Khrushchev's plans were ambitious, calling, for example, for an increase in per capita consumption of meat products of 150% within a ten year period. Consumption goals were generally placed within the context of economic competition with the West: "We have undertaken the task of surpassing the most advanced capitalist countries in living standards."\textsuperscript{15}

Brezhnev, like his predecessor, has embraced the goal of satisfying consumer demand. He has made it clear that "The production of consumer goods must grow at higher rates than the cash income of Soviet people."\textsuperscript{16} He has called for "serious work" in order "to ensure the fuller satisfaction of the population's demand for consumer goods."\textsuperscript{17}

Brezhnev has, however, avoided two characteristics of Khrushchevian statements of policy intent: extravagant promises and competitive imagery about out-stripping American living standards.

In the post-Stalin era, personal consumption has consistently been categorized into three major components. Indeed, in what appears to
indicate a descending order of priorities, Soviet leaders have typically discussed foodstuffs, then manufactured goods, and then services. Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev have shown a great concern for the improvement of the Soviet diet. Khrushchev stated that nutritious and higher quality foods must account for a larger share of the diet for all sections of the population. The consumption of bread and potatoes was expected to decline, while per capita consumption of meat and meat products, milk and milk products, vegetables, eggs, fish, and fruit was to increase.

Under Brezhnev meat consumption has been widely regarded as the basic plank in the Soviet Union's consumer program. Brezhnev has placed great emphasis on the rapid growth of animal husbandry, so that supplies of valuable foodstuffs to the population will not be interrupted. In his report to the 24th Party Congress, Brezhnev noted how the structure of consumption had improved. Figures were cited which showed that per capita consumption of meat, milk and dairy products, eggs, and fish had increased, while the consumption of potatoes and grain products had declined.

A second important component of consumption involves manufactured goods. Khrushchev typically spoke of the need to increase both the quantity and the quality of such goods as clothing, footwear, furniture, and articles of cultural and everyday use. He was critical of the performance of light industry, noting the absence of certain commodities from store shelves and the frequent shoddiness of merchandise.

Brezhnev's discussion of manufactured goods for consumers are similar, except that he appears somewhat more likely to mention such consumer durables as refrigerators, washing machines, televisions, and
passenger cars. Brezhnev recognizes that "the production of many
types of these (consumer) goods still lags behind today's requirements." And he is blunt concerning problems of assortment, quality, and distribution: "it is not always possible to obtain attractive clothing for
children or the dress, suit or coat one wants"; "the working people
have serious and justified complaints about the work of light industry
and other branches that produce consumer goods."

Soviet leaders have also spoken of the desirability of improving
personal services. Khrushchev wanted the numbers of barber shops,
laundries, restaurants, repair shops, and bakeries greatly expanded,
so that people could rely on public services "instead of doing household
work themselves."

Brezhnev is agreed that there is a need to expand the service
sector.

People's requirements for everyday services are growing
steadily. For the purpose of their fuller satisfaction,
the new five-year plan provides for at least doubling
the volume of paid services to the population.

Brezhnev has also made it clear that the quality of work in public
catering, tailoring, and repair work leaves a great deal to be desired.

All of these goals are placed within a context of growing equality.
According to Khrushchev, the Soviet state will see to it that "all
sections of the population enjoy a good diet of high quality"; and that
"all Soviet people will be able to acquire a sufficiency of consumer
goods." In speaking of everyday services, Brezhnev has noted that
the "improvement of rural communities has not had proper attention in
our country for many years." Indeed, Brezhnev has characterized
overall economic planning as having the objective of "bringing the living standards of the rural and urban populations into . . . closer approximation." 30

Despite all the aforementioned similarities the Khrushchev and Brezhnev-Kosygin regimes are not mirror images of one another. In contrast to Brezhnev, Khrushchev placed important qualifications on the concept of material abundance. Although he had set the goal of achieving a higher living standard than that of any capitalist country, Khrushchev specified that he had in mind "the spheres . . . in which our country really must overtake and outdistance the capitalist countries." 31

Khrushchev's reservations can best be understood by citing a passage from his Central Committee Report to the 22nd Party Congress.

The concept of abundance as the limitless growth of personal property is not ours; it is a concept alien to communism. The worker's personal ownership of a number of objects, as a form of personal consumption, does not conflict with communist construction as long as it remains within sensible limits and does not become an end in itself. But under certain conditions exaggeration of the importance of personal property can . . . turn into a brake on social progress, into fertile soil for the growth of private-property mores; it can lead to petit-bourgeois degeneration. It happens that things gain the upper hand over a person and he becomes a slave to them.

Communists reject the morality of bourgeois society, where the concept of 'mine' is the sovereign principle . . . where the corrupting psychology of egoism, money-grubbing, lust for wealth is fostered. Against the world of private ownership the Communists set the world of public ownership, and against bourgeois individualism they set the principle of comradeship and collectivism. 32

As the 1961 Party Program puts it, "the requirements of people will express the healthy, reasonable requirements of persons of rounded development." 33
In recent years there has not been so much rhetoric concerning the corrupting influence of consumer goods. Instead, a more positive light is placed on the possession of consumer durables. There is a tendency to make an ideological distinction between private property in a capitalist society and personal property in a socialist society. Hence, "consumerism" has been accorded greater legitimacy.

These differences in emphasis are manifest in important policy differences between the two regimes. Under Khrushchev there was a preference for expanding the rate of growth of the social wage more rapidly than labor payments. This perspective is incorporated into the 1961 Party Program, in which the further development of the social wage—and the ultimate reliance on this aspect of income—is viewed as consistent with "communist construction." In contrast, Brezhnev has declared that increases in wage earnings will represent the primary means of raising living standards.

What difference do these preferences for personal consumption versus public consumption make? For the consumer, a great deal of difference. Khrushchev's position implied the development of a peculiarly Soviet pattern of consumption. In regard to consumer durables, it was considered correct, for both ideological and economic reasons, "to provide public service facilities (such as taxi 'pools') for transportation, rental centers for home appliances, and communal services for laundry rather than attempt to supply each family with its own automobile, washing machine, and vacuum cleaners."

The present regime has apparently abandoned Khrushchev's vision of a society whose predominant style of consumption would involve the utilization of public services. Perhaps the most striking reversal of the spirit
of the Khrushchev era—and of the 1961 Party Program—has been the decision to rapidly expand the production and sale to the public of passenger cars. Indeed, other opportunities for conspicuous consumption have been made available: the importation of consumer goods has rapidly grown; high cost restaurants and hotels exist; Khrushchev's campaigns against dachas (country homes) have been dropped.

Brezhnev and Kosygin's intentions are more in line with mass aspirations, but they may also be less egalitarian. It is noteworthy, for example, that polls have shown that the number one consumer item desired by the Soviet public is private ownership of an automobile. On the other hand, the public services route would presumably facilitate greater access across occupational groups to high-cost luxury items.

From this discussion several criteria for the assessment of performance can be derived. The Soviet diet has clearly been a matter of high priority; shifts should occur toward the consumption of high quality foods (in particular, meat products). The output and consumption of clothing and shoes should have increased. More Soviet families should possess such consumer durables as television sets and washing machines. Overall, the distribution of goods and services should reflect one of the targets of socio-economic planning—equality.

Measures

In this study retail trade turnover per capita within each oblast represents the primary indicator of consumption. The growth of turnover of retail trade is cited in the speeches of Soviet leaders, utilized in five-year plans, and incorporated into the analyses of Western social scientists. It is an important indicator of well-being.
As with all measures, advantages and disadvantages accrue to the use of retail trade turnover. The chief advantage lies in the relative inclusiveness of the measure and the level at which it is aggregated. Retail trade turnover includes the ruble value of all goods purchased in the state and cooperative retail trade network. Hence, the bulk of consumer spending for food and manufactured goods is accounted for. Moreover, the oblast is the ideal level at which to examine retail trade turnover. Data broken down among smaller units, or along urban-rural lines, is likely to hide much rural consumption. This is because rural residents often buy commodities in town stores. A comparison of retail trade across regions is not likely to be distorted by such travel. 39

The comparability of the retail trade data across regions and years is fairly good. Sharp price rises have, with the exception of 1962, been exceptional. Overall, inflation has been quite moderate. Thus, the growth of retail trade turnover reflects, for the most part, genuine improvements in consumption. Moreover, as part of a program to increase agricultural production, the prices of foodstuffs and manufactured goods in rural areas were reduced and brought into line with urban prices. This occurred in 1966, and eliminated one of the major sources of price differentiations.

On the negative side, retail trade turnover tells us nothing about the underlying structure of consumption. What is purchased and by whom? What does the average Soviet citizen spend the bulk of his or her funds on? Are the goods and services of high quality? How are specific items—
for example, vacuum cleaners or television sets—distributed across occupational groups?

These questions will be discussed within the context of this study. It should be pointed out, however, that available data are much too sketchy to authoritatively explore any of these issues. At this point some insight into the underlying structure of consumption can be gained through an examination of family expenditure patterns.

As Table 4-2 illustrates, a large proportion of household expenditures goes for food purchases. The percentage share of food and drink in total retail trade turnover (rather than total household expenditures) was nearly 60% in 1964. The second largest category of family expenditure involves clothing and footwear. These patterns have caused Western analysts (and Soviet leaders) to emphasize the dependence of Soviet consumption on developments within the agricultural sector.

The appreciable narrowing of the gap between worker and peasant incomes may have brought rural and urban expenditure patterns closer together. With rises in peasant income, the percentage of expenditures for food products should decline. On the other hand, certain aspects of Soviet life make a duplication—and comparability—of urban/rural consumption patterns unlikely. The private plot serves both as a supplier of foodstuffs and as a category of expenditures (capital investment) for the peasant household. Moreover, collective farmers are largely responsible for housing themselves, and thus incur substantial costs for building materials and repairs.

Policy Actions

The strategies chosen to move Soviet society toward consumption goals can be summarized under four major headings: 1) the growth rate
controversy; 2) agricultural policies; 3) efforts to stimulate local Party and State commitment; and 4) wage policies. The first three categories subsume policy actions designed to increase the production or availability of consumer goods. The fourth category—wages—has a tremendous impact on the way in which opportunities to purchase goods and services are distributed in the population. While these categories are not exhaustive, they all do bear heavily on questions related to consumer welfare.

Growth rate ratios between heavy and light industry are excellent summary indicators of how well consumption fares in overall economic planning. The growth rate controversy involves the ratio of planned expansion of Group A and Groups B industrial sectors. Group A includes what has variously been called heavy industry or producer-goods industries; Group B, industries that produce articles for consumption. A basic tenet of the Stalinist economic model is the priority of Group A industry over Group B.

The priority of heavy industry over all other interests is evident in the average annual growth rates for Group A and Group B industrial sectors from 1929 to 1940: the rate of growth for heavy industry was almost 70% higher than the rate of growth for light industry. With the death of Stalin in 1953, proponents of a re-allocation of resources argued for bringing the growth rates of the two types of industry closer together.

One such proponent of change was Khrushchev. For the period from 1961 to 1980, Khrushchev proposed a differential of about 20% with capital-goods industries continuing to play the leading role. Actual growth rates for Group A and Group B were, respectively, 58% and 31%
for the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1961-65). Thus, a differential of 27%, rather than 20%, existed.44

The traditional system of priorities was further eroded with Khrushchev’s introduction of a distinction within Group A:

It is known that heavy industry is made up of two types of enterprises: First, there are those that produce means of production for enterprises that in their turn also produce means of production, and second, there are the enterprises that produce means of production for the enterprises of light industry and the food industry, for agriculture, for housing construction and for cultural and everyday services for the population. When our heavy industry had just been created we were obliged to direct accumulations primarily toward the development of enterprises of the first type and to limit investments in those of the second type. We are now able to increase capital investments considerably in the second type of enterprise as well, and this will raise the growth rate of the consumer goods industry.45

Thus, a new theme began to be echoed by those who desired a reallocation of resources away from heavy industry: it was time for heavy industry to make a greater contribution to the raising of living standards. Khrushchev asserted that the rate of increase from 1961 to 1980 should be 8% and 13% for, respectively, capital goods industries that supplied machinery to Group A and Group B. In other words, looms rather than rolling mills were to be given the advantage.46

From the data presented in Table 4-3 it would appear that consumer-oriented production within Group A has fared reasonably well under Brezhnev’s rule. Note particularly the planned increase of industrial output for agricultural machinery, equipment for light industry, and machinery for the automotive industry. Because actual growth rates for 1971-75 have fallen short of those planned, it is difficult to assess how well the plan figures match reality.
Regarding the Group A/Group B debate, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime reduced—and ultimately reversed—the growth ratios between the two sectors. Brezhnev announced that for the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1966-70), "provision has been made for a 49% to 52% increase in the production of the means of production and a 43% to 46% increase in the production of consumer goods."47

Actual growth rates were 52% for Group A and 49% for Group B. Consumer-oriented production actually grew faster than producer-oriented production from 1968 to 1970. The Eighth Five-Year Plan was the first (and so far only) five-year plan for which consumption goals were met. The Brezhnev-Kosygin regime appeared to be moving steadily toward what Kosygin has described as a situation in which "never before have such vast monetary and material resources been allocated for the development of agriculture and branches connected with the manufacture of goods for the population."48

This ballyhoo had some merit: the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-75) finally broke with ideological orthodoxy. Brezhnev announced that it was now possible "to shift to a certain preponderance in the growth rates of Group B, which will enable us to ensure the planned upswing in the well-being of the working people."49 Capital-goods production was to increase by 41-45%, while the production of consumer goods was set to increase by 44-48%.50

Through 1972 consumer production did outstrip capital-goods production. After 1972 the original goals of the full five-year plan were trimmed back. As of December 1973 growth in the consumer sector was estimated to be at least 20% short of plan objectives.51 Recently published data comparing the first nine months of 1974 with the first
nine months of 1975 show that many aspects of consumer production continue to lag behind even the reduced goals. The plan has been underfulfilled for technological equipment and spare parts for light industry and the food, meat, dairy and fishing industries, certain types of fabrics, knitted outerwear, leather footwear, butter, china, earthenware, dishes, and refrigerators.

Preliminary information on the Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976-80) indicates that planned economic growth for 1976 has been set at the lowest rate in the post World War II period. And, significantly, the new Five-Year Plan restores priority to heavy industry: Group A is slated to grow by 38 to 42%; Group B, by 30 to 32%. Thus, the steady erosion of forces for heavy industry has, at least temporarily, been stemmed. The slow-down in economic growth, coupled with the Soviet leadership's response to the current economic troubles, does not bode well for the immediate future of the Soviet consumer.

A good deal of the blame for the shortcomings of the Ninth Five-Year Plan has been assigned to agriculture. A crisis-free, productive agricultural sector is a necessary condition for sustained improvements in consumption. As was already discussed, Soviet consumption is highly dependent upon agriculture. This is not only true for foodstuffs, but also for soft goods. The production of artificial fibers is limited. While it is not within the scope of this study to give a detailed accounting of agricultural policies, the status of the agricultural sector is clearly germane to consumer welfare.

Efforts to increase agricultural production have been serious and multi-faceted. This is particularly true of the Brezhnev-Kosygin
restrictions placed on private plots by Khrushchev were abolished shortly after his ouster. Economic pragmatism apparently out-weighted ideological considerations. Agricultural programs have included a wide variety of approaches, from land reclamation to more farm machinery to raising the living standards of collective farmers. Agricultural investment has grown rapidly under the present regime: investment doubled in the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1966-70) over the previous plan period. Substantial additional infusions of funds have marked the Ninth Five-Year Plan and are scheduled for the Tenth Five-Year Plan. This allocation of resources has lead Alec Nove to conclude that by 1970 the traditional pattern of subsidies—of agriculture paying for industrialization—had been reversed.  

Brezhnev's view of agricultural developments is not overly sanguine. As he stated in 1971,  

Comrades, the problems of agriculture are such that they cannot be fully solved in one or two years, or even in five years; this will require a much longer time, enormous appropriations and great efforts, not only by the toilers in agriculture but also by all our industry.  

The reduced investment plan adopted after 1972 and the new five-year plan for 1976 to 1980 give great weight to agriculture. It is noteworthy, in view of Soviet history and the current economic setbacks, that for once it is not agriculture that is being sacrificed for some other sector of the economy.  

Despite these efforts, Soviet agricultural production continues to lag behind domestic requirements. Soviet leaders have consistently defined the key agricultural problem in terms of the need to increase grain production. The program to provide more meat to the Soviet
consumer has sharply pulled up the demand for grain. The Ninth Five-Year Plan in particular has been a disaster for agriculture. Instead of the traditional reaction of belt-tightening, however, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has sought to cushion the impact of agricultural shortcomings on the consumer sector by importing massive quantities of grain from abroad.

Western analysts are generally agreed that the Soviet decision to import grain was primarily designed to prevent the abandonment of the regime's livestock goals. Until 1975 this strategy worked: livestock inventories increased while domestic food requirements (and commitments to client states) were met. The 1975 grain harvest is so poor, however, that it is unlikely that it can be offset by the purchase of even 20 to 25 million metric tons of grain. The program to provide the Soviet consumer with more meat and meat products may be in danger: according to recent reports, livestock herds were being slaughtered for lack of fodder.

The continuing agricultural crisis undermines and limits the regime's efforts in the consumer sector. Soviet leaders have found it exceedingly difficult to take agricultural production out of the hands of "King Weather" and into the hands of "socialist planning." It is not clear that they have been any more successful in another area: convincing local Party and State officials that consumer welfare is not a "trifle."

Local decision-makers have always had an unusual amount of responsibility for the production and distribution of consumer goods. Most light industries involved in the production of consumer goods for local
consumption are subordinate to the regional Soviet. Food, in particular, has been largely a matter of local concern, with local governments organizing supplies, contracts, and distribution points. Providing furniture for the public has been almost totally a local responsibility. All restaurants and some retail stores and services are under the direct supervision of local government. Although heavy industrial enterprises are typically subordinate to All-Union Ministries, local decision-makers play a key role in seeing to it that these enterprises produce (as a side-line) a wide variety of consumer durables for local consumption. For these reasons the attitudes of local officials toward consumer welfare are significant.

The efficacy of local party activism is a common theme in the Soviet press. An article in Izvestia, for example, discussed the "good works" that had followed from a provincial party committee plenum in Yaroslav. The plenum dealt with a variety of aspects of consumer welfare. A number of decisions were adopted, ranging from the formation of mobile brigades to take clothing orders in rural districts to practical assistance to service personnel (providing apartments and nurseries for their children). The results of the plenum were discussed at lower party meetings. The Izvestia article claimed that attitudes toward problems of everyday services had changed noticeably.

Local Party activism is an essential ingredient in campaigns to increase the production of consumer durables. Soviet society has been and continues to be plagued by a shortage of ordinary household items—pots, pans, dishes, and so on. Central decision-makers appear convinced that these shortages can be resolved through the utilization of "hidden
reserves" in producer-goods industries. Demands—in the form of decrees from the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers—have been issued to enlist all heavy industrial enterprises in the drive to increase the production of what the Soviet press calls a "thousand trifles."

The success of these campaigns hinges upon the willingness of local party organizations to bring continual pressure and supervision to bear on producer-goods industries.

From the speeches of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, we can infer that party officials, both in the center and in the localities, vary in their willingness to accord consumer welfare the same status they are willing to give to the regime's industrial goals. Khrushchev, for example, apparently felt it necessary to attack the idea that communism could be equated with asceticism or a "table with empty plates, where sit people of 'high consciousness'." 60

The following excerpt from Brezhnev's address to the 24th Party Congress is telling in its emphasis on how "subjective factors" can bar progress in the consumer sector.

... as in any undertaking, success here (in substantially expanding the production and quality of consumer goods) is determined not only by objective conditions—subjective factors are also enormously important. In this connection, the Central Committee deems it important to call the attention of the planning and economic agencies and the Party, Soviet and trade union organizations to the necessity of a substantial change in the very approach to the production of consumer goods.

Comrades, we have behind us long years of heroic history, when millions of Communists and non-party members consciously accepted sacrifices and privations, were prepared to rest content with the bare necessities and denied themselves the right to demand any special comforts of life. This could not but have an effect on their attitude toward the production of consumer goods, toward their quality and assortment. But that which was explicable and natural in the past—when other tasks
and other undertakings stood in the foreground—is unacceptable in today's conditions . . .

There are still officials, and not only in local areas but in the center as well, who contrive to 'peacefully coexist' with shortcomings, who have somehow gotten used to low quality in a number of consumer goods and are developing their production at an impermissibly slow rate. Some of them reduce or stop altogether the production of needed items or . . . take out of production inexpensive output that is a daily necessity for the population. That is how shortages arise of certain goods that are customarily called 'trifles'. But there can be no trifles when it comes to items in daily demand.

According to Brezhnev, these officials do not understand "the essence of the Party's policy, which is aimed at a steady rise in the well-being of the working people." 

In which oblasti do local party organizations place a high priority on the flow of goods and services to the public? Over time, are regional Party organizations paying more attention to consumer problems? Do differentiations in the performance of regional party organizations translate into regional diversity in retail trade turnover? Unfortunately, data limitations do not permit the systematic exploration of these issues.

It is quite possible that Party activism is inversely related to conditions in the oblast. It is a common complaint that the work of local Party organs is dictated by crises. In other words, leading Party officials direct their attention not only to areas which reflect the values of central decision-makers, but also to areas which pose severe problems within the oblast.

Philip Stewart's study of the "perceptual world" of obkom first secretaries provides some interesting evidence on this point. In Stewart's work issue orientations were coded for 39 regional secretaries, based upon their published writings. Twelve of the 39 secretaries had made "critical" or "demanding" statements involving "consumer welfare."
These 12 individuals served as the top party official in 13 regions. Of these 13 regions, 10 fall under the median point for housing space per capita (in the oblast administrative center) and/or retail trade per capita. One of the 3 regions which scores above the median point for both measures in Rostov, where the worse of the 1962 disturbances—over living conditions—took place. While the data base is skimpy, the pattern does suggest that local leaders respond to local conditions, and that their concern reflects a need to alleviate sub-par conditions.

While the impact of regional party organizations remains somewhat of a mystery, there is no doubt that wages figure mightily in determining who will be able to buy available commodities. Equalizing per capita income—through wage and transfer payments—is a necessary condition for an egalitarian distribution of goods and services. A policy of reducing income differentials was initiated at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. Since that time dramatic changes have occurred in the distribution of income.

Among workers wage differentiations between skilled and unskilled occupations were narrowed: between 1956 and 1965 the most extreme differentiations within pay scales were reduced from 1:4.1 to 1:2.6. Generous rises in minimum wage differentials have in particular served to reduce inter-industrial wage differentials and foster wage "compression":

In 1968, average money earnings for industrial workers were reported to be approximately 156% of their 1955 level. For minimum wages, the corresponding figure is in the range of 225-286 percent.

Change has also occurred in the relationship of workers' earnings compared to those of engineering-technical personnel. In 1960 "the
ratio of engineering-technical earnings to workers' earnings stood at 1.83 in nonferrous metallurgy and 1.98 in the cement industry as compared to 2.06 and 1.76 respectively before the wage adjustments made in the late 1950's. Comparisons between the average earnings of engineering-technical personnel and workers over a longer time span is particularly revealing: the relative wage advantage of engineering-technical personnel had fallen from 163% in 1932 to 50% in 1960. As a general rule, the higher up the earnings scale, the smaller the pay increase has been.

The most dramatic improvement has taken place in peasant incomes. The gap between urban and rural incomes has been closing: collective-farm income in 1950 was roughly 25% that of the average worker, by 1975, roughly 60%. (See Table 4-1) It has been the continuing intent of the post-Stalinist leadership to raise collective-farm pay more rapidly than that of industrial workers. Exceptional progress was achieved during the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1966-70), when the average wage of collective farmers increased by 42% compared with 26% for workers and employees.

The figures in Table 4-1 exclude collective-farm earnings from private plots. Peasants tend to produce high-quality, high-cost items on the private sector. Prices on the collective-farm market have been rising in recent years, and it is believed that peasant incomes from the private sector have been--as in the socialized sector--increasing. If private plot earnings are included in average kolkhoz earnings, peasant incomes trailed the average urban workers' wage by only 15% in 1970.
The implementation of a number of welfare measures has aided the underprivileged. The most extensive of these programs was carried out from 1965-1967. Minimum pensions were boosted by at least a third, and over 24 million collective farmers and their families were brought under a social insurance system similar to the one that existed for wage and salary personnel. The impact of Soviet transfer payments has been to distribute per capita income more equitably than the distribution of earnings throughout the labor force.

At least two important points need to be made about Soviet income policy. First, income distribution has become more egalitarian through a "levelling-up" process. There has been no challenge to the perquisites of the privileged. No reduction has occurred in the income of the best-paid strata. Income differentials remain, and they are substantial. (See Tables 4-4 and 4-5) The compression of earnings and per capita income has not been accompanied by any onslaught against amply rewarded Party and State officials, managers, scientists, and other "elite" personnel.

Secondly, the reduction of pay differentials has not been rationalized in terms of "elementary class justice." The promotion of equality per se has not generally been invoked as a raison d'etre for innovations in Soviet income policies. Instead, objective economic reasons are more likely to be given: the scarcity of unskilled labor; the rise in the educational level of new entrants into the labor force; the need to raise "material incentives" for collective farmers. As Murray Yanowitch puts it, there has been a "non-equalitarian reduction of income inequality."
In order to pursue the goal of more fully satisfying consumer demand, the Khrushchev and Brezhnev-Kosygin regimes have upgraded the consumer and agricultural sectors in overall economic planning, sought to encourage greater concern for consumer welfare on the part of party and state officials, and raised and equalized incomes. The impact on consumption, as will be discussed below, has been substantial.

Policy Results

Retail trade per capita has grown much more rapidly under Brezhnev's rule than during the Khrushchev era. (See Figure 4-1 and Table 4-6) From 1959 to 1964, per capita retail turnover rose in the RSFSR provinces by 79 rubles; from 1964 to 1970, by 227 rubles. The small increases in the early 1960's coupled with the sharp price hikes in 1962, paint a picture of stagnation for the latter years of Khrushchev's regime. In contrast, the data provide strong support for the widely held view that the present regime has chosen to emphasize the flow of goods and services to the population.

A greater understanding of changes in consumer welfare can be gained by looking at the various component parts of consumption: foodstuffs, manufactured goods, and services. The quality of the Soviet diet has improved. Since 1950 per capita consumption of meat and fish products has nearly doubled. (See Table 4-7) The consumption of grain products and potatoes has declined. Nonetheless, Khrushchev's goal of overtaking the most advanced capitalist countries remains distant. In the early 1970's, Soviet per capita consumption of meat was half the level in West Germany and about 40% that of the United States. Indeed, Soviet consumption lags well behind those of her socialist neighbors; per capita meat consumption is only about 60% of that in Czechoslovakia.
In a similar fashion, progress achieved for manufactured goods is impressive, yet leaves the USSR behind standards reached in other industrial nations. Concerning soft goods, "the variety, color and assortment of fabrics underwent something of a revolution." In 1950 2.6 pairs of hosiery and 1.1 pairs of shoes were produced per capita; by 1968 these figures had reached 6.2 and 2.5. The Soviet consumer is now much more able--and willing--to buy ready-made clothing. "Fabrics that were turned into clothing at home accounted for 42 percent of retail sales of soft goods in 1950, and only 12 percent of retail sales in 1971." Per capita consumption of soft goods grew by an average of 5.8% from 1964 to 1972. Overall, David Bronson and Barbara Severin have concluded that, at present levels of quality and assortment, much of the demand for soft goods has been met.

Truly striking improvements have taken place in the consumption of consumer durables. This is especially true for televisions, refrigerators, and washing machines. In 1960 only about one household in ten owned a television set; by 1971, three out of five families. Comparable figures for washing machines are one out of twenty and three out of five; for refrigerators, one out of 25-30 and more than one in three. Except for certain models of refrigerators and (especially) cars, waiting lists are no longer needed for consumer durables.

Many items, however, are not manufactured or sold in the USSR. These include automatic washers, dryers, and freezers. Moreover, it will be many years before the pent-up demand for passenger cars can be met. As of 1967 the USSR's 5 cars per 1,000 persons compared with 419 in the U.S., 189 in the U.K., 184 in West Germany, 139 in Italy, 35 in Czechoslovakia, 48 in East Germany, 14 in Poland, and 11 in Hungary.
The rapid expansion of production from 60,000 per year in the 1960's to 377,000 in 1972 has resulted in a reduction of the waiting period to 2-3 years—an improvement over the previous 6 year wait.

The personal services sector—barber and beauty shops, repair services, laundries, and dry cleaners—remains totally inadequate.

In 1960 there were only 12.6 such units per 10,000 urban residents; after a decade of considerable attention to developing this sector, the availability had risen to a mere 17.2 per 10,000 urban population.83

Plans for the service sector may well have gone the route of retail service construction in Leningrad: in 1962 only 3 of 19 planned new retail store outlets were completed.84

Overall, consumer inconvenience was, and still is, rampant.

"During 1950-69 a five-fold increase in the volume of retail trade was accompanied by a 2 1/2 fold rise in the number of workers and a 50 percent rise in the number of retail outlets."85 Compared with other countries, the retail trade network is grossly underdeveloped.

In 1971 the USSR had 128 square meters of retail floor space per 1,000 residents. This figure compared with 130 square meters in Bulgaria (1969 data), 139 in Hungary, 151 in Poland, 210 in Czechoslovakia and 290 in East Germany. The US with a population about a fifth smaller than the USSR, has roughly three times as many retail trade establishments and half again as many employees in the sector.86

Because of this inadequate record in developing a distribution system, as much as 2 hours per day is spent shopping for necessities, 70% of shopping time is spent in lines, and 60% of food products bought in state stores must be weighed and wrapped. As Marshall Goldman notes, Soviet marketing has seldom been considered important.87
The improvements in Soviet consumption have led to two unanticipated and seemingly contradictory consequences: 1) personal savings have been growing more rapidly than retail sales; and 2) inventories of unsold goods have been piling up. These developments stem from what Gertrude Schroeder calls "embryonic consumer affluence." 

Before the 1960's, any consumer item produced could find a buyer. Now that minimum needs have been met, Soviet consumers have become choosy. People have saved money not only in order to purchase consumer durables and cooperative apartments, but because they could not find anything to buy. Shoddy goods no longer sell. Inventories of soft goods grew more rapidly than sales in the early sixties and again in the early seventies. For the first time, backlogs of consumer durables, including poorly-made washing machines, have piled up.

Conditions of embryonic affluence raise new and crucial problems for the Soviet state. The Soviet economy is more sensitive to planner preferences than consumer preferences, and relies more on quantitative than qualitative measures of success. Strategies to further improve consumer welfare are likely to be increasingly dependent upon economic reforms geared toward "sensitizing" the Soviet economy to consumer demand.

Equality and the Distribution of Consumer Goods

In literature on Soviet consumption there is a strong expectation that living conditions have become more equal. Bronson and Severin, for example, argue that the wage reforms carried out in the post-Stalinist era must surely mean that low income groups now live much better relative to those earning high incomes. Gertrude Schroeder asserts that peasants are now better off relative to urban wage earners than they were in 1913, and that nearly all this improvement must have occurred since 1950.
Data on retail trade turnover per capita does not, however, bear out these expectations. As Table 4-10 and Figure 4-2 show, per capita consumption has risen dramatically for urban, mixed, and rural regions; but the gap between "rich" and "poor" regions does not show any sign of narrowing. Although there are wiggles within the 11 year period from 1959 to 1970, the overall picture is one of stability: per capita retail trade increased by roughly 300 rubles in all 3 groups of oblasti.

From 1960 to 1970, collective-farm income, as a percent of the average industrial workers' wage, rose from 31% to 56%. There are at least two factors which may account for the failure of this greater income equality to translate into more equal consumption. These factors involve: 1) a distribution system that still favors urban areas; and 2) the almost complete absence of consumer credit.

The rural distribution system is underdeveloped both in terms of numbers of stores and the goods available. An Izvestia article on rural trade in Bryansk province—in 1975—describes conditions that were probably worse in the past and that remain widespread today. In Bryansk cash income per capita has been growing faster in rural areas than in the cities, yet goods turnover in the urban areas was increasing more rapidly than in the countryside. The fundamental explanation for this phenomenon was that rural residents simply did not enjoy an equal opportunity to consume.

Many of the village stores in Bryansk remain "mixed"; that is, they contain small sections of groceries, manufactured goods, household goods, a cafe, and a bookstore. An inspection of one such store found a complete absence of work shirts, although the store had 20 black
(unsaleable) suits available. Within the cooperative (rural) retail network as a whole, knitted and sewn garments, footwear, teapots, mugs, basins and cans were in short supply. As a solution to these problems, Soviet press articles periodically advocate that retail service personnel go from village to village, taking orders for clothing, furniture, and so on.

It appears that double standards still operate for the urban/rural sectors. In the mid-1960s, stocks of soft goods that went unsold in the cities were reduced by cumping the goods in the rural trade network. Rural residents were not only less picky than their urban counterparts, but apparently came last in the scheme of things.

For the scarcest good of all—cars—the RSFSR has established explicit guidelines which discriminate against rural residents. Priority for the purchase of cars is not based solely on how far down your name is on a waiting list: a disproportionately large share of car production has been directed toward the urban sector, with various occupational groups (manager, technicians) possessing highest priority. The Soviet press has been critical of the attempts of rural residents to circumvent this discrimination by putting their names on lists in cities, instead of local regional lists.

The general lack of consumer credit also probably discourages rural consumption. In accordance with the income differentiation, per capita savings of the rural population in 1966 was only half that of the urban population. Since Soviet consumers usually must pay the full price for consumer durables, differentiation in the ability to purchase probably exceeds differentiation in incomes by a considerable margin.
Substantial differences in the diets of urban and rural populations is evident in Tables 4-11 and 4-12. Note the very large gap in the consumption of quality foods by collective farmers and urban workers. From 1960 to 1971 the urban/rural gap in meat consumption actually widened slightly. The gap is also considerable for vegetables and fruits. Rural consumption of fish and fish products is, however, now much closer to urban standards; and the consumption of eggs is greater in rural areas.

Variations in the level of consumption within the urban sector are illustrated in Table 4-12. This table shows the distribution of a number of commodities across occupational groups in a highly atypical Soviet community—the "science town" of Akademgorodok. The differences for vacuum cleaners, musical instruments, cars or motorboats, and refrigerators are substantial. Because of the special nature of Akademgorodok, it is likely that the exact figures are not representative of the RSFSR or the country as a whole. Nonetheless, the study does demonstrate social stratification in the consumption of consumer goods.

Clearly, inequalities in the distribution of goods exist. Based on the above evidence, regional divergences should be based upon urbanization and the relative size of various social groups in the oblast population. Data that would permit the characterization of oblasti on the basis of the social make-up of the population are not, however, available.

The Models and Retail Trade Turnover

Which model of the welfare policy process applies to retail trade? No one model fits the data. Retail trade per capita appears to be a
function of aspects of both the "level-of-development" and the "political clout" model. The key variables are urbanization and the strength of the local Party organization. Although urbanization is highly correlated with the size of the party organization in the early 1960's, this correlation declines to .37 by 1967. Hence, Table 4-13 shows that urbanization and the Party have an independent and substantial effect on the level of per capita retail trade.

Because the production of many household items for local consumption takes place within heavy industrial enterprises, it is somewhat surprising that the industrial measure explains so little variance (less than 10%). (See Table 4-14) Again, it is the Party that counts, explaining from 30-60% of the variance. Before concluding that Party activism is an all important factor in creating conditions of high consumption, a word of caution is due.

The strength of the local Party organization is a political variable: The Party represents a tool to be used for mobilization, for the implementation of policy. Moreover, local responsibilities are probably greater for the flow of goods and services than for other aspects of "well-being," like health care, education, and housing. Unfortunately, however, there is some ambiguity involved. It may be equally plausible, in the case of consumer goods, to view the Party as a measure of socio-economic development. The Party contains disproportionate numbers of the very people who are likely to score high on consumption: managers, specialists, and graduates of institutions of higher education. In other words, where the Party is strong, it may well be that the province's population contains relatively large proportions of "elite" groups. Thus, the strength of the local Party organization may be measuring two very different aspects of reality: political activism and/or purchasing power.
Conclusion

In contrast to the Stalinist era, tremendous progress has been made in upgrading the quality of the Soviet diet and in providing the public with soft goods and consumer durables. Retail trade has grown more rapidly under Brezhnev than Khrushchev. This is presumably due to the greater efforts of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, particularly in the areas of resource allocation, wage and social security reforms, and a greater willingness to import soft goods and grain.

Regional inequalities in per capita retail trade exist, and have persisted through the time period from 1959 to 1970. A significant amount of variance in retail trade is explained by urbanization and the strength of the local Party organization. Underlying this pattern is a distribution system that still favors urban areas, and the role of the Party as either a vigorous promoter of consumer welfare or as an indicator of the disproportionate presence of high-income, high-consumption groups in the population.

The improvements in consumer well-being have fueled public expectations. These rising expectations have been summarized in the following description of the Soviet consumer: "Yesterday he bought a television set, and today he dreams of a car..." It appears that the Party cannot substantially suppress or transform consumer demand. The rhetoric of the early 1960's, with its emphasis on achieving a "rational" or "scientific" level of consumption, is no longer so evident. These strategies rested upon the assumption that the Party, through upbringing work (socialization, propaganda), could shape public aspirations into a mold defined by the Party elite. Instead, it would appear that the direction of influence has been reversed, with the Party responding to societal pressures.
Table 4-1. Average Monthly Wage in Kolkhozy, Sovkhozy and Industry (in rubles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kolkhozy</th>
<th>Sovkhozy</th>
<th>Industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The figures for kolkhoz workers in 1970 and 1975 are estimated; the figure for industrial workers in 1975 is estimated.
Table 4-2. Expenditure Structure of Families of Collective Farmers, Workers and Employees in Industry, Per Capita Per Annum, as % of All Expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Itemization</th>
<th>Collective farmer</th>
<th>Industrial worker</th>
<th>Industrial employee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure, or value of consumption of all products including:</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing, linen, footwear</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural and household goods, furniture</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building materials, repairs, construction</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visits to cinema, theatre, other cultural and educational needs, payment of personal services (cures, laundry, baths, hairdressers, transport, communications, etc.)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment for communal services (water, gas, electricity, heating)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product Category</th>
<th>Greenslade-Robertson Estimates (1966-70)</th>
<th>Published Plan (1971-75)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Machine building &amp; metalworking</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producer durables</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum equipment</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generators</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical equipment</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turbines</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformers</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forge press machines</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal-cutting machine tools</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicles</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric motors</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural machinery</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment for light industry</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer durables</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-4.
Extremes in Soviet Salary Rates in the Steel Industry, 1959 as compared to 1965
(in rubles per month)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director of scientific research institute</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of steel plant</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elevator operator, janitor, watchman</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typist, secretary</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-5. Average Monthly Wages in the Soviet Economy, 1967
(Non-kolkhoz Sector, in Rubles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector of the economy</th>
<th>Average Wage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Science and supporting enterprises</td>
<td>122.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction (building &amp; repaid personnel)</td>
<td>118.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport (all types)</td>
<td>115.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State &amp; economic apparatus, administration offices or cooperative &amp; public organizations</td>
<td>112.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry (production personnel)</td>
<td>111.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (schools, colleges &amp; cultural institutions)</td>
<td>96.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit &amp; insurance institutions</td>
<td>93.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State farms &amp; subordinate agricultural enterprises</td>
<td>84.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, catering, supplies</td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health services</td>
<td>82.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and communal services</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The economy as a whole</td>
<td>103.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mervyn Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*  

Notes: This table severely underestimates the extremes in Soviet incomes. In the mid sixties, office workers, shoemakers, nurses, cashiers, and junior shop assistants earned 45-55 rubles a month. Directors of industrial enterprises earned 200-400 rubles; top academicians in Akademgorodok, more than 1,000 rubles monthly; army colonels, 400 rubles monthly. Moreover, opportunities exist for leading technical and administrative personnel to earn much more than their regular salary. Some of these means are "official," such as generous royalties, bonuses, and prizes. Other means are confidential, and include payments for "rest cures" and special "blue envelopes" (cash payments from the Central Committee of the Communist Party for top Party and state personnel.)
Table 4-6. Retail Trade Per Capita in RSFSR Oblasti, 1959-1970, in rubles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>214-943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>230-974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>235-1008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>256-1837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>267-1757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>280-1081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>311-1119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>348-1188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>322-1276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>416-1384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>473-1503</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4-7.
(Kilograms per year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk (excluding butter)</td>
<td>116.6</td>
<td>146.5</td>
<td>182.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fats and oils (including butter)</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain Products</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4-8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>U.S.S.R.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grain Products and Potatoes</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat and Fish</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables, Fruits, Eggs, etc.</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk and Milk Products</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(excluding butter)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fats and Oils</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-9. The Personal Services Sector, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Service</th>
<th>Number of Service Enterprises per 10,000 Urban Residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoe Repair</td>
<td>1.13&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry-cleaners</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundries</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair of consumer durables</td>
<td>7.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barber shops and beauty shops</td>
<td>13.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Data for the United States is for the year 1963.

<sup>b</sup> Data for the Soviet Union is for the year 1968.

Figure 4-2. Retail Trade Per Capita in RSFSR Oblastis, Grouped According to Level of Urbanization, 1954-1970
Table 4-10. Retail Trade Per Capita in RSFSR Oblasti, 1959-70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Urban Oblasti</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Mixed Oblasti</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Rural Oblasti</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$X$</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Range</td>
<td>$X$</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Range</td>
<td>$X$</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>357-942</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>290-417</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>214-326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>381-973</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>319-449</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>230-354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>366-1007</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>325-460</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>235-370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>307-1837</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>344-478</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>256-392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>322-1757</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>351-471</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>267-404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>426-1081</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>359-520</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>280-433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>458-1119</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>385-518</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>311-491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>484-1188</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>410-547</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>348-530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>322-1276</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>444-825</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>383-587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>555-1384</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>474-643</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>416-633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>625-1502</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>550-765</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>474-748</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** For each year, the oblasti are grouped according to whether they fall into the third most urban oblasti, the third least urban (the rural group), and the third in-between (mixed oblasti).
Table 4-11. Consumption of Food Products in Worker Families of Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, Donbass, Gorky, Sverdlovsk, and Ivanovsk Oblasts

(kilograms per capita)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1922</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meat and fat</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk &amp; milk products</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>334.7</td>
<td>334.0</td>
<td>388.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs (numbers)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish &amp; Fish products</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>140.0</td>
<td>119.9</td>
<td>125.8</td>
<td>115.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables &amp; melons</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>97.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit &amp; berries</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain products</td>
<td>241.8</td>
<td>137.2</td>
<td>131.5</td>
<td>119.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consumption of Food Products in Peasant Families of Vologda, Tambov, Ryazan, Voronezh, and Orel Oblasts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1922</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meat and fat</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk &amp; milk products</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>306.4</td>
<td>314.5</td>
<td>368.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs (number)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish and fish products</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>212.9</td>
<td>215.9</td>
<td>217.2</td>
<td>199.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables &amp; melons</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits &amp; berries</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain products</td>
<td>202.4</td>
<td>181.4</td>
<td>180.3</td>
<td>177.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: This table is typical of the material released by the Central Statistical Administration. The years are chosen in order to demonstrate "upward trends" under Soviet rule. If data for the 1930's were included, they would show the impact of collectivization—a down turn from the preceding period.
Table 4-12. Level of Supply of Cultural and Personal Goods to the Population of Akademgorodok, By Basic Social Group, In Percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Group I</th>
<th>Group II</th>
<th>Group III</th>
<th>Group IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Radio receiver</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sewing machine</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Washing machine</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Refrigerator</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Television set</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Library (over 100 books)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Bicycle, motorcycle, or motor scooter</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Vacuum cleaner</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Piano, accordion</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: Group I contains top managers and specialists; Group II middle-level managers and specialists; Group III lower specialists, white-collar employees, and workers; Group IV, low-skill white-collar employees and workers. This stratification scheme, utilized by Soviet sociologist M.V. Timyashevskaya, is one example of the alternative stratification models being developed by Soviet scholars. The Central Statistical Administration typically releases data organized according to "officially" recognized social groups: workers, employees, and collective-farm members.
Table 4-13. Beta Coefficients: Retail Trade Turnover in RSFSR Oblasti, 1960-1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Urbanization</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>P/S Ties</th>
<th>Cohort Pairs</th>
<th>Ultimate Mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.11</td>
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</table>
Table 4-13, continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>Per Cent of Variance explained</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>53</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
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<td>.88</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>76</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 4-14. Beta Coefficients: Retail Trade Turnover in RSFSR Oblasti, 1960-1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weighted Industrial Performance Index</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>P/S Ties</th>
<th>Cohort Pairs</th>
<th>Ultimate Mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.10</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4-14, continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>Percent of variance explained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>42</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>39</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOOTNOTES


4. Ibid.


11. Ibid.


13. Ibid.


25. Ibid., p. 21.


30. Ibid., p. 22.


32. Khrushchev, p. 66.

34. In the USSR personal income comes from two sources: 1) wage earnings; and 2) the social wage (transfer payments and public services such as education and health care).


37. Soviet leaders have been increasingly willing to import ready-made clothing and shoes. During the 1960's imports of clothing and footwear generally amounted to about 25 million rubles per year. By 1968 imports reached nearly a billion rubles. Although most of these goods are imported from fellow communist countries, the imports of soft-goods from Western countries increased 19-fold from 1960-1972. The number of shoes imported (from all countries) from 1956 to 1968 increased 5-fold. These goods have been extremely popular in the USSR, and have greatly improved clothing availability and variety.


40. The third category—employees—contains both highly-paid specialists and low-paid service personnel. For purposes of analysis, the traditional Soviet definition of "employee" is useless.


42. As reported by Khrushchev, "Report of the Central Committee," in Saikowski, op. cit., p. 89-90.

43. It was Malenkov who pioneered this line from 1953-1955.


47. Brezhnev, p. 17.


50. Kosygin, p. 22.


58. This is not to imply that the sole problem in agriculture involves weather--far from it. But the wide fluctuations in the grain crop from year to year does have a great deal to do with weather conditions: from 222 million metric tons in 1973, for example, to 137 million metric tons in 1975.


62. Ibid.


64. The consumer welfare category includes references to housing, consumer goods, educational facilities, medical services, and worker income.

65. This analysis is for the year 1963. This year was chosen because 32 of the 39 secretaries held office during that time period.


68. Yanowitch, p. 688.

69. Ibid.


71. The measures carried out in this period had been planned under Khrushchev, but the new regime chose to speed up the implementation of the welfare package. The most far reaching reform of all went into effect in 1974: cash allowances for children to families whose per capita income is less than 50 rubles (per month). Fifty rubles per capita per family member had become the cutting line to measure poverty in the 1960's. Soviet sociologists had estimated that 32-40% of workers fell into this category. Presumably even a larger percentage of the rural population is, by Soviet standards, in dire economic straits.

72. See Matthews, op. cit., p. 77.

73. Yanowitch, p. 694.


77. Ibid.


79. Ibid., p. 382.

80. Ibid., p. 384.


82. Schroeder, p. 25.


89. The following data give some idea of the dimensions of this problem: savings bank deposits grew nearly 20% annually from 1965-1968; in 1968 the average urban worker's savings account equaled 4 months' wages and even more for the average rural worker. In 1969 almost 70% of each additional ruble of income was saved. During the early 1970's Soviet leaders have slowed down the growth of money incomes in an attempt to bring public demand and the kind and quality of goods and services into greater equilibrium. (Data are from Gertrude Schroeder, "Consumption in the USSR: A Survey," Studies on the Soviet Union, Vol. 10, No. 4, p. 29.


92. Actually, it can be argued that the gap in life styles, if not in per capita consumption, has closed. Presumably, past a certain threshold of per capita retail trade, basic needs for foodstuffs and soft goods are met, and ownership of consumer durables becomes widespread.

94. See Baxter, _op. cit._, p. 227.

95. Wagener, _op. cit._, p. 11.

96. In the study of Akademgorodok, families are grouped according to criteria of occupation and income. For the provinces, it would be useful—at a minimum—to know what percentage of the population are collective farmers, workers, and salaried employees.

Chapter V. Medical Services

... the Ministry decided ... to send him to the Drozhanesk district. Abram Leibovich made a wry face, but later kindly accepted the assignment and left to investigate. When he returned from the district, he came to the department of cadres at the Ministry and categorically declared
"It does not suit me! I am not going!"
"Then, maybe you would like to go to the Jutazink district?"
"Jutazink? All right!"
He received the assignment, plus travelling expenses, the fare, daily allowance and ... he did not go.1

-the case of Dr. Abram Leibovich Rosenmer, graduate of the Kazan Medical Institute

The Soviet medical system is held in esteem by a wide variety of sources. Western observers have been prone to describe Soviet medical services as a "great and remarkable achievement."2 In the USSR medical care is regarded as "one of socialism's greatest achievements."3 This consensual view is based upon the impressive record the Soviet state has built in the areas of health resources (facilities and personnel), and in the reduction of infectious diseases and mortality rates. Despite Soviet accomplishments, a good deal remains to be done: Health services are not uniformly available to all those who need them; specialists are in short supply; and deficiencies in modern equipment and medicines are perennial.

The Legacy

The post-Stalinist leadership inherited a well-developed medical-care system. A set of guiding principles had been firmly established;
the "material foundations"—in terms of personnel and facilities—had been built; and a system of centralized, comprehensive planning had been created. Moreover, there is evidence that the Soviet public was largely satisfied, indeed impressed, with their society's medical care programs. Responsibility for these accomplishments rests largely with Stalin.

The 1920's produced a philosophy and a set of guiding principles that remain central to Soviet socialized medicine. From a philosophical viewpoint; the idea that medical care is a basic right of Soviet citizenship received widespread acceptance. The first Commissar of Health, N.A. Semashko, expressed this view as follows: "the taking over by the state of the responsibility of providing for everyone at his earliest need a free and well qualified medical treatment . . . This is the perspective of communist medicine." 4

The below list of principles, fundamental to the organization of medical care, emerged:

1. Public health and medical care are the responsibility of the state.
2. Health services are planned and developed as an integral part of national socioeconomic plans.
3. There are no direct charges for medical treatment. Nominal charges are made for such services as drugs, eye glasses, and so on.
4. Medical and health services are available and accessible to all.
5. Health services are financed through the national state budget.
6. Great emphasis is placed on preventive rather than curative medicine. 5

In the 1920's these guidelines represented ideals; they bore little relation to reality.
In the field of medical care, the Stalinist era did not—formally, at least—lead to the repudiation of the egalitarianism and the idealism so evident in the early years of Bolshevik rule. Incorporated into the 1936 USSR Constitution was a guarantee of free medical care, a guarantee absent from the 1923 Constitution.

Citizens of the USSR have the right to maintenance in old age, as well as in case of sickness or disability. This right is ensured by extensive development of social insurance for workers and employees at state expense, by free medical care for the working people, and by provision of an extensive network of health resorts for the use of the working people.

Under Stalin medical care enjoyed a high priority, and progress was made toward the translation of ideals into practice.

It should be pointed out that this priority did not stem primarily from considerations of fundamental rights, but rather from the requirements of industrialization. A year after the industrialization drive began, a Central Committee resolution declared that industrial development was being hindered by a lack of progress in medical work. The viewpoint that medical care was crucial to economic development had several consequences: 1) "Communist medicine" came to mean that medical care serves the interests of the state; 2) a closed system of medical care for key industries was created; and 3) a tremendous effort was undertaken to develop health resources, in terms of hospitals, clinics, and manpower.

During the 1930's, the idea that medical care was a fundamental right frequently came into conflict with the instrumental view of medical care as a means of promoting production. Physicians were under intense pressure—and sometimes threatened with the accusation of "saboteur"—if they granted too many certificates of illness to
workers. Absenteeism, without such a certificate, was a criminal offense. The doctor's first priority was to see to it that production goals were met; if this meant denying sick leave to individuals, the doctor was only doing his (or more likely, her) duty. While Stalin regarded medical care in instrumental terms, the idea that medical care constitutes a "right" to which citizens are entitled was never totally supplanted.

In keeping with the economic goals of the regime, a closed system of clinics was created for large industrial enterprises. It may be recalled that investment funds for housing were channelled through two routes: the regular state budgets and the industrial ministries. In a similar fashion, adequate medical care was guaranteed to workers in key sectors by allowing important industries to build their own medical facilities. To a much greater extent than in the case of housing, however, the financing of health care remained within the confines of the regular state budgets.

With the industrialization drive the effort to improve medical services gained momentum. From 1928 to 1941 the budget for health increased from 660.8 million rubles to 11,960.0 million rubles. Between 1930 and 1939, 22 new medical schools were created. The number of doctors rose from 4 per 10,000 population in 1928 to 7.2 in 1940 and 13.6 in 1950. The comparable figures for hospital beds are 16 in 1928, 40.2 in 1940, and 55.7 in 1950. By international standards, the Soviet Union ranked in the forefront on these measures by the close of the Stalinist era. Indeed, the USSR had a higher doctor-population ratio than any other country, with the possible exception of Israel.
The rapid expansion of medical manpower was accompanied by changes in the training and status of physicians. The scientific content of medical education was de-emphasized, and opportunities for specialization were downplayed. The accent was on graduating droves of general practitioners. Concerning material rewards, the policies of the 1930's reduced the medical profession to a middle income group in Soviet society. The relatively low salaries paid to medical professionals helps explain certain practices, which, from the American perspective, appear wasteful and inefficient. The implications of having an "inexpensive" corps of physicians will be discussed in greater detail later.

Although medical services improved for both the urban and rural populations, disparities existed in the level of medical care. In 1953 about 1/3 of the medical districts (uchastoks) in the RSFSR were not staffed with physicians; in Kazakhstan and Tadzhikistan, almost 1/2. In the USSR as a whole, there were 1,080 rural hospitals without a single doctor. Moreover, modern equipment, like X-ray machines and medicines, were frequently absent, especially in rural areas.

Whatever the shortcomings in the quality of medical care, it is clear that tremendous progress was made during the Stalinist era. The average life expectancy increased from 44 years in 1926-27 to 68 in 1950, and the crude death rate dropped from 20 per 1000 inhabitants in 1926 to under 8 per 1000 in 1956. Infant mortality was reduced from 187 per 1000 births in 1926-27 to 47 per 1000 births in 1956. While medical care alone does not fully explain these achievements, the figures do demonstrate truly extraordinary advances in the well-being of the Soviet people.
There is strong evidence that the Stalinist heritage included not only a well-developed system of socialized medicine, but a satisfied public as well. As part of Harvard University's Project on the Soviet Social System, 1650 former Soviet citizens filled in questionnaires on their experiences with the Soviet medical system. There is a high degree of consistency in the answers, especially among people of the same socio-economic background. The higher the socio-economic status, the more likely the respondent was to give favorable evaluations. The bulk of the respondents, across social lines, agreed that collective farmers got the worst medical care. Overall, however, most emigres did not report serious difficulties in seeing physicians, nor did they find doctor-patient relationships "depersonalized." They particularly liked the Soviet medical system for two reasons: access and lack of cost. The survey suggests that Soviet socialized medicine had, even under Stalin, generated public support for the regime.

The post-Stalinist leadership thus confronted a health care situation which contrasted sharply with that of housing or consumer goods. Medical care had been a high priority item, and outstanding progress had been achieved. Nonetheless, problems remained: personnel and facilities were unevenly distributed; modern therapeutic and diagnostic equipment as well as medicines were often absent or of poor quality; and specialists--rather than general practitioners--were in short supply.

Policy Intent

Statements of policy intent generally exhibit both a satisfaction with and a desire for further improvements in Soviet medical care.
When top Party leaders outline the major tasks facing the USSR, health care receives little attention. This is because Soviet leaders do not perceive health care as constituting a major problem. Khrushchev asserted, for example, that medical care was one area in which the USSR did not have to overtake and outdistance the most developed capitalist countries: the Soviet Union had "long ago left the capitalist countries behind."\(^{18}\)

Despite this viewpoint, Khrushchev called for still more effort to be directed toward the provision of health care.

In the Soviet Union the state has undertaken to provide health care for the working people. We must continue improving medical services for the population, promoting physical culture and sports, and building more hospitals, sanatoriums, polyclinics and other medical facilities, especially in the rural localities and the country's eastern regions.\(^{19}\)

In Brezhnev's major addresses to the 23rd and 24th Party Congress, health care is scarcely mentioned. In 1966 Brezhnev approvingly noted that "the network of hospitals, polyclinics, sanatoriums and rest homes expends year by year."\(^{20}\) In 1971 he stated that there should be a "Further improvement of medical services."\(^{21}\)

Khrushchev and Brezhnev's desire that more doctors, more clinics, and more hospitals be built can best be understood with reference to Soviet norms. The current medical system does not conform with Soviet standards. According to official norms, a uchastok (medical district) should contain 2,000 adults and 1,200 children (under age 15). For this population there should be one general physician and one pediatrician. These are minimum requirements. Urban districts today are supposed to contain a variety of specialists--an eye, nose, and throat doctor, a dermatologist, a dentist, and so on. As of 1967
the norms for general practitioners and pediatricians much less specialists, had not been met by any of the Union Republics. Moreover, Soviet planners favor 130-140 hospital beds per 10,000 population as an optimum figure, while there were only 111 per 10,000 population in 1972. Thus, despite the high doctor-population and hospital bed-population ratios, the construction of the health care system remains an unfinished enterprise.

It should be pointed out that from an American perspective, Soviet norms, especially regarding hospital beds, appear overly generous if not wasteful. Hospitalization rates in the USSR are, however, high; and, in contrast with trends in other developed, industrial countries, the average length of hospital stays has been increasing in recent years. This phenomenon appears to stem from two factors: 1) a preference for hospital recuperation, due to overcrowded housing conditions; and 2) the tendency to hospitalize rural inhabitants, because of "their reduced opportunities to receive qualified extra-hospital care." The rural population remains large: until the early 1960's over half of the population lived in rural areas. Thus, the relatively intractable problems of housing and of providing primary medical care in rural areas have lead Soviet planners to consider desirable yet a further expansion in hospital facilities.

Concerning physicians, there are also peculiarities inherent to the Soviet system that are associated with the setting of high norms. In the United States there were, in 1968, roughly 10 health personnel (other than doctors) per physician; in the USSR, the ratio was only 3 to 1. There is no evidence to suggest that Soviet decision-makers
regard it desirable to increase the ratio of middle-level medical personnel to physicians. This may explain in part the setting of norms that require extraordinarily high doctor-population ratios. Compared with advanced, Western countries, Soviet doctors are "inexpensive;" they are expected to carry out functions that would be considered wasteful or inappropriate in American society.

Aside from further increases in the numbers of personnel and facilities, it is possible to identify certain other objectives that are regarded as crucial to the upgrading of Soviet medical care. From the statements of Health Ministry officials and articles in the Soviet press, it is evident that the following tasks are important:

1) to improve emergency care, first aid, and medical transport
2) to extend gradually the medical check-up system to the whole population
3) to increase the number of dentists and improve dental work
4) to end shortages (and shoddiness) in medical supplies and equipment.

The USSR Minister of Health has, however, singled out one area that "will have a decisive effect on progress in the health services": improved personnel training, with emphasis on specialization.

Soviet health policy today is rationalized both on the grounds that a healthy population is consistent with the economic interests of the state and with socialist laws. A brief excerpt from an article by Boris Petrovsky, USSR Minister of Health, illustrates this mixture of values.

...the protection and improvement of the people's health
...is a public asset—'public property,' as Lenin put it
...The right to health protection is a law of socialist society. The socialist principles of health care are clearly reflected in policy documents of the Communist Party.
Petrovsky goes on to say that "improving people's health benefits the economic condition of Soviet society." The state's interests and individual "rights" are presumed to be non-conflictual; in the case of medical care, it is indeed probable that state and individual goals largely coincide.

Measures

At the oblast level, data are available for the numbers of physicians, middle-level health personnel, and hospital beds per 10,000 population. The Soviet Union has "been much more generous with statistical data pertaining to their health resources (in manpower and facilities) than with data that would show the magnitude of their morbidity problem or the effectiveness of the Soviet health system in dealing with that morbidity." Thus, it is easier to measure the level of medical services than it is to measure the actual "health" of the population.

Due to the absence of more direct measures of the population's health, the level of medical services will be considered policy results in this analysis. It should be remembered, however, that a high level of medical care is not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end, e.g. good health.

It might also be noted that oblast-level data hides much variation in medical services, though not so much as do data aggregated at the Union Republic level. It is known, for example, that the population of Ryazan province is 70% rural, but that only 17.5% of the physicians work in rural districts. This means that there are 22.4 doctors per 10,000 urban residents; 2.2 for village residents. To measure truly the quality of medical care, information about how many medical
districts meet national norms would be necessary. Nonetheless, variations in average figures for the RSFSR provinces provide a good deal of evidence concerning the distribution of medical services.

Policy Actions

How—and by whom—are crucial decisions made which affect the level and quality of provincial medical services? How is responsibility allocated between the private and state sector? Between local and central decision-makers? Answers to these questions provide contrasts to both housing and consumer goods policies. Unlike housing, the state has, since the early 1930's, chosen not to turn to the private sector to help ease the burden of providing services. And, in contrast with the situation regarding consumer goods, responsibility has been lodged overwhelmingly in the hands of central decision-makers. The key words which describe policy actions in the field of health care are state responsibility and centralized planning.

Health services are overwhelmingly state-supported. Although it is legal for Soviet doctors to accept private patients for privately set fees, this practice has not been encouraged. There are no statistics available on the extent of fee-covered medical care. Some Soviet clinics do charge fees; these clinics are supposed to be economically self-sustaining. There are various "closed" medical-care systems: for the military, the top Party and state elite, and certain industrial enterprises. For the bulk of the population, however, medical care is provided, free of (direct) charge, through a system of institutions funded through the regular state budgets.
The state-supported sector is shaped by decisions made at the center. The All-Union Ministry of Health has responsibilities in the following areas: 1) the drafting of plans for public health, including the construction of new facilities; 2) the establishment of medical and pharmaceutical education, and the assignment of specialists graduating from higher educational institutions; 3) the production and distribution of medicines and medical equipment; 4) fixing norms for the size of staffs of public health institutions, and transportation facilities; and 5) standardizing medical terminology and regulations for health institutions.33

This list suggests that local authorities have little room for initiative or important secondary decision-making. Local governmental units are responsible for the day-to-day operation of the health care system. The oblast Soviet draws up a proposed health plan that must be reviewed and incorporated into plans at the Union Republic and All-Union level. Final decisions rest with the All-Union Health Ministry and Gosplan (State Planning Committee). How well a province fares in the planning process is certainly important but by no means fully accounts for the amount of health resources—facilities and manpower—found in particular oblasti.

Plans have a tendency to go astray. This is particularly true in relation to the problem of allocating physicians and, probably to a lesser extent, to the problem of creating a network of hospitals situated to serve the needs of the people. Both of these areas are of strategic importance to an equitable distribution of medical services and will be examined in greater detail. Another factor, crucial to
Improving medical care in all the oblasti—revising medical-school training—will also be explored.

In the USSR the primary method of ensuring a well-distributed medical corps has involved the assigning of positions to newly graduated doctors. After qualifying as a general practitioner, physicians are assigned a position for (usually) a 3 year period. This assignment is viewed as representing a means for the physician to "pay back" the "people" who have educated him. After completing this initial assignment, the doctor is free to seek employment elsewhere and continue to work as a general practitioner, or to apply for re-admission to a medical school for advanced, specialized training.

"Placement" commissions are set up within the medical schools; lists of positions are provided by the Health Ministry. The allocative plans are, however, rarely fulfilled. Positions in the countryside, in the Central Asian Republics, and in agricultural and industrial areas east of the Urals are considered undesirable. A wide variety of criminal and administrative penalties have been directed against individuals who fail to show up at their assigned job. 34 It does not appear that these laws or rules have been vigorously (or otherwise) enforced. Moreover, Soviet doctors have proven adept at exploiting legal loopholes or otherwise circumventing unpleasant assignments.

In 1951, 56 physicians trained at the First Moscow Medical Institute were assigned to Kazakhstan: 26 showed up at their posts. 35 K. P. Savichev, an official of the RSFSR Ministry of Higher and Middle Special Education, has stated that in the 1960's underfulfillment of
distribution plans for the Union Republic ran at least 18-20%. These figures are higher for Ministries which offer jobs in rural areas: Agriculture, Education, and Health. The "forcible assignments" of new physicians has surely diminished geographical maldistribution, but it also seems incapable of permanently resolving the problem.

V.I. Perevedentsev's study of population movement and labor supply in Western Siberia argues that lags in medical services are based upon two factors: 1) the inadequate graduation of doctors in Western Siberia; and 2) the inability of professional people assigned from Western parts of the USSR to "adjust well." Perevedentsev's solution is to increase the intake of students in medical institutes in Western Siberia. Another possible solution would involve the emulation of a tactic currently being employed to tackle a similar problem with rural teachers: active recruitment of students from the rural population. Of the 55 RSFSR oblasti, 32 contain higher medical education establishments. Although there is a geographical spread in the location of medical institutions, there is no evidence to suggest that medical schools in backward areas are being expanded rapidly or that special efforts are being made to recruit rural students.

The reliance upon assignments gives local authorities an opportunity to try to hold professional personnel by creating favorable living and working conditions for them. Occasionally, articles in the Soviet press call upon local officials to offer solicitous attention to rural doctors: to see to it that they receive adequate housing, passes to vacation facilities, and so on.
Despite these admonitions, rural doctors often find living conditions difficult. As the Chief of the Volgograd Public Health Department remarked, "Normal living conditions are not always provided for newly arrived specialists in rural areas." The rapid turnover of physicians and middle-level medical personnel in rural areas in the Union Republic of Uzbekistan has been blamed on the failure to provide these specialists with apartments. Even where local officials engage in special efforts to attract professional manpower, there is probably nothing they can do to make life in an isolated village more attractive than that in an urban center.

To induce physicians to serve in rural areas, Khrushchev introduced a salary reform in 1964. Country physicians now are paid at rates roughly 15% above urban pay scales. Actually, rural doctors have received more pay than their urban counterparts since 1942, but the differential had only been 3-4%. Whether or not this reform has significantly influenced personal choices is impossible to assess. The wage differential attests, however, to the reliance upon material incentives rather than exhortations or enthusiasm.

One other comment should be made about the nature of the "assignment system." Both in the Stalinist era and today, medical personnel sometimes point out that—from a medical viewpoint—isolating young, new doctors in villages does not exactly promote good health care. There is often no one to turn to for advice, no one to answer questions. Interviews with physicians as part of Harvard University's Project on the Soviet Social System indicated that these initial assignments were often harrowing experiences. Unfortunately, it is the rural population which is continually served
by these relatively inexperienced physicians, who, for the most part, are (hopefully) just passing through.

Regarding hospitals, recent 5-year plans have emphasized the improvement of facilities in rural areas. The impact of local authorities is probably substantial in the area of hospital construction. Soviet construction organizations typically find it necessary to sacrifice some projects in order to complete others. Local Party leaders play a central role in determining which planned items are actually achieved.

In keeping with the objective of upgrading the quality of Soviet medical care, the program of study in Soviet medical institutes was substantially overhauled in 1968. First, it should be pointed out that Soviet medical students enter medical institutes directly after graduation from their secondary education. During most of the Stalinist era, a five-year program existed, which allowed for specialization only in 3 broad areas: child and maternal care, general medicine, and public health. After World War II, the period of medical training was extended to 6 years, with the last year devoted to specialized training. This apparently proved unsatisfactory, and the emphasis on educating generalists was re-instated in 1955.

The 1968 reforms reversed these earlier patterns. The emphasis is now on biomedical sciences and specialization. Soviet medical institutes are separate from medical research institutes, and biomedical sciences have had little impact on medical school curriculums. Current goals are to engage both faculty and a high percent of students in medical research. The curriculum has been lengthened to 7 years.
All students are now tracked, at the end of a 5 year program, into programs on surgery, pediatrics, and so on. The objective is to turn out "generalist specialists," individuals capable of participating in health care teams in uchastok clinics. Moreover, a higher percentage of students are being kept on after graduation for further specialist training, without the interruption of a ministry assignment.

Medical care in the provinces is thus greatly influenced by decisions made elsewhere—decisions about where to send physicians and where to build hospitals. The strong personal preferences of medical personnel clearly play a part in fostering a mal-distribution of physicians. The ability to evade commission assignments rests, however, upon a large degree of official "winking" and connivance.

**Policy Results**

In keeping with the objectives of Soviet leaders, the decade of the sixties saw more doctors, more hospital beds, and more middle-level medical personnel per 10,000 population. (See Tables 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3) The upward trends are substantial. The figure for doctors rose from 16.9 to 26.3; for hospital beds, from 77.5 to 112.0; for middle-level medical personnel, from 62.8 to 80.5. These figures are close to, just slightly above, national averages for the USSR.

Evidence that the health of the population has improved as a result of these quantitative improvements is found in the following statistics. The incidence of infectious diseases such as scarlet fever and hepatitis has declined. (See Table 5-4) The infant mortality rate fell from 32 per 1000 live births in 1961 to 23 in 1971. The crude death rate rose slightly, from 7.2 per 1000 population in 1961 to 8.2 in 1971. This probably reflects growing numbers of old people in
the population. Lower rates of infectious diseases and infant mortality are presumably due to better living conditions as well as improved medical services.

Cross-nationally the USSR ranks first in the world on doctor-population and hospital-bed population ratios. Infant mortality rates suggest, however, that quantitative superiority does not automatically translate into top performance. (See Table 5-6) In this one area, the USSR compares quite favorably with Eastern European countries, trails the United States, and falls far short of Swedish standards. Whether the explanation lies in a lack of quality care, the mal-distribution of medical services, or poor living conditions, is difficult to determine.

Dental care remains a serious problem. The USSR has roughly half the dentists per 10,000 population as has the United States. (See Table 5-5) Surveys conducted in the 1970's show that 70-90 out of every 100 persons need dental work. Although the numbers of dentists are reportedly increasing rapidly, they are said to carry a much heavier patient load than doctors in other fields, and to be burdened by poor equipment.

As in the Stalinist era, it is likely that the medical care system stimulates public support. Mark Field has noted, from his conversations with Soviet citizens in 1956, that people viewed medical care as "free." They did not consider indirect costs, in the form of lower pay checks or high prices for consumer goods. Gertrude Schroeder similarly asserts that the fact that health services "are 'free' undoubtedly impresses Soviet citizens when they assess and compare the achievements of the economic system."
It should be pointed out that in recent years a strikingly high percentage of the population have been "clients" of the state-run medical system: excluding dental and specialist visits, 80% of the population sees a uchastok primary physician one or more times per year. Moreover, by the close of the 1960's, about 1/3 of the Soviet population was included in some form of a regular, medical-screening process. If the population has been convinced, as Soviet propaganda insists, that the government is to be thanked for such services, then a good deal of friendly feeling toward the regime is indeed generated.

Inequality and Medical Services

There is evidence that the urban/rural gap with respect to hospital beds has been substantially closed, while regional inequalities in the distribution of health personnel persist. (See Tables 5-7, 5-8, and 5-9) For hospital facilities, almost 1/3 of the gap between urban and rural regions has been closed. Concerning physicians, the distance between urban and rural oblasti is nearly constant throughout the decade, with the urban regions almost twice as well endowed as the rural ones. The attractiveness of the big cities is evident in the fact that Moscow and Leningrad have more than 60 doctors per 10,000 population, a figure 3 times the national average.

The figures for middle-level medical personnel are somewhat surprising. Mark Field has argued that the difficulties in distributing physicians do not apply to other health personnel. He bases this assertion on the widespread availability of training programs, the heavier influx of rural students into such occupations as feldshers, nurses, and midwives, and the social prestige that such occupations carry in the countryside. Feldshers, in particular, are
Important in rural areas: they frequently serve as the primary point of contact for the population, and are given responsibility for districts containing roughly 1000 people. Nonetheless, the pattern is similar to that for physicians. The distance between urban, mixed, and rural regions remains the same: urban areas enjoy an advantage of about 1/3 more middle-level health personnel per 10,000 population.

One area in which regional inequalities exist—but cannot be systematically measured—involves medicines. The non-availability of drugs is a recurrent phenomenon. In 1974 it was reported that there was no nitroglycerin—a medicine often prescribed for cardiac patients—in the drugstores of Voronezh. The city of Yaroslav had not had any nitroglycerin for years. In the early 1970's only about 20% of the requirements for heparin ointment could be satisfied. Overall, the demand for medicines—by medical institutes and the population—has not been met.

There are two reasons for these deficiencies: under-production and poor distribution. Nitroglycerin is apparently produced in sufficient quantities, but supply difficulties—shortcomings in planning and delivery—lead to interruptions in supply. In the case of heparin, it was admitted that production was well below demand. In all probability, Moscow and Leningrad fare better than provincial administrative centers.

We do not prescribe an effective imported preparation that helps people with nervous ailments because it vanished from our drugstores a long time ago. Those who know that this medicine can help them, buy it in Moscow or Leningrad and then show it to us reprovingly, saying, 'Didn't you know about the existence of this medicine?'

As the physician who described this problem pointed out, "people pay for such 'trifles' (the non-availability of drugs) with their health."
In summary, progress has been made in equalizing hospital facilities. While urban, mixed, and rural regions have all experienced improvement in the population ratios of health personnel, the gap between the best and worst-off provinces remains constant. These findings reflect the simple fact that inanimate objects, like hospitals, do not have as one of their major life goals getting to or staying in Moscow, Leningrad, or some other major population center. There is fragmentary and alarming evidence that needed medical supplies are not always available. Thus, within a context of improvement, inequalities in the level of medical services, especially regarding trained manpower, persist.

The Models and Medical Services

What factors affect the level of medical services? For hospital beds, the level-of-development model is prominent, with urbanization accounting in most years for roughly 40% of the variance. (See Table 5-10) The picture for physicians is more complicated. (See Tables 5-11, 5-12, and 5-13) Urbanization, and to a lesser extent, industry, aid explaining the distribution of doctors: urbanization typically accounts for about 25% of the variance; the industrial measure, about 12%. In general, however, the Party plays a more important role than do these two variables.

The Party may, as in the case of consumer goods, be tapping aspects of development. The correlation between the strength of the local Party organization and the number of adults with a higher education per 1,000 population is high: .70 in 1959. Thus, the Party may be serving, at least in part, as a surrogate variable for the presence of skilled groups within the population.
The regression analysis employing the incidence of higher education as a measure of development (Table 5-12) must be viewed with caution, in light of the aforementioned correlation. A highly educated population appears to be very important: the beta for the education variable is a hefty .91. This may not be too far out of line with the true magnitude, since the correlation between this variable and the doctor-population ratio is greater than that for any other independent variable—.93. This pattern suggests that a conscious policy of providing better medical care to privileged groups is being pursued, or that doctors are attracted to "cultured" regions.

The political variables of ultimate mobility, politburo-secretariat ties, and cohort pairs do not figure significantly in the regression analyses. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that "political clout" either is—or can be—utilized to affect plan decisions; and ultimately, the level of medical services in particular provinces.

Conclusion

The Soviet Union has continued to increase its health resources—facilities and personnel—in an impressive fashion. This progress represented additions to, rather than the creation of, a system of socialized medicine. Because the medical care system was relatively developed by the end of the Stalinist era, current efforts can be channeled toward the alleviation of such weaknesses as regional disparities in medical care, modernizing equipment, ending shortages of medicines, and raising the quality of health care.
Despite the intent of Soviet leaders to pay particular attention to improvements in rural and other less developed areas of the country, regional inequalities persist. More progress has been achieved in closing the urban/rural gap regarding hospital beds than personnel. Although rural regions are markedly better supplied with health care resources than they used to be, the figures probably overstate the amount of actual improvement in the delivery of health care to the rural population: physicians tend to cluster in the major population centers.

Regional differentiation in the level of medical care appears to be a function of economic development, and in the case of professional manpower, the strength of the local Party organization. It is possible to attribute the importance of the local Party to a variety of explanations: the Party is a privileged group which receives superior living conditions; the Party is strong in areas where the population is well-educated and a variety of amenities exist—areas attractive to physicians; the Party organization makes an effort to enforce the assignment system and entice trained personnel to stay on.
Table 5-1. Hospital Beds Per Ten Thousand Population in RSFSR Oblasti, 1959-70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mean</th>
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<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>73.1-144.7</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>50.8-148.9</td>
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<td>79.8-152.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
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<td>85.9-164.3</td>
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Table 5-2. Doctors Per Ten Thousand Population in RSFSR Oblasti, 1959-70

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<th>Range</th>
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<td>10.7-63.9</td>
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<td>12.7-69.5</td>
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<td>13.3-72.8</td>
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<td>14.0-71.6</td>
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Table 5-3. Middle-Level Medical Personnel Per Ten Thousand Population in RSFSR Oblasti, 1959-1967

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<th>Range</th>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>43.2-125.0</td>
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<td>47.3-136.1</td>
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Figure 5-1. Hospital Beds Per Ten Thousand Population in RSFSR Oblasti, 1959-1970
Figure 5-3. Middle-Level Medical Personnel Per 10,000 Population in RSFSR Oblasti, 1959-1967
Table 5-4. Infectious Diseases, Selected Cases, USSR, Cases per 100,000

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<tr>
<th>Type of Disease</th>
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<th>1968</th>
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<tr>
<td>Typhoid and paratyphoid, A, B, C</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scarlet fever</td>
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<td>211</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diphtheria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Whooping cough</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infectious hepatitis</td>
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<td>156</td>
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<tr>
<td>Typhus, including Brill's disease</td>
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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<td>15.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dentists per 10,000 population</td>
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<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital beds per 10,000 population</td>
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<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude death rate per 1,000 population</td>
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<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality, deaths under one year per 1,000 births</td>
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<td>21.7</td>
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Table 5-6.
Infant Mortality Rates Per 1000 Live Births, in 1972

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<th>Country</th>
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<td>Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
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</tr>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>23.0^a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>18.1^b</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

^a Data is for the year 1971  
^b Data is for the year 1970

| Year | Urban oblasti | | Mixed oblasti | | Rural oblasti |
|------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|
|      | X  SD Range   | X  SD Range     | X  SD Range   |
| 1959 | 95 18.4 72-153 | 75 10.6 59-102 | 62 9.9 39-81  |
| 1960 | 99 18.2 77-153 | 79 10.1 62-103 | 65 9.7 44.85  |
| 1961 | 101 18.2 82-153| 83 10.4 64-106 | 69 10.0 50.88 |
| 1962 | 104 16.9 85-152| 87 10.1 68-107 | 73 10.8 55.91 |
| 1963 | 106 17.0 87-154| 90 10.5 73-111 | 77 11.3 61.97 |
| 1964 | 109 15.9 88-146| 94 9.0 78-112  | 80 11.2 65-101|
| 1965 | 111 14.6 92-142| 97 8.5 80-114  | 84 10.7 70-104|
| 1966 | 114 14.4 95-145| 100 8.2 82-115 | 87 10.3 73-106|
| 1967 | 113 20.7 51-149| 105 12.3 86-143| 92 10.1 77-110|
| 1968 | 113 18.1 79-153| 105 8.5 89-119 | 95 10.4 80-114|
| 1970 | 125 16.2 105-164| 111 8.8 96-130 | 101 11.0 86-120|

Notes: See Appendix C for a complete description of the break-points used in Tables 5-7, 5-8, and 5-9.
Table 5-8. Doctors Per 10,000 Population in RSFSR Oblasti, Grouped According to Level of Urbanization, 1959-70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Urban Oblasti</th>
<th>Mixed Oblasti</th>
<th>Rural Oblasti</th>
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<td>SD</td>
<td>Range</td>
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<td>12.7-57.4</td>
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<td>16.4-65.5</td>
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<td>Mixed Oblasti</td>
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<td>Range</td>
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Figure 5-4. Hospital Beds Per Ten Thousand Population in RSFSR Oblasti, Grouped According to Level of Urbanization, 1959-1970.
Figure 5-5. Doctors per Ten Thousand Population in RSFSR Oblasti, Grouped According to Level of Urbanization, 1959-1970.
Urbanization, 1959-1967

Obvestilo: Grouped According to Level of Per Ten Thousand Population in USSR

Figure 5-6: Middle-Level Medical Personnel

Years

- Urban
- Mixed
- Urban
Table 5-10. Beta Coefficients: Hospital Beds Per 10,000 Population in RSFSR Oblasti, 1959-67

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Urbanization</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>P/S Ties</th>
<th>Cohort Pairs</th>
<th>Ultimate Mobility</th>
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<td>-.01</td>
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Table 5-10, Continued

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Table 5-11. Beta Coefficients: Doctors Per 10,000 Population in RSFSR Oblasti, 1959-67

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Table 5-11, Continued
Table 5-12. Beta Coefficients: Doctors Per 10,000 Population in RSFSR Oblasti, 1959-67

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<th>Cohort Pairs</th>
<th>Ultimate Mobility</th>
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N=53
Multiple R = .94
Per cent of Variance Explained: 89
## Beta Coefficients: Doctors Per 10,000

**Population in RSFSR Oblasti, 1959-67**

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<td>Number of Cases</td>
<td>Multiple R</td>
<td>Per Cent of Variance Explained</td>
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Footnotes


5. Field, pp. 28-29.


7. For a discussion of the certification issue during the 1930's, see Field, op. cit., Chapter 9.


9. Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Consumption in the USSR: A Survey," Studies on the Soviet Union Volume 10, No. 4 (1970), p. 16; and Ellen Mickiewicz (editor), Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 108. This pattern is quite different from that exhibited by the United States, where there were 16 doctors per 10,000 population in 1890, 14.4 in 1913, and 15.5 in 1968. By 1968 the USSR had 22.5 doctors per 10,000 population.

10. Schroeder, p. 16; Mickiewicz, p. 112.


12. In 1963 the average monthly wage in industry was 98 rubles; beginning basic salaries for physicians (in cities) was 72.5 rubles per month in 1964.


14. Ibid.


17. For an analysis of the findings regarding the Soviet medical system, see Field, Doctor and Patient in Soviet Russia, Chapters 10-13. Most of the people covered in this survey were in displaced persons' camps in Germany at the end of World War II.


19. Ibid., p. 63.


24. Ibid.


27. Ibid., p. 52.

28. Ibid., p. 54.
29. The bulk of these personnel consist of feldshers, midwives, and nurses.


31. For data on medical services in Union Republics, see Mickiewicz, op. cit., pp. 112-117.

32. Mark Field, Soviet Socialized Medicine, p. 94.

33. For a complete description of the responsibilities of the All-Union Health Ministry, see the 1969 Public Health Act, in CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 48 (December 23, 1969).

34. For a brief description of the legal aspects of the placement system, see Mervyn Matthews, Class and Society in Soviet Russia (New York: Walker and Co., 1972), pp. 348-351.

35. Mark Field, Doctor and Patient in Soviet Russia, p. 95.

36. As cited in Matthews, op. cit., p. 346.


41. See Field, Doctor and Patient in Soviet Russia, pp. 87-88.


45. Field, Doctor and Patient in Soviet Russia, p. 29.

46. Schroeder, p. 16.


51. Ibid.
Chapter VI. Conclusion

If changes are less than dramatic, are they the kind of incremental changes that, taken individually, appear relatively insignificant but which, over time, cumulatively transform society and the political system in a most fundamental way? — Jerry Hough

The empirical evidence presented on housing, retail trade, and medical care allow us to address several questions: Which model of the welfare policy-process is most appropriate, for particular policy areas and regimes? How does the evidence relate to broader images of Soviet society? What is the impact on Soviet political culture of changes in living standards? What kinds of future research are needed in order to flesh out more fully those issues which remain unresolved?

The Models, Issue Areas, and Regimes

The statements of Soviet leaders regarding the importance of closing the gap between urban and rural living standards appear to be largely rhetoric. Except for hospital facilities, a more equitable distribution of goods and services is not evident. Regional stratification, largely along urban/rural lines, persists. Moreover, the cities of Moscow and Leningrad clearly enjoy a privileged status, with living standards substantially higher than those which exist elsewhere in the Soviet Union.

Rises in policy results are too great, however, and policy actions too out of keeping with Stalinist models, to warrant the total
rejection of the equalization model. In contrast with the Stalinist era, progress, rather than stagnation or decline, marks the policy areas of housing and retail trade. Such policy actions as reversals in the growth rates of Group A and Group B industry and the sharp pay differential in favor of rural physicians argue against the continuity of Stalinist patterns, and for the seriousness of the post-Stalinist leadership's commitment to raising living standards. Moreover, it is clear that the level-of-development model, with its stress on bare necessities, has never been, now or in the past, an accurate description of Soviet efforts in the area of medical care.

Thus, an anomaly exists: rises in living standards support the equalization model but distribution patterns lend credence to the level-of-development model. The importance of the level-of-development model for distribution issues calls for an expanded discussion of the importance of economic development.

As in the case of Thomas Dye's research on American states, high levels of economic development—measured by such variables as urbanization, industrialization, and adult education—are associated with a high level of expenditures (for civil construction) and a variety of services (housing, medical care, retail trade). For the nation and the region, economic development imposes restraints on decision-makers. At the national level, B. Guy Peters has pointed out that it is assumed that as the ability of the economy to provide goods and services increases, a "slack" develops. This slack is available for extraction and reallocation through the public budget.
The familiar argument, in American state and local politics, that localities which possess more resources spend more resources is consistent with "end of scarcity" arguments about the USSR. When Brezhnev asserts that "we are setting and accomplishing tasks that we could only dream about in preceding stages," he is arguing that the Soviet Union can now afford to accomplish simultaneously a broader range of tasks including the raising of living standards.4

For the region, the economy "provides a general resource base on which to draw in the implementation of public policy."5 The socio-economic development of oblasti provides constraints in a variety of ways: institutions and enterprises to shoulder part of the burden of providing goods and services; construction organizations to build housing, stores, and medical facilities; a skilled and educated populace capable of producing (and attracting) highly trained professional personnel. Presumably, previous socioeconomic development makes it easier to achieve still higher levels of popular welfare.

The importance of economic development for high living standards supports Jerry Hough's contention that the "military/heavy industrial complex" remains a powerful political force in the USSR. The shift in priority to Group A industry in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976-1980) further demonstrates that the Stalinist model cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to contemporary policy-making.

The economy-policy linkage should not, however, be exaggerated. In general, the multiple regression analyses show that the individual measures of economic development do not account for more than 50% of
the variance. Thus, the importance of noneconomic factors should not be overlooked.

Moreover, the assumption that socioeconomic development is unidimensional is questionable. Although the urbanization, industrialization, and education measures are all highly intercorrelated, they relate differently to particular issue areas. In the case of housing, for example, the weighted industrial performance index was considerably more important than it was for either retail trade or medical care. It is overly simplistic to view the oblasti as arrayed in a linear fashion along a single dimension of socioeconomic development.

Despite the failure of various indicators of the obkom first secretary's bargaining power—ultimate mobility, cohort pairs, and politburo-secretariat ties—to account for much regional variation, the possible importance of political factors cannot be dismissed. Compared with measures of socioeconomic development, it is extraordinarily difficult to develop valid measures of local political activity. The political variables utilized in this study cannot be regarded as representing the entire range of political factors. Overall, "political clout" has not received an "equal opportunity" to influence policy variations.

Regime is not an important factor for either housing or medical care. Rises in policy results are largely incremental across regimes. A major exception to this pattern occurs in regard to retail trade. Here, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime's performance contrasts with that of Khrushchev. The distinctiveness of the two regimes is limited, however, to the magnitude of change rather than the distribution of retail trade
per capita. The superior record of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime reflects a fundamental shift in attitude toward personal consumption, as well as more intensified efforts (investment in light industry and agriculture, increases in monetary income) to stimulate the growth of retail trade turnover. The provision of consumer goods is one area in which Soviet society cannot be characterized as Khrushchevism without Khrushchev.

In conclusion, it should be noted that changes in socioeconomic development constitute underlying structural trends which probably ensure the continued rise in living standards in all regions. Soviet society is becoming more urban, more educated, and more industrial. In 1959 52% of the population of the RSFSR lived in urban areas; in 1970, 62%. In 1969 twenty-four of every thousand persons more than ten years old had a higher education in the RSFSR; in 1970 the figures were forty-four individuals per one thousand. The numbers of collective farmers and co-operative handicraftsmen has declined from 31.4 million in 1959 to 22.3 million in 1968. Thus, the maturing of the economy fosters improved opportunities for raising living standards.

The Models and Images of Soviet Society

Jerry Hough has pointed out that American specialists writing on the Soviet Union, "though usually liberal in their domestic politics and inclined to judge American political leaders by their activism on social-welfare issues, seldom consider such issues in evaluating the Soviet leadership." Soviet performance in the realm of social policy is generally ignored in the construction of broad images of Soviet society.
The inclusion of evidence from the issue areas of housing, retail trade, and medical care throws a different light on one of the more predominant themes in the literature: the idea that the Soviet political system is stagnating or degenerating. Richard Lowenthal, for example, has interpreted the ouster of Khrushchev as signifying the erosion of dynamism. He regards the present regime as reduced to the conservative roles of administering society, stabilizing institutions, and defending oligarchic privileges. He contrasts this party-society relationship with the Stalinist aspiration to transform society at will.

Similarly, Zbigniew Brzezinski has argued that the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime is hostile to talent and political innovating. He asserts that the Soviet political system is degeneration: the ruling elite is held no longer to be capable of defining the purposes of the political system or of effectively implementing any program. Brzezinski summarizes the recent past in terms of a Party in search of a role; he tends to see the Party as representing a barrier to socioeconomic development.

Michel Tatu has also argued that the party machine constitutes the most conservative element in Soviet society. The Party is viewed as "the principal curb on progress." Likewise, Robert Conquest has characterized the present leadership as timid and mediocre, incapable of providing genuine direction. Again, the Party is pitted against the forces of modernity: "it (the Party) is fully capable of blocking and containing all the economic, intellectual, and other forces which run continually against it."
Thus, a popular image of the Soviet political system stresses consolidation and stabilization—no role for the Party beyond retrenchment. While there is evidence to support this theme, trends in social policy point in the opposite direction. According to the evidence provided in this study, Soviet society is not static. Change in the form of higher living standards is occurring.

Gradual changes in living conditions lack the drama associated with the industrialization and collectivization drives. Incremental change, rather than massive transformations, has been the norm. As Hough has pointed out, however, incremental change can, over time, result in the reshaping of a society and its political system. The Khrushchev and Brezhnev-Kosygin regimes have had an impact on society, at least in the area of social welfare. Indeed, as Hough argues, the wage and social security programs carried out under Brezhnev were more successful—in regard to their impact on the income levels of the poor—than was the War on Poverty in the United States. Arguments that the post-Stalinist, and especially the present leadership, are incapable of providing genuine leadership and lack goals beyond the maintenance of their own privileged position are inconsistent with the record achieved in the areas of housing, retail trade, and medical care.

The Models and Political Culture

Has the rise in living standards—better housing, more consumer goods, improved medical care—resulted in a greater amount of regime legitimacy? In the absence of survey data, some speculative views can be offered. According to Brezhnev, the answer is yes, the Soviet
people's ties to the regime have been strengthened.

The Soviet people's successes in economic construction are of great political importance. They have led to the further strengthening of the socialist system in our country and to the still closer cohesion of the entire Soviet people around the Party.

Andrei Amalrik and Walter Connor assert that a seesaw relationship exists between regime acceptance and popular welfare. Both emphasized the necessity of steady or gradual improvements in living standards. These gradual improvements have taken place. The relationship between strongly felt desires for better living conditions and regime legitimacy is, however, an ongoing one.

Despite improvements, public demand, in at least two of the three areas examined in this study, appears to be unabated. Lists of people waiting for apartments have not grown shorter; the waiting period generally ranges from one and a half to three years. Because rents are low and aspirations high, almost anyone can "afford"—and most desire—better housing. In regard to consumer goods, expectations apparently are skyrocketing. These aspirations mean that continued rises in living standards are essential that is, if scholars who posit the public welfare-regime legitimacy linkage are correct.

In so far as mass aspirations for a better life play a central role in public evaluations of the regime, the management of expectations is a crucial task for the Party leadership. In order to evaluate social progress, the Soviet citizen can utilize a variety of frames of reference. He can compare his situation now with his situations in the past; he can accept the Party leadership's definitions of social progress; he can compare his situation with that of citizens in other countries.
Khrushchev tended to inflate people's expectations and to invite comparisons of Soviet living conditions with those found elsewhere. He engaged in grandiose promises and in rhetoric which stressed competition with advanced, capitalist countries. In contrast, Brezhnev and Kosygin have emphasized their commitment to raising living standards, but they have been more cautious in stating goals and more careful to note the difficulties involved in solving problems like the housing shortage. They have declined to speak of catching up to and overtaking American living standards. Thus, Brezhnev and Kosygin have apparently sought to narrow the gap between expectations and performance.

The issue of internal repression relates to the problem of managing expectations: preventing the disclosure of information that is incompatible with official images of Soviet reality. Restrictions on freedom of travel, information, and expression make it easier to convince people that they live in the best of all possible societies. The growing concern in recent years with preventing criticism that is regarded by the leadership as subversive has led to increased repression. In turn, this repression may help to ensure that living conditions are evaluated from a Party viewpoint.

Increased contact with the West and greater travel to Eastern Europe may serve to increase dissatisfaction with the regime's performance. Differences in living standards become more difficult to conceal. Soviet citizens line up in East Berlin to buy products unavailable in the USSR. And public lecturers "in Moscow are frequently badgered with questions as to why Soviet citizens do not have the
gadgets that Westerners have long been accustomed to."\textsuperscript{20}

Overall, however, Soviet leaders appear to have been successful in generally satisfying public expectations. As George Feifer puts it, the Soviet, especially the Russian, working class is convinced "that they have never had it so good."\textsuperscript{21} The effects of improved living standards on the political culture have not, however, been entirely desirable from the leadership's viewpoint. Higher living standards have apparently generated "privatization": a withdrawal into private interests or family life. More and more Soviet families now live in private apartments and apparently prefer to spend time in their own homes or with their own families rather than engage in common or public activities.\textsuperscript{22}

Future Research

There are several lines of inquiry which would aid in the resolution of issues raised in this study. Future research might involve:

1) the application of the welfare-policy models to other issues areas;
2) the development of new concepts, measures, and models; and 3) the focusing of attention on alternative units of analysis.

The issue areas covered in this work are by no means exhaustive of the social welfare realm. More evidence bearing on the policy models can be gained by the inclusion of additional issue areas: the provision of pre-school institutions, cultural and recreational facilities, public transportation, opportunities for secondary and higher education, and so on. Moreover, it would be useful to have multiple measures for housing and retail trade. The policy results
employed in this research are important, but are too few in number to justify hard-and-fast conclusions.

New concepts and/or models are also needed. Especially in the area of political factors, there is a need to develop indicators which are of theoretical significance and empirical value. The failure of any one model to "fit" the data suggests that the synthesis of the level-of-development and equalization models might be in order.

A third line of future research could well focus upon units of analysis other than the RSFSR oblasti. RSFSR patterns may differ from those found in other Union Republics. Hence, an examination of policy results for another set of provinces— in the Ukraine, for example— is relevant. The choice of a lower unit of analysis— the raion (county) — would enhance sensitivity to urban/rural distinctions and would allow for the raising of new and interesting questions. Less differentiation would be hidden by average figures for the raion than by the oblasti-level data. Spill-over effects could be pinpointed: do residents of rural areas in better-off provinces, for example, enjoy higher living standards than residents of rural areas in poorer regions?
Footnotes


13. Tatu, p. 46.


17. Brezhnev, p. 4.


22. For an interesting discussion of commune-type apartments which have been proposed as models for future residential patterns, see Robert Osborn, *Soviet Social Policies: Welfare, Equality, and Community* (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1970), Chapter 7. These apartments are designed to foster common activities and reduce the time people spend in their individual apartments.
Appendix A: The Mobility Index

The following is a partial outline of the positions assigned mobility scores ranging from 1 to 9. Position is position held after leaving Obkom First Secretaryship.

Score 0
Missing data code, died in office, retired.

Score 1
Primary Party Organization except 1st Secretary, Urban or Rural Raion Executive Committee, student.

Score 2
Most Urban and Rural District posts (raion) in party as well as City Committee posts below Secretary (Gorkom). Most Executive Committee posts at City or Autonomous Oblast level, Chairman of Raion Executive Committee, teacher.

Score 3
1st Sec Raikom, 2nd see or see gorkom (city committee), Oblast Executive Committee post, Administrative post in Education, Director of enterprise, Chm. City or Autonomous Oblast Executive Committee.

Score 4
Chm., Central Aud. Com. Dept. Head Republic Party Organization, Executive Party Worker, Obkom 2nd Sec or Sec, Gorkom 1st Secretary, Many Governmental positions at All-Union or Republic level such as Deputy Ministers, Chm Oblast Executive Committee.

Score 5
Obkom First Secretary.

Score 6
CC Department Head, USSR Ambassador, Dep Chm STate Com of All-Union Council Min Editor Party Press Organ, Chm of Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium, Dep CM, Dep 1st Sec Republic Party organization.

Score 7
Dep Chm All-Union Party Control Com, 1st Sec Republic Party Com, Dep Chm CC Bureau for RSFSR, 1st Dep Chm All-Union Council of Ministers (CM), also Dep Chm, Minister of USSR, Chm of State Com of USSR Council of Ministers.

Score 8
Secretariat Member, Candidate Member Politburo, 1st Dep Chm Council of Min. Chm of Economic Council.

Score 9
Full member of Politburo, Chm CC Bureau of RSFSR, Pres Supreme Soviet or Chm of Council of Ministers.
Appendix B.

Sources for Biographic Data:

**English:**


*Directory of Soviet Officials,* (U.S. State Department, 1960).


*Current Digest of the Soviet Press*

**Russian:**

*Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSR Pyatoso Soyuza,* (Moscow: 1959).

*Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSR Shestogo Soyuza,* (Moscow: 1962).

*Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSR Sedmogo Soyuza,* (Moscow: 1966).


*Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSR Sedmogo Soyuza,* (Moscow: 1970).

**Additional:**

*Obituaries in Moscow Newspapers*

*Notes collected by Robert Blackwell,* (Emory University).
Appendix C. Break-points for urban/mixed/rural oblasti in Tables 3-7, 4-10, 5-7, 5-8, and 5-9. (All figures are in percentages)

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Bibliography


CDSP. "On Developing Housing Construction in the USSR," Decree of Party Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers, Volume IX, no. 31, pp. 3-6, 32.


Daniels, Robert S. "Health Planning in the USSR: Are There Lessons to be Learned?" American Journal of Public Health, Volume 64 (June 1974), pp 613-615.


Echols, John M. "Politics, Budgets, and Regional Equality in Communist and Capitalist Systems," Comparative Political Studies, Volume 8, no. 3 (October 1975), pp. 259-292.


Protozanov, A. Secretary of the Tyumen Province Party Committee, "Cities of the Transurals," CDSP, Volume XVIII, no. 49 (December 28, 1966).


