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FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
AN AMERICAN OCCUPATION POLICY IN EUROPE

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

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* * * * *

The Ohio State University

1976

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PREFACE

The purpose of this dissertation is to trace the influence of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on the development of the American occupation policy, 1941 to 1945. A general agreement that the administration of occupied areas during a brief initial phase was the responsibility of the military can be seen running through the entire period of plans and preparations. The points of conflict revolved around such questions as which group would formulate occupation policy, when the civilian authorities would assume control, whether it would be a gradual assumption of responsibility or a clear cut one, and whether the civilian authority in liberated territories would be indigenous or American. The preponderance of the controversy centered in the supply and relief functions. It was principally in this field where the difficulties between the President and the various government agencies occurred.

This work shows, despite the basic controversy between the civilian and military authorities, a remarkable amount of coordination and consideration on the part of all concerned when meeting the politico-military problems of the war. The President frequently consulted with the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Supreme Allied Commander before making decisions and these men kept the President informed, in great detail, of their political actions.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Civil Affairs and Military Government On the Eve of World War II.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>The White House and the Military at Odds.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>The President and the School of Military Government</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>The School Issue Settled.</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Pre-Invasion Plans for Civil Affairs In North Africa</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>The Darlan Arrangement.</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Post Darlan Civil Affairs in North Africa.</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Washington Organization for Civil Affairs During The Early Part of the North African Campaign</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>Washington Organization for Civil Affairs As the North Africa Situation Developed</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Planning for Military Government in Sicily and Italy</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI</td>
<td>The Collapse and Surrender of Italy</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII</td>
<td>Allied Occupation Control Organization In Italy.</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII</td>
<td>Domestic Italian Affairs.</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XIV Civilian Relief and Rehabilitation in Italy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td>XV Washington Organization for Civil Affairs During the Italian Era.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219</td>
<td>XVI Civil Affairs for France.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>237</td>
<td>XVII Plans for Germany.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>266</td>
<td>XVIII Zones of Occupation in Germany and Austria.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>XIX Summary and Conclusion.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>318</td>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>331</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABBREVIATIONS

ACC
ACofS
ACPPFP
AFHQ
AGO
AMG
AMGOT
ASF
ASW
AT(E)
BEW
BOB
CA
CAD
CCAC
CCS
CCPNA
CFB
CG
CINC
CinCMED
CLN
COB
CofS
COSSAC
CRC
CWRA
DPEO
Dep't
Dir
Div
EAC
EDB
ET or ETO
FCNL
FDRL
FEA
FRUS
G-1
G-2
G-3
G-4
G-5

Allied Control Commission
Assistant Chief of Staff
Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy
Allied Forces Headquarters
Adjutant General's Office
Allied Military Government
Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory
Army Service Forces
Assistant Secretary of War
Administration of Territories Committee (Europe)
Board of Economic Warfare
Bureau of the Budget
Civil Affairs
Civil Affairs Division
Combined Civil Affairs Committee
Combined Chiefs of Staff
Combined Committee for French North Africa
Combined Food Board
Commanding General
Commander in Chief
Commander in Chief, Mediterranean
Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale
Committee of Combined Boards
Chief of Staff
Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command or Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander
Civilian Rehabilitation Corps
Committee on War Relief Agencies
Director for Foreign Economic Operations
Department
Director
Division
European Advisory Committee
Economic Defense Board
European Theater or European Theater of Operations
French Committee of National Liberation
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York
Foreign Economic Administration
Foreign Relations of the United States
Personnel Division, General Staff, War Department
Intelligence Division, General Staff, War Department
Operations Division, General Staff, War Department
Supply Division, General Staff, War Department
Civil Affairs Division, General Staff, War Department
GHQ  General Headquarters

HUSKY  Allied Invasion of Sicily, July 1943

IAC  Interdepartmental Advisory Committee

JAG  Judge Advocate General

JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staff

LOC  Library of Congress

MG  Military Government

MGD  Military Government Division

MGS  Military Government Section

MTO  Mediterranean Theater of Operations

NAEB  North African Economic Board

NAJEM  North African Joint Economic Mission

NARS  World War II Records Division, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D. C.

NATO  North African Theater of Operations

OCMH  Office, Chief of Military History

OES  Office of Economic Stabilization

OEW  Office of Economic Warfare

OFEC  Office of Foreign Economic Coordination

OFRRO  Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations

OFT  Office of Foreign Territories

OLLA  Office of Lend-Lease Administration

OPD  Operations Division

OUSW  Office of Under Secretary of War

OWI  Office of War Information

RSC  Reconstruction Services Committee

SAC  Supreme Allied Commander

SACMED  Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater

SCAEF  Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces

SHAEP  Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces

SMG  School of Military Government

SW  Secretary of War

TORCH  Allied Invasion of North and Northwest Africa, Nov. 1942

USW  Under Secretary of War

WD  War Department

WPD  War Production Board

WSA  War Shipping Administration
CHAPTER I

CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT
ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II

On the basis of the evidence presently available, there is no indication that in the years immediately preceding the Second World War, anyone in Washington, D. C. was consciously concerned with the administration of liberated territory or conquered areas.

When the various federal officials who ultimately concerned themselves with such matters came to prepare for managing the occupation of formerly enemy-controlled areas, they were inextricably tied to the emotions engendered by the inner political machinations in Washington. For instance, in May 1940, Harry H. Woodring was forced out of his position as Secretary of War. Harold Ickes, Secretary of Interior, wanted the position. According to Ickes, the President toyed with the idea of asking Fiorello La Guardia to take over the War Department, but Governor Herbert Lehman protested he wanted La Guardia to remain on in New York to work on the racial problem. Then the President wanted to name Ickes to the position but could find no suitable replacement for the Interior Secretary. Most historians seem agreed that Henry Stimson was named as Secretary of War to impart bipartisanship to the administration in the pending crisis. As will be
shown in this work, when civilian planning began in earnest it was closely tied to grand strategy and the progress of the military forces in overcoming the enemy.

The first indication of the President's interest in the area was his creation of the President's Committee on War Relief Agencies in late March 1941. It is doubtful if Roosevelt connected this action to future civil affairs planning or military government, but as events were to transpire this was the origin of the American effort which was to culminate in a massive effort. Relief was to be the prime concern, the basic problem, and the crowning achievement of the Americans in the civil affairs/military government arena during and following the war.

Joseph E. Davies was named chairman of the committee and Charles P. Taft and Frederick P. Keppel were members. They were provided a $10,000 budget and were charged to study the methods being employed to raise private relief funds in the United States for the victims of war. In July 1942, the committee was renamed the President's War Relief Control Board. The committee was faced with a monumental task. Its report of July 1942 included a statement that there were in the United States more than three hundred groups seeking funds for various aspects of relief for war sufferers. Among these was a group with the title, "Reconstruction Service Committee." The Acting Secretary was Harold Weston who was a friend of
both Henry N. Delano, a cousin of the President, and Milo Perkins, Executive Director, Board of Economic Warfare, and a close friend of Roosevelt. It was rumored that Herbert Hoover actively supported this group.³

In the summer of 1941, the Economic Defense Board was established. Even though the United States was not then at war, the President was aware that this organization was designed to play a critical role in post-war planning. The Vice President, Henry A. Wallace, was designated Chairman of this board. Its charter included obtaining, developing, and determining at the national level estimates of the materials and commodities for export purposes. Later in the year, the charter was expanded to include all national functions related to international economic affairs. The membership of the board included representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, War, Justice, Navy, Agriculture and Commerce. The President felt that a great deal of post-war foreign policy would emanate from this board. In December 1941, this key unit was renamed the Board of Economic Warfare.⁴ During the time this board was being organized, the Secretary of Navy and the Secretary of War proposed that an economic priorities board of established under the auspices of the military in Washington to assure that the armed forces of the United States were supplied with their requirements, including military government supplies, even before the American home front. Roosevelt declined to approve the proposal.⁵
The President began to press Secretary of State Hull and the Under-Secretary, Sumner Welles, to make plans for the postwar world as early as October 1941. In December the State Department Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy was formed. At that time, a sub-committee began to work on the German problem. Early in 1942, Roosevelt approved of the arrangements and the committee began working in earnest. 6

Roosevelt wanted it made clear to all the Board of Economic Warfare members, but especially the Vice President and the Secretary of State, that the State Department was responsible for postwar planning and that the Board of Economic Warfare should defer or eliminate all postwar planning work. Here the President voiced what was to be a central theme that was to have a tremendous impact on civil affairs/military government: "The slogan is Win the War before we give too much thought to postwar plans." 7

In the War Department in the era 1919-1939, little or no thought was given to the problem of how territory captured from the enemy was to be administered. The policy of the government as the United States began contingency planning in 1940 was expressed in General Order Number 100. The General Order was expanded into Field Manual 27-5, Basic Field Manual on Military Government, June 30, 1940, by Colonel Archibald King, Judge Advocate General's Department. At the tactical level, no detailed planning for training or manning in civil affairs took place. As outlined in the Field Manual, the
theater commander would select and train civil affairs personnel from those available within the theater. There were two developments which caused the manual to be written at this particular time.

In the spring of 1940 the United States Military Attaché to Great Britain forwarded a report outlining a course at Cambridge University being given to selected British Army Officers. This course was designed to prepare officers for administrative and advisory duties in the "period of disorganization and reorganization" which was expected after the war. At approximately the same time, Major General Allen W. Gullion, then both the Provost Marshal General and the Judge Advocate General, came across the Hunt Report on the U.S. Army occupation of the Coblenz area following World War I. This report had been compiled by Colonel I. L. Hunt, Officer-In-Charge of Civil Affairs, and subsequently "buried" in War Department files. For General Gullion, and others concerned with military government, the critical point in the Hunt Report was the tremendous responsibility which had faced the American Army of Occupation in World War I and in past wars, and how little attention had been paid to training people for these duties.

As the Army manual on military government was being compiled and digested by the Provost Marshal, Lieutenant Colonel S. A. Greenwell, United States Assistant Military Attaché to Great Britain, forwarded another report outlining in detail
the course in civil affairs being given to British Army personnel at Cambridge. Colonel Greenwell's report concluded with a recommendation that the United States Army take "preliminary steps for the selection and training of Army officers and others for postwar activities abroad." Greenwell's report was indorsed by the Military Attaché who added that it would be advisable to begin training Americans abroad and in schools at home. Not only Army officers, but people from all concerned departments of the government and civilians from key domestic industries should be trained. His concluding remarks were prophetic: "a step of this sort taken in time will obviate the rush to improvise the missions of all sorts which will be required from the United States immediately upon conclusion of present conflict . . . It is a matter which goes beyond the scope of the War Department and should, therefore, be the subject of joint attention by a number of the departments of the government." 9

The Attaché report found its way to the desk of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence who forwarded it to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations for his comment. Within the Operations Staff the Operations and Training Division recommended no action in view of the vagueness of the possible use of the personnel, The War Plans Division and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence agreed with this assessment. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel did not agree but suggested the matter be explored further.
In this staff work it came to light that the faculty of the Foreign Service School at Georgetown University were conducting a similar course for officers attached to the Office of Administration of Export Control. The officials at Georgetown assured the Army staff that an appropriate military government course could be conducted at their institution. Major General Russell L. Maxwell and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel were disposed toward proceeding. They felt that a nucleus of officers should be trained to serve on staffs as the need arose and that such officers should be trained to work with reconstruction problems once military government was terminated.

In the autumn of 1941 the various staffs agreed that military government training was a necessity but there was difficulty in agreeing on where the training responsibility lay. On November 19, 1941, General Gullion expressed a willingness to include military government instruction in a school for military police and provost marshals then being organized.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations objected to this proposal on the ground that the scope and nature of military government were so different from military police matters that the two should not be combined in a single training program. Although this objection was accepted as having some validity, it was nevertheless agreed that because of the particular qualifications of the Provost Marshal General and the work he had already done in the area, that training
responsibility should rest with him. In late December 1941, it was further agreed, although the two training concepts were widely divergent, both the military police and the military government schools could share facilities and thus avoid the expense of establishing separate training centers.

It was recommended that a school be established to train officers in "politico-military courses" in connection with their possible utilization in reconstruction of "conquered countries." The concerned staff agencies agreed and on January 7, 1942, the Secretary of War approved the plans and issued the order which established the School of Military Government. The school was temporarily lodged in Washington, D. C. The staff contemplated several proposed locations in and around the capital as a permanent site for the school. Hardy C. Dillard, Director of the Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia and a West Point classmate of General Gullion, proposed settling the school at his institution. Dr. John L. Newcomb, President of the University of Virginia, made a formal offer late in January 1942. The offer was accepted and the school opened on May 11, 1942. The initial contact with Georgetown University was dropped on the ground that the rental arrangements were unsatisfactory and that the available space was inadequate. No further mention was made of the fact that the military police and military government schools could share facilities. Ultimately, they did in some instances, such as at Fort Custer, Michigan.
In summary, there is no indication that prior to Pearl Harbor President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave more than casual attention to the subject of occupied areas. An article in Fortune in February 1943 stated that the War Department announced in March 1942 that a school for military government was to be established in Charlottesville, much to the President's surprise. There is, however, nothing in the record to indicate any knowledge, much less surprise, at that time by the President. The school was briefly mentioned in the Chief of Staff's Biennial Report for the period January-June 1942, but by the date of its publication Roosevelt was all too aware of its existence. Further, there is no indication that any question was posed as to the federal agency which would be charged with the responsibility for the formulation and implementation of occupation policy. 11
NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1 Harold Ickes, "My Twelve Years With F.D.R.", Saturday Evening Post, CCXXI (July 17, 1948) 98.


3 Memo., H. Hopkins to Milo Perkins, Jun. 16, '42, Harry Hopkins Papers, Box 115, Footnotes 1942, FDRL; President's War Relief Control Board Report, Jul. 16, '42, O.F. 4356, FDRL.

4 Executive Order 8839 Jul. 30, '41 amended Dec. 17, '41, O.F. 4226, FDRL.


7 Memo., Roosevelt to Attorney General, Dec. 12, '41, O.F. 4226, FDRL.


CHAPTER II
THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE MILITARY AT ODDS

As the war progressed it was a foregone conclusion on the part of the staffs of several Federal agencies that the responsibility for occupation would rest with a civilian group once an armistice had been signed. Army planners were equally confident that the occupation, at least in an initial stage, would be theirs. There were some military officers who even felt the American Army alone would be able to initiate the reconstruction process. This premise was based primarily on the fact that the military would be in the area to be governed. Further, it was held that the problem would not be one of reconstruction of liberated areas only but would include facing opposition in occupied areas. These officers wished the military not be hampered by other agencies of the government. In support of this position they drew on the experiences of Generals Otis, MacArthur, and Chaffee and their relations with the Schurman and Taft Committees in the Philippines at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Since assistance in liberated countries and occupation of conquered countries was an Army responsibility, it was assumed that selection and training of the personnel to carry out that responsibility lay with the Army. The military staffs were aware, however, that others were planning in this area,
primarily the Board of Economic Warfare. Since the General Staff felt quite strongly that military government could best be accomplished by the military, they wished to avoid loss of the responsibility. At the same time, it was evident to the General Staff that certain facets of military government would require civilian assistance, particularly in determining political and economic policy. It was said that the civil affairs in an occupied territory would be managed by the military but that its problems would be civil. To preclude losing the occupation responsibility and to present a complete program which would facilitate accommodation of the civilian agencies, the General Staff proposed the formulation of a unit designed to coordinate policy for occupation not only within the War Department but between it and the various Federal agencies. On July 25, 1942, the Military Government Division was organized in the office of the Provost Marshal General in order to perform these functions and to supervise the School of Military Government at Charlottesville, the Military Police Schools, and any other such units to be established.¹

Brigadier General Cornelius W. Wickersham, the Commandant of the School of Military Government, was placed in charge of this division while retaining his position as head of the Charlottesville School. Wickersham was a graduate of both Harvard College and Law School. Until early 1942 he had been a member of Cadwalder, Wickersham and Taft law firm in New York. He was the son of George W. Wickersham, Attorney General in the Taft Administration.
While these developments were taking place within the War Department, other interested officials were drawing up plans in the same area. The Reconstruction Services Committee, a part of the President's Committee on War Relief Agencies, drew up a proposal for a Civilian Rehabilitation Corps. The plan called for a training program for civilians who would then go into liberated areas to administer relief, re-educate the people, govern, and administer the areas.

Word of the proposed plan reached Mrs. Roosevelt through Harry N. Delano. Mrs. Roosevelt wrote a memo to Hopkins that she understood Herbert Hoover was behind the proposal "to train people to go abroad and mould" the post-war world in a "safer way than the present Administration can from their point of view." She suspected that the Provost Marshal General was interested in teaching and encouraging people of a conservative outlook in the school at Charlottesville. There is nothing in the files to indicate how Mrs. Roosevelt formed her opinion of the school.

Hopkins sent Mrs. Roosevelt's memo to Milo Perkins suggesting that since this was a post-war problem he consult with the President's Committee on War Relief Agencies to work out a coordinated program. Perkins responded that he had asked Harold Weston, Secretary of the Reconstruction Services Committee, not to rush into this area precipitously. Perkins had looked into the Hoover "gossip" and was of the opinion that the former President was not involved in this Reconstruction
Services Committee. The note closed "Incidently, sometime soon I would like to tell you about some work we are doing for the Army on reoccupation."³

This remark referred to a meeting the Board of Economic Warfare members had attended with School of Military Government personnel at Charlottesville. The Board of Economic Warfare and School of Military Government personnel agreed that military government and training were a military responsibility. Since the military would need assistance in personnel selection and in economic matters, the BEW personnel were enthusiastic in offering their cooperation during meetings held in July, 1942.

On June 20, 1942, the President's Committee on War Relief Agencies presented a proposal to the President asking him to appoint an interdepartmental committee of interested groups to determine occupation policy, including the training of personnel for occupation duties. Arthur C. Ringland, President's War Relief Control Board, prepared a memo for the President in which it was pointed out that several agencies were engaged in planning for liberation and occupation problems and these plans would be implemented during the period from an armistice until "the establishment of a stable pattern of administration in the affected areas."⁴ The memo also maintained that the existing School of Military Government was not on a scale sufficient to meet the expected needs as envisaged in light of the World War I experience. In view of the number
of agencies involved in the area, the President ought to appoint a committee to draw up occupation plans. It is noteworthy that at this juncture, no mention was made concerning which department should have responsibility for the overall program.

Mrs. Roosevelt evidently read the memo for on July 14, 1942, she suggested to the President that this "bears on the problem of the Charlottesville training school." Roosevelt sent the entire file to the War Department for an evaluation of the proposal for a committee. Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War, wrote to the President that extensive planning by various agencies for occupation was taking place but no one had done anything about training personnel for the job. The Army was interested, he continued, in both the planning and training. To avoid the danger of interdepartmental rivalry and a public battle among the President's staff, Patterson requested that the matter be kept at a low key until the details were worked out and responsibilities assigned. Patterson's letter to the President was then sent to Wayne Coy, Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, on July 28, 1942, with a note by the President asking Coy to speak to him about it. At this point there appears to be no real excitement about the matter as the Roosevelt memoranda are leisurely in tone with no emphatic words or punctuation marks such as he used when he was truly upset.

Mr. Coy called the Undersecretary of War and asked for a copy of the President's memo. Colonel E. S. Greenbaum,
Executive Assistant to Patterson, sent the memorandum along and included a memo of his own which, among other observations, contained the following:

The outstanding lesson gained from American experiences in military government, including the Civil War and the Philippine Insurrection, and from experiences of other countries, is that the prime direction and administration of military government belongs wholly to the military command. In recognition of its important obligation to fulfill the mission of military government, the War Department has established, under The Provost Marshal General, a School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia; Military Police Schools at Chickamauga, Tennessee, and the Division of Military Government in the Office of the Provost Marshal General.

The School of Military Government is for training the personnel to fill the key positions in military government and the Military Police Schools will train personnel to perform subordinate and preliminary functions. The Division of Military Government is taking steps to integrate, under the War Department leadership, civilian agencies both public and private, now or hereafter, to be interested in the problem of military government. Its duties include the activation of the program, to recruit, train and make available such reservoirs of additional personnel as may be deemed requisite for missions of military government, including technical experts and advisory personnel, both of whom will have to be recruited from persons presently in civil life.6

It is interesting that the essence of this memorandum is drawn from a letter written by the Assistant Director of the School of Military Government to Colonel Greenbaum under the subject: "Premature Civilian Influence in Military Government."7 The letter went on to say that, "The prime direction and administration of military government belong wholly to the military command. If there is one outstanding lesson to be
gained from prior American experience in military government, it is the unwisdom of permitting any premature interference by civilian agencies with the Army's basic task of civil administration in occupied areas." The letter concluded with an analysis of how well the Germans had administered their occupied areas and pointed out that it was a military occupation. Finally, it drew attention to the poorly administered civilian programs during the American Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and World War I. There is no direct evidence this letter was read by anyone other than Colonel Greenbaum.

The Undersecretary of War completed the file with his memo that whenever the President cared to he would set up a meeting to outline the entire program. It was assumed by the staff in the Undersecretary's Office that Coy indicated the President was satisfied the Army had taken proper steps to develop the occupation program. 8

In a conversation with Coy on August 6, 1942, the President's view of occupation policy was first voiced. Roosevelt was of the opinion that it was impossible to train men for specific occupation tasks when those tasks were unknown. He felt that the demands could be met as they occurred by men of proven experience in the areas of concern. The President felt very strongly that in Europe, particularly, the administration could be better accomplished by indigenous people and under no circumstances would the liberated people tolerate an army administration. It was possible that France could be an
exception and, in this case, the most talented men available should be pressed into service - not someone trained at Charlottesville. Roosevelt concluded this conversation with Coy by stating that the School in Charlottesville might just as well be discontinued and that he would tell Judge Patterson so. Coy responded that the Bureau of Budget people were looking into the situation and the President asked to be informed of the results of their investigation.  

Just at the time the President expressed the opinion that the school might as well be eliminated the army staff was busy completing inter-agency plans for a vastly expanded program. The school in Charlottesville was organized to train approximately 450 students a year who were to be field grade staff officers. It soon became apparent that this number would not be sufficient to meet the needs. Based on the Rhineland experience, an arithmetical formula for future requirements indicated one-tenth of one percent of the combat forces would be required in top staff duties for military government. For each top staff position three and one-half technical and advisory staff would be needed and five and one-half enlisted personnel. Thus, for each one hundred officers graduated at Charlottesville, 900 other personnel would be required for military government. This meant that a minimum of 4,525 military government personnel should be trained each year. The problem was that these people needed to be trained and ready
to assume their duties but nothing could be done with them until there were areas to be occupied. The answer to this was to establish an Army Specialist Corps Reserve. To this end it was proposed the Army begin contacting other agencies to ascertain the proper subjects for training and to assemble names of qualified personnel for commissioning in the Army Specialist Corps. A series of meetings to explore this means of carrying out such a program was held in late July and early August, 1942. From the tone of the reports on these meetings, it appears that all was proceeding well, at least at the staff working level. It seems, furthermore, that the agencies approached were happy to cooperate with the army. No question was raised at the time challenging the military assumptions concerning their occupation responsibility. Among themselves, the army staff worked to "silence any claims to leadership in the military government program by civilian agencies by giving to all of them an active part in the program but in such relation to it as to forestall their acquiring its direction or control, either singly or collectively." In addition to this, the staff felt there must be utilized, "in every possible way, the service and assistance of all organizations, whether public or private, capable of making useful and necessary contributions to the complete program." Only in this manner "complete cooperation can be achieved and the administration of the total program be safely lodged in the Army."
NOTES TO CHAPTER II


2 Memo., Mrs. Roosevelt to Hopkins, Jun. 16, '42, Harry Hopkins Footnotes, 1942, Box 115, FDRL.

3 Ltr., Milo Perkins to H. Hopkins, Jun. 24, '42, Harry Hopkins Footnotes 1942, Box 115, FDRL.


5 Memo., Mrs. Roosevelt to Roosevelt attached to Ringdale memo. in fn 4 above Jul. 14, '42, O.F. 4351 FDRL, copy also located in Patterson Papers, Under Secretary of War Files, School of Military Government, Library of Congress.

6 Ltr., Greenbaum to Coy, Jul. 30, '42, USW: Military Government, NARS.

7 Ltr., J. Miller to E. S. Greenbaum, Jul. 23, '42, Subj: Premature Civilian Influence in Military Government, SMG files 014.13, NARS.


9 Memo., Conference of Coy with Roosevelt, Aug. 6, '42, Harold D. Smith closed material, Harold D. Smith Conferences With The President 1942-Dec. 18, 1942, Vol. 13, August 6, 1942, pages 1 and 2, FDRL.

10 Memo., Miller to Gullion, Oct. 28, '42, USW (Greenbaum): Military Government, NARS.
Ltr., J. Miller to E. S. Greenbaum, Aug. 5, '42, USW (Greenbaum): Military Government, NARS; diary entry Sep. 28, '42, Oscar Cox Collection, FDRL.
CHAPTER III

THE PRESIDENT
AND THE SCHOOL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

While the military were preparing to carry out their apparently secured civil affairs mission, the executive office of the President had other action in mind. Coy sent a member of his staff, Donald Stone, ostensibly to lecture to the students at the School of Military Government, but actually to have a look at the school. Stone reported that the Charlottesville undertaking was a "misfit" and appeared "faulty," but he did not elaborate on the reasons for his judgment.¹ The Bureau of Budget staff continued to study the problem within the army and began to enquire about what other agencies such as the State Department, Board of Economic Warfare, Treasury Department, and others were doing to plan for civil affairs.

On August 13, 1942, Roosevelt asked the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, for information concerning the school. The President wrote he understood the General Staff was then making an examination of the Charlottesville establishment and he wanted a list of those taking the course and their selection qualifications.² This information was forwarded to the President on August 18, 1942. The report mentioned Cornelius W. Wickersham, Hardy C. Dillard, and Arnold Wolfers of Yale as faculty members, and among the students
listed Julius Klein who had been Assistant Secretary of Commerce during the Hoover Administration. Born in Germany and educated at Harvard, Klein had been in government service since 1917 and was reported to be the perfect public servant. He had performed yeoman service during the early years of the depression and he was an old and intimate friend of former President Hoover. Whether the President actually ever saw the report or not is unclear from available records, but others near him certainly did. The reaction was so fierce that for a while the entire occupation program seemed in danger of cancellation. In the midst of the furor, however, it was discovered that the Julius Klein enrolled was not Hoover's friend but another Julius Klein from Chicago. 3 But, no sooner than this mistake was ironed out, than there appeared an article in the Raleigh News and Observer, entitled, "Getting Ready for Imperialism?", suggesting that the soldiers in training at Charlottesville should be sent to the front to do the fighting and leave the ruling to the civilians. 4

The furor over occupation policy responsibility even before an enemy-occupied territory had been liberated, threatened to become a full-blown "press ordeal." The President tolerated "in-house" controversy but only to a point. On August 20, 1942, he admonished all those concerned through a general letter that members of the Administration would not resort to public debate in settling differing points of view. Any disagreements among heads of the conflicting agencies should be presented to the President for resolution. 5
Both Marshall and the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy had briefed the Secretary of War on the situation. In his diary, Stimson dismissed the "attacks" as angry accusations by people who had anticipated gaining the responsibility for determining occupation policy and conducting the training. "They accuse Gullion of being a fascist and all other kinds of iniquity . . . a typical New Deal attack from the New Deal Cherubs around the throne." Stimson felt the school was easily defensible and that he would be able to show the President it was necessary. On September 10, 1942, McCloy explained in a note to Harry Hopkins that there was nothing wrong with the school. He felt the entire matter rather ridiculous in view of the fact that the Army was simply getting ready to do what it would have to do. McCloy was of the opinion that the furor was being caused by "chronic under-the-bed-lookers who had visions of grand rehabilitation schemes after the war in which they themselves might play no mean part." Hopkins agreed with McCloy. The President's advisor was sure there was nothing wrong with the program.

Early in September the Undersecretary of War called for a meeting with the Secretary of Treasury, members of the staffs of the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare, and the Secretary of the Navy to discuss military government. During the course of the meeting it came out that the President was currently of the opinion that if the military were to be concerned with occupation policy, it ought to be at the Joint
Chiefs of Staff level. The Secretary of Treasury seemed to be causing trouble not because he felt there were errors in responsibility or concept but because of lack of knowledge of what was going on. As a result of this meeting, Patterson instructed the Provost Marshal General to issue a resumé of the work the army had done and its conception of how occupation duties would be handled.

The first draft of this paper said that, during a period of actual fighting, the military must have control of occupation policy. When that period passed, the civilians could assume the responsibility. Patterson suggested that the paper was appropriate but wanted some mention made of the character of the problems connected with the administration of occupied countries such as waterworks, food, currency and so on. He felt it should also show the kind of technical and advisory personnel required. The inclusion of such matters would demonstrate that the army had a grasp of the comprehensiveness of the problems and of the necessity for "first class technical and advisory personnel." A revised paper, entitled, "Synopsis of War Department Program for Military Government," was sent to all the agencies interested in military government with a cover letter signed by the Secretary of War. The letter stated that the army would recruit groups of men from the agencies who were best qualified to meet the occupation problems. It was assumed that each of the departments or agencies would want to cooperate with the War Department in this endeavor.
and it requested a project officer be appointed in each agency so that all matters dealing with occupation policy might be funneled through one man. These letters were dispatched the last week of September 1942.

Occupation policy and the School of Military Government were still controversial subjects. Rumor had it that the school was training pro-consuls to maintain military control of Europe after the war. Possibly, some of this gossip stemmed from garbled reports of discussions in the school concerning postwar reconstruction and political problems. Given the experience and background of some of the staff and the boredom of discussion about such matters as waterworks and sewers, these more theoretical subjects were a natural outlet. Unfortunately, the gossip reached cabinet level, where Harold Ickes, Secretary of Interior, and Francis Biddle, Attorney General, became the chief critics.

Early in October 1942 Gardner Jackson, Special Assistant to the Undersecretary of Agriculture, met and talked with Wickersham. During the course of the conversation Jackson asked Wickersham if the School of Military Government used any "criteria in the selection of its candidates" to determine their social attitudes, their degree of devotion to democracy, their racial attitudes, and so on. Wickersham replied that the question had never occurred and he saw no reason why it would or should since the students were selected by the military and they had a deep devotion to democracy.
Later in the month Abe Fortas, Undersecretary of Interior, wrote to the Secretary of Interior that the military should confine its occupation duties to policing functions and that occupation policy should be the "responsibility of civilians from the very outset of military occupation." He continued that if the War Department sought to recruit from civilian agencies they would get "second rate men as no one would let his most able men go." 10

Ickes became convinced that the school at Charlottesville was being conducted by Anti-New Dealers and was a school for American gauleiters who would be more concerned with imperialism than with democracy. He accused the War Department of recruiting a huge army of potentially second rate administrators. He urged the President to settle the matter before it became impossible to dismantle the huge organization the War Department was building.

These charges aroused the President and the entire occupation program was reviewed in a cabinet meeting on October 29, 1942, and again on November 6, 1942. Stimson reported that in the cabinet meeting Ickes was very upset by Gullion's synopsis. The large number of men trained for service in the occupied countries pointed towards imperialism in Ickes' view. The President indicated his chagrin at not having been consulted on the matter in the first place. He made it clear that governing occupied territory might be "of many kinds," but in most instances, it was a civilian task. The President conceded that the school might be necessary but he felt it
should be limited in scope. The limitation was necessary because the President feared that large numbers of military-trained personnel would lead to a continuing monopolization of foreign administration by the military. He expressed the view that the instructors did not seem to be the best that could have been selected. In fact, he thought they were rather second-rate and that the job required first-class men. The President further indicated his interest in the matter by asking for a complete report of what had been done, what type of instructors were being used, what courses were being taught and the type of men being trained. Roosevelt's request for full information seems odd in that he had asked for and had received an almost continuous flow of information on the subject for the past four months.11

Stimson continued to hold that the position of the Army was easily defensible and that the entire situation was a "foolish rumpus." In a lengthy diary entry he reviewed the entire episode and wrote that, heretofore, little foresight had been given to the subject of military responsibility in civil affairs; consequently, men with little or no training in political or financial affairs found themselves assigned the task of governing occupied countries. Recognizing the deficiency, the Provost Marshal General had initiated a rather ambitious program to correct this situation for the future. Stimson was of the opinion that the reason the program was under fire was just that it was perhaps overly ambitious.
Other departments were "picqued" at the program because they felt it was or could develop into an encroachment on their rightful duties. Stimson's diary entry indicated that this issue had come up earlier but McCloy had had a talk with Dean Acheson in the State Department and convinced him of the innocence of the military. "But the Cherubs" in the cabinet still were not entirely convinced and when they found out that Julius Klein was assigned to the school they pressured the President to open the subject once more.

Again, the Provost Marshal General sent along a brief of the situation, this time an immense one. Stimson was of the opinion that if the entire report were submitted the President "would think the worst had happened; it would prove to him that a formidable undertaking was underway." The Provost Marshal General's brief said that the military strongly desired to yield occupation government to civilian control as soon as the military situation permitted, but insisted that the military must determine the exact date they would relinquish control. The military concept envisaged federal civilian agencies designing policy to be implemented by the military. When military government terminated, the policies would be continued by the civil governor. Finally, the military were struck by the seeming anomaly of the executive charges of "incipient grandiose plans and mediocrity of personnel."

Stimson decided the best way to handle the entire affair was to "laugh it off as a joke" on the President concerning Julius Klein since the Julius Klein in the school was an
entirely different person "and an insignificant Jew who had pushed himself into enrollment." Stimson then discovered that the cabinet challenge also included a question of the competency of Wickersham and the impractical, theoretical character of some of the instructors. This information came from Dr. James Grafton Rogers, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army. Stimson asked McCloy to look at this charge quickly so that he could be ready with an answer if the President broached the subject again. A few days later Gullion forwarded a note to the Secretary of War pointing out that the philosophy of the school was misunderstood. The faculty had been chosen as a practical group of men of the "dirt-farming" category. Consequently, there were neither stellar names on the faculty nor esoteric subjects in the curriculum. The entire approach was vindicated in Gullion's eyes because several students had been sent to the North African area and the Allied commander there had requested that more be assigned.14

Continuing to protest, Secretary Ickes asked the President again to establish a committee to deal with this situation. Ickes argued the fact that a civilian training program must be established or the military would have the only group of "supposedly" trained personnel capable of doing the job. The upshot of these exchanges was that the President directed William C. Bullitt and Jonathan Daniels to investigate the school.15
In the notes asking Bullitt and Daniels to have a look at the "machinery" of occupation policy the President expounded his views following the rather heated cabinet meetings on the subject. The most important point was that the occupation should be a military matter initially and as long as operational necessity dictated. The military were to determine when the occupation responsibility could be relinquished to civilian authority. The President's second point was that to the extent practicable civilian authority should remain with the local existing governments and if this was not possible local civilians should exercise authority under direction of U.S. military commanders. The President concluded that no general policy for occupation could be determined because each area would pose a separate problem and thus would have to be dealt with separately. It is interesting to note that this letter was written on November 19, 1942, only a few days after the "Darlan Deal" had taken place. The practical aspects of securing a tranquil rear in support of forward combat operations overrode the immediate civilian occupation ideals voiced by the President earlier in the year. This conceptual change to meet the situation was typical of the generally pragmatic views of the President. He rarely allowed previously held theories to dictate the solution to practical problems.

The military were well aware that some of the criticism of the school, particularly with regard to the selection of
students was justified. Subsequently the staff of the Provost Marshal General's office notified all furnishing commands that only the most highly qualified personnel would be selected. The roster for the third class had already been submitted but was discarded and a new group selected.17

In a report submitted November 20, 1942, Jonathan Daniels, among other things, addressed the President's allegation that friends of the Roosevelt Administration need not apply to the school. While not strictly true, there was some basis for this charge. There were some "New Dealers" in the school, more in the second class than in the first. The New Deal men, however, were of questionable value in administration and organization. Daniels charged that, by and large, the classes were made up of over-aged men who were lawyers or insignificant civilians who were generally rated as conservatives. He was of the opinion that they were too old and set in their ways to be given the responsibility for governing strange people in strange places. Daniels further charged that there were a few outstanding, forward looking students who were "constantly paraded in all the Army's talking about the school."

Daniels asserted that the personnel running the school were overly sensitive to criticism and almost too quick to point out that they were New Dealers. Daniels doubted the sincerity of their professed liberalism. Gullion was insistent that the Army was not training American gauleiters. Daniels noted that Wickersham was "ineffectual appearing" and
read, "as he apparently reads to everyone," selected passages from the Army Manual on the justice and humanity required of an occupying army. Daniels pointed out that the Deputy Commandant, Jesse I. Miller, a former Washington lawyer, was held in high regard by the school students. Miller, however, was highly disliked by labor circles because he so vigorously opposed the formation of the National Labor Relations Board. Daniels commented that Miller denied the charge that the school was training "incompetents to be imperialists."

Daniels appeared to be worried by the concept that the military phase of occupation might be very long. Along with this problem he was concerned with the Army proposal that when the military relinquished occupation to the civilians, those same Provost Marshal trained personnel would take off their uniforms and become the civilian authorities. He feared that this would result in a police-military oriented civil administration. The final trusteeship could be repressive and Daniels was sure this was not the intention of the President.

Daniels went on to point out that occupation was a bigger problem than the military seemed willing to admit. The State, Interior, Treasury, and Agriculture Departments were all planning in the area and Daniels was impressed with how little coordination the War Department effected. Daniels proposed that a civilian be appointed to the State Department who understood the democratic process and who was devoted to the
welfare of people along with a staff to coordinate occupation policy. He pointed out that even in the initial steps taken by the Army this would be necessary as the tone for the entire occupation should be established from the beginning. He concluded that however well intentioned the Provost Marshal and his staff were, they simply could not implement the kind of occupation the President desired.  

The entire concept of civil affairs authority and responsibility had been called into question by the furor over the School of Military Government. While the attacks on the school were being made and countered, and while the Presidential investigation continued, the school attempted to meet the planned needs of the coming operation,
NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1 Memo., Coy to Roosevelt, Aug. 11, '42, OF CFWAR, FDRL.

2 Memo., Roosevelt to Gen, Marshall, Aug. 13, '42, O.F. 5136, FDRL.


4 Newspaper clipping editorial, Aug. 19, '42, School of Military Government, Undersecretary of War Files, Patterson Papers, Library of Congress.


6 Stimson Diaries, entry Aug. 27, '42, Henry L. Stimson Collection, Historical Manuscripts Division, Yale University Library, hereafter referred to as Stimson Diaries.

7 Memo., J. J. McCloy to H. Hopkins, Sept. 10, '42 and memo., H. Hopkins to McCloy, Sept. 11, '42, OFCF WAR, FDRL.

8 Ltr., Stimson to Morgenthau (as example) Sept. 17, '42, PMGO: Mil. Gov. Div., 321 PMGO Organization, NARS.

9 Ltr., G. Jackson, Dep't of Agri. to J. Miller, SMG, Oct. 13, '42, PMGO: Mil. Gov. Div. 014.13, Relations Btw. Civil and Mil. Auth., (Misc.), NARS.

10 Memo., Fortas, Under Sec. of Int. to Ickes, Sec. of Int., Oct 23, '42, OF 25 Jul - Dec 1942, FDRL.

Stimson Diaries, Entry for Wed., Nov. 4, '42 and Fri., Nov. 6, '42; draft memo., Stimson to Roosevelt staffed by Gullion, no date, PMGO; Mil. Gov. Div., 353 Inspection and Report, NARS.

Memo., B. Somervell to Gullion, Oct. 21, '42, AG 352 (12-3-41) NARS; memo., Col. R. N. Young Sec. Gen'l Staff to CG, SOS (Somervell), Oct. 30, '42, PMGO; Mil. Gov. Div., 352-S.M.G. - General, NARS.

Stimson Diaries, entry for Nov. 6, '42; memo., Gullion to Stimson, Nov. 9, '42, PMGO; Mil. Gov. Div., 352-S.M.G. - General, NARS.

Memo., Ickes to Roosevelt, Nov. 11, '42, OF 5136, FDRL; memo, for the record unsigned, Nov. 17, '42, with added note, Nov. 23, '42, USW (Greenbaum): Military Government, NARS.

Ltr., Roosevelt to W. C. Bullitt and J. Daniels, Nov. 19, '42, OF 5136, FDRL.


Memoes., Daniels to Roosevelt, Nov. 20, '42 and Feb. 8, '43, both in OF 5136, FDRL and in OF 5230, OF CFWAR, FDRL.
CHAPTER IV

THE SCHOOL ISSUE SETTLED

As Daniels completed his investigation and report to the President on the school and as Bullitt was looking at the school and the military occupation program, the Secretary of Interior made a further charge, instigated by a letter from the Assistant Secretary of Interior. On January 9, 1943, Ickes forwarded the staff memorandum to the President with a cover letter which charged that civilians were in danger of losing control of the post-war world because of a lack of a comprehensive plan and a unified purpose." The military had a plan and a purpose and thus were moving into the area by default. The Army, however well intentioned, was not capable of imbuing "foreign areas with the essentials of a democratic, social-economic structure." Ickes proposed that a Center of Administrative Studies be established by the Department of the Interior, State Department, and the Board of Economic Warfare to develop plans and train administrators for the post-war world. Ickes added that the plans of the "ambitious General Gullion" frightened him and that if the military were not stopped the United States was headed into the "worst kind of trouble." The President gave both these notes to Jonathan Daniels for his comment.¹

38
In mid-December 1942, Bullitt had verbally reported to the President that the accusations against the school and Wickersham were without foundation. On January 14, 1943, after consulting with State, War, Navy, and Interior department staff members and visiting the schools with Dr. James Grafton Rogers, representing the Chief of Staff, Bullitt submitted a written report to the President. By this time, the United States was faced with the practical problem of the occupation of North Africa. Thus the theory and planning could be evaluated in the light of actual experience. The former ambassador to France could find no trace of imperialism in the School's orientation and found the students not being trained as military dictators at all. When the relatively low quality of the students had been pointed out, Wickersham took almost immediate action to assure that a better caliber of men were recruited for the school. Bullitt did criticize the school because there was no foreign language training. He pointed out that language capability was critical in exercising effective control in occupied areas. The school implemented foreign language training. Finally, Bullitt was of the opinion that area team training was of greater value than general training. He reported to the President that Wickersham agreed and area training had been implemented. Bullitt felt the school to be of great value and that it ought to be enlarged. He pointed out that Wickersham was doing a good job and that the school had only been in
operation seven months. Since the school was being properly developed Bullitt assured the President he need worry no further. He did suggest, however, that it would be well to have someone visit the school later to ascertain that it was progressing as planned.²

Dr. Rogers reported within military circles essentially the same criticisms as Bullitt. Rogers was of the opinion that the criticism of the school, although not unfounded, was unjust. As a result, he felt that some new guidance would be appropriate as the present administration had become overly defensive. He proposed the Army appoint an advisory board consisting of a diplomat, a senior army officer, and a scholar. This idea was picked up by Jesse Miller, Director, Military Government Division, Provost Marshal's Office, and proposed to Isadore Lubin, a Hopkins assistant who was also a close friend of the President. Lubin suggested that the military might invite some well known, liberal-minded civilians to assist in screening candidates for the school. He felt this would allay the imperialistic suspicions current in the cabinet. Stimson disagreed but changed his mind when it was explained to him that the committee was not to decide who would or would not be commissioned. An advisory committee headed by Oscar Chapman, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, and consisting of John Corson, Social Security Board, and Major Charles Schottland, formerly of the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services, was appointed.³
In view of the events which led to the establishment of the School of Military Government it is significant that at the height of the furor the commander of the British School for Civil Affairs visited Charlottesville and was so impressed that he suggested the British effort be repatterned after it and that British officers be allowed to attend the American school. The third class which began in January 1943 had two British officers on the roster. By the time the fourth class started in May 1943, there was a British officer on the teaching staff and exchange students from Poland, Norway, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Great Britain. Subsequently, Canadian, French, Czechoslovakian, and officers from Luxembourg attended.  

In spite of the fact that Ickes had given permission for one of his staff to serve on the advisory committee, Ickes remained suspicious. He and Chapman worked to improve the school but Ickes continued to maintain that occupation policy and administration should be civilian-controlled. Both Daniels and Ickes agreed that there was little hope the advisory committee could cure the alleged ills of the school. Daniels also continued to be alert to the program at Charlottesville but he seemed never to be alarmed by it.  

The School of Military Government staff were careful never again to venture into the civilian realm. Their approach was that the military would do all it could while it had the responsibility but the civilians should have the job just as
soon as possible. Despite this official position Gullion continued to defend his views. He pointed out that the Army effort was small indeed when compared to the German experience. There were 7,000 Germans in Poland alone dealing with the occupation while the total planned American effort was less than 6,000. Another of the defenses of the system rested on a letter from General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, Western Task Force, stating that fifteen graduates of the school had arrived and were of exceptional value. The field commander would like to have ten more as soon as possible. It should have been noted in Washington that the field commanders had been polled for their opinions and the Commander, Caribbean Defense, responded that he had one graduate of the School of Military Government, did not need him, and suggested he be transferred.

Gullion personally chaffed at the attacks and claimed in a letter to General Leroy H. Watson in February, 1943 that they were unfair. In this letter, Gullion attempted to rationalize the Army position by reviewing the history of military government from the Byzantine Empire to the American experiences. These philosophical and historical meanderings of the Provost Marshal General resulted in the President taking a dim view of the General. He commented that he would like to see Gullion some time and talk to him. "He evidently has no elasticity of mind and he needs some." Stimson supported Gullion through the tirades and was quite bitter about the attacks on the school, its program, and its staff. He had
visited the school and felt that it was performing a very useful function. He left Charlottesville with the opinion that since he had inspected the school himself he was secure in meeting any criticism that might be offered.

Even the Nazi and the Negro entered the problem. The German radio aired the school's history and intent for the Germans and Italians under the broadcast heading: "The Foundation on Roosevelt's Order of A Political and Military College." The gist of the broadcast was the "boundless arrogance of the United States" in planning for an occupation when they had not yet made any serious attempt at waging war. Furthermore, it was presumptuous of the Americans to assume that it could ever possibly understand European problems and provide an effective occupying force.  

In February 1943, Rufus E. Clement, President of Atlanta University, wrote Mrs. Roosevelt asking that Negroes be trained for occupation duty. Mrs. Roosevelt turned to the President with the problem. He, in turn, suggested she take the issue up directly with the Secretary of War. In her note to Stimson, Mrs. Roosevelt suggested that if the problems in Virginia were too great perhaps some Negroes could be trained at Columbia University in the Navy program. The problems of housing, feeding and so on were such at the University of Virginia that no Negroes were ever trained there. The Army staff officers were aware of and deplored discrimination but were helpless to act in this area since the facilities had been provided at a nominal cost to the government.
Ickes continued to press for firmer civilian control of civil affairs. In March 1953, the Secretary of State, at the direction of the President, created an Interdepartmental Committee to study the need for civilian personnel for non-military overseas service. Oscar Chapman worked with this group as well as serving on the Army Advisory Committee. This new committee was comprised of representatives from thirteen Federal agencies. Those who advocated the formation of the committee saw it as the vehicle for a non-military occupation authority. The authority was designed to be the point of contact in Washington for all agencies dealing with occupation matters as well as dealing with manning and establishing policy for actual occupations. Daniels was of the opinion that it would assure the proper democratic attitudes were imbued in the occupation; attitudes which he was not convinced the military held. This unit appeared to be the answer to the muddle in Washington.\textsuperscript{10}

In April 1943, the War Department staff met to frame a policy concerning its attitude toward the Interdepartmental Committee. The staff confirmed the policy that the responsibility for civil affairs and military government training, regardless of the area, rested with the Provost Marshal General under the supervision of the Personnel Branch. The military staff took the position that in view of the President's opinion in late 1942 that indigenous personnel or indigenous governments should assume control of liberated or occupied
countries following the military period, there was no need for civilian agencies to train civilian government administrators. Finally, the military were aware that the expertise of personnel in the various government agencies would be required in the military phase of an occupation, thus training and coordination between those agencies and the Army would be necessary. This staff work ultimately was fruitless as the committee was never able to establish itself nor was civilian training ever implemented.  

The School of Military Government did not draw the attention of the President after March 1943, although Walter Winchell, the news commentator, attempted to interest the President's secretary in bringing the "Anti-New Dealer" issue before the President once again later in 1943. In April 1943, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation (OFRRO), recognizing the need for trained personnel and having no such facilities, requested permission to place their personnel in the Army school. The Army trained OFRRO personnel as long as the school was in operation.

In May 1943, the Interdepartmental Committee had before it a proposal by Lehman of OFRRO to recruit and train civilians for participation in military government. The War Department took the position that OFRRO was attempting to implement a program before it had been properly formulated. This proposal and response were typical of official wartime Washington where agencies were sprouting and spreading overnight. Everyone
wanted to cooperate but they were reluctant to commit resources without a written directive.

Although the course content and the attitude of the instructors never drew the attention of the President again, others continued to debate the old issues. In April 1943, Paul K. Appleby, Undersecretary of Agriculture, sent a long memorandum to both Jonathan Daniels and Harold Smith, Director, Bureau of the Budget. In this study Appleby drew attention to the fact that the military had begun training people for civil affairs and military government duties without having had the problems of such duties analyzed by any government agency. He pointed out there was quite a sophisticated civil affairs training program being conducted by the educational institutions of the United States but that no one yet knew the value of the program. In view of these discrepancies and because of lack of employment of School of Military Government graduates in North Africa, there was no standard of measurement to determine if the training being given was appropriate. Appleby suggested that a statement of general policy was required and a determination of the means necessary to achieve that policy would follow.

The theme of civilian direction and active participation in civil affairs and military government was constantly stressed throughout the Appleby report. He criticized the Army and the university contractors for training practical people in banking, waterworks management, farming, and so on. He stressed
that rather than this type of training what was needed was a great number of people who knew treasury functions and economic systems and so on. Appleby was of the opinion that occupation was simply a matter of good, public administration management. He continued to stress that the Charlottesville school was training in the routine operations of municipalities when the crying need was to train "high-level, national government people of administrative capacity and policy sensitivity."

Events in Sicily and Italy, scarcely three and one-half months later, were not to bear out Appleby's position. This "high-level" approach Appleby proposed was one of the reasons the school program had been attacked earlier on in the fray.

Another attack on the School came in June 1943, when S. Harrison Thomson, Editor, The Journal of Central European Affairs, wrote to the Provost Marshal General stating that the competency of the faculty at the School of Military Government was questionable. Thomson charged that the faculty included imperialists, charlatans, refugee political lameducks, or men who were deliberately chosen on the ground that they knew nothing of Europe.

A War Department staff officer responded that whether a teacher was an imperialist or not was irrelevant because imperialism as an attitude was not part of the school program. Viewpoints supportive of imperialism, isolationism, and so on, were in the civilian realm and thus were not the business of a military government officer. The letter concluded with a
lengthy analysis of the students and faculty. Mr. Thomson wrote again stating that imperialism could be insinuated into any situation and he was shocked that a man teaching at the school was not for freedom and that a classicist was given a teaching position simply because he was a Rhodes Scholar. In essence, this was the charge levied against the school a year earlier and the response of the military was the same. The staff member who framed the letter to Mr. Thomson was on loan to the War Department from the Bureau of the Budget - the office which only a few months earlier had been concerned with the attitude now being put forward by one of their own. Despite arguments of this nature, others visited the school from the various agencies in Washington and approved of it.  

By mid 1943, there were two schools of military government in North Africa and there were other civilian contract schools in the United States filling the requirements for civil affairs and military government personnel. Within Army circles there was discussion that the Charlottesville facility should be closed. One of the reasons it continued was that after the antipathy to it faded in 1943, the school came to be associated with the farsightedness and efficiency of the Army. The staff felt that to allow it to cease operation might bring down more criticism. The last civil affairs and military government personnel trained for Europe began in February 1944.
Between May 11, 1942 and April 29, 1944, 3,550 U. S. Army officers were trained in civil affairs and military government for the European Theater.

Until the end of 1943, the charge was still being made that the School of Military Government system was dominated by "dyed-in-the-wool" Republicans and a suggestion was put forward that the President or one of his trusted advisors might look into the situation. Roosevelt did not respond.

Operations in the field which would vitally affect both the theory and practice of civil affairs and military government were now commanding attention.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1 Ltr., Ickes to Roosevelt, Jan. 9, '43, OF 5136, FDRL; memo., Roosevelt to Watson, Jan. 11, '43, OF 4351 Post-War Plans, FDRL.

2 Ltr., Bullitt to Roosevelt, Dec. 17, '42, PPF 1124, Bullitt, Hon. William C., FDRL; ltrs., Bullitt to Patterson and Patterson to Bullitt both dated Dec. 30, '42, School of Military Government Under Secretary of War Files, Patterson Papers, Library of Congress.

3 Memo., Wickersham to Gullion, Jan. 8, '43, PMGO; Mil. Gov. Div., 352.01 Establishment of School of Military Government, NARS; ltr., Ickes to Stimson, Jan. 5, '43, Book 601, 1-5 Jan. '43, Morgenthau Diaries, Morgenthau Collection, FDRL.

4 CAD, History Military Government Training, Nov. 30, '44, 5 not in print; memo., Miller to Wickersham, Dec. 22, '42, SMG Files, Box 762, NARS.

5 Memo., Daniels to Roosevelt, Feb. 8, '43, OF 5136, FDRL.


7 Memo., Roosevelt to Watson, Feb. 16, '43, OF 255 War Department, PMG 1942-1945, FDRL.

8 Ltr., Wolfers to Miller, Jan. 19, '43, PMGO 300.7, Manuals, Handbooks, General, NARS.

9 Ltr., R. E. Clement to Mrs. Roosevelt, Feb. 18, '43; memo., Roosevelt to Mrs. Roosevelt, Mar. 3, '43; memo., Mrs. Roosevelt to Stimson, Mar. 4, '43; ltr., Stimson to Mrs. Roosevelt; all in SMG Files 291.2, Box 774, NARS.

10 Ltr., Stimson to Hull, Mar. 15, '43, CAD 353 (3-8-43) Sec 1, NARS.

12 Ltr., Winchell to G. Tully, Dec. 15, '43, OF 5136, FDRL.

13 Memo., Hilldring to McCloy, May 17, '43, CAD 230 (3-5-43) (1), NARS.

14 Unsigned, undated paper, Subj: Things Needing Definition or Management in Connection with Reoccupation, Appleby Papers, Box, OPT, FDRL.

15 Ltr., Thomson to PMG, Jun. 28, '43; ltr., Hyneman to Thomson, Jul. 6, '43; ltr., Thomson to Hyneman, Jul. 10, '43; ltr., Hyneman to Thomson, Jul. 13, '43, all in PMGO: Mil. Gov. Div.: 330.14, Criticisms (General), NARS.

CHAPTER V

PRE-INVASION PLANS
FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS IN NORTH AFRICA

In retrospect the initial planning for civil affairs matters in the liberation of North Africa bordered on the ludicrous. Those dealing with the situation were somewhat naive. The President imagined it a rather simple matter of turning affairs over to whichever French authorities exercised control over the geographic area, with coordination through the State Department. Several of the wartime agencies in Washington assumed they would be responsible for parts, if not all, of civil affairs. The military ordered up a few tons of chocolate, some barter goods, and a few medical supplies to help the local people during the first forty-two days after the liberation, by which time they would have overcome the dislocation of changing regimes.

How quickly all were to learn that civil affairs were a vastly complicated business and that mountains of goods were needed by the local population first to survive, later to be self-sustaining, and later still to make any material contribution to the war. To the credit of the Americans working in the field they soon learned there were no simple answers to liberation problems. Civil affairs in North Africa were further complicated because it involved relations
with a suspected ambitious partner, Great Britain, a defeated country embroiled in socio-political reorientation, France, and a watchful, suspicious ally, the Soviet Union. In addition to these complications there was the confusing situation in Washington concerning who was responsible for civil affairs and a multitude of organizational problems.

In the beginning of Operation TORCH, the President had turned a rather jaundiced eye to civil affairs because of the continuing problems within the School of Military Government. He was acutely aware of the in-fighting within his Administration and knew his subordinates were watching each other closely as a result of rather serious, open arguments in Washington. Finally, the President and the Prime Minister were forced into a rather precarious situation by the war itself. There was simply not enough trained manpower or material to mount an assured successful invasion of North Africa, yet it was imperative to protect the Mediterranean area and take the pressure off the British forces in Egypt. It was equally imperative to involve America actively and successfully in the war in Europe. This forced America and Britain to adopt an approach with the French which neither leader found entirely palatable. With this in mind it is small wonder any headway was made at all in civil affairs in Africa.

For sometime prior to the invasion of North Africa, reports from the Americans on the ground indicated that the local population and military-civilian leaders would not
oppose American action but would resist any British force. French cooperation was essential to maintain rearward tranquility. It was hoped that they would contribute to the forces opposing the Germans in North Africa and that they would soon contribute surplus foodstuffs to the war effort. Despite the gulf between what was desired and what was possible, the Americans working in civil affairs never ceased to think things would work out as hoped.

From the beginning, the North African operation was Roosevelt's concept. He overrode his military advisors' objections and initially Churchill's alternate proposal in ordering the invasion and he established the pattern for the occupation. All during this period, it was clear that the President considered the Department of State as the proper agency for administering civil affairs in liberated areas.¹

It is not the purpose of this work to trace the complete unfolding Franco-American relations during the war. Certain aspects of those relations, however, must be treated because they had a profound effect on the President's thinking, not only about the policies in North Africa, but in Metropolitan France and other areas as well.

In the period after 1940, when relations between Great Britain and France were in a shambles, President Roosevelt felt that American representation at Vichy was of importance to the Allied cause. Admiral William D. Leahy, later the President's Chief of Staff, and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was sent to Vichy for the express purpose of
bolstering whatever spirit of resistance remained in the French after the surrender. The United States furnished non-military supplies to both unoccupied France and the French colonies in Africa, to help assure either the neutrality of the French fleet or its escape, and to preserve the neutrality of the colonies. There were American economic and political experts from the State Department at several locations in North Africa.

During the spring and summer of 1942, as the decision was being weighed concerning the liberation of North Africa, many reports surfaced through both military and civilian channels giving various estimates on the situation in North Africa. The preponderance of opinion reaching the President indicated that the French were quite pro-American and would support an invasion. There were some official pronouncements and informal reports, however, that the Vichy regime, the North African government, and military leaders would resist any invasion. On balance the State Department, the War Department, and the White House felt there would only be a token resistance if the invasion were American.²

The problem was to gain a definite commitment for the Allies from a French civil or military leader in North Africa of sufficient stature to assure there would be no resistance. General Henri H. Giraud appeared to be the man who met the American requirements and negotiations were opened with him through intermediaries in French North Africa.³ Giraud at one critical point in history could perhaps have been the "man of destiny." In 1942, Combat, one of the resistance newspapers
in France, hailed the General as an "inflexible and unsullied soldier. He has kept his sword immaculate for the service of France." Moreover, to many Frenchmen, he came to be regarded as a French General in charge of French soldiers in an Allied Army; not merely a leader of a handful of French volunteers under the "wing of the British in London." 4

It should be noted that the Free French movement was represented in Washington by a group who attempted to gain official American recognition of their cause. The British had recognized the group under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle. The Americans refused to extend such recognition for very complex reasons. Because of American ties to Vichy, occasional reports trickling back to Washington that the Gaullists were not particularly popular in France, and intense personal dislike of de Gaulle by both Hull and Roosevelt, the Administration saw no value in recognizing the Free French movement as the French government-in-exile. As events in Washington, London, and North Africa unfolded, there was increasing pressure on the Americans by the British and the Free French to recognize de Gaulle and work with him. The Americans were not then prepared to take such action. The Undersecretary of State, Sumner Welles, suggested the Gaullist group join other French outside Metropolitan France in a union dedicated to liberating the country. Welles was of the opinion that some control over de Gaulle would be necessary. The Administration took the stand even before the Americans entered the war that
it would support and give encouragement to any French element resisting aggression. As one official stated, the Americans should "stiffen Petain, energize Weygand, and support de Gaulle." The upshot was that wherever the Free French were actually in control of a geographical area, the American government was prepared to work with them, but it was not prepared to extend diplomatic recognition to the Fighting French as the legal government of France. In the arrangement of the political affairs organization for North Africa, the President's influence can be seen quite strongly. As the plans for invasion went forward, the British War Office suggested that a planning-working staff of Americans and British be formed to plan civil affairs with the idea that this group could later become the Civil Affairs Section of Allied Forces Headquarters. The U. S. Army staff agreed to the concept; the British, subsequently, quietly expanded their representation on the staff. This presented no particular problem in North Africa but it would later in Italy. Robert Murphy was designated by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War to be head of the planning staff and H. Freeman Matthews of the State Department was named as the deputy early in August 1942. In September, Marshall asked the President to make this arrangement formal. On September 22, 1942, Roosevelt notified Murphy that upon the occupation of French North Africa by American forces, he would act as the advisor for civil affairs under Eisenhower. Murphy was also
designated to serve as Chief, Civil Affairs Section, Headquarters, Allied Forces, and at the same time retained his position within the State Department hierarchy. All matters of civil affairs in French North Africa were entrusted to Murphy. In the initial planning for the operation, Eisenhower had asked for a political advisor on his staff. He had stipulated, however, that the staff member have no other avenue of official communication upward than through himself. This was not to be the case with Murphy who had direct access to both the President and the Secretary of State. Murphy was officially designated the President's personal representative in the theater on December 18, 1942. At the same time, Roosevelt specifically mentioned that Murphy was to remain on Eisenhower's staff.7

The British were concerned that they were playing a secondary role in civil affairs activities in North Africa. The Foreign Office staff were suspicious of the "inexperience of the American Generals" and the lack of "real understanding of the French state of mind."8 Roosevelt suggested that Churchill might want to name a counterpart to Murphy to represent the British on Eisenhower's staff, provided Eisenhower agreed, Harold Macmillan was appointed as Minister Resident at Allied Forces Headquarters. The American ambassador to Great Britain felt the title inappropriate since Macmillan would not be equal to Murphy or subordinate to Eisenhower. Roosevelt took up the matter of titles and duties with Churchill. The Prime Minister explained that he had intended Macmillan to serve with
Eisenhower in precisely the same manner as Murphy; he proposed a new title, "His Majesty's Government's Political Representative at General Eisenhower's Headquarters." No more was mentioned on the subject until the Sicily campaign organization was discussed.9

On the surface the "triple-hatting" of Murphy might appear to have led to awkwardness in the conduct of civil affairs. Apparently, because of the close working relations between Murphy, Eisenhower, Marshall, and Roosevelt, fewer difficulties were encountered than might be imagined. There was one occasion on which Murphy attempted to influence the conduct of military affairs. While Eisenhower was temporarily in England, Murphy asked the President to delay the initial landings in North Africa so that Giraud might have time to establish control over the French in order to assure their support of the Allies. On November 2, 1942, the President responded through Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, that the invasion was to proceed as scheduled and that Murphy would simply have to explain this to Giraud as best he could without divulging the date or location of the landings until Eisenhower authorized him to do so.10

The administrative methods established for the civilian conduct of the occupation in North Africa also reflected the direct influence of the President. Once Roosevelt had charged the State Department with the responsibility for civil affairs
and appointed a civilian, Robert Murphy, to head the civil affairs organization in the field, he assumed that all problems were eliminated.

Despite Roosevelt's arrangements, civil affairs problems were prominent in every phase of the military operation. When Eisenhower arrived at Gibraltar on the eve of the invasion, he met with Giraud. The French general erroneously assumed he was to be offered command of the invading forces; he further demanded a simultaneous attack in Southern France. Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, and Gabriel Kolko, in their works on World War II, maintain that Roosevelt, through Robert D. Murphy, had promised these conditions to Giraud. Arthur L. Funk and Milton Viorst, in their recent works, provide an intriguing explanation of this situation. After a long period of negotiating, Giraud agreed to participate in the operation in a reduced role.11

In October 1942, during the negotiations between Major General Charles E. Mast, Commander of the French Algiers Division and representative of General Giraud in French North Africa, and Murphy, Mast indicated Admiral Jean-Francois Darlan, the "anointed heir" to Marshal Henri Petain, wished to join the Allied cause. Murphy indicated some interest in the Darlan move. While Murphy was negotiating with Mast and Giraud about the Allied landings, he was encouraging the State Department and the War Department to consider the case of Darlan. Murphy was of the opinion that Darlan would come to
North Africa if there were a large scale invasion and if he did there would certainly be no French opposition. Murphy wanted to encourage Darlan; he had been given specific permission to negotiate with the Admiral by Roosevelt. Mast conveyed to Murphy that Giraud was certain the French army and navy units within North Africa would follow Giraud. At the same time, Mast was convinced that Darlan could not command a following in North Africa.12

Early in November 1942, the Consul General in Algiers, Felix Cole, wired the Secretary of State that Darlan was on a visit to French North Africa under the auspices of General Oskar Vogl, President of the Wiesbaden Armistice Commission. It was the Consul General’s impression that Darlan appeared then not to be so emotionally opposed to the British and Americans as formerly. Despite the nuance of change, Cole felt the Admiral had no prestige with either the military or civilians in North Africa.13

Just before the invasion Darlan was called to the bedside of his son who had been stricken with polio in Algiers. General Mark Clark, in his work, Calculated Risk, maintains that Darlan was sufficiently aware of and impressed with the Allied plans to plan to be in Algiers on the eve of the liberation. The fact that there was to be an invasion was certainly known by the Admiral but the timing and his appearance remain somewhat mystifying unless it was mere coincidence. Peter Tompkins maintains that Darlan knew of the invasion
plans within a day or two and deliberately arranged to be in North Africa during that time. With Darlan on the scene all the political arrangements went awry. The French military and political leaders would no longer follow Giraud. Giraud refused to cooperate further with the Allies unless charged directly to do so by the Admiral. A crisis had developed in attempting to deal with the situation, the Allies became embroiled in an uncomfortable situation which was to plague them for the remainder of the war and was to have a direct bearing on British-French-American relations for years to come.
NOTES TO CHAPTER V


5 Memo., Bullitt to Roosevelt, Jul. 1, '41, PPF 1124, FDRL; memo., Atherton to Welles, FRUS 1942, Vol. II 544; memo. of conversation by Welles, May 11, '42, Ibid., 513; memo., Asst. Sec. of War to Ch. of Staff, Nov. 25, '42, OPD 336, Sec. 1, NARS.

6 Memo., Dunn to Hull, Feb. 17, '43, Subject File, France General, Hull Collection, LOC.


Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (Harper, New York, 1950) 96; Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Total War: Causes and Courses of the Second World War (The Penguin Press, London, 1972) 307; A. L. Funk, The Politics of Torch (Univ. Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1974) 60ff; Milton Virost, Hostile Allies: FDR and de Gaulle. (The Macmillan Company, New York) 100; msg., Eisenhower to Marshall, Nov. 7, '42, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, The War Years: II (The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1970) 665; Stimson Diaries entry for Nov. 8, '42. It has been documented for a number of years that prior to the invasion Murphy, in the name of the United States, promised Giraud through intermediaries in North Africa that 1) one of the Allies' war aims was the restoration of France in Europe and its colonial empire as it existed in 1939, 2) French sovereignty would be restored in Metropolitan France and her colonial territories, 3) the U.S. would not interfere in matters of national administration or the exercise of French sovereignty, 4) French areas would be placed under French commanders as soon as possible after liberation, 5) the U.S. would make every effort to equip a French Army, 6) and that any military action in French areas would be conducted by American troops. As early as Feb. '43, Roosevelt was aware these promises had been made. The British had made essentially the same promises to de Gaulle in Aug. '40. See memo., Hull to Roosevelt, Feb. 9, '43, Map Room Files, Box 12, France Folder: Naval Aide's Files; France 1942-45, State Dept., FDRL; memo. of conversation Hull and Lord Halifax, Feb. 4, '43, State Dept. 851 R.00/331, NARS; Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War (Random House, Inc., New York, 1963) 66; Giraud maintained, however, that a clandestine American source promised him essentially those conditions listed and in addition promised him command of all Allied forces in areas where
French forces were fighting. The clandestine American source has never been identified. The promises in Giraud's files are marked O.K. Roosevelt, but not in Roosevelt's hand and his notes were always marked O.K. FDR, rather than Roosevelt.

12 Burns, Roosevelt, 291; msg., Murphy to Leahy, Oct. 15, '42, FRUS, 1942, Vol. II, 394; undated msg., Murphy to Handy, OPD 336 Africa, Murphy Messages, NARS.


CHAPTER VI

THE DARLAN ARRANGEMENT

The Allied debarkation took place as scheduled on November 8, 1942, with varying degrees of resistance by the French. Murphy and Clark proceeded to Algiers to negotiate new terms with Darlan or to seize him, if necessary. After rather intensive deliberation, an agreement between Clark, Darlan, and Giraud was reached. Later in November, this agreement was formalized at Algiers after the draft had been approved by the President. Eisenhower pressed for the President's approval because he felt very strongly that Allied success "in the battle about to start in Tunisia" depended on the background support the French were providing. In this move the military were supported by Roosevelt even though it caused the President a great deal of embarrassment with critics at home, with the British, and with the Russians. From several quarters the President was attacked for collaborating with fascist leaders while refusing support to the independent French elements centered around de Gaulle.¹

When the Darlan arrangement became known in Washington, there was such an uproar that Stimson and McCloy were hard pressed to explain Eisenhower's actions, especially to some of Roosevelt's warmest supporters. Leahy wrote that "in spite of our full adoption of Stalin, even the President offers strong objections to any agreement with Darlan." Morgenthau,
for one, was beside himself; he was so "sick about it he no longer had any interest in the war." Stimson had him, along with Archibald MacLeish and Felix Frankfurter, to tea on November 16, 1942, to explain the situation and felt he had mollified the Secretary. This was not true, however, because Roosevelt had to justify the affair to Morgenthau personally the following day.²

The Vice President wrote that it was critical for the post-war world to be certain the Allies made only proper arrangements in these initial days of occupation. Wallace suggested that in the future Harold Smith and Hull examine all such proposals before the President agreed to them. Oscar Cox, Office of Lend Lease Administration, suggested that French affairs were in such a state perhaps it would be just as well to have a military government or a United Nations government in trust until a democratic government could be established. Even Mrs. Roosevelt voiced her dislike of the arrangement. When Stimson heard that Wendell Wilkie intended to blast the President over the affair, he called Wilkie and after a heated exchange Wilkie finally agreed to be "shackled." Samuel I. Rosenman was of the opinion that the President had never before been more deeply affected by a political attack, chiefly because it came from those who usually supported Roosevelt.³

The Russians reluctantly approved of the Darlan arrangement but wanted it made clear that no government would be established in North Africa without first consulting with them.
The State Department staff advised the Secretary that the American government should keep the Soviet Union informed but that prior consultation could conceivably hamper military action. Not even the American government had not been consulted in the purest sense of the term prior to the North African arrangements.⁴

Earlier Roosevelt cabled Churchill explaining the situation. The President wanted Darlan, Giraud, and de Gaulle to understand that the political maneuvers in North Africa were solely in the interest of military expediency and that any decision by any one of them, or by all of them concerning the government of French North Africa was subject to the review and approval of Eisenhower. For instance, on one occasion when Darlan wished to inform French civil servants in the colonies that he had assumed the defense and administration of the French empire until that "sacred trust" could be returned to Petain, Roosevelt personally refused to have such a message processed through American communications facilities. His objection was based on the idea that to do so would implicitly recognize the Petain-Darlan regime and the President was unwilling to do this.⁵ Thus he defined his feelings on the matter and at the same time demonstrated his willingness to tolerate political abuse for military expediency. The President felt that civil affairs and military government were within the purview of the chief executive; however, it was necessary and expedient during the operational phase that
the military exercise control over such matters. The implications of an initial military phase did not appear to concern the President.

Although the President had ostensibly approved the Darlan arrangement purely on the grounds of military expediency, it could be argued that this may have been his manner of side-stepping the issue of sorting out French affairs as they were related to Anglo-American relations. The British were strong supporters of de Gaulle. Their entire relationship with France and their plans for post-war affairs hinged on this position. If they were forced to abandon de Gaulle their aspirations for a balance of European power and an economically strong Europe could not be realised. They pressed this point in discussions with the President. The liberals and the socialists in the House of Commons caused great difficulty over the affair. Lord Halifax, British Ambassador to the United States, discussed the Darlanists and their anti-British, anti-Jewish regime on occasion with Hull, Leahy, and Roosevelt. He proposed forming a more democratic government in North Africa; by which he meant a Gaullist government. Leahy informed the ambassador that it was necessary to accept Darlan "or anybody who can and will join in our effort against the Axis Powers." The emotional reaction of the President and the Secretary of State to de Gaulle was bolstered by reports reaching the Americans. Although the thoroughness of the reporting could be doubted, Roosevelt and Hull felt they were justified in their concern that de Gaulle was the desired
leader for post-war France. Actually, neither de Gaulle nor any of the Vichyites in North Africa, for that matter, were democratic enough according to the ideas of the Roosevelt Administration.⁸

From other vantages, the Darlan Deal was a convenient expedient. Prior to and during the initial military operation the French political scene of the era 1934-1940 was re-enacted in microcosm — the bickering, venality, and place seeking. Though he shared in full measure the vices of other French political figures Darlan was accepted by most French military officers in North Africa as the legitimate heir of Petain. In addition, although Roosevelt was convinced that the civilians should ultimately be responsible for civil affairs, he could see that they were not yet organized to assume such duties. With Darlan assuming control of the North African political administration, the Allied military could concentrate on combat operations and the War Department, State Department, and all the other agencies attempting to gain control of the situation were free to continue planning.⁹

Negotiations which had been proceeding between the Gaullists and Giraud came to a complete halt when Giraud accepted the Darlan arrangement. The Gaullists were violently opposed to Darlan who embodied what they hated most. They took the matter up with the State Department. The Assistant Secretary of State patiently explained many times in great detail the situation but the Gaullists never agreed to accept the arrangement. The group then took the matter up with the
President. Roosevelt again explained the arrangements. He stressed this time that the United States was "the occupying power in North Africa," and that "the final decisions would be reached solely by that occupying power." Sumner Welles reported this meeting. The Fighting French were alleged to have said no foreigner would be permitted to administer a French "town, village, or farmhouse." Welles concluded by remarking that at no time did the callers express any gratitude for what the Americans had done for the French. As the North African situation became more and more a political arena, Roosevelt came to regard the whole affair as a military occupation which was utilizing indigenous administrators.  

Eisenhower was aware of the President's problems. He wired General Marshall to explain to the President that any other arrangement would have necessitated a huge combat operation and an army of occupation. Only Darlan was able to stop the French resistance. Eisenhower commented that the actual state of affairs did not agree "even remotely with some of the prior calculations."  

During the Darlan negotiations a similar situation arose in French West Africa. The Allies wished to secure use of that strategically located colony but encountered difficulty because Governor General Francois Pierre Boisson was loyal to Vichy. When Darlan threw his influence to the Allies' cause, Boisson joined him. Eisenhower immediately opened negotiations with Darlan and Boisson to draw the area into
the war on the Allies' side. The draft agreement denoted Darlan as the "High Commissioner for French North Africa" and referred to the "French Imperial Federation." The President reviewed the negotiations and gave the needed approval but at the same time emphasized that the agreement was being made out of military necessity and in no way was to be construed as implying formal American recognition of the local regime as the government of France. Roosevelt further informed the theater commander that rather than signing an agreement he preferred a joint announcement. He also informed Eisenhower that the term "French Imperial Federation" was not to be used by the Allies for Roosevelt did not want to imply any step toward political recognition of a French government. That term, or any other term any French group wanted to use to describe themselves, was of no concern to the President as long as the Americans did not use it. The local French authorities in French West Africa and Togoland, like those in North Africa, were to continue to exercise administrative sovereignty over their areas.

Subsequently, Eisenhower attempted to negotiate an agreement between the Vichy French, the British, and the Gaullists in West Africa. Part of the problem there was that each side charged the other held political prisoners. Each of the groups further charged that opposition propaganda was causing difficulty. The job of completing the negotiations in this matter was left to Rear Admiral William A. Glassford who was
assigned as chief of a United States Mission to French West Africa. The purpose of the Glassford mission was to arrange for the use of military bases in French West Africa, secure the cooperation of the portions of the French fleet in French West African ports, and to lay plans for the economic rehabilitation of the area. Later the President appointed the Admiral his personal representative in French West Africa. Roosevelt instructed Welles to secure the approval of all concerned prior to the official appointment. The State Department, War Department, and the Theater approved of Glassford but Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, preferred to see Admiral Richard Byrd in the post. Roosevelt overrode King's wishes and appointed Glassford who was directed to report to the North African Theater Commander on all items of a military nature, to the Chief Civil Affairs Officer in North Africa for all political instructions, and to the Navy for specific instructions in other matters. The record shows the Americans and local French authorities were fearful that the British intended to align the area politically and economically to their possessions in that part of Africa. To counter this, Glassford was named United States Minister so that he could deal as an equal with the British Minister, Lord Swinton. Glassford continued in this position until June 30, 1944; after which Dakar was no longer a centerpiece in the war. American relations in French West Africa reverted to the State Department on July 1, 1944.
A part of the political upheaval in June 1943 in North Africa was de Gaulle's wish to settle an old account with Boisson. The President was loyal to Boisson. He informed both Churchill and Eisenhower he would send American troops to Dakar rather than see it fall under the control of de Gaulle. Subsequently, Boisson resigned and Roosevelt made it quite clear that a successor must have American approval. Pierre Cournarie was proposed as Boisson's replacement. Before Roosevelt approved Cournarie's appointment he directed that Hull and the Joint Chiefs of Staff be consulted. Leahy objected to the appointment because it was rumored that Cournarie was unduly anti-Ally and pro-de Gaulle. Despite Leahy's objection, Cournarie was appointed but with the provision that at any time the Americans so desired he might be replaced.

While the uproar over the Darlan and Boisson arrangements was being worked out in Washington, the Acting Secretary of State asked the Chief of Staff to instruct Eisenhower to demand of the local French authorities that objectionable Vichy officials be purged from the government, that there be racial equality, and that all political prisoners be freed. Marshall replied to Welles that in view of the dependence on Darlan and with the furor then going on it could be construed by Darlan that this demand applied to himself. The Chief of Staff pointed out that this could not be done. Marshall said, however, that as soon as Eisenhower could, he should take up the liberalizing demands with the French. At the same time the American Ambassador in London asked Roosevelt to press
for this type of action on the grounds that it would relieve the anti-Darlan feelings in Great Britain. The President responded that he agreed but it would have to fit into Eisenhower's ideas on the subject. The problem in Britain was that although Roosevelt had announced the temporary nature of the civil arrangements in North Africa the news was full of the "French Imperial Council" and Darlan's title "High Commissariat," which implied a permanency the British and Gaullists were not prepared to accept. The President attempted to hold off British objections as long as possible.\textsuperscript{16}

The atmosphere in Washington and London became so charged that the Office of War Information drafted a message for release in both capitolis. On November 17, 1942, the President made an official statement on the political arrangement in North and West Africa. He publicly announced that the agreement with Darlan was only temporary and that there was not to be any implication that the Vichy government was being recognized. The American Ambassador to Great Britain wired that this release laid to rest the animosity building over the Americans dealing with Darlan.\textsuperscript{17}

This announcement may have had the desired affect in the civilian realm but in North Africa it caused some problems. Marshall reported to Stimson that it created a peculiar situation between Eisenhower and Darlan. Darlan wrote Clark on November 21, 1942, "I am only a lemon which the Americans will drop after they have squeezed it dry." Hull, Stimson, Marshall, and Major General John E. Hull of the General Staff, framed a
message for the President to send to Eisenhower to mollify Darlan. The Admiral, however, continued to feel his prestige with the Allies was limited at best. 18

Despite the mistrust in which the Roosevelt Administration held Darlan and the warnings by the President to those in the field to watch the Admiral carefully, Eisenhower continued to lean on him for valuable assistance. Eisenhower continually stressed to Washington that the Americans had entered the campaign knowing they would have to deal with the existing civil organization. They knew the politics of the area were complicated and they felt they could establish a commission which would interface between the military and the existing bureaucracy. Eisenhower summarized that he had "attempted to force Giraud as head but he collapsed. Giraud himself finally admitted that he could not do it because he could not control the situation except on the basis of a huge military support which I could not possibly afford." 19

Again in mid-December 1942 and early in January 1943, Eisenhower appealed to Marshall to attempt to calm the critics at home. He stressed in both instances that the military were straining every "nerve in order to put on an offensive" and that it was absolutely necessary that the distasteful political arrangements made in the field be accepted. It would be a long time before the Americans could maintain an offensive military force in Tunisia and enforce "our will on the French." 20
Early in December the President sent the Chief of Staff a memorandum stating that a real desire existed both in the United States and in Great Britain for a statement indicating that Vichy civil restrictions had been lifted. The President wanted to issue such a statement but hesitated to do so without Eisenhower's thoughts on the subject. Significantly the original instruction concerning "objectionable Vichy officials" was not mentioned by Roosevelt in his note. Eisenhower agreed that such a public statement would be beneficial. He stated that Darlan also agreed with the idea of a joint Franco-American announcement. Darlan was pleased that the President appreciated the complexity of the Jewish-Moslem problem in North Africa. The Darlan regime subsequently granted freedom of individual expression and political prisoners were released; but the Vichy racial laws remained in effect in French North Africa. With the assassination of Darlan, Giraud immediately re-imposed the two social restrictions mentioned above. General Walter Beddell Smith, Macmillan and Murphy attempted to persuade Giraud to relax the restrictions; but he agreed to do so only after the Casablanca Conference. Giraud maintained he could act no earlier because of his concern for the security of the conference.

Social problems in North Africa could hardly have been more complex. There were 350,000 Jews in the area; some were European but most were African. There were some twenty-five million Arabs. Legally, neither the Jews nor the Arabs were the political or social equals of the French Colons.
While at Casablanca in January 1943, Roosevelt took the subject up directly with General Auguste P. Nogues, Governor General of French Morocco. The President felt the matter ought to be studied very carefully and progress definitely planned. He thought that the numbers of Jews in professions such as law and medicine should be limited in direct proportion to the percentage of Jews in the total population of French North Africa. The President felt his plan would eliminate "the specific and understandable complaints which the Germans bore towards the Jews in Germany, namely, that while they represented a small part of the population, over fifty percent of the lawyers, doctors, school teachers, college professors, etc., in Germany were Jews." From the Allies' point of view in Washington and London, the Jewish problem should have been addressed but no one seemed concerned about the position of the Moslems. In North Africa, however, to grant equality to all Jews and not to Moslems was impolitic. In March 1943, Giraud restored the civil rights of the French Jews in North Africa and began to address the problem of the African Jews. Their citizenship was finally restored in October 1943. Peter Tompkins and Milton Viorst in their work in this area, disagree with this position. They maintain that Darlan and Giraud continued to restrict civil liberties and that Giraud was indifferent to any such liberalizing moves.\textsuperscript{22}

During late December 1942, these problems were overshadowed by the assassination of Darlan and the choice of
his successor. Hull and Stimson wanted the French Imperial Council to name the leader. Leahy pointed out to the President that the British would make an effort to see that de Gaulle was appointed to succeed Darlan. The British could be more successful operating through the Imperial Council than in attempting to influence Eisenhower. Roosevelt decided that Eisenhower should appoint whomever he felt appropriate. Eisenhower appointed Giraud provisionally as both military and civil leader in North and West Africa. Even this solution proved troublesome because Giraud envisioned a government which would form the nucleus for all unoccupied France and for all of France as it was liberated. His plans also included bringing de Gaulle into the government.

The British supported this developing relationship and pushed it further. They saw Giraud as the military leader and de Gaulle emerging as the political leader of the French. Roosevelt fell back on his old view of the situation. In a message to Churchill drafted by Welles the President stated, "We have a military occupation in North Africa and as such civil affairs is in the hands of the Commanding General and we must not let our French friends forget this. By the same token I don't want any of them to think we are going to recognize any one or any committee or group as representing the French government or the French empire. The French people will settle their own affairs after the war. Until then we will deal with local French wherever we can and if we can't
we will replace them. I don't know whether we can hold Giraud but I'll find out." The President closed this message with the quip, "Why doesn't de Gaulle go to war? Why doesn't he start North by West half West from Brazenville? It would take him a long time to get to the Oasis of Somewhere."
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1 Robert W. Komer, ms. Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater, Office, Chief Military History, Department of The Army I-20; ltr., Wallace Murray to Hull, Nov. 19, '42, Correspondence Hull Collection, LOC; msg., presumably from Eisenhower, no addressee, Nov. 19, '42, France General, Hull Collection.

2 Stimson Diaries, Nov. 16, '42.


5 Msg., Roosevelt to Churchill, Nov. 11, '42, Map Room Files, Box 2, Political, Military Messages, Roosevelt to Churchill, Nov. '42, Dec. '42, Folder, Nov-Dec '42, FDRL; Leahy Diaries, Nov. 23, '42.


9 Rosenthal and Bernstein Rep't. on North Africa, Feb. 5, '43, 851R.00/334, State Dept., NARS.


15. Msg., Roosevelt to Eisenhower, Jul. 4, '43, FW 851T.001/31 State Dep't., NARS.


17. Msg., Winant to Roosevelt, Nov. 27, '42; msg., Roosevelt to Winant, Nov. 28, '42; msg., Winant to Roosevelt, Dec. 3, '42, Map Room Files, Box 6, Roosevelt - Winant Messages Folder, 1942, FDRL.


19. Stimson Diaries, Nov. 18, '42, Nov. 26, '42; Clark, Calculated Risk, 126; Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government, I-24; memo., Hopkins to Roosevelt, Nov. 16, '42, Harry Hopkins Papers, Footnotes (1942) Classified, FDRL.

21 Memo., Roosevelt to Marshall, Dec. 5, '42, Map Room Files, Box 6, Roosevelt-Winant Messages Folder, 1942, FDRL.


23 Msg., Roosevelt to Churchill, Jan, 1, '43, FRUS, 1943, Vol 11, Europe 23,
Throughout January 1943, the political scene in French North Africa remained bothersome. At one point, Eisenhower asked that John J. McCloy be sent over to help straighten out the muddle. Stimson analyzed the situation early in 1943 when he noted that there were several factors at play in events. One was that the theater commander was not being assisted by the best qualified people. The other was that the President was watching the situation very closely to see that the military did not step into the State Department's arena. In late January 1943, after several days of discussion between Stimson and Roosevelt, the Secretary convinced the President that McCloy should go to Africa and that some sort of formal organization should be established for dealing with civil affairs in the field and in Washington. In the discussions, Stimson pointed out that Eisenhower's staff simply was not adequate to the job nor could the North African Economic Board (NAEB) meet the requirements expected of it. Marshall was of little help beyond agreeing something must be done to ease the situation. The heart of the problem, however, was the haphazard, off-handed manner in which the President delved into the situation. For instance, the exchange rate between the Morocco Franc and the dollar was signed over a drink. When Stimson
made this charge to the President, Roosevelt "laughed and virtually admitted many arrangements had been made in such a manner."¹

The Giraudists continually sniped at the Gaullists and vice versa. The Allied military leaders and their advisors in the theater agreed among themselves not to interfere unless it began to affect the war or was destructive to Giraud's authority in North and West Africa.²

As a result of all these developments, the French in North Africa were left with the growing belief that they had merely exchanged the threat of a military occupation for an actual one. This was in direct contradiction of the Murphy-Giraud negotiations prior to the invasion and the President's proclamation broadcast at the time of the invasion.³

Roosevelt and Churchill came to the conclusion that in addition to planning the next strategic moves in the war at the Casablanca Conference, January 1943, it would also be useful to establish a semblance of order in the French political-military administration. The heart of the problem was that Giraud was strong on military leadership and the French military units in North Africa were loyal to him but he was politically naive. De Gaulle was strong in political leadership but it was reported the French officer corps in North Africa refused to serve under him. Finally, the Allied leaders suffered on their respective homefronts and with the French themselves from the stigma of the Darlan Affair. The British
were willing to place civil affairs in North Africa under British civilian authority. Neither the Americans nor the French were prepared to accept this solution. The French could only manage their affairs by utilizing local regimes which, in some cases, were "Vichy tainted" and thus were untrustworthy to either the Giraudists or Gaullists. The American civilians were not prepared to assume occupation duties. Thus, the responsibility fell to the military who were hard pressed to assume this mission and prosecute the war at the same time.  

Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to offer Giraud and de Gaulle joint leadership in North Africa. This agreement, however, was not reached before the President explored and discarded several other possibilities; Jean Monnet was considered along with Roger Cambon as likely civilian heads of the French administration in Africa. When the President agreed to a joint Giraud-de Gaulle regime, the problem lay in getting the two Frenchmen together. With a good deal of "arm twisting" that sometimes bordered on the comic, this event took place at Casablanca in January 1943. Out of the various meetings between the four leaders, the Committee for the Liberation of France emerged. Roosevelt felt he had solved the biggest problem of civil affairs for North Africa.  

Some civilian leaders in Washington continued to hold that the regime in French North Africa was unduly fascist. Eisenhower and Murphy went on working with Giraud attempting
to liberalize the regime. Their stand was that they needed able administrators, a commodity not in plentiful supply in North Africa. Some were adherents of the Vichy regime and some had worked for Vichy but were not necessarily "Vichyites." This was to be a constant problem for the Americans in North Africa and in other countries subsequently liberated. The level of epuration had no neat, arithmetical formula. Administrators must be available, yet the war was being fought against fascists. How many and what kinds of persons were to be left in positions of responsibility and how was it to be decided whether the incumbents were actually fascists, opportunists, or neither?

An interesting example of this situation occurred during the Casablanca Conference when Eisenhower approved the appointment of Marcel Peyrouton as Resident General of Algeria. The appointment caused a "Darlan-style" tempest in Washington and London. Peyrouton had a long, unsavory, right-wing background which made him most unattractive to many people in the United States and Europe. He had figured in the Bonnet Rouge and Stavisky scandals of the twenties; he had been the Minister of Interior when the first proscriptions of French Jews occurred during the Vichy regime; and he had signed de Gaulle's death warrant. Peyrouton was quite active in Laval's dismissal in December 1941 and Darlan, in attempting to protect his old friend, tried to keep Peyrouton away from the capital at Vichy. He was assigned as Resident General of Tunis and then as the
French Ambassador to Argentina. When the Allies invaded North Africa and Darlan assumed the title High Commissioner, he reaffirmed Peyrouton's appointment as the French political representative to Buenos Aires. Hull regarded this action as being unnecessarily high handed. Subsequently, Darlan asked the Allies to assist in bringing Peyrouton to Algeria to serve in the government. Eisenhower approved and Peyrouton had reached Rio de Janerio when Darlan was assassinated; Welles had Peyrouton detained in Brazil. Hull objected to this action and, with Eisenhower's and Murphy's approval, arranged for Peyrouton to continue his trip. The Gaullists were so incensed that they threatened to assassinate Peyrouton. Eisenhower commented in his diary that the announcement was greeted "at home with howls of anguish." Despite the animosity aroused in the United States, the President upheld the appointment.6

One of the most controversial and popular issues of the Second World War, the unconditional surrender policy, grew out of the vociferous opposition to the appointments of Darlan and Peyrouton. The President made the policy statement in a more narrow and definitive connotation than it was taken by large numbers of people at the time of its pronouncement, or later. The strongest supporters of the President and the majority of the people in the United States were waging a war against totalitarianism. They had not approved of the American relationship with Vichy France, nor did they approve of
the relationship with Darlan or his North and West Africa administration. They were incensed at the appointment of Peyrouton, whatever the rationale; they did not approve of Roosevelt's relations with the Bey of Tunisia or the Sultan of Morocco. They were highly critical of the conservative tone of the School of Military Government. They were unaware or refused to believe that the support of such groups was necessary for the successful prosecution of the war. Sumner Welles wrote that few Americans knew how the propaganda of the Free French backed by the British government, and the propaganda of the "Communist Party" was responsible for the failure of the people in the United States to understand "the why and the wherefore of the Vichy policy."7

Certain elements in the House of Commons seized on the American relations with semi-fascists and outright fascists as an indication that the Americans were, after all, not true Allies. The Russians continued always to press for a second front in Europe to take the pressure off the Eastern Front. They were convinced that the Allies would plot with anyone to bring about peace, leaving the Germans on Russian soil and Soviet control of Russia in jeopardy.

To counteract these currents of thought, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, and many of his advisors had been thinking along the lines of "unconditional surrender" for some time.8 To those around the President the phrase was a military term which meant the enemy government and forces
must surrender without condition. In addition to allaying the fears of those elements of society mentioned earlier, it would also avoid the recurrence of an error Roosevelt felt was made following the First World War. The German people in the years following the Great War thought they had been betrayed by their government and military into surrendering when they had not yet been defeated.

The subsequent misinterpretation of the unconditional surrender policy by large numbers of people was either ignored by the President or, since "he loved mystery in all forms," he simply allowed the misconception to exist because he knew it gave the enemy the "jitters." He appeared oblivious to the "jitters" it gave the Allies as well.

For example, Anthony J. D. Biddle, Jr., Ambassador to the governments-in-exile in London of Poland, Belgium, Norway, The Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Greece, and Luxembourough, reported that the political arrangements in North Africa, the Casablanca Declaration, its subsequent vagueness, and Russian post-war intentions left his "clients" in an unsettled, nervous situation. They could visualize themselves closely paralleled to the Gaullists while they could see the governments in their own countries under German domination as the Giraudists. The President's position vis a vis the Free French in London was worrisome to them. They further feared that military government would be established in their countries as they were liberated and this would leave the exiles adrift. In March 1943, when the President discovered this
attitude, he was upset. He instructed Hull to inform Winant and Biddle that both he and Churchill had agreed that "unconditional surrender" was the sole criterion for ending the war, and that there would be no military governments established in liberated countries, only conquered ones. In fact, the President was then engaged in a minor disagreement with his staff on that very subject. Elmer Davis, Director, War Information Office, Leahy, and Welles submitted a press release to the President on the subject. Roosevelt had accepted the draft except for one paragraph which he changed to much harsher terms. Davis elected not to use the Roosevelt release because he was sure it would stiffen German resistance.  

Frequently during the war, civilian and military leaders of the Allies returned to the policy statement. In April 1944, the military approached the State Department with the thought it might be well to define surrender terms for the enemy. Two things would be achieved; it would put a stop to German propaganda which was strengthening German military and civilian morale and definition might result in some type of alternate in Germany as it had in Italy. No such definition was permitted. Eisenhower requested a definition again in November 1944. Roosevelt queried Churchill on the matter. The Prime Minister responded that such a definition at the moment would look like appeasement; Churchill concluded with ". . . I shall remain set on unconditional surrender, which is where you put me."  

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On occasion the President would deny having discussed the subject. The record shows that the subject of unconditional surrender was discussed at dinner on November 28, 1943, by the "Big Three." Stalin felt that leaving the terms undefined "merely served to unite the German people, whereas, to draw up specific terms, no matter how harsh, and tell the Germans that this was what they would have to accept, would, in his opinion, hasten the day of German capitulation." Later in the year, the President reported to Hull that the subject had not been discussed at all at the Teheran Conference.  

Other times Roosevelt dismissed the policy statement as a subject for discussion at another time or at another level; or he would simply restate what he had said at Casablanca on January 23, 1943 and blithely assume the statement of itself was sufficient. Those planning and executing military governments had to work with this policy always in mind as will be shown subsequently.  

Another of the problems first encountered in North Africa concerned the elimination of the concentration camps. The gates could not simply be opened and the inmates turned loose. Homes, jobs, transportation, and so on had to be arranged for the displaced persons who came in most cases from areas not yet free of Axis control. The Americans anticipated that refugees and displaced persons would be encountered during and in the wake of battle but, as in so many instances during the war, the magnitude of the problem was a great deal larger than imagined.
Immediately upon landing in North Africa, the Allies found 4,000 non-French, non-Moroccans in labor camps. The French were using the men to construct the Trans-Sahara Railroad. There were some 500 British, 500 Poles, 50 Czechs, 500 Germans and Austrians, and 2,000 Spanish. The British, Poles, and Czechs were returned to Great Britain; State Department officials asked for instructions on the remainder. The Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee pressed the President for the immediate release of the political prisoners and requested permission to send help into the area. Lehman pointed out to Roosevelt that the American Red Cross, State Department officials, American Friends Service Committee personnel, Joint Distribution Committee staff, OFRRO, and the military were involved in the area so there was no need for more. The Executive Secretary of the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade attempted to direct the attention of the Vice President to the problem but, by that time, the military and OFRRO had the situation well in hand.\textsuperscript{14}

Some Spanish refugees were sent to Mexico. Many of them did not want to leave the area because they wanted to be prepared to fight again against Franco. The Germans and Austrians presented a problem; they could be organized into labor groups, or inducted into the American Army, or remain in the camps. Later in the summer, Roosevelt made arrangements for the camps to remain open under the administration of the OFRRO and assured that the Spanish understood this. The refugees who wanted to remain there were free to do so and
those coming out of Nazi Europe into Spain were quickly sent along to the camps in North Africa. The funds for operating the facilities initially came from the President's Unrestricted Emergency Fund. Subsequently, the military funded for the camps through May 31, 1943, when OFRRO assumed the responsibility. As the war progressed and military involvement in North Africa was reduced, it became increasingly difficult for the military to support the refugee camps; nevertheless, they continued to provide assistance into 1944 when OFRRO assumed the responsibility.\textsuperscript{15}

As Sicily was liberated and plans were going forward for the invasion of Italy, McCloy wrote to Hilldring that he wanted the prisoners in the Lipari Concentration Camp, off the northeast coast of Sicily, treated more expeditiously than those who had been uncovered in North Africa. He did, however, acknowledge that the situation in North Africa had been more delicate because in that case the Americans had dealt with the political prisoners of the French who were an ally in a manner of speaking.\textsuperscript{16}

Early the following year, the President established a War Refugee Board chaired by the Secretary of Treasury with membership consisting of the Secretaries of State and War. Roosevelt indicated he expected the group to work very closely with UNRRA and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. In the preliminary discussions on the board organization, Hull made it clear that he did not want the board working within
the line organization of the State Department and he did not want to serve as the chairman of the board. Both Hull and Stimson were well aware of Morgenthau's emotional embroilment and agreed he or his designee should chair the board. Leahy subsequently referred to the Executive Director as someone "who is connected with the Jewish relief." Morgenthau was an avid worker in the refugee area. He enjoined Treasury officials world wide to help save Jews and other victims of the war. The Executive Director of the board was John Pehle of the Treasury Department.¹⁷

The British were dubious about the sincerity of the Americans and viewed the formation of the War Refugee Board as a political move made in an election year to catch the vote of the Jewish population of the United States. Part of the British suspicion stemmed from the fact that the American Secretary of War served on the board which implied the American military were to be used in the rescue or relief function. The British military were not connected to their rescue and relief effort and they were dubious of the consequences of the American arrangement. The American board chairman assured the British the U. S. Army would not be used for rescue work unless it were to be the "direct result of military operations conducted with the objective of defeating armed forces of the enemy."¹⁸

It should be noted that this board was specifically charged with the rescue and relief of the victims of enemy
oppression who were in imminent danger of death, that is those who were still in enemy occupied territory. Other refugees were cared for by the military, Foreign Economic Administration or UNRRA. This board was engaged in such activities as seeking to have the military bomb a rail chokepoint to avoid German transportation of Jews from Hungary and Slovakia to the death camps in Poland. In this attempt the board was unsuccessful because the air forces could not divert men and equipment from more critical operations. In another instance, board action was successful in bringing a group of Jews out of Germany into Switzerland; the WRB wanted to use military food there. The military could not help. A Jewish charity unit in the United States, however, raised funds to help the refugees in Switzerland but requested the military forward the funds. Stimson approved, provided the funds actually went for that and were not to be used "to ransom more Jews out of Germany." Later, Stimson softened his position somewhat when he allowed trucks, fuel, and supplies to be turned over to the International Red Cross in Switzerland to be used for the relief of former German concentration camp inmates. 19

By spring 1944, the refugees were pouring out of Eastern Europe into Italy in such quantities that they presented a real problem to the military. The Washington staff became concerned that they would be unable to provide adequate relief for them. The matter was taken up with the President. Roosevelt made it quite clear that no American would take any action
or make any statement which might in any way serve to discourage refugees from coming into Allied areas. The President indicated that facilities caring for these people in Italy simply would have to be expanded.20

As the Italian, Sicilian, and North African camps became more crowded and refugees continued to enter all the Allied countries, Roosevelt expressed a desire to share the burden by having some brought to this country. Morgenthau worked with the military and the War Relocation Authority to settle on Fort Ontario, near Oswego, New York, as a refugee camp. The President announced the American plans to the press on June 9, 1944. Of the 2,000 refugees who applied for resettlement, 983 actually went to New York.21

In the midst of the political turmoil in North Africa, Giraud attempted to place as many Frenchmen as possible into the war against the Italians and Germans in Tunisia. He had to contend with the propaganda and terror tactics of the Gaullists. Finally, Giraud had to guard against de Gaulle's constant struggle to gain control of the Committee for the Liberation of France. Despite these difficulties, Nogues in Morocco, Boisson in West Africa, Peyrouton in Algeria, with Giraud leading them all, accomplished, after a fashion, what the Allies wanted.

In June 1943, the North African political situation assumed such crisis proportions that it threatened to disrupt the planned assault on Sicily. In mid May 1943, word reached
Washington that de Gaulle was agitating to broaden the span of the nominal Giraud-de Gaulle accord which had been reached between the two at the Casablanca Conference. Negotiations were opened and by the end of May it had been decided that the French Imperial Council was to be expanded to a total of seven, Giraud and three of his nominees with de Gaulle and two of his men. De Gaulle quickly named his members but Giraud was hesitant; Murphy attempted to influence Giraud to name strong personalities to counteract Gaullist pressure. On June 9, 1943, the two groups joined to become the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL). 22

The State Department staffed and coordinated a proposal for limited recognition of the FCNL. The President declined to consider the proposal until it had been submitted to the theater commander. In an exchange of messages between Washington, London, and the theater of operations, it came to light that where originally the FCNL was composed of seven equal members, it suddenly "sprouted out into fourteen" equals. It appeared de Gaulle could exercise control through the strength of his members. Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to inform Harold Macmillan, His Majesty's Government's Political Representative at General Eisenhower's Headquarters, and Murphy that they would deal only with the Committee of Seven in a collective capacity. At the same time, the Russians informed the British and the Americans that they were thinking of recognizing the FCNL as it was then constituted. Churchill appealed to Stalin not to make such a move because they were unsure of
their ability to control de Gaulle and Operation HUSKY might be compromised.\textsuperscript{23}

Nothing more was done about recognizing the FCNL until the second week in July 1943 when Roosevelt heard that Eisenhower and Murphy were thinking of recognizing the group. The President was quite clear in his instructions, "under no conditions are you to recognize this committee without my approval and full consultation." Roosevelt remained steadfast in his opinion that de Gaulle was more concerned with personal power than French liberation. Although he had been prepared to accept the Darlan arrangement as a military necessity, he was not prepared to do the same with de Gaulle. Later in the month, Murphy asked Hull for direction on a British request for comments on a proposed agreement for FCNL recognition. Hull confirmed that such negotiations were going on but that the Americans in the field need not bother to comment as the entire affair was being dealt with in Washington. The President objected to full recognition of the FCNL. He proposed to the British that the Allies accept the FCNL as the local civil authority in North and West Africa.\textsuperscript{24} On August 16, 1943, the FCNL was recognized by the Allies as representing the broad interests of the overseas French on the "mutual war effort against the Axis powers."\textsuperscript{25}

At the time of the formation of the FCNL, de Gaulle demanded he be appointed Commissioner for National Defense and Commander of French non-operational forces. Giraud wanted to
retain control of those positions. Roosevelt was quite unhappy at de Gaulle's bid for power. He and Hopkins framed a strong message to Churchill and Eisenhower on the subject, over the objection of Stimson, Hull, and McCloy who thought the message overly brusque. The President wanted it known he objected to de Gaulle's controlling the French Army. "I would not rest easy for the security of our rear in North Africa if he (de Gaulle) were in control," The Prime Minister agreed with the President and informed Macmillan that de Gaulle was not to be given control of any military forces. When he was informed of this, de Gaulle threatened to resign from the FCNL. Leahy feared the FCNL would not accept the resignation. He felt Eisenhower was making a mistake in allowing these political machinations to disrupt the progress of the war.26

Leahy and Hopkins prepared another message for the President to send to Eisenhower cautioning him not to allow de Gaulle to command the French forces; in this instance Hull, Stimson and Marshall agreed. Eisenhower agreed in a return message; he felt the situation had calmed somewhat and hoped there would be no further flare-up because it could interfere with pending military operations. At the same time, Roosevelt expressed his complete disgust and mistrust of de Gaulle to Churchill and hoped Churchill could exercise some control over de Gaulle. He complained that Eisenhower had to devote more than half his time to "purely" political "machinations."27
On June 19, 1943 Eisenhower met with de Gaulle and Giraud to inform them that he intended Giraud to be the commander of the French forces. De Gaulle appeared "amiable" and agreed to the decision, at least for the moment. While reporting this to Marshall, Eisenhower requested his disposition of the situation stand at least until the invasion of Sicily had been well launched. By the following week Giraud and de Gaulle had reached a compromise; they were to be joint presidents of the FCNL and Joint High Commanders with joint chiefs of staff for air, navy, and army. Although they were joint commanders, actually Giraud was the commander of French forces in North and West Africa and de Gaulle was commander only of the Fighting French forces in other areas. Roosevelt, Marshall, and Eisenhower seemed satisfied by early July 1943 that the crisis was over and that Giraud appeared well in control of political and military affairs.  

As combat operations advanced eastwards in North Africa the question of occupation in Tunisia and Tripoli arose. Feeling that Tunisia, Tripoli, and Northwest Africa were a social and economic unit, the President preferred they be administered by the Americans but his advisors sensed he was not unduly concerned one way or another with the matter. What was significant was that Tunisia was to have a true military occupation. The British asked the Americans to name a military man as an advisor rather than a civilian since the British did not care to break the precedent by having civilians involved directly in military government.
Despite the planned military occupation the civilian agencies in Washington assumed the theater commander would rely on them for professional expertise in their areas of concern and also assumed that occupation duties would be turned over to civilian authorities at an early date beyond the "chaotic stage." Final judgment on the degree of support and assumption date, it was agreed in Washington, lay with Eisenhower. The civilian agencies in Washington served in an advisory capacity to the War Department staff and the AFHQ Civil Affairs Division while the military accomplished, in retrospect, a rather trouble-free occupation. Civil affairs were conducted by the French military under command of General Alphonse Juin with materiel support being provided by the U. S. Army. There were very few civilians actually involved in field operations until responsibility for civil affairs passed to the control of the North African Economic Board, May 22, 1943.30

Tunis was the first enemy occupied city to be liberated by the Americans. The situation found in Tunis was illustrative of what was to be encountered later. The Italians and Germans had seized property and levied costs on the local population. Some of the seized property was found locally and returned, other had been sent off to Nazi-held Europe. Seized and shipped personal property worked a local hardship but the levied costs were much more troublesome. For instance, the Jewish community, in order to meet levied costs, had borrowed
from local French banks. Even though the enemy were gone the French banks still held the paper from the outstanding loans and assumed payment would be forthcoming. The Secretary of State took a dim view of this attitude and wired Murphy to work with the French to see that none of the parties were unnecessarily hurt in this situation, while the President went on record with a stronger view on this point. He informed the Secretary of State to instruct the French Administration that there were to be no foreclosures on property under the circumstances. The military handed over responsibility for this and other problems to the NAEB in mid-May 1943.

Soon after the Americans took an active part in the war in North Africa, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the National Gallery of Art approached the President with the idea of creating an organization which would work for the protection and conservation of works of art and for returning to their lawful owners objects which had been unwillingly appropriated. Roosevelt responded that he favored such a group and he directed the various government agencies to draw up an organization plan along the lines suggested by Stone. Later in the month, Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone further proposed the President name the commission the American Committee for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe. Stone went on to suggest that the Russians and the British also form like commissions and that the three groups cooperate in "effecting a program for the protection
and conservation of works of art and of artistic or historic monuments and records in Europe." The President approved of Stone's proposal and instructed the Secretary of State to explore the idea with the British and the Russians.\textsuperscript{32}

At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the committee and its work were of value. Although their mission did not appear to "promise any military advantage" the American military commanders would be instructed to give the committee "every practicable assistance that" did not interfere with military operations. The British Government hedged in their response. They appeared much more interested in establishing that it was a matter of concern between governments over claims for looted artworks. The British failed to address the issue of preserving monuments and fine arts in operational areas until May 1944 when they appointed a counterpart group to the Roberts Commission.\textsuperscript{33}

In June 1943, after the Secretary of State proposed and the President appointed the Roberts Commission, the School of Military Government instituted courses to train officers to be attached to the staffs of occupation forces to advise on the location and care to be given the various artistic and historic objects. Museum officials and art historians were assigned to operational commands to advise wherever possible that works of cultural value might be protected. The commission was also charged to compile lists of property appropriated by the enemy. Later in 1943, rare and valuable books were added to the charter.\textsuperscript{34}
The commission agreed to furnish to the War Department lists of personnel who were qualified to serve commanders in the preservation program. They also agreed to furnish lists of monuments, museums, private collections, maps, indigenous personnel, and guidance for field preservation, conservation, and restoration. In March 1945, one of the commissioners proposed that perhaps the commission could be disbanded since its work appeared completed. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended the proposed appropriation of $40,000 for the commission for FY 46 be eliminated. McCloy was opposed and voiced the hope that it would continue because their advice and guidance was valuable to the military. The commission continued well into the postwar era.35

In May 1943, Roosevelt voiced concern to Marshall that precautions should be taken during World War II which had not been taken before to preserve local archives. As a result of this comment, Marshall instructed all the theater commanders to take every possible step necessary to preserve local archives at the time of initial liberation and subsequent occupation. This directive caused a real flurry of activity with the forces preparing for the invasion of Sicily as nothing had been done to take such precautions. Identification guides were drawn up which would have been very useful to combat staffs. Unfortunately, the military governor would not allow them to be distributed before the invasion for security reasons.
The real threat to historical materials did not come as much from direct combat operations or the prelude as from the service troops filtering into newly-liberated areas. Museums were looted, palaces raided, and general havoc ensued. Sumner Welles implored Roosevelt to instruct Stimson to order the military police to guard all sites to avoid this wanton destruction. There is no suggestion that Roosevelt followed Welles' advice. General Orders were issued, however, that no building listed in the zone handbook for Italy could be taken for military use without the Commander-in-Chief's or General Officer's Commanding, 15th Army Group, permission. By the same order, field commanders at all levels were authorized to put any building on the "approved" list of Off Limits and post guards to enforce the proscription. The building list was supplemented by a list of art treasures and scientific objects which were to be protected. Although the Roberts Commission was slow in getting started and there was much destruction, the President's attention highlighted an area which might have been neglected had he not expressed an interest.

As the military campaign in Africa came to an end, the attention of the Allies focused on the next phase of the war, and French politics became more troublesome. Roosevelt seemed to alter his position. He appeared to hold that when it came time to liberate metropolitan France perhaps it would be best simply to have a military occupation administered by the Americans and British in order to avoid further difficulties with de Gaulle.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII


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4 Memo., McCrea to Roosevelt, Jan. 17, '43, Map Room Files, North Africa, CCF, FDRL.


7 Welles, 7 Decisions, 45.


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25. Staff Paper, Aug. 16, '43, Map Room Files, 011 North Africa French National Committee, (1), Section 2 Box 11, FDRL.


29. Ltr., Roosevelt to Hull, Jan. 15, '43, State Dept. 865c. 01/15, NARS.


33 Ltr., Hull to Roberts, May 9, '44, CAD Files 000, CAD 000, NARS.


35 Ltr., McCloy to Finley, Mar. 16, '45, OF 5372, FDRL.

36 Smith Diaries, Jun. 3, '43, FDRL; ltr., Welles to Roosevelt, Aug. 11, '43, OF 5372, FDRL; GO 68, Dec. 29, '43, OF 5372; msg., Hilldring to NAAGO, Apr. 12, '44, CAD 000.4 (3-25-43) (1) Sec 2, NARS.

CHAPTER VIII

WASHINGTON ORGANIZATION FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS
DURING THE EARLY PART OF THE NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

As a result of the cabinet debates during the summer and autumn of 1942, which had partially been precipitated by the conflict over the School of Military Government, the President held even more firmly to the view that the responsibility for the conduct of civil affairs lay within the civilian realm. While the clash over the School of Military Government waxed and waned, the military went forward with plans for civil affairs administration in North Africa and other agencies continued to organize and plan as well.

Early in August 1942, the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW) created a Reoccupation and Reconstruction Division which was to be the coordinating office for civil affairs. In September 1942, personnel of the Provost Marshal General's Office met with Lend Lease Administration (OLLA) personnel and Department of Agriculture personnel to work out the details of stockpiling, funding, and distributing foodstuffs to liberated people. The Agriculture Department appeared content to participate in the military program.¹

From August through October 1942, the Army staff met with the State Department, BEW, OLLA, and other civilian agencies to work out supply and administrative procedures. The papers
exchanged show the plans were well intentioned and there seemed to be no undue amount of conflict. Milo Perkins, Dean Acheson, John Nef, John McCloy, E. R. Stettinius, and Harry Hopkins consulted with one another frequently. They were aware that the groundwork they were laying would be apt to set the tone and precedent for subsequent operations and thus were determined to do the best possible job with the best people available.  

Earlier, the Secretary of State had taken some preliminary action in organizing within his department units to deal with both occupation policy and administration. The Office of Foreign Territories (OFT) directed by Paul Appleby, was established to implement economic and social programs in occupied countries. An Interdepartmental Advisory Committee (IAC) and a Committee of Combined Boards (COB) were established. These units were designed to draw together the plans and actions of the growing number of Washington agencies concerned with civil affairs and military government. The COB was by charter the highest authority for civil affairs and its decisions were forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for implementation. The COB was chaired by Thomas K. Finletter, Division of Defense Materials, State Department, and was made up of representatives of the British Embassy, the Combined Raw Materials Board, the Combined Food Board, the Combined Shipping Administration, and the Combined Production and Resources Board. The Secretariat was provided by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff and consisted of one U. S. Army and one British Army officer. Within the COB there was an informal group, the Combined Committee for French North Africa (CCFNA), which dealt with daily and routine civil affairs in North Africa. By design, there were no participating military in these organizations, a situation which was "corrected" before the end of December 1942.  

By early December 1942, the Army staff brought to the attention of the Assistant Secretary of War that the civilian departments' and agencies' control machinery was not effective. The IAC failed to meet for as many as eight or nine days at a time. Problems arising were treated through informal coordination. It was pointed out that this "chance method of operating resulted in duplication of effort and a great deal of confusion." Despite the pressing need there was no clear operational process for dealing with civil affairs in Washington. Later in the month, similar conclusions were drawn by the State Department staff. It was suggested that perhaps the IAC should be elevated to operate directly from the White House. 

Also within the State Department, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO) was created and the President appointed Herbert H. Lehman, former governor of New York, as director on December 4, 1942. There were mild protests from a few people who maintained that Herbert Hoover, because of his work in this area during World War I, should have been given the job. Despite the protests, Lehman was
chosen because Roosevelt felt he was an able administrator and because the President thought "it would be wonderful, poetic justice if we would get a Jew to head the agency which is going to feed and clothe and shelter the millions whom Hitler has robbed and starved and tortured -- a member of the group Hitler first selected for extermination." More important than having the "wrong" man head the new unit was the fact that Stimson, Major Generals John E. Hull and Lucius Clay of the General Staff, and Lehman himself, thought OFRRO would have been more appropriately placed in the War Department rather than in the State Department.

The new office was given the responsibility for planning, coordinating, and arranging for the victims of war in areas liberated from Axis control. It was to provide food, fuel, clothing, and other basic necessities such as housing, facilities, and medical services. Finally, in areas receiving relief it was to facilitate "the production and transportation of these articles and the furnishing of these services." The office was authorized to issue directives to the "various government departments, agencies, and officials" deemed necessary to achieve its mission. The one restriction placed on the office was that its overseas operations would be subject to the approval of the United States military commander of the area as long as the military operations continued. Unfortunately, these instructions were verbal. The Secretary of State had proposed to Roosevelt that an Executive Order be issued
outlining the OFRRO mission to avoid further complications in civil affairs administration. The President sent a memo to Hull stating "We'll just arrange it." The lack of a written directive for three months was a factor contributing to the confused administration of civil affairs for North Africa.6

On December 11, 1942, the President voiced concern that the OFT might be overlapping with OFRRO. He suggested to the Secretary of State that perhaps an official mission statement was needed after all. This note to Hull was prompted by Roosevelt being asked to sign the cover letter to Congress transmitting the seventh quarterly report on Lend Lease operations. The report contained the basic principles and objectives of Lehman's new operation but the President thought these concepts might be buried in the OLLA letter.7 Roosevelt wanted it made clear that Lehman was in charge of all relief activities and that all the people dealing in the area - OLLA, Red Cross, OFT - should report to Hull through Lehman. The President's instructions were not disseminated until months later. Lehman felt from the beginning of his tenure that he had a clear charge to deal with all relief and rehabilitation matters. As will be shown, when a formal document was signed by the President which established the terms of reference of the OFRRO, another furor ensued in the capital.

From the three agencies, OFRRO, OFT, OLLA, originally designated as offices to conduct the civil affairs program, the number involved grew to catalogue size. By December 1942,
the American agencies alone included: OFRRO; OFT; OLLA; Red Cross; BEW; Agriculture, Treasury and Interior Departments; the two military departments and the Office of War Shipping, to mention only the more important ones. Despite the President's charge to Hull or the Secretary's own directives, each of these agencies seemingly went its own way, planning, procuring, attempting to ship, and attempting to distribute supplies. There were numerous conferences in Washington concerning authorization, priorities, and innumerable messages to the field. Little, however, in the way of tangible assistance emanated from the agencies.

Prior to the invasion a French mission in Washington had been purchasing needed consumer goods for North Africa. Two ships were being loaded in New Orleans with cotton piece goods, used clothing, condensed and powdered milk, matches, tea, nails, copper sulphate, pharmaceutical products, coal, sugar, and tobacco at the time the military expedition was departing the United States. Had these ships joined the initial convoy, their cargoes would have been of immense value both materially and morally. They were not given clearances because of a controversy between the French authorities and the BEW. The French wanted more used clothing and coal than the BEW was willing to allow. There were further complications because the State Department maintained the export licenses had not been submitted by the French. The French countered that the appropriate licenses had been submitted two weeks prior to the requested shipping date. Added to this confusion was the
fact that the railroad companies had not been given the proper clearances to ship the goods to New Orleans and the BEW would not release jute bags for shipping the sugar. Thus a tragi-comic situation developed that precluded a movement which would have been most helpful. The OLLA eventually purchased the goods from the French and shipped them to North Africa late in November 1942.

Emergency and normal shipping began to reach North Africa within a short time following the invasion. In no instance was the need, either in kind or quantity of goods, forecast. Shipping space was always a problem. Early in November 1942, an attempt was made to centralize shipping control when a North African Shipping Committee was formed under the leadership of Sir Douglas Thomson representing the British Minister of War Transport, the U. S. War Shipping Administration, U. S. Army Chief of Staff for Services of Supply, the Royal Navy, and the U. S. Navy. The supply problem was further complicated by an unanticipated requirement for great amounts of bulky items such as coal. The French authorities in North Africa had alerted the Americans that local coal supplies would be insufficient. Murphy and his consular staff discounted the potential shortages because they felt Moroccan coal would make up the shortfall. Such was never to be the case; by late November 1942, it was estimated that 175,000 tons of coal per month would be required for North Africa.

The initial procurement and shipment of goods for civilian consumption to North Africa by the military consisted of
chocolate bars, face powder and rouge, nail polish, stockings, shoes and slippers, and three tons of notions - a total of some ninety-six tons.\textsuperscript{11} It was estimated that another 500 tons of consumer items be "stowed in odd corners" of the early shipping.\textsuperscript{12} The Deputy Civil Affairs Officer for Allied Forces stated that these goods were to be used as barter to assure an adequate labor supply in direct support of the military forces. The War Department staff suggested 150 tons a month of consumer goods for this purpose.\textsuperscript{13} Later in November 1942, OLLA determined that thirty-three to thirty-five tons a month would take care of civilian needs. Very quickly it could be seen that barter goods were insufficient to meet the needs of the North African civilians once the forces were on the ground. The arrival of Allied forces complicated the issue because they created needs in their own right and they cut North Africa off from Metropolitan France, its principle source of supplies. The situation was compounded by the failure of the French to furnish requirements data, by the time required to manufacture, collect and process goods once requirements were known, and finally, by either lack of shipping space or by lack of adequate port facilities.\textsuperscript{14}

From December 1942 through June 1943, the Army, the British, and OLLA shipped less than 40,000 tons of civilian supplies a month as filler to military convoys. This was not as much as the French desired, nor as much as shipping space allowed for, but it was as much as the North African port
facilities could handle at that time. This amount was sufficient to meet only the barest needs of the area.¹⁵

Because of military security, very few people knew of the invasion plans or dates. Adolph A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, explained that the initial effort had been relatively successful in North Africa but the failings were due to the fact that "people would not act without a reason and the military were not allowed to give a timetable or a reason."¹⁶

On November 10, 1942, the Commanding General, Army Supply Forces, suggested to the Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, that in dealing with civilian supplies Eisenhower create a staff of BEW and OLLA personnel to coordinate civil supplies, "ascertain requirements, screen requisitions and determine return shipping cargoes."¹⁷ At the same time, the appropriate British authorities would have to be informed of all civil affairs activities. Eisenhower responded that his chief administrative officer, chief operations officer, chief supply officer, chief CAO, commodity experts, and special staff officers, as necessary, would be working the civil affairs supplies area. Eisenhower, himself, was to take care of the British coordination. He concluded by suggesting that OLLA and BEW personnel be sent over to work in the theater.¹⁸ Murphy agreed and wired essentially the same plan through State Department channels.

Oscar Cox felt that this initial effort must be well launched because it would set the tone for all subsequent
action in the area. For this reason he suggested to Harry Hopkins that Paul Appleby be assigned to Eisenhower's staff to represent BEW and Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., to represent OLLA. In addition, he suggested Eugene Rostow and Lloyd Cutler round out the staff. Hopkins agreed and suggested the select staff leave the States the latter part of November. Isadore Lubin, Director, Department of Labor Statistics, informed Hopkins that the staff working in this area should be "keen and liberal . . . the top person in this Mission should be somebody who would develop policies along the lines the President would want . . . He should, however, be sent as the temporary head of the Mission, thereby giving us time to pick out a real high-grade liberal with real political sense for the permanent job." Lubin suggested Dean Acheson as the man most suitable for the job. Jonathan Daniels echoed these thoughts in a note to the White House, ". . . only those who support the President and his ideas would be in key controlling areas . . . the President is adamant in avoiding even the slightest basis for charges that he is being political in any part of the war effort but he had better put someone of power quietly in charge of this business or he is going to have trouble on the home scene."

Simultaneously, the Chief of the Combined Staff, Sir John Dill, was in touch with Milo Perkins of BEW with correspondence to the effect that political and economic matters were to be dealt with by each of the concerned branches of the government.
Dill asked Perkins to coordinate the economic efforts in North Africa with the British Ministry of Economic Warfare. The Secretary of State wrote the President that such fragmented staffing would not work; he suggested that each concerned agency detach personnel to work with Murphy and that all activities be funneled through the State Department. Hull had previously sought Murphy's opinion on this matter. Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell agreed that a small staff in the field would be beneficial but he cautioned that initially it ought to be very restricted. The transportation facilities were saturated and at that point only a survey team was required in the field.  

The President stepped into the breach on November 18, 1942 when he clearly directed that the State Department was charged with the responsibility for civil affairs. On November 26, 1942, the President admonished the entire cabinet for "trying to butt in and interfere with the civilian government of the occupied territories in North Africa. He (Roosevelt) said he addressed it to everybody except Frank Walker, the Postmaster." Both the letter and the cabinet scolding were the results of a meeting between the President and the Secretary of State. Hull told Stimson that he had finally compelled the President to back him up in clearing up the muddle of all the agencies attempting to conduct civil affairs from their own parochial points of view.
The Secretary of State then assumed the responsibility for those civil affairs functions which heretofore had been conducted in Harry Hopkins' office. Hull wired Murphy that the President had directed the State Department to coordinate all civil affairs matters both in the field and in Washington. He informed Murphy that all communications would be between Murphy and the State Department and not with individual agencies. Hull proposed a staff made up of Paul Culbertson, Executive Assistant; Donald Hiss, Economic Executive Assistant; Lloyd Cutler and Livingston Short of OLLA; Robert Garthoff, Department of Agriculture representative; Morris Rosenthal, Deputy Executive Director of BEW, along with Harold Starr; and DuBois from the Treasury Department. Paul Appleby had originally been proposed as the civil mission chief but he was retained in Washington to head the Office of Foreign Territories.

This group was to deal with essential supplies for the civil population, the purchase of strategic materials, currency and financial problems, repair, maintenance and expansion of vital transportation facilities, maintenance of public health and the expansion of production of foodstuffs and other materials for use in the war effort.

Eisenhower was advised by Marshall of the President's letter and of the subsequent action taken by the Secretary of State to implement a program. It was pointed out to the Commanding General that after the experts arrived in the field, a survey should be made to determine the civil affairs program and channels of communications and that both must meet with
Eisenhower's approval, Marshall further advised Eisenhower that a separate section was being established under the Chief of Staff, Services of Supply within the Army General Staff, to handle these matters. Subsequently, Marshall wired Eisenhower a clarification of the Roosevelt letter of November 18, 1942. The Chief of Staff informed the field commander that civil affairs could remain his responsibility as long as he, the field commander, deemed it necessary.\(^{27}\)

By late November 1942, the North African situation had become so complicated and cumbersome that the Americans and British formed a group in the field to deal with the problems, the North African Economic Board (NAEB).\(^{28}\) This board was comprised of military and civilian divisions and the members were both American and British. Initially, it was headed by Colonel John Morrow, former Vice President of International Harvester. Later, the Civilian Division was led by Murphy and the Military Division by a British officer, Major General H. M. Gale. The purpose of the board was to draw together all the British and American agency personnel in the field with the military staff to achieve a concerted civil affairs program for North Africa. That it did not fully achieve this design was owing to the great numbers of people in the field, personality difficulties, and lack of clear administrative controls.

Although the State Department was supposedly in charge of all civil affairs, each of the agencies felt responsible for their areas of expertise. The military commander required
control of all elements in the theater yet the OLLA personnel reported to OLLA; Murphy reported to the State Department and the President; BEW personnel reported to BEW, and so on. For routine matters, consensus could be reached and policy determined. For anything beyond the routine, the entire ensuing debates mirrored the Washington scenes previously described. Nevertheless, the NAEB continued as the organizational vehicle until May 1944, when it was replaced by the North African Joint Economic Mission (NAJEM). When the NAJEM was proposed, the State Department staff was apprehensive that they would not be prepared to assume the responsibility. The NAJEM assumed responsibility for civil affairs in North Africa on August 1, 1944, but military personnel continued to serve on the board until the end of 1944 when the NAJEM was abolished. The French Provisional Government assumed full control of the area at the beginning of 1945.29
NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

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4 Memo., Div., Int'l. Div. to COS, SOS, CAD 092, 3 N. Africa (11-10-'42) (1) NARS; memo., E. V. Rostow to O. S. Cox, Dec. 30, '42, H. Hopkins Papers, Book 10: Supplies for Liberated Areas, FDRL.


6 Stimson Diaries, Feb. 12, '43; press release with background files in same folder, Nov. 21, '42, OF 5175 FDRL.

7 Memo., Roosevelt to Hull, Dec. 11, '42, Correspondence, Hull Collection; Seventh Report of the President to Congress on Lend Lease Operations, Dec. 11, '42, Goodrich and Carroll, DAFFR, 264.

8 Memo., Rostow to Appleby, Nov. 28, '42, State Dept's., 851R, 24-31-1/2, NARS.


13 IAD, ASF, CSB History, 13; msg., Murphy to Acheson, Royce, Jul. 12, '43, State Dep't. 851 R.24/131, NARS.


15 Msg., Murphy to Hopkins, Mar. 27, '43, State Dep't. 851R. 24/57, NARS.

16 Memo., Berle to Hull, Nov. 12, '42, State Dep't. 851R. 50/28, NARS.

17 Msg., CG ASF to CG NATO, Nov. 10, '42, CAD 092.3 North Africa (11-10-42) (1), NARS.

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19 Ltr., Cox to Hopkins, Nov. 11, '42, Harry Hopkins Papers, Box 319, Pre-Casablanca, North Africa Situation, FDRL.


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23 Ltr., Roosevelt to Hull, Nov. 18, '42, PSF Box 35, Cordell Hull, 1941-42, Sec. of State, FDRL; Stimson Diaries, Nov. 20, '42.
Stimson Diaries, Nov. 24, '42.

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CHAPTER IX

WASHINGTON ORGANIZATION FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS
AS THE NORTH AFRICA SITUATION DEVELOPED

As the war progressed in North Africa, the record shows continuing confusion among Washington officials. Stimson and the War Department staff were impressed by the fact that Lehman was attempting to organize a realistic relief and rehabilitation effort which would be responsive to the needs of the civilian population in North Africa and which could be responsive to future programs. He was hampered by lack of a directive from the President. Stimson and Hull were concerned that the President continued to persist in his opinion that the State Department was the responsible agent for civil affairs, "despite the fact that it has never been an administrative department and is not organized to perform such a function." Stimson felt that the situation was further complicated by, "...the various newborn babies which the President has created which are clamoring for a share of the pap." Early in February 1943, the confusion of responsibility among the civilian agencies became so apparent that the Bureau of the Budget staff brought the subject to the attention of the President. Again, a month later, Roosevelt received a memorandum from the Director of the Bureau of the Budget emphasizing the duplication of effort and lack of satisfactory, tangible results for dealing with civilian efforts in
overseas theaters. The memo voiced grave concern at the task of "dealing with a large array of civilian agencies, here, in North Africa, and on new fronts."2

Lehman was well aware of the situation; he was also aware that he was being ignored by certain officials in Washington. For example, on one occasion, he tried for five days to see the Assistant Secretary of State in an attempt to clarify some administrative problem. In mid-February 1943, Lehman drafted an Executive Order which would formally establish OFRRO. James Byrnes, Office of Economic Stabilization, convinced the OFRRO Director to issue the statement as a letter rather than having the President sign an Executive Order.3 A few days later the President enquired about the status of the draft Executive Order establishing the OFRRO.4 He was told there were some conflicts among the coordinating agencies which were not yet resolved. Later, the draft was left with Roosevelt.

At a cabinet meeting the following week, Sumner Welles, Deputy Secretary of State, suggested Roosevelt establish a committee of concerned agency personnel to draw up lists of people available and qualified to deal with civil affairs in areas yet to be liberated. Welles pointed out that the Secretary of State had discussed this matter with the President previously. The military were aware that this type of planning was going on in the State Department and had suggested earlier that their efforts be joined in order to avoid competition in recruiting personnel for similar jobs. OFRRO had
agreed to look at the situation but nothing more was done. Patterson was upset at the cabinet exchange because the Army was already organizing and training reserves of civil affairs officers. Roosevelt vetoed the idea of a central committee and told the cabinet he would write a letter explaining what was to be done in the area.\(^5\)

On March 19, 1943 the President sent to the Director, OFRRO, his long overdue charter:

\[\ldots\text{You are authorized to plan, coordinate, and arrange for the administration of this government's activities for the relief of victims of war in areas liberated from Axis control through the provision of food, fuel, clothing and other basic necessities, housing facilities, medical and other essential services; and to facilitate in areas receiving relief the production and transportation of these articles and the furnishing of these services.}\]

\[\text{In planning, coordinating and arranging for the administration of the above mentioned work, you may utilize the facilities of the various government departments, agencies and officials which are equipped to assist in this field and you may issue to them such directives as you deem necessary to achieve consistency in policy and coordination in administration. You may also utilize the facilities of such private organizations and individuals as you may find helpful in your work.}\]

\[\text{Your operations in any specific area abroad will, of course, be subject to the approval of the U.S. military commander in that area so long as military occupation continues, and in matters of general foreign policy you will be guided by the directives of the Secretary of State\ldots\ldots\ldots.}\]

Lehman began to meet with various agencies almost immediately upon receipt of Roosevelt's letter. To facilitate planning and preserve security, the Army agreed to assume full
responsibility for relief and rehabilitation matters for the initial period of liberation and for the first three months following an armistice. This would allow the OFRRO time to survey requirements, stockpile, and ship needed goods for the follow-on occupation. 7

Although the "Ninety Day Decision" came too late to be of value for North African operations, it was a significant milestone in civil affairs/military government planning. Heretofore, there had been a good deal of controversy about resources, stockpiling, and funding, between the military and the civilian agencies, among the agencies themselves, and between the Allies. The British military had always followed the rule of a forty-two day stockpile; the Americans informally adopted this yardstick. Subsequently, the British added another six months to this time for the convenience of the civilian agencies and for security. Thus, the British civilian planners had seven and one-half months after an invasion or liberation to prepare for the assumption of the civil affairs function.

The Americans, however, were unwilling to go this far. The War Department staff did not want to have such demands placed on their resources. The Director, Civil Affairs Division, Army General Staff (CAD), objected to any kind of definite date on the grounds that it would preclude flexibility in operational situations. In late July 1943, the CAD staff finally agreed to the six months rule in order to allow the
civilian agencies to prepare to assume the function after an invasion became public knowledge.⁸

After a few months of experience in civil affairs, it was clear to the Secretary of War and his staff that there was no unit within the War Department at the required level to deal with the problems arising either in Washington, London, or in the field. If the civilian occupation organization seemed confused, it appeared crystal clear when compared to the War Department organization for military government. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of War; the Office of the Under-secretary of War; the Operations Division of the General Staff; the Army-Navy Petroleum Board; the Personnel Division of the General Staff; the Military Government Division of the Office of the Provost Marshal; and the Operations Division, the Transportation Corps, and the International Division of Services of Supply had been dealing with military government in one phase or another with overlapping authority and unclear responsibilities. In addition to these organizations, there was a War Department Committee for North African Civilian Supply chaired by Colonel John B. Franks who was McCloy's alternate on the State Department's Interdepartmental Advisory Committee.

Stimson asked McCloy to have the General Staff establish an office which would be a central clearing point for all civil affairs and military government matters.⁹ He felt that eventually Roosevelt would see that however much he distrusted the
military to do an adequate job in this area, the Army would inherit the responsibility even if by default. The Secretary of State "quietly" agreed with the Secretary of War. A further requirement existed for the military staff to have a central buffer unit between the field commanders and the civilian agencies. On February 27, 1943, the Civil Affairs Division was created at the General Staff level where it could serve both the staff and the Office of the Secretary of War.

There was a great deal of discussion about the level of the new organization. It was recalled that the old Bureau of Insular Affairs which had dealt with such matters after the Spanish American War had been at an improper level to be effective. The level of coordination with the civilian agencies dictated that CAD would work through the Secretariat of the General Staff with the Secretary of War rather than being subordinate to the Chief of Staff. Colonel J. H. F. Haskell was named the acting director; on April 1, 1943 Major General John H. Hilldring was appointed director.

Despite the work of the State Department and the CAD organization, Washington issues were not yet settled. Hardly a month had passed after the OFRRO "charter" was signed when it became evident that civil affairs administrative matters in Washington were as complicated as ever. In consonance with the desire of the President, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had delegated all problems of civil affairs to the State Department with the suggestion that this responsibility be met through the mechanism of the Committee of Combined Boards.
The Director, OFRRO, saw the CCS letter in London in May 1943. He had no quarrel with the arrangements for North Africa but Lehman did want it clearly understood that in the future the OFRRO would be responsible for relief and rehabilitation after the initial military phase was complete. The State Department, however, delegated all civil affairs supply problems to Lend Lease. Lend Lease had a separate "charter" from the President on the same subject. Through the terms of this "charter" OLLA felt obliged to present the entire civil affairs supply program, including relief and rehabilitation to the Washington community for approval. As far as OLLA was concerned, they alone bore the responsibility for the civil affairs supply problem; not even the War Department had a responsibility in this area. Moreover, the Lend Lease staff, in essence, informed the War Department staff that any queries on their part about how OLLA planned to meet its responsibilities were not in order.

The military could see that if OLLA were unable to supply the French then the theater commander would be forced to requisition civilian supplies through normal military channels and at military expense. The OLLA, OFRRO, and the War Department were at an impasse over this matter. The Assistant Secretary of War turned to Harry Hopkins for help. Hopkins agreed that the Army must have the final decision in these matters at least in the initial phase. The Director, OFRRO, objected to the OLLA approach because under this arrangement he was completely out of the picture.
By the first week in May 1943, the military were deeply concerned about the North African situation. Irrespective of the plans and proposed organizations for dealing with future areas to be uncovered, the military were still faced with the problem at hand. The Committee of Combined Boards and the Combined Committee for North Africa had not met since the latter part of January 1943. Each individual agency in Washington continued dealing directly with the theater rather than going through the COB or the CCNA. The military were uncertain about which agency to turn to with current problems.

The President was concerned that the inter-agency conflict over civil affairs would be publicly aired as a result of the Lend Lease appropriations hearings in the House of Representatives. Oscar Cox advised Hopkins that the President should clarify the division of responsibility and authority between OLLA and OFRRO before further testimony in the House revealed the conflict within the Administration. Hopkins and Smith of the Budget Office framed a letter for Roosevelt to send to Hull and the President signed it. This letter attempted to define the role of each of the agencies dealing in foreign economic activities, particularly in occupied areas. Smith took the signed letter to Hull for discussion; they agreed on the wording but Smith did not formally deliver the letter because they felt the contents required interdepartmental coordination.14
Roosevelt directed Hull to appoint a Director for Economic Operations (DEO). The DEO was to be the single source of contact for all civilian agencies on economic matters in their dealings with military commanders. Roosevelt further directed Hull to create a Director for Foreign Economic Operations (DFEO) and an Inter-Departmental Policy Committee comprised of OFRRO, BEW, OLLA, and the Treasury, War, and Navy Departments. These two Directors, with the Committee, would serve as the interfacing element of the administration between the civilian agencies and the military for liberated areas.\(^{15}\)

Coincidently, the same day, May 8, 1943, the Director, OFRRO, wrote a letter to the Secretary of State, War, Treasury, Navy, and Agriculture, OLLA, War Shipping Administration, War Food Administration, BEW, WPB, and the Bureau of the Budget, which outlined OFRRO policies in some detail. The two letters were at odds. The Director, OFRRO, assumed the responsibility for the activities of the United States government for the entire civilian supply function in liberated areas during the relief and rehabilitation period. This authority included the submission of requirements to OLLA and distribution of the goods in the area. Finally, OFRRO was to be the focal point for coordinating the Washington agencies' work and during a military phase the OFRRO would be the focal point for the military commander.\(^{16}\)

Soon after the receipt of this letter, the Secretary of State wrote the President commenting on the undelivered Roosevelt
letter and by inference the Lehman instructions. Hull pointed out that Roosevelt's suggestions formalized and strengthened what was already being done. He went on to say that relief and rehabilitation were important but that they were only one aspect of an overall post-war program which must be designed and implemented from the beginning of freedom from enemy control. Hull then listed some ten problem areas in civil affairs which lay beyond the purview of OFRRO. Hull concluded his memo by stating that he would coordinate and cooperate with OFRRO but that the Secretary of State was responsible for an entire and coherent foreign policy and as such he would formulate and control that policy. In addition to the State Department, BEW, OLLA, et al., were upset by the Lehman instructions. The Washington scene was not only confusing, it was also in an uproar.¹⁷

By this time Lehman had seen the Roosevelt letter of May 8 and objected to it on the grounds that it "puts some State Department man directly over" his relief operations.¹⁸ Roosevelt sent the draft of a new letter to the cabinet to H. D. Smith, BOB, asking him to go over the draft and to talk to Lehman.¹⁹

Unaware of these events, the CAD staff was prepared to utilize the newly-reorganized method of operating as outlined by the Lehman letter. Although they seemed content to have a central point for dealing with civilian agencies on matters of civil affairs, there were certain points they wanted cleared
up with the OFRRO director. But before these points could be broached, the letter was superseded by one from the President.\(^{20}\)

On June 3, 1943, Roosevelt signed another letter to the key administration officials forwarding his "Plan For Coordinating the Economic Activities of U. S. Civilian Agencies in Liberated Areas." In essence, it was much like the undelivered letter of May 8. In accordance with a plan drawn up by the Director of the Budget, the State Department was to have full responsibility for coordinating civil affairs both in Washington and overseas. The President established an Interdepartmental Committee for Economic Policy in Liberated Areas to be chaired by a newly-created Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Economic Coordination. The Committee was made up of the heads or deputies of the State Department (Political Policy), Treasury Department, War Department, Navy Department, BEW, OLLA and OFRRO. An Area Director was to be appointed for each area to be liberated. The Area Director was to integrate the plans and activities of all the agencies in the field and report through the corresponding Area Director in the State Department in Washington. He was also supposed to serve as the coordinating officer between the civilian agencies and the military both overseas and in Washington.\(^{21}\)

The Secretaries of Treasury, Navy and Army, and the Administrator of OLLA, acknowledged Roosevelt's letter and officially recognized the Secretary of State's leadership in civil affairs. The Secretary of War commented in his diary that he
had received a long letter from the President in which Roosevelt was trying to settle the civil affairs confusion which "is a result of his own mistakes." Stimson felt the President was attempting to avoid using the military even though it was well equipped to do the job. The system established by the President perpetuated the discord by failure to establish clearly overall supervision and allowing the Secretary of State to "fall back" on BEW, OLLA, etc., when programs went awry. Later, Dean Acheson described this organization as a genuine "Rube Goldberg." On the other hand, the Director of the Budget wrote to the President that the difficulties were "pretty well" resolved by the recent letter. Smith commented that the definition of function had been most favorably received. I. F. Stone, writing in P.M. under an editorial headline, "Hull Wins Power Over Foreign Relief From Lehman," felt that the "new setup was a bit of fancy footwork by the State Department and the Bureau of the Budget." This was but a harbinger of what was to come in the summer of 1943.

In the meantime, the military and the NAEB, sometimes with difficulty because of the confusion in Washington, continued to provide for the civil affairs needs of the North African Theater. The military participation in the occupation of North Africa, in one form or another, continued through April 1945. By that time, only a few port facilities remained under the control of the Allies. The previous summer the Secretary of State had informed the President that
the State Department was sending a commercial mission to North Africa to study the problems concerned with returning trade to normal, private, civilian channels. Roosevelt approved; the mission was headed, however, by a man in uniform, Lt. Col. William S. Culbertson.

In summary, the initial experience of the Americans in civil affairs—military government disclosed the weaknesses of the civilian agency control. Stimson maintained that although the fault may have been partially due to the lack of control and multi-agency interference in civil affairs, the administrative habits of the President were at the seat of the problem. According to Stimson, Roosevelt felt his personal administration solved all problems. Roosevelt indicated that Eisenhower conducted the military operations, Murphy conducted civil affairs for the General, and acted as Roosevelt's personal representative in the field. "This was a truly Rooseveltian position." As far as Roosevelt was concerned, it was a satisfactory arrangement. Stimson implied that the President was amazed that there need be any further discussion of the subject. The President agreed with Stimson that a small number of War Department personnel might be detailed to North Africa to help with civil affairs administration but he tenaciously held to the premise that the State Department was responsible for civil affairs even during the military phase. He also felt that civilians, e.g. Murphy and Macmillan, appointed to commanders' staffs, had veto authority over local civil affairs matters.
mirroring the military position, felt the government had the opportunity to learn a real lesson from the North African experience which was that civil affairs could not be separated from military operations in areas where fighting was still going on. Thomas K. Finletter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, commented that there was a possibility that the problems involving the civilian economy of occupied areas in the future would be handled as badly as they had been in North Africa. He felt there needed to be one integrated program for civilian participation. A CAD commentary on the situation echoed Finletter's sentiments. The staff officer hoped the unfortunate experience of the CCNA and the NAEB would result in future arrangements being centered in one agency rather than being controlled by a "debating society." Some of his comments were particularly apt assessments on the inner workings of government agencies:

- The two boards, CCNA and NAEB, were more concerned with clearing the agenda than making meaningful decisions.
- Decisions took weeks to process, not because they were necessarily momentous but because each agency was searching for the ulterior motives behind the positions taken by the other agencies.
- Tremendous amounts of time were wasted dealing with insignificant items while important decisions went begging.
- The wrangling agencies precluded timely decisions which were of importance to the Allies and to military operations.
With Lehman, the Lend Lease, the Board of Economic Warfare, and other agencies working at cross purposes, there was a lack of coherent economic direction in North Africa. Lehman believed it essential that a top committee of the concerned agencies be formed in Washington which would establish definite policies for the future and direct advance planning. He did not believe that existing combined committees were at a high enough level to be effective. The OFRRO staff felt that the Army practice of using the Vichy French Civil Service apparatus doomed the relief effort in North Africa because that Civil Service was corrupt. The staff felt the correct solution would be to have an American group on the scene of operations with sufficient competency and numbers to analyze the situation, implement, and oversee a program. Because of lack of resources, this was precisely what the Allies could not do; occupy a country and at the same time carry on combat operations. Eisenhower succinctly commented, "Sometimes I think I live ten years each week of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters."
NOTES TO CHAPTER IX

1. Stimson Diaries, Feb. 11, 12, '43.


6. Ltr., Roosevelt to Lehman, Mar. 19, '43, OF 5175, FDRL.


9. Stimson Diaries, Feb. 9, '43; Wright Study, IAD, ASF, Basic Policy File General 1942-43, NARS.

10. Stimson Diaries, Feb. 11, Mar. 28, '43.

11. Memo., ACOS/OP to AG, Feb. 17, '43, OCS014, NARS.

13 Ltr., OLLA to OFRRO. May 17, '43, Jackson Papers, Lehman Collection, Columbia University Lib.

14 Memo., Cox to Hopkins, May 3, '43, Oscar Cox Diaries, May-June 1943, State, FDRL.


17 Memo., Cox to B. V. Cohen, May 12, '43, Oscar Cox Diaries, May-June 1943, State, FDRL; memo., Hull to Roosevelt, May 18, '43, OF 20 State Dept., Sep-Dec '43, FDRL.

18 Ltr., Roosevelt to Hull, Jun. 3, '43, OF 20 State Dept., Sep-Dec '43, FDRL.

19 Memo., Roosevelt to Smith, May 21, '43, OF 20 State Dept., Sep-Dec '43, FDRL; Smith Diaries, Jun 3. '43, FDRL.


21 Ltr., Roosevelt to Hull, et. al., Jun. 3, '43, OF 20-D, OFEC, FDRL.

22 Ltr., Roosevelt to Stimson et. al., Jun. 3, '43, CAD 320.2 (3-1-43) Sec. 2, NARS; Stimson Diaries, entry for Jun. 4, '43; ltrs., Morgenthau to Stettinius to Knox to Roosevelt, Jun. 4, 8, 7, '43, OF 20, State Dept. Sep-Dec '43, FDRL.

23 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation. (W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1969) 44,


26 Msg., Murphy to Hull, Jun. 7, '43, State Dept., 851R. 50/107, NARS.

27 Msg., Cdr, 8 Flt to Cdr INCH, Apr. 7, '45, Map Room Files, Box 11, France Civil Affairs 1944-45, Folder 2:011 France (1) Sec 2 Civil Affairs For France Sep. 17, '44-Apr. 7, '45, FDRL.

28 Stimson Diaries, Feb. 1, '43.


30 Leahy Diaries, Dec. 9, '42.

31 Memo., Somervell to McCloy, Apr. 3, '43, CAD 100 (3-12-43) Sec. 1, NARS.


35 Memo., Jackson, et. al., to Lehman, Feb. 10, '43, Jackson Papers, Lehman Collection.

In January 1943, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) met at Casablanca to plan the phase of the war to follow the North African campaign. After extensive discussions between the military staffs, it was decided that Sicily should be attacked next. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that a military government would be instituted in Sicily. They hoped that this would avoid the political entanglements which had caused so many problems in North Africa. The institution of military government also avoided an unpleasant confrontation between the two leaders. The Americans feared that the British would leave much of the Fascist influence in Sicily intact while the British feared that all of Europe might be subjected to an American form of liberalism.

As the occupation continued these concerns became more prevalent. What disturbed the Europeans were the "leftist" ideas of the Americans as well as their "extreme doctrinaire" approach and the fact that they were "superficial experimentalists." The American personnel at the policy-making level were felt to be "arbitrary, unjust," and not looking to the "true welfare of the people or the stability of the nation." The decision for a military government meant that
a joint military group would have to plan, man, fund, and operate the entire civil affairs program. The fact that the President even envisioned this role for the military was significant. During the North Africa experience, Roosevelt had held that civil affairs belonged in the civilian realm. In the case of Sicily and Italy, he now appeared to feel that beyond the policy-making levels in Washington and London, the military must be completely responsible for civil affairs. Military government was to be the vehicle for reconstituting Italian domestic affairs along democratic lines. The ideas of Roosevelt and some of those around him during this era show the emergence of concepts which appeared later in the President's proposed treatment of Germany.²

Initial occupation plans were drafted by AFHQ staff personnel early in 1943. The draft directive which was patterned after the British experience in the field, was sent to London and Washington for coordination. In Washington, the War Department, the State Department, and the White House staffs refined the draft. Most of the provisions were quite straightforward: there was to be a military administration with coordination with civilian agencies as required; any civilians who were to be brought into Allied Military Government, Occupied Territory (AMGOT) were to be responsive to the military command and not the agency from which they came; Italian political leaders in exile were not to be allowed into the country initially; Italian military units were not to be used in AMGOT; the prerogatives of the crown were to
be suspended; and, insofar as possible, personal freedom was to be restored. In other words, an attempt was made to correct or avoid mistakes previously made in North Africa.\(^3\)

There were, however, points in the directive which drew the attention of the President. His main objection to the original draft was the wording concerning the continuation of the Fascists in office. For example, one sentence of the document read, "The services of local technical and professional officials, although nominally Party members, may be retained, and the lower ranks of the existing administration may be continued in the performance of their normal functions, responsible to the military administration, after the elimination of all political agents of the Fascist Party." In the President's own hand this sentence was marked to read, "The services of local technical and professional officials free from Fascist association can be used."\(^4\)

The President objected to the local administration remaining in office because he felt it would be demoralizing to the Italians and would result in undue opposition in the United States. He was fearful the military would not go far enough or deep enough with the purging. He would have preferred that Allied military officers hold government positions at all levels rather than Fascists. The Prime Minister agreed with this concept but disagreed with the President on how deep the epuration should go. He did not want Italy flooded with Allied "gauleiters."\(^5\) Churchill felt that if the Italians collapsed it would be sufficient to occupy ports and air bases.\(^6\)
In the pre-planning the leaders dropped this issue because, until the Allies were actually on the ground, they could not tell how many local officials would be available.

The joint military staff began planning the occupation organization amidst confusing concepts. The British planning staff were inclined to the view that AMGOT for Operation HUSKY should be a British responsibility. The American military staff were led to believe by the British that Eisenhower supported this position. The Americans, however, were of the opinion that Eisenhower favored a truly joint AMGOT, while they themselves felt that since the Allied commander was an American, AMGOT should be principally American. It was understood that McCloy wanted AMGOT to be totally American. Initially, the President suggested that AMGOT for Sicily be a British responsibility. Marshall and Leahy were disturbed by this notion and convinced the President that the Italians would be less prone to resist an American administration. Still, the President left the impression with the military planners that the military governor should be British. When the planning document for AMGOT was presented to Leahy, he commented that such a concept no longer followed the most recent thoughts the President had conveyed to Eisenhower. If the military persisted in the concept, Leahy insisted State Department concurrence be obtained before they attempted to gain Roosevelt's approval.

Churchill wired Roosevelt that since the Forces Commander under Eisenhower was British, the British should be the
"senior partner" in the military administration of the area. The Prime Minister wanted the Forces Commander named the Military Governor under the "supreme authority" of Eisenhower. "Of course" this arrangement would "in no way affect decisions on major policy being taken as usual by agreement between our two governments if convenient by general correspondence between you and me." Leahy felt this was a move by the British to achieve a favorable position in the peace negotiations whenever they began. The President objected to the tone of the phrase "senior partner;" he wanted military government "presented to the world as a definitely joint allied control." He told the Prime Minister that since a large number of Americans were of Italian descent and since the Italians were favorably inclined toward the Americans, the civil administration would go more smoothly if it were American. When Churchill received this message, he realized he had pushed Roosevelt too far. He responded to the President that he contemplated "HUSKY as our joint enterprise on terms of perfect equality, with our usual intimacy and confidence and with no question of a 'senior partner'." He went on to mollify Roosevelt with the idea that "one voice" would speak for the two countries. After this exchange Stimson, McCloy, Hildring, and Ray Atherton from the State Department completed the outline of the military government organization to the satisfaction of the President.8

The Americans suspected throughout the Italian campaign that the British, sometimes boldly, sometimes subtly, attempted
to dominate civil affairs management. Both McCloy and Stimson voiced concern at the British attitude. Stimson was unsure about the results; perhaps, in his opinion, it was just as well the British were dominant since the President had the American effort so fragmented that control was impossible. Sporadically, the Americans broached the subject with the British. In each case, the British appeared amazed at the charges and in great detail showed that there was, at worst, a fair balance and, at best, a preponderance of Americans in "key" civil affairs managerial and administrative positions. The difficulty was that the British and American views of what constituted a "key" position differed. 9

Americans expressed the same fear that the British were dominant in the relief and rehabilitation supply area. It was reported that the civilian supply system improved measurably once the British began administering the program. Again, the Americans voiced complaint that they furnished the money, supplies, and transportation while the British provided the administrative leadership. 10 The Americans pointed out that there was indication the post-war aims of the two countries were at odds. The critical occupation mechanisms were British controlled or gave "every promise of being so." Making an American head of the Allied Control Commission, Italy Monuments or Education Sub-Commission, hardly altered the fact of real control. All the military supplies to the Italian army were being furnished by the Americans and ninety percent of the civilian aid was also American. Had the situation been
the reverse, and had the British been furnishing the major share of aid, it was reasonably certain that control would not have rested with the Americans.\textsuperscript{11}

It appeared to the Americans that they were making an active contribution to a bigger and better British Empire. Later in 1944, State Department officials suggested that the chief Allied administrator be an American to avoid further British dominance. McCloy wrote that the British seemed to regard Italy in the same manner as they did Egypt and Greece — "their sphere." Myron Taylor, United States Representative to the Vatican City, writing directly to Roosevelt in October 1944, felt the British dominated Allied policy in Italy. The British, in his opinion, were attempting to retard recovery at the moment, hoping Italy would be a source of markets for British goods in the post-war era.\textsuperscript{12} No doubt these suspicions would have been reinforced had the Americans seen Macmillan's note:

\begin{quote}
We, my dear Crossman, are Greeks in this American empire. You will find the Americans much as the Greeks found the Romans - great big, vulgar, bustling people, more vigorous than we are and also more idle, with more unspoiled virtues but also more corrupt. We must run AFHQ as the Greek slaves ran the operations of the Emperor Claudius.\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

The Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces (CINCAP) was responsible to both governments for occupation administration. He was to use the directive which was subsequently issued as a Combined Chiefs of Staff document containing policy guidance on political, financial, and economic affairs. A Military Government Section was established at AFHQ; this unit had an
American appointed as a Deputy Chief of Staff. The Forces Commander, General Sir Harold R. L. C. Alexander, was named as Military Governor. The Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Major General Lord Rennell of Rodd, was British and his deputy, Colonel Charles M. Spofford, was American. Spofford was replaced by Brigadier General Frank J. McSherry early in June 1944. The HUSKY Civil Affairs staff was mixed and was organized to deal with legal, financial, public safety, property, supply and resources, welfare and health, labor and media affairs. It was agreed that in the ranks of major and above the British-American mix would be equal; at the working level, however, the mix was approximately sixty-five percent American, thirty-five percent British.\textsuperscript{14}

McCloy and the other military planners in Washington were determined that, since the military were fully responsible for civil affairs matters in Sicily, they were going to do a better job than had been done in North Africa. In addition to assuring that the basic operating organization was properly established, they wanted to provide adequate and timely definitions and policy guidance to the field.\textsuperscript{15}

It was decided initially that no civilians would be directly involved in the theater of operations. Later, when civilians were assigned, it was made quite clear that they were to be responsible to the field commander and not to their respective agencies. The President was opposed to having civilians in the field at all except as technical advisors.
Civilian political affairs officers, as far as Roosevelt was concerned, tended to confuse authority. This attitude opened another question between the British and the Americans. Since the entire affair was to be a military operation, the Americans were of the opinion that all matters of policy, decisions and questions should be channeled from the Allied governments to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, thence to the theater commander and to the Forces Commander/Military Governor and the reverse in matters emanating in the field. The British agreed except they did want Macmillan on the ground so he would apprise his Government of what was taking place in the field. They did not necessarily require he be there in an official capacity but they did ask that he be allowed to see the message traffic dealing with civil affairs and have access to communications facilities to London.16

The Americans objected to having a British cabinet officer in the headquarters in addition to a British Military Governor and a British Chief Civil Affairs Officer. They turned to the President to resolve the issue; Roosevelt proposed to the British that the two, Macmillan and Murphy, remain at AFHQ but that only military command and control channels for civil affairs be authorized. Churchill responded that this was suitable except that he saw no reason why the civilian representatives should not be in touch with their leaders. He pointed out that the system had worked well in TORCH and that it should continue under HUSKY. The President agreed and there the matter rested.17
With these arrangements, Roosevelt once again compromised an earlier concept. Formerly, he implied that certain civil affairs could best be conducted by civilians even during the initial military occupation. He now agreed that all political problems would be dealt with by the military. Policy for the occupation was to be determined by the civilian agencies and given to the forces in the field through the CCS. The actual administration was to be accomplished by the military. This policy was to stand for the rest of the war. Roosevelt subsequently disapproved a plan for appointing political advisors to the headquarters responsible for planning the invasion of northwest Europe.¹⁸

After what the forces in the field considered an overly long delay, the AMGOT directive was approved and forwarded. The invasion took place and the military government personnel went ashore shortly after the initial wave of combat forces. The combat commanders, military government commanders, and administrators were engrossed in a multitude of problems, thinking they were relatively free to implement the policies being conveyed to them from the CCS. In July 1943, however, the Director, Civil Affairs Division, Army General Staff, asked the Commander, NATO, when representatives of civilian agencies might expect to enter the theater and which agencies should, in the commander's view, participate in the occupation. At the same time the commander was asked when full working teams from the agencies might come over. Macmillan and
Brigadier General Julius C. Holmes, Deputy CAO, NATO, echoed the widely-held opinion that civilian and military occupation administration could not be mixed. They did feel that should the need arise, civilian experts could be called on in advisory capacities. They also felt that it was premature to form any sort of unit like the NAEB and that this was the only way formal bodies of agency personnel could come into the area. Eisenhower responded to Hilldring that the answer to his questions depended on developments in the theater. He wired that he did not believe a formal civilian organization could be effective in the field as long as combat operations were going on or as long as the area was being used as a base of operations for other areas. He agreed with Holmes, Macmillan, and others that the two concepts simply could not be mixed.19

When that message was received Marshall reminded Eisenhower that the President had directed earlier, on June 3, 1943, that civilian agencies, under military control, be integrated into military government at the earliest possible time "consistent with the military situation." Marshall took this opportunity to bring to Eisenhower's attention the views of the President so Eisenhower could prepare a program in consonance with Roosevelt's desires. Eisenhower wired Marshall that when the short-term military occupation was secured, it would be the time to begin planning for long-term policies for both Sicily and Italy and the civilian agencies should begin to organize for this phase. Specifically, now that he
had the President's letter making Sicily eligible for Lend
Lease assistance, Eisenhower suggested that Preston Sturges,
the Area Director from the State Department, accompany Lehman
to Sicily. Eisenhower assumed that civilian participation,
like military government, would be a joint affair with the
British.²⁰

The British were opposed to this approach. Their main
objection was that they did not want to see "thousands of
starry-eyed American civilians running loose in Europe, in­
jecting into the picture ideas that might be contrary to the
political doctrines of Britain."²¹ The British broached the
matter through the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC),
an adjunct of the CCS. The CCAC were of the opinion that
individual civilians might enter the theater but that the CCS
were unable to authorize agency participation. The President's
desires in this matter were circumvented for the moment.
Sturgis was of the opinion that civilian agency participation
was premature. Although others in Washington might not agree,
developments would show that the agencies were not yet pre­
pared to assume responsibility for occupation duties.²²
NOTES TO CHAPTER X

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4. Draft of Husky Civil Affairs Directive, Hopkins Papers, Facsimile Folder, Box 245 Army, FDRL.


7. Stimson Diaries, Apr. 5, '43; msg., Roosevelt to Churchill, Apr. 14, '43, FRUS Italy 1943, 327; Leahy Diaries, Apr. 3, '43.


9. Ltr., Dep CINC AFHQ to Asst. Sec. of War, Jun. 12, '44, CAD 334 ACC (9-17-43) (1) Sec 2, NARS; memo., McCloy to Roosevelt, Nov. 8, '43, FDRL; Stimson Diaries, Nov. 6, '43; msg., SACMED to CCS, Feb. 9, '44, Map Room Files, Box 14, Surrender of Italy, MR 370-916-12/14/43, Folder: Jan-Oct 1944, FDRL.

10. Memo., unaddressed, unsigned, undated, Harry Hopkins Files, Box 324, Relief for Italy, FDRL; ltr., Grady to MacFarlane, Apr. 14, '44, file: CAD 334 ACC (9-17-43) (1) Sec. 2, NARS.
11 Ltr., Dep. Pres. ACC Italy to AFHQ, Mar. 13, '44, CAD
334 Allied Control Commission (9-17-43) (1) NARS.

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17 Memo., McCloy to Hopkins, May 25, '43, Hopkins Papers,
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18 Msg., JCS to CG ETO, USA, Aug. 31, '43, in Coles and
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20 Msg., Marshall to Eisenhower, Aug. 7, '43, CAD Msg files,
CM-Out 3075, NARS; msg., Eisenhower to Marshall, Aug. 30, '43,
Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 215.
21 Memo., Hammond on mtg. with Finletter, Sep. 23, '43, Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 216.

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CHAPTER XI

THE COLLAPSE AND SURRENDER OF ITALY

The successful Allied invasion of Sicily brought about a change in the Italian government. For some time it had been evident to the Italian leaders that they could not continue in the war much longer. With Sicily captured and a mainland invasion imminent, the central question for the Italians became how to get out of the war without suffering German retaliation and how to approach the Allies in view of the announced "unconditional surrender" policy. The first step was taken when King Victor Emmanuel III replaced Mussolini with Marshal Pietro Badoglio. It was hoped that the new government would gain something for the Italians other than unconditional terms.¹

Some concepts of how the Italians should be treated in the event of surrender surfaced in Washington in late Spring 1943. The Operations Division of the General Staff sent a message to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) in May 1943 requesting that the Psychological Warfare Plan for the invasion of Sicily be altered. The proposed alteration, which had been initiated in the field, would have allowed announcements to be made to the Italian people that if they would cease hostilities they could eventually achieve peace with honor and the Allied governments would pledge "full nationhood"
for the Italians once the enemy was defeated. The reaction of Roosevelt to this proposal was sharp. "Most certainly we cannot tell the Italians that if they cease hostilities they will have a peace with honor. We cannot get away from unconditional surrender."^2

Oscar Cox wrote to Hopkins that the issue was a real conundrum. It was vital, in Cox's view, that the Italians surrender in order to avoid the demoralizing effect on the American people of a fake peace. Still, in order to lessen the war it should be possible to work out an alternative for the Italians. Robert Sherwood, Office of War Information, studied the Cox memo and rejected even discussing it further. Roosevelt had expressly forbidden any idea that the Italians could "gain peace with honor," however much it would save in manpower, time, or material.\(^3\)

It is interesting to note that the message which caused this issue to surface came from AFHQ and was signed by the Allied commander. On May 30, 1943, Eisenhower sent a note to his Chief of Staff to "see to it that the Psychological Warfare Section does not send to Washington or London any more messages suggesting broad policy changes in existing directives from the Combined Chiefs of Staff without referring them, in each case, to you. I am exceedingly irritated by the recent incident in which the expression 'Peace with honor' was used." Eisenhower either signed the message, having paid only scant attention to it, or someone signed it for him, or he was unhappy not that the message he signed was sent, but
In July, following the invasion and rapid occupation of Sicily, Eisenhower approached the CCS on the subject of negotiations with the Italians. Bearing in mind that for the Americans at least, the main Allied thrust of the war was to be in northwest Europe, manpower in the Mediterranean area remained a worrying issue to the theater commander. If the Allies should conquer all of Italy, AMG would be hard pressed to occupy the country. If the Allies captured only part of it and had to fight for the rest, again, they would be hard pressed to provide both occupation and combat forces. In the event the Fascist government ceased to exercise sovereignty and was replaced by an indigenous group who were capable and acceptable, Eisenhower wanted the authority to deal with this situation. Marshall wired Eisenhower that he was only authorized to deal with individual, local military commanders on unconditional surrender terms; he was not free to negotiate for the establishment of military government or anything beyond. Just as the Chief of Staff provided this response, the Mussolini government was replaced. Roosevelt was in immediate touch with Churchill. Among other things, the President wanted to be sure that the Allies came "as close as possible to 'unconditional surrender' followed by good treatment of the Italian population." There appeared to be a slight nuance of change in Roosevelt's approach.

On July 27, 1943, Eisenhower forwarded to the CCS a draft of the armistice terms which he hoped would be approved and
returned to him in the form of a directive should it be needed. The main points of this draft were: hostile activity was to halt; POWs were to be turned over to UN forces; the Italian fleet was to be turned over to UN forces; German forces were to be evacuated; Corsica was to be surrendered; other islands and the mainland were to be used as UN staging bases; the Allied commander was to be able to institute Military Government wherever necessary; the UN was to be given the use of airfields, ports and facilities; Italian forces in other theaters were to be withdrawn to Italy; and the Italians were to use force, if necessary, to implement the armistice. The President reviewed the terms and asked both Leahy and Churchill for their views. The President felt it likely the Allies would be able to take Italy out of the war without the sacrifice of large numbers of men. The terms of the armistice would, for all intents and purposes, make Italy an Allied cobelligerant for it was not likely the Germans would idly stand by and allow those portions of the terms which affected their forces to be implemented. The President wanted to be exceedingly careful about the terms and the negotiations with the King and Badoglio since, "There will be a great fuss by the same people who fussled about the Darlan Deal." Roosevelt reported to Churchill that he told the press, "we have to treat with any person or groups who can give us an armistice and maintain internal order." By return message the Prime Minister agreed with the President.
Churchill wrote, "I will deal with any Italian authority which can deliver the goods." 7

The "Eisenhower Draft" with some refinements was returned to the field on August 1, 1943, with Roosevelt's and Churchill's approval. The commander was instructed that the armistice terms were not to be made public. At the same time he was informed that both the British and the Americans were drawing up a surrender document. Churchill wanted to go immediately to the imposition of a long term, detailed surrender document. Eisenhower, Murphy, and Macmillan, along with Roosevelt, insisted on the flexibility and speed of a short-term document. The President felt that long, involved terms could not be adequately foreseen and suggested they be left to another time. 8

The Anglo-American leaders and staffs met at Quebec during August 1943. While the conference was going on the Italian government collapsed. At first the President and Prime Minister attempted to dictate the Italian surrender from Quebec. Murphy maintained that on second thought the government leaders, fearing another "Darlan Backlash" episode in their own countries, directed negotiations through military channels. 9 Brigadier General Walter B. Smith, U. S. Army, and Brigadier K. W. Strong, British Army, were sent by direction of the Prime Minister and the President to Lisbon to work out the armistice details with General Guiseppe Castellano of the Italian Army. Subsequent negotiations took place in
Madrid and the final talks and signatures took place in Sicily. The principal stumbling block was the Germans -- would they seize the government or scorch Rome? The Allies entered the negotiations to secure unconditional surrender while the Italians went to the meetings to talk about becoming an ally against Germany and, in the process, safeguarding Rome and as much of Italy as possible.

In the meantime, Eisenhower was waiting for a civil affairs directive for Italy and a long-term surrender document if one could be agreed upon between the British and the Americans. Eisenhower wanted the documents on hand for use together or alternatively, as the situation demanded. The theater commander proposed that the basic Allied Military Government (AMG) directive used and the personnel assigned for Sicily be employed again on the mainland. Eisenhower also requested a senior American and British official be assigned to assist in the planning. Both the requested documents were staffed in Washington and the surrender document was discussed at Quebec. Again, the President insisted that, initially, a short-term military surrender document would be sufficient and that a long-term surrender instrument could be negotiated with the Italians later. The British continued to press for a long-term surrender document which they had previously prepared and submitted to the CCS, JCS, and CAD in turn. The CAD staff took the stand that the British proposal did not call for unconditional surrender. The CAD concept was that the
Italian government would surrender unconditionally and the Allies would institute a military government.\textsuperscript{10}

The British and Americans were in basic conflict. Roosevelt and Hull did not appear to object to the long terms \textit{per se}, they just failed to see why the King should be forced to sign them under the uncertain political conditions of the moment. Roosevelt, after talking to Churchill and Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, changed his mind. The President issued instructions to Eisenhower on August 23, 1943 that the "long-term" surrender document was to be used at the first suitable opportunity after the military surrender was signed. The result of all this was a good deal of irritation, confusion, and frustration at AFHQ and in the actual armistice negotiations themselves. The President acquiesced to avoid further delay and conflict. Later he commented that he had been opposed to the concept because all the problems which must be dealt with could not be foreseen and thus innumerable protocols would be required.\textsuperscript{11}

By this time the Germans controlled the bulk of Italy including the Italian government apparatus in Rome and the Italians could not publicly surrender. This made Allied landings on the mainland necessary to hold the Italians to their surrender on the one hand and to prove to the Italians that the Allies would not abandon them to the Germans on the other. Roosevelt and Churchill approved the mainland invasion and a planned airborne landing near Rome. The Rome landing plan
was intended to reduce the German reaction to the Italian surrender.\textsuperscript{12}

The short-term military surrender was secretly signed on September 3, 1943 and announced five days later. Because the Germans had greater forces around Rome than the Allies had been led to believe, the airborne landing was cancelled. Badoglio requested a delay in the announcement of the surrender. Roosevelt and Churchill were of the opinion that the requested delay should be refused. They directed that the surrender announcement come from the Algiers military headquarters and not from London and Washington.\textsuperscript{13}

The landings in Italy proper began on September 3, 1943 and Military Government personnel were with the initial forces. The plans used for Sicily were re-employed with some alteration to correct deficiencies noted in the earlier experience, e.g., pre-invasion propaganda was reportedly more realistic; the Sicilians had been misinformed or had mistakenly chosen to believe that with the liberation there would be an immediate "wave of plenty." Such was not the case and the demoralizing disillusionment was rather a serious matter, particularly in friendly or "semi-friendly" invasions such as occurred in North Africa, Sicily, and initially in Italy. Finally, if local administrations were to be "cleansed," then military government administrations must be prepared to fill the gap.\textsuperscript{14}

The long-term surrender and a declaration of war were real problems for the Italian government. As far as Badoglio was concerned, the Italians were at war with the Germans. He
bridled at signing the long-term surrender document on the ground that his already insecure government could not survive such a move. The Germans and the Fascists charged that the King and Badoglio had betrayed Italy and the Italian armed forces by their act of unconditional surrender. A compromise was reached in late September. The British persisted in having the long-term surrender document signed. They were certain Badoglio would sign if the Allies would quit haggling over the matter. Badoglio agreed to sign the surrender if it were withheld from public announcement. He further agreed that the Italians would issue a formal declaration of war but he preferred to postpone such a declaration until Rome was captured. Roosevelt agreed to these terms but only after consulting with Eisenhower and despite the fact that he was sure the "anti-Darlanists" in the United States would react adversely. 15

The long-term surrender document was reworded and signed at Malta by Badoglio and Eisenhower on September 29, 1943. The American, British and Soviet leaders agreed to retitle the long-term document to Additional Conditions of The Armistice With Italy. The preamble was changed to read "and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government." The original statement stressing unconditional surrender was omitted. Under the terms Corsica was to have a French administered military government, the British were to govern Sardinia, the forward areas were to
be under Allied Military Government, and "King's Italy" was
to be governed by Badoglio under the supervision of an Allied
military mission. Early in November 1943, the British Gov­
ernment proposed publicly releasing the Italian terms. The
Greek government and others concerned expressed chagrin at
not having been informed about affairs concerning what they
considered to be "their enemy." Eisenhower was consulted by
the White House on the matter. The General asked that the
terms not be released in view of the critical state of combat
operations at the moment. The State Department and the For­
eign Office then agreed that the Allies could be secretly in­
formed of the terms but they were not to be published openly.
Again on December 1, 1943, the British pressed to have the
terms made public and again, on Eisenhower's opinion, the
request was denied. In June 1944, the Undersecretary of State proposed the
terms be revised and publicly released. The Italian govern­
ment had submitted a pro-memoria describing the manner in
which the Allies had not conformed to the armistice and sur­
render terms. The Secretary of State commented to the Presi­
dent that some of the items were accurate, some were ques­tionable and others were not valid. The terms were not re­
vised and the President still refused to release them because
of the theater commander's request for secrecy.

By February 1945, the military occupation of Italy was
confined to the area immediately to the rear of the combat
zone. The Italians proposed a revision to the armistice terms which was more lenient than the original. The Italians felt new terms were warranted because of the part the Italians had played in the war as a co-belligerant since October 1943. The rationale, supported by American civilians working in Italy, was that the harsh, older terms were being used by the Italian communist party to draw support for the overthrow of the government. By this time, the armistice terms were caught up in the emerging East-West conflict and the President's attention was focused elsewhere. The proposal was approved.
NOTES TO CHAPTER XI


2 Rep't., Hilldring to McCloy, May 20, '43, Asst. Sec. of War, Class. Subj. File, 1940-47, McCloy's Permanent Files, NARS.

3 Memo., Cox to Hopkins, May 25, '43, Hopkins Papers, Box 319, Operation HUSKY, FDRL.


6 Msg., Eisenhower to CCS, Jul. 27, '43, Map Room Files, Box 14, Surrender of Italy, MR 370 Italy (1), FDRL.


8 Higgins, Underbelly, 104; msgs., Roosevelt to Churchill, Jul. 30, '43, Marshall to Eisenhower, Aug. 1, '43, Map Room Files, Box 14, Surrender of Italy, MR 370, Italy (1), FDRL; msgs., Roosevelt to Churchill, Aug. 2, '43, Map Room Files, Canadian Fishing Trip, August 1943, FDRL.

9 Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, (Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1964) 188.


12 Msgs., Eisenhower to CCS, Sep. 1, '43; Roosevelt and Churchill to Eisenhower, Sep. 2, '43, Map Room Files, Box 14, Surrender of Italy, MR 370, Italy (1), FDRL.

13 Msgs., Eisenhower to CCS, Sep. 8 & 9, '43, Map Room Files, Box 14, Surrender of Italy, MR 370, Italy (1), FDRL.


16 See Chapter XII, page 174, below for further explanation of "King's Italy".

17 Msg., Roosevelt to Churchill, Nov. 21, '43, Map Room Files, Box 4, Roosevelt to Churchill messages, Nov. '44-Apr. '45, Folder: Nov. '44, FDRL; msg., Hull to Kirk, Nov. 26, '43; memo, Dept. of State to British Embassy, Nov. 16, '43, both in FRUS, Vol. II, Italy, 43, 397.

18 Sec. of State memo. on Italian Pro-Memoria, Jun. 12, '44, PSF Files, Italy 1942-45, FDRL.

19 Msg., Actg. Sec. of State to President, Feb. 25, '45, Map Room Files, Box 25, Yalta Conference, Classified State Department Messages, 2/8-2/27/45 (1), FDRL; ltr., Taylor to Roosevelt, Mar. 6, '45, PSF files: Dip. Correspondence I, Box 21, FDRL.
Throughout the Italian campaign, Eisenhower and later, Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, directly supervised the occupation. They were provided ample guidance, bordering at times, perhaps, on undue interference; nevertheless, the generals managed the entire program - a different approach from that followed in North Africa. The combination of civilian and military control was accomplished through various means which emerged from the military government apparatus and the Allied Military Mission originally organized to deal with the Italian government in Brindisi.

Initially, it had been planned that AMGOT would control the immediate combat zone and critical combat support areas. The management of these areas caused little concern at the Allied national level. Eisenhower continually stressed that it should be thoroughly understood that these areas were under the sole control of the military. There is no record that this concept was ever challenged. Early in the campaign it was decided that as the combat zone advanced, the rearward areas would be governed by an indigenous regime under the supervision of an Allied mission. This area was dubbed "King's Italy." The procedure was implemented for two reasons:
to reduce the number of personnel required to govern Italy and to give some measure of stature to the Badoglio government which had established itself temporarily at Brindisi soon after the surrender was made public. Initially, the Italian state under the sovereignty of the King comprised five provinces.¹

The King wanted more territory placed under Italian control and he wanted to exercise more authority within those areas. Stimson drafted a telegram for the President to send to Eisenhower supporting the King's desire. Eisenhower responded that he posed no objection as long as combat areas and combat support areas were under his direct control. The President wrote the King that as much Italian territory as possible would be returned to his control. Despite the desire of Victor Emmanuel, it soon became apparent that the Badoglio government had neither the will nor the means for administering liberated Italy beyond the southernmost provinces. Badoglio was of the opinion that only after Rome was free could more territory be managed by the Italians. As the war continued, and the Italians declared war on Germany, however, they grew stronger and more territory was released to them. Early in 1944, Field Marshal Wilson, the military governor, suggested that indigenous Italian control did not extend over as much territory as it could, particularly in view of the fact that ultimate control lay with the Allies. It was presumed by the Americans at the time that this was
a move on the part of the British to strengthen the Italian monarchy.  

The military were not prepared initially to deal with the issues of the sovereignty of Italy and the part the Italians were to play in the war. Nevertheless, the Italian campaign presented problems in civil affairs which the military were expected to address. The Badoglio government and the Italian military forces in liberated Italy wanted to participate in the war against Germany. In accord with this desire, the Badoglio government maintained that they conformed to the terms of the armistice as closely as possible without compromising their desire to be afforded a co-belligerancy status. Those military units which the Italians could muster participated with the Allies in the war against Germany. They were reluctant, however, to issue a formal declaration of war for fear of reprisal in the industrial areas of Northern Italy which were firmly under control of the Germans. The Allies sought active Italian participation in the war in order to free manpower and material for the desired attack on northern Europe. The Allied leaders felt a formal declaration of war was required; this would be difficult to achieve in light of the surrender terms. Roosevelt, Churchill, Eisenhower, Murphy, and Macmillan had all broached the subject with the Italians on several occasions in August 1943. The Badoglio government was reluctant to act without assurance that they would be actively supported by the Allies
in this move. The Allied invasion of the Italian mainland in September 1943 provided that assurance. Later in September, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to extend recognition to the Badoglio government if it would formally declare war on Germany.3

Harry Hopkins argued against this position. He felt that if the Italians declared war they would be equal to the other Allies and this was difficult for Hopkins to accept. He preferred employing the Badoglio forces much in the same manner as the Darlan forces had been used in North Africa. Stimson, on the other hand, preferred recognition of the King and Badoglio. Churchill, in agreeing to the recognition of the Brindisi group, wanted the Allied representatives to encourage both the King and Badoglio to promise to broaden their government at the earliest opportunity to include all anti-Fascist representation. It was further made clear to the Italians that as soon as the Germans were driven out of Italy they were free to select their own government.4

The King and Badoglio took the stand that they could only declare war once Rome was out of danger from German reprisal. Even though the road to Rome proved difficult, the Allies continued to urge the Italians to declare war on the Germans. The pressure point in early October was based on the idea that the Italians would mitigate the surrender terms by taking a more active, formal part in the war. The Russians agreed with the Americans and British. Roosevelt, at
the Prime Minister's urging, instructed Eisenhower to increase the pressure on the Italians.

The Italians were reluctant because to this point not only Rome but all the industrialized, heavily-populated areas of Italy were under German domination. As the military campaign bogged down in the autumn of 1943, the Italians could see no good reason and several adverse possibilities arising from their formal participation in the war. In October, however, they did declare war on the Germans and the remaining Axis powers. Since this was not in strict accord with the armistice terms, the theater commander sought guidance on the issue.5

Eisenhower pointed out that in the interest of military operations, the surrender had already proven quite valuable and in view of what was to come promised to be even more so. Eisenhower further pointed out that the Italian effort would release more manpower for the pending operation in northern Europe. Roosevelt, in what appeared to be a further nuance of change, expressed the opinion that the long-term control of as much of Italy as possible should be the responsibility of the Italians themselves, but under close Allied military supervision. This was a constant source of conflict between the British and the Americans and within the government circles of each. It was thought that sufficient political control should be given Badoglio to enable him to establish his authority with the Italians but not so much that the Allied
military forces would appear to be serving in friendly ter­ritory.6

Italian territory lying between military government areas and "King's Italy" was administered by an Allied group, the Allied Control Commission (ACC), which was established in November 1943. It was comprised of a group of military and civilian personnel from the three Allies and later, France. The ACC provided public administration and supervision of uncovered Italy in the name of the Allied commander.

While the British and the Americans were negotiating the Italian armistice, the Secretary of State reported that the Russians felt Allied unity and unconditional surrender would be sham concepts if an armistice were signed with the "House of Savoy and Badoglio." The President immediately wired Stalin the background to the situation and solicited his comments and assistance. Stalin reported to Roosevelt and Churchill, meeting in Quebec, that the background briefing message had never reached him and he did not understand the delay. The time was ripe, said Stalin, to establish a commission of the three countries for dealing with "various governments falling away from Germany." The British and Americans negotiated between themselves and informed the Soviet Union of their position as if the Soviets were "merely a third party looking passively on."7

Replying to Stalin's complaint, Churchill and Roosevelt explained the surrender and pointed out that Eisenhower was
to sign the armistice in the name of the Soviet Union as well as for the British and Americans. The two leaders invited the Russians to participate in the armistice negotiations. Then Roosevelt wired Stalin his approval of a "political and military meeting on the State Department level." He proposed the date, September 25, 1943, and London, Washington, Tunis, or Casablanca for a site. Accommodations, especially communications, were still too difficult in Sicily for it to be considered as a conference site. Stalin had proposed the establishment of a more permanent body than Roosevelt's response indicated. The Chairman wired that having a Soviet officer participate in the negotiations was inadequate. He stated again that a "military-political commission" was needed. The British replied by proposing an advisory council for Italy and a more wide-ranging commission to sit in London to deal with problems of mutual concern other than Italy.  

The French joined the Russians in voicing their unhappiness at being ignored. The FCNL representatives in Washington made it known that in the event of an Italian collapse they would like France to participate in the armistice negotiations. Later, Rene Massigli, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, FCNL, and de Gaulle met with Hull in London to discuss the Italian issue and presented their views that the French should have been included in the surrender negotiations and must now be included in the civil affairs arrangements for Italy.
As a result of these events and on the recommendation of Eisenhower, the Allies established an Advisory Council to the Allied Control Commission for Italy which included the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, Greece, and Yugoslavia. Brazil and China indicated they would like to participate in one of the governing bodies. The British and the Americans were concerned that this would open the door for each of the United Nations to be included. The President established the policy that only those countries who had actually fought the Italians might participate in the civil affairs arrangements.\(^\text{10}\)

The Advisory Council served a dual role. First it served as a group of high commissioners who advised the president of the ACC, who was also CINC Med on general occupation policy, and represented the special interests of their states. Almost immediately, Macmillan and Murphy were appointed to the council as representatives of Great Britain and the United States respectively with the rank of ambassadors. Eisenhower asked for Murphy but he was not appointed until Roosevelt specifically made his wishes known. The Russian representative was Alexander E. Bogomolov, later to be replaced by Andrei Y. Vishinsky. The French were represented by Rene Massigli.\(^\text{11}\)

The Advisory Council appears to have been a thinly-veiled cover for avoiding the insistence of both the Russians and the French that they be allowed to participate directly in
the occupation of Italy. The Soviet Union objected to the establishment of the council in the first place on the grounds that it was unnecessary. They advocated continuance of the Allied Military Mission and had appointed Vishinsky as the Soviet Union representative to that group. They were opposed by the Americans and the British in their stand that the mission be charged with political power while the theater commander retained control of military matters in Italy. When the Russians also indicated disfavor at the prospect of equal representation for the FCNL on the ACC, Roosevelt assured Stalin that such was not the case. He was quite insistent that the French were not to participate in the military government of Italy. The British, however, did not agree with the American position. In any event, the governments in London and Washington approved the establishment of the Advisory Council but did not furnish any direction to the field concerning its functioning. Eisenhower brought this shortcoming to the attention of the CCS and on November 21, 1943, shortly before the Russians arrived to participate in the Council deliberations, the directive was received.12

While this issue was being settled, the Russians and French requested positions on the Allied Control Commission. The President approved the appointment of a Soviet member but declined to agree that the FCNL should be represented. The CCS attempted to link the two issues. They refused to send forward to the field the authorization for Russian
participation unless the FCNL authorization were approved as well. The President was not pleased at this move and asked the Secretary of State to inform the CCS that they were exceeding their authority in this matter. In late January 1944, the ACC Italy approved the Russian seating and voiced the hope that the CCS would soon resolve the issue of the French desire to participate. Finally, in mid-February 1944, Roosevelt approved the FCNL representation on the ACC Italy.13

Although the Russians were represented on ACC Italy, they constantly protested they were not full participants in the same manner as the British or the Americans. Partially to overcome this frustration and for other reasons to be discussed below, the Russians ignored the Allied occupation organization and recognized the Badoglio government in March 1944. Both the Americans and the British were unhappy at the Russian move but there was little they could do about the situation.14

In the winter of 1944, occupation arrangements for Italy were reorganized. Military government in the combat areas remained under direct control of the field commander. Technical control and coordination of military government fell under the purview of the ACC organization. Other ACC responsibilities were consolidated in what amounted to an operational centralization. This, along with Eisenhower's departure for the northern European command, left the British holding all the key positions in the ACC. The Americans were acutely aware and resentful of this situation.15
By the summer of 1944, ACC Italy controls had become less stringent. The Italian government was free to deal with most of its domestic problems and conduct its foreign affairs by simply informing the ACC of its actions after-the-fact. With the exception of certain facilities such as the port of Naples, control of territory south of Rome was returned to the Italian government. In August 1944, it was proposed that the ACC be "demilitarized." Allied control and internal ACC civilianization was gradual and in September 1944 the ACC title was replaced by "The Allied Commission." In actual fact, ACI was never completely civilianized; the American military were much more desirous of this move than the British or the American civilian agencies.16

At the time the Commission was reorganized, its mission changed very little. It was suggested by the British that the ACI by-pass the AFHQ and deal directly with the administration in Washington and the government in London. The American military were opposed to this. They did not want to be placed in a position of implementing Foreign Office-State Department policy without having had it negotiated through the CCS. McCloy and Stimson feared that this was a British move to turn military government into an active foreign policy mechanism. The Americans favored relaxing the occupation at this time and broached the idea to negotiating a peace treaty. The British declined to discuss the idea because the issue of the disposition of the Italian Fleet and the Italian colonies in Africa were insurmountable at the time.17
By the end of January 1945, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the political section of the ACI was to be abolished and that relations between Italy and the former occupying powers were to be conducted through the respective embassies. The ACI became an advisory body rather than one of control. From this time until the end of the war, the Allied Commission figured more in the internal politics of Italy and the Anglo-American influence conflict than as an actual control mechanism.
NOTES TO CHAPTER XII


2Msgs., Eisenhower to Marshall, Sep. 26, '43, msg., Wilson to CCS, Jan. 13, '44, both in Map Room Files, Box 14, Surrender of Italy, MR 370, 9/16-12/43, FDRL.

3Entries for Sep. 19 and 23, '43, Leahy Diaries; msg., Roosevelt to Leahy, Sep. 19, '43, Map Room Files, Box 14, Surrender of Italy, MR 370, 9/16-12/21/43, FDRL.


5Higgins, Underbelly, 123.


7Msg., Hull to Roosevelt, Jul. 31, '43, Map Room Files, Box 14, Surrender of Italy, MR 370 Italy (1) FDRL; Kolko, Politics, 38; msg., Stalin to Roosevelt and Churchill, Aug. 22, '43, Correspondence Between Chairman, President and Prime Minister, 84.


10. Msg., Roosevelt to Hull, Nov. 4, '43, Dep't correspondence, State Dept. 1940-45, Box 34, PSF II, FDRL; msg., Eisenhower to CCS, Nov. 6, '43, Map Room Files, Box 13, Italy, Folder: MR 210, Allied Control Commission for Italy, Aug 43-Aug. 44, FDRL.

11. Msg., Roosevelt to Murphy, Nov. 25, '43, OF 5197, FDRL; msg., Roosevelt to Stalin, Oct. 17, '43, Correspondence Between Chairman, President and Prime Minister, 100, CCAC paper, Military Political Commission in Mediterranean Area, Oct. 1, '43, CAD Files, 334, CCAC (9-17-43) (1) NARS.


14. Memo., Russian Embassy to State Dept., Hull to Roosevelt, Mar. 20, '44, PSF Russia 1942-45, Box 18, FDRL.

15. Memo., Hilldring to McCloy, Jan. 5, '45, ASW 370.8, General, NARS; msg., Chapin to Sec. of State, Jan. 17, '44, CAD 334, ACC 9-17-43) (1), NARS; memo., McCloy to Stimson, Mar. 24, '44, ASW 370.8 ACC, NARS.

16. Document 387.4-1, AFHQ, Organization of ACC-Italy, Sep. 30, '44, Hopkins Files, Box 324, Relief for Italy, FDRL; ltr., Kirk to Sec. of St., Aug. 16, '44, State Dept. 740.00119, Control (Italy), 18-1644, NARS.

17. Harris, Allied Military Administration, Italy, 236, 263-264; memo., Matthews, Dept. of St. to Chandler, Gen. Staff, Oct. 9, '44, CAD 014, Italy (1-25-43), Sec. 7, NARS; Stimson Diaries, Nov. 8 and 12, '43.

18. Memo., for the Rec., Hilldring to Smith (OPD), Jan. 19, '45, OPD 014, ITS Section (Case 1 through 13), NARS.
CHAPTER XIII

DOMESTIC ITALIAN AFFAIRS

Italian political affairs following the arrest of Mussolini were quite complicated, troublesome, and time-consuming for the Allied military commanders. The President's influence in these arrangements was pervasive. Italian affairs were further complicated by frequent input from the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the Premier of the Soviet Union. After Mussolini had been arrested in the summer of 1943, and Badoglio had been appointed in his place, the Marshal set up a government supposedly free of Fascist leanings. The problem was that after twenty-odd years of Fascist control there were few non-Fascists who could administer the country adequately. This situation was further complicated by the fact that the temporary capital was located in a backwater town with no facilities or mechanisms for governing. The seat of power was Rome and Rome was in the hands of the Germans.

Badoglio did his best under the circumstances; the legality of the Badoglio Government was the germane point for all concerned. Both the British and the Americans supported Badoglio, partly because he represented the only legal government available, and partly because they could not agree between themselves on anyone else to exercise power. The British would like to have seen Count Dino Grandi, who had been a member of
the Grand Council and who had been instrumental in the deposition of Mussolini, lead the new government or at least play a major role in it. The President objected because even though Grandi had been a help to the Allies, he was too closely associated with the hard-line Fascists.¹

The Americans supported Count Carlo Sforza, Foreign Minister of Italy in pre-Mussolini days, and leader of the Anti-Fascists in North and South America. The White House staff, upon the direction of the President, arranged for Sforza's son to be discharged from the American army and for the family to travel to North Africa. They proceeded via London where Sforza conferred with Churchill. When the British Minister to the United States originally heard of this proposal, he informed the Assistant Secretary of State that the British did not favor the move. An American official felt that the British were opposed to Sforza because the Americans supported him and because Sforza and Churchill clashed. The difficulty with Churchill and Sforza, according to one observer, was that "both of them wish to do all the talking."² The Assistant Secretary of State informed the British Minister that the Americans would be "quite unopposed to announcing the British were not in favor of Sforza's plans."³ The British then withdrew their objection. The British Foreign Office encouraged Badoglio to invite Sforza to participate in the government while some British military were of the opinion Sforza was old, opportunistic, and no longer able to make a helpful contribution.
The French were very cooperative in seeing the Sforza party through North Africa as they were opposed to the Count and did not want him circulating in Tunisia any longer than absolutely necessary. Eisenhower requested Sforza not enter Italy until the political situation became more stable. Despite Eisenhower's objection, Sforza proceeded to Italy to meet with Badoglio at Brindisi. It later had to be made clear that Sforza was not the protegé of the Americans simply because his travel to and within Italy had been arranged by the Americans. True or not, Eisenhower felt that Sforza was the American choice as the political leader for Italy. The Count was opposed to Victor Emanuel continuing as King but agreed to support Badoglio without actually joining in the government. He agreed that he would do nothing to upset the Badoglio government but he informed Eisenhower that Badoglio could never hope to form a viable government as long as Victor Emanuel remained on the throne. Sforza advised the Allies that the best possible solution was for the King to abdicate in favor of his grandson, the Prince of Naples.

In the meantime, Ivanoe Bonomi formed a shadow government in Rome, the Committee of National Liberation (CNL), comprised of The Six Parties: Communists, Socialists, Christian Democrats, Liberals, Action, and Labor Democrats. The CNL had branches throughout Allied and Axis-occupied Italy. In the long term, the CNL favored a democratic government and were opposed to both the King and the Badoglio government. They were agreed, however, that for the moment and at least until
Rome was free, they would serve in the Badoglio government. They further agreed to serve under a king or a regent but not Victor Emanuel who was thoroughly discredited in the eyes of the non-Fascists. Sforza joined the Naples branch of the CNL whose most active member was the scholar, Benedetto Croce. The Naples group was extremely strong and became the center of Italian political activity in the liberated area.

As soon as Sforza arrived in Naples, Croce with Bonomi's support, began to agitate for a new government under the leadership of Sforza. The CNL solution to the problem was that the King would abdicate in favor of the Prince of Naples with Badoglio as Regent and Sforza as Premier. If the present King and Badoglio agreed to this arrangement, the sovereignty could be transferred and there was no need to wait until Rome was freed. There followed several days of negotiations between Badoglio, Sforza, and others. The crux of the matter was that Badoglio would have no part in forcing the King to abdicate. Badoglio proposed resigning, leaving the way clear for Sforza to form a government which would force the abdication.

The Allied military were faced with a serious constitutional crisis and an open confrontation between Churchill and Roosevelt. The military wanted to maintain order at all costs. The Americans in the field were not unduly concerned at the fate of the King but they did feel that Badoglio could hold Italy together better than either Croce or Sforza. Sforza was out of touch with the realities of Italian politics and
Croce appeared to follow a rather emotional line of thought in his solution to the knotty problem.

The military planned at first to turn to Washington for guidance. Later, as the situation became more confusing, they decided that it would be best to insist that no change at all be made in the Italian government. In a long message to Washington, the situation was reviewed and it was pointed out that by remaining steadfast to the status quo, the military did not imply they were supporters of the King or Fascists; it was simply less complicated to continue the present arrangement for the moment. Murphy informed Washington the military would follow this plan unless otherwise directed by the government. Macmillan sent the same information to London. The Acting Secretary of State provided tentative approval of the plan to the Americans by return message.5

The British were strong supporters of Badoglio and the King on the ground that they were responsible for having overthrown Mussolini and bringing the Italians into the war on the Allied side. Implicitly, the British were loath to disturb monarchies in the social sweep of the war and they were opposed to changes which might adversely affect the military situation. They made it clear that the theater commander would be the judge of whether or not the machinations between the CNL and Badoglio were disruptive. The Prime Minister was of the opinion that the theater commander was in agreement with this stand, and he appealed to the President for support.6
Roosevelt had previously voiced concern about the King to Churchill. He was ambivalent in his feelings. On the one hand he felt the King was old and senile and his twenty-year record with Mussolini brought into question his possible effectiveness in governing. Roosevelt felt the Italians needed a democratic government as quickly as possible and he was certain the King could not achieve that. On the other hand, he thought that perhaps the King could be of value in the war effort. In any event, he suggested that the decision on the King be left to Eisenhower. When Churchill put the question to Roosevelt the President sought Eisenhower's opinion before responding. 7

Eisenhower wired Roosevelt that the plan which proposed the abdication of the King with Badoglio serving as Regent and Sforza as Premier was satisfactory. But he requested that no changes be made until the Allied forces passed north of Rome. The commander felt that the Allies were in a different position in Italy than they had been in North Africa; they were organized and manned to establish military government in Italy and thus were not dependent on political arrangements which might prove unpopular on the homefront. This analysis was questionable since Hull commented later that no change was approved before Rome was free because the Allies were unsure of the Italian military reaction and their instability could have caused difficulties. Roosevelt feared the consequences of anarchy developing in Italy. The President
followed Eisenhower's request and suggested to the Prime Minister that no changes be made in the Italian government until Rome was free.8

Badoglio stayed on along with the King. Badoglio did agree to resign when Rome was free; in the meantime he formed a government of civil administrators who were as apolitical and as free of Fascist taint as possible. The CNL did not accept this arrangement and continued to agitate for abdication and the formation of a new government. The Americans could not understand the posturings of the politicians in the face of the war which was going at a much slower pace than had been anticipated. Throughout the winter of 1943-44, the Italian political situation remained unstable. These machinations served to reinforce the view of the Allies that although the King and Badoglio might not be the most effective leaders, they were preferable to anybody else available. Opinion in the theater was that the King was the only rallying point for the Italian military and to force him to abdicate would have resulted in real problems.9

Despite the reports from the field as the winter wore on, Hull came to hold the opinion that the King was an obstruction to epuration and democratization and wanted him removed. His opinion became the official position of the State Department. Finally, in early February 1944, the President intervened in the situation by directing that no changes be made in the position of the King. The Allied Commander, Wilson, and the British Prime Minister had asked for Roosevelt's
help with this problem, Roosevelt informed Stettinius, Acting Secretary of State, that he had taken this action to avoid military hardship. It might be added, it also halted, at least for the moment, the agitation of Sforza for democracy in Italy.10

The CNL did not long abide by the President's directive; Sforza and Croce persisted in their effort to force the King to abdicate. In mid-February they hit on the idea of accepting Prince Humbert as Lieutenant of the Realm and exercising the real power through the CNL. The King was equally persistent in insisting that he remain on the throne; he felt that when Rome was free Bonomi or Orlando would form an acceptable government under the crown. By the last of February, Wilson wired the CCS that the situation was so serious the Allies could no longer delay reorganization of the government until Rome was free. The CCS would not agree to a reorganization unless Roosevelt himself personally agreed. Reluctantly, the President seemed to retreat from his former position. He suggested that a broad-based government would be preferable to the King's; he held that such a government should be organized as soon as possible but in no case later than when Rome was free. The King agreed to the establishment of a lieutenancy of the realm for his son, but he refused to abdicate.11

Churchill and Roosevelt discussed the matter in a message exchange. In the meantime, the situation became so tense in Italy, especially around Naples, that it threatened the war effort and it appeared that the Allies might have to employ
military force to control the anti-Fascists. Roosevelt proposed to Churchill that the anti-Fascists be allowed to form a government. Churchill responded that the British and Russians were of the opinion that the "ambitious windbags, now agitating behind our front" were not representative of the Italian people and to permit them to form a government would unnecessarily complicate the war effort. Churchill went on to say that if the CNL were allowed to form a government, the Allies would have the same kind of situation on their hands as they had in North Africa with the "Gaullist" Committee. He reminded the President that the British had acquiesced to the Americans in the Darlan Arrangement, so surely the Americans could remain steadfast with the King and Badoglio. His parting comment was that a democratic government formed with the metropolitan areas of the north omitted would be rather foolish. He felt that a weak democracy which could not survive into the post-war world would be worse than the present situation.  

While the Anglo-American debate continued, the Russians further complicated the issue by recognizing the King and Badoglio as the government of Italy. They sent a fully credited ambassador to Brindisi. This was a signal to the western Allies that although the Russians might not physically participate in the occupation of a western European country, they certainly intended to make their presence known. The Russian action made the King aware that he could play the Allies
against one another and survive in the process. Both Churchill and Roosevelt were shocked by the unilateral action of the Soviet Union. They protested and at the same time agreed between themselves to postpone any further action in the political affairs of Italy at least until Rome was captured. Roosevelt could not totally ignore the realities of the situation; he wired Churchill that the postponement was satisfactory provided the Six Parties accepted it. If they refused, however, and the situation continued to threaten military operations, then the King and Badoglio should be replaced by a government of the Six Parties.\textsuperscript{13}

The Six Parties continued to insist that the King abdicate. In April 1944, the King agreed to withdraw from public affairs and appointed his son Lieutenant of the Realm. Badoglio formed a new government which included Mario Ercoli, better known as Togliatti, the foremost Italian communist. AFHQ had given permission for Togliatti to return to Italy from Moscow early in 1944. The day after Rome was freed, June 5, 1944, the King formally abdicated. Badoglio resigned shortly after and Bonomi attempted to form a government. The atmosphere became charged when Bonomi announced his intention of appointing Sforza Foreign Minister. The military and the Americans did not object to the appointment but the British did. Churchill felt the new government of "aged and hungry politicians" was a disaster. He understood that the Allies had agreed no new political arrangements were to be made in Italy until the "democratic north" could be brought in. He invited Stalin
to express his feelings on the affair. Stalin wired back that he was unaware that such a change could be made without the consent of the "Allies - the British and Americans . . ." Stalin assured Churchill that if he and Roosevelt wanted to refuse to accept the Bonomi government the Russians would "raise no obstacles."14

While Churchill was negotiating the crisis, Badoglio stayed on as Premier. Churchill reported to Stalin that Roosevelt agreed the matter should be taken up by the "Joint Advisory Committee." Evidently Badoglio, weary of the struggle by this time, felt it no longer worthwhile to continue in the government. Churchill became convinced Badoglio could no longer serve effectively and, in any event, the monarchy was lost. The British were upset but they could do nothing further without appearing anti-democratic. The President simply did nothing and said nothing. Finally, Churchill resigned himself to a government without the King or Badoglio and with the prospect of his bête noir, Sfroza, being named Foreign Minister.15

Again in November-December 1944, the political scene threatened military operations in Italy. Bonomi wanted to retire; his government collapsed and he was unable to form a suitable administration. The State Department took the stand that as long as internal politics did not interfere with the prosecution of the war the Italians were free to choose their government. Churchill and SACMED took the view
that no Italian government could be appointed unless it met the approval of the Allies. For the British, Sforza was the seat of the problem; he had schemed to bring about the downfall of the Badoglio government earlier in 1944 and worked in this instance to have himself named Premier or Foreign Minister after the fall of Bonomi. Churchill remained opposed to Sforza and appealed to Roosevelt to help in the matter.\textsuperscript{16}

This issue was further complicated by the communists who wanted a greater voice in the government. Their leader, Togliatti, felt that Bonomi was acceptable; however, other communists did not. Togliatti was only able to hold the communists to Bonomi by threatening them with the alternative - an Italian even more conservative than Bonomi. The final complication was the news that Badoglio had been or was to be arrested by the Italian epuration committee which was led by Sforza. The upshot of this crisis was that Bonomi stayed on as Premier, Sforza remained in the government, and Badoglio returned to the seclusion of his home near Rome.\textsuperscript{17} The Bonomi government continued by a narrow coalition to administer Italy until just before the end of the war.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER XIII


2 Msg., Murphy to Dunn, Nov. 1, '43, 740.00119, European War 1939/11-143, State Department Files, NARS.


4 Msg., Hull to Murphy, Nov. 27, '43, Ibid., 432.

5 Memo., Murphy to Sec. of State, Nov. 4, '43, State Dept. 865.01/876, NARS; msg., Stettinius to Murphy, Nov. 9, '43, FRUS, 1943, Vol. II, 422.

6 Msg., Churchill to Roosevelt, Nov. 6, '43, Ibid., 420.

7 Msgs., Roosevelt to Churchill, Sep, 21, '43, Roosevelt to Eisenhower, Nov. 9, '43, Map Room Files, Box 14, Surrender of Italy, MR 370, 9/16-12/31/43, FDRL.

8 Msg., Eisenhower to Roosevelt, Nov. 10, '43, Map Room Files, Box 14, Surrender of Italy, MR 370, 9/16-12/31/43, FDRL; Burns, Roosevelt, The Soldier of Freedom, 391.

9 Msg., Murphy to Hull, Nov. 15, '43, FRUS, 1943, Vol. II, 427; msg., Reinhardt to Hull, Jan. 15, '44, State Dept. 865.01/919, NARS.

10 Ltr., Sec. of State to President, Jan. 25, '44, FRUS, 1944, Vol. III, 1004; memo., President to Sec. of State, Feb. 10, '44, Map Room Files, Box 13, Italy, Folder: Naval Aides' Files: Italy-Sicily, State Dept. Classified, FDRL.

11 Msg., Wilson to CCS, Feb. 19, '44, Map Room Files, Box 14, Surrender of Italy, MR 370, 9/16-12/13/43 Folder: Jan-Oct 1944, FDRL; memo., Asst. Sec. of War to Under Sec. of State, Feb. 21, '44, CAD 014 Italy (1-25-43) Sec. 4, NARS; Woodward, British Foreign Policy, 233ff.

12 Msg., Churchill to Roosevelt, Mar. 15, '44, Loewenheim, Secret Correspondence, 128.
13 Resume State Dept. Paper, Apr. 20, '44, Correspondence, Hull Papers, LOC.


15 Higgins, Underbelly, 169.

16 Msg., Kirk to Sec. of State, Nov. 26, '44, State Dept. 865.01/11-2644, NARS.

17 Msg., Roosevelt to Churchill, Dec. 6, '44, Map Room Files, Box 4, Roosevelt to Churchill Messages, Nov. 44-Apr. 45, Folder: Dec. '44, FDLR; Calvocoressi and Wint, Total War, 387; Loewenheim, Secret Correspondence, 60-61. The editors are of the opinion that Churchill was more upset with the Americans in this particular instance than at any other time during the war.
CHAPTER XIV

CIVILIAN RELIEF AND REHABILITATION IN ITALY

Supplies for civilian relief and rehabilitation were a major issue that came before the President repeatedly. Throughout the war it was claimed that one of the critical factors was shipping space. Another of the issues was the lack of agreement between the British and Americans on who would ship, what proportions would be shipped, where the shipping space was to come from, and where the goods were to be procured. Such specific issues as the difficulty of shipping coal from India and South Africa into Italy and wheat from North America and Argentina caused endless problems between the Allies. The British wanted the short hauls and wanted the Americans to take the long trips while the Americans wanted the hauls assigned proportionately. The State Department was forced to procure wheat from Argentina over the protest of the Secretary of Treasury. These issues all served to retard the relief effort in Italy.¹

General John H. Hilldring, Chief, CAD, once informed the Secretary of State that: "The Army is not a welfare organization. It is a military machine whose mission is to defeat the enemy on the field of battle."² While Hilldring's statement was true as a general proposition, it was also a
fact that welfare functions took a major proportion of the
effort and time of the military during the war and nowhere
was this more evident than in Italy during the period 1943-
1945. Complicating the issue, was the fact that relief and
rehabilitation in Italy were clearly connected to the domes­
tic political scene in the United States.

Presidential guidance through June 1943 was firm that
the Department of State was the office responsible for civil
affairs. In the name of operational necessity the military
were to provide relief until such time as the civilians were
capable of exercising their assigned responsibilities. The
President specifically directed that lend-lease supplies be
made available to Sicily and that the army see that the sup­
plies were delivered to the people. No fanfare was to be
made of the fact that Italian territory had been declared
"vital to the defense of the U. S." in the same manner as
had British areas. At first there was a good deal of con­
fusion regarding when the civilian agencies could begin to
provide relief. By the summer of 1943, it was agreed by the
civilians and the military that six months after an invasion
should be the minimum time before a civilian agency would be
expected to assume relief and rehabilitation responsibilities.

It would seem that once this decision had been made re­
lief and rehabilitation would be relatively free of high
political interference. Such was not the case. AFHQ was
unable to draw up an overall program until after April 1944.
A list of requirements which would show what was available in the area and what was needed so the planners in Washington could program for the deficit would have helped tremendously. The Washington planners were placed in a position of having to respond to spot requisitions. Only supplies sufficient to "facilitate the maintenance of order, preservation of public health, and the utilization of local labor" were ordered.  

The greatest need of the Italians was fuel supplies. In planning for the relief of Italy it had been estimated that between 200,000 and 300,000 tons of coal and 50,000 tons of oil a month would be required. The planners estimated that the next largest requirement would be seed to raise food to carry the Italians over the unstable period of combat and changing regimes. It was estimated that the Italians were seventy-five percent self-supporting. As it turned out, these estimates were in gross error and major shipments of both fuel and food were required for Italy all during the war and long afterwards.

Roosevelt feared just such a situation. He was concerned that combat damage and scorching by the Germans would leave food production and industrial output in such a state that major relief and reconstruction would be required for a long time. The President could foresee an indefinitely long period of rehabilitation.

There were problems in transportation both from production sources to the Italian ports and within Italy itself. There were psycho-social problems because under German
occupation the Italians were better off for food and other consumer products than they were at various times subsequently under Allied occupation. Another of the issues in relief supplies in the theater was uneven distribution. Southern, rural Italians, for example, had more food than Northern, urban Italians. Efforts to discourage hoarding were major economic problems the military authorities always faced and never satisfactorily settled. The Americans had studied the issues in great detail. They were prepared to help the Italians as much as possible but the planners knew how much food the Italians had been accustomed to for years and they were not prepared to exceed that level; the priorities of the war made it impossible even if the desire had been there.\textsuperscript{6}

Unfortunately, the psychological warfare personnel were unaware, it would appear, of these priorities. Their programs promised a great deal more than the Allies were willing or able to deliver. The failure to meet the formal and informal promise of "plenty" caused the military trouble. The Italians were quite bitter and verbose about this. They had carefully "listening" ears in the United States. There were many Italian voters throughout the United States but they were particularly numerous and powerful in politically important states such as Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. For example, when Vito Marcantonio or La Guardia spoke or wrote to the President about some problem in Italy, Roosevelt answered promptly. This situation was the more critical because until October 1943 the Italians had been
one of the enemy. The political paradox and the dilemma of Roosevelt was vexing to say the least. For example, the Italians created a stir when it came to light that they had more bread under German occupation than under the Allies. The President promised they would have more. Immediately, the exile governments pointed out that now the Italians, former enemies, would have more bread than some of the Allies, e.g., the Greeks and Yugoslavs. Both these peoples had experienced hardship at the hands of the Italians and were not particularly upset at the prospect of the old enemy having less bread than they wanted. There were, however, more Italian voters in the United States than Greeks or Yugoslavs and 1944 was an election year.

By December 1943 it became apparent that the initial plans were not going to meet the requirements for the Italians. The reports indicated that harvests would be twenty-five to forty-five percent below normal. Accordingly, the January-June 1944 flour/wheat import requirements was revised upward to 700,000 metric tons from a previous 450,000 metric tons. The American government set about immediately to meet this additional requirement. Morgenthau protested when Hull and Stimson purchased wheat from Argentina but Hull pointed out this was one of the few areas where an uncommitted surplus existed. By mid-winter the situation had become so acute that bread riots threatened. Eisenhower issued orders to his commanders that no further military operations were to commence unless the military planners were sure adequate supplies
were available to feed the "uncovered" civilians.\(^7\)

The first priority was food for the Italian population. In the words of one staff officer in Washington, "It is difficult to conceive of responsible War Department representatives entering into or approving procurement of civil relief goods which would in any way interfere with military programs unless there was an operational urgency. Likewise, it is inconceivable that such supplies would be shipped if it meant interfering with the shipment of military goods . . . "\(^8\)

Such conditions had arisen in Italy. The conclusion was drawn that distribution problems were simply too complicated to be solved by the military alone. By contrast the existing government apparatus in North Africa had been able to deal with the problems. The message of the North African and Italian experience appeared to be that perhaps it would be wise to have an indigenous administration prepared to assume relief duties following the military period.

As the campaign in Italy progressed, there were areas such as Sicily and Sardinia, along with portions of the mainland, which were far removed from the combat zone and were not considered communications zones. It was increasingly difficult to rationalize any form of military control over these areas. From late winter 1943 to the end of the war and beyond, the military were interested in relinquishing these areas to civilian control.\(^9\)

The civilian agencies appeared to be more interested in long term rehabilitation and reconstruction than in relief
alone. Funds had not been appropriated for any sort of civil affairs activities within the civilian budgets. To exacerbate this situation, the military did not include any funds for relief for Italian areas which had been occupied for more than six months in the fiscal year 1945 budget. To settle the financial issue, Oscar Cox proposed submitting a letter to the President designating the remainder of Italy a lend-lease area. Since the military were opposed to extending lend-lease credits to enemies or former enemies, the proposed letter for the President's signature was not submitted. 10

By April 1944, it was agreed that the War Department would maintain the relief program for Southern Italy and Sardinia until the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration assumed control in October 1944. The military were to continue with the Sicily program until FEA assumed control in July 1944. As these dates approached, the civilian agencies were still not organized to assume the duties and appeared to have no real desire to do so. One State Department official noted, "At some later date, which we will try to stave off as long as possible, we anticipate the Army will want to relieve itself of the complete responsibility." 11

During the spring, summer, and early fall, 1944, there were exchanges of papers concerning the limitations of the disease and unrest formula, the desire of the military to relinquish control of relief, which agency was to assume the responsibility, and how the funding was to be arranged once
the civilian agencies assumed the responsibility. While all this was going on, the Italians were provided only a minimum diet and in many areas not even that. It was apparent that the military formula—prevention of disease and unrest—was politically unsatisfactory. It was rumored that the relief and rehabilitation program for Italy was not an accomplishment that the military could be particularly proud of, and at least one staff officer agreed with that assessment.  

By mid-August 1944, the supply and distribution situation in Italy became acute. The political advisor to the ACC reported to the Secretary of State that a "famine and unrest situation" was in the making. He made the charge that in the relief area the military were acting "in most cases out of convenience rather than necessity." In September it was reported that the average Italian diet amounted to 665 calories per day and that in August, a particularly good month, the average reached only 800 calories per day. Such conditions could not continue without serious repercussions. Brigadier General William O'Dwyer reported to the President that the situation was truly serious and that if something were not done to correct the undernourishment, there would no doubt be epidemics, riots, and other problems. The report concluded that it was difficult for the Italians to understand how they could be fighting with the Allies and at the same time be occupied by them and starving for good measure. 

Early in September Roosevelt wrote to Stimson directing the military to take immediate action to correct the situation.
In addition, he informed the Secretary of State and the Director of Foreign Economic Administration to expedite any assistance necessary to the military in alleviating the problem. The CAD Director was unsure whether the President wanted to increase the rations of the Italians or whether he wanted to make sure they received what had been previously determined as adequate.  

Hopkins, meanwhile, outlined the required action: (1) the military were to be given additional shipping space; (2) additional trucks were to be sent to Italy for internal distribution; (3) and the dollar equivalent of American troop pay spent in Italy, plus immigrant remittances and Italian exports to the United States were to pay for the additional foodstuffs. In addition, Hopkins proposed that an effort be made to rehabilitate agriculture and essential industries as quickly as possible to save on shipping and supply sources.

The Secretary of War queried the theater commander about the situation. SACMED responded that bulk wheat shipments would help immensely. He had previously requested an increase for the area north of the Pisa-Rimini Line but the supply staff in Washington had been unable to honor the request. It was suggested that perhaps in light of the President's interest the military might want to reconsider its position.

Stimson informed Roosevelt that the Americans and British were doing everything possible to meet the civilian food requirements as stated by SACMED. Stimson reminded the President
that the military had been charged only with a program to prevent disease and unrest. Immediately following these exchanges and for a month afterwards, there was a flurry of activity in the field, in Washington, and in London but in the end there was little additional aid for the Italians. During September 1944, the situation continued to worsen--additional food, trucks, supplies were non-existent--despite the concern of Roosevelt, Churchill, HQAF and ACC. Early in October members of the Italian community in the United States expressed concern that "we must do something to redeem the democratic pledges." Lauchlin Currie informed Hopkins that Thomas Dewey, Republican candidate for president in the November 1944 election, intended to make a bid for the Italian vote by blasting the Administration on Columbus Day for their shabby treatment of the Italians "back home."

Hopkins immediately suggested that Roosevelt announce through the press on October 11 that additional aid was going to Italy. Oscar Cox joined Hopkins in urging the President to thwart Dewey with the pre-Columbus Day release.  

There was one thing wrong: the military knew nothing of this hastily-contrived tactic and would be caught completely unprepared to respond. Furthermore, Currie informed Hopkins that even if the plan were announced, shipping was in such short supply that little additional food could reach the Italians before early 1945. By this time, McCloy had heard of the scheme and echoed Currie's concerns on the shipping shortage. He further cautioned that nothing could be worse
than to announce an increase in food and then fail to make good on the promise. Oscar Cox reaffirmed this point later in the winter when he wrote, "let's be sure they expect less in the form of supplies and get more rather than the exact opposite which has previously been the case." This particular plan was dropped. 18

Behind the scenes, however, the military, the Washington agencies, and AFHQ began to plan seriously for what was required to increase the food available to the Italians. The first requirement was for the ACC Italy to draw up an additional requirements list. The President in the meantime had tempered his earlier excitement; he now wanted to meet the additional needs of the Italians, "if it can be done without serious prejudice to other essential programs." 19 Currie informed Hopkins that the military had requisitioned the necessary supplies and equipment for Italy. These requisitions clashed with other programs previously approved by the President. It was then up to the President to establish a priority. Isadore Lubin, Director, Bureau of Labor Statistics, helped by suggesting that chrome, bauxite, manganese, and nitrate shipments from Brazil, Chile, and Surinam could be temporarily suspended in order to release shipping space for Italian foodstuffs. It was further determined that the stockpile held in reserve for feeding northern Italians in the event of German collapse could measureably contribute towards easing the actual situation. Roosevelt approved these measures and
informed the Secretary of War he intended to announce that the Italian bread ration was to be increased to 300 grams a day. Stimson responded that the theater commander would be ordered to increase the ration. It was estimated that it would be necessary to ship 520,000 tons of wheat to Italy by November 1, 1944, if the ration were to be increased to 300 grams a day. At that time, the shipping schedule showed 180,000 tons were to be shipped, a shortfall of 340,000 tons. 

The bread ration increase was announced by the President on Thursday, November 2, 1944, before the election on Tuesday, November 7, 1944. The next week Churchill sent a message to Roosevelt pointing out that it was awkward giving the Italians, former enemies, more bread than the Greeks or Yugoslavians were receiving. As a matter of fact, the theater commander had proposed to the CCS on September 24, 1944 that the Italian bread ration be increased to 300 grams a day. At the time of the announcement, the British had not concurred in the increased ration and neither the CCAC nor the CCS had approved it; hence, it really was not an Allied policy at the time the President made the announcement.

Perhaps the timing was a coincidence or perhaps the pending election and the large Italian-American vote prompted the premature announcement. Later, Roosevelt admitted to Churchill he had "jumped some fences" and would continue to do so because of the great number of Italians in this country. What so many people did not realize was that there was a war on,
and for as long as it was on there simply would not be an abundance of food anywhere. In any case, events were to show that the announcement was an expression of hope rather than a statement of fact. The Battle of the Bulge, other operational requirements in Northern Europe, requirements in the Pacific, and the Balkans placed such a strain on shipping that it was simply impossible to put more foodstuffs into Italy. Despite the President's approval to do so, the military were reluctant to use the emergency stockpiles.^{22}

On November 17, 1944 General Wilson informed CCS that because of shipping it was impossible to increase the ration as the President had announced. He requested advice on November 30, 1944, and again on December 21, 1944. By December graffiti showed serious unrest in Italian metropolitan areas such as Rome, Pisa, and Florence. Rumoured imbalances, 400 grams a week for Greeks, 350 for the French, 300 in the rest of northern Europe and Southern Italy, were particularly irksome to the Romans. Oscar Cox proposed that the President re-announce the 300 gram ration in January 1945 because it would have a great political impact abroad, in the United States, and particularly in New York City. Myron Taylor suggested immobilized Italian shipping be used. All through the winter the military and the shipping agencies were faced with the disparity between promises and capabilities. Despite pressure from prominent Italian-Americans such as Congressman Vito Marcantonio, it was simply not possible to raise the level of imports of grain into Italy.^{23}
Finally, on March 1, 1945, it could be stated that all Italians were receiving 300 grams of bread a day. Since the President had made the "headlines" the previous November, General Alexander suggested the actual attainment date be quietly announced in Rome and his suggestion was followed. Significantly, it was the same date that the first United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration shipments of civilian supplies arrived in Italy and the military could begin withdrawing from the responsibility for the program after having provided support to the Italians for almost two years.24

By this time the military policy towards civilian relief had relaxed somewhat. Supplies for the restoration of power systems, transportation and communications systems, other machinery and equipment were being shipped to Italy along with direct use supplies.
NOTES TO CHAPTER XIV

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16 Staff papers, Hilldring to Stimson, Sep. 11, '44, CAD 400.38 (2-20-43) (1) Sec. 9, NARS.

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18 Memo., Currie to Hopkins, Oct. 11, '44, H. Hopkins Files, Box 324, Relief for Italy, FDRL.

19 Memo., Roosevelt to Leahy, Oct. 19, '44, H. Hopkins Files, Box 324, Relief for Italy, FDRL.

20 Ltr., Roosevelt to Stimson, Oct. 31, '44, OSW, White House Correspondence, NARS; Ltr., Stimson to Roosevelt, Nov. 7, '44, CAD Files 400.38, NARS.

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CHAPTER XV

WASHINGTON ORGANIZATION FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS
DURING THE ITALIAN ERA

As the summer of 1943 progressed, it became increasingly apparent to the President that the various Federal agencies would not be prepared to provide civilian relief in the foreseeable future although at the beginning of the summer he dismissed their lack of action as growing pains. In his letter of June 3, 1943, Roosevelt formalized the Bureau of the Budget plan for reasserting civilian control of occupation policy and administration of liberated areas. The letter had been signed in order to emphasize that civilian agencies were to play a major role in the economic affairs of the liberated countries. The President also made it clear that he favored the entry into occupied areas by civilian authorities, as soon as the military situation would permit.

To implement the directives from the President, the Secretary of State formed the Office of Foreign Economic Cooperation (OFEC) under the general supervision of Dean Acheson and the operational direction of Thomas K. Finletter on June 24, 1943. By mid-summer the OFEC demonstrated its ineffectiveness. The primary reason for its failure lay in the fact that the civilian agencies refused to surrender their prerogatives of action and responsibilities. A secondary reason was
that the State Department clearly demonstrated it was a policy-making body and not an administrative, working agency. Oscar Cox and James F. Byrnes, Director, Office of War Mobilization, thought the Department had not adapted itself to do its job well in liberated areas. The organization established by the President could only work if the man in charge of the area directorship system could "orchestrate" the system properly. The President's letter provided for the coordination of the various agencies. It did not merge agencies, redefine their responsibilities, or eliminate their overlapping duties. Acheson complained that it was not clear in other agencies that the State Department had the authority to establish policy. When Acheson suggested that Hull take the matter up with Roosevelt, Hull directed Acheson to go to the President's office with the problem. Acheson complied by simply delivering a memo on the subject to the White House.²

Lehman, Director of OFRRO, commented that there was a good deal of jealousy within the State Department, and between it and other departments. The various agencies including the Lend Lease Administration, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Raw Materials Board, the Production and Resources Board, the Food Board, and the Shipping Adjustment Board were all fighting for power. The only group not grasping for power, according to Lehman, were the military. Since they had power, their efforts were directed toward keeping it.³

In addition to the agency disputes, there was bitter personal controversy in Washington in the summer of 1943.
The discord centered around the Vice President, Henry A. Wallace, and the Secretary of Commerce, Jesse Jones. Wallace publicly accused Jones of blocking the work of the Board of Economic Warfare. Behind the scene, Cox and Byrnes drafted a proposal for the President to consolidate BEW, Lend Lease, and OFRRO. Byrnes was reluctant to sign the proposal because he thought the President would feel he was "grubbing for more power." Rosenman felt the responsibility ought to be moved from the State Department to the Office of War Mobilization.

Roosevelt was angry at the public show of disunity. He wrote a letter to the various executive offices reiterating his position of the summer before that he did not want disagreements publicly aired. He voiced his unhappiness that his instructions were being ignored, "if when you have a disagreement with another agency instead of submitting it to me or submitting it to the Director of War Mobilization for settlement under the terms of the order creating that office, you feel you should submit it to the press, I ask that when you release the statement for publication, you send to me a letter of resignation."

In the hope of curtailing the wrangling, the President adopted the Cox-Byrnes proposal which dissolved the Board of Economic Warfare and established the Office of Economic Warfare under the direction of Leo T. Crowley on July 15, 1943. Roosevelt had been reluctant to make this move. He complained
to Harold D. Smith that he had asked Hull to take the responsibility but Hull refused. Hull later told Smith that he had refused because the President would not support him in his moves to draw the divergent views and actions together. Rosenman informed Smith that his prodding the President to consolidate the offices was wreaking havoc with the agencies trying to organize for civil affairs administration. Smith pointed out to Rosenman that such was not the case; that what he was trying to do was sort out chaotic Washington conditions so that a viable civilian civil affairs program could be implemented. This action did not entirely clear the air. Cox subsequently proposed a general staff of civilians "like the Joint Chiefs of Staff" to make plans for civil affairs programs. At the working level it became obvious that the various staffs were not going to cooperate and that the instructions in the President's letter of June 3, 1943 were being ignored. A battle royal emerged between the Secretary of State, his Under Secretary, and the Director of OFRRO.

Lehman wrote a long letter to Roosevelt complaining that the scope of his authority and responsibility had been questioned by others since he first arrived in Washington. The President's letter of June 3, 1943 diminished Lehman's work. The erosion continued until by the end of August Lehman felt his authority had vanished into the authority of the Secretary of State.
The Secretary of State refuted these comments with the point that Lehman attempted to determine general policy for liberated areas instead of confining himself to relief and rehabilitation matters. Hull also drew to the President's attention that the State Department had been of assistance to the Lehman organization. Hull wanted to have the matter settled because he understood that the OFRRO functions were to be transferred in toto to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration which was then being organized.¹⁰

To conclude this argument, both Lehman and his wife commented on Hull's statements. Lehman wrote that some of the problems with civil affairs administration were caused by the inefficient and outmoded approach of the State Department. He closed with the comment that the efforts of some of the offices "should be frustrated." Mrs. Lehman wrote in the margin of the Hull letter, by the paragraph which outlined how much help the State Department had given OFRRO, "Oh Yeah!" To pursue the matter further, Lehman telephoned Hull and followed that conversation with a long memorandum showing in detail the way OFEC had operated to impair the work of the other agencies.¹¹

At the same time H. D. Smith wrote to the President to inform him that the reason the civil affairs area was so muddled, despite Roosevelt's personal attention throughout the summer, was because the State Department did not act quickly enough to gather the agencies together before they went off
on their various ways again. "The division of the economic functions of the OFRRO, OLLA, and OEW are such that no coordinating mechanism, no matter how well organized or how extensive its authority, could bring about clear-cut operations."
The fighting and bickering continued; planning and operations were at a virtual standstill. As a result, the military were at a loss to know what they could rely on from the civilian agencies. More importantly, to Smith, "the whole range of civil-economic affairs is being taken over in default by the military." Smith urged Roosevelt to put OFRRO, OEW, and OLLA into one agency.12

Oscar Cox echoed these sentiments; he commented that OFEC was "no good." What was needed was one agency headed by a man who would exercise authority without injuring the "pride of Stettinius, Lehman, and Crowley." Roosevelt's intimates continued to tussle with the problem. There is some indication they were quietly working to solve the issue without upsetting either Lehman or Crowley. There was a proposal to create a new office with Lehman as its head until UNRRA was launched. Once Lehman was installed as head of UNRRA, then the new office with Crowley as head would be placed under Stettinius. There was opposition to this plan because if the UNRRA organization were stalled the situation in Washington would remain untenable. It was then suggested that Bernard Baruch, Al Smith, James Conant, or John Winant might be strong enough to head the new unit and at the same time be able to get along with the Secretary of State. The
upshot was that the "old cronies" discarded all these ideas and turned to Hopkins for his thoughts on the matter.\textsuperscript{13}

With input from Cox and Smith, Hopkins suggested that Roosevelt create the Foreign Economic Administration under the direction of Leo T. Crowley on September 25, 1943. At the same time, it was announced that Lehman was appointed Special Assistant to the President to assist in perfecting the plans for the organization of UNRRA. Sumner Welles resigned as Under Secretary of State and was replaced by E. R. Stettinius, Jr. The re-organization put an end to the competition between the agencies lending, leasing, and giving away goods overseas. The new office was placed directly under control of the President and absorbed the factious agencies into one functional unit. The FEA was charged to assure responsibility and control of all activities in liberated areas with respect to supplying the requirements as soon as military operations would permit. Policy in this area was still to be determined by the State Department. Stettinius requested that Hopkins talk to him and Dean Acheson as quickly as possible to assure the relationship between the State Department and FEA were set right while they were in the organizational stage.\textsuperscript{14}

While the reorganization in Washington was going on, Norman H. Davis, Chairman of the American Red Cross broached yet another facet of the relief problem. In a letter to the President, he proposed that the Red Cross, since it was
accustomed to working with the military, assume the relief function during combat operations and until OFRRO was prepared to assume the function. The military approved the idea. The President approved with the comment that when there had been "no fighting" in an area for two weeks and when the "R & R top men" had two or three weeks more to study the situation, then the function must be assumed by OFRRO. Other arrangements, however, overtook these plans which were never implemented.\(^\text{15}\)

Hilldring wrote in late October 1943 that the organization created in September was "even more hopelessly confused than the old one." There appeared to be no progress in determining the jurisdiction of the FEA. Hilldring felt no one was assuming aggressive leadership. While the reorganization was taking place the military were directed to continue to conduct business with all the old offices.\(^\text{16}\) Hilldring wrote to Acheson that this arrangement was becoming increasingly unsatisfactory and that the military must have a revitalized old organization or a new organization with whom they could work.\(^\text{17}\) The President was aware that despite the reorganization, all was not well; he continued to search for someone who could bring order out of the confusion. He proposed to Hopkins that James Farley be given the job. Hopkins replied that the new man would be "under Leo Crowley--I do not believe Jim would consider it very important."\(^\text{18}\)
Crowley and the FEA staff continued to work at the problem of establishing themselves as the civilian agency responsible for civilian relief in liberated areas. According to one of the editors of The Washington Post, the new agency atrophied "abornin." Personnel procedures were a major problem. Many whose jobs were eliminated continued to work; new positions were created with no one employed to fill them; inexperienced, temporary appointees filled other jobs; there was overlapping; and there was a lack of interface between FEA, the State Department and the military.\textsuperscript{19}

There were indications, however, that the President and those around him were altering their views concerning civil affairs supply problems. Early in November 1943, Roosevelt commented to Stettinius that feeding occupied Europe was a military question with many complications which many people did not understand but he felt everything was being done on the matter which could be done.\textsuperscript{20}

On November 7, 1943 Edward Stettinius and Crowley met with McCloy who explained the situation from the War Department point of view. It was agreed that the Army would be responsible for civilian relief and rehabilitation while the State Department and the other Federal agencies would confine their efforts to long range post-war programs. Stettinius began writing a letter to this affect. He talked over the subject with Stimson and consulted with McCloy on the proper wording of the letter.\textsuperscript{21}
Another of the factors bearing on the President's reconsideration of the occupation policy was the creation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). When UNRRA was formed on November 9, 1943, its charter provided aid to all nations which had been occupied by the Axis powers. OFRRO became the American contingent of UNRRA. For all practical purposes Lehman and his staff were no longer available to formulate policy or administer an American occupation program. More importantly, UNRRA was to remain for some time in an embryonic stage. In the meantime, relief activities had to continue. Acheson felt the military, since they were already organized to do so, should be designated to bridge the gap.22

The final factor which must be borne in mind is that in the early fall 1943, Roosevelt's thoughts turned more and more to the post-war world and to the practical problems emanating from the statements made concerning self-determination and unconditional surrender. Roosevelt and Churchill had varying views on North Africa, Italy, France, Germany and Eastern Europe which were sometimes settled, on the surface at least, at the various wartime conferences. Political arrangements in North Africa and Italy were time-consuming and frequently contrary to New Deal ideals. Relations with the French were particularly troublesome. As a result, Roosevelt began to have misgivings about the manner in which the post-war world was to be constituted. On September 21, 1943, he
wrote to George Norris asking him to join the State Depart-
ment as a special consultant in connection with post-war
planning. The President commented that he was inclined to
believe there should be a trial or transition period after
the fighting stopped. During this trial period the Allies
would act as sheriffs for the maintenance of order.23

With these considerations in mind, the President dele-
gated the entire civilian relief and rehabilitation program
to the Secretary of War on November 10, 1943:

Although other agencies of the Government
are preparing themselves for the work that must
be done in connection with relief and rehabili-
tation of liberated areas, it is quite apparent
if prompt results are to be obtained the Army
will have to assume the initial burden of ship-
ning and distributing relief supplies. This will
not only be the case in the event that active
military operations are under way, but also in
the event of a German collapse. I envisage that
in the event of a German collapse, the need for
the Army to undertake this work will be all the
more apparent.

Therefore, I direct that you have the Army
undertake the planning necessary to enable it to
carry out this task to the end that it shall be
prepared to perform this function, pending such
time as civilian agencies must be prepared to
carry out the longer range program of relief.

You may take this letter as my authority to
you to call upon all other agencies of the Gov-
ernment for such plans and assistance as you may
need. For all matters of policy that have to be
determined in connection with this work, you will
consult with the State Department for any poli-
tical advice; and upon the Treasury Department
for such economic and fiscal direction as you
may need.24

Normally those around the President gave some clues as to the
genesis of such pronouncements. Neither Smith, Cox, Hopkins,
Morgenthau, Currie, nor Stimson make any prior reference in their private papers about the subject. The Stettinius comment described above is the only indication of how the letter came to be put forward for the President's signature. Stimson felt the letter was a final recognition of the proper function of the military, that it revoked his letter of June 3, 1943, and that it indicated the military should step forward to take a more dynamic leadership role in the area. Stimson responded in a letter to the President that the military had already begun the necessary work.  

Even though the important relief and rehabilitation functions were assigned to the War Department and despite the fact that the President had decided on military government for Sicily and Italy, he did not give up the hope that occupations should be basically civilian.

In going over the letter several questions were raised by the military staff; among these were: did the term "liberated areas" include enemy countries such as Germany? Did the military relief responsibility extend into areas where no American occupation was contemplated such as the Balkans? Would Europe be zoned for occupation and if so would American forces be responsible for relief in non-American zones?

Within a few days CAD called meetings within the Army staff and with other agencies to address these and other problems. It was quite clear that the military were fully prepared to step forward in the leadership role. Hilldring wrote that
the "effect of the President's letter is to extend the jurisdiction of the military commander not only in space but also in time. It is obvious that to accomplish the mission ... we must raise our sights." Hilldring asked for copies of both the June 3, and November 10, 1943 letters to be framed to hang in his office.\textsuperscript{26}

Although the arrangements with the military had been on a pragmatic basis, Oscar Cox feared there would be liberated areas which would necessarily fall outside military responsibility and he wanted civilians to be prepared to administer programs in those areas. He further objected to the establishment of a procurement agency within the military when there were civilian agencies perfectly capable of handling the job. The efficiency of the military while impressive "may lead, by default or otherwise, to military control over friendly countries that are liberated." It seemed clear to Cox that CAD considered itself the responsible agent for civilian relief in liberated areas.\textsuperscript{27} Stettinius attempted to allay Cox's fears by writing that he did not see the military action in the same light as Cox. Although Stettinius did not feel that FEA authority was being diminished, he informed Cox that he would have appropriate State Department staffs offer their opinions on the matter. There is evidence that the military and FEA were working closely together to assure continuity between the "short-term" program of the military and the "long-term" arrangements of the civilian agencies.\textsuperscript{28}
Cox was not the only one concerned about civilian control. In February 1944, a State Department official paved the way for Hilldring to appear before Congress to testify that the military were attempting to do the relief assignment to the best of their ability but they neither wanted nor relished the job.\textsuperscript{29}

In March 1944, nine months after the first landings in Sicily, the War Department staff queried the civilian agencies as to when they would be prepared to assume occupation administration. The Assistant Secretary of War maintained that as long as the military provided relief in the wake of its advancing troops to prevent disease and political unrest, it was on safe ground. He feared, however, that expanded occupation duties of the nature then being conducted in Sicily made the War Department vulnerable to Congressional enquiry and public censure.\textsuperscript{30} The Director, Foreign Economic Administration, countered that his agency considered itself an adjunct to the military in this respect and was not prepared to assume the occupation responsibility. He proposed that the military provide for civilian relief and rehabilitation until UNRRA or some other agency was prepared to do so. This, in fact, was what transpired. There were, however, frequent protestations throughout the war and into the post-war period that the military were anxious to limit their responsibility to provide only for relief with very little rehabilitation, no reconstruction, and to relinquish their duties at the earliest moment.\textsuperscript{31}
From this point on, until after the death of Roosevelt, the organization for civilian relief in liberated areas remained as it was in the early winter 1943. Only as a matter of interest it is noted that the military terminated relief to France with the exception of coal shipments on May 1, 1945 and to Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark on August 1, 1945. Responsibility for Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania passed to UNRRA; responsibility for France, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Norway passed to FEA and, for awhile in the summer of 1945, it was unresolved who would be responsible for Italy, Denmark, Germany, and Austria.
NOTES ON CHAPTER XV


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4Memo., Cox to Hopkins, Jul. 7, '43, Cox Papers, Box 70, Harry Hopkins Folder, FDRL; note, Cox to Hopkins, Cox Diary Entry Jul. 12 and 13, '43, FDRL; ltr., Attorney General to President, Jul. 15, '43, PSF 5330, FDRL.

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29 Testimony of Hilldring before Senate Committee on UNRRA Bill, Feb. 14, '44, CAD 334 UNRRA (5-25-43) (1) NARS.

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31 Memo., McClean to Laux, May 1, '44, CAD 400.38 (2-20-43) Sec 6, NARS.

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CHAPTER XVI

CIVIL AFFAIRS FOR FRANCE

After the "crisis" in June 1943 when the French Committee for National Liberation (FCNL) was created, the British continued to press the Americans to recognize the new group as the government of France. The British motives hinged on the belief that the Americans would not remain long in Europe once the war was over. Roosevelt himself fed this British concern by assuring Churchill on various occasions that American troops would be removed from Europe soon after the collapse of the Germans. The British wanted a strong postwar France in order to reestablish a balance of power in Europe. This desire carried with it the conviction that de Gaulle was the only leader capable of creating such power in France. The British feared that the Americans were "muddling" their French policy and dragging them along behind. What the Americans failed to understand, according to Macmillan, writing several years later, was that with the growing power of the Soviet Union the British needed the French and other central European countries to be strong in order to pose a counter power base.¹

There were members of the American cabinet who shared the British view. Roosevelt and Hull were not among them.
Neither supporting nor opposing a strong France, they believed they were resolved not to favor the Gaullists as opposed to any other group, in gaining power in postwar France. There were some observers who felt there was some professional jealousy and not a little personal animosity involved. De Gaulle was not a likeable fellow in the New Deal sense of the word. There can be little doubt that the President hoped someone or some group would step forward to capture popular appeal in French politics. Roosevelt made no attempt to disguise his dislike of de Gaulle.²

Having lost the power play of June 1943, Giraud began the trip to oblivion. The next step in the process occurred in November 1943 when Giraud was forced out of the FCNL and then resigned as CINC of the French Army. This left de Gaulle as the sole political and military leader of the French resistance. Even Churchill appeared unhappy at this development. A few days later Giraud withdrew the resignation and continued as co-president of the FCNL. The President wired Churchill that he had no intention of withdrawing support from Giraud. "He is a fine old fellow and represents certain decencies which I still like."³ Since his position was becoming more and more untenable, Giraud wanted to retire. He had become thoroughly disenchanted with the Gaullists and told Eisenhower that he had reconstituted the Army to liberate France, "not to insure the triumph of dictatorship."⁴

By mid-April 1944, it was clear de Gaulle had succeeded in pushing Giraud out. The FCNL, motivated by de Gaulle's
urging, appointed de Gaulle head of the French military and encouraged Giraud to step down as commander of the French Army. When the Committee offered him the position of Inspector General, Giraud refused the post. The Americans brought pressure to bear on de Gaulle and pointed out there would be no FCNL, no state in North Africa, and no French Army if it were not for American aid. Macmillan expressed regret at the situation but there was to be no help coming from the British in applying pressure to de Gaulle on this matter. There were several days of negotiations and attempts to find Giraud a position. He proposed being appointed as an advisor to SAC Med but the British were not enthusiastic at the prospect. The President suggested he be assigned to Eisenhower's headquarters. Marshall felt this might be embarrassing for Eisenhower and cause other difficulties with the French. In the end, Giraud retired.5

Giraud's departure caused no great harm to the French military. The Americans fought the action because of the callous manner in which an old friend was repudiated; they admitted that Giraud had not proven to be the leader they had hoped. He lived on in Algiers. In August 1944, he was placed under police surveillance by the Gaullist-dominated FCNL. The surveillance was authorized on the pretense that the police had discovered attempts at assassination. Murphy suggested that perhaps the attempts had been staged for this purpose. A few weeks later it was reported that "lunatic fringe" Gaullists tried several times to assassinate Giraud.
In September he returned to France. The President appreciated what Giraud had done for the Allies in 1942, but he knew Giraud would never be able to stand up to a Gaullist onslaught. Roosevelt told Stalin at Teheran that Giraud "was a good old military type, but with no administrative or political sense, whatsoever."6

Several other key Frenchmen who had helped the United States in the North African operation were attacked by the Gaullists. In December 1943, the FCNL arrested Pierre Boisson, Marcel Peyrouton, and Pierre-Etienne Flandin with the idea of trying them in France after the war. This was done because Boisson had successfully defended Dakar against de Gaulle in 1940, and in order to show the resistance forces in Metropolitan France that Flandin and Peyrouton were to be punished. Shocked, the President proposed that he and Churchill make strong protests in view of the help these men, particularly Boisson, had given the Allies. Normally, Roosevelt made suggestions to his military commanders, but in this instance he forwarded the following instructions to Eisenhower: "Please inform the French Committee as follows: In view of the assistance given to the Allied armies during the campaign in Africa by Boisson, Peyrouton and Flandin, you are directed to take no action against these individuals at the present time."7 At one point, Roosevelt wanted to instruct Eisenhower to replace de Gaulle and disband the FCNL, but Leahy and Matthews argued against such precipitous action. Churchill appeared
equally upset with the Gaullists. He thought the entire question of relations with France was at stake. France could only be liberated by the Allies. To allow a "handful of emigrees" to use that power to carry a civil war into France and thus disrupt the liberation efforts was a disgrace. 8

Following this exchange, the President seemed to mellow somewhat and informed Eisenhower that what the Allies wanted was formal assurance that there would be no trials until they could be held with due process of law in France. The case threatened the rearmament and use of the French Army and the civil affairs negotiations for France. De Gaulle refused to back down; he intended placing the three under house arrest in a villa in Algiers and stated that when France was free the material would be available to bring them to trial. Eisenhower asked the President to accept this situation. 9

In January 1944, when Churchill and de Gaulle met in North Africa, the Prime Minister informed de Gaulle that it would be unwise to alienate Roosevelt by bringing Boisson and Peyrouton to trial. De Gaulle again assured Churchill he would not bring them to trial until France was free. Later that month, the three were seized and confined to a barracks pending removal to a villa in the area. In May 1944, the villa became a virtual prison and the Gaullists pressed for an immediate trial. Boisson was brought to trial in France in late 1944 and despite Eisenhower's written testimony, was found guilty and served a prison term. 10
In addition to this seemingly personal vendetta, de Gaulle took some rather high-handed action in curbing civil liberties in Lebanon. As a result, the President became ever more distrustful. Leahy commented that it was tiresome listening to the Gaullists relate the oppression and atrocity record of the Vichvites without saying anything "about the known arbitrary and cruel activities of the de Gaullists." Nevertheless, in late August 1943, the President recognized the FCNL as a political entity for the duration of the war but not as the government of France.

At the same time, Roosevelt cautioned Eisenhower that he was to deal with the French military authorities, not with the FCNL, on matters pertaining to French forces. This continuing problem prompted Roosevelt to comment that he had no intention of providing a white horse for de Gaulle to gallop into France. The Gaullists and resistance elements were aware of this attitude and feared it. At the working level the facade was maintained between the Americans and the French Military Mission that the American position was predicated on "military necessity in conformity with international laws, without any consideration of political postwar aims." There was some indication from various sources reaching the President that de Gaulle was not as popular in France as the British would have him believe. Roosevelt was receptive to the anti-Gaullist reports. For example, General Odic, one-time head of the French Air Force, reported that de Gaulle
was primarily an opportunist and that as soon as possible would stage a coup d'état in France.

As early as February 1943, and as the war progressed, the President came to hold that postwar France would present chaos undescrivable, a situation more complicated than that which had faced for forces in French North Africa. Supported by his Chief of Staff, the President was adamant that the American forces not be involved in another such embroglio. As the President watched de Gaulle's actions in the political arena, he became more steadfast in this belief.

Again and again, the President stated quite clearly that he laid the utmost importance on allowing the French people the freedom of holding an "untrammeled election" once the enemy were cleared from French territory. With this guidance the planners began drawing up a civil affairs agreement for France. Since the military commanders felt there was a strong possibility the Germans would collapse in the fall of 1943, there was a sense of urgency in having a plan which addressed French affairs. The British and Americans were unable, however, to agree on what level the agreement should be negotiated. The British thought that since the document dealt with a former Ally and since the FCNL was of sufficient stature, the plans should be taken up at the governmental level rather than at the military level. The British felt that in the event of German collapse, it would be necessary for some authority to be exercised over large portions of
French territory quickly. The FCNL, which then included a wide spectrum of resistance elements, were the only body capable of exercising administrative control over Metropolitan France.  

Secretary of State Hull proposed a joint Anglo-American commission to deal with the political situation in France. It was proposed that the commission be responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander. In order to eliminate the irritation and distrust which arose out of the differing policies of the Americans and British, it was proposed that the commission be responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander. McCloy explored the concept with Eden who seemed favorably disposed toward the idea. McCloy also sounded out Hopkins for his thoughts on the President's reaction to such a plan. Roosevelt suspended further action until he returned from the conferences at Teheran and Cairo.

In suspending further planning, Roosevelt noted that de Gaulle claimed the "right to speak for all of France" and talked openly about how he intended "to set up his government in France as soon as the Allies get in there." The President commented that he was "increasingly inclined to the thought that the occupation when it takes place should be a wholly military occupation." Stimson was somewhat bemused at this attitude in light of the arguments about military versus civilian government which had been going on in the White House for the past year. Stimson hoped that the President
would not go too far in the other direction. A few days later Roosevelt relented and allowed planning to continue in routine areas, but he again made it clear that no firm decisions were to be made until his return. He noted that he and Churchill had discussed the matter; until the situation could be more clearly seen no further political arrangements were to be made.16

As the year closed there were four civil affairs options for France: (1) Recognize the FCNL and let it exercise administrative control over French territory; (2) Appoint a French military officer as a Military Governor under the Supreme Allied Commander and let him exercise administrative authority under a military occupation; (3) Appoint an Anglo-American commission under the Supreme Allied Commander and let that group exercise administrative authority over the area; (4) Do nothing, "keep your fingers crossed," and hope that the Germans did not withdraw quickly and hope that the resistance forces would be able to organize themselves and exercise administrative authority over France. The planners in the Chief of Staff's Office, Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) favored option two but were doubtful any French military man could be successful without de Gaulle's and FCNL approval which would imply incorporating option number one as well.17

In early January 1944, the President consented to a joint statement which approved of the French administering their own affairs. It made reference to the FCNL but it did not extend recognition to that group as the government of France.18 At the same time, however, Roosevelt assigned Edwin C. Wilson
as the American representative to the FCNL. In his letter of instructions, Roosevelt returned to the theme that the French must be given a freedom of choice as to their government. He wrote that with ninety percent of the French people "under chains" the FCNL could not be recognized as the government of France.¹⁹

Stimson, McCloy, and Eisenhower continued to struggle with the French problem. Feeling that something had to be done to break the log jam, McCloy favored recognizing the FCNL. He was always convinced that Roosevelt was acting out of true concern about the future of the French people and not out of personal animosity toward de Gaulle. The French were equally uncompromising. De Gaulle refused to allow FCNL personnel to work with COSSAC. Eisenhower appealed to Marshall to encourage de Gaulle to name FCNL personnel to proceed with civil affairs planning. Eisenhower felt there was no one but de Gaulle and the FCNL to deal with. He pointed out that the alternative was an Allied Military Government. This was unacceptable to the American military. There were some indications that the FCNL was softening its position on certain matters. For instance, in January 1944, FCNL agreed to put their forces in Allied Armies under command of the Allied CINC. Command of the French forces and Allied forces had been a contentious point since the Allies went ashore in North Africa in 1942.²⁰

Stimson approached Hull who, although he remained unhappy with de Gaulle and the FCNL, could at least see Stimson's
point of view. The State Department staff submitted reports that the attitude of the leaders placed the Allies in a position where they were going to be forced to administer the entire civil affairs program themselves and that would be far worse than allowing the FCNL to do it. McCloy approached Roosevelt and convinced him that his attitude was causing delay in the military planning. The President relented somewhat in mid-February 1944 and permitted the staff to go on with drafting some sort of civil affairs plan for France.

When the draft was submitted, Roosevelt questioned Stimson because it appeared the directive was so long, complicated and detailed that the people in the field would never be able to understand it much less work with it. Stimson responded that he and McCloy had talked to Eisenhower about it. Eisenhower indicated he wanted as much detailed guidance as possible. Roosevelt edited many political phrases from the document and sent it back to Eisenhower with the comment that it went into "all kinds of unnecessary details," which could be arranged later if they were required. He regarded the plans "as prophecies by prophets who cannot be infallible." He thought it would suffice to let the directive state the commander was responsible for law and order. He suggested the commander be in touch with the FCNL and other local people to work out the plans. The President denounced and protested the "paternity of Belgium, France and Italy." Stimson felt this position hamstrung Eisenhower and McCloy was also upset with Roosevelt.
Finally, the last of May 1944, the directive was approved; Roosevelt had agreed on a *modus operandi* with the FCNL but it fell short of recognition. Churchill remained steadfast in his position of extending exclusive recognition to the FCNL. Ambassador John G. Winant wired Roosevelt that now the Americans could take "a realistic approach to that difficult problem." A few weeks later Roosevelt had Edwin C. Wilson, United States Representative to the FCNL, convey to de Gaulle that if Eisenhower elected to deal with the FCNL it was likely that the relationship would continue provided the FCNL was cooperative. It appeared the President was softening in his approach to de Gaulle.24

Brigadier General (Retired) T. Bentley Mott, a retired American Military Attaché who lived in France, travelled throughout both occupied and unoccupied France, and periodically during the war wrote letters to the Secretary of War which were read by the President, had previously reported that de Gaulle was not well liked in France and that if he were imposed on the nation by the Allies it would hasten an "inevitable revolution." While Mott was in New York in April 1944 for medical treatment, he wrote to Stimson again. The tone of his letter showed a slight change in his previously stated anti-Gaullism. He repeated an idea expressed previously that most of the information available about de Gaulle had been passed through the Gaullist and British propaganda "sift." Nevertheless, he now felt that de Gaulle could be
of value if the Americans looked over his shoulder all the time to assure the Gaullists remained democratic. There is some evidence to show that at this time Roosevelt may have been willing to alter his view of de Gaulle but the inclination faded quickly as the FCNL announced they would assume both civil and military power in France following the liberation. Roosevelt and Hull thought the announcement presumptuous. 25

Meanwhile, the British delayed the newest draft of the civil affairs directive for France. They thought the "Roosevelt Draft" too flexible and feared the Americans would make another "Darlan Deal" once the liberation began. Despite these difficulties, Eisenhower was free to deal with Lieutenant General Pierre Koenig, Senior Military Officer, FCNL, at the military level. Among other things, this arrangement allowed the staff to work with the FCNL on civilian supply plans, which, judging by previous experience, would be one of the biggest problems in the nearing phase of the war. "Free to deal with" and "allowed to work with" were relative terms the military were to discover. 26 In April 1944, Smith and Koenig opened negotiations on a wide range of problem areas such as the treatment of banks and security exchanges, transfer of property, and displaced persons. Obviously these were non-military matters. Roosevelt instructed Leahy to inform Marshall that the President did not understand this move by Smith, did not want such discussions limited to the FCNL, and in no case was action to be taken on these matters unless
Roosevelt himself approved. While this particular move drew the President's attention, the War Department and State Department staffs arrived at the conclusion that wherever they could they would deal with the FCNL without referring every case to the White House.

Neither party in this political bout was prepared to capitulate. The last of April the French committee continued insisting that even military matters be handled at a political level. Roosevelt sounded like a cracked record: he wanted Anglo-American-French affairs handled between Allied commanders and French military authorities, not at the governmental level. This desire was expressed when Lend-Lease arrangements were discussed, and again when currency problems were addressed and, yet again, when the Prime Minister wanted to discuss Operation OVERLORD with de Gaulle. A short time later, Eisenhower remonstrated that although he was following the President's instructions faithfully, Roosevelt should be aware that there existed in France only two major political groups with any influence; one was the Vichy "gang" and the other were the followers of de Gaulle.

As might have been anticipated, Roosevelt did not let this message go unanswered. The President wrote to Marshall to explain to Eisenhower that he did not care if de Gaulle became President, King, or Emperor, or anything else, as long as it came from the French people themselves. He disagreed with Eisenhower that there were only two groups in France.
He thought that many people leaned to de Gaulle and many others leaned to Petain but more than likely, most French were in a state of shock or apathy and did not care one way or another who exercised authority as long as they were left alone. Roosevelt seemed irritated that Eisenhower appeared to believe the "utter nonsense" put out by the press that the President hated de Gaulle. The President wanted to be cautious because in judging the activity of the FCNL over the past two years he doubted if they were going to give the people a free choice of government once France was liberated. On another occasion Roosevelt wrote that "self-determination really means absence of coercion." The President rationalized that he was well aware of how easy it would be to accept the FCNL but in the interest of the French people it could not be handled that way. The President may have felt that he, not de Gaulle, knew what was best for the French. It appears that Roosevelt bridled at sharing the limelight with the FCNL leader. Roosevelt wanted to be the guardian savior of France, rather than allowing de Gaulle to take that claim.

In mid-May Eisenhower appealed to Washington for a joint civil affairs directive for France. Much to the confusion of the field operations personnel, the staff had a British and American civil affairs directive for France in addition to abundant instructions from the President. None of the three agreed except by coincidence. This lack of direction
and persistence in looking to all elements of French political power, made the work of those in the field tremendously complicated and further splintered the factions trying to draw together within the FCNL. Eisenhower had the very difficult job of serving as mediator between the President, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Office, the State Department and de Gaulle himself. Critical issues in civil affairs, such as military security and civilian police arrangements, distribution of civilian supplies, and psychological warfare were left undecided. The major difference between the British and American versions of the directive was the degree of recognition given the FCNL. The American version read that the military might deal with the FCNL or with any other non-Vichy group while the British text indicated the FCNL alone could act in the name of the French people.32

The invasion came, the first areas of France were liberated, and still there was no combined directive. The issue of non-recognition or recognition manifested itself in several areas. First there was the matter of a public announcement to be broadcast on D-Day. De Gaulle was asked to make a recording to be broadcast that day. When it came to light that his recording would be played after that of Eisenhower as a military leader rather than with Roosevelt's and Churchill's as a political leader, he refused to participate. In another instance, some five hundred French civil affairs officers had been trained by the Americans and British.
De Gaulle initially refused to allow any of them to partici­
pate in the invasion but relented finally and permitted a
token force of some twenty to go shore with the invading
forces. Another manifestation of the problem was the currency to
be used during the invasion. The change to a new currency
was designed to control inflation, to penalize collaborators,
and to control war profiteers. The FCNL wanted their currency
issued in the name of the Republic; Roosevelt was not pre­
pared to accept this. He objected to the overstamp, "Republic."
"How do we know what kind of a government they are going to
have." The background issue was more important, Stimson felt,
that the word; if FCNL currency were used it would imply rec­
ognition. The Treasury officials wanted to use the FCNL cur­
rency; but when Roosevelt's wishes were made known they did
not press the issue further. The British and Americans agreed
that Eisenhower would issue supplemental francs. De Gaulle
refused to acknowledge the supplemental fracs. The Gaullists
attempted to employ this problem as blackmail, after a fashion.
The British pressed the issue of the currency so relentlessly
that the FCNL agreed they would approve it in exchange for
recognition. The Americans were not impressed with the ploy
and the British would not extent recognition unilaterally.
When the "threat" was briefed to Roosevelt, he wired Churchill
that de Gaulle could sign any currency statement "in any capa­
city he desires, even to that of the King of Siam. Prima
donnas do not change their spots."
Not only did the currency issue threaten to retard combat operations, but it also caused a good deal of petulance between the political staffs of the Allies. Eden absolutely failed to see any reason why the Americans were being so obstinate on the issue and said as much to Marshall and McCloy at dinner one night at Checquers. Marshall retorted that both France and Great Britain would be "swamped by indignation" if the American people ever found "out how de Gaulle has acted and they had better leave well enough alone." Eden was so upset with Marshall, he left the dinner meeting abruptly.35

The alternative to issuing the supplemental franc was to issue Yellow Seal Dollars and British Military Authorized Pounds. Since this would imply military occupation, de Gaulle acquiesced to the use of the supplemental franc. It was August before the issue was settled.

As a result of these situations, Stimson came to hold the opinion that de Gaulle was opportunistic. Hull became even more bitter than ever about de Gaulle. Roosevelt thought the French people would never accept de Gaulle as their leader and he would topple from power. A few days later Stimson, although deeply mistrustful of de Gaulle, faced the reality of the situation. The Secretaries of War, State and Treasury met and the three of them proposed to the President that the same sort of working agreement be reached with the FCNL that had been negotiated with political elements in Belgium, Norway, and The Netherlands, so that the field commanders could
get on with the business at hand. Such terms as civil authority, administrative authority, French authority and de facto authority, were proposed. The President hit on the term de facto authority but, again, made it clear that he wanted to see the draft before it became a directive.36

Reports came to the President from a variety of sources showing the problems being encountered by the military because they had no basic directive from which to work. By mid-June the SHAFE staff had combined the British, American, and French drafts and incorporated the latest idea of Roosevelt, extension of de facto recognition to the FCNL. The President wanted it understood that CINCSHAFE had complete freedom of action and that the French people were to be given a choice of their own government. In a meeting with Leahy and Hildring, the President indicated he was prepared to accept the FCNL as the de facto authority for civil affairs in France.37

The slight change of attitude on the part of the President may have been due to his having finally met and talked with de Gaulle. Early in 1944, de Gaulle had broached the subject of a visit to Washington with Churchill. De Gaulle did not expect a formal invitation and certainly could not invite himself but an informal indication that he would be received at the White House would suffice. Nothing came of the proposed visit until some months later when it was broached in Washington again. Churchill actively promoted the visit. Roosevelt passed a message to de Gaulle through Admiral Raymond Fenard, member, French Military Mission, Washington, that he
could not invite de Gaulle but if the President were to receive a message asking if he would see de Gaulle there would be an "immediate and cordial affirmative response." McCloy, Stimson, and Morgenthau were opposed on the grounds that de Gaulle would capitalize on the visit to gain recognition. De Gaulle did express a desire to visit America; Roosevelt responded with proposed dates and placed no prohibitions on the conversations. De Gaulle was aware, however, that the President remained steadfast in his attitude "je cederai rien." The President was extremely curious about de Gaulle's attitude, what he would say, and how he would act during his planned trip.38

De Gaulle visited Washington the first week in July 1944, and was much less forbidding than expected. He was well entertained at the White House and various other places about Washington and had two long conversations with the President. De Gaulle did not ask for recognition and Roosevelt did not offer it. The conversations were frank and friendly; the President found him amazingly tractable. It has been asserted, however, that the reported amiability was without any real substance.39

By mid-August it was generally known that the President had agreed to de facto recognition of the FCNL and that a draft agreement had been reached. Roosevelt remained steadfast in his belief that it was wrong for the Allies to force the French people to accept de Gaulle when the Germans still controlled "over 99 percent of the area of France." There were
still reports going to the White House that created doubt in the mind of the President that de Gaulle was as popular with the French as he (de Gaulle) would have the Allied leaders believe, and Roosevelt was still prepared to believe them. A subsequent report from Normandy reached the White House which suggested that de Gaulle was not well known in the area and the French felt he was being foisted on them by the Allies. It should be noted that none of the reports suggested any other Frenchman could do better.  

In an effort to force the Allies to recognize him as a political rather than as a military leader, de Gaulle divested himself of military authority in August 1944, while retaining his duties as chief of government. Eisenhower elected to ignore this move and continued to treat de Gaulle as if he occupied both positions. If de Gaulle came to France prior to the provisional recognition, Eisenhower decided to greet him as commander of the French army. If he came afterwards, he was to be greeted as the head of the Provisional Government of France. This was the guidance proposed by Eisenhower and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The next stumbling block in the recognition process was the question of who would sign the formal document of recognition. Massigli and Koenig were to sign for the French, Eden was to sign for the British. It should be noted no record was found of a British military officer being present. Winant and Eisenhower were supposed to sign for the Americans.
The President did not want an ambassador or any other State Department personnel there because this would be taken to imply a political status which Roosevelt did not intend. Eisenhower suggested Smith, rather than the Supreme Allied Commander, sign for the Americans. Koenig was a very junior French general and it might appear demeaning to Europeans to have the ranking American military person in Europe sign. Marshall and McCloy directed Eisenhower to sign for the Americans. The directive was signed on August 25, 1944.\textsuperscript{42}

As the Allied forces moved forward, liberated French territory was assigned to Koenig for administration. Civil affairs, although being handled by FCNL, fell in the military chain of command: The CCS, the CINCSHAFE, General Koenig. In September 1944, Eisenhower agreed that it was no longer feasible to refuse recognition to the FCNL on military grounds despite his position to the contrary earlier. It is noteworthy that the Secretary of State altered his position and encouraged the President to recognize the FCNL; the President replied that it was not yet time to take that action. A few days later Hull sent Roosevelt another memorandum encouraging FCNL recognition. In view of the fact that there were still "several hundred thousand Germans in France at the time," Roosevelt thought it unwise to recognize the FCNL. And so the obstinacy continued. Leahy and H. Freeman Matthews, who had voiced disapproval of de Gaulle for a long time, now encouraged recognition. Roosevelt did lay out the conditions for recognition in a message to Churchill. He said that when
France was free of Germans and when there was some indication de Gaulle was organizing a civilian administration for French affairs, it would be time to start thinking about negotiations.  

At this point, Allied rivalry entered the picture. The British let it be known that they would be perfectly happy to recognize the de Gaulle government but because of the "unyielding attitude" of the United States, they were unable to do so. In mid-October Churchill wired Roosevelt that the FCNL was taking action to broaden the base of democratic government in France and that it appeared it would be appropriate to recognize the French government. Although Roosevelt appeared to agree, he wanted to treat such matters as French representation on the European Advisory Commission (EAC) as separate issues. McCloy urged recognition to avoid further embroiling Americans in French internal affairs. He felt that Italian affairs were a great drain on the American taxpayer; he had every indication that an identical situation was apt to develop in France and he wanted no part of it for the Americans. Eisenhower was not as concerned about the international fine points as he was about having a strong central authority in France which, hopefully, could avoid the difficult economic and supply situations the Americans had previously encountered. Eisenhower was convinced that like it or not, no one in France could challenge de Gaulle for popularity or had as good a hope for creating a government.
Roosevelt decided that at the time the FCNL created an interior zone, the Allies would recognize them as the Provisional Government of France. The creation of the interior zone meant that the French assumed full responsibility for the civilian administration of France rather than the prior military administration. On October 22, 1944, the Americans, the British, and the Russians extended recognition. Two weeks later the French were made the fourth member of the EAC. They were not, however, invited to attend the Yalta Conference. Roosevelt did not feel anything could be gained by French attendance. The President did want to see de Gaulle either on the way to or returning from the Big Three Conference. The President decided to stop at Toulon on the return journey and invited de Gaulle to meet him there. Subsequently, the plan was changed and de Gaulle was invited to meet Roosevelt in either Algiers or Oran, depending on which port Roosevelt stopped. De Gaulle accepted initially, but later changed his mind. Since de Gaulle was the recognized head of the French state and any one of the proposed meeting sites was on French territory, he took exception to being invited to meet the American president in his own "house." He declined the invitation. The real cause of picque and refusal to meet the President lay in the fact that the communique of Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt did not afford de Gaulle the role in postwar Europe he expected.
As 1944 wore on, the war moved away from France and the attention of the Allies was directed toward the Battle of the Bulge and other more startling events. Civil affairs in France as a central theme ceased to capture the President's eye.
NOTES TO CHAPTER XVI


2 Viorst, Hostile Allies, 75.


4 Msg., Chapin to Sec. of State, Apr. 4, '44, State Dept. 851.01/3619, NARS.

5 Leahy Diary, Apr. 5, '44, LOC; msgs., CG, AFHQ to SW, Apr. 11, and 18, '44, Map Room Files, Box 11, France, Civil Affairs 1944-45, Folder: 011 French National Committee (Sec. 3) FDRL.

6 Viorst, Hostile Allies, 194; Bohlen minutes, FRUS, 1943, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 483.

7 Msg., Roosevelt to Eisenhower, Dec. 22, '43, Map Room Files, Box 11, France CA 1944-45, Folder: 011 PNC Sec. 3, FDRL.


10 Msg., OPD to SHAEF, Oct. 26, '44, OPD 336 Africa, Folder Entry 41, NARS.


12 Statement by Roosevelt, Aug. 26, '43, Forrest C. Pogue, The United States Army in World War II, Special Studies, The Supreme Command (GPO, Washington, D. C., 1954) 141. As an example of the President's attempt to deal with the French at
the military level only see memo. to Marshall, Oct. 13, '43, with memo. to Churchill attached. Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R., His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, II, 1453-1454; it was exactly one year later, August 1944, that de facto recognition was extended by the United States to the FCNL.


14Ltr., Hilldring to Eisenhower, Sept. 18, '43, CAD 321 CAD (12-21-42) (1) Sec 3, NARS; memo., Sec. of State to President, Nov. 24, '43, CAD 014 France (3-8-43) (1) Sec 2, NARS.

15Msg., Hilldring to McCloy, Nov. 25, '43 and McCloy to Hopkins, Nov. 20, '43, FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943, 423, 447.

16Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1947) 560; memo., Mathewson to Sec. of State, Nov. 27, '43, Correspondence, Hull Papers, LOC.

17Ltr., Phillips to Dunn, Dec. 19, '43, ASW 370.8 Countries A-G France, NARS; ltr., Bendetsen to Hilldring, Dec. 20, '43, CAD, NARS.

18Annex 5 to Moscow Conference Declaration, FRUS, 1943, II, Europe, 760; Roosevelt approved joint statement on France, Jan. 5, '44, France 1944-45, PSF, FDRL.

19Ltr., Roosevelt to Wilson, Jan. 5, '44, France 1944-45, PSF, FDRL.

20Leahy Diaries, Jan. 22, '44; Stimson Diaries, Jan. 2, '44.


22Msg., Chapin to Sec. of State, Feb. 12, '44, SD 851.24/381, NARS.
23 Stimson Diaries, Feb. 28, '44; memo., ASW to Sec. of War, Feb. 18, '44, OSW, NARS; msg., Eisenhower to CCS, Jan. 4, '44, Box 11: France Civil Affairs, 1944-45 Folder: 011 FNC (Sec 3), FDRL.

24 Memo., Roosevelt to Eisenhower, Feb. 26, '44, Box 12, France Unclass Naval Aide's File 1942-45 all in Map Room Files, FDRL.

25 Pogue, Supreme Command, 245; Leahy Diaries, Mar. 30, '44, LOC; note, Mott to Stimson, Apr. 11, '44, OPD 336 France Sec. III Cases 139-173, NARS.

26 Msg., Chapin to Sec. of State, Mar. 28, '44, SD 851v.50 CCNA/397, NARS.

27 Msg., Leahy to Marshall, Apr. 24, '44, CAD 014 France (3-8-43) (1) Sec 3, NARS.

28 Memo., Hilldring to Marshall, Apr. 20, '44, CAD 014 France, (3-8-43) (1) Sec 3, NARS.


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31 Eden, Memoirs, II, 553; Viorst, Hostile Allies, 96; Tompkins, Murder of Darlan, 9.

32 Msg., Eisenhower to CCS, May 11, '44, Map Room Files, Box 11, Fr. C.A. 1944-45, Folder: 001 Fr. (1) Sec (1) Apr. 8- Sep. 22, 1944, FDRL; Leahy Diaries, May 29, '44, LOC; Pogue, Supreme Command, 141ff.


34 Msg., Hilldring to Holmes, Jun. 13, '44, CAD 014 France (3-8-43) (1) Sec 3, NARS.
35 Stimson Diaries, Jun. 21, '44.

36 Stimson Diaries, Jun. 11-14, '44, msg., Marshall to Eisenhower, Jul. 7, '44, Map Room Files, Box 11, Fr. C.A., 44-45, Fldr: 001 Fr. (1) Sec (1) Apr 8-Sep 22, '44, FDRL.

37 Msg., McCloy to Eisenhower, Jul. 10, '44, Map Room Files, Box 11, Fr. C.A., 44-45, Fldr: 011 Fr. C.A. 001 Fr (1) Sec (1) Apr 8-Sep 11, '44, FDRL.


40 Msg., Holmes toMcCloy, Jun. 18, '44, CAD Files CAD 014 Fr (3-8-43) (1) Sec 3, NARS.

41 Msg., Eisenhower to CCS Aug. 15, '44, both in Map Room Files Box 11, Fr. C.A. 44-45 Fldr: 011 Fr C.A., 001 Fr (1) Sec (1) Apr 8-Sep 22, '44, NARS.

42 Telecon record between Holmes and Hildring, Aug. 16, '44, CAD 014 Fr (3-8-43) (1) Sec 5, NARS; Leahy Diaries Aug. 18, '44.

43 Msg., Roosevelt to Churchill, Sep. 28, '44, Map Room Files, Box 11, Fr. C.A. 44-45, Fldr. 2; ltr., Matthews to McCloy, Sep. 21, '44, ASW 370.8 Fr. 1944, Jul. thru Dec. '44, NARS.


45 Ltr., McCloy to Donovan, Oct. 9, '44, ASW 370.8 Fr, 1944 Jul. thru Dec. '44, NARS.

46 Msg., Eisenhower to SW, Oct. 20, '44, CAD 014 Fr. (3-8-43) (1) Sec 6, NARS.

CHAPTER XVII

PLANS FOR GERMANY

During the first part of the war the President felt no sense of urgency in planning for the occupation of Germany. He did suggest to the Secretary of State in March 1943 that it might be well to initiate occupation plans in coordination with the War Department and the British. At the same time, Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, while visiting in Washington, discussed with Roosevelt Stalin's ideas on the dismemberment of Germany. Stalin seemed to favor the idea. Roosevelt, himself, had explored the concept as early as 1941 and 1942 with Churchill, Leahy, and Sumner Welles.

Welles pointed out in *The Time For Decision* that a centralized Germany had led to militarism. He proposed permanently partitioning it into states as it had been in 1866-1871. Taking this concept as his own, Roosevelt would have separated Germany into five states. He felt indigenous movements would take care of the separation; if that did not occur, however, Roosevelt was prepared to force a dismemberment. The State Department staff did not favor forced dismemberment because it would probably result in arbitrary zones which would all too quickly settle into spheres of influence.

Hull broached the dismemberment issue at the Quebec Conference in August 1943. Neither Eden nor any of the British
cabinet were as favorably disposed toward the idea as they had been the previous March. The discussions on the subject never amounted to much and the notion of dismemberment was dropped. By October 1943 Roosevelt's idea was becoming more sophisticated and not so harsh as it had first appeared. He wanted Germany divided into three states but certain services such as railroads, communications, and customs could be common user facilities. 3

Prior to Hull's departure for the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference, October 1943, the President approved the Department of State plan for the treatment of Germany which was to be presented at the conference. In broad terms, it excluded Nazis from holding positions of power and suggested a minimum of Allied interference in a decentralized government, a demilitarized economy, a tolerable standard of living, and a broad-based democracy for Germany. The State Department plan did not mention dismemberment. The proposal was accepted in Moscow as the minimum treatment to be afforded the Germans and was forwarded to the newly-created European Advisory Commission for further development. 4

During the Moscow Conference the European Advisory Commission (EAC) was established to formulate plans for the treatment of the enemy following the war. This group, consisting of representatives from the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and later France, began meeting in London in 1944. Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary,
initially proposed the group deal with broad postwar European policy. On the contrary, the Americans and the Russians suggested that the commission treat only narrowly-defined, specific problems submitted to them by the three European Allies. The most important responsibility of the EAC was the development of surrender terms and the machinery of control of Germany.

The American representative to the EAC was John G. Winant, a close friend of the President. Winant, though provided information first by the Working Security Committee and then by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on the American policies to be followed in the negotiations, appeared to share the President's lack of urgency in formulating plans for Germany. The British named William Strang and the Soviets chose Feodor T. Gusev, Ambassador to Great Britain to represent them.

The EAC as a concept had been forced on the Americans by the Russians. Hull agreed to its establishment without having specifically cleared the decision in Washington. The commission was designed to serve as a companion piece with the Allied Control Commission, Italy. The administrative procedures of the EAC were established by the Americans to stop the British desire to transfer the responsibility for civil affairs planning from Washington to London. Stimson was instrumental in assuring that although the EAC was to meet in London their decisions could not be implemented without the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS).
At the Teheran Conference in November 1943, Roosevelt proposed a plan for the dismemberment of Germany which would have partitioned it into seven states: Prussia, Hanover, Saxony, Hesse-Darmstadt-Isse-Cassel, Bavaria-Baden-Wurttemberg were to be independent and two states were to be placed under United Nations control, Kiel—the Kiel Canal—Hamburg and the Ruhr-Saar area. During the conference, Stalin insisted that German industrial power be completely destroyed. Churchill wanted the German aircraft industry destroyed and proscribed. Yet, he was less than enthusiastic about the President's proposal; for dismemberment, the Prime Minister suggested that the south German area be combined with Austria into a Danubian Confederation, and that East Prussia be separated from the rest of Germany but he was not disposed to go further. Stalin disapproved of the Churchill proposal and wanted it understood that Roosevelt's proposal was only a statement of intent.

The President's private files contain several papers dealing with various aspects of partitioning and the State Department studied the impact of such a separation continuously from 1942 onwards. Although Roosevelt spoke about dismemberment frequently throughout the war, he never directly insisted on addressing the issue with specific plans. The war, at the time, was of primary concern; it seemed inauspicious to take up the question of a German occupation policy in detail.

There seems to have been little further discussion of the dismemberment idea until the Crimean Conference when Stalin
introduced the subject once more. Churchill wanted three states: Prussia and northern Bavaria, South Germany, the Ruhr and the Saar and he wanted France consulted on this idea. The three leaders agreed in principal to the concept of dismemberment, but referred the issue to the European Advisory Commission for resolution. Elliott Roosevelt maintains that by the time of the Yalta Conference the President favored integrated control for Germany at all levels. This attitude may have risen out of a desire to retain Russia in cooperation rather than out of any conviction that this was the best way of treating the German problem. If this is what Roosevelt thought it is not what he said. Hopkins suggested the foreign ministers continue to work on the dismemberment proposal. At the meeting on February 5, 1945, Roosevelt still seemed very much in favor of dismemberment. In any case, the zone issue overtook dismemberment and for all intents and purposes the zones as they evolved dismembered Germany.10

In January 1944 Fred W. Shipman, Director, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, was detailed personally by the President to AFHQ Med to help with the preservation of archives. Later in the year he was asked to go to London to help formulate plans for the preservation and utilization of German archives. Shipman's work highlighted two areas which were of interest to both Roosevelt and Eisenhower. Shipman pointed out that following World War I, the German General Staff had preserved their files and under the cover
name **Tuppenamt** continued as an entity, although specifically proscribed by the Treaty of Versailles. Roosevelt and Eisenhower wanted to assure that such a situation would not be allowed to develop following World War II. Shipman proposed a committee be formed to establish policy for the disposal of German archives. The American military staff were of the opinion that the Working Security Committee and the European Advisory Commission could deal effectively with this problem. Later in the summer it came to the attention of one of the military advisors that the subject was indeed on the EAC agenda but was rather low in priority of treatment. The military staff officer proposed to his superior that because the President was very interested in the subject and that because the President's son-in-law, Major John Boettiger, knew the EAC was not dealing with the subject with any priority, perhaps it might better be moved higher on the list.\(^{11}\)

By February 1945, the disposal instructions had not yet been determined. Shipman wrote to Hilldring pressing for resolution before the various interested American, British, French, and Italian agencies scattered the records irretrievably. Because of Shipman's position **vis a vis** the President, any letter he wrote should have received prompt attention in the War Department. Later in the month he again wrote to Hilldring pressing for resolution of the problem; his letters were referred to the SHAEF staff. Ultimately, the bulk of the German records were brought to Washington for storage and research.\(^{12}\)
As in the case of the monuments and fine arts problem, the President's interest drew attention to the archives and doubtless resulted in masses of files being saved which might otherwise have been destroyed.

Early in 1944 the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the General Staff, U.S. Army, and the Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) realized the need for practical instructions to military government personnel. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister provided firm guidance concerning the occupation and the Combined Chiefs of Staff were inclined to the view that detailed matters of the occupation should not be their concern. As a result, the various military offices proceeded to formulate plans for the occupation but in a rather leisurely fashion.13

In March 1944, SHAEF created a German Country Unit consisting of British and American military personnel and patterned after the existing German government. This unit was destined to evolve into the Allied Control Commission for Germany. The President suggested that the military draw on the State Department, the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Treasury Department for expert advice. The Secretary of War agreed but proposed that the civilians be placed on the commission as such rather than commissioning them as military officers, as had been done in Italy. It was understood that Hull intended protesting that the State Department rather than FEA should have the responsibility for recruiting for these positions. Laughlin Currie pointed out to Grace Tully, the President's secretary,
that FEA would do a good job.\textsuperscript{14}

Nothing more was heard on the subject until the following January when the military turned to the Bureau of the Budget for assistance. It appeared that overly rigid interpretation by the cooperating agencies was causing serious delay in the effort to obtain the best civilians available for military government administration. Harold D. Smith proposed that Roosevelt approve a plan whereby the military would not be limited to State, FEA, and Treasury for recruiting. He also proposed that the military be the final responsible agent for selecting, assigning, and directing the civilian personnel. The Smith memorandum was marked O.K. and initialled by the President.\textsuperscript{15}

Corollary to this was the military requirement for such greater numbers of personnel for military government than were ever required in liberated areas. The German Country Unit anticipated governing Germany along the established pattern since a zonal division had not been chosen and it was assumed there would be a German political system in existence following the surrender.\textsuperscript{16}

The staff of the German Country Unit based their planning on expediency, limited participation in political matters, and efficiency. The military attitude toward occupation traditionally followed the theory of preventing disease and disorder to facilitate rear area service for the combat troops. The military were charged with being more concerned with what was an efficient administration than being concerned with the fact
that they were dealing with the enemy. Military plans followed a course designed to make the German economy self-supporting as quickly as possible but at the same time eliminating the German war industries. In this vein, the military found the Nazi method of control, production, and distribution of food to be very much like the system followed in America. It was never contested that denazification would take place but there were those who cautioned that it ought to take place carefully and slowly, otherwise the chaos caused by replacing trained personnel with untrained, politically clean personnel could be catastrophic.

The Allied planners assumed that if Germany were not restored to self sufficiency it would fall to the Allies to support and administer the former enemy over an extended period. In the opinion of McCloy any other type program would be very difficult for the military to implement in view of the deep-seated philosophy outlined above; others in civilian agencies agreed with these concepts. The President had indicated general approval of this philosophy. He would not, however, agree to soften the terms of unconditional surrender and was adamant that the "Reich" would have to be reconstituted. This philosophy was expressed in a SHAEF Handbook For Military Government designed for the military in the field. As in the military government school episode of an earlier time, the handbook precipitated a controversy within the President's official family.
In the summer of 1944 Secretary of Treasury Henry A. Morgenthau, Jr., with Roosevelt's specific approval, went to Europe to observe at first hand the French monetary situation. Among others, Harry Dexter White, Director of Monetary Research, Department of the Treasury, was one of Morgenthau's travelling companions. During the flight to Europe, White showed Morgenthau a memorandum from the State Department which called for the economic rehabilitation of Germany. The proposal was based on the notion that German industry could be devoted to the reconstruction of devastated Europe. In addition, two Treasury Department employees briefed the Secretary on this concept. Morgenthau felt this was a "soft" approach and placed the onus for German rehabilitation on the victors rather than on the defeated.

As early as 1942, Morgenthau had talked about leveling German industry and restricting aircraft built in the future to a 200 to 300 mile range. At a luncheon on August 7, 1944, he approached Eisenhower concerning the General's feeling on German occupation. Eisenhower expressed his personal opinion that there must be no room for doubt as to who won the war. He felt that those who were for a "soft" peace wanted Germany to serve as the bulwark against the Soviet Union. Germany must be occupied and, more importantly, the German people should not be permitted "to escape a sense of guilt in the tragedy that engulfed the world." The Germans should "stew in their own juice." Prominent Nazis, along with certain industrialists must be punished. Membership in the Gestapo and the SS should
be taken as face value evidence of guilt. The General Staff must be destroyed and its archives confiscated. The German nation should be responsible for reparations to the Allies while the war-making power of the country should be eliminated. Eisenhower thought this could be done by strict controls on industries or by the "mere expedient of preventing any manufacture of airplanes." The Germans should be required to make their own living. Choking off their natural resources, therefore, would be folly and Eisenhower repudiated the suggestion that the Ruhr mines be flooded as being "silly" and criminal.20

Parts of this program seemed appropriate to Morgenthau but other parts seemed overly lenient. Right or wrong, and Morgenthau felt the concept was wrong, these were issues of national policy which he felt should be determined "elsewhere than at the technical military level." Morgenthau questioned the wisdom of allowing the military to conduct the occupation at all. He later developed this thesis along another tack; he granted the military were well intentioned but they would not, could not, enforce an unpalatable peace because of their American background. The Secretary felt that because the Europeans had suffered greatly, only they could enforce an "Old-Testament" peace.21

It should be noted that certainly those around Morgenthau, if not he himself, knew there were many "soft" peace devotees in the military and other departments responsible for policy. For example, Oscar Cox had sent a memorandum of his ideas on
German occupation policy to the Treasury Department in June 1944. He proposed rebalancing the German economy to assure peace rather than completely disrupting it and setting the stage for another war.22

The events surrounding the Morgenthau plan, as they unfolded during the period August-September 1944, are well documented. There is hardly a national figure or an historian of the era who has not delved in great depth into the controversial subject of the President and his ideas concerning the Morgenthau Plan. There are several points, however, which bear directly on occupation policy that might not be readily apparent in a general treatment.

Girded for battle, Morgenthau returned to the United States. He knew McCloy and Stimson were concerned because there was no adequately staffed directive or long range guidance for treating the issue. Morgenthau's impression was the "G-5 is ready to go in and do a WPA job for Germany." Roosevelt refused to address the problem and dismissed those who pressed him on the issue with the flippant remark that he could settle all the problems in thirty minutes with Churchill. Even before Morgenthau reached Washington after his return from Europe, he directed his staff to work quietly within the Treasury Department to draw up some plans for Germany.

Morgenthau talked to McCloy on the telephone when he reached Washington to coordinate a mark-dollar-pound-ruble exchange rate for the occupation forces. Morgenthau had attempted on two separate occasions to have a decision from
the President on this issue. Morgenthau's objection to the rate issue was that both the British Foreign Office and the American State Department staffs had determined what they considered a reasonable rate. To adjust it artificially would unbalance the German economy which would retard the economic recovery of Europe. Morgenthau saw no reason for being reasonable with the Germans. Both times Roosevelt voiced the opinion that the soldiers should be given dollars and let them determine the rate. In a Treasury Department Staff Meeting, Morgenthau commented "we ought to give the soldiers a Yellow Seal Dollar with the Star of David on it." He closed the meeting with the comment that he was not going to broach the subject with the President again "because I have bigger fish to fry with him." He commented then that someone had to take the lead in being "rough" with the Germans.²³

In response to Morgenthau's comments about the military plans for the occupation of Germany, McCloy pointed out that the handbook had not been approved but that since there were no other directives if Germany collapsed, it would have to be used. Later the same day Morgenthau told McCloy he had no intention of fighting about the exchange rate and again said, "I think I've got bigger fish to fry with him (Roosevelt) on Germany." By this time, Morgenthau had completed a note to Roosevelt. In a conversation with the President, Morgenthau said he did not want to give him the memorandum on what the civil affairs personnel were planning because it would irritate
Stimson who had not seen it. Roosevelt, naturally, demanded to have the memo. 24

Morgenthau's tactic was that if the military would not act to crush Germany then he would go behind Stimson's back to the President to have him force the military to do so. Failing to arouse the interest of the President by pointing out that the European Advisory Commission was not planning a "hard" peace for Germany, Morgenthau then gave the SHAEF Handbook to Roosevelt.

McCloy had forwarded a copy of the handbook to Hopkins on July 24, 1944. McCloy drew Hopkins' attention to the military plans for occupation duties. Hopkins had the handbook in his office until August 9, 1944 when he returned it to McCloy. The handbook produced, for Morgenthau, the desired effect. On August 26, 1944, Roosevelt sent a memorandum to the Secretary of War protesting the handbook. He asserted that it gave the impression Germany was to be restored in the same manner as the former Nazi-occupied countries and that the people of Germany were to be restored as quickly as possible to their pre-war standard of living. It was of the utmost importance that every person realize that Germany was defeated this time. He believed that the Germans would have to work many years to make up for the incalculable damage wrought by their military forces. Roosevelt did not want the German people to starve, but he felt that, for example, if they needed food to keep body and soul together beyond what they had, they could be fed three times a day from Army soup kitchens. The crux of his memorandum was
that the German people as a whole were responsible for the "lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization" and not just the Nazi leaders.25

It was clear there were two schools of thought on how to treat the enemy. Roosevelt commented in a letter to Queen Wilhelmina that the one school would be "altruistic. . . .hoping by loving kindness to make them Christians again . . . and those who would adopt a much tougher attitude. Most decidedly, I belong to the latter school for though I am not blood-thirsty, I want the Germans to know that this time at least they have definitely lost the war."26

The Secretary of War countered that a policy such as Morgenthau advocated would require American assistance to Germany in order for the nation to survive. He pointed out that the handbook Morgenthau gave the President was a working document, had not been approved by Eisenhower, and had not been distributed to the field. It was revised almost immediately and it satisfied Morgenthau that it met the views of the President.27 The Secretary of War may have stretched a point somewhat. Hilldring telephoned London on August 28, 1944 to make sure that the handbooks were suspended and if they had been issued to have them recalled. Major John Boettiger, the President's son-in-law, was a party in this conference call. Hilldring commented at the end of the conversation that although their heads "are bloody and somewhat bowed, I think our blood has not been spent in vain." Hilldring hoped at last to have some guidance so a policy would be determined.
Two days later Hilldring followed this telephone conversation with a background letter. Attached to the letter is a proposed draft of a letter written by Hilldring for Stimson to send to the President. It is interesting to note that Stimson did not sign the letter CAD sent forward and that the CAD proposal is different from the Secretary's letter. The most significant alteration was that Hilldring's version made it clear the handbook was a finished product while Stimson called it a draft.28

The President agreed with Morgenthau that occupation policy was outside the authority of the military and designated a cabinet committee consisting of the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of Treasury, and the President's Special Advisor to develop a policy. Hull, Stimson, and Hopkins soon reached an impasse with Morgenthau on the treatment of Germany. It was significant that part of Morgenthau's concept of how Germany should be treated was intertwined with concern for Britain and Belgium. The Secretary wanted to put England back on "its feet." The unemployment in Britain in the pre-war era had been caused by the Ruhr and Saar industries. Morgenthau wanted the Ruhr "completely out of business." He seemed extremely concerned that Germany might re-establish herself after the war and compete again with England. Roosevelt stood much closer to Morgenthau than he did to Hull or Stimson on this issue. At this juncture, not only was the cabinet committee inoperative but the policy for post-war Germany
was taken out of the hands of the two departments most con-
cerned. 29

The President departed for Hyde Park for the Labor Day
weekend. He was accompanied on the train by Morgenthau. Dur-
ing the holiday, Morgenthau and Roosevelt reviewed the Treas-
ury Plan. Morgenthau later commented he had quiet and unin-
terrupted time with the President and Mrs. Roosevelt. The
President agreed to close the Ruhr. "He (Roosevelt) is will-
ing to go as far as I am or he is willing to go farther than
I am. Now the man is hungry, crazy to get some stuff to work
with, when he saw what we were talking about he said, 'I don't
know how far I will get with Churchill on this.'" Morgenthau
said also that Mrs. Roosevelt, "who was a great pacifist be-
fore this" liked his plan. She said, "Put the thing under
lock and key and shut it down completely." The President
approved and after the meeting Morgenthau made it even harsher. 30

On the return to Washington there were long discussions
among Stimson, Hull, Morgenthau, and Hopkins over the plan.
Hull brought forward the State Department plan at a meeting on
September 4, 1944. Stimson and Hopkins agreed with the plan
which was not Carthaginian. The destruction rather than re-
direction of German industrial might was a tragedy to Stimson
and bordered on criminal action. Such a program along with
the subsistence diets being proposed surely laid the ground-
work for yet another war. Morgenthau seemed to agree but
would not commit himself. Stimson commented that Morgenthau
was bitter and a bit ignorant of both history and economics. If Morgenthau appeared to Stimson to agree with a more moderate approach toward Germany, it was only a charade. Actually, Morgenthau termed Stimson's attitude towards property "horrid." Morgenthau was sure Hull sided with him but wanted Hull to state so clearly in front of the President, Stimson was equally shocked at Morgenthau's approach. According to both Stimson and Morgenthau, Hull was most vindictive, he felt Nazism was a "thousand miles deep in the German people." Yet Stimson was beginning to gain ground with his position that one does not "burn down the world to roast one pig."

The President appeared not to accept Morgenthau's idea of destroying the Ruhr. He argued "that Great Britain was going to be in some straits after the war and . . . that the products of the Ruhr might be used to furnish raw materials for the British steel industry." A few days later he returned to this subject. He feared the British economy was on the verge of bankruptcy and felt the Americans could not encourage the British to profit from German assets.

At the time Roosevelt departed for the second Quebec Conference, the Morgenthau Plan was still intact. Significantly, neither Hull, Stimson, nor Hopkins attended this conference. After Roosevelt arrived at Quebec, he called Morgenthau to the conference when post-war economic problems were being discussed. The general thrust of the President's concern at Quebec was the fear that Britain was completely bankrupt.
Roosevelt simply could not stand aside and watch the Germans building a potential "rearmament machine" while at the same time the British economy collapsed.

Churchill came to the conference as ill prepared to deal with Germany as Roosevelt. He was primarily concerned with the economic condition of the Empire. During the conference, the Morgenthau Plan was laid out for Churchill. He was not happy at having been brought all the way from London to see a proposal which "chained them to a dead body." Roosevelt proposed the two leaders leave further discussion of the matter to their aides. Morgenthau, White, Lord Cherwell, and Lord Leathers met to discuss the issue. Cherwell was even more rabidly anti-German than Morgenthau. The American Secretary of Treasury proposed a plan for the treatment of Germany which was put forward by the Americans with the rationale that it would help solve British economic problems. The Ruhr and Saar basins were in an area the Americans wanted to occupy but were willing to give to the British on the ground that Europeans could administer a harsh peace where the Americans would be reluctant to. Churchill agreed to the Morgenthau Plan on September 15, 1944. When Eden arrived at Quebec the following day, he was shocked that the Prime Minister had agreed to such a statement, and he remonstrated with Churchill to no avail. At the close of the conference, a modified Morgenthau Plan, which the Prime Minister had dictated, was initialled by the President and the Prime Minister.
Stimson continued to argue against the plan. He felt it was an "open confession of the bankruptcy of hope for a reasonable economic and political settlement of the causes of war." Morgenthau was jubilant, "... it was the high spot of my whole career in the government. I got more personal satisfaction out of those forty-eight hours than with anything I have ever been connected with." When the agreement leaked to the press, public reaction was unfavorable and the President retreated. Neither he nor the Prime Minister ever discussed the plan again for the record. The Russians were curious about how seriously the Western Allies regarded the plan. A State Department staff officer explained to Russian diplomats that the de-industrialization plan was not to be taken seriously.

Eleanor Roosevelt left the impression that the Morgenthau Plan was actually the Roosevelt Plan. Her thesis was that as a result of the public reaction the President made a scapegoat of Morgenthau in order to avoid loss of public popularity. She further held that the President never relinquished his desire for a program which would serve to remind the Germans that they had been defeated. Stimson hinted at a "monopoly game" theory which may have taken place at Quebec. He stated that Churchill traded British Morgenthau Plan concurrence and $6½ billion in post-war credits for Great Britain while Roosevelt accepted the southwest zone of occupation in Germany with enclaves and access corridors to the northwest to avoid crossing France. Elliott Roosevelt, one of the President's sons,
stated that "Father was a proponent of what was known in this country as the Morgenthau Plan. It is the fault of neither of these two men (Stalin and Roosevelt) that these stringent terms have not been followed out." Stimson wrote that the President called to say that perhaps he had made an error; he just wanted to divert Ruhr business to Britain. Later when Stimson was with the President "He (Roosevelt) grinned and looked naughty and said, 'Henry Morgenthau pulled a boner.'" I read him the "pastoralization sentences and he was staggered and said he had no idea how he could have initialled this." Hull was convinced that Morgenthau had "sold the President a bill of goods." Tugwell maintained that as the President's strength failed he depended more on those around him and some of them may have taken unfair advantage of the situation. Tugwell held that Roosevelt signed the Morgenthau Plan absentmindedly. Morgenthau himself always maintained that he was expressing the true views of the President and lamented the fact that the American people or at least their leaders would not support the "required" policy in Germany.

After being subjected to criticism over the Morgenthau declaration at Quebec, the President was in no hurry to make known alternative plans, despite Oscar Cox's urging. When pressed for his views on one occasion he commented that he could not decide at the moment as to what kind of a Germany he wanted. He even denied there were problems in the cabinet over such an issue. Much would depend, he felt, on what was found when the Allies actually occupied the country. He
disliked making plans for a country which was not yet occupied. In another instance, the President inferred that he intended to visit Germany and after a personal inspection he would be able to design a meaningful policy. He did publicly comment in mid-October 1944, "As for Germany, that tragic nation which has sewn the wind and is now reaping the whirlwind - we and our allies are entirely agreed that we shall not bargain with the Nazi conspirators, or leave them a shred of control -- open or secret -- of the instruments of government."  

Despite these evasive public announcements, Roosevelt did take action to assure that an occupation plan was being drafted. The Cabinet Committee was dissolved; the President publicly released a letter to the Director, FEA, giving him the responsibility for working out an economic policy for Germany. Because of lack of clear direction, FEA drew up two economic annexes for the treatment of Germany, one "soft" and one "hard." At the same time, the President directed the Secretary of State to design policy for Germany. He wrote to Hull that no one wanted complete eradication of German industrial productive capacity. The State Department and FEA staffs were working together closely on this issue.  

A military government policy somewhere between the Morgen­thau stand and the Hull position would have to be designed. The rough draft of what came to be JCS 1067, the official policy statement on the treatment of Germany, was given to the President by Hopkins in late September 1944; McCloy is reported to have been the author of this document. The paper
was finally sent to the field in January 1945. It had been coordinated by the State, Navy, and War Departments, approved by Roosevelt and Eisenhower and was to be considered the policy. McCloy informed the EAC that gossip to the contrary, 1067 was not a "Morgenthau-Treasury" effort and it was to be taken quite seriously. Later the President told Hopkins that the JCS paper was written in accordance with his views but it would still have to be cleared through the British and the Russians. The Americans anticipated trouble in this area because it was reported that "all the king's horses and all the king's men have met in London on this subject and they are determined to have their directives prevail."

The charge has been made that for over four months, October 1944 to February 1945, there was no action on a policy for Germany. The field asked for guidance several times in October 1944; there were even requests sent directly to the President. Draft statements of one phase or another were drawn up in Washington and whether they contained finance matters or not they were always coordinated with the Secretary of Treasury; in any case, papers could only be approved to a certain point up the chain of command. As one Colonel in CAD put it, "It is not possible to clear policy at this time in view of the fact that the broad policies for the control of Germany are currently being considered on a high level and until those policies have been formulated we will pretty much have to mark time . . . " Did the Morgenthau Plan
episode clear the air as McCloy suggested or did it simply complicate the Washington scene with more layers of coordination? There are indications that clearing policy became even more cumbersome than before and that as a consequence of the "handbook affair" the military were reluctant to bring forward any more drafts. There were other indications that in actual fact the Morgenthau Plan was not dead. Leahy commented to Morgenthau that the Secretary would never get his program through. When Morgenthau was told that, as a result of his plan the Germans would never surrender, he became more convinced that "Soldiers don't want to treat people harshly." He felt he must continue the fight for a harsh peace.  

By November Morgenthau seemed to have lost heart in his "Carthaginian Peace Plan." The current instructions from the President were that a general policy statement would be required and a short-term plan for the military while the long-term treatment of Germany could be postponed. Roosevelt did not want to deal with partitioning, reparations, or pastoralization without giving it some more thought. Above all, the President cautioned against reducing any of these concepts to policy documents. The State Department forwarded a proposed long-term economic policy on November 11, 1944. The President gave tentative approval but because of its nature it was not of any great value to those in their field. It is noteworthy that Stettinius did advise in a later note that it would be a poor policy to allow Germany to "stew in her own juice" and cited the Russian advances in the era 1920-1940.
as proof of what a nation could achieve while isolated. Acknowledging receipt of the memorandum, Roosevelt stated that Germany should be allowed only sufficient industry to meet her own needs. The Americans would be opposed to reparations but desired restitution of looted property of all kinds. These statements were impromptu between Stettinius and Roosevelt and were not coordinated with the concerned federal agencies in Washington. It came to light a few days later that this was the procedure the President had initiated.\textsuperscript{55} 

In November 1944, the Secretary of State, after having reviewed JCS 1067 carefully, informed the President that neither it nor the Quebec Pronouncement were in the national interest. Roosevelt agreed, but nothing was done and planning continued without Presidential direction.\textsuperscript{56} Subsequently, JCS 1067 was sent to the EAC with the statement that it represented the short-term views of the United States. There were rumors that the Americans working with the policy statement in the EAC could not support it; the staff assured the senior military advisor to EAC that such was not the case.\textsuperscript{57} Initially, the military had encountered difficulty with the statement; Hilldring, however, informed the SHAEF Chief of Staff that JCS 1067 was a policy statement and no longer open to debate.\textsuperscript{58} Rather than propose changes it was simply their military duty to implement it. The British were now on record, despite the work of Lord Cherwell, as opposed to sweeping de-industrialization and extreme impoverishment of Germany.\textsuperscript{59} The following month SHAEF forwarded the proofs of a new handbook.
By early 1945 it could be said with some degree of accuracy that the latest SHAEF handbook and American policy as expressed in JCS 1067, were in accord. The new handbook resembled more the one which caused the furor in August 1944 than it resembled the Morgenthau Plan. Other statements of policy, however, continued to go begging. In February 1945 Leon Henderson returned from Europe charging that the economic policies were both unsound and unrealistic. The Treasury and War Departments were usurping responsibilities of the State Department. There was a total lack of coordination between the military and the EAC. Since Henderson was a close friend of the President, the military fully expected an uproarious spring in 1945. A Henderson attack, however, failed to materialize.

Upon his return from the Crimean Conference, Roosevelt directed the State Department to plan to implement the Yalta decisions concerning the occupation of Germany. These plans were presented to Roosevelt on March 10, 1945 with the understanding that the military had approved them. McCloy denied so vehemently that the military knew about the plans, that they were withdrawn and others were submitted on March 23, 1945. The problem with the "uncleared" policy statement was that the EAC had sent it directly to the State Department and it envisaged a highly centralized military government in which the zone commander was a nonentity. Despite the President's order to the State Department that policy statements were to be treated unilaterally until the White House released
them, McCloy had secured a copy. Earlier in March Stimson had reviewed the latest contradictory options with Roosevelt. There were certain elements in the Administration who still advocated pastoralization and there was the "medium proposition" brought forward by the military. Stimson was upset that as a result of lack of guidance no plans were being made at the top level in Washington; Roosevelt made no comment. By approving the March 23 plan, the President abrogated the EAC-State Department plan of March 10, 1945. The Acting Secretary of State was careful to note that the President had read and approved this new policy statement. As a matter of fact, the President commented to Morgenthau on the evening before Roosevelt's death that the military government plans of March 10, 1945 were "terrible." Roosevelt commented that he had to re-write the entire document. It was a rather harsh document but not as strong as the original Morgenthau Plan. It decentralized the military government administration. At last the issue was settled but Stimson promised, himself at least, to send his best man to Germany to lay the foundation for the military government. He felt it would be too much to expect Eisenhower to be able to understand the processes and desires of "this government after the last six months of fantastic, tumultuous vacillation."

At this point, FEA informed the State Department that neither the March 10, nor 23, 1945 letters had been properly
coordinated with FEA. By the letter of September 19, 1944, FEA was charged by the President with economic policy determination for the United States. This new issue and the final plans for the treatment of Germany were settled after Roosevelt's death. 66
NOTES TO CHAPTER XVII


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CHAPTER XVIII

ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

One of the factors influencing the development of the German occupation policy was the attitude of President Roosevelt regarding the zones of occupation. When American forces first arrived in the United Kingdom prior to the invasion of North Africa, they were quartered in northern Ireland and the west of England. As the buildup for the cross-channel attack continued, the American troops remained in western England and the plans for the invasion of the continent called for the Americans to be on the right flank in the attack. This development would send the American forces through France and into southwest Germany. The British Armistice and Post-War Committee, known as the Attlee Committee, proposed early in 1943 that Germany be occupied by the Allies in zones with a joint occupation of Berlin. The largest zone was to go to the Russians, the most populous zone was to go to the British, and the smallest one to the Americans. Marshall saw the proposal but there is no indication the President saw it.\footnote{1}

By October 1943, the American military planners began to see the inherent problems in this arrangement. They could envision the French demanding a zone and if American lines of communication to the United States' zone ran through France then the French could exert pressure on the Americans. To

300
give the French a zone would require rearrangement, so while
the rearrangement plans were still fluid it would be a simple
matter to give the northwest zone to the Americans. When the
zonal occupation principle was agreed upon, it fell to the
Americans to take the southwest zone. This arrangement was
generally discussed and accepted by Roosevelt at the first
Quebec Conference in August 1943.2

By the time the President was enroute to the Cairo-
Teheran Conferences, November-December 1943, he had changed
his mind. The President now feared that by accepting the
southwest zone the United States would be placed in a posi-
tion of having to reconstruct France, Italy, Austria, and
the Balkans, a job he did not relish and one he thought rightly
belonged to the British. His experience with the French
reinforced this conviction. The President thought it would
be a relatively simple exercise to help reconstruct North-
west Europe, lay the foundation for a peaceful Germany, and
have the work completed in the maximum one or two years he
felt the American public would support an overseas commit-
ment.3

When the President made his views known, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff pointed out that a change in the plans of Operation
Overlord would not be insuperable but there would be some
problems. Nevertheless, Roosevelt directed that such plans
be made and accordingly, the Joint Chiefs took the subject
up with the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Cairo Conference.
Later on during these conferences Roosevelt, Leahy, Churchill, and Eden discussed the zone problem and agreed to turn it over to the European Advisory Council for resolution. Apparently, Roosevelt assumed it had been agreed in this instance that the United States was to have the northwest zone. When Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan, Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command, first became aware of the discussion, he assumed it was a joke. This was far from being the case. Plans were made for the change in both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Opinion was split in both staffs on whether such a change could be made at all and, if so, at what point could the change-over be most effective. In February 1944, Roosevelt wired Churchill that the zone arrangement should be formalized before the invasion began. Although the President was to charge later that he assumed the issue had been settled, this particular message would indicate he still attempted to convince Churchill that the Americans should have the northwest zone. Roosevelt asked Stettinius to confirm the position of the Russians and the British on zone assignment. Somehow he had heard that perhaps their ideas did not conform "with what I decided months ago." Stettinius responded that as far as the Allies were concerned, the Americans were to be assigned the southwest zone. Although the American military staff and the Prime Minister pressed the President to accept the southwest zone, the President refused.
While the zone problem was being discussed, Eisenhower, recently appointed Supreme Allied Commander, proposed that the occupation be Allied and based on a centralized concept with no zones. This idea was discarded by the Allies, including the American military staff and the President. Nevertheless, in January 1944, Eisenhower broached the subject with the President. Eisenhower commented later that the President listened but refused to commit himself. In March 1944, Eisenhower modified his view somewhat by proposing that the British and Americans occupy separate zones but administer them as a single Allied unit. This approach had the approval of the British but the Americans rejected it. Again in April 1944, he appealed to the President, through a Department of State mission visiting London, for a centralized occupation of Germany. Since this position was at odds with the policy of the President and the State Department, the American representative to the European Advisory Council asked guidance. Eisenhower's idea went unaddressed for some months and was overtaken by the decisions made at the second Quebec Conference in September 1944.5

For all practical purposes there were two policies at SHAEF in the summer of 1944 so the staff prepared two occupation plans, one for the Americans to assume control of the southwest portion of Germany, and one for the American forces to cross the British and Canadian lines and occupy the northwest zone of Germany by direction of the President.6
Those near the President may have drafted messages for Roosevelt's signature dealing with the zone issue to draw his attention to the fact that the problem was not settled and was unnecessarily frustrating those working in civil affairs. At the end of April 1944, McCloy explained to Eisenhower that the President had decided he would not participate in the occupation or administration of Germany except with the northwest zone. Furthermore, Roosevelt did not welcome suggestions from the Americans, either military or civilian, to the contrary. It should be borne in mind that at this time the political situation with regard to both Italy and France was particularly worrisome to the President. The last of May Roosevelt wired Churchill to propose the CCS inform Eisenhower the Americans would occupy the northwest. Churchill responded that he assumed the issue had been settled the previous February and it would not be practical to change the present arrangement. In a long message a few days later, Roosevelt strongly objected to the southwest zone. Stimson commented that the President was "hell-bent" on the northern area and this would lead to another clash with the British. Stimson felt the President simply had to be persuaded to change his mind.\(^7\)

In the summer of 1944, the Department of State entered the controversy with a proposal that the United States assume the southwest zone with enclaves in the British zone to assure port and rail service to the south, thus avoiding France.
Later the State Department staff sent another message to
Roosevelt pointing out that further work with the Russians
on the German problem was being delayed because there was no
"zone decision." Roosevelt responded that there would be no
problem with the Russians because the issue was over the two
western zones, not the Russian zone.\(^8\)

By August, in addition to the Russians, Stettinius,
Stimson, Forrestal, the British, and the American military,
were attempting to settle the "zone" issue. August came and
went and still the President would not yield. Late that
month Roosevelt saw a long memorandum which reviewed the
situation. The note made mention of the fact that Churchill
had ignored the issue and it would be necessary for Roosevelt
to take up the question at the forthcoming conference. The
troops were faced with a military occupation and had no idea
or direction about what they were going to occupy nor how
they were going to go about it.\(^9\)

At the second Quebec Conference, it is known the Presi­
dent and Prime Minister had at least two separate unrecorded
conversations on the zones. It was after this that Roosevelt
accepted the southwest zone; in essence, the State Department
proposal had been adopted. It is thought Roosevelt accepted
the southwest zone because Churchill had accepted the Morgen­
thau Plan discussed above.\(^10\) The President wanted the British
to be in charge of the Ruhr and the Saar so that they would
have to implement the pastoralization policy embodied in the
Morgenthau Plan. This theory would coincide with Morgenthau's previous comment that it would not be possible for Americans to conduct a "Carthaginian" peace program.11

The zone issue was settled but not before Eisenhower once more voiced his notion that an integrated occupation was a better idea, particularly now that it was obvious the French would be asking for a zone of their own. The closing scene with the zones issue concerned the French. No sooner had Roosevelt consented to recognize the de Gaulle regime as the provisional government of France, than Churchill broached the idea that France would like to have a zone of occupation in Germany and would like to participate in the occupation of Berlin. This implied equal participation in the control apparatus. The Russians and the Americans were not prepared to take this step. For that matter, neither were the British, but they pressed for French participation because they wanted help in eking out their meager manpower and resources in reconstituting Europe and the Americans were emphatic in their declarations that they would be leaving Europe in two years. Roosevelt was an unwitting contributor to this development. He rarely let pass an opportunity to state that the Americans would not remain long in Europe once the war was won. Unable to go it alone, the British promoted the idea of a French zone to fill the supposed vacuum of the American departure. However much the Americans objected to the Gaullists, they were sure the British and
Soviet governments intended approving French participation. Thus there was little to be done but acquiesce. 12

When Hopkins visited Paris prior to the Crimean Conference in early 1945, de Gaulle and Bidault laid all these proposals before him. At Malta, during the preliminary meetings of the Western Allies' foreign ministers, Stettinius proposed the French be given an occupation zone in the Anglo-American area and that the idea be laid before the Russians for their approval. Later on at Yalta, Roosevelt told Stalin he thought it not a bad idea to give France a zone out of kindness. Both Stalin and Molotov agreed that kindness was the only reason. At the Big Three session on February 5, 1945, Churchill proposed giving the French a zone in Germany to lighten the burden of the occupation. Stalin did not appear unduly concerned at the French being given a zone, but he did not seem to favor their being included in the control machinery. To avoid this, he proposed the British invite the French, Belgians, and Dutch to participate in the occupation of the British zone. To avoid further debate, Hopkins passed a note to Roosevelt suggesting the three agree on a French zone and agree to discuss the issue of control later. The discussion passed on to other subjects. It was finally agreed to give the French a separate zone created out of the British and American zones. Roosevelt and Stalin were initially opposed to permitting French participation in the control mechanisms but finally agreed to this as well. 13
As mentioned earlier the President felt that "The post-war burden of reconstituting the Balkans is not a natural task of the United States." Thus, Roosevelt let it be known the Americans were not interested in what they considered a troublesome area of Europe. Early in the war Roosevelt made it clear to both the Russians and the British that the Americans were opposed to "spheres of influence" or areas of special interest and he persisted in this concept throughout the war. Roosevelt did not want to maintain troops in Yugoslavia or elsewhere in the Balkans. His Allies, however, did not share this disinterestedness. Despite the President's disclaimer he was placed in a position of having to acquiesce to the concept for Eastern Europe and the Balkans as the Russians and the British went on to develop spheres without ever openly making such an arrangement a matter of record.  

In late January 1944, the question of the occupation of the Balkans arose. The State Department favored using token military forces to control the distribution of American goods. The War Department argued that since there was no American military operation in the Balkan area, this was purely a matter of national policy and, as such, the State Department should administer the program. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee announced the policy that the military government of an area would conform to the character of the military operations, i.e., unless the military forces of an Ally were active in the area, then they would not be expected to form
the military government. Officially, the President favored the State Department proposal, but only a small number of supply personnel were ever sent to the Balkans to supervise the program of relief and rehabilitation. In addition, there were Americans on the Allied Control Commission of Bulgaria and Rumania who played a token role in these activities. When representation was made to the Russians that there was no significance attached to these roles, the Soviet staff innocently replied that the Allied control commissions in Eastern Europe were patterned after the one in Italy and that the Americans played the same roles in Bulgaria and Rumania that the Russians played in Italy.\(^{15}\)

The Director of UNRRA appealed to the military either to detail Army personnel to UNRRA to administer the relief program or to assume the UNRRA tasks in the Balkans. The request was made for two reasons. One, UNRRA was unable to field an organization and was not able to finance its program there. Second, when UNRRA was organized to perform the mission their personnel were subject to combat conditions, particularly in Greece. Both McCloy and Hilldring successfully opposed this plan.\(^{16}\)

In February 1942, Otto Hapsburg, pretender to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, wrote the President asking to be allowed to participate in freeing Austria. Welles, Stimson, and Roosevelt felt such action by the Archduke commendable. Stimson drafted a letter for the President to send
to Hapsburg which amounted to tacit approval of the pretender participating in Allied military government. The representatives of the governments-in-exile in London were considerably upset with the Roosevelt Administration when it came to light that an offer had been made to the Austrian which none of them had been afforded. 17

After the tempest, the CAD staff assumed that the Americans were not to participate in the occupation of Austria. Any planning for Austrian civil affairs progressed in a relaxed manner over the following two-year period. The SHAEF staff delegated the responsibility to AFHQ. Since the EAC addressed the political and diplomatic issues for Austria as well as Germany and, since EAC was located in London, it was subsequently decided that SHAEF would be responsible for Austrian affairs rather than AFHQ. Manning was the principal problem; it had been determined that 400 officers and 600 enlisted personnel would be required for the occupation. Neither SHAEF nor AFHQ had that number of personnel available.

A final problem in the planned occupation of Austria was the "zones" issue. The Secretary of State informed Murphy it was premature to discuss any of the issues and there the matter rested on the eve of the invasion of Northern Europe. In July 1944, Roosevelt permitted Winant to negotiate within the EAC for the military government of Austria on a tripartite basis. Inasmuch as the President was adamant during this era that the Americans occupy Northwest Germany, his
attitude toward Austria caused havoc among the members of the General Staff. The military suggested the President be asked about the indicated change as it had been clear to them up to late spring 1944 that the Americans would not physically participate in the occupation of Vienna or Austria.\textsuperscript{18} Nothing more on the matter was done for the moment.

In early December 1944, the Russians proposed that each of the Allies should have an occupation zone in Austria as well as participating in the occupation of Vienna. The background files indicate that as late as December 5, 1944, the President did not appear to favor the Americans occupying a zone in Austria. However, on December 6, 1944, Roosevelt wrote to the Secretary of State that he would be willing to accept an occupation zone in Austria which would be contiguous to the American zone in Germany.\textsuperscript{19} From that point on, there is little to indicate the President's further interest or any problems of significance in the Austrian occupation.

The last instance of President Roosevelt's influence on occupation policy concerned the question of whether to appoint a military governor of Germany rather than a civilian as high commissioner. When Churchill was visiting in Hyde Park in September 1944, he mentioned that a high commissioner would have to be named for Germany. Morgenthau later discussed the issue with his staff and was afraid that Generals Holmes, McSherry, or Wickersham might be appointed because they were on the spot. The Secretary would not approve any
one of the three. Hilldring would have been acceptable but the staff were not certain he would accept such an appoint-
ment because he had heart trouble. Murphy was unsuitable as well. The issue remained unresolved for although the peo-
ple in Treasury knew who they did not want they were unable to agree on a positive recommendation. Scarcely a week later the issue came up again; Hopkins and Byrnes were the candi-
dates figuring in this exchange. Byrnes ruled himself out but Hopkins remained in the running. Could it have been Morgenthau himself wanted the job? At another point, Oscar Cox suggested Hopkins or Lewis Douglas for the position.20

After the furor over the Morgenthau plan, McCloy had to assure Eisenhower that in the initial phase of the Ger-
man occupation there would be a military officer in charge and the President agreed that, in no event, would anyone be appointed without Eisenhower's specific approval. Earlier, Roosevelt complained that he saw no reason why the War Depart-
ment insisted on having a high commissioner named so soon and if there had to be one it was going to be Byrnes and not a military man. In late November 1944, the President was concerned at the prospect of complete military domina-
tion in Germany. The plan, as then envisaged in the European Advisory Council, placed a military commander in charge of each zone. There was then to be a military commission of lower ranks to assist the commander in governing the area. To assure a "tough civilian point of view" the President
proposed to commission some outstanding civilian as a general and appoint him as a member of the Berlin Commission.\footnote{21} In the spring of 1945, according to both Robert Murphy and Lucius Clay, it was a foregone conclusion in Washington that a civilian would be appointed to direct the military occupation of Germany. Morgenthau heard that Averell Harriman was a candidate along with McCloy. The Secretary was opposed to either of these because they were "big business men with vested interests." He further objected to McCloy on the ground that he was opposed to a "hard" peace because he believed the Germans were needed as a buffer against the Russians. His favorite for the position was Patterson. The most likely candidate was either Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson or Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy.\footnote{22} At one point, however, General Donald A. Connally was proposed as the high commissioner for Germany. Despite kind public words about Connally, Stimson did not care for him and asked Byrnes to have Clay appointed to the position. General W. Beddell Smith proposed that he could handle the job along with his other duties. Stimson commented in his diary that that notion was "silly." Later he termed Smith's proposal as "sheer nonsense." Smith "is getting a bit big of the head and even the President has noted it, consequently he has lost confidence in Smith."\footnote{23}

In late March 1945, Lieutenant General Lucius B. Clay was appointed Deputy Military Governor to the Commander of American Forces. Stimson had previously asked Byrnes for him;
Byrnes wrote that he wanted to assign Clay to the position temporarily with the view of his later becoming high commissioner. Clay was, in Byrnes' opinion, the best man available for the job; he possessed that rare attribute of being a military person with a thorough understanding of the government from the "civilian point of view." Though there is no indication of the President's view of this matter, it does meet his previously known opinion that the occupation should be a military affair until it was possible to relinquish it to the civilians. Byrnes' reasoning not only coincided with that of the President but also provided for leadership continuity in the transition of control from the military to the civilian realm. The appointment was announced the day before the President departed for Warm Springs, Georgia, where he died two weeks later.24

One of the President's concepts on occupation survived his death, in intent if not in substance. General Clay established an organization in Germany in which there was a distinct separation between the military government and the military occupation forces - a military government and a constabulatory force.25 Thus when the time came, the civilians would be able to assume government control without disrupting occupation administration.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER XVIII

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CHAPTER XIX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

President Roosevelt's influence on the formulation of American occupation policy in Europe during World War II can be seen both in a positive and a negative sense. The President felt that basically the occupation of liberated territory should be a civilian task; he never changed that opinion. Roosevelt was suspicious of the military because of their highhandedness in administering Hawaii immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Subsequent events in Washington in the summer of 1942 reinforced this concern. Circumstances both on the domestic and foreign scene, however, led him to make arrangements which had the effect of giving ascendancy to the military not only during the period of active hostilities but also for a long post-war period. The events surrounding the establishment of the School of Military Government were the first evidence of the President's concern with civil affairs as such in the Second World War. Although he allowed the military training program to continue, he made it abundantly clear that the occupation was to be mainly in the civilian realm. For two years thereafter, the President attempted unsuccessfully to establish civilian organizations which could effectively carry on an occupation. At first the President
looked to the Department of State to formulate policy since civil affairs were so intimately related to foreign affairs. He felt that even during the hostilities certain functions could best be accomplished by civilians and, at the same time, free the military to concentrate on the primary objective. At the earliest possible time after the military phase, full control of civil affairs or military government should pass to civilian control.

One of Roosevelt's motives for insisting on civilian control and direct participation in the North African operations was to assure success of the venture. The military, he reasoned, would find it difficult to occupy a country, to procure, ship, and distribute civilian supplies, and at the same time carry on combat operations. The President was well aware that manpower and materiel were critically scarce in this first operational exposure.

The early hopes and plans for civilian control were never carried out. Some of the civilian leaders were not as enthusiastic about the occupation as the President and allowed themselves to become involved in bureaucratic and personal conflicts. They could not design and implement a program which would meet occupation requirements. In fairness to those leaders it should be noted that the President preferred the competitive approach to administration because it left the basic decisions to himself. He felt that such a system revealed the vibrant personalities in his Administration and militated against stagnation. While this might have been
his explanation of affairs there were others around the President who described the situation in a different light. Stimson felt that two-thirds of his difficulty in administering the Department of War was because of the "topsy-turvy, upside down system of poor administration (with) which Mr. Roosevelt runs the government." On another occasion Stimson noted that the administration was loose; that the President would sign any paper presented to him by one of his advisors without waiting for the criticism and counsel of the others.²

It is difficult to recall that in 1942 the Department of State was only a small, policy-determining agency. Robert Murphy, one-time Deputy Under Secretary of State and closely associated with American occupation government in Europe, maintains that the civilians may have wanted control of the occupation but they were never organized to assume such control.³ It should be noted that from December 1941 until his death, Roosevelt created more than 130 executive agencies to deal with various aspects of the war. Soon after the invasion of North Africa, several of these were prepared to field teams to carry out restricted civil affairs functions. It must be pointed out, however, that these agencies were only prepared to administer relief programs and did not intend to reconstitute the political structure of the liberated areas. After mid-November 1943, the Department of State concentrated on long-range plans while the military assumed control of the civilian supply function.⁴ The military, acting under directives drawn up by the Department of State, laid the foundation
for political and economic reconstruction. When it was deemed advisable to turn to civil control, it was to be to an indigenous government.5

By the fall of 1943, the President felt that direct civilian participation was no longer necessary or even possible. After a final and unsuccessful effort to establish a viable organization, the President assigned the civilian supply responsibility to the military. Apparently, the President felt if a program for the relief and rehabilitation of liberated territories was to be carried out, the military must be given the job.

Military attitudes toward the tasks of occupation evolved slowly. At the beginning of the war the military assumed that both occupation policy and administration were in their realm. The military definition of occupation did not encompass the broad aspect it was to assume. The military concept of occupation envisaged relief to check disease and political unrest to preclude the civilian populace hampering the prosecution of the war.6 Beyond this narrow interpretation, political and economic rehabilitation were the responsibility of civilian authority either American or indigenous. Even in this limited concept, the military admitted there were certain political and economic matters which would require civilian guidance. After the North African experience, the military became convinced that in order to insure favorable results in their primary mission, they must control and administer
liberated areas for a greater length of time than they had originally planned. Even so, they recognized that long-range plans were closely related to foreign policy and must ultimately rest with civilian authority. Eisenhower mirrored the feeling of the military establishment; he did not want the military assigned the occupation function for an indefinite period and was continually looking for the means of limiting military responsibilities.\(^7\) Illustrative of this was his direction of General Clay to arrange matters in Germany so the military could transfer authority "at the top" within a few weeks after the surrender.

Thus it can be seen that the President exercised considerable direct influence on the formulation of an occupation policy. His influence can also be seen through his views on the war, the peace, his method of dealing with the Allies, and his thoughts concerning the enemy. This was particularly true after the Allied forces invaded northwest Europe in 1944.

The President waged the war to rid the world of fascism and to form the Allies into an organization which would prevent war in the future. He wanted nothing to interfere in achieving those two prime goals. Even so, the President wished to avoid becoming embroiled in European political issues. He felt that the American public would tolerate neither a long post-war commitment in Europe nor a "sphere-of-influence."\(^8\) On several occasions Roosevelt commented that American troops would not be able to remain in Europe more than one or two
years following the war. Even with regard to his concept of the "Four Policemen" of the world, the President felt that only sea and air forces should be involved. In a letter to the Acting Secretary of State in February 1944, the President said that the principal object of the United States in the war was to eliminate Germany as a threat to world peace. America was not fighting to reconstitute southern Europe. Because of this fear of becoming embroiled in European political issues the President insisted on the northwest zone of occupation for the United States and later only consented to accept control of the southwest zone under pressure from the British and his own advisors. Further, he declined to provide more than token occupation forces in the Balkans and only accepted an Austrian zone late in 1944. In an attempt to control American involvement in Europe, the President initially dealt with political issues directly, as seen in relations with Bey of Morocco or with the secret negotiations on the surrender of Italy. Then the President turned to the concept of assigning responsibility for civil affairs to the military. By doing this, he hoped to avoid the pitfalls of political involvement which had not only proven bothersome but had also endangered his Grand Alliance. He hoped to extricate the United States from internal European affairs by assuming that all international problems outside the formation of a United Nations organization and strategic decisions could be settled at the military level. This method of
operation was particularly evident in his treatment of de Gaulle from August 1943 until July 1944.

Until late 1943, the President devoted his full attention to the war; after the Teheran Conference in November 1943, he gradually turned his attention to the establishment of a world peace organization. He desired the Allies and his cabinet to follow suit. Throughout the war, the President wanted no controversial issue to detract from the central aim of winning or to cause loss of support for the United Nations organization. He had witnessed the political debacle following the First World War which had resulted in America not joining the League of Nations and he was determined to avoid seeing that experience repeated. For instance, each time the German question was presented, either at the various wartime conferences or at his cabinet meetings, there were sharp differences of opinion; hence, the President avoided or postponed the discussion whenever possible.

There was yet another factor which made the President reluctant to discuss post-war settlements. He wanted the Germans to be well aware that the entire nation had been defeated, not just the leaders. He wanted them to pay for what they had done. The President did not want the Germans to be as well off as other Europeans for many years. He wanted to find some method of reconstituting the German nation so that it could never endanger peace again. He was not certain how this could be achieved without disrupting the economic base
of Europe. Perhaps the memory of the First World War overshadowed the reality of the Second. Because of the nature of the wars and the fanaticism of the Nazi, Germany in 1944-45 was a good deal different from the Germany of 1918. The immediate problem in 1945 was to keep Germany alive and to avoid the chaos of socio-economic collapse. Roosevelt was well aware of the economic predicament of Great Britain and he came to fear that whatever was done in Germany might bear adversely on the British. Thus, because the President was not certain which economic course was best and because his conscience rebelled at announcing a "Carthaginian" peace, he avoided the "German" issue as much as possible, particularly after the Morgenthau Plan episode.

It appears that the ideas of the President affecting occupation consisted of three broad principles. Wherever it was absolutely necessary to deal with what the President considered "lesser lights," such as de Gaulle, he relegated the discussion to the military level. Richard Leopold feels his treatment of de Gaulle shows that for all his breadth of vision Roosevelt could be petty. Wherever the President thought he would not be supported by American public opinion, he avoided the issue. The President believed that through his skill as a politician, negotiator, and charmer, he could overcome all difficulties, treat with his counterparts in the Alliance system and when disagreement was encountered, simply postpone the issue, as in the case of the dismemberment
of Germany. Gabriel Kolko, in his work on the Second World War, however, seems to disagree. He comments that the President was a "consistently destabilizing element in the conduct of foreign affairs, highly impressionable, yet unaware he was."

He was susceptible to influence by men -- such as Leahy and Morgenthau -- of "extremely limited" talent and strong impulses who gave the President "consistently inaccurate advice" on many questions. Under such conditions, Roosevelt provided government administrators inadequate and confused direction in planning an occupation. Such critical questions as which department should coordinate the occupation policy and how the occupation was to be constituted, whether to follow a policy of wrecking the enemy with the possibility of wrecking the Allies in the process, or to follow a more educative peace aimed at re-establishing a balance of power in Europe, went unresolved.

Decisions concerning the immediate treatment of Germany, the question of dismemberment, and the location of the zones of occupation, were important to the military. Corollary concepts such as whether the conquered nation was to be re-established with a strong national government or a decentralized government, were also important. Decisions on these questions, when promulgated, would dictate the actions of the military in planning for the occupation, in designing training programs, and in the quality, quantity, rank and placement of their personnel. At a time when definitive
guidance was needed it was not forthcoming. To meet their requirements, the military planned a program for Germany which was neither "soft" nor "hard," consciously, but was designed to establish a self-governing and self-supporting former enemy at the earliest possible time with the least expenditure of Allied funds and manpower. This policy incurred the ire of the President and was withdrawn. From September 1944 until April 1945, the military knew only what the President did not want.17

The United States had never encountered a problem such as that posed by the Second World War in providing civilian relief and reconstituting governments following six years of Nazi occupation, wholesale bombing, and extensive ground battle. No one could conceive the magnitude of the problem either in area or amount of devastation.18 It is interesting to note that when the Germans invaded a country, the resources of that country complemented and contributed to the German effort. When the Allies liberated an area, it tended to become a drain upon Allied resources.

The civilians attempted to plan for the occupation yet they were unable to react quickly enough to meet the requirements following military operations. They proved late in the war and in the post-war period that they could perform the tasks of civilian relief and rehabilitation as well as other civil affairs functions, but they simply could not prepare and implement their plans quickly enough to meet the
first post-liberation exigencies. The military planned an occupation which did not encompass anything beyond assisting the combat troops or holding an area until civilian control was established. Even in this limited scope the actual occupation went far beyond that anticipated. To their credit, the military were flexible enough to meet their expanded requirements in an acceptable manner.

The President had definite ideas which affected the occupation. His concept included the military only in the initial occupation while the primary responsibility rested with the civilians. After the President found civilian control unfeasible, he gave control to the military. Subsequently, the President doubted that the military were planning an occupation in accordance with his wishes. He withdrew the military plans and, during a critical period both in planning and initial implementation, pursued a course of purposely declining to provide policy. His position on the occupation zones in both Germany and Austria caused unnecessary confusion. The President's influence on the formulation of American occupation policy in Europe from the beginning of the war until his death was constant and far reaching. Often, it was not constructive.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER XIX


3. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 229.


5. Memo., Dep't. of State, forwarded to the President's Office, Nov. 11, '43, FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 183; also see Briefing Book Paper, State Department for the President, The Treatment of Germany Summary, Jan. 12, '45, FRUS, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 178ff.


8. Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1964) 409. The author maintains that Roosevelt was cowed by the American isolationist feeling. He reports Roosevelt said, "It's a terrible thing to look over your shoulder when you are trying to lead -- and find no one there." Roosevelt's evasiveness in discussing an Occupation Army can be seen in Press Conference, Feb. 23, '45, Rosenman, ed., Public Papers, Vol. 1944-1945, 560; on spheres-of-influence see Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, 10-12.


10. Matloff, Strategic Planning, 491.
11 Biddle, "Cabinet," 72.


13 Leopold, American Foreign Policy, 546.

14 Ibid.


16 Willard Range, Franklin D. Roosevelt's World Order. (University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1959) 83.


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