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AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIALIZATION PROCESS BASED ON A SOCIAL ACTION MODEL

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By
Angel Federico Nebbia, M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1975

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Alfred C. Clark, Dr. Russell Dynes, and Dr. Timothy J. Curry, for all their kindness and support in this intellectual adventure.

Thanks also goes to my colleagues and friends in this "Castalia" of ours, particularly to Benigno Aguirre, Ines Kreinbring, David Orenstein, and Judy Arnold, who in different ways helped me in paying attention and even watching the breathing and growing of some of my ideas.

This dissertation is dedicated to my three "children," Ruth, Selva, and Gerardo, from whom I am still learning so much.

A special thanks will go to Mrs. Jean Stouder for her patience and her skill in shaping this paper so beautifully.
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**PUBLICATIONS**


"The Labor Movement in Argentina, History and Analysis." Paper presented by the Department of Sociology of the National University of Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1960.


FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Sociological Theory

Studies in Sociology of the Family. Professor Alfred C. Clarke

Studies in Collective Behavior. Professor Enrico Quarantelli

Studies in Social Stratification. Professor Russell Dynes
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In Personality and Social System, Smelser and Smelser stated that for centuries civilized man has "recognized" that he is a social animal. But it comes as a surprise that educated or civilized man has also attributed social nature to animals and insects. Accepting the "fact" that all men are equally social by nature, and considering the use of some concepts such as socialization, deviance, or even collective behavior, it is easy to arrive at the conclusion that some men are much more equal than other men. In our everyday language we find concepts such as anti-social or a-social which make reference to a certain man or, more accurately, to some group of men who are not quite social or not quite as social as other men. The latter are commonly used as a yardstick to measure the former. So the question about the social nature of man arises again and again in the sociological literature. And socialization as related to the social nature of man and about its peripeteias is at the center, explicitly or implicitly, of all theories of society.

PARADOXES

We live in a time in which certain myths have become widespread and accepted as truth. Amateurs and specialists alike subscribe to them.
One of those myths is the universality of the family, another the omnipresence of its nuclear form, and a third, the socialization process itself.

I will consider here the last one, and I will try in its analysis to remain at the sociological level. Socialization seems to have been a fundamentally interdisciplinary concept. For a better understanding of the socialization process, after reviewing the literature, one would have wished to find a different concept used by each of the different disciplines which refer to this phenomenon. The paradoxes which I am going to explore are, I think, a result of this conflictive overlapping of treatments. The concept is supposed to be the same throughout the different approaches, but its meaning at the final stage has become so blurred that it has become more than the reference to a unique and differentiated process, the reference to contradictions and conflicts between the different disciplines which make use of it.

In this sense the concept has become a myth. Why is socialization a myth? I shall say it bluntly, it is a myth because it does not correspond to any real phenomenon, it is a pure abstraction of a methodological nature, or may be, as we say in these occasions, an ideal construction. I am not implying that because socialization is a myth it is not real, but its conceptualization has to be qualified. The concept is heuristic in its very nature. I would add that it is heuristic, having those who use it, some previous purpose in mind. Sooner or later, as those purposes may change, it has to be replaced by some other more useful concepts.
The first paradox could be expressed in the following way:

Socialization for any individual in society is an endless process which starts with his birth and ends with his death. It is a process through which we become social human beings. The paradox here is that wherever we take that particular individual, he is supposed to be always in the making; that is, he has to wait, a tragic surprise, indeed, until his days are over to find himself at the stage of being completely social, that is, "human." If we try to correct our assumptions in order to avoid this trap, we may say that the individual in case is always at each stage social, but if we reach this surprising conclusion, then there is no socialization process, socialization has vanished. So as always, facing similar difficulties, we may conclude that our truth "must" lie in some middle point between those two extremes.

But what I propose here is to take things as they are and see if, as a myth, socialization conserves some heuristic value and, if so, to use it as such. Marion J. Levy, Jr. pointed that,

...the end of the game is propositions which are conceivably falsifiable and preferably informative, regardless of whether they are temporarily confirmed or falsified!\(^3\)

The same would be valid for more complex theoretical constructions, at least providing a model or a starting point.

When we speak of socialization it is necessary to keep in mind that because of its original treatment, society was emphasized as active, and the individual as passive.\(^4\)
The very term socialization seems to posit society as a goal-setter and active principle, leaving the individual as something that is worked upon more or less successfully. Socialization is usually thought of as something that happens to or is done to the individual—the focus is not on the active shaping of his life by the individual, but on the plasticity and passivity of the individual in the face of social influences.5

Here we find ourselves in the middle of another paradox, because if society is active and the individual is passive, then society is something whose existence does not rely on the component unities, that is, individuals. The misunderstanding, I think, comes from a time in which social scientists opposed the individual to society as two distinct and irreconcilable entities.6 In today's conception the individual gets his identity through intersection, that is, by shaping simultaneously the identity of the alter, in an overall context which expands the core of the process in further and further constitutive horizons. Interaction is at the core of all social processes.

Analyzing this latter paradox, if, in order to avoid it we choose the opposite point of view, we think that the individual is active instead of passive, then we should conclude that the individual shapes (socializes) society; and if we, at the fringe of desperation, think of both the society and the individual as active, then we reach the absurdity that the individual and society socialize each other. Should we also add in an endless process?

It is curious that usually, even if the different authors speak of socialization as a process that involves the whole life of the individuals which comprise a particular society, they usually concentrate upon the earlier childhood years to present their theories.7
It seems that there is something implied in these approaches, mainly, that childhood constitutes some preliminary stage and that being social starts with the end of the childhood period. This point of view obviously becomes a misconception of our everyday life experience since we all know the enormous influence children have in affecting consumption patterns in a consumption-oriented culture. The effect of this is that socialization, as many other labels we use in our society, has been tailored for our minorities and society is defined in terms of some normal, adult, mature, unchanging sector of that same society. 8

We have taught our undergraduate courses using a model which shows a asymmetrical relation between children and parents from the family of orientation stage to the family of procreation stage.

\[ a = \text{parents} \quad \quad b = \text{offspring(s)} \]

**Figure 1**

In Stage II, former children \( b \) become parents \( a \) and repeat the cycle (socializing cycle) from the opposite side than previously in Stage I. The straight-broken line represents the social constant theme around which the socialization "variation" is supposed to be played.
With this scheme in mind, as shown in Figure 2, we could describe subphases in each cycle.

Figure 2

The typical family with its traditional features comes to the fore. That is, the "traditionally" structured nuclear family with father, mother, and children. The mother playing the "expressive" role in Phase I, the father playing the "instrumental" role in Phase II and older sisters, brothers or peer playing the value acceptance set of complementary roles in Phase III.⁹

SOCIALIZATION: CONSIDERING A DEFINITION

To start with we are going to discuss a definition of socialization and, for that purpose, we have selected the following.

Socialization is a broad term for the whole process which an individual develops, through transaction with other people, his specific patterns of socially relevant behavior and experience.¹⁰

We may justify our selection by pointing to the general character of the definition, it points to the interactional process itself as the source, for behavior and experience. This is the way we could read this definition. A modification of this definition could
be offered adjusting it more narrowly to what we have already said in the following way: Socialization is a heuristic construction for understanding the interactional process itself in all its complexity and consequences, as it is related to the characteristic patterns of social behavior and experience of the individuals. Socialization has to be considered a reciprocal process, that is, with reciprocal consequences; consequences which constitute the structural feature of the society in which the socializing process takes place. It is a reciprocal process which does not mean an equalitarian rational process. On the contrary, an equalitarian relation can only be thought as an extreme case at which the socialization process would become ineffective or non-existent, only thought as a limit case, which cannot be a goal in this process. Because of its very inequalitarian nature, interaction can be analyzed as a mutually changing process which differentiates the constitutive parts of the social structure.

The interactional model is well known and is usually constituted by a dyad

A \leftrightarrow B

Figure 3

in which \(A \neq B\).

If we consider that socialization is an overall phenomenon that can be analyzed at any life stage of any individual, we are implying that we can uncover what goes on in any interactional process, so far as it is related with a structurally defined social context. Patterns of change are culturally derived: any distinction is a value related
The reciprocal character of the socialization process is explained in the following paragraph.

...the phenomenon of socialization can only be understood as seen as a complex interaction process governed by a reciprocity of needs, demands and perspectives. In other words, rather than treating the adult's behavior as an independent variable, both the behavior of adult and children must be seen as mutually dependent variables. The adult-child relationship is just one case of possible relationship in the social context and must be headed, taking into account that context in all its dimensions. Every interactional process defines a situation, or has a definition of the situation, at its very core. In other words, every interactional process is rooted in a situation or context. None of the elements which constitute the socialization phenomenon are independent of any other element, their reciprocity is a radical one. We have constructed an action orientation model which should be able to show the multidimensional aspect of the interactional process within a social context. The multidimensional action approach should be thought as a way to integrate a concept, which appeared until now to individualistically oriented, in a more complex sociological context.

But before we enter into its full consideration we will explore briefly what we mean by a more sociological consideration of the socialization process.

DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIALIZATION

Developmental theories are very important from the biological and psychological point of view, less so from the sociological per-
spective. It may even help to clarify a vast array of important problems or it may be used as a parallel reference tool for more socially integrated or structured phenomena. The social setting, nevertheless, demands a new set of concepts and a new way of conceptualizing. Society as an integrated array of interrelated parts should be studied as a whole phenomenon. Everything which can be considered as a special field of inquiry should always make reference to the whole of which it constitutes such a part. We cannot go in detail into this approach which has old roots in sociological and anthropological thought. We may only state that we are not trying to impose a metaphysical entity called society as opposed to the individual. What we are stating here is a constitutive reference which runs from the whole to the parts and from the parts to the whole. We are implying at the same time that the process set up by the dynamic interrelationship between the parts has a dynamic structural-astructural character which we are going to explore below with some detail. This dynamic structural-astructural character of the social interactional process, for which the triad is the most appropriate unit, is at the center of our conception of the socialization process.

The fact that the new-born baby is able by its mere presence to transform a dyad, husband and wife, into a triad and to metamorphorize two people from the state of husband and wife to the state of father and mother is all important here and in no way can this be related with the almost too fragile and helpless situation which is used to describe the baby from the biological or psychological point of view. Taking all these facts and consequences due to the mere
presence of the new-born baby, we cannot accept statements like the one with which H. R. Schaffer uses to start his work on socialization.

At birth an infant is essentially an asocial being.14

How can this be if he has already a social name and was able to change so much. On the contrary, the new-born baby is so "powerful" sociologically that by its mere presence he has legitimated a new relationship, he is able now to consolidate or to disrupt the previously arranged dyad. He has been able to create a new identity, a new institutional order.15

This is a sociological fact for which developmental theories are of little use. At the same time, the new-born baby has started a process of socialization, social change, playing himself the important role of socializer, a process in some way contradicting the accepted trend which sees him as a pure recipient of "reverse" socialization: the socialization of the parents, grandparents, and other relations, even of friends of the kin group. The adult group will develop and the pace for that development will be directed largely by the child himself. The conception of the child as an active member in the socializing community is receiving more and more recognition and is being studied more and more carefully.16 Only a full recognition of the role played by the infant will confirm the whole process of socialization as a reciprocal process of a dialectical nature. Through it we may eliminate the myth we reach by defining implicitly society, using a reference a partial sector of its whole composition, that is, the grown-up sector, the adults, etc. In a quiet strange way children have been treated as a minority or marginal sector which has to gain
entrance into "society" which, as we have implied, he has already transformed so much.

This "stagification" tendency, the tendency to measure the growing process of the human being in terms of stages, is very old, indeed. But if the child "grows" the people related with him must "grow" with him at the same pace. What is really paradoxical here is that the account of the phases is always an adult enterprise, he is the one who labels the stages to full acceptance of the new-comer into the social order. If the interactional process should be taken seriously as a reciprocal process, we would suggest that the labels that the adult applies to the child are nothing but those labels which reflects his own stages,\(^7\) that is, the stages through which the adult finds himself going through the socializing process confronting the child. That is, they should be held as showing the difficult crisis through which adults go in their socialization process trying to catch up with the child. In such a way we may make references to stages, but we are using them in an arbitrary way to show the dynamics of the other side of the coin. If one would take the child as continually present, in its own right, the socializing reciprocal process that goes on between adult and child would be continuous and the stages absent. The socially differentiated pluralistic structure does not allow any consideration for considering any of its parts as transitory. At each stage, taking this consideration into account, the child would be considered an absolutely integrated being in the social context, and in its own right terms.
What we can say here is something similar to what J. Myrdal implies in the American Dilemma in reference to race relations in America. It is not a black man's problem but, on the contrary, a white man's problem. In the same way we could say that "stagification" accompanied in most of the cases by description of crisis at each stage is not a child problem at all, but an adult problem. It shows mainly the hard time adults have in coping with the child pressure of socialization; the child trying to overcome a status of marginality and frustration. The main obstacle is here, that society has been defined for him in advance as a system in which he is continuously an alien.18

Feebleminded and irremediable idiots are better treated in sociological terms than children, because of the former ones, as they have no further "stage" to go, become fully integrated in their own terms. And the adult strong-minded face them as equal human beings. It is well known that in Buga, a small town in Columbia, South America, the idiots, because of what they are, the result of an inbred gene pool at the upper class level, the descendents of the old Spanish aristocracy, are displayed as status symbols at the front door in order to give evidence of the noble origin of the family.

In human society the new-born baby acts and reacts toward a context of relationships which he already helped to establish by his mere presence. The child is not born in an interactional system which was pre-existent. What was mainly pre-existent was quite different in its structural and relational aspects from what he has re-structured, re-named and legitimized.19 From now on a new interactional referential multibonded system starts to function, a reciprocal socializing
process with specific features starts to operate, a new institutional order begins to function. If the child is considered at the center of a process of structural modifications, then the family becomes the center of analysis, and behavioral modifications can be seen as spreading into the community along the kinship links. It is possible to construe different models of the way those modifications spread from the child to other differential aspects of the social system. This can be considered a process of socialization in the sense of modifying broader and broader related substructures.

These models are at this stage empty heuristic models but useful, I believe, for guiding further inquiries and research. It is possible to think that the path of modification and transformation of certain structures are different in different cultures. So, instead of the described chain of influence considered so far:

Child → Family → Kinship → Community at Large

in another society the chain of influential structure modifications would be:

Child → Community → Kinship → Family

or even presenting a somewhat different shape:
Maybe that way of integrating the child into the community could be seen in some efforts under way of integrating the family into some communal shape. In this sense the promising future which many sociologists see in the communal family can be considered in such a way of reintegrating the child as a full member in a community of interests and expressions. The family is becoming more and more an alienating setting with its own ideology of segregation and marginalization and the whole unit was near the point of total disruption. As Drietzel stated it,

The urban commune seems to be the most promising alternative to the nuclear family.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I


"Socialization in addition to biological and hereditary makeup, is the common meeting ground of all the sciences dealing with man; for here biology, psychiatry, psychology, sociology, and anthropology come together."


Distinguishes the psychological aspects, the anthropological aspects, the political aspects, and adult socialization as main areas of concern.


"This whole area (socialization) is vague, somewhat muddled, and, according to some sociologists, suffers from an excess of psychologizing."


The importance of studies in the area of culture and personality during the 1930's and '40's seemed to have been a major influencing factor in this direction.
At the same time, the need to integrate psychology, anthropology, and sociology seems to have lead to formulate proposition which kept those three areas of concern separated.


On the other side, we have to point out that Durkheim himself distinguished individual representations and collective representations, the latter as Dr. Hinkle says, "can emerge only as the individual is socialized by and incorporated into (a prior existing) society and learns his language, including its systems of ideas or concepts."

Peter Berger. Invitation to Sociology.

...distinguishes between primary socialization and secondary socialization in order to make reference to those two phases. The former belongs to the childhood years and the latter, which belongs to the adulthood years.


The traditionalistic position of Parsons is clear in his analysis of the internal role differentiation described by this author and shared by most of his colleagues.

It is as we are going to see, a multi-dimensional process, the actors become reciprocally mobilized because there is always "disagreement" between particular levels, because of their different nature, and because in the interactional system it is impossible to distinguish the inner from the outer realm as far as the actors are concerned.

The underlining is mine.

Some relevant aspects are going to be discussed in relation with Marcel Mauss' conception. See Chapter VI.

The impact of the new born child on the structural aspects of the social system is presented here only to point to a phenomenon not mentioned in the literature on socialization. This shows the overall psychological concern in describing the socializing process.

Arlene Skolnick, op. cit.

There is always in analyzing social phenomenon to point to the reciprocity of perspectives of the real. If interaction is an accurate and fundamental ingredient in the definition of sociology, then by analyzing one side of the dialogical relationship, it is always possible to see the other as giving or receiving their "image" from the first one.

The marginalization of children in our society alienates the adults as well. Marriage and earning a living are combined the ritual which offers full acceptance and having children and supporting a household their correlates. But the attitude of adults toward children is one of rejection and control and the attitude which results from the children toward the adults is one of resentment and distrust.

No systematic study of this process of structural change due to the influence of the child has been found in the literature.

The child, because of the modification and transformation through which the family has gone, has been forced to withdraw from the communal bonds. The communal family appears as a substitute for the previous, now almost perished, consanguineal for....

H. P. Dreitzel, op. cit.
CHAPTER II

THE DYAD AND THE TRIAD AS UNITS OF ANALYSIS FOR SOCIAL INTERACTION

We may distinguish in the dyad three elements: the ego, the alter-ego, and the link. These three constitutive elements of the dyad are only visible from outside the dyad itself, from a supposedly third party position. This could be an important reason for considering the triad instead of the dyad as the social unit in interactional analysis. Levi Strauss found,

"...consciously formulated dyads overlaying unconscious triads and concluded that perhaps there were no purely dyadic forms in society, although such simple binary oppositions are common in the human conceptual apparatus."

From a different angle, and related with my personal teaching experience, it struck me when in different opportunities I was explaining the basics of group dynamics and interactional process, and I came to understand the relevancy of each element constituting the dyad that the analysis which was being performed was only possible from the position I was occupying in front of the blackboard, from a position outside the dyad itself. I was, undoubtedly, the third party during the lecture but was never considering myself explicitly in that explanation. I was still speaking of the dyad. In reality, I was there as a tacit third party so to speak. This third party which complements necessarily always..."
the dyad can be expressed from different perspectives, it may be real, as really there; it may be individually there but as having been there, that is, remembered by the dyadic units; or individual as imagined by the members of the dyad; or as a generalized third party, again with the two alternatives described before, remembered or imagined. Through the pure process of experiencing the discrimination of the constitutive parts of the dyad would be impossible. Through the process of experiencing, a process which means the inclusion in the flow of events, which take place in the interactional process, both participants are immersed, and thus the differentiation of the parts from the inside becomes impossible to accomplish. The differentiation is only possible from a third party position. This third party position can be reached, nevertheless, through an act of reflection, by anyone of the actors involved. In this case we would speak of an objectivation of the dyad through reflection. The actors step out of the flowing course of events into which he was previously involved and sees himself and the other in the past tense, or remembered, objectified. And through an analytical mechanism already implied in the reflective attitude he is able to distinguish the other, himself, and to qualify the link between both. This apprehension through reflection is not only a reproductive phenomenon which gives the actor at another level what he got already by being immersed in the situation, but it means a recreation of the situation itself. The whole relational process becomes not only objectified but placed in a time perspective. As a content of consciousness objectified through an act of reflection, it makes reference to a past event. As an experienced objectification it belongs
to the present and at the same time because of its relocation with the still ongoing experiencing interactional process, it projects itself into the future.\textsuperscript{3} It is clear through this explanation that experiencing and objectification through reflection are complementary phenomena interrelated in a dynamic and dialectical way. What we will try to show is that the objectification process is not just a cognitive phenomenon but a phenomenon of a complex structure in which emotional as well as evaluative elements are present as constitutive parts.

Simmel defined the dyad as a system based on pure reciprocity. Only the triad is able to show heterogeneity in terms of asymmetry and hierarchy.\textsuperscript{4} Simmel was not given to simplistic formulation by which quantity passes into quality. His essay on numbers concerned itself with the radical structural (or formal) changes that occur when a shift is made from two parts to three-part (or more) interaction system.

Dyads are symmetrical and depend upon pure reciprocity. Triads, by the introduction of a third member, automatically becomes asymmetrical and hierarchical, as each one of its members operates as an intermediary between the other two, 'exhibiting the twofold function' of such an organ which is to unite and to separate.\textsuperscript{5}

In place of the completeness of the relation of the two, each pair within that triad has an incomplete relationship that can only be filled by the third. Reciprocity exists between the three, or more, elements, but it is indirect. To give a number to the smallest unit of analysis seems to be a useless endeavor, but analyzing what happens in small group dynamics in terms of a dimensional approach, the triad seems to
fulfill almost all the basic requirements in terms of an orientation of action model. At the same time the possibility of expanding the characteristics of the third party to overall social dimensions gives to the triad a peculiar advantage. A married couple is a dyad confronted by different third parties—relatives, friends, or society at large—but when it becomes a "permanent" three member group by the birth of the first child, it becomes at the same time a triad in terms of a face-to-face small group. We should keep in mind again that we are devising heuristic tools for analysis in the social context and not pointing to necessary real entities. Society at large seems to be the most abstract, general, and elusive entity, but from the sociological perspective, the most real. But explaining the structural differentiation implicit in the dyad, what was left unexplained was the role of the person who did the explaining. He was a tacit third member and the differentiated elements in the dyad became relevant and visibly only because he did not belong to the dyad, he had the perspective to see from a distance.

The reflective mechanism in man is congruent with the group situation in which man operates. By the design of an action orientation model we are going to try to show that it can be useful in describing certain parallelisms between the mechanism which operates at the personality structural level and the mechanism that expresses the structural group dynamics. This approach could be labeled as structural and in this sense its source of inspiration could be thought of as deriving from Levi Strauss who analyzed society from a parallel multistructural perspectivism. He described in that way a congruence
between society, language and thought. Levi Strauss, in this sense, was following the lead of two other structuralists, Jean Piaget and Roman Jacobson. What I think, nevertheless, is that it is possible to find such parallel congruence between action orientation and structural differentiation at the group level, but that this parallelism is part of the heuristic model elaborated to analyze a particular reality which defies always at the end any such tentatives. It is always possible to imply, as Murphy does in his excellent book, that

...the mental structures appropriate to life in a particular society are selected according to their conformity to the social structure.

![Figure 4](image)

A TRIAD AS A MODEL OF SOCIAL INTERACTION

Full Line = Interactional Link
Broken Line = Interactional Link

In the triad each member is related with each other directly and at the same time with the other two apprehending the link which binds them together in a dyadic relationship. We could imply that here we have the possibility to point to another structural parallelism, the one described by Freud in terms of id, ego, and alter ego. The first could be referred to the actor himself as related with his biological instinctive nature; the second, the ego, as he is able to gain identity
through his interactional process with the other; and the third, the alter ego, as the control agent or the social agent as represented by the third party. I do not think that the translation of a personality structural description into group arrangement distort the main dimension of the freudian scheme. This, nevertheless, is only an introductory way to start the explanation of another parallelism, this time in terms of an orientation of action model.

To begin, we may say and as a third party in the scene that we are confronting a two member group, in brief, a dyad, for use in this case a schematic unit of analysis. We are supposing, also, that there is a continuous process going on between these two partners and that this process is taking place in a social-cultural context. As always, the dyad in case is "functioning" not in a vacuum but in a context of tacit, so to speak, relationships. By analyzing this particular dyad we are not interacting with it, but acting toward it. That is, analyzing, trying to find a pattern, an explanation of what, if not, would be a chaotic happening or at least a meaningless succession of events.

Because, as Murphy has stated, that

....although we search for order, social life is visibly chaotic. Its basic characteristic is flow and flux; its concrete ingredients are people, numbering into the millions and hundred of millions....

and a little further he insists that

....as strict empiricists, we must confront the truth that we work with apparent (i.e., sensate) disorder, non-replicable people, and non-repetitive events.8

In this sense we are categorizing and typifying knowing, aware that there are other categorizations and typifications equally possible
confronting the same phenomenon and the same sense data.

So for us, and to start with, the simple model would be described by the following figure:

\[
\text{(Ego) (Link) (Alter)}
\]

\[
A \quad \longleftrightarrow \quad B
\]

Figure 5

In order to differentiate actor A from actor B and to start the description on one side of the relational bound, we call A the Ego and B the other, or the alter, in the interactional context. The double arrow is the link, the communication link or the emotional link or just the perceptual link, that relates A and B into a unit. Martin Buber called the link the "in between." The process which goes on between A and B is crucial in the sociological sense, it is in the first place generative, it generates identity for the parts involved, or better, it constitutes an identity actualizing phenomenon. From the sociological perspective we may say that it is omnipresent at such a point that it may be used, and it is used, as the cornerstone for the whole building we call sociology. In this sense the process, represented in the dyad, is used as an ideal construction for what is at the core of the social process itself.

In the real context the dyad is constituted by concrete human beings. This should serve as a reminder that the actors in the situation are not reducible in their beings to any other element or data we may find in the system they are able, because of their intrinsic characteristics to build. But at the same time what they are is
what they are able to produce. Each element in the dyad, understood as a model for the social phenomenon in all its complexity, is part of the dyad in a radical way, in the sense that it cannot be thought separately from that unit. This unit is also and through the mechanism of experiencing-reflection which we have already described, a temporal unit. It comprises, in its structure, the past, the present and the future as a time referential system. To take the dyad as the unit of analysis does not allow us to speak of the actor as active or passive because the only activity or passivity belongs to the actor as related to other actors. If we describe what happens in the dyad as a process, then it is only in relation with this process we may consider the nature of the units. Even the relationship between ego and alter can be considered in itself for some analytical purposes, but it has always to be referred to the whole social context as integrated into or as a part of that context. We can refer to each unit as integrated into broader units, each one with its own internal as well as external constitutive horizons.

The dyad implies in itself a complex process of structuralization and destructuralization in Gurvitch's terms, or it can be treated as a continuous process of assimilation and accommodation in Piaget's terms.

Several years ago, to be precise in 1965, being visiting professor at the University of Puerto Rico interested in some aspects of the Puerto Rican culture, I started some research using a qualitative approach. I was interested in the reaction of the students to some gradually changing patterns and values in the Puerto Rican society,
and in the way this reaction was expressed. The topic which I selected was a trivial one, but of concern to everyone in such a way that building some situational variation in which it could be considered and described, was able to arouse strong feelings in almost all the students questioned, males as well as females. The issue discussed was smoking among women. The issue was discussed in terms of personal reaction toward women who smoke in different circumstances and differently related with the subject questioned. We tried to modify the circumstances into which a particular woman appeared smoking and asked the interviewer to express his reaction first and then the bases for supporting such a reaction. What we were trying to do was to get as many negative reactions as possible. The situational dimension along which we presented specific cases of women smoking were of the following nature: on the street, driving, walking, at certain hours, and modifying the time of the event from early in the evening to late at night. The relational dimension made references to the closeness of the relationship of the woman in the case with the respondent: sister, wife, mother, etc. By combining the relational dimension with the situational dimension we were able to dramatize the picture quite severely, reaching a point where almost all of the students reacted negatively. The answers of a sample of fifty students were registered and analyzed, trying to discover certain common elements in order to build up a typology of different answers. We had in mind an action orientation model and this model was used finally to classify those answers. In this way the answers were classified into three main categories.
The first group of answers pointed clearly and distinctly to the other in the reference-interactional system. It pointed to the other in an objective sense, implying his physical being, it took into account certain physical or biological characteristics, and related those characteristics with the smoking issue. A model reply or answer could be characterized in the following statement: "It is dangerous or harmful for a woman to smoke because of the constitution of her body," or "Women are weaker, from the biological point of view, than men, and because of this it is more harmful for her to expose her organisms to the influence of tobacco," or "Women are built in order to bear children and smoking will endanger this function."

What we found distinctive in all those types of answers was the reference to an objective state. There was always an objective appraisal of the other. (See Fig. 6) In short, the respondent was always careful in providing objective data on which to base his or her judgment. The structure of the argument was always explicit, clear and without internal contradictions. We could qualify those statements as logically structured along the inductive-deductive line. Once accepted, a belief, based on facts, the conclusion followed smoothly and logically almost "necessarily." This is not to imply that the person was right,
but that as far as his basic data were true, the conclusion was congruent with those data. It was always possible to present a counter-argument, but any argument of that sort should be based on facts which contradict the facts on which the respondent based his statement. In no case were we interested in agreeing or disagreeing with those respondents, we were only interested in the content and structure of those answers.11

The second group of arguments ran in a counter-direction. In this case the objective reference was not explicitly there; in some of its forms, there was no objective reference at all. The model for these types of answers could be built up through the following statements: "Smoking destroys femininity" or "Smoking is a man's habit and because of that women should not smoke" or "Women become masculine if they smoke."

What is here involved is, undoubtedly, a value (See Fig. 7), a value shared by the community. A clear distinction is made in Puerto Rico between the sexes, men are men because of certain symbols, beliefs and deeds, which differ sharply from symbols, beliefs and deeds which characterize women. Men are referred to in terms of values as masculine and women as feminine. By opposing smoking to women, the actor was
emphasizing the need to keep this value differentiation alive, because if not so, the whole structural aspect of the community was in danger. The position of the actor, male or female, could be shaken by accepting a behavior that contradicted deep-rooted beliefs. Masculinity and feminity are opposites, the first decreases by performing, in an overt-way, certain types of activities, at the same time that, in relation with the same activities, the other increases. Smoking was regarded as a male activity so it was good for them. Increasing frequency in this activity and especially its public display, taken in account also circumstances, was a way of enhancing the already secured position of one-half of the population. For women social security, estimation and prestige was related with the avoidance of a man's regarded activity. In comparing this second type of answer with the first one we may say that the first reflects a more "scientific" type of attitude, the second a more ideological or "ought to be" attitude. In the latter we do not find any fact-based approach to reality. Objective data, if there is some, implied or mentioned, are only substantiated to the main emphasis and ideal conception of what should be. What underlines this statement is a hierarchical arrangement of estimates on which the community agrees and supports. All the members in a particular class, men or women, in our case can be arranged in terms of degree of relatedness to those attributes. Values serve as a yardstick for social placement. Smoking was appropriate for the distinction, and situational circumstances and type of relatedness was used in order to consider placement in the scale.

The third type of answer was again clearly distinctive from the former two. It differs from the first because it lacked objective re-
ferences and it was different from the second because value references were almost absent. It presented, in general, the following model form: "I simply do not agree with the idea of women smoking," or "It is disgusting to me," or "I feel badly about this issue," or "When I face a woman smoking, I have to leave the place."

Here the problem has a personal connotation, a type of emotional reaction to the issue. In most of the cases it was accompanied by different gestures and body movements. The ego was deeply involved (See Fig. 8) with all his past experiences.

![Figure 8](image)

Now it will become clear why we have classified the first type of answers as rational, the second as value related, and the third as emotional.

When the person was pushed, usually from the extreme rational side of the spectrum, he retreated to the value position and finally to the emotional side without leaving his overall opposition attitude toward the issue. This shows that the dyad was a unit and that the ego emphasizes in his statements one element the other two must be thought of as tacitly incorporated or included; the shift from one type of argumentation to another type has to be thought, then, as a change in emphasis from one part to another part in the system.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II


3This is only a tentatively construction of time dimension through the interactional process. The actors are regaining momentum of the process by reflecting about the ongoing flow of events. The third party has the advantage of perceiving the relationship of the members of the "dyad" confronting him in the present, but at the same time, he is only able to grasp his own participation in the whole process through reflection.


5Ibid., p. 135.

6On the contrary, we may add that the individual actor is the most concrete, specific, and ever present entity, but at the same time (from the sociological perspective, of course), the most unreal.

7Robert F. Murphy, op. cit., p. 179.

8Ibid., p. 39.


11We were working at that time (1965) with an unidirectional or unilinear action orientation model.
CHAPTER III

THE ACTION APPROACH

SOME BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

In action theory many assumptions are made. These assumptions are not true postulates, but inferences from the ego's position in the social system about his experience of his everyday life. The main focal concern is the actor and the actor occupies the center of a context which includes other actors and objects. We start here from the subjective reference, that those others and objects imply for the actor in orienting himself in the situation. Because of this reference to the individual actor, the theory has become suspicious of nominalism and a refuge from psychological reductionism. The action theory centers its attention on the individual actor and tries to integrate him in the social system by referring the situation, others and objects to the actor's own definition of the situation. In the Parsonian scheme the actor is dispossessed of everything which may allow us to consider him as an active factor in modeling the main feature of the social order. Even if Parsons uses many Freudian concepts in his explanatory endeavor, he has purified before the Freudian man from all his autonomous features, such as instincts and the like, which allow Freud to consider the social dynamics as a dialectical process, and
Parsons sees man as a system of action,

...is organized about the internalization of systems of social objects which originated as the role-units of the successive series of social systems in which the individual has become to be integrated in the course of his life history.²

As Murphy has stated it, in Parsons' theory, the actor sits there in the social system waiting for something to happen.³ In Parsons' approach the actor is the mere recipient of values and norms through a process, which is full of mechanistic connotations, that is, "internalization." It is not surprising that the action theory has slowly become integrated into a system theory and finally has looked for support from the exchange theory, mainly because of its shortcomings.

The action approach confronts the actor with a goal or a set of goals to choose from and a set of means to select from in order to fulfill a particular goal. The goal constitutes the main target in which the actor acts, and it implies other actors and objects. Actors and objects which become integrated in the ego-actor's definition of the situation and facilitates and hampers his action at the same time. Taken all the actors simultaneously in defining a social context and fixing habitulized patterns of behavior and differentiating the system in terms of actors' position, we may reach the level of the social system. Allaine Touraine makes a distinction following in this sense the lead of George Gurvitch between action and behavior. Behavior would mean the plain adaptation of an actor to a norm and value context. It will imply the conforming mechanism of internalizing the
main values of a particular community and the norms to follow. In this sense behavior would mean an equivalent of the Parsonian action concept and the actor's orientation of action will be held as the mere result of an internalization process of the group culture.

Touraine reserves the concept of action for a quite different meaning. He implies that besides the conformist type of dynamism that an actor may show in the social system, there is a more creative approach and this creative approach to other actors and toward objects in the situation defined in accordance by the ego-actor deserves the special qualification of action. We are pointing here to this, in some sense basic distinction, because we are going to refer to this conception, making clear that for us that creativity is always at the roots of the social process itself in general and at the basis of the actors' action in particular. At the general level, creativity becomes expressed in history; at the particular level, becomes expressed in the very process of actualization. We are going to explore this in the fifth chapter.

In a general sense, action theory presupposes a social system approach as the latter presupposes the former as complementary conceptions. If both explorations are not handled in a dialectical way but in a causal-effect way, then the explanation becomes circular or tautological:

The social situation is the product of action and action is governed by the situation, and by the culturally accepted modes of perceiving and reacting to these situations.4

If, on the other side, the action approach should be used in a descriptive way to show the actor's integration in the social system
and the dynamic role played by those "units," the action system has to be constructed in such a way as to serve that purpose in mind.

As we said before, the social situation is not only defined in the action approach in terms of the actor pursuing ends through appropriate means, but by the intervention of other actors and by the presence of objects in the situation. Other actors and objects build up the situation in which the actor's action takes place. The ends that the actor sets for himself as the means he chooses to reach ends depends on the actor's knowledge. This definition of the situation makes use of that knowledge, making in accordance the theory of action a rational-oriented approach. The orientation of action is, nevertheless, not always defined in rational terms, but a rationalization process (in M. Weber's terms) is almost always present.

The actor is supposed to be mainly a rational being because in order to act he has to define the situation. But the actor is only mainly rational because for Parsons the orientation of action could be also defined in cathetic or evolutive ways. These three orientations of action are considered as three different aspects or motivations of the action orientation. The actor (ego) in the situation has to choose between goals as well as between means in any situation and this choosing implies a weighing of alternatives and this process of weighing alternatives implies the arrangement of those alternatives into some hierarchial order. These alternatives in an interactional situation, that is, our actor (ego) facing other or other actors (alters), may be shared, that is, there may be a coincidence in the selection of alternative ways of acting. This share of patterns of
behavior may become recognized by the interacting members as habitual and after a while the actors may typify the whole situation in terms of those shared patterns and after a while further they may attach to those patterns a certain legitimacy which now not only relate the members into a certain system, but it obliges them to remain where they are in terms of performance and expectations. At this stage our initial loosely interactional system has become a structured system and our actors have become role players. The system now can be recognized and described by everyone besides the participants themselves as a social structure defined in terms of rights and duties. This description is, of course, a generative process, but only secondarily because it usually reproduces what is already accepted at other parts of a much broader defined system. Some elements may be recognized as ideosyncratic or the way values are held by the members may be considered so, but from the point of the pure action theory the main features are those which belong to the main values and norms through which the whole system may be recognized and described.

Since Freud's discoveries, actors and objects in the situation are embedded by positive or negative values of an emotional nature. They are, so to speak, feeling-generating items. Those emotional attachments are able to orient the actor (ego) in the situation. The actor (ego) is guided or motivated because of those emotional characteristics even under the complete absence of other elements in the situation such as values or knowledge. Because emotional meanings are related to the object and emotions and feelings are expressed by the
actors, actors and objects are interrelated. The main mechanisms at play here which are used to describe this relationship are "identification, incorporation, projection and displacement."5

The third type of orientation of action is known as the value-orientation of action. It becomes manifested when the actor confronts alternative goals to reach or different means to use in the prosecution of a particular end. Values implies a hierarchical arrangement of priorities, they do not imply specific types of action but they prescribe certain patterns which implicitly determine norms. Norms are not always related with values, but they are generally in the type of ought-to-be prescribed social and cultural defined behavior.

In a large measure, the action theory as formulated so far contributes a quite linear conception of the dynamic aspects of actions in the interactional system. The actor at the center of the sociological inquiry is oriented toward a goal for which attainment he chooses the appropriate means.

\[
\text{Actor } A \rightarrow \text{Mean } \sigma \rightarrow \text{Goal } \alpha
\]

Figure 9

This neat picture becomes sometimes blurred because means and goals appear as interchangeable or are in the final analysis undistinguishable. But what is most important to emphasize is the linear structure of the action, and the isolation of the actor (ego) in the situation. It seems that the other or others (alters) and objects do not receive the attention they deserve. A system can be geometrically represented by a
surface as two dimensional but in essence the action orientation model, as we find it, remains a one-dimensional model, and the use of the dyad in Parsons' analysis reinforces this assumption. Only a triad as a model would give the model a two-dimensional characteristic. What we need so far is a multidimensional model which represents the social context in all its complexity. We have tried for too long to explain the "complex" through the "simple," the multidimensional social world by the undimensional action orientation construction. Now it seems that just the opposite procedure would have been more appropriate. A model of social action should be constructed in such a way that the first term of the pair, that is, the social part receives as much stress in the representation as the second, that is, action. Any explanation which, by trying to explain the social, starts with some elementary unit, runs the risk of being unfruitful if the total social phenomenon is not already presupposed in the constructed model for that unit.6

Professor R. Hinkle in a paper on antecedents in the action orientation theory in American Sociology Prior to 1935,7 summarizes its main characteristics in its early development:

1. Self-awareness, in terms of the presence of others.

2. Awareness of subjectively defined goals.

3. The selection of means for the attainment of goals or ends.

4. The integration of the course of action in a context of facilitating as well as limiting factors.

5. The ability to evaluate the situation in which action takes place; its proper course and its consequences.
6. Patterns of action as related to the resolution of the problematic aspects of the situation.

7. The need for a subjective approach for the understanding of the action in terms of its meaning.

The subjective approach in action theory leads to many misunderstandings and makes the whole approach prone to nominalism. It links historically the action theory to idealistic philosophy. The shift in recent years and related with the phenomenological way of thinking has changed the emphasis in a more social perspective. Subjective orientation of the actor in the situation has been modified by the incorporation of the notion of intersubjectivity, which places the whole problem at the interactional collective level. In an intersubjective approach to social reality, subjectivity does not belong any more to the biologically defined individual entity. Subjectivity is no more necessarily inside the actor, it belongs to the context shared by a whole group of actors building a social system. I would say that intersubjectivity has become, in terms of the theory of action, the very foundation of the social system. We may say that because subjectivity has become intersubjectivity, the former is not any more inside the actor but also outside him and because at the same time intersubjectivity supports a socially constructed reality, it becomes meaningless to take the subjective state or experience of the actor as the reference to understand and to describe social action in terms of ego-alter relationships. Intersubjectivity means as much as interobjectivity and man becomes an object in an externalized world of objects as well as actors, the ego in the situation being no exception.
The mechanism involved here could be summarized in a quotation from Buckley which makes reference to Mead's theory of the self.

An organized "self" arises in the human individual and becomes the reflective seat of decision-making and control of behavior. This organized self is simply the organization, by the individual organism, of the set of attitudes toward its social environment—and toward itself from the standpoint of that environment.

Mead was already aware of the importance of the environment in shaping the individual self. He was also aware of the importance of the intersubjective context, that is, of the interactional process which constitutes via the individual reflection, the foundation of the self. The process is ongoing in the sense that the self is continuously linked with the interactional mechanism which shapes it in an ever-present actualization process. We could use to describe this continuous process of organizing the social environment through an interactional mechanism, which at the individual level means reflection, we could use the concept of "aufhebung" as it was employed by Hegel and the Hegelian current in Marxism, which has no English accurate translation, but which means incorporation through actualization. The use of interactional experience in shaping the self and remaining, nevertheless, immersed in the flux of the interactional process at the same time.

An action orientation approach has been used by many scholars, especially in relation with political socialization. See, for example, Easton, Easton and Hess, Almond, Almond and Verbe, Greenstein, Pye, Mitchell, Froman, Hyman, Dennis.
THE PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF THE ORIENTATION OF ACTION

It is usually emphasized in the literature that there is no pure orientation of action. That every orientation of action is an abstraction and that what we find in the social context is always a mixture or better spurious contamination of the other five remaining orientations of action in the consideration of one of them specifically.

I will try to schematize a distinctive systematic description of each of the main orientation of action and by doing so I will try to present each one in a social ideal context where the whole scheme becomes more relevant and meaningful.

I will start with the rational orientation of action. Rational belongs more to the Weberian approach, for Parsons' the term which is appropriate here, we must remember, is cognitive.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 10**

The rational orientation of action will be considered here as the main orientation and the other two which seem to be present always are going
to be considered as complementary orientation of action which work together in support of the main one. To illustrate this type of orientation of action we may think of a group of people confronting a problem of a rational or cognitive nature. Groups of this sort are usually known or described as problem-solving groups and are usually set up in a laboratory for the study of small groups. We have considered that the emotional feeling which supports the problem-solving process step-by-step could be called "confidence" and that the value-supportive orientation of action could be quite accurately called estimation, which means here the complementary process of estimation between alternatives which the people in such situations face defining clearly the problem to start with until the final solution is reached after a laborious search for the right way to solve it.

The second orientation of action which we will analyze in its simple form is the value orientation of action.

![Diagram of Value Orientation of Action](image)

This orientation of action can be illustrated using a value discussion group such as a group discussing political or aesthetic matters--an ideological discussion group. Here the alternatives supported by each
member in the group are dependent of the value construction which each member holds as legitimate; the best one to defend taken into account a whole array of supportive elements. Once a supreme value, may it be freedom or equality in a political discussion group, is choosen, then the other elements are arranged along the alternative hierarchy in support of the first one. The use that each member makes of the rational mechanism is not, in this case, guided by a path of a logical inductive-deductive nature because the facts which are brought into the picture are not handled as mere facts, but as pure data which are only justifiable as far as they help to keep the hierarchical order undisturbed. The emotional supportive orientation of action plays here a very important role. It gives the emotional style or tone to the presentation of the point and is there in order to reinforce the convincing attitude that the actor holds in front of the others.

The third orientation of action is the emotional, or in Parsons' conceptualization, the cathetic orientation of action.

![Diagram](image.png)

The rational complementary orientation of actions in support of an emotional orientation of action has to be seen as an opposed way of
backing an opposite mode of expression. The distance between rational orientation and emotional orientation is so great that the rational orientation in support of an emotional orientation usually implies a continuous rearrangement of the alternatives in terms of the effective proclivities of the actor. As an illustration of this type of orientation of action we could think of some spontaneous play group among children, making faces, for example, or some situations of overt emotional manifestations in group therapeutic situations.

In all of these three cases the two supportive and complementary orientations of action seem to be related, building a common front.

What we will emphasize here is that this way of treating the orientation of action problem is purely linear in the sense that the main orientation is predominant and there is, or seems to be, one scheme at each time. This way of handling the orientation of action is too individualistic and does not show the presence of the others or of the situation or context in which the action orientation takes place. We are going to see in the next chapter how it is possible to arrive at a more complex picture and without abandoning the action orientation approach to broaden the context into which any action happens to occur.

**STRUCTURE—STRUCTURE DIFFERENCE IN THE ACTION ORIENTATION SCHEME**

We would like to emphasize one aspect of the action orientation approach which in another context has been considered by George Gurvitch. Gurvitch implies that the overall social process at the interactional
levels implies a mechanism of structuralization at the same time that a process of un-structuralization. He is able to distinguish three elements here. One, that there are some aspects of the social system which tend to be structured; some other elements which tend to become structured. The first aspect of the social system do not need to be seen as more basic or more important than the other. Second, there are other elements more in a state of flux, or in a state of constant change. Those are the non-structured aspects of the social system, but they may become structured at any time. The third group is formed or constituted by what Gurvitch calls the A-structural aspects of the social system. These elements are never structured and because of their very nature they constitute the most fluid aspects of the social system.

We can apply this distinction to our schematic model of the theory of action.

![Figure 13](image)

In the first type of orientation of action, the rational one, the path to follow is a unique one and usually prescribed by the methodological rules
to follow.

The second is built up by a set of alternative equally valid, but only from a theoretical perspective. In reality and during the process of defining, in a hierarchical order of priorities (a, b, c, d, e, in Figure 13) but this arrangement depends on the definition of the situation, the hierarchical order may be changed as the circumstances demand for that change.

The third, or emotional, is diffused and usually contradictory. There is always a "more" or a "less" attached without logical or value "necessity," so to speak.

The main point which we will raise here is that there may be different structural "qualities" and that in terms of rational criteria, the line from structural to A-structural goes as indicated in Figure 13, but from the point of view of a different structural qualified criteria, the structural -- A-structural proclivity may run just in the opposite direction. Finally, that it would be even possible to imagine the value, arrangement between alternatives, as the starting point and to build up a structural non-structural, A-structural path starting with the value situation of action.

But let us examine first the possibility of constructing a more integrated model of social action, and after having done so, to discuss the matter from a completely renewed perspective.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III


4Percy S. Cohen, op. cit., p. 92.

5Ibid., p. 93.


CHAPTER IV

THE EXPANSION OF THE ACTION ORIENTATION MODEL

In order to expand the action orientation model, we have to consider first the sociological structural characteristics of its basic features. In a paper on motives using a social ascription perspective, Blum and McHugh\(^1\) perform an analysis of motives as "a way of conceiving social action." Motives for these authors are not psychological in nature, not internal features of the individual, but structural aspects or references of the social situation.\(^2\)

Motives are ascribed features of the interactional web in which the actor finds his place and his definition as such. Motives are ways in which social action is organized. For Blum and McHugh,

Motive...is one collective procedure for accomplishing social interaction, and for sorting out the various possibilities for social treatment by linking specific acts and social rules in such a way as to generate the constellation of social actions that observers call "persons," "members," and "membership."\(^3\)

We are emphasizing in this paper the sociological perspective, and for that purpose the categories employed in our analysis must be defined--strictly maintaining that perspective in mind.

In sociological analysis the actors should be treated as objective entities, ego as well as alter, and their relationship in the dyad has to be defined in those terms. The action orientation
is, from this perspective, a motive-structured ascribed system and should be analyzed not only from a static descriptive point of view, but also in its dialectical, or dynamic aspects as well.

We have to keep in mind that the dyad with which we started our considerations about the interactional system is only apprehended from a third party position. The ascription of motive or orientation to the actors involved in the socialization process constitutes a way of looking at the interactional process from without as well as from within through the reflective mechanism. In this sense, the orientation of action, in the same way that the motivational aspects as understood by Blum and McHugh, can be seen as an "observer's character of behavior." We have seen in our previous discussion that the actor objectifies the interactional system through a reflective mechanism which is recurrent with his direct experiencing of the relationship with the other. He gets an objective perspective through reflection of the interactional process into which he is otherwise presently immersed. He objectifies in a present act of apprehension only the interactional system built up by others in front of him. The main issue here is the possibility of describing the interactional social setting in terms of ascribed characteristics which are useful in ordering a phenomenon which resists systematic analysis. We think that through the expanded model of orientation of action different types of ordered behavior can be illuminated, and that the concept of the order or the normative acquires through this analysis connotations which are able to enrich our analysis.
Actors are always social, socialized and socializing entities which, because of this, are able to enact or to actualize a "culture" and to contribute to its modification or change through their actions. In this sense, enactment or actualization means the act of expressing a "culture." That "culture" enacted or actualized by the actor in the course of his interaction with others can be analyzed in terms of a grammar or text. To analyze a particular social event in these terms is nothing more than to attach to each term in the text a related weight or meaning, and to comprehend the text as a whole.

If we say, for example, that "A" performs an action "X" because of some "Y," we can, in order to avoid a causal effect relational link of events, take "AXY" as a unitary complex phenomenon. By including "Y" in "X" we have that "Y" is only a way of completing the meaning of "X" or of "AX" in terms of social or cultural demand for such a completion. The previous causal explanation can be read also as "A" performs "Y" in "X" or actualizes himself in terms "YX," or in some other way--by doing "X". "A" actualizes himself in terms of "Y". The text we confront can be read in different ways. What we have to decide is not which one is the right way to express the fact, but which one is the best way in terms of some overall conception and purpose. In general, social psychology treats motives or orientation of action from the actor's inner perspective and not from the objectified context into which the actor gets his full sociological meaning. The actor's action becomes the main feature to be described, and the constitution of this feature is the issue at hand which has to be analyzed. The
classification or typification of all the circumstances which may be recognized in such an action are those used to make the action meaningful. The meaning implied may be the actor's implied meaning, or the researcher's implied meaning, or both. It is here where we can apply what Gurvitch has recognized as different modes of dialectical relationships which are at the core of the very method for sociological analysis.

What we have tried to do is to describe all the dimensions which project the action orientation into the social context beyond the individual actor's position. In the same way that the statement actor "A" performs action "X" because of motive "Y," can be restated in the following way action "X" is a situational event which implies in its description an array of elements or factors among which we can find or locate "Y." The factor "Y" belongs now to the very description of the event which characterizes the actor "A" at a particular time. We are going to insist in a situational structural analysis in which the action acquires its full sociological meaning. The situational context is, in essence, an appreciation context in all its complexity, to use a concept coined by Geogrey Vickers in a revealing chapter entitled "Science is Human." And precisely to this appreciation context we are going to point out through the expansion of our action orientation model.

The action model, as presented, is dynamic. Only in static systems do we find a reason for change, a cause, so to speak, but in an intrinsically dynamic system there is not such a need for a reason
because each stage is an "end" stage which subsumes the previous
states, offering an explanation for them, and not getting its
reason of being from them. As Vickers stated it, only in a static
system,

    Where bodies remained at rest until something
    moved them and in which, therefore, the explanation
    for the direction, no less than the speed, of the
    movement was to be sought, at least in part, in the
    "mover."  

We are considering here a phenomenon which is changing
constantly, which is dynamic in its very nature—namely, the inter-
actional process which builds up the social system itself. Socializa-
tion is the basic expression of the dynamic nature of the social
phenomenon.

In the expansion of the action orientation model that we intend
to develop, every dimension seems to belong to the open space of the
social world and is able to be defined along its dimensions. Each
dimension supports the actor's role. The "content" at which the
actors in the situation use to express these dimensions is changing
all the time because at the core of the interactional process there
is, as we have already emphasized, a creative process; a creative
process which is built around two fundamental processes; a process
of reflective interpretation, and a process of continuous objectifi-
cation and experiencing. In the same way that if we ask an actor
for a reason or a motive for having committed a particular act, he
may search for a while and finally he will come up with some reason
or motive which will complete his description, which is part of our
interest and our way, shared with him, of understanding human events.
In the same way we are going to give an account of some structural dimensions through which human actions and their orientation can be best understood.

The reasons an actor uses for his action are usually reasons which support it in its actuality in the same way that we usually attach to every act a reason which serves to illuminate it in its overall dimensions. Motives can be added and they vary in accordance with the cultural setting in which they happen to be invoked in order to satisfy people's needs to complete a "picture." This picture can be structured in terms of any of the three time dimensions. Alfred Schutz distinguished two types of motives--one with reference to the past which he called the "because" motives, and the other rooted in the future which he called the "in-order-to" motives. In the first case, the act gets its explanation from the past, and in the second, from some future event. 12

What we intend to do by expanding our action orientation model is avoid the undirectional bias of the classical model. The expanded model becomes a multi-dimensional or structural model. In this case, we will see that it is not only a multi-dimensional model, but a multi-directional model. Also, it is possible to apply it to various levels of concreteness of the social phenomenon--it becomes finally a multi-level model. In each case, we could speak of the inner constitutive horizon of social action and through the references to the more expanded dimensions, we can also refer to the outer constitutive horizon of the level considered. Both horizons are, in conjunction,
constitutive of the actor's action and of the overall social dynamics in a reciprocity of perspective process.  

The Rational Action Orientation

In our previous considerations we saw that the actor is rationally oriented when the situation he defines is of a certain "nature." A problem solving situation or a task situation can be used to consider the rational action orientation. In the study of group dynamics, these type of situations have been explored rigorously under controlled conditions in appropriately equipped laboratories. The different concepts used by Max Weber and by Talcott Parsons to point to this orientation--rational by the former, cognitive by the latter--gave us some clue for the need to make reference to two different dimensions. The action from the actor's perspective or the action emphasizing the actor's position can be described best, in our opinion, through the use of the concept rational--the immediate situational context into which this actor's orientation gets its full meaning may be called cognitive.

But, having reached this point, we felt that the picture was lacking the overall framework which allows the action described so far to become socially integrated. We felt that at this point, having an actor rationally oriented pointing to a situation cognitively defined, needed the material with which the actor was working and which belonged to society at large. This new dimension was designated as knowledge.
The relationship between these three complementary orientational dimensions of action were considered as dialectical in nature. For these purposes a new diagram was thought more appropriate:

There is here a dynamic dialectical complementarity between rational, which emphasizes the actor's position; cognitive, which describes the situational immediate context into which the actor is placed, and in which the action takes place; and knowledge, which is the general background and overall content of the action so defined. There is a phenomenon of partial inter-penetration of the three sub-divisions of the action, as well as a complementary dialectical inter-relationship. We could start by analyzing the "rational" orientation of action from the general framework of knowledge, analyzing its relationship with a particular problem-solving situation, and after that, analyzing the way each actor operates in such a situation. Or we may analyze the use each actor makes of the overall stock of knowledge.
available at the interactional level in defining operationally the situation.

We could start our analysis with the dimension of knowledge in general, of which the stock of knowledge of the actor's shared by the actor's in defining the situation is only a reduced sphere of knowledge, but is related nevertheless, to it. In this case, we would reach the final actor's sphere of the actor's defined orientation as rationale, which justifies him in such situations. The actor is active rationally and his actions have consequences in the dynamics of the situation, as well as for knowledge in general. The whole schematic picture shows that the rational orientation of action as previously defined and emphasizing the actor's position in the system does not occur in a vacuum, but in a situational context of relationships, which can simultaneously be defined at three different complementary directions. This way of treating the actor's orientation of action places him in the wide world of the "social" which can be seen as its external horizon of constitution.

None of the three dimensions in the "rational" orientation of action is clearcut; the three are open to each other's influence and they inter-penetrate each other. We are going to describe in detail these dynamic inter-relational characteristics in the next chapter. Also, in the next chapter we are going to expand even further our model in order to cover analytically other features and levels of the social reality.
The Value Action Orientation

The value orientation of action points to an emphasis on the link in the dyadic interactional system and represents the structured value system of society as a whole. Value orientation could be defined here in the actor's choice of the right pattern, among the other possible patterns of action, in order to establish a norm for the interactional system. Volumes have been defined by Smelser as the "most general component of social action." They make reference to "whole classes of behavior" and "they provide the broadest guides to purposive social behavior."  

Several alternative ways of action are open, framed by general values at the first stage of any interaction system. A process of selection of alternatives and of consolidation of an established and accepted pattern, a norm, becomes constructed step-by-step into the system. Luckman and Berger have described this process as a process of selection between alternatives and finally the establishment of the one which best expresses the intentional purpose of the actors involved.  

We may describe the consolidation of the normative system in an interactional relationship in the following way: the first period could be called the habitualization period—a stage at which the actors recognize each other's way of acting or behaving. Each way of behavior expresses a value or a value system through a mechanism of generalizing and transcending the particular. This is a stage of pure recognition and acquaintance. At a second stage in the norm consolidation process, each actor is able to classify or to typify
those repeated ways of acting of the other actors involved in the situation and to present a congruent response to those typified modes of acting. We may call this step the typification stage. The third and final stage in the norm consolidation process can be called the legitimation stage. This phase is reached when the norm accepted can be invoked as rights and obligations for each member involved in the interactional process.

The best alternative or alternatives as patterns of behavior have been transformed from very loose, but accepted guides of behavior to guides which have now a coercive and obligatory character for everybody involved. The completion of the consolidation normative process has become also a structuralization process through which the interactional system has become a system which can be recognized and described through it. The structural feature which any group may acquire is usually defined as possible already in the culture or cultural setting in which the process of consolidation takes place. In this sense, our expanded model of the value orientation of action presents the following feature:

Figure 16

\[ V - N - S \]

In this figure, "V" stands for value, "N" stands for norm, and "S" stands for structure.
In the same way that we described the relationship between the three constitutive dimensions in the rational orientation model, we have here that values, norms and structure (the norm-value-structure of the whole social system) are dialectically inter-related—in terms of a complementary dialectical relationship.

Figure 17

\[ N \leftrightarrow S \]

Values place the emphasis on the link from the shared perspective of the actors involved in the interactional system; norms place the emphasis on the patterns of behavior accepted by the actors as part of the defined situational configuration of the relationships; and structure to the norm-value framework which belongs to a more extended social context of relationship. Values can be considered as the more general elements guiding social behavior and norms and the concretization of values shrinking the whole array of alternatives to the "one" which becomes legitimized. At the situational level or at the informal level, norms are more loosely defined and can be redefined in terms of values which are competing in terms of guide outlines for social behavior. At the structural social level, values and norms are more expressively stated and serve as references for all the groups and institutions involved. We may distinguish, as before, an actor's
emphasized level, a situational defined level, and an overall refer-
ential level. We have a dialectical relationship between each of
these levels that works for continuous change in the micro, as well as
in the macro, defined system. The process is one of structuralization
as well as destructuralization.

If we use the example of Puerto Rican's attitude toward smoking
in relation with women we may say that the pattern of prohibition was
related with a value of discrimination between the sexes, with a habit
which was supposed to work against this discrimination. The value
supported by the majority of the people interviewed backed a type of
behavior which received overall approval as the right type of behavior;
that is, rejection of the women who smoked. Those values which
support discrimination between the sexes are held in high regard by the
Puerto Rican community and may be related with other structural
normative characteristics of that society.

We may add that even if we can consider the dialectical relation-
ship between values--norms and structure as complementary--it can
become conflictual in character. But a full consideration of the
dialectical relationship between the different dimensions of the
expanded action orientation model will be worked out in the next
chapter. A polarization between contradictory values and norms can
be considered as a characteristic of times of rapid change or revolu-
tion. But the main feature of the dialectics is that each dimension
is backed and modified by the other dimensions, and modifies and
defines the other two in a constant process. Neither the individual
actors, not the circumstantially defined situational set of relation-
ships, not even the whole social normative-value system is fixed or has pre-eminence in this relationship which defines the actions orientation.

The relationship between the three categorial dimensions which define the value orientation could be considered more flexible than the relationship between the three categorial dimensions which defined the rational orientation, because the latter one is rooted in the objective natural world. But this may be only an illusion or a naturalistic bias. In the case of the value reference system, we may think ourselves in the region of pure possibilities.

The Emotional Action Orientation

Emotion has been a matter of concern in several studies in group dynamics.\textsuperscript{20} Emotional orientation of action has been understood in a very narrow sense at one time, and a very broad sense at another time.\textsuperscript{21}

The illustration of an emotionally defined situation was already offered in Chapter . We are implying that emotions can be "objectified" and considered and analyzed accordingly. We live in a world that not only can be seen but that can be emotionally felt as well. Each object in our surroundings has emotional values attached to it. We can orient ourselves in that world because the way the world of object, as well as symbols, is structured is a replication of the way we are emotionally structured in terms of the world around us.

In the words of Talcott Parsons, the world can be "cathected." We have placed in our dyad as unit of analysis, emotions on the ego in
the situation. That is, that to analyze the emotional aspect of the interactional process, we have to think always in terms of the actor as ego in the interactional context. Not only the objects are "organized" in our surrounding, but symbols and other actors as well. Through their emotional connotations, objects, symbols and actors are related to each other. Through these halos of emotional nature the ego-actor becomes integrated into the system. The nature of this relationship of all the parts which constitute a system is completely different than the one described as rational-objective, or value-normative. It is, nevertheless, as valid in order to define a system as the other two. We may make the distinction, but they are at the very base of the social phenomenon itself. It is possible to think that when emotionally constitutive elements of the social system get some independence from the other two or when they acquire a dominant character in reference to the other two, the world around becomes animated magically, as projection that derives from the accentuation of the actors-ego feeling, unchecked by the other two dimensions of action orientation. Here we speak of dominance of the emotional orientation within the total social phenomenon. 22

In a relative sense, we will see that this orientation may become institutionalized and co-participate with other institutional contexts which emphasize each of the other two orientations. This happens to be the case with art as a social institutionalized manifestation. Kavolis, for example, implies that,

The most obvious... explanation of the societal universality of art is the assumption that affective orientation to the situation of action is one of the
basic requisites of the successful functioning of
the human society, and that art is a strategic
mean of fulfilling this need.23

Traditionally, the emotional orientation of action was related
or made reference to the actor himself, with his inner feelings but in
our analysis it is related with an emphasis on the ego in the inter-
actional model. We never leave to consider the whole system.

In the same mode that we analyzed the previous two action
orientation models, we are going to analyze this one. The first addi-
tional dimension in our consideration of the emotional orientation of
action is affection, which relates the actor-ego in the situation with
other actors. Affection must be understood here in its positive, as
well as its negative, characteristics. The third dimension relates
to closed systems of relationship with farther removed systems in the
open space of society as a total phenomenon. For this dimension the
best word which we found is relation, understood here as relational
aspects of the social system of an emotional-affective nature.

Figure 18

E - A - R

In the same way as previously, with the other two orientations
of action, we are considering the relationship between the three
constitutive dimensions of the emotional orientation model as
dialectically related.
We have tried to present in this chapter the orientation of action model as fully integrated in the social system at different levels of integration. We have tried to show, at the same time, how each system has to be understood in order to be used as a support to the action orientation model.

We are going to expand even further our actional orientation model in order to use it at the institutional level, analyzing the dialectical relationship as played by the institutional orders.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV


On pages 147-48 we can read: "Even the word motivation has an archaic ring, reminiscent of the days when mind seeking an explanation for a happening were wont to seek for a 'mover' and ultimately for a 'prime mover.' 'Drive,' with which some writers seem to identify motivation, has even stronger energetic connotations."

3Alan F. Blum and Peter McHugh, op. cit., p. 98.


5Culture is here between quotation marks because a special emphasis is implied to modes of acting which are part of the overall array of accepted patterns of behavior.

6To develop a full conception of motives from a sociological perspective from a dynamic point of view would be a parallel starting purpose of this paper.

7See Chapter VI for a list of the different dialectical alternatives. Gurvitch said that this typology has only in his book an illustrative and provisional character and that further elaboration could enrich or modify his typology.

8This is what we imply by the scientist as a social actor.

9What we try here is to make a distinction between internal dynamism and external pressure to change. It is recognized that equilibrium model is needed for external pressure to change, instead internal dialectical related systems do not need such pressures. The term end has to be understood here as the stage on which an analysis is performed.


13. We should not be misunderstood here. The actor's action implies always a social setting, an interactional system where ego "faces" and other actor, alter, real or tacit. The whole construct is built up step by step and at each constructed step the previous step and the next serve as constitutive horizons of reciprocal references.


15. Alfred Schutz, op. cit.


18. Ibid., p. 24


This was the position of Max Weber.


On page five we read, "The empirical evidence surveyed in this book suggests the comprehensive hypothesis that
the main sociological function of artistic style is the shaping or emotional re-enforcement of general tendencies to perceive situations of action in certain structural ways. I have proposed elsewhere that artistic content has the function of helping man to develop an emotional involvement with the objects of his social and cultural environment and that the creation of art by providing new symbolic foci of socio-cultural integration, contributes to the reintegration of society after disturbance of a relative equilibrium. In these ways art is, actually or potentially, functional for the society as a whole." And, further, on page six, "But, from the point of view of sociological research, style is a projection of subjective (affective rather than cognitive) perceptions of, and responses to situations of action."
CHAPTER V

THE DIALECTICS OF SOCIAL LIFE

A TWO-DIMENSIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF AN

ACTION ORIENTATION MODEL

We have emphasized already the dynamic interrelationship between the different components of the expanded model of social action. Now we are going to expand even further our construction, combining the different orientation of action. In this case, we are going to change somewhat the conceptualization used so far.

The first effort to develop such a model was intended in a joint paper published some time ago. The main purpose in that paper was to relate a social action orientation model with Piaget's and Wollon's combined development theory. At that occasion the model was developed to analyze the stages through which the child travel from its birth to the end of adolescence. Eschematically, the model appeared as shown in Figure 20 on the following page.

It was supposed that the child covered broadly the three areas of action orientation. A close relationship between the areas and the stages of development of a combined Piaget-Wollon was described. The authors spoke of areas of sedimentation which in the growing process went from emotion-affection sedimentation, to rational sedimentation (school years), to finally, the value sedimentation
stage (adolescent years). The stages were described in the action orientation model as areas of sedimentation-actualization. Considering the process as similar, from the conceptual point of view, to assimilation-adaptation process as described by Piaget. As there is some "overlapping" between the areas in the developmental process, the authors spoke of stages of emphasis. But reconsideration of that model and its application to a developmental conception of the socialization process and of its value for sociology convinced me that a more realistic approach was necessary. Piaget himself remarked in different parts of his extensive opus that the description concepts used at each stage had different meanings in terms of the phenomenon they were denoting.

The emotional-affective area was placed in the center of the figure in order to illustrate the first area of consolidation in the socialization process, and the whole process was seen as a personality
growing process which covered successively the three areas. It was clear that if the same model was going to be used from a "better" social perspective, a different arrangement should follow. As the link in the interactional dyad was related with values and considering the value dimension, the most social dimension of the dyadic model, then a combined two-dimensional action orientation model should place value at the center of consideration. Nevertheless, as we are considering here an heuristic model for the analysis and understanding of social phenomena, then different arrangements could be considered only depending on the central core of support of the phenomenon considered. In the case of the analysis of social institutional order, the central core should be the value area.

In speaking of areas we have substituted the word orientation by a less utilized concept, namely, actualization. Orientation was too unidirectional and implied two things which we have tried to avoid—one is the actor motivated construction and the second that the striving toward a goal that was external to him. The conception of a learning process through internalization seemed too mechanistically oriented. In our model the actor is part of the dynamic aspects of a field which is defined multi-directionally. The actor does not lose his antonomy because the whole field is defined in terms of an interactional set of related actors. If the process of growth of the actors involved in any social process can be referred to as "assimilation" and "accommodation" or "sedimentation" and "actualization," what really matters here is that the "growing" process of the actors implies the simultaneous growing and changing process of the system itself.
There is a multiple relational dialectical process going on at different levels of complexity. We have already pointed to one of those processes, that is, the action actor's orientation dimension between the three sub-dimensional aspects of the orientation of action complex. That analysis was supposed to show how the individual actor aspect of the social interactional system was closely and intimately interrelated. Each orientation of action had one actor's side or moment, a situational side and a social side. No single perspective could be considered separated from the others. The three perspectives are also considered as dynamically interrelated; no single perspective could change without modifying somewhat the other two. And, third, no equilibrium could exist between the three orientation perspectives or moments because of the very nature of each one and of its relationships. We will try to offer an explanation of dialectics as it should be understood here in its different modalities in the next chapter.

Suppose that we intend to represent one of those more complex levels of the social institutional order. We can start to distinguish those different social institutional constructed levels using a specific criteria. The most commonly used that comes to our mind is to classify the levels in terms of more abstract in terms of the content, to less abstract or more concrete. There is always some arbitrary starting point which we shall use in order to construct this hierarchical arrangement of levels. We have, nevertheless, to point here that the arrangement in terms of more to less abstractness of the different institutional orders is not very important. What is important is the possibility to point to their interrelationships in a tri-dimensional analysis of the "orientation" of action model.
In this sense and in order to specify institutional defined areas in our two-dimensional model, let us start with a representation of that model.

Figure 21

In this model we have at the center of consideration the area of values, norm, and structure as the "most" social area to which, in some sense, the other two appear as subordinated or in which the other two will root their actualization. Now suppose that we have defined our level of analysis as the artistic level of analysis as considered by a sociology of art. We speak, usually, of three main sectors--institutional sector--as recognized each time we speak of art in society. That is, the artists themselves as producers of works of art. The critics which analyze, classify, and evaluate the work of art, and finally, the public which "enjoys" the work of art. That there is an
Dynamic interrelationship between these three institutionalized sectors in society is without doubt. The characteristics of this interrelationship may vary at different times and places in any considered social system. It is also true that it can be found more than those three institutionalized groups related with art in any given society, but nobody will deny that those three are important and are "working" in relation with art at the same level of abstraction. The three are interrelated in such a way that each one of the numbers in value and the numbers of the other two in mind or better, that each one has as a reference for its own constitution the other two. In some other terms, the other two are external horizons in the constitutive inner-horizon of the first one.

In this sense, we may imply that at this particular level of social abstraction there is one group which emphasizes starting from a set of accepted values (artistic values), the emotional-affective relational orientation; another group which emphasizes starting with the same set of accepted values (artistic values), the rational cognitive-knowledge orientation of action; and a third group which emphasizes the value set per se and manifests itself at the subordinated emotional-affective-relational and rational, cognitive-knowledge level as supportive and not as mainly oriented level.

In sum, the first group is the artists, the second the critics and the third the public. In order to perform a mapping of the three groups in terms of our two-dimensional action orientation model, we offer the following schematic representation.
As we can see in this figure, the artists are rooted in their creative endeavor in the values which are central to the whole system of interrelationships, but their main action orientation as far as it is related with the work of art is emotional-affective-relational only secondarily, and as subordinated to the value normative structural orientation it is related to the rational-cognitive knowledge orientation. The "boomerang shape" of the artistic area of actualization presupposes a common ground with the critics and the public at the same level of abstraction. The critics are mainly rational-cognitive-knowledge oriented and their "boomerang shape" area of actualization shows the same value-normative-structural relatedness
with a reference to the supportive position of the emotional-affective-relational orientation as related to the value area. 6

The public, finally, is rooted in its relationship with the work of art at the value-norm-structural level and does not exercise in a main orientation sense the rational or the emotional orientation, but only a rational and emotional subordinated orientation to the other two and combined with the value-norm-structural area. The shape of the area of actualization which belongs to the public is an oval figure. The public in this way actualizes an area in which the value core of society is prominent. Values here, at this level of social abstraction, are artistic values. This is the public that the artist has in mind and for which the critics are also active. The value actualization of the public implies a fundamentally pure actualization in the sense that there is no rational "consideration" of those values, nor a defense of them. At the same time, neither is there a remodeling of "reality" through an emotional emphasis. To be sure, in our model there are rational and emotional elements involved in the value actualization represented by the public, but these elements are supportive of the rational and emotional orientation of action which are emphasized by the critics, the former, and by the artists, the latter. It means on the one side "confidence" and on the other side "rationalization." This level of social abstraction shows as we have seen the dynamic interrelationship of three institutional distinguished groups which are dialectically interrelated, which belong to the same set of phenomena, and which cannot be considered, but in a close relationship.
One of each supports and receives support from the other two. What is at stake here is value expressions as artistic values as "art poiesis."

In present philosophy we do not use the term "poiesis" any more, but as practice or as praxis to refer to the act that through action modifies the world around us and by modifying it the actors modify themselves. But in relation to this, something will be added in the next chapter. What we are implying here is that the dynamic interrelationship between the three institutionalized groups can be considered a socialization process from a broader or social two-dimensional perspective. We are going to consider next another level of abstraction. In accordance with some criteria indicated above, we may consider this second level of institutional relationship as less abstract than the artistic one, but as this consideration is only marginal to our main purpose, we are not going to either give foundation to this suggestion or to expand it further.

The following level will be the religious level which has in the same way at its core the value actualization area. Religious values and artistic values are in some way related, but they may also be seen as two more or less autonomous value levels. The religious level of abstraction is in the same way as the artistic value level differentiated in terms of institutionalized groups. (See Figure 23)

Here we have the value core that is referred to as religious ethic and the different sectors in the action orientation model support it from their own perspective. The priests are emphasizing the emotional orientation in their service toward the general believer, giving support, offering comfort, etc. Their rational orientation is
a subordinated one and as we shall remember, it was qualified previously in a quite general way as argumentation. The theologies are also rooted in their action in the religious value system, but their role in the institutional order is different from the priests. They must offer directives of a rational nature, they interpret rationally the value system, they may even modify it substantially, responding not only to the pressures of the other two sectors, but also to other levels of abstraction of the social phenomenon. Each sector is not only dynamically related with the other two sectors at the same level of abstractness, but with other sectors as well. The general believers' institutional area is again as in the artistic level, rooted in their action to the religious value system and related to the other two dimensions in the action orientation system as supportive orienta-
tions. Through their attachment to the religious value system, the general believer sector supports the other two institutional orders.

We may say that each of the two abstraction levels just discussed has its own "emphasis of importance." In the artistic one the emphasis is on the emotional side (the artists), in the second it is more on the rational side, that is, the theologians. We may analyze now a third level of abstraction where the emphasis falls on the value orientation area. But we have to insist that this problem of emphasis of particular or specific area of differentiation is in some sense an historical phenomenon of temporal resolution phenomenon related with the problematic characteristic of the differentiation level. The same would be true if we thought of the interrelationship between the different levels of abstraction; the problem of emphasis or domination would be always related with time and with particular societies. We are here in our consideration of the socialization process interested in the dynamic relationship between the resolution of inherent problematic character at each level of abstraction than in any other related issue like the issue of dominance. There is always controversy and lack of adjustment, or in another way we may say that there is always a conflictual complementary adjustment which always defines the situation in terms of its being problematic. (See Figure 24)

Figure 24 shows the institutional differentiation around ideological political values. As in the previous two descriptive models, we may distinguish that differentiated sector or group which emphasizes the emotional orientation of action in a value-rooted area.
This sector is built up by all those who have a practical-emotional involvement in politics, who are related with the wide body of the citizens looking for their support. Those who emphasize the rational orientation in the same ideological context are the interpreters of the system who may rearrange things in order to dictate new ways of making policies or enforcing old ways.

The "general voter sector" supports the ideological value structure, and is only related with the dominant emotional orientation through a process of rationalization with the rational one through a process of confidence.
A THREE-DIMENSIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF AN
ACTION ORIENTATION MODEL

What we may now construct is a three-dimensional action orientation model in which the different levels of abstraction may become related along an axis. In that case, the dynamic interrelational system that we have constructed is a spacial model for a more sophisticated analysis of the social phenomenon in its dynamic aspects.

Kavolís in his book on the sociology of art has shown how the artistic creation is influenced by other social sectors. He has used a causalistic model and has failed to see the reciprocity in the dynamic interrelationship of the artistic social endeavor and the other parts or aspects of society. If we take the most abstract level of institutional differentiation as presented in our model and relate it to our other two levels as described, we may get the following:

Figure 25
We have selected here only three levels, but undoubtedly, there can be constructed many more. We have selected these three because we have implied already that it would be possible to differentiate an emphasis in each one of them. This emphasis is arbitrary in our comparative and relational arrangement. At the same time, we may say that it can be thought as related with a particular social order. In this sense, different social orders ideally described would correspond to different emphasized dimensions.

In our description, Level I was related with an emotional orientation emphasized area of actualization; Level II with a rational orientation emphasized area of actualization; and Level III with a value orientation emphasized area of actualization. In this case, we could imply that the value area on which each level finds its justification will also become qualitatively differentiated from the other two in terms of that specific emphasis.
^Expanded at the level of the main orientation arrow which showed the integration of the social actor in the social system.


^The center of the model was conceived as the first area of sedimentation in the growing process of the personality system. This emphasis is found in Wollon's position which covered the first five to six years of the life of the child. The second area was the rational area of sedimentation, which covered the period from six to twelve years in the life of the child and, finally, the value sedimentation area, which covered the period of development known as adolescence, the period from twelve to nineteen or twenty years.

4The concept of actualization which we got by reading Maurice Merleau-Ponty implies just the dialectical relationship between actors in the social system as integrative and constitutive parts of the social system. The social system expresses itself through the interactional process itself and the social units may express that well because they constitute it. The actors are not more actors in the sense of units which can result in the social system through addition. The actor actualizes from a particular position in the social space from a specific perspective, the whole from which it derives or a part.

5It is our contention that the work of art is supported in its "birth" in its meaning as an art work by the institutionalized differentiation interactional process between the artists, the critics and the public.

6The three institutional differentiated groups "responsible" for the work of art derive their communality from the value area which they share as area of actualization. This does not mean, of course, a simple conformistic attachment. Value means from the dialectical perspective, something dynamic.
It is because of the work of Marcel Mauss that the concept of "total social phenomenon" has become incorporated into the sociological literature via anthropology. The conception of "total social phenomenon" comes from Emile Durkheim's inspirational thrust, and was reworked and reconsidered by George Gurvitch and Levi Strauss. Some years ago Klausner edited a collection of essays which showed some acceptance of the conception of "total social phenomenon" by American sociologists and, curiously enough, the name of Marcel Mauss got only one entry in the whole book, namely, in an essay written by Tyriakian.

It was in Marcel Mauss' book, *Essai sur le don,* which appeared in an English translation under the title, *The Gift,* where Mauss presents his conception of "the total social phenomenon" in its most elaborated form. This is true to such an extent that it is possible to state that the whole sociological conception of Mauss receives full expression in this important book of his.

For Marcel Mauss to understand the social phenomenon was, as Evans-Pritchard wrote,

...to see social phenomenon—as indeed, Durkheim taught that they should be seen—in their totality.
Total is the key word of the essay. The exchanges in archaic societies which he examines are total social movements or activities. They are at the same time economic, juridical, moral, aesthetic, religious, mythological and socio-morphological phenomena.

For Marcel Mauss, totalities give meaning to their constitutive parts, and the parts must be analyzed considering in their meaning as integrated into totalities, immersed into totalities which they contribute to create. Each part had to be studied in terms of broader and more complex contexts of interrelated phenomena. Each part means the embodiment or the actualization of broader and broader contexts of meaning, expanded horizons of meaning. At the core of this process of interrelationships, Mauss found that interaction, analyzed as exchange of goods, as giving and receiving gifts, could be held as the main articulation and integration factors in the social system. Mauss not only studied institutions like the potlatch and the kula as archaic forms of exchange which could be found among North American Indians and Melanesian tribes, but as universal features which, with different connotations, could be considered as mainsprings for our present day social order as well. This does not mean that institutions like the potlatch and the kula are still with us. To be sure, the phenomenon, as such, has been modified through different content, its cultural meaning. In its intrinsic structure, it has nevertheless, continuously served as the foundation of the social order. From a "traditional" based system of relationships related with an subsequently coherent economic order, we have moved in an historical trend to a system in which a more rational oriented
integrated social system has taken the lead. The exchange of gifts among the primitives and among ourselves with its underlying features of obligations and rules of reciprocity, lead us to search for some more basic reason which lies at the center of different institutional orders in society.

G. Davy, in this same Durkheimian tradition, used the case of exchange of gifts among the primitives in order to build up a coherent theory about the contract. The main point here is that there is not the individual (the reasons for giving or receiving gifts at the individual level have a completely different meaning) who gives or receives gifts; it is the group, and it is precisely through the group that the whole community justifies such transactions. The interchange of gifts serves, in Mauss' conceptions, as the cornerstone for the whole process of social interaction in a social system. Everything which becomes an exchange goal in the interactional social process belongs to the gift category, and can be referred, in its basic features, to the relational context itself. We may consider the exchange process as an actualization process at the interactional level. As a process of actualization, the accepted patterns of behavior dominates in a particular culture. We usually refer to the process through which the individual acquires those patterns as an internalization process, a learning process, quite mechanistically conceptualized.

Internalization mainly receives this emphasis in American sociological literature. It cannot, from our perspective, be seen as a "cause" for the integration of the individual in the social
system, but only a mere description of his integration. We are tempted to say that the individual "internalizes," not for becoming integrated into the social system, but because of some vacuum factor due to empty or vacant spaces in the social structure. In this case, we may imply that our actor was absorbed into that position. To say that the individual actor internalizes the rules of the game would be equivalent, and for us, equally meaningless, as to say that society internalizes the individual actor into the rules of the game. In our conception, what we find is an individual actor who is always, already, playing in accordance to the rules of the game. The socialization process is very complex because it reproduces the dynamics of the social structure itself; it is integrated into the whole, and it receives and it gives meaning to that whole.

In the explanation about the gift, given by Marcel Mauss, the goods, which are offered and accepted in an exchange process, called *tonge*, are much more than "objects." They are spiritual parts from the giver; they exert, because of this, some power on the receiver. They relate people at that particular level of the action orientation system which we have explicited as emotional-affective-relational orientation.10 The receiver is obliged to offer something in return in order to avoid breaking the chain in the process of reciprocities involved. Solidarity and structural integration is built into the social system itself, but it becomes actualized each time only through the concrete actor in concrete forms of social behavior. Social structure and the actualizing process at the group level constitute a reciprocal self-supportive mechanism of the social
system. This can be seen also as a change-generating mechanism because the dynamic interrelation at the different levels of complexity are dialectical in nature. This conception takes us to a formulation of actor and social system as open entities, as entities open in "a reciprocity of perspective," using the concept so frequently applied by George Gurvitch. To Mauss, to have is to be in the social system; to give is to exert power, and to be retributed is to be recognized and legitimized in status and role.

The structure of social action places the actor in an interactional context which he actualizes in his action toward others. This action can never be isolated because it is defined from the beginning by the social system in terms of some social order. Actualization means interpretation; modification, structure enhancement. Integration means a process of becoming, for the actor and for the system, alike. What the actor does constitute a definition of the social system and of himself in that system. The actor definition means "interpretation" in a problematic context structured dynamically by the action orientations. It means, further, a perspectivism confronting other possible orientations of action at a particular backbone which supports the whole social system in its dynamic, dialectical aspects. A tacit, referential baseline on which the content of social interaction plays its main tunes. The content is what counts and what has historical, as well as ongoing, significance.

Following Lucien Goldman we could call such an action orientation construction a genetic structure, but it should be very
important to keep, always, in mind that it is the content which is dynamic following the guideline of an action orientation model, or better, an action actualization model; not the underlying dimensional aspects used as an heuristic device to put some order in a chaotic world of events. It is always possible to imagine that there seems to be no other historically based alternatives. Since Aristoteles, philosophers and sociologists, as well, have handled the human matter in almost the same way, the action dimensional model reflects "human nature" or reflects the limited alternatives man has to order the world around him and be molded by it. This could be considered as part of the basic dialectical process which was implied by the general opposition between mind and world in Marx's thinking.12 That the alternatives implied in the action orientation model are limited cannot be said with any certainty because we lack the appropriate historical perspective, a perspective which could reach itself into our distant future. At the same time, we are handicapped by another limitation which could be even more serious, that presents us as eternally coetaneous defined beings. This coetaneity defines our very historical concern.

Gurvitch has defined sociology as that science which studies total social phenomena in its different aspects and movements comprehending those aspects and movements in the micro-social dialecticized types in groups and whole structures in the process of organization and disorganization.13 Socialization has been seen as the central core of the social phenomenon itself. For Gurvitch, the socialization process could be used to define human condition and, more specifically,
the exercise of human freedom confronting the obstacles around men. The total social phenomenon is dynamic and society is seen as a process of continuous change.

**THE DIALECTICAL NATURE OF THE INTERACTIONAL PROCESS**

We have repeatedly emphasized the dialectical nature of social interaction. Now we will try to explain the meaning we have given to this notion. There are so many dialectics almost as philosophers have used and analyzed this notion in their writings. We are going to consider Gurvitch's conception of this notion. His sociology has been considered as dialectical, not only in his approach to social reality, which for him is dialectical in its very nature, but in relation to the methods used for its exploration and analysis as well. Gurvitch has dedicated a book to exploring this subject matter systematically, searching into different interpretations through history, to find, finally, a more useful conceptualization of dialectics which could suit a scientific approach to the social phenomenon. We are not going to follow his description step-by-step, but only to point out his own understanding of the dialectical process and its usefulness in sociological analysis. After an exhaustive review of dialectics in the works by Hegel, Fichte, Marx and Sartre, among others, he rejects the way the concept of dialectics was used by these authors. One dominant feature of dialectics in those, on other respects so different in authors, is the conception of dialectics as a process based on the polarized
opposition between terms. Those authors were unable to see in the confronting terms, building up the system, but radical opposition, anihilation, and absolute negation. For Gurvitch, this polarization can be found, but it constitutes only one form of the possible dialectical relationships, and not even the most important one. Gurvitch is able to describe five different types of dialectical ways of relationship.

1. The dialectical complementarity,
2. The mutual dialectical implications,
3. Dialectical ambiguity,
4. Dialectical polarization, and
5. The reciprocity of perspectives.

We are not going into a detailed exploration of each of these modalities of dialectics in Gurvitch's sociology. We are going to show how they may be related with our socialization action-oriented process. We shall, instead of explaining in detail Gurvitch's dialectical modalities, going to describe in general terms some basic features of dialectics and what should be understood by dialectical social relations.

To start with, we have to distinguish dialectics as a method and dialectics as a model which intends to reproduce basic features of social reality, or which is constructed in order to analyze and to describe social reality. We should add as a way of defending the scientific status of dialectics as a method the usefulness it represents in the realm of the natural sciences. Here, Gurvitch emphasizes that in natural science, only the method has to be considered dialectical, not the subject matter itself. Gurvitch rejects the position
held by Engels when this author defended the dialectics in nature.

Dialectics, as a method, was used by important scholars in physics and related sciences. Among others, Gurvitch mentions Niels Bohr, Louis de Broglie, J. L. Distouches, Heisenberg and Von Neumann. In mathematics, F. Gonseth, who applied the dialectical method to relation between infinitely large numbers and arbitrarily small quantities. But as opposed to nature, that is to nature as object of study for the natural sciences, the social world is inherently dialectical. "Human and social reality is in itself dialectical."

In accordance with this author, dialectics has a number of characteristics which we are going to consider briefly, and in our concluding section, we are going to relate those characteristics to our own conception of the socialization process in terms of our theoretical model.

In the first place, dialectics is inherent in the real social phenomenon. In this sense, a model constructed along the dialectical lines would better (that is, more fruitful in its discoveries) the description of social reality than any other method which does not take dialectics into consideration. The dialectical method has to keep the relationship between the constitutive parts of a whole and the whole itself in balance. The relationship so described cannot be but dynamic. It is the continuous changing of each unit in terms of the other units constituting the whole that is relevant here. Categories which serve as explanatory dimensions to explain or to give reason for change in the system will be appropriate from the dialectical perspective. Change, here, means a continuous process
of problematic resolution within the system. Different interpretations, as Gurvitch says, may emphasize either totalities or the constitutive parts, or they may insist either in the unitary aspects or in the multiplicity involved. But above all those possibilities, all true dialectics avoids destroying the unity either through a consideration of the multiple in the unity, or the multiple through a consideration of single units. A simultaneous approach of groups and structures of constitutive parts is basically presupposed in this conception.  

In the second place, dialectics means always negation. But negation not just in the sense of polarization in terms of opposition. This constitutes only one case in the dialectics of the real. It means, also, negation in the sense that dialectics negates the laws of formal logic.

In a third sense, dialectics eliminates all petrified forms of theoretical constructions of social reality.

And, finally, dialectics implies tensions built in the social reality, tensions through opposition. We have to remember that in the classification of different types of dialectical relations, Gurvitch recognizes different degrees of opposition between the parts. The problematic social context allows for resolution of tensions without definite solutions. The resolution of the problematic situation implies a redefinition of tensions and conflicts at different levels of meaning. The structural arrangement becomes dynamized continuously by the very existence of those tensions and conflicts. We may recognize the existence of complementary tensions
and conflicts which dynamizes the structure, changing it without
disruptions or desintegration. If we handle the relationship between
the units in a system as determined by causal effect links, then we
have to start with a problem that can be used to dynamize the rela-
tionship which in itself has to be thought as static, or in
equilibrium. The units take account of the problem by defining it.
This could be related with a first phase of the movement; second
stage would be related with an effort made to find a solution, or
the appropriate solution for that problem. The third phase will be
determined by the final standstill situation after having showed
the problem.

As we can see, we go always in this type of explanation from
a state of equilibrium to a state of equilibrium going through a
stage of dynamism determined by an external factor in our example
by a problem for which a solution is required. Each specific problem
requires a specific solution. At the same time, we may say that this
is a bad model for analyzing social dynamics, because it resembles
it, in a pseudo way.

The problem which was defined in the first place worked
through looking for a solution in the second place and arriving at
its solution in the third place has been learned; if the person
or the group has learned successfully to do it, it has only to
reproduce it. The solution is implied in the very definition of the
problem itself. There is, in other words, nothing novel in the whole
process, and consequently, nothing new in order to recognize change.
in the system. In the dialectical approach to social reality, novelty and the process of creation is built in the dynamics of the system. The situation is always defined as problematic, which means that no solution can be foreseen, no standstill can be forecasted. What we have here is a creative process, a resolution of tensions, a constant going from one state to another state, without "modifying" the "internal" mechanisms of the process. Those built-in mechanisms based on negations, tensions, conflict, ambiguity, transitory and partial resolutions, are always present in the social system. There is always a flowing process of events whose intrinsic contradictions are partially overcome by the actors involved in the social stream of events through objectification, which allows the actors themselves to operate as units in the social process.

CONCLUSIONS

The process of constant change, just described, is the one we have tried to consider at length, using a model based on the action-orientation theory. We started with the classical consideration of the action orientation model and we implied that it relates the action orientation scheme to the individual actor, making him, and him alone, the dynamic unit in the social system. We have tried to overcome that individualistic bias by integrating the actor into an interactional system. (See page 7) We found that this unitary system of analysis could only be the triad because the triad could always be handled as a reduced or an extended unit of analysis without loosing its main virtues, which is to point to the complexity of the
social system itself in terms of an action orientation model as here considered. In other words, the triad could be thought of as an expanded or expandable field of interpersonal relationships.

The "analysis of the dyad," implicitly or tacitly, implies a third party. We placed our emphasis on each element of the dyad, true centers of gravity of the system (See page 27), and we expanded the meaning of those "centers of gravity" in terms of the action orientation model to point to a relationship between the model itself and the structure of the unit of analysis. In this way, and from the starting stage of our description, it was possible to analyze the dynamic characteristics of the interactional unit itself, using an action orientation model. This could be considered so because even if each part of the dyad (the ego, the alter, and the link) was complementarily related with the other two parts of the categorial system, the dyad was able to constitute, in its reference to the action orientation categories, to show opposition and incompatibility through complementarity in the different ways of defining "reality." The more expanded version of the action orientation model in terms of broader defined social spaces (the actor defined space, the group defined space, and the social defined space) allows us to speak of a "reality" which belongs to the units, a "reality" which belongs to the sub-system defined context, and, finally, to the broader social space, the society as a total social system.

We tried to show, also, the complexity involved in the concept of the orientation of action in terms of specific orientation. We started exploring something so often repeated in the literature, that
there are not pure orientations of action. We constructed a model specifying the meaning of those spurious or contaminating influences played by the other two orientations of action when the third one was dominant. The model constructed allowed us to speak of one main orientation of action and two subordinated or supportive orientations of action. At each orientation level, main or supportive, it was possible to describe a three-dimensional categorial system. (See page 56) It appears clear that in our present work each orientation of action is always constructed with positive valence. This is most crucial in the case of the emotional dimension. The author is well aware that in the integration of the action orientation model in concrete situation, positive as well as negative, valence should be considered.

There is not only one way to consider the dialectical inter-relationship between the different orientations in the model constructed (See page 69) for each main orientation of action, but it is also possible to think that the supportive thrust for the main orientation by a conjunction of a dialectical nature between the two supportive orientations. The two supportive orientations would be working in this way as building a common front of support, for the main orientation, through a dialectical relationship.

In order to integrate the action orientation model into a broader social context from which it receives its "social" meaning, we have a three-categorial system for each action orientation. (See page 82) The three sub-categories can be seen as levels of concreteness, or as levels of generality. One extreme of the categorial
differentiation points to the actor's significance in the orientation of action system; the next category points to the situational definition conceived in terms of all those elements immediately relevant in the situation which constitute the immediate framework for the actors' performance; and the third, the most general, all embracing, the context into which the first two get their true meaning. There is here what would be referred to as the reciprocity of perspectives. We pointed out that the relationship between the three sub-categories for each main orientation of action was of a dialectical nature. We may suggest, even if we have not developed further the matter in this paper, that the same categorial subdivisions that we have described for the main orientations of action should be thought for the sub-ordinated or supportive orientations of action, as well, and conceptualized fully in those terms.

The two-dimensional model was constructed integrating the different orientation of action models which must be thought of as sub-action orientation models. In this new stage of the development of the general model, we were able to substitute the concept of orientation for the concept of actualization because now we are able to speak of areas, and each area does not only imply a main orientation, but two other not directly supportive orientations of action. The significance of this can be appreciated in the next step of the model construction. Those areas of actualization are able to express a more elaborated, a more complex, and a more integrated aspect of social behavior.
This model is able now to take us directly to an analysis of the social structure at a higher level, the level of institutional differentiation. We have pointed, at this particular stage of the development of our model, that some type of differentiation between levels of analysis was possible. The criteria used here was expressed in terms of abstractness as referred to values. So the differentiation between levels does not mean hierarchy at all in terms of value, which could be, by any other criteria, considered superior. The distinction is only in terms of abstractness and the most abstract level for description was the artistic level. The second one used for some sort of comparative reference was the religious level, and the third one selected was the political level of institutional differentiation. (See page 72) At the same time, it was also possible to speak in our analysis of a different emphasis in terms of predominant orientation of action characterizing the differential institutional structure, or in terms of the leading institutionalized group at each particular level. The differentiation between levels in terms of the criteria selected proved to have enough demonstrative power and adequately served our intentions. The discrimination made between the institutionalized differentiated levels by establishing different orientation emphasis was also used to show a dialectical relationship between the different levels of institutional differentiation. (See page ) An analysis of a social system must be performed in terms of its content and in these terms it would be arbitrary to presuppose specific emphasis at the different levels of institutional differentiation.
We started our paper indicating that an analysis of the socialization process should be approached from a sociological perspective. In this sense, the process cannot be isolated from the social system in which it takes place. It cannot be referred to the career of the individual actor or to any defined trend in his career, because, first of all, from the structural social perspective, there is not such a thing as an isolated, or isolable, individual actor. He is part of the social structure as an integrated unity and as such, he has to be analyzed. Socialization, as far as our model is concerned, is a total phenomenon which gets its full meaning as an expression of the overall dynamics of the social system. The social system understood here as an integrated system in terms of dialectically opposed defined categories.

As a problematic setting of alternatives; alternatives actions orientationally defined, always open, always forcing upon the actors, constitutive units of the system, a process of being through becoming, or becoming through being. In this respect, we have tried to use a motivational model which places the mainspring for social action in the objectified world of concreteness. The structuralization and a structuralization process that goes on all the time in society and to which Gurvitch pointed repeatedly in his work, is based, in our model, in the opposition between the different orientation of action in its very nature. The only thing that we have added is that it is always possible to think of structures of different nature at each orientational level, and what could be considered as a structure from one perspective is structure from another action orientation
perspective. The dialectical relation between the different action orientations could be seen in this sense as the placement of different kinds of structures as related with those different orientation of action.

Gurvitch has emphasized that the methodology in social sciences is also dialectical and I would say that it is, or must be so, because the social scientist is a social actor, because of the embodiment of social reality in the social scientist.

Sociologists are often all an expression of the dynamic forces in the social scenario. In any other way his work would be meaningless and ignored.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI


3Jean Cazeneuve, op. cit.


6Jean Cazeneuve, op. cit., especially Chapter VIII.

7Ibid., especially Chapters VII and VIII.

8Marcel Mauss, op. cit., p. 4.

"Although the prestations and counter-prestations take place under a voluntary guise, they are in essence strictly obligatory, and their sanction is private or open warfare. We propose to call this the system of total prestations..." "The Tlingit and Haide of North-West America give a good expression of the nature of these practices when they say that they 'show respect to each other'..." "We propose, following American authors, to call it the potlatch..." "Potlatch" means originally to 'nourish' or to 'consume."


"The concept of internalization is often used to refer to the child's adoption of social norms or roles as
its own, and to the resulting control of its behavior by the most complex mediational functions of cognitive and verbal processes...." "There are many experiments in psychology in relation with internalization but none of them, to my knowledge, seem to have been able to separate the process of internalization from some other cognitive elaboration and interpretation processes at the individual level."

10 This was explained before. See page 62.


12 Robert F. Murphy, op. cit.


15 George Gurvitch, op. cit.

16 F. Engels, Dialectics in Nature.

17 George Gurvitch, op. cit., p. 17 and 19.

18 Ibid., p. 27.
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