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THE PHILIPPINE SCOUTS: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF AMERICA'S COLONIAL ARMY

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
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*****

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1975

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PREFACE

In the last years of the 19th Century the U.S. Army occupied the Philippine Islands. Before the completion of that task it became expedient to arm a limited number of Filipinos and to make them part of the conquering forces. When the U.S. Army realized many Filipinos would continue to resist American control, larger numbers of select Filipinos were organized to subdue Aguinaldo's remaining followers. That effort proved successful and by late 1901, the U.S. Army's Filipino contingent, the Philippine Scouts, consisted of 5,000 fighting men.

The Scouts are not to be confused with the Philippine Constabulary, a national, native police force formed in 1901 by the civil government headed by William Howard Taft. While the two forces were equal in size and the Scouts did assist the Constabulary in the handling of insurrectionist groups, the Scouts were an official branch of the U.S. Army under the direct supervision of the officer commanding the Philippine Division. Taft's civil regime had complete control of the Constabulary.

The objectives of this dissertation are to explore (1) the origins of the Scouts: (2) their use as a police auxiliary force
the civil government; (3) their organizational development from independent rifle companies to a full tactical division; and (4) their officers, enlisted men and combat success. These aspects of Scout history were the key elements in the maturation of the Filipino force from assorted companies to a bull-fledged army that by 1922 was the backbone of the American garrison in the Philippines.

In the preparation of this study, many people were generous with their time, ideas and personal encouragement. My advisor, Dr. Harry L. Coles, and the other members of the reading committee, Dr. Stephen Boyd and Dr. Francis P. Weisenberger, have been indispensable. Dr. David L. Sturtevant of Muskingum College also read the paper and helped with a basic understanding of Philippine history. The staffs of the Office of the Chief, Military History, Fort McNair; the National Archives; the U.S. Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania; The Ohio State University Library; and the Denison University Library handled every demand made on them with professional care. Family and friends such as Mr. and Mrs. L. A. Messimer, Mrs. Bryan Woolard and Mr. and Mrs. William J. Holland provided either funds or inspiration that will always be remembered. And to my wife, Nancy, I owe debts that can never be repaid.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE MACABEBE SCOUTS: THE ORIGINS OF THE
U.S. FILIPINO ARMY--1899

America's imperialistic adventure in the Philippines began May 1, 1898, when Commodore George Dewey destroyed a Spanish naval squadron at Manila Bay. Commodore Dewey, attempting to maintain his tenuous foothold until land forces arrived, fostered the development of a Filipino army under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo. Dewey's decision to solicit Filipino aid against the Spanish boomeranged. By mid-August, 10,000 Americans seized the city of Manila and defeated the Spanish. But the U.S. Army then found itself confronted with the very forces Dewey helped to create. Except for Manila and the naval base at Cavite, Aguinaldo's units controlled the entire island of Luzon. When they realized the Americans planned to annex their homeland and deny them independence, Aguinaldo's men grew increasingly bitter. In February 1899, an American-Filipino War erupted.

If anyone had suggested at the beginning of their struggle that Filipinos be armed to fight their fellow countrymen, the suggestion would have been regarded as a ludicrous one. Nevertheless, within the short space of about two years there were
5,000 Filipinos serving as an unusual but legal part of the U.S. Army establishment. The origins of the Philippine Scouts can be traced to the 1899 campaign against Aguinaldo. Tactical and logistical complexities attending the reduction of his forces caused the Americans to arm a limited number of Filipinos. In contrast to the earlier experience with the followers of Aguinaldo, the Macabebes did not turn on their benefactors but proved themselves entirely reliable fighters. Macabebe success gave the U.S. Army the precedent on which to later build the colonial army it needed to garrison the islands.

The tactical and logistical problems that brought about the use of armed islanders were not immediately apparent to the invading Americans. The insurgents entrenched outside Manila were dispersed in short order. Malalos, the insurgent capital 20 miles north of Manila, fell in March 1899. Calumpit, seven miles north on the Manila-Dagupan railway, was taken in April. The following month another northward surge secured the pueblo of San Fernando. Here the advance bogged down. Each mile covered had multiplied logistical problems. Pampanga Province, the center of operations was virtually divided into a series of islands by the rivers and streams emptying into the main watercourse, the Rio Grande de la Pampanga. Roads, few and difficult, became seas of mud with the advent of the rainy season in May. Existing bridges were often frail bamboo structures capable at best of handling a single
cavalry mount. The 18 mile trip from San Fernando along the Pampanga to Macabebe, for example, required the crossing of six different waterways by bridge or by swimming.¹

First Lieutenant Matthew Arlington Batson, Fourth U.S. Cavalry, was keenly aware of the logistical problems facing the Eighth Army and his response to them initiated the first employment of Filipinos in the Luzon campaign.² Assigned to scouting duty on the flanks of the advancing American units Lieutenant Batson learned that the Macabebes residing downriver from San Fernando had no difficulty traversing the tropical lowlands. In their bances (native canoes) the Macabebes pleyed the waters of Pampanga with ease. After observing the Macabebes closely for almost two months and visiting their barrio, Batson in early 1899 met 120 of them at San Fernando. The Macabebes wanted to enroll under the American flag. Major General Arthur MacArthur, commanding the Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, received them at his headquarters but refused their services despite the fact they had served in the ranks of the Spanish regime. MacArthur was not prepared to arm any Filipinos. The Macabebes, furthermore, made it clear they wanted any detachment raised among them retained in the vicinity of their own towns.³ MacArthur saw little value in arming Macabebes if they were not to be available as guides and scouts after American divisions moved forward into northern Luzon. Batson, however, developed a plan he believed would overcome these impediments and employ the Macabebes to advantage.
On July 6, 1899, Batson forwarded his plan to the Adjutant General's Office, Eighth Army Corps, Manila. He proposed to use 100 Macabebes to patrol their home province of Pampanga. Their critical functions would be to prevent small insurgent parties from cutting railroad and telegraph lines, to locate and notify division headquarters of any large rebel contingents, and to prevent the operations of the marauding outlaw bands infesting the region. The Macabebes, Batson contended, were ideally suited to perform these tasks. Being friendly and possessing a manifest ambition to cooperate with the American military, they would in their bancas enjoy the mobility that land-based cavalry and infantry lacked. Each banca accommodated from four to six men and their arms and rations. All Macabebes were skilled in handling these craft, which were capable of making from eight to ten miles per hour with just two men paddling. Their skill in handling the paddles, moreover, allowed them to move through the water with almost no noise. Often hidden by the high river banks of their province, they could travel considerable distances without detection. If armed with American carbines, the Macabebes, Batson claimed, would be particularly well fitted for scouting in their home locale.

Major General Elwell S. Otis, commander at Eighth Army headquarters in Manila, was faced with a heavy work schedule in the summer of 1899. The planning of a major offensive into northern Luzon once the rainy season ended in October, the disposition of
the fresh American units arriving in the Philippines, the allo-
cation of supplies and his own penchant for handling detail work
kept him busy far into the night. Once Batson's plan reached his
desk, however, the wearied Otis studied it with great care.

Otis did not favor the arming of any Filipinos. Such an in-
clination on the part of Dewey had largely produced the present
conflict. But the Macabebes were a Malay group particularly fami-
liar to both Otis and his staff. The Americans had come into con-
tact with them after occupying Manila the previous summer. Among
the 14,000 Spanish prisoners that fell into American hands was a
regiment of Macabebes known as the Seventy Second, which had
remained loyal to Spain throughout the convulsive Filipino revolts
of 1899 and 1898. The loyal Macabebes, numbering 10,400 in 1902,
were a distinct minority group among the 8,000,000 inhabitants
of the Philippines. Their distinctiveness derived primarily from
their feudal association with the wealthy Spanish family, the
Blancos, who owned large tracts of land in the Macabebe district
of Pampanga Province. Organized into military units by the sons
of the Blanco family, the Macabebes whole-heartedly supported the
Spanish cause, being among the first provincial residents to
voluntarily aid the Spanish in the 1896 insurrection, and in
1898, refusing to revolt. Pampangan in tribal origin, and
speaking the Campampangan dialect as a native tongue (some also
knew Spanish, others Tagalog), the Macabebes did not enjoy a
peaceful relationship with the Tagalogs, who provided the core strength of the Filipino resistance to Spain.

Macabebe loyalty to Spain had cost them dearly. In late June 1898, General Ricardo Monet, commanding a column of 700 Spanish troops, withdrew from northern Luzon while being pursued by Filipino insurgents. Burdened with wounded soldiers and Spanish women and children, Monet retreated toward Macabebe, where he knew the wife and children of Governor General Basilio Augustin had taken refuge in the Blanco mansion. The insurgents immediately laid siege to the barrio and on July 3, 1898, overran the defenders. While Monet and the Augustin family managed to escape along with a number of Spanish troops, many Macabebes lost their lives.

These events had a profound impact on the Seventy Second Macabebe Regiment (numbering 270 men) now stranded in Manila. Disbanded by the Spanish authorities prior to the signing of the Treaty of Paris, the Seventy Second found itself isolated in a city surrounded by the same hostile Tagalog forces that had taken possession of their home barrio. The Macabebes expressed considerable interest at this juncture in becoming an adjunct of the protective American Army. But their overtures were spurned since their Spanish officers wanted to remain with them. The Americans would not accept this arrangement because of the unsettled diplomatic situation. Their immediate problem was mere subsistence. The
American Provost Marshal General of Manila solved the hunger problem. In return for food the Macabebes cleaned Manila's botanical gardens.10

The signing of the Treaty of Paris (December 10, 1898) did not alter the Macabebe situation. Without permission a few of them tried to sneak through the insurgent lines coiling around Manila, but they were killed. This discouraged any further such attempts. In April 1899 the Spanish tendered a new solution. Colonial authorities asked permission to transport the Seventy Second to the Caroline Islands, where they would provide a needed garrison. The fearful Macabebes found the offer attractive since their families would be allowed to accompany them. President McKinley expressed no objection and the overwhelming majority of the Seventy Second, despite the American advance to the north past their home barrio (Malalos was occupied in March), proceeded to sail for the Caroline Islands. The remainder filtered back to Macabebe.11

The thought of employing the Macabebes did not dissolve with the departure of the Seventy Second. Impressed by the military bearing of the Macabebes, Otis discussed with MacArthur the possibility of using them just before the assault on Malalos. Both officers, however, hesitated. Aware of the intense hatred the Macabebes bore for Tagalogs like Aguinaldo, neither general wanted to arm a minority group he might not be able to keep under control. The attitude of the emotional Macabebes toward all
Tagalogs frequently assumed a barbaric quality. The subject was tabled for consideration at a later date while the Macabebes continued to be overtly friendly to all Americans.\textsuperscript{12} When army gunboats advanced up the Pampanga to Calumpit on May 11, 1899, the Macabebes joyfully hailed their passage.\textsuperscript{13}

The arrival of Batson's plan at Otis's office in July occasioned further deliberation on the subject. Otis was convinced the Macabebes, of all the various Filipino tribal groups, could at least be trusted to remain loyal to the United States, as they had to the Spanish. He was also inclined to approve Batson's proposal because of a thorny tactical problem facing the Eighth Army. Ladrones (outlaws) and opposing rebel forces in the swamps and the estuaries fringing northern Manila Bay had been a persistent headache. Independent bands operating from secluded camps in the dense tropical growth of the lowlands raided small American forces with impunity. They interfered with supply details and harassed MacArthur's rear lines. The failure of American forays to effectively handle the situation made another alternative appealing. Perhaps a native force already possessing the only practicable means of transportation (bancas) could achieve some success.\textsuperscript{14}

Before making a final decision, Otis consulted with the general officers commanding the two divisions of the Eighth Army Corps. Major General Henry Ware Lawton, presently directing the First Division, was scheduled to head a column in the coming fall
campaign. Lawton wanted at least a small party of Macabebes to serve as guides and scouts for his command. Therefore, he endorsed a plan calling for the establishment of "native troops" as auxiliaries.\(^{15}\)

Otis next turned to MacArthur. Although willing to concede the Macabebes could be useful, Otis anticipated acts of revenge by the proposed scouts on the Tagalogs. On July 26, 1899, he requested MacArthur's opinion on this possibility and on Batson's idea as a whole. MacArthur's response on July 31 first noted his previous determination in regard to the Macabebe wish to be stationed near their home environs. However, since Batson intended to use them in Pampanga, MacArthur concluded that in the hands of a skillful officer assisted by a number of noncommissioned officers from the white regiments, I think it would be safe to place arms in the hands of a few of these Macabebes. They have a number of guns in their hands at present, obtained in one way or another, which they use for defense of the town, and, so far as is known, they have not attempted any excesses, although this may possibly arise from the fact that they are conscious of their own weakness and do not care to provoke any retaliation.\(^{16}\)

Buttressed by these opinions, Otis decided that Macabebe efficiency should be tested.\(^{17}\)

Several factors were important in his decision. The tactical problem presented by the insurgents and outlaws had to be solved. If the Macabebes could be employed, American personnel would be free for the major thrust to the north. Batson's plan, moreover, involved the arming of only a selected number of Macabebes. There
was no chance that the Americans would repeat their previous mis-
take of assisting a large number of Filipinos who would change
sides. Batson's proposal would test the value of the Macabebes in
a very controlled situation. If the new scouts proved amenable
to discipline and presented themselves as reasonably good sol-
diers, Otis could then utilize their services in the coming
offensive without undue risk. The odds, of course, favored Otis.
Regardless of what transpired, not even the slightest possibility
existed that the Macabebes would desert and offer their arms to
the Tagalogs.

His decision made, Otis personally directed the implementa-
tion of Batson's proposal. Ordered to Lawton's headquarters in
Manila, Batson was asked to submit a detailed plan of organization
for a company of 110 men. Batson suggested a unit consisting of
1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 first sergeant, 1 quartermaster ser-
geant, 6 sergeants, 8 corporals and 92 privates. The officers and
sergeants were to be detailed from the line of the Regular Army.
All corporals and privates would be Filipinos. Batson stipulated
that once his company was formed, Filipino sergeants could be
appointed. The pay would be Mexican money instead of gold. The
earnings would thus be one-half that received by Americans. The
Macabebes would use magazine carbines so their fire could be
easily distinguished from that of the insurgents and their com-
manding officer was empowered to impress or purchase a supply of
bancas. An interpreter capable of speaking English, Spanish and
either Campampamong or Tagalog would travel with the company. Finally, Batson recommended that any contract entered into with the Macabebes should contain as few provisions as possible.\textsuperscript{18}

Lawton endorsed Batson's work and forwarded it to Otis on September 2, 1899. Otis, a man devoted to thoroughness, immediately ordered Batson to Macabebe.

After journeying to Calumpit by train, Batson secured a banca and paddled down the Pampanga to Macabebe barrio. He located Pacia Sanches, alcade (mayor) of Macabebe and informed him the Americans wanted to enlist 100 Macabebes "as scouts in connection with the operations of the troops in the Philippines."\textsuperscript{19} The obliging alcade dispatched a circular requesting a rendezvous of interested young men. Batson picked the number he needed from those Macabebes with prior service as Blanco volunteers and returned to Manila to secure arms and equipment for his new recruits.\textsuperscript{20}

On September 6, Major General Otis, having formally approved Batson's guidelines, issued a few of his own. The natives proposed as corporals and privates would be employed by the Quartermaster's Department as scouts and paid from civil funds. The monthly pay rate was increased $3 (Mexican) to provide a clothing allowance. The Quartermaster's Department was authorized to sell clothing to the Filipinos and acquire the bancas needed. The interpreter's salary was not to exceed $60 (Mexican) per month.
plus rations. Otis's orders finalized the organization and administrative structure under which the Macabebes would be employed.

A tireless Batson had arms and equipment in Calumpit on September 10 to meet a Macabebe escort for the trip downriver. By now he had acquired his first assistant, Corporal James N. Conway, L Troop, Fourth Cavalry. And Batson acquired more noncommissioned officers in Macabebe. A number of Macabebes presenting themselves for enrollment as Quartermaster employees had been subalterns and noncommissioned officers in various Blanco military units. They were, Batson discovered, "as a rule intelligent men and understood Spanish." Departing completely from the original plan of white noncommissioned officers above the rank of corporal, Batson proceeded to appoint all company noncommissioned officers from this group.21

His company assembled, Batson took the field. Since the Americans had only supplied Aguinaldo's insurgents with arms and never been involved in their organization or training, Batson's company was the first Filipino unit organized along American lines. Therefore, the results obtained by his company were of utmost importance to Otis, Lawton and MacArthur.

The Macabebe Scouts were an instant success. Patrolling the nipa swamps and rivers of Pampanga Province, they demonstrated ability as guides, scouts, boatmen and detectives. They harassed rebels and outlaws who had previously used the terrain to their
advantage. A number of insurgent parties were surprised and disarmed. Slowly the insurgents were driven inland. Assured that no disciplinary problems had developed, a delighted Otis ordered the formation of a second company as the first was destined for use with General Lawton's troops. By the end of September, Batson had the second Macabebe company in the field. Assisted by First Lieutenant Edward T. Balch, Thirty Seventh Volunteer Infantry, the Macabebe force extended its operations southwards to the very outskirts of Manila.

As the date for the launching of Lawton's trek northward drew closer, Otis, continually reassured that the Macabebes were proving themselves faithful and useful, authorized a third company on October 6, 1899. The make-up of the officer and non-commissioned ranks was similar to that of the two present companies—a clear indication headquarters had no objection to additional Macabebe sergeants. Here Otis drew the line. When Batson requested the power to appoint two Filipinos to the rank of lieutenant, Otis flatly refused. No Filipino was to have the status of a commissioned officer. The only change he permitted Batson to make was an increase in enlisted strength to 128 per company. Lieutenant Balch's Macabebes were assigned to duty with MacArthur's Second Division on October 10, and Batson and the original two units were ordered to report to Lawton's First Division.
The "Northern Expedition" of October to December 1899 was designed by the Eighth Army Corps to overcome the armed Filipinos occupying the central plain of Luzon and capture Aguinaldo. Because of their effective work under Batson, Otis assigned two Macabebe companies to Lawton's division. Their overall performance had convinced Otis that the Macabebes could be trusted to restrict themselves to civilized warfare. Their role in the fall campaign now posed a new challenge. Henceforth, they would be employed more as soldiers than scouts. The weeks ahead would thoroughly test their fighting ability, stamina, loyalty and true disposition toward duty under American auspices. If the Macabebes met the challenge, the Americans would unquestionably be more inclined to arm additional Filipinos.

Major General Otis had determined the strategy of the Eighth Army as early as August. Aguinaldo had retreated to the north and established his base at Tarlac, about 80 miles up the single track connecting Manila and Dagupan. Otis calculated that, if the Filipinos were bested on the plain of central Luzon, Aguinaldo would withdraw along the line of the railroad and seek the passes of the Caraballo and Sierra Madre Mountains to the north and east. The isolation of his army and the taking of Aguinaldo necessitated the closing of all exits from the plain. Once in the mountains
or beyond Aguinaldo would have the bulk of northern Luzon in which to regroup his men or simply go into hiding.

The American objective and the topography of Luzon dictated a strategy of encirclement coupled with direct pressure. A column commanded by Major General Lawton would follow the course of the Pampanga and the northeastern borders of the central plain, then bend westward along the base of the mountains bisecting Luzon to Lingayen Gulf, garrisoning population centers and closing the passes providing access through the mountains into northern Luzon. An amphibious expedition under Major General Lloyd Wheaton, U.S. Volunteers, would sail around the west coast of Luzon, land at the northwestern corner of the plain, occupy the coast road providing access to northern Luzon and effect a junction with Lawton's force to the east. MacArthur, whose Second Division was already situated on the railway at Angeles in northwestern Pampanga Province, would apply the direct pressure. 26

Execution of the strategy required strict timing. If it were to succeed, Lawton, with the greatest distance to cover, would have to move rapidly, close the mountain passes to the north and east and complete the encirclement of Aguinaldo's men. Even a partial failure on the part of his column would seriously undermine the possibility of smashing the Filipinos and taking Aguinaldo. Lawton had to start early. MacArthur would inch forward on the railroad only enough to contain the opposition confronting him, then hold his lines until Lawton and Wheaton
achieved positions virtually assuring the success of their respective assignments. Because of the large scope of his assignment, Lawton was to have practically all the cavalry on the island and the two Macabebe companies. 27

In late September Lawton ordered the elements of his column to rendezvous at San Fernando. Brigadier General Samuel B. M. Young was put in immediate command. 28 When assembled, the force, totaling almost 3,000 effective fighting men, consisted of 15 infantry companies, 17 troops of cavalry (3 not yet mounted), artillery and engineer detachments, a company of selected American scouts, Batson's Macabebe and "Lowe's Scouts." 29 The Lowe Scouts, the only military unit in the Philippines besides the Macabebe force to contain a significant number of islanders, were Lawton's personal creation. He eventually intended to establish a pure Tagalog company. But the Tagalogs, the linguistic group headed by Aguinaldo, represented the very backbone of Filipino resistance to American control. Exercising caution, Lawton deliberately put together a hybrid outfit, mixing Americans with Tagalogs, planning to gradually do away with the American component. 30 Captain Percival G. Lowe of the Twenty Fifth Infantry organized the company in mid-September 1899. But, on October 8, Captain Lowe went on sick leave, relinquishing command to First Lieutenant Joseph C. Castner, Fourth Cavalry. Henceforth, the company was called Castner's Lowe Scouts. Upon its arrival at
San Fernando in early October the seasoned unit contained 2 line officers, 1 assistant surgeon, 24 U.S. enlisted men, 12 packers, 22 Tagalogs and 6 Chinamen.31

On October 12 Brigadier General Young got the expedition underway by taking the important river point of Arayat at the cost of one private wounded.32 Meanwhile, Lieutenant Matthew Batson was bringing his Macabebe companies north and by mid-afternoon on October 11 was ready to proceed to Candaba. At the last moment Second Lieutenant Henry Moss Routelle, Third U.S. Artillery, arrived, adding a second line officer to Batson's command. Routelle was placed in charge of the First Company. Three other non-Filipinos accompanied the Scouts. Acting assistant surgeon M. S. Simpson and Corporal James Conway had worked for several days with Batson and the Macabebes. The interpreter and official guide, Fedrico Fernandez, had been a captain in a Blanco regiment and would later be commissioned a captain in the Spanish Army.33 By noon of October 12 the marchers reached Candaba, having covered 32 miles despite a persistent rainfall. The next morning their line of march took them across a carabao trail to the river bank opposite Arayat.

Batson received his orders from Young. While remaining on the opposite shore (the east bank), he was to establish quarters two miles downriver and send daily 50-man patrols toward Candaba to provide a protective screen for the cascos and tugs carrying supplies from Calumpit to Arayat. In addition, he would
reconnoiter to the front—where the Filipinos were about to provide the Scouts with their first taste of combat against a prepared, entrenched foe.  

On the evening of October 12, Batson's advance scouts informed him that a body of insurgents occupied Libutad, a hamlet a few miles upriver. The Scout leader sent a spy into the enemy camp who returned with information that the rebel force consisted of two companies of the Manila Battalion, an easily recognized Filipino unit since their "uniform" consisted of "gaudy trousers, picturesque straw hats and fancy blouses." The night of October 16, Batson, Simpson and Fernandez journeyed by banca to San Mateo, landed and advanced to study the outpost by moonlight. The following morning Batson informed the newly arrived Lawton of his findings.

Major General Lawton, fretting over supply problems and the construction of a rope ferry across the Pampanga, wanted action. He consented readily to Batson's proposal that the Scouts be allowed to start upriver at 2 a.m., make a long detour around the left flank of the enemy at Libutad under cover of darkness and attack down the road in the rear. During the evening of October 17, however, a conference involving Lawton, Young, Captain John Ballance, commanding the First Battalion, Twenty Second Infantry, and other staff officers, revealed some doubts about the ability of the Macabebes to handle their mission. To ensure success, Captain Ballance's Battalion would cross the
Pampanga by means of the rope ferry just completed and be in position to attack Libutad at daylight, the time of the Macabebe assault. Lieutenant Castner's Lowe Scouts would move along the west bank, prevent any insurgents from crossing over and drive out any force encountered. Hopefully the offensive would surge beyond Libutad and occupy Cabiao, guaranteeing a clear road for the rest of Lawton's soldiers, who would cross the river during the engagement. As a final protection against any misunderstandings, Ballance crossed the river and discussed the plan personally with Batson.

The Macabebes initiated their daring attempt to get behind the insurgents at 2:30 a.m., but it took until daylight to reach the San Mateo outpost undetected. The Scouts advance guard drove back the outpost and the Macabebes pressed on. Batson then dispatched Lieutenant Boutelle's company to flank the enemy's trenches to the left and joined Second Lieutenant Dennis P. Quinlan and the Second Macabebe unit to the front. Encountering fire at 100 yards, the Scout leader ordered Quinlan's men to direct a return fire from the ground until Boutelle gained the flank. Fedrico Fernandez, shunning cover, walked along the line repeating all orders in Campampangan. Fifteen minutes later, Boutelle was in position and Batson ordered both companies to charge. In the hand to hand struggle in the trenches that followed, the Scouts forced their opponents from their positions and dispersed them. Overall, the fight cost the Manila Battalion
15 dead, 19 wounded and 59 prisoners, including their commanding officer. The Macabebe loss was one private wounded. 40

Batson quickly forged ahead and reached Cabiao at 9 a.m. with 35 Macabebes. The enemy retreated without a struggle. At 9:30 a.m. Captain Balance's Battalion arrived. They had taken Libutad with a frontal assault, killing 4, wounding 30 and capturing 70. Castner's Lowe Scouts entered Cabiao in the afternoon. The hamlet became a temporary concentration point. 41

Various American officers considered the results of October 18 highly significant. Young stated in his report that the overwhelming defeat of the insurgents at Libutad and San Fernando, and the capture of a very large number of them at the very beginning of my northern advance, had a marked influence in disheartening them and in increasing the ardor of my command, already anxious for an opportunity to engage the enemy. 42

Batson was thoroughly satisfied with the conduct of his officers and men. Boutelle had not only flanked the enemy but captured a fortified sugar house. Lieutenant Quinlan (a new officer in his command) had handled his company skillfully and shown no hesitation during the attack. Surgeon Simpson had exposed himself to enemy fire while carrying the only Macabebe casualty to a protected place. And the Macabebes had welcomed the chance for action. 43 In his written account Ballance noted specifically that this encounter was the Macabebes' first real fight and that, previously, considerable doubt concerning their reliability had permeated division headquarters. Afterward, despite their
failure to get completely behind the opposition, Ballance believed "they could be trusted to fight efficiently against the Tagalogs."44

The positive results scored by the Macabebes did not go unnoticed by Lawton, especially in light of the problems besetting the expedition's commanding officer. The Pampanga was falling and launches towing cascos began to go aground between Candaba and Arayat, threatening the tenuous supply line extending to the southwest. A manpower shortage, moreover, compounded the transportation difficulties. Speed was critical if Lawton hoped to circle the northern curve of the Luzon plain on schedule. Being short on infantry, particularly scouts, he had been obliged to place the Macabebes to the front. Splendid achievements had followed but at the cost of not having the Macabebes (as Lawton had intended) to patrol the Pampanga, help work supplies upriver, guard any boat aground and maintain communication lines until basic supplies and additional soldiers arrived at Arayat and points north. Lawton simply did not have enough Macabebes to profitably divide them.45

The simplest solution to the problem was either hand-picked American scouts or more Macabebes. Lawton requested a company of scouts from the ranks of the Thirty Fourth Volunteer Infantry, a regiment scheduled to join his column. In a second wire to Manila he stressed the excellent services rendered by the Macabebes and their availability at half-pay. Lawton asked for a
minimum of a full battalion and Manila, stirred by Macabebe success on October 18, gave him permission to secure the additional companies. Approval of the company of Thirty Fourth Infantry scouts was telegraphed later.

Lieutenant Batson was the logical choice to enlist the new Macabebe units. Lawton, however, decided that the strategic water and road junction of San Isidro, five miles north of Cabiao, must be taken first. Captain Ballance with a temporary brigade as an advance guard was ordered to direct the main column over the river road to San Isidro. Batson and Castner would cross the Pampanga and proceed along the opposite bank in support.

Across the river by 9 a.m., October 19, Batson joined Castner and his Lowe Scouts. At the hamlet of San Antonio, Lieutenant Castner swung his outfit onto a road leading to the San Isidro Ferry while Batson's Scouts continued on the main west bank road. With the terrain on both sides of any road dominated by flooded rice fields, which were divided by raised dykes and interspersed with bamboo tangles, patches of jungle and lagoons, any military body traversing central Luzon lent itself to insurgent ambushes. Indeed, a mile and a half beyond San Antonio Batson was ambushed. Approximately 200 members of the Manila Battalion suddenly opened fire on the advance members of his Macabebes from both sides of the road.
The Macabebes conducted themselves admirably. On the march Batson always placed himself in the lead. Behind him came a small advance guard, followed by the column in two files. When not in motion, the files faced outward to both sides of the road if there existed any danger of attack. If fired upon from ahead, the main column hustled forward while maintaining its respective positions on the road perimeter. Sure, therefore, that his Macabebes would be advancing to him despite the rifle fire of the Manila Battalion, Batson, unable to deploy to the front because of the nature of the ground, plunged down the road with 20 Scouts to split the rebels lying in ambush. The first and second companies followed, files intact, stopped and opened fire to the right and left. Disconcerted, the Manila Battalion withdrew suffering numerous casualties. The Scouts emerged unscathed. In fairly adverse circumstances, the Macabebes had maintained discipline in their ranks and obeyed orders with boldness and dispatch, averting the possibility of a bad mauling of the advance guard and the head of the column.

By mid-afternoon, the Macabebes arrived opposite San Isidro. The main column had taken the town and bridge and was driving toward Gapan. Batson, signaled to cross the river, was handed a telegram ordering him to report to General Lawton at Cabiao with 14 Scouts to assist in locating a channel so the gunboats with the expedition could advance the cascos of supplies. Arriving at Lawton's headquarters at 9 p.m., Batson received a new assignment.
He was to proceed to Macabebe with all possible speed, and once there, he was to recruit and arm two new Scout companies.

With a four-man Scout escort headed by Corporal James Conway, Batson departed by banca, covering the 60 miles to Macabebe by noon the next day. While stressing the need for men with previous military service, Batson detailed Conway to enroll those volunteering and proceeded to Manila for the necessary rifles and ammunition. On October 23 the Lieutenant had two fully armed Macabebe companies ready to move upriver from Calumpit. During the next three days, the new units were split into groups of ten under noncommissioned officers and guarded cascos being moved to the front. On October 26 Batson's Macabebes were ordered to proceed to San Antonio while clearing out all the natives found anywhere near the mouth of the Rio Chico, a tributary of the Pampanga.

Batson left Aiyat shortly after noon and proceeded north three miles, then turned west around the base of Mount Arayat. A carabao trail through lush tropical growth provided access to the Rio Chico. The Scout leader later described the difficulties of the journey:

At this time it had been raining for some days, the trails were muddy, and in the bamboo jungles mud and water were in some places up to our waists for 200 or 300 yards at a stretch, and in many places up to our chins. Arriving at the mouth of the Rio Chico at about 9 p.m., where, the bencas containing my supplies having arrived, supper was cooked and the men rested until 11 p.m. when the march was resumed from the mouth of the Rio Chico to opposite Cabiao, arriving
there at daybreak. Breakfast was cooked and the march resumed, arriving at San Antonio about 12 o'clock noon, where the men were put into quarters. It was asserted by the natives that it was impossible for us to march from Arayat to San Antonio by the west bank of the Rio Grande. 55

The arrival of Batson brought the entire Macabebe battalion together since Lieutenants Quinlan and Boutelle used San Antonio as a base to patrol the Pampanga in bancas toward the Rio Chico. 56

The Macabebes' persistent duty along the river indicated that the supply and transport problems worrying Lawton and the whole expedition had not been overcome. A week had passed since the occupation of San Isidro and no forward movement had been achieved. The Pampanga became too shallow for cascos and insurgents multiplied the difficulty by constant sniping from both shores. Finally, rain began to fall, lifting the river and promising a greater flow of supplies but, at the same time, transforming all roads into almost impassable strips of mud. A determined Lawton, however, decided to launch a mobile force north, regardless of the attendant risks and short rations. 57 From this date, October 27, Young, directing the forward units, dominated the expedition. Lawton devoted his time to supplying Young's forces. 58

The immediate objective was Santa Rosa to the north, separated from San Isidro by six streams in just over nine miles. Ballance's Battalion, preceded by a picked screen of infantry
scouts and accompanied by Castner's Lowe Scouts and six pieces of artillery, spearheaded the advance. The gunboat Laguna de Bay moved up the Pampanga in support. A rope ferry, followed by two hastily rigged bamboo structures anchored to old piers, and a floating bamboo bridge were used to cross the water barriers and push back Filipino opposition. At the Toboatin River, Castner's Scouts and Ballance's Company A flanked the rebels entrenched on the opposite shore and were the first troops to enter Santa Rosa.

Ballance's Battalion rested for two days. Impressed native carts hauled supplies to the Taboatin River and small rafts ferried them across. Bancas captured by Castner's command provided additional transportation. Batson and two Macabebe companies arrived on October 29. The newer Macabebe units had been left behind to garrison the shoreline opposite San Isidro. The next day, the Macabebees were sent to guard the road crossing three miles west of the new objective—Cabanatuan. Ballance proceeded to drive the insurgents from Cabanatuan while capturing a large quantity of rice, telegraphic equipment and supplies and an arsenal for the manufacture of small arms ammunition.59

Bolstered by the courage and capacity of his men, Young surveyed the results of the past four days and concluded that he faced a badly frightened enemy. He telegraphed Lawton that if his present force could have packmule transportation and, if one or two fresh regiments could garrison the lines already established, all concentrated insurgent forces in northern Luzon could be
smashed in six or seven weeks. Lawton dampened Young's enthusiasm by reminding him of the miserable state of the roads, the lack of supplies and the embarrassment that would follow a hasty retreat spawned by overzealous judgment. Young, however, could occupy Talavera and Aliaga if he could obtain the necessary supplies. The redoubtable Young responded that he had ordered a squadron of Fourty Cavalry with three days rations to occupy Talavera, nine miles north of Cabanatuan. Lieutenant Colonel James Parker, Forty Fifth Volunteer Infantry, with two troops of the Fourth Cavalry and Batson's Macabebes would seize Aliaga, nine miles west of Cabanatuan.

On October 31 Colonel Parker ordered the Macabebes toward Aliaga. They secured the pueblo when a force of 200 raw Filipino troops withdrew without a fight. The next morning Batson scouted toward the Rio Chico. In the afternoon he obtained information that a Colonel Padilla and a body of insurgents were in the vicinity of Zaragosa and Carmin, hamlets about 10 miles northwest of San Isidro. On November 2 Batson, Lieutenant Boutelle and 100 Scouts (70 men of the First Company, 30 of the Second) began a reconnaissance of the roads in that direction. The usual scouting formation was assumed: a small advance guard, two files and frequent halts to scour the flanks.

A mile and a half from Aliaga the Macabebes marched into the small barrio of Santiago. Batson became convinced something was afoot. No women and children could be seen; yet one or two
Filipino males occupied each dwelling. All adamantly claimed the area was free of insurgents. Then, the column moved toward the edge of the barrio, an elderly man lighted a brush heap. Despite the recent heavy rains the pile ignited immediately, indicating the material had been stored in a dry place. The Scout leader assumed the fire had to be a signal for someone beyond the barrio. A half mile beyond Santiago, he halted his command to reconnoiter. After studying the surrounding countryside, Batson moved ahead to join the advance guard. Boutelle remained at the head of the column. The signal to advance was given but the Macabebes had marched less than 100 yards when a Filipino force rose from concealment behind the near bank of a canal flanking the road. The insurgents let loose a terrific fire virtually the length of the Scout files.

The canal angled away from the road so that at the front the enemy was only 25 yards from the Macabebes while at the rear approximately 75 yards. Riding quickly to the main column, Batson found Boutelle standing on the road calmly directing a rapid fire by the First Company, which he had ordered to cover in a ditch at the edge of the muddy highway. Ordering the officer to join his men, Batson moved along the line to the Second Company, planning to flank to enemy at his left. The First Company would then advance up the road and foil any attempt the insurgents might make to escape.
Batson turned the flank of the Filipinos without undue difficulty and the opposition scrambled from the canal. Reaching the canal, Batson signaled the First Company to pursue the fleeing insurgents. The Macabebes, however, came running to him. Puzzled as to why he had not been obeyed, Batson hurried to the road. There he found Boutelle dead. Quickly reassembling his Macabebes, Batson determined he must hold his position and inform Colonel Parker of the situation. The insurgents seemed to possess numerical strength of a dangerous magnitude. During the charge across the canal the advance guard had repulsed a group of rebels approaching from the direction of Zaragosa. A detail with rapidly constructed litters for Boutelle's body and Corporal Rafeal Manugud, who had been wounded in the leg, set out for Aliaga to report. At Santiago, the detail encountered several men armed with bolos and soon it was taking fire from some of the houses. Alerted by gunfire, Batson sent another detachment on the run which engaged those shooting from cover and set fire to the town. The Scout leader later learned that an organized bolo band in Santiago had planned to attack from the rear once the original ambush had pinned his men down.

Parker appeared within an hour with 50 more Macabebes (Second Company) and 75 mounted cavalrymen. Determined to force the issue the strengthened column made a punitive sweep to Zaragosa. It routed rebel units within a mile of the initial clash, at Zaragosa and again at Carmin. Late in the evening the exhausted soldiers
returned to Aliaga. The Macabebes had maintained the lead position throughout, swimming five streams due to the destruction of bridges by the Filipino insurgents and seeking a fight with the enemy at all times. Batson claimed 40 Filipinos killed while Parker believed the opponents' losses were heavy but made no positive estimate. For the "bravery, coolness, skill and judgment" exercised by Batson during the day, Colonel Parker recommended him for the Congressional Medal of Honor.

The Macabebes garrisoned Aliaga with Parker's troops until November 5 when they were ordered to report to Young at Cabanatuan. Decisions had been made at division (San Isidro) and brigade (Cabanatuan) headquarters that were to determine the final role of the Lawton column in the "Northern Expedition."

* * *

Amidst the severe supply problems which now had the division on half rations, a distinctly alarming telegraphic message arrived at San Isidro on October 31. From Manila came word that a captured document, dated October 5, contained a statement by Aguinaldo that he intended to move his capital from Tarlac to Bayombong in Nueva Viscaya Province for sanitary reasons. If the Filipino leader slipped through the mountains to Bayombong all the labors of the First Division to date would be for naught. Major General Lawton made plans for a move on Bayombong (to be led by himself) and hustled the details to Eighth Army headquarters.
the next day. 69 On November 2 Otis wired Lawton that his advance was not to go beyond San Jose. The most efficient service Lawton could perform would be to block the mountain trail with cavalry and to continue operations from San Isidro and Cabanatuan to the west. MacArthur planned to move soon and Wheaton would block the coast road north of Dagupan from the sea. Given the bad roads making wagon transportation almost impossible, and his personal conviction that Aguinaldo would not abandon the railroad unless compelled to do so, Otis could see no useful purpose in occupying Bayombong at this time. 70

Brigadier General Young at Cabanatuan was not so confident. Although Wheaton could cover San Nicholas Pass above Humingan and Tayug, the easiest route to Bayombong from his base on the Gulf of Lingayen, he was still in Manila and the heavy surf on the western coast had delayed landings in the past. There was also an additional mountain route leading north through Pozorubbio, Rosario and Tubao and connecting with the coast road at Aringay. It should also be closed. Personally, Young was positive, based on information obtained from recently released Spanish prisoners, that Aguinaldo’s route would indeed be through Tayug and San Nicholas Pass. As an additional assurance that the Tagalog insurgent would be captured, Young began to speculate on the ways a fast-moving force could intercede and live from the land until it connected with Wheaton on the coast.
News on November 3 that MacArthur was scheduled to move in two days and Wheaton in three, along with a report that Aguinaldo was moving property to Tayug, clarified Young's churning thoughts. On November 5 he broached to Lawton an intriguing proposal. Emphasizing the improbability of the column accomplishing anything while anchored to wagons and carts and the unpredictable Pampanga, he asked permission to proceed with Batson's Scouts, Ballance's Battalion, a battery of artillery and three squadrons of cavalry to San Jose. There he would cut loose from his own supply train and occupy Tayug and San Nicholas. In bold language, Young was requesting permission to dash into country never seen by a white man before and intercept Aguinaldo. Lawton, perhaps in an attempt to enhance what chance the expedition had of being successful, probably wishing he himself could go, and certainly influenced by Otis's theme that San Jose was a legitimate objective, endorsed Young's proposal.

Recalling all troops from Aliaga, Young published field orders the next morning. The order of march placed the Macabebes in the van, followed by Troop F, Third Cavalry; Ballance's Twenty Second Infantry Battalion; and the artillery and additional cavalry. The unfolding rush for Bayombong along the base of the mountains brought the Macabebe companies together and permitted them to function as a battalion for the first time. Lieutenant Quinlan brought the two units stationed at San Isidro upriver to join forces with Batson. Additional officers for the organization
also reached Cabanatuan. First Lieutenants H. R. Chadwick and Albert C. McMillan, Thirtieth Volunteer Infantry, were given command of the Fourth and Fifth Companies respectively, while Quinlan assumed command of the Second and Batson the First. Second Lieutenant Albert V. Faulkner, Twenty Seventh Volunteers, served as battalion adjutant and quartermaster.

The Macabebe Battalion, except for a 50-man detachment guarding a gunboat aground at San Isidro, crossed to the west bank of the Pampanga on November 6 and the next morning marched nine miles north to Talavera where a squadron of the Fourth Cavalry had established a base. During the same early hours of daylight, Young began to work the rest of his 1,100-man command across the now swollen, raging river. By 5:30 p.m. the crossing was still underway. Determined to be in San Jose within 24 hours, Young swam the Pampanga with a 30-man cavalry escort and rode during the night to reach Talavera.

The Brigadier General could think only of San Jose, the road center now just 17 miles away. At 6 a.m. a squadron of the Fourth Cavalry took one road to San Jose. Batson’s Scouts and a troop of the Third Cavalry took the other. In a forced march, the cavalry troop, owing to better roads near the objective, arrived in San Jose 30 minutes ahead of the walking Macabebes and secured the mountain pass beyond the road center. No resistance was encountered. Frightened by the yelling, galloping cavalry as they passed through, the few insurgents still present hid their
guns in an attempt to pass as residents of San Jose. The Macabebes quickly detected them and put them under guard. One of the prisoners was the son of Llanera, a Filipino general who had escaped earlier. On November 9, a 30-man Macabebe patrol under Lieutenant Quinlan scoured the countryside for the general but found only his dispatches.75

The dispatches interested Young. They indicated Aguinaldo had been in Tarlac the day before. One message directed the repair of the military road through Tayug to the mountain pass at San Nicholas and the construction of telegraph lines; another ordered the erection of fortifications for different towns, including Lupao. Collectively, the information impressed on Young the need to seize Lupao, Humingan and Tayug before the construction of defenses could be instituted.76

Leaving 180 men to hold San Jose, Young lunged forward the next morning, moving beyond the telegraph lines and abandoning his supply train altogether. The Macabebes and a troop of cavalry led the way to the new objective—Lupao. Its 40 odd defenders withdrew toward Humingan without a struggle. The Third Cavalry continued the advance and captured a series of unfinished trenches at a stream two miles beyond the hamlet. At daybreak, November 11, the command marched for Humingan, five miles away on the headwaters of the Agno. Here the Filipinos determined to offer at least token resistance. About 100 of them took positions in front of the pueblo and opened fire on the Macabebes at 500 yards.
Batson, with a battalion at his disposal, sent Quinlan and his company to the right to prevent any escape on the Tayug road. Lieutenant J. D. Hall, Thirty Fifth Volunteers, commanding the First Company since San Jose, was ordered to intersect the road to Rosales. With the two remaining companies, Batson mounted an attack that routed the enemy. The Scouts paused to feast on captured food while the cavalry bucked the muddy roads to San Quintin (three miles), Tayug (another five miles), and the San Nicholas mountain pass (six more miles).

Another pass was closed. If Major General Wheaton closed the trail running north through Pozorubbio, Alava and Rosario giving access to the coast highway further west, Aguinaldo might still be captured. Young fretted. Aguinaldo had to be near. On November 14, the Third Cavalry encountered his rear guard to the west. By November 16, Young's virtually exhausted, unmounted Macabebes and mounted cavalry had reached Pozorubbio, only 20 miles from Lingayen (the capital of Pangasinan Province on the Gulf) and just a short distance from the coast road. He had accomplished the taks of the Lawton column. The column, or at least a part of it, had worked its way completely around the armies of Aguinaldo and MacArthur by traveling from San Fernando east and north and then west, almost reaching the sea above both forces, covering 120 miles of difficult terrain in just 6 weeks. MacArthur had also completed the most important phase of his
assignment. He reached Tarlac on November 13, but a key bridge
washed away and he could not reach Dagupan. Still not sure of Wheaton's position or whether Aguinaldo
had already moved past him, Young refused to admit defeat. His
command had been reduced by sickness and exhaustion, but he was
determined to make one last attempt to catch the elusive
Aguinaldo. Wiring Otis in Manila that Aguinaldo had been
reduced to "a fugitive and an outlaw seeking security in escape
to the mountains or by sea," Young headed north on November 18
with the only part of his command able to move—a troop of Third
Cavalry (80 men) and the Macabebe battalion. As the Macabebes
approached Rosario the next day, 30 insurgents camped nearby
withdrew towards Tubao. Young, estimating Aguinaldo had as much
as a 60 hour lead on him, camped at Rosario. Insurrectos kept the
Macabebe outposts occupied all night. Unwilling to lose more time,
Young took his force over the difficult mountain pass to Tubao at
dawn and established a temporary camp. An hour later, a Macabebe
brought him word that enemy soldiers were moving up the coast to
join General Manuel Tinio at Aringay, six miles away. Cognizant
of the small size of his force and the disaster any enemy concen-
tration could produce, Young decided to push on, leaving all "foot-
sore and tired Macabebes" and a few Americans behind.

The pueblo and telegraph station of Aringay were located on
the Aringay River at the crossing of the coast highway. Batson,
in the van with the Macabebes, learned that an insurgent body
awaited him at the ford a few miles this side of Aringay. At 5:30 p.m. the Macabebe advance guard came under fire. As before Humingan, Quinlan took his company to the right and Hall to the left. The remainder of the depleted battalion gained the near bank of the river and opened a rapid fire. Shortly thereafter, Batson was wounded, but continued to issue orders.

Extending his line to the left to enfilade the Filipino earthworks, Batson hurried Lieutenant Faulkner off to see if a ford existed to that side. Approaching darkness and the difficulty of forcing the rebels from their trenches by gunfire made the Scout leader anxious to initiate a crossing. Lieutenants Faulkner and Quinlan spared the battalion a frontal assault by leading a detachment across the river. Faced with a determined fire and the threat of a flanking movement, the insurgents began to fall back. Batson's line moved into the water while the newly arrived Third Cavalry warded off another Filipino body appearing on the coast road and occupied the sharpshooters positioned on the hillsides above the ford. Fires were lighted to enable everyone to cross safely and take shelter in Aringay for the night.

Batson's injury proved more serious than realized at first, for although the bullet had passed through his foot without exploding, some small bones were shattered. The Scout leader could not continue—he would have to go to Manila for treatment. Young described the situation as "a very sad and at this
particular time a very grave misfortune, and one particularly
disheartening to the Macabebes, who performed prodigious work
under him. Lieutenant Colonel Wilbur E. Wilder, Forty Third
Volunteer Infantry, took command of the Macabebes.

Young continued the pursuit of Aguinaldo. On November 21,
he reached San Fernando de la Union, 45 miles north of Dagupan
where he awaited supplies landed by the naval gunboat Samar.
Other supplies and troops began to trickle in slowly from the
south and provided Young with the means to continue the chase and
militarily occupy northern Luzon. The Macabebes, however, did
not go far beyond San Fernando de la Union. Since Cabanatuan they
had spearheaded the advance of Young's men and, as usual, obeyed
orders willingly, shown courage under fire and maintained a stead­
fast loyalty to Batson. But Lieutenant Colonel Wilder was forced
on November 24 to leave between 120 and 150 of them at San
Fernando. Disheartened over the loss of their leader, Batson,
the foot-sore Macabebes began to come down with malaria, a devel­
opment Wilder attributed to continuous fatigue and exposure to
rain and water on the march from Cabanatuan to Aringay. Malaria
and sore feet also kept more than half of the battalion from
gathering at Young's new temporary station (Namacpacan) on
November 27. Those reporting were ordered to garrison Namacpacan,
Balauang, Bangar and San Fernando.

Garrison duty and illness dispersed the Macabebes across a
wide area in small groups. As a consequence a number of American
officers, with whom they had served continuously and who were accustomed to keeping them under close scrutiny, lost contact with them. The removal of the control these men had exercised freed the Macabebes to move about unattended in a strange province. They were soon terrorizing the countryside. By November 30, Lawton had convicted one Macabebe of rape, others of robbery and assault and he was considering disarming all of them once they had been concentrated at Tayug. 87

It was not easy for Lawton to admit their guilt. During the northward trek of his column, various Filipinos had charged the Macabebes with similar offenses. But Lawton had denied the validity of these accusations. In part, he defended the Macabebes because he admired their courage and respected Batson’s ability to keep them out of trouble. 88 At the same time, he knew the Macabebes were feared by the general populace and exaggeration of their behavior by those facing their guns was entirely possible. Finally, he tended to attribute the alleged offenses to the insurgents themselves. 89 His contention here did have some merit. The Macabebes had never been issued American infantry or cavalry uniforms. Their dress, therefore, consisted of khaki pants, hickory or blue cotton shirt, straw hat and no shoes. 90 Virtually every lowland dweller in the Philippines dressed the same way. When similar dress was coupled with the absence of physical disparities exhibited by non-mountainous inhabitants, the Macabebe
became a person not easily distinguishable by sight, since only language and area of residence differentiated most Filipinos.

Two particular events known to Lawton had given his argument credence in the past. On November 3 between Aliaga and Cabanatuan, a supply train guarded by Lieutenant Castner's Lowe Scouts was completely deceived with insurgents claimed to be Macabebes and approached the pack ponies. Not until the rebels opened fire at 75 yards did Castner's company realize it had been duped. Brigadier General Young immediately ordered 450 American campaign hats for Batson's Scouts to prevent such treachery in the future. Yet, later, during the sweep to Tayug, three American infantrymen almost lost their lives when they responded to a number of armed men calling in broken English that they were "American Macabebes." 91

Although the number of complaints against the Macabebes prior to November, 1899 had been few and generally unsubstantiated, Lawton and Young, in particular, were at fault for allowing the Macabebes to assume a variety of stations without adequate supervision. The Spanish had at times shown faint concern as to how native troops squelched revolts and maintained public order. Both officers as well as Otis knew that the Macabebes had previously been guilty of atrocities in their dealings with the Tagalogs. The Tagalogs, in turn, had frequently been brutal with the Macabebes. Thus, neither Lawton nor Young was on solid ground when assuming a brief tour of duty with American officers had or
could convert the Macabebes to the standards of civilized warfare. Indeed, the Macabebes, as well as any other Filipino, were liable to abuse the power identification with the American military gave them unless they were officered by men who demanded proper military conduct and accepted nothing less.

Faced with indisputable evidence, Lawton ordered Young to dispatch one or two Americans on duty with the Macabebes to collect those left behind in his rush after Aguinaldo. Young immediately ordered all detailed Macabebes to report to San Fabian for assignment to their proper companies. A subsequent investigation revealed that only 100 Macabebes were fit for duty and on December 6, 1899, Young recommended they be removed from service in the northern sector. Lawton and Otis agreed.

Throughout December 1899, detachments of Macabebes arrived at Manila in bad health. Calumpit became a recuperation center for them. On January 6, 1900, Lieutenant Colonel Wilder arrived with the last detachment and took command. As soon as their health improved, the Macabebes returned to work as a mobile patrol force in Pampanga province.

Lieutenant Castner's Lowe Scouts remained in northern Luzon. On November 3, after providing them insurrecto uniforms and Mexican money, Lawton ordered the Lowe Scouts through San Nicholas Pass to Bayombong (capital of Nueva Viscaya Province) in search of Aguinaldo. A battalion of the Twenty Fourth Infantry under Captain Joseph B. Batchelor followed. From Bayombong the two officers led
their respective commands (without precise orders) down the Cagayan River Valley to the northern coast of Luzon, a distance of 200 miles. Naval gunboats then conveyed them to the west coast. Castner worked diligently throughout the march to establish contacts in every sizable barrio. These contacts were instructed to compile lists of prospective recruits for the U.S. Army. Using Vigan on the western Luzon coast as a base, the Lowe Scouts began a quest for insurgents still armed.95

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The "Northern Expedition" successfully shattered the larger units of Aguinaldo's Army. But guerrilla fighting would continue for years. That Filipino troops bearing arms for the United States played a role in this protracted struggle resulted largely from the record of the Macabebes in the Luzon campaign of late 1899. It was the tactical problem facing the Eighth Army in Pampanga that led Otis to overlook the end result of building an army for Aguinaldo and begin arming the Macabebes. He was influenced heavily by the Macabebes pro-Spanish sentiments and prior duty as mercenaries. Once these particular Filipinos were organized along American lines and enjoyed considerable success under the tutelage of Batson, subsequent decisions to secure more of them to not only continue local patrols but also serve with Lawton's column were not difficult. Throughout the exhaustive chase of Aguinaldo, in engagements at San Mateo, Santiago,
Humigan and Aringay, the Macabebes demonstrated the potential of the Filipino as a soldier. Beyond the soldier's skill as a warrior they exhibited skills as boatmen, guides, scouts, detectives and spies. In the years ahead their achievements served as a constant reminder to Americans that the Filipino could be a good soldier.

In the eyes of the American high command, the Macabebes possessed only one serious fault: a tendency to revert to the barbarous practices previously allowed by the Spanish, particularly when confronted with Tagalogs or allowed to wander in a province other than Pampanga. Macabebe transgressions were at first minimal. But the breakdown of discipline and its ugly results after the Aringay assault revealed to Lawton, Young and Otis the extremes Macabebe behavior could achieve. The crimes committed by the Macabebes would also be a reminder that the antagonisms existing between linguistic groups in the Philippines did not lessen simply because a Filipino donned an American uniform. Since the United States did not want to discontinue the services of the Macabebes but wanted to adhere to the principles of civilized warfare, the U.S. Army would have to maintain a policy of close observation regarding them to prevent excesses in the future.96

A constant criterion for Filipino enlisted personnel would be their loyalty to the American cause. Castner's Lowe Scouts suggested that even certain Tagalogs might be trusted. Perhaps other
Filipino linguistic and tribal groups would respect an oath of allegiance to the United States. Loyalty, however, was never a question where the Macabebes were concerned. Acutely aware of the Macabebe-Tagalog discord, American officers and administrators took Macabebe loyalty for granted. Nor did the question whether the Macabebes were professional mercenaries bother the American government. They had served Spain and now served the United States. They almost seemed to come with the Philippines.
NOTES: CHAPTER ONE

1. Plan to organize a force of Macabebe scouts to patrol the province of Pampanga, submitted by Matthew A. Batson, July 16, 1899, records of the Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94, National Archives. Hereafter the records of the National Archives are indicated by the record group (RG) followed by the symbol NA. The above document will be cited as Batson Plan, AGO 468092, RG 94, NA.


The primary sources of information about Batson's service in the Philippines are the letters he wrote to his wife in the form of a personal journal. Matthew A. Batson Papers, 9th U.S. Cavalry Regiment Collection, Spanish American War Survey, U.S. Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Penn. Hereafter cited as Batson Papers, date, USMHRC.

3. J. N. Munro, Capt., 3rd Cavalry, "The Philippine Native Scouts," Infantry Journal II (July, 1905), p. 180; Batson Plan, AGO 468092, RG 94, NA. Batson later described his visit to Macabebe and revealed a firm grasp of Macabebe history, Batson Papers, June 1, 1899, USMHRC.

4. Batson Plan, AGO 468092, RG 94, NA.


John R. M. Taylor, in his compilation, *The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States*, galley proofs in five volumes (Washington, 1906), records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, RG 350, NA, I, 8, claimed the head of the Blanco family had the authority of a tribal chief in regard to the Macabebes.

8. See the sources cited in footnote 7 above.

9. Le Roy, *The Americans in the Philippines*, I, 199-201; Batson Papers, June 1, 1899, USMHRC.


13. WD, Correspondence Relating to War with Spain, II, 986.


15. Letter from Lt. Col. Clarence R. Edwards to 1st. Lieut. M. A. Batson, March 24, 1900, AGO 317496 (Squadron, Philippine Cavalry), RG 94, NA. Batson believed Lawton understood clearly the merits of arming Macabebes and would be persuasive when talking to Otis. He also realized Otis's fears that Macabebe behavior would prove a problem represented the greatest obstacle to the implementation of his proposal. Batson Papers, September 24, 1899, USMHRC.

16. Batson Plan, AGO 468092, RG 94, NA.


20. The Blanco family, under the leadership of Eugenio Blanco, had raised a number of Macabebe military units besides the Seventy Second Regiment previously discussed, Larkin, "Evolution of Pampangan Society," pp. 150-151. Batson took particular pains to select those with prior military experience, Batson Papers, September 17, 1899, USMHRC.


22. Otis, Report, 1900, p. 13. Batson was the source of Otis's belief that the Macabebes were behaving themselves. The Macabebe leader, who had served with non-whites by serving with the 9th Cavalry in Cuba, believed the Macabebes could give American volunteer personnel pointers on discipline, Batson Papers, September 24, 1899, USMHRC.

23. Batson Report, AGO 318980, RG 94, NA.


28. Lawton was the logical choice for the command of the northeastern push. Besides a campaign south from Manila to Imus, and one from Manila to Laguna de Bay, he had led an expedition up the Pampanga to San Isidro (23 miles above San Fernando) in May 1899, New York Times, December 20, 1899, p. 1. Young, like Lawton a soldier of considerable distinction, had commanded the Third Army in Cuba. For details of his long career, see William Thaddeus Sexton, Captain, U.S. Army, Soldiers in the Sun: An Adventure in Imperialism (Harrisburg, 1939, pp. 176-177; Mark M. Boatner, III, The Civil War Dictionary (New York, 1959), p. 953; New York Times, September 2, 1924, p. 9.

29. The infantry companies and cavalry troops were from the Twenty Second and Twenty Fourth Infantries and the Third and Fourth Cavailrites, Lawton, Report, 1900, p. 7.


33. Batson Report, AGO 318980, RG 94, NA; Batson Papers, November 26, 1899, USMHR.


35. Ballance, Report, 1900, p. 301; Batson Papers, November 26, 1899, USMHR.

36. For a detailed description of the night journey by Batson, Simpson and Fernandez, see Batson Papers, November 26, 1899, USMHR. See also, Special Field Orders No. 4, October 17, 1899, Batson Report, AGO 318980, RG 94, NA; Ballance, Report, 1900, p. 246; Young, Report, 1900, p. 264.


40. Otis, Report, 1900, p. 23; Batson Papers, USMHR, October 29, 1899.


42. Young, Report, 1900, p. 265.

43. Batson Report, AGO 318980, RG 94, NA; Batson Papers, October 29, 1899, USMHR.


45. Lauton, Report, 1900, p. 41.

46. Ibid.

47. Young, Report, 1900, p. 270.

48. Ibid., p. 265.

49. Batson Report, AGO 318980, RG 94, NA.


51. Batson Report, AGO 318980, RG 94, NA.


54. Lauton, Report, 1900, p. 67.


60. Young, Report, 1900, p. 270.


63. Lauton, Report, 1900, pp. 112-114.

64. Batson Report, AGO 318980, RG 94, NA; "Report of M. A. Batson, First Lieutenant, Fourth Cavalry, Commanding Macabebes Scouts, November 2, 1899," WD, Annual Reports, 1899-1900, I, Part 6, 126-127; Lawton, Report, 1900, p. 119. For a detailed essay on the battle and a hand-drawn map of the engagement site, see Batson Papers, November 5, 1899, USMHRC.

65. Batson Report, AGO 318980, RG 94, NA.

66. Lauton, Report, 1900, p. 126; Batson Papers, November 5, 1899, USMHRC.

67. Lauton, Report, 1900, p. 126. Lauton recommended an appointment for Batson as a major of volunteers since he already commanded a battalion of Macabebes. Young, sharing Batson's sadness over Boutelle's death, informed the Macabebe leader of his immense pride in the achievement of the scouts to date, Batson Papers, November 5, 1899, USMHRC.


69. Ibid.

70. Young, Report, 1900, p. 271.

71. WD, Correspondence Relating to War with Spain, II, 1092; Lawton, Report, 1900, pp. 141-142.


73. Young, Report, 1900, p. 273.

74. Batson Report, AGO 318980, RG 94, NA; Lauton, Report, 1900, pp. 83-84. McMillan had been wounded while serving with the Rough Riders in Cuba. Chadwick was a regular army sergeant.

75. Otis, Report, 1900, p. 36; Young, Report, 1900, p. 274.

76. Young, Report, 1900, p. 274; Otis, Report, 1900, p. 37; Batson Report, AGO 318980, RG 94, NA.

78. Young, Report, 1900, p. 275; WD, Correspondence Relating to War with Spain, II, 1100.
80. Young, Report, 1900, p. 279.
81. Ibid.
82. Batson Report, AGO 318980, RG 94, NA; Otis, Report, 1900, p. 73; Lawton, Report, 1900, p. 168. For complete details of the engagement and Batson’s hand-drawn map, see Batson Papers, November 21, 1899, USMHR.
84. Otis, Report, 1900, p. 73; Army and Navy Journal XXXVII (March, 1900), p. 708.
86. Young, Report, 1900, p. 281.
87. Lawton, Report, 1900, p. 205.
88. Ibid., p. 204.
89. Otis, Report, 1900, p. 70.
90. U.S. Senate, Affairs in the Philippines, 1902, III, 2429.
91. Lawton, Report, 1900, p. 142; Young, Report, 1900, p. 277.
92. Lawton, Report, 1900, p. 205.
93. Ibid., pp. 206, 215, 231.
CHAPTER TWO

THE PHILIPPINE SCOUTS: GUERRILLA FIGHTERS AND
POLICE AUXILIARY FORCE—1900-1904

The disintegration of Aguinaldo's organized military units under the pressure of the "Northern Expedition" introduced another phase of the American-Filipino struggle. Unable to field combatants on an equal footing with their opponents, the Filipinos resorted to guerrilla tactics: fighting in small bands, attacking only when possessing a tactical advantage. Insurgent soldiers, often operating militarily on a part-time basis, became both farmer and fighter.1

The separation of hostile insurgent from peaceful inhabitant was only one facet of the complex situation confronting the American army. During the previous four years, the domestic stability of the Philippines was undermined. Civilian casualties, untilled fields, loss of work animals, destruction of food stores, epidemics and pestilence had produced by 1900 a high degree of economic dislocation. The defeat of Spain had completely toppled the decaying colonial government structure. The chief beneficiaries of the resulting turbulence were the ladrones inhabiting the countryside. Since the Spanish had never
seriously attempted to eliminate this lawless element, the brigands had grown progressively bolder in the last years of the nineteenth century. Often poorer barrio residents not only gave aid and comfort to the outlaws, but idolized them for their forays against the more prosperous members of society. Enterprising law breakers claimed the possession of supernatural powers to enlarge their coteries of supporters and admirers. Their disruptive ability increased in direct proportion to the acceptance of these claims to divine power and their success afield.²

To Americans, the ladron and Filipino patriot had much in common. Both received support from the barrios, extracting aid by threats and violence where sympathetic attitudes did not exist. Both vehemently opposed the establishment of public order. Given the tenacity they had already displayed, implementation of American colonial policy required the elimination of their power and influence. The United States Army, in command in the Philippines until civil government could be erected, assumed the responsibility of determining friend from foe and restoring enough public security to permit new municipal governments, courts and schools to function. The assignment necessitated a prodigious effort. The Philippine Islands contained over 100,000 square miles of land and a population of more than 8,000,000 while American forces reached a peak of a little more than 70,000 in late 1900. The numerical disadvantage resulted in an occupation
policy limited to the garrisoning of key communities and strategic points. From occupied sites, large columns as well as small detachments would then attempt to force the recalcitrant into submission. American units were divided and subdivided. By July 1901, the army manned 502 posts and stations throughout the Philippines.³

As pacification proceeded, several problems faced the occupying forces. The Americans intended to retain governmental control after the cessation of hostilities; thus it was imperative that the bulk of the islanders accept American domination. An awesome occupation force could establish and maintain order if given a free hand, but the value of such an approach was debatable, particularly in light of the reluctance of American citizens to support a large island garrison for a long time. Indeed, Congressional authority for the Volunteer Army on duty in the Philippines expired July 1, 1901, and there was little prospect of extension. The fundamental question for the future was whether or not the Filipinos could be persuaded to police themselves and provide a military body to complement reduced American strength, or replace it altogether.⁴

The demands of the Filipino insurrection on the U.S. Army made immediate use of the native soldier a practical venture. The final outcome of the endeavor to suppress Filipino resistance depended on the critical function of locating the opposition. Whether hidden in mountain retreats or passing as residents of
any given barrio, both ladrones and insurgents often went undetected by American soldiers. The native scout suffered from no such handicap. He was intimately acquainted with certain parts of his country by either residence or past service with the Spanish army or insurgent forces, and he often knew the most probable campsites and rendezvous points. Acquainted with many leading insurrectos and their subalterns by sight and reputation, the Filipino soldier generally recognized any of them he encountered. The most valuable asset of the island trooper, however, was his general knowledge of the language, habits and customs of the people. With such knowledge the scout could frequently uncover the methods insurgents used for recruiting, obtaining rations, concealing weapons and spying on towns garrisoned by American units.5

Despite the talents of the Filipino soldiers, employment of their skills took place on a cautious and piecemeal basis. The rugged guerrilla battle enveloping the archipelago aroused an instinctive disinclination toward arming many natives. Such hesitancy made a policy of gradual recruitment more acceptable since it would likely forestall any mutinous tendencies until the loyalty of all candidates had been confirmed. Enrollment of islanders at even a slow pace, however, could proceed only as fast as American officers became available to organize and train them. Training, Secretary of War Elihu Root proclaimed in late
1900, could not be slighted. The Filipino recruit needed to "cultivate the habit of subordination, respect for authority, self-control and regard for the usages of civilized warfare" that characterized the disciplined soldier.6

With the Macabebe experience as a solid precedent, the guerrilla-seeking American army began a careful alteration of existing native forces, as well as the creation and expansion of additional units. The Macabebe companies raised by Batson were reorganized in May 1900 as the Philippine Cavalry Squadron and engaged to serve until June 30, 1901.7 Castner's Lowe Scouts, depleted by the rigors of the recent campaign, were rebuilt and by January 24, 1900, the company, still stationed at Vigan, the capital of Ilocos Sur Province, consisted of 16 white men and 72 Tagalogs. Brigadier General Young increased Castner's outfit by enrolling 250 Ilocanos in March.8 Young's decision to accept Ilocanos as soldiers was carefully made. The Ilocanos resided in Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Abra and Union Provinces, governmental units located on a narrow, overcrowded coastal plain in northwestern Luzon. Numbering slightly less than a half million, the tall and dark Malay group harbored a fierce cultural pride. Always land hungry, they were known as the "Yankees of the Philippines" for their aggressiveness, acquisitiveness and pioneering nature.9

In late 1899, several hundred Ilocanos had offered their services when the Americans reached Cabanatuan. American officers
hesitated. A large number of Ilocanos, including General Antonio Luna, had supported Aguinaldo. Fearing the Ilocanos were merely seeking revenge for Luna's subsequent assassination by Aguinaldo's Tagalog followers in June 1899, the U.S. Army employed the volunteers at first only as road builders, ration carriers and guides. Young's decision to arm a substantial number of them indicated a changing American attitude. By December 1900, the Ilocano ranks swelled to 480. Generally they were detailed for service in small detachments with specific American units. 10

Between May and December 1900 the creation of Filipino military units in the Visayan Islands was undertaken. A provisional police force was authorized for the island of Samar along with scout companies for the islands of Leyte, Negros, Cebu and Panay. 11 Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes, commanding the Department of Visayas, instituted a firm set of rules for selecting and arming natives. All potential soldiers were carefully examined for physical fitness and personal reputation. If accepted, the new recruit was first assigned various tasks that did not require the use of arms. Once he demonstrated proper conduct and his loyalty was reasonably established, the new man was issued a rifle. Hughes's subordinate officers diligently carried out his orders. For example, a second lieutenant detailed to raise a detachment of scouts on Cebu could have secured 150 men immediately, but picked only 30, all of whom were vouched for
by local officials and several of whom had served with Spanish military forces. Training was also emphasized in Hughes's department. The Second Company, Leyte Scouts, for instance, received daily instructions in rifle practice, guard duty, drill and the English language.  

The growth of scout organizations continued into January 1901. Permission to establish Filipino detachments in the Department of Southern Luzon was granted by division headquarters and Manila. In northern Luzon, a battalion of Cagayan native troops, an independent Macabebe company, a new or additional Macabebe battalion, yet another Cagayan battalion, and, finally, full Ilocano companies were authorized. The Cagayan, numbering about 100,000, inhabited Cagayan Province on the northern coast of Luzon. Pacific and affable, these Christian natives had their own dialect and farmed extensively. Since a large group of Ilocanos had migrated to this province, when the first Cagayan battalion emerged it contained Cagayan and Ilocano residents at a ratio of three to two, respectively. Each enlistee had to present the recommendation of the presidente of his home barrio and the local official was held responsible for any questionable characters forwarded to recruiting stations. Far more Cagayans and Ilocanos applied for service than the U.S. Army could accept. Examining officers had the rare opportunity of choosing only the most suitable and the healthiest.
To avoid confusion and standardize all native units, Major General MacArthur issued "General Orders NO. 11" on January 16, 1901. This directive established the following pay rates and clothing allowances (in U.S. currency):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Monthly Pay</th>
<th>Clothing Allowance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant Major</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
<td>$1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster Sergeant</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissary Sergeant</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Sergeant</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>10.80</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>7.80</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"General Orders NO. 11" also stipulated that the subsistence provided would be the regular ration; public civil funds would continue to provide all financial support; all native personnel would, henceforth, be subject to the Articles of War; and enlisted men were free from revenue taxes on their salaries since they formed part of the military forces of the islands.15

All Filipinos bearing arms for the United States government through July 1901 were civilian employees of the Quartermaster Department. Written contracts, ranging from periods of two months up to a year, formed the sole basis of their connection with the American army. The binding oath administered to recruits in the Philippine Cavalry Squadron became a model for all island units. The Macabebes had to swear that

We the undersigned, do severally agree that we will well and faithfully serve the United States of America in the Squadron of Philippine Cavalry from the _____ day of _____, 1900, until the 30th day of June 1901, unless sooner discharged. This contract is made with the full knowledge of and in
conformity with General Orders allowances established therein, are hereby accepted and made a part of this contract. And we do further agree to obey and abide by such laws, orders and regulations as have been or may be hereafter prescribed.16

Source of revenue (insular or civil funds) did not in itself determine the status of enrolled Filipinos. They were civilians because no Congressional authority existed to permit their utilization except as a hired adjunct of the Volunteer Army's Quartermaster Department, a military structure scheduled to terminate no later than July 1, 1901, (when the provisions of the Act of March 2, 1898, lapsed.)17 The McKinley administration, aware that new legal power was necessary if the Scouts were to continue as a branch of the U.S. Army after July 1, sought the requisite legislation during the fall and winter of 1900-1901.

Secretary of War Elihu Root in his annual report for fiscal 1900 formulated the basic guidelines of administration thinking regarding the military situation in the Philippines. Fully admitting the restoration of order would necessarily be "a work of time," he stated that the War Department and key officers on duty in the Islands had been seriously considering the feasibility of utilizing native troops to suppress the rebellion and maintain peace. Root personally had no reservations regarding the practicality of such an approach. Experiments with several different bodies of islanders, particularly Macabebes, had already been successful and demonstrated that Filipinos were "faithful, courageous and responsive officers."18 If the United States desired,
Root predicted, it could obtain all the soldiers needed in the Philippines from among the inhabitants, who needed only half the pay tendered American personnel. The enlistment of native troops would also permit a substantial reduction of the oceanic transportation costs burdening the War Department budget. In conclusion, he estimated that the immediate military requirement of the Filipino colony was 60,000 men with this number decreasing progressively first as the real insurrection dissolved and ladron activities were checked, and secondly, as native soldiers were substituted for the bulk of American personnel.19

The Philippine question was part of a larger problem facing Secretary Root. He had to convince Congress that colonial responsibilities, if nothing else, demanded a permanently expanded military establishment. Consequently, President McKinley in his annual address to Congress, December 3, 1900, called for a regular army of 60,000, plus the personal power to increase that force to 100,000 if conditions in Cuba or the Philippines worsened. Fifteen thousand Filipino soldiers were to be included in the new force levels since the Philippine Commission, a body of civilian officials scheduled to control the future civil government in the islands, believed they would "be more effective in detecting and suppressing guerrillas, assassins and ladrones than our soldiers."20

Once the proposals were submitted to Congress (Senate Bill 4300), debate centered on the issues of presidential versus
congressional powers and the relative merits and dangers of a large standing army. The conflict in the Philippines played a secondary role in the Senate discussions. The particular subject of arming Filipinos came up twice. Both incidents involved the Macabebes. Colorado Senator Henry M. Teller, an Independent Silver Republican, maintained the Macabebes were uneducated, wicked and cruel. They did not represent the educated Filipinos. Although he believed the United States should hold the islands, Teller advocated an early dismissal of the Macabebes from U.S. service as their use of torture to locate guns was intolerable. While hoping the Filipinos succeeded in their quest for independence, Richard F. Pettigrew, Republican Senator from South Dakota, agreed with Teller about the Macabebes. Pettigrew denounced them as savages who had looted and burned under indifferent Spanish government. Equating them with the kind of people the English had enlisted against the United States in the American Revolution, he read several messages purportedly documenting Macabebe atrocities. Pettigrew declared that since only such savages would join an insular army, America was threatening to create an armed force that would ravage the Christian population of the Philippines.

Despite considerable opposition, Senate Bill 4300 (an act to increase the permanent military establishment of the United States) was approved on February 2, 1901. Three paragraphs of Section 36 sanctioned the creation of the Philippine Scouts and defined the
basic components of the future insular army. Henceforth, when
conditions in the Philippine Islands justified such action the
President could enlist natives of those islands

for service in the Army, to be organized as scouts, with such officers as he shall deem necessary for
their proper control, or as troops or companies, as
authorized by this act, for the Regular Army. The
President is further authorized, in his discretion,
to form companies organized as are companies of the
Regular Army, in squadrons or battalions, with
officers and noncommissioned officers corresponding
to similar organizations in the cavalry and infan-
try arms. The total number of enlisted men in said
native organizations shall not exceed twelve thou-
sand, and the total enlisted force of the line of
the Army, together with such native force, shall
not exceed at any time one hundred thousand.23

To officer the insular corps the President was empowered to
select captains of the line of the Regular Army as majors to
command the squadrons and battalions. While serving as majors,
the captains of the line would have the rank, pay and allowances
of the grade of major as established for the Regular Army. First
lieutenants of the line of the Regular Army would serve as cap-
tains of native troops or companies. The detached first lieu-
tenants were entitled to rank, pay and allowances of captain of the
arm to which they were assigned. To complete the commissioned
ranks, the act provided that

The squadron and battalion staff officers, and first
and second lieutenants of companies, may be selected
from noncommissioned officers or enlisted men of the
Regular Army of not less than two years service, or
from the officers or noncommissioned officers or
enlisted men serving, or have served, in the volun-
teers subsequent to April twenty-first, eighteen
hundred and ninety eight.24
Commissions for these grades were provisional, each bearing a term of four years. Subsequent or further appointments required satisfactory conduct in every respect.

In reference to native officers, the Act stipulated the President could grant provisional appointments as first and second lieutenants to natives of the Philippines who demonstrated by service and character the fitness required for command. The pay and allowances of officers thus commissioned would be determined by the Secretary of War and would not exceed those of like grades in the Regular Army. All other provisional officers were to receive the pay and allowances of the Regular Army.

Beyond granting the Secretary the power to define their pay, rations and clothing allowances (again not to exceed those of the Regular Army) the legislation of February 2 said nothing about enlisted personnel. The War Department was not saddled with any restrictions concerning term of enlistment, physical requirements, arms to be issued, or length of service. Therefore, unless the Act itself was revoked, Filipino scouts could exist indefinitely as part of the Regular Army.25

The sweeping authority the new law granted the U.S. Army did not immediately alter the prudent policy that the War Department was employing to construct a Filipino army. On April 20, 1901, the Department informed the New York Times that the "pet project" of Secretary Root meant long, tedious work. To insure proper implementation each Filipino had to be personally selected by an
American officer. The numerous scouting bands already attached to American forces would provide skeletal organizations on which future companies could be built. Good service as a scout counted but did not represent a full certificate of ability. Only the best would be retained.

The New York Times released the story on Root's policy. All contracts tendered Filipinos contained a specified period of service. But even that commitment could be terminated since the provision "unless sooner discharged" was always included. As a result, the army gained the privilege of using short terms of enrollment as probationary interims that weeded the loyal from the disloyal, the amenable from the uncontrollable. Once a nucleus of desired Filipinos had been formed it could, of course, be expanded or reorganized at will.

The early history of the Thirty Eighth Company, Philippine Scouts demonstrated Root's policy in action. Organized as the Provisional Police of Samar, a group of natives were transferred to Leyte in early 1900, and, in August, became the First Company, Leyte Scouts. On December 19, 1900, the men reenlisted and were designated as Company A, Leyte Scouts. In April 1901, 24 men were transferred with an equal number from Company B, Leyte Scouts to form Company D. When Companies A and B were subsequently mustered out of the service (September 30, 1901), 13 of the more desirable men of Company A and 17 of Company D formed the nucleus of the newly ordered Thirty Eighth Company, Philippine Scouts.
Consolidation and creation of new companies became pronounced from July through October 1901 as the Filipino contingent took a permanent form and the name Philippine Scouts. With Regular Army strength declining throughout 1901, Root's method of selection, slow but productive, could not be applied indefinitely. By November 1 only 1,111 officers and 42,128 enlisted men of the Regular Army remained in the Philippines. The last of the U.S. Volunteer forces had been shipped home by July. Certain volunteer officers were retained as commanders of scout units by discharging them and then hiring them as civilian chiefs of scouts. A more permanent arrangement was now necessary to insure their continued services.29

Finances also needed clarification. Only July 4, 1901, William Howard Taft became civil governor of the Philippines and the Philippine Commission assumed the administration of the executive functions of government. Seven weeks later, Governor Taft informed Washington that the civil government's creation of a national police force made it impossible for it to cover the costs of enlisting native scouts. He asked that the burden be shifted to Congressional shoulders.30 The U.S. Army, in critical need of trained soldiers to support the declining Americanarrison as well as the monetary means to pay for them, began to rapidly construct a native army under the provisions of the Act of February 2, 1901.

The first major step toward providing a uniform structure for native forces had already taken place in the Department of Northern
Luzon, where the majority of Filipino scouts were employed.

"General Orders, NO. 25," dated July 3, 1901, first initiated a more sophisticated classification system for the units in the department. Henceforth, tribal or provincial names rather than military, geographic boundaries drawn by Americans would provide company identity; thus the Third and Fourth District Scouts became simply Ilocano Native Scouts while the Second District Scouts became the Cagayan Native Scouts. Company strength was limited to 120, preferably 100. One first and one second lieutenant were appointed for each company under Section 26, Act of February 2, 1901. White civilian scouts serving with any unit remained on the rolls at $40 per month (U.S. currency) and with the Regular Army ration. Every company, mustered bi-monthly according to Army Regulations, forwarded a copy of each muster roll to the Adjutant General of the Philippines Division. 31

On September 27, 1901, "General Orders NO. 293, Headquarters Division of the Philippines," continued the definition of the organization on an even wider scope, reorganizing all "Native Scouts" into infantry companies according to current Army Regulations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Sergeant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster Sergeant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artificer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musician</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Authorized Strength</strong></td>
<td><strong>104</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Only the physically sound would be engaged to serve until June 30, 1902. Each company would have one or two commissioned officers. If necessary, Regular Army officers of such rank would be detailed to fill vacancies. Companies were numbered from 1 to 50, with the tribal name designating the personnel composing each. The 50 companies were assigned to the following subdivisions: companies 1 to 26, Department of Northern Luzon; 29 to 34, Department of Southern Luzon; 35 to 47, Department of the Visayas; 48 to 50, Department of Mindanao and Jolo.

"General Orders NO. 293" also detailed the procedure by which "Native Scouts" would be armed. Each individual would receive a Springfield rifle, caliber .45 and a limited amount of black powder ammunition. All companies were to use the same weapon even if more rifles had to be shipped from the United States. Magazine carbines presently in the hands of native scouts were to be shipped to Manila. The scouts in the Department of Northern Luzon would receive arms first by selected companies; when all units in that department had the prescribed weapons, the arming of those in another department would be undertaken.33

After being prodded by Taft's letter concerning expenses, division headquarters issued "General Orders NO. 310" of October 8, 1901, which required that Philippine Scouts previously paid from insular funds be enlisted and mustered from October 1, 1901, and paid from Regular Army appropriations. The length of enlistment was for three years "unless sooner discharged." Each scout was to
receive the Regular Army ration and "General Orders NO. 293" was to be adhered to in all respects, except that company commanders had the power to appoint noncommissioned officers. 34

The last important directive of the transitional period extending from July through October came, as had the first, from Headquarters, Department of Northern Luzon. "General Orders NO. 39," October 29, 1901, provided for the 28 companies assigned in division "General Orders NO. 293" by designating companies 1-11 Macabebe units, companies 12-24 Ilocano units and companies 25-28 Cagayan units. In regard to enlisting men for three years, the October 29 order stated that

Men who do not come up to the physical standard prescribed for recruits for the regular army but who are sound in the generally accepted meaning of the term, those who are married, and those above the age limit may be accepted, provided that they are eligible for enlistment and that the existence of physical or other defects is fully described and noted on the enlistment paper. 35

Reaffirming a maximum enlisted strength per company of 104, the pay scale previously established (General Orders NO. 11," January 16, 1901) and the issuance of the Regular Army ration, "General Orders NO. 39" established the uniform of officers of infantry (United States Army), minus collar insignia, as the uniform of officers of the native scouts. The order also permitted the employment of five white civilian scouts with each company. They would be paid $40 per month (U.S. currency) by the Quartermaster's Department from public civil funds. The district
commander had the power to hire and discharge any of these whites. The final sentence of the October 29 proclamation stated that "No other organization of native troops other than those enumerated above are authorized, and any authority previously given for their employment is hereby revoked." This last command emphasized the finality and scope with which revision of the native contingent had been consummated.

The reorganization was achieved with considerable smoothness. The three-year enlistment mandate did, however, foster a minor problem. Some Filipinos refused to accept such a lengthy extension of tours of duty unless assured they would not be stationed away from their home barrios. When the army refused to meet their demand, a number of experienced scouts left upon expiration of their six-month contracts. But the enlistment squabble never posed a serious obstruction; it simply delayed the achievement of authorized strength by a few companies until late 1901. Brigadier General Hughes faced the opposite problem in the Department of the Visayas. The transfer from Quartermaster to Regular Army status allotted him only 13 companies of 104 men each. He had already employed between 1,800 and 2,000 islanders. Again, the problem was easily resolved. The discharged Filipinos accepted their fate without protest and consolidation of various detachments proceeded at a steady pace.

The establishment of 50 companies on a tribal or provincial basis by the United States Army gave it the capacity to employ the
military policy of the defeated Spanish: the use of Filipinos from one region to quell disorder in another. Not even the profusion of Macabebes in the new American Filipino Army (11 companies) could be construed as a significant deviation from Spanish practice. Pampanga, although the smallest administrative unit on the large central Luzon plain (3,500 square miles), had for decades supplied Manila with food and more colonial soldiers than any other province in the islands. Since 1603 a Pampangan mercenary force had loyally served the colonial regime. The contented Pampangans usually were not affected by issues causing revolt elsewhere in the late nineteenth century. The local Pampangan populace had owned most of the arable land and the Catholic friars had never acquired large estates as they had in the Tagalog provinces around Manila. The Pampangan elite, devoutly religious and simulating Spanish culture, did not harbor any anti-colonial aspirations; and the peasants, loyal to these leaders, followed suit. Only when it became apparent that the Tagalogs would emerge victorious over Spain, did Pampangans, to insure their own safety, renounce their Spanish sympathies. Not unexpectedly, when the Americans offered peace and order through municipal government directed by Pampangans, the populace reverted to its historic position of support for the occupying power.39 Macabebe companies were really products of Pampangan tradition, distinctive solely because all came from one barrio of that province.
Like the Pampangans, many Ilocanos and Cagayanes had never been content under the leadership of Aguinaldo and the Tagalogs. This attitude plus the economic hardships produced by the fighting of recent years induced many Ilocanos and Cagayanes to join the ranks of the Scouts. In general, the further Filipinos lived from Manila where the Tagalogs exerted great influence the easier it was for them to change their political affiliations and serve another flag. Altogether, 28 companies or 56% of the original Scouts came from Pampanga and northern Luzon.

Tagalog resistance of American domination, however, did not arbitrarily exclude them from the Scouts. The Tagalogs, the most numerous and rebellious tribal group on Luzon, would be the prime consideration of any pacification program. Trusted Tagalogs were important for operations among their fellow inhabitants of the provinces of Cavite, Batangas, Rizal, Laguna, Marinduque, the city of Manila and the island of Mindoro. Using the Tagalogs who had already served as guides, interpreters and scouts as a base, the U.S. Army, during the 1901 reorganization, put together four Tagalog companies (designated the Twenty Ninth, Thirtieth, Thirty First and Thirty Fourth). The total of four companies characterized the extent of American willingness to arm Tagalogs. Most United States officers were inclined to let future developments determine if more Tagalogs should be admitted to Scout units.
The new Philippine Scout organization also contained the first Bikol companies. Peace-loving, contented, industrious, and brave, the Bikols lived in the provinces of southern Luzon—Ambos Camarines, Albay and Sorsogan—and on the large island of Catanduanes. Natural resources, particularly hemp, abounded in the area, one of the wealthiest in the Philippines. Here as in Pampanga and northern Luzon, resentment of Tagalog leadership and economic dislocation aided American recruitment of soldiers. The raising of the Thirty Second and Thirty Third Companies, Philippine Scouts proceeded without difficulty. 43

When enlisting Philippine Scouts, the American command sought to construct companies composed of a single tribal, linguistic or provincial group. In the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, however, the new colonial overlord abandoned this policy. Distrust of the Moslem Moros retarded the formation of such symmetrical units and the two companies mobilized were hybrids resembling original Lowe Scouts. The Fiftieth Company, according to its commanding officer, mustered the following islanders:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Ramon</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Zamboangueno</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iligan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Visayan</td>
<td>Visayan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotabato</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Moro</td>
<td>Maquindanao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotabato</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>Mixed dialects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malabang</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Moro</td>
<td>Maquindanao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davao</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Visayan</td>
<td>Visayan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davao</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bagobo</td>
<td>Bagobo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43
Included among the foregoing were one Spaniard, one Tagalog Mestizo, one Bikol Mestizo and four Tagalogs. No attempt was made at first to unite these detachments. Company headquarters at San Ramon, Mindanao kept the company books, garrisoned that pueblo and performed guard duty at the local military prison. Small stations at Cotabato, Iligan, Davao and Malabang provided guides and interpreters for American troops operating in Mindanao and maintained military telegraph lines. Following frequent changes of station the scattered elements of the Fiftieth Company joined in May 1903 to undertake extensive training as an infantry company.45

The reorganization of the native scouts was completed by January, 1902. Fifty companies, enlisted, officered, administered, and armed and rationed according to specific regulations now constituted the entire Filipino adjunct of the United States Army. While American officers would have preferred to follow Secretary Root's policy of gradual enlistment, manpower shortages and the need for a stable source of pay for the Filipinos bearing arms stimulated an accelerated pace in establishing the Philippine Scouts according to the Act of February 2, 1901. The successes scored by Filipino soldiers throughout 1900 and 1901 also played a key role in the army's decision to forge ahead. Any prolonged failure by the islanders to render useful service might well have terminated American experiments in arming them. As in 1899, the
Macabebes during 1900 and 1901 best portrayed the virtues and vices of the native soldier. Their history for these 24 months reflected the efforts of all Filipino soldiers.46

* * * * *

Once recovered from the "Northern Expedition," the Macabebes, after being reconcentrated at Calumpit, had started a prolonged patrol of their home territory. Whether working as detachments or in conjunction with American personnel, the objective of all Macabebe companies was the subjugation of hostile inhabitants by search, confiscation and relentless pursuit. Their attitude and methods provoked varying responses within the American command. General Otis disclosed that 60 Macabebes accompanying Brigadier General Theodore Schivan's expedition to the south of Manila during January, 1900 were shipped home so the villagers, who feared the Macabebes more than the Americans, "might be persuaded to leave their concealments in the hills and mountains and return to their towns."47 In contrast to this reaction, Brigadier General F. D. Grant, reporting two sweeps of 450 Macabebes under Lieutenant Colonel Wilbur E. Wilder from Calumpit through southwestern Pampanga and Zambales in February and March, maintained that

the results of the work of the Macabebe scouts in this expedition, as well as the preceding one, can not be fully stated in guns and insurgents captured, the amount of fear in the native population, especially in the insurgents, inspired by the Macabebes,
being of much greater value than the actual number of arms taken or prisoners captured, for as a result of the work of the Macabebes in the swamp region west of Guagua there was a large delivery of guns to the stations of our troops which would not otherwise probably have secured, the natives preferring to give them to our people rather than have them taken by the Macabebes. The native population was also taught that in the Macabebe scouts the United States has a loyal servant who can be depended on to pick out of a crowd of natives, however large, all the insurgents masquerading as "amigos" and the culprits from other provinces. 48

While Generals Otis and Grant might differ about the value of generating fear in peaceful inhabitants, neither contemplated a termination of Macabebe employment. When dealing with charges that the Macabebes were great thieves, Grant stated that investigations failed to produce incriminating evidence. He contended that word of alleged abuses often reached his office prior to the arrival of the Macabebes. 49 Obviously, the Macabebes were effective, and results tended to outweigh criticism in the middle of a guerrilla war.

The Macabebes did not engage in the harassment of their fellow Filipinos, especially when securing information, without enduring a measure of retribution. A Macabebe disappeared without a trace in January, 1900 after straying from his detachment's campsite. Two months later three other Macabebes, just released from the hospital, were kidnapped by insurgents on the streets of San Isidro and detained overnight in the nearby barrio of Gapan. The next morning these prisoners were marched towards the mountains to the north. Only the opportune escape of one Macabebe led to the
rescue of the other two by an American detail headed by Brigadier General Frederick Funston. Funston immediately hanged the abductors publicly in the barrio plaza, and burned the house in which the hostages had been confined. The retrieved Macabebes, both badly cut by bolos, were returned to the hospital.50

Continued Macabebe success was particularly important to Matthew A. Batson, recently promoted to Captain, United States Cavalry. Wearing a specially constructed shoe to support his wounded foot, he arrived in Washington D.C. seeking authorization for a squadron of Macabebe cavalry with himself, as Major of Volunteers, in command.51 He submitted his new scheme to the Adjutant General's Office on March 23, 1900. After devoting several paragraphs of his letter to the organization and operations of the Macabebes the previous fall, and extolling their cheerfulness, obedience and bravery, Batson claimed that his proposed squadron, composed of young men 20 to 30 years of age with some military experience, would be an ideal instrument for guerrilla warfare. Mounted on native horses the squadron would enjoy great mobility. The ability to live entirely on the country eliminated supply problems and besides, General Young had already noted that "a regiment of Macabebes would be more effective than a regiment of volunteers, and would be only about one-half as expensive."52

Batson reinforced his initial correspondence the next day by forwarding to the same office a letter solicited from Lieutenant
Colonel Clarence R. Edwards. The Lieutenant Colonel cooperatively placed on paper, as he knew them, the views of his former commanding officer, Henry W. Lawton. General Lawton, killed by an insurgent in December 1899, had, Edwards related, never lost his enthusiasm for native troops. Included in his future plans had been a regiment of Macabebes led by Batson. On March 29, Batson presented his final entreaty—a personal, detailed report on the operations of the Macabebes from September to November 19, 1899.

On April 3, 1900, Secretary of War Root conferred with President McKinley and obtained the Commander-in-Chief's approval for Batson's proposal. The Philippine Cavalry Squadron, to be recruited from existing Macabebe companies, would consist of four troops of 120 men each. In its assessment of the decision, the Army and Navy Journal concluded such a positive response represented a solid recognition of Macabebe loyalty and activity. The Pampangan group would, because of Batson's initiative and reports, be given an expanded role in the island conflict.

When informed of this decision, Generals Otis and MacArthur were receptive, objecting only to the projected pay rate—the standard U.S. Army wage plus benefits. They considered such a salary extravagant and unnecessary since it exceeded the income of any Filipino. Substitution of half-pay removed this minor area of discord and mobilization of the new cavalry force commenced even before Batson arrived to take command.
The Philippine Cavalry Squadron developed into the most conventional military structure composed of Filipinos before the ordering of Philippine Scout companies in the second half of 1901. Not until Philippine Scout battalions appeared in 1904 and 1905 did any single native military body equal it in size. The officers, almost all of whom had previously directed other Macabebe units, were appointed with rank as United States Volunteers. A noncommissioned staff of one sergeant major, one quartermaster sergeant and one commissary sergeant was detailed. Bi-monthly muster roles were maintained for the rank and file although they served as civilian employees under contracts expiring June 30, 1901. The barracks at Caloocan, four miles north of Manila, served as headquarters and provided a training facility.

Normal organizational structure suited Major Batson's purpose. He had convinced himself that Filipinos could be disciplined soldiers and the Squadron became a testing ground for his theory. He issued orders accordingly, arranging everything as if establishing a Regular Army force, never doubting that he faced a peculiarly difficult situation. A fair percentage of the Squadron's recruits had served in the Blanco regiments. Yet a greater number had belonged to Batson's four original companies. In the end, even past service counted for little since Batson's objective—complete military training—demanded more than the two skills required of Filipinos to date—the ability to fire a rifle and to follow simple instructions relayed by an interpreter.
For four and one-half hours a day both "veteran" and novice took instruction in the manual of arms, marching, and sighting and aiming. Every command was presented in English, completely foreign language to the enlisted men. First Lieutenant James Munro, Fourth Cavalry, one of the few officers present unaccustomed to dealing with Filipino soldiers, later described the results of orders in English by observing that "to be able to produce all positions in the manual from 'parade rest' to 'load' by a single command may be a remarkable performance but it can hardly be considered encouraging." To bridge the communications' gap between American officer and native trooper a form of "pidgin" Spanish, broken and inflexible, came into use on less perfunctory occasions and the proper response to each command was acted out physically.

Munro discovered daily sessions threatened to dissolve into complete chaos when drill first began with marching and movements by fours, military skills much harder to illustrate than the manual of arms. He wrote:

The English words 'left' and 'right' had no distinctive sound to the Filipino ear. The command of 'fours right' and 'fours left' was liable to result in anything, but confusion was certain. To add to the confusion, each man in ranks would promptly proceed to loudly upbraid his neighbors as the sole cause of the trouble, and some fifty violent arguments would be in progress at once.

Batson and Munro persevered. Both men realized Spanish military training had not been either effective or extensive. But the Macabebes' desire to learn kept them going even on particularly ineffective days.
The answer to their problems was the Filipino noncommissioned officer. At first the permanently appointed noncommissioned staff (entirely Filipino at Batson's insistence) accomplished little. Instinctively shy and unquestionably overwhelmed by the complexity of the training program, even the brighter and quicker Macabebes NCO's shunned the assumption of the authority they were to exercise. But their hesitancy faded as they learned the drill regulations and realized what was demanded of them. They forcibly ended arguments in the ranks during drill. Once indoctrinated, Filipino noncommissioned officers, unless watched, went to the other extreme by overdrilling and overworking their squads. As soon as Batson was sure his native NCO's were in complete control, he refused the assistance of any white civilian scouts or Regular Army noncommissioned personnel. He did not want anything to usurp the native NCO's authority or confidence.

Although lasting just over a year, duty with the Squadron converted First Lieutenant Munro from a skeptic to a steadfast supporter of native soldiers. He saw keen competition evoke creditable performances from Macabebes in all drills. Even the English language problem appeared soluble. The Filipino sergeant major of the Squadron proved a classic example. Though writing and speaking virtually no English when appointed, he developed enough skill in the language to handle the paperwork functions of his office practically unaided. Other Macabebes officers made similar progress. In general, Munro believed the Filipinos of the Squadron had
proven themselves satisfactory soldiers. They demonstrated a proclivity for learning, enjoyed pagentry, exercised fastidious care in regard to dress and appearance, and were intelligent. If handled with justice and care, properly officered, subjected to training, and severely disciplined, the Filipinos, Munro believed, represented the makings of an excellent colonial army capable of replacing at least a large portion of the American force in the islands.  

The Philippine Cavalry received only dismounted instruction. Complete equipment for 500 mounts, fashioned in the United States to fit native ponies, arrived at Squadron headquarters and funds were appropriated to buy the necessary animals. But the purchase was never made. Troop D did capture 40 ponies and secure permission to keep them. The rest of the Squadron trained and served as infantry. Work in the field, commencing after just six weeks of very basic drill, intermittently dispersed the Philippine Cavalry units. Still, the level of training achieved made the Squadron the best prepared native force in the islands. Once afield the dismounted troops, whether operating collectively, as single troops or in smaller detachments performed well in numerous engagements. The Macabebes left little doubt as to their ability and willingness to fight. But training and subsequent military achievements did not eliminate the possibilities of misbehavior by one or more Macabebes, some of whom required constant observation. As discussed in Chapter I, American officers
had realized the necessity for close supervision of native soldiers by the end of the Lawton and Young phase of the "Northern Expedition." The pressure of establishing civil order while American numerical strength declined, however, taxed American officers serving with native soldiers. This created situations where those troopers, if so inclined, could engage in improper conduct. In early 1901, certain members of the Philippine Cavalry took advantage of just such a situation.

Shortly after dusk on February 25 a telegraphic message informed temporary Squadron headquarters, Montalban, that an insurgent leader, General Licerio Geronimo, was recruiting in the pueblo. With Major Matthew Batson on leave in Manila and Captain Francis H. Cameron off-duty following an exhaustive field trip, First Lieutenant Dennis P. Quinlan, the only officer present, had to decide whether to act on the information just received. He called out the 200-man Macabebe force at hand, surrounded the town, ordered a house-to-house search, and, to avoid unnecessary trouble, stipulated that only noncommissioned officers were to actually enter native dwellings. In the darkness of the night, amidst the confusion of the general "round-up" that ensued, Quinlan lost control of his men. Macabebes of all ranks barged into homes, physically hustled a number of "suspicious" persons off to the pueblo calaboose and occasionally extorted money from members of various families. Women were molested before the night ended. The beaten body of elderly Catalino Calixtro was discovered the next morning in the cane field behind his nipa hut.
Alerted by an anonymous complaint from a Montalban resident, General MacArthur ordered an investigation in early March. Subsequent inquiries conducted by Volunteer officers Major Frank B. McKenna (Inspector General, Department of Northern Luzon) and Colonel J. M. Thompson (Sixth District Commander) exposed the Macabebe sergeant and three enlisted men who had murdered 80-year-old Calixtro after robbing his house. Two other Macabebes were convicted of maltreating and robbing Montalban Tagalogs. All other allegations brought forward by inhabitants were dismissed for lack of evidence. In the opinion of the two investigators Lieutenant Quinlan had to bear the brunt of overall responsibility for the events of February 25. While not pressing for a court-martial, they deplored his launching of a legitimate search of Montalban without enough American officers to properly execute it. It was difficult for them to understand how Quinlan had expected to maintain personal supervision over troops occupying positions for two miles on opposite sides of Montalban and searching houses in every quarter at the same time.  

The underlying premise for faulting Quinlan was the belief shared by Major McKenna and Colonel Thompson that the Macabebes, whenever freed of restrictions, would seize every opportunity to perpetrate outrages on the Tagalogs they so despised. Brigadier General Lloyd Wheaton, commanding the Department of Northern Luzon, disagreed. He maintained that not just Macabebes but all native troops, if given the chance, were liable to commit murder and
indulge in robbery regardless of tribal animosities. MacArthur took a similar view by construing the whole affair as a deplorable case of the Macabebes imitating the behavior of insurgent soldiers. Neither Wheaton nor MacArthur, however, translated their indignation into a fundamental questioning of the wisdom of organizing Filipino units. Both men were officers of a military organization assigned the task of establishing permanent public order under difficult circumstances. Short of manpower and subordinate officers, they needed all the soldiers they could get if the environs of Manila (populated almost entirely by Tagalogs) were to be brought under firm control. Until such control was implemented, it was doubtful the residents would embrace the educational and legal reforms the Americans wanted to undertake. Therefore, the U.S. Army had to use Filipino troops even if those natives, hired and trained to secure public order, occasionally fostered disorder by failing to obey orders. Indeed, in his official report, Wheaton reminded Manila headquarters that the Macabebes had been sent to Montalban because no other troops were available to replace the Twenty-Seventh Volunteer Infantry. He contended that unavoidable manpower shortages committed the United States to employment of "these Malay savages." MacArthur agreed. To insure adequate replacements for American Volunteers lost through muster out, he believed the military had to risk breaches of discipline. The two Generals concluded they could only emphasize the need for greater
caution in establishing and commanding Filipino companies to avert future excesses like Montalban. 66

Ironically it was during the month of the Montalban inquiries that a group of picked Macabebe played a vital role in the most important and most publicized military event of 1901--the capture of Emilio Aguinaldo. Selected for their superior physique, intelligence and ability to speak Tagalog, 81 Macabebe of Company D, Macabebe Scouts (a unit formed at Macabebe, Pampanga, January 22, 1901) were brought to Manila in February and given special training. The ruse devised by Brigadier General Funston called for them to impersonate insurgent soldiers. Accompanied by Tagalogs acting as insurgent officers, Funston and the Macabebe steamed by gunboat through the San Bernardino Straits up the east coast of Luzon in early March. At 1 a.m., March 12, Funston's men disembarked at Casiguran Bay. Short rations made the long march that followed hard on the troops. On March 23 the column entered Aguinaldo's hideout at Palanan. Deceived by messages sent ahead on captured stationery, the insurgent leader believed a loyal force, suffering from hunger, was arriving with American prisoners and was taken with little bloodshed. 67 This portentous achievement completely overshadowed the Montalban incident. Not until 1902, when the Senate investigated American Army conduct in the Philippines, did Macabebe actions on the night of February 25 attract public attention in the United States. 68
With the return of Major Batson from leave in March, the Philippine Cavalry Squadron experienced no further disciplinary problems before its muster out as a Volunteer organization on June 30, 1901. In fact, the Batson Cavalry earned considerable praise. Colonel Thompson, the district commander, stated in April that the constant activities of the four troops in the field, which kept opposing forces north of Manila in disarray, had influenced significantly the surrender of General Licerio Geronimo and other rebel officials. Converted to individual companies on July 1, 1901, the Squadron left behind a record of military success marred only by a single episode of gross misconduct.

The brief life of the Philippine Cavalry undoubtedly enhanced the idea that the Filipinos (or at least Macabebes) could undergo regular training with some expectation of positive results. Conversely, its short existence revealed that the demand of the moment—namely, the suppression of public disorder—represented the greatest obstacle to the imparting of standard instruction. The critical need of the American Colonial regime, whether under military or civil control, was not numerous forces of battalion or squadron scale. What was needed was a large number of native units ranging from company size down to small detachments of frequently less than 50 men. These small, armed bodies could garrison the important barrios on a day to day basis and curtail the flow of supplies to the surrounding countryside. The American-Filipino conflict, therefore, determined that almost any native
company would man a number of stations simultaneously. In effect this meant any Filipino bearing arms for the United States Army first as a quartermaster department employee, then by authority of the Act of February 2, 1901, was being used primarily as a policeman rather than as a combat soldier. The police function assigned the Philippine Scouts became even more prevalent after the civil government formed the Philippine Constabulary. Work with the Constabulary committed the Scouts to service solely on a company and detachment footing through 1904.

When the Taft Philippine Commission became the legislative branch of the archipelago on July 4, 1901, it faced a pressing problem. Without a law enforcement arm of its own the Commission was forced to rely on the United States Army or municipal police it did not trust for the maintenance of peace even in areas where full civil government had been established. If prolonged, such a situation would not only undermine the stature of the new civil government but also keep the American soldier in the forefront of a pacification effort for which the Commission believed he was unsuited. On the other hand native police conversant with local dialects and customs would be effective peacekeepers. An island gendarmerie loyal to Manila, the Commission argued, might even inspire enthusiasm for law and order.
Beyond the tangible possibility that a police force operating on a provincial level could establish public order, the proposed switch from soldier to policeman had political advantages. An insular constabulary functioning according to mandates handed down by the civil government might well escape the anti-imperialist sentiments presently confronting the American Army. A colonial official or Republican party member could defend the presence of civilian law officers more than that of a regular or native army. Witness Governor Taft's testimony before a Senate committee in 1902 to the effect that "the Constabulary is a civil force, that is under the civil government.... The Constabulary are not native troops. They are the police of the civil government."71

What the Philippine Commission was really instituting was a politically and militarily acceptable policy of letting Filipinos shoot Filipinos. Remaining American military units would be concentrated at a few large posts and the native police would spearhead the pacification task in the future. A novel idea in 1901, this policy became an ingrained concept within three years. Secretary of War Taft would state officially in 1904 that "the political advantages of suppressing disorder by the use of natives rather than American troops should be manifest to anyone familiar with the conditions in the islands."72

On July 18, 1901, the Commission passed Act NO. 175 establishing the Philippine Constabulary. American officers from both
the Regular and Volunteer Armies filled the positions of assistant chief and inspector. Captain Henry T. Allen, Sixth United States Cavalry, late Major Forty-Third Volunteers, a West Point graduate with experience in Cuba and the Pacific, accepted the post of Director of Constabulary. Each province was to have a force of 150 men enlisted to serve for two years. To prevent a resurrection of the defunct Spanish Guardia Civil, which had terrorized the populace by applying the historic technique of pitting traditional enemies against each other, Constabulary personnel were to serve as nearly as possible in the province where recruited. The Commission planned from the beginning to gain local support for its newly acquired legal arm, and to avoid the barbaric implications resulting from the promotion of intergroup conflict to resolve problems relating to public order.

Historically, public cooperation with the police seldom materialized overnight. Everyone expected that it would be a long time before barrio, municipal and rural dwellers accepted the idea that impartial justice could be secured through the existing legal system. It was just as unlikely that the Constabulary could avoid a military character in these formative years. The withering American military presence and the assumption of law enforcement duties by the Constabulary produced new unrest and revolt. The urge to challenge the new force tempted many. The Spanish regime had long faced such challenges which were in reality a multiplicity of personal, social and religious upheavals, each
varying in origin, influence and size. Whether motivated by primitive mysticism, superstitious fetishes, resentment of the Catholic norm, hill dweller hatred for coastal wealth and control or just plain avarice and greed, social turbulence had erupted spasmodically throughout Philippine history. The disruptive capabilities of this prevailing social tension imperiled what success the Constabulary achieved for a decade.74

If they were to handle individual fanatics, dissident groups, die-hard ladrones and carabao thieves, American officers of the Constabulary knew their men needed thorough training. As a result, political definitions stressing the Constabulary's civil nature were brushed aside in the field. Insular police companies received extensive training according to the dictates of the United States Army Manual of Arms.75 The instruction paid off handsomely. At the end of the fiscal 1902, the Constabulary, totalling 193 Inspectors and 5,317 enlisted men, reported the following statistics: "Insurgents killed, 11; captured 35; surrendered 360; ladrones killed, 663; captured 2,802; surrendered, 707."76 In addition, the Constabulary captured 2,989 firearms and recovered 959 stolen animals. All told, the insular police force undertook 2,736 expeditions covering 110,466 miles and lost only 22 men killed and 41 wounded.

Despite the Constabulary's early accomplishments and continued growth, its director, Henry T. Allen, knew his force was not yet capable of policing the archipelago alone. Political and
military developments, however, were pressuring his corps. The United States Army, while campaigning actively from Mindanao in the south to provinces around Manila well into 1902, undertook in late 1901 a policy of consolidation. By September 1902 American units occupied only 178 posts. The actual number of Americans on duty in the Philippines dropped to 1,039 officers and 19,800 enlisted men. Over the next 12 months the decline continued. On October 15, 1903, the strength of the American garrison was 843 officers and 14,667 enlisted men.78

The gradual withdrawal reflected the continuing commitment of the Roosevelt administration to a civil regime. It also indicated a growing reluctance to involve American soldiers in the civil function of police work. The declaration of martial law and the use of reconcentration tactics in Batangas and elsewhere in the islands during 1901 and 1902 had aroused an anti-imperialist storm culminating in a Senatorial investigation.79 After this experience, and in light of Theodore Roosevelt's executive message of July 4, 1902, announcing that a state of peace existed in the Philippines, the Republicans were unlikely to favor frequent calls by the Constabulary for American aid. Being oriented to the theme of civil government, Chief of Constabulary Allen accepted the sentiments of his government. American troops would have a restraining influence because of their presence but would not be made available except in case of emergency.80
Allen, needing more manpower on a day-to-day basis, proceeded to explore the idea of greatly expanding the Constabulary. Little progress was made. The Philippine Commission lacked the necessary civil funds and disliked the prospect of depending on federal assistance from Washington.81

The prevailing attitudes in Washington and Manila thus led Allen and the Constabulary to investigate the feasibility of a guarantee of support on the part of the Philippine Scouts. At first glance the Scouts seemed an ideal solution to the problem. Since they were not Americans, they would not distort the Commission policy of having Filipinos deal with Filipinos. The federal government, furthermore, had the legal privilege of paying the Scouts from Congressional appropriations, a situation relieving the Philippine Commission of any financial responsibility. The services of the Scouts, however, were not easy to obtain. They were federal troops under the jurisdiction of the United States Army. Any service they rendered the civil government would, therefore, be regulated by general orders issued through division headquarters in Manila.

Discord developed immediately. The Philippine Commission wanted help but was unwilling to ask for it according to the procedure stipulated by the army. According to "General Order NO. 152, Division of the Philippines" of July 7, 1902, any request for military assistance had to be in writing, detailing the service to be performed and stating clearly that the civil authorities at the
scene of the emergency were unable to cope with the situation. 82 Neither Governor Taft nor Chief Allen favored such an open admission of ineptitude on the part of the fledgling Constabulary. As responsible officials, they refused to slight the civilian apparatus they represented. Allen personally disliked the provision of "General Order NO. 152" placing Constabulary units in a subordinate position whenever federal troops were deployed in the same area. 83

In mid-September 1902 Taft submitted the whole question to Washington, emphasizing the need of the civil government for immediate control of any Scouts detailed to it. 84 The War Department in turn asked Charles E. Magoon, Law Officer of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, for an opinion. Reaffirming the legal right of the Secretary of War to authorize the use of the Scouts (as a part of the U.S. Army) to execute the laws in force in the Philippines, Magoon, in a November 29 report, suggested the Secretary of War present the governor of the islands with a signed order granting him the right to call upon the resident United States commander for the services of the Scouts he needed. The division commander should then comply with any request presented to him. The Scouts' regular officers would retain control of their units. The Constabulary of the province in which the Scouts were engaged would be considered an auxiliary force and be under the general control of the officer directing the Scouts. Magoon noted that, although he had consulted civil officials in the Philippines who
believed the Scouts should be subordinate to the Constabulary, he considered such an arrangement illegal in terms of existing law. If the civil government found such a legal situation did not suit it, he concluded it should increase the size of the Constabulary. The organization known as the Scouts could then be abandoned. 85

Secretary of War Root dispatched a verbatim copy of Magoon's report to Manila. In a personal note accompanying it, Root reinforced the civil governor's power to fully instruct Scout officers called to civil duty. At the same time, he reinforced the Scout officers' right to control the actual conduct of operations. 86 The solution from Washington failed to satisfy either Taft or Allen. No longer did civilian officials have to admit in writing that they could not maintain order. However, the continuance of a mandatory role of support on the part of the Constabulary was unmistakable. Both men decided the civil government would sacrifice too much power by accepting Scout aid on these terms.

Still determined to have their way, Taft and Allen, with President Roosevelt's backing, turned to Congress for legislation sectioning their requests. On December 3, 1902, two Republicans—Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr., and Representative Henry A. Cooper—introduced simultaneously bills providing that officers of the U.S. Army could be detailed as Chief and Assistant Chiefs of Constabulary. Any such officer serving as Chief, both bills specified, were entitled to the rank, pay and allowances of a
colonel in the Regular Army. The Philippine Island treasury was to cover the difference in pay between an officer's actual rank in the Regular Army and his temporary status in the insular police. Both bills (S. 6358 and H. R. 15510) next specified that Philippine Scout companies working with the civil government would be subject to the orders of the Chief and Assistant Chiefs of Constabulary.

As Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, Representative Cooper took personal control of his own bill. His Republican dominated committee quickly conducted hearings to record the authoritative support of officials like Luke E. Wright, Vice Governor of the Philippines, and Colonel Clarence R. Edwards, head of the Bureau of Insular affairs at the War Department. Then, by offering a fixed date on the House calendar to guarantee Democratic members of his committee could be present, Cooper circumvented any need of a minority report and got his bill before the House on January 8, 1903.87

During the one day of debate on the bill, the Committee on Insular Affairs dominated the discussion. In supporting the bill Republican members of the committee based their arguments on the following assumptions: the position of Chief of Constabulary, entailing the direction of over 5,000 native policemen, warranted the status and pay of a brigadier general; the Philippine civil government had to have the services of the Scouts because it could not afford to increase the size of the Constabulary; the Chief of
Constabulary, as the official primarily responsible for the performance of purely domestic police duty, should have control of any Scouts sent to assist his men; and the employment of Scouts as policemen would, in the end, produce greater internal stability in the islands and permit further reductions of American personnel. In response to this line of argument, Democrats on the committee attacked issues concerning the logic promoting a Captain of the Regular Army (Henry T. Allen) to brigadier general when the military already possessed numerous generals of that rank capable of being Chief of Constabulary, the desire to tie command of the Constabulary to the United States Army, the need for a greatly expanded police force in an area the Republicans had already declared pacified, and the wisdom of turning American officers over to a civilian police force. One Democrat on Cooper's committee, Malcolm Patterson of Tennessee, disagreed with his colleagues. Reiterating the names of officials, including the Philippine Commission, who supported the legislation, Patterson claimed the proposal at hand was in tune with the Democrats' goals of reducing the cost of governing the Philippines and the size of the American contingent there.

Despite the partisan exchanges, just two amendments to the bill were tendered. Democrat William A. Jones of Virginia recommended that the number of Assistant Chiefs to be detailed should not exceed four to avoid any large drain on the officers corps. A non-member of the Insular Affairs Committee, Republican John A. T.
Hull of Iowa, the Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, suggested the other change. Strenuously objecting to any measure calling for American officers to serve beneath civilian police, Hull insisted the bill be amended to allow Scouts to serve the civil regime only when directed by those officers appointed Chief or Assistant Chief from the Regular Army. Both amendments were adopted.91

After three hours of debate the House of Representatives voted. The final tally was 102 yeas; 83 nays; 164 not voting; and 4 answering present. Referred to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Cooper's bill replaced Lodge's and reached the Senate floor on January 24. It passed without debate. Six days later, President Roosevelt signed the measure.92 The new law--officially titled An Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Philippine Constabulary--represented a substantial victory for Taft and Allen. The Constabulary, and hence the civil government, had been granted the means to acquire military support without sacrificing its supremacy in civilian affairs.

The Constabulary Act of January 30, 1903, which was about to alter the course of Philippine Scout history, did not particularly please Major General George W. Davis, commanding the Philippine Division. Civil-military relations in the Philippines had been defined again. And the U.S. Army had suffered a diminution of power and stature. First, Governor Taft's appointment in July 1901 had stripped the American military of all civil power. Next, in
July 1902 when President Roosevelt had declared the Philippine Insurrection at an end, he had abolished the office of military governor altogether. In the future, the military forces, while still under the control of their own officers were to be available to the civil authorities whenever those officials needed more manpower. Now a new federal law transferred even tactical command to those same civilian officials.93

The acquisition of the right to command the Scouts by Taft's government without having to assume any of the responsibilities connected with the maintenance of those men added to Major General Davis's displeasure. The army, he believed, had been handed an embarrassing lot. He expressed his regrets that political considerations seemed to require that the captains, field officers and generals of the forces here occupy the mortifying position which the execution of this law involved, viz, to be forbidden to lead into action the troops of their command whom they had organized, instructed for years, brought to a high state of efficiency, whose material wants under other leadership, they must still supply.94

But Davis abided by the law. On February 10, the day Washington warned him the civil government would soon call for Scout pursuit of lawbreakers, Davis sent the following message to a fellow officer:

Whenever organizations of Philippine Scouts are furnished for operations against disturbers of the peace under orders of the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary the companies continue to be dependent on the army for their pay, rations, clothing, medicines, and medical attendance, arms and ammunition, and, of course, they continue to be amenable to the rules and articles of war. As respects animals and wagons for transportation, the scouts should be furnished with such as are
available, and arrangements should be made for their forage by the army quartermaster.95

"General Orders NO. 13, Philippine Division," issued by Davis on February 20, made the position official and emphasized the retention by the division commander of administrative control. The Scouts would be subject to other orders "for tactical purposes only."96

Although fully aware of the odd situation created by having one department organize, train and supply an armed body while another department guided it in the field, Governor Taft and Chief Allen, pressed for reinforcements, called on Major General Davis for assistance on February 11. The division commander had the 8 Scout companies requested on their way to designated sites within 48 hours. Once initiated, the reliance of the civil apparatus on the Scouts increased. In less than four weeks, seven more units came under Constabulary orders. By July 25, 1903, 30 of the 50 Scout companies were engaged in peacekeeping work.97 A new phase of Philippine Scout history--police work for the Philippine Commission--had begun in earnest. It would last until 1907.

Duty with the Philippine Constabulary expanded the scope and importance of the Scouts' role in the continued American effort to eradicate all organized Filipino resistance. In addition to the towns garrisoned, the miles marched, the arms and men destroyed and the skirmishes fought and won, the Scouts gave the civil government needed flexibility in policy and strategy. The Philippine Commission had officially rejected the Guardia Civil
policy of employing tribal prejudice to advantage and committed itself to a standard of individual Filipino groups maintaining order among themselves. The availability of Scout units made the approach chosen by the Commission much more viable and politically acceptable. The United States Army had never rejected the Guardia Civil technique for securing public order. Thus, the Scouts had never been publicly saddled with territorial restrictions in regard to areas of operation as had the Constabulary. With the Scouts under its control, the Commission had an experienced, effective, mobile force that could be shifted from province to province without official explanation.

The availability of Scout companies also simplified the peacekeeping strategy evolved by the civil regime. Increased manpower meant an enlarged ability to garrison barrios and patrol incessantly—the two basic criteria for establishing and preserving peace in any locality. In general, the Scouts were to man points selected by Constabulary headquarters—while the police themselves tracked down the rebellious in the countryside. In actual practice, any given set of circumstances determined what form Scout work with the Constabulary took.

As in the case of the history of the Filipino as a soldier in 1900 and 1901, voluminous documentation chronicled the activities of the Scouts as a police auxiliary. The history of a few companies represented accurately the service rendered by all the Scouts.
The Fourth Company, Philippine Scouts, a Macabebe organization, was one of the first native army units to arrive in central Luzon to support the Constabulary in February 1903. The Tagalog provinces of Bulacan, Rizal and Batangas—where American control was sternly opposed—had been greatly agitated by Luciano San Miguel, a former general under Aguinaldo. A native of Cavite, San Miguel had entered Rizal Province in late 1902 to revive the old Filipino secret society, the Katipunan. Within a few weeks he had gathered the support of hundreds of Tagalogs and been proclaimed generalissimo of the New Katipunan. A full scale provincial campaign faced the civil authorities.

The Fourth Company brought a large measure of field experience to the Katipunero—Constabulary struggle. One of the original Batson Macabebe units, the Fourth Company had participated in the fall campaign of 1899, then, after recuperating, operated from Calumpit under Colonel Wilder. Discharged May 31, 1900, the company was reorganized as Troop D, Philippine Cavalry Squadron and saw action in Bulacan, Rizal, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Laguna and Infanta Provinces. Mustered out on June 30, 1901, with the rest of the Squadron, and designated Company D, Macabebe Scouts the following day, the veteran organization performed garrison duty at Caloocan, Rizal Province until October. On October 22, "General Orders 293, Division of the Philippines" formally organized the
long serving unit as the Fourth Company, Philippine Scouts, strength 104 men, First Lieutenant Boss Reese, Philippine Scouts, commanding.

Ordered south the same month, the Fourth Company took station at Batangas. It helped apply a policy of reconcentration in that province which forced the surrender of insurgent leader, General Malvar on April 15, 1902. During these months, the Macabebe force at times occupied as many as four substations with detachments, patrolled extensively and fought numerous engagements. Garrison duty and suppression of a cholera epidemic occupied the company until its return to Caloocan for garrison duty in late October 1902.

On February 23, 1903, the Fourth Company was ordered to report to either Brigadier General Allen, Chief of Constabulary or Colonel W. S. Scott, First Assistant Chief, for the purpose of suppressing public disturbances in Bulacan and Rizal. Seven other Scout companies joined the search for General San Miguel. For a while the rebel leader eluded all pursuit. If cornered, the New Katipuneros simply dispersed, mixing with the native populace. Chief Allen and Colonel Scott exerted more pressure. Barrio populations were consolidated, six additional Scout companies entered the campaign and Bulacan and Rizal were cordoned off. Government forces, numbering almost 2,000 men, gradually stripped away what support the local inhabitants had extended to San Miguel and his followers. Numerous small engagements with the Constabulary and
Scouts drained irreplacable manpower and guns from the New Katipunero ranks. Finally, in late March, the Philippine Scouts located San Miguel.

The Fourth Company had returned to Caloocan after patrolling in Bulacan and Rizal Provinces for nearly a month, but, it remained under the control of the civil government. On the night of March 26, Colonel Scott ordered Lieutenant Reese and First Lieutenant Frank Nickerson, First Company, Philippine Scouts to search the Corral Na Bato country at the headwaters of the San Francisco del Monte River, six miles from Manila. No trace of San Miguel had been uncovered in over a week and Scott suspected he had taken cover somewhere near Manila. The Fourth Company, consisting of 90 men, and the First Company, composed of 80, departed Caloocan before daylight on March 27.

The First Company, like the Fourth, was a seasoned unit. Formed at Macabebe Pampanga, November 14, 1901, from men who had served with Company A, Macabebe Scouts the previous year and Troop A, Philippine Cavalry Squadron, the outfit had served in Batangas in the struggle against General Malvar. Transfer to the civil government on February 24, 1903, brought the company new field service after a stretch of garrison duty. Frequent skirmishes followed. One particular engagement demonstrated the experience and poise of the First Macabebes. Attacked at midnight while marching from Caloocan to Mariquina, Nickerson and 60 men held out
until morning, then repulsed a general assault. The rebel casualties were 19 killed and 10 wounded. The Macabebeas suffered no casualties. 106

At 7 a.m. on the morning of March 27 the two Scout companies arrived at San Francisco del Monte, a hamlet four miles northeast of Manila. At this juncture the companies separated and divided into sections of approximately 20 Macabebeas each. The First Company deployed to the north or left, and the Fourth to the right or southeast. The sections, working a mile apart, were to advance northeast toward the San Francisco del Monte and Mariquina Rivers. All sections would rendezvous at San Mateo, a pueblo situated 14 miles up the line of march. If firing occurred to the right or left, everyone was to close in on the fire.

Just two and a half hours later, after a march of less than five miles, the second section, First Company found San Miguel's hiding place, an old fort located on the San Francisco River. All sections, hearing the shooting, began to converge. When Lieutenant Reese arrived on the scene at 10 a.m. he found San Miguel and about 150 Katipuneros behind a square of stone walls. Yet another stone wall, at least eight feet tall, fronted the square. From loopholes in this outer wall the insurgents were bringing an effective fire to bear without exposing themselves. Unable to devise a flanking movement because of the fort's construction and the heavy bamboo growth surrounding it, he decided upon a frontal assault. With the arrival of more sections, Reese, having already weathered a heavy
fire for 30 minutes, ordered his musician to sound the charge. Thirty-five Scouts vaulted the eastern and northern walls with him. A fierce hand-to-hand battle developed. The Katipuneros, though superior in number, broke. In their mad scramble over the south walls, they came under the fire of the Scouts holding the ground across the river. Still, a number managed to cross the water and escape through the Scout line. San Miguel, however, was killed on the river bank. 107

The fight at Corral Na Bato was the decisive event of the Rizal-Bulacan uprising. The loss of General San Miguel and 59 of his men in this one clash smothered the declining momentum of the New Katipunan. Only a few of his subordinates remained in circulation. 108 At a cost of 3 dead and 12 wounded, the First and Fourth Companies had proven the value of the Philippine Scouts to the civil government. Delighted Constabulary officers lavished praise on both companies. 109

Spectacular battles such as Corral Na Bato did not characterize service with the Constabulary, as the Seventeenth Company, Philippine Scouts learned over a period of months. Organized in Ilocos Norte Province in October 1901 by the consolidation of the Fifth and Seventh Companies, Lepanto Scouts, the new company garrisoned several barrios with detachments until ordered to Batangas in November. For the next three months, various detachments of the Seventeenth scoured the Lepa Mountains, frequently contacting insurgents and marching an average of more than 150 miles per month.
But, after being transferred to Mindoro Island in late February 1902, the Ilocano unit occupied two stations and scouted the interior of the Island for a solid year without locating any hostile Filipinos. On April 1, 1903, the division commander, responding to a Constabulary request, placed the Seventeenth on duty with the civil government. The lack of action continued. The number of miles marched doubled. Fifteen-man patrols, frequently moving at night, toured the countryside near both company posts every 24 hours searching for ladrones but had no success.

On November 8, the 2 officers and 101 enlisted men moved by army transport to a new station—Catanauan, Tayabas Province, on the southwestern coast of Luzon. Four patrols of 20 men each searched the countryside near the post in all directions. Contact with ladrones finally took place on November 24 when Sergeant Santos Miguel and 10 Ilocanos, acting on information from local officials, found an outlaw camp in the mountains near Lopez, Tayabas. A 5 a.m. attack resulted in the capture of only one prisoner. But a document found at the scene by Sergeant Miguel named the 17 men who had just departed so hastily. At the top of the list was Colonel Jose Roldan, a notorious lawbreaker with a price on his head. 110

After this fleeting encounter, months passed without any further sighting of Roldan and his band. The Seventeenth Company marched to Guinayangan, Tayabas in early February 1904 and
constructed quarters, cutting the timber for the buildings in the mountains 10 miles away and hauling it in themselves. In midsummer, efforts to locate Colonel Roldan were intensified. The company adopted a different patrol system, which kept one half of the organization, split into five detachments, in the field constantly. The extra exertion paid off. News reached Guinayangan on September 10 that ladron Chief Roldan and his followers were in the mountains nearby. First Lieutenant Lindzey M. Cheatham and 24 enlisted men immediately made a forced march to Cagascas, Tayabas. Reaching the perimeter of the campsite undetected, Cheatham and the Ilocanos struck in the early hours of September 11. In a short fight, Roldan and four of his men lost their lives. The 20 outlaws, 35 rifles, 3 revolvers and 4 bolos captured were taken back to Cagascas by the Scouts and turned over to the civil authorities.

The experiences of the Seventeenth Company were not unique. As servants of the civil regime, most Philippine Scouts at one time or another endured frequent changes of station, the maintenance of more than one company post or a series of substations, patrols during both daylight and nighttime hours, construction of barracks and quarters, and miles of marching to secure the surrounding terrain. Constabulary support was, in essence, a duplication of Constabulary work: field service in detachments, except when a severe disturbance required a concentration of forces. By 1904, there was little difference between the Constabulary and the Scouts
in regard to functions in the field. The insular government, beset by financial difficulties, began to count on the permanent assistance of the federal native contingent. Many officers of the United States Army and Philippine Scouts resisted. They considered Constabulary support a temporary assignment, terminable whenever the restoration of peace occurred in any locale.

The disagreement heightened when both sides looked ahead. Civilian officials expected the Scout to become a better police officer. American officers wanted the same individual, if he remained a part of the United States Army, to become a professional soldier. The organizational and functional future of the Philippine Scouts hinged on the resolution of this controversy by federal officials in Manila and Washington.
NOTES: CHAPTER TWO

4. New York Times, December 1, 1900, p. 8; Batson Papers, June 15, 1899, USMHR.
7. General File 1877, Enclosure 1, RG 350, NA. The official records consistently referred to the Squadron, Philippine Cavalry. For the sake of smoothness, the writer has used the title Philippine Cavalry Squadron.


Critically important also is the History of the Philippine Scouts: 1899-1934, Compiled in the Historical Section, Army War College, Fort Humphreys, D.C., May 1935, by Charles H. Franklin, Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, AGO 314.73, Adjutant General's Office Project Files, 1917-1925, RG 407, NA. Hereafter cited as Franklin Compilation, AGO 314.73, RG 407, NA. Franklin's collection of documents contains a list of the various Ilocano units. Franklin had access to the muster roles presently closed to scholars and his careful tabulation is the only detailed resume of the available.


15. General File 1877, Enclosure 1, RG 350, NA.

16. Ibid.


19. Ibid., pp. 53-54. Root's thinking on colonial policy can be found most readily in Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott (eds.), The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States: Addresses and Reports by Elihu Root (Cambridge, Mass., 1916); and U.S. War Department, Five Years of the War Department Following the War with Spain, 1899-1903, as shown in the Annual Reports of the Secretary of War (Washington, 1904).


22. Ibid., pp. 1080, 1714-1715.


24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., pp. 1064-1065.


27. Franklin Compilation, AGO 314.73, RG 407, NA.

28. History of the 38th Co., Philippine Scouts, AGO 1294194, RG 94, NA.


30. Letter: Taft to Secretary of War, September 24, 1901, General File 1877, Enclosure 4, RG 350, NA.

31. General File 1877, Enclosure 3, RG 350, NA.
33. General File 1877, Enclosure 9, RG 350, NA.
34. General File 1877, Enclosure 8, RG 350, NA.
35. General File 1877, Enclosure 11, RG 350, NA.
36. Ibid.
40. U.S. Senate, Gazetteer of Philippine Islands, 1902, p. 66.
45. Ibid.
46. For all practical purposes the Macabebes represented all native soldiers to those observing the Philippine situation from Washington, D.C. Senators Teller and Pettigrew, when condemning native soldiers during the debate on the Act of February 2, 1901, mentioned only the Macabebes. As late as 1902, the Senate Committee on the Philippines demonstrated a knowledge of Filipino soldiers basically oriented to an awareness of the Macabebes, U.S. Senate, Affairs in the Philippines, 1902, I, 33, 103, 516, 795. See also New York Times, July 17, 1900, p. 10 and Army and Navy Journal XXXVII (March, 1900), p. 708.


See also, Telegram: Funston to Otis, March 27, 1900, Otis Report, 1900, p. 233.

50. MacArthur, Report, 1900, pp. 443-444; Grant, Report, 1900, p. 90.

51. Army and Navy Journal XXXVII (March, 1900), p. 708. The desire to form a squadron, preferably a regiment, of Macabebe cavalry had been on Batson's mind for sometime. From the beginning, he wanted to enlist them as a part of the regular army, Batson Papers, October 29, 1899, USMHRC.

52. Batson to Adjutant General's Office, March 23, 1900, AGO 317496, RG 94, NA.


54. Batson Report, AGO 318980, RG 94, NA.


56. Cables: Adjutant General's Office to Otis, April 4, 1900, Otis to War Department, April 6, 1900, MacArthur to Adjutant General's Office, April 4, 1900, A. E. Bates, Paymaster General, U.S. Army, to Adjutant General's Office, May 15, 1900, AGO 317496, RG 94, NA.

57. General Orders No. 25, Headquarters, Division of the Philippines, May 24, 1900, General File 1877, Enclosure 1, RG 350, NA. Seven of eight officers had worked with Macabebes in the past.


59. Ibid., p. 182.


Annual Reports, 1901, I, Part 4, 15, 17-18, 22, 25-28. Major General Lloyd Wheaton, commanding the department, prepared this summary report. For Batson's account of this period, see Batson Papers, October 12, 14, November 9, 1900, February 3, 1901, USMHRC.


68. MacArthur submitted the documented evidence to the War Department on March 16, 1901, to illustrate the difficulties in disciplining Filipino troops. He requested that the February 2, 1901, law authorizing the organization of Philippine Scouts be implemented "under very conservative restrictions and very careful administrative control," U.S. Senate, Affairs in the Philippines, 1902, II, 1750. The War Department then handed the reports to the Senate Committee when requested to do so in 1902.

69. Company History: 4th Company, Philippine Scouts, September 24, 1899, to December 31, 1909, AGO 1645863, RG 94, NA.


73. U.S. War Department, Division of Insular Affairs, Public Laws and Other Resolutions Passed by the United States Philippine Commission (Washington, 1901), pp. 369-374; Rhodes, "The Utilization of Native Troops in Our Foreign Possessions," p. 15.
77. Ibid.
79. Salamanca, The Filipino Reaction to American Rule, 1901-1913, pp. 29-31. The work of the investigating committee is located, of course, in U.S. Senate, Affairs in the Philippines, 1902, (3 vols.). Selections from the proceedings may be found in Henry F. Graff (ed.), American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection: Testimony Taken from Hearing on Affairs in the Philippine Islands before the Senate Committee on the Philippines—1902 (Boston, 1969). For a collection of anti-imperialist editorials of the day berating the United States Army, see B. O. Flower, "Topics of the Times: Some Dead Sea Fruit of Our War of Subjugation," Arena XXVII (June 1902), pp. 647-652.
82. General File 1877, Enclosure 14, RG 350, NA.
84. Cablegram: Taft to War Department, September 15, 1902, General File 1877, Enclosure 14, RG 350, NA.
86. An Order from the Secretary of War, November 29, 1902, General File 1877, Enclosure 16, RG 350, NA.
88. Ibid., pp. 608-616.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid., pp. 612.
91. Ibid., pp. 617-621.
92. Ibid., pp. 624, 667, 613; Part 2, 1169, 1289, 1296, 1346, 1523.
93. Davis, Report, 1903, pp. 133-134, 144.
94. Ibid., p. 144.
97. Davis, Report, 1903, p. 145; Cablegrams: Taft to War Department, February 8, 1903, and Davis to Adjutant General, February 13, 1903, General File 1877, Enclosure 18, RG 350, NA; Cablegram: Davis to Adjutant General, March 10, 1903, General File 1877, Enclosure 19, RG 350, NA.
98. Willis, Our Philippine Problem: A Study in American Colonial Policy, pp. 123-125. For the Macabebe—Ilocano stations in a given year, see "Distribution of Troops in the Philippine Islands, September 1, 1903," WD, Annual Reports, 1903, III, 455-459.
99. Vice Governor Wright had stated before the House Insular Affairs Committee in December 1903 that the Scouts would garrison the villages and towns, "Then General Allen with his assistants may take the 6,000 Constabulary familiar with the country and make a determined, persistent war upon the ladrones and exterminate them," Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 2nd Sess., XXXVI, Part 1, 616.


102. Company History: 4th Company, Philippine Scouts, AGO 1645863, RG 94, NA.

103. Ibid.


106. Historical Record of 1st Company, Philippine Scouts, AGO 972992, RG 94, NA.

107. The deployment of the Companies and the details of the Corral Na Bato fight are best portrayed in the reports of Lieutenants Reese, Nickerson and J. S. Finlayson submitted by Colonel Scott with his personal account. Miguel's followers who managed to escape did so primarily because of events prior to the charge of Reese and the 35 Scouts. Having suffered six casualties on the west side of the fort, First Lieutenant Nickerson had sent 15 Scouts to reinforce the line there, reducing the contingent holding the river bank to the south to the same number of soldiers, Scott, Report, 1903, pp. 213-218. See also Company History: 4th Company, Philippine Scouts, AGO 1645863, RG 94, NA; Historical Record of 1st Company, Philippine Scouts, AGO 972992, RG 94, NA; New York Times, March 28, 1903, p. 5, March 29, 1903, p. 13; New York Tribune, March 29, 1903, p. 4; Manila Times, March 28, 1903, p. 1; Coats, "The Philippine Constabulary: 1901-1917," pp. 132-133.

109. Company History: 4th Company, Philippine Scouts, AGO 164863, RG 94, NA. Scott, claiming there no longer seemed any reason whatever to believe the Macabebes might be disloyal, recommending First Lieutenant Reese (who was wounded in the thigh) for a commission in the regular army, and attaching great importance to documents captured at the scene, proclaimed that "I do not believe that during the entire service of our armies in the Philippines there has been a more hotly contested affair or more gallantry shown than in this engagement," Scott, Report, 1903, pp. 214-215.

110. Historical Sketch of 17th Company, Philippine Scouts, File No. 146-11.4, RG 120, NA.

111. Ibid.
CHAPTER III

THE TRANSITION FROM POLICE AUXILIARY

TO PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER: 1904-1922

From the beginning of the year to the fall of 1904 a relatively peaceful situation persisted in the Philippine Islands. It appeared for a time that the United States Army, Philippine Scouts and the Constabulary had established effective law enforcement procedures. The quiet atmosphere provoked a discussion of the future of the Philippine Scouts among American military and colonial officials. After all, the enlistments of the overwhelming majority of the Scouts expired in October 1904, and the provisional appointments of most Scout officers were subject to renewal in 1905. If Scout ranks were deemed expendable, now was the likely and logical moment to discontinue them. Similarly, organizational changes seemed in order if they appeared necessary. Much of the discussion centered around whether the Scouts were to be policemen or soldiers. In its broader contexts, this question necessitated a consideration of internal security policy as well as the relationship of the civil government and the American garrison. So long as the Scouts stood obliged by law to assist the insular regime, civil and military affairs were inseparable.
Until the latter half of 1904 opinions on the Philippine Scouts submitted to the War Department were generally very favorable. Inspection reports indicated that Scout company commanders credited their forces with an unmistakable pride in their vocation, temperance, neatness and loyalty. With proper management native troops could largely replace American personnel. One adverse comment came from Major James S. Pettit, First Infantry. While granting the Scouts learned the mechanical portions of drill rapidly, were useful in cutting the way for white troops with bolos and constructed shelters admirably, Pettit doubted their value as a fighting force among their own people. A more caustic judgment of native units was put forth by Major General George W. Davis. Writing in February 1903, he announced relations between the Scouts and Constabulary were often not amicable, forcing him to remove the former from certain stations to avoid friction. The Scouts, Davis maintained, received better pay than the Constabulary and flaunted this as a mark of superiority. Davis considered the Scout organization deplorable and called for its dissolution. The Constabulary would then have access to all the Filipinos it needed to keep the peace. The Regulars under the division commander constituted a supportive force, the only one needed.

With the preponderance of opinion on the side of the Scouts and the War Department committed to a policy of replacing Americans with Filipino troops at all small posts, continuation of the 4,805-man force required little debate. In August 1904,
however, Secretary of War Taft asked Philippine civil officials if the Scouts should be reduced in number. Newly appointed Governor Luke E. Wright, devoted to less Constabulary to limit civil government expenditures, doubted the wisdom of a Scout reduction even in times of quiet. Constabulary Chief Allen insisted that if the insular police were reduced to the original estimate of approximately 5,000, the present number of Scouts was sufficient. Heeding this advice, Taft on September 6 directed Chief of Staff Adna R. Chaffee to reenlist all willing Scouts another three years.³

The civil officials sanctioning the reenlistments also had in mind organizational changes designed to enhance the value of the native soldier to the colonial regime. Constabulary Chief Allen spearheaded the civil drive for an improved Scout organization. Always thinking in terms of public order, he emphasized in various reports the two qualities the American Army's Filipino adjunct needed to render the best service to his office—mobility and efficiency. In his report for 1903 Allen analyzed both Filipino forces at his disposal and determined the Constabulary had greater mobility because of more officers, a greater period of service in small detachments and greater facility in subsistence. The Scouts, in garrison in entire units, might be better disciplined and drilled, he admitted, but they normally had few officers present due to leave, medical problems and detached service. Since it was not believed wise to place a Filipino NCO in charge of a station,
Scout companies were limited by their shortage of commissioned officers (two per company by regulation) to the manning of not more than two stations at one time. Since the Scouts were tied to the quartermaster department for supplies instead of receiving a per diem allowance, their mobility was further limited. The more stations occupied the easier the task of enforcing the law. But, Allen also admitted, scattered stations tended to reduce efficiency.

With the police force substituting for postmasters, enforcing quarantines, escorting prisoners from province to province, supplying rural officials and guarding telephone and telegraph lines, as well as pursuing lawbreakers, the Constabulary always needed more manpower. In an attempt to relieve his beleaguered units, Chief Allen worked to increase the efficiency of those Scout companies on duty with the civil government. In August 1904, he asked the War Department to implement more fully the Act of February 2, 1901. Allen wanted three officers appointed for each Scout company and one-half of the units organized into battalions. With three officers per company, the Scouts could be dispersed over a greater geographic area. At the same time, active battalion commanders through frequent inspections of their widely scattered companies and detachments would overcome the inefficiency fostered by continuous service at small, isolated posts. Allen believed battalion commanders and more company officers would double the overall efficiency of the Filipino infantry. Such an achievement
might even permit a reduction of the size and cost of the Constabulary as the Philippine Commission desired.\(^5\)

Forwarding Allen's request to Washington, Governor Luke E. Wright seconded the proposal of Scout battalions, emphasizing the need for additional officers so the Scouts could garrison more stations. If captains of the regular army were appointed as provisional majors in command of Scout battalions, Chief Allen would be helped even more since these men could take charge of those districts where present Assistant Chiefs were either former civilians or U.S. Volunteer officers and not detailed, commissioned officers of the U.S. Army.\(^6\) Both Governor Wright and Chief Allen indicated by their correspondence they believed the experimental stage was past. The Filipino had proven himself and deserved an improved organization.\(^7\)

Some of the highest ranking officers of the Philippines Division, while not disclaiming the Filipino as a soldier, did not accept the idea that battalions should be created, as Allen proposed, to make the Scouts better policemen. The most fervent opposition came from Brigadier General William Harding Carter, presently commanding the Department of the Visayas. Well-known and respected in Washington, Carter had been a confidant of Elihu Root, introduced him to the words of Emory Upton, and written for him those sections of the Act of February 2, 1901, establishing the Philippine Scouts.\(^8\) In an attempt to refute the opinions of Allen and Wright, he prepared a long memorandum in September 1904. He
first reviewed the history of the army's planning regarding its Philippine garrison. According to Carter, the faithful service of Filipino scouts in 1899-1900, so reminiscent of the work done by army Indian scouts on the American frontier, had caused the War Department in 1901 to devise a plan whereby a number of white regiments would be replaced gradually by battalions of trained islanders. Subsequently, American regiments were either reduced in terms of actual number per company or shipped home. At this juncture, however, the civil government under Taft, in an act Carter maintained demonstrated little consideration for military planning, secured the passage of the Constabulary Act of January 30, 1903.

The original blueprint, Carter insisted, had no intention of mixing Scout companies with the Constabulary or the municipal police forces to be established. The Scouts were to be as distinct as the Indian scouts and Indian reservation police in the United States. To mix Scouts and Constabulary destroyed the use of the Scouts solely as a U.S. Army reserve. Carter was also concerned about rumors suggesting the Scouts and Constabulary be merged. This would create a Filipino force that collectively outnumbered the American garrison left in the islands. How could anyone honestly concerned about internal security contemplate such a move? What if, as in 1899, the Filipinos turned on their benefactors?
The momentary problem, as Carter saw it, was to provide a force to maintain order yet dispose of the present system of control over the Scouts, where the civil government commanded and the Army supplied material wants. He first wanted to make sure the Constabulary operated strictly as a provincial and central government police force. The present Constabulary trend appeared to be towards a Philippine colonial army, with all the titles, customs and expenses normally associated with such a body. If the Constabulary were deprived of its military character and made to depend on regular troops backed by Filipino auxiliaries, Carter predicted the goal of a smaller police force was achievable. To separate the two forces now, Carter recommended that 36 Scout companies be reorganized with a strength of 85 men each, brought together in battalions, and have Americans as battalion NCOS. This action left 2,000 Scouts (14 companies) for civil duty until the colonial regime could finance a sufficient police force. At the same time, the department commander would know which Scout commands constituted a part of his permanent organization and provide proper barracks, quarters and training for them.9

The Allen-Wright correspondence and the Carter memorandum, although having points of agreement, brought out the root adversity existing among American officials. All civilian officials favored Scout battalions to increase their efficiency when they were on police duty. Carter's position, on the other hand, represented those military officers who desired more
formal organizations to improve the soldierly qualities of the Scouts. Carter's supporters intended to concentrate any battalions ordered at one post to undertake intensified military training. There was to be no further splintering of Scout units.

The response of the War Department satisfied neither the civil government nor officers like Carter. On October 20, 1904, Chief of Staff Adna R. Chaffee issued a memorandum that dictated a status quo policy for the islands. To meet the desires of the Constabulary, Chaffee wrote, 25 first lieutenants of the line would have to be detailed as captains and 5 captains as majors or battalion commanders, all of whom were to receive the pay of the higher rank as specified by the Act of February 2, 1901. Chaffee declared this impracticable. It had not been practicable even in 1901 to officer Filipino companies with commissioned men. The drain on the army's commissioned ranks would have left all regular organizations in the islands with but one officer. Even now, Chaffee continued, the Scouts with an average of one and a half officers per company were not much worse off than their American counterparts with a figure of one and three-fifths. Since the heavily taxed regular units simply could not afford further deletions, he suggested the War Department request legislative relief. Congress could authorize the president to appoint captains provisionally for four years, as it had already done in the case of first and second lieutenants on duty with the Scouts. Most of the captains might well as be selected from among the lieutenants
within Scout ranks qualified for promotion, thus avoiding any sizable impact on the regular establishment. Personally, Chaffee did not believe battalion organizations were needed at the time.\textsuperscript{11}

Chaffee's remarks, while temporarily preventing both the army and the Constabulary from realizing their objectives, did not put an end to the controversy. The argument received considerable attention in military journals and newspapers.\textsuperscript{12} Both sides continued to look for evidence to advance their causes. For the army, only one thing was needed to keep the battalion concept alive—an example of what battalion organization would do for the Scouts. The Provisional Battalion, Philippine Scouts, an organization created by chance, provided that example.

The establishment of the Provisional Battalion originated with a request by the President of the St. Louis Exposition of 1904 (commemorating the Louisiana Purchase) that a number of Filipino soldiers attend. The War Department immediately asked Major General George Davis, commanding the Philippines Division, his recommendation on the subject. Davis, frequent critic of the Scouts, advised against sending any Scouts to St. Louis. He believed the Constabulary was already a Philippine Army capable of replacing the Scouts. The police force, Davis proposed, was the body most characteristic of native soldiers. It was a permanent part of the island scene while the Scouts were a temporary adjunct of the U.S. Army. He also emphasized that hostility existed between Scout companies, particularly where the Macabebes
and Tagalogs were concerned. It would be difficult to predict how they would behave in a foreign country.\(^13\)

Upon receipt of a copy of Davis's letter, Governor Taft on February 12, 1903, forwarded an entirely opposite view to Washington. Taft suggested the Scouts be allowed to go since the United States treasury, not the insular treasury, would pay their way. While admitting the Scouts might be merged with the Constabulary or disbanded in the future, Taft maintained the Scouts possessed sufficient discipline to make the trip. He could find no reason to deny the request of the Exposition's President. The War Department agreed with Taft and Davis could only concur.\(^14\) In the April issue of the *Army and Navy Journal* it was announced that a battalion of Filipinos would attend the St. Louis Exposition. The publication heralded the decision as one strictly in line with the wholesome policy of Great Britain, a power that brought colonial corps to London on an irregular basis to impress them with the might and dignity of the empire to which they belonged.\(^15\)

On August 1, General Orders NO. 78, Division of the Philippines, series 1903, gathered four companies at Caloocan for drill instruction. The Fourth Company (Macabebes), Twenty Fourth Company (Ilocanos), Thirtieth Company (Tagalogs) and Forty Seventh Company (Visayans) composed the new organization. Men unwilling to travel abroad were transferred or discharged and replaced by enlistments or transfers. Each company soon possessed 104 men. First Lieutenant Wesley King, Forty Seventh Company, Philippine
Scouts, expanded the band he had already initiated within his company by selecting members from all the units. The band members, all enlisted men, were henceforth considered on special duty. A former Chief Trumpeter, Eleventh U.S. Cavalry, arrived to give the 45 musicians an instructor of merit, and the American officers of the battalion purchased the needed instruments. After only 16 days of training, Governor Taft reviewed the battalion at Caloocan. The Manila Cabelnews reported that "the little brown warriors did indeed put up a good front. To the music of their own band they came marching down the parade ground, their campaign hats settled properly on their heads, their leggings close-laced and chests bulging." 16

Training continued until mid-February 1904 when the Provisional Battalion embarked at Manila for the United States via Japan and Hawaii. On March 31 the four companies became officially a battalion of infantry as authorized by the Act of February 2, 1901, such organization to terminate upon return to the Philippines. Captain William H. Johnston, Sixteenth Infantry, received the assignment of battalion commander, officially designated Major, Philippine Scouts, status subject to revocation at the end of the Exposition. Following a cross-country journey by train the First Battalion went into camp on the grounds of the Exposition at St. Louis, April 17, 1904.

Having donned new olive drab uniforms in San Francisco, the First Battalion on arrival turned in their U.S. Springfield
carbines, models 1873 to 1878, (some so worn they were smooth-bores), and received U.S. magazine carbines, model 1898 with 1901 sight. They also received machetes, infantry russet belts and boxes, web cartridge belts and suspenders. For the first time Filipino troops were as well equipped and armed as any United States Infantry force. Drill with the new equipment began immediately. Instruction took place daily, lasting at least two and often three hours. The sessions were mandatory for all personnel, even those on extra and special duty. In addition to the hours spent on the drill field, the four companies (by order of the War Department) furnished the Exposition a large detail of men to work as carpenters from April 18 to July 2. The detail—numbering from 80 to 190—constructed with native materials buildings to house the Philippine exhibits on display. Upon completion of this project, the battalion undertook work on a pavilion for specific materials representing the Philippine Scouts, a stable, a parade ground, a fence to surround the camp and ditches for both water and sewage. Major William Johnston wrote later that "for three or four months of the Exposition, the same men who elicited such applause for their neat appearance and excellent drill were, during the remainder of the day, hard at work in brown fatigue dress either as carpenters or on general fatigue."18

Major Johnston, believing military training for the Filipinos should extend beyond drill and guard duty, established a school under Chaplain J. C. Granville, Fourteenth Cavalry, for
noncommissioned Scout officers. The one-hour daily class covered a conversational knowledge of the English language and the basic components of United States history and geography. Part of the course involved a visit to all the exhibits at the Exposition. Johnston's hope was to teach the enlisted Filipinos through their fellows serving as officers.¹⁹

Both construction details and school ranked behind the most important functions performed by the Scouts at St. Louis: escort and guard duty. Between the opening of the Exposition on April 30, 1904, and its close on December 1, the battalion conducted 24 escorts of honor. Among the dignitaries guided through the grounds were the President and Directors of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, the Governors of Missouri, Kentucky, Iowa, Wisconsin, Indiana, Maryland, Louisiana, Colorado, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Connecticut, and New Mexico, and the President of the United States. The first Battalion also held personal reviews or gave exhibition drills for military and civil officers visiting the Scout encampment. Camp visitors included the Inspector General, Northern Division, Secretary of War Taft (on two different occasions), Major General S. S. Summer, Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, Major General J. C. Bates, Lieutenant General S. B. M. Young, a number of governors and the President of the United States. Altogether an estimated 1,000,000 people saw the Scouts and their camp during the Exposition. Thousands more attended concerts by the battalion band.²⁰
The Philippine Scouts made a distinct impression on their observers at St. Louis. Various officials complimented the four companies on their fitness, intelligence and soldierly bearing. No other military organization present, except the United States Military Academy contingent, received such praise. Captain James N. Munro, Third Cavalry, who had served with the Philippine Cavalry Squadron, wrote in the Infantry Journal:

To anyone who has seen the First Provisional Battalion, Philippine Scouts, at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition during the past summer, no comments on the development of the scouts are necessary. Here were four companies, from four different tribes. Their camp was a model of cleanliness. Discipline was perfect. Their drill was precision itself. Any regular organization might be proud of a similar performance. Their battalion drill, which was according to the latest Infantry Drill Regulations, was executed throughout to the trumpet signal, without a break, and scarcely a ragged edge. This briefly is the transition from Batson's first ragged, ununiformed, undisciplined company of Scouts to the present First Battalion.

A few officers found some compliments extravagant. Major Johnston, Battalion Commander, for example, warned that claims the Scouts were superior to American soldiers would do the Filipinos more harm than good. On the relative merits of the American and Filipino soldiers he expressed his views as follows:

While the Filipino as a rule is more tractable, or fond of drill and ceremonies, scrupulously neat, and certainly loyal and efficient, there are many qualities of the soldier in which the individual intelligence of the American makes him the peer of all others.

Major General J. F. Wade, on duty as Division Commander in the Philippines, did not share Johnston's opinion. Terming much of
the printed material on the Scouts absurd, Wade assailed the whole idea of comparing American and Filipino, arguing that

The Filipino soldier, both scout and constabulary, has done and is doing good work, but it is the work of the trained soldier against the mob. He has been well armed, drilled, and disciplined by American officers, and led by those officers against the undisciplined, undrilled, and poorly armed outlaws of the provinces, man of his own race but lacking his advantages and having nothing to gain and all to lose by fighting. . . .

The actual value of the Filipino as a regular soldier is still open to question. His staying powers when brought against a force equal or superior in numbers, drill, and arms, his loyalty to those who employ him, and many questions of vital importance have not been decided. He has, to some extent, been a pupil of the American soldier, but is far from being a graduate. 24

Secretary of War Taft, in his annual report for 1904, spoke favorably of the appearance and conduct of the Scout Battalion at St. Louis. Taft believed Exposition duty had established two important characteristics of the Christian Filipinos: their capacity for receiving discipline and their martial spirit. The Constabulary, the Secretary asserted, could maintain order in the islands alone once the effects of the war, cholera, and pestilence were overcome, but he continued to support as a wise concept the presence of a small, well-trained Filipino army. And he was convinced these native soldiers should never be slighted in training. The Scouts deserved the same training Americans received, including the same discipline, rifle practice and complement of officers.

To enhance discipline and promote efficiency in the field the Secretary of War called for battalions, 13 in all, to include all Scout companies. Taft suggested the fairest policy to apply in
securing the needed officers was first to create the office of
captain on a four year, provisional basis, then select those Scout
lieutenants most qualified for advancement to higher rank. Such
an approach would not deepen the dearth of commissioned personnel
continually plaguing the regular army. The U.S. Army, would,
however, provide 13 captains to serve as majors in command of the
new Scout groupings.25

The first fundamental change in Scout organization took
place, as had the creation of the Provisional Battalion, by
chance, shortly after the date of Taft's report. President
Roosevelt was as impressed with the First Provisional Battalion
as his Secretary of War following a personal visit to the St. Louis
grounds on November 26. The four Filipino companies escorted the
Chief Executive on his tour of the Exposition and later honored
him with a full dress review. Finding the Scouts "remarkably clean
and effective in battalion drill," Roosevelt invited them to stay
in the United States and participate in his inaugural parade
scheduled for March 1905.26 Fulfillment of his request necessi-
tated an altered status for the First Battalion since it was to
serve as a unit only until its return at a fixed date to the
Philippines. On December 1, 1904, General Orders NO. 101, War
Department, Washington, designated the Filipino units the First
Battalion, Philippine Scouts, a permanent organization. Major
William H. Johnston remained the superior officer in charge.27
The formation of a battalion for special purposes in the United States did not, of course, mean the creation of such units in the Philippines would follow. But a precedent had been set and both the President and the Secretary of War were personally responsible. Meanwhile, events in the Philippines began to produce an increasingly favorable climate for a larger Scout command. The expiration of Scout enlistments in 1904 had produced a large turnover in the Filipino force. Of 4,535 Filipinos enlisted, 2,173, or less than one half, had records of prior service. The effect on discipline and efficiency produced by the induction of 2,362 recruits was augmented in late 1904 by steadily worsening conditions in the Visayan Islands, particularly on Samar. Here the hill dwellers, called Pulajanes (because of their red garb), revolted as they had in the past against the coastal residents who exploited them at the market place. The mystically inspired Pulajanes, numbering in the thousands, gained confidence with each passing month, burning, kidnapping and killing across the coastal lowlands. Engagements with Constabulary and Philippine Scout companies increased.

Vastly outnumbered, Constabulary and Scout forces, awaiting extensive reinforcements, fought a survival campaign. One Scout company, the Thirty Eighth, found itself in dire straits on Samar's east coast. Having shrunk to 63 men in August 1903 the Thirty Eighth had recruited diligently on Luzon and arrived at Taft, Samar, on September 30, 1904, with a complement of 99 men.
But 27 men, concerned for their own safety in light of the large number of inexperienced Filipinos just taken into the company, refused to reenlist. The Scout company had 72 effectives with which to defend alone a 125 mile stretch of coastline. An additional 26 Filipinos, moreover, were scheduled for discharge within 90 days. To protect the local inhabitants with so small a body, First Lieutenant G. F. Abbott, Philippine Scouts, kept one or two detachments in the field constantly even though some reports intimated a Pulajan concentration was underway in both the San Julian and Ores regions, two widely separated areas. The troubled Lieutenant Abbott fervently hoped outside aid would arrive soon.

On November 9, 1904, Quartermaster Sergeant Simeon Cerbana and 20 men hurried to the pueblo of Ores in accordance with Abbott's orders to assist the volunteers of that place, numbering about 800, against a threatened Pulajan attack. At noon the next day the Pulajan bolomen entered the town. A large portion of the Ores volunteers joined them and attacked the Scouts. Sergeant Cerbana, 10 Scouts and an American hospital corpsman were killed and five others wounded. The remaining five soldiers managed to flee with the wounded while the Pulajanes and their cohorts burned and looted Ores. The danger of using small numbers in a situation lending itself to enemy consolidation had taken a savage toll, but Abbott believed he had to maintain his strategy if he were to effectively police the area. For a while his decision seemed to be a sound one. Operating with 40 armed members of his company
against the Pulajanes, who possessed few firearms, Abbott on three occasions in early December routed superior numbers, killing over 80 Pulajanes in all. But the tide changed on December 16, 1904. Second Lieutenant Stephen K. Hayt and 38 enlisted men, one hospital corpsman, and several volunteers were overwhelmed by hundreds of Pulajanes at the small sitio of Dolores. Hayt, the corpsman and all but one of the Scouts lost their lives.29

The massacre accelerated the American campaign against the Pulajanes. Scout and Constabulary forces on Samar swelled to approximately 1,900. Sixteen companies of the Twelfth and Fourteenth U.S. Infantry arrived to free the native soldiers from all garrison duty. Brigadier General Henry T. Allen of the Constabulary and Major General William H. Carter, commanding the Department of the Visayas, took the field in person to direct the reduction of the Pulajanes.30 The large scale routing of personnel to Samar encouraged unrest in central Luzon and late in January 1905 the Third Squadron, Second Cavalry and First Battalion, Seventh Infantry were dispatched to Cavite Province in support of the Constabulary and Philippine Scouts.31

Renewed hostilities provoked fresh considerations of American military policy in both Manila and Washington. One officer particularly interested in any new perspective that would avoid the use of United States troops, Major General Henry C. Corbin, commanding the Philippines Division since November 11, 1904, assessed the future of the Philippine Scouts in early 1905.
Inclined to a posture of complete cooperation with civil authorities, Major General Corbin had discussed the Philippine civil-military situation with Secretary of War Taft before his departure for the islands. Part of their conversation had involved the organizational future of the Scouts and from the beginning Corbin demonstrated a favorable attitude toward battalion, and even regimental, status for the Filipino force. In October, while in San Francisco, Corbin had asked the War Department for authority to reorganize the Scouts as soon as he took command. Chief of Staff Chaffee responded by citing his October 20 memorandum on the subject.\(^{32}\) Undaunted, Corbin, when faced with a deteriorating situation on Samar, asked for the same authority on December 11, 1904, mentioning now his earlier meeting with Taft. Again, Chaffee deemed such an organization unwise at the moment, noting that the Secretary of War planned to ask Congress for legislation regarding captains for Scout companies.\(^{33}\)

With American soldiers back on Samar, many abandoned posts being reoccupied, and burgeoning unrest on the perimeter of Manila in Cavite and Batangas Provinces, Corbin petitioned for a reorganization of the Scouts once more on January 13, 1905. In a long letter he touched on every aspect of the Philippine Scout apparatus from pay to clothing. The bulk of his letter, however, dealt with the role of the Scouts in the American garrison. Noting that the United States Army contingent had dwindled to 13,188, only 9,544 of whom were present for duty, Corbin opposed
any further reductions. The eastern frontier of the United States, he believed, warranted attention beyond the question of local police. It was in this light that Corbin analyzed the Scouts. He could see no reason for a consolidation of the Constabulary and the Scouts, the former being an insular police, the latter a part of the American Army. The Constabulary was sufficient for normal times but would occasionally require a back-up force. Since no insular militia had been formed, and present conditions made the organization of one doubtful for some time, Corbin contended the Scouts should not only support the Constabulary but act as militia under certain insular officials. He disliked, furthermore, the idea of the civil government bearing the cost of a combined Constabulary-Scout organization. The insular treasury would probably prove unreliable and force the United States to pay part of the bill, thereby undermining the development of economic self-reliance in the Philippines. Overall, Corbin was of the opinion that maintenance of a special native force of Scouts, subject to call, fostered the feeling of protection on the part of the United States in grave emergencies. 34

The position of the General Staff had already softened by the time Corbin’s letter arrived. In late December, Major William H. Johnston had submitted to the War Department a legislative proposal representing the concerted opinion of all the officers on duty with the First Battalion at St. Louis. A few days later the
First Division of the General Staff began a careful scrutiny of the Johnston document. In a memorandum report dated January 15, 1905, the officers of the General Staff endorsed a full complement of officers for each Scout company, the advancement of Scout lieutenants to the office of captain, the examination of current officers for renewal of provisional appointments, and the assignment of Scout companies to battalions. The General Staff believed the battalions should be ordered at once and suggested that if legislation to promote Scout lieutenants was not immediately obtainable, a lieutenant of the line of the regular army should be detailed to command each company as a captain.\textsuperscript{35}

By January 24, the Secretary of War had perused the report of the First Division and President Roosevelt had heartily approved Corbin's letter.\textsuperscript{36} As a result, Chaffee informed Corbin the Department favored six more battalions, commanded by regular officers. Corbin concurred and telegraphed early in February a suggested composition for each.\textsuperscript{37} General Orders No. 32, War Department, February 28, 1905, reiterated Corbin's delineation. The organizations and their initial members were as follows:

- 2nd Battalion = Companies 12, 14, 26, 28
- 3rd Battalion = Companies 13, 22, 29, 45
- 4th Battalion = Companies 43, 44, 48, 49
- 5th Battalion = Companies 15, 16, 21, 23
- 6th Battalion = Companies 1, 5, 35, 37
- 7th Battalion = Companies 11, 17, 31, 32

The ordering of battalions was a landmark decision in the history of the Philippine Scouts. As independent units, the Scouts had been essentially native policemen organized as rifle companies,
taking orders from either civil or military officials but always
equipped and fed by the United States Army. Regardless of how long
it might take to effect consolidation of the designated companies
into battalions in actual fact rather than just on paper, the pre­
sence of a unifying command structure for 28 companies placed the
Scouts more securely in the realm of the soldier. Henceforth,
they would be viewed more as soldiers than policemen by all con­
cerned.

The internal unrest in the Philippines and Major General
Corbin's reaction to it provided an important incentive for the
reorganization of the Scouts. But the First Battalion,
Philippine Scouts proved the primary motivation behind the organi­
zational changes. The visit of the Battalion to the United States
put the Filipino on stage for the American public. And the four
companies, all of different tribal origins made a lasting im­
pression. President Roosevelt as well as lesser dignitaries,
were impressed with the discipline, manners and martial spirit of
the Scouts.

In light of the attention devoted by all observers to the
discipline of the Scouts at St. Louis, some observations are
needed at this point. The discipline was exemplary. Not a single
blemish appeared on the record of the First Battalion for its
entire tour. But all the observers failed to take into account
several key factors. First, all the companies involved were
veteran units who had had good training and firm discipline for
almost three years before they were brought together at Caloocan. Secondly, it can be assumed their American officers watched them with special diligence at St. Louis and later in Washington. Those officers, aware of the attention being given the Scouts, had no desire to lose track of a single Filipino in possession of a firearm for even a few minutes. One unsavory incident could have wiped out an otherwise entirely commendable performance. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it was not unnatural that the normal tribal animosities existing between Macabebe, Tagalog, Visayan and Ilocano failed to surface during their months in the United States. They could not speak English and had been transported thousands of miles from home. Service in an entirely alien land undoubtedly generated a greater sense of group cohesiveness among them than would have been true in their own country. The U.S. Army would discover in the years ahead that the mixing of different tribal companies in battalions in the Philippines would lead to severe discipline problems. However, in 1904, the ability of the First Battalion to drill and function cooperatively in various capacities convinced many the Filipino was indeed a soldier of merit, had progressed beyond tribal leanings, and was worthy of the uniform of the U.S. Army. The achievements of the First Battalion made the prospect of numerous Scout battalions desirable and promising to the Republican administration, to important Army officers and to the insular government. The prime consideration now was how the decision, once made, would effect the Scouts in coming years.
Since domestic peace was not yet firmly established in some island provinces, Scout service with the Constabulary had to continue. Thus no hasty attempt was made to consolidate the companies of the newly designated battalions at single stations. The single battalion united almost immediately was the Second, and its duty was to guard civil prisoners on the Tabaco-Albay road project in Albay Province, Southern Luzon. The assignment allowed little time for military instruction. As work progressed on the road the battalion encampment as well as the mobile prison stockade had to be relocated. All supplies, both civil and military, had to be escorted. From 6 a.m. to 5 p.m. each day the four companies watched 500 convicts as they toiled in the sun. Escape attempts taxed the nerves of the Scouts. At night one officer and 32 enlisted men drew guard duty over the prisoners locked in the stockade. Even the weather proved uncooperative. A late September typhoon blew the stockade apart and washed away the battalion's records.

Lack of training added to the battalion's work load. Inexperience permeated the rank and file. Almost 60 per cent of the enlisted personnel were raw recruits, many having signed up at the construction site. Some had never handled a rifle. Often, a recruit, while loading his gun prior to going on guard duty, failed to control the stiff hammer on his old Springfield carbine and discharged it. The alarm would sound and the whole camp would turn
out. Practice eliminated most of these sleep shattering inci-
dents. But not until late November 1905, after the prisoners
were returned to Manila, did the Second Battalion have a chance
to undertake serious training. Ten weeks of arduous drill and
instruction followed. And even though three companies were trans-
ferred to Cavite Province in February 1906 at least they occu-
pied the same post through May. The ordering of the Twelfth and
Fourteenth Companies to Samar then effectively disrupted train-
ing. 38

Other battalions received even less or absolutely no train-
ing during their first year of existence. Some frustrated
organizations would not be brought together for almost three full
years. 39 But as the overall situation in the Philippines became
more stable, that stability gradually made garrison duty at a
single post the normal mode of service for Scout battalions.

The most vital factor promoting garrison life for the Scouts
was the establishment of peace and order in Samar, Leyte, Mindanao
and Southern Luzon. By 1907 the Philippine Constabulary enforced
the law without the aid of a single Philippine Scout company. 40

Except for the campaigns against the Jolo Moros from 1911 to 1913
the Philippine Scouts would not experience any further combat of
note until World War II. What service the Scouts rendered the
civil government through these years amounted to quarantine duty
and the infrequent manning of isolated stations where domestic
unrest was anticipated but failed to materialize.
The advent of peace allowed the American policy of concentration announced by Major General Leonard Wood in 1906 to continue unabated. The U.S. Army wanted all forces at a few large posts to reduce expenditures, to improve the quality of instruction (particularly where large field problems were concerned), to minimize health problems by restricting American soldiers to carefully inspected military reservations, and, after the Japanese war scare of 1907, to enhance the land defense of a major naval base once its location was pinpointed. The Scouts, in turn, felt the effects of concentration. Many posts previously housing American soldiers were turned over to Scout units. At the same time, preoccupation with professional training on the part of American officers (including those commanding Scout battalions and companies) helped to spur an increasing "Americanization" of the Philippine Scouts. In August 1905 the Eighth Battalion was formed. The Ninth Battalion followed in October 1908, Tenth and Eleventh two months later and the Twelfth in December 1909.

On the company level, unit size rose to 110, an increase of six, in early 1908. The increase permitted three enlisted men per company to be detailed as privates, sanitary, to learn the duties performed by Hospital Corpsmen in the regular army. Six men were also detailed from each company to form a Scout band for each battalion. To provide a constant flow of experienced officers, an act of Congress on May 16, 1908, created the office of Captain
of Scouts as a rank in the military establishment. Captains were
to be selected from those serving as Scout first lieutenants.
Appointments were for four years on a provisional basis. General
Orders No. 195, War Department, dated December 4, 1908, detailed
regulations governing the examination of applicants for appoint­
ment as second lieutenant and for promotion or reappointment of
all officers. In August 1909 schools for instruction of Scout
officers were ordered for all Scout stations. Scout arms and
equipment were updated.

All of these developments indicated that the Philippine
Scouts might become duplicates of regular infantry in the near
future, particularly since many high ranking American officers
stressed repeatedly the need for improved training. Leonard Wood,
Major General commanding the Philippines Division, stated in his
report for 1907 that

upon the completion of a campaign such as the recent
one in Leyte the Scouts are very useful in relieving the
American infantry in the towns of the disaffected dis­
trict and garrisoning them until conditions become
sufficiently settled for the Constabulary to resume con­
trol. But when quiet has been restored there is no good
reason why, if quarters are available, the companies
belonging to battalions, at least, should not be concen­
trated at battalion posts. On the contrary there are
many arguments in favor of this plan. Drill and in­
struction under a major is valuable to both officers and
men. Officers have an opportunity to attend schools and
by association with brother officers to get new ideas.
No American officer can live among natives for any length
of time without becoming somewhat rusty. It often hap­
pens that a company is stationed alone in some outlying
town that has only one officer with it, and he and the
medical officer are the only American men there. While
this is of course often necessary, such companies should
be drawn in whenever possible.
A friendly rivalry between companies grows up in a four-company post and both officers and men feel there is an object in trying to make their company the best in the post.47

Brigadier General Albert L. Mills, commanding the Department of the Visayas, went even further, recommending that since field work had shown the Scouts to be loyal, patient and efficient, the number of companies should be increased and organized as regiments. He believed the Scouts provided good material from which an insular army could be molded to help maintain peace and order throughout the archipelago, and in time of war, to repel hostile attacks from without in association with American troops.48

Many officials, both civil and military, objected. The tendency to "Americanize" the Scouts refueled the long standing debate over what role the Scouts and the military and the civil government should play in the colonial administration of the Philippines. Charges and countercharges filled pages of private correspondence, annual reports, the Infantry Journal, the Army and Navy Journal and newspapers in the Philippines.

The most penetrating objections to the new Scout battalions came from the civilian regime. Governor Luke E. Wright, Chief of Constabulary Henry Allen and other Constabulary officers had earnestly supported the founding of Scout battalions. As previously recounted, their endorsement had stemmed from the assumption that the presence of battalion commanders would substantially increase the value of the Scouts' service to the civil
government. Chief Allen announced in his report for 1905, however, that the battalion organizations had not helped meet the needs of the insular office. Instead of devoting their time to serving the civil governor, particularly when asked to cooperate fully, the battalion commanders had clamored loudly for a bringing together of their scattered companies. To Allen, this attitude originated in the conviction held by many Scout officers that any duty under civil auspices was temporary, involving a punitive expedition at best. Such a conviction, Allen believed, exposed the failure of many to understand the true nature of service in the Philippines. Once more, he emphasized that only numerous stations could prevent disturbances and discourage ladron bands before they became serious affairs. To make imitation American soldiers of the Scouts by concentrating them at a few posts, feeding them a diet including meat and ice, and allowing them American company impedimentia that hampered their mobility, rendered them almost useless to the civil government.

As always, the future concerned Allen the most. Since the shifting of the Constabulary of one province to quell disorder in another was not considered wise strategy, and a current lack of public funds and revenues pressured for less Constabulary, the insular regime now counted on "permanent assistance from the federal native contingent." Scout assistance, however, would
prove effective only if the majors commanding battalions recognized the need for small stations and served the governor-general diligently.50

Both Allen and his subordinate officers realized the Scouts and Constabulary were on divergent paths of development. While the basic orientation of the Scouts was becoming a purely military one, the disappearance of armed bands would soon terminate the distinctly military phase of Constabulary history. In the future the chief requisite of a Constabulary officer would be his ability to function as a police officer and political agent loyal to the central government, yet enforcing the law impartially. The new role would demand a knowledge of local political conditions in addition to a briefing in matters pertaining to courts, arrests, and the presentation of cases to justices of the peace. Versatility, rather than sheer fighting skill, would be the forte of the Constabulary officer of tomorrow.51

Following a visit to the islands to witness the opening of the Philippine Assembly in late 1907, Secretary of War Taft defined the future status of the Constabulary. Although conceding considerable friction and suspicion had long existed between the Constabulary and the populace they were sworn to protect, Taft claimed years of training, careful selection of officers and severe discipline had finally established a corps of Constabulary leaders who understood their proper role in regard to the elected officials of the municipalities and provinces. They were to assist
in a sympathetic way the local presidentes in the enforcement of the law. The native newspapers, Taft pointed out, proved his statements. No longer was the Constabulary a subject of bitter condemnation as the force had been just two years ago.\textsuperscript{52}

The gradual assumption of a fundamentally "police" orientation did not relieve the Constabulary of its workload. If anything, Constabulary duties grew larger. Even the development of effective municipal police forces rested primarily on Constabulary shoulders. Generally overworked, consistently short of men and occasionally subjected to shaky financial support because of their utter dependence on the insular treasury, Constabulary officers heightened the animosity already existing between the central police and Scouts with comments carried by the island newspapers and the \textit{Army and Navy Journal}. As early as mid-1905, for example, one Constabulary officer contended in the latter publication that the Philippine Scout was "over-petted" and led by his officers to believe he was the "real thing." Moreover, the Scouts were bound to be more disciplined since their main preoccupation tended to be drill and the policing of their cuartel grounds.\textsuperscript{53}

Such criticism was not uncommon even within the ranks of the United States Army as the Scouts became more sedentary garrison troops. Some American officers concerned with the "Professional" status of the American Army as a whole, the overall effectiveness of American forces in the Philippines, and occasionally influenced
by racial sentiments, found nothing attractive about the suggestion that Filipinos could be classed with their American counterparts. Their verbal attacks questioned the loyalty, courage and cost of the Scouts. The root source of the anti-Scout sentiment centered on the corp's increasing tendency to adopt American methods and standards. Major General J. F. Weston, who assumed command of the Philippines Division in February 1908 supported the Scouts but warned that

"care must be exercised that they are not diverted into a copy of the regular troops. Mobility, simplicity of equipment and ability to live on such supplies as can be obtained from the country at hand are the prime virtues of native auxiliary forces and this fact should be kept in mind. When the scout requires the same food, clothing and equipment as the white soldier his special value will be gone."

A few officers believed it was already too late. Captain Robert W. Mearns admitted openly that

"the name, Philippine Scouts is a misnomer. It comes from the fact that the nucleus of the organization was a small force formed during the war for scouting purposes. They are mostly native infantry organized as battalions and enlisted in the Regular Army. The only difference is they receive just half the pay of Regulars. . . . They are uniformed and armed the same."

Yet another officer, Captain John R. M. Taylor, Fourteenth U.S. Infantry, agreed with Mearns. In a long essay written in 1909, he bitterly denounced the situation in the Philippines. Taylor claimed the Scouts were at best a poor imitation of American infantry. Supplied with clothing, rations and arms from the United States just as Americans, the Scouts, Taylor observed,
had developed tastes for foreign equipment such as cooking ranges, ice plants, etc., that limited their mobility and made them nearly as expensive as regular infantry. At the same time, the fighting capacity of this foreign corps had never really been tested. He believed the Spanish-American conflict had reflected little of credit on the ability of the average Filipino to perform under fire. Commenting on Taylor's essay, Major F. R. Day, 36th U.S. Infantry, also classed the Scouts an "expensive luxury." Day, granting the Scouts had in the past educated various Filipinos to a sympathetic understanding of America, garrisoned remote posts and suppressed ladrones, theorized that if political or sentimental reasons demanded use of the natives they should be put in regular infantry regiments with Americans. Then if the Filipinos could be made into soldiers success would be forthcoming. The Army and Navy Journal in an editorial comment, depicted these opinions as honest attempts to avoid having the Scouts become weak replicas of American soldiers. The Scouts should be developed, the publication stressed, along the lines of their racial limitations for their own good.

The commentary on the Scouts and the evils of "Americanization" reached a ludicrous stage in April 1909. In denying a request by a Scout captain that the department quartermaster at Manila sell him certain knives, forks and spoons for the use of his company, Major General Tasker Bliss said:
There is a growing tendency to encumber companies of Philippine Scouts with unauthorized tableware, by purchase from company funds. The issue of crockery, glass and tableware to Scout companies has not been authorized and its sale by the Quartermaster Department to Scout companies is hereby prohibited. Scout companies must confine themselves to authorized issues. The only departure in tableware will be an enamel plate for use in garrison.

The "Americanization" debate cooled abruptly, never to be revived again, after Major General William P. Duvall assumed command of the Philippines Division on April 23, 1909. Duvall had commanded Filipino (Ilocano) units during the Spanish-American conflict and remained closely in touch with Scout affairs through the intervening years while a member of the General Staff. His report for the division, issued August 24, 1909, became the definitive statement on the present and future position of the Scouts both within the general ranks of the United States Army and the Philippines Division. Few officers made adverse public remarks concerning the Scouts following the publication of Duvall's assessment.

At the beginning of the section of his report devoted to the Scouts, Duvall professed that he was about to consider various features of this "extremely important and valuable corps of native infantry" because of the appearance of remarks in numerous publications which, although stemming from interested sources, were irresponsible and biased. It was Duvall's intention to set matters straight, to give the Scouts what credit they had earned and "to conduce to a clearer, saner, and above all, safer practice
regarding these troops than has hitherto obtained." The Scouts, Duvall reasoned, received adverse criticism from those commentators incapable of separating them from the Philippine Constabulary on one hand, and, on the other, from Army officers who believed the existence of the Filipino corps represented an obstruction to any increase in their own number. He emphasized that no one should forget that the Scouts were a part of the regular army and, except for legal provisions making them liable under certain conditions to service with the Constabulary, they enjoyed the same status. Even when used by the civil government the Scouts did not become policemen. Army discipline still applied to them and only Army officers could command them.

Without hesitation Duvall conceded that:

It is not questioned that fifty-two companies of good American infantry would be a more effective fighting body than the scouts, but those charmed with the shaping of legislation to replace scouts by American infantry—particularly service in the tropics—would surely look carefully to the cost. When the facts are examined much will be found in favor of the Scouts.

Specifically, Duvall noted the Scout received one-half the pay of his American counterpart and little more than one-half the ration. The Filipino, moreover, had no bed, mattress, pillow, sheets, tableware or locker. No particular posts were constructed for him. To date, all posts occupied by Scouts had been built by their own labor or were those abandoned by Americans. As a permanent island resident, the Scout did not have to be transported to and from the
United States. At the same time the quartermaster expenses for the maintenance of a Scout battalion of 440 men was less than the maintenance of an American garrison of 220 men. The only quartermaster employees permitted the Scouts were stevedores, scavengers, machinists and a few United States teamsters to instruct the Scouts in the art of moving supplies. Even when in the field, Duvall calculated, the Scout cost even less since:

scout impedimentia consist of the field kit and what can be carried in a telescope case. On taking the field this is reduced to what the occasion requires. The scout can and does go into the field with the minimum equipment. Scouts habitually leave their station on an hour's notice, and frequently only the scout quartermaster and his employees are left to take care of his property.52

The cost of the Scout ration Duvall believed had been vastly misconstrued. Whenever native products were available in sufficient quantities at reasonable prices they were purchased. Most of the food products consumed by the average Scout ration cost less than the food served a convict from Bilibid prison working on a military construction site.

To conclusively prove his argument, Duvall had his personal staff analyze Scout costs to the last detail. Then, using their figures, and comparing every item of maintenance from pay, rations, clothing, kitchen utensils, chinaware, bedroll, transportation, barracks, pay scale, and even non-efficiency rates for disease, he estimated that the Scout's first enlistment cost was 36% of that of the American soldier. Even if non-efficiency rates
for disease were omitted, to the satisfaction of those who con­tended American venereal disease costs were abnormal and subject to improvement, the Scout still cost but 43.8% as much as his American counterpart. With every economic factor taken into consideration, he concluded the object for which the Scouts had been recruited—to furnish an efficient body of native troops at a comparatively low cost and to save American troops a part of the great losses they incur when in the field in tropical countries—was being well accomplished.

Duvall's support of the Scouts, however, did not rest solely on economic facts gathered by his staff. An officer given to thoroughness, he took the field to see for himself. He related that:

Since arriving here, toward the end of April, I have thoroughly inspected, at their posts, camps, and other stations, 86 per cent of the scouts—45 of the 52 companies; the inspection in ranks (arms, equipment, etc.), preceded by a review where two or more companies were present, always extending to a close examination of all buildings (barracks or tents, kitchens, rears, guardhouses, hospital, storehouses, stables, etc.), and including close-order-drills, extended-order drills (whatever the grounds would permit), wall scaling, rifle exercises to music, sentinels on posts, and occasional fire alarms. During the same period I have likewise inspected all the white troops here, also the 25th Infantry, the only colored regiment now serving in the division, and while purposely refraining from drawing any direct parallals, yet I wish it fully understood that it is with a distinctly high standard in mind that I pronounce the Philippine Scouts a very valuable adjunct to the Army; well-armed, equipped and accoutered; their maintenance economically administered; of exceptional soldierly bearing; in the main well-drilled, trained and disciplined; eager and quick to learn and with exemplary ardor for field service. . . .
Turning to individual Scouts, Duvall continued:

As for their racial courage, which has of late been so openly aspersed, it is known that their officers repose much confidence in the dash and grit of the men, those officers who have been in the tightest places with them being the most pronounced in such confidence, and in this opinion, I fully concur, from abundant experience with a company of my own command during the insurrection, a leader, a native Ilocano, being now a captain of scouts.

The division commander was willing to qualify such positive remarks only a slight degree. He did affirm he had stated that:

in the main these troops are well-trained and disciplined. I mean that gratifying condition is found to exist, almost without exception, where companies are serving together, or even in close proximity, under their battalion commanders. As these detailed majors are especially selected captains who had service in the islands (generally with native troops), and as, under the new law they are the only class of officers with previous commissioned service, the results are exactly what might and ought to have been anticipated but evidently were not. The companies serving separately, or not directly under a major are, with very rare exceptions, far behind in every way, but particularly in the vital respects of drill, discipline and spirit.

Predicting that one minor flaw of the Scout organization, the presence of a few ineffective American officers, could be corrected without much difficulty, Duvall concluded his report on the Scouts, asking "the War Department's constant support in all matters tending not only to abolish the evils but to increase the world of good existing in this admirable body of troops."

While Duvall's well-documented opinion terminated the "Americanization" issue it could not dampen another facet of the continual Scout-Constabulary debate, that facet being the
possibility of amalgamating the two forces. The demise of the "Americanization" issue advanced the amalgamation proposal to the fore-front of Scout-Constabulary relations from 1910 to 1917. The latter issue, eventually involving the highest officials of the War Department, both civilian and military, was a serious matter to Scout proponents since if carried out it might yet make policemen of the Scouts.

From the viewpoint of the civil government, amalgamation made a great deal of sense. Absorption of the Scouts would mean acquisition of highly trained personnel with the possibility that the federal government might willingly fund a portion of the cost of the mixed force. Civilian officials held strong opinions as to why the Constabulary should be the dominant core of the new force. W. Cameron Forbes, Secretary of Commerce and Police from 1904 to 1909 and Governor General from 1909 to 1913, stated the position insular officials took on the subject in 1905. He opposed any suggestion that the work of maintaining order be turned over to military authorities by abolishing the Constabulary. The idea of transferring the Filipino police to the Philippines Division appealed to him even less. Maintaining established order, Forbes asserted, constituted a purely civil function. The United States Army, with its desire for large posts, drill, discipline and fixed two-year rotation of U.S. regiments, simply did not possess the capability of providing officers on a long term basis who could operate over a wide geographic area, learn island dialects and
respond to local conditions. These same limitations, Forbes argued, destroyed the feasibility of using the Scouts to do the bulk of Constabulary work.69

When, early in 1909, Henry T. Allen's successor as Chief of the Constabulary, Henry Hill Bandholtz, put together a memorandum advocating amalgamation, he echoed Forbes's thinking. Life and training as garrison troops had taken the Scouts away from the life of the community. Aloof from local events, the Scouts' usefulness tended to be only what moral effect their presence in the neighborhood had on those prone to disorder. Frequently, Bandholtz maintained, the Constabulary stood for the community against any impositions made by the Scouts. Overall, the new Chief of Constabulary believed Scout officers were overpaid, Constabulary officers underpaid; Scout companies were too large, Constabulary companies too small; the Scouts received too much long-range target practice, the Constabulary too little; the Scouts had too much impedimentia, the Constabulary not enough, particularly in regard to transportation and quarters; and the Scouts were too concentrated, the Constabulary too scattered. He could see:

no necessity for maintaining two separate forces of natives, each commanded by officers of the regular army, two systems of supply, different rates of pay, different standards for officers, duplicate machinery of administration, and both economy and efficiency would result from having one homogeneous force combining the good qualities of both and formed from the two existing organizations.70

The combined force, Bandholtz speculated, could perform the Constabulary's present civil duties and become in the time of
insurrection or war an auxiliary of the regular army. The less costly, reorganized Filipino body could also serve as an expansive core for a future Philippine national guard. Governor General Forbes heartily endorsed Bandholtz's memorandum, suggesting the scheme would strengthen his right arm—the Constabulary, save the United States approximately one million dollars per year, and clarify civil-military relations in the Philippines.

The amalgamation theme received additional impetus in 1910 with the visit of new Secretary of War Jacob M. Dickinson. From July 24 to September 2, Dickinson toured the Philippines, consulting with insular officials and members of the Philippine Commission. Shortly before his departure for home, the Army and Navy Journal reported the Secretary had given his approval to the scheme of consolidating the Filipino forces. The Philippine Commission, in its annual report two months later, took the same position, suggesting the expanded police force might occasionally be concentrated for a course in military discipline and drill.

In Washington, meanwhile, Major General Leonard Wood, now Chief of Staff, was developing some personal opinions on the Bandholtz paper. Wood, a soldier of vast colonial experience including much work with the Scouts during his tours of duty in the Philippines, rejected the concept of a united Filipino force. Believing the present native government contained elements disloyal to the United States, Wood could visualize only increased
difficulty if the Bandholtz proposal was adopted. The new corps could become a permanent fixture in local and national political campaigns. Aspiring Filipino politicians would view the enlarged Constabulary as the nucleus of a future national army in an independent Philippines and appeal to its members for support. Such political inducements would undermine the loyalty of the proposed force and render it unreliable in case of serious trouble with the people of the islands.

Wood disliked, furthermore, the open intention to remove a large part of the forces in the division from the hands of its commander and turn them over to the Governor General. He anticipated a strong antagonism between the division commander and the regular army on one side, and the civil government, with the so-called "native army," on the other. The U.S. Army, without the Scouts, might well find itself dragged into purely insular police work in the time of peace, a role many had found objectionable in the past. At the same time, the Chief of Staff declared the inability of the insular office to get funds from the Philippine General Assembly did not warrant combining the Scouts and the Constabulary. If the Governor General and the Philippine Commission found the necessary Constabulary appropriations impossible to secure in the General Assembly (the purely Filipino equivalent of the U.S. House of Representatives elected in 1907), Wood suggested Philippine laws be amended so as to give the Commission greater power. He wondered how a mixed Filipino corps, neither
police nor army, could be expected to remain trustworthy in its support of United States policy if insincerity and insecurity permeated the General Assembly, which, if one considered the niggardliness of Constabulary funds, certainly seemed to be the case.

In Wood's opinion, no sound reason existed to alter the status of the Scouts. The Scouts could continue to support the Constabulary when necessary. Otherwise, they should remain under the full control of the division commander. Thus the islands would have a highly effective civil police force and the army would continue to have a valuable and useful body of Filipino troops whose loyalty to the United States was beyond question.

The position of the Chief of Staff did not deter Secretary of War Dickinson. Advocating amalgamation to President Taft, Dickson, on December 30, 1910, confronted Wood with the proposition in a personal letter. Requesting a complete analysis of the prospects of amalgamation, he affirmed his support for such a move rested on certain assumptions presented to him in the islands, namely that the U.S. government would save money and give the Philippine government a larger and more effective force for security and sanitary reasons especially regarding epidemics, locusts and pests. The federal treasury would, of course, help support the new Constabulary. Amalgamation, Dickinson prophesied, would produce a homogeneous force resembling the national guard of the several states.
Wood, in turn, forwarded Dickinson's letter along with his own opinion to the First Division of the General Staff. On February 11, 1911, that group of officers issued a report. The 17-page document composed by the First Division considered the amalgamation scheme from every conceivable angle, even dissecting the respective powers of the Governor General and division commander. While not vetoing the suggested alteration of Filipino security forces, the First Division considered any such action at the present time inappropriate. If, in the future, the finances of the Philippine government improved and the municipal police came to be trusted, it might be advisable to consolidate the "native contingents." But the municipal police could not replace the Constabulary at the moment and the Scouts were not presently trained or officered to do the work of the insular police. For the foreseeable future then, conservation of both the Scouts and the Constabulary represented the wisest course of action.  

The report of the First Division forestalled any further immediate consideration of amalgamation in 1911. In 1912, however, Governor General Forbes visited Washington and approached President Taft personally. The President would not consent to any such proposal. He refused to mix civil and military functions. He believed, moreover, that the entire cost of the civil administration in the islands should be borne honestly by the insular treasury.
After the Forbes-Taft discussion, two years lapsed before the possibility of transferring the Scouts to the Constabulary received any attention other than brief editorials mentioning various rumors in Washington and Manila. Then, in both 1913 and 1914, Inspector General E. A. Garlinton of the U.S. Army, desiring to have the mobile troops of the Army at war strength at all times, recommended the military establishment give the Scouts to the insular government to save money and permit the inclusion of 5,000 more white troops among the Regulars. Brigadier General Hugh L. Scott, Chief of the Mobile Army Division, favored Garlinton's suggestion and asked the Judge Advocate General's office if, under existing law without further legislation, the Scouts could be handed over to the Governor General. Judge Advocate General Enoch H. Crowder replied quickly in the negative. No authority existed for such a transfer by executive order. The Scouts were a part of the regular army. Not even temporary Constabulary duty changed their character or removed them from the army. The President could, Crowder admitted, reduce the Scouts and increase the regular army or simply do away with the Scouts altogether. Personally, Crowder could see no reason to alter a Filipino Army Congress willingly supported.

After 1914, the amalgamation concept attracted the attention of very few key officers in Washington. The War Department, Major General Tasker A. Bliss stated in 1916, had considered the matter thoroughly and not recommended the legislation such action would require. Unless some Congressional committee solicited the
Department's views, further comment on the subject was inappropriate. The Scouts were, Bliss observed, a continuing part of the U.S. Army.84

Bliss's statement was indicative of the general acceptance the hierarchy of the army gave the Philippine Scouts from 1915 through 1918.85 Widespread endorsement of the Scouts, the most vital factor in the preservation of their institutional integrity, stemmed mainly from their long-standing connection with the U.S. Army. Even during the years when the "Americanization" and amalgamation issues posed threats to the Scouts' existence as professional soldiers, this connection brought forth sufficient support to protect them.

The U.S. Army's endorsement was about to reach new heights. The election of Woodrow Wilson and the approach of World War I wrought significant changes in the Philippines. These two events made amalgamation or any other detrimental tinkering with the status of the Scouts an anachronism in army quarters. Both events also played a decisive role in the final reorganizations experienced by the Scouts.

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The inauguration of President Woodrow Wilson ended the long period of Republican party control of the Philippine civil government. For the first time since 1900 William Howard Taft would not play a pivotal role in determining insular policy for the islands.
And Democratic policy proved a significant departure from its predecessor. The core of the new policy was a "Filipinization" program designed to turn as much of the insular government as possible over to Filipinos themselves. In 1913 a Filipino majority assumed seats on the Philippine Commission. The civil service was revamped with Filipino appointees. The Jones Act of 1916 adopted "Filipinization" as the standard Democratic policy and replaced the Commission with an elected Senate. Naturally, as part of the civil administration the Constabulary underwent a major transformation. In 1915, the Constabulary had a total of 241 officers, of whom 87 were Filipinos. After a vigorous application of "Filipinization" the Filipino officers numbered 117 within a year with American officers declining to 212. By 1917, all officers of the United States Army were relieved from duty with the Constabulary and only 102 Americans still held police positions. Most importantly, on December 17, 1917, Colonel Rafeal Crame, a Filipino, received the appointment as Brigadier General and Chief of the Constabulary. At the end of 1919 just 21 Americans were still officers in the central police force.

To the U.S. Army "Filipinization" was an acceptable policy so long as it did not touch the Philippine Scouts. The thought of Filipinos assuming command of Battalions magnified army concern for the integrity of the Scouts as constituted. Brigadier General Henry Jervey, Director of Operations for the National Army, pinpointed the thinking of the General Staff in a memorandum dated
March 13, 1918. According to Brigadier General Jervey, American work over the past 20 years with native troops in the Philippines had proven two things conclusively: first, that when serving under American officers, native troops could be made into highly efficient fighting organizations; secondly, that when under native leaders, these same troops were a failure as a military force. This failure Jervey attributed to a general lack of discipline and the fact Filipino leadership did not inspire confidence in the Filipino soldier. Faced with such indisputable evidence, Jervey believed the United States could legitimately utilize island forces only when they were officered by Americans. Since army officers were willing to accept the Filipino as soldier but not as a commissioned officer, the American command resisted "Filipinization" of the Scout officer corps. In 1917, only 9 Filipinos held commissions as Scout officers. Two enjoyed the rank of captain. By 1923, the total number of Filipino officers had grown to only 22. Three held the rank of major, three were captains, the rest were first and second lieutenants.

While evasion of "Filipinization" did not tax the U.S. Army, the threat to the integrity of the Scouts posed by the Philippine National Guard proved somewhat more difficult to handle. The Philippine National Guard was a by-product of American entrance into World War I. To show their loyalty, Filipino leaders of the insular government, guided by President Wilson's selection as Governor General, Francis Burton Harrison, offered to raise an
infantry division as a National Guard unit for service wherever and whenever needed. Philippine Senate President Manuel Quezon even journeyed to Washington to solicit recognition for the proposed division. Both President Wilson and Secretary of War Newton D. Baker responded favorably. But problems developed. Initial enthusiasm waned and not until December 1917 did the War Department under Secretary Baker push for passage of a bill permitting the President to call into federal service the Philippine National Guard. With the approval of the necessary legislation by Congress on January 26, 1918, the General Staff began to pay more attention to the projected Filipino militia. The most unsettling aspect of the situation was the obvious expectation of Governor General Harrison, Manuel Quezon and Brigadier General Frank E. McIntyre, head of the Bureau of Insular Affairs branch of the War Department, that Philippine Scout officers would be merged into the volunteer division in great numbers. Secretary Baker compounded the army's growing concern by proposing legislation allowing Scout officers to serve voluntarily with the native militia.

The War College Division, the General Staff body responsible for overall planning, had no intention of seeing the Scouts weakened by even a temporary loss of seasoned officers. With the withdrawal of 5,000 men for service in the U.S. and Europe, the Scouts now outnumbered their American counterparts for the first time. Since the U.S. Army planned to further reduce the American
contingent, the Scouts would become the entire island garrison. If they were to perform their duties effectively, the Scouts would have to undergo training as engineer, artillery and machine gun companies. To date U.S. personnel had handled these refined skills. At the same time, the Scouts needed a more sophisticated organizational structure.

In early 1918 the Scouts totaled 52 companies organized into 13 battalions. Down to 1916 each battalion had consisted of four companies, a sergeant major and a regular army captain with the rank of major in overall command. No commissioned or noncommissioned personnel were assigned specifically to the overall supply and administration of each battalion. After the passage of the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, the War College Division moved to rectify the situation. While no legislative provision existed to organize headquarters companies equalling those of American infantry regiments for the Scouts, the Act of February 2, 1901, did give the President power to provide such officers and noncommissioned officers as he deemed necessary for the proper control of them. The Judge Advocate General's office ruled this statement could be interpreted to include some kind of battalion headquarters company. The army proceeded to reorganize Scout companies as it had each American unit in 1916, rendering surplus 10 men per company. The 40 men of each battalion available became a battalion headquarters company, composed of the following:
1st lieutenant, mounted (battalion adjutant)  control
2nd lieutenant, mounted (battalion supply officer)  administration and supply
battalion sergeant
color sergeant
mess sergeant
2 cooks
2 privates, first class
6 privates
band leader
2 band sergeants
4 band corporals
2 musicians, first class
4 musicians, second class
13 musicians, third class

Total: 2 commissioned officers (control, and 41 enlisted men.  

While the reorganization materially increased the daily efficiency of Scout battalions, it proved insufficient once American units began to sail for home. General officers serving in the islands knew additional upgradings were mandatory if the Scouts were to become a reasonable substitute for the normal American garrison. But, at first, their proposals represented patchwork measures. For example, late in 1916, Major General Hunter Liggett, commanding the Philippine Department, requested an eight company increase in the Scouts. Liggett wanted two new Moro companies to make the 13th Battalion entirely Moro in composition. Two more companies, recruited from the Bikol population, would combine with the 49th and 50th Companies to establish a completely new, all Bikol battalion, the 14th. One company, Visayan in content, was destined for the 10th Battalion. The 37th Company of that battalion, since 1912 performing the duties proscribed for an engineer company, would continue to do so on a permanent basis.
Of the other three companies, Liggett wanted one organized as a wire company, while the final two would serve as machine units. Altogether the Scouts would gain 30 officers and 731 men, bringing their total complement to 225 officers and 6,464 enlisted. Liggett considered it important that an organization the size of the Scouts have auxiliary and special troops. The War College Division agreed. But a lack of appropriations forestalled any action on his suggestions. 

In mid-1917 another temporary measure did win War Department approval. Brigadier General Charles J. Bailey, Liggett's successor, received permission from Washington to keep in the Philippines for use by the Scouts the mountain guns and equipment of the First Battalion, Second Field Artillery, U.S.A., an outfit ordered back to the United States. When Brigadier General Robert K. Evans assumed command in August, he added to the confusion by suggesting the nine battalions of Scouts stationed in Luzon be organized into three regiments of infantry under authority of the Congressional Act passed May 18, 1917. Brigadier General Evans' proposal encountered an initial legal roadblock. The Judge Advocate General's office ruled that no precise authority for the creation of Scout regiments and officers existed. The President could, however, by the power of the Act of May 18 group the battalions provisionally and detail the officers from other forces. But Secretary of War
Baker and Chief of Staff Tasker A. Bliss demurred. The War Department was not yet ready to substantially alter the Philippine garrison.

Persisting, Brigadier General Evans cabled for regimental Scout status twice in October and in mid-December 1917. Again, his requests were turned down. By early 1918, however, the U.S. Army had to act. The Philippine National Guard Act had been passed. Secretary Baker favored Scout officers joining that Guard. Governor General Harrison, through Brigadier General McIntyre at the Bureau of Insular Affairs, sought an immediate call-up of the Guard. More Americans arrived in the States from the Philippines every month. Within the War College, the War Plans Division, after assuring Evans the Scouts would not be merged with any native militia, began a careful scrutiny of the Philippine situation.

The first consideration of the War Plans Division was the military division desired by the insular government. In a report for the Chief of Staff prepared February 21, 1918, Colonel D. W. Ketchum, the Acting Director of the Division, asserted that he and his fellow officers could see no possibility of utilizing the insular militia for any purpose during the current war. The United States by no means lacked men to train, equip and officer for service at home, in a foreign possession or in any theatre of the war. The only military reason for recruiting native troops, therefore, would be if they offered greater value, greater availability
for service or greater economy. Value of troops depended on discipline, training, quality of officers and special adaptability for service. Beyond perhaps adaptability for service in the Philippines, fresh American troops had far greater value than any native forces (except the Philippine Scouts). The discipline and training of native troops depended on the quality of their officers. The Division understood that the officers in the case at hand would be largely Filipinos "without military experience and with the limitations of their race." Little value could be discerned here. After all, Ketchum wrote, "the Philippine Scouts are valuable because they are long service professional soldiers, trained and rigidly disciplined by white officers, and purely a federal force divorced from all local affiliations."

The War Plans Division believed the Philippine Militia would simply duplicate the weaknesses inherent in the National Guard system of the United States. No reason existed to expect even a fair degree of professional fitness from Filipino militia officers. Neither could an adequate standard of discipline and training be achieved in a short period of time. Hence, to use such troops abroad would be unthinkable. Even their employment along the Mexican border of the United States appeared adventurous. A patient and disciplined U.S. Army maintained control there in a delicate set of circumstances. The introduction of a Filipino force as undisciplined as the Mexican one across the border defied logic.
As to the use of the militia in the Philippines as a substitute for the normal garrison, the Division found it difficult to see any cause for such a turnabout from either a military or political viewpoint. The Scouts would lose, not gain, from association with the new force. While no one questioned the loyalty of the Filipinos, the organization of militia units in rural communities might well arm one clan, faction or tribe to the detriment of another and foster political turmoil. The Division, moreover, retained the belief (learned from hard experience) that the Filipino by custom and inclination lapsed into banditry. Often the possession of a rifle proved sufficient incentive. The task of disarming the Filipinos had required great effort. Little could be achieved if arms were once again distributed throughout the islands.

In concluding his preliminary summary, Colonel Ketchum reported that if it became desirable to utilize native troops to permit the Filipinos to demonstrate their loyalty to, and support of, the United States, the best native troops available (the Philippine Scouts) should be used as a base for any increase in numbers and they should be officered more carefully than white troops. Such a policy required the organization of the Philippine Scouts on a war basis. Any use of a purely native militia would obviously be inconsistent with this policy. The War Plans Division recommended, therefore, that the Philippine Militia not be called to federal service during the present emergency.106
On March 1, 1918, the Acting Chief of Staff, Major General John Riddle, in answer to an inquiry regarding the militia from Brigadier General McIntyre, announced his concurrence with the War Plans Division's preliminary estimate. The Chief of Staff, however, did not openly declare the Philippine National Guard question a closed issue. Riddle recognized the delicate political overtones involved.

The War Plans Division next turned to Brigadier General Henry Jervey, Director of Operations, for his opinion and any solution he would care to recommend. The Director of Operations, never one to avoid an issue, submitted a personal statement on March 13, 1918. Jervey first noted that three native forces existed in the Philippines. The Philippine Scouts were a federal organization composed of 13 battalions, officered almost entirely by Americans and paid for by the United States government. The Philippine Constabulary, on the other hand, was a force organized by the Philippine Government, consisted of a large number of separate companies, and was officered principally by Filipinos. The final native force, the proposed militia, Jervey classed as a typical militia organization, authorized by an Act of the Philippine Congress. Presently in a very incomplete state of organization, it was also officered mainly by Filipinos. Any Americans involved with this force would probably serve under Filipino generals. Given these facts, Jervey found only the Scouts
(a highly trained military organization) deserved to be the basis for any expansion of native military forces in the islands.

Jervey supported a native force equal to the pre-war garrison. To achieve a military body of that size the Philippine Scouts required expansion and reorganization. Reorganization meant four provisional regiments, commanded by regular officers of the U.S. Army. Jervey, like Riddle, did not rule out the militia. If it could be organized without any aid from the Scouts, Jervey advocated co-operation on the part of the Philippine Department commander to insure an efficient National Guard. But this co-operation was not to interfere with the efficiency of the federal forces in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{108}

The War Plans branch took into account Jervey's ideas and prepared a final memorandum on the whole question. Colonel Ketchum again handled the secretarial work. The Division as a whole agreed to follow a detailed proposal by one of its members, Major W. W. Taylor, Jr. Major Taylor, who had served extensively in the Philippines, recommended, as had Jervey, an increase in, and reorganization of, the Philippine Scouts. No longer, Taylor emphasized, were the Scouts merely an auxiliary to the regular forces. Unless they were reorganized into self-containing units, patchwork organizations would be created to satisfy various needs. In training artillery, signal troops and engineers, he doubted if satisfactory results could be obtained without complete units commanded by regular officers. The ideal solution thus required
the consolidation of the two battalions now serving as mountain artillery into a regiment and the organization of one battalion of engineers as well as one battalion of signal troops instead of the one company of each suggested by Major General Liggett in 1916. The designation of all new units, Taylor concluded, should be "Philippine Infantry" (provisional) rather than "Filipino Infantry" to avoid changes in collar ornaments and marking on equipment. Also, personnel obtained in the Philippines was not composed entirely of Filipinos.109

On April 2, 1918, three days after the American Congress passed a bill permitting Philippine Scout officers to serve with the Philippine National Guard, the Acting Chief of Staff, Major General Peyton C. March, accepted Taylor's proposal without consulting either Governor General Harrison or the Bureau of Insular Affairs. Brigadier General Evans in Manila received cabled instructions the next morning to establish provisional organizations with the Philippine Scouts.110 General Orders NO. 21, Headquarters Philippine Department, Manila, P.I., April 5, 1918, instituted the War Department directive and produced the greatest upheaval in Philippine Scout history. The entire corps underwent a complete reorganization and redesignation. General Orders NO. 21 read as follows:

1. Pursuant to instructions from the War Department, dated April 3, 1918, under the Army Reorganization Act approved February 2, 1901, as amended, the President authorized an increase in the Philippine Scouts of four battalions, without bands, and
eighteen separate companies, which will be referred to as the 14th to 17th Battalions (53rd to 68th Companies), and as the 69th to 85th Companies.

2. The 2nd, 5th, and 13th Battalions, Philippine Scouts, remain organized and stationed as at present.

3. The other units will be organized into provisional organizations to conform to minimum strength. Tables of Organizations of May 3, 1917, as far as available personnel permits, as follows:

At Fort William McKinley, Rizal—
1st Philippine Infantry (Provisional):
   1st Battalion, Philippine Scouts,
   6th Battalion, Philippine Scouts,
   14th Battalion, Philippine Scouts,
   69th, 70th and 71st Companies.

2nd Philippine Infantry (Provisional):
   4th Battalion, Philippine Scouts,
   10th Battalion, Philippine Scouts (less 37th Company),
   15th Battalion, Philippine Scouts,
   without band, and
   72nd, 73rd, 74th, and 75th Companies.

At Camp McGrath, Batangas—
3rd Philippine Infantry (Provisional):
   7th Battalion, Philippine Scouts
   (to remain stationed at Camp Eldridge, Laguna, until further orders),
   16th Battalion, Philippine Scouts,
   without band, and
   76th, 77th, and 78th Companies.

At Fort Mills, Corregidor Island—
4th Philippine Infantry (Provisional):
   8th Battalion, Philippine Scouts,
   9th Battalion, Philippine Scouts,
   17th Battalion, Philippine Scouts,
   without band, and
   79th, 80th and 81st Companies.

At Camp Stotsenburg, Pampanga—
1st Philippine Field Artillery (Provisional, Mountain):
   11th Battalion, Philippine Scouts,
12th Battalion, Philippine Scouts, and
82nd Company.

NOTE: One Headquarters and Supply Company
instead of separate Headquarters and
Supply Companies is authorized for the
1st Philippine Field Artillery
(Provisional, Mountain).

At Fort William McKinley, Rizal--
1st Philippine Field Signal Battalion
(Provisional):
83rd and 84th Companies.

At Camp Nichols, Rizal--
1st Philippine Engineers (Provisional):
37th, 85th and 86th Companies.

Authority was also given Evans to use 12 separate companies as
the headquarters, supply and machine gun companies of the infantry
regiments, one as headquarters and supply company of the artillery
regiment, two for the field signal battalion and three for the
engineer battalion. The reorganization meant an increase in the
Scouts from 183 officers and 5,733 enlisted men to 314 officers
and 8,129 enlisted. 111

The decision to increase the Scouts upset both Governor
General Harrison and Brigadier General McIntyre. The disgruntled
Governor General cabled the Bureau of Insular Affairs on April 6
and restated the aspirations of the Filipino people for a full
division plus service abroad. Service anywhere outside the
islands would be satisfactory. The Scout increase and the organi-
zation of the militia division, Harrison lamented, could not pro-
ceed at the same time. He hoped the matter could be placed before
the President for an early decision. McIntyre immediately
forwarded the Harrison cable to the Chief of Staff. He noted personally that, in his opinion, no organization of native troops in the Philippines was warranted without the approval of the Governor General. It was not in the interests of public opinion, McIntyre emphasized, to undertake any reorganization lacking Harrison's approval and opposing the desires of the leaders of the Filipino people. Three days later, National Guard supporters in Washington forwarded both the cable and McIntyre's letter to Joseph P. Tumulty, Secretary to the President.

The initial position of the War Plans Division when confronted with the insular reaction was one of resolute opposition. Colonel D. W. Ketchum, still Acting Director, repeated the earlier opinions rendered on the Guard, and pointedly discouraged the suggestion of service abroad tendered by Harrison. Any native militia could honestly be used at first only in the United States where troops were needed along the Mexican border. Expanding his original statement on this theme, Ketchum expressed his conviction that Southern people would make no distinction between Filipinos and Negroes. The presence of Filipinos in their midst would only revive the race question with its consequent disorders. The Division saw no reason to change its previous conclusion. The Philippine National Guard should not be called into federal service.

Harrison and McIntyre refused to admit defeat and induced President Wilson to write the Secretary of War. When confronted a
second time, the War Plans Division defended its decision even more rigorously, then softened somewhat. Brigadier General Lytle Brown, Director of the Division in the latter part of April, contended that the Scout increase had been approved to partially replace the regulars moved from the islands for duty elsewhere. Under the circumstances, preliminary consultation with the Governor General did not seem necessary or justified. At the same time, the Division had consistently opposed the National Guard. If the Guard were to be called into service, it should be officered by regulars from the National Army and established according to the specifications for United States National Guards located in the 1916 National Defense Act.\(^{116}\) Spurred by the Secretary of War and President Wilson, the Chief of Staff relented also. The commanding general in the Philippines was informed that while it was still not practicable to employ the militia division outside the islands, the Guard could be called into the service of the United States for a period of training if the Governor General so desired. The Philippine Scout increase, however, would not be interrupted.\(^{117}\)

In the end, due to problems of supply, selection of officers, determination of length of service and expenses, the Philippine National Guard was not mobilized until November 11, 1918. On November 20, 1918, with World War I already over, the Guard was mustered into federal service. Brigadier General R. R. Day, United States Army, served as commanding officer. At the
insistence of the War Department, all officers above the grade of major were Americans except for Lieutenant Colonel Vincente R. Barros, a Filipino graduate of West Point. The Philippine Scouts and the Constabulary provided most of the officers. All had wide experience in the field and years of service behind them. The War Department authorized 14,000 of 28,000 volunteers. The federal government paid for one month's service. The Philippine Government bore the expense of two additional month's training.

While the Philippine National Guard, a product of wartime conditions, enjoyed a brief life and passed into history, the Philippine Scout regiments spawned by the same conditions thrived. By June 1918, the regiments and battalions had been formed. The Filipino force totaled 156 officers and 6,615 enlisted, distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Regiment, Infantry</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Regiment, Infantry</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Regiment, Infantry</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Regiment, Infantry</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiment of Field Artillery</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion of Engineers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Signal Battalion</td>
<td>(No Returns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Field (separate battalion)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th (separate) battalion</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th (separate) battalion</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>156</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unit expansion continued and in December the Scouts totaled 7,828.

In preparing its post-war budget, the Office of Director of Finance asked the War Plans Division a pertinent question: would
the Philippine Scout provisional regiments continue now that the national emergency had ended? Brigadier General Lytle Brown, Division Director, replied on February 4, 1919, that although the reorganization and expansion had resulted from circumstances surrounding the emergency, it had been affected under Section 36 of the Act of February 2, 1901. The authority of the 1901 Act made the regiments as permanent in nature as any other authorization for the Philippine Scouts. Brown did admit, however, to a possible need of additional legislation to prolong the life of the regiments but he believed appropriations for them should be made in the coming fiscal year. With the strength of the post-war island garrison still unsettled, Chief of Staff Peyton C. March agreed with Brown and financial allocations were made.  

The Chief of Staff's decision foreshadowed the National Defense Act of June 4, 1920. As Secretary of War Newton D. Baker wrote: "the Philippine Scouts are a continuing, permanent part of the military forces of the United States." The National Defense Act of 1920, by giving the President the explicit power to form the Scouts into branches and tactical units as he deemed necessary, guaranteed continuity. Scout officers also obtained a degree of permanence. The Act of 1920 replaced provisional appointments with career commissions including the right of promotion to colonel and retirement in grade.

The legal affirmation of Philippine Scout regiments indicated the U.S. Army intended to make the Filipino force the internal...
part of its post-war Philippine garrison. In 1922, after restructuring the Scouts into just two regiments (the 45th and 57th) the American command established the Filipino corps as a complete tactical division, known simply as the "Philippine Division." Of the 12,115 soldiers on duty, 8,015 were Scouts. The Scouts had become a colonial army, complete with all special and auxiliary forces.

The progression of the Philippine Scouts from rifle companies to independent battalions to a self-sustaining colonial army had taken 22 years. Many factors, ranging from insular politics to the American defensive posture in the Pacific, played a role in that transition. Through it all the real sources of success for the Scouts as soldiers were the officers and enlisted men who toiled afield and fought for professional status.
NOTES: CHAPTER THREE


3. Cablegrams: Colonel Clarence R. Edwards to Governor Wright August 24, 1904, Governor Wright to Secretary of War, August 27, 1904, Henry T. Allen to Secretary of War, August 29, 1904, General File 1877, Enclosure 22, RG 350, NA. See also Taft's letter to Edwards, September 6, 1904, in the same file.


5. Letter: Allen to War Department, August 18, 1904, AGO 931399, RG 94, NA.

6. Governor Wright's letter to the Secretary of War, August 24, 1904, is stapled to Allen's letter, AGO 931399, ibid.


11. Memorandum, War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, October 20, 1904, AGO 942230, RG 94, NA.


13. Letter: Davis to War Department, February 7, 1903, General File 1877, Enclosure 21, RG 350, NA.

14. Taft to Secretary of War, February 12, 1903, General File 1877, Enclosure 22, RG 350, NA.


17. Army and Navy Journal XLI (September, 1903), p. 90.


19. Ibid.

20. History of the First Battalion, Philippine Scouts--1904, AGO 972992, RG 94, NA.


27. Copy of General Orders NO. 181, dated December 1, 1904, AGO 947505, RG 94, NA.


29. The details of the manpower dilemma, Abbott's strategy, and personal success afield can be found in History of the 38th Company, Philippine Scouts, AGO 1294194, RG 94, NA. For newspaper accounts of the Oros and Dolores debacles, see New York Times.


32. Telegrams: Corbin to Military Secretary, October 8, 1904, and Chaffee to Corbin, October 31, 1904, AGO 933492, RG 94, NA. Chaffee noted in his return message that the civil government had broached the same topic weeks ago. The Chief of Staff appeared unclear as to Taft's position at this juncture, indicating he did not know what Taft had discussed with Corbin.

33. Cablegrams: Commanding General, Philippine Division to War Department, December 11, 1904, and Chaffee to Corbin, December 12, 1904, AGO 952485, RG 94, NA.

34. Letter: Corbin to War Department, January 13, 1905, AGO 982309/filed with 968510, RG 94, NA. The letter was six pages long.

35. Memorandum Report: First Division, General Staff, January 15, 1905, AGO 958399, RG 94, NA.

36. Roosevelt's reaction, as expressed by his personal secretary, is appended to Corbin's letter cited in footnote 36.

37. Memorandum: Chief of Staff to General Corbin, January 24, 1905, AGO 968510, RG 94, NA; Corbin to War Department, February 10, 1905, AGO 975407/filed with 968510, ibid.; Cablegram: Commanding General, Philippine Division to Washington, February 13, 1905, AGO 976588/filed with 968510, ibid. On February 13, Taft cabled Corbin to personally sanction his proposed battalions and grant him power to assign first lieutenants and captains of the line as he saw fit, AGO 976283/filed with 968510, ibid.


39. See the following battalion histories from RG 94, NA:

- History of the 3rd Battalion, Philippine Scouts, submitted by E. G. Peyton, Major, Philippine Scouts, Comdg., December 31, 1910, AGO 1750748;
- History of the 7th Battalion, Philippine Scouts, January 1 to December 31, 1907, AGO 1246463/A;
- History of the 8th
Battalion, Philippine Scouts, and Histories of original companies from date of organization, submitted by George H. McMaster, Major, Philippine Scouts, Comdg., AGO 1294194/B. Not until October 7, 1909, were three companies of the Eighth Battalion brought together at one post. A careful perusal of division rosters establishes clearly the absence of unified battalion posts in the first years. See Roster and Directory, Philippines Division, Officers of the Army serving in the Division, Stations of Troops and List of Garrisoned Towns, February 20, 1906, RG 165, NA; and those dated December 20, 1907, and October 20, 1908, in the same record group.

43. Copy of General Order NO. 172, War Department, October 29, 1908, AGO 1440890/Enclosure 1, RG 94, NA; Copy of General Order NO. 291, War Department, December 11, 1908, AGO 1461114, Enclosure 1, ibid.; "Report of the Secretary of War, 1910," WD, Annual Reports, 1910, I, 7.
44. The details of the company increase can be found in a letter from Wood to the War Department, November 14, 1907, AGO 1318131/filed with 9S8510, RG 94, NA. General Order NO. 6, War Department, January 10, 1908, granted Wood the necessary authority. A copy of this order is attached to Wood's letter.
45. A copy of the order is filed under AGO 2489687/B, RG 94, NA.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., pp. 64-66.
54. The Army and Navy Journal devoted considerable space to the Scout--Constabulary rift and the attacks upon the Scouts's
reputation, see Vol. XLII, 52, 392, 636; XLIII, 10, 175, 798; XLIV, 58, 251, 652, 1166; XLV, 5, 538, 720, 1414-1415.


56. Mears made this statement in Paris on September 6, 1907, while en route to Manila to assume command of a Philippine Scout battalion, Army and Navy Journal XLV (September 14, 1907), p. 32.


61. Ibid., p. 169.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., p. 170.

64. Ibid., p. 172.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., pp. 172-173.

67. Ibid., p. 173. Duvall referred here to the Act of May 16, 1908, advancing first lieutenants of the Scouts to the newly established rank of captain. Only regular army captains detailed as majors, Philippine Scouts had any previous commissioned service.

68. Ibid.


70. H. H. Bandholdt, Memorandum of the Director of Constabulary relative to the proposed amalgamation of the Scouts and Constabulary, Henry T. Allen Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Bandholdt's study, 30 pages in length with a dozen appendices, is located in Military Reports--Philippines, Mexican Expedition--Box 32 of the Allen Papers. A complete copy minus appendices may be found in The proposed amalgamation of the Philippine Scouts and Philippine Constabulary: Report NO. 6698, War Department General Staff, October 13, 1910, reports of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NA. Hereafter cited as Report NO. 6698, RG 165, NA. This file contains virtually every document pertaining to the subject of amalgamation through the year 1917.

71. Report NO. 6698, RG, 165, NA.

72. Ibid.


74. Army and Navy Journal XLVIII (September 8, 1910), p. 7. Early in 1909, the same paper, XLVI (May 1, 1909), p. 979, had
mentioned the *Cebu Courier* of the islands believed the Scouts and Constabulary could exchange functions without any trouble and the Washington administration was contemplating such a move. See also Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, I, 208.


76. Remarks by the Chief of Staff, October 18, 1910, Report NO. 6698, RG 165, NA.

77. Memorandum: Proposed Amalgamation of Scouts and Constabulary, February 18, 1911, Report NO. 6698, RG 165, NA.

78. Ibid.


82. Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General, October 6, 1914, Report NO. 6698, RG 165, NA.

83. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, October 16, 1914, ibid.

84. Memorandum for the Adjutant General, February 16, 1916, AGO 2369300, ibid.

85. Record Group 165, National Archives, contains numerous General Staff documents giving blanket approvals of the Scouts. For representative samples (from RG 165) see the following: Efficiency of the Philippine Scouts, Memorandum for the Chief, War College Division, by Lieutenant Colonel William H. Johnston, May 7, 1915, War College Division, 9136/2; Proposed changes in organization and strength of the Philippine Scouts by Brigadier General Joseph E. Kuhn, February 7, 1917, AGO 2509960, War College Division 9136/13; Memorandum for the Chief of Staff by Colonel D. W. Ketchum, February 21, 1918, War College Division 10032/10; Memorandum for the Secretary of the General Staff, March 26, 1918, War College Division 9136/40.


88. This statistic is from Francis Burton Harrison's report as Governor General for 1919, located in WD, Annual Reports, 1920, III, 25.
89. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, March 13, 1918, filed under the title The use of native military forces in the Philippine Islands, AGO 32282, RG 407, NA. Hereafter cited as Native Military Forces, AGO 32282, RG 407, NA. This file, compiled by the historical division of the American Expeditionary Forces employed in World War I, contains more than 100 documents on the Scouts. In support of Jervey's conclusions see the memorandums of Colonel D. W. Ketchum dated February 21 and March 26, 1918. Jervey's opinions permeate another collection of documents, titled Philippine Scouts, War College Division File NO. 9136, RG 165, NA. Hereafter cited as Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136, RG 165, NA.

90. Roster and Directory, United States Troops serving in the Philippines Department, August 20, 1917, RG 165, NA.

91. General File 1877, Enclosure 120, RG 350, NA.

92. For the overall germination period of the National Guard see Harrison, The Cornerstone of Philippine Independence, pp. 160-165. The correspondence between Harrison and Secretary Baker, Baker and President Wilson and the Bureau of Insular Affairs and the Chief of Staff regarding the project is attached to a memorandum by the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, March 1, 1918, Native Military Forces, AGO 32282, RG 407, NA. Secretary of War Baker's December letter to the House Committee on Military Affairs urging passage of the bill authorizing the Guard for federal service at the President's discretion is included.

93. Ibid. In early January, Brigadier General Robert K. Evans cabled the War Department concerning the rampant newspaper discussion in the islands of the upcoming federalization of the Philippine National Guard and the design to get Philippine Scout officers and men into it through legislation. Brigadier General Jervey, in reporting on the cable to the Chief of Staff, noted that the Bureau of Insular Affairs under McIntyre planned to incorporate the Constabulary and use the Scouts freely, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, January 9, 1918, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/29, RG 165, NA. McIntyre, a consistent supporter of Harrison regarding the civil-military situation in the islands, had long favored the merging of the Scouts and Constabulary, the resulting force to be under the control of the Governor General. See his memorandum on the Philippine Scouts and Constabulary, February 13, 1917, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/13, ibid.

94. The Secretary of War contacted S. Hubert Dent, Jr., Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, by letter on January 29, 1918. Early approval of the Guard project eventually trapped Baker into supporting the realization of its goals, Baker to Dent, January 29, 1918, Philippine Scouts, WCD, 9136/30, ibid.

95. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff by Brigadier General Henry Jervey, March 13, 1916, Native Military Forces, AGO 32282, RG 407, NA.
96. Memorandum for the Secretary of the General Staff: The use of native military forces in the Philippine Islands, March 26, 1918, Native Military Forces, ibid.
97. The details of the reorganization, including the opinions of the Judge Advocate General, were stipulated by Brigadier General H. M. Macomb, Chief of War College Division in his memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Organization of the Philippine Scouts, August 3, 1916, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/8 (AGO 2429370), RG 407, NA. General Orders No. 41, War Department, August 31, 1916, which made the new units official, is appended to Macomb's paper. The company change, made in accordance with Section 17, Act of June 3, 1916, added to each company 1 mess sergeant, 1 supply sergeant, 1 corporal, 2 buglers, 1 mechanic and 19 privates, first class or a total of 25 enlisted men. Every company lost 1 quartermaster sergeant, 1 artificer, 2 musicians and 31 privates. Hence, each company lost 10 men. Macomb's analysis included this information.
98. Liggett's original cablegram, November 22, 1916, the response of the War College Division, Brigadier General Frank E. McIntyre's opposing position, and the Chief of Staff's response to Liggett, February 8, 1917, appear collectively in a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Proposed changes in organization and strength of Philippine Scouts, February 9, 1917, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/13 (AGO 2509960), RG 165, NA.
100. Memorandum, Organization of Philippine Scouts into Regiments, August 28, 1917, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/22, ibid. The Judge Advocate General's opinion appeared in a later memorandum for the Chief of Staff, September 24, 1917, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/24, ibid. The latter document contains the various cables Evans sent to the War Department.
101. Evan's December request was answered on January 8, 1918. The Judge Advocate General's opinion was cited once more as the cause of the negative response. The Department did not want, according to Secretary of War Baker, to seek legislation for a new Scout reorganization if it could be avoided. War Department to Evans, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/27, ibid. The pressure on Baker from the Philippines over the National Guard was mounting during December and January. The Army and Navy Journal LV (December, 1917), p. 629, reported that many islanders believed the failure of the American Congress to enroll the militia represented discrimination. Baker's bill, however, was now being pushed forward with all speed possible in the House of Representatives. See also Evan's cable cited in footnote 94.
102. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Philippine National Guard and attitude with reference thereto, March 1, 1918, Native Military Forces, AGO 32282, RG 407, NA. This report, prepared by
McIntyre, contains all the correspondence between the War Depart­
ment and Governor General Harrison from May 28, 1917, to March 1, 
1918.

103. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, January 9, 1918, 
Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/29, RG 165, NA. The reassurance to 
Evans rested on the absence of any law permitting the Scouts to 
serve even in the U.S. National Guard. Baker's proposal of 
January 29, 1918, would, of course, undercut such a position.

104. Memorandum, Philippine Militia, Native Military Forces, 
AGO 32282 (WCD 1033/10), RG 407, NA.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

107. Memorandum for the Acting Secretary of War, Philippine 
Militia, March 1, 1918, Native Military Forces, AGO 32282, ibid.

108. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, March 13, 1918, ibid.

109. Memorandum for the Secretary of the General Staff, The 
Use of Native Military Forces in the Philippine Islands, March 26, 
1918, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/40, RG 165, NA. All equipment 
presently bore the insignia "p" for Philippine Scouts. The 11th 
Battalion, Philippine Scouts, had acquired the equipment of the 
First Battalion, Second U.S. Field Artillery in August 1917. The 
12th Battalion took possession of the 24 guns, horses and equip­
ment belonging to the Second Battalion, Second U.S. Field Ar­
tillery when it was ordered home in February 1918, War Department 
to Brigadier General Evans, February 9, 1918, Philippine Scouts, 
WCD 9136/31, ibid.

One other Scout battalion, the 13th, had two 2.95 inch 
mountain guns. As the only Scout unit still stationed on the 
Moro island of Mindanao, the U.S. Army had allowed the 13th to 
form a mountain gun detachment in March, 1918. The detachment 
consisted of 50 enlisted men, Memorandum for the Adjutant General, 
Mountain Gun Detachment for the 13th Battalion, Philippine Scouts, 
March 7, 1918, Native Military Forces, AGO 32282, RG 407, NA. It 
was to these groups that Taylor referred when he mentioned patch­
work units.

110. Memorandum for the Adjutant General, April 2, 1918, 
Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/40/A, RG 165, NA. The bill passed on 
March 30, 1918. Scout officers appointed to the National Guard 
did not have to vacate their Scout commission terminated during 
Guard service, the officer was entitled to reappointment in the 
Scouts when such service ended.

111. Franklin Compilation, AGO 314.73, RG 407, NA. A repro­
duction of General Orders NO. 21 also appears in WD, Annual 
Reports, 1918, I, 172.

112. Ibid.

113. Harrison to War Department, filed with Memorandum for 
the Chief of Staff, Scout increase and organization of a division 
of Philippine National Guard, May 6, 1918, Philippine Scouts, 
WCD 9136/42, RG 165, NA. McIntyre's letter appears here also.
114. Memorandum for the Chief, Operations Division, Philippine Militia, April 12, 1918, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/41, ibid.

115. Ibid.

116. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Scout increase, May 6, 1918, Philippine Scouts WCD 9136/42, ibid.

117. War Department to Brigadier General Evans, April 25, 1918, and War Department memorandum for Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs, May 17, 1918, ibid.


119. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Status of Philippine Scouts, September 8, 1918, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/55, RG 165, NA.

120. WD, Annual Reports, 1919, I, Part 2, 2408.

121. The Inquiry of the Office of the Director of Finance was dated January 25, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Philippine Scouts, February 4, 1919, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/60 (AGO 32282). Brigadier General Brown's paper bears the date February 1, 1919.

122. Baker to Chairman, House Committee on Military Affairs, November 6, 1919, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/63, ibid.


CHAPTER FOUR
OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN: 1899-1920

When raising colonial infantry units in the Philippines, American military leaders gave the selection of officers highest priority. They believed the success of Filipino troops depended upon a proper detailing of officers to command positions. When properly led, Filipinos were loyal, amenable to discipline and trainable. Improper supervision invited indifference, desertion or cowardice under fire.¹

As in the case of other imperial nations of the era the American military stipulated that important officers of Filipino organizations were to be white and citizens of the occupying power. General MacArthur, for example, stressed an all-white noncommissioned staff in 1899.² Because of a lack of manpower the Americans quickly deviated from MacArthur's viewpoint. During the years leading to World War I, and later, however, the initial emphasis on white commissioned officers remained constant.³

At first, the location and retention of qualified personnel to fill the commissioned ranks of the Scouts posed a problem. The very first officers associated with Filipino forces, men like Matthew Batson, Henry M. Boutelle and Dennis Quinlan, held full
commissions in regular regiments. But these regiments could furnish only a few officers. General officers then turned to the volunteers serving in the regular army. Of 50 officers assigned to various native groups prior to 1901, 36 came from U.S. Volunteer ranks. Four noncommissioned officers of the U.S. Army also held command positions.

Events made even this situation tenuous. Volunteer forces were being mustered out. Fresh soldiers from stateside would replace regular units. Newly arriving regular forces would be of little assistance since they would, as always, have few commissioned officers to spare. Rotation back to the states, moreover, would limit the time any available regular officer could command a Scout company. What General MacArthur and the War Department needed was a method of retaining those presently commanding Filipino organizations and the means by which additional officers could be secured now and in the future. The Act of February 2, 1901, provided both. It stated that squadron and battalion leaders along with first and second lieutenants of companies could be picked from the noncommissioned and enlisted personnel of the U.S. Army with at least two years as officers; noncommissioned officers or enlisted men in U.S. Volunteer units raised for the Spanish-American War were also eligible for such appointments. All appointments would be provisional and last for four years. Reappointment required satisfactory performance in every respect.\(^5\)
The Act of February 2 had been carefully worded. Its provisions pertaining to Scout officers were astonishingly broad in scope and implication. Any male with a minimum of 24 months military service was eligible for appointment. The absence of precise age qualifications meant those having passed the Army's legal age for appointment could receive Scout commissions. No physical examination was necessary. At the same time, the U.S. Army had the power to terminate any appointment after four years on whatever grounds it chose.

The Act of February 2 was put into effect in the summer of 1901. Little difficulty was experienced in locating the 50 first and 50 second lieutenants needed for the Philippine Scout companies being organized. Inquiries poured into MacArthur's headquarters once it became common knowledge that the Act of February 2 granted Scout lieutenants the same pay and allowances as corresponding grades of the regular army. By March 1908 over 1,000 regular army NCO's had applications on file at Division Headquarters in Manila for appointment with the Filipino infantry.

The first appointments went to those men who had already acquired experience with various native units and desired to continue serving with the newly formed Philippine Scout apparatus. To fill the remaining vacancies MacArthur solicited recommendations from the regimental commanders of both the regulars and the volunteers. The recommendations he received were simply written testimonials, uncertain estimates at best. All have details of
good service in the field or efficient work in the staff departments of various regiments. Little or no emphasis was placed on educational background or exact state of physical health. Reputed character and experience counted heavily.⁸

Among those men appointed either first or second lieutenant of Scouts from 1901 to 1904, ten Americans made first lieutenant without any regular army experience. Except for four U.S. Volunteer officers and three Filipinos selected as second lieutenants, every other male serving as a Scout officer through 1904 had at one time been a regular army NCO. They had all entered regular regiments as privates and advanced through the ranks.⁹ The overwhelming majority of them had fought in the Philippines. More importantly, each had extensive exposure to the various phases of post and field training required by an infantry company. They may not have handled an infantry unit from the standpoint of overall decisions and paperwork but all had witnessed the making of decisions and the writing of schedules and reports. Such experience proved invaluable. Since Scout stations tended to be isolated and manned by a single company, Scout lieutenants could depend only on themselves.

Since Filipino companies and detachments were reorganized in 1901, many newly appointed Scout officers had as their first task the reenlistment of those Scouts desiring further service. Next, new recruits to fill the void created by those departing had to be located, their loyalty determined as best as possible, enrolled,
armed and uniformed. The applicants who seemed the most intelligent and could read and write a little were made noncommissioned officers. Between periods in the field against insurgents, the companies often drilled eight hours per day. Schools for noncommissioned officers took up the early evening hours. American officers spent the remainder of the day working on company records and trying to teach Filipino first sergeants how to compose guard details. Essentially, Scout lieutenants found their respective companies occupied them from dawn to 11 p.m. on a daily basis. Not infrequently, they had to handle all rations and help prepare the food.10

Given the arduous demands of Scout service, no one expected complete success on the part of every Scout lieutenant. Overall, those commanding Scout companies rendered satisfactory service from 1901 to 1904. Many developed into capable and intelligent unit commanders, observed good habits and maintained the physique so essential to any officer undertaking continuous field service in the tropics. Some, however, proved ineffective as leaders. In recommending applicants for officers of Scouts army officers frequently favored old soldiers who they believed deserved recognition. This tendency introduced into the Scouts a number of officers too old for field service and too conservative to adapt themselves to conditions with which their long garrison duty had not prepared them. A few men appointed did not have the ability to perform the administrative work of their companies or to submit
required reports. Yet another group, enjoying their new status and pay, indulged heavily in alcoholic beverages which impaired their efficiency. More than one brought his moral qualifications into question by maintaining a native mistress.\(^{11}\)

The qualifications and past performances of Scout officers became increasingly important in 1904 as American officials began to consider organizing the Scouts into battalions. By the Act of February 2, 1901, Scout captains were to be selected from Regular Army first lieutenants. But regular units could not afford such a loss of commissioned personnel. Chief of Constabulary Allen suggested in 1903 that qualified Scout first lieutenants deserved promotion. Chief of Staff Chaffee agreed in October of 1904. The following month Secretary of War Taft in his annual report endorsed the creation of the office of Captain of Scouts on a four-year provisional basis. Worthy first lieutenants would be selected to fill the fifty openings.\(^{12}\)

If such wholesale promotions were contemplated, Major William P. Johnston, commanding the First Battalion, Philippine Scouts at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, believed a review of present Scout officers should be undertaken. In late December 1904 Johnston submitted to the War Department a legislative bill proposed by the officers of his battalion. Besides endorsing battalion status for the Scouts, the bill recommended Scout captains be selected from those presently commanding Filipino units; the commissions of Scout officers be permanent rather than provisional;
all Scout officers be examined prior to July 1, 1905, with the discharge of those found deficient; only noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army be appointed in the future; and any action decided upon by the Department be carried out before June 30, 1905, when the provisional appointments of a majority of Scout leaders expired. Major General Chaffee forwarded Johnston's letter to the First Division of his staff.

On January 15, 1905, the First Division submitted its report to Chaffee. Admitting that some Scout lieutenants probably deserved to be discharged and that all appointments should be reviewed carefully, the First Division supported all of Johnston's proposals except the issuance of permanent commissions in place of the four-year provisional ones currently in use. The First Division believed the future of the American presence in the Philippines had to be more precisely defined before Scout officers received permanent posts.

Almost one month later, President Roosevelt and Secretary of War Taft gave Major General Henry C. Corbin permission to organize six Scout battalions in the Philippines. Major General Corbin favored the use of Regular Army first lieutenants as captains and Taft, ignoring the report of the General Staff's First Division, concurred. But Chief of Staff Chaffee insisted all Scout officers be tested before they were granted a second provisional commission. On February 20, 1905, he detailed in a personal letter to Corbin the guidelines for the projected examination. With
proper allowance for the fact most terms of service involved duty at isolated posts, Chaffee wanted the Scout lieutenants examined as to physical health, moral character, general efficiency and professional qualifications. An officer's moral behavior had to be satisfactory in every respect. The greatest leeway would be granted in any test of professional qualifications since little time had been allowed for study. Each officer would submit individually an application for reappointment. Post physicians would administer the physicals which were to be the same as for reenlistment. A board of three officers convened by the commanding general, Philippine Division, would study the personal files of all applicants and forward any unfavorable findings to the War Department for final action.16

The 1905 examinations were carried out among first lieutenants only. Of the original 50 first lieutenants selected in 1901, 30 still commanded a company in 1905. Each of the 30 received a second appointment. Thirteen men advanced from second to first lieutenant during 1904 and 1905 were also tested and retained. Five other second lieutenants obtained promotions on July 1, 1905. A total of six first lieutenants received discharges.

Although not connected with the examination dictated by Chaffee, the greatest changes in Scout officers took place among second lieutenants. Seven applicants received commissions in 1904. Another 29 secured the rank of second lieutenant the
following year. The First Division's emphasis on enlisting only Regular Army noncommissioned officers was strictly adhered to. For instance, on March 15, 1905, after perusing the recommendations of Major General Corbin, the War Department appointed the following men:

Michael O'Keefe, Sgt. Maj., 2nd U.S. Cav. (17 yrs. service)
Taylor A. Nichols, Sgt., Signal Corps (5 yrs.)
Edmund A. Harwart, Corp., Troop E, 14th Regt. U.S. Cav. (5 yrs.)
John McBride, Hospital Corps (14 yrs. service)
John N. Turean, Battln. Sgt. Maj., 14th U.S. Inf. (9 yrs.)
Wm. J. Browne, Post Commissary Sgt. (15 yrs. service)
Patrick McNally, 1st Sgt., Troop F, 2nd U.S. Inf. (12 yrs.)
George C. Charlton, Battln. Sgt. Maj., 22nd U.S. Inf. (12 yrs.)
Ernest E. Farrow, P. M. Sgt., Co. C, 12th U.S. Inf. (9 yrs.)
Wm. J. Ayers, 1st Sgt., Co. B, 6th U.S. Inf. (11 yrs.)

Of these new second lieutenants, all were under 40 years of age with 4 over 35 and 2 not yet 30. Each was in the Philippine Islands and in excellent health.

Regardless of how much overall effect the 1905 examinations had on the Scouts, the fact that they took place set a precedent for future application. The Act of February 2, 1901, had required satisfactory service in all respects before any reappointments. The U.S. Army by requiring personal tests in 1905 started to establish standards of performance by which officers in charge of the Philippine Scouts could be judged. And concern for these standards grew when the use of Regular Army first lieutenants as captains for Scout units provoked considerable discontent in the U.S. Army's Philippine garrison.
The first lieutenants detailed from the Regular Army to the Scout companies forming the battalions ordered in February 1905 possessed excellent records. They had been recommended by the commanding officers of regular infantry regiments. Each man appointed knew he would serve at least two years with the Scouts. But friction over their appointments developed quickly. In a March 1905 editorial, the Army and Navy Journal claimed that the employment of Regular Army commissioned personnel on the company level was an injustice. Young Scout lieutenants had developed their companies, knew the habits and needs of their men, and were thoroughly familiar with the conditions of Scout service. Army inspectors, the editorial noted, believed the present Scout first lieutenants made the best material for company captains. Any other first lieutenants had to acquire the experience and knowledge already existing within the Scout officer corps. The detailing of Regular Army captains as majors commanding battalions, the editorial concluded, worked hardships on no one. Letters from various Scout officers appearing in the subsequent issues of the same publication stated the same opinions.

By mid-1905, Major General Corbin in Manila had second thoughts about the situation. In his annual report he suggested that the detailing of lieutenants of the line not only increased the number of regular officers on detached service but demoralized Scout officers. Why should they give their best efforts, if after three years of hard work, men with less knowledge of Filipino
troops took over their commands. There were, Corbin claimed, many capable Scout officers deserving of promotion and Congressional action looking to their advancement should be pursued.22

Secretary of War Taft, repeating the remarks he had made regarding the office of Captain in his annual report for 1904, moved to secure Congressional power to promote Scout officers in May 1906.23 His legislative proposal (S. 1673) was introduced in Congress, however, just a few weeks before adjournment. The bill died in committee.24 For the next two years the proposal journeyed from Senate to House chambers without passage.25 Meanwhile, pressure in favor of it mounted. General officers exerted their influence in annual reports and private correspondence with the War Department. Reporting in May 1906, Brigadier General James A. Buchanan, commanding the Department of the Visayas emphasized the need to avoid frequent changes in commissioned personnel where "native" troops were concerned. Only long-service officers came to know and work effectively with Filipino soldiers. Buchanan could not believe first lieutenants of the line would stay in the Philippines long. If they were made captain in their own regiments they would want to return to duty with American troops. Some might well find Scout service did not agree with them and request a transfer after a couple of years. In any event, the detailing of Regular Army first lieutenants did not appear a wise policy. Buchanan also believed that unless an
adequate means of promotion as well as retirement was extended to Scout veterans the most valuable of them would be lost.²⁶

Major General Leonard Wood, commanding the Philippine Division, was quoted in October 1906 by the Army and Navy Journal on the subject. Wood objected to the lack of promotion afforded veteran Scout officers. He favored passage of the bill establishing the rights of promotion. Applicants could then be examined and the best chosen. Until 50 qualified first lieutenants of Scouts were promoted, however, he urged the detailing of officers of the line continue.²⁷ In both 1907 and 1908, as well as urging the promotion of worthy Scout lieutenants in his annual report, Wood twice wrote to the War Department personally.²⁸ Also, in 1907 Major General J. F. Weston, commanding the Department of Luzon, and Brigadier General A. L. Mills, commanding the Department of the Visayas, joined those supporting Taft's bill.²⁹

The editorials of the Army and Navy Journal remained firmly behind it.³⁰

With William Howard Taft's tenure as Secretary of War drawing to a close, a new Congress, the 60th, passed S. 652 with virtually no debate on May 16, 1908.³¹ The new law read as follows:

The office of captain in the Philippine Scouts is hereby created as a grade of rank in the military establishment. Such captains shall be selected from officers of the grade of first lieutenants in said scouts, and shall be given provisional appointments for periods of four years each, and no such appointments shall be continued for a second or subsequent period unless the officer's conduct shall have been satisfactory in every respect: Provided, That the number of officers provisionally appointed under the terms of the Act shall not at any
time exceed the number of companies of said troops which may be formed by the President from time to time for service in the Philippine Islands. 32

Passage of the bill immediately made qualifications for promotions within the Scouts a vital concern at the War Department. 33 After much deliberation, the Chief of Staff's office decided to follow a method suggested by Major William H. Johnston, 16th Infantry, former Major, Philippine Scouts. In a letter to the Department prior to final passage of the Act of May 16, Johnston contended that the examination need not be as rigorous nor as technical as one prescribed for the grade of captain of infantry. But any exam should include

a knowledge of infantry drill regulations, field service regulations, army regulations, manual of guard duty, the manual for courts martial and preparation of all reports, returns and records of a company; as well as an investigation of the command heretofore exercised by the candidate, his control of the enlisted men under him and his ability to command, instruct, discipline and feed a company. Credit should be given him for duly authenticated efficiency in the field and for his knowledge of Spanish or any of the native dialects. Above all his moral character, habits, and his physical ability to serve in the field under tropical conditions should be scrutinized. 34

Johnston also detailed how the examination should be held. Scout officers were scattered across the archipelago at stations where at most two officers held sway. At the same time, any honest test of their efficiency could best be made by examining the companies or detachments they were commanding. Only at their stations could the moral character and habits of Scout officers be investigated. So the examination, Johnston concluded, should be
made by a board of officers that included the usual proportion of medical officers. Once convened by the commanding general, Philippine Division, the board should visit in person each first lieutenant whose promotion was contemplated. The advantages of his method, Johnston pointed out, were threefold. First, it would not require the absence of so many lieutenants from their stations. Secondly, it would be less expensive. Finally, since the candidates would not have a great deal of time to cram textbook knowledge into their heads or hide immoral conduct and bad habits, it would secure better results.35

The Philippine Division, commanded at the moment by Major J. F. Weston, applied Johnston's suggestions with vigor. Scout officers underwent the most thorough examinations of their careers. The results were tabulated and cabled to the War Department on August 7, 1908. The report declared 27 of 53 first lieutenants were fully qualified for promotion. Eight others found slightly deficient (on oral examination) also deserved promotion to captain along with two first lieutenants presently on leave in the United States. In addition, four second lieutenants, once promoted to first lieutenant, Weston wanted advanced immediately to the rank of captain. Altogether, 41 captains were now provided for. To complete the 50 needed (one for each Scout company), Weston asked for the retention of the 9 regular army first lieutenants on detached duty with the Scouts. Twenty-one Scout first lieutenants thus failed to qualify for promotion.
Since second lieutenants also underwent examination, Weston listed 28 as fully qualified with 9 found somewhat deficient. Seventeen second lieutenants were deemed undeserving of promotion. All of Weston's promotions had been determined by a process of selection, with no adherence to the traditional Army procedure of advancement according to the lineal list of seniority. The best qualified, Weston contended, deserved promotion first. 36

The Assistant Chief of Staff at the War Department, Major General William P. Duvall, questioned the validity of Weston's findings and his recommendations. In a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Duvall attacked the suggestion that the nine regular army first lieutenants be retained. Citing the reports of the Secretary of War and the House and Senate Committees on Military Affairs, Duvall claimed the law creating the position of captain had been designed to benefit Scout first lieutenants. It required regular officers serving as Scout captains to return to their own regiments. Any other action deliberately frustrated the intentions of the lawmakers.

General Duvall objected next to the proposal that four second lieutenants be advanced to first lieutenant, then jumped to captain. The intent of the law, he stressed, was to confine to first lieutenants the list of eligibles for captaincies. If four second lieutenants obtained the rank of captain in the manner prescribed
by Weston, Duvall believed it would open the way for wholesale promotions by the same method, an open denial of the law's plain purpose.

The final objection concerned the scheme of promotion by selection (or promotion based on examination and proven ability rather than mere length of service). Although claiming to support in general the use of a selective process when promoting officers, Duvall declared the application of such a technique was improper in this instance. Scout promotions in the past had always been by seniority on the lineal list to avoid the complaints of favoritism "irregular" upgrades inevitably provoked. A departure from normal procedure without advance notice (as recommended by Weston) would arouse discontent among the present Scout officer corps. Duvall believed, moreover, that the use of selection was unfair since most Scout officers lacked the training and educational background of normal commissioned personnel and had had little time to prepare for an examination determining their future. Duvall recommended, therefore, that the lineal list be adhered to until 50 first lieutenants had been advanced (assuming 50 of such were eligible.) Those found deficient physically or morally would be passed over. In any event, final determination of who would be promoted rested with the General Staff, not the division commander. After this initial round of promotion of first lieutenants by application of the lineal seniority list, Duvall favored the use of a selective process (including written
and oral examinations) for all future upgrades. In conclusion, he emphasized again that his present objections to Weston's findings stemmed solely from his concern that, if Scout officers were subjected to rigid examinations on short notice, their morale would suffer greatly.  

Duvall's memorandum, approved by Secretary of War Luke E. Wright and Chief of Staff J. Franklin Bell, overturned Weston's recommendations. The nine detailed first lieutenants returned to their regular regiments. The four second lieutenants were promoted to first lieutenant but not to captain. All promotions made in 1908 followed the lineal list of seniority. Only the physical and moral qualifications of each candidate received serious consideration. But fair warning had been given to all concerned. In the future, although the general rule of seniority could apply, examinations (written and oral) would be given and the results applied in all cases.

The creation of the position of captain and the subsequent appointments to that office advanced an equal number of men from second to first lieutenant. The War Department, in need of qualified personnel to fill the rank of second lieutenant, issued strict rules for their selection in December of 1908. "General Orders No. 195" called for the convening of a board of officers at suitable army posts on the first day of November each year to examine applicants. Each board was to consist of five commissioned officers, including two medical officers. Applicants for appointment
had to be citizens of the United States or the Philippine Islands, unmarried, at least 21 years old but not over 30, in sound physical health and possessing good moral character. To be eligible, a regular army enlisted man had to have at least two years service.

Enlisted men applied through military channels by July 1 of the year examination was desired. Company commanders would submit personal opinions as to qualifications. Post commanders would see that the applicant was examined by a medical officer and add their own personal judgments of the individual's aptitude. To broaden the pool from which applicants were drawn, the U.S. Army now permitted civilians to apply in their own handwriting to the Adjutant General by July 1 of the year they wanted to take the examination. Recommendations of reputable persons were to be submitted along with the record of a physical examination administered by a public physician.

After physical and moral standards had been met, "General Orders No. 195" provided for an examination of educational qualifications. Each board of officers was to compose the questions. Answers were to be submitted in writing. The mental test was to cover the following: English grammar (orthography, reading and writing from dictation), elementary principles of arithmetic, geography of North America and the Philippine Islands, outlines of the history of the United States, Army Regulations, Infantry Drill Regulations. All results, accompanied by the necessary papers, would be contingent upon approval by the War Department.
Besides establishing guidelines for selecting those to be appointed second lieutenant, "General Order 195" set forth the procedure by which Scout officers were to be examined for promotion or reappointment. Once every year, preferably about the 1st of January, the commanding officer of the Philippine Division would convene a board of five officers: two of whom would be medical officers and the rest officers serving with, or having served with, the Philippine Scouts. The board was to visit the post of each Scout officer whose status on the lineal list made his promotion possible in the coming year or whose provisional term would expire in the next 12 months. Written testimony as to an officer's efficiency would be solicited and his command visited. Field service of any quantity as well as distinguished service noted by superior officers would be included in the estimation of any officer prepared.

The professional examination administered did not require written answers. The Board would devise its own questions. The oral questions for promotion to first lieutenant or reappointment as second lieutenant were to cover the following: administration of company, Infantry Drill Regulations, Manual of Guard Duty, Small Arms Firing Regulations and Spanish or any Philippine Island dialect. Promotion to captain or reappointment as captain or first lieutenant required questions on all of the above as well as on Field Service Regulations and Military Law.
When reporting on any officer, the board was to determine if reappointment or promotion should be undertaken, or if the man should be discharged on the date his provisional appointment expired or sooner in the interest of the service. Any officer ordered to report for examination who had passed the mental test the previous year was not required to repeat it. Overall, "General Orders NO. 195" left little room for uncertainty. Its express guidelines applied fair and equitable standards to anyone seeking appointment, reappointment or promotion.

In 1909, Major General William P. Duvall assumed command of the Philippines Division. After a thorough inspection of the Scouts and their officers, he determined that, since the prescribed examinations had become a part of Scout life, schools for the instruction of Scout officers to prepare them for the tests were mandatory. Duvall thus issued "General Orders NO. 56" Headquarters, Philippine Division, on August 25, 1909. "General Orders NO. 56" called for post commanders to have charge of immediate instruction and keep records of school operations. The annual term of theoretical instruction aggregated 90 days between July 1 and November 30. Class instruction was to last two hours per day. The post commander served as instructor. All officers below the rank of major had to take the course as instructor or student and then submit to a test covering the entire curriculum.

The course of instruction, to last three terms, was divided into theoretical and practical sections. The theoretical course
required recitations (in the prescribed manuals and textbooks) covering the following: Army Regulations, Infantry Drill Regulations, Field Service Regulations, Military Law, Military Topography, Field Engineering and Spanish or the native dialect of an officer's battalion or company. The practical component of the course consisted of the practiced application of the theoretical instruction received in each subject as the post commander could best dictate throughout the year. Each term covered specific topics and provided for a continual review as the course progressed.

To ensure honest efforts, Duvall stipulated that written exams would occur whenever the recitations in each subject were completed. The sealed examinations would be delivered, administered by a designated officer who remained in the room during the test, resealed and delivered to the examining board scheduled to mark them. A mark of 75% or more in any subject earned an individual a certificate of proficiency. Possession of a certificate excused the holder from examination in that particular subject during his four year appointment.43

Like "General Orders NO. 195," General Orders NO. 56" was precise. Scout officers, to hold their appointments for more than one term or to be promoted, had to take a carefully administered course. In four short years, from the Chaffee exams of 1905 to "General Orders NO. 56" in 1909, standards for appointment to, and promotion in, the Philippine Scouts had been defined and
implemented. These standards not only upgraded the quality of the Scout officer corps, they also enhanced the institutional integrity of the entire Scout organization. With proscribed examinations and schools of instruction, Scout officers could at least begin to approximate the qualifications and skills attributed to their counterparts in the Regular Army.

After 1908, the examination procedure followed with those seeking appointment as second lieutenants became even more rigid. While "General Orders NO. 195" again provided the basic procedure employed in 1912, the examination, because of the limited number of vacancies in the Scouts, was administered on a competitive basis. Of 60 candidates, only 28 qualified. The majority of those passing were Regular Army NCO's. In the end only 12 men received immediate appointments. Seven were NCO's, three were civilians and one was a second lieutenant, Philippine Constabulary. 44

In preparation for the examination scheduled for 1913, the test questions for second lieutenant candidates were made uniform throughout the U.S. Army. The Army War College prepared the questions. The War Department also announced that when an applicant passed he would be eligible for appointment for only one year as in the Regular Army. But the absence of vacancies forced a cancellation of the 1913 test and the Department maintained for a second year the eligibility of those who had already qualified. 46
The next examination held took place in 1914 and the Chief of Staff (Brigadier General H. L. Scott) made sure it was competitive. All those passing received certification for appointment in order of the average percentage scored on the test. Twenty-five qualified: 16 were U.S. Army NCO's, 8 were civilians and 1 a Constabulary second lieutenant. Seven received immediate appointments. None were civilians. At this juncture the War Department moved to limit whatever chances civilians had of gaining a provisional commission. As in the case of the Regular Army, two separate lists—one for Regular Army NCO's, the other for successful civilian applicants—were established. The Army and Navy Journal supported the action, believing NCO's with two years of service rated preferential treatment. In 1917, with several vacancies to be filled, the War Department issued "Special Regulations NO. 4" on September 18. Superceding "General Orders NO. 195" of 1908, "Special Regulations NO. 4" stated that non-commissioned officers of the Army would have precedence over all others in filling vacancies. Of the 200 applicants in 1917, 66 passed. When listed in order of merit (with precedence to NCO's of the Army) 41 were NCO's and 9 were civilians. Three Philippine Constabulary lieutenants and 1st Sergeant Mateo M. Capinpin of the 49th Company, Philippine Scouts also passed.

As the appointments to the rank of second lieutenant from 1901 through 1917 clearly indicate, Regular Army NCO's dominated the Philippine Scout organization. For many of them service with
the Filipino companies represented their only chance of ever enjoying the pay and allowances of commissioned officers. And duty in the Philippines suited them. The most striking facet of the Scout officer corps in the years prior to World War I was its stability. The NCO's secured appointments and then held them until retirement. Of the original 50 first lieutenants selected in 1901, 19 still commanded a company in 1918. Forty-four other NCO's had retired between 1907 and 1916 after varying lengths of service.

Perhaps because of their similar backgrounds, and their lengthy Scout careers, Scout officers had little difficulty developing group cohesiveness. By 1911 they had formed a Philippine Scouts Association, complete with constitution and by-laws. Members of the Association devoted considerable time from 1911 on to two particular goals: the achievement of permanent commissions and retirement as commissioned officers. Permanent commissions became a prime interest of the Association's members after the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, gave pay clerks of the Quartermaster Corps as well as veterinarians career appointments. Captain A. W. Barry of the Scouts protested to the War Department for his fellow officers on August 5, 1916. With 15 years service, Barry believed he rated the same stature as a veterinarian of equal service.

Barry's contention encountered initial resistance when the War College Division solicited the opinion of Adjutant General H. P. McCain. The Adjutant General believed officers left for a
long time in the tropics deteriorated in efficiency. Provisional appointments thus motivated an officer to maintain a peak of efficiency. The War Department, moreover, had been enabled by the presence of provisional appointments to eliminate those men who proved to be poor leaders. Permanent appointments would only increase the number of unqualified officers holding command positions over an extended period of time. The War College Division, however, disagreed with Adjutant General McCain. Reviewing the history of how Scout officers had been examined appointed, Brigadier General Charles G. Treat called for permanent commissions. All examinations would be those administered to Regular Army officers. Use of the tests given Regular Army commissioned personnel would guarantee that only those Scout officers truly qualified would be promoted.

The efforts of Parry and the War College Division produced nothing concrete. An important segment of the War Department was now on record as favoring an increased stature for Scout officers. But Chief of Staff Hugh L. Scott ruled that Congress was too preoccupied with events in Europe to consider the legislation needed. World War I erupted for the United States a few months later and the whole question was filed for future reference. Finally, the Acts of June 4, 1920, and June 30, 1922, permanently commissioned all Scout officers, with the right to promotion to the grade of colonel and retirement in grade.

Retirement for age and disability, the second major objective of the Association, had occupied numerous officers for years.
As early as 1907, Brigadier General Albert L. Mills suggested that Scout officers were entitled to the same privilege of retirement as officers of other troops. Major Generals Leonard Wood and William P. Duvall followed suit. Editorials and letters on the subject became a regular feature of the *Army and Navy Journal*. But the War Department did not at first respond. The legal status of Scout officers presented some complications. The Scout commanders (those not detailed from the Regular Army) were provisionally appointed by the President. They were not nominated or confirmed by the Senate. They were, therefore, prevented from retiring as officers by a recent Supreme Court decision limiting the officers retired list to those who had been nominated and confirmed by the Senate. This ruling forced the 44 Scout officers who retired between 1901 and 1916 to do so as enlisted men of the Army with 30 years service. Each man resigned from the Scouts, reenlisted in the Regular Army and then retired. Some left the service as first sergeants, others as chief musicians, a few as commissary sergeants, still others as quartermaster sergeants. The grade in which retirement occurred depended entirely upon the grade held immediately prior to retirement.

Members of the Philippine Scouts Association exerted a continual pressure on the War Department for relief. By 1914, the members claimed their duties paralleled those of any regular officer. After all, to secure an appointment in the Scouts an enlisted man had to sever all ties with his regular unit. He then
took the Scout officer's oath and the President signed his four year, provisional commission. In light of these facts, the Association claimed they were already commissioned officers and deserved retirement as such. On March 21, 1914, Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison, as quoted by the Army and Navy Journal, agreed. He favored retirement of Scout officers as officers, both for disability and for age. Otherwise, the Secretary feared the continuation of the present unjust situation would deplete the efficiency of the entire Scout organization.

Early in January of 1915, Chief of Staff Hugh L. Scott informed the commanding officer of the Philippine Division that, in response to representations made to him by Scout officers through the office of the Secretary of War, a legislative draft would soon be submitted to Congress. The proposed law would permit captains and lieutenants of Scouts who were citizens of the United States to retire under the laws of retirement applying to like ranks in the Regular Army "except that they shall receive as retired pay and allowances the amounts now or hereafter allowed by law, to retired master signal electricians of the United States Army, and no more." Anyone with five years service in the Scouts would be eligible for the retired list for Philippine Scout officers.

The Chief of Staff's proposal became law as part of the National Defense Act passed June 3, 1916. As enacted, the new law extended Scott's original legislative draft to include those
officers who had resigned or were discharged because of wounds and subsequently retired as enlisted men. Disability contracted in the line of duty also made one eligible for the new benefits. The War Department's move was generous. Scout officers were to receive the retirement income of the highest paid enlisted grade in the Army. Such a concession represented an obvious recognition by the Department that service under "provisional" commissions rated greater regards than ordinary duty.

By late 1916, 31 former Scout officers had been placed on the retired list established by the Act of June 3. These men—20 captains and 11 first lieutenants—had all retired as enlisted men. They were now listed according to the highest grade they had held in the Scouts. But Scout officers, both active and retired, wanted more. They still wanted the retirement pay enjoyed by regular army officers. Thus pressure on the War Department continued through World War I. The National Defense Act of June 4, 1920, besides giving permanent commissions to Scout leaders, provided for retirement after 20 years as other officers of like grades and length of service.

In the final analysis, as the Philippine Scouts grew into a colonial army, their officers gained professional status and recognition. Permanent commissions and full retirement privileges were just regards for men who had served for years in a tropical climate, studied in earnest to gain the military knowledge required of a commissioned officer and struggled to make the Philippine Scouts
a reasonable duplicate of the U.S. Army. Primarily because of their efforts the Scouts became a military adjunct the U.S. Army found indispensable by the 1920's.

*     *     *

Although the U.S. Army came to accept the Filipino as a combat soldier of merit, its attitude toward the Filipino as a commanding officer of commissioned status was persistently negative in tone. The American attitude stemmed mainly from the experiences of the Spanish-American War and the subsequent Philippine Insurrection. It was not unusual for various American officers to attribute all Filipino military failures to incompetent leadership. As one officer described him, the typical Filipino officer lacked courage. He was "accustomed to a life of luxury, often a half-breed, a small dealer, a hanger-on of the Spaniards." Against disciplined white troops such a leader seldom demonstrated initiative and could hardly be trusted to train members of his own race. This image of incompetency regarding Filipinos as commissioned personnel, regardless of its validity, continued into the 1920's. The U.S. Army believed Filipinos could be made effective soldiers only when they were commanded and disciplined by whites.

Despite the prevailing American opinion regarding the commissioning of Filipinos, the U.S. Army, always in need of men who could command, did make legal provision for the "exceptional" islander. According to the Act of February 2, 1901:
When, in the opinion of the President, natives of the Philippine Islands shall, by their services and character, show fitness for command, the President is authorized to make provisional appointments to the grades of second and first lieutenants from such natives, who, when so appointed, shall have the pay and allowances to be fixed by the Secretary of War, not exceeding those of corresponding grades of the Regular Army.  

This provision allowed four enterprising Filipinos to gain provisional appointments as second lieutenants during the first decade of American control. In 1902 two Filipinos—Jose Maria del Rosario and Crispulo Patajo—were appointed directly from civilian life. Jose Maria del Rosario served a little more than a year. Crispulo Patajo, on the other hand, enjoyed a lengthy career in the Scouts. Patajo had sided with the Americans early in 1900. Under the auspices of Major General William P. Duvall, he formed a detachment of "native" scouts. His force rapidly expanded to over 100 men. Single-handedly, Patajo fed, sheltered and armed his private command, even appointing sub-officers as he needed them. During the insurrection, operating in the provinces of Abra, Union and Ilocos Sur, Patajo's command earned unstinting praise from various officers for its operations (both undercover and public).  

In February of 1902 Crispulo Patajo became a second lieutenant with the 24th Company, Philippine Scouts. As such he accompanied the First Battalion, Philippine Scouts to the St. Louis Exposition of 1904. After the return of the Battalion to the Philippines, the four-company unit helped suppress the
Pulajan revolt on Samar in 1905 and 1906. Promoted to captain in 1906, Patajo was subsequently disqualified for promotion in 1908. But Major General Duvall, when overturning the decision to pick Scout captains by selection, interceded for him. On September 19, 1908, Crispulo Patajo achieved the rank of captain. He retired in 1922 with the rank of major, Philippine Scouts.

Whereas del Rosario and Patajo entered the Scouts from civilian life, Pedro Lora earned the distinction of being the first man commissioned from the ranks of the Scouts. A Visayan, Pedro Lora served for ten years with the Spanish Native Infantry. In May 1900 he joined the 43rd U.S. Volunteer Infantry Native Scouts on Leyte. When this Filipino unit became the 39th Company, Philippine Scouts in 1901, Lora was made a sergeant. In February 1902, Sergeant Lora served as a guide for a detachment of the 39th Company that penetrated the interior of Samar and captured the insurgent leader Vincente Lukban. For bravery and distinguished service, Lora, upon the recommendation of Brigadier General Jacob Hurd Smith, was commissioned a second lieutenant, 38th Company, Philippine Scouts on April 16, 1902. But his career as a Scout officer lasted only a short time. Lora died of Asiatic cholera in mid-1903.

The final Filipino officer to emerge prior to 1912, Ignacio Abelino, was also commissioned from the ranks. After serving with various Macabebe companies during 1899 and 1900, Abelino enlisted in the 4th Company, Philippine Scouts in 1901. He served as
private corporal and sergeant. When the First Battalion, Philippine Scouts was formed, Abelino became battalion sergeant major. Like Patajo, Abelino made the trip to St. Louis and later fought the Pulajanes on Samar. Appointed second lieutenant in 1907, Abelino, again like Patajo, was found unqualified for promotion in 1908. Major General Duvall also interceded in this case. September 1908, Abelino became a first lieutenant. He later retired with the rank of captain.78

From 1907 to 1912, Patajo and Abelino were the only two Filipinos holding a provisional appointment in the Scouts. The U.S. Army did, however, move in 1908 to further open its doors to Philippine residents. The Legislative Act passed by the American Congress on May 28, 1908, included the following paragraph:

The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to permit not exceeding four Filipinos, to be designated, one for each class, by the Philippine Commission, to receive instruction at the United States Military Academy at West Point: Provided, That the Filipinos undergoing instruction, as herein authorized, shall receive the same pay, allowances, and emoluments as are authorized by the law for cadets at the Military Academy appointed from the United States, to be paid out of the same appropriations: And provided further, That said Filipinos undergoing instruction on graduation shall be eligible only to commissions in the Philippine Scouts. And the provisions of section thirteen hundred and twenty-one, Revised Statutes, are modified in the case of the Filipinos undergoing instruction, so as to require them to engage to serve for eight years, unless sooner discharged, in the Philippine Scouts.79

The Philippine Commission did not take advantage of this privilege immediately. In 1910, however, the Commission appointed
Vincent P. Lim and each year thereafter the Commission faithfully made an appointment. In 1916, the power of the West Point appointment was transferred to the Governor General of the Philippine Islands.

Although Vincent P. Lim would not graduate and join the Scouts until 1914, the Filipino segment of the officer corps doubled in 1912. "General Orders NO. 195" of 1908, in establishing guidelines for examining those desiring commissions as second lieutenants, had not eliminated citizens of the Philippine Islands. To insure equitable results, "General Orders NO. 195" stated that when a "native" of the Philippine Islands took the exam, the questions were to be of such character as a Filipino of fair education could be expected to answer. If the candidate preferred, he could answer all questions orally. He would, however, have to write from dictation when the exam requested him to do so. Civilians Pedro D. Dulay and Vincente R. Barros qualified on the examination and were appointed in 1912. Estaban B. Dalo, also a civilian, became a second lieutenant the following year.

The Filipinos holding provisional appointments were augmented from 1914 to 1920 by seven Filipino graduates of West Point. The first graduate, Vincente P. Lim, ranked 77 in a class of 107. He entered the Philippine Scouts as a second lieutenant on June 12, 1914. Prior to 1920 only one other Filipino secured a position in the Scout officer corps. Mateo M. Capinpin, who had served as
private, corporal, sergeant and sergeant 1st class, Companies 32 and 49, Philippine Scouts, passed the 1917 qualifying exam held under "Special Regulations No. 4." 84

The number of Filipinos in the commissioned corps of the Scouts continued to grow after World War I. The National Defense Act of June 4, 1920 (Section 22) restricted further appointments of officers to citizens of the Philippine Islands. Appointments would be as second lieutenants under such regulations the President might prescribe. 85 The effect of the restriction was readily apparent by 1923. Of 16 lieutenants, 14 were Filipinos. Eleven of these men had been appointed from civilian life. In addition, 2 of 33 majors were Filipinos. Finally, of 21 captains, 3 were Philippine citizens. Of 35 first lieutenants 2 had been born in the Philippines. 86

While the number of Philippine residents occupying command positions in the Scouts did increase after 1920 (as shown by the figures cited above), Americans continued to dominate the officer corps. The distrust of Filipino officers on the commissioned level was deep-seated and did not diminish perceptibly. In 1934, for example, the Philippine Scouts had a total of 63 officers, divided among Americans and Filipinos, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>American</th>
<th>Filipino</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonels</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majors</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenants</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lieutenants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Totals             | 36       | 27       | 63    | 87
Over the years, Filipino dominance had advanced from the rank of second to first lieutenant. But from the grade of captain up, American personnel remained firmly in charge. The same situation existed in the late 1930's.

* * *

In contrast to the poor opinion of the Filipino as a commissioned officer that permeated the U.S. Army, American officers who worked closely with Filipino forces developed a solid respect for that same individual as a soldier and noncommissioned officer. From the standpoint of personal philosophy and habits, life style, family ties and tribal origins, the Filipino was a model colonial soldier. One American officer, for example, wrote that

The Filipino, as a soldier, is, on the whole, most satisfactory to his officers. His besetting sins are few and easy to deal with. Drunkenness is practically unknown and almost never habitual. The so-called vino, which wrought such havoc with some of our American soldiers, is perfectly safe for the native, as a rule. He is never noisy or disorderly, and the presence of 100 men, even when closely confined to quarters, is scarcely noticeable. His amusements are simple. An inveterate gambler, he is a devotee of the cock pit and lost and won side by side with those who under other circumstances would gladly have cut his throat.

The one characteristic of the Filipino American officers found most appealing was his love for military life. Being caste oriented by tradition, Filipinos habitually sought a patron or leader and attached themselves to him for good or evil. When that patron happened to be a military officer, so much the better.
To the Filipino, the donning of a military uniform represented a step upward to a higher social plane. Within the community, a soldier commanded recognition and respect. And since Filipino existence beyond family life revolved around formal ceremonies—church services, fiestas and funerals, marriages and baptismal processions—military parades and drills offered the individual another form of display and ritual. Pomp and circumstance, U.S. military officers quickly learned, were sources of personal satisfaction to most Islanders.  

Another Filipino characteristic that intrigued many Americans was the philosophical stoicism with which the average trooper accepted the rigors of life. In a perceptive essay, one American officer noted that

While the Filipino is no saint, the virtue of patience, at least, may be attributed to him without flattery. Amid depressing circumstances, at isolated stations, in the field with half or less than half of the ration, exposed to cold or wet weather, the Philippine Scout, instead of grumbling, seeking a change of station or applying for admission to the sick report in order to avoid disagreeable duty, cheers himself by singing, smoking or gambling; and if he has opinions about the apparent neglect of his government or his officers, does not express them, nor grieve over his own uncomfortable situation. 

This stoical penchant, many believed, played an important role in the bravery exhibited by Filipinos. Christian by religious faith, somewhat fanatical by instinct, the Islander looked upon death as an act of God which he was unable to postpone by personal effort. Thus when properly encouraged and led into military action, the Filipino could be quite careless of dangers to himself.
The acceptance of authority exhibited by Filipinos did have one serious drawback. Frequently, the islander looked upon the word of his accepted patron with unbounded reverence. That leader could, if he so desired, go to the most extreme lengths and resort to great injustice before any of his followers would leave him. Such a situation opened the door to abuse of Philippine enlisted personnel by any American inclined to harsh, dictatorial behavior. Such incidents, fortunately, proved rare.  

Overall, the Filipino as a soldier proved trainable, amenable to discipline, capable of great pride in his vocation, and courageous. He looked to his commanding officer for proper instruction and understanding. He expected his leader to provide those things, tangible and intangible, that made him a better soldier. For example, the Filipino took great pride in his personal appearance. Since he received only half pay and a minute clothing allowance, it was expected that his American commander would loan him the money to purchase a tailored uniform. In return, the Filipino strove to prove himself a soldier of distinction.

The family ties of the Filipino influenced his performance as a soldier as much as his personal philosophy and habits. To the Filipino, who approached life on an extremely personal basis, the family was the basic fulcrum of existence. Right or wrong, those of kin stood together. Even the most distant cousin was important. When enlisting a Filipino soldier, the U.S. Army gained a legion of new friends, for the soldier's relatives inevitably sided with him. The acquisition of these supporters
did create some problems. When called to duty in some area remote from his own community, the Philippine Scout naturally wanted to take his family with him. If the U.S. Army balked, it was inevitable that the Scout soldier would seek contacts with women in the barrios surrounding his post. But he preferred a woman of his own tribal unit. If allowed to have his wife and family with him, the Filipino showed no inclination to mingle with a local population personally foreign to him. His loyalties thus remained with his military commander, safe from local political issues. In a sense, his family could be employed to screen out local influences.  

The American military command, in the end, allowed families to accompany Scout companies from station to station. As in the case of personal uniforms, the officer commanding the company was expected to arrange transportation and advance the money several family heads always lacked at the moment. So strong were Filipino family ties that the only serious near mutiny taking place in Scout ranks prior to World War I occurred when a company commander failed to make the necessary transportation arrangements.

With the creation of Scout battalions and the concentration of companies at larger posts near population centers, family residence rather than transportation became a continual problem for the U.S. Army. Since the majority of the Scouts were married, venereal disease presented no great problem. But the Filipino
often slept in the nearest town with his family without benefit of a mosquito bar, thereby greatly adding to the incidence of malaria among Scout personnel. Even more disturbing to the Surgeon General was the following 1915 report from Camp Keithley, Mindanao:

A manifest sanitary defect at not only this station, but at other posts garrisoned by Philippine Scouts, is the method of housing the families of Scout soldiers. It appears to be the custom for native soldiers to acquire families and to carry from post to post their women and children, and as the Government makes no provision for housing them, scout barrios, in which sanitary conditions are often deplorable, have grown up adjacent to posts. A census of the population at this post compiled in October, 1914, showed 731 civilians, the vast majority of whom were native women and children. These people are housed in old corrals and other buildings on the reservation and in native barrios in Dansalan. As a large proportion of the men live with their families in overcrowded, squalid and filthy surroundings which the military authorities are powerless to correct, it is obvious that sanitary measures in the post are largely nullified.

The problem persisted. The only viable solution was to bring the family of the Scout under the complete sanitary control of the U.S. Army. The solution proved difficult to implement. No appropriations for housing married enlisted men had ever been made. Consequently, any structures built on military reservations for such a purpose had to utilize native materials or materials gained by tearing down outmoded military corrals, warehouses and outposts.

Construction of reservation housing was slow but steady from 1918 to 1920. The project was completed in a period of four years. By 1924, Captain Ralph Hirsch, writing about the 24th Field Artillery, Philippine Scouts, could claim paternalistically that
No description, however short, of a Scout regiment is complete without at least a reference to its bamboo complement, the "Scout Barrio." This neat little village of nipa-covered bamboo houses is undoubtedly the greatest reason for the high state of morale prevalent in the Scout regiments. Built on the reservation and supervised by the military authorities, it affords an opportunity to the lowest paid private soldier to marry and raise the large family of brown babies so dear to the heart of every Filipino. Sufficient ground provides garden space for each little home. Here, a few steps from his battery parade, he has his wife and children, camotes and chickens. Thus, in the face of the increased cost of necessities and the reduction of almost pitifully small pay, has discontent been kept from entering the "Scouts."

While family ties influenced the career of the Scout soldier and how Americans handled him, tribal origins had an even greater impact on the Scout's day-to-day life. The presence of differing groups in the Philippines, each with its own dialect, had, as previously noted, worked to the advantage of the Americans. The fact that the Macabebes, Tagalogs and Ilocanos, for example, did not get along well with each other prevented the formation of a united front opposing American domination. But while these group differences tended to simplify the process of occupation and pacification, they presented special problems for the Philippine Scouts. From the beginning the U.S. Army, acutely aware of Filipino inter-group tensions, restricted the membership of any particular Scout company to one tribal or language group, be it Macabebe, Bicol or Ilocano. Companies so constituted proved more controllable with the chance of conflict between enlisted personnel significantly reduced. The language problem also eased when only one native dialect was in use per company.
As long as Scout companies composed of members of one tribe served independently at separate stations, no discipline problems developed. However, when Scout battalions were formed, the U.S. Army mistakenly combined different tribal companies within individual units. The Army's error resulted from the exemplary behavior of the First Battalion at the St. Louis Exposition of 1904. The four companies, each composed of a different tribe, got along so well American officers assumed that the same behavior could be expected on a regular basis. Thus, the initial Scout battalions formed in 1905 simply lumped together any four companies serving in the same geographic area. But as battalion companies were brought together at the same post the traditional animosities that had kept Tagalog from working peacefully with Macabebe surfaced once again. The enlisted component of one company often found it difficult to compete on a friendly basis with another battalion unit of different background. On more than one occasion enflamed feelings produced brawls in the barracks and on the parade ground. Language presented yet another problem. Many American officers found mixed guard details a headache some most of them spoke only one native dialect and could not converse with outpost members speaking a different tongue. Frequently, Filipino noncommissioned officers spoke only their own dialects, a circumstance severely restricting conversation between company staffs. To correct all these difficulties, the U.S. Army reorganized Scout battalions in 1907 into four-company commands
composed of single tribes. The Scouts now had two battalions of Macabebes, three of Ilocanos, two of Visayans, and one of Tagalogs. Eighteen companies remained unattached.104

Besides determining which companies belonged to what battalions, tribal origins came to determine where they would be stationed and how their enlisted members would be recruited. In general, the Philippine Division had stationed individual companies, as previously noted, outside their own barrios. The reasoning here was simply to pit one tribal group against another, promoting internal security. At first, battalion posts were not so carefully selected. An incident in 1910, however, caused a complete review of battalion campsites.

On September 1, 1910, Major General William P. Duvall, commanding the Philippine Division, was called to the office of Governor General W. Cameron Forbes. The Governor General needed troops. An ex-provincial governor convicted of a felony while in office had defaulted on bail and, with a large following, seized control of Solona in Nueva Viscaya Province. Governor General Forbes wanted three battalions prepared to march. The question of which Scouts to use was not easily decided. The closest battalion was the 2nd, and Ilocano force. But Ilocanos resided in the troubled area. The next closest Scout battalion was the 9th, essentially a Cagayane command. Again, Governor General Forbes demurred, knowing Cagayanes lived in Nueva Viscaya also. The two units he wanted most—the 10th (Visayan) and 7th (Macabebe)—were
located too far away. In the end, the Constabulary handled the disturbance and no Scout assistance was needed.

The conference with the Governor General made a lasting impression on Major General Duvall. He decided that in the future it would be sound policy to have Filipino troops serve habitually in parts of the division other than those from which they were recruited. Local questions—political, social and economic—would then have no interest for them. Freed from any distracting influences, the battalions could devote themselves entirely to their own work. With permission from Washington, Duvall immediately put his policy to work. Down to World War I, as a result of Duvall's decision, Scout battalions were not permitted to man posts in their home locales. They were to be denied prolonged association with the other members of their tribal group.

Tribal origins, made even more pertinent because of their geographic distribution, also played a key role in the development of recruiting techniques. On the company level recruiting had always been done in the particular barrios. The 4th Company, for example, had been raised at Macabebe. When, as a member of the First Battalion stationed on Samar in 1905, the 4th Company needed manpower, First Lieutenant Boss Reese made the trek to Macabebe by ship and train to secure the recruits. The round trip took 24 days. Such a trip was common practice among Scout officers.
In January 1907 the First Battalion became an all Macabebe command. By April 1907 the four companies had gathered at their assigned station, Camp Eldridge, Laguna Province, Luzon. At this juncture, a recruiting scheme devised by Major General Leonard Wood was instituted. Wood wanted any Scout organization returning from hard field service to arrive at its tribal home about the date its members were scheduled for discharge. The soldiers would delight in the opportunity to see their friends and tell stories of their service under arms. Since the average native traveled but little, Wood hoped the homecoming would induce enlistments as well as reenlistments. Important, too, to soldiers who placed a premium on home life, was the understanding that they would be returned to their own barrios after a tour of duty well performed in a distant place.109

To carry through Wood's scheme, each company of the 1st Battalion was ordered to Macabebe for a period of enlistment and stayed approximately three weeks. Recruiting on the hearthstone brought good results. None of the companies had any difficulty recruiting to capacity. To promote even more enthusiasm, the Second Company, after winning a silver cup at the 1907 Division Military Meet (for being the best Scout company), was given an extra three days at Macabebe. The relatives of the enlisted men were to have an opportunity to see the cup.110

Wood's scheme became standard policy. If it was not employed, a single officer returned to home barrios whenever men were needed
as Boss Reese had in 1905. To facilitate matters for the Macabebe battalions a military station was constructed at Macabebe. It was designated Camp Treadwell on September 14, 1909. Similar recruiting stations for other tribal battalions appeared across Luzon shortly thereafter.\textsuperscript{111}

Prior to World War I the U.S. Army experienced no difficulty obtaining the Filipinos needed to keep Scout companies and battalions at assigned levels. Although the pay was low, service with the Scouts did offer diversion, adventure, travel and a steady income. All kinds of Filipinos drifted into the ranks of the Scouts. Ex-insurgents, landowners, relatives of provincial governors, sons of the wealthy and shoeless taos served together.\textsuperscript{112} Some served a single enlistment. Others stayed on. Reenlistment was facilitated when the Scouts were granted continuing service pay in 1907.\textsuperscript{113}

Although he was less expensive to maintain, healthier than his American counterpart, and capable of impressive soldierly bearing, the Philippine Scout, to be a soldier, had to be able to fight. The Scouts, however, for several years had no one to fight. Garrison duty at post, training and quarantine duty occupied their time. The Philippine Constabulary kept order without assistance. In 1913, however, the Scouts were confronted with a situation calling for a military campaign of some magnitude. The Moros of the Lati ward district on the Island of Jolo in the Sulu Archipelago had steadfastly refused to disarm themselves.
Brigadier General John J. Pershing, commanding the District of Mindanao, attempted repeatedly to achieve some compliance of his 1911 order to surrender all guns among these particular Moros, led by a Moslem named Amil.

When all attempts at a peaceful solution failed, Pershing decided on military action. He knew the resistance of the Jolo Moros would be fanatical. As Moslems, they believed in spreading their faith by conquest. They had no intention of surrendering their cherished arms. Pershing also knew the Moros, every man, woman and child, would flee to their fort atop Mount Bagsak, a volcanic crater, at a moment's notice. They had already done so in December 1912.

The only effective military approach depended on absolute secrecy. As many Moro males and females as possible had to be kept from reaching Mount Bagsak. A night movement and dawn attack would be mandatory. For the campaign, Pershing had the following troops at his disposal: Detachment Troop H, 8th Cavalry; Company M, 8th Infantry; Mountain Gun Detachment, 8th Cavalry; Demolition Squad—Detachment Company I, 8th Infantry; 16th, 21st, 24th, 29th, 31st, 40th, 51st, and 52nd Companies, Philippine Scouts.

On June 9, 1913, Pershing, moving by transport, steamed for the Island of Jolo, collecting the 51st and 52nd Companies, Philippine Scouts, late at night from two separate islands. Arriving off Jolo at 8 p.m. June 10, the forces, employing another transport and launches, combined with the troops already on Jolo
and sailed into position. The 24th and 31st Companies, Philippine Scouts were left on land. They would attack and hold the south slope of Mount Bagsak at daybreak.

The order of battle called for Column No. 1, consisting of Company M, 8th Infantry, 40th Company, Philippine Scouts and the Mountain Gun Detachment to attack Languasan, a Moro Cotta on the right of Mount Bagsak. Column No. 2, consisting of the 29th, 51st and 52nd Companies, Philippine Scouts, and a second Mountain Gun Detachment, would attack Puyacabao and Matunkup Cottas on the left. The reserve forces would wait in absolute readiness at the beach, 3½ miles from Bagsak.

Pershing's forces were on the move at 5:15 a.m., July 11. At 7:15 a.m. the enemy opened fire with cannons. By 12 noon Column No. 1 had taken its objectives, Column No. 2 followed suit at 12:30. To take Matunkup the 51st Company had 8 men wounded, including an officer. The 52nd and 29th suffered five casualties. The taking of Languasan was done at a cost of two dead, five wounded.

Pershing now had the volcanic crater completely sealed off. During the afternoon of June 11, positions held were strengthened and Bagsak reconnoitered. On the morning of June 12 the mountain guns opened fire. The Moros, unable to stand the strain, began to rush the Scout trenches at Languasan, led by Amil, his son and other leaders. On June 13, the 24th and 31st Companies disassembled a mountain gun and carted it up a sheer hogback to where it could shell Bagsak with impunity. Losses were one Scout killed
and one wounded. The next morning the 51st and 52nd Companies (all Moros) obtained a favorable position on the south slope 600 yards from Bagoak.

At 7:30 a.m., June 15, the mountain gun placed on the 13th opened fire and the 51st and 52nd Companies advanced. The 24th and 30th Companies provided a covering fire with rifles. The fighting, lasting some hours, was fierce. The Moros repeatedly launched ferocious, fanatical counter attacks. Resistance was tenacious. Finally, with a toll of 6 killed and 13 wounded, Pershing had taken Bagoak. Moro losses were unknown although from 300 to 500 held Bagoak before the fighting started. Altogether, the Philippine Scouts suffered 40 casualties (killed and wounded).

Brigadier General Pershing, convinced the assault on the center by the 51st and 52nd Companies had been the key to victory, later stated that

The Commanding General had the privilege of directing this action in person, but he cannot forbear expressing his appreciation of, and pride in, the cool courage, the fortitude, and the splendid gallantry displayed by the troops engaged; pride of blood in the superb fighting qualities of the American soldier and pride in the Native Soldier, who under the leadership of experienced white officers, has again demonstrated, in the battle, his loyalty and efficiency.

Thus, in the single opportunity to do battle the Scouts had before World War II, they proved their ability to fight. Scout service extracted a considerable toll among Filipinos from 1899 to 1914. During this time, 7 officers were killed in action, 13 were wounded and 17 died of other causes. The enlisted
count was, of course, much higher, with 110 killed in action, 157 wounded and 574 having died of other causes. Scouts soldiered in the backwaters of the Philippine Archipelago, noticed chiefly by only U.S. Army personnel working with them. A measure of recognition was granted in 1932 when the United States made it possible for enlisted men to retire.\textsuperscript{116} They were as deserving as their American officers.
NOTES: CHAPTER FOUR

1. Important men such as Generals MacArthur, Otis and Lawton, plus Secretary of War Root emphasized the need for selected, qualified officers. See footnotes 18 and 20 in Chapter One and footnotes 19 and 53 in Chapter Two. All early essays on the use of Filipino soldiers devoted considerable attention to the same theme. Some examples include Major Louis Livingston Seaman, M.S., LL.B., "Native Troops for our Colonial Possessions," Journal of the Military Service Institution CLXXI (November, 1900); Colonel James W. Powell, U.S.A., "The Utilization of Native Troops in our Colonial Possessions," ibid., XXX (January, 1902); Lieutenant John W. Ward, U.S.A., "The Use of Native Troops in our New Possessions," ibid., XXXI (November-December, 1902); Rhodes, "The Utilization of Native Troops in our Colonial Possessions"; Parker, "Some Random Notes on the Fighting in the Philippines."

2. See footnote 20 in Chapter One.

3. See footnotes 90, 106, and 109 in Chapter Three.

4. Franklin Compilation, AGO 314.73, RG 407, NA.


6. Memorandum Report by the First Division, General Staff, January 12, 1905, AGO 958399, RG 94, NA; Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Retirement of officers of the Philippine Scouts, February 4, 1919, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/59, RG 165, NA; Army and Navy Journal XLIII (October, 1905), p. 175.

7. Letter: Commanding General, Philippine Division, to War Department, March 25, 1908, AGO 1374630/filed with AGO 968510, RG 94, NA.

8. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Status of officers, Philippine Scouts, November 28, 1916, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/10, RG 165, NA. See the sources cited in footnote 6 also.


10. This description of the first months of duty with Philippine Scout companies in a summary of a letter written by an original first lieutenant. It appeared in the Army and Navy Journal XLIII (October, 1905), p. 175. The company histories cited in footnote 102 in Chapter Two support the accuracy of the unidentified letter writer. See in particular Narrative history...
of the Twenty-Fifth Company, Philippine Scouts (Cagayan),
December 20, 1904, AGO 1336578, RG 94, NA.

Clerical work occupied a lot of time. As early as mid-1902,
Brigadier General William H. Bisbee suggested that each Filipino
company needed one or two white clerks. Otherwise, company
officers would have to curtail other important duties to keep
their records accurate and up-to-date, "Report of Brig. Gen.
William H. Bisbee, U.S. Army, Commanding Second Separate Brigade,"
WD, Annual Reports, 1902, IX, 251.

In regard to the quality as well as the deficiencies of Scout
officers from 1901 to 1904 see also U.S. House of Representatives,
Philippine Commission, 4th Report, 50th Cong., 2nd Session,
House Doc. 2, 1903-1904, Part 3, 17-19; Letter: Major William H.
Johnston, 16th U.S. Inf. to Adjt. Gen., U.S. Army, February 25,
1908, AGO 1204824, RG 94, NA; A. Henry Savage-Landor, "A Word for
the Filipino Scout," Harpers Weekly XLVIII (February 20, 1904),

12. U.S. House of Representatives, Philippine Commission,
3rd Report, 1902-1903, I, 47; Memorandum, War Department, Office
of the Chief of Staff, October 20, 1904, AGO 942230, RG 94, NA;
"Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1904," WD, Annual Reports,

13. Letter: Johnston to War Department, December 27, 1904,
AGO 958399/filed with 968510, RG 94, NA.

14. Memorandum Report, First Division, General Staff,
January 15, 1920, ibid.

15. Cablegram: Secretary of War to Corbin, February 13,
1905, AGO 976283/filed with 968510, ibid.

16. Chaffee to Corbin, February 20, 1905, AGO 979592/filed
with 968510, ibid.

17. Memorandum, Employment of Philippine Scouts in war,
prepared by Major William H. Johnston, Philippine Scouts,
December 27, 1905, AGO 1083734/filed with 968510, ibid.; U.S.
Adjutant General's Office, Official Army Register-1906 (Washington,
1905), pp. 355-369; Cablegram: Corbin to Chaffee, July 26, 1905,
AGO 996355, RG 94, NA.

18. Cablegram: Corbin to War Department, March 9, 1905,
AGO 986369/filed with 968510, RG 94, NA.

19. To locate interested officers, on February 11, 1905, the
Military Secretary's Office asked the top officers of all infantry
regiments to submit one name each. The recommendations, if not
used at once, would be referred to when vacancies occurred. War
Department to Headquarters, 6th Inf., AGO 983905, ibid. For the
names of the first lieutenants selected see Special Order NO. 48,
War Department, February 28, 1905, AGO 981335, ibid., or Army and


21. Ibid., XLII (September, 1905), p. 10 and (October, 1905),
p. 175.
23. Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General from the Secretary of War, May 6, 1906, AGO 112777/filed with 968510, RG 94, NA.
28. "Report Philippines Division, 1907," WD, Annual Reports, 1907, III, 236; Letters: Wood to War Department, November 16, 1907, AGO 1337918/2, and January 7, 1908, AGO 1337918, RG 94, NA.
30. Army and Navy Journal XLIV (June, 1907), p. 116. See also XLIV, 643, 1423; XLI, 183, 211, 815.
31. Taft served as Secretary of War from February 1, 1904, to June 30, 1908. For the details of the congressional action, see Congressional Record, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., XLI, Part 1, 145, Part 2, 1662, 1812, 1972, Part 3, 2050, Part 7, 6089-6090.
33. The Department had already started working on obtaining better applicants for second lieutenant. In March 1905, Major General J. F. Weston had requested that regimental commanders hold such competitive tests of their NCO's as would determine the most qualified for Scout duty and submit those decided upon in their respective order of merit. Each applicant was to submit in his own handwriting his civil and military history, along with the result of a surgeon's physical exam. Weston hoped this procedure would eliminate the individual applications he received at Manila headquarters. These documents had been of little value. Chief of Staff J. Franklin Bell approved Weston's letter on March 25, 1908, and ordered it printed as Circular No. 36, War Department, May 7, 1908, AGO 1374630/filed with 968510, RG 94, NA.
34. Johnston to Adjt. Gen., U.S. Army, January 25, 1908, AGO 1204024, RG 94, NA. Johnston, at the time a member of the Army War College staff, submitted his recommendations without invitation. He gave as cause for his letter his experience with the Scouts at the St. Louis Exposition and then three years in the field with the First Battalion, Philippine Scouts on the island of Samar.
35. Ibid.
36. Cablegram: Weston to War Department, August 7, 1908, AGO 1411047/filed with AGO 1204824, RG 94, NA.
37. Duvall stated the Secretary of War had signed the memorandum calling for promotion by selection on April 1, 1908. Mailed on April 2, the document failed to make the April 5 mailboat and did not arrive in Manila until June 5. These facts, Duvall reasoned, supported his contention that most Scout officers had had little warning. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, August 20, 1908, AGO 12110471/1, ibid. Duvall also fought to have four men denied promotion upgraded. All four were promoted.
38. Ibid., General Order NO. 26, War Department, February 2, 1909, (Issued by Acting Chief of Staff William P. Duvall), AGO 1426865/c, ibid., stated that the President, in filling vacancies in the grades of captain and first lieutenants, Philippine Scouts, would be guided by the general rule of seniority in the next lowest grade, subject to the system of examinations already proscribed. Exceptions would be made only in cases of distinguished gallantry or exceptionally meritorious service. The names of those promoted (both to captain and first lieutenant) appeared in the Army and Navy Journal XLVI (December, 1908), p. 99.
39. General Orders NO. 195, War Department, December 4, 1908, AGO 1155501/filed with 968510, RG 94, NA. Attached to this official copy are eight pages of text explaining various paragraphs of it.

Brigadier General A. L. Mills, commanding the Department of Visayas in 1908, had strongly recommended no favorable consideration be given any married man seeking a commission in the Scouts. A married officer, contended Mills, could not move promptly when so ordered. Superior officers were also embarrassed at times to order him into the field or to a post where families could not be housed or safely cared for. Until Scout companies had "home" stations where family and baggage could be left, unmarried officers were best. "Report Department of Visayas, 1907," WD, Annual Reports, 1907, III, 275.
40. General Orders NO. 195, War Department, December 4, 1908, AGO 1155501/filed with 968510, RG 94, NA. The inclusion of civilian candidacy seemed to have been inspired by Major General Wood. Writing to the War Department in 1907, Wood, while admitting most Regular Army NCO's had developed into good Scout officers, believed some younger men were needed. He had in mind graduates of military schools that had regular officers as instructors or cadets of least two years service at West Point found deficient in only one subject. Recommendations of instructors would be expected. Letter: Wood to War Department, November 16, 1907, AGO 1337918/filed with 968510, ibid.
41. General Orders NO. 195, War Department, December 4, 1908, as cited in footnote 40. Concessions were made to Regular Army NCO's in the subject area of arithmetic. Test Questions in
this subject were not to be as hard as those required for appoint-
ment as a second lieutenant in the Regular Army. See the explana-
tions attached to General Orders NO. 195.

42. Ibid.

43. General Orders NO. 56, Headquarters Philippine Division, 
Manila, P.I., August 25, 1909, AGO 1573447, RG 94, NA.

44. Army and Navy Journal XLIX (February; 1912), p. 728.
General Orders NO. 195 was reissued on April 4, 1912, see AGO
1924799/filed with 968510, RG 94, NA.


46. Ibid., p. 204, (July, 1913), p. 1460.

47. Staff Memorandum, Brigadier General H. L. Scott to 
Adjutant General, February 17, 1915, AGO 2215878/10, RC 94, NA.


50. Special Regulations NO. 4, Appointment of Second Lieu-
tenants in the Philippine Scouts, War Department, September 18,
1917, copy courtesy U.S. Military History Research Collection,
Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The preference to be
allowed the NCO's was the only significant departure from General
Orders NO. 195, 1908.


52. A perusal of the Official Army Register for the years
1906, 1909, 1910 and 1916, for example, provided all the evidence
needed to substantiate this conclusion.

53. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Status of Philippine
Scout officers, July 6, 1918, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/51,
RG 407, NA.

54. Franklin Compilation, AGO 314.73, RG 407, NA.

55. Constitution of the Philippine Scouts Association, United
States Army—1911, Office of the Chief of Staff, War Department,
March 22, 1911, copy courtesy of U.S. Military History Research
Collection, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

56. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, November 28, 1916,
 Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/10 (AGO 2468271), RG 407, NA.

57. Memorandum, Adjutant General for the Chief of the War
College Division, November 17, 1916, Philippine Scouts, WCD
9136/10/c, ibid.

58. See memorandum cited in footnote 56.

59. Memorandum for the Adjutant General, December 11, 1916,
 Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/12 (AGO 2482351), ibid.

60. U.S. Adjutant General's Office, Military Laws of the

61. "Report Department of Visayas, 1907," WD, Annual Reports,
1907, III, 275; "Report Philippines Division, 1908," WD, Annual
Reports, 1908, III, 203; "Report of the Chief of Staff, 1909,"
WD, Annual Reports, 1909, I, 195; "Report Philippines Division,
1911," WD, Annual Reports, 1911, III, 195; Army and Navy Journal
XLIV (September, 1906), p. 58; (June, 1907), p. 1166; XLVI

62. Franklin Compilation, AGO 314.73, RG 407, NA.
63. Ibid.; Army and Navy Journal XLIV (September, 1906), p. 58; Memorandum for the Chief, War College Division, Efficiency of Philippine Scouts, prepared by Lt. Col. William H. Johnston, General Staff, May 7, 1915, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/2, RG 165, NA.
69. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Officers of Philippine Scouts, March 2, 1916, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/4, RG 165, NA; Memorandum for the Chief, War College Division, Status of officers, Philippine Scouts, December 1, 1916, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/10 (AGO 2468271), ibid.; Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Proposed bill for retirement of officers of the Philippine Scouts, February 12, 1919, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/59, ibid.; Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Retirement of officers of Philippine Scouts, February 21, 1919, ibid.
72. Powell, "The Utilization of Native Troops in Our Foreign Possessions," p. 26; Crane, "The Fighting Tactics of Filipinos," p. 505; Munro, "The Native Scout Organization," p. 302; Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Native military forces in the Philippine Islands, March 13, 1918, RG 407, NA. See also the documents cited in footnote 90 of Chapter Three.
74. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, August 20, 1908, AGO 1411047/1, RG 94, NA. This memorandum, composed by Major General William P. Duvall, contains the complete efficiency file of Crispulo Patajo. Major General J. Franklin Bell thought so much of Patajo he recommended an appointment to the Leavenworth General Service and Staff College for him in 1903, New York Times, August 9, 1903, p. 11.
75. History of the First Battalion, Philippine Scouts, 1905, AGO 972992/A, RG 94, NA; Letters: Crispulo Patajo to Duvall, October 4, 1907, AGO 1411047/8, ibid.


79. U.S. Adjutant General's Office, Military Laws of the United States (Washington, 7th Edition--1929), paragraph 1207; "Report of the Adjutant General, 1909," WD, Annual Reports, 1909, I, 254. Although several countries had the privilege of having one resident present, only five other foreign students were attending the Academy in 1908.


81. General Orders NO. 195, War Department, December 4, 1908, AGO 1155501/filed with 968510, RG 94, NA.


83. All of the Filipino graduates of West Point can be found in Franklin Compilation, AGO 314.73, RG 407, NA. The information regarding Lim appeared in "Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, 1914," WD, Annual Reports, 1914, III, 11.


87. Franklin Compilation, AGO 314.73, RG 407, NA.


89. Munro, "The Philippine Native Scouts," pp. 185-186.
This composite picture regarding the Filipino's love for military life was drawn from many forces. See, in particular, Rhodes, "The Utilization of Native Troops in Our Foreign Possessions," pp. 16-17; Johnston, "Philippine Infantry," pp. 870-871, and "First Battalion Philippine Scouts," pp. 31-32; Ward, "Use of Native Troops in Our New Possessions," pp. 799-800; Stacey, "The Philippine Scouts," pp. 221-223; Memorandum for the Secretary of the General Staff, March 26, 1918, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/40, RG 407, NA.

Memorandum, Employment of Philippine Scouts in War, December 27, 1905, AGO 1083794, RG 94, NA.

Ibid.

Ibid. See also Ward, "The Use of Native Troops in Our New Possessions," pp. 799-800.


Ibid. See also History of the 5th Company, Philippine Scouts, from January 1 to December 31, 1909, submitted by Captain Julian de Court, Commd. Co., March 9, 1910, AGO 109267, RG 94, NA.

Ibid. See also History of the 5th Company, Philippine Scouts, from January 1 to December 31, 1909, submitted by Captain Julian de Court, Commd. Co., March 9, 1910, AGO 109267, RG 94, NA.


"Report of the Adjutant General, 1907," WD, Annual Reports, 1907, I, 204. Along with the reorganization, which Major General Leonard Wood carried out, went express orders that American officers were to learn the dialect of their battalion and all Scouts were to be instructed daily in the English language.

Tribal restrictions on the battalion and company levels remained in effect through 1914. Then, except where the
non-Christian Moros were concerned, the restriction that all the members of any company be of the origin was dropped. By 1930, tribal distinctions had virtually disappeared, Ren H. Chastain, Captain, "Macabebe," Infantry Journal XXXVI (June, 1930), pp. 626-631.

105. Letter; Duvall to War Department, December 10, 1910, AGO 1703753/filed with AGO 968510, RG 94, NA. Duvall did not mention his conference with Forbes in this report for the fiscal year.


107. In regard to Scout stations see the various Rosters and Directories of the Philippines Division printed annually in Manila, located in RG 165, NA.

108. History of the First Battalion, Philippine Scouts, 1905, AGO 972992/A, RG 94, NA.


110. History of the First Battalion, Philippine Scouts, January 1 to December 31, 1908, AGO 972992/c, RG 94, NA.


112. Army and Navy Journal XLIII (March, 1906), p. 798. Many comments to this effect appear in the Annual Reports of the War Department.

113. Franklin Compilation, AGO 314.73, RG 407, NA. Franklin accumulated all the changes in pay and allowances from 1699 to 1934. See also History of the 5th Company, Philippine Scouts, 1907, submitted by Captain Julian de Court, AGO 109267, RG 94, NA.

The number of enlistments and reenlistments for each year, the medical problems of the Scouts, their deficiency rates, ration components, etc., may be found in the Reports of the Surgeon General, an annual part of the Reports of the War Department.

114. This account of the storming of Mount Bagsak was drawn from the official reports submitted later. Brigadier General Pershing's report, October 15, 1913, contained a detailed drawing of the Bagsak fort and surrounding terrain. His report was filed under AGO 2016194, RG 94, NA. The reports of every officer, Regular Army and Scouts (submitted on various dates) appeared under this file number. Pershing's cables on each day of the battle to Manila and Washington are included. Newspaper accounts of the battle were sketchy. See New York Times, June 13, 1913, p. 4, June 14, 1913, p. 7, June 17, 1913, p. 4. The International Socialist Review XIV (October, 1913), pp. 198-199, had some very unkind remarks for Pershing and the Scouts. The Army and Navy Journal of the Philippines, August 9, 1913, p. 11, heaped commendations on the Scouts.
115. Memorandum for the Chief, War College Division, May 7, 1915, Philippine Scouts, WCD 9136/2, RG 407, NA.
116. Franklin Compilation, AGO 314.73, RG 407, NA.
EPILLOGUE

From the formation of the Macabebe Scouts in late 1899 to World War II the Filipino as a soldier formed a vital part of the U.S. Army's Philippine Island garrison. After an initial period of service as rifle companies deployed over a wide geographic area in detachments, the Philippine Scouts were subsequently organized first into battalions, then regiments and finally, in 1922, a full tactical division. A transition in function accompanied the organizational growth. As rifle companies, the Scouts served the civil government essentially as support troops, often duplicating the tasks of the Philippine Constabulary. The Scouts became garrison troops as they gained the organizational command structure required to concentrate them on military reservations and train them collectively. The Bagoak Moro campaign of 1913 indicated that the Scouts had been trained as soldiers, and were employed as such.

At all times, regardless of function or organizational status, the Scouts were treated as a part of the United States Army. Since they were considered a part of the Regular Army, the United States through Congressional appropriation bore the financial costs. The Philippine Constabulary, on the other hand, were
the civilian police force of the islands, under the direct control of the office of the Governor General. The Constabulary received financial support from the civil revenues of the colonial government. Neither body proved exorbitantly expensive. For example, according to a Bureau of Insular Affairs report prepared for the U.S. Senate, the cost of the United States Army in the Philippines from July 1, 1902, to June 30, 1914, totaled $119,010,677. Of that amount, $11,159,647 was expended on the Scouts for pay of officers and enlisted men, travel pay, interest on soldiers' deposits, clothing and beneficiaries. From fiscal 1909 to 1914, the expenditures of the Scouts averaged $1,100,000 per year.\(^1\)

To the commanding general of the Philippine Division the Scouts and Constabulary, beyond sources of finance, were distinctly different bodies of men. The U.S. Army officers directing the Constabulary stationed Filipino policemen as a rule in the areas from which they were recruited. It was the mission of the Constabulary to know the local trails, local people and local dialect. An understanding of the political and social conditions of their own people was already in their grasp. The theory of the Constabulary directors was that men serving in their own provinces would be amenable to public opinion and less liable to antagonize local inhabitants than outsiders brought in to enforce the law. The Constabulary's attitude was thus that of a provincial police force reporting to a central office in Manila.\(^2\)
The commanding general of the Division maintained an opposite interpretation of the Philippine Scouts. The Scouts were federal, military and national in orientation. They would serve in areas other than those in which recruited. Their stations would be rotated to prevent the development of local affiliations and interests. As Filipinos came to dominate the Constabulary and U.S. forces were withdrawn in 1917 and after, the Scouts became the one body of Filipinos the American command believed it could trust at all times.

The contrasting views of the two Filipino forces produced constant friction between the Governor General, Secretary of Commerce and Police and the Chief of the Constabulary, on one hand, and the commanding general of the Division on the other. The civilian officials always wanted the Scouts dispersed at numerous stations. When so dispersed, the Scouts provided ready reinforcements for the Constabulary in a number of provinces. The U.S. Army, however, wanted the Scouts consolidated at large posts, preferably on the Island of Luzon. Concentration permitted training and drill, enhanced the Scouts' military skills and knowledge, made for better discipline and was more economical. The friction existed regardless of whether the Governor General was appointed by the Republican or Democratic parties. During the tenure of Governor General Francis Burton Harrison his determination to organize the Philippine National Guard, as noted previously, increased the normal tensions that existed between his office and Division headquarters.
The ever increasing efforts to make the Scouts professional soldiers did not segregate them from the civilian population. Service as a Scout had an impact on many. Between 1902 and 1917 some 14,667 different individuals enlisted for at least one term with the Scouts. Each enlistment meant exposure to American thinking, the English language, rigid medical and sanitary standards, a higher standard of living (even on half pay) and a new identity. Over the years, the Scouts had, of course, been the purveyors of American customs and expectations to countless civilians simply by manning various stations, patrolling the countryside or enforcing quarantine laws. In remote areas, such as the interior of Mindanao, Scout companies, as the Constabulary, convinced residents the American concern for justice and honesty was real and worthy of support. Many American officers sought to establish companies of the hill tribes in the Scouts to prevent their alienation and disaffection.

In the years after 1922 the United States maintained an Island garrison of 10,000. The Scouts made up more than one-half. Where the Scouts had averaged approximately 6,000 members per year before World War I, the yearly average after 1920 and into the 1930's increased to 6,800. Not until 1932 did the Scouts drop below 6,500. Organized as the 45th and 57th Infantry, Philippine Scouts, the 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, the 24th Field Artillery, Philippine Scouts, the 91st and 92nd Coast Artillery, Philippine Scouts, and the 12th Medical Regiment, Philippine Scouts, the Filipino Infantry served efficiently year after year.
The only negative mark accrued during these years was the 1924 mutiny. Early in July of that year 204 Scouts refused to form, drill or obey orders. Their complaints centered around the belief that the Philippine Scout soldier was discriminated against in regard to pay, allowances and benefits. In the end 204 Scouts received prison confinements at hard labor for a period of five years and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. But the memory of the mutiny and its bitter feelings lasted only a few years.7

After the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in the mid-1930's, the Scouts remained intact. When Douglas MacArthur began to build a Philippine Army the Scouts provided the Commonwealth with instructors and officers of merit. During the Japanese invasion several Scout units distinguished themselves. Many Scouts continued to fight the Japanese later as guerrillas.8

A by-product of America's overseas expansion, the Philippine Scouts survived the first tumultuous years of the United States occupation, gained institutional stature and solidity, and became a permanent part of the United States Army. By 1907, American defensive strategy for the Philippines called for the holding of a naval base near Manila until the American fleet arrived from the Atlantic Ocean. Two years later came the decision to make Pearl Harbor the main U.S. Pacific naval strong point. In following years, American strategy continued to indicate that the defensive posture of the Philippines was precarious and vulnerable at best.9 In the end, the Philippine Scouts, a body raised to
track down Filipino insurgents and *ladrones*, kept a lonely vigil with a few American troops on the nation's most distant Pacific outpost. Like the Philippines themselves, the Scouts were relegated to the back pages of newspapers. But when the opportunity arrived in World War II to prove themselves as U.S. soldiers, they fought with valor. The service they rendered should not be forgotten.
NOTES: EPILOGUE


2. The most succinct statement on the Constabulary's recruitment program and approach to civilian law enforcement was made by Colonel W. C. Rivers of that force in the first annual edition of the Manila Times (February, 1910), Army and Navy Journal XLVIII (March, 1911), p. 786.

3. Governor General W. Cameron Forbes complained vociferously in 1910 about the removal of two Scout battalions from Mindanao to replace a U.S. Army regiment being shipped home from the Visayan Islands. He later complained about plans to remove two other battalions from Samar. Then, on November 23, 1910, he detailed the civil government's long standing concern over the concentration of Scout units to the detriment of Constabulary efficiency. Cablegrams: Forbes to Secretary of War, November 8, 1910, and November 17, 1910, and Letter: Forbes to Secretary of War, February 23, 1910, General File 1877/73, 76, 77, RG 350, NA.

4. The total of enlistments was derived from the Reports of the Adjutant General appearing annually in the Reports of the War Department for the years cited in the text.

5. Brigadier General John J. Pershing constantly pushed the inclusion of the mountain tribes of Mindanao and Luzon in the Scouts. A detachment of Company A, 45th Philippine Scout Infantry was formed in 1914 among the head-hunting Igorottes of Luzon. The only members of their tribe to wear pants, they excelled at target practice, Army and Navy Journal LXI (September, 1923), p. 73. For details on the unusual recruiting techniques used with Igorottes, see "From Headhunters to Soldiers," Infantry Journal XXIV (January, 1924), pp. 40-44.

6. Franklin Compilation, AGO 314.73, RG 407, NA.

8. Louis L. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, is an abundant and documented source of information about the Scouts' role in the first days of World War II. A unit account of note is Lieutenant Colonel William E. Chandler's "26th Cavalry (P.S.) Battles to Glory," which appeared in *Armor Armored Cavalry Journal* in three installments from March to June 1947.

9. Theodore Agoncillo, a Filipino historian, noted that the Japanese were extremely harsh on members of the Philippine Scouts. They identified ex-Scouts by the callouses on their trigger fingers.

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The National Archives, Washington D.C., contains a voluminous amount of information on the Philippine Scouts. The bulk of the material is located in the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, General Correspondence, 1890-1917, Record Group 94. Almost all of the battalion and company histories are filed here under various AGO numbers. Other important documents on the Scouts may be found in the Records of the American Expeditionary Forces (Historical Division), Record Group 120; Records of the Inspector General's Office, Record Group 153; Records of the General and special Staffs, Record Group 165; Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, Record Group 350; and Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Project Files, 1917-1925, Record Group 407.

A copy of Charles Hope Franklin's History of the Philippine Scouts may be found in Record Group 407 under file designation AGO 314.73. Franklin, a U.S. Army Warrant Officer, compiled in 1935 all the documents available on the Scouts at the Historical Division, Army War College, Fort Humphreys, D.C. His work has only a 33 page text and he did not consult company and battalion histories, periodicals, newspapers and miscellaneous materials at the Archives. But his charts and graphs, covering everything from pay and allowances to Filipino graduates of Est Point, are indispensable. Franklin has provided any scholar interested in the Scouts with an essential foundation of facts. At the end of his brief text, Franklin himself wondered who no Scout officer had ever written a detailed narrative of such an interesting and unusual portion of the U.S. Army.

The United States Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, has a collection of pertinent documents on the Philippine Scouts. Many, such as the Matthew A. Batson Papers, 9th U.S. Cavalry Regiment Collection,
Spanish American War Survey, have been transcribed and are available through inter-library loan. Research on the American presence in the Philippines has been facilitated by the publication in April 1974 of Special Bibliographic Series, Number 9, The U.S. Army and the Spanish-American War Era, 1895-1910 (compiled by Thomas E. Kelly, III). This excellent bibliography is available from Carlisle Barracks upon request.

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