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All errors of commission and omission in this study are mine.
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"Sometimes I wish I could be President and Congress too."
Theodore Roosevelt.

"It is much easier in many ways for me ... when Congress is not in town."
John F. Kennedy.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The President is the paramount political figure in the United States. The importance of the institution of the presidency is acknowledged by all observers. Yet the study of the presidency has been hindered by the nature of the institution and by the limitations of social science. As late as 1969 Aaron Wildavsky complained:

The eminence of the institution, however, is matched only by the extraordinary neglect shown to it by political scientists. ... There is an extraordinary dearth of students of the presidency, although scholars ritually swear that the presidency is where the action is before they go somewhere else to do their research.¹

Why did this happen? The behavioral revolution and the ventures into policy studies gave impetus to a more "scientific" approach to political science. Researchers began a "quest for indisputable data, measureable forces, and provable judgments,"² and focused their attention on those areas that provided these things, e.g. voting behavior and budgetary studies. As Hughes has pointed out, in many ways the nature of the presidency precludes this scientific quest.³
When studying the presidency, social scientists face a number of obstacles caused by the nature of the institution which are not present in the study of other institutions or areas of political science. One problem is that the idiosyncratic nature of the office impedes efforts at generalizations. Since each president and his administration are to some extent unique, many extraneous factors exist which make comparisons among administrations difficult. A second problem is that accessibility to the chief executive is strictly guarded. The isolation of the President prevents the gathering of "hard data" necessary to employ sophisticated quantitative techniques to issue confident statements about presidential behavior.

Two studies by Kessel have partially overcome these problems. In the first, he used content analysis to investigate the policy content of States of the Union addresses from Truman to Johnson. More recently, Kessel utilized systematic interviews with Domestic Council staff members in the Nixon administration to discuss the formulation of domestic policy. Yet he was not able to interview Special Assistant John Ehrlichman or the President. Researchers are still often forced to rely on conflicting second-hand sources. Therefore, the presidential literature has been limited to three types of studies: "Traditional analyses of the formal and informal powers of the office, generalizations extrapolated from particular sets of events in which presidents have been involved, and personality studies of individual presidents."
In the past few years the presidency has engendered more research among scholars and political scientists. The growth in power of the modern presidency combined with revelations of abuses of that power has stirred renewed interest in the institution. This study is an outgrowth of that renewed interest. Neustadt has suggested that a president deals with five sets of constituencies. This dissertation will examine the relationship between the President and one of those constituencies, the Congress, from 1954-1973. It will include the administrations of Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon.

This study asserts that the relationship between these two major institutions of the American political system is profoundly important. It assumes that the problems of this society demand actions by the federal government. The complexity of these problems requires solutions that only the federal government has the capacity to provide. A President has to accept the idea that he must provide leadership: doing nothing would be politically unfeasible. A President must also realize, that despite the rhetoric, Congress is not structurally designed to formulate policy and lead the country. Even the most conservative leaders will discover that the people depend on their government to supply the answers to economic problems, to energy problems, to foreign and defense problems. Yet at the same time a President must recognize that the legislature has a legitimate constitutional role in solving the nation's problems and cannot be ignored.
The twenty year period under examination includes cycles of activity in both foreign and domestic affairs. The era began with the United States adjusting to peacetime following the armistice ending the Korean War. Although international tensions remained high in the 1950s during the period known as the "Cold War," peace generally prevailed. During the 1960s the deepening involvement of the United States in Southeast Asia led to the longest war in American history. The conflict in Vietnam dominated American life throughout the mid and later 1960s and into the early 1970s. The period under study ended with the extrication of American troops from that war and another readjustment to peacetime.

In domestic affairs the 1950s were a period of consolidation and limited expansion of programs initiated during the New Deal. The 1960s saw a resurgence of federal government activity. Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" programs moved the national government into many areas heretofore left to the private sector and/or state and local governments. The era ended with another period of consolidation and quietude in terms of new federal activity.

Politically, more people during this period identified themselves as Democrats than as Republicans. This was reflected by Democratic control of Congress for nineteen of the twenty years. Yet the growth of the independent voter helped the Republicans win three of the five presidential elections
giving the minority party control of the executive branch in eleven of the twenty years. There were three landslides in 1956, 1964, and 1972, while the elections in 1960 and 1968 were extremely close.

President Eisenhower enjoyed tremendous popularity throughout his tenure. Presidents' Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon all achieved peaks of popular acclaim, but as their terms proceeded their ratings declined. Extraordinary circumstances surrounded the completion of three of the four administrations. Kennedy was assassinated; Johnson, in a sense abdicated; and Nixon was forced to resign or face certain conviction on impeachment charges.

Polsby has described the relationship between the President and Congress as one of cooperation and conflict. Yet the literature about the relationship between the two branches has focused mainly on the attempts of one branch to dominate the other. In 1885 Woodrow Wilson wrote Congressional Government, describing the American government as one where Congress was the central and predominant power in the American political system. Wilson dismissed the presidency as an ineffectual office. Some twenty years later in Constitutional Government in the United States, Wilson reversed himself and decided that the President was the paramount leader of the U.S. government with the opportunity to be "as big a man as he can." Scholars attribute this change in Wilson's thinking to the birth of the modern presidency exemplified by Theodore
Roosevelt.

Corwin in an examination of the President's office and powers concluded that the whole "history of the presidency, has been a history of aggrandizement," a continual increase in the President's powers. For most of the twentieth century this has certainly been true. Presidents have been certified by the Supreme Court as the nation's sole spokesmen in foreign affairs. Congress has delegated powers to the President in economic matters such as tax and tariff policy. Only in recent years with the passage of the War Powers Act, the Budget and Impoundment Act, and the decision on executive privilege in United States v. Nixon, have the powers of the presidency been somewhat diminished.

Although Corwin was disturbed by the development he reported, most writers not only accepted, but extolled Corwin's thesis during the past two decades. They argued that the nature of the times, an "era of permanent crisis," produced crisis government. Under these conditions only the President could act with "alacrity and knowledge" to solve the nation's problems. A strong president was needed to break the "deadlock of democracy." Writers pictured Congress as too slow and cumbersome, as obstructionists to much needed legislation. From within its own ranks the legislature was criticized for its antiquated procedures and lack of responsibility. Huntington concluded that Congress should no longer function as a legislative body, since
most of that function had been preempted by the executive branch, but should concern itself with the oversight function.\textsuperscript{19} The growth of "central clearance" coupled with the President's control over the budget, gave the President's programs priority.\textsuperscript{20} The access to modern systems of information accumulation and communications afforded the executive branch further advantages over the legislature. Reedy's conclusion was typical of these writers. He noted: "Presidents found it relatively easy ... to place the Congress in a position where it had no other alternative than to back the President."\textsuperscript{21}

The Vietnam War had a profound effect on the thinking about the relationship between the two branches. The alleged abuse of presidential power that involved the United States in that conflict caused many scholars to reassess their positions. They now claimed there were dangerous implications in the swing of the pendulum toward excessive power in the hands of the executive. Earlier writers were criticized for "mythologizing" the office of the presidency.\textsuperscript{22} Schlesinger, once a proponent of strong executive power, now warned about the dangers of the "Imperial Presidency."\textsuperscript{23} He believed that when presidents brazenly ignore Congress, the only check upon their power is the next presidential election. The delay in removing President Nixon convinced people that the impeachment process was too cumbersome to remove presidents who abuse their office. The reform literature has re-appeared suggesting changes in the
structure of the institution, e.g. six year terms with no re-election, multiple vice-presidents.\(^9\) Furthermore, proposals have been introduced to institute procedures borrowed from parliamentary systems, such as the vote of no-confidence.\(^{25}\)

Attempts at systematic research in the area of presidential-congressional relations have generally lacked scope and/or depth. Binkley's historical description offers an important perspective that is necessary for understanding the relationship.\(^{26}\) Many case histories of a particular piece of legislation have been done. While these provide interesting insights, it is difficult to generalize from their often narrowly based conclusions. Two major studies have investigated the question of who initiates legislation? Chamberlain, who examined legislation from 1870-1940, and Moe and Teel, who studied legislation from 1940-1967, have challenged the notion of the President as the major source and initiator of legislation.\(^{27}\) Both studies found the Congress to be an important breeding place for new ideas for legislation. Robinson's study of laws passed in the area of foreign affairs concluded that the President initiated most of this type of legislation.\(^{28}\) These three studies were concerned with the development of new proposals. This does not seem as important as the relationship which exists in putting the ideas into practice.
An exception to these patterns is Louis Fisher's examination of the policy conflicts between the branches. Fisher has described the legal and historical justifications that lead to the sharing by both branches of the legislative power, spending power, taxing power, and war power. He concluded that the shift of power to the President was not irreversible, and that Congress could alter its procedures to match better the resources of the executive branch.\textsuperscript{29}

This dissertation is concerned with Presidential performance with the Congress. Admittedly, the legislature is only one of many arenas where chief executives perform. For example, many of a president's foreign policy activities do not involve Congress. Yet interaction with the legislature remains an important function for a president. Theodore Roosevelt remarked: "I have a very strong feeling that it is a President's duty to get on with Congress if he possibly can, and that it is a reflection upon him if he and Congress come to a complete break."\textsuperscript{30} Schlesinger has noted that one of Congress' major roles is the responsible partnership in the use of executive power.\textsuperscript{31} The President and Congress must cooperate or the nation will drift. The chief executive needs Congress to pass his programs, to appropriate money for those programs, and to confirm his appointments. Sometimes he even needs them to legitimatize his unilateral decisions. Above all, most presidents
are concerned with their place in history. A record of legislative achievement is still a major part of that record.

There are, however, problems in assessing that record. Is the President who gains acceptance of a few landmark proposals more of a success than the President who obtains enactment of a large proportion of his proposals, not all of equal importance? Evaluating a president's legislative performance is thus extremely difficult.

In this dissertation performance will connote the congruence of positions held by the President and Congress. To some extent it will also suggest the President's power to persuade Congressmen to respond to the legislative demands the President makes upon them. In a larger sense, presidential performance suggests the ability of the President to get Congress to follow his leadership in solving the problems of the United States. The Congress is expected to enact his programs, to support him on roll call votes and on those actions the President claims have a high priority. The concern is not with evaluating the proposed solutions, but with the legislature's reaction to the President. The reports and studies of the Congressional Quarterly service have been invaluable in maintaining a chronicle of Presidential-Congressional activity. They will be relied upon heavily in the following study.

A number of elements that influence presidential performance with the Congress are illustrated by figure 1. Many of these were suggested by Ripley in Kennedy and Congress as
FIGURE 1: FACTORS AFFECTING PRESIDENTIAL PERFORMANCE WITH THE CONGRESS
policy-relevant relationships between the executive branch and the legislature. The Constitution, party, and personality have been the most described explanatory factors affecting presidential behavior.

The Constitution establishes the framework and rules of the game for the executive-legislative relationship. The framers of the Constitution were trying to prevent one branch of the government from dominating the other. Madison argued in Federalist #47 that "the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary in the same hands ... may be justly pronounced the very definition of tyranny." To many this suggested that a firm belief in a separation of powers was a cornerstone of Constitutional government. Yet Hamilton's remark in Federalist #70 that, "Energy in the executive is a leading character of good government," implies the realization that the President would emerge as the leader of the nation.

Neustadt has pointed out, however, that the system the framers created was one of "separated institutions sharing powers." This occurs because of the governmental structures the framers established and the distribution of powers among those structures. The division of the legislative and executive functions into two separate institutions with different terms of office, different constituencies to represent, and a single unitary
executive against 535 legislators, produces checks and balances which have influenced the relationship between the branches.

The provisions of the Constitution illustrate the overlapping of the powers of the President and Congress. The most obvious example is Congress' power to enact legislation and the President's power to sign or veto it. The ratification and confirmation role given to the Senate on treaties and presidential appointments is another example. The power of the legislature to appropriate funds and to investigate the executive branch provides a third example of the checks and balances sought by the framers.

The Constitutional framework provides enough flexibility for other factors to influence the relationship. Two of the most important, reflecting the development of the two institutions and their occupants, are personality and party. The impact of personality on political institutions has long been acknowledged. Alexander and Juliette George demonstrated that understanding Wilson's personality problems could lead to a better understanding of his presidency. A number of studies have investigated Richard Nixon's psychological make-up in attempts to explain his actions as president. James David Barber's ambitious study which examined the personalities of the twentieth century chief executives further illustrated the influence of this factor. He believed that comprehending the
background, character, and world view of a president could help predict his behavior in the White House. Although Barber's analysis can be criticized for various reasons, his correct prediction of Nixon's behavior under pressure, demonstrated the validity of his argument.

Although relatively little work has been done in this area, the literature on Congress suggests that personality distinctions among legislative leaders has an impact upon the functioning of Congress. John Stewart has noted that Lyndon Johnson and Mike Mansfield were two very different people and this was reflected in their leadership styles which in turn influenced the operation of the Senate.

The nature of the political party system in the United States affects the executive-legislative relationship. The work of Truman, Turner and Schneier, and MacRae demonstrated that party affiliation is the major component explaining a Congressman's response to presidential initiatives. Yet the decentralization of the party system produces a lack of discipline necessary for the President to assert total control of his party in the legislature. Despite the President's role as leader of his party, chief executives have demonstrated different commitments to this function. Some strongly asserted their partisanship, while others ignored their party in order to build consensus or bipartisan support for their administrations. Political parties are also accounted for in the organization
of the legislature. For example, leadership selection and committee assignments are based upon party strength.

As figure 1 illustrates, these three elements, the Constitution, personality, and party, affect other presidential and congressional factors. In this dissertation the concern will be with certain intervening variables that affect presidential behavior. These factors are often neglected in discussions of the President's performance with the Congress. Two presidential factors, roles and staff operation, and two components of the composition of Congress, the strength of the conservative coalition and the majority party leadership, are assumed to have an impact on presidential performance. Furthermore, the nature of the issue content of legislation will also be examined to determine whether the President's performance is affected by different policy questions.

The delineation of presidential activity by role expectations is common in discussions of the presidency. Some presidential roles do not influence the relationship with the legislature to any great extent. Three roles that I believe have an impact on the presidential-congressional relationship are Chief Legislator, Chief Executive, and Leader of Public Opinion. As Neustadt and Gilmour have pointed out, the growth of "central clearance" has made the formulation of legislative proposals a major function of the executive branch. Therefore
the President is expected to become Chief Legislator and propose a program to each session of the legislature. The role of Chief Executive affords the President the opportunity to pressure Congress into cooperation by threatening the use of executive powers. By issuing executive orders the President can avoid a recalcitrant legislature. The relationship between the President and public opinion is a complex one. Through the use of the media the President can manipulate public opinion to accomplish his legislative goals. Each of these roles will be influenced by the personality of the President in terms of the energy and time he devotes to the playing of them.

The second presidential factor is the nature of the staff the President chooses and how that staff operates. The personality of the President will affect the choice of the men and women he selects. The patronage system, although not as important as in the past, indicates the influence of party on this variable. How the staff operates will also depend on the personalities of the staff members and this cannot be ignored. Norman C. Thomas and Robert Gilmour have discussed the growth and institutionalization of the executive branch which gives the President an array of trusted lieutenants to do battle in the legislative arena. The growth of legislative liaison operations in the White House and the Departments has been the subject of two studies. Holtzman's comprehensive examination of these
operations in the Kennedy administration, and Pipe's narrower look at departmental liaison efforts, have provided descriptions of attempts at cooperation between the two branches. Both studies illustrate the institutionalization of these procedures to provide further assistance to the President. Kessel's study of Nixon's Domestic Council staff has illustrated the role of a new policy-making body. Of primary interest is the manner in which the President employs these people in attempting to pass his legislative program.

The composition of Congress has an enormous effect on the President's performance. The impact of party differences has already been mentioned. Two other facets of the legislative process will be examined in this dissertation. Ripley has noted that the relationship between the President and the majority party leadership will vitally affect the performance of the President. The legislative leadership, however, is caught in a dilemma. The President needs them as his lieutenants in the Congress, while at the same time they attempt to provide leadership for their fellow legislators.

The nature of the legislative process leads to the formation of coalitions to pass bills. These coalitions may form along other than partisan lines. One ideological coalition which has had an important impact on presidential performance is the conservative coalition made up of Southern Democrats and Republicans.
The issue content of legislation will affect presidential performance. Wayne has claimed that presidents devote much of their limited time and energy to activities in policy areas where the threat of congressional obstruction is low. Vogler has noted that this may not be by choice. Using Lowi's categorization of the policy arena, he suggests there are certain policy areas which the President cannot affect. According to Vogler: distributive policies are determined chiefly by arrangements between subgovernments that severely circumscribe the options of the chief executive; regulatory policies are more likely to involve political actors in the President's administration, with the President often playing a direct role; while redistributive policies are the areas in which the President comes close to executive domination. It is difficult to prove Vogler's assertions since it is hard to operationalize Lowi's policy arenas. Kessel and Clausen have suggested that both Congress and the President order their decision-making thoughts according to issue delineations. These may provide a better clue to the impact of different types of issues upon presidential performance.

Within the dissertation, each of the four variables will be examined for each year, except the staff variable which will be done for each administration. House-Senate differences will be explored where appropriate. Chapter 2 is concerned with the legislative history of the twenty year period, and examines
the performance of the four Presidents. It introduces the three measures of performance that will be employed in this study. Chapter 3 probes the effect of the President's role expectations upon his performance with Congress. Kendall's tau b will be employed as a measure of association. Chapter 4 describes and evaluates the importance of the staff operations of each of the Presidents. Qualitative analysis will be undertaken with the aid of descriptive statistics. Chapter 5 examines the factors of majority party leadership in Congress and the strength of the conservative coalition on presidential performance. Product-moment correlations will be employed in this chapter. Finally, Chapter 6 investigates the Presidents' performances in different issue areas. Again descriptive statistics will illustrate the relationships. The final chapter will summarize the performances and attempt to discern some overall patterns from these factors which influence presidential behavior. Sophisticated statistical analyses seem to be hindered by unbalanced and missing data for some of the variables.

The major purpose of this dissertation is to systematically examine the relationship between two institutions of American government. It seeks to delineate the influence of certain factors thought to have an impact on the relationship between the President and Congress. The author realizes that the factors being studied do not necessarily include all those that
may explain the interaction between the two branches. It seems to this observer, however, that presidential roles, presidential staff, the composition of Congress, and issue content of legislation, are extremely significant in this key relationship and presently remain relatively unexplored in the literature on this subject.

Quantitative measurements will be employed in this study to provide objective definitions for the variables and to test various hypotheses. This will help to deal with some of the problems previous political scientists have faced in studying this subject. The testing of the hypotheses should produce results which can be checked on other presidents and congresses. The data base of four administrations and ten congresses over a twenty year period is a small segment in the history of the relationship. Yet this time span should provide a sound basis for comparative analysis.

The Constitution demands that the nature of the relationship between the President and Congress be one of cooperation and conflict. This necessitates a dynamic and ongoing power struggle between the two institutions. In the twenty years under examination a dramatic change in the relationship between the institutions occurs. The growth of presidential power during this period reaches its pinnacle as presidents attempts to minimize the role of the legislature in the policy-making process. This precipitates a resurgence of congressional
power as Congress tries to reassert its policy-making prerogatives. In examining presidential performance with Congress this dissertation will attempt to systematically explore the nature and consequences of these important changes.

The previous literature on the subject of the relationship between the institutions of the Presidency and Congress has been sporadic and piecemeal. Researchers have limited themselves to over-generalizations or narrowly based conclusions. In seeking explanations for presidential behavior with the legislature this dissertation will hopefully add much needed scope and depth to the present literature.
Notes - Chapter 1


3. Ibid.


35. Ibid., p. 423.


CHAPTER 2
PRESIDENTIAL PERFORMANCE

The reasons a President needs to perform as a legislative leader have already been mentioned. His ability to lead the Congress will enhance his prestige and reputation in Washington and the rest of the country. This will help to increase his sources of power. The President is also concerned with making a record for the next election, as well as for history. Legislative accomplishments have been used by Presidents and President-watchers as an important indicator of a President's success. Moynihan has said, "Getting a program through the Congress has become almost the first measure of a successful Presidency."\(^1\) Hugh Sidey claims that to Lyndon Johnson's mind little else mattered but legislative achievement.\(^2\) To emphasize this, the inside cover of Johnson's memoirs are a complete listing of the programs passed during his administration.\(^3\)

Yet it is still difficult to conceptualize and operationalize the notion of Presidential performance. Often it is left to the researcher to make a subjective determination based on whether the measures the researcher favors become law. In the past, Presidents have also issued subjective appraisals of
their relations with the Congress. (We shall discuss some of these later in this chapter.) Usually these Presidential pronouncements were vague generalizations either congratulating the legislature for passing his requests, or self-serving rhetoric chastising the Congress for ignoring his program. From the perspective of the Chief Executive what counted was how much of his program Congress enacted, especially those items on which he placed a high priority.

With the aid of Congressional Quarterly it is now possible to develop measurements that would move "performance" beyond the vague generalities and subjective assessments that have been previously employed. Ideally, these measures of performance would indicate the amount of influence the President had upon the Congress. In fact, they only demonstrate the congruence of presidential and congressional positions. Influence still remains beyond the reach of objective measurement. Yet these measurements are useful because they do tap a number of important dimensions of the presidential relationship with Congress.

The Boxscore measures the performance of the President with the Congress based upon a tabular checklist of the President's program. The measure is defined as the percentage of the President's requests enacted by the Congress. The President makes demands upon the Congressmen by proposing a program he expects will
be enacted. It is assumed the President will marshall his considerable forces to work for his program. Thus, to some extent, the Boxscore also measures the responses of Congressmen to demands placed upon them by the President.

It is on roll call votes that Congressmen react most visibly to these demands made by chief executives. A President will often make known his position on particular roll calls. The Support Score measures the percentage of roll call votes the President wins when he takes a position.

Not all roll call votes are equally important. Some votes involve "matters of major controversy, tests of presidential or political power, decisions of potentially great impact on the nation and lives of Americans." These roll call votes

Congressional Quarterly names "key votes." Thus, the Key Vote Score is simply the percentage of "key votes" the President wins, assuming he has taken a position on that particular issue.

The measurements are not free from problems. The Boxscore does not include alterations that Congress may make in the President's requests before final passage. The Boxscore also assumes the President's request will be passed in the same year it has been introduced. This may penalize innovative chief executives since it has been demonstrated that bold new programs usually require a period of gestation before they are finally passed.
The major problem with the Support and Key Vote Scores is that many parts of the President's program may never reach the roll call stage of the legislative process. Many bills become stalled in congressional committees. A President may have high Support and Key Vote Scores, while the major part of his program is never enacted.

The effect of presidential vetoes on these scores is important as well. A President may lose numerous votes on amendments to his proposal. The bill will then pass in a form different from the President's request. The President may then veto the bill, and have his veto sustained. Thus, although his support score will be low, he will still accomplish his goals. Finally, the Key Vote Score is a subset of the Support Score. They are correlated, Pearson's r = .85.

The following three tables display the data. The mean Boxscore for all Presidents for the twenty year period was 46.5%. During this time span Support Scores averaged 75% overall, with very little difference between the House (76.5%) and the Senate (74%). The mean Key Vote Score was slightly lower at 67.9%, while again the differences between the House (69.2%) and the Senate (67%) were negligible. I will now discuss in some detail the meanings of these figures for each President.
TABLE 1: PRESIDENTIAL BOXSCORE BY PRESIDENT: 1954-1973

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**Eisenhower** $\bar{X} = 44.5$

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**Kennedy** $\bar{X} = 40.1$

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**Johnson** $\bar{X} = 57.1$

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**Nixon** $\bar{X} = 34.6$

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**Eisenhower**  
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**Kennedy**  
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**Johnson**  
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**Nixon**  
\[ \bar{X} = 64.9\%; \bar{X}_{\text{House}} = 68.3\%; \bar{X}_{\text{Senate}} = 62.6\% \]

Source: *Congressional Quarterly Almanacs 1954-1973*.
TABLE 3: KEY VOTE SCORES BY PRESIDENT: 1954-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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Eisenhower X=58.2%; XHouse=60.8%; XSenate=56.0%

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Kennedy X=68.3%; XHouse=68.7%; XSenate=67.8%

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Johnson X=80.5%; XHouse=76.7%; XSenate=84.9%

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Nixon X=63.4%; XHouse=69.2%; XSenate=58.1%

Key: %P.V. = percentage of presidential victories.
Eisenhower

Emmet John Hughes suggests that "there was no aspect of the Eisenhower presidency misunderstood so widely - and so understandably - as his behavior toward the Congress."\(^6\) That behavior was based on the president's own highly personal interpretation of the relationship between the executive and legislative branches. The separation of powers were to be stressed. The Chief Executive was but one of three coordinate branches of government, with little room for political trespassing.\(^7\) Eisenhower believed that it was his obligation to correct the executive-legislative imbalance that had occurred during the Roosevelt-Truman years. He wanted to "restore" some power to the legislature.\(^8\) One consequence of this philosophy was the failure to create a true partnership between the President and the Congress. The Congress was used to being led by a strong executive who would propose a program and fight for it. (In 1953 Eisenhower abandoned this prerogative almost entirely.) Instead, Eisenhower stressed a leadership of "persuasion, conciliation, education and patience."\(^9\) Parmet called it an attitude of "tolerant understanding."\(^10\) It was a "quiet leadership," reflecting the politics of moderation.

The strategy of conciliation and patience did not prove too effective. This is in evidence by examining Eisenhower's scores. His Key Vote Score (58.2%) is the lowest of the four
Presidents in this study. Even though his Boxscore is the second highest it is still below the mean for all four presidents.

By far Eisenhower's most successful year was 1954. He had 64.6% of his proposals enacted, the second best year for any President in the study. His Support Score was the highest of the seven years,\textsuperscript{11} while his Key Vote score was also way above his average. For Eisenhower, the second year of his presidency was to be a fresh start. After the bickering of 1953 over the Bricker Amendment, as well as the lack of presidential initiatives, Eisenhower had a long list of legislation with a wide scope that he wanted Congress to pass. Eisenhower considered his 1954 legislative recommendations of utmost importance: "The prestige of my administration was riding on their enactment into law."\textsuperscript{12} He congratulated the second session of the 83rd Congress for compiling "an extraordinary record, ... despite the fact that these changes caused major difficulties with individual Congressmen, despite the distractions of Senator McCarthy - and despite a recession."\textsuperscript{13}

Another indicator of Ike's 1954 performance were his vetoes of forty-two bills, none of which were overridden. By the administration's calculations 13 of 19 major proposals were enacted. The most important victories for Eisenhower in 1954 were the passage of the St. Lawrence Seaway bill, a new definition
of farm parity and price supports, a tax reduction bill eliminating the Korean War excise taxes, and the Communist Control Act. His major defeats were on a health re-insurance bill, on attempts to extend the Public Housing Act of 1949, on statehood for Hawaii, and on the Trade Agreements Act.

Despite the successes of 1954 and some high hopes for working amenably with the new Democratically controlled Congress, 1955 was not a very successful year for the President. His Boxscore dropped to 46.3%, and on "key votes" he was able to win only 46%, the third lowest score of the period.

Eisenhower's own summation of the 1955 session was one of acute disappointment. He said, "I feel the departing Congress laid aside, without action, some extraordinarily important measures." He also blamed excessive Democratic partisanship for what he considered, an inordinate amount of Congressional investigations - thirty within a two month period. The major disappointments included a School Construction bill, a Highway bill, and the Health Reinsurance plan left over from 1954. He did veto a postal and federal employee pay increase which Congress failed to override. He was also able to beat back an attempt to limit the President's trade pact powers, and win passage of the Formosa Resolution, which reaffirmed Presidential predominance in foreign affairs.
In 1956, Eisenhower believed the executive-legislative relationship would be greatly affected by the upcoming Presidential election. He expected a session in which "partisan temperatures would inevitably run high" that would result in a "six months long political donnybrook." The second session of the 84th Congress lived up to his expectations. On "key votes" the President's support sunk to 23%. In the Senate he managed to lose nine out of ten important votes. The Boxscore decreased again to 45.7%. Once more he was defeated on a Highway Bill, on Hawaiian statehood, and on the School Construction bill, which lost mainly as a result of Adam Clayton Powell's insistence on attaching anti-discrimination provisions. Attempts to liberalize immigration, and to offer aid to depressed areas were also defeated. Eisenhower vetoed a natural gas bill, as well as an agriculture bill to create a soil bank program.

If there were problems in the first term, the relationship with Congress was only to get worse from 1957-1961. Despite his overwhelming re-election victory in 1956, the first session of the 85th Congress was another disappointment for Eisenhower. He claimed that before it was finished that year, Congress "was to lose all sense of direction." This was the year of the battle over the 1958 budget with the administration and the Democrats in Congress trying to out-cut each other. Eisenhower criticized Congress further: "While it worked to establish a record for economy, it also worked to
increase expenditures for pet projects and pressure groups.\textsuperscript{18}

In all, Eisenhower concluded, the "1957 session marked the low point in effective cooperation between the administration and Congress."\textsuperscript{19}

Eisenhower's Boxscore decreased to 36.9%. Once again the fight over school construction "enlivened and marred executive-legislative relations."\textsuperscript{20} The fight over Foreign Aid or Mutual Security, as it was then called, which Parmet notes was an annual battle for the President,\textsuperscript{21} was especially bitter in 1957. The dispute over the Girard Case and the rights of American military personnel abroad also strained the relationship between the two branches. The one major accomplishment of the session was the passage of the first Civil Rights bill in over eighty years. Yet even this involved compromising on some of the key provisions of the original proposal. Congress also passed the Mideast Resolution, which reaffirmed the President's right to move troops wherever and whenever he wanted to save the world from Communism.

The following year Eisenhower's performance recovered from the disaster of 1957. His Boxscore climbed back to 47%, while his Support and Key Vote Scores remained high. The most spectacular legislative battle of the year in the President's estimation was his determination to reorganize the Defense Department. After months of negotiation, and some key
concessions to House Armed Services Committee Chairman, Carl Vinson of Georgia, the plan was passed. As a result of Sputnik, an education bill was finally enacted into law. Another legislative triumph was the establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Eisenhower even signed bills he thought were imposing unwarranted drains upon the treasury. He did this essentially for political reasons, in order to categorize the Democrats in Congress as "big spenders" during the upcoming fall elections. This move backfired in the Republican disaster in the 1958 Congressional elections.

With the backfiring of the "big spender" tactic in the Congressional election, and the departure from the administration of Sherman Adams (to be discussed in detail in a later chapter), Eisenhower decided to do battle with Congress for real during the last two years of his administration. He would get tough by holding the line against the soaring spending proposals of the Democrats. In spite of this negative attitude, some positive accomplishments occurred in the first session of the 86th Congress. Hawaiian statehood, another one of Ike's annual battles, was finally achieved. The Landrum-Griffin act, which regulated labor unions, was passed. The vetoes of "exorbitant" housing bills held. On the negative side, he was overridden on a Public Works appropriation bill. The 1959 session was also to give Eisenhower, "one of the most depressing official disappointments I experienced during my eight years in the White House,"
when the Senate failed to confirm the nomination of Lewis Strauss to be Secretary of Commerce.

This "tough" act of Eisenhower's had its consequences in his scores. The Boxscore receded to 40.8%, while the Support and Key Vote Scores were only in the 50% range. The Support Score was the lowest for his entire Presidency and the second lowest for the twenty years of this study.

By 1960 the lame-duck effects of the 22nd Amendment were affecting the Eisenhower legislative performance. Ike admitted that his influence, especially in domestic affairs was waning.\textsuperscript{24} The output, in terms of the number of bills enacted, was the lowest of his Presidency. Politics was an important factor, as Presidential hopefuls from the Congress jockeyed for position in the 1960 Presidential sweepstakes. Eisenhower's Boxscore reached a nadir of 30.8%, as less than one of three proposals were enacted. On the "Key Votes" of the session the President was successful 82% of the time, winning votes on Civil Rights, the Farm Surplus Reduction Act, and the annual fight over Mutual Security. Two projects of the Democrats, the Area Redevelopment Act and Medical Care for the Aged through Social Security, were vetoed and beaten respectively.

After eight years of dealing with Congress, Eisenhower concluded that a number of reforms would help mitigate the battle between the two branches. He believed that a two-thirds vote
should be necessary to increase federal expenditures above the Presidential budget. He felt further that Presidents should have the power to item veto legislation, especially appropriations. He also became a proponent of four year terms for members of the House.\(^{25}\)

In looking back over the seven Eisenhower years in this study, most of his problems with Congress involved questions of money. Congress was usually appropriating more money than the President requested. His successes occurred after much compromise and did not represent what could be called, "landmark" legislation. He essentially accepted and to some extent, expanded the legislation of the New Deal. He did not, however, achieve much in the way of innovation. In fact he spent a lot of time and energy fighting other people's innovative proposals.

Kennedy

John Kennedy's relationship with the legislative branch has been summed up elsewhere as "both success and failure in terms of what he asked from Congress, but his rehabilitation of a dynamic legislative role for the President was successful."\(^{26}\) This reassertion of the President's role as chief legislator, after it had lain dormant for most of the Eisenhower years, often frustrated Kennedy in his relations with the Congress.
A basic hostility between the branches seemed to exist from the beginning of his administration. He was too young, too alien to many members of Congress. His previous service in the House and Senate did not endear him to its power-brokers. The old barons of the hill, like Rayburn, Kerr, Russell, Stennis, and others had their own power bases, and they felt they did not owe the new President anything. As Sorenson suggested, it was "a struggle for power between two different branches of the government and two different generations of politicians." As Sorenson stated:

He vetoed minor bills he did not like, impounded appropriated funds he did not need, ignored restrictive amendments that he found unconstitutional, and improvised executive action for bills that would not pass.

These attitudes reflected a deeply held belief in the primacy of the Executive Branch and the expanded power of the Presidency.

Yet Schlesinger tells us that Kennedy's measure of Presidential success was concrete achievement. He quotes Kennedy:

People who educated the nation without necessarily accomplishing their particular purposes rated ... below those ... who accomplished their purposes without necessarily bringing the nation along with them.
Based on these ideas, Kennedy's relations with Congress were indeed mixed. He did partially break the deadlock that had existed since 1937 on liberal domestic legislation. Yet many of his major proposals were treated quite harshly by the legislature. His performance on our three scores was also mixed. His Boxscore of 40.1% ranks him behind Eisenhower and Johnson. However, his Support Score of 84.6% was the highest for the four Presidents. On "key votes" he also did quite well, winning 68.3%. One explanation for this seeming discrepancy between the low Boxscore and the high Support and Key Vote Scores was given by Schlesinger who suggested, "Every President has to husband his bargaining power for its most effective use." Kennedy did this each year with certain key things he wanted. Also, many of his major proposals were stalled in committees, and never came to a vote, which inflated the Support and Key Vote Scores.

Kennedy's relations with the Congress were fairly good in 1961. His Boxscore was a respectable 48.4%, slightly above the mean for the twenty year period. His Support Score was a high 81%, and on "key votes he scored 71%. None of the key votes of 1961 was more important than his victory on the decision to enlarge the House Rules Committee. Its importance was noted by Tom Wicker:

In retrospect, it is possible to say that this was the one vote JFK had to win during his brief tenure in office. More than procedure, more
even than the substance of a few or many bills was at stake; for the real task of politicians is to manage men, to influence them, to produce an effect on them, and the effect on men of victory or defeat in the House that day would roll on far beyond immediate consequences. (underlining his)\textsuperscript{35}

Presidential prestige was the key administration lobbying message. Yet the small margin of victory (217-212) would have an important effect on the administration's legislative strategy. Although, Fairlie criticizes Kennedy for never exploiting the advantage he gained,\textsuperscript{36} Kennedy now knew that every program would necessitate a struggle with the Congress. As O'Brien admitted after the Rules Committee vote, "Our honeymoon with Congress was over before it began."\textsuperscript{37}

Still, Kennedy could tell the Congress at the end of the 1961 session, "You can go back home and point with pride to the record of this Congress,"\textsuperscript{38} O'Brien calculated that 33 of 53 major bills were passed.\textsuperscript{39} Schlesinger claimed the first session of the 87th Congress had "a record of action on the domestic front unmatched in any single sitting since 1935."\textsuperscript{40} An Area Redevelopment bill was passed, an Omnibus Housing bill was enacted, a rise in the Minimum Wage was passed after compromises, Social Security was liberalized, and the Peace Corps was established. Yet there were too many compromises and some outright failures which led to negative evaluations like the following:
Thus as Congress saw things, Kennedy had not only failed in his first big tests, he had botched the job. The minimum wage bill might have been passed at smaller political cost; the education bill might have been steered or slipped through if the President had not at first stood so firm, only to retreat so quickly. Since a leader requires above all, the respect of his followers, in losing at the outset the essential respect of the 87th Congress, Kennedy lost whatever chance he had to remake the country.

Thus, 1962 would be a disappointment, although once again Kennedy was able to win one big fight. This was the approval of the Trade Expansion Act, which O'Brien and Schlesinger both admit was the number one priority for the year. Yet despite O'Brien's claims that 40 of 54 major bills were enacted, in our terms 1962 was not a good year for Kennedy with the Congress. His Boxscore declined to 44.6%, on "key votes" he was only able to win 61% of the time. However, his Support Score remained remarkably high at 85%. The major defeats in 1962 came on Medicare, which never got out of the Ways and Means committee; and a proposed new Cabinet department of Housing and Urban Development, which lost because of Kennedy's avowed intention of appointing a Negro to head the new department. Major victories besides the Trade Act, were the passage of a Manpower Development and Training Act, and the Communication Satellite Act.

Schlesinger noted that 1963 was "the hardest of the Congressional sessions he faced." The long-delayed legislation on Civil Rights was costing Kennedy popular support, especially
in the South. Congress was to enact only 27.2% of Kennedy's proposals that year. O'Brien claimed that Kennedy did get 33 of 58 major bills through, which could explain why his Support Score remained very high at 87%. Again many of his proposals, including two of the most important, Medicare and Federal Aid to Education, died in committee. Civil Rights did not move out of the hearing stage in 1963. The extension of the Area Redevelopment Act was defeated. The Tax Cut to stimulate the economy passed the House, but was stalled in the Senate Finance committee. The President was able to obtain Senate ratification of the limited Test-Ban Treaty, a number of debt ceiling increases, an accelerated Public Works program, and the permanent increase of the House Rules committee. However, by the summer of 1963 there was a sense that the "New Frontier", if not exactly stalled, was in a holding pattern. As Evans and Novak related, "There was an ill-defined sense of going downhill." There are indications that by the fall the "New Frontier" was getting its second wind. The log-jam of legislation seemed to be breaking up. Breakthroughs seemed to be occurring, especially on Civil Rights and Medicare, at the time of the assassination.

However, the notion still persists that Kennedy could not master the Congress. There was an impression created that he had promised much, but that he could not deliver. Fairlie accuses the President of failure to carry through on the substance of
his proposed domestic legislation. There was, Fairlie claims, a lack of clear direction from the White House:

He would send a message to Congress in support of a measure, he would then forget about it until the time for a crucial vote had arrived; then Lawrence O'Brien would be found, trying to stitch together the votes which were needed to carry a bill which no one had been given any reason to know was considered by the administration to be important.48

This somewhat negative appraisal of Kennedy's performance can be justified by noting Schlesinger's comment that, "ground was being sowed in 1961-2, to be harvested in 1964-5."49

Johnson

When Lyndon Johnson came to the Presidency after the tragedy of Dallas, he faced what one observer called "a sit-down strike" in the Congress.50 The new President would not stand for such recalcitrance from the body he once controlled. Lyndon Johnson, who had been master of Congress as Senate Majority Leader in the 1950s, was now to be master of Congress as President. Even in those dark days of November 1963 he had to demonstrate that the executive could still control the legislature. Rather than a post-tragedy recess, he kept Congress in session in order to pass the Soviet wheat bill, to demonstrate the exercise of Lyndon Johnson's presidential power.51
O'Brien and Sidey both testify that Johnson became deeply involved with the legislative process. O'Brien notes:

"No detail of the legislative program was too minute to involve him. ... Congress was a 24 hour a day obsession."\(^52\) Johnson himself admitted that merely placing a program before Congress was not enough:

> Without constant attention from the administration most legislation moves through the congressional process at the speed of a glacier.\(^53\)

For these reasons Johnson spearheaded the effort in the 89th Congress to obtain as much legislation as possible. In doing so, he established an image in Congress, as well as with the public, of Presidential mastery over the legislature.

However, Johnson also admitted:

> I have watched Congress from either the inside or the outside, man and boy, for more than forty years, and I've never seen a Congress that didn't eventually take the measure of the President it was dealing with.\(^54\)

In some respects this happened to him. Some people think he tried to reach too far, too fast. Geyelin noted: "There is always a built-in anti-Presidential vote ready to exert mastery over the Executive if once the potential for doing so is established by one significant Presidential defeat."\(^55\) By the end of 1965, after most of the great achievements of the 89th Congress had already occurred, Congressional rejection of a relatively minor measure like Home Rule for the District of
Columbia, was a signal that this process would soon engulf Johnson. It was a signal Johnson chose to ignore.

His performance with the Congress still remains remarkable. He was the only one of the four Presidents to achieve a Boxscore average above 50%. Even his lowest score of 47.6%, was better than all the others except two. On "key votes" he averaged 80.5%, twelve points higher than second-place Kennedy. Although not as high as Kennedy's, his Support Scores averaged 82.2%, going over the 90% mark in 1965.

Johnson would pass the Kennedy legislative program in 1964, but this was not enough. Lyndon Johnson needed to put his personal stamp upon the 88th Congress. Thus, the swift passage of the War on Poverty with very little dissent, provided an important dramatization of the consolidation of Johnson's power. Even though, as mentioned earlier, some of the log-jam on Civil Rights and other Kennedy proposals had begun to break at the time of his death, Lyndon Johnson did finally get them enacted in 1964. The passage of the Civil Rights Act without compromises, and the Tax Reduction bill, demonstrated an ability to get the Congress moving on long-delayed measures. As great as the record of the 89th Congress was to be, it was Johnson's achievements with the second session of the 88th, that proved his mastery of Congress. The Boxscore for 1964 was 57.6%, the third highest of the twenty
year period. He received an 88% Support Score, while on "key votes" he won 84%.

With the landslide of the 1964 election, overwhelmingly large Democratic majorities took control of the 89th Congress to "turn the Capitol upside down." The first session of the 89th Congress was to enact almost 69% of Johnson's requests. They were to "support" him on 93% of the votes he took positions on. Those matters considered "key votes", Johnson would win 91%. He was to call the 1965 session, "The greatest outpouring of creative legislation in the history of this nation." Unlike the New Deal, where domestic creativity occurred at a time of crisis, 1965 saw "a burst of national self-improvement in a time of prosperity." The administration calculated it enacted 84 of its 87 major requests. Tom Wicker concluded:

In the early months of 1965 it could fairly be said, that no President - save possibly FDR - had disposed of so much sheer political power or faced such a limitless future of achievement as did Lyndon Johnson of Texas.

The accomplishments of 1965 moved many items off the domestic legislative agenda. Those items passed by Congress included: Medicare, Aid to Elementary and Secondary Education, Aid to Higher Education, Air and Water Pollution Control, the Voting Rights bill, the Immigration reform bill, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Older Americans Act, an Omnibus Housing Act, and the Presidential disability constitutional amendment.
By the end of 1965 Congress wanted to slow down. The defeat of the D.C. Home Rule Bill was already mentioned. The war in Vietnam was beginning to consume more of Johnson's time, and some in Congress were questioning the United States' role in that war. Yet in 1966, Johnson's scores remain quite high. The Boxscore is 55.8%, the Support Score 79%, and on "key votes" he was still winning 75%. Despite growing vocal criticism of the war, a Vietnam supplemental appropriations bill passed Congress with very few dissenting votes (3 in the House). Morse's attempt to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin resolution received only five votes in the Senate. The President decided the country could have both "guns and butter" as Representative Fino's attempt to kill the War on Poverty was beaten back in the House. Model Cities was passed, as were a Federal Highway Act, a Traffic Safety Act, and the Freedom of Information Act. The Department of Transportation and the Teacher Corps were established. The major defeat came on an inability to end a Senate filibuster on the Civil Rights bill, which included Open Housing provisions. The administration was quite pleased with the results of the 89th Congress. By their calculations they enacted 191 out of 200 major requests.

After the Republican gains in the 1966 elections, Johnson would use 1967 to consolidate the gains made in the previous Congress, and to extend the Great Society programs.
already passed. However, stalemate soon developed. Few bills went through this session of Congress unscathed. Johnson's Boxscore drops below 50% for the first and only time, to 47.6%. In a speech on November 9, Johnson blamed the "old coalition of nay-sayers and stand-patters" for the problems he encountered with the first session of the 90th Congress. His Support Score remained high at 79%, but on "key votes" he had dropped to 72%, even though he won all seven key votes in the Senate.

Johnson's major victories of the year included, Senate ratification of the U.S. Soviet consular treaty, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, a Meat Packaging act, an increase in civilian and postal workers pay, and the rejection of Senator Mundt's proposal to impose a five percent across the board budget cut. The President's proposal of an income tax surcharge to finance the Vietnam war never got out of committee. Funds for many existing programs were scaled back. There were major defeats on a Rat Control bill, an anti-crime bill which included gun control legislation, highway beautification, and an East-West Trade bill. A proposal to combine the Labor and Commerce departments never got off the ground.

By 1968 the country and the Congress seemed to be upset by inflation, crime and campus disorders. Yet Johnson made a comeback of sorts. Affected by his withdrawal from Presidential election politics in March, and the tragic events of the year, Johnson's Boxscore returned to its 1966 level of
55.8%. His Support and Key Vote Scores remained steady in the 70% range.

In 1968 the Tax Surcharge was finally passed. The Civil Rights bill including the Open Housing provisions, was enacted in the aftermath of Martin Luther King's assassination. In reaction to Robert Kennedy's assassination a limited Gun Control law was put on the books. A Safe Streets act was passed. A strong Truth-in-Lending bill became law. The major setback of the year was the rejection of Johnson's longtime friend, Abe Fortas, as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty was also stalled because of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The Johnson record of legislation was remarkable. He desired to be master of Congress and for two and one-half years he accomplished that. Yet as time went on and the war in Vietnam replaced the legislative struggle as Johnson's obsession, the record of the last two and one-half years dimmed. Evans and Novak sum up:

The conflict between objective and performance, between the public posture of the President and the private manipulations of the politician, is the essence of the Johnson paradox. The lofty goal and the hard use of power to achieve it are essential components for any successful Presidency, but Johnson often overstates the goal and overuses his power to achieve it. Sometimes these characteristics have been self-defeating for him; sometimes they have produced greater accomplishments than he had any right to expect.64
During Richard Nixon's tenure in the White House there was a widespread belief that he lacked interest in executive-legislative relations. Some suggested this lack of interest reflected Nixon's desire to concentrate on foreign affairs and his passive approach to domestic affairs. He gave an early indication that Congress was not high on his list of priorities when he refused to deliver his own State of the Union address upon taking office. However, others claim that there existed an attitude in the White House that "Congress was an awkward and obnoxious obstacle, a hostile foreign power." This attitude did not help Nixon when he did get involved with legislative matters. These two notions resulted in an early decision noted by Moynihan:

The 91st Congress seemed destined for prolonged and bitter partisanship between the Congress and the President. ... It seemed the best that could be hoped for was a passive acceptance by all concerned that nothing much big in the way of legislation was going to be dealt with seriously during these years.

Nixon's scores illustrate the problems he had. During his five years encompassed by this study, he was able to obtain Congressional acceptance of slightly over one-third of his proposals (34.6%). His Support Score was under 65%, the lowest of the four administrations. What is even more evident was the low legislative output for the period. The average for Nixon's
five years was 60 bills enacted per year, compared to Eisenhower's 97.7, Kennedy's 138, and Johnson's 218. Nixon's Key Vote score of 63.4% was higher than Eisenhower's, but a significant factor was the amount of "key votes" Nixon participated. Whereas, Eisenhower was involved on 79% of "key votes" selected, Nixon took part on only 58%. Once again, this illustrated Nixon's essential attitude towards the executive-legislative relationship.

As appeared true in the Kennedy administration, Nixon decided to put all his efforts on legislation on one measure per year. In 1969 it was the protracted struggle over the Safeguard ABM system. After a two-month debate in the Senate, the administration finally won by a very slim margin. However, many observers believed this victory came at a high cost. Evans and Novak point out: "The high pressure tactics employed by the administration during this fight created a mood of hostility that would sour Congressional feelings far into the future."\(^67\)

Another problem in 1969 was the slow pace of the session, which led to a very low legislative output. (55 bills enacted.) John Osborne comments that by the middle of the year Congress was wondering why Nixon was taking so long to formulate and submit a domestic legislative program.\(^68\) It was not until mid-summer that the administration's proposals emerged. There were other achievements besides the victory on ABM; the Senate
ratified the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the surtax was extended, the draft lottery was instituted, the Philadelphia Plan was upheld, a Mine Safety Act was passed, and an Environmental Impact bill was enacted. However, despite this list, Nixon was only able to obtain passage of 32.2% of his proposals in 1969. Nixon's fortunes in this session were best symbolized by the Tax Reform bill, which by the time Congress completed action became a giveaway Tax Reduction bill, much to the administration's chagrin. The President also suffered a bitter defeat when the Senate rejected the nomination of Clement Haynsworth to the Supreme Court.

In 1970 Nixon's relations with Congress improved somewhat. His Boxscore rose to 46.2%, and his support and Key Vote Scores were in the 70% range, better than most of Eisenhower's record. His biggest disputes with the Congress that year were over spending priorities, which led to nine Nixon vetoes, a number of which were overridden. To a great extent this veto strategy seemed to dominate Nixon's relationship with Congress during the first two years, oftentimes eclipsing efforts to get his own bills passed. The President was successful in vetoing the HEW and Labor appropriations bill, and the HUD appropriations bill. He was overridden on the Office of Education appropriations, and most dramatically on the veto of the Hill-Burton Hospital Construction program. Evans and Novak comment on what they and
many others considered the sheer stupidity of this particular veto:

Mesmerized by what he believed to be the immense political power of the spending issue, Nixon swept away the feelings of his own leaders in Congress, disregarded the advice of his Congressional lobbyists inside the White House, failed to inform his lieutenants in HEW, and rushed to veto a nonspending bill authorizing funds for one of the federal governments most popular programs.70

He also lost another fight over a Supreme Court nomination. The President reacted angrily to the rejection of G. Harold Carswell's nomination with a vituperative attack on the institutional prerogative of the Senate to confirm Presidential appointees. Some point out that in making this statement, Nixon was thinking of his political debt to the South first, and about his relations with the Congress not at all.71

The President's major proposal of the year, the reform of the welfare system known as the Family Assistance Plan, did not get enacted either, dying an ignominious death in the Senate Finance committee. There were some who thought that Nixon did not apply enough Presidential "muscle" to get FAP through the Congress. Osborne points out that the Nixon "soft-sell" on FAP left many Congressmen questioning whether Nixon really wanted the program.72
There were some victories in 1970 as well. Many of these came in the area of the Environment and Consumer Safety. There was also an anti-crime bill with the "no-knock" and "preventive detention" provisions, for 1970 was also the year of "law and order." The Voting Rights Act was extended against the administration's wishes, but with a provision to allow 18 year olds the right to vote in federal elections, which Nixon supported.

By November 1970 the administration admitted that its relations with Congress were deplorable. There was a consensus that a softer line toward the legislature and new liaison people were needed. Clark MacGregor was brought in with his "I Care about Congress" buttons. However, these changes had little impact after Nixon once again lashed out at Congress in January 1971. In a speech in which the legislative liaison staff was not even consulted, Nixon castigated the 91st Congress, which incredibly had adjourned just three days before, ending the longest Congressional session in history.

Foreign policy dominated the Presidential-Congressional relationship in 1971. It was the year the Senate was to spend months debating various end-the-war, bring-the-troops-home-by-a-certain-date amendments. One version proposed by Senator Mansfield passed the Senate three times, only to be ignored by both the House and the President. Another indicator of the large gap between the administration and the Congress, was the total shock
of the Nixon people when the Senate startled everyone by refusing to pass the foreign aid bill.\textsuperscript{73} Foreign aid eventually did pass, but only after economic and military aid were voted upon separately. Also in 1971, the draft was extended for two years, a loan was approved to bail out the Lockheed Corporation, the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 was extended with wage and price control authority for the President. Yet the President's Boxscore declined to a new low of under 20\% (19.8). The SST was killed, probably the most spectacular defeat for the President in 1971. None of the six major proposals he outlined in his "New American Revolution" State of the Union speech was enacted. A bill to provide federal aid for Day Care centers was vetoed. A revived Family Assistance bill also went down to defeat in the Senate.

The battle between Nixon and Congress saw a year of relative quiet in 1972. His Boxscore improved back up to 44\%, yet again legislative output was minimal. Congressional Quarterly could find only 83 votes on which Nixon took positions. His Support Score declined to 66\%. It seemed clear that Nixon had his thoughts elsewhere. The trips to China and the Soviet Union, and his upcoming re-election, which included what to do about the Watergate break-in, took up most of his thinking. One major success with Congress, more important in hindsight than at the time, was his ability to stop a proposed investigation by Wright
Patman's House Banking and Currency committee into the Watergate break-in. Otherwise the White House did not work very hard for its proposals in 1972. Most of the successes again came in environmental areas, such as noise control and pesticide control. One of his biggest battles of the year came when Congress overrode his veto of the Water Pollution Control bill, and his subsequent impoundment of the approved funds.

The major success of the year was the passage of one of Nixon's "New American Revolution" proposals, general revenue sharing with states and localities. The Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution also passed Congress with the President's blessing.

With his re-election behind him and Watergate not yet totally catching up to him, President Nixon got more involved with the Congress in 1973. It did not help his performance any, as his Boxscore decreased again to 31.2%, his Support Score reached the twenty year low of 50%, and he won less than half (44%) of the "key votes" he took positions on.

The most significant action for future executive-legislative relations, was the passage over the President's veto of the War Powers bill which limits to sixty days the President's power to commit American troops abroad unilaterally. The Senate Watergate hearings seemed to transfix most of the Congress through the summer. The resignation of Vice-President Agnew led to a
Nixon victory with the confirmation of Gerald Ford as the new V.P. The choice of Ford seemed to be dictated by the President's desire to avoid a confrontation with the Congress over confirmation. After the Arab Oil Embargo, the Trans-Alaskan pipeline was finally given the go-ahead after years of delay by environmentalists. Yet at the end of the year most of the President's energy proposals seemed to be languishing.

Throughout the year the President's attempts to absolve himself from any connection with Watergate pervaded his relations with the Congress. The opening of a full-scale impeachment inquiry in November 1973 by the House Judiciary Committee, which led to the climactic events of August 1974, were another factor that confronted the executive-legislative relationship.

The Nixon years were marked by a pervasive hostility between the two branches of government. Given the attitude of the administration and the make-up of Congress, it is not surprising the accomplishments were few.

In evaluating the performances of the four Presidents it seemed clear that President Johnson performed the best, and President Nixon the worst. The most successful president in this study became totally involved with Congress and the legislative process. During his tenure cooperation between the branches was at the apex. The least successful President was disdainful of the
legislature, treating it as an institution to be ignored. He did not consider it important for the major objectives of his administration. As a result, inter-branch conflict reached its zenith during the Nixon years.

The other two presidents examined in this study had mixed performances. President Kennedy did remarkably well on the Support Score measure of success, but overall he was a disappointment as a legislative leader. President Eisenhower had problems winning key votes, and demonstrated that a policy of moderation and conciliation toward Congress was not necessarily the way to achieve legislative success.

The data also demonstrated that it was very difficult for a president to obtain passage of more than half of his proposals in any one year. However, the two branches agreed with each other on three-quarters of the roll calls on which the President took a position. On "key votes" involving major policy questions, the Presidents achieved their desired outcomes two-thirds of the time. The data further suggested there was very little difference between the House and Senate in the support they gave the four presidents. The only significant figures seemed to suggest that Nixon had more trouble with the Senate than the House of Representatives.
Notes - Chapter 2


5. Ibid., 1973, p. 927


7. Ibid., p. 128.

8. Ibid., p. 127.


11. 1953 was not included in this study because of data collection problems. Congressional Quarterly used different standards for computing Boxscore and Support Score in 1953, which would have made comparisons difficult.

13. Ibid., p. 304.
14. Ibid., p. 43.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 546.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 147.
20. Ibid., p. 136.
23. Ibid., p. 390.
24. Ibid., p. 485.
25. Ibid., p. 640.
30. Ibid., p. 388.
31. Ibid.


35. Wicker, p. 35.


38. John F. Kennedy, as quoted in O'Brien, p. 129.


40. Schlesinger, p. 578.

41. Wicker, p. 146.

42. O'Brien, p. 131; Schlesinger, p. 651.

43. O'Brien, p. 131.

44. Schlesinger, p. 892.

45. O'Brien, p. 142.


48. Fairlie, p. 344.

49. Schlesinger, p. 654.

50. Walter Lippmann, as quoted in Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, p. 34.


58. Lyndon Johnson, as quoted in Sidey, p. 102.


60. Wicker, p. 234.


62. Sidey, p. 103.


64. Evans and Novak, *Lyndon B. Johnson*, p. 11.


66. Moynihan, p. 3.


70. Ibid., p. 126.

71. Ibid., p. 171.


CHAPTER 3
PRESIDENTIAL ROLES

The major assumption of role theory is that expected behavior will influence actual behavior. McFarland defines role as: "[The way] individuals in social locations behave with reference to expectations."\(^1\) Thus, role is concerned with the expected patterns of behavior in a social system. These expectations imply a normative aspect to the notion of role that gives the concept psychological validity.\(^2\)

How the individual ought to act in any position stems from two sources: the individual's own perception of what the role involves, and the expectations others have for that role. The first suggests that persons set their own expectations for roles they fill. Individuals bring their own orientations to any situation. Therefore, the conceptions in the minds of the actors are important in defining role expectations. The second presumes that roles are not isolated, but are related, based on interactions among actors. These interactions occur within assumed norms of behavior. Each actor expects the others to behave according to prescribed patterns that have been established for that particular role.
We are most interested in the expectations and relationships associated with the role of President of the United States. One approach is to focus on the conceptions of the presidency held by its occupants. Fortunately for students of the presidency, chief executives have not been reluctant to discuss their expectations. Unfortunately, most of their comments were generalizations about the need for leadership by the President, and many were made after they left office. Yet these general ideas were applied to specific role situations.

A distinction has been drawn between the ideas of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, which forms the basis for two conflicting conceptions of the presidency. Roosevelt expressed the belief:

That it was not only his right, but his duty to do anything that the needs of the nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws.¹

This "stewardship doctrine" of the presidency has been accepted as the "activist" conception of the office. Roosevelt believed presidents possess inherently broad powers to meet any situation. Their major role was to use the White House as a "bully pulpit" and lead the nation. Taft, on the other hand, believed the powers of the chief executive were more narrowly defined. His view is regarded as the passive or restricted conception. Taft said:

The true view of the executive function is, as I conceive it, that the President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably
traced to some specific grant or justly implied and included within such grant as proper and necessary to its exercise.\textsuperscript{4}

The divergent views of these two Presidents have been the models for later twentieth century chief executives. Three of the four Presidents under consideration in this study perceived activist roles for themselves. John Kennedy discussed his view of the presidency while still a candidate in 1960:

\begin{quote}
[The President] must above all be the Chief Executive in every sense of the word. He must be prepared to exercise the fullest powers of his office - all that are specified and some that are not. ... a Chief Executive who is the vital center of action in our whole scheme of government.\textsuperscript{5}
\end{quote}

The previous chapter described how Lyndon Johnson also subscribed to this view. Richard Nixon, also in a campaign speech, discussed his perception of the presidency:

\begin{quote}
The next President must take an activist view of his office. He must articulate the nation's highest values, define its goals, and marshall its will. ... He must lead. ... The President's chief function is to lead and not to administer.\textsuperscript{6}
\end{quote}

In 1968 Nixon foresaw an activist role for himself in the White House. Only Eisenhower, saw himself as closer to the Taft view. As was noted in the previous chapter, Eisenhower believed in patience, tolerance, and accommodation: a very restrained notion of presidential leadership.

The second source of role expectations is also of interest. Wildavsky suggests that the "presidential role is largely defined by the expectations that others have developed about the
man and the office." Clinton Rossiter described several roles that Presidents play in relationship to their constituencies.

We are interested in how three of these roles—Chief Legislator, Chief Executive, and Leader of Public Opinion—affect the President's performance with the Congress.

In each of these three roles there are certain expectations. As Chief Legislator, the President should formulate a legislative program with developed proposals to be presented to the Congress. This will be operationalized by the number of legislative proposals of the President in each year. As Chief Executive, the President should be able to issue orders to other members of the executive branch that will affect public policy. The number of executive orders issued each year will measure this role. Finally, as Leader of Public Opinion, he should use the resources available to generate support for his policies. The number of appearances on television and radio each year will measure this role. Table 4 displays the data for each of these roles.

Chief Legislator

One of the major role expectations of the presidency is that the chief executive will act as Chief Legislator, Rossiter has suggested: "The President alone is in a political, constitutional, and practical position to provide such leadership, and he is therefore expected ... to guide Congress in much of its
TABLE 4: PROPOSALS, EXECUTIVE ORDERS, AND TELEVISION/RADIO APPEARANCES MADE BY PRESIDENTS: 1954-1973

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<th>Year</th>
<th>#Proposals</th>
<th># Executive Orders</th>
<th># TV/Radio Appearances</th>
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<td>183</td>
<td>56</td>
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**Eisenhower**

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<td>1962</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>55</td>
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<td>1965</td>
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**Johnson**

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<td>1973</td>
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**Nixon**

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lawmaking activity." Woodrow Wilson believed that the President should have "the personality and the initiative to enforce his views upon the people and the Congress." The major assumption is that one way to accomplish this is to propose a program of requests to Congress.

Presidents have made legislative proposals since the beginning of the nation. The ideas for these proposals emerged from many sources. Studies by Chamberlain, and Moe and Teel suggested the original ideas for many presidential initiatives came from elsewhere: Congressmen, pressure groups, other parts of the executive branch, and academia. Yet until they are included in the President's program, rarely do they become part of the agenda for the nation. Both Neustadt and Gilmour described how legislation emerges from a "central clearance" procedure in the executive branch. The President announces his proposal packages in the State of the Union, Economic, and Budget messages, supplemented by special messages to the Congress. In this manner, the President sets the agenda for legislative action.

Hypothesis 1: There is a relationship between the number of proposals a president makes to the Congress, and his performance with that Congress.

As Chief Legislator, the President may employ two strategies in making proposals to the Congress. President Kennedy endorsed the strategy that presidents should propose large amounts
of legislation. He told Sorenson, "They are only going to pass part of what I send up anyway." President Eisenhower, on the other hand, reminded his department heads to confine their annual legislative requests to ideas that had a reasonable chance of success.

The first strategy often involves submitting programs for exposure purposes only, or to politically embarrass the Congress. However, a president cannot do this very often or he will lose his credibility in the legislature. By proposing programs he knows will not pass, a president also risks damaging his prestige and reputation with the Congress. If this happens continually, a chief executive will lose much of his power.

Therefore, in this dissertation, the assumption will be made that Chief Legislators will generally propose programs they expect will be enacted. Presidents want to maintain the power of the oval office. They need to protect the prestige and bargaining power inherent in the presidency. They do not want to be considered ineffective legislative leaders. Thus we expect a positive relationship between the number of presidential proposals and presidential performance with the Congress.

From 1954 to 1973, presidents made an average of 267.6 legislative requests per year. Lyndon Johnson had the highest average, 380.4 proposals per year, as well as the largest number
in a single year, 469 in 1965. Richard Nixon had the lowest average, 177.2 requests per year, while also making the fewest in a single year, 116 in 1972. The measures of association indicated a strong positive relationship. The more proposals a president made to the Congress, the better his performance. The relationship was strongest between the number of proposals and the Support Score measure of performance, Kendall's Tau b = .52 (significant at the .05 level). It was also strong between number of proposals and Boxscore, Kendall's Tau b = .44 (significant at the .05 level). The relationship did weaken with the Key Vote Score as the measure of performance.

Parmet claimed that by 1953 the country wanted consolidation without undermining the achievements of the immediate past. After the turmoil of the Roosevelt and Truman years, Eisenhower promised the American people less government. There was an almost total absence of a presidential program in 1953. Truman's preparation of the Fiscal 1954 budget, according to Eisenhower, restricted his options in 1953. Yet the 1954 proposals, "constituted the most massive and comprehensive set of recommendations of my entire eight years." Eisenhower averaged 216.5 proposals per year. The number of his proposals remained consistent until 1960, when his lame-duck status led to a self-acknowledged waning influence, especially on domestic affairs.
John Kennedy campaigned in 1960 on the theme of getting America moving again. The new administration desired to establish its agenda during the first one hundred days, by introducing 277 specific legislative requests. Yet Sundquist and Ripley have pointed out that a large number of these proposals were familiar, having been developed by the Democrats in the 1950s.

The glaring omission of civil rights legislation in the first two years, reflected the administration feeling that what was theoretically desirable had to be tempered with what was politically feasible, and gaining the support of Southern Congressmen was still a major priority.

Kennedy averaged 351.3 requests per year. The results for the Kennedy administration differed from the other three presidents. The relationship between the number of proposals he made to the Congress and his performance was negative for his brief three year tenure. Schlesinger noted what appears to be an explanation:

There were too many new ideas, coming too fast, couched in too cool and analytical a tone, implying too critical a view of American society.

Thus one result of the flow of Kennedy's proposals was likely to be increased Congressional anxiety. Yet, as stated earlier, Kennedy seemed pleased with the legislative strategy of bombarding Congress with proposals.
Lyndon Johnson seemed to endorse this tactic as well. Although the number of proposals in 1964(217) seemed small, Johnson felt he had some obligation to the Kennedy program. After his overwhelming victory, which brought the large majority Democratic Congress to the hill in 1965, he made 469 legislative requests. Even after the setbacks in the congressional election in 1966, Johnson still made more than four hundred requests in 1967 and 1968.

In terms of legislative proposals, Richard Nixon was the least active President in our study. As noted in the previous chapter, Nixon's interests and priorities were not on legislation. Moynihan has pointed out:

> A case could be made and was, for proposing one or two major initiatives that would be unmistakably Nixon's and forcing the Congress to accept or reject them.\(^2\) This was essentially done. The Family Assistance Plan, urged on Nixon by Moynihan, was a prime example. In 1971 Nixon made a series of proposals that he dubbed, "The New American Revolution." However, most of these were quickly forgotten by the administration. The lack of proposals in many ways reflected Nixon's passivity to domestic affairs discussed in the previous chapter.

There was a suggestion that a poor performance in one year might lead to fewer proposals the following year. This seemed apparent for Nixon in 1971 and 1972. The results did not provide
any evidence to support this notion for the twenty year period. In fact, the relationships weakened. For example, Kendall's Tau b decreased to .33 in the relation between number of proposals and Boxscore. Thus, we can conclude, that other things being equal, the more the President proposed in a single year, the more Congress accepted, and the better was the President's performance.

Chief Executive

A President sometimes finds it expedient to bypass the Congress. As Chief Executive, he possesses the power to issue instructions and orders that may affect public policy. This is a constitutionally acceptable method of avoiding a recalcitrant legislature. When they are based upon the Constitutional powers given to the President or upon statutory authority, executive orders have been held by the Courts to have the same effect as if they had been incorporated in an act of Congress. Executive orders have been used by presidents since the beginning of the nation. However, before 1907 they were not counted, estimates range from fifteen to fifty thousand orders were issued prior to that date. Since tabulation commenced there have been close to twelve thousand executive orders. Franklin Roosevelt was the President who used them to the greatest extent; issuing 654 in 1933, 467 in 1934, and 383 in 1935. Most of these implemented New Deal legislation. Since then their use has declined considerably. Over the twenty
year period under consideration the average was sixty-two per
year.

Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between
the number of executive orders
issued, and the President's
performance with the Congress.

William Neighbors and Robert Cash report that since
the New Deal the use of executive orders has assumed a new
dimension. Neighbors claims: "The purely administrative function
originally played by the orders, has been largely supplanted by
uses which have the same net effect as legislation." They have
given the President even more power than he already has as Chief
Legislator. George Reedy notes that executive orders are another
technique that gives the executive initiative over the legislature.

According to Ruth Morgan, presidents will issue executive orders
instead of recommending legislation when the following conditions
prevail:

1) the goals are extremely important;
2) the degree to which the President's
program can be implemented adminis-
tratively is high;
3) the chances for enactment of legis-
lation is low;
4) the effect that presidential pressure
or action will have on other executive
programs being considered by Congress
will be favorable.

Neighbors notes that executive orders have been issued
mainly in three broad categories:

1) the development of public land and
resources;
2) the regulation of administrative and executive departments of government;
3) civil rights.30

In each of these areas presidential action by executive order can provide significant law in the void created by Congressional inaction.31 Executive orders are more flexible than laws, and are more easily amended and abolished. Therefore, it is assumed that presidents issue executive orders because the legislature will not enact their policies. Thus, we expect a negative relationship between number of executive orders issued and presidential performance with the Congress.

The use of executive orders over the twenty year period under study pretty much conforms to the notions of Morgan and Neighbors. Most of Eisenhower's executive orders dealt with the administration of acts already passed, the establishment of emergency boards, and granting Congress the authority to inspect tax returns.32 Almost all of these matters were done under authority given to the President by the Congress. Eisenhower did issue two important orders in 1954, one dealt with non-discrimination in employment (#10,557), and the other involved security and loyalty in the executive branch (#10,548). In 1957, a type of order was issued that would be repeated by Ike's successors. It provided assistance to the state of Arkansas for the removal of an obstruction of justice; federal register jargon for the sending of federal troops to Little Rock to aid in the integration of Central High School (#10,730).
It has already been pointed out that Kennedy was, at least verbally, determined to use all the powers of the presidency to achieve what he desired. The executive order was a major weapon to accomplish his ends. In his three years in office, Kennedy averaged 71.3 executive orders per year, more than any of the other presidents in this study. There is a suggestion that Kennedy's appraisal of his relations with the Congress led him to employ this tactic. However, his use of the executive order did not differ too much from Eisenhower. Most of the orders concerned the establishment of executive boards and commissions, and directives to departments involving civil defense procedures.

Yet there were instances where President Kennedy did use the executive order for policy making purposes. Immediately upon taking office he expanded the program of food distribution to the needy, fulfilling a campaign promise made in West Virginia (#10,914). His second order moved the Food for Peace program into the Executive Office of the President, making its director report directly to the President (#10,915). Also in the first year, Kennedy established the Peace Corps by executive order (#10,924), using funds from the office of the President to finance the agency until Congress formally voted it into existence some months later.
However, the executive order which afforded Equal Opportunity in Public Housing (#11,063) was the most important of his administration, and the one that engendered the most controversy. It was based on a campaign promise that Kennedy had made, to eliminate discrimination in public housing, "by the stroke of a pen," using the executive order to circumvent a Congress he presumed would never pass such legislation. However, it was not until late in 1962 that Kennedy got around to picking up the pen. Fairlie suggests that it took a concerted "Ink for Jack" campaign to pressure the President into finally issuing the order. In another civil rights matter, Kennedy used the executive order to assist in the integration crisis in Alabama in 1963 (#11,111).

Lyndon Johnson's use of the executive order resembled the pattern of the other presidents. Most of his orders dealt with operational instructions to other areas of the executive branch, as well as the appointment of commissions and boards. (Two of the most famous: the Warren Commission to investigate the assassination of President Kennedy (#11,130), and the Kerner Commission to investigate Civil Disorders (#11,365). This President was also forced to issue orders to handle civil rights crises: sending federal troops to Detroit in 1967 (#11,364), and doing the same in Washington D.C. and other cities to quell
the riots that followed the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King in 1968 (§11,403). President Johnson also moved the federal government into the area of pollution control by a number of executive actions that generally preceded Congressional action.

Richard Nixon's use of the executive order primarily concerned the establishment of councils and commissions and the reorganization of the executive branch. For example, in 1969 President Nixon by executive order established the domestic council (§11,452), the Office of Intergovernmental Relations (§11,455), a presidential foreign intelligence advisory board (§11,460), and an Environmental Quality Council (§11,472). Two years later using this power he instituted an Office of Consumer Affairs (§11,583).

President Nixon's most important executive orders came in 1971 in dealing with the economic situation. Acting under authority granted to him by the Congress, he imposed wage, price, and rent controls and established councils to monitor each of these, (§§ 11,615, 11,617). In 1973 faced with an energy crisis the President used the executive order to create a Federal Energy Office and Czar in the Executive Office of the President (§11,748).
The results indicated a fairly strong positive relationship between the issuance of executive orders and presidential performance with the Congress. Kendall's Tau b between the number of executive orders issued and Boxscore was .32 (significant at the .10 level). The relationship with Support Score was .37 (significant at the .05 level). While the relationship with the Key Vote Score was a non-significant .23. Rather than using executive orders as a method of avoiding a recalcitrant legislature these figures suggest that presidents performing well with Congress make the greatest use of the executive order. In a sense, successful presidents are active presidents in every way.

I would conclude, however, that the reported relationships are spurious, and there is no real connection between the use of executive orders and presidential performance with Congress. The major reason for the rejection of these findings is that most executive orders are issued under grants of authority from Congress. Therefore, the President is usually implementing the recommendations of a generally supportive Congress. Morgan reports that of 1769 executive orders issued between 1945 and 1965, 83% were issued under statutory authority. Those not issued under statutory authority were not of any major policy significance to alter these conclusions. Most of the executive orders have not really affected major public policy questions, but have involved administrative maneuvering.
Leader of Public Opinion

Pendleton Herring suggested: "A mighty but dangerous weapon in the Presidential arsenal is his power of going direct to the public over the heads of the Congress." The President's ability to exploit his platform for popular leadership is an important factor affecting his performance. The opportunities presented allow him to set the public debate, to define the nation's agenda, "to focus, blur, or make issues," and above all, to place his views before the public.

In other eras communication with the people occurred indirectly through the press, or in those rare instances when the communication was direct, through the campaign train. (e.g. Wilson's fight for U.S. involvement in the League of Nations). However, in the last twenty years the marvels of technology have made the electronic media the primary source of presidential contact with the people. As James has pointed out:

Technological developments have provided the President with invaluable new means to reach the public directly and continually, and to receive accurate information on the nature of the public response.

The most important factor was the tremendous growth of television. Minow, Martin and Mitchell in a study of the presidential use of television commented:

Time and again, and in recent years with increasing frequency, presidents have appeared on television to explain their policies, to mobilize support, to go over
the heads of Congress and the political parties - and to speak directly to the people for their cause.\textsuperscript{40}

The television networks have been unusually cooperative with the White House. A presidential request for TV time has never been rejected by the networks. Their introduction of nightly half-hour newscasts in 1963 provided the President with even greater exposure to the public. In recent years presidents have also learned about the viewing habits of Americans and have scheduled presidential speeches into the prime evening hours, sometimes following the top-rated shows. The preoccupation of presidents with television was illustrated by the hiring of actor Robert Montgomery as coach and consultant during the Eisenhower administration, and by the installation of a television studio in the basement of the White House by President Johnson.\textsuperscript{41}

The increased use of television and radio for direct communication by the President to the people, has led to the decreased use of the press conference. This trend was particularly true during the Nixon administration. Press conferences, as an indirect form of communication with the people, were considered an important part of the President's attempts at persuasion. Cornwell described how Franklin Roosevelt used them "as a forum from which to discuss pending policies and their favorable consideration in Congress, or to build support in the country that in turn would be translated into pressure on the legislature."\textsuperscript{42}
John Kennedy transformed the press conference into a totally public meeting, in which the press merely provided an excuse for a meeting in which the President used television to reach beyond them to the public. Press conferences became the same show as a presidential address. Yet this format was curtailed somewhat during the Johnson administration. The paucity of these meetings with the press during the Nixon administration caused concern in some quarters, yet as we shall see, this did not diminish President Nixon's contact with the public.

Hypothesis 3: There is a relationship between the number of appearances a president makes on television and radio, and his performance with the Congress.

The assumption was made that presidents would employ the resources of television and radio as a pressure device on Congress to get their programs enacted. However, Cornwell noted:

As the range of presidential policy concerns has steadily broadened since World War II, and as the White House staff for legislative liaison has taken over more of the day to day job of Congressional surveillance, conscious advance preparation by the President of public opinion for pending measures has doubtless become increasingly rare. The tools and potential are still ready at hand, however, to be used when the urgency is great enough and the stakes high enough to demand their use.

This suggests that the President will resort to media contact with public opinion when the normal policy process is not working.
Thus it might be expected that a poor performance in one year might lead to more television and radio appearances the following year.

Despite his enormous popular appeal, President Eisenhower's use of television and radio was limited. Hughes noted, "As for using the power of his own personality in direct appeal to the people - to summon support, to bestir the Congress, or to rally the party - Eisenhower felt and practiced the same constraint and diffidence" that marked the rest of his presidency. He never used these resources in any coherent and sustained campaign. Most of his television appearances occurred either leaving or returning from a trip or foreign conference. He did not like the direct address to the people, preferring instead informal discussions. On a couple of occasions, well-rehearsed Cabinet meetings were televised, as well as reports from the Secretary of State on his travels, which were accompanied by presidential commentary. Eisenhower's other media appearances usually coincided with crisis events, such as the integration struggle in Little Rock, and the launching of the Sputnik by the Soviet Union, both in 1957. In 1959 Eisenhower used television in an attempt to explain his budget. Most observers felt this was not a very successful use of the medium.

Eisenhower did not enjoy press conferences either. Hughes reports that Press Secretary Hagerty had to talk the President into holding them. They were usually filmed, and
after editing by the White House, made available to the networks.

President Kennedy's reputed transformation of the presidential use of television is not entirely accurate. Fairlie claims:

Whenever there was something he wished to do, he went before the TV cameras, and could rely on obtaining the desired popular reaction.  

Kennedy's most significant contribution was the introduction of the live television press conference. He also instituted a series of informal talks with network newsmen, which came to be known as "conversations with the President." In our list he was only on the screen slightly more than Eisenhower. (6.0 appearances per year, to 5.3). Yet there was a feeling among the Kennedy people that "television was his greatest weapon." As Minow, Martin, and Mitchell suggest, "Television's most significant political characteristic is its ability to present an image of a politician." It was the image that television presented of Kennedy that became important. Mendelsohn and Crespi claim that TV created the "cult of the Kennedy personality," which made the President into a movie star.

Kennedy's appearances on television occurred during times of crisis, such as the confrontation with the Soviets over the missiles in Cuba in 1962, and the civil rights struggles at the Universities of Mississippi and Alabama in 1962 and 1963. Like Eisenhower, they also included reports to the people on presidential
journeys. There was little systematic effort to use television and radio for legislative purposes. An occasion it was used came in 1962 when Kennedy plugged the Trade Expansion Act at ten press conferences, introducing the subject himself three times. Kennedy was criticized for not using Franklin Roosevelt's "fireside chat" technique to push for legislation. Sorenson notes that Kennedy felt that a large proportion of the public just will not listen to a Presidential speech on legislation. As public opinion studies demonstrate the public will pay attention only in times of great urgency.

Lyndon Johnson acknowledged that "when traditional methods fail a President must be willing to bypass the Congress and take the issue to the people." Yet he also admitted that he did not like to appeal over the heads of the Congress. He noted, "Good legislation does not come from rhetoric." He therefore, rarely used television to make appeals for legislation. One major exception was the Voting Rights Act in 1965.

Johnson did however, make some unique contributions to the presidential use of television. The President liked to exhibit his triumphs before the American people. Thus, he was the first president to sign bills into law on live television, as he did on numerous occasions in 1964 and 1965. Sidey also noted another instance of showing off on TV, when Johnson's personal
intervention helped settle the railroad strike in 1964:

Such triumphs made the Johnson juices boil. A spectacle was demanded so the country could share in his success. Johnson wanted the announcement on TV... He wanted it on prime evening news time.58

Johnson rushed over to the Washington studios of CBS and appeared live on the Walter Cronkite evening news with the announcement of the railroad settlement. He was to repeat this performance a year later in a similar situation with the steel industry.

Despite all this, Johnson also carried on the traditional presidential use of television. These included reports to the nation following foreign travel, and the report to the nation during crisis periods - e.g. the Detroit riots, and the Kennedy and King assassinations. There was a marked decrease in Johnson's TV appearances after 1965. Goldman attributes this to a decision by the White House that frequent television addresses by the President were annoying the public thus exacerbating Johnson's image problem.59

More than any other modern President, Richard Nixon tried to take advantage of the opportunities presented to the chief executive by the new media techniques to enlist support for his administration. He appeared on television and radio more than twice as often as the other presidents in this study. He averaged thirteen appearances per year. One explanation for
this high frequency of media use, was the enormous amount of hostility between Nixon and the press, which resulted in the near elimination of the press conference as a means of communication with the people in favor of more direct methods. John Osborne pointed out:

Nixon has said several times that he regards the press conference as merely one means of communication with the public and that he has the right to choose it or any of his other means - statements, speeches, etc. - for communication.60

Like the other presidents Nixon reported on his foreign travels. Yet since he was the first President to visit Peking and Moscow, he received enormous amounts of extra coverage during these journeys. These trips were also well-coordinated for maximum television exposure for the President. Schlesinger reports that "Returning from China, he lay over at Anchorage, Alaska for nine hours simply so that he could descend on Washington at 9 P.M. the primest of prime hours."61

Nixon continued the practice of informal conversations with network newsmen. He employed a series of systematic television reports about the war in Southeast Asia which helped generate support for his policies in that area. Especially effective in this regard, was the speech on November 3, 1969, which countered significant anti-war activity at the time. Nixon also became the first president to veto a bill on live TV.
The revival of the use of the radio was Nixon's most important contribution to presidential use of the media. First employed during the 1968 campaign to deliver short messages on serious topics, as President, Nixon returned to this technique. He delivered his annual foreign policy reports in this manner. In 1973 he discussed the State of the Union in five separate radio addresses. Since these speeches were usually brief statements on specific topics they offered some advantages to the President. James reported that one of the most significant of these for the Nixon people, was that the President could control how his message would be reported. It forced the other media, especially television news, to focus on the points the administration wanted emphasized.

In 1973 Nixon tried to use television to defend himself against charges of his involvement in the Watergate scandal. One could suggest that these speeches helped to postpone the eventual downfall. Yet television in this instance was working against the President, as other significant actors learned how to use the medium to tell the other side of the story.

The results do not support hypothesis 3. Presidential appearances on radio and television were not used, except in rare cases, to stir up public support for specific legislation. Instead, presidents used television for three broad purposes:
1) to expose themselves to the public in the hope of creating a favorable image;  
2) to reassure the nation during times of crisis;  
3) to report on their journeys abroad and their dealings with foreign leaders.

Therefore, it was no surprise that the data revealed very little relationship between television and radio appearances and presidential performance with the legislature. Kendall's Tau b was -.09 for the relationship with the Support Score, and .10 for the relationship with the Key Vote Score. The relationship with the Boxscore was slightly better, Kendall's Tau b = -.23.

There was also a slight suggestion that a poor Boxscore in one year would lead to more appearances the following year, Kendall's Tau b = -.30, but there was no such relationship with the other two measures of performance.

There are many people who are concerned with the manipulative power that television affords to Presidents. Yet the danger of over-exposure is just as great. As Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon discovered, if public confidence in the president has eroded, appearances on TV or radio are not going to help restore that confidence.

Cornwell suggests another explanation for the lack of a relationship. He felt that the "bully pulpit" is not really very effective in moving Congress. Congressmen are exposed to other inputs besides public opinion in responding to presidential
program requests. Further, Cornwell thinks the public is reluctant to accept "the symbol of national unity," the President, making partisan appeals for public support. Thus, the presidential use of television and radio gives the chief executive the ability to set the agenda, but the power to see that agenda enacted involves other kinds of considerations besides appearances on the media.

Conclusion

Three roles played by presidents have been examined as they relate to presidential performance with Congress. It was found that the role of Chief Legislator was an important factor affecting performance. In their role as Chief Executive, Presidents issued executive orders. The quantitative data suggested the more executive orders issued the better the president's performance in Congress. However, the qualitative analysis led to the rejection of these findings because of the administrative nature of many of the orders, which seemed to indicate that executive orders had very little to do with the legislative process. As the Leader of Public Opinion, Presidents have frequently employed television and radio to generate support over the past twenty years. The nature of that use, however, led to the conclusion that president's appearances on the electronic media were not related to the legislative process.
It was suggested earlier that role expectations stem from two sources; the individual's own conceptions of the role, and the expectations others have for that role. Presidents' Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon defined their role expectations as "activist", while Eisenhower, saw himself as more restrained. In playing the roles of Chief Legislator, Chief Executive, and Leader of Public Opinion, it appeared that Kennedy and Johnson fulfilled their expectations. This was especially true for Johnson as Chief Legislator. Nixon was only active in his use of television and radio, and quite inactive in relative terms as Chief Legislator. Eisenhower's moderate perceptions of the role were reflected in the moderate manner in which he played each of these roles.

We started by claiming that role theory assumed expected behavior will influence actual behavior. We also were assuming a successful presidency is the goal of every person who occupies that office. If we define success as performing well with the legislature and expected behavior as the roles presidents are expected to fill, then Chief Legislator becomes a very significant role for a president, while Chief Executive and Leader of Public Opinion are not as important for this kind of success.
Notes - Chapter 3


15. Ibid.


17. Ibid., p. 286.


21. Ibid., p. 652.


24. Ibid.


27. Neighbors, p. 112.


31. Morgan, p. 82


35. Morgan, p. 82.


41. Reedy, p. 161

42. Cornwell, p. 152.

43. James, p. 70.

44. There are data collection problems with this section. The discrepancies among the numerous sources as to the number of television and radio appearances by each President is enormous. See the Appendix for a list of appearances that were included in the data evaluation.

45. Cornwell, p. 141.


47. Ibid.

48. Fairlie, P. 150.

50. Minow, Martin, and Mitchell, p. 6.


52. Cornwell, p. 195.

53. What most of these critics failed to realize was that Roosevelt's use of this technique was also limited. See Cornwell.

54. Sorensen, p. 369.

55. For a discussion of the effect of this fact see Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 662.


57. Ibid.


62. James, p. 79.

63. Cornwell, p. 300.
CHAPTER 4
PRESIDENTIAL STAFF

A President cannot go it alone in this complex society. He must assemble a White House staff, appoint a Cabinet, fill various other positions in the Executive Branch, and then delegate power. As Clinton Rossiter observed: "The Presidency has been converted into an institution, and we can never again talk about it sensibly without accounting for the men around the President."¹ The growth and institutionalization of the office of the presidency has been one of the major developments in government in the last forty years.

Norman C. Thomas has traced that development since the late 1930s. He has noted:

The Brownlow Committee Report of 1937, the Reorganization Act of 1939 which established the Executive Office of the President, the Employment Act of 1946 which created the Council of Economic Advisers, the reports of the two Hoover Commissions in 1949 and 1955, the development of an elaborate formal staff under President Eisenhower, the use of informal and ad hoc study groups, task forces, and committees by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and, most recently, President Nixon's creation of the Domestic Council, are manifestations of the continuing effort to respond to the presidential need for assistance.²

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Still, observers, such as Henry Fairlie, argue that "There is no high political office which is less institutionalized," and all that has happened in the past thirty years is "the President does many things which he did not do before, and needs a larger staff to help him." Others, like Robert Gilmour, dismiss Fairlie's claims out of hand.

Gilmour uses criteria established by sociologists and developmental analysts to define the institutionalization of the presidential office as an index of boundaries, organizational complexity, routinization and role development, and symbolic attachment. The growth of the formal organization of a presidential advisory system within the Executive Office of the President is one example of the development of boundaries that separate the American presidency from other institutions. The internal division of labor and the sheer size of the Executive Office has led to organizational complexity. The formalization of presidential actions once considered extraordinary represents routinization. Routine role expectations, some of them discussed in chapter 3 of this study, provide further satisfaction of the third criteria. Finally, the symbolic life attached to the Office of Management and Budget as the "fiscal arm of the President" is evidence of the fourth criteria.
Seligman has pointed out that personal organizations surrounding positions of leadership are characteristic of executive leadership. He notes: "A group of loyal personal aides who are incorporated into or retained alongside the formal organizations are characteristic of executive positions in many large scale organizations." Presidents have relied on special advisers since Washington. However, they were usually members of the Cabinet or remained outside the government. Andrew Jackson had his "Kitchen Cabinet," William McKinley had Marcus Hanna, while Woodrow Wilson relied extensively on the advice of Colonel House.

In 1937 the Brownlow Committee on Government Reorganization recommended, "provision for a number of new presidential assistants to expand the presidency into a genuine institution. These new assistants should not be officials in their own right, but should virtually be extensions of the President himself." Starting with Franklin Roosevelt's last years in office, the number of personnel assisting the President has increased tremendously. Data for the number of people working for the President in the Executive Office of the President and the White House staff are difficult to discover. They are supposedly listed in the Budgets of the United States. Yet it appears that for a long time a number of people working for the White House were ostensibly
employed by other agencies of the government, which made the Budget figures unreliable.

A report released by Congressman Morris Udall (D-Ariz.), delineated the growth of the Executive Office of the President. The study only reports figures for selected years, but since they have been adjusted in order to make comparisons among the last four administrations, they will be displayed in this chapter. Table 5 reports the Udall Committee figures for the growth of the Executive Office of the President and the White House staff from 1955-1973. The data indicate that the major increases occurred in 1970 during the Nixon administration. There was also a slight decline after President Nixon's re-election in 1972.

Averill Harriman suggests the need for these personal assistants arose from two sources: the proliferation of independent agencies of the New Deal with their personnel reporting directly to the President, and the expansion of presidential prerogatives as Commander-in-Chief throughout World War II. A further contributory factor was the enormous growth of the federal bureaucracy, which has frustrated the attempts of chief executives to gain "command and control" of the government.

One consequence of this new reliance on personal staff has been the diminished role of the Cabinet. Although it is generally acknowledged that the Cabinet as a whole was rarely

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Number of Employees White House Staff</th>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>2,206</td>
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involved in policy making, in the past its members often served in important advisory capacities. However, as Fenno notes, the role of the Cabinet member involves dual loyalties: to the President who appoints him, and to the department he leads. According to Bill Moyers, Cabinet members are often people the President does not know, who have independent political bases and ambitions, and who may have been appointed for political patronage reasons. These factors often combine to make the President less confident of these people and more willing to trust those aides who put personal loyalty to the President above other outside interests.

The Brownlow Committee further recommended that White House aides should exhibit "a passion for anonymity." However, Patrick Anderson claims the White House staff has emerged, "from its previous shadowy status to its place of prestige today." Yet, Rather and Gates claim that such powerful assistants as Haldeman and Ehrlichman were generally unknown to the public until they were involved in the Watergate scandal. Finally, Moyers argues that the influence of television has made it difficult for White House staff members to remain anonymous anymore.

What White House aides have not had is enormous amounts of political experience. Emmet John Hughes calculated that from 1939 to 1969 only fifteen of one hundred and seventy presidential
aides have had previous political experience. Bryce Harlow, who has served two Presidents claims this may not be important. He notes the men around the President need most of all, "a capacity for personal loyalty and selflessness."

Personal assistants perform many functions for their President. They can act as buffers to absorb pressures; as catalysts to expedite administrative or political action; as liaison men with the press, Congress and administrators; as policy advisers and experts; as ideologists; and as communications experts. What I am concerned with in this study is how the nature of the President's staff is related to his performance in the Congress. Differentiating among the various staffs under study is difficult. Thomas has noted the influence of the personalities of the people involved. Two hypotheses can be suggested based on two factors: the structure and operation of the staff system, and the amount of turnover on that particular staff.

Richard Tanner Johnson delineates three models of White House management. In the formalistic approach the emphasis is on an orderly procedural system concerned with finding the "best" solution, rather than working out settlements among conflicting views. Information is funneled up a distinct chain of command to the President at the top.
Interpersonal conflict among staff members is discouraged. Koenig has referred to this type of staff system as "hierarchical" and I shall use that nomenclature.

The second model Johnson calls the competitive approach. This type of operation thrives on aggressive advisers pitted against one another on overlapping assignments. Conflict and controversy are deemed essential to the functioning of this system. It is pragmatic and opportunistic, with short-run bargaining more important than long-range analysis. The President is seen as the arbitrator among the competing contestants. Franklin Roosevelt's staff operation is seen as the prime example of this model. Koenig and Neustadt both greatly admire Roosevelt's handling of his staff and by implication this model.

The third approach Johnson calls the collegial. Here the President is concerned with building a team of colleagues to work together. Conflict is seen as a resource out of which divergent points of view can be fused to generate solutions. The President is seen as the main cog in the team, and the skilled manager of personnel. I have combined Johnson's second and third approaches and called it the "wheel" model of staff operation.

The hierarchical staff structure suggests a closed advisory system in which the President's information is restricted and access to him is controlled by a single Special Assistant to the
President. The wheel model suggests a looser, more open, staff structure. The President is at the hub of the wheel with his advisers as the spokes. They are all able to gain direct access to him. There is no chain of command or funneling of information up a hierarchy.

One of the concerns of the literature has been the isolation of the President from the rest of the government. The White House staff has been blamed for keeping the President out of touch, especially with the legislature. Congressmen have complained that they should have better access to the White House. It appears that Congressmen would be more receptive and responsive to the open or "wheel" staff system. Thus:

Hypothesis 4: The more open the President's staff system, the better his performance with the Congress.

A special part of the staff structure significant for its impact on the Presidential-Congressional relationship, was the development of an Office of Congressional Relations in the Executive Office of the President. The OCR was begun during the administration of Harry Truman, and his successors have institutionalized its use. The idea behind the OCR was to integrate legislative liaison in the executive branch under the leadership of the President. Holtzman concluded:

No chief executive will hereafter feel that he can afford to deal with Congress without a special liaison unit or to staff it with other than highly sophisticated actors.
However, it should be made clear that the Office of Congressional Relations does not have sole responsibility in the Executive Branch for dealing with Congress. Cabinet members still lobby for legislation that will affect their departments, and those departments have their own liaison officers. Members of the White House staff outside the OCR, lobby for specific measures the President deems important. Often the OCR will be overridden by these other lobbyists. However, I will examine the use of the OCR by each of the administrations under study.

The second hypothesis is based on the stability of the staff. A highly unstable staff leads to a deterioration of efficiency. Constant turnover of personnel will force the President to adjust to the new personnel. This can mean problems with the smooth administration of government. Relationships with other branches, including the legislature could be hindered. Thus:

Hypothesis 5: The larger the turnover in staff, the poorer the performance of the President in Congress.

In this context, staff will be defined as Cabinet members and people listed as White House staff members in the government organization manuals.

Analysis of the hypotheses will be based on descriptions of the staffs of the four Presidents. These descriptions have been extracted from information provided by people who participated
directly in the staff systems they are describing. It is im-
portant to keep this in mind in the following discussion.

Eisenhower

The Eisenhower staff system was marked by three
important factors. First, the President desired more efficiency
in running the government. Second, the President's passive view
toward his job required him to delegate tremendous amounts of
authority. Third, as a consequence of the above two, a formal
hierarchical staff system with set procedures was established,
with Sherman Adams as Assistant to the President.

Parmet notes that Eisenhower conceived himself as
the head of a well-organized team.25 When he first entered the
White House, Eisenhower was amazed:

With my training in problems involving organization
it was inconceivable to me that the work of the
White House could not be better systemized than
had been the case during the years I observed it.26

Thus to the new President, "one of my first responsibilities
was to organize the White House for efficiency."27 This meant
the revival of formal Cabinet meetings and the increased use of
the National Security Council as a policy making tool with its
own sub-structure. Positions such as Secretary to the Cabinet,
Staff Secretary, and Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
were created to bring coordination to the formal organizations.
Eisenhower was aiming to mitigate the complexities of the modern
Presidency.28
This was more evident in terms of delegating authority. Eisenhower noted: "Every subordinate was always expected within his own area of delegated authority and within the limits of established policy to solve his own problems." The President gave his Cabinet members almost an enforced autonomy, that sometimes created embarrassment for the President. For example, Treasury Secretary Humphrey contradicted the President's own budget message in 1957. Johnson claims that in no recent administration were so few decisions made by the President. He notes:

The parceling out of tasks to departments and committees and task forces, the delegation of authority to advisers, the President's insistence on unanimity before decisions reached him - all served to limit his role to veto and ratification, with ratification the rule.

These procedures were facilitated by the staff system Eisenhower established, and the role in it played by Sherman Adams. Eisenhower viewed Adams as the Assistant to the President who would bring coordination at the staff level. The President admitted that, "A man like that is valuable because of the unnecessary detail he keeps away from the President." This attitude gave Adams an opportunity to become involved in much more than staff coordination. A strict chain of command was built running from Eisenhower to Adams and then to the various staff components. Eisenhower told other governmental officials "to clear it with Sherm" before bringing their problems to him.
Adams was also involved in settling policy disputes among departments and agencies. Thus, Adams became a protector, buffer, and shield for the President.

Despite Adams' power it is clear from the literature that other advisers did have access to the President. Secretary of State Dulles was generally exempt from the Adams system. Press Secretary Hagerty had direct communications with the President, especially during the heart attack recovery period. Treasury Secretary Humphrey used his personal relationship with the President to circumvent Adams.

Still, Eisenhower had a closed hierarchical staff system designed to meet the efficiency needs of the government. Perhaps the best thing about the system was its ability to function without Eisenhower. His preference for dealing with a single Chief of Staff caused an isolationism that marked his Presidency, and affected his relationship with Capitol Hill.

Adams had difficulty relating to other politicians, especially in the legislative branch. Congressmen felt that it was difficult to get through the protective shield of Adams. Hughes notes that Adams was constantly alienating Congressmen with his monosyllabic answers to their requests (usually negative), and his refusal to treat them as "very important persons." To a great extent Adams' departure in 1958 occurred because of his
personal reputation with other officials, as much as, because of his indiscretions with Bernard Goldfine.

The staff structure and the role of Adams, made the job of General Persons as head of the Office of Congressional Relations more difficult. Persons seemed well qualified to head the OCR, since he had served for many years as the Congressional liaison officer for the Department of Defense. Hughes claims Persons was responsible for healing "as many wounds in Congress as Adams opened up." Yet Persons operation at the OCR was criticized for being too concerned with fulfilling requests of Congressmen, rather than pushing the President's legislation.

After Adams departure in late 1958, the staff structure was opened up to some extent. Access to the President was not as restricted as before. Persons replaced Adams as Chief of Staff, but some of the duties of that position were transferred to Gordon Gray, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Bryce Harlow was promoted to head the OCR. Yet Eisenhower's performance in Congress did not improve. The changes came too late to have any major impact, and the combination of other factors made the change in staff structure relatively unimportant.
Turnover on the Eisenhower staff was remarkably low. It averaged only 17% a year over the eight year period. (See Table 6). Cabinet turnover was also quite low. There were 21 department heads of ten departments over the eight year period. A few major losses did occur. The resignation of Adams has already been mentioned. Another major loss was the death of Secretary of State Dulles in 1959. Dulles' control of foreign affairs decision making had frustrated other advisers trying to have some impact on that process. Presidential subordinates such as Nelson Rockefeller, C.D. Jackson, and Harold Stassen, clashed with Dulles, and soon after left the government. The departure of George Humphrey at Treasury in 1957, cost the President his major fiscal adviser, as well as a close personal friend in government. However, he was replaced by a man Eisenhower came to admire greatly, Robert Anderson. The relatively low turnover in the administration does not seem to have affected the President's performance with the Congress.

Kennedy

John Kennedy's staff more than any other under consideration resembled the "wheel" model. It was a fluid, collegial approach to staffing that allowed Kennedy to, as Anderson puts it, "hold all the strings of the government in his own hands."
Sorenson notes that Kennedy "required a personal staff ... that represented his personal ways, means, and purposes." 37

There was no Chief of Staff, but rather a small core of senior aides with relatively fixed assignments. Yet, Schlesinger suggests that Kennedy wanted in the White House an all purpose group to whom he could toss anything. 38

Formal organizations established in the Eisenhower administration, especially in the national security area, were abolished. The Cabinet as a collective body was ignored, meeting only six times in three years. 39 Kennedy preferred to interact with Cabinet members on a bi-lateral basis. The President did have a special relationship with his brother, the Attorney-General, and soon developed one with the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. However, from the rest of the Cabinet Kennedy remained quite detached. In the early stages of the administration, Commerce Secretary Luther Hodges, complained about his lack of accessibility to Kennedy because of the interference of the White House staff, Kennedy chose to ignore the complaint. 40

Kennedy is extolled in the literature for his skillful juggling of personalities and the avoidance of rancor among the staff. Accessibility for staff members was not limited. Kenny O'Donnell was the doorkeeper, but resourceful presidential aides soon discovered they could circumvent O'Donnell by going through
the President's secretary, Mrs. Evelyn Lincoln. Although he sometimes overlapped staff assignments, conflict among the staff was discouraged. Teamwork was the most important factor and the fussing and feuding common to the Roosevelt staff was avoided. The appearances may have been illusory. Even Schlesinger admits that a pecking order among the staff emerged, with Bundy and Sorenson above the rest. Anderson notes that after the assassination the repressed animosities surfaced in the memoirs and articles written by Kennedy staffers.

Kennedy is credited with upgrading two positions instituted in the Eisenhower years, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and the Special Assistant for Congressional Relations. Although the former is not of great concern to this study, let me suggest that Kennedy reshaped foreign policy decision-making by placing McGeorge Bundy in the White House basement. The President also made sure that all relevant information, including intelligence reports went directly to Bundy's office. After disappointments with the State Department, particularly on the Bay of Pigs and Berlin, these new procedures gave Kennedy greater control over foreign policy.

The key organizational move for the purposes of this study was the structuring of the Office of Congressional Relations, and the appointment of one of Kennedy's most important political
advisers, Lawrence O'Brien, as its head. Kennedy wanted a well-organized, aggressive congressional relations program that would be centralized in the White House. O'Brien notes that at the beginning of the administration he and his assistants, Mike Manatos and Henry Hall Wilson, sat down with three Kennedy friends in the legislature, Representatives' Thompson, Bolling and Elliot. They went through the entire list of Congressmen, assessing the ways these men and women could be convinced to support Kennedy's programs.

Centralization was achieved through reports sent to O'Brien's Office each week, describing the Congressional activities of each department. This allowed for greater coordination in planning the administration's legislative strategies. The President made it known early in his tenure that Congressmen should direct their inquiries to O'Brien and his staff.

Turnover during the three years of the Kennedy administration was remarkably low. On the White House staff the turnover rate was 20% (see Table 6). All of his major aides were still with Kennedy at the time of the assassination. Cabinet turnover was also quite small, even Luther Hodges remained.

Yet despite this seeming well-oiled, smooth functioning staff, Kennedy was unsuccessful in getting things done. His relations with Congress were not good, despite all of O'Brien's
efforts. The collegial approach has been criticized because
the development of a cohesive team sometimes facilitates a
closed system of mutual support, the phenomenon Irving Janis
calls "Groupthink." Kennedy critics, such as Henry Fairlie,
believe that a small, personally devoted staff will function
well, but will not accomplish much. He claims that strong
personalities willing to engage in fussing and feuding, in
the manner of the FDR staff, is the type of staff system that
gets things done.

Lyndon Johnson's staff system is hard to classify
as either hierarchical or wheel. The literature on Johnson's
staff is preoccupied with personalities, Johnson's and the men
around him, rather than descriptions of the operation. With this
in mind, I am going to suggest that Johnson's staff in domestic
affairs began as a wheel system, but soon evolved into a hierar­
chical arrangement in which authority was delegated and
specific functions were assigned. The major goal was to get
things done. However, this system was different from the
Eisenhower or Nixon hierarchy. Johnson was his own Chief of
Staff and positions in the hierarchy shifted because of the
enormous amount of turnover of top aides during his administra-
tion. Thus, a true formal hierarchy never developed. Furthermore,
in foreign affairs a collegial group operated, especially in decision-making on Vietnam.

The unusual circumstances that brought Johnson to the Presidency were responsible for this evolutionary process, and the dual nature of the staff operation. After the assassination, for reasons of continuity, Johnson asked the Kennedy staff to remain. Johnson's own lack of expertise in foreign affairs made him dependent on Kennedy appointees like Bundy, McNamara, and Rusk. As described earlier, Kennedy's staff was a fluid, collegial system. The retention of Kennedy's people combined with Johnson's admiration for FDR, who also employed the "wheel" arrangement, made Johnson's original intention to maintain this type of staff operation.

However, it soon became evident that this was not going to work. Lyndon Johnson was not John Kennedy or Franklin Roosevelt. Johnson was aiming for consensus within the government to match his consensus policies for the nation. Loyalty to Johnson's idea of consensus became paramount in the White House. Conflict over ideas was discouraged. Conflict among the staff was perceived as disloyalty to the President, and was repressed. Furthermore, friction developed between the holdover Kennedy men and the new people Johnson had brought into the White House with him.
Philip Geyelin, writing in 1964, complained about the lack of Johnson men in positions of importance on the White House staff. The inherited Kennedy team was still operating. Yet Goldman points out, that by the middle of 1964 most of the Kennedy men had left the White House, while those who remained, Bundy, O'Brien and Goodwin, were willing to transfer their loyalties to LBJ. The Johnson people were beginning to assume positions of influence and power in the White House. Men such as Walter Jenkins, George Reedy, Jack Valenti, Marvin Watson, Horace Busby, and most importantly, Bill Moyers, were already in their places.

The career of Bill Moyers as a White House assistant was typical of the staff operation of the Johnson presidency. During the early years of the administration Moyers played a major role in coordinating the task forces that developed much of the Great Society legislation. In 1964 and early 1965 he was at the top of the domestic hierarchy. Later he turned his attention to foreign policy and built a network of contacts in the bureaucracy that he employed for sources of information outside the normal channels. In these early years the President developed a special relationship with Moyers, even tolerating dissent from the young Texan. However, Moyers star shone brightly for only a short while. By the end of 1965, as their disagreements on Vietnam grew stronger, Moyers influence on policy diminished, and by January 1967 he was gone from the White House.
After Moyers' loss of policy influence, President Johnson began to use his personal staff as operators rather than advisers. Their major role was to monitor the activities of the government. For policy advice Johnson went outside the government to old friends such as, Dean Acheson, James Rowe, Ed Weisl, Abe Fortas, and Clark Clifford. (The latter two would soon become insiders.) The use of the Cabinet was also revived, with even Kennedy holdovers like Dean Rusk gaining more influence than they ever had under Kennedy.

By the middle of 1966 with Johnson increasingly involved with Vietnam, authority in domestic affairs was delegated to a new set of aides within the White House. In the final three years of his tenure Johnson's staff functioned as a formal, hierarchical system. It was not the hierarchy explicit in the Eisenhower administration or the Nixon administration that was to follow. There was no Sherman Adams or H.R. Haldeman. Yet there were broad delegations of authority. Joseph Califano became the overseer of domestic programs and built his own staff in an attempt to coordinate the domestic bureaucracy. Staff members were given specific policy responsibilities. For example, Harry MacPherson was the White House special liaison with the urban agencies, while Douglass Cater filled a similar role with the health and education agencies.
There were two major exceptions to this pattern. The first was in foreign affairs where a collegial group, dubbed the "Tuesday for lunch bunch", shared the responsibility for decision making, especially on Vietnam. An inner group consisting of National Security Assistant McGeorge Bundy, later replaced by Walt Rostow, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, later replaced by Clark Clifford, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Earle Wheeler, and CIA director Richard Helms, met with the President to discuss options and alternatives. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William Bundy often joined the group. For a while Moyers and Under Secretary of State George Ball also sat in, but as their opposition to the war grew, their attendance declined. Irving Janis suggests that this group was a highly cohesive, mutually supportive team, that became a perfect example of the dangers of "groupthink."^54

The second exception occurred in Johnson's relations with the legislature. I have already described in Chapter 2 how the President was personally concerned with almost every detail of that relationship. Until mid-1965 the liaison staff was still operating under the leadership of Larry O'Brien. However, O'Brien's role was diminished as the President involved himself in the day-to-day operations of congressional relations. As MacPherson notes,
"Johnson remained his own master of the Hill." After O'Brien was appointed Postmaster General, Jake Jacobsen and then Harold "Barefoot" Sanders, two friends from Texas, led the OCR. At the same time departmental liaison officers were given more leeway. Still Johnson involved himself in the major battles, making phone calls, pushing his legislation, reviving the "Johnson treatment" for his old friends on Capitol Hill.

I have already alluded to the high turnover in the Johnson administration. There was a 36% turnover rate for the White House staff. Over the five years of his tenure, 25 cabinet members served in 12 cabinet positions. Most importantly were the losses of the top aides. The departure of Moyers has already been mentioned. One of Johnson's top aides from his Senate days, Walter Jenkins, was forced to resign in October 1964. George Reedy left in July 1965, and then wrote a book attacking Johnson's White House operation. Jack Valenti was gone by April 1966, Horace Busby by the end of that same year. Jake Jacobsen came in the spring of 1965, stayed twenty months and returned to Texas. Of the three Kennedy aides who tried to make the transition, Bundy and Goodwin were gone by early 1966, leaving Larry O'Brien as the sole survivor.

Their departures were blamed on Johnson's personality and the harsh manner in which he treated his staff. He was willing to use them to accomplish his ends, and then discard them when they
displeased him and were no longer useful. Johnson took the admonition of the Brownlow Committee literally. He expected his aides to be "extensions of himself." If Lyndon Johnson drove himself relentlessly, he expected the same from his assistants. For many of them the demands were too much, and the rewards too little. Yet in terms of performance this staff operation guided an enormous amount of legislation through Congress.

Nixon

The Nixon staff system resembled Eisenhower's, yet there were some important differences. The Nixon system was a formal, hierarchical structure with a definite chain of command. However, unlike Eisenhower, Nixon wanted the options presented to him for his own decisions. Nixon was a private man with a penchant for working alone, who wanted machinery to staff out the options, but provide plenty of time for reflection.\textsuperscript{58}

Nixon's staff was the largest in history. John Osborne notes: "It was the biggest, and most elaborate array of assistants, assistants to assistants, councils and sub-councils in Presidential history."\textsuperscript{59} It was a staff very much concerned with the orderly process of government. Conflict among the staff was to be avoided. The feeling among the staff was of men banding together to fight a hostile environment.\textsuperscript{60} Loyalty to Richard Nixon and his public relations image was an overriding concern with everything that was done.
The most important person on the White House staff was H.R. Haldeman, who was Nixon's Sherman Adams. At the beginning of the administration he was little more than the doorkeeper, guarding access to the President. Haldeman did not assume a more powerful role until the end of 1969, and only after a vacuum had developed in the staff system. After that he became one of the most powerful influences on the thinking and actions of Richard Nixon.61

From the beginning Nixon's major interest was foreign affairs. Henry Kissinger was appointed Special Assistant for National Security affairs. Kissinger established an orderly staff system using the National Security Council apparatus. The Nixon-Kissinger relationship remained strong throughout the administration, and Kissinger always had direct access to the President.

In domestic affairs the President established a highly structured counterpart to the National Security Council and called it the Domestic Council. Kessel notes that this group served the needs of President Nixon by preparing detailed written analyses for the private contemplation the President preferred.62 At the same time, Nixon was prepared to delegate tremendous amounts of authority in this area.

In 1969 he appointed an old friend from the Eisenhower administration, Arthur Burns, as Counsellor to the President
with authority to coordinate domestic policy. At the same time Nixon named Daniel Patrick Moynihan to head the newly established Urban Affairs Council (a predecessor to the Domestic Council). Throughout 1969 Burns and Moynihan engaged in a struggle for control of domestic policy. Despite some early successes, for instance, the President's acceptance of Moynihan's proposal for a Family Assistance Plan, neither man was able to become the domestic czar of the Nixon White House. By the end of 1969, Burns was exiled to the Federal Reserve Board, while Moynihan was "promoted" to a position with little policy influence, and would soon thereafter leave the White House entirely.

Into this vacuum stepped an increasingly confident Haldeman, suggesting White House counsel John Ehrlichman, as the man to coordinate domestic affairs. The President agreed, and named Ehrlichman to head the new Domestic Council. The old college friends were now esconced at the top of the White House domestic hierarchy and together they were soon keeping tabs on almost everything that went on in the White House and the country.

Yet despite their power, other voices were heard on various policy matters during the Nixon years. George Shultz, was one of the few members of the original Nixon Cabinet to gain stature and power in the ensuing years. As head of the Office of Management and Budget and later as Treasury Secretary, Shultz
became Nixon's chief economic adviser and one of the top six or seven advisers who had a decisive influence on policy.\textsuperscript{64}

John Mitchell was probably closer to the President than any other adviser during the first two years of the Nixon administration. In spite of his formal role as Attorney General, like his predecessor Robert Kennedy, Mitchell acted as a special adviser on a variety of topics. However, Mitchell's bungling of the Haynsworth and Carswell nominations cost him the confidence of the President. By the end of 1971 his role as close adviser was diminished, and by 1973 Nixon was ready to use him as the scapegoat in the Watergate scandal.\textsuperscript{65}

I have already talked about the disdain the Nixon administration had for the legislative branch. This attitude affected the operations of the Office of Congressional Relations. Evans and Novak have pointed out, "Not for decades had an incoming White House staff appeared so much a mystery to Congress. It was populated with too many unknowns."\textsuperscript{66} Yet Bryce Harlow, who had held the same post under Eisenhower, was appointed head of the OCR. A rivalry soon developed between Harlow and Haldeman, essentially over strategy in dealing with Congress.\textsuperscript{67} However, underlying these disagreements over tactics were basic attitudinal differences towards the other branch of government. As a man who
had experience as liaison officer and lobbyist, Harlow had some understanding and concern for the procedures and personnel of Congress. Haldeman lacked both.

Another important factor in the rivalry was Haldeman's control of access to Nixon, which made it difficult for Harlow to see the President. Harlow became so frustrated by Haldeman's methods that he soon left the government. Clark MacGregor was the next head of the OCR, but despite some public relations gimmicks, there was little improvement in the administration's relations with the Congress. MacGregor was replaced by William Timmons, with announced plans for better cooperation between the two branches. However, these did not materialize either, as the President concerned himself, first with his re-election, and then with Watergate.

An example of the way Haldeman operated with respect to Congress is related by Rather and Gates. They report that after the 1972 election Haldeman launched a move to replace Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott without consulting any Republicans in the Senate. A further example of Haldeman's and Ehrlichman's relations with the Congress was provided by the general jubilation on Capitol Hill that greeted the announcements of their resignations in April 1973.
Despite promises of a new White House structure after April 1973, the staff system remained essentially the same. Alexander Haig replaced Haldeman as Chief of Staff, but access to the President was not any less restricted. The major change occurred in domestic policy making where Ehrlichman's departure left a power vacuum that was filled by members of the Cabinet such as Weinberger at HEW and Butz at Agriculture. For the rest of 1973 the President was pre-occupied with Watergate and the impending impeachment hearings.

Turnover in the Nixon administration was extremely high. Departures from the White House staff averaged 34%, which was slightly less than Lyndon Johnson's staff. (See Table 6) The turnover on the White House staff followed some interesting patterns. It was quite low in non-election years, but following the 1970 and 1972 elections many people departed. Some who left after 1970 later surfaced at the Committee to Reelect the President—e.g. Jeb Magruder. The Watergate scandal claimed almost the entire staff in 1973. (31 of 48 offices turned over.)

Cabinet turnover was the highest for the four administrations under consideration. There were 31 cabinet members in 12 positions for 5 years. Nixon for the most part ignored his Cabinet, and strong personalities like Romney and Hickel became frustrated and either left of their own accord or were eased out by Haldeman. Elliot Richardson served in three Cabinet posts in
three years, finally resigning for good in October 1973 following the firing of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox.

Nixon's congressional relations were not aided by the staff system he established. The formal hierarchy, with Haldeman controlling access to the President, disturbed many Congressmen. Turnover was extremely high, but perhaps some people should have departed earlier.

Conclusion

The descriptive analysis is summarized in Table 6. Neither hypothesis 4 nor hypothesis 5 is supported by the evidence. The President operating with an open, "wheel" system did not achieve the best performance with the Congress. High turnover did not have an adverse affect on presidential performance.

Lyndon Johnson was the most successful President with Congress in this study. His staff structure was a shifting hierarchy with high turnover. This approach was described as result oriented. The President was mainly concerned with getting things done, and that included enacting legislation. Johnson's ability to deal with the legislature as a past master of that body, made the staff operation less important than in the other administrations. Johnson was willing to risk the loss of good people to accomplish his ends.
### TABLE 6: PRESIDENTIAL STAFF AND PRESIDENTIAL PERFORMANCE
**1954-1973**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff Structure</th>
<th>Turnover (% W.H. Staff)</th>
<th>Performance BS</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>KVS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>Formal Hierarchy</td>
<td>Low (17%)</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>Wheel</td>
<td>Low (20%)</td>
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<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>Shifting Hierarchy*</td>
<td>High (36%)</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>82.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>Formal Hierarchy</td>
<td>High (34%)</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* I have previously noted that Johnson's staff on foreign affairs was a collegial operation. However, the structure that most affected his legislative performance can best be summarized in this manner.

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**Key:** % W.H. Staff = percentage turnover per year on the White House Staff; BS = Boxscore; SS = Support Score; KVS = Key Vote Score. The performance scores are all percentages.
The hypothesized ideal staff system, a "wheel" structure with low turnover, produced good results for Kennedy on the Support Score. Yet it was quite evident that despite the efforts of Larry O'Brien and his cohorts, Kennedy failed to enact a majority of his proposals. The difference between the scores can perhaps be explained by the nature of the staff system. The Support Score measures votes on which the President takes a specific stand. On these specific votes the "wheel" staff can concentrate their efforts and attention and contribute to improved Presidential performance. On the other hand, when we examine the Boxscore, the percentage of presidential requests enacted by Congress, the wheel structure does not function as productively. Its non-systematic approach precludes focusing on a broad range of legislative problems.

The formal hierarchy model did not contribute to better presidential performance whether turnover was high or low. I think some blame for Eisenhower's and Nixon's poor performance can be attributed to the nature of their staff systems. It allowed men like Sherman Adams and H.R. Haldeman to control the President's relationship with the legislature. These Assistants to the President frustrated the liaison people, Persons, Harlow, MacGregor, and Timmons, by regulating their access to the President. One could argue that the problem was
the personalities of Adams and Haldeman. Yet as Haldeman once observed, if he wasn't performing the job for Nixon, the system would require someone else to do it; e.g. Al Haig. Access and information were limited by the system, not by these particular personalities.

Kessel concludes that a White House staff has to serve the personal needs of the President, the needs of the voters, and the needs of the presidency. Selecting men and women and assembling a staff system that meets these requirements is difficult. What works for one president is not necessarily the "ideal" system. It is hard to imagine Eisenhower or Nixon operating with Roosevelt's staff system.

The hierarchical system isolates the chief executive from conflicting opinions that are considered necessary to provide the President with policy options and alternatives. Therefore, the "wheel" system is offered as the solution to the isolation problem. Yet this system is attacked for developing mutually supportive conditions labeled "groupthink," that also preclude the discussion of policy options and alternatives.

In many ways the staff system becomes the dependent variable influenced by a number of different factors. For example, Norman C. Thomas suggests that presidents seeking new policy departures will tend to prefer flexible staffing arrangements. He also notes that crisis conditions create chaotic and
and informal staff systems.\textsuperscript{72} It appears, however, that the personality of the President will influence the system he employs. Their need for orderly and systematic procedures produced the formal hierarchies of the Eisenhower and Nixon administration. Johnson's relentless drive presumed friction with his staff and large turnover. While Kennedy's willingness to consider discordant ideas led to the establishment of the "wheel" system.

A president has to be comfortable with the people around him. They have to serve his interests, since they are his creatures. Every administration has its share of staff problems. As with any large organization, motivating subordinates toward certain goals may require special techniques. The kind of staff system that works best to achieve a level of presidential performance that could be labeled success is difficult to determine. There appear to be costs and benefits to each type.
Notes - Chapter 4


13. Ibid., p. 470.


19. Thomas, p. 163.


27. Ibid., p. 114.


30. Richard Tanner Johnson, p. 84.

31. Ibid., p. 91.


34. Ibid., p. 66.

35. This percentage figure was derived by dividing the number of White House staff positions listed in the Government Organization Manual for a particular year by the number of people who had left since the previous year, and then averaging over the time period of the administration.


41. Ibid., p. 631.

42. Anderson, p. 239.


44. Ibid.


49. Goldman, p. 104.


51. Ibid., p. 361.


60. Richard Tanner Johnson, p. 212.


64. Rather and Gates, p. 231.


69. Rather and Gates, p. 304


72. Thomas, p. 162.
CHAPTER 5

COMPOSITION OF CONGRESS

The composition of Congress is an important factor in the President's dealings with the legislature. The membership and organization of the legislative body strongly influences the relationship between the two branches. Since Congress remains organized around the two major political parties, leadership posts and committee assignments reflect party strength. Both parties in the legislature employ elaborate organizations such as caucuses, policy committees and campaign committees, to help conduct their business. A communications network through a system of assistant leaders or "whips" also operates. Despite the lack of party discipline present in parliamentary systems, a number of studies have noted that the Congressman's party affiliation is the best single predictor of his roll call voting.¹

For nineteen of the twenty years under study, the Democrats were the majority party in Congress. The size of those majorities ranged from razor thin in the early years, through moderate in most of the years, to overwhelming following the 1958 and 1964 elections. Table 7 displays this information. Despite these advantages the Democrats were unable to dominate public
### TABLE 7: PARTY COMPOSITION OF CONGRESS: 1954-1973\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress (years)</th>
<th>House</th>
<th></th>
<th>Senate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>DM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83 (1953-54)</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84 (1955-56)</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>+29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85 (1957-58)</td>
<td>234</td>
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<td>+33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86 (1959-60)</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>+129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87 (1961-62)</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>+89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88 (1963-64)</td>
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<td>89 (1965-66)</td>
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<tr>
<td>90 (1967-68)</td>
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<td>91 (1969-70)</td>
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<tr>
<td>92 (1971-72)</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>+75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93 (1973-74)</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>+51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) These figures are election results and do not reflect changes during the Congressional session.  
\(^b\) Wayne Morse (Oregon) elected as Independent, later switched to Democrats.  
\(^c\) Harry Byrd Jr. (Virginia) elected as Independent, but caucused with Democrats.  
\(^d\) James Buckley (New York) elected as Independent, but caucused with Republicans.  

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Key: D = \# of Democrats; R = \# of Republicans; I = \# of Independents; DM = Democratic margin.

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Source: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, November 9, 1974, p.3105.
policy making. One reason for their failure was that during eleven of those years the Republicans controlled the executive branch. A second important factor was the split which existed within the Democratic party in Congress.

Despite the predictive value of party affiliation, oftentimes "Congressional politics is coalition politics," where party lines cross and majorities develop among different factions. During the years under study the most potent non-partisan alignment in Congress was labeled the conservative coalition. An ideological split in the Democratic party replaced the partisan alignments. An alliance of Southern Democrats and Republicans often opposed the stand taken by Northern Democrats. According to Congressional Quarterly, the coalition appeared when a majority of Southern Democrats combined with a majority of Republicans to oppose a majority of Northern Democrats on roll call votes. The South was defined as the eleven states of the Confederacy plus the border states of Kentucky and Oklahoma.

The coalition has been an important force in the policy process during the past twenty years. Because of its conservative nature it should be against new initiatives in public policy making. The expectation would be that this group would block proposals by any president, including conservatives. The coalition in Congress would essentially be interested in
preserving the status quo and would resist any policy innovations from the White House. Thus:

Hypothesis 6: The stronger the conservative coalition, the poorer the President's performance with the Congress

Another important element of the composition of Congress is the majority party leadership. Ripley defines four types of leadership based upon the criteria of party control of the White House and Congress, the attitude of the President toward his legislative role, and the nature of the appeal the President makes for support. He labels these the Presidential Partisan, Presidential Bipartisan, Congressional, and Truncated types of majorities.  

In Presidential Partisan majorities the Presidency and the Congress are controlled by the same party. The President is active and his party controls both Houses of the legislature. The 89th Congress (1965-66) operated under this type of majority.

In the Presidential Bipartisan type, the President and the Congress are of the same party, and the President is active. Yet the majority party in Congress experiences disunity or its advantage is small, so that the President is forced to make overtures to the minority party in order to achieve his objectives. The 87th (1961-62), 88th (1963-64) and 90th (1967-68) were examples of this type of majority.
The Presidency and the Congress are controlled by the same party again in the Congressional majority. However, the President is passive and is willing to allow the legislature to determine its own priorities. The Congress is expected to develop programs of its own. The 83rd (1953-54) Congress is supposed to fit this category.

Finally, in the Truncated majority at least one house of the Congress and the Presidency are controlled by different political parties. The President may be either active or passive. The 84th through 86th (1955-1961) Congresses, and the 91st through 93rd (1969-1975) were classified as this type of majority.

Hypothesis 7: Presidential performance will vary with the type of majority party leadership according to the following rank order: It will be the best in Presidential partisan, next best in Presidential Bipartisan, then Congressional, and worst in Truncated majorities.

The Conservative Coalition

The history of the "conservative coalition" is full of denials of its existence. Both Southern Democrats and Republicans claim the alliance is a statistical artifact based largely on the natural voting inclinations of members of Congress. Little effort, they note, is exerted to wield it into an effective
group. Attempts by liberal Democrats to discuss the effect of the coalition result in angry retorts from conservative members of both parties disowning such an alliance. Recent studies by John Manley and Joel Margolis, however, report the existence of "an informal, bipartisan bloc of conservatives with leaders who jointly discuss strategy and line up votes." Manley notes that although "the coalition is an informal organization, which given its existence in the no-man's land between the two major political parties, operates in subtle, hard-to-observe ways,... it is in fact, a consciously designed force in the legislative process."

Neil MacNeil points out that the coalition emerged in the House of Representatives as disaffection for Franklin Roosevelt grew among Southern Democrats after the "court-packing" plan in 1937, and the attempted purge of anti-New Deal Democrats in the primaries of 1938. The coalition originally formed in the late 1930s when the leaders of the respective groups, Joe Martin (R-Mass.) and Eugene Cox (D-Cal.) met informally to line up votes on issues of mutual interest. Howard Smith (D-Va.), who replaced Cox as the leader of the Southern Democrats in the House, admitted later that consultation and cooperation with the Republicans was a key policy strategy. "Judge" Smith soon moved into an especially strategic position as Chairman of the Rules Committee, giving the coalition control over the House calendar.
Martin's replacement as House Republican leader, Charles Halleck of Indiana, admitted that Republican tactics encouraged disunity in the majority party. This included allowing Southern Democrats to co-sponsor Republican legislation such as the Landrum-Griffin labor relations bill in 1959. When Gerald Ford of Michigan replaced Halleck in 1965, he announced the Republicans would no longer openly cooperate with the Southern Democrats to obstruct Democratic legislation. Instead the Republicans would offer "constructive alternatives," in order to build a platform to capture the White House in 1968. Despite these pronouncements the coalition endured.

Margolis reports that the coalition emerged in the Senate as Southerners angered over Roosevelt's intervention in the 1938 primaries and in the fight over Joe Robinson's successor as majority leader, defected from the Democratic party on different issues. He also notes that although these reasons explain its formation, the coalition in the Senate was ineffective until the early 1940s. Under the leadership of Richard Russell (D-Ga.) the Southerners remained a potent force in the Senate during the 1950s and early 1960s.

Manley reports that the coalition enjoyed its greatest successes during the Truman and early Eisenhower era. He provides data that indicate the coalition success rate did not fall below seventy percent for this time period. Charles Clapp
notes that Republicans identified spending issues, labor legislation, "the extension of the hand of the federal government", and loyalty-security issues as the major areas of cooperation with the Southern Democrats. MacNeil suggests the coalition did not function on every roll call, but "on the great economic questions, the coalition was an effective way to mass House conservatives into a solid phalanx, unaffected by party labels."15

The number of Southern Democrats, until recently, has remained remarkably stable, since most of them came from safely Democratic states. The nature of the coalition was largely affected by the shift in the numbers of Republicans and Northern Democrats. Four elections had an effect on the strength of the coalition during the time period under discussion. The replacement of many Northern Democrats by conservative Republicans in the 1946 congressional elections provided the coalition with numerous supporters during the 1947-1958 period. In 1958 liberal Democrats swept many of these conservative Republicans out of Congress, costing the coalition numerous supporters. Many who managed to survive this first electoral onslaught, were devastated in the Goldwater debacle in 1964. Between 1959 and 1966 the coalition's strength was diminished and its effectiveness hindered. After the comeback
by the Republicans in the 1966 congressional elections, the coalition also rebounded in strength. Rieselbach writing in 1973 noted, in recent years the "conservative coalition achieved considerable results in pushing a hard line in foreign relations and in imposing restrictions on the scope of federal activities in the areas of social welfare and civil rights."\(^{16}\)

The analysis that follows is based on roll call votes recorded by Congressional Quarterly for the 85th through 93rd Congresses.\(^{17}\) The operational definition of the coalition has already been noted. It is important to realize that roll call votes demonstrate only one area of the coalition's effectiveness during these years. Manley notes that during this period the coalition often controlled the following Congressional committees: Armed Services, Finance, Appropriations, and Judiciary in the Senate; Ways and Means, Appropriations, Education and Labor, Un-American Activities, and District of Columbia in the House.\(^{18}\) Conservatives were thus in positions of power to prevent many pieces of liberal legislation from reaching the floor of either House for a roll call vote. Furthermore, it is difficult to measure the number of bills altered during the legislative process, in attempts to keep both wings of the Democratic party together. I have already discussed President Kennedy's two year postponement of civil rights legislation in order to mollify the
Southern Democrats. Roll call votes are thus imperfect measures, but they can offer some insight into the strength of the coalition.

The strength of the coalition was measured in two ways: the number of times a majority of Southern Democrats and a majority of Republicans coalesced on a roll call; and the number of times the coalition was victorious when this occurred. The figures in Table 8 indicate the strength of the conservative coalition in Congress from 1957 to 1973. The conservatives coalesced on almost 21% of all roll calls during this period. Yet it achieved victory on more than three out of every five roll call appearances. The coalition was most salient during the Nixon administration, while it was most successful during the Eisenhower period. The strongest single year for the coalition was 1971.

Table 9 displays the figures on the coalition's strength in the Senate and the House of Representatives. The mean differences between the two bodies were slight. In the House, the coalition appeared and succeeded most often during Nixon's tenure. The Eisenhower years brought its greatest success in the Senate. Strangely the coalition was most apparent in the upper House during Johnson's administration.

Of interest were the differences between the "liberal" Democratic Presidents and the "conservative" Republican
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>TRC</th>
<th>CRC</th>
<th>%CRC</th>
<th>CV</th>
<th>%CV</th>
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<td>207</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>X=74.3</td>
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<tr>
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Key: TRC=total # of roll calls; CRC=# of roll calls during which the conservative coalition was present; CV=# of roll calls on which the conservative coalition was victorious.

FIGURE 2: CONSERVATIVE COALITION ACTIVITY IN CONGRESS:
1957-1973

Key: CCA=conservative coalition appearances; CCV=conservative coalition victories. The numbers on the ordinate are percentages. The numbers on the abscissa are years.
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Key: CRC=# of roll calls on which the conservative coalition was present; CV=# of roll calls on which the conservative coalition was victorious.

FIGURE 3: CONSERVATIVE COALITION ACTIVITY IN CONGRESS:
HOUSE-SENATE: 1957-1973

Key: CCA=conservative coalition appearances; CCV=conservative coalition victories; ——— = House; ——— = Senate.
The numbers on the ordinate are percentages; the numbers on the abscissa are years.
Presidents. I had expected similar activity from the coalition under each. I was wrong. During the Republican control of the White House the coalition appeared on 22.2% of all roll calls, while during Democratic rule it appeared on 20.8%. The coalition was victorious on 71.6% of these roll calls when the Republicans controlled the White House, while it was successful only on 56.4% of these roll calls during the tenure of the Democrats. The distinction between Republican and Democratic Presidents on coalition appearances was slight, yet it was clear that the coalition was more successful during "conservative" Republican administrations. The data also provide evidence that the coalition agreed more with the positions taken by conservative Presidents. For example, in 1971 President Nixon disagreed with the conservative coalition on only four out of fifty-four votes on which they both took positions. By comparison, the coalition in 1966 agreed with President Johnson's position only seven times, while disagreeing with him on fifty-five votes.  

The successes of the coalition during the Eisenhower years occurred on those issues outlined by Clapp. The major battles were fought over extending the role of the federal government in civil rights, education, health or redevelopment. Fights over increased spending for domestic programs usually allied the President and the conservatives in Congress.
At the beginning of the Kennedy administration, the coalition suffered a major defeat when the House Rules Committee was enlarged. The closeness of the vote, however, presumed the coalition's resurgence on other issues. It would play a large role delaying and defeating much of Kennedy's legislative program. The major coalition successes came on bills to aid education and to establish an urban affairs department. Also the conservative alliance was instrumental in preventing Medicare from leaving committee.

The early Johnson years, as already noted, were the nadir of coalition effectiveness. The President was able to persuade enough Republicans to defect from the coalition to pass a Civil Rights bill in 1964 and a Voting Rights bill in 1965. On the anti-poverty bill, he borrowed a tactic from the coalition and employed Southern Democrat Phil Landrum (Ga.) as the chief spokesman for this legislation.

In the final years of the Johnson administration the alliance reformed to force cutbacks in many of the Great Society programs passed during its period of quiescence. The coalition defeated legislation on rent supplements, rat control, and gun control, blocked a Supreme Court nominee, and forced reduced funding for model cities, highway beautification, and many other programs.
The coalition continued its resurgence during the Nixon administration. From 1969 through 1973 it was successful in defeating numerous anti-war amendments. It aided in passing the President's ABM proposal in 1969 after a bitter struggle in the Senate. Bitter defeats for the coalition and the President occurred with the failure of the Senate to confirm two Southern Supreme Court nominees.

The future of the conservative coalition depends on a number of factors. Some suggest eventually re-alignment of the two political parties will occur along ideological lines. This would totally formalize the coalition. Despite this speculation, however, trends in the opposite direction are also taking place. The growth of the Republican party in the South, and the emergence of liberal Southern Democrats, has caused the alliance to undergo some strain. Thus, the close cooperation may finally end as two party competition comes to the South.

The effect of the success of the conservative coalition on Presidential performance supports the hypothesis. The more successful the coalition, the lower the Boxscore ($r=-.47$), Support Score ($r=-.48$) and Key Vote Score ($r=-.27$) for the seventeen year period. The relationships are not that clear for appearances of the coalition. The correlations indicate no relationship between appearances and Boxscore ($r=.09$) or
Support Score \( (r=-.06) \). There is a very slight correlation between appearances and Key Vote Score \( (r=.18) \), implying the more appearances the coalition makes the better the President's performance.

Upon examining the results for Republican and Democratic Presidents, the hypothesized relationships clearly exists only for the scores for Democratic Presidents. This was true for Boxscore \( (r=-.35) \), Support Score \( (r=-.75) \), and Key Vote Score \( (r=-.68) \). The success of the coalition yields higher scores for Republican Presidents only on Support Score \( (r=-.37) \). There are no relationships between the coalition's success and the Boxscore \( (r=-.04) \) and Key Vote Score \( (r=-.01) \) for Republican Presidents.

The results indicate the conservative coalition affected Presidential performance with the Congress. The success of the coalition was a more important factor than its appearance. Democratic Presidents encountered greater difficulty with the coalition than did Republican Presidents.

**Type of Leadership**

Leaders of Congress often face difficult role choices. If they are members of the President's party, they are expected to be his lieutenants in the legislature. This sometimes conflicts with their role as member and leader of the legislative branch.
If their party controls the legislature, but not the executive, the leaders are expected to cooperate with the President in the national interest, yet at the same time to attack the President in order to minimize his re-election chances. Finally, if they are leading the minority party in Congress, similar role conflicts may occur, but they are accompanied by different strategies in dealing with the Executive Branch. A President's relations with the leaders of Congress exemplify the cooperation and conflict inherent in the relationship between the two branches.

Ripley's four types of majority party leadership in Congress have already been defined. Table 10 lists the Congressional leaders over the twenty year period under discussion, as well as classifying each type of leadership.

The two periods of Truncated majorities (1955-1960, 1969-1973) provide different examples of Presidential-Congressional leadership relations. In each situation the Presidents, Eisenhower and Nixon, were essentially passive in their attitudes toward the legislature. The Democratic majorities in Congress reacted to each President in a dissimilar manner. Eisenhower was viewed as the great popular hero, who somehow was above partisan politics. Nixon, on the other hand, was perceived as a relentless partisan crusader. It was thus easier for the
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</table>

Democrats to cooperate with Eisenhower than with Nixon.
Another significant difference in the relationships was the evolution that occurred in Congress, especially in leadership styles.

During the 1950s the Democratic leaders exhibited characteristics of strong Congressional leadership. Both Sam Rayburn in the House of Representatives and Lyndon Johnson in the Senate, managed a complex system of relationships with other members which allowed them to function as Chief Spokesmen for their party in Congress. Rayburn's dictum that "to get along, you go along" kept freshmen in their place, while the seniority system remained sacrosanct. Johnson's legendary "treatment" enabled him to cajole and manipulate the Senate. The "folkways" of the Senate were still operative as well.

President Eisenhower described his relations with the majority leadership as quite good. In fact they were probably better than his relationships with the Congressional leaders of his own party. The President noted he shared a special kinship with Speaker Rayburn since they were born in the same Congressional district in Texas. He complimented the Senate Majority Leader for their cooperative efforts over the years:
He was far more often helpful than obstructive in furthering the recommendations I sent to the Congress. The amount of legislative accomplishment that had been achieved during the six years I had to work with an opposition led in the Senate by Lyndon Johnson was impressive.24

Yet, Evans and Novak describe a Majority Leader Johnson bristling with frustration over his inability to challenge Eisenhower effectively.25 The National Democratic party pressured the Congressional leadership to be more aggressive in opposing the President. Both Johnson and Rayburn knew, however, that to challenge directly such a personally popular President would be political suicide. So they maneuvered as best they could to build a record for the Democratic party, while trying to diminish the performance of the President.

They achieved some success in this manner because of Eisenhower's troubles with the Republican leadership in Congress. The minority leader in the Senate, William Knowland of California, created a complicated situation for the President. Although it was obvious that Knowland was philosophically opposed to Eisenhower's "new Republicanism", the President refused to prevent Knowland's elevation to the leadership post after the death of Senator Taft in 1953. As a consequence, Knowland caused the President acute embarrassment, when on a number of occasions, he stepped down as Republican leader to oppose Eisenhower programs in the Senate.
In the House of Representatives the leadership of Joe Martin of Massachusetts presented Eisenhower with some of the same problems. Although Martin subordinated his own positions better than Knowland, the Bay State Republican represented the "old guard" of his party who were opposed to many of Eisenhower's "progressive conservative" ideas. These Republicans frustrated Eisenhower to the point where he toyed with the idea of forming a new political party. By 1959 the President was so fed up that he gave tacit assent to the successful challenge to Martin's leadership by Charles Halleck of Indiana.

The new Republican leadership team of Senator Dirksen of Illinois, and Representative Halleck in 1959, was much more attuned to Eisenhower's desires for modern Republicanism. The election of 1958, however, altered the nature of the Democratic leadership, while other factors discussed in chapter 2 and 4 forced Eisenhower into a more partisan mood for the final two years of his presidency. The influx of many new Democrats into Congress, with visions of success in the 1960 Presidential election dancing in their heads, led to uncontrollable Democratic majorities. Lyndon Johnson's tight control on the Senate was evaporating. The emergence of the Democratic Study Group in the House, led to a decentralization of the leadership in that body. The cooperation that previously existed between the President and the majority party leadership degenerated into partisan warfare.
The second truncated situation during the Presidency of Richard Nixon occurred under very different leadership circumstances. For the first time since Zachary Taylor's election in 1848, the country elected a new President of one party, and a Congress controlled by the other party. Furthermore, since Nixon was elected with less than a popular vote majority, the Democrats were less fearful of attacking this Republican President. Combined with these factors was the diffusion of leadership in both the Senate and the House. All this created opportunities for individual Democrats to take partisan swipes at the President and made cooperation quite difficult.

The Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield of Montana, assumed a very different leadership style than his predecessor. As John Stewart noted, Mansfield, unlike Johnson's tight centralized leadership, was willing to allow individual Democrats to emerge as leaders in various issue areas. Leadership in the Senate shifted with different legislative issues. Many Senators were also using the Senate as a spawning place for their Presidential ambitions and thus visibility became important. Democratic Senators such as McGovern, Kennedy, Jackson, Bayh, and others, combined with Republicans such as Javits, Mathias, Hatfield, and Cooper, often sponsored legislation and led it through the Senate. As Ripley noted in Power in the Senate, patterns of leadership became very individualized.
In the House, the Democratic leadership was also weak. Speaker McCormack was old and ran a collegial type operation, consulting other Democrats. The Democratic Study Group, which began in 1959 as a minority of liberal Democratic House members, had grown into a controlling majority within the majority party. After McCormack retired in 1970, his replacement Carl Albert of Oklahoma, was also perceived as a weak leader. A revival of the Democratic caucus system led to reforms that tried to strengthen the leadership. The Nixon years were still marked, however, by complaints of a leadership vacuum on Capitol Hill.

Nixon had better relations with his Republican leaders than Eisenhower. In the House, Gerald Ford played the good lieutenant role. He was rewarded for his services by promotion to Vice-President after the resignation of Spiro Agnew in late 1973. As described in chapter 2, the President's relations with the Senate were not too good. Minority Leader Dirksen's death in 1969 cost the President a strong leader and close ally. His successor, Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, in many ways became Nixon's Knowland. Scott, like Knowland in the 1950s, found himself in personal disagreement with the President on numerous issues and did not hesitate to say so. Also the
individualism prevalent in the Democratic party began to infect some Republicans in the Senate. Defections from the President by members of the "liberal" wing of the Republican party cost him some bitter defeats. (e.g. the Haynsworth and Carswell nominations.)

The Nixon disdain toward Congress combined with the individualism and the lack of strong leadership, led to years of conflict between the administration and the Congress. The Truncated majority created a paucity of legislative accomplishment. Even on measures where Democrats might be expected to cooperate with the President, such as FAP, they refused. Republicans, especially in the Senate deserted the President on numerous occasions. The conflict over the legitimate powers of each branch exacerbated this situation as well.

The three Presidential-Bipartisan majority situations (1961-62, 1963-64, 1967-68) created difficulties for both President's Kennedy and Johnson. Despite fairly large Democratic majorities, the ideological divisions in the 87th, 88th, and 90th Congresses forced both Presidents actively to seek Republican support for their programs. As in the Truncated majority, good relations were necessary not only with leaders of the President's party, but also with the leaders of the opposition party. In this Johnson proved more successful than Kennedy.
Larry O'Brien claims that President Kennedy lacked a degree of intimacy with the Democratic leadership when he first entered the White House. Speaker Rayburn and Senate Majority Leader Mansfield had both supported Lyndon Johnson for the Presidential nomination the previous year. House Majority Leader McCormack was an old Kennedy rival from Massachusetts, while House Whip Carl Albert was unfamiliar with the new President. Hubert Humphrey, the new Senate Whip, had been Kennedy's rival for the nomination.

Their common membership in the Democratic party overcame most of these problems. The weak leadership abilities of Mansfield, McCormack, and Albert have already been described. Humphrey turned out to be a valuable asset in the Senate. In the House, however, the Kennedy administration dealt directly with those members it believed could influence others, such as Carl Vinson of Georgia, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Sorenson claims Kennedy had "good professional relationships" with the Republican leaders, Halleck and Dirksen. Clearly, the administration needed Republican help to enact its programs. This necessity was demonstrated by the narrow margin on the Rules Committee fight in early 1961. Yet Kennedy was generally unsuccessful in obtaining Republican support for his proposals. Ripley reports that Republicans, especially in
the House, remained united in their opposition to the Kennedy administration throughout its tenure.32 The overtures to Dirksen and Halleck were for the most part unfruitful. O'Brien notes that Kennedy's legislative successes occurred when he enticed Southern Democratic defections from the "conservative coalition." Despite Schlesinger's suggestion that Kennedy wanted to avoid an overly partisan Presidency in the manner of Harry Truman,33 bipartisanship was not accomplished very often during the Kennedy administration.

Johnson's relations with the 88th Congress enabled him to achieve the bipartisanship Kennedy sought. The national consensus that followed the assassination of President Kennedy accounted for much of the Republican spirit of cooperation. Yet President Johnson revived the techniques he perfected as Senate Majority Leader in the 1950s and in 1964 they worked. As noted in an earlier chapter, the President assumed direct control of his Congressional relations. His skill at handling Republican Senate Leader Dirksen, especially on the Civil Rights bill of 1964, made this Presidential Bipartisan majority a success.

The 90th Congress was a different story. Johnson's Presidency was being assaulted from both political parties. The President lost support among liberal Democrats because of the war in Vietnam, while at the same time the "conservative
coalition" enjoyed a resurgence that debilitated Johnson's Great Society programs. The Republicans sensing Johnson's vulnerability in the 1968 elections became quite obstreperous. A revived Republican House leadership under Gerald Ford and Melvin Laird terminated the bipartisan cooperation of the early Johnson years.

The 89th Congress (1965-66) was the only example of a Presidential Partisan majority during the period under study. The Democrats' overwhelming margins in both Houses of Congress would have allowed President Johnson to ignore the Republicans. Yet in his desire to achieve a national consensus and to be "president of all the people" Johnson sought Republican votes for the Great Society legislation. He remained on good terms with Senate Minority Leader Dirksen. There was difficulty in the House, however, as a Republican revolt thrusted Gerald Ford into power replacing Charles Halleck. Ford and his allies, such as Laird, Goodell, Quie, and Griffin promised constructive opposition by the minority party to the Democratic President. Task forces led by Melvin Laird generated Republican alternatives. In 1965 these forces were overwhelmed by the momentum of the administration and the Democratic majority. During the second half of this Presidential Partisan majority they would achieve some success. It would take the 1966 elections, however, to decrease the Democratic margins and force them to seek support from the Republicans.
The 83rd Congress (1953-54), was classified as an example of the Congressional majority type leadership. In 1953 President Eisenhower surrendered the legislative initiative to the Congress. The President's passive attitudes toward executive-legislative relations were reflected in the first year of this Congress. In 1954, however, the President regained the initiative and introduced a full program to the Congress. His attitude towards this legislative session (see Chapter 2) indicated he desired legislative success. Eisenhower vetoed forty-two bills in 1954, none of which were overridden. Eisenhower's relations with the congressional leaders were similar to his relations in the Truncated situation; some cooperation with the Democrats, Rayburn and Johnson; frustration with the Republicans, Knowland and Martin.

Table 11 indicates the mean scores for each type of majority as it affected presidential performance. The results demonstrate support for hypothesis 7 on Support Score and Key Vote Score. The relationship between type of majority and Box-score suggests 1954 was an aberration. Thus, the hypothesis was generally supported on this measure as well.

The difference between the two Presidents who dealt with Truncated majorities was not great. Eisenhower performed better on the Boxscore than Nixon, while the latter did better on Support Score and Key Vote Score. The differences in
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Majority</th>
<th>Boxscore</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Key Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congressional</td>
<td>N=1</td>
<td>64.6%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>N=2</td>
<td>62.4%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bipartisan</td>
<td>N=6</td>
<td>46.9%</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated</td>
<td>N=11</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Congresses</td>
<td>N=20</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

performance were greater between Presidents' Kennedy and Johnson in their relations with the Presidential Bipartisan majorities. As noted earlier, Johnson achieved more success in obtaining Republican support for his programs.

Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated that the composition of Congress affected presidential performance. The previous literature has generally focused on the role of the political parties in the presidential-congressional relationship. I have suggested that other factors besides party can determine the success of the President with the legislature. I have examined a bi-partisan coalition based on ideology and have found there to be a significant relationship between the victories of that alliance and the performance of the President in Congress. Furthermore, the type of majority party leadership and the President's relations with the congressional leaders were also important factors affecting the performance of the chief executive. A Presidential Partisan majority provided the President with the greatest opportunities for success, while a Truncated majority offered the fewest chances for success.
Notes - Chapter 5


3. This is the definition employed by Congressional Quarterly. It is criticized by Manley for including the two Border states, and for failing to eliminate "hurrah" roll calls, those votes where the opposition vote is less than 10%.


5. See denials by Sen. Everett Dirksen, as quoted in Manley, p. 229.


17. Congressional Quarterly does not give data for Congresses before 1957. Although Manley and Margolis do have this data, Manley's is by Congress rather than year, while Margolis only studies the Senate. Also they both use different definitions of the "conservative coalition" than Congressional Quarterly which would make comparisons difficult.


30. Ibid., p. 117.


33. O'Brien, p. 112.

CHAPTER 6
ISSUE CONTENT

Thinking about policy in terms of particular issue areas serves an important function for decision-makers. It allows them to compartmentalize and simplify their extraordinarily complex world. It also serves as a psychological shortcut in making decisions. Studies demonstrate that these thought processes occur in both the executive and legislative branches of the federal government.

All presidents reach office with strengths in particular issue areas. The campaign often defines for the President-elect those issues he should stress when he enters the oval office. For example, in 1960 the unemployment issue helped John Kennedy and the Democrats, while in 1968 law and order or the "social issue," aided Richard Nixon and the Republicans. Future chief executives may also develop expertise and interests in certain issues from their pre-presidential careers. For example, President Eisenhower's military career strengthened his ability to deal with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Once they are elected, Presidents attempt to establish their priorities for the nation. Usually these will be announced in the Inaugural Address and the State of the Union
message. John Kessel has content analyzed the States of the Union messages of Presidents' Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson and discovered that the nature of the Presidents' program requests subsumed six different policy areas. Three of these areas, international involvement, the distribution of social benefits, and economic management were the major policy areas that consumed most of the President's time and energy. The three minor policy areas were natural resources, civil rights, and agriculture.

Congressmen are also elected to office with issue predispositions. Although Congressional campaigns seldom focus solely on national issues, the future legislator becomes aware of national pressure groups and constituency opinion on those subjects. Incumbent Congressmen also gain issue expertise through committee assignments and career backgrounds. Thus, Congressmen in facing a decision are also affected by issue delineations. Clausen has noted that legislators make decisions by:

(1) sorting specific policy proposals into a limited number of general policy content categories, and by (2) establishing a policy position for each general category of policy content, one that can be used to make decisions on each of the specific proposals assigned to that category.
In analyzing Congressional decisions Clausen argued that there were five major policy dimensions that Congressmen use to simplify their decision-making processes. These dimensions were agricultural assistance, international involvement, civil liberties, government management, and social welfare. It thus appears that Presidents and Congressmen employ the same policy content categories to aid their decision-making. Kessel's extra category, natural resources, is subsumed by Clausen's government management dimension. Since the two classification schemes are similar, for purposes of increasing the data for each category in the analysis, I will use Clausen's categories. A description of the substantive issues included in each dimension follows.

The Five Dimensions

The international involvement dimension includes all non-domestic policy questions and national security policy. The war in Indochina, although not a specific legislative policy question until the Nixon administration, is a part of this dimension. The major debates over foreign aid appropriations dominated this dimension for most of the period under study. Immigration legislation and the space program are also included in this category.
The government management dimension embraces legislation concerned with the government ownership and regulation of economic enterprises, natural resources, taxation, conservation, and budget balancing. The federal government's housekeeping function of overseeing a large bureaucracy and its employees is also a part of this category. Other policy areas covered by this dimension are transportation, communications, the environment, and consumer protection.

The social welfare dimension involves the "direct intercession on the part of the government to help the individual achieve a better life." In this category are most of those policies Lowi labeled redistributive. They include Medicare and other health legislation, the Poverty program, food stamps, aid to education bills, welfare programs, social security, public housing, urban renewal, veteran's benefits, minimum wage laws, unemployment compensation, and labor union regulation.

Federal government support for "freedom from unsanctioned violence on the part of the enforcement officers and the sanctity of private life" forms the basis for the civil liberties dimension. Legislation dealing with civil rights and equal opportunity dominate this category. Since most of the legislation concerning the District of Columbia has granted, to its mostly Black residents, various rights already guaranteed
to most Americans, these bills are included in this category. Loyalty and security questions were an important civil liberties issue in the early 1950s. Most of this legislation has been overturned by court decisions, and thus these questions were not the subject of subsequent legislative concern. During the latter part of Johnson's term and during the Nixon tenure, crime prevention became a new focus of federal government activity. The series of bills dealing with this topic are also included in this dimension.

Finally, the agricultural assistance dimension dealt with farm subsidies and other agricultural questions, such as price supports and rural assistance. This dimension declined as an area of presidential interest over the past twenty years. In his analysis of the 91st Congress, Clausen found evidence that the dimension has disappeared. 8

I have examined each of the Presidents' proposals as delineated by Congressional Quarterly for the years 1954-1973, and classified them into these five categories. 9 I have done the same for roll call votes on which the President took a position (hereafter referred to as Presidential roll calls), and on those votes designated as "key votes." Omnibus bills and supplemental appropriations bills that covered multiple categories were classified according to their most important
issue area. Floor amendments to legislation were classified according to their particular subject rather than the category of the major legislation. For example, anti-busing amendments to education bills were considered civil liberties issues rather than social welfare. In this manner 5,360 proposals, 3,410 roll calls, and 365 "key votes" were classified.

Suggested Hypotheses

One question worth pursuing is on which of these five dimensions does the President perform most successfully? Aaron Wildavsky has written about the "Two Presidencies", one for foreign affairs and defense, and the other for domestic policy. Based on data from 1946-1964, he concluded that Presidents achieved greater success in controlling the nation's defense and foreign policies than in dominating its domestic policies. Wildavsky noted:

In the realm of foreign policy there has not been a single major issue on which Presidents, when they were serious and determined, have failed.12

The above statement is no longer true. In 1973 Congress passed over President Nixon's veto, the War Powers Act which places limitations on Presidential power in foreign policy.
Furthermore, Kanter demonstrated that Congress played a significant role in the determination of the defense budget in the 1960s. Yet, despite this, over the twenty year period the President still controlled national security and foreign policy. I expect the President to perform better on the international involvement dimension than on the domestic dimensions. Thus:

Hypothesis 8: Presidents will achieve the best performance with the Congress on issues dealing with foreign policy and national security.

Distinctions among the domestic issues present difficulty. Clausen's analysis found little Presidential influence on the four domestic dimensions. In this study, the final outcome is important, not influence, and the literature suggests there are other clues to examine. Other pressures on the Congressman besides the President include the political parties, Congressional leadership, pressure groups, constituents, and state delegations. Unfortunately, some of these factors are beyond the scope of this study.

Clausen discovered that partisan battles were most prevalent on the government management dimension. Thus it appears these issues would be affected by the composition of Congress and the type of majority party leadership. A President facing a Congress controlled by the opposition party should encounter difficulty in performing successfully. On the other hand, a
President who can build winning coalitions without depending on the support of the opposition party should perform quite well on this dimension. Thus:

Hypothesis 9: On the government management dimension: Presidential performance will be the best in Presidential partisan majority Congresses, while it will be the worst in Truncated majority Congresses.

Miller and Stokes noted that constituency pressures existed as a major factor in legislator's decisions on civil rights. Clausen found that the civil liberties dimension was related to the regional and ideological divisions in the Democratic party. This suggests that the strength of the Conservative Coalition would affect the President's performance on this dimension. Thus:

Hypothesis 10: The President will perform the best on the Civil Liberties dimension when the Conservative Coalition is weakest, except on issues where the President and the Coalition are on the same side.

Clausen found that a combination of party and constituency were the most important factors influencing legislators on the social welfare and agricultural assistance dimensions. Therefore, predicting presidential performance on these two dimensions, based on the factors examined in this study, becomes difficult. Lowi, Freeman, and Cater have pointed out that
agricultural policy in this country is controlled by sub-governments in Washington. The policy triangles of congressional committees, interest groups, and bureaucratic agencies, are often able to circumvent the chief executive. Constituency differences along urban-rural lines have often eroded the partisan divisions in the legislature. Thus, we might not expect very much activity on this dimension from presidents anxious to avoid disturbing the sub-government arrangements. However, the variations in presidential performance appear to be explained by factors beyond the scope of this study.

The differences in presidential performance on the social welfare dimension related to partisan factors should be evident from the analysis. We would expect that the Democratic Presidents demonstrated more concern and performed better than the Republican chief executives. The discovery of further explanations for this dimension also seems beyond the purview of the study. I will just report the results and see if there are any patterns.

Proposals, Roll Calls, and Key Votes

Kessel suggests there is a contest among issues for the President's time and energy. Tables 12 and 13 illustrate the distribution of each President's proposals on each issue dimension. Over the twenty year period presidents proposed
TABLE 12: NUMBER OF PROPOSALS BY PRESIDENTS BY ISSUE
DIMENSION: 1954-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>I.I.</th>
<th>G.M.</th>
<th>S.W.</th>
<th>C.L.</th>
<th>A.A.</th>
<th>T.P.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>1,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1,902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1,056</td>
<td>1,886</td>
<td>1,574</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>5,360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: I.I. = international involvement; G.M. = government management; S.W. = social welfare; C.L. = civil liberties; A.A. = agricultural assistance; T.P. = total proposals for each President.

### TABLE 13: PERCENTAGE OF PROPOSALS BY PRESIDENT BY ISSUE

**DIMENSION: 1954-1973**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>I.I.</th>
<th>G.M.</th>
<th>S.W.</th>
<th>C.L.</th>
<th>A.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dimension Totals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I.I.</th>
<th>G.M.</th>
<th>S.W.</th>
<th>C.L.</th>
<th>A.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: I.I.=international involvement; G.M.=government management; S.W.=social welfare; C.L.=civil liberties; A.A.=agricultural assistance; all numbers are percentages.

the most legislation in the government management area. Since Hamilton's "Report on Manufactures," and despite laissez-faire rhetoric to the contrary, the direction and regulation of the nation's economy has always been one of the major functions of the national government. The actions of the Presidents in this study continued that role with proposals concerning tax rates and loopholes, and industry regulation and incentives.

Three other issues on this dimension engendered numerous proposals during this period. An enlarged federal bureaucracy demanded further activity from the leaders of the government. This led to proposals for salary increases for federal employees, as well as attempts to limit the size of these organizations. The area of natural resources was a battleground between the forces of development and the forces of conservation with the federal government compelled to choose sides. Finally the massive commitment to the building of an interstate highway system created disputes among the transportation interests of the country - truckers vs. railroads, automobiles vs. mass transit - each demanding legislation supporting their positions.

While all the Presidents in our study concerned themselves with these issues, President Nixon gave more of his
legislative attention to this area than did the other Chief Executives. Governmental reorganization, tax reform, and environmental protection were the major subjects of Nixon's concern.

The enormous growth of federal governmental intervention in providing social services and security for the people of this country accounts for the importance of the social welfare dimension in the distribution of presidential time and energy. Since the New Deal, Presidents have proposed legislation providing federal assistance or regulation in the areas of health, education, welfare, housing and labor.

It appears obvious from the tables that as expected, the Democratic Presidents, Kennedy and Johnson, evidenced more concern with these subjects than their Republican counterparts, Eisenhower and Nixon. Sundquist noted that many of Kennedy's proposals in this area gestated in the Democratic Congresses of the 1950s and emerged full born as the social welfare programs of the new Democratic President in 1961. The effect of Lyndon Johnson's visions of a "Great Society" are reflected in his numerous proposals in this area. Eisenhower's and Nixon's relative lack of interest in these issues still could not deter them from meeting certain expectations. Eisenhower proposed health reinsurance legislation,
and extensions of public housing and hospital construction programs. Nixon introduced a welfare reform program, the Family Assistance Plan, that would have implemented a guaranteed minimum income.

Presidential preeminence in the international involvement area has long been established. Often in this area, however, presidents decided that legislation was unnecessary. He would use other means to provide for the security and defense of the nation. On a number of occasions, however, Congress gave the President the authority to use "whatever means necessary" to deter Communist aggression in Formosa, the Mid-East, Berlin, Cuba, and Southeast Asia.

Foreign aid proposals led to annual battles between the two branches. The defense budget was also a battleground. In the 1950s Congress tried to add programs to the President's requests, while in the 1960s they often attempted to delete programs. Proposals for extending the draft during the war in Vietnam, provided another issue for bitter debate. Commercial treaties made up a large number of non-controversial proposals in this area.

In a reversal from the social welfare dimension, Republican Presidents were relatively more concerned
with this dimension than their Democratic counterparts. The relative lack of interest of Kennedy and Johnson, however, indicates a greater focus on the other dimensions rather than a neglect of this one.

The civil liberties dimension, as noted, was a minor area of Presidential concern. The major exception was the administration of Lyndon Johnson, which made close to 300 proposals in this area. The man from Texas was going to use the moral and legal suasion of the national government to "overcome" the discrimination and injustice in American life. Later in his administration he would attempt to focus attention on the violence of a society that saw three of its major figures assassinated.

Richard Nixon evidenced some concern on these issues. The major initiatives of his administration on this dimension focused on the questions of criminal activity. He also sought to implement a "southern strategy" for political purposes, which led to attempts to retreat from gains made in previous civil rights legislation - e.g. his Voting Rights proposals in 1970. Furthermore, cognizant of the volatile public opinion on the issue, Nixon initiated legislation opposing the busing of children for the purposes of integrating schools.
As expected, the agricultural assistance dimension generated the fewest proposals. None of the four presidents paid an inordinate amount of attention to this policy area. It appears from these data that agriculture may not be all that important in the totality of American public policy, anymore.

Tables 14 and 15 indicate the distribution of presidential roll calls on each issue dimension. These numbers, of course, reflect the number of proposals made in each area. The largest amount of roll calls occurred on the government management dimension. This coincides with the large amount of proposals on this subject. However, in a reversal from the distribution of proposals, more roll calls occurred on the international involvement dimension than on the social welfare dimension. One explanation suggests that foreign aid and defense appropriations measures generate numerous amendments on which the President takes positions. Another explanation is that many social welfare proposals never emerge from the committee process to the floor for roll call voting. As noted previously, this happened frequently during the Kennedy administration.
**TABLE 14: NUMBER OF PRESIDENTIAL POSITION ROLL CALLS BY ISSUE DIMENSION: 1954-1973**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>I.I.</th>
<th>G.M.</th>
<th>S.W.</th>
<th>C.L.</th>
<th>A.A.</th>
<th>T.R.C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>797</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dimension Totals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I.I.</th>
<th>G.M.</th>
<th>S.W.</th>
<th>C.L.</th>
<th>A.A.</th>
<th>T.R.C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>1,137</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>3,410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:** I.I.=international involvement; G.M.=government management; S.W.=social welfare; C.L.=civil liberties; A.A.=agricultural assistance; T.R.C.=total presidential position roll calls.

**Source:** Congressional Quarterly Almanacs: 1954-1973.
TABLE 15: PERCENTAGE OF PRESIDENTIAL POSITION ROLL CALLS BY ISSUE DIMENSION: 1954-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>I.I.</th>
<th>G.M.</th>
<th>S.W.</th>
<th>C.L.</th>
<th>A.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Dimension Totals: 30 33 22 8 7

Key: I.I. = international involvement; G.M. = government management; S.W. = social welfare; C.L. = civil liberties; A.A. = agricultural assistance. All numbers are percentages.

The relatively minor nature of the civil liberties and agricultural assistance dimensions are again evident in these figures. Only during the Johnson administration did civil liberties questions generate many roll call votes, while most of the agricultural assistance roll calls occurred in the Eisenhower administration.

The Key Vote Scores for the five dimensions are illustrated by Tables 16 and 17. These figures, to some extent reveal the issues on which the major battles occurred during each administration. Despite the small number of cases per category, some patterns can be discerned. The government management dimension remained the key policy area for executive-legislative relations over the twenty year period. As expected, most of the "key votes" during the Johnson administration took place on the social welfare dimension. The large number of "key votes" on the international involvement dimension during the Nixon administration reflects the attempts of Congress to restrain presidential power in this area.

Performance

The Boxscore and Support Score for each president for each year on each issue dimension are displayed in Tables 18 and 19. Table 20 indicates the Presidents' performances on Key
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>I.I.</th>
<th>G.M.</th>
<th>S.W.</th>
<th>C.L.</th>
<th>A.A.</th>
<th>T.K.V.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dimension</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>89</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: I.I.=international involvement; G.M.=government management; S.W.=social welfare; C.L.=civil liberties; A.A.=agricultural assistance; T.K.V.= total number of key votes.

TABLE 17: PERCENTAGE OF KEY VOTES BY PRESIDENT BY ISSUE
DIMENSION: 1954-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>I.I.</th>
<th>G.M.</th>
<th>S.W.</th>
<th>C.L.</th>
<th>A.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dimension Totals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I.I.</th>
<th>G.M.</th>
<th>S.W.</th>
<th>C.L.</th>
<th>A.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: I.I. = international involvement; G.M. = government management; S.W. = social welfare; C.L. = civil liberties; A.A. = agricultural assistance; all numbers are percentages.

TABLE 18: BOXSCORE FOR EACH PRESIDENT BY ISSUE DIMENSION: 1954-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>I.I. % (#)</th>
<th>G.M. % (#)</th>
<th>S.W. % (#)</th>
<th>C.L. % (#)</th>
<th>A.A. % (#)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>65 (26)</td>
<td>70 (92)</td>
<td>46 (57)</td>
<td>61 (23)</td>
<td>85 (34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>63 (63)</td>
<td>46 (78)</td>
<td>29 (58)</td>
<td>0 (3)</td>
<td>67 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>36 (61)</td>
<td>43 (55)</td>
<td>55 (58)</td>
<td>23 (13)</td>
<td>59 (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>61 (64)</td>
<td>20 (75)</td>
<td>24 (37)</td>
<td>42 (12)</td>
<td>46 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>63 (64)</td>
<td>53 (83)</td>
<td>24 (62)</td>
<td>100 (5)</td>
<td>55 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>53 (70)</td>
<td>29 (58)</td>
<td>49 (74)</td>
<td>8 (12)</td>
<td>14 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>48 (48)</td>
<td>29 (70)</td>
<td>15 (33)</td>
<td>50 (12)</td>
<td>10 (20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eisenhower Totals 53.7(406) 43.0(521) 36.9(379) 42.5(80) 50.7(136)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>I.I. % (#)</th>
<th>G.M. % (#)</th>
<th>S.W. % (#)</th>
<th>C.L. % (#)</th>
<th>A.A. % (#)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>70 (74)</td>
<td>39 (115)</td>
<td>48 (124)</td>
<td>8 (13)</td>
<td>48 (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>80 (44)</td>
<td>34 (131)</td>
<td>43 (96)</td>
<td>50 (2)</td>
<td>44 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>34 (67)</td>
<td>8 (109)</td>
<td>37 (158)</td>
<td>24 (46)</td>
<td>35 (20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kennedy Totals 59.5(185) 27.9(355) 42.3(378) 21.3(61) 43.2(74)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>I.I. % (#)</th>
<th>G.M. % (#)</th>
<th>S.W. % (#)</th>
<th>C.L. % (#)</th>
<th>A.A. % (#)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>79 (38)</td>
<td>70 (27)</td>
<td>52 (126)</td>
<td>30 (10)</td>
<td>56 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>72 (57)</td>
<td>66 (186)</td>
<td>86 (132)</td>
<td>46 (57)</td>
<td>54 (37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>56 (55)</td>
<td>50 (143)</td>
<td>70 (109)</td>
<td>61 (46)</td>
<td>50 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>57 (54)</td>
<td>32 (133)</td>
<td>72 (162)</td>
<td>20 (80)</td>
<td>0 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>61 (41)</td>
<td>38 (130)</td>
<td>67 (126)</td>
<td>65 (91)</td>
<td>46 (26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Johnson Totals 64.5(245) 49.1(619) 69.8(655) 46.5(284) 50.5(99)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>I.I. % (#)</th>
<th>G.M. % (#)</th>
<th>S.W. % (#)</th>
<th>C.L. % (#)</th>
<th>A.A. % (#)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>32 (38)</td>
<td>36 (67)</td>
<td>23 (31)</td>
<td>31 (29)</td>
<td>50 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>57 (35)</td>
<td>43 (104)</td>
<td>36 (42)</td>
<td>57 (28)</td>
<td>50 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>41 (34)</td>
<td>10 (126)</td>
<td>18 (38)</td>
<td>50 (12)</td>
<td>100 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>52 (46)</td>
<td>21 (28)</td>
<td>38 (26)</td>
<td>57 (7)</td>
<td>78 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>46 (67)</td>
<td>25 (76)</td>
<td>24 (25)</td>
<td>7 (14)</td>
<td>0 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nixon Totals 45.9(220) 27.4(391) 27.8(162) 40.0(90) 65.0(20)

All Presidents 55.6% 38.9% 51.0% 41.8% 49.9%

TABLE 19: SUPPORT SCORES FOR EACH PRESIDENT BY ISSUE DIMENSION: 1954-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>I.I. % (#)</th>
<th>C.M. % (#)</th>
<th>S.W. % (#)</th>
<th>G.L. % (#)</th>
<th>A.A. % (#)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>81 (21)</td>
<td>74 (50)</td>
<td>75 (16)</td>
<td>100 (3)</td>
<td>84 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>96 (48)</td>
<td>50 (32)</td>
<td>70 (10)</td>
<td>100 (1)</td>
<td>0 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>84 (31)</td>
<td>77 (22)</td>
<td>43 (14)</td>
<td>67 (3)</td>
<td>63 (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>90 (42)</td>
<td>48 (46)</td>
<td>67 (9)</td>
<td>80 (15)</td>
<td>40 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>85 (39)</td>
<td>71 (56)</td>
<td>74 (35)</td>
<td>67 (6)</td>
<td>75 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>85 (46)</td>
<td>39 (69)</td>
<td>35 (43)</td>
<td>100 (5)</td>
<td>47 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>86 (36)</td>
<td>53 (30)</td>
<td>53 (32)</td>
<td>75 (20)</td>
<td>44 (9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eisenhower

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>I.I. % (#)</th>
<th>C.M. % (#)</th>
<th>S.W. % (#)</th>
<th>G.L. % (#)</th>
<th>A.A. % (#)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>90 (51)</td>
<td>77 (53)</td>
<td>80 (65)</td>
<td>57 (7)</td>
<td>85 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>94 (64)</td>
<td>83 (69)</td>
<td>77 (31)</td>
<td>67 (6)</td>
<td>87 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>83 (77)</td>
<td>94 (54)</td>
<td>92 (38)</td>
<td>55 (9)</td>
<td>89 (9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kennedy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>I.I. % (#)</th>
<th>C.M. % (#)</th>
<th>S.W. % (#)</th>
<th>G.L. % (#)</th>
<th>A.A. % (#)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>85 (46)</td>
<td>91 (53)</td>
<td>95 (22)</td>
<td>100 (12)</td>
<td>79 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>93 (74)</td>
<td>88 (69)</td>
<td>94 (80)</td>
<td>95 (38)</td>
<td>100 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>78 (55)</td>
<td>88 (72)</td>
<td>73 (71)</td>
<td>62 (13)</td>
<td>100 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>79 (68)</td>
<td>74 (103)</td>
<td>87 (77)</td>
<td>79 (14)</td>
<td>38 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>83 (78)</td>
<td>78 (58)</td>
<td>81 (42)</td>
<td>55 (66)</td>
<td>83 (12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Johnson

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>I.I. % (#)</th>
<th>C.M. % (#)</th>
<th>S.W. % (#)</th>
<th>G.L. % (#)</th>
<th>A.A. % (#)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>97 (37)</td>
<td>62 (45)</td>
<td>52 (27)</td>
<td>100 (6)</td>
<td>75 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>91 (23)</td>
<td>89 (53)</td>
<td>52 (44)</td>
<td>87 (31)</td>
<td>75 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>86 (64)</td>
<td>73 (33)</td>
<td>46 (24)</td>
<td>80 (15)</td>
<td>-- --</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>72 (36)</td>
<td>63 (24)</td>
<td>63 (8)</td>
<td>60 (15)</td>
<td>-- --</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>68 (80)</td>
<td>53 (136)</td>
<td>32 (57)</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>39 (31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nixon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>I.I. % (#)</th>
<th>C.M. % (#)</th>
<th>S.W. % (#)</th>
<th>G.L. % (#)</th>
<th>A.A. % (#)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>97 (37)</td>
<td>62 (45)</td>
<td>52 (27)</td>
<td>100 (6)</td>
<td>75 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>91 (23)</td>
<td>89 (53)</td>
<td>52 (44)</td>
<td>87 (31)</td>
<td>75 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>86 (64)</td>
<td>73 (33)</td>
<td>46 (24)</td>
<td>80 (15)</td>
<td>-- --</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>72 (36)</td>
<td>63 (24)</td>
<td>63 (8)</td>
<td>60 (15)</td>
<td>-- --</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>68 (80)</td>
<td>53 (136)</td>
<td>32 (57)</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>39 (31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Presidents 84.8% 71.3% 69.8% 74.4% 67.8%

TABLE 20: KEY VOTE SCORE FOR EACH PRESIDENT BY ISSUE DIMENSION:
1954–1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>I.I. % (#)</th>
<th>C.M. % (#)</th>
<th>S.W. % (#)</th>
<th>C.I. % (#)</th>
<th>A.A. % (#)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>61.5(26)</td>
<td>56.4(39)</td>
<td>58.6(29)</td>
<td>71.4(7)</td>
<td>44.4(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>66.7(18)</td>
<td>73.7(19)</td>
<td>63.2(19)</td>
<td>0.0(1)</td>
<td>83.3(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>68.4(19)</td>
<td>80.0(25)</td>
<td>87.8(41)</td>
<td>73.9(23)</td>
<td>100.0(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>69.2(26)</td>
<td>50.0(30)</td>
<td>69.2(13)</td>
<td>85.7(7)</td>
<td>33.3(3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Presidents | 66.3% | 62.8% | 72.6% | 73.7% | 65.2% |

Vote Score for each dimension. An annual breakdown for these scores was omitted because of the paucity of cases on the dimensions in many of the years. Some data to keep in mind during the following discussion: for all presidents the mean Boxscore was 46.5%; the mean Support Score was 75%; and the mean Key Vote Score was 67.9% (see Chapter 2).

The results on Boxscore and Support Score verify hypothesis 8. Over the twenty year period the highest percentage of proposals enacted (55.6%), and the highest percentage of roll calls won by the President (84.8%), occurred on the international involvement dimension. As might be expected Johnson performed better than the other Presidents. Yet this was not his most successful issue area. President Nixon's inability to enact one-half of his foreign policy proposals provided evidence of a growing reluctance by the Congress to accept Presidential domination of this policy area.

The results on Support Score qualify this conclusion. Each President averaged over 80% support of foreign policy and national security roll calls. Although Eisenhower and Kennedy received slightly higher support than Johnson and Nixon, the differences do not appear significant enough to dismiss Wildavsky's conclusion that supporting the President
was the major role for Congress on this dimension and nothing that happened in the last ten years has altered that situation.

The percentage differences among the five dimensions on the Key Vote Scores, given the small number of cases for some categories, appear insignificant. Nixon performed slightly better than the others, indicating that despite his Boxscore problems, he was still capable of winning the major struggles - e.g. the ABM deployment votes in 1969.

Johnson's tremendously successful performance in the social welfare area dictates the overall scores on this dimension. His 69.8% Boxscore was the highest for any President on any dimension. Thus, despite relatively poor performances on the Boxscore by Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nixon, Social Welfare becomes the second most successful issue dimension for Presidents.

The partisan nature of the social welfare dimension is revealed on the Support Scores. The Democratic Presidents, as expected performed significantly better than the Republicans. Yet these partisan differences disappear on the Key Vote Scores. On this particular measure, President Nixon did even better than President Kennedy. One reason for Nixon's success was that some of his "key votes" on this dimension sustained vetoes, and thus he needed the support of only one-third plus one of one House of Congress.
Fewer than forty percent of the proposals were enacted in the government management area, again suggesting that this was the major battleground for executive-legislative relationships. Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson performed the best on the Boxscore, while Presidents Kennedy and Nixon enacted only slightly more than a quarter of their proposals. The stridently partisan nature of their administrations may have contributed to the problems Kennedy and Nixon encountered on this dimension. Bipartisanship appeared to be important on these issues. Yet on the Support and Key Vote Scores the Democratic Presidents did substantially better than the Republicans, and the expected partisan divisions occurred.

Results on the civil liberties dimension offered some interesting surprises. Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon all performed about the same on the Boxscore. In comparison to his success on the other dimensions, Johnson did poorly on this one. Despite the civil rights achievements of his administration, President Johnson experienced difficulty on other proposals in this policy area, such as legislation dealing with the District of Columbia and Gun Control. It was also clear that President Kennedy performed poorly on all three measures on this dimension. The most surprising statistic showed President Nixon winning a greater percentage of roll calls on this
dimension than the other presidents. If we remember, however, that this policy dimension includes crime legislation and antibusing maneuvers, these numbers might not be so unexpected.

The results on the agricultural assistance dimension substantiated what was said earlier in this chapter. When presidents venture into this policy area controlled by subgovernments the results are unpredictable. President Nixon was successful on 65% of his proposals, yet he made only twenty of them. He also fared the worst on the Support and Key Vote Scores. This implies that he could get his proposals enacted, but not without losing roll call votes on amendments. Partisan divisions seem prevalent on the Support and Key Vote Scores, yet the number of cases appear too small to discern any meaningful patterns.

Tables 21, 22, and 23 illustrate the performance scores by type of majority party leadership for each issue dimension. The linkages between this variable and the issue dimensions are hindered by data problems. Only one year exists as an example of the Congressional majority, and only two years of the Presidential partisan type. Nevertheless I will try to suggest some relationships.

The composition of Congress did not affect performance on the international involvement dimension. Presidents performed well on this dimension with all types of majorities.
TABLE 21: BOXSCORE FOR EACH MAJORITY PARTY LEADERSHIP CATEGORY
BY ISSUE DIMENSION: 1954-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Majority</th>
<th>I.I. (%) (#)</th>
<th>G.M. (%) (#)</th>
<th>S.W. (%) (#)</th>
<th>C.L. (%) (#)</th>
<th>A.A. (%) (#)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congressional</td>
<td>65 (26)</td>
<td>70 (92)</td>
<td>46 (57)</td>
<td>61 (23)</td>
<td>85 (34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan</td>
<td>64 (112)</td>
<td>59 (329)</td>
<td>79 (241)</td>
<td>52 (103)</td>
<td>53 (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bipartisan</td>
<td>62 (318)</td>
<td>33 (645)</td>
<td>54 (792)</td>
<td>37 (242)</td>
<td>44 (120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated</td>
<td>50 (600)</td>
<td>33 (820)</td>
<td>33 (484)</td>
<td>38 (147)</td>
<td>43 (122)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Majority</th>
<th>I.I.</th>
<th>G.M.</th>
<th>S.W.</th>
<th>C.L.</th>
<th>A.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
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<td>(#)</td>
<td>(#)</td>
<td>(#)</td>
<td>(#)</td>
<td>(#)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional</td>
<td>81 (21)</td>
<td>74 (50)</td>
<td>75 (16)</td>
<td>100 (3)</td>
<td>84 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>87 (129)</td>
<td>88 (141)</td>
<td>84 (151)</td>
<td>86 (51)</td>
<td>100 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan</td>
<td>85 (384)</td>
<td>82 (400)</td>
<td>85 (275)</td>
<td>63 (114)</td>
<td>79 (71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>84 (482)</td>
<td>59 (546)</td>
<td>49 (303)</td>
<td>79 (117)</td>
<td>57 (113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Majority</td>
<td>I.L.</td>
<td>G.M.</td>
<td>S.W.</td>
<td>C.L.</td>
<td>A.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
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<td>% ((#)</td>
<td>% ((#)</td>
<td>% ((#)</td>
<td>% ((#)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional</td>
<td>67 (3)</td>
<td>80 (5)</td>
<td>40 (5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>67 (9)</td>
<td>88 (11)</td>
<td>91 (23)</td>
<td>71 (7)</td>
<td>100 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>68 (28)</td>
<td>73 (33)</td>
<td>73 (37)</td>
<td>71 (17)</td>
<td>88 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bipartisan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated</td>
<td>65 (49)</td>
<td>52 (64)</td>
<td>65 (37)</td>
<td>79 (14)</td>
<td>30 (10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the government management dimension Presidential partisan majorities scored better than the Truncated majorities on the Support and Key Vote Scores. Thus hypothesis 9 is supported by the results on these two measures. Eisenhower's success in 1954 resulted in an excellent Boxscore for the Congressional majority on this dimension. However, the low Boxscore for the Presidential Bipartisan majorities further indicates the partisan divisions on government management policies.

The scores for the Civil Liberties dimension confirm the notion that party splits in the composition of Congress were not a significant factor in determining Presidential performance in this policy area. Table 24 displays the data on the activity of the conservative coalition during the twenty year period under study. From these figures the conservative coalition appeared weak during the Kennedy administration. The Kennedy people, however, were well aware of the coalition's potential strength. Thus, although the numbers may not demonstrate it, the Kennedy administration was operating under Friedrich's "rule of anticipated reactions,"22 and was greatly affected by the strength of the conservative coalition on this issue.

On the other hand, the successes of the coalition during the Nixon years matched the successes of that administration
## TABLE 24: CONSERVATIVE COALITION ACTIVITY IN CONGRESS: 1957-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>TRC</th>
<th>CRC</th>
<th>%CRC</th>
<th>CV</th>
<th>%CV</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>89</td>
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<td>1958</td>
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<td>1959</td>
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<td>300</td>
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<td>Eisenhower</td>
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<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>17.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>55</td>
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<td>1962</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>58</td>
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<td>Kennedy</td>
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<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>19.7</td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>112</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>68</td>
<td>63</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
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<td>422</td>
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<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>684</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>1971</td>
<td>743</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>83</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>861</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1135</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>25.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>All Congresses</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>20.6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key: TRC= total # of roll calls; CRC= # of roll calls during which the conservative coalition was present; CV=# of roll calls on which the conservative coalition was victorious.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
on Civil Liberties questions. Tougher crime laws and antibusing proposals were issues that joined the administration and the coalition on the same side. Therefore we can conclude that the strength of the Conservative Coalition had a negative affect on performance on the Civil Liberties dimension, except when the President and the coalition were on the same side. Thus Hypothesis 10 is supported.

On the two other dimensions, agricultural assistance and social welfare, the partisan patterns also exist. Presidential partisan majorities achieved better performances than do Truncated majorities. Yet the Congressional majority did the best on agricultural policy, again reflecting the non-Presidential nature of this dimension. The effects of constituency on the social welfare dimension cannot be determined from this analysis. From the figures included here it appears to be strictly a partisan dimension.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have examined Presidential performance on five issue dimensions. I have related performance on these dimensions to some of the factors I considered in earlier chapters, notably the composition of Congress as measured by the strength of the Conservative coalition and the
type of majority party leadership. A number of conclusions can be made about each issue dimension and each President's performance.

Presidents performed the best on the international involvement dimension during the twenty year period under study. To a great extent Congress gave the President the legislation he wanted in this area. Increasing Congressional scrutiny of Presidential activity on this dimension may create difficulty for the President in the future. The passage of the War Powers Act in 1973 may be an indication of a change in the relationship between the two branches in this policy area.

The major activity of the government is taking care of itself, and what Henry Clay called internal improvements. Raising revenue and managing its increasing number of employees were a major concern to all presidents and congressmen. Republican Presidents seemed more active here, but this reflected their lack of concern in the civil liberties and social welfare areas. Presidential success in this policy area depends on the nature of the President's majority in Congress. The more partisan his majority the greater the chances he has for success.

Strong presidential commitment and leadership were necessary to enact legislation in the civil liberties area.
The congressional process offers too many opportunities for coalitions to oppose such legislation. A strong conservative coalition has an important impact on these issues. In order to perform well on this dimension the President needs an ideological majority instead of a partisan one.

Social welfare was primarily a concern of Democratic Presidents acting in concert with Democratic Congresses. Republican Presidents placed a low priority on these policy questions. Republican Congressmen were generally opposed to initiatives in this policy area.

Finally, it was demonstrated that agriculture was declining as an important policy interest for chief executives. It was an issue controlled by forces that can circumvent the President. When the President did become involved on this dimension, he was usually able to enact his proposals, but often they would be loaded down with amendments.

President Eisenhower's success occurred on the international involvement dimension. As the history books have noted, domestic policies were not his forte. President Kennedy's successes also occurred in foreign policy, and to some extent, on social welfare issues. His greatest failure was in the civil liberties area. President Johnson's enormous success centered on his
ability to enact social welfare legislation. Finally, President Nixon was also strong on foreign policy, but the civil liberties dimension provided this president with his best domestic issue area.
Notes - Chapter 6


4. Ibid., pp. 40-51.

5. Ibid., p. 46.


7. Clausen, p. 40.

8. Ibid., p. 77.


10. Beginning in 1971 Teller Votes in the House of Representatives were recorded and thereafter were included in this study.

12. Ibid., p. 235.


15. Ibid., p. 214.


17. Clausen, p. 222.

18. Ibid., p. 217.


CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has examined the relationship between the President and Congress from 1954-1973. The primary interest has been the performance of Presidents' Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon with the legislature. Legislative achievement was assumed to be an important indicator of a President's success. Measures devised by Congressional Quarterly were employed to evaluate the performance of each President in obtaining acceptance of his program by the legislature.\(^1\) The Boxscore measured the ability of the President to enact his proposals. The Support Score and the Key Vote Score measured the congruence of the positions of the President and Congressmen on roll call votes. The latter score included those votes concerned with key policy questions. The relationships among the three scores are indicated in Table 25.

Since the President's time and energy are limited, and the resources he has available to promote his legislative objectives are also limited, the President cannot focus his efforts on every piece of legislation. Allocations of Presidential resources for legislative purposes must be made wisely. Therefore it was not surprising that the four Presidents fared best on roll call votes on
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Boxscore</th>
<th>Support Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boxscore</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Score</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Vote Score</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
which they took specific positions. They won about three-quarters of these votes. On roll call votes concerning key policy questions, they were successful about two-thirds of the time. However, on the score which measured the whole range of their proposals, the Presidents were rarely able to achieve a fifty percent success rate.

The results further indicated that President Johnson was the most successful of the four Presidents examined in this study. President Nixon was the least successful President in his relations with the legislature. President Kennedy scored well on specific roll calls and key policy questions, but in terms of his overall program he was generally unsuccessful. Many of his proposals never emerged from committees to reach the floor of Congress for roll call votes. President Eisenhower's performance peaked in 1954 and then generally declined thereafter. The performance scores are illustrated by Figure 4.

Previous presidential-congressional literature has focused mainly on the factors of party and personality to explain the relationship between the two branches. In order to add depth to this literature, this study has examined four other factors which were thought to influence the President's performance with Congress: presidential roles, presidential staff, the composition of Congress, and issue content of legislation.
FIGURE 4: PRESIDENTIAL PERFORMANCE SCORES: 1954-1973

Key: KVS=Key Vote Score; SS=Support Score; BS=Boxscore. The numbers on the ordinate are percentages; the numbers on the abscissa are years.
Role theory is concerned with the effect expected patterns of behavior in a social system will have on actual behavior. Three roles played by the President were assumed to affect his performance. They were: Chief Legislator, Chief Executive, and Leader of Public Opinion. The results indicated that, other factors being equal, the more proposals a President made to the Congress, the better was his performance. This confirmed Rossiter's expectation that the activist Chief Legislator would be the successful President. The results imply that Wilson's admonition for Presidents to employ a legislative strategy in which they take the initiative by proposing programs to the Congress, remains valid.

The role of Chief Executive, as measured by the issuing of executive orders, did not influence the performance of the President with the legislature. Neighbors and Cash has overreacted in suggesting the idea that executive orders have replaced legislation. Instead, the results indicated that executive orders were a device used by active Presidents to supplement rather than avoid the actions of Congress. Each President used them in a similar manner. They were issued, usually under statutory authority granted by the Congress, to administer acts already passed, to establish boards, commissions, and councils, and to intervene in civil rights emergencies. Rarely did they initiate policy innovation.

As Leader of Public Opinion it was hypothesized that the President would employ all available resources to bring public
pressure on the legislature to pass his programs. The growth of radio and television as instruments for mass appeals for presidential support has been documented. However, Cornwell was correct in suggesting that Presidents would not use the media to push specific legislative proposals. Instead, it was found that chief executives appeared on television and radio to expose themselves to the public in the hope of creating a favorable image, to soothe the nation during crisis periods, and to give reports on their foreign travels. President Nixon was the most prolific user of the media, while President Eisenhower seemed uncomfortable with this new presidential resource. President Kennedy transformed the televised press conference into an institution. President Johnson's use of television provided a demonstration of the opportunities available for publicity conscious chief executives.

The number of appearances on television and radio is only one method of measuring this presidential role as Leader of Public Opinion. Another method employed by Vance Tiede did not prove very useful. He analyzed survey data to investigate which institution, the President or Congress, better reflected public opinion on specific issues. He discovered, however, that the differences were not significant enough to arrive at any conclusion. The growing influence of public opinion polls may provide another alternative measurement of the President's role as Leader of Public Opinion. John Mueller has used Gallup poll data to study
presidential popularity. The relation of his findings about presidential popularity to presidential performance with Congress should prove a useful opportunity for research, and perhaps could better explain the differences among Presidents in their performance with the legislature.

The institutionalization of the office of the presidency was deemed important to the performance of the President with Congress. A number of scholars have suggested the impact of this institutionalization during the past thirty years. Both Richard Tanner Johnson and Norman C. Thomas have noted that different types of staff systems had implications for policy making. It was therefore hypothesized, that the type of staff operation and the amount of turnover on the White House Staff and Cabinet would affect the President's chances of succeeding with Congress. A "wheel" staff system with low turnover was believed to be the ideal system for presidential success.

The analysis revealed, however, that the "wheel" configuration and low turnover of Kennedy's staff did not prove significantly helpful in his performance with Congress. As expected, the strict hierarchical staffs of President Nixon and President Eisenhower contributed to their lack of success with the legislature. President Johnson, whose staff was the most chaotic, with a shifting hierarchy and large amounts of turnover, still managed to perform the best.
As Thomas has pointed out, and was confirmed in this study, the impact of personality was the most important factor delineating staff systems. The personality of the President and the personalities of staff members affected the operation of the staff. As a result, an examination of the patterns of interpersonal staff interaction might be a more useful approach to determining the impact of staff operations on the President's performance.

Kessel has discussed these interactions among members of the Nixon Domestic Council staff, but his study examined only a small segment of Nixon's staff operation. Another approach to the relationship between staff operations and presidential performance might call for a closer investigation of the legislative liaison operations of each administration. Researchers could extend Holtzman's analysis to compare different styles of liaison staffs.

The composition of Congress has an important effect on the President's performance. The previous literature takes note of the impact of party distinctions. This study examined two other elements. A bipartisan coalition of Southern Democrats and Republicans, bound together by a conservative ideology, was found to have a significant negative effect on the performance of the President. This was particularly true for Democratic chief executives. The coalition appeared on about one-fifth of all roll calls, but it was successful on over three-fifths of these. The Kennedy administration anticipated the potential strength of the
conservative coalition by postponing the introduction of civil rights legislation. The Johnson years were the nadir of strength for the conservatives and this partially accounted for Johnson's success with the legislature. These results suggest that further explorations of the effects of sub-groups within the legislature may help explain variations in presidential success with Congress. For example, Ferber's study of the Democratic Study Group could be extended to determine its impact on presidential performance.\textsuperscript{12}

The type of majority party leadership also made a difference in the performance of the Presidents. As Ripley has demonstrated in his study, a President's relations with the legislative leadership affects his performance.\textsuperscript{13} In the twenty years under study, the Presidential Partisan type majorities, as expected, offered the best opportunities for presidential success. The Truncated majorities, in which the Presidency and Congress were controlled by different parties, presented the President with fewer opportunities to achieve a good performance.

These two factors are not the only elements of the composition of Congress that may have an impact upon presidential performance. An extension of the various studies of Congressional committees to examine their impact on presidential performance presents an area for further exploration.\textsuperscript{14} An additional area of Congress suitable for investigation would be the effect of the Seniority System on presidential performance.\textsuperscript{15} A third possibility
is provided by a large number of freshmen legislators in the 94th Congress. Whether or not they will affect presidential performance could also be explored. All these studies may be able to provide further clues to explain why some presidents perform better than others with Congress.

In this dissertation the five issue dimensions delineated by Clausen revealed distinctive patterns of presidential performance with Congress. Wildavsky's thesis that a President performs better on foreign and defense policy than he does on domestic policy was reaffirmed for this twenty year period. The data for the most recent years, however, suggests that these differences may soon disappear. During the early 1970s the Congress, disturbed by its acquiescence in the presidential usurpation of its foreign policy role, attempted to reassert itself. Recent events such as the Congress' refusal to appropriate more money for the war in Southeast Asia, and the cutoff of military arms sales to Turkey provide evidence of legislative reassertiveness in this area. Yet it should be remembered that many of the President's foreign policy activities do not even involve the legislature, as President Ford's handling of the Mayaguez incident demonstrated. The continual blurring of the distinctions between foreign and domestic policy create further problems for this kind of analysis.

During the twenty years under study, the impact of partisanship was revealed to be important on the Government
Management and Social Welfare dimensions. The Government Management dimension, which includes the raising of revenue, the distribution of public works and the management of the federal bureaucracy, was the major area of contention between the two branches throughout the period. The results indicated the more partisan the nature of the President's majority in Congress, the greater the chances for his success on this dimension. The Social Welfare dimension was generally a poor issue area for Presidents, although this was overshadowed by Lyndon Johnson's tremendously successful performance of the Presidents.

The nature of the Civil Liberties dimension changed during the twenty year period and this affected the performance of the Presidents. In the 1950s loyalty and security questions dominated this dimension in the 1960s civil rights took on importance; while the late 1960s and early 1970s crime or law and order was the major focus of this policy area. The results suggested that President's performed better when this dimension concerned crime legislation than when either civil rights or loyalty and security legislation were paramount. A major surprise on this dimension was President Nixon's relatively good performance. This was accounted for by the impact of the conservative coalition on this issue area.

Finally, the results of this dissertation substantiated the decline of the Agricultural Assistance dimension as an
important factor in the totality of American public policy. Presidents did not appear to place a high priority on legislation dealing with agricultural problems. When they ventured into this policy area the results were unpredictable. It appeared that the influence of subgovernments described by Lowi, Freeman, and Cater was operative in this area. 18

The combined impact of the four variables: presidential roles, presidential staff, composition of Congress, and issue content of legislation, on presidential performance was difficult to determine. Intuitively, the four variables are related. As Chief Legislator, the President makes proposals in specific issue areas. The nature of the Congress the President faces affects the nature of his proposals. The influence of the staff on the President's decisions is also important. Yet, attempts to ascertain any overall patterns from the results on each variable failed to yield any significant information.

One pattern did emerge from the performance scores. Time in office seemed to affect the President's performance. In examining the popularity of Presidents, John Mueller has described the principle of "coalitions of minorities." 19 Mueller discovered that the President's standing in the polls generally declined as his time in office proceeded. He attributed this phenomenon to the public's disenchantment with the President's actions. The longer he remained in office, the more segments of the population he alienated. There
is slight evidence (see Figure 4) that this principle may be operative with respect to the President's relations with Congress. It is most evident on the Boxscore for Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, and on the Support Score and Key Vote Score for Nixon.

Kessel's discussion of the different political calendars under which the President operates suggests these factors may also influence his performance with the Congress. The effect of the "honeymoon period" in his first year in office, the mid-term elections, the re-election maneuvering during the fourth year, and the lame duck status in the eighth year, all could affect the relationship with Congress. Kessel claims that these relatively fixed patterns which make up the President's political calendar will limit the President's opportunities and affect the behavior of his administration.20 Systematic exploration of this idea may provide further insights into the relationship between President and Congress.

This dissertation does not claim to account for all the reasons why some Presidents do better than others with Congress, but only purports to acknowledge the influence of certain factors that seemed important to this observer of the legislative process and the relations between the two branches. A number of other factors, upon investigation, may prove to be better explanatory indicators of presidential performance with the Congress. For example, the effect of pressure groups on the agricultural field
has already been noted. The influence of pressure groups in other areas of presidential-congressional relationships may be worth exploring to determine their impact on presidential performance.

In addition, a consideration of the impact of election results may yield valuable information. There is evidence to suggest that the close electoral results in 1960 had an effect on Kennedy's ability to deal with the Congress. His party lost seats in the House of Representatives, and Kennedy ran behind many Democratic Congressmen in their districts. This increased the difficulty of Kennedy's task.

Researchers could also probe the complex external environment to determine additional influences on the success of the President with Congress. The impact of external events on issues that the President is forced to deal with was hinted at in this study. President Kennedy's proposal of Civil Rights legislation, was precipitated by events at Oxford, Mississippi, and Birmingham, Alabama. The passage of mild gun control legislation in 1968 is generally believed to have occurred because of the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy. Finally it is apparent that world crises and international incidents create atmospheric conditions which make it easier for some Presidents to accomplish their objectives. Congressional acceptance of President Ford's defense budget was facilitated by the Mayaguez incident. Thus the impact of environmental factors such as these external events
must be recognized and should be systematically studied to ascertain their influence on the presidential-congressional relationship.

Of the four Presidents examined in this study Lyndon Johnson achieved the best performance with the Congress. What factors distinguished his presidency from the three others and made him more successful? Were there elements of his presidency that could help future occupants of the oval office achieve success with Congress?

It has been noted that Johnson played the roles of Chief Executive and Leader of Public Opinion only slightly differently from other Presidents. He focused on the issue areas of social welfare and civil rights that were generally unsuccessful policy areas for the other Presidents. His staff functioned in a chaotic manner, with constant turnover keeping it in general disarray. There were two factors, however, that primarily accounted for his good performance: his actions in the role of Chief Legislator and the composition of the Congresses he faced.

As a former leader of the legislative branch Johnson was thoroughly familiar with the operations of the Congress. His experience as Majority leader of the Senate granted him exceptional expertise, as President, in dealing with the legislature. Johnson recognized that Congress had a legitimate role in policy making in the United States. Yet he was also aware that the executive must take the initiative. Thus he inundated Congress with proposals for new programs. He actively involved himself in the legislative
process. He became his own best liaison person. The same techniques that served him so well as leader of the Senate were employed again, this time in the oval office. The famous "Johnson treatment" remained effective enough to enable Johnson to amass the best legislative record of the four Presidents in this study.

President Johnson was undeniably aided by the composition of the Congresses he faced. The 89th Congress with its overwhelmingly Presidential Partisan majorities presented him with a unique opportunity for success. The diminished power of the conservative coalition during most of his tenure gave Johnson the ideological majority he needed. Although these conditions allowed him to ignore the minority party, his skill as Chief Legislator enticed many Republicans to join his causes. This enabled his Presidential Bipartisan majority Congresses to be successful as well. Johnson's major problems with Congress came late in his term when members of his own party deserted him because of the war in Vietnam. Still, President Johnson took advantage of his opportunities and made a remarkable legislative record.

The comparative success of President Johnson with the Congress during the last years of his tenure raises an interesting question. According to Neustadt, a President's personal prestige and reputation in the Washington community and the nation are major components of presidential power. It was clear that Johnson's prestige and reputation were declining during this time period. Despite this decline, Congress continued to pass his legislation.
A simple congruence of objectives between a majority of the legislature and the President may be the explanation. Yet this occurrence suggests that a President may still accomplish his objectives without satisfying Neustadt's criteria for presidential power.

John Kennedy's relationship with the legislature was somewhat less successful. Congressmen would support him on specific votes (reflected in his high Support and Key Vote scores), but he was unable to enact the major part of his program. Kennedy played the Chief Legislator role vigorously, proposing a large number of measures to the Congress during his tenure. His commitment to a strong legislative liaison operation was also apparent. His staff operation worked smoothly with low turnover. In short, many of the conditions necessary to produce legislative success were present. Yet, Kennedy was stymied by the composition of the Congresses he faced. Although nominally controlled by his own party, the 87th and 88th Congresses were in reality controlled by an ideological majority opposed to his programs. The power of this majority was not apparent on the floor of the Congress, but rather in its control of key committees. Kennedy's major problems occurred because of his inability to convince conservative committee chairmen to allow his proposals to emerge from committee and reach the floor for a roll call vote. He also faced a strongly united Republican minority, and this situation in a Presidential Bipartisan majority Congress created further difficulties for Kennedy's legislative programs.
The Republican Presidents, Eisenhower and Nixon, encountered difficulty since, except for one year in the Eisenhower administration, they continually dealt with Truncated majority Congresses. Thus in order to enact their programs they needed to enlist the support of the opposition. This, to a great extent, precluded their chances for legislative success. However, I would conclude that their attitudes and actions further exacerbated their problems with Congress.

President Eisenhower's belief in a strict separation of powers prevented him from acting vigorously as Chief Legislator. He refused to take advantage of his tremendous popular prestige to pressure the legislature. His attitude of remaining above the political battle further hindered his legislative efforts. In many respects he surrendered the legislative initiative to the Democratic leadership in Congress. Eisenhower's attempt to alter this strategy in the final two years of his presidency, resulted in heightened conflict between the branches. The Democrats were willing to battle the President in order to create campaign issues for the 1960 Presidential election.

Richard Nixon decided early in his presidency that the major achievements of his administration would not be the result of legislation. His attitude of disdain toward Congress was reinforced by the staff he selected and the manner in which they operated with respect to Congress. The isolation of the legislative liaison staff from the President made their job of lobbying for the President's
program increasingly difficult. On some of the major proposals he did make, such as the Family Assistance Plan, President Nixon's unwillingness to provide strong follow-up support prevented legislative enactment.

The twenty year period examined in this dissertation has seen the relationship between the President and Congress undergo many changes. For a number of reasons the post World War II era has been one of presidential power. The activist, institutionalized presidency created the illusion of an omnipotent President. Congress was relegated to a secondary position. The war in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal have destroyed the myth of the all powerful President. Congress has attempted to reassert itself by curbing the power of the chief executive to make war, impound funds, and withhold information. However, as a number of observers have noted, the loss of presidential power does not necessarily lead to the growth of congressional power. The relationship is not a zero-sum game. In fact, the decline in popular support for the presidency has been accompanied by a similar decline in support for Congress and other institutions.

In recent years some reformers have renewed their periodic call for a switch to a parliamentary system or at the very least, a responsible political party system. These proposals would eliminate Truncated majority situations in which one party controls the executive and the opposition party the legislature. Non-partisan
coalitions could not develop to thwart the objectives of the chief executive. Votes of no-confidence would be instituted to prevent the continuance in office of a President who had abused his power or who had become totally unpopular. All these reforms would require a massive overhauling of the American political system, something which is not about to occur.

Thus less sweeping reforms will have to suffice to re-establish the balance in the presidential-congressional relationship. Some of these have already occurred in the dilution of the power of the congressional seniority system, in the legislature's assumptions of a greater role in the budgetary process, and in Congress' closer scrutiny of presidential appointments. If Congress is to remain a potent force in American politics it must continue to play its two major constitutional roles: "Intrepid resistance to the misuse of executive power, and responsible partnership in the use of that power."24

This dissertation began with the suggestion that each presidency was in some ways unique. Although this hinders political scientists in their attempts to generalize about patterns of presidential behavior, it also provides them with unique opportunities for replication of studies of the institution. The election of a new Congress every two years creates further opportunities for investigation of the executive-legislative relationship. The works of Kessel, and the just published work of Jong Lee, who examined
the use of the President's veto power, demonstrate the applicability of certain sophisticated quantitative techniques to presidential behavior. The revitalization of the prescriptive public law approach to studying the presidency, the reassessments of the presidential power scholars, and the further refinement of the psycho-historical techniques, should produce interesting contributions on this subject from political scientists and others.

This dissertation has systematically examined the relationship between the President and Congress. The impact of four variables: presidential roles, presidential staff, composition of Congress, and issue content, were delineated over a twenty year period. Quantitative measurements were employed to provide objective definitions for these variables, and to allow the testing of a number of hypotheses. The major results indicated that the President's role as Chief Legislator and the composition of Congress, as measured by the strength of the conservative coalition and the majority party leadership, were the most significant factors influencing the President's performance.

Within this dissertation an attempt has been made to codify and elaborate upon the diversified and narrowly focused previous literature on Presidential-Congressional relations. Hopefully, with its longitudinal and comparative analysis of the subject, this dissertation has added some much needed scope and depth to our knowledge of the relationship between the President and Congress.
Notes - Chapter 7


9. Thomas, p. 163.


26. See Richard M. Pious, "Is Presidential Power 'Poison'?" Political Science Quarterly 89 (Fall, 1974): 627-43, for a discussion of some of the more recent literature.
APPENDIX

RADIO AND TELEVISION APPEARANCES BY PRESIDENTS, 1954-1973

EISENHOWER

1954

January 4 - review of 1st year in office
January 7 - State of the Union address
March 15 - address on Tax Program
April 5 - report on "State of the Nation"
August 23 - address on achievements of the 83rd Congress

1955

January 6 - State of the Union address
July 15 - address prior to departure for Geneva
July 25 - address on returning from Geneva Summit Conference

1956

February 29 - announcement of decision to run for second term
April 16 - address on veto of Farm Bill
August 3 - remarks on Dulles' broadcast on Suez Canal
October 31 - report on Mid-East and Eastern European situations
January 5 - remarks on State of the Union at Key West

1957

January 10 - State of the Union
January 20 - Inaugural Address
February 20 - report on Near East crisis
May 14 - address on Cost of Government
May 21 - address on need for Mutual Security
September 24 - address on situation in Little Rock
November 7 - address on Science and National Security
November 13 - address on "Our Future Security"
December 23 - report on NATO conference in Paris

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1958

January 9 - State of the Union address
March 31 - remarks on the veto of the Farm Freeze bill
September 11 - report regarding situation in the Formosan Straits

1959

January 9 - State of the Union address
January 19 - statement by President on Annual Budget Message
March 16 - report on "Security in the Free World"
August 6 - address on Labor Reform bill
September 10 - report on talks with Allied Leaders in Europe
December 3 - address before leaving on Goodwill Tour

1960-61

January 7 - State of the Union address
February 21 - address on eve of South American Trip
March 8 - report on trip to South America
May 25 - report on Paris Summit Conference
June 27 - report on Trip to Far East
January 17 - Farewell Address to the Nation

KENNEDY

1961

January 20 - Inaugural Address
January 30 - State of the Union address
June 6 - report on meetings in Europe
July 25 - address on Berlin Crisis

1962

January 11 - State of the Union address
March 2 - address on Nuclear Testing and Disarmament
August 13 - address on State of National Economy
September 30 - report on situation at the University of Mississippi
October 22 - address on Soviet Arms buildup in Cuba
November 2 - address on the dismantling of the Soviet missiles in Cuba
December 17 - Interview: "A Conversation with the President"
1963

January 14 - State of the Union address
June 11 - report on Civil Rights
July 26 - report on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
September 18 - address on Test BAN and Tax Cut
July 5 - report on European Trip
September 2 - TV interview with Walter Cronkite
September 9 - TV interview with Chet Huntley and David Brinkley

JOHNSON

1963-64

November 28 - Thanksgiving Day Address
January 8 - State of the Union address
January 21 - address on reopening of Geneva Disarmament Conference
February 28 - signing of the Tax Bill
March 15 - Interview with major broadcasting representatives
April 9 - announcement of a moratorium in railroad-labor dispute
April 22 - announcement of the settlement of railroad dispute
July 2 - the signing of the Civil Rights bill
August 4 - address on renewed aggression in Vietnam
October 18 - address on recent events in Russia, China and Great Britain

1965

January 4 - State of the Union address
January 20 - Inaugural Address
March 26 - announcing the arrest of members of the Ku Klux Klan
May 2 - report on the situation in the Dominican Republic
May 7 - signing of Vietnam Appropriations bill
June 21 - report on Nation's economy
July 30 - signing of Medicare
August 6 - signing of Voting Rights bill
August 30 - announcement of the postponement of shutdown in steel
September 3 - announcement of settlement of steel industry dispute
October 3 - signing of Immigration Bill

1966

January 10 - State of the Union address
October 27 - remarks following the Manila Conference
1967

January 14 - State of the Union address
July 27 - Address on Civil Disorders
December 19 - "A Conversation with the President"
December 24 - address upon return from Round the World Trip

1968-69

January 17 - State of the Union address
January 26 - address on the seizure of the Pueblo by North Korea
March 31 - address announcing bombing limitation and decision not to run
April 5 - address on the death of Martin Luther King
June 5 - address following the death of Robert Kennedy
October 31 - address announcing his decision to halt the bombing
December 27 - Interview: "A View from the White House"

NIXON

1969

January 20 - Inaugural Address
May 14 - address to the Nation on Vietnam
August 8 - address to the nation on Domestic Programs
October 17 - address to the nation on Rising Cost of Living
November 3 - address to the nation on War in Vietnam
December 15 - address to the nation on Progress Toward Peace in Vietnam

1970

April 20 - address to nation on progress toward peace in Vietnam
April 30 - announcing the incursion into Cambodia
June 3 - address on the Cambodian Sanctuary Operation
June 17 - address to nation on Economic Policy and Productivity
October 7 - address to the nation about a new peace initiative in Vietnam
July 1 - conversation with the President about Foreign Policy
August 31 - Interview on CBS Morning News
1971

January 4 - "A Conversation with the President"
January 22 - State of the Union address
February 25 - radio address on Annual Foreign Policy Report to Congress
March 22 - A Conversation with Howard K. Smith
April 7 - address to nation on situation in Southeast Asia
April 16 - radio panel interview at American Society of Newspaper Editors Convention
May 2 - radio address "A Salute to Agriculture"
July 15 - announcement of trip to People's Republic of China
July 31 - TV interview with Frank Gifford
August 15 - address to nation outlining New Economic Policy
October 7 - address to nation "The Continuing Fight Against Inflation"
October 21 - address to nation announcing Rehnquist and Powell nominations
September 23 - radio question and answer session with Economic Club of Detroit

1972

January 2 - a conversation with Dan Rather
January 20 - State of the Union address
January 25 - address to nation making public plan for peace in Vietnam
February 9 - radio address on Annual Foreign Policy Report
March 16 - address on Equal Educational Opportunity and Busing
April 26 - address to Nation on Vietnam
May 8 - address to nation on situation on Southeast Asia
May 28 - address to people of Soviet Union
June 1 - address upon return from trip to Soviet Union
July 4 - address to nation announcing plans for Bicentennial
October 7 - radio address on Federal Spending
October 15 - radio address on Crime and Drug Abuse
October 21 - radio address on Philosophy of Government
October 22 - radio address on American Veteran
October 25 - radio address on Federal Responsibility to Education
October 27 - radio address on the American Farmer
October 28 - radio address on "One America"
October 29 - radio address on Defense Policy
October 30 - radio address on Older Americans
November 1 - radio address on Urban Affairs
November 4 - radio address on Foreign Policy
November 5 - radio address on "The Birthright of an American Child"
1973

January 20 - Inaugural address
January 23 - address on Paris Peace Accords
January 28 - radio address "The New Budget Charters a New Era of Progress"
February 14 - State of the Union: Natural Resources and Environment (Radio)
February 21 - radio address: "The State of the Economy"
February 24 - radio address: Human Resources
March 4 - radio address: Community Development
March 10 - radio address: Law Enforcement and Drug Abuse Prevention
March 29 - address to nation on end of Vietnam War, Domestic Issues
April 30 - address to nation on Watergate; Haldeman, Ehrlichman resign
June 13 - address to nation on the economy; 60 day freeze on prices
July 1 - radio address on nation's economic progress
August 15 - address on Watergate investigation
September 9 - radio address: National Legislative Goals
October 12 - announcement of nomination of Gerald Ford to be vice-president
November 7 - address to nation on Energy Emergency
November 25 - address on National Energy Policy
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