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THIRD PARTY RESPONSE BEHAVIOR
IN FOREIGN POLICY
DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
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Despite all that assistance, I retain full responsibility for any errors of commission or omission that may exist in the dissertation.
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CHAPTER I

DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

In recent years there has been growing recognition by scientific international politics scholars of the need to move beyond the study of bilateral relationships and consider the impact of the behavior of additional states (third parties) on foreign policy and international processes. For example, Brams (1966: 850) has asserted: "More than ever, however, the actions of nations have multiple reverberations on each other and can be ascribed meaning only within the context of the relations of many nations with each other." And Singer (1969: 382) cautions analysts to be aware that "the international system is neither a dyad (duopoly) nor a multiple of dyads."

Such perceptions have been buttressed by some current trends in the international system. Diplomatic behavior is becoming more and more intertwined and interdependent among larger groups of actors than ever before. Perhaps the most striking evidence for that assertion concerns the interrelations of the United States, the Soviet Union and China. With the breakdown of Communist solidarity in the 1960's and United States recognition of that fact in the 1970's,
it has become increasingly popular to refer to those three states as a triangle or a triad. Indeed, with the possible exception of nuclear weapons control it would be hard to imagine a political/security issue between any two of those states which could be analyzed in dyadic terms. It is widely presumed, for example, that the Chinese reaction to the fall of Vietnam was tempered by their desire for the United States to maintain an Asian presence that would counterbalance growing Soviet power in the region. It is also a prevalent view that Soviet objectives in arms reduction in Europe are conditioned by their concern about their difficulties on the Chinese border.

Relations among the super powers are not the only realm of extensive third party behavior. The Arab embargo on oil shipments to the Western world was motivated to a large extent by their anger at the assistance given Israel by those nations. That embargo induced various Western states to modify their Israel policies with a view to placating their Arab oil suppliers.

And the behavior of the United States in attempting to resolve the conflict in the Middle East provides further evidence of the impact of third parties. At first the Kissinger "shuttle diplomacy" provided a channel for communication between the parties. That communication led to the first interim agreement between Israel and Egypt. Then, when further negotiations bogged down, the United
States announced a withdrawal from its role of mediator and a reassessment of its Middle East policy. That action had the apparent effect of inducing changes in the objectives of both the Egyptians and Israelis.

As those examples indicate, the behavior of third parties can be extremely consequential. That fact has not been lost on policy makers. Evidence exists that they have built into the policy making machinery structures and processes that facilitate coping with the behavior of third parties and with responsibilities to act as third parties. Sapin (1966: 259) claims that

Officers in the political sections of large and medium-sized embassies, for example, follow developments in particular parts of the world where the local government is substantially involved. The U.S. Embassy in Paris undoubtedly has one or more officers following events in the former French areas of sub-Saharan Africa and others with responsibilities for North Africa, the Near East and Southeast Asia.

And Pruitt (1964: 25) points out that

The desire to be consulted is particularly strong among officers in charge of the affairs of important countries such as France or the Soviet Union. These countries have such broad interests around the world that they are indirectly involved in a large number of problems being handled in various branches of the government.

Although these quotations are only directly related to the United States, it is a reasonable presumption that such sensitivity to third party considerations will also be built into the governments of many other nations.
Because of the apparent practical significance of third party behavior in foreign policy there would seem to be a pressing need for research on such behavior. That research should involve both conceptual development and empirical applications. It should proceed from both of the two main thrusts of current international relations research—comparative foreign policy and international systems. From both perspectives some of the questions which need to be asked are:

When do third parties become active on an issue?

What sorts of issues tend to involve the behavior of third parties?

What sorts of entities are most inclined to behave as third parties?

What are the immediate and long term impacts of third party behavior on the behavior of other states and the structure of the international system?

Scholars working at the level of international systems have attended to the problems of third party behavior. Their research has been centered on questions of the balance of power, the cohesion of alliances, the tendencies of the international system to move toward violent confrontations, and the maintenance of structural balance in the system.

The balance of power is one of the most venerable of the research traditions in international politics. It has also been the subject of a great deal of intense debate among its proponents and opponents in terms of the requi-
site conditions for its operation, its effect on the frequency of war and the maintenance of national sovereignty, its overall moral evaluation, and whether as a concept it has any meaning at all. (See Haas, 1953, for an indication of the range of the arguments over the balance of power).

As an analytic system the balance of power was supposed to predict the patterns of coalition and alliance in an international system. The dynamics of the system have been concisely summarized by Wright (1955: 141-2):

If state A conquers its neighbor B, its power will be so augmented that it can more easily absorb C and D, and then E and F. State Z cannot fail to observe the process and will therefore seek to persuade its probable predecessors in the process to act with it in order to curb state A before even its first conquest is complete.

Thus, a maldistribution of power joined with an apparently aggressive state is expected to cause third parties (the "balancers") to ally with the weaker state, correct the maldistribution of power and restore peace and security to the system.

Research on alliance processes has also focused attention on third party processes. The central question concerns the conditions under which alliances become more or less cohesive. The central hypothesis to have been examined is that alliance cohesion decreases with decreasing levels of external threat and increases with increasing threat. Tests of that hypothesis have been carried out by Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan (1973) and Harle (1971). Both
tests support the hypothesis. That support is relevant to the understanding of third party behavior, because when the external threat increases, other members of the alliance increase their support for the threatened member of the alliance. In doing so, they act as third parties.

One of the most important debates in the scientifically oriented literature on international politics has been over the question of which kind of international system is best suited to the maintenance of peace in the world. Central to most of the positions in that debate has been the impact of third party behavior. Waltz (1964; 1969) has argued forcefully for the bipolar international system. One of his reasons concerns the modification of third party roles when the disparity of power is too great between the great powers and lower powers. In a bipolar system the great powers can safely ignore the actions of third parties because none of their actions could have any meaningful impact on the balance of power. Conversely, if the great powers should wish so, they are able to apply persuasive force and control the behavior of smaller states. Deutsch and Singer (1969) counter with arguments that a multipolar system is the most stable. They argue that in a multipolar world the attention of each state is divided between many other states. As a result, the chances are reduced that adequate attention will be focused on any one other state for a conflict with that state to escalate into
war. Thus, attention devoted to the behavior of third parties decreases the possibility of bilateral escalation and war. Moreover, with increasing numbers of states, there will probably be more cases of cross-cutting alignments. When alignments are cross-cut, the antagonism between A and B on one issue, is likely to be moderated because of their shared disagreement with C on another issue. Moreover, in a multipolar system, if A and B should take up hostile stances over some issue it is possible for a third state that is allied with both on another issue to intervene and mediate the conflict. Thus, in a multipolar system the activities or potential activities of third parties are conducive to system stability.

Finally, system theorists have been concerned with the development of structural balance theory. Balance theory is a specific mathematical model built on the theory of graphs. Substantively, the theory assumes that in the interrelations of any three states the patterns of cooperation and conflict will be stable only if there are an even number of hostile dyads in the system. If there are two hostile dyads in the system (X and Z, Y and Z), then two states (X and Y) are allied by mutual hostility with the third (Z). But if there is only one hostile dyad (X and Z), then one state (Y) will be in a situation of being friendly with both sides in the conflict. The assumption is that Y will tend to be cross-pressured by conflicting loyalties
and by requests or demands for assistance from each of the conflicting parties. Faced with such cross-pressures, Y's response will be to abandon one friendship and join an alliance or coalition with the other party, or to pressure both of the hostile parties to moderate the conflict, or to take a neutral stance. No matter which option is chosen, the implication of balance theory is that the behavior of Y toward X and toward Z is partially determined by the behavior between X and Z. Thus, balance theory contains specific predictions of the conditions under which a state will act as a third party.

Recently, balance theory has been in vogue in international political studies. That spurt of popularity stems from the basic simplicity of the mathematics involved and from the intuitively pleasing substantive implications of the balance theorems. The earliest studies were methodologically inadequate, so their results are not of great interest here (Harary, 1961; Doreian, 1969). Studies by Sigler (1972a) and Newcombe and Koehler (1974) have generated mixed results—some support for balance theory, some conflicting evidence. Healy and Stein (1973), on the other hand, found very strong support for the proposition that unbalanced systems will be more prone to change than will balanced systems. Again, that suggests that third party response behavior may be empirically a rather significant portion of foreign policy behavior.
Juxtaposed against that impressive body of research developed at the level of the international system is the fact that third parties have been virtually ignored by scholars engaged in the comparative study of foreign policy. Only two studies (Phillips and Hainline, 1972; Phillips and Callahan, 1973) have made efforts to empirically relate the behavior of states to the impact of third parties, and those efforts were only indirectly comparative studies of foreign policy.¹

The research reported in this dissertation is an initial effort to investigate the problem of third party behavior from the comparative foreign policy approach. As an initial effort it cannot address all aspects of third parties which are interesting, nor can it confront all theoretical issues. Rather, it will focus on the single problem of explaining the occurrence of third party response behavior.

Definition of Third Party Response Behavior

Before third party response behavior can be comprehended as a concept, a number of other crucial concepts

¹The dependent variable was defined as the reciprocality in the interrelations of two nations. Reciprocality is a mathematical function defined on the behavior sent from A to B and from B to A. As such it does not directly deal with the behavior of a single state. Instead it measures the functioning of a system of interactions. The relevance of such a study to the comparative study of foreign policy is only indirect and inferential.
need to be defined. Much of the discussion of third party responses involves the use of the terms stimulus and response. A stimulus is a foreign policy action—any foreign policy event is a stimulus. Another foreign policy action undertaken by a different actor is considered to be a response to the stimulus (1) if it occurred after the stimulus, and (2) if the stimulus is considered to have been a necessary condition for the occurrence of the latter event. That is, if the second event would not have occurred had it not been for the stimulus, then it is a response. One implication of these definitions is that a foreign policy event is considered a stimulus even if it produces no responses.

A foreign policy event consists of three main components: an actor (or set of actors), an action, and recipients. The recipients of a foreign policy event are those entities that were the intended objects of the influence or impact of the foreign policy event. Any nation which was not a recipient of a stimulus is considered to be a third party in respect to that stimulus.

Thus, "third party" is an analytic term. A nation is considered a third party because of certain characteristics

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2In the terminology developed by Hermann (1971) and used in his CREON Project (Hermann et al., 1973), the recipients of a foreign policy event are the direct targets and indirect objects of the event.
of the stimulus, not because of any characteristics of its own behavior. The use of the term in this dissertation is much different from its use in other contexts, such as the strategic bargaining literature, in which a nation is a third party only after it is actively involved in the interaction process (Young, 1967).

An example might help further clarify the use of these terms. When the United States sent its military forces onto Koh Tang Island to recover the freighter Mayaguez and its crew, that action was a stimulus for all other nations in the international system. With the exception of Cambodia, all other nations in the world were third parties to that action. The Thai and Chinese condemnations of the action were responses to it, as was the strong praise from the Shah of Iran. Because they were third parties, the actions of Iran, China and Thailand would be considered third party responses.

The Questions to be Investigated

This dissertation will examine three basic questions about the determinants of third party response behavior in foreign policy: What are the characteristics of stimuli and their contexts which tend to produce third party re-

Determinants are partial causes which are factors which make the effect more probable. A complete inventory of determinants would be the statement of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the effect.
response behavior? What are the characteristics of nations which predispose them to undertake third party response behavior? What is the nature of the interaction between stimulus characteristics and national characteristics in determining which nations make third party responses to which stimuli?

The first question is premised on the assumption that third party responses are not randomly made. Decision makers choose to respond as third parties to certain stimuli and do not choose to do so for others. Presumably, one important class of variables affecting the impact of a stimulus on a specific third party is the characteristics of the stimulus itself or the context in which it occurred. Certain of those characteristics give events greater salience in the world environment and make them more closely related to the goal attainment of third parties. Those characteristics ought to make it more probable that the stimulus event will indeed trigger responses by third parties. The first area of inquiry in the dissertation concerns the discovery of those characteristics of a stimulus that increase the probability that it will elicit third party responses.

The second area of inquiry concerns the characteris-

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4That may happen because of a conscious choice not to respond or because an occasion for decision (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, 1962) was never presented to the decision makers.
tics of states that predispose them to respond to events when they are third parties. That predisposition has two components: a greater total number of third party responses and a higher proportion of total behavior which is accounted for by third party responses. It is hypothesized that the national attributes of a state and its orientation toward its role in the world account for much of the differences between nations in their propensities to make third party responses. The second area of inquiry is an examination of the interrelationships of those attribute, role and behavior variables.

The third area of inquiry is somewhat more complicated than the first two. They each concern a separate and different set of determinants of third party response behavior. But as Rosenau (1971: 98) has argued about the study of foreign policy generally, "To identify factors is not to trace their influence. To uncover processes that affect external behavior is not to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not under others." In other words, a crucial step in the creation of knowledge is to examine the interaction of variable clusters and integrate them into a more general structure. Complete understanding of third party response behavior requires such an undertaking. That is the intent of the third area of inquiry.
Overview of the Research

Any research as long and intricate as a dissertation presents a major problem for the reader. The length and detail involved in reporting any one component of the research makes it hard for the reader to recall the role of that component in the total research. The last section of this chapter is intended to ease that problem somewhat. It summarizes the content in each chapter and indicates how the chapters are interrelated. In so doing, it presents the logic of the entire dissertation.

Chapter II is intended to present the paradigm underlying the conceptual development in later chapters. That paradigm is composed of a set of relatively basic notions of the fundamental sources of third party response behavior. First of all, the necessary conditions for a third party response to occur given a specific stimulus are considered. Given a set of necessary conditions for a third party response, the analysis then turns to a description of how those conditions can come to be met for any specific stimulus for any specific third party. That analysis in turn suggests a small set of theoretical constructs. Variance in those constructs will result in variance in third party

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5That conceptual development will frequently be referred to as theory, although in the strict sense of a set of deductively related propositions it is not theory.
response behavior. Those theoretical constructs provide the conceptual link between the necessary conditions and the observable characteristics of stimuli and of nations.

Chapter III discusses the characteristics of stimuli. Two tasks are undertaken. First, for each of five characteristics of a stimulus arguments are presented that show how variance in that characteristic is related to variance in one or more of the theoretical constructs developed in Chapter II, and thus to third party response behavior. That results in the statement for each stimulus characteristic of a bivariate hypothesis relating that characteristic to the probability of a third party response. Second, the operationalizations of the stimulus characteristics are presented. That somewhat unorthodox procedure is adopted in the belief that it will be easier for the reader if the conceptual and operational treatments of the variables are presented together. As a result, after the statement of the bivariate hypothesis for each variable, the operationalization of that variable is presented.

Chapter IV undertakes the theoretical linkage of national characteristics to third party response behavior. That theoretical linkage is treated much differently from the way stimulus characteristics were treated. Stimulus characteristics were placed in bivariate hypotheses. Although different stimulus characteristics are not independent of each other, they cannot be easily related to each
other in simple cause-effect ways. Such is not the case with national characteristics. Those variables can be related in the form of causal chains in which characteristic A is presumed to influence characteristic B which in turn influences third party response behavior. As a result the conceptual development of the impact of national characteristics will not culminate in a set of bivariate hypotheses. Instead, their interrelations will be provisionally traced out in the form of causal models.

The development of the causal models in Chapter IV will take place incrementally. Each variable will be considered in order in terms of the proximity of the variable to third party response behavior. The variable which is considered most proximate to third party response behavior will be discussed first. Thus, in the simple causal chain $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$, the impact of $B$ would be considered first, then the impact of $A$. The discussion of each variable will involve an a priori analysis of the relationships of the variable with third party response behavior and with each of the other national characteristics already in the model. Then the national characteristic will be operationalized. The final result of the analysis is the development of a causal model of the impact of national characteristics on third party response behavior.

The second half of the fourth chapter is a consideration of the problem of the interaction of stimulus charac-
teristics and national characteristics in determining third party response behavior. The first part of that analysis is a discussion of how the interaction of two variable clusters has been treated in other analyses of international politics. Then the specific handling of the interaction problem in this dissertation is considered.

Chapter V examines questions of data and research design. The first section of the chapter is an analysis of the three main alternative techniques available for measuring stimulus-response processes in international politics. Two are rejected as unworkable in any limited research program. As a result, the remaining set of techniques is adopted. Those techniques involve the identification of a foreign policy event and then the subsequent search for the stimulus that triggered the event, if any. The nature of that data gathering procedure means that the data set to be used contains only those cases in which there is both a stimulus and a response. There are no stimuli identified which are not paired with a third party response. That has important consequences for how the bivariate hypotheses developed in Chapter II can be empirically tested. Those consequences are discussed at that point and a strategy for dealing with them is outlined.

The second section of Chapter V presents the actual procedures used in gathering the stimulus-response data used in the research. Those data were originally gathered
as part of the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) Project (Hermann et al., 1973). The nature and quality of those data are examined in some detail and the implications of using that data set for the research are considered.

The third section of the chapter considers causal modelling techniques. The assumptions of causal modelling are listed and some evidence on how well those assumptions are met in this research undertaking is presented.

Chapter VI is a presentation of the finding of the empirical analysis. The results for the bivariate hypotheses are presented first, then the causal modelling results are discussed, and finally the empirical evidence on the interaction of stimulus and national characteristics is presented.

Chapter VII concludes the research. The first part of the chapter summarizes the empirical findings of the dissertation. The second section attempts to place those individual findings in a broader context by relating them to the original assumptions articulated in the paradigm in Chapter II. Finally, those broader conclusions are used to suggest research priorities for future attempts to understand third party response behavior from the comparative foreign policy perspective.
CHAPTER II

FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS

One of the purposes of this dissertation is to contribute to the development of theory about third party behavior. In pursuit of that objective a series of hypotheses and models will be developed in later chapters. The logic which supports those hypotheses and models share a set of common assumptions. The purpose of this chapter is to articulate those assumptions.

The argument developed in the chapter has three separate parts. The first part considers the necessary conditions for a third party response to an external stimulus. Those conditions are related to the process of decision making in foreign policy. After those conditions have been identified, attention is turned to the identification of a set of theoretical constructs which are related in a probabilistic manner to the meeting of the necessary conditions for a response.

The outcome of that analysis is a set of theoretical constructs. Those constructs cannot be easily measured given available monitoring systems. However, they can be related to observable variables. That is what is done in
Chapters III and IV, in which the hypotheses and models are developed. So this chapter provides the conceptual glue which holds together the independent and dependent variables in the hypotheses and models. The third section indicates how that linkage works.

**Necessary Conditions for Third Party Responses**

All third party responses to external stimuli are the results of decision making processes. A decision to respond must be made by some person or group in the third party nation before any observable response can be made. That fact provides the basis for the identification of necessary conditions for a response.

The first necessary condition stems from the assumption that decision makers make decisions on the basis of what they perceive. "Cognitive behaviorism simply affirms the elementary first principle that what matters in decision-making is not how the milieu is but how the decision-maker imagines it to be" (Sprout and Sprout, 1969: 45). Given that assumption it follows that the first necessary condition for a third party response (or for any kind of response) is that governmental officials who are authorized to respond to a stimulus become informed of the occurrence of the stimulus.

However, the mere communication of information about the stimulus does not necessarily result in the decision
maker perceiving the stimulus. A large number of cognitive processes can intervene between the transmission of information about the stimulus and the information having an impact on the perceptual field of the decision maker (de Rivera, 1968). Thus, the second necessary condition for a third party response is that the authorized decision maker perceive the stimulus once the information about the occurrence of the stimulus is presented to him.

Those two conditions are not sufficient for the occurrence of a third party response. Presumably, decision makers are aware of many events in their environments to which they do not respond. There are a number of possible reasons why they do not respond. They could be involved with other pressing issues which leave them no time or attention to spare for the consideration of a response to an external stimulus, or the stimulus may seem irrelevant to their goals and objectives. The stimulus may trigger conflicting beliefs about an appropriate response, thus producing an internal deadlock within the government. There also may not seem to be an available alternative response that promises to produce benefits greater than the costs of the response. So, the third necessary condition for a third party response to a stimulus is that the decision makers must be motivated to respond.

Meeting the Necessary Conditions for a Response

This section of the chapter considers the variables
that are assumed to have an important effect on whether the necessary conditions for a third party response will be met in specific instances. Those variables are considered in two groups: (1) Those which have an effect on the probability that a third party will be aware of the existence of a stimulus; (2) Those which have an effect on the motivation of decision makers. It should be explicitly noted that from this point on the variables that have an impact on the second necessary condition for a response, the perception of the stimulus, are not dealt with further in this dissertation. That decision is based on the belief that the factors that affect perceptions are too diverse and too idiosyncratic to be handled manageably within the scope of this research.

**Determinants of awareness**

Awareness means that some individual in the government has access to the information that the stimulus has occurred. That definition is not equivalent with more usual definitions of awareness that emphasize the impact of information received on the cognitive map of the recipient. The term awareness as it is defined here is used primarily as a rhetorical shorthand for the condition defined above.

In their discussion of how decision makers become aware of events in the external environment of the nation, Hopkins and Mansbach (1973: 58) claim that "generally actors learn of an event from various sources after a time
lag. Often it is ambassadors and newspaper reporters who relay information to leaders." Although it is questionable to what extent either ambassadors or newspaper reporters personally communicate information to decision makers, the quotation does suggest two primary institutions or organizations that play a critical role in the communication of information about external events: the nation's diplomatic network and the private news media of the world.

The importance of the diplomatic network of a nation in channelling policy relevant information to the government is a fairly familiar fact to most international relations scholars and does not need a great deal of elaboration here. One of the traditional triad of responsibilities for a diplomat at a foreign post is reporting on events and developments in the host nation.

The inclusion of the private media as an important source of information about external events is more problematic. A number of observers have noted the importance of the media for just that function. For example, Brecher and his colleagues (1969: 80) define international communication as "the transmission of data about the operational environment by mass media and face-to-face contacts."
Fisher (1972: 4) argues: "Embassy reports and analyses now compete as never before with those of reporters, travelers, and other officials which may reach the home public and government officials first." Bobrow (1972) claims that one
of the effects of the electronic media was to lead to a decreased reliance on field officials as sources of information. Scott (1967) includes in his enumeration of common means of international political communication a number which are components of mass media: newspapers, wire services, radio, television and others. Finally, in their reporting of interviews with members of the United States government, both Cohen (1963) and Chittick (1970) quote a number of policy makers who assert a great deal of reliance on private news sources for information about external events. Cohen nicely sums up the argument:

It does seem clear, in any case, that the reporting function of the diplomat—one of the classic triad of functions: reporting, representation, and negotiation—stands in need of reexamination in the larger context of the total flow of foreign policy information from abroad to foreign policy officials (Cohen, 1963: 212).

So the identification of private news institutions as a source of information for governmental decision makers is not particularly ideosyncratic to this dissertation. Nevertheless, questions can be raised about the importance of news organizations in the establishment of governmental decision making agendas. The essential challenge can be stated as follows. Governments are primarily concerned with certain specific problems in foreign affairs. For Ghana, for example, the market for cocoa is a major concern. Because of the importance of those problems to the government most of the agenda on foreign affairs is effectively
allocated to the consideration of those problems. And for those problems the information received by the government will generally not be drawn from the private news media. The reason is that for each problem the actions of certain other states are of central importance. For example, a limited number of nations are the primary importers of cocoa. In order to maximize the amount of useful information about developments in those other states, a government will send a diplomatic mission to those nations whose actions are important to the government's primary foreign concerns. Those diplomatic missions, in carrying out their normal reporting function, will provide information relevant to those problem areas. Information that is relevant to the problems and that is carried by the news media will generally be redundant with the information reported by the nation's diplomatic network.

That argument does strongly suggest that a nation's diplomatic network will be the primary source of information on which foreign policy behavior will be based. However, it does not completely justify ignoring the private media as a source of information about stimuli. Although it is true that certain central concerns tend to be predominant in a nation's foreign policy, it is not the case that those are the only problems to which a government attends. Additional problems also receive attention. However, it is the nature of such problems (for example, outbreaks of
international or domestic violence) that they tend to manifest themselves only sporadically. That tendency to be sporadic has a number of important consequences. The first is that such problems are largely unanticipated. As a result they are not continuously part of a nation's foreign policy docket, but they can be added to the agenda when they arise. Second, such problems are more difficult to monitor with a normal diplomatic network. Because they are sporadic and unanticipated, it is hard to create monitoring structures that can efficiently gather adequate information on such problems. Instead, monitoring is focused on those continuing problems of central concern to the government. So, for such problems the news media is a supplement to the diplomatic reporting network of the government. In other words, the private news media can be a valuable source of information on events relevant to problems that concern the government.

So, the two main components in the process by which governmental decision makers become aware of stimuli in their environments are the reporting activities of governmental monitoring networks and the reporting activities of news organizations. Those two components can combine in a variety of ways to produce channels for the communication of information to authorized decision makers. Four main patterns can be described. In the first pattern the private news media plays no important role. Rather, some member
of the government of the third party is directly informed of the occurrence of the stimulus by a member of the government of one of the nations involved in the stimulus (the actor or a recipient). For example, such a pattern occurred when Acheson personally informed deGaulle of the upcoming blockade of Cuba in 1962 and the reasons for the action.

In the second pattern, the news is transmitted by a news organization indigenous to the nation which was involved in the stimulus and which made public the news of the stimulus. An example would be if the Iranian government made public a Soviet threat toward Iran and if the news of that threat were then published in a Tehran daily. The pattern is completed when an official of the embassy of a third party receives the news while monitoring the local news flow. To complete the example, when an American official reads of the Soviet threat in the Tehran newspaper, the pattern is completed and the American government can be said to have received the information about the stimulus.

There is some evidence that indicates that the second pattern may be an important component in a nation's intelligence efforts. Cohen (1963: 212) quotes an American diplomat as saying: "The embassies find out what the government to which they are accredited is doing via the press.... In ______ I used to mine the local newspapers
all the time, for my reports to Washington." And Kirk-Greene (1974) noted that missions in African nations hire local citizens to read and summarize vernacular newspapers and broadcasts.

In the third pattern, the news about the stimulus is transmitted by an organization involved in the transnational transmission of news. The most notable of those organizations are the international press agencies such as Reuters and Tass. The flow of the news from those agencies is monitored by subunits of some governments. When the news about the stimulus comes across the press agency ticker in the foreign policy bureaucracy it is routed to the relevant agencies within the government. When that is done, the information can be said to have entered the government. To follow up on the example, suppose UPI had transmitted news about the Soviet threat. That news would come off the UPI tickers in the State Department, where the officer in charge routes the copies of the printout to the Iranian and Soviet desk officers and/or other interested parties.

The fourth pattern has the news being picked up and transmitted by a news organization indigenous to the third party nation. High level governmental officials read or listen to the output of that organization and receive the news about the stimulus from that source. That pattern would be met if the New York Times carried a report about the Soviet threat, and the Secretary of State read the
Those four patterns are not mutually exclusive. All four may be met in regards to any particular stimulus. What is of primary importance is whether any is fulfilled in a specific case. If so, then the government can be said to have received information about the stimulus.

There are two variables which determine which, if any, pattern will occur in a specific instance. One is the extensiveness of the news flow about the stimulus. If the flow is very limited, as when it is reported only in the indigenous press of states involved in the stimulus, then the third and fourth patterns cannot occur. If the news flow is extensive, then the third and fourth patterns are possible, and perhaps likely.

The second variable is the capacity of a government to monitor the international system. For the second pattern to occur the government must have an organizational subunit geographically situated to be able to monitor the indigenous media of other states. Examples of such subunits would be embassies, consulates and "listening posts." To monitor the Tehran newspapers, the government should have an embassy in Tehran. Similarly, for the third pattern to occur, the government must subscribe to the services of international (or regional) press agencies and must have a staff of personnel assigned the task of reading the ticker output and routing the stories to the interested
bureaus.

There is an interactive effect of the two variables. The greater the monitoring capacity of the state, the more it will be able to receive news about stimuli through the third and especially the second pattern, the less important to that state is the extensiveness of news flow. On the other hand, the more extensive the news flow, the more states there will be which receive news about the stimulus, including states with relatively small amounts of monitoring capacity.

So, two variables have been identified as important theoretical constructs to be used in the development of hypotheses and models: the extensiveness of the news flow about the stimulus, and the monitoring capacity of the third party nation.

Determinants of motivation

Motivation has been defined by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1962: 140) as "a psychological state of the actor in which energy is mobilized and selectively directed toward aspects of the setting." The question to be asked here about motivation is: In what kinds of circumstances will authoritative decision makers choose to take overt action as a third party in response to stimuli in the external environment?

Clearly, motivation as defined by Snyder, Bruck and
Sapin can be affected by a large number of factors: the personality of the decision maker in terms of his willingness to act in foreign policy, the press of matters not related to foreign policy on the attention of governmental leaders, and the configuration of political forces within a government are some of the most salient ones. Unfortunately, the scope of this dissertation is not broad enough to allow an extensive and integrated consideration of the factors affecting motivation. Instead, it will focus on one very general class of factors—the nature of the situation that the stimulus creates for the authoritative decision makers.

The analysis of the impact of situations on foreign policy has been the topic of considerable investigation in international politics (Hermann, 1969; Brady, 1974). In this dissertation three characteristics of a situation will be assumed to have important impacts on the motivation of decision makers: the ambiguity of the situation, the requiredness of the situation, and the cruciality of the situation. Those characteristics were proposed by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1962: 81) and can be defined as follows: The ambiguity in a situation is the extent to which decision makers find it difficult to establish or ascribe meaning to the situation. The requiredness of the situation is the amount of pressure arising both within and outside the government for action in response in the situation. The
cruciality of the situation is the relatedness to and importance of the situation for the basic purposes of the decision makers.

Each of those characteristics of a situation should be related to the outcome of the decision making process. In highly ambiguous situations there should be a tendency to delay making a final decision in hope that the situation would tend to clarify with more time. Also, when there is a great deal of ambiguity in the situation there is a greater chance of there being intense conflict between subunits of the government over an appropriate response. Under those circumstances action is likely to be delayed pending the search for a more generally acceptable alternative.

The requiredness of a situation is a function of the number, size and power of the groups pressing for a decision and the intensity of that pressure. The assumption is that foreign policy decisions are not unlike other political decisions; they are often made to placate or respond to demands placed on the government by groups whose support the government needs. The stronger those demands and the pressure generated by them, the greater the requiredness of the situation.

Requiredness is assumed to have an important impact on decision making. The greater the requiredness of the situation, the more likely that a decision will be made to
make a response to the stimulus. Even if the decision is made to respond with an ambiguous action, it will be important for the government to appear to be attending to the problem. More frequently, though, a high level of requiredness will tend to be uniform in the behavior demanded of the government and lead to more vigorous responses.

The cruciality in the situation is perhaps the most important of the three situational variables. The assumption is that decision makers seek to advance certain goals and objectives through foreign policy. Those goals and objectives can be placed on some hierarchy of desires. The higher the goal or objective is on the hierarchy, the more likely that the government of the nation will act to foster those goals. The concept of cruciality relates to the importance of the goals. Stimuli that have the apparent potential to either endanger or enhance very important goals are going to create situations of greater cruciality. The greater the cruciality in a situation, the more likely that the highest authorities in the government will make the decisions. Moreover, the greater the cruciality in the situation, the greater will be the pressures from inside and outside the government for a response. The greater the cruciality in the situation, the more likely it will be that the problem will become a high item on the decision making agenda and, thus, be acted on. For all those reasons, the greater the cruciality in the situation, the more
likely that decision makers will take overt action in response to a stimulus.

In this section of the chapter, five theoretical constructs have been suggested as they relate to meeting one of the necessary conditions for a third party response. They were:

1. The extensiveness of the flow of news about the stimulus.
2. The monitoring capacity of the third party nation.
3. The ambiguity of the situation created by the stimulus.
4. The requiredness of the situation.
5. The cruciality of the situation.

What remains to be done in this chapter is to indicate how those constructs can be used in developing hypotheses and models relating to third party response behavior.

**Linking the Constructs to Third Party Responses**

In this section of the chapter the elements developed earlier will be brought together to develop a general explanatory framework for third party response behavior.

The first basic assumption of that framework can be stated as follows:

A1: Any variable that increases the probability of meeting any of the necessary conditions for a third party response will also increase the probability of a third party response (other things
That is not an unreasonable assumption. The necessary conditions for a response are not incompatible. An increase in the probability of meeting one will not result in a decreased probability of meeting another. Indeed, if anything, the impact of the conditions is cumulative in that the first condition (information transmission) must be met before the second (perception) can be, which in turn must be met before the third condition (motivation) can be met. Thus, under some circumstances, meeting one of the conditions increases the probability of meeting the others.

The five theoretical constructs developed in the second part of the chapter are all related to third party response behavior because they have an impact on the probability of meeting one or another of the necessary conditions for such a response. The extensiveness of news flow and the monitoring capacity of nations are both related to the probability of meeting the first necessary condition for a third party response—the communication of information about the stimulus to the third party. The three situational variables are all related to the third necessary condition for a third party response—motivation of the decision maker to decide to respond to the stimulus. Applying those statements to assumption A1 articulated above produces by implication five additional assumptions;
A2: The more extensive the news flow about the stimulus, the greater the probability that it will trigger third party responses.

A3: The greater the monitoring capacity of a nation, the greater the probability that it will respond to any particular stimulus.

A4: The lower the ambiguity in the situation created by a stimulus, the greater the probability of a third party response.

A5: The greater the requiredness in the situation created by a stimulus, the greater the probability of a third party response.

A6: The greater the criciality in the situation created by a stimulus, the greater the probability of a third party response.

In the next two chapters assumptions A2 through A6 will be used as the bases for the construction of hypotheses and models relating observable variables to third party response behavior. With the exception of monitoring capacity, no attempt will be made to directly measure any of the theoretical constructs developed in this chapter. Instead, certain measurable variables will be theoretically related to the five theoretical constructs and, thus, to third party response behavior. The model for that argument can be illustrated as follows:

\[ W \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z \]
W is an observable variable, X is one of the theoretical constructs (for example, requiredness), Y is one of the necessary conditions (motivation to act) and Z is the probability of a third party response.
CHAPTER III

HYPOTHESSES USING STIMULUS CHARACTERISTICS

The previous chapter has established the groundwork for relating the characteristics of stimuli to the occurrence of third party response behavior. This chapter will complete the task of hypothesis development by linking certain characteristics of stimuli to the theoretical constructs: news flow, ambiguity of the situation, requiredness of the situation, and cruciality of the situation; thereby establishing the hypothetical link between stimulus characteristics and third party response behavior.

An additional task to be taken up in this chapter is the operationalization of the stimulus characteristics. After a hypothesis has been developed linking a stimulus characteristic to third party response behavior, that characteristic will be operationalized. It is hoped that the close positioning of those two discussions will help to clarify each.

In this chapter five characteristics of a stimulus will be examined: (1) the regional focus of the stimulus; (2) the salience of the participants in the event; (3) the degree of violence involved in the event; (4) the crisis
or noncrisis context of the event; and (5) the identity of the individual actor.

Regional Focus

Regional focus concerns whether the stimulus event involves entities from the same region as the third party. A region is a group of states sharing relatively close geographical proximity and some set of other characteristics. It is hypothesized that regional focus will tend to affect third party response behavior both because it is related to the flow of news and because it will tend to affect the requiredness and cruciality of the situation created by the stimulus.

One class of factors which affects the flow of news is the capacity for identification with the news on the part of the consuming public. Presumably, if a person can feel some identification with a story, the story is more meaningful and more likely to be read. Schramm (1949: 265) has claimed that "the case of self-identification with the story is powerfully influential on the probability that a reader will select the story." Ostgaard (1965: 46) has concluded that "the greater the possibilities of identification, the greater will be the news flow, and conversely, that the less the possibilities of identification, the more the news flow will be hampered."

Three variables are related to the potential for
identification. One is geographical proximity. "Proximity—in a geographical sense—is a key element in reader interest" (International Press Institute, 1953: 67). Geographical proximity is probably important because people tend to be aware of and sensitive to nations which are close. It is not clear how quickly geographical proximity declines as a sensitive variable as one moves from neighboring states to those with which there are no shared boundaries, but Sigler (1972b: 17) found that "the press does reflect a bias toward more extensive coverage of one's own region."

The second variable is cultural proximity or cultural similarity—shared languages, values, traditions and other aspects of a nation's culture. Galtung and Ruge (1965: 67) assert that "the event-scanner will pay particular attention to the familiar, to the culturally similar, and the culturally distant will be passed by more easily and not be noticed."

A third variable is the strength of the historical ties between the two states. North (1968) has claimed that frequent interactions between two actors lead to each being sensitive to the actions of the other and being more attuned to its behavior. Sigler (1969) produced some evidence which supports the application of this principle to news flows—the Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian press report the foreign affairs of France, the former colonial
power, more than they report for any other state.

All those factors are clearly highly related. By and large, the greater the geographical proximity, the greater the cultural similarity. One can easily identify some counterexamples such as the similarity of the Latin American nations to Spain and Portugal, Australia and New Zealand to Britain, and so on. But on the whole, the relationship is fairly close. For example, the memberships of the regions identified by Russett (1967) along cultural and geographic lines tend to overlap to a great extent. Geographical proximity and historical relationships are also closely related, and will become more related as the memory of colonialism weakens and interactions among former colonial states increases. Cultural similarity and strength of historical relationships are also closely related because cultural similarity increases or facilitates interactions which bring states into an historical relationship.

Because all those factors are more or less closely related, regional membership can serve as a unifying concept for all of them. Geographic variables tend to correlate highly with certain cultural variables. Most nations with predominantly black populations are in sub-Saharan Africa. Most predominantly Oriental nations are in Asia (although not all nations in Asia are predominantly Oriental). Most nations in Latin America share a
common language and religion, as do most Middle Eastern states.

Geographic regions also serve as surrogate indicators for common historical experience. The European nations share the ravages of two World Wars. The African nations shared the shackles of slavery. The East Europeans share the recent Cold War, as do the West Europeans. Adelman and Morris (1967) show that patterns of development differ across regions.

Geographic regions also indicate physical proximity. Physical proximity has implications for the patterns of interactions, at least for nations with smaller capabilities. A number of studies (Gleditsch, 1967; Reinton, 1967; Linneman, 1966) have demonstrated that interactions between poorer states fall off after regional (or sub-regional) boundaries are crossed.

Thus, regional co-membership should have an impact on the capacity for identification. The implication is that the press of a nation should be more likely to select a story for publication if it involves other states from the same region than if it does not. As a result, the news about such a stimulus is more likely to come to the attention of governmental policy makers than are other events.

Regional focus is also related to the kind of situation that a stimulus presents to decision makers. Those
events that involve states from the same region as the specific third party will tend to create situations of greater cruciality and requiredness than do other events. There are three reasons for that claim.

First, many of the problems which face states tend to be regional problems in that they are shared by other states in the region. For African states, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia tend to be seen as African problems. The Arab and/or Israeli problem is seen as a Middle Eastern one. For N.A.T.O. planners, their problem is Western European defense. Latin American economic integration is a problem for nations in that area. As a result, an action involving a state in the region may have implications for the resolution of common problems, thus increasing the cruciality of making a response.

Second, due to the similarities among the states in a region, an action involving one of them may be perceived as establishing a precedent having potential consequences for all. Examples of that dynamic come readily to mind. Most Latin American nations oppose the use of American force or pressure against any Latin American nation because that force could later be turned against them. African nations opposed any support for the secessionist regimes of Biafra and Katanga because they might themselves be faced someday with a secessionist rebellion. Rumania and Yugoslavia were terribly upset about the Warsaw Pact in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia because of the possibility that they could be next.

Third, regional boundaries tend to demarcate groups having high levels of identification with each other. Regional organizations reflect and in turn help to define that regional identification. Patterns of diplomatic representation tend to fit regional patterns (Alger and Brams, 1967), suggesting that the perceptions of regional identification are shared by governmental officials.

That higher identification tends to produce a sensitivity to interactions involving states within the region whether or not the substantive goals of the government are directly affected by the interactions. Because of that increased sensitivity, stimuli involving members of the same region are likely to produce a higher sense of requiredness than will other stimuli.

Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan (1973: 56) claim that greater geographic distribution within an alliance increases the strain because nations tend to see problems faced by distant allies as "local" problems and are less likely to come to their aid than is the case with geographically proximate allies. The argument made here takes that premise and generalizes it into the hypothesis:

H1: States are more likely to make third party responses to events involving other states from the same geographical region than to other events.
Operationalization of Regional Focus

The first task in measuring this variable was to identify a set of regions and to group nations into regions. The primary solution to that task was to adopt in basic outlines the set of regions and regional memberships provided by the Russett, Singer and Small (1968) standardized country codes. That scheme was then modified in the following four ways.

First, the European region was subdivided into two subregions, Western Europe and Eastern Europe. The latter contains, obviously, the Communist states of Europe. The reason for that change was to allow for possible tests of whether in a behavioral sense the Iron Curtain serves the same function as other regional boundaries.

Second, the United States and Canada were given dual regional memberships. Both are physically located in the Western Hemisphere, but it is arguable that they, and especially Canada, perceive more of an affinity with the nations of Western Europe than with the Latin American states. Moreover, their high levels of development allow them to overcome to a large extent the barrier of distance with the vaulting pole of technology.

Third, Turkey was considered a Western European nation rather than as a Middle Eastern nation. Again, that is because Turkey perceives itself more as a European nation than a Middle Easterner, a fact attested to by
Fourth, Oceania was excluded as a continent and its nations were classified as Asian nations. The reason was that it was felt that those nations, by their close proximity to the Asian land mass would tend to be drawn to Asian issues. It was a hunch converted into an assumption that they will tend to react as Asians.

The next problem was the classification of international organizations. It was decided that any organization whose mission or membership was concentrated in a single area would be considered part of that region. Thus, the Economic Commission of Latin America was considered to have a regional membership. The Commonwealth was not.

Given that classification of entities, a regional focus variable was generated by computer. The categories of that variable and their definitions are:

1. Intra-regional stimulus--at least one actor and one recipient of the stimulus were members of the same region as the third party making the response.
2. Intra-penetrating stimulus--at least one of the recipients of the stimulus was a member of the same region as the responder, and all actors were of different regions.
3. Extra-penetrating stimulus--none of the recipients was a member of the same region as the responder and at least one actor was a member of the region.
4. Extra-regional stimulus--none of the actors and
recipients of the stimulus were of the same region as the responder.

In the examination of Hypothesis 1, special concern is centered on the fourth category compared to the first three. The first three are those categories in which the stimulus involved entities from the same region as the actor. The fourth category are those stimuli which did not involve entities from the same region as the actor.

Salience of Participants

The salience of an entity (a nation or an international organization) is the amount of attention paid to it by other entities in the international system. The more salient an entity, the more attention it receives from others.

Salience is related to third party behavior partly because of its effect on news flow. There seems to be a bias toward reporting stories that involve elite nations. Galtung and Ruge (1965) claim that is because the actions of elite nations are more consequential in their ramifications, and therefore, more relevant than similar actions of non-elite nations. The expectation that elite nations are likely to produce more consequential, and therefore, more newsworthy, actions also has an effect on the policies of the international media. Both the international press services (Wilhelm, 1963) and the prestige press (Mowlana,
n.d.) tend to allocate their correspondents in ways that overrepresent large, powerful nations, by and large. The end result is that "clearly the world flow of foreign news deal chiefly with a group of highly developed countries which are also dominant in world politics" (Schramm, 1964: 63). Some additional evidence for this claim comes from Gamson and Modigliani (1971). They found that there were no significant differences in the reporting of U.S.-U.S.S.R. interactions by the New York Times, the Times of India and the Manchester Guardian. Because almost all other studies of source validity show that there are wide divergences in reporting across sources, the consistency of those three sources is quite striking. A plausible explanation would be that the focus on the dominant powers in the world circumvented other causes of source bias due to the bias toward reporting the actions of elite nations.

The same premises also suggest that when an event involves high salience participants it is going to have an effect on decision making variables. Because the actions of highly salient actors are more consequential for the international system and for the targets of the action, they are also more likely to have an impact on the goals of the third party state or be perceived as having such an impact. Moreover, the precedent implications of an event are likely to be much greater when that event is made by an actor with the resources to repeat the event again with different
targets. A similar action by Uruguay and the United States will be differentially scary to a variety of third parties. Thus, the higher the salience of the actor in the stimulus event, the more likely the event will create a situation of high cruciality for third parties and, thus, the more likely that it will elicit third party responses. For that reason and because of the effect on news flow, the second hypothesis is

H2: States are more likely to make third party responses to events involving highly salient entities than to other events.

Indirect support for that hypothesis comes from a study by Phillips and Callahan (1973). They grouped third parties into two classes—those which were salient to the actor and those which were not. They performed parallel analyses on each group to determine if the inclusion of third parties affected the dyadic behavior of states. They found that for all analyses except those which included China as an actor the group of salient third parties had a stronger effect on behavior than did the group of non-salient third parties.

Operationalization of Salience

Salience refers to the attention that is paid to the behavior of an international actor by the entire international system. The more attention which is paid to an
actor's behavior, the more salient it is.

Salience should be a function of a number of factors. The more consequential an actor's behavior for the system, the greater its salience. Salience should increase with the amount of resources available to an actor for use in the international system, and should also increase with membership in an intense conflict subsystem.

One indicator of the salience of an entity is the centrality of its location in the international communication system. An entity is considered to be more salient as the number of entities from which it receives some minimum number of actions increases. For example, if entity A received ten or more events from fifty-nine actors and entity B received ten or more events from fifty-two entities, then A would be considered a more salient entity than B.

It is not a particularly original idea to use the behavior directed at an entity to measure some aspect of the role or impact of that entity in the system. That is the essential tenet of sociometric measurement in groups. In international politics, the number of state visits which a nation hosts has been used as an indicator of its level in the international influence hierarchy (Brams, 1969; Kegley et al., 1975).

The assumption underlying the proposed indicator is that when an actor directs behavior at an entity, that act
signals some minimum of attention to the target by the actor. The more behavior directed by the actor at that target, the more attention which must be paid to the target. And the more behavior directed at a target by all actors in the international system, the higher the total attention paid to that target by members of the system.

In this research, the total number of events received by an entity will not be used as the operationalization of salience. Two assumptions underly that decision. First, not all actors behave with the same frequency. The United States does more than Malawi, to take an extreme example. Second, an entity may be measured in terms of its salience to particular actors as well as to the system in general. Zambia is unlikely to be salient to the entire system; its salience to Southern Rhodesia should be very great. The problem of using the total number of events received as a measure of salience arises from the possibility of an entity being of much greater salience to a very prolific actor than it is to the system. The behavior directed at the entity by that one actor would tend to bloat the total number of events which the entity received and give a misleading impression of its salience. The best example of that would be South Vietnam. The large number of events it received from the United States would tend to overstate its salience in the world.

So what is needed is a measure which makes allowance
for the differences in activity of different actors. The strategy adopted in this research is as follows. For each state in the international system, the mean number of events which it directed at other entities in the international system was calculated. The data base for that calculation was the events data set gathered by the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) Project (McClelland and Hoggard, 1969) for the years 1966-1968.\(^1\) Then taking a single entity (i) as target, the total number of events it received from a particular actor (j) was compared to the mean number of events for the actor. If the total received by i from j was larger than the mean sent by j to any i, then a counter was incremented by one. If the mean was larger than the total, the counter was not incremented. That operation was repeated across all actors (all j's). The result was the total number of actors that directed more than their mean amount of behavior at an entity i. That measure captures the number of actors that believe that an entity is worthy of a sizable portion of their attention. That makes it a measure fitting the conceptual notion of salience.

The operation described above produced a variable having a large number of values. That wide range of values

\[^1\text{The WEIS data set was chosen for that task because it does not have a regional interest and, therefore, includes all nations as actors.}\]
made the original variable awkward for analysis purposes, so it was dichotomized. In order to choose a point at which to dichotomize the measure, the frequency distribution of the measure was examined for two qualities: (1) a "gap" in the distribution where there were no cases having that value on the measure; (2) the distribution above that value was discontinuous (there were more gaps) whereas below that point the distribution was fairly continuous and complete. In a sense, the operation was like the use of the scree test in choosing the number of factors to rotate in a factor analysis (Rummel, 1970). Using those criteria, the ideal cutting point for dichotomizing the scale was established as twenty. Twenty or more of the nations in the world had to direct more than their average number of events at an entity for it to be considered salient in a dichotomous sense.

The operation described above was only half the battle, though. The use of the WEIS data only allowed the establishment of the salience of nation-states because WEIS did not adequately differentiate among international organization targets. Therefore, an effort was needed to determine which, if any, international organizations were salient entities in the international system. The core of that effort was to use the CREON data to estimate the salience of international organizations. The following estimation procedure was employed. It was determined how frequently
an entity, whether nation-state or international organization, was the intended influencee in a CREON event, that is, either an indirect object or a direct target in events with no separate indirect object. The number for each international organization was then compared to a cutoff point. That cutoff point was the number of times the nation with the lowest score within the "salient" range on the salience from WEIS was the intended influencee of a CREON event. If the international organization received more CREON events than the number of CREON events received by that nation, it was considered a salient entity. There were no close decisions. All international organizations either passed or failed the test with a fairly wide margin.

That set of procedures generated a set of sixteen "salient" entities. They are listed in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1: ENTRIES CODED AS SALIENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At this point the operationalization is relatively straightforward. A computer program was written to search
the actors and targets identified for a stimulus. The final output variable was:

(1) No salient actors or targets.
(2) At least one salient target, no salient actor.
(3) At least one salient actor, no salient target.
(4) At least one salient actor and target.

**Violence of the Stimulus**

Of course, who is involved in the stimulus is only one aspect of the sources of third party response behavior. What is done should also be significant in determining whether third party responses occur.

The nature of the stimulus ought to affect third party responses first of all through an effect on the flow of news about the stimulus. The evidence suggests that the more violent the action, the higher the probability that news about it will be reported in nations other than those directly involved in the action. The International Press Institute (1953: 19-20) has claimed that "the newspaper, since its earliest days has cultivated a particular kind of story--a sudden outbreak of violence either in nature or human emotions. The news agencies report these events from any area of the world." Mowlana (n.d.: 10) reaches a similar conclusion: "It has been repeatedly shown that media tend to emphasize violence and dissent rather than areas of agreement or peaceful progress in the international system."
And Galtung and Ruge (1965: 68) claim that "the more negative the event in its consequences, the more probable that it will become a news item."

A number of systematic studies exist which buttress that position. Sigler (1969) found in his study of the North African press that conflictual actions were more likely to be reported. Hatchen discovered that the news coming out of Africa tended to be biased in the direction of conflict, political upheaval and military coups (Thoren, 1968). Hoggard (1970) presents data on interactions during the 1962 Sino-Indian border dispute, as reported in four sources. About 25% of all events were reported in more than one source. Of the events classified in the cooperative categories of the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) scale, only 19% were reported in more than one source, whereas 28% of the conflictual events were multiple reported. This supports the supposition that messages about conflict are more likely to be reported than those about cooperation. Smith (1969) found a rank-order correlation of .335 between the extent of negative consequences of the event during a crisis and its probability of being reported. It should be explicitly noted that although the evidence produced by Hoggard and Smith are in the correct direction, the support for the hypothesis is somewhat weak.

In addition to affecting the flow of news about an
event, and thus the probability that governments will be aware of it, the level of violence in an event should also be related to the degree of requiredness in the situation created by the event. The assumption is that the more violent the action, the more demands there will be for the government of third parties to make some reaction to it. Generally, those demands will come from a few groups—the aggrieved nation and its close allies, supporters of the aggrieved nation within the government of the third party nation (the relevant regional bureaus of the foreign ministry, for example), and supporters of the aggrieved nation within the domestic system of the third party nation.

Violent behavior is especially likely to create such demands for a number of reasons. Just as violence is especially noteworthy to the editors and reporters in the news media, it is especially salient for the relevant publics of governmental decision makers. Violent actions are much more spectacular than other actions. They tend to have moral or ethical implications more frequently than do other, less conflictual actions. Thus, violent actions, once perceived, are more likely to trigger strong emotive responses than do other actions.

Second, violent actions, because they are more widely reported in the press, are more widely perceived by nongovernmental actors than are less conflictual actions. Nongovernmental actors are more dependent on press sources
for information about international affairs than govern­mental actors. Whether an event is reported in the press is crucial for whether such groups will be aware of the event and, thus, capable of making demands for a response.

Third, violent actions are more likely to trigger demands for a response from other states in the system. They are more likely to produce a polarization of the system. And they are more likely to carry precedent implications for other states than are other actions.

In addition to having an effect on the requiredness in a situation, violent actions are also more likely to produce situations having a higher degree of cruciality. Many of the states in the international system define as a goal of their foreign policy the reduction of the level of conflict in the international system. For those states, a violent action constitutes a threat to that goal. Such a threat tends to produce a situation of higher cruciality, which in turn makes a third party response more probable.

The arguments offered in this section can be summed up in the following hypothesis:

H3: States are more likely to make third party responses to violent events than to less conflictual events.

**Operationalization of Violence**

Violent behavior is a subset of conflictual behavior. Generally, conflictual behaviors are those events that
express negative affect or hostility toward the primary recipient of influence. Violent behaviors are intense conflict behaviors.

That definition of conflict requires a couple of major assumptions. The idea of a single affective direction for an event can be somewhat misleading. A single event may communicate friendship to some states and hostility to others. For example, American pledges of support to the Thieu regime indicated positive intentions to that regime but negative ones to the Viet Cong. A threat to one party is tantamount to promises to another. Nevertheless, it is generally the case that observers of such actions, both within and outside governments, are able to make fairly consensual assessments of whether an action is conflictual or cooperative. They do that by deciding first which entity was the most direct object of influence or target of communication, and using the affect relative to that entity to fix the affective direction of behavior. The assumption that legitimizes the definition of conflict and violence is that in most cases the idea of a most direct influence is appropriate.

Given that the affective direction of a stimulus can be determined, there remains the problem of establishing its intensity. Affective direction is a continuum that can be readily dichotomized (or trichotomized) to distinguish conflictual from other actions. Intensity is not so
easy to handle. There are no salient cutting points on an intensity dimension that stand out as adequately distinguishing intense from nonintense actions.

However, the connotative meaning of violence does suggest a reasonable cutting point. The term "violent" is not applied to all intense behavior. For example, the recall of an ambassador during a conflict is a very intense form of diplomatic signal, but very few observers or participants would want to call it violent. As the concept is typically used, violent behaviors are those that entail the use of force against another in order to achieve a set of objectives. Therefore, in this dissertation violent behaviors will be considered to be those that apply military force against the target.

The information required to empirically distinguish violent from nonviolent stimuli can be drawn from a variable coded for each stimulus. That variable is the Sequential Action Scheme developed by the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) Project (Hermann et al., 1973). The Sequential Action Scheme, as described in CREON documents (Salmore and Brady, 1972: 8-35; Hermann et al., 1973: 77-85), contains a differentiation of behavior into seven primary categories. Those categories are reported in Table 2. The crucial distinction in that variable is between category 7 and the rest. All stimuli coded 7 (military conflict deeds) on the Sequential Action
TABLE 2: CATEGORIES OF SEQUENTIAL ACTION SCHEME

(1) Statements of evaluation
(2) Statements of desire
(3) Statements of intent
(4) Symbolic deeds
(5) Significant deeds
(6) Military non-conflict deeds
(7) Military conflict deeds

Scheme will be considered violent; all others will not be.

Crisis Context of the Stimulus

In the literature on international politics there are two general approaches to the definition of a crisis. The decision making approach treats crisis from the perspective of governmental policy makers. A crisis is a situation which was unanticipated, produces a strong threat to national goals, and allows very little time to prepare an appropriate response (Hermann, 1969). For the decision making approach, a situation is not a crisis for all states in the system, and may not be for all states involved in the interaction sequence which produced the crisis.

The other approach to the definition of a crisis takes what is called a systemic perspective. There has not been the convergence on a common definition of crisis within the systems perspective that there has been within the decision making perspective. As a result, there is no commonly accepted systemic definition of crisis. However, within the diversity of definitions there are some elements which are fairly common. First, a crisis situation is not
dependent on the perception of any single actor. Second, a crisis is a situation having the possibility of producing a transformation of the international system. Thus, Boulding (1963: 250) refers to a crisis as "some kind of boundary or turning point." Third, a crisis is marked by a high level of tension.

This research will focus on a systemic definition of crisis. A crisis is defined as a sequence of behaviors on a set of related issues, unfolding over time, having the capacity to modify the level of violence in the international system or a subsystem. International crises are closely related to the patterns of news flow in the international system. Actions which occur in a crisis are more likely to be reported for three reasons. First, a crisis adds an additional aura of drama to any action, not only because of the tension involved, but also because an action in a crisis has greater potential consequentiality. Therefore, the clientele is likely to demand more messages about actions in crises. Second, there appears to be a general tendency on the part of the press to report on any day those events which were news on the prior day. Cohen (1963) has brilliantly documented this sort of positive feedback process in the development of the news. Last, a crisis has an effect on the pattern of distribution of foreign correspondents. When a crisis breaks, the press services and the prestige press send additional correspon-
dents into the areas involved. For example, Hilsman (1967) reports that an additional fifty correspondents appeared in Laos after the fall of Nam Tha in early 1961. Such additional attention indicates heightened interest and feedback to further increase attention on the crisis.

Crisis is also related to the degree of requiredness in the situation. That is true for many of the same reasons that the degree of conflict is related to the degree of requiredness. A crisis increases the degree of requiredness for another reason. One of the characteristics of a crisis is that it carries with it the perception that the system may change, and change rapidly. The potential rapidity of that change compresses the time frame within which stimuli are evaluated. There is a tendency to believe that a response must come quickly or else the situation will change before any influence can be exerted. Studies of dyadic patterns show that the time lapse between stimulus and response tends to decrease during crisis periods (Corson, 1969; Smoker, 1969). That increased pace of stimulus-response sequences is indicative of the perception of the need to respond rapidly. It is reasonable to assume that a similar relationship should also hold for third parties.

One of the consequences of that perceived need to respond quickly is to increase the level of requiredness in the situation. Because there is no perceived value in
putting off a decision, the pressure to act is increased.

It should be pointed out that all the effects of a crisis do not increase the probability of third party response behavior. A notable exception is the impact of crisis on the ambiguity in a situation. As Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1962) have noted, ambiguity can be a result of the instability in the situation. The more rapidly things change, the more difficult it is to ascribe meaning to the situation. Thus, in a crisis, ambiguity ought to be increased and that should depress the tendency to make third party responses. However, on balance, it is expected that the effects of crisis will result in an increased, rather than decreased, probability of third party response behavior. The relevant hypothesis can be stated as:

H4: States are more likely to make third party responses in situations of crisis than in other situations.

At this point, it may be useful to make more explicit the differences between the concepts of crisis and violence. In many ways the processes that link them to third party response behavior are similar. But that does not mean that the concepts are identical. There are two important points of divergence. First, violent behavior can occur in contexts other than a crisis. For example, after a period of time, the Vietnam war became routinized; it was no longer a crisis for the system. Nevertheless, it was the context for a number of very violent events. Second, the
idea of a change in the level of violence can include peaceful behavior. Negotiations between the Egyptians and the Israelis over a Sinai disengagement would constitute a systemic crisis, but would not be violent.

**Operationalization of Crisis**

The researcher who wishes to measure systemic crises is confronted with a choice of two approaches to the operationalization of the concept. The first is to examine the quantity and variety of behavior in a system. That approach has been developed and advocated by McClelland (1968). He contends that when the quantity and variety of behaviors become great enough, a systemic crisis can be said to have taken place. As a result of his studies of crisis, he recommends the definition of an acute crisis as a period in which the measure of relative uncertainty in the system (H-rel) is above a specific threshold value (.7).

Despite the potential promise of that approach it is not a viable option for this research. The calculation of H-rel requires that the researcher have available fairly comprehensive events data for each of the years he is studying. For reasons to be explained in Chapter V, this research covers the time period 1959-1968. But there is no events data set that includes the behavior of all actors in the international system for that time period.

The other approach is to identify crises from the
narratives of current events and diplomatic histories covering the time period to be studied. Using that technique, one would examine the relevant literature and make a determination if a sequence of events met the definitional criteria for a crisis. That approach was adopted for this research. However, the amount of effort required for a comprehensive search was too great for this research undertaking. Therefore, some initial boundaries had to be placed on the search. The boundaries adopted are the set of sequences of events identified by other observers of international affairs as crises. Essentially, what was done was to use the informed perceptions of others to supply an initial screening of the possible crises in the international system.

The first step in the creation of that initial screening was to inventory different sets of identified crises. The researchers whose lists of crises were consulted were Rusk (1966), Kim (1968), Schwartz (1967), Phillips and Lorimor (1972) and groups at Bendix Corporation and I.B.M.²

A number of problems were encountered in compiling a crisis inventory from those lists. One was the problem of what might be called idiosyncratic perceptions. For example, Rusk included in his list an item called "threat

²I would like to thank James Moore of Consolidated Analysis Centers, Inc. for supplying me with those latter two sources.
of Castro government of Cuba to political stability in the Western hemisphere" (Rusk, 1966: 32). Value judgements are usually somewhat involved in the systemic identification of crises. The challenge is to get around the influence of one such set of judgements or perceptions. That was done by adopting the rule that a crisis would be identified only if two or more sources identified a particular crisis in a particular year. Thus, for example, both Rusk and Kim identify a crisis in Vietnam including the year 1959. 1959 was, thus, initially considered a year with a crisis in Vietnam. No other source included Rusk's Castro threat as a crisis, so it was not included in the crisis inventory.

The next problem was that the original lists often were vague in identification of the crisis. For example, one found such crises as "French crisis with Algeria--1961." The difficulty was that there were a number of aspects of the Algerian problem in 1961 which were more or less distinct. Did the source mean that all were crises, making the whole year one of crisis, or was the source thinking only of one aspect (peace negotiations, the generals' revolt)? At this point in the data-gathering process it was assumed that the whole year was meant as a crisis. That decision maximized the number of entries on the original crisis inventory. The reason was that bogus crises could be removed during subsequent cleaning of the inventory, and it was better to err on the side of being too inclusive.
that early in the process.

Having in that way identified the initial inventory of crises, an effort was made to determine if in fact a systemic crisis occurred and what the time boundaries of the crisis were. The Deadline Data files of the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) Project and the New York Times Index were examined to determine if there was some crisis as defined above, and what the time boundaries of the crisis were. In order to establish time boundaries on the crisis some specialized sources (Hilsman, 1967; McClelland, 1968; McClelland 1972) were also consulted. That operation resulted in the elimination of a number of "crises" included in the first inventory, such as Vietnam in 1959.

A final step was required in the preparation of the inventory of crises. Before it can be understood, it is first necessary to anticipate part of Chapter V. The data set being used in this dissertation includes data for 1959-1968, but for sampled quarters of each year, not for the entire year. As a result, some of the crises did not coincide with one of the sampled quarters. The problem was whether to include them in the inventory of crises. That problem was solved in this way. If there was some period of intense interactions or some spectacular policy change during or just before the sampled quarter for a particular year, then it was assumed that the crisis was
occurring during that quarter. If some specific event started the crisis during a quarter, such as the clash in the Tonkin Gulf, then the time preceding that date was not a crisis period but the time afterwards was. If some period of crisis occurred during a quarter, then the entire quarter was considered to be a time of crisis. The exception was when some specific event could be said to have ended the crisis, such as the United States withdrawal of its fleet from the Tonkin Gulf on August 7, 1964.

With that set of rules on hand, the preliminary set of crises was pared down to produce a final set of crises which could have affected behavior during the sampled quarters. That set is presented in Table 3. Appendix B presents a short narrative about each crisis, the issues involved, and the main participants.

There are two issues involved in assessing the validity of this measure. The main difficulty would seem to be that the primary sources were all American, which suggests a chance for bias due to American values. There is, indeed, that possibility, but the initial lists of the sources used for the original compilation all included a number of interaction sequences in third world areas in which the United States and other great powers were not directly involved. Although that does not deny that an American bias may have been at work, it does suggest that the results are not solely a function of American values.
TABLE 3: FINAL CRISIS INVENTORY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>1959, 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>1961 - 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab-Israeli</td>
<td>May 18 - June 30, 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian civil war</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-China border dispute</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti-Dominican Republic</td>
<td>April 17 - June 30, 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam Buddhist crisis</td>
<td>May 1 - June 30, 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonkin Gulf incident</td>
<td>Aug. 2 - Aug. 7, 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing of North Vietnam</td>
<td>Feb. 7 - March 31, 1965</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The greatest problem with the measure stems from the divergent time frames used in the individual original sources. Only two (Phillips and Lorimor, 1972; Kim, 1968) covered the time period 1967-1968. There is some likelihood therefore, that there will be some errors of omission in those years. For all earlier years, though, there are good reasons to have confidence in the adequacy of the measure.

Identity of the Individual Actor

The last of the stimulus characteristics is the identity of the decision maker who initiates the stimulus event. Concerning news flow, Galtung and Ruge (1965: 68) argue "the more the event concerns elite people, the more
probable that it will become a news item." Cohen (1963) relates that his press contacts indicated one thing which makes an event newsworthy is the participation of "big names."

Although both references indicate a concern with the individual, there is some divergence. Galtung and Ruge (1965) are referring basically to the governmental roles which individuals hold. Cohen (1963), while acknowledging the importance of governmental role, is also emphasizing something else. The examples he cites include as "big names" some persons who had no governmental office at the time of his interviews. In developing a theory of news flow about foreign policy actions it is possible to have a synthesis of the two emphases without doing violence to either. All foreign policy actions are made by persons with some governmental role. Those roles can be treated as being arrayed on a hierarchical dimension, which can be dichotomized into high decision makers and lower official groups. We can now draw on Cohen's insight. A person is unlikely to become a "big name" holding a low decision maker role. Moreover, high decision makers vary in the degree to which they are big names. Adenauer was a bigger name than Erhard; Kissinger is a bigger name than Rusk was. Applying this criterion to that of holding governmental office produces a three-point scale of the newsworthiness of a person (from highest to lowest):
(1) High decision maker and "big name"
(2) Other high decision maker
(3) Lower official

In terms of impact on the situational variables, the identity of the decision maker is probably not as important as the governmental role which he occupies. The hierarchical level of the role is related to response behavior through the intervening notion of commitment. Major commitments are very consequential actions. They indicate the likely future behavior of the state, either explicitly or by implication. Because they are highly consequential they are likely to be of some importance to the goal attainment of other states.3

The hierarchical level of the decision maker affects the level of commitment in an action. Only the very highest policy makers in a state can make decisions of a high level of commitment—those which bind the government to pursue a course of action. Thus, the higher the hierarchical level of the decision maker, the more likely that the event is at a high commitment level. Therefore, the actions of high decision makers will tend to be more consequential than the actions of others, and to generate a higher level of cruciality in the situation.

3Commitment was not examined as an independent characteristic because of the difficulties in operationalizing it in the data set used.
A second line of argument deals with the effect of the decision maker's role on the ambiguity in the situation. Governments often announce important policy decisions from the middle levels of the bureaucracy. Therefore, an observer cannot be sure that just because a decision was not announced at the highest level that decision was not an important commitment. However, when the decision is announced as one coming from high level decision makers, observers can be fairly sure if the action constitutes a major commitment. Thus, there is more ambiguity in the level of commitment involved when actions are announced at the lower levels of the government than when they are announced at the higher levels.

Thus, the following hypothesis would seem to be called for.

H5: States are more likely to make third party responses to events taken by internationally newsworthy decision makers and other high governmental officials than they are to respond to events taken by lower governmental officials.

Operationalization of Newsworthiness

The first step in operationalizing this variable was to make an inventory of the primary decision makers in each of the CREON actor nations for the 1959-1968 time period. We examined that variable for only the nations which were CREON actors in order to provide some bounds for the data-
gathering part of this operationalization. Choice of the CREON nations was dictated by the fact that the CREON Project had already compiled a list of three governmental positions for each nation—Head of State (President, King), head of government (Premier, Prime Minister), and Minister of Foreign Affairs. That list was compiled, however, when there were thirty-three nations in the sample of actors used by CREON. The list was, therefore, brought up to date with the addition of Canada, Uganda and the United Arab Republic.

Clearly, a major flaw in the use of that list was the exclusion of some important offices, notably, ministers of defense and economic affairs. It is an entirely reasonable conjecture that such persons as Pierre Messmer and Moshe Dayan would be perceived as newsworthy decision makers. Despite those and other possible omissions, the data do provide a reasonable approximation of the set of newsworthy decision makers.

An additional problem was raised by the Communist states. In those states, governmental power is split between the party and the government. When different persons hold the positions of head of party and head of government the typology leaves no room for the head of party. For Communist regimes it would be a gross distortion to exclude them, though. Therefore, in both cases of such split power the heads of the party (Brezhnev and Mao Tse-Tung)
have been included along with the heads of government (Kosygin and Chou En-Lai, respectively).

Armed with this preliminary list of primary decision makers, data was gathered on the attention of the media to each of those leaders. The source was the New York Times Index. The procedure was to count the number of column-inches in the Index describing stories about the decision maker. Only stories indexed under the decision makers' names were measured, and only those during the decision makers' years in office. Moreover, the references to other sections in the Index ("See also . . .") were not measured. Those choices were to minimize the bias introduced by differential rates of activity for nations. Only those stories perceived by the compilers of the New York Times Index as being about the decision maker were included in the data.

The New York Times Index was chosen for a number of pragmatic reasons and one conceptual one. Pragmatically, it was the one source which covered the whole time period, could be efficiently used, and which made the distinction between stories about the decision makers and stories about their actions. Conceptually, the New York Times is one of the most prestigious newspapers in the world. Although the space it allots would be biased by its Western and developed location, its perceptions are probably as close to the mainstream as those of any other single source. Of course,
multiple sources would have been more desirable, but such an effort would have been impractical for this research. However, beyond the Times' Western and developed bias, there is the additional bias of it being an American source. That bias would be debilitating in its bloating of the column-inches of American policy makers, so the Americans were excluded from this portion of the data-gathering effort.

After the column-inches for all decision makers were measured, the original list was pared down by excluding all persons not having at least one year in office during which the Times ran enough stories to produce at least one column-inch of print in the Index. That reduced the original list of several hundred decision makers to thirty-four. The average number of column-inches for the years in office of each of those thirty-four was then calculated. That data, along with the years of tenure and the range of attention in the Index is presented in Table 4. The decision makers are presented in rank-order by their average. A couple of comments are in order. First, it is very clear that from the perspective of the New York Times, Nikita Khrushchev was the single most newsworthy (non-American) political leader. That is not surprising; had it been otherwise, the data would have been suspect, indeed. What is surprising is the size of the difference in the attention paid to Khrushchev to that paid to any other decision maker. Second, the total rank-ordering is gen-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</tr>
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<td>.75 (67/8)</td>
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<td>1.00 (64/6)</td>
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<td>1.00 (62/8)</td>
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<td>1.00 (59)</td>
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<td>.27</td>
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TABLE 4: (cont.)

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>High</th>
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<td>(60)</td>
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<td>.00</td>
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erally in accordance with expectations. That suggests that the procedure for operationalizing the variable has a great deal of face validity. Third, there are some significant differences between the attention paid to some leaders and that paid to their successors. The gap between Khrushchev and Kosygin or Brezhnev, Adenauer and Erhardt, Nehru and Shastri and Gandhi, all indicate that the operationalization is tapping attention to the person, not just to his role and the power, status or activity of the nation. Again, that reinforces the belief that the operationalization is valid. Fourth, the rank-ordering and the composition of the list indicates a strong tendency toward attention to the leaders of large, developed nations. That is not particularly shocking. That there are some leaders of smaller nations (Castro, Nasser, Nkrumah) included supports the notion that the data are valid. Last, there is what at first seems an under-attention to the leadership of China. In fact, the data probably do deceive us on that point. The space in the Times Index is a function of the number of stories. Since the Chinese were very secretive in that time period, especially toward the
United States, it should be expected that there would be fewer stories to print on them. What the measure would ideally tell us is the relative probability of a story being printed given that one has been filed, but unfortunately that is effectively impossible for this research, or for any research, for the 1959-1968 time period.

The concept offered in the theoretical part of the analysis treated newsworthiness as a dichotomous variable—either an individual was newsworthy or he was not. The data presented above demonstrate how simplistic that either-or view of reality is. Still, in order to test the hypothesis it is necessary that the variable be dichotomized. In choosing how to dichotomize, there are essentially two choices. One is to include the whole set of thirty-four leaders listed in Table 4. The other is to choose some subset. In making that choice it is important to remember that the "one column-inch in one year" rule was not theoretically grounded. It was only a convenience to eliminate many leaders so as to facilitate later analysis. There is no a priori reason for accepting the entire set of thirty-four as newsworthy. If being newsworthy means anything, it must mean that there is some continuing interest in the person who is a leader across most years. Therefore, the relevant piece of data is not the maximum, but the mean number of column-inches in the Index for the years of the leader's tenure. Examining
that column of Table 4, it becomes clear that certain leaders ought not to be included in the final set of newsworthy persons. But where should the division be drawn? The decision was made to exclude all those leaders who did not have an average of at least 1.0 column-inches. An average of 1.0 seemed to be a salient cutting point, both because 1.0 is a round number and because it seemed to represent a hiatus in the distribution such that the averages of those falling below 1.0 are much more closely bunched than those above 1.0.

At this point the American policy makers were reintroduced into the analysis. It was assumed that each of the American Presidents and Secretaries of State was a newsworthy individual and they were, therefore, included in the final set of such actors.

**Summary**

In this chapter, five characteristics of the stimulus have been related conceptually to the occurrence of third party response behavior and operationalized for use in the empirical analysis later in the dissertation. Those characteristics are: (1) the regional focus of the stimulus; (2) the salience of the participants in the stimulus; (3) the violent or nonviolent nature of the stimulus; (4) the crisis or noncrisis context of the stimulus; and (5) the newsworthiness and hierarchical level of the individual making the stimulus action.
Before turning from this chapter it should be explicitly noted that the variables considered here do not constitute an exhaustive set of the stimulus characteristics that can be presumed to have an impact on third party response behavior. Others might be the existence of alliance bonds or other formal commitments between the third party and the participants, ideological cleavages or the forum in which the stimulus occurred. Nevertheless, it is felt that the variables considered here are important ones that need to be examined and that have some potential for explaining third party response behavior.
CHAPTER IV

THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND THEIR INTERACTION WITH STIMULUS CHARACTERISTICS

In this chapter the nature of the analysis undergoes a major change. Not only are new kinds of variables examined; in addition, a different kind of theoretical product is generated. The previous chapter produced a series of bivariate hypotheses. This chapter produces a series of causal models.

There are two primary reasons for that shift in analysis. First of all, stimulus characteristics change with the stimulus. One can uniquely assign to each stimulus some value on a stimulus characteristic variable, thus allowing analysis on the discrete stimulus level. National characteristics, on the other hand, do not change with the same frequency. For each third party, its national characteristics are constant across a number of stimuli. Therefore, analysis needs to move up from the level of discrete stimuli to the analysis of tendencies in aggregated data. As was indicated in Chapter I, those tendencies are the absolute frequency of third party responses for each nation and the relative frequency of such behavior.

Second, in the case of stimulus characteristics one
could not easily establish any causal interrelationships among them. The stimulus characteristics were in effect independent. On the other hand, the national characteristics to be examined here are all causally interrelated. Therefore, it is desirable to acknowledge that interrelatedness and integrate it into the development of the models. And causal models are one of the primary means for achieving such integration.

The organization of the chapter is as follows. First, the causal model is developed for explaining cross national variation in the frequency and relative frequency of third party response behavior. As in the previous chapter the operationalization of the causal variables will be discussed soon after the conceptual importance of those variables is presented. That is the second part of the chapter.

The third section of the chapter involves a slight change in focus. The first two sections are concerned with the direct impact of national characteristics on third party response behavior. The third section is concerned with how national characteristics interact with the stimulus characteristics in the generation of third party response behavior.

Development of the Causal Model

Monitoring Capacity

In Chapter II it was indicated that one of the im-
portant theoretical constructs in the explanation of third party response behavior is the monitoring capacity of the third party. Monitoring capacity is also the first variable to be brought into the causal model.

Monitoring capacity is related to third party response behavior because of its impact on the frequency with which a third party becomes aware of stimuli in the environment. States that have more monitoring capacity have more diplomatic missions and other kinds of listening posts to keep track of events in foreign countries. Those listening posts give a government access to information about international affairs that is not reported in the global news media (the press wire services, the prestige newspapers). Therefore, the more listening posts that a government has, the more stimuli that it will become aware of. And by assumption A1 (p. 34) it follows that the more listening posts (or the greater the monitoring capacity of the government) the more frequently will the state make third party responses.

The relationship of monitoring capacity to the relative frequency of third party responses is not as straightforward as it is for the raw frequency of such behavior. In order to establish that relationship two additional assumptions need to be made. First of all, it is assumed that simple awareness of a stimulus by some member of a government is not a sufficient condition for the authorized
decision maker to perceive the stimulus. Usually the individual who first becomes aware of the stimulus must make an effort to communicate the information upward through the bureaucracy to the authorized decision maker. Whether that effort is made depends on the individual's perception of whether the stimulus ought to be acted on or his perception of the decision maker's probable desire to act on it. If the stimulus does not seem to require any response by the government, then the information about it will not be communicated up through the bureaucracy to an authorized decision maker.

The second assumption concerns when the individual who first receives the news about the stimulus will see it as something worthy of a response and thus initiate upward communication of the information through the bureaucracy. It is assumed that the necessary condition for that perception is that the individual must see the stimulus as having some impact on the achievement of national goals. The stimulus must create a situation of at least some minimum cruciality.

The first two assumptions suggest the conclusion that the notion of monitoring capacity includes not just the information-gathering function. It must also include the analysis function. If the analysis function is not performed completely and successfully, the situations created by stimuli will tend to be more ambiguous, thereby
depressing the tendency to respond. The more successfully
the analysis is performed, the less ambiguous will be most
situations and the more clear will be the implications of
a stimulus for a government's goals and objectives. That
increased clarity in the impact of a stimulus will tend to
produce more situations of high cruciality and high re-
quiredness arising from within the government. Therefore,
there will be more responses.

However, the argument as developed so far only applies
to responses in general. It does not suggest that increased
analysis and monitoring capabilities leads to relatively
more frequent third party responses. In order to establish
that part of the argument it needs to be pointed out that
in no foreign policy organization is the analysis function
completely ignored. The crucial point is that with greater
monitoring capacity the amount of analysis increases and
with that increase, comes a shift in the amount allocated
to stimuli to which the government is a third party.

In order to establish that point some assumptions
need to be made about the priority placed by governments
on analysis. Pool and Kessler (1969) have suggested five
factors that increase the amount of attention paid by an
individual to a piece of information. They are: (1) if it
deals with them; (2) if it does not contradict previous
views; (3) if it comes from trusted, well liked sources;
(4) if they will have to act on it or discuss it because
of attention by others; (5) if it bears on actions they are already involved in. It can be assumed without too much danger of error that those same five factors will have an impact on the priority given information for analysis. If so, then there will be a priority given to the analysis of stimuli in which the government is a participant rather than a third party. That is the clear implication of the first factor. In addition the fourth factor will also tend to give priority to such dyadic stimuli because such events are more likely to require a response and to attract the attention of nongovernmental groups in the society. And the fifth factor also suggests the priority given to dyadic stimuli. By the very nature of third party status, the state cannot be closely involved in the interaction system that produced the stimulus. Thus, in most instances a stimulus will not bear on the prior actions of most third parties.

The implications are that for each nation whose affairs are being monitored there is some minimum amount of monitoring capacity that will be allocated to the reporting and analysis of bilateral interactions with that nation. It is when some surplus monitoring capacity exists that it is allocated to the reporting and analysis of the implications of the relations of the monitored nation with nations other than the third party. For example, it is only after the Ghanian mission to London is large
enough to handle the direct relations between London and Ghana that individuals will be assigned the task of reporting and analyzing British relations with Dahomey.

Thus, the greater the monitoring capacity of the state, the less the concentration on bilateral interactions and the greater the relative frequency of third party response behavior. That theoretical expectation along with the expected relationship between monitoring capacity and the frequency of third party response behavior can be summarized in the arrow diagram in Figure 1. In the figure

FIGURE 1: RELATIONSHIP OF MONITORING CAPACITY TO THIRD PARTY RESPONSE BEHAVIOR

the term "Third Party Response Behavior" can mean either the total frequency of such behavior or the relative frequency. The single-headed arrow indicates a unidirectional causal relationship—monitoring capacity has an effect on third party response behavior, but the reverse is not true.

Extensiveness of Goals and Objectives

The next national characteristic to be related to the frequency and relative frequency of third party response
behavior is the extensiveness of the nation's goals and objectives. Extensiveness refers not only to the number of goals and objectives, but also to the range of geographical regions and number and diversity of issues about which the government has goals and objectives.

The extensiveness of goals and objectives has an impact on the frequency with which stimuli create situations of high requiredness and, especially, high cruciality. The more extensive the goals and objectives, the more frequently will stimuli impinge on the attainment of the nation's goals and objectives. That increased frequency of impact on goals and objectives will result in more frequent situations of high cruciality and, therefore, more situations of high requiredness. That should result in more third party responses, by Assumptions A5 and A6 (p. 36).

The argument for relating the extensiveness of goals and objectives to the relative frequency of third party responses is not as simple and compelling as the argument for total frequency of such behavior. A state with relatively narrow goals and objectives could still be moved by those goals to be attentive to stimuli to which it is a third party. For example, a country whose economy is dominated by a single export commodity will be very sensitive to trade agreements with other countries entered into by its primary markets.

However, it is assumed in this research that govern-
ments that adopt more extensive goals and objectives will have relatively more frequent third party responses than will states with less extensive goals and objectives. The assumption that underlies that expectation is that as a nation's goals and objectives become more extensive, the rate of increase in goals and objectives that define needs and responsibilities of the nation as a third party increase at a faster rate than do goals and objectives that define dyadic needs and responsibilities. So, states that have extensive networks of goals and objectives have a higher proportion of such "third party" goals than do states with less extensive networks of goals and objectives.

Turning from the direct effects of the extensiveness of goals and objectives on third party response behavior, there is an important indirect effect that needs to be considered. Goals and objectives have an impact on third party response behavior indirectly through their impact on monitoring capacity. It is assumed that decision makers, when they adopt some foreign policy goal, take certain steps to insure that the goal is in fact implemented. One component of that implementation is the search for information relevant to the achievement of that goal. That requires the creation of monitoring capacity. And the more extensive the goals and objectives, the more monitoring capacity that is required to implement those goals.

All those observations about the impact of the exten-
siveness of goals and objectives can be integrated into the causal model being developed. Figure 2 does that diagrammatically. Figure 2 is an elaboration of Figure 1. The arrows drawn in Figure 2 indicate that the extensiveness of goals and objectives is directly related to the frequency and relative frequency of third party response behavior and to the monitoring capacity of the state.

**National Capabilities**

The capabilities of the nation is the next factor to be included in the model. Capabilities refers to the total resources at the disposal of a government. Resources are related to third party response behavior through their impact on monitoring capacity and on the extensiveness of national goals and objectives.

National capabilities have a decided impact on the monitoring capacity of governments. The establishment of organizational units to carry out monitoring requires re-
sources. The capabilities of states are related to the resources available to the government, with marked impacts on the foreign affairs organizations.

With fewer resources available for allocation to the foreign-affairs sector, the size and capacity of the organization charged with primary responsibility for foreign affairs are likely to be small. This means that there will be fewer persons involved in monitoring international events and executing foreign policy decisions (East, 1973: 559).

The greater the capabilities of the state, the greater the monitoring capacity of the state.

There is also a strong tradition in the literature on international politics that relates the purposes of states, their perceived interests and objectives, to their capabilities. For example, Burton (1968: 114) claims that

Perception of State interests is a function of State capability. Economic and military power is not just a means of pursuing given national interests; it also helps to determine them. Weak States have few interests which are vital; great Powers have few interests that are not vital. State interests are like the basic needs of individuals; they expand with the ability to acquire.

The arguments normally made on behalf of that conclusion begin from a rationality assumption. It is assumed that states with lesser capabilities will perceive the constraints placed on their ability to influence by the inadequacies in their capabilities. Realizing those constraints, they will seek to maximize the effect of their
influence by concentrating on a limited range of interactions over a limited range of problem areas. Wolfers (1969: 176) argues that "the degree to which power is available or attainable frequently affects the choice of ends. Prudent policy makers keep their ends and aspirations safely within the power which their country possesses or is ready and willing to muster." Thus, the greater the capabilities of the state, the more extensive the goals and objectives of the government in foreign policy.

Those two points establish that the capabilities of states must be indirectly related to third party response behavior. By having the effect of leading to increased monitoring capacity, increased capabilities increases the frequency and relative frequency of third party response behavior. And by increasing the extensiveness of national goals and objectives, increased capabilities have the same effect.

But do national capabilities have a direct impact on third party response behavior; an impact not channeled through the intervening variables "monitoring capacity" and "extensiveness of goals and objectives"? In this development it will be assumed that no such direct relationship exists. Given that assumption the role of capabilities can be integrated into the model as in Figure 3, which is an elaboration of Figure 2. In the figure it can be seen that capabilities are presumed to
FIGURE 3: RELATIONSHIP OF CAPABILITIES TO MONITORING CAPACITY, EXTENSIVENESS OF GOALS AND OBJECTIVES, AND THIRD PARTY RESPONSE BEHAVIOR

Capabilities

↓

Monitoring Capacity ← Extensiveness of Goals and Objectives

Third Party Response Behavior

have a direct impact on both the monitoring capacity of the government and the extensiveness of goals and objectives. Through those two intervening variables it can be expected that capabilities will also have an indirect effect on third party response behavior. The lack of an arrow directly connecting capabilities and third party response behavior indicates the expectation that there will be no relationship between capabilities and the frequency and relative frequency of third party response behavior once the effects of monitoring capacity and the extensiveness of national goals have been removed.

Size and Development

The final factors to be included in the model are the two national attributes size and development. In recent years the impact of those variables on foreign policy has been widely studied (Kean and McGowan, 1973;
Size and development are of interest here primarily because they are the two primary determinants of the capabilities of a nation. Size is the general overarching concept for a number of the raw or basic resources of a nation: population, geographic and agricultural area, and so forth. Development refers to a number of processes that affect the ability to convert raw resources into usable ones. The capabilities of a state are, therefore, a function of the size of the state and its level of development. Therefore, the greater the size and the greater the level of development of a state, the greater its capabilities.

Are size and economic development related to any of the other variables in the model? There is remarkably little previous research on which to base an answer to that question. Kean and McGowan (1973) and Callahan (1974) have both demonstrated that neither size nor development are directly related to the level of a state's involvement in the international system. That suggests that there will probably not be any direct relationship between either size or development and the monitoring capacity of the state. However, Kean and McGowan (1973) show that the level of involvement in regional affairs is directly related to both size and development. That association is not adequately explained by the authors,
and it remains a possible explanation that size and development each have some direct impact on national goals independent of total national capabilities. In order to test that possibility in this research it will be assumed that there is a direct effect of both size and development on the extensiveness of goals and objectives.

When size and development are grafted onto the diagram in Figure 3, the process of building the causal model is completed. That model is presented in Figure 4. As

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**FIGURE 4: THE CAUSAL MODEL**

![Causal Model Diagram](attachment:causal_model.png)

---

the model indicates, both size and development have a direct impact on capabilities and all three have a direct impact on the extensiveness of goals and objectives and, thus, indirectly on the frequency and relative frequency
of third party response behavior. Capabilities and the extensiveness of goals and objectives both have a direct impact on monitoring capacity, and thus, have an indirect impact on the third party response variables. Finally, monitoring capacity and the extensiveness of goals and objectives are the only variables having a direct effect on the dependent variables.¹

Having developed that causal model for relating national characteristics, it is now appropriate to turn to the operationalization of those characteristics.

Operationalization of National Characteristics

The operationalization of national characteristics will be discussed essentially in reverse order from the order in which they were built into the causal model. The exception is that the extensiveness of goals and objectives will be treated last because that is the most complex and problematic operationalization.

Size and Development

Research on the attributes of nations is one of the most well developed bodies of research available to the international relations scholars. Concern with the des-

¹The discussion in this paragraph does not detail all the indirect paths relating national characteristics to third party response behavior because such an enumeration would have been too long and involved, and not germane to the comprehension of the causal model.
cription of the underlying patterns of variation across nations has existed for a number of years. That concern peaked in the 1960's with the creation of major data gathering and analysis projects having as part of their mission the rigorous quantitative description of cross-national variance (Rummel, 1972; Russett et al., 1964; Russett, 1967). Rummel (1972) and Russett (1967) both made efforts as part of their research to compare their results with those of their predecessors. They generally found that over time there has been a high degree of stability in the underlying dimensions of nations. Thus, there is a strong basis for describing national attributes.

For this research, two dimensions are of special interest, namely, the size of the nation and its level of economic development. What are the best indicators of those dimensions? Answering that question presumes criteria for judging candidates. Rummel (1972: 268) has suggested five criteria:

(1) Data must be readily available on the indicators for most nations.

(2) Data on a basic indicator should be comparable.

(3) Each basic indicator should be measured on an interval or ratio scale.

(4) Each basic indicator should index a dimension of variation among nations.

(5) The set of basic indicators should encompass the major variance among nations.
Taking those criteria in reverse order, the last one can be easily dispensed with. It assumes that one is interested in establishing a set of indicators with which to map the set of basic dimensions of nations. That is not the purpose of this research. The purpose here is the evaluation of a theoretical model in its early stages of development. That model indicates certain dimensions to be of particular interest. All that is needed are indicators for those dimensions. The other dimensions can go unmeasured because they are not used.

The fourth criterion means that an indicator should load highly on one and only one dimension. If that is the case then the substantive interpretations of relationships using that variable can be made in terms of the factor on which it loads. Rummel's (1972: 268) reason for requiring that the indicator load highly on a dimension is worth quoting:

Since the attribute indexes a pattern of intercorrelated variables, the correlations or findings which hold for the attributes—the indicator—hold also for the other attributes involved in the pattern.

To the extent that is true, then meeting the fourth criterion is the crucial test for any indicator. For tests of relatively simple theories such as the one in Figure 4 the absolute precision of the results is not of great import, meeting the fourth criterion is sufficient grounds for the choice of an indicator.
What variables for each concept, size and development, meet that fourth criterion? Rummel has suggested three indicators of development and two of size that meet all five criteria. They are presented in Table 5. Russett (1967) did not present a list of indicators which he considered most useful, so we shall go to his original results. From his Table 2.1 (Russett, 1967: 18-21) we extract the variables with the highest loadings on each of the relevant factors. They are given in Table 6. From a comparative standpoint, population and GNP per capita appear to be the strongest candidate indicators of size and economic development respectively, because those two are the indicators that rank most highly on their respective factors in both analyses. For the size variable that is adequate justification. It is not decisive for GNP per capita because Russett did not include its most important alternatives in his analysis, so the high loading of GNP per capita cannot be used to compare against the excluded variables. In addition,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>telephones/population</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GNP/population</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>telephones/population / population</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>energy consumption/pop / national income</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GNP/population</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 6: ALTERNATIVE INDICATORS OF SIZE AND DEVELOPMENT SUGGESTED BY RUSSETT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>GNP per capita</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>newspapers/1000 pop.</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nonagricultural workers as % of wage/salary earners</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>life expectancy</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>total population</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Russett did not examine the oblique solution to the factor space to determine whether the factors could be highly correlated. If they were, then the loadings would be unstable across solutions, and the orthogonal solution he used would be an especially poor tool for comparing the contribution of a variable to the system structure.

There is no particular problem for any of the indicators meeting Rummel's first and third criteria. All are on the interval level of measurement, and all are readily available for well over one hundred national political units for a number of years. However, the GNP per capita measure has some problems on the second criterion. Exchange rates and differences in national accounting systems introduce some level of noncomparability into the measure that would seem to make GNP per capita a less desirable measure of economic development. Despite that difficulty, the GNP per capita was chosen as the measure of development. The fact that it loaded highly on the
development dimension of both Russett's (1967) and
Rummel's (1972) analysis indicates that the results found
using that indicator ought to also hold for the other
possible indicators of development.

Data on population and GNP per capita were drawn from
the archived version of the *World Handbook of Political
and Social Indicators*, second edition. The data for both
variables are for the year 1965.

**Capabilities**

In this research, the total capabilities of a state
will be indicated by its level of Gross National Product
(GNP). GNP measures the total economic resources avail­
able in a nation, and although the variable, economic
resources, does not completely measure all aspects of
capability, it does capture the central heart of the
matter. First of all, the economic resources in the
society is the crucial determinant of the economic re­
sources in the government. The correlation between gov­
ernment revenue and GNP is .99 (Callahan, 1973). Second,
the attainment of any other means of action is dependent
on the availability of economic resources. Thus,
Wilkenson (1969: 48) claims that "the most broadly con­
vertible power factor is economic capability;" and
Russett (1965) contends that GNP is the single best
measure of national capabilities. The GNP data used are
those gathered for the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* for 1965.

**Monitoring Capacity**

Monitoring capacity will be operationalized as the number of diplomats that a state sends to foreign capitals. There are some inadequacies of that measure. For one thing, diplomats may be sent for reasons other than to carry out reporting functions, for example, to increase the status of the state (Levi, 1970). Second, the number of diplomats sent does not directly measure monitoring efforts based in the home country. Third, the total number of diplomats sent to all countries may not reveal a concentration of those diplomats in a few countries. Thus, the actual scope of monitoring may be less than what is indicated by the total number of diplomats abroad. Despite those inadequacies, it is believed that the measure will give a reasonably adequate picture of the monitoring capacity of states. Even if diplomats are sent to another nation for reasons other than to report on events, it is reasonable to expect that they will do some reporting anyway. Second, with the exception of states whose legitimacy is challenged, it is hard to imagine that the relationship between the size of the diplomatic corps and the foreign ministry is not very close. Last, it is reasonable to assume that there will also be a strong relationship between the number of dip-
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Diplomats a state sends out and the number of states in which it is represented.

The data on the size of a nation's diplomatic corps are those gathered by Alger and Brauns (1967) for the 1963-1964 time period.

**Extensiveness of Goals and Objectives**

The researcher who wants to study cross-nationally the impact of goals and objectives is confronted with a major problem. The necessary groundwork for research has not been laid; there are no generally accessible, easily used data sets that catalogue the foreign policy goals and objectives of a number of nations. Indeed, such data are not even generated for rigorous single nation case studies with any frequency. And without access to such a data base on goals and objectives it would be impossible to operationally define the extensiveness of goals and objectives.

Despite that problem this research will make an effort to operationalize the concept. However, that operationalization will not be based on any direct measure of goals and objectives. Instead, an indirect measure on which data are available will be used. That indirect measure is the national role conceptions of the state. According to Holsti (1972: 122) national role conceptions are the "policy makers' definitions of the general kinds of deci-
sions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state and of the functions which their state should perform in a variety of geographic and issue settings."

Thus, national role conceptions are not goals and objectives, which are desired future states of affairs. They are, however, related to goals and objectives, and the strength of that relationship establishes the validity of the use of national role conceptions as an indirect measure of goals and objectives. There are three main reasons for believing that a close relationship does exist between national role conceptions and goals and objectives. The primary reason is that to a large extent the goals and objectives of a state determine or guide the national role conceptions adopted by the state. The adoption of a national role is one step in the implementation of the goals and objectives. For example, nations that have as a goal the production of change in some problem area are likely to adopt as a national role that of being an agent of change. Thus, Zambia's adoption of the role of leading liberation movements in Southern Africa is a result of their prior adoption of the goal of the eradication of the minority white-dominated and colonial regimes in that region. Without the goal the national role conception would not have been articulated.

In the other hand, the flow of causation can be reversed in some cases. The adoption of a national role
conception may in some cases result in the later acceptance of a new goal or more frequently of a new objective of policy. For example, it can be plausibly argued that the response of the Ford administration to the imminent collapse of Cambodia, namely, to urge an increase in American assistance, was partially motivated by the desire to fulfill the self-defined role of the United States as the protector of the "free world." In other words, national role conceptions are initially derived from broad notions of a nation's goals and objectives, but once adopted they serve to generate new goals and objectives and reinforce old ones.

The third reason to believe that goals and objectives ought to be closely related to national role conceptions derives from the well documented tendency for humans to seek consistency in their cognitive makeup. Goals, objectives and national role conceptions are all elements in the cognitive makeup of decision makers; they are part of the general orientation toward the world. If there were repeated cases of inconsistency between the action implications of goals and objectives and the action implications of national role conceptions, a tension would be produced that would result in those two divergent components being changed so that they were no longer incompatible. Thus, there is an internal dynamic that keeps goals and objectives and national role conceptions in
fairly close accord.

However, having made those arguments for the close relationship of national role conceptions with goals and objectives, a couple of possible sources of divergence ought to be recognized. The first is that all goals may not lead to the articulation of national role conceptions. Certain goals may be held and never used to indicate appropriate national roles. The second is that the statement of a role may be nothing more than so much rhetoric used to provide a smokescreen for real national objectives and behavior.

Both those objections are important, although the latter is the more dangerous. The former merely suggests a possibility for slippage between the concept and the indicator. All research suffers from such problems to some extent, and the first objection does not indicate that it should be either worse or better for this research. The second argument, though, is a serious challenge to the use of verbal statements of intention as an indicator of behavior. As such it addresses the fundamental problem of the measure and needs to be directly confronted. Two arguments can be offered that contend that verbal statements of norms such as goals and, especially, national role conceptions will generally be useful guides to behavior.

First, national role conceptions, by being stated,
will tend to create constraints on the behavioral options available to the decision makers.

It has been argued that in many situations policy makers operate as "guardians" of one or more national role conceptions. The more these national role conceptions become part of the political culture of a nation, the more likely they set limits on perceived, or politically feasible, policy alternatives, and the less likely that idiosyncratic variables would be crucial in decision making (Holsti, 1970: 298).

Not only does the statement of national role conceptions affect the constraints placed on the government by extragovernmental parts of the society, it can also change the political interactions within the bureaucracy. Halperin (1974) argues that one of the primary constraints on bureaucratic politics, on the alternatives and arguments which can be advanced, is shared images. He then indicates a series of such shared images in the United States government, three of which involve national role conceptions.

(6) The United States—and only the United States—has the power, ability, responsibility, and right to defend the Free World and maintain international order.

(7) The United States has an obligation to aid any Free People resisting Communism at home or abroad.

(8) Peace is indivisible, therefore collective defense is necessary. The new international order is based primarily on U.S. assumption of responsibility for other states' security, in support of which the United States must show itself ready to resist aggression (Halperin, 1970: 11-12).
Second, statements of national role conceptions may create psychological predispositions on the part of decision makers to act in accordance with those roles. As Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1962: 147) point out:

It is a well-known principle of behavior that an actor may influence himself, so to speak, by his own declarations. In short, motive statements—although originally not reflective of real motive—may become guides to conduct.

Thus, it can be expected that most assertions of national roles will not be bogus rhetoric but will be meaningful indicators of behavioral tendencies.

If national role conceptions are accepted as an appropriate indirect indicator of the goals and objectives of a nation, the problem becomes one of relating them to the extensiveness of goals and objectives. Recall that the extensiveness of goals and objectives refers to their number and to the range of geographical regions and number and diversity of issues about which the government has goals and objectives. That notion can be approximated by the concept of the activity of national role conceptions. The activity of national role conceptions refers to the degree to which the state defines for itself broad responsibilities for involvement in international affairs. The activity of national role conceptions is a function of three elements. The first is the number of roles adopted. A state that adopts only one or two roles is less active (other things being equal) than a state that
adopts four or five roles. Second, activity is a function of the range of referents for each role, or the number of possible sets of conditions in which the role could indicate appropriate behavior. Thus, a state that adopts the role of revolutionary leader only with reference to a single issue (e.g., Zambia with reference to white-dominated regimes in southern Africa) would be considered less active than a state that adopted a revolutionary role towards many regions or issues (e.g., Libya or China).

Third, activity is a function of the orientation of the role toward involvement in the international system. A state that adopts a single role of being an isolate or neutral is less active in its role conception than is a state that adopts a single role of mediating conflicts.

How does the activity of national role conceptions capture the substantive idea of extensiveness of goals and objectives? First of all, it is highly unlikely that states that adopt passive role orientations toward the world or that adopt few roles will be states that have the sort of wide-ranging goals and objectives that are associated with extensiveness. Second, by the argument offered above for why national role conceptions should be related to goals and objectives, it can be expected that states that have multiple foreign policy goals, especially ones that are substantively different, should also adopt more national roles, and more varied national roles.
Third, states that define their goals and objectives in broad rather than narrow ways ought to adopt more roles to implement those broader goals, and also ought to articulate those roles with a wider range of referents.

All three of the above arguments link some facet of the extensiveness of goals and objectives to the activity of national role conception. Based on those arguments it would appear that on the conceptual level the activity of national role conception is an appropriate indirect indicator of the theoretical concept of extensiveness of goals and objectives.

Having stated the justification for using the activity of role conception as an indicator of extensiveness of goals and objectives, the next task is to explicate how it can be measured. That task involves two components. First, the raw data on national role conceptions need to be discussed. Then how those data were used in the construction of a measure of activity needs to be examined.

The national role conceptions data to be used in this research consists of the information reported by Holsti (1970) in his pathbreaking article on national role conceptions.

In gathering the data, Holsti worked with a sample of seventy-one nations. That sample included all nations for which he could find at least ten "general foreign policy statements" which were unambiguously the views of
the top leadership of the nation. The time frame covered the period 1965-1967. There were 972 "general foreign policy statements" for the sample of seventy-one nations.

The national role conceptions data were gathered through a content analysis of those 972 documents. The unit of measurement was the theme, which was an assertion of a national role. Holsti abstracted and recorded each of the themes, a total of 1247. From that set of themes he inductively derived seventeen national role conceptions, plus one residual category (see Table 8). He then assigned each theme to one of those national roles according to the one which it most clearly fit.

That operation produced a matrix with nations as the rows and role conceptions as the columns. The entries in the cells are the number of times the state on that row uttered themes that fit the role conception in that column. That matrix was printed as Table 2 in the article (Holsti, 1970: 274-6) and was subsequently keypunched for analysis in this paper.

What problems might be entailed in using that data? There are four possible areas of concern. First, the quality of the data is unknown. Holsti does not appear to have had any rigorous rules for the identification of a theme or for the assignment of a theme to a role conception. Therefore, it is not clear to what extent the data reflect the idiosyncracies of Holsti's coding.
Second, there are problems with the set of seventeen national roles. Because those roles were generated empirically, rather than analytically, the set is not exhaustive. Thus, a residual category is necessary, which tends to become a hodge-podge of diverse roles. Also, the scheme would be of less value if applied to a different time frame.

Third, and most importantly, there are missing data problems. Nine of the thirty-six nations in the sample to be analyzed in this research were outside Holsti's sample of seventy-one. They are listed in Table 7. Given

<p>| TABLE 7: SAMPLE NATIONS WITHOUT NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the small sample size of thirty-six, the loss of nine cases (twenty-five percent of the data) could have important effects on the results. To check against that possibility an alternative method for handling those nine cases was also employed. The basis of that alternative was the assumption that rather than being missing data those cases adopted no roles in foreign policy. Holsti speaks to the validity of that assumption when he notes (1970: 259):
We can draw no firm conclusions about the absence of certain evidence; it does not prove that policymakers in some states hold no national role conceptions. However, where a large number of a country's official foreign policy statements are confined to specific issues, such as trade, and reveal no particular orientation toward the external environment, it does suggest that policymakers have little notion of a global or regional role, or of specific international tasks.

In other words, Holsti, despite his extensive efforts, was not able to find statements of role conceptions for those states. Given that he was able to uncover national role conceptions data for such nations as Burma, Mali, and Guyana, the inability to find such data for the countries in Table 7 needs to be explained—it cannot be dismissed simply as missing data. For some reason those countries did not make general foreign policy statements with adequate frequency, and when they did make such statements, foreign policy was not conceptualized in terms of roles. That suggests that there was an extreme dominance of domestic concerns over foreign policy concerns for those countries, and that when foreign policy concerns were addressed, they were addressed in a very narrow context. If that suggestion is correct, then assuming that those nations adopted no roles and, thus,

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\[2\] Holsti identified for the Philippines five sources adopting four roles, and for Venezuela six sources adopting two roles. Those were the only two of the nine countries that Holsti found five or more sources for.
consigning them to the low end of the activity of role conception measure does not do great violence to the validity of the measure.

Fourth, there may be a problem in terms of the differences in the time frame of the data on third party responses (1959-1968) and the Holsti data. It is possible that a state's perception of its appropriate roles in the system may have changed over time so that role conceptions for the 1965-1967 period may not adequately describe the way things were during the 1959-1961 period. Such a problem definitely exists for Ghana due to the coup that deposed Nkrumah. Other countries in the sample could present similar but less spectacular examples.

Despite all those possible problems, the Holsti data on national role conceptions were used in this research. They provide a reasonable first approximation of the universe of national role conceptions for the sample of nations and the time period being studied. As such they allow the empirical explanation of a very interesting substantive problem—the effect of the extensiveness of goals and objectives on third party response behavior. That problem is so important that its examination is well worth the compromises necessary to study it.

The last remaining problem in the operationalization of the extensiveness of goals and objectives is the creation of a single measure of the activity of national
role conceptions. The development of that measure is based on the three components of activity detailed earlier in this section: (1) the number of roles adopted, (2) the number of referents for each role, and (3) the orientation of the role toward involvement in the international system. The most desirable way to build the measure would be to measure each of the components individually and then combine them into a single measure. However, in practice that was not a viable possibility primarily because of the difficulty in measuring the number of referents for each role. One way of doing that was explored. That was to use the number of times that a role was articulated as a surrogate for the number of referents for the role. The critical assumption would be that a role with a number of referents would be stated a number of times by the state adopting the role. Although there may be some tendency for a state with a large number of referents for a role to state that role more frequently, that does not adequately justify the assumption that the number of times that a role is stated will roughly indicate the number of referents of the role. There are two ways in which the correlation between frequency of statement and number of referents of a role could be confounded. First of all, a state could articulate the role only a few times, but with fairly broad definitions of referents. Under those circumstances it would be hard to claim that
there were fewer referents for that role for that state
than for another state that stated the role more fre­
quently but with a more narrow definition of the referents
in each statement. Second, the number of times that a
role is stated is a function of the total activity level
of the state in foreign policy. It is a widely documented
fact that some states behave more frequently in foreign
policy than do others, and the restatement of national
roles is affected by that tendency toward more frequent
behavior. Therefore, when a state articulates the same
role a number of times it is likely that there is some,
and perhaps a great deal, of redundancy in the referents
of the role. For both those reasons it would be inappro­
priate to assume that there is any close correspondence
between the number of times that a role is cited and the
number of referents for that role.3

Because no good measure of the number of referents of
a role could be devised with the available data, the
measurement of activity came to rely on the other two
components. The first component, the number of roles,
was easily measured by a simple frequency count for each
nation of the roles claimed at least once by that nation.

3Also, inclusion of that estimate of the number of
referents of a role significantly increased the problem
of multicollinearity in the empirical testing of the
models.
The third component required the assignment to each role of some weight that represents the orientation of that role towards involvement in the system (hereafter referred to simply as "activity" or "passivity" of the role). There were two possible approaches to the estimation of the weights to be assigned to a role. One was to assign weights on an a priori basis as Holsti (1970) did in his research. The other approach was to empirically estimate the weights. In this research, the weights were estimated by calculating the product-moment correlation between the frequency with which each state asserted a role conception and the frequency of that state's foreign policy behavior, as indicated by the number of acts in the WEIS data.\textsuperscript{4} The correlation coefficient was the empirically estimated weight assigned a role. Table 8 presents each of the role conceptions, along with the empirically determined weight and the weight Holsti assigned on an a priori basis. The approach that uses the empirically estimated weights was used for the remainder of this research. That choice was motivated by two considerations. First, the attempt to derive the weights from behavior data seems in principal to be a more appropriate tactic than assigning weights based only on intui-

\textsuperscript{4} That data set was used because it provided data on the behavior of all national actors in the international system.
TABLE 8: WEIGHTS ASSIGNED TO EACH NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Conception</th>
<th>Empirically determined Weight</th>
<th>Holsti's assigned Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bastion of revolution</td>
<td>.0981</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional leader</td>
<td>.2367</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional protector</td>
<td>.4996</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active independent</td>
<td>.0163</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberator supporter</td>
<td>.1531</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-imperialist agent</td>
<td>.2164</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defender of the faith</td>
<td>.6946</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator/integrator</td>
<td>.3125</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional/subsystem collaborator</td>
<td>.2766</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developer</td>
<td>.4863</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridge</td>
<td>-.0308</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faithful ally</td>
<td>.1167</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>-.2050</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example</td>
<td>.2880</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal development</td>
<td>-.1365</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protectee</td>
<td>-.0166</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolate</td>
<td>-.1035</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>.3267</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

tive judgements. Second, the empirically estimated weights are intuitively more pleasing because of the negative weights given to very passive roles. Roles that indicate withdrawal from the system, such as isolate and protectee, ought to produce a decrement in activity of role conceptions, rather than an increment.

The number of roles adopted by a nation and the weights to be assigned each role were combined into a single measure according to the following formula:

\[ A_j = \sum_{i=1}^{17} b_i R_{ij} \]

In the formula \( A_j \) is the activity of national role conceptions measure for the \( j \)th nation, \( b_i \) is the weight
assigned to the $i$th national role conceptions, and $R_{ij}$ is a binary variable indicating if the $j$th nation adopted the $i$th role ($R_{ij} = 1$) or if it did not ($R_{ij} = 0$). In other words, the activity of national role conceptions equals the weighted sums of the roles adopted by the nation. That was the operationalization used in this research for the extensiveness of goals and objectives.

**Interaction of Stimulus and National Characteristics**

This final section of the chapter takes up the last of the three research tasks posited in the first chapter. That task is the examination of the interaction of stimulus and national characteristics in the generation of third party response behavior. Although the relationships of third party response behavior with stimulus characteristics and with national characteristics are in and of themselves interesting and important research problems, the examination of the interaction between them is a crucial step in their integration into any single explanatory framework.

In this research the problem of the interaction of stimulus and national characteristics will be approached in a manner similar to the use made of national attributes by Andriole, Wilkenfeld and Hopple (1975). They suggest that the characteristics of nations can be most fruitfully considered as a filter between dynamic factors and foreign
policy behavior.

A major assumption underlying the present framework is that type of state constitutes a mediating factor of critical importance in the analysis of foreign policy behavior. We propose that states differ from each other along certain major dimensions, and that these dimensions modify the relationship between the variable components of foreign policy and the behavior exhibited (Andriole, Wilkenfeld and Hopple, 1975: 188).

The nature of that mediating effect can be discussed in terms of the concept of sensitivity. Sensitivity is the extent to which a given state requires "high" values on a stimulus variable (violent behavior, crisis, etc.) before it will usually be motivated to make a third party response. The more that such high values on a variable are required, the more sensitive that state is to that variable. For example, if one state makes 85 percent of its third party responses to violent stimuli and for another state the comparable percentage is only 30 percent, that would mean that the first state is considered to be more sensitive to the violence variable than is the second, or more concisely, it has greater sensitivity to violence.

The way that national characteristics mediate the effects of stimulus characteristics is by their impact on the sensitivity of states to the stimulus characteristics. More precisely, the greater the monitoring capacity of the state and/or the more extensive its goals and objectives, the less the sensitivity of the state to the stim-
ulus characteristics.

That approach to the interaction problem was not arbitrarily chosen. It was clearly required given the nature of the arguments relating stimulus characteristics and national characteristics to third party response behavior. To illustrate that point, consider the example of the effect of crisis on third party responses. There were two ways that crisis was related: (1) by expanding the flow of information about the stimulus, (2) by increasing the requiredness and cruciality of the situations generated by the stimulus. But those factors are of less importance for states with greater monitoring capacity and more extensive goals and objectives. With more monitoring capacity the government will become aware of a larger proportion of noncrisis stimuli and be able to evaluate more of them. With more extensive goals and objectives, a larger proportion of noncrisis stimuli will generate situations of high requiredness and cruciality. For both those reasons, states with greater monitoring capacity and more extensive goals and objectives will respond to more noncrisis stimuli and to a higher proportion of noncrisis stimuli. Hence, they will be less sensitive to the crisis variable than will be states with less monitoring capacity and less extensive goals and objectives. Making the necessary substitutions in terms, the preceding argument ought to hold for each of the
other stimulus characteristics.

If this approach to the interaction of stimulus and national characteristics is appropriate, then the appropriate formalization of the problem is an adaptation of the causal model in Figure 4 such as the one in Figure 5.

FIGURE 5: THE CAUSAL MODEL FOR THE INTERACTION OF STIMULUS AND NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

In Figure 5 the term "Sensitivity" refers to the sensitivity toward each of the stimulus characteristics. The minus signs beside the arrows leading from monitoring capacity and extensiveness of goals and objectives to sensitivity indicate that the expected relationship is a negative one—the higher the monitoring capacity or the greater the extensiveness of goals and objectives, the lower the sensitivity to stimulus characteristics.

Summary

In this chapter three important tasks have been ful-
filled. First, the characteristics of nations were related to third party response behavior through the development of a causal model. Then those national characteristics were operationalized. Third, the interaction of stimulus and national characteristics was conceptualized and stated as a researchable problem.

With the completion of those tasks the "theoretical" sections of the research are completed. All that remains are the construction and execution of tests of the hypotheses and models. The next chapter begins to confront those tasks.
CHAPTER V

DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter confronts the final two tasks that need to be completed before the tests of the hypotheses and models can be executed. They are the description of the data set on third party response behavior and the discussion of the design of the research techniques.

The description of the third party response data is the first task. In order to establish the importance of how those data were gathered, the first section of the chapter begins with a methodological treatise on the basic strategies that can be used to structure the measurement of stimulus-response processes in international politics. Based on that discussion one of those techniques was adopted.

The discussion then turns to the description of the data set that was used in this research. One of the most critical aspects of any research effort in foreign policy is the choice of a data set with which to measure foreign policy behavior. To the extent that the data set provides an inadequate window to the world, adequate answers to certain questions will be made impossible. The data set
that was used in this research is described and evaluated from three different perspectives: the characteristics of the data base from which it was drawn; the rules used to establish the stimulus-response relationship between events; and the quality of the data set.

The last two sections of the chapter are concerned with problems of research design. The first problem is how the hypotheses developed in Chapter III can be tested. The primary options are through the analysis of conditional and raw probabilities. The advantages and disadvantages of using either are explored. The second problem is the evaluation of the causal models in Chapter IV. The assumptions of path analysis are stated and evidence is presented on how well those assumptions are met in this application of the technique.

The Stimulus-Response Data

The substantive problem in this research is response behavior. Response behavior implies the existence of a relationship between two events, a stimulus and a response. There are two things involved in determining whether such a relationship exists. One is the particular coding rules used in inferring the stimulus-response relationship in specific cases. The other is the strategy used in approaching the data when looking for stimulus-response relationships. The solution to that latter problem is
logically prior to the solution to the other. Therefore, the strategies for data-making are considered before the specific rules for data-making are discussed.

One important decision is that international events data will be used in the empirical analysis. The case for using events data in research on foreign policy behavior has been cogently argued elsewhere (Hermann et al., 1973; Brady, 1974) and will not be repeated here. In the case of this research, the value of events data is even more pronounced. The research problem concerns patterns measured quantitatively across a series of decisions, and events data is the most advanced technology available for recording and handling information on many decisions.

Strategies for the Measurement of Stimulus-Response Phenomena

Given that the raw data base is an events data set, there are three basic classes of strategies available for relating stimuli and responses. One strategy involves the use of correlational techniques on aggregated events to tease out patterns of stimulus and response. The other two operate on discrete events by pairing single stimuli with single responses. One of those discrete strategies involves working from the stimulus to find responses; the other involves the identification of the stimulus which produced the response. In this research the last strategy is employed, but in order to understand the implications
of that choice and the rationale for it, it is first necessary to consider in greater depth the first two.

Aggregate strategies have been the dominant ones in the quantitative research on stimulus-response processes for many years, and have been used twice in research on the effects of third parties (Phillips and Hainline, 1972; Phillips and Callahan, 1973). Such strategies involve three processes. First, the behavior which an entity receives from some set of other entities and the behavior sent to those entities is aggregated over some time period. There are two ways of aggregating the data. One is to accumulate the values of the actions along some scale of behavior (usually it has been a cooperation-conflict dimension) and then normalize that total by the number of actions in the time period to get some average value. Such an approach was used by Zinnes (1966), Sigler (1972a) and Healy and Stein (1973).

The other aggregation technique is to sum the number of events a nation takes in a time period across some categorization scheme. That will show, for example, how many threats A directed at B during time t, how many promises, how many accusations, how many cooperative deeds, and so forth. Wilkenfeld (1972) and Phillips (1975; 1973) and their associates employed that data aggregation technique.

The second step is to reduce the data matrices. Some-
times that is done at the same time as the first, when the values are summed along some scale. At other times, the data reduction is carried out through some inductive routine such as factor analysis (Wilkenfeld et al., 1972) or canonical analysis (Phillips and Callahan, 1973).

The third step is to correlate the two matrices. When the researchers have used data already reduced to dimensions, that correlation was carried out through simple correlation and regression routines. When the data had not previously been reduced, a correlational routine, such as canonical or factor analysis, which contained a reduction component, was used to simultaneously reduce the data matrix and perform the correlation.

The end result using such a strategy was a conclusion that the behavior which A received from B and that which B received from A were correlated at a certain strength. (It should be understood that A or B could be sets of actors). The correlation, when adequately high, implies the workings of some causal mechanism (although it need not be direct, bivariate causation). Something is causing there to be a regular pattern in the behavior of A to B and of B to A. Usually that causal mechanism has been called reciprocity.

In the study of third party response behavior, aggregate strategies would be used in the following way. The assumption would be that the third party response
behavior of a state A could be measured by the covariance of (1) the deviation from reciprocity in the relations of A and B and (2) the behavior directed at B by C and at C by B. Thus, third party response behavior is that deviation from reciprocity which is statistically explained (in a "variance explained" sense) by behavior in the external environment.

There are three classes of problems with aggregate strategies which militate against their use in this research. The first is that when data are aggregated, information is lost. Especially critical is the loss of temporal sequencing which is necessary for the unambiguous determination of the direction of causality. With aggregate data one cannot be sure that the results indicate that A is making third party responses to the interactions between B and C. It is also possible that B and C are interacting because of the prior behavior of A. In other words, a very high level of inference is required to ascribe to a statistical relationship the causal or theoretical relationship one is interested in.

The loss of temporal sequence can be compensated for somewhat by introducing time lags into the analysis (Tanter, 1972) or by using Markov chain models (Phillips, 1975). But the explicit introduction of time into the analysis is only a partial solution, because the time breaks used must be to some extent arbitrary and will
inevitably add considerably to the random error in the analysis.

The second problem with aggregate strategies is that they yield unwieldy amounts of analysis to be performed. For example, to fully estimate the third party response behavior of A, a distinct analysis would need to be performed for each dyad of a unique pair of B and C, where B and C are allowed to be any state in the system. If there are 136 nations in the system, and A is removed for analysis, then there are \((135 \times 134)/2 = 9045\) dyads producing interactions in the external environment of A. There would have to be 9045 data analyses to produce a complete description of the third party response behavior of A alone. If one wanted to do cross-national comparisons of n nations, one would have to do \(n \times 9045\) analyses. Clearly, that is an unmanageable task, forcing the analyst to either limit his study or make strong compromises in the research design.

The third problem with the aggregate strategies is that the results include the effects of more than this research defines as its area of interest. It is concerned with the public, observable third party responses of states. But in a correlational analysis, the results could reflect more than that, as, for example, when the third party reacts to an external development by withdrawing and decreasing its involvement in international
affairs.

For all those reasons, aggregate strategies were deemed inappropriate for the measurement of stimulus-response phenomena for this research.

The second strategy involves a search from a discrete stimulus event for a response by a third party. It is, therefore, referred to as the stimulus-to-response strategy. Aside from the creation and validation of rules for inferring a stimulus-response relationship between two events, the stimulus-to-response strategy presents no major conceptual problems. However, it is fraught with problems in the actual execution which make it unworkable when resources are limited.

Those practical problems stem from the fact that every foreign policy event which takes place in the international system is analytically defined as a stimulus. Therefore, any complete execution of this strategy would require a search for responses to each and every foreign policy event.

Clearly, in the absence of a coup d'état in which the National Science Foundation takes over the United States government, there will not be adequate resources for a complete execution of the stimulus-to-response strategy. Therefore, less ambitious efforts are required which involve sampling from the set of possible stimuli. However, sampling in turn creates a very sticky problem.
Based on public records there seem to be very few foreign policy events which trigger any observable responses. In the early stages of this research a trial run of data-gathering using the stimulus-to-response strategy was made. The behavior of Mexico, Venezuela and West Germany was searched for responses to each of a set of 120 foreign policy events. The search was not limited to third party responses but could also include responses to actions targeted at the responder. Using the loosest of all possible rules for inferring a stimulus-to-response linkage, only eleven responses could be identified: one for Mexico, four for Venezuela, and six for West Germany.

Those results suggest a terrible dilemma for researchers who want to use a stimulus-to-response strategy. On the one hand, if they identify a manageable set of stimuli, they are not likely to find enough responses to allow any confidence in results. On the other hand, if the sample could produce adequate numbers of responses, it will probably be too large to be manageable. Because no way could be found to avoid the horns of the dilemma, the stimulus-to-response strategy was abandoned.

That left the third strategy. Essentially, that third strategy requires that a set of foreign policy events be identified as candidate responses. The historical record is then searched to determine if an event which could have triggered the candidate response can be found. If so,
then the stimulus-response linkage is inferred.

As a result of choosing that strategy, the basic unit of observation is the paired stimulus and response. For the five hypotheses dealing with the effects of stimulus characteristics it is also the case for analysis.

The primary difficulty with the third strategy (response-to-stimulus) is that the cases for analysis that it produces all have the paired stimulus-response. There are no cases of a stimulus without a response. That is indeed a severe difficulty, but not an insurmountable one. The solutions to that problem require modifications of the research design and are, therefore, discussed in the research design section of the chapter.

The Data Base—CREON

During the early 1970's, one of the major foreign policy research efforts has been the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) Project (Hermann et al., 1973). Part of that project was the creation of a foreign policy events data set to be used in measuring foreign policy behavior. More than any other data-making operation in international politics, CREON has made a conscious effort to record evidence about many facets of foreign policy behavior. One of those facets is the context for an event, and of specific concern here is the fact that CREON attempted to record the identification of the stimulus that appeared to have triggered the foreign policy
event. Because CREON is the only major data set that has gathered such information, it is the data base that is used in this research.

As is the case with any data set, CREON had to sample from the universe of foreign policy actions. In terms of time, the data include events from randomly sampled quarters, one per year, for the years 1959-1968. In terms of actors, CREON has recorded the behaviors of a set of thirty-six nations. Those nations are listed in Table 9. The choice of nations was made in order to pursue certain questions of interest to the principal investigators on the CREON Project. Of interest here is the fact that the sample of nations contains a wide range of variation in terms of the size of the nations, their levels of development, their degrees of political accountability, and geographic distribution. As a result, the sample is not

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Tugoslavia</td>
<td>U.A.R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Israel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>China</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
random, but does reflect the main divisions among nations of the world.

The most consequential sampling decision made by CREON was in terms of the data source to be used in the identification of foreign policy events. That is a sampling decision because the data collector cannot collect that which is not in his source material. Since no source provided universal coverage of foreign policy actions, what the data-gatherer gets is the sample chosen by his source.

The sole source used by the CREON Project was Deadline Data on World Affairs. Deadline Data is a widely used global chronology (Feierabend et al., 1966; Hoggard, 1975; Burrowes, 1975) that compiles news items from a variety of primary sources.

The last important way in which CREON defined its sample was through its definition of a foreign policy event. Basically, an event is a "minimally aggregated action resulting from a decision by the political authorities of a state who have the power to commit the resources of the national government" (Hermann et al., 1973: 19). Two important implications of that definition need to be pointed out. First, the political authorities of a state are officials from the executive branch of government. That rule excludes certain actions such as those of a legislative body. For example, the decision of the United
States Senate to not allocate additional military assistance to the governments of Cambodia and South Vietnam in 1975 would not be considered foreign policy events by CREON. Similarly, the vote by the British people to remain in the Common Market would not be a foreign policy event.

Second, the notion of a minimally aggregated action has implications. According to the rules used by CREON, what from one perspective appears to be a single historical occurrence (a speech by a head of state, for example) will frequently be coded as a number of different foreign policy events. Actions are "exploded" into multiple events whenever there is a change in (1) the actor, (2) the time frame, (3) the degree of commitment, or (4) the kinds of skills or resources involved in the action (Hermann et al., 1973). As a result, if a head of state in a single address announces a formal protest of another's behavior, a break in diplomatic relations, and the imposition of a trade embargo, that would be coded as three events in the CREON data.

The implications of the choice of CREON as a data base can be explored under three headings: (1) the implications of the sample of time and actors; (2) the implications of the use of Deadline Data; (3) the implications of the definition of an event.

There are a number of implications of the sample of
time and actors. The first is relatively trivial. Because the sample of nations and of time was not randomly drawn, the value of most tests of statistical significance is nullified. Thus, there is no mathematical way of estimating the probability that the results obtained in this research will hold for another sample of nations.

The second implication of the sample derives from a limitation on regression analysis. The results that one obtains from regression can only be assumed to hold over the range of observations represented in the sample. If one shows a functional relationship between X and Y over the range of X values one through ten, one cannot assume that the same function would provide the value of Y when X had a value of fifteen. There would be the empirical possibility of a different functional relationship between X and Y which applies to values of X that are greater than ten. Such a change in functions could be due to a threshold effect, for example, which makes the relationship nonlinear when the range one through fifteen is considered.

As a result, the conclusions of this study may be valid only for the ten year period 1959 through 1968. The results could be different for a study of the period 1969 through 1975, for example, or for a study of the 19th century.

More importantly, though, the range of the states in
the sample in terms of their size and level of development takes on added significance. That range essentially encompasses the outer limits of variance in levels of development for the time period being considered, and only fails to cover the micro-states in terms of the size coverage. On those grounds, there is little problem in generalizing with caution from the CREON sample of nations to the universe of states other than micro-states.

Third, the sample of nations is not representative of the world at large. Specifically, there is an overabundance of large nations and Western European nations and a relative undersampling of African nations. For that reason, the interpretation of the findings should be sensitive to the fact that they could be skewed due to the effect of the overrepresentation of some groups of states and the underrepresentation of others.

Fourth, the sample of nations is relatively small. A sample of thirty-six is close to the lower limit of sample size for the results to merit much trust. However, the fact that the sample does capture the better portion of the range of variation in the universe does mitigate the effects of small sample size somewhat.

Turning to the implications of the use of Deadline Data as a source leads to questions of validity and source bias. One of the central concerns of researchers using events data gleaned from public news sources is the extent
and nature of the bias inherited from those sources. Almost all researchers who have gathered events data have attempted to assess the extent of bias in their data. CREON is no different. Presently a major effort is underway to compare the data in the CREON set with data gathered by indigenous coders using non-American sources. Preliminary results seem to indicate that there are some major differences among regional sources in their attention to certain actors and targets (Salmore, 1975), but that there are also some important similarities in the patterns of reporting along other dimensions (Salmore and Butler, 1975). Unfortunately, the analysis at present is too preliminary to offer any firm answers on the validity of the CREON data.

Other researchers have also examined Deadline Data as a source. Their conclusions have generally been quite negative about the quality of the source (Doran et al., 1973; Burrowes, 1975; Hoggard, 1975). However, their results are not conclusive because they used a library copy of Deadline Data as their source. The editors of Deadline Data make a conscious effort to constantly update their files. Partly that involves adding new data as the time frame of the chronology expands. In addition to that, though, they also seek to maintain a constant size for the files containing the chronology. In order to meet that goal they re-edit many of the older informational
file cards, deleting entries and compressing older reports onto a single card. As a result there is a rather severe loss of information for the early years of the time frame. A stark example is Laos. The present library copy of Deadline Data has one card in the Laos file which is the replacement for 192 cards in the original file. It is little wonder, then, that researchers using a library copy of Deadline Data would find it an inadequate source. The relevance of those findings for a data set such as CREON that uses Deadline Data's complete, backdated chronology is very tenuous.

So there is no direct, comparative evidence of the quality of Deadline Data as a resource. However, some light can be thrown on the problem by examining some of the characteristics of Deadline Data. First of all, Deadline Data is meant to be a source of information for scholars and government. Thus, the criteria for the selection of a story will not be quite the same as those used by a newspaper. There should generally be a lesser emphasis on the human interest or sensational aspects than one finds in other news sources. On the other hand, the targeting of the source for scholars implies the existence of a set of criteria for inclusion, those criteria having at least some implicit theoretical basis. To the extent that basis does not conform to the theoretical interests of the researcher, the researcher could be in trouble.
Moreover, to the extent that different abstracters and editors have different theoretical notions, there is a danger for cross-national bias within the data.

Second, Deadline Data abstracts the news items from multiple sources. An examination of the patterns of source usage by Deadline Data (Gatliff, 1974) indicated that a wide variety of global and regional sources as well as sources with specific issue concerns were used by Deadline Data. That means that the editors of Deadline Data were not dependent on the biases of a single set of newspaper editors. On the other hand, that study also shows a heavy dependence by Deadline Data on a few Western sources, especially the New York Times. That probably results from Deadline Data's use of American nationals as its abstracters and editors.

The fact that Deadline Data appears to rely heavily on the New York Times is a useful piece of knowledge, because a number of studies have been carried out to assess the value of the Times as a data source. The basic results of those studies (Azar et al., 1972; Burrowes, 1975; Hoggard, 1975; Smith, 1969) are that there appears to be a predictable bias in the Times towards reporting conflict and/or events for Western nations. That bias is determined through comparison with regional sources. The precise extent of the Times' bias is thus unknown because the divergence in reporting would be a function of the biases
of both the Times and the regional source. Other re-
searchers (McClelland, 1972; Hazelwood and West, 1974) 
dispute the significance of the bias of the Times. Al-
though they acknowledge its inadequacies for regional 
interactions compared to regional sources, they argue that 
for the examination of global questions it is still the 
best possible source. Since this research is concerned 
with a problem not limited to a single region, the use of 
a largely Times based source may be the most adequate 
single source. The addition of foreign policy events from 
other sources by Deadline Data tends to further mitigate 
the dangers of source bias. In short, the assumption is 
that the results obtained in the empirical analysis repre-
sent conditions and processes in the real world and are 
not merely a function of data source.

The last set of implications of using CREON data 
derive from the definition of an event used by that pro-
ject. The first problem is that there are certain kinds 
of events which are lost. That problem is most serious 
for those nations which have a relatively dispersed power 
structure so that different groups share or alternate 
power over foreign affairs. However, even for those na-
tions, the exercise of foreign policy tends to be generally 
an executive function, so the events which are lost are a 
relatively small proportion of its foreign policy be-
behavior. Quantitatively, their impact should not be
terribly significant.

Second, there should be a number of cases in which a state initiates a number of events in response to a single stimulus. One example was the set of actions the United States took at the start of the Cuban Missile Crisis: establish a blockade, mobilize forces, call the O.A.S. and the Security Council into session to consider the matter, and so forth. In CREON each of those events would be recorded as a response. Thus, the minimal aggregation of events could tend to bloat the number of responses recorded in the system. More importantly, if there are differences across stimuli in their tendency to produce multiple responses, that could have an effect on the interpretation of the tendency of certain kinds of stimuli to produce responses.

To summarize, the use of CREON data carries with it a number of highly significant ramifications on the confidence of the conclusions which are drawn from the analysis. Generally, those ramifications suggest greater caution in the interpretation of results.

Rules for Linking Stimulus and Response

The CREON coding procedures supplied a very detailed set of instructions which guided the search for the stimulus for a foreign policy event. Those instructions are presented in the section on the RESPONSE variable in the
coding manual for CREON's descriptive deck (Salmore and Brady, 1972: 92-102). This section will provide a brief review of those rules and the next section will consider their adequacy and reliability.

At the heart of the coding rules are three basic ways of inferring a stimulus-response linkage. The first was if the actor asserted that there was a linkage between a prior occurrence and his own behavior. With only two exceptions, that was always adequate evidence of a linkage. The first exception was that events which had ended over a year before the present behavior could not be accepted as stimuli. Thus, for example, Vietnam decisions could not be considered responses to the appeasement of Hitler at Munich.

The second exception was what CREON called the "third party hostile" rule. According to that rule, a linkage could not be drawn when the actor identified the stimulus, the stimulus was considered hostile by the actor, and the occurrence of the stimulus could not be verified by its begin reported elsewhere. For example, if China accused the Soviet Union of some particularly heinous act, and no one else supported China's charge, then the coders could not have accepted that as a stimulus-response linkage.

The second basis for a stimulus-response linkage was if the data source suggested the linkage. The data source could do that in two ways. First, Deadline Data fre-
quently extracts commentary from its primary sources to provide background on the action. If the commentary claims that a linkage existed, that was adequate grounds for coding the stimulus-response linkage. Second, Deadline Data may indicate a linkage through its positioning of stories. The standard layout for Deadline Data is to have a main story followed by a series of related stories. When two foreign policy events, each with a different actor, were positioned together in that way, the coders were allowed to infer the linkage.

The third general class of means for identifying stimulus-response linkages provided rules for coder inference. CREON supplies three. The first is called "Descriptive Similarity and Influence." For this rule to apply, three conditions must be met: (1) the event being considered as a stimulus must be the action of some entity other than the government of the actor in the event; (2) the stimulus and the response must both deal with the same issue and at the same level of generality, with the issue being described in the same or synonymous words for both events; (3) it must be possible for the responding actor to have considered itself an object of influence in the presumed stimulus event.

The second basis for coder inference of a stimulus-response linkage is when the actor is the subject of the goal in the stimulus, and the goal involved something
happening to or being done by the actor in the response event. Suppose that the United States announced an embargo on trade with South Africa in order to force it to change its racial policies, and later South Africa said it would not succumb to foreign pressure on apartheid. That would be an acceptable event for inferring a stimulus-response connection using the "Actor-as-Goal-Subject" rule.

The last basis for coder inference of a linkage concerned cases where one could logically presume a stimulus given the nature of the event. For example, a denial of an accusation presumes an accusation. Granting a loan presumes a request. And so on.

Through the application of those rules the CREON coders were able to identify a stimulus for each of 4184 foreign policy events, roughly one-third of the data set. The relative frequency with which different coding rules yielded stimuli is reported in Table 10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actor relates</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source relates</td>
<td>1402</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive similarity</td>
<td>1359</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject of goal</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logical inference</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4184</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Quality of the Data Base

The quality of the data base is dependent not only on the validity of the source and the sample but also on the adequacy of the coding rules and the reliability of their application. This section takes up both those questions in order.

A number of points can be made about each of the bases for establishing a stimulus-response linkage. Concerning the "Actor Relates" rule, the most obvious criticism is that the asserted linkage may really be just a rationalization for an action which would have been taken anyway. An obvious example of that is the United States' use of the attack on Pleiku as a reason to begin major air operations over Vietnam that had been planned before the attack. On the other hand, one could also argue that in such cases the stimulus was at least a necessary condition for the event. The fact that a rationalization is used suggests that there was some opposition to the event. The stimulus provides a means for overcoming that opposition. The stimulus, although not providing the urge to make the action, does knock down a barrier to the action and in that sense is a partial cause of the event coded as the response.

Also, it should be noted that the "third-party hostile" rule has some important consequences. It means that a lot of propaganda behavior will not be coded as a
response to an external stimulus. It will also exclude many cases of rationalization. That is a fairly satisfying result. Less satisfying is the fact that the rule will undoubtedly filter out some stimulus-response linkages, and will tend to be biased against conflictual stimuli. That bias will tend to cancel out somewhat whatever bias there is for violent stimuli to elicit more multiple responses than nonviolent stimuli.

The "Source Relates" rules are somewhat more problematic than the "Actor Relates" rules. Those linkages that come from the commentary on an event may be only journalistic speculation. The validity of such speculation is open to question and obviously will tend to vary across newsmen (not everyone is a Walter Lippmann). There are four considerations that suggest that by and large, the linkages in the commentary included in Deadline Data will tend to be high quality. First, Deadline Data does not provide background material on all news items. Most events having commentary will be the more "significant" ones. Those same events are also more likely to be commented on in a number of newspapers. For those events the sources used by Deadline Data would provide cross-checks. Thus, in most cases when commentary is provided, the stimulus-response connection suggested by that commentary will often reflect an inter-subjective consensus of sorts. Second, when only one newspaper has commentary
on an event, it may be that the journalist is not operating merely on a journalistic hunch. He may have been informed by some government official that the supposed stimulus was really a consideration in the decision to respond. In such cases, a source-related linkage is really an indirect, actor-related linkage. Third, Deadline Data does not provide background material on all items. Presumably there are some criteria for choosing whether to provide background commentary. One criterion is probably the intuitive plausibility of the connection. If only one journalist noted the connection and the Deadline Data abstracter thought it improbable, it would likely not be printed. And fourth, the newspapers that Deadline Data uses are almost universally regarded as "elite" press, and they would exercise their own control over journalists' judgements.

Given that there could be errors in the identification of stimulus-response linkages, what are the chances that they would be biased in any direction? If the argument made above is true, then the bias should be along a "significant-insignificant" dimension. Significant actions have more checks against idiosyncratic perceptions. That suggests that on the whole there will be more questionable stimulus-response pairings for smaller and poorer states than for larger and richer ones. There will probably also be more error for nonviolent rather than violent and low
commitment rather than high commitment actions. The extent of that bias is unknown, however.

Another implication of that argument, though, is that there will be a bias in the direction of not reporting the response material as frequently for "insignificant" as opposed to "significant" issues. There will be some under-reporting of the stimuli when both the stimulus and the response are judged by the editors of Deadline Data to be insignificant. Again, there is no good way to estimate the severity of the bias.

Turning to the other means for a source-related linkage, the positioning of stories in Deadline Data, the problems would seem to be much greater. That relies on the perceptions of the abstracters and editors of Deadline Data rather than on the perceptions of trained and experienced journalists. There is less reason to presume their reliability than for the journalists. However, it may be that the two are not totally independent. The abstracters and editors of Deadline Data may be taking their cues from connections suggested by journalists that are not reported because of space limitations. If so, and it is a reasonable conjecture, then the connections identified by that rule are probably not much worse than those where an identified journalistic source provided the connection.

Finally, turning to the rules for coder inference,
the "Goal as Subject" and the "Logical Inference" rules can be safely ignored because both require that the actor have been a target or object of the stimulus. As a result, those events cannot be relevant to this research on third party response behavior.

The "Descriptive Similarity" rules are Spartan rules. It is very difficult for a stimulus-response linkage to meet those requirements, so, if anything, they militate against the identification of some stimulus-response linkages that would be identified by substantive experts. Does that introduce any sort of patterned bias? The kinds of linkages this rule would miss would be cases in which issues were coupled on a bargaining process, but the coupling would be implicit. It would, therefore, be a subset of tacit bargaining. If there are any variations across situations or nations in the relative propensity for tacit bargaining, that would indicate a possible source of bias in the data. However, there is no sound body of literature on propensities of different nation-types to engage in tacit bargaining, so the impact of that possible source of bias is unknown. The situations most prone to tacit bargaining are those which involve a fairly rapid rate of interaction and higher tension. But those are also the kinds of situations that are most likely to be commented on in press sources and, thus, have a source-related linkage identified. So the biases
work in opposite directions and could cancel each other out, depending on their relative strengths.

In summary, then, the position that is suggested is that the rules used by CREON for linking stimuli and responses are basically adequate. The bias that is introduced at various places is of undetermined extent, but probably small, and frequently what bias there is works at cross-purposes with other sources of bias. That leaves the reliability of the coding as the only data issue still to be confronted.

One of the common tenets of scientific method is that the data have to be reliable. They cannot represent the idiosyncratic perceptions of a single individual, but must be representative of what would be a consensus opinion of reasonable people sharing a common set of rules for perception. Operationally, the question is whether different people applying the same rules to the same events make the same coding decisions. To determine that, CREON carried out reliability tests in which all coders were required to code the same events. Their coding was then compared to determine the frequency of common as opposed to idiosyncratic decisions. After a large series of those tests had been carried out the overall reliability of the data was determined using a statistic created by Krippendorff (1971). The Krippendorff statistic measures the degree of agreement among coders above chance levels.
Thus, a value of 0.00 indicates totally random coding and a value of 1.00 indicates no random elements in the coding. On that basis the CREON response variable was reliable at the .75 level (Hermann et al., 1973: 99).

However, the reliability of a variable may be broken down because the reliability test does not only evaluate the coders; it also evaluates the rules. Krippendorff (1971: 228) argues that "errors in data-making can almost always be traced to the inability of an instrument to disambiguate the given observations, its lack of specificity regarding criteria of judgment and meaning of terms, or its incomprehensibility to human observers." To the extent that there is variation in the quality of the rules, it would be useful to know in case it would affect results.

A reanalysis of the data from the reliability tests was undertaken to disaggregate the components of reliability. In the CREON reliability procedures an effort was made to determine the "correct" answer. In the de-briefing session after the test the coders made a collective decision about which alternative was the best coding decision. That provided the take-off point for the reanalysis, which sought to determine the probability that a coder using a specific rule would identify the correct stimulus for the event. The data are presented in Table 11.

The data suggest that the rules tend to be of homo-
TABLE 11: RELIABILITY OF SPECIFIC CODING RULES FOR CREON RESPONSE VARIABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>Number of Answers</th>
<th>Proportion Correct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Correct</td>
<td>Incorrect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor relates</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source relates</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive Similarity</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal subject</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logical inference</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

geneous quality. The "Logical Inference" rule does the best, which is probably because that rule does not require the coder to match two events or to draw conclusions from the statements of others. Rather the coder only needs to estimate what must have been based on the nature of the event. Although that procedure yields higher reliabilities, it also produces stimulus-response connections that have more missing data. Also, the results for "Goal Subject" and "Logical Inference" can be ignored here because they do not involve third party response behavior. Of the other rules, there is only a very small difference in their reliabilities. That the "Descriptive Similarity" rule should be the weakest is not surprising since it required the most coder inference. That the "Actor Relates" and "Source Relates" rules should be as low as they are is surprising. It is a testament to the occasional ambiguity of policy makers and substantive experts alike as they are recorded in Deadline Data.
A final point on the reliability of the data—the information originally gathered in the RESPONSE variable in the CREON data set were stored in alphabetic text. In order to carry out analysis on that information the alphabetic data had to be reduced to numeric codes. That was carried out by the members of the CREON coding staff according to the codebook reproduced in Appendix A.

In the process of iterating through the data some of the previous coding decisions were rechecked. The coders were able to evaluate when the stimulus-response linkage previously determined was inappropriate. When there was some question about the adequacy of the earlier decision, they discussed the case and came to a consensus decision whether the linkage could appropriately be drawn. They also re-evaluated other questionable coding decisions. In that way, the data to be analyzed are cleaner than those which originally were gathered by the CREON Project.

**Research Design for Hypothesis Testing**

Now that the data set used in this research has been described and all the independent variables operationalized it is possible to turn to an examination of the research design problems involved in constructing tests of the hypotheses and models developed earlier. This section will consider the testing of the hypotheses and the next will consider causal modelling techniques.
The hypotheses as stated in Chapter III were intentionally ambiguous in terms of their operational implications. The operative phrase in each hypothesis was: "States are more likely to respond . . . ." The meaning of being more likely to respond can be interpreted in two distinct ways: raw probabilities and conditional probabilities.

Raw probabilities refer to the univariate distribution along some independent variable $X$ of stimuli that triggered a response. That is illustrated in Figure 6. In the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE 6: ILLUSTRATIVE RESULTS FOR RAW PROBABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Third Party Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

figure the relevant comparison would be in terms of the column percentages: $A/A+B$ and $B/A+B$. Those column percentages indicate the relative frequency of third party responses when $X$ takes a high value (e.g., a crisis, a violent stimulus) and when $X$ takes a low value. A comparison of the column percentages will indicate some useful information about third party responses, most notably whether third party responses are more frequently
taken in response to stimuli with high values on a variable than to stimuli with low values on the variable. Such information is especially important when the responses to the high values approximate the totality of the set of third party responses. That would indicate that high values on that stimulus characteristic tended toward being a necessary condition for a third party response.

As interesting as the raw probabilities are, they do not constitute an adequate test of the hypothesis as they were developed. The whole logic underlying the hypotheses was that certain characteristics make it more probable that a third party response will occur if a stimulus has them than if it does not. Thus, in their overall context the hypotheses refer to conditional probabilities.

The meaning of a conditional probability can be best explicated with reference to the dummy crosstabulation table in Figure 7.

FIGURE 7: ILLUSTRATIVE RESULTS FOR CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>X</th>
<th>Third Party Response</th>
<th>Row Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column totals</td>
<td>A + B</td>
<td>C + D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conditional probabilities refer to the question: given that the stimulus has high values on $X$, what is the probability of a third party response? In the figure, that asks the relative size of cell A compared to cell $(A+C)$.

The test of a hypothesis requires a comparison of conditional probabilities—is the probability of a third party response given high $X$ greater than the probability of a third party response given low $X$? If so, then the hypothesis can be considered confirmed; if not, then it is disconfirmed. In terms of the cells in the figure that means that $A/(A+C)$ must be greater than $B/(B+D)$.

That discussion of conditional probabilities makes it now clear why raw probabilities are an inadequate way to test the hypotheses. Raw frequencies only tell the relative sizes of A and B. If A is twice as big as B that may not provide support for the hypothesis because $A+C$ may also be twice as big as $B+D$. If so, then $A/(A+C)$ would equal $B/(B+D)$. The conditional probabilities would be the same.

And that leads to a most difficult problem in the design of the research. Given the way the CREON data were generated, the response-to-stimulus method, there are no cases of stimuli without responses. There are no data on the second column of the crosstabulation table. The frequencies in cells C and D are unknown, so the values of
A+C and B+D (the row totals) are also unknown. So, the calculation of conditional probabilities is impossible.

The resolution to that problem involves first the generation of some estimates of the total frequencies of the different values of the stimulus variable, that is, estimates of A+C and B+D. The procedures used to generate those estimates for each stimulus characteristic are discussed along with the presentation of results for that characteristic in the next chapter. With those estimates, estimates of the conditional probabilities could be reached.

However, the fact that the estimates of the row totals are derived from a different data set than the one used to generate the response data has implications for the conclusions drawn from the analysis. There are two reasons to be cautious about the interpretation of the results. First, the measures of cells A and B and the estimates of the row totals A+C and B+D were drawn from different data sets. Because no data set provides a perfectly clear window on the world, there probably was some divergence in the estimates of A+C and B+D that are used and those that would have been obtained had direct measures of C and D been possible. As a result, the difference between A/A+C and B/B+D contain some component of error. Because the impact of that error cannot be determined, the substantive interpretation of those results
must be highly cautious. Second, because the tests involve the comparison of values drawn from two different data sets, the operational definition of the variables in the two data sets were not totally equivalent. That also allows room for errors to creep into the results and indicates the necessity of caution in the interpretation of the results.

Finally, it would be worth reviewing some of the problems discussed earlier that are germane to the interpretation of the hypothesis testing. First of all, is the fact that CREON may report a single action as a number of minimally aggregated events. When the action was a response to a stimulus, each of the minimally aggregated events would also be a response. The difficulty is that the data in the first column of the crosstabulation table, either cell A or B, would be incremented more than once. One observation would be counted for each of the events. Thus, the stimulus would be multiply counted. If, as seems reasonable, the events that rank high on the stimulus variable are more likely to produce multiple responses, then there would be a consistent bias introduced into the data. The number in cell A would be more bloated than that in cell B. Therefore, the conditional probability \( \frac{A}{A+C} \) would be larger than \( \frac{B}{B+D} \) than it ought to be. In other words, it is reasonable to expect that the data and research design contain an inherent bias toward confirm-
tion of the hypotheses. Therefore, when $A/A+C$ is only slightly larger than $B/B+D$, that result should not be considered a confirmation of the hypothesis.

And a last source of bias comes from the rules for identifying a response. It was argued earlier that those rules are biased in the direction of the identification of responses when the stimulus characteristics take on high values. The implications are the same as above—the chance for spurious confirmation of the hypotheses. Therefore, caution is again recommended in the interpretation of results.

**Causal Modelling Techniques**

In this section attention is turned to the aspect of the research design related to the evaluation of the causal models developed in Chapter IV. Causal modelling techniques include a variety of different methodologies, but all can basically be classed into one of two groups. First, there are those which are designed primarily to determine if a direct causal linkage exists between any two variables in a larger multivariate system (Simon, 1957; Blalock, 1962). Second, there are those which are intended to yield empirical estimates of the strength of the relationship between two variables. In this research, that second class of techniques will be employed, for three reasons: (1) estimates of the strength of a relationship
also allow inferences about whether the linkages should exist; (2) path analysis methods allow one to estimate the total influence, direct and indirect, of one variable on another; and (3) questions of the strength of the relationship between variables are the most interesting ones because the need for parsimony and for research priorities demand that strong relationships be distinguished from weak ones.

The first step in any application of causal modelling techniques is to give the system of variables a mathematical statement in a system of equations. For the causal structure in Figure 4 the set of equations is:

\[ X_3 = p_{32} X_1 + p_{32} X_2 + p_{3u} R_u \]  
\[ X_4 = p_{41} X_1 + p_{42} X_2 + p_{43} X_3 + p_{4w} R_w \]  
\[ X_5 = p_{53} X_3 + p_{54} X_4 + p_{5w} R_w \]  
\[ X_6 = p_{64} X_4 + p_{65} X_5 + p_{6w} R_w \]

where \( X_1 = \) size (population)
\( X_2 = \) development (GNP per capita)
\( X_3 = \) capabilities (GNP)
\( X_4 = \) extensiveness of goals and objectives (activity of national role conceptions)
\( X_5 = \) monitoring capacity (number of diplomats)
\( X_6 = \) third party response behavior (frequency and relative frequency)
R_i = residual in the prediction of the dependent variable—unexplained variance

The theoretical problem for path analysis is to produce estimates of the path coefficients (p_{ij}). That problem is made much easier by the fact that the system of equations is a special kind—it is recursive. A recursive system is one in which there is no reciprocal causation among variables. If variable X_i directly or indirectly causes X_j, then X_j cannot directly or indirectly cause X_i if the system is to be recursive. The advantage of a recursive system is that it eases the problem of identification relative to a nonrecursive system. It is much easier to mathematically derive the appropriate estimations of the path coefficients.

It is also necessary to make three assumptions about the behavior of the residuals or error terms (R_i) in the equations in order to solve the system. The first is that the expected value or the mean of the error term (R_i) is zero. That assumption was checked by the calculation of the means of the error terms for the whole sample as reported in Table 12. With one exception the data seem to conform fairly closely to the assumption. That deviant case, the mean residual for the number of diplomats a nation has, is due to the effect of a couple of major states that do not have diplomatic networks commensurate with their resources (e.g., West Germany,
TABLE 12: MEAN VALUES OF THE ERRORS IN THE PREDICTION OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity of Role Conceptions</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Diplomats</td>
<td>-6.696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of third party responses</td>
<td>.463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative frequency of third party responses</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

China). On the whole, though, the assumption is fairly adequately met.

The second assumption about the behavior of the error terms is that they will be uncorrelated with each other. The results for a test of that assumption are presented in Table 13. Correlations greater than zero are indications of the impact of additional variables, n relationships.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 13: INTERCORRELATIONS OF RESIDUALS*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_u$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_v$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_w$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_x^1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_x^2$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*R_x^1$ is the residual for frequency of third party responses; $R_x^2$ is the residual for relative frequency of third party responses.
that are not included in the model. Such additional variables would indicate a failure to achieve closure in the system. One possible result of such a failure to achieve closure is that the results in the model could represent spurious, rather than real, correlations. In view of that possibility, what do the results in Table 13 reveal? There are four sets of correlations that are of any interest at all: $R^2_x$ with $R_u$ (residual for GNP with the residual for relative frequency of third party responses); $R_v$ with $R^1_x$ (activity of national role conceptions with frequency of third party responses) and with $R^2_x$ (relative frequency of third party responses); and $R_w$ with $R^1_x$ (number of diplomats with frequency of third party responses). However, in none of those cases is the correlation particularly high; the largest of the four, -.38, is only a moderate relationship. Thus, there are additional relationships that, if brought into the model, would make it a better model, but that are not so strong as to make spurious the relationships included in the model.

The last assumption about the residuals is that no residual is correlated with the variables included in the equation in which the residual appears. That means, for

---

1. The .77 correlation between the residuals for the frequency and relative frequency of third party responses is irrelevant because those two variables are never estimated in the same model.
example, that $R_u$ must be uncorrelated with $X_1$ and $X_2$. Table 14 reports the correlations relevant to the validity of this assumption. Those results provide very strong support for the validity of that assumption. When tested all three assumptions seem to be fairly adequate but not completely adequate. However, the remainder of the research will proceed as if the assumptions were totally met with the data and models being used. Although the failure to meet that assumption should introduce some error into the results, the deviation of the results from an accurate answer ought not to be as great as to invalidate them.

Given those assumptions about residuals, it is possible to prove that the estimator of a path coefficient

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>$X_1$</th>
<th>$X_2$</th>
<th>$X_3$</th>
<th>$X_4$</th>
<th>$X_5$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$R_u$</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_v$</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_w$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_x^1$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_x^2$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
\( p_{ij} \) is the standardized regression coefficient \( BETA_{ij} \) (see Stokes, 1974 for such a proof). In other words, the appropriate technique for evaluating the structural equations (1) - (4) is to perform multiple regression analysis.

The introduction of multiple regression as a research technique imposes on the researcher another set of assumptions. The extent to which those assumptions are met determines the degree of confidence which can be placed in the results.

Some of those assumptions are relatively simple to explain. The first is that the variables must all be measured on an interval or ratio scale. Such scales are required if the calculations of means and variances are to have any strict meaning. That assumption is met for all the variables.

Second, the variables must be related in a linear, additive fashion. The additivity assumption is met in that there are no interaction terms \((X_iX_j)\) in the set of structural equations. In order to test the assumption of linearity, scatterplots were produced for each pair of variables. Inspection of the plots indicated a great deal of scatter, but no marked observable curvilinear relationships. If there were any nonlinear relationships, they were so weakly nonlinear that a linear estimation of the relationship would provide an adequate estimate of
the relationship. However, it is important to point out, once again, that no guarantee can be made for the accuracy of any projection of a relationship beyond the parameters of the sample of nations and time used in this research.

Third, the variance of the residuals needs to be constant across all values of the dependent variable. That assumption is often referred to as the assumption of homoscedasticity. To test the validity of that assumption, the standardized residuals from each regression were plotted against the standardized predictor generated by that equation. Those plots were then inspected. If the assumption of homoscedasticity were valid, the residuals would all fall between a pair of parallel lines drawn perpendicular to the standardized predictor axis, and the residuals would be distributed between those lines in a relatively homogeneous fashion. Indeed, the assumption seemed to be valid in almost all cases. In some cases some residuals fell well outside the range of the others. However, in only two cases did the plot of the residuals indicate important problems. In one there was evidence of the need for another variable in the predictor of GNP. That additional variable would of course be the multiplicative interaction of population and GNP per capita, which is the definition of GNP. The other was an indication of increasing variance in the residuals as the predicted frequency of third party responses increased.
Other than that the assumption of constant variance of residuals was fulfilled.

Fourth, the intercorrelations among the independent variables must not be too high. If they are too high, then the stability of the results can be greatly decreased so that what is found in one sample may not provide any evidence about what would be found in another sample. Generally, that is called the problem of multicollinearity. There is no consensus among methodologists as to when intercorrelations become so great that the results become meaningless. However, it does seem that the rate of increase in the instability of coefficients accelerates with increasing levels of intercorrelation among the dependent variables, and at least some competent methodologists (Fox, 1968) claim that multicollinearity only becomes a serious problem when the intercorrelations among the dependent variables reaches the .6 to .7 level.² In order to determine the degree of multicollinearity Table 15 presents the correlations between independent variables that are included in the same regression equation. The results suggest some major problems in the intercorrelations of the independent variables. The correlation between the per capita GNP and the total GNP is very high in this sample. Of greater importance, though, are the

²Herbert Asher, personal communication, 1974.
TABLE 15: TEST FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$X_1$ (Population)</th>
<th>$X_2$</th>
<th>$X_3$</th>
<th>$X_4$</th>
<th>$X_5$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2$ (GNP/capita)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_3$ (GNP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_4$ (Activity of role conceptions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_5$ (Number of diplomats)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

High correlations between the activity of national role conceptions and total GNP and number of diplomats. Those three measures are closely related empirically, as was anticipated in the creation of the model. That close relationship, though, results in a very high level of multicollinearity in the system. As a result, it should be anticipated that the results obtained in this research should be very susceptible to change with a different sample. Therefore, all conclusions should be tentative.

The fifth assumption of multiple regression is that there are no errors in the measurement of the independent variables. To the extent that assumption is false, the standardized regression coefficients (the path coefficients) become unstable across samples. It is highly unlikely that the data used here are free of measurement error. It has long been recognized that the data produced by national self-reporting procedures are subject to
intentional distortion. Unintentional distortion is also probable given the underdeveloped techniques some nations have for generating statistics on population and GNP. It has already been indicated that the national role conceptions data were not gathered according to any rigorous procedures. That increases the chances for error in those results. The extent of the error in the data on size of diplomatic corps cannot be estimated. So, there are likely to be errors in the dependent variables with some subsequent instability in the results.

The final assumption that needs to be considered is called the assumption of closure. That assumption has already been alluded to while the assumptions about the residuals were being examined. The assumption of closure is that all relevant variables and relationships have been included in the causal model. That assumption is crucial because if variables and relationships are excluded, then the relationships observed could to some degree be spurious. Only if all important causal variables and relationships are included in the model can the results of the analysis be given a firm causal interpretation.

Earlier, the results on the validity of the assumptions about the residuals indicated that some relationships were not included that perhaps ought to have been. In addition, there are two other ways in which the
assumption of closure may be inadequate. First, it is undoubtedly the case that some variables that have an impact on the activity of national role conceptions have been excluded from this model. Second, it is likely that additional variables will need to be taken into account to explain third party response behavior.

Despite the failure to fulfill the assumption of closure, the analysis will proceed. Even if the results are not conclusive, they could be suggestive of new insights and provide a firm ground for the further development of the model. However, the validity of the conclusions should be considered tentative until further research can confirm or refute the results generated here.

Summary

This chapter has confronted the problem of the description of the data set on third party responses and the research design for testing the hypotheses and models. Generally, the discussion in this chapter has indicated that the conceptual issues addressed in this dissertation can be empirically researched, but that the results generated need to be considered very tentative pending further research on the problem. The next chapter presents those results.
CHAPTER VI

RESULTS

This chapter examines the results of the research developed in the previous chapters. The chapter is subdivided according to the three questions raised in the first chapter: the impact of stimulus characteristics on third party response behavior; the impact of national characteristics on third party response behavior; and the interaction of stimulus and national characteristics in the generation of third party response behavior.

The Impact of Stimulus Characteristics

Regional Focus

The first hypothesis to be tested is H1: States are more likely to make third party responses to events involving other states from the same geographical region than to other events. Before turning to the results of the test of the hypothesis it would be appropriate to examine the raw frequencies on the distribution of third party responses across the regional focus variable. Those results are presented in Table 16. It is clear from those results that most (63.5%) third party responses are made
TABLE 16: FREQUENCY OF THIRD PARTY RESPONSES FOR EACH CATEGORY OF REGIONAL FOCUS VARIABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intraregional stimuli</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outward penetration</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inward penetration</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraregional stimuli</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>898</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

to stimuli that do not involve another state from the same region as the third party. Thus, the regional focus of the stimulus does not approximate being a necessary condition for a third party response.

In order to test the hypothesis it is necessary to develop some estimate of the frequency that stimuli would be considered extraregional for any third party. Such an estimate is hard to derive empirically. Each case being analyzed here is based on a relationship between actors, targets and responding parties. No other data set is built using that relationship as a way of defining the case for analysis. Therefore, the estimate will be generated by developing a null model for the expected frequency of the categories in the system. That null model is based on the following assumptions:

1. There is only one actor and one target for each event.
2. All regions have equal sized memberships.
3. There is no difference in the probability of a third party response depending on whether the
stimulus was totally outside a nation's region or not.

Given those assumptions, the number of third party responses to an event totally outside the region of the third party is equal to the probability of a third party response times the number of nations outside the regions involved in the stimulus. The number of third party responses to the event by nations within the regions represented by the event is equal to the probability of a third party response times the number of nations within the region involved in the stimulus, after removing the two nations which were target and object. Mathematically, the expected proportion of third party responses to extraregional stimuli is given by the statement

\[
1 - \frac{p ((I \times N) - 2)}{p ((R - I) \times N)}
\]

where \( R \) = number of regions in the system
\( I \) = number of regions involved in the stimulus
\( N \) = number of nations in each region
\( p \) = probability of a third party response

To calculate the expected proportion of responses to extra-regional stimuli, two sets of calculations need to be carried out. Common assumptions of each calculation are: (1) there are 9 regions in the system \((R=9)\) because in this analysis 9 regions were used; (2) there are 15 nations in each region \((N=15)\) because there are 136 nations
in the world, and $136/9=15$. The differences in the calculations concern different values of $I$. In the first calculation, $I$ is set to equal 1, indicating that the actor and the target of the stimulus are both from the same region.

$$E(X) = 1 - \frac{p((1 \times N) - 2)}{p((R - I) \times N)} = 1 - \frac{p(13)}{p(120)}$$

Since $p$ is the same value in the numerator and the denominator, the statement yields

$$E(X) = 1 - \frac{13}{120} = .892$$

In the second calculation, $I$ is set to 2, indicating that the actor and the target are members of different regions.

$$E(X) = 1 - \frac{p((2 \times N) - 2)}{p(7 \times 15)} = 1 - .266 = .734$$

The results in Table 16 can be compared to the expected values calculated by the null model. In both cases, the percentage of responses to extraregional stimuli (63.5%) is less than the calculated expected value (89.2 or 73.4). Thus, there is a difference between two sets of stimuli those that produced third party responses and those that were estimated to represent the universe. Of the stimuli that triggered third party responses, extraregional stimuli accounted for a smaller proportion than they did of the estimate of all stimuli. Although con-
ditional probabilities cannot be calculated from those results, they are clearly compatible with the conclusion that the conditional probability of a response by a third party is greater if the stimulus involved a nation from the same region as the third party.

The adequacy of that conclusion depends on a number of factors, the first of which is the adequacy of the null model. Clearly, the model was built using a number of strong simplifying assumptions. It is not clear that those assumptions had any great cumulative effect on the outcome of the calculations. Some, such as the assumption of only two states involved in the stimulus, tended to increase the value of $E(X)$. If there were three participants, each representing a different region, that would lower $E(X)$ by increasing the value of the numerator and decreasing the denominator. On the other hand, the assumptions of equally sized regions may have tended to decrease the value of $E(X)$.

However, even if the inference is supported that states are more likely to respond to stimuli involving their own regions, it should be noted that the level of support is extremely weak. The difference between the expected and observed proportion of responses to extra-regional stimuli is very small. It is so weak that it is highly possible it could be merely a function of the sample of nations used by CREON. Even if that were not the
case, the empirical potency of the hypothesis is so slight that it should be accorded a relatively trivial position in the set of hypotheses.

Why should the hypothesis be so weakly supported? There are a number of conjectures which can be offered. First, it is possible that the set of third party responses is disproportionately representative of the behaviors of the great powers. Such great powers are more likely not to depend on the news media for information, and thus not incorporate media biases into their foreign policy. Great powers are also very likely to define their national interests and goals in ways that go beyond traditional regional boundaries. Therefore, interactions outside their region are more likely to generate situations of high requiredness and cruciality for such actors.

In addition to the great powers, there are other actors that are to some extent transregionally involved. A prime example would be the former colonial states, which still maintained special relationships with former colonies during this time period.

Another possible factor is that states may be cross-pressured by events that occur wholly within the context of the same region. Such cross-pressures may then tend to inhibit responses, thus reducing the relative frequency of third party responses to events that involve nations from the same region.
Salience of Participants

The hypothesis tested here is $H_2$: States are more likely to make third party responses to events involving highly salient entities than to other events. Again, the analysis can begin with the presentation of the raw frequencies of stimuli in terms of the joint salience of the participants. Those data are included on Table 17.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No salient participants</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low salience actor, high salience target</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High salience actor, low salience target</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High salience actor and target</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first fact which jumps out from the data is that the crucial distinction in this variable is between events that have a high salience actor and those that do not. Events without a high salience actor constitute only a small proportion of the stimuli that produce third party responses. Partly that may be due to the fact that high salience actors are generally the most active states in the system. That possibility will be explored, but first
it should be remembered that even though they are fairly active entities, there are only sixteen such salient actors and that is a very small percentage of the world's total set of actors.

In attempting to measure the marginal frequency of the categories of this variable, a major problem is confronted. There is no data set that includes as actors all nation-states and all international organizations. As a result, it is impossible to determine directly any estimate of the total amount of behavior of salient actors relative to nonsalient ones.

However, it is possible to develop a fairly valid indirect measure of the marginal frequency. The basic premise of that measure derives from the data in Table 18, which provides a breakdown of the frequency with which specific salient entities were coded as an actor in a stimulus. Those numbers indicate that, in terms of triggering responses by third parties, the behavior of international organizations is relatively unimportant. Most responses are to the behavior of nation-states. Therefore, the data on the relative frequency of actions by salient nation-states ought to be an adequate indicator of the marginal frequencies of the salience variable in the international system. That was obtained from the WEIS data, and is presented in Table 19.

Thus, approximately 54 percent of all foreign policy
behaviors in the international system are the actions of salient nations. That compares with 66 percent of all third party responses being to the behavior of salient entities. That suggests that the hypothesized relationship between the salience of the actor and the likelihood that the event will elicit third party responses is in the proper direction. The conditional probability, as estimated here, of a third party response given a salient actor in the stimulus is about .05. The conditional probability given a nonsalient actor is about .03. The

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Frequency of response-producing actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.A.R. (Egypt)</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Vietnam</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. General Assembly</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Peacekeeping forces</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development Association</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 19: FREQUENCY OF ACTIONS BY SALIENT & NONSALIENT NATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>4037</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1220</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.A.R. (Egypt)</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Vietnam</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total for salient nations</strong></td>
<td>11202</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total for nonsalient nations</strong></td>
<td>9369</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td>20571</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

absolute values of those probabilities do not have any inherent meaning, but the difference between them does indicate support for the hypothesis. However, the relationship is relatively weak, especially when it is recalled that not all responses were to unique stimuli. That suggests that states are not as sensitive to who the actor is as was expected.

If there is a weak relationship between the salience of the actor and the frequency of third party responses, the relationship between the salience of the targets and third party response behavior appears to be nonexistent. States appear to react no more frequently to actions with salient targets than they do to actions with nonsalient targets, once the salience of the stimulus actor has been
controlled for. In fact, the results seem to indicate that, if anything, there is a greater sensitivity to events with lower salience targets than to those with high salience targets.

That finding seems to have some strong implications for the underlying paradigm of this research. One component of that paradigm was the belief that the flow of news about an event should be an important factor in determining the kinds of responses which it triggered in the international community. Assuming that the paradigm was adequate and that news flow varies according to the salience of both the actors and the targets of an event, the expected results in Table 17 would have been a monotonic increase in the proportion of the stimuli falling into higher categories on the joint salience variable. Because that expectation was not met, one of the two assumptions must have been false. There is no strong reason to assume that news flow in not sensitive to the salience of event recipients. If there is supposed to be some inherent interest in the affairs of certain countries, that interest should manifest itself when the news about the entity concerns its actions or actions directed against it. Moreover, it was shown that foreign correspondents, the primary newsgatherers in the international system, are generally distributed according to the salience or importance of individual nations. So the problem would seem to lie in the belief that news flow is
is an important process in determining interaction processes in the international system. There is no conclusive proof that the assumption is false, but the circumstantial evidence is strong enough to warrant a further empirical examination of the impact of news flow on foreign policy behavior.

**Violence**

The third hypothesis was: States are more likely to make third party responses to violent events than to nonviolent events. The data relevant to the testing of the hypothesis are presented in Table 20.

**TABLE 20: DISTRIBUTION OF STIMULI ON SEQUENTIAL ACTION SCHEME**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stimuli with Third Party Responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>All Stimuli</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verbal statements—evaluative</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>5289</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal statements—desire</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>3446</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal statements—intent</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>1328</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic deeds</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant deeds</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonconflict military actions</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military conflict actions</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td>11665</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The distribution of all stimuli on the Sequential Action Scheme is drawn from the entire CREON data set for thirty-six nations for the 1959-1968 time period.

The most relevant comparison to be made is between the frequency of military conflict actions for all stimuli and for those that generated third party responses. As was indicated in Chapter II, such actions are considered to be the violent ones. The data in the table indicate that the level of violence in the action is, indeed, a very crucial variable. Whereas the estimated conditional probability of a third party response given a nonviolent stimulus is only about .06 (for these two data sets), the conditional probability given a violent stimulus cannot be calculated because it would be greater than 1.0, a logical impossibility. Clearly, the violent stimuli produce multiple third party responses, and that partly accounts for the abnormally large number of third party responses to violent stimuli. Despite the fact that the conditional probability cannot be calculated, it is very clear that it must be much larger than .06. So the hypothesis is supported.

Before turning to the fourth hypothesis, a number of further conclusions can be drawn from those data. The first is that in terms of raw frequencies violence is not a necessary condition for a third party response. There are a number of nonviolent events that also elicit such
responses. Indeed, nonviolent events seem to produce the majority of third party responses.

Second, the data also seem to indicate that governments are much more likely to respond to military actions that are not violent than they are to nonmilitary actions. That coupled with the results for violent stimuli seem to suggest that military affairs and the use of military resources are the most sensitive aspects of foreign policy behavior. Foreign policy decision makers seem to focus on violent or potentially violent actions in deciding what deserves their attention. It would be interesting to compare those results with ones for the middle 1970's to determine if the progression of detente and the erosion of alliance systems, and the increased salience of issues of economic and resource distribution, would require a modification of the results. For the period 1959-1968, Aron's (1968) characterization of international politics as the preserve of the diplomat and the soldier does not seem to be terribly inaccurate.

Crisis

The fourth hypothesis was that states are more likely to make third party responses in situations of crisis than in other situations. The relevant data pertaining to that hypothesis are presented in Table 21. The first two columns of data in that table are those which relate to
the stimulus. The second two columns concern the relative frequency of crisis events in the international system, as estimated from the CREON data.

Those results suggest strong support for the hypothesis. Although responses to noncrisis events do constitute a major portion of the total number of third party responses, it is clear from a comparison of the contribution of crisis events to the set of stimuli and to the total set of events in the international system that the fact that an event occurs in the context of a crisis does enhance the probability of it evoking response behavior from third parties. The conditional probability of a third party response given that the stimulus occurred in a crisis is estimated at .19, whereas the conditional probability given a noncrisis stimulus is about .06.

**Newsworthiness of Decision Maker**

The fifth hypothesis to be tested is that states are more likely to make third party responses to events taken by internationally newsworthy decision makers and other
high governmental officials than they are to respond to events taken by lower governmental officials. The examination of that hypothesis can begin with the presentation of raw frequencies in Table 22. The data in the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 22: RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF THIRD PARTY RESPONSES TO DIFFERENT HIERARCHICAL LEVELS OF DECISION MAKERS, FOR ALL STIMULI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High government officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other government officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International organization officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

table includes the responses to all stimuli. Because that includes stimuli taken by actors who were not measured for their personal newsworthiness, only the distinction between governmental roles are presented in the table.

The first salient fact in the table is the very large residual category "other." That category, as well as the category for international organization officials, was necessitated in the actual data collection stage of the research because the original conceptualization of the variable was inadequate. Not all third party responses were to the behavior of governments of nation-states, and not all the behavior of nation-states was announced or implemented through the actions of identifiable indivi-
duals. Indeed, the bulk of the stimuli appeared to be the output of large organizations. Those events were the predominant component of the 560 stimuli coded in the "other" category in Table 22.

That finally suggests need for fundamental reconceptualization of this variable. Much of the significant behavior in the international system appears as the output of relatively impersonal, large organizations (Allison, 1969). For such behavior, the supposed tendencies to be more responsive to the behavior of personally salient, high level decision makers would be irrelevant.

Still, for behavior which is identifiable with a single person, the hypothesis is not totally irrelevant. The data in the table suggest that the behavior of higher level officials constitutes the bulk of those stimuli which elicit third party responses.

In order to test whether an action by a high political official is more likely to elicit third party responses than is the behavior of lower officials, the data in the table can be compared to some data generated by the larger CREON data set. One CREON variable is the official position of the announcer of the event. That variable has a rather detailed breakdown of governmental roles. One category includes "head of government or of ruling political party or minister within acting state" (Hermann et al., 1973: 101). That corresponds to the class of high
decision makers in the variable being analyzed here, and can be compared to the frequency of other announcers within the acting nation. Those data are presented in Table 23.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 23: FREQUENCY OF HIERARCHICAL LEVELS OF DECISION MAKERS, ALL EVENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top policy makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other announcers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From a comparison of Table 22 and Table 23, it can be seen that in the international system as a whole, there is almost a 50-50 split between the announcements of top policy makers and lower officials, whereas in the set of stimuli which elicit responses the breakdown is almost 5 to 1. That suggests strong support for the hypothesis that organizational rank of an individual is an important component of the set of factors which determine if an action will receive a response. The conditional probability of a third party response given that the stimulus was announced by a high governmental official is estimated as .08, whereas the conditional probability for events announced by other decision makers is about .02, so the hypothesis is, indeed, supported at this point in the analysis.
The other aspect of the hypothesis has not yet been examined, that being the effect of the newsworthiness of the individual decision maker. The data on that problem are presented in Table 24. The data are broken down to include only those stimulus actions which were initiated by CREON nations and which were verbal behaviors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 24: RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF STIMULI BY NEWSWORTHY OFFICIALS</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newsworthty individuals</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other high government officials</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other government officials</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At first, the data would seem to support the assumption that the newsworthiness of the official has an impact on whether third parties respond to the event. However, more thought suggests that is an inappropriate conclusion. There is no way to get a quantitative fix on the relative frequency of action by newsworthy officials as opposed to other high officials. However, a few ancillary facts should provide some guidelines. The first is that the set of newsworthy individuals is largely composed of the leaders of the most active nations in the world. Indeed, fairly frequent activity would probably be a prerequisite for an official to become newsworthy. The second fact is
that the foreign policy behavior, to the extent that it involves verbal activity, is usually the preserve of the officials who were checked for newsworthiness—heads of states and governments, and foreign ministers. Those two facts in tandem lead to the strong suspicion that very much of the verbal behavior in the international system is that of "newsworthy" individuals. One should expect that it should approximate the value in the table of around 50 percent of all stimuli. Therefore, the data in the table suggest the strong possibility that the newsworthiness of an individual is not a particularly important variable for explaining foreign policy behavior.

The Impact of National Characteristics

Whereas the previous sections of this chapter were devoted to the problem of the immediate causes of third party response behavior, this section is concerned with variation in third party response behavior across nations. The variables to be considered are the frequency of third party responses (the number of times each state makes a third party response) and the relative frequency of such behavior (the total number of such events as a proportion of all foreign policy behavior). Table 25 presents data on those variables for all thirty-six of the CREON actors. In the table the nations have been ranked according to the relative frequency of third party response behavior.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of Total Behavior</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of Total Behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.A.R. (Egypt)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The task of this section of the chapter is to account for the variation in that table using the causal model developed in Chapter IV and the methods discussed in Chapter V. The results of that analysis are presented in Figures 8-11. For each of the dependent variables, frequency and relative frequency of third party responses, two analyses were performed. For reasons pointed out in Chapter IV, the analysis was run both on the entire sample of thirty-six nations that were included in the CREON data and on the subset of twenty-seven for which Holsti reported national role conceptions data.

**FIGURE 8: RESULTS OF THE CAUSAL MODELLING ANALYSIS FOR FREQUENCY OF THIRD PARTY RESPONSES, USING ENTIRE SAMPLE OF NATIONS**

![Diagram of causal model with coefficients]

- **Size** → 0.38, **Development** → 0.15, **Capabilities** → 0.86
- **Development** → 0.58, **Extensiveness of Goals and Objectives** → 0.30
- **Size** → **Capabilities** → **Monitoring Capacity** → 0.63
- **Development** → **Extensiveness of Goals and Objectives** → **Monitoring Capacity** → **Frequency of Third Party Responses**
FIGURE 9: RESULTS OF CAUSAL MODELLING ANALYSIS FOR FREQUENCY OF THIRD PARTY RESPONSES, USING SUBSET WITH DATA ON NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Size} & \rightarrow \text{Development} \\
& \downarrow \quad \quad \downarrow \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{Capabilities} \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \downarrow \quad \downarrow \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{Goals and Objectives} \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \downarrow \quad \downarrow \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{Monitoring Capacity} \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \downarrow \quad \downarrow \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{Frequency of Third Party Responses}
\end{align*}
\]

FIGURE 10: RESULTS OF CAUSAL MODELLING ANALYSIS FOR RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF THIRD PARTY RESPONSES, USING ENTIRE SAMPLE OF NATIONS

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Size} & \rightarrow \text{Development} \\
& \downarrow \quad \quad \downarrow \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{Capabilities} \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \downarrow \quad \downarrow \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{Goals and Objectives} \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \downarrow \quad \downarrow \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{Monitoring Capacity} \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \downarrow \quad \downarrow \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{Relative Frequency of Third Party Responses}
\end{align*}
\]
The discussion of the results will proceed sequentially, beginning at the top of the model and moving downward. Therefore, the first set of relationships in the causal model has the nation's capabilities (GNP) being a result of its size (population) and development (GNP per capita). The results for that analysis are presented in Table 26.

The results for those variables should not be pushed too far. For one thing, the model was deliberately mis-specified. The value of a nation's GNP is clearly a simple multiplicative function of its population and its GNP per capita. The model was mis-specified with the hope of being able to trace the indirect influence of size and development on other variables through the mediating
TABLE 26: RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF CAUSES OF TOTAL Capacities of a Nation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal variable</th>
<th>Whole sample</th>
<th>Subset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple correlation | .67 | .71 |
R²                   | .45 | .50 |

effects of total capabilities. Another reason for not going too far on these results is that the individual path coefficients are not in accord with other research findings that show a much more equal impact of size and development on total resources (Kean and McGowan, 1973). Still, it is clear that size and development additively have a strong impact on the amount of resources in the society, and that development has the strongest impact.

At this point it may be useful to indicate how the residuals will be treated in this analysis. Essentially, too much emphasis should not be placed on those values. The residual is computed as the square root of the unexplained variance. As such it has a strong tendency to take on very high values. For example, if a model explained 75 percent of the variance, the 25 percent that was unaccounted for would produce a residual of .50. All the residual indicates is the amount of variance yet to be accounted for by the model. That is also what the
squared multiple correlation ($R^2$) indicates, but without any upward bias.

The second set of relationships concern the direct causes of the extensiveness of goals and objectives (activity of national role conceptions). The predictor, or causal, variables are capabilities (GNP), development (GNP per capita) and size (population). The results are summarized in Table 27.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 27: RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF CAUSES OF EXTENSIVENESS OF GOALS AND OBJECTIVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Path Coefficients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first point to be made in the analysis of those results is that the model provides fair predictions of the extensiveness of goals and objectives as measured. About half of the variance is explained. However, there is still a great deal of improvement that could be accomplished because much of the variance remains to be explained.

Of the three causal variables, the capabilities of the state seem to be most important. That suggests that
it is indeed the case that governments adopt their goals and objectives in accordance with their capabilities to achieve them. It must be noted, however, that an alternative interpretation of that result can be made. Because the measure of extensiveness is based on the number of goals asserted, it is a function of the amount of the goal-asserting behavior of the state. As such, the critical intervening process may not be that the government adopts its goals upward or downward depending on resources available. It may be that the amount of resources in the nation affects the total amount of activity, and that with increased activity the number of role conceptions asserted increases even though the number adopted by the government remains constant.

The results also indicate that total capabilities is not the only variable that has some impact on the extensiveness of goals and objectives. Both size and development have direct, albeit weak, impacts on the extensiveness of goals and objectives. Substantively, that suggests that governments take cues from variables other than total capabilities in deciding how active they should be in the international system. Both size and development help to define a nation's status in the world, and that status may be a source of goals and objectives.

However, an alternative explanation is available for the path linking development to the extensiveness of goals
and objectives. A number of scholars have articulated the hypothesis that the economic surplus in a state, the differential between available resources and those required for the maintenance of subsistence levels of existence, is an important consideration (East, 1973; Wilkenson, 1969). With an increasing economic surplus, more resources may be allocated to foreign affairs problems. The results here may provide some indirect support for that hypothesis. Economic development is usually considered to be a good indicator of the economic surplus of the state. The path from economic development to the extensiveness of goals and objectives may mean that increasing development, by increasing resources available for allocation to foreign affairs, leads to the adoption of more extensive goals and objectives.

Finally, it is noted that the results for this variable differ considerably between the whole sample and the subset. Apparently the way one chooses to treat the cases without national role conceptions data has implications for the results obtained. In that context, the most important change is the marked increase in the path coefficient in the analysis using the subset.

The next set of results concern the prediction of the monitoring capacity of the state. They are presented in Table 28. There are reasons to feel confident about this set of results, along with reasons to be dubious. On the
TABLE 28: RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF CAUSES OF MONITORING CAPACITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path Coefficients</th>
<th>Whole Sample</th>
<th>Subset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extensiveness of Goals</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple correlation</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

positive side, the two variables jointly account for almost all the variance in the monitoring capacity of states. The residual that remains is probably almost all random or measurement error. On the negative side, these results are very susceptible to problems of multicollinearity. They should be considered applicable only to this sample unless further analysis supports them.

However, the results are stimulating. It would appear that the amount of monitoring capacity that a state has is almost wholly a function of the amount of resources, the capabilities of the state. (That one variable accounted for 95 percent of the variance). The extensiveness of goals and objectives is only weakly related. The substantive implication of that finding seems to be that the tendency to create organizational structures seems to be constant across all states. As the resources needed for such organization become more available, the organization is created. The extensiveness of goals and objectives
is relatively ineffectual as a spur to the creation of additional organizational capacity.

The final sets of results concern the direct causes of third party response behavior. The results for the frequency of such behavior are presented in Table 29.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path Coefficients</th>
<th>Whole Sample</th>
<th>Subset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring Capacity</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extensiveness of Goals</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple correlation</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As was the case for the previous set of results, the high multiple correlation and \( R^2 \) provide reason for faith in the results, but the problems of high intercorrelations of the independent variables sow the seeds of disbelief.

The results seem to indicate that both monitoring capacity (number of diplomats) and extensiveness of goals and objectives (activity of role conceptions) have important impacts on the amount of third party response behavior. The path from monitoring capacity has about twice the strength of the path from the extensiveness of goals and objectives. However, that was to be expected because
of the close association of organizational capacity and total behavior of all kinds. Of more substantive interest is the fact that the path linking the extensiveness of goals and objectives to the frequency of third party responses is so substantial. That means that the goals and objectives of the state have a statistical impact on behavior even after the effects of raw and organizational capabilities have been controlled for. Thus, stated goals and objectives are not merely rhetoric. They have an impact on behavior.

That conclusion is made even stronger when the results for the relative frequency of third party responses are examined. Table 30 provides those results. Those results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path Coefficients</th>
<th>Whole Sample</th>
<th>Subset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring Capacity</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extensiveness of Goals</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple correlation</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

indicate that of the variables in the model the extensiveness of goals and objectives (activity of national role conceptions) is clearly the strongest. Indeed, the monitoring capacity of the state (number of diplomats) is
negatively related to the relative frequency of third party responses. That suggests that the argument made in Chapter IV relating monitoring capacity to increased levels of third party responses was wrong.

However, even more than in the previous results, these interpretations should not be pushed too far. The multiple correlation, the $R^2$ and the residuals all indicate that these two variables are not particularly good predictors of the relative frequency of third party responses. Indeed, most of the variance remains to be explained, and the addition of more variables to the model could demonstrate the relationships developed here to be spurious.

One final concern needs to be addressed before turning to the problem of the interaction of stimulus and national characteristics, or the differential sensitivity of states to stimulus characteristics. One of the implications of the model was that there would be no direct paths linking the basic national attributes of size, development and capabilities to third party response behavior. How valid is that implication?

In order to test that validity, the first step is to display the bivariate correlations between the independent variables and the dependent variables. That is done in Table 31.

Assuming that none of the relationships is spurious, the correlation between any two variables is the sum of
TABLE 31: BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS OF NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS WITH THIRD PARTY RESPONSE VARIABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Relative Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whole Sample</td>
<td>Subset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the direct and indirect compound paths that link them. If a direct path has been inappropriately excluded from the model, it should become apparent when the sum of the indirect paths is subtracted from the bivariate correlation. Such an operation was performed, yielding the results presented in Tables 32 and 33. Because the patterns in the bivariate correlations are so similar for both the sample and the subset, only the results for the whole sample are presented here.

TABLE 32: DECOMPOSITION OF BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND FREQUENCY OF THIRD PARTY RESPONSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Bivariate Correlation</th>
<th>Sun of Indirect Paths</th>
<th>Residual Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results in the two tables are strikingly similar. In both, the evidence indicates that the model was correctly specified in leaving out a direct linkage between
development and capabilities on the one hand and third party response behavior on the other. However, the model may not be adequate in that there is a meaningful residual correlation in both cases between the size of the nation (population) and its frequency and relative frequency of third party response behavior. Why should that be so?

The first possibility is that the operationalization of the extensiveness of goals and objectives (as the activity of national role conceptions) may have been faulty. Thus, some of the relationship of size to third party response behavior through the nation's goals would not have been empirically captured by the model. Although that is indeed a possibility, the fact that the residual correlations for development and capabilities were low suggests that the operationalization of the extensiveness of goals and objectives was appropriate.

Another substantive interpretation of the residual correlation of size and third party response behavior may be that size creates a predisposition of intervene as
development and capabilities on the one hand and third party response behavior on the other. However, the model may not be adequate in that there is a meaningful residual correlation in both cases between the size of the nation (population) and its frequency and relative frequency of third party response behavior. Why should that be so?

The first possibility is that the operationalization of the extensiveness of goals and objectives (as the activity of national role conceptions) may have been faulty. Thus, some of the relationship of size to third party response behavior through the nation's goals would not have been empirically captured by the model. Although that is indeed a possibility, the fact that the residual correlations for development and capabilities were low suggests that the operationalization of the extensiveness of goals and objectives was appropriate.

Another substantive interpretation of the residual correlation of size and third party response behavior may be that size creates a predisposition of intervene as
a third party, but that predisposition does not receive verbal affirmation through the adoption of goals, objectives, and role conceptions. Instead, it is triggered in an ad hoc fashion by the stimulus and never generalized. Although that is a possibility, it seems highly improbable. Governments tend to espouse generalized purposes even if to justify actions taken for ad hoc reasons.

The appropriate development of a substantive interpretation of that result begins with a more detailed examination of the raw data on third party response behavior. As can be seen in the distribution of frequency and relative frequency of third party responses by nation (Table 25), there are a number of states that have extreme values on those variables. For the frequency of third party responses they are the United States (141), the Soviet Union (113) and China (90). Those three states were the leaders or the aspiring leaders of large groups of nations in the international system. It would appear that the leadership roles they adopted in the system led them to engage in larger amounts of third party response behavior than would be expected based on their national capabilities. Moreover, those leadership roles were not reflected in the measure of the activity of national role conceptions. Apparently that variable becomes insensitive to differences among states at the higher levels of activity.
Based on that interpretation it becomes unclear what the effect of size is. It would appear that large size is a prerequisite for leadership roles in the international system. However, it is not a sufficient condition, as evidenced by the fact that India, the second largest nation, undertook only twenty-three third party responses.

In terms of the relative frequency of third party responses, China is the outstanding extreme case with 17.7 percent of its behavior. Two factors seem to make China such an abnormal case. First, China was not as closely involved in as many dyadic relationships as were most other states its size because of its condition as a pariah state in the international system. That reduced the denominator in the calculation of relative frequency. Second, China had a very small diplomatic corps, given the size of the state, because it did not have formal diplomatic relations with many other states in 1963-1964. That reduced the strength of the path from size through monitoring capacity to the relative frequency of third party responses. Thus, the argument is that the unexplained residual correlation between size and relative frequency of third party response behavior is primarily a function of the deviant Chinese case and does not actually call for a re-evaluation of the model as a whole.
Interaction of Stimulus and National Characteristics

In the previous two sections it has been demonstrated that the characteristics of the stimulus and the characteristics of nations have an impact on third party response behavior in the international system. Here attention turns to the interaction of those two variable clusters. The model being tested is that states with a greater propensity to engage in third party behavior are less sensitive to the value that a stimulus takes on any stimulus characteristic. The expectation would be that a high capabilities state having extensive goals and objectives will be more likely to respond to an event which is nonviolent, not related to a crisis, and so on, that is, they will have lower sensitivity to stimulus characteristics.

The dependent variables to be examined were created by counting the number of times a state responded to crisis events, to violent events, to events by salient international actors, and to events that were extraregional for the third party. Each of those sums was then divided by the total frequency of third party responses. If the expectation in the model is correct, the numerator should increase slower than the denominator with increasing national capabilities and extensiveness of goals and objectives. That means that ultimately the model predicts
a negative association between capabilities and extensiveness of goals on the one hand, and sensitivity to stimulus characteristics on the other.

One alternative to that expectation is that there should be no differences among states in their sensitivity to stimulus characteristics. The best way to test that possibility is to examine measures of dispersion in the sensitivity variables. Those data are presented in Table 34.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% responses to crisis</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% responses to violent stimuli</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% responses to actions of salient entities</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>96.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% responses to regional stimuli</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from those results that states do vary in the kinds of stimuli to which they respond. Thus, the next question is whether that variance is related to variance in the characteristics of nations. That question can be answered first by examining the relevant bivariate correlations in Table 35. In calculating Table 35 those cases were excluded that had fewer than five third party
responses. That decision was made because with fewer responses than that the calculation of a percentage would have been misleading. As a result, the size of the whole sample was reduced to twenty-eight, and the subset having data on national role conceptions was reduced to twenty-two cases.

The pattern of correlations is very revealing. First of all, it appears that the relationships of national attributes and response behavior becomes more complex when one is considering the interaction of national attributes and stimulus characteristics. That is revealed by the mixture of positive and negative correlations in the table. In all previous analyses in this research, the
bivariate correlations were uniformly positive in direction (although some of the path coefficients had negative signs). The increased complexity is also revealed by the changes in the sign and strength of the correlations of the same national characteristic with different measures of sensitivity.

How might that complexity be unraveled? First of all, there is a marked difference between the variable "percent regional" and the others. That is the only dependent variable that did not have a correlation in the wrong direction (positive). Moreover, it was the one dependent variable with which capabilities and monitoring capacity strongly correlated.

Second, only the level of development of a nation (GNP/capita) was consistently related in the proper direction with the dependent variables. As a general rule, then, the higher the level of development of a nation, the less it is necessary for an event to attain high values on a variable for the nation to respond to the event.

Third, the extensiveness of goals and objectives is related in the proper direction only with the percent regional variable. Thus, the more extensive a nation's goals, the more frequently will its third party responses be to events in a crisis, violent events, and actions by salient actors.
Fourth, the two basic national attributes (GNP/capita and population) are more strongly related to the dependent variables than are the measures of capabilities or extensiveness of goals and objectives. The only exceptions to that statement are the percent regional variable and the percent violent variable, in which extensiveness of goals is more strongly related than is population.

What does all that mean substantively? The last comment means that the causal model developed in Chapter IV is grossly inappropriate for explaining the interactions of national characteristics and stimulus characteristics. The impact of size and development cannot be totally or even largely mediated by the intervening variables of monitoring capacity and extensiveness of goals and objectives, given the pattern of correlations developed above. There are direct impacts between size and development and the propensity to react to certain kinds of events. (For that reason the path analysis for these interrelationships will not be reported. The results are unquestionably misleading).

The fact that the correlation of GNP per capita is uniformly in the proper direction can perhaps be explained as follows. As a state becomes more developed, it becomes more tied to the international system in a variety of ways (Morse, 1969). Those additional ties to
the system tend to involve issues that do not ordinarily erupt into crises or violence. Such issues would include most economic issues as well as most problems in the control of transactions between nations. As a result of their increased attention to such issues, more developed states are likely to make third party responses to behavior that is nonviolent and that is not related to an international crisis.

The negative correlation between development and percent of third party responses to the actions of salient actors can perhaps be accounted for in a similar manner. One of the components that is clearly related to the salience of an entity is the amount of its conflict behavior. That is the only possible explanation for the presence of the U.A.R. and North Vietnam on the list of salient actors. The United States, China and Israel were also highly involved in international crises and conflicts. Thus, a tendency to respond to the behavior of such entities will to some extent be a function of sensitivity to crisis and violence. Conversely, a tendency to attend to issues that do not produce crises and violence will lead states to respond to actions of another group of states, such as Japan, Canada, and some Western European nations.

How can the positive correlations of the size of the nation and the sensitivity to crisis and to salient actors'
behavior be accounted for? To shed more light on the problem, more detailed results can be examined. Table 36 presents the raw data on the sensitivity to crisis for the most and least sensitive states in the sample. Based

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>% crisis</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>% crisis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>U.A.R. (Egypt)</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 36: STATES WITH HIGHEST AND LOWEST SENSITIVITY TO CRISIS

on those data it would be very difficult to offer any substantive interpretation of the results based on any dynamic presumed to result from size. There are large and small states in both groups of nations. Instead, a more plausible interpretation would be that the correlation is a statistical artifact. The two largest states in the sample were China and India and both seem to have been very sensitive to crisis-related stimuli. It would seem that those two states, by being outliers on size, produced a correlation that would probably not hold for the rest of the nations.

A similar analysis was performed to determine why
there was a correlation between size and sensitivity to salient actors' behavior. Although the patterns were not so erratic as for the sensitivity to crisis, a similar conclusion must be urged. The United States was among the least sensitive states to the behavior of salient actors; Spain, Yugoslavia, Ghana, and Lebanon were among the most sensitive. And once again, China and India were among the most sensitive. Therefore, it is highly plausible that the correlation is due to their status as outliers on size.

The final question concerns why it is that the results for the percent regional variable were as predicted when the others were not. The argument is that beyond some baseline, any concern for affairs outside one's region is dependent on having some continuing relationships with nations in that other region. Such relationships would create greater sensitivity to what goes on in the region. If commerce follows the flag, then sensitivity follows the embassy.
CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

At this point in the dissertation all of the empirical research has been completed. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to tie together the various parts of the research. That will involve three steps. First, the empirical findings generated in the previous chapter will be summarized. Then the implications of those findings for the validity of the fundamental assumptions articulated in Chapter II will be considered. Last, the importance of the research in its broadest context, as a contribution to the study of third party behavior, will be examined and avenues for future research will be mapped out.

Summary of Findings

In the previous chapter a number of empirical findings were revealed. Those findings will be recapitulated here.

The first set of findings concerned the impact of stimulus characteristics on third party response behavior. The most important of those characteristics seemed to be
the degree of violence involved in the stimulus. Although most third party responses were taken in response to nonviolent stimuli, the violent stimuli seemed very clearly to have been those that were most likely to elicit responses from third parties.

The second most important variable in the explanation of third party response behavior was the context in which the stimulus occurred. Events that happened during a crisis seemed much more likely to trigger response behavior than was the case with events that were not crisis related.

The third most important variable is the level in the governmental hierarchy of the individual who makes the stimulus action. States seem to be much more likely to respond as third parties to the behavior of heads of state or government or to the behavior of Cabinet Ministers than they are to respond to the behavior of lower level governmental officials.

The international salience of the actor in the stimulus was somewhat related to the likelihood that the event would trigger third party response behavior. Although that relationship was in the direction specified in the hypothesis, the strength of the relationship was relatively weak.

The regional focus of the stimulus, whether it involved as actor or recipient a state from the same region
as the third party, was found to be related positively to the probability that the third party would respond. However, the level of support was very weak. The hypothesis was nearly disconfirmed. Therefore, the regional focus of the stimulus seems to be a relatively low priority consideration in decisions whether or not to respond as a third party to the stimulus.

Finally, two of the expectations suggested in Chapter III turned out not to hold up under empirical investigation. One was the expectation that those events with more salient recipients would be more likely to produce third party responses. The reverse seemed to be a more accurate conclusion. The other was the expectation that the behavior of certain individual decision makers, dubbed "newsworthy individuals" would be more likely to trigger third party responses. Although firm evidence could not be marshalled on this point, it seemed to be the case that the hypothesis was false.

In the causal modelling analysis of the impact of national characteristics, a number of interesting conclusions were found. The first was that the extensiveness of goals and objectives, operationalized as the activity of national role conceptions, is a function of three national attributes: size, measured by population; development, measured by per capita GNP; and capabilities, measured by GNP. Together those three accounted for
about half of the variance in the extensiveness of goals. Of the three, capabilities was the dominant predictor, with development as the second most potent variable.

The monitoring capacity of a government was measured by the number of diplomats sent to foreign nations. It was almost totally predicted by the capabilities of a nation (GNP). The extensiveness of goals had a relatively trivial positive impact on the amount of monitoring capacity created by a government.

The frequency of a state's third party responses was quite well accounted for by the monitoring capacity of the state and the extensiveness of its goals and objectives (about 75 percent of the variance was explained). Of the two causal variables, monitoring capacity had the greatest impact with extensiveness of goals and objectives having a smaller, although significant, direct impact on the frequency of third party responses.

The relative frequency of third party responses was generally immune to explanation within the causal model developed for this dissertation. Only 32 percent of the variance in that variable was accounted for by monitoring capacity and extensiveness of goals. Of those two, the extensiveness of the nation's goals was the most important predictor.

It was also observed that the causal model performed fairly well in terms of there being no apparent direct
effect between development and capabilities and either frequency or relative frequency of third party response behavior. However, there was a residual correlation between size and the dependent variables. It was speculated that the reason for the unexplained correlation between size and the frequency of third party responses was that there was a threshold in the function such that "great powers" or aspiring "great powers" were much more active than their size alone would indicate (assuming a linear function). It was also speculated that the residual correlation between size and relative frequency of third party responses was largely the result of China as a deviant case.

Turning to the interactions of stimulus and national characteristics, the primary empirical finding was that the causal model developed to handle that problem was grossly inadequate. With the exception of those relating to development, the bivariate correlations between national characteristics and sensitivity to stimulus characteristics generally either indicated a direction of relationship opposite that expected or were so weak as to be empirically meaningless.

Development seemed to be associated with decreasing percentages of third party responses being made to crisis and violent behaviors and to the actions of salient nations. That was speculated to be the result of increasing
levels of development leading states to be more attentive to economic issues.

Before turning from those findings to a consideration of their broader implications, the reader is once again reminded most strongly that each of those findings must be considered very tentative at this time. The full set of reasons why caution should prevail will not be reviewed here but were discussed in great detail in the body of the research.

**Implications of the Findings**

A number of implications of this research could be pursued here. All cannot be considered, however, without greatly expanding the scope of the dissertation. Instead, three areas will be explored for the implications of this research: the role of news flow variables and the private media in the explanation of third party response behavior; the study of goals in foreign policy; and the study of national attributes in foreign policy.

**News Flow and the Media**

This dissertation began with a set of fundamental assumptions. Those assumptions emphasized the role of four variables and processes in the prediction of when third party response behavior would occur: (1) the flow of news about the stimulus in private media channels; (2) the monitoring capacity of states; (3) the ambiguity,
requiredness and cruciality of the situation generated by the stimulus; and (4) the extensiveness of national goals and objectives.

The findings in the dissertation allow the re-evaluation of one of those components—the flow of news in the private media. Two of the results suggest that component was given too much importance in the development of hypotheses: (1) the salience of the recipients of the stimulus was not related to the probability of a third party response; (2) the individual newsworthiness of the decision maker was not related to the probability of a third party response.

Those findings are crucial because they relate to the only two a priori expectations that derived solely from the logic of news flow. All other hypotheses were redundantly generated because they were supported by the logic of situations as well as by the logic of news flow. Therefore, their confirmation or falsification is ambiguous with regard to their implications for the priority given to news flow variables.

In principal, there are two reasons why those hypotheses could have been falsified. One is that the flow of news in the private media is unimportant in determining what governments are aware of. The other is that the awareness of a stimulus does not in and of itself constitute a reason for responding.
Returning to that first alternative, the argument that would support that position can be stated as follows. Policy makers decide which nations it is important for them to have accurate images of. That decision is based on their conception of the national interest and some notion, perhaps a hazy one, of how other nations are related to the national interests. Once the decision is made, the machinery is created to continuously monitor the affairs of the important states. The richness of the information feedback from that machinery trivializes the sporadic and superficial news coming from the news media.

However, the results do not unambiguously support that alternative. The results do not provide any direct evidence that states rely entirely on their diplomatic and intelligence networks for information about what goes on in the world. For that alternative to be accepted a much more detailed analysis needs to be performed in which it is determined if the third party responded only in those instances in which it had a diplomatic mission assigned to at least one of the participants in the event. If so, then that would provide strong support for the alternative. To the extent that governments respond to events among entities to which there are no diplomatic missions or diplomatic intelligence operations, that would suggest that the alternative is invalid. In that
vein it is worth noting that China, with a very small diplomatic network, was the third most active state in the making of third party responses.

The other alternative merely asserts what should have been apparent. That is that mere awareness of an event is not sufficient reason to make a response. The event must create a situation of high requiredness or cruciality or it will not elicit responses from third parties.

In either case, the results suggest that news flow is a relatively less important factor than had been originally imagined. Whether it should be of any interest at all to students of third party response behavior remains to be determined by other research.

Goals and Foreign Policy

The research completed in this dissertation also speaks to the use of goals in scientific foreign policy research. It has been shown that for some purposes the concept of the extensiveness of goals and objectives can be given an operational meaning through the use of national role conceptions, and, thus, related to the behavior of states. Goals can be related in a quantitative way to foreign policy behavior.

More importantly, though, the creation of cross-national indicators of goals seems to have some important
limitations. The first of those limitations discovered in this research was the inability of the indicators to capture the marked change in the goals and foreign policy orientations of the nations that are or aspire to be dominant actors in the system. The direct relationship of size to frequency of third party responses was largely a function of the failure of the model to empirically incorporate the impacts of the behavior of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. That failure was largely due, it is speculated, to the fact that above some point there can be quantitative and perhaps qualitative changes in the aspirations and motivations of governments, and those changes are not well reflected in the verbal behavior of governmental representatives. That suggests a need for further work in the measurement of theoretically interesting aspects of national goals. It further suggests that adequate measures will not be simple or easy to generate.

A more telling implication of this research for the study of national goals in foreign policy derives from the results of the analysis of sensitivity to stimulus characteristics. Those results indicated almost no explanatory power being derived from the quantitative measures of the extensiveness of national goals and objectives. Why was that?

One possible reason is that as the measures of foreign
policy behavior become less gross and more closely tied to substantive content, the kinds of goals and measures of goals required to explain behavior will have to be more detailed and defined more in terms of substantive categories. Thus, for research on the sensitivity of states to international crises measures of goals would have to be defined in terms of the substance that crises might be related to. Broad conceptions of goals such as the idea of extensiveness employed here are not adequately sensitive to be used in the analysis of more subtle measures of foreign policy.

National Attributes and Foreign Policy

A number of scholars have been studying the impact of national attributes on foreign policy behavior. One of the most consistent findings coming out of that research is that increasing capabilities have the effect of increasing the total amount of behavior engaged in by governments (Kean and McGowan, 1973; Salmore and Hermann, 1969). This dissertation has provided additional evidence of that relationship.

More importantly, though, this research has demonstrated the importance of another dynamic in relating national attributes to foreign policy. In that dynamic, national attributes have an impact on the goals and self-defined responsibilities of a nation and through that they
have an impact on foreign policy behavior. That dynamic relates national attributes such as size and development and capabilities, not only to the total third party response behavior of the state, but also to the relative frequency of such behavior and, it was conjectured, to the sensitivity of the state to certain kinds of stimuli. An important aspect of those findings was that the second dynamic was much more important for understanding those latter variables than was the first dynamic. Thus, the impact of national attributes on behavior through their mediating impact on goals and self-defined responsibilities becomes more important as the behavioral phenomenon becomes more related to tendencies and propensities, whereas the direct impact of increasing capabilities becomes less important.

That suggests a need to change the major thrust of research on the effects of national attributes on foreign policy. Although the impact of attributes on behavior through the mediating effects of goals has been recognized in the literature (East, 1975) it has not been the primary empirical concern of researchers. The research findings of this dissertation suggest that a reorientation of priorities is needed.

**Avenues for Future Research**

How might this research be augmented with further
research? The most immediate and pressing need is for replication of the findings generated in this research. The conclusions drawn in this dissertation must be shrouded in skepticism because of the problems in the research design. The replication of this research should proceed along two paths. First, the causal model should be re-examined using a larger and different sample of nations and if possible a longer time span. An integral part of that effort should be a renewed effort to measure the extensiveness of national goals in a more adequate way and in a way that is not as susceptible to the problems of multicollinearity as is the measure based on the activity of national role conceptions. Second, an effort should be made to gather a third party response data set using a stimulus-to-response approach. That would allow the testing of the hypotheses in a manner that met the criteria for quasi-experimental research.

Aside from the replication of the research reported here, further analysis could usefully be performed on the same data set to extend and refine the findings reported here. There are at least three major projects that would be valuable for the understanding of third party behavior. One would be to posit and test additional hypotheses about the effects of more stimulus characteristics. Of special interest ought to be the examination of additional variables that tap the relationship of the third party to the
participants in the stimulus. Examples of such relationships might be alliance bonds, histories of intense affect, or high levels of social and economic transactions. Especially intriguing would be an effort to reformulate the propositions of balance theory so that they pertain to more spontaneous and rapidly changing aspects of the relationships among states, and then test those reformulated propositions. Such a research effort would begin to provide a bridge between theories of foreign policy and one important theory of the international system.

The relationship of the third party to the participants in the event would not be the only interesting kind of stimulus characteristic for further exploration. It would also be interesting to examine the impact of the relationships between actors and recipients. Are there significant differences between them in capabilities? Does the stimulus take place between allies or between enemies? Those and other relationships would conceivably have an impact on the likelihood of third party responses.

In addition to the examination of additional stimulus characteristics, a priority item on the agenda should be the examination of the interrelationships of stimulus characteristics. Are there differences in the relationship of actor salience and third party responses when the event occurs in a crisis as opposed to when it does not?

Related to that research task would be to develop a
profile of the characteristics of stimuli that jointly seem to be the best combination for the explanation of third party responses. The question would be "What combinations of characteristics of a stimulus occur most frequently in events that trigger third party behavior?" Conceivably that could produce a limited set of characteristics that in the proper combinations would constitute or approximate the sufficient conditions for a response.

The findings on the impacts of the characteristics of nations should also be expanded. Two tasks seem to have the highest priority. One is to directly examine and analyze the residuals produced by the regressions. That should be done with the intention of identifying any additional variables that should be brought into the causal model. The other task would be to examine in greater detail the problem of sensitivity to the stimulus characteristics.

Finally, further work can and needs to be done on the conceptualization of third party responses. At present, response behavior is conceived of as a dichotomous variable. Either an event is a response or it is not. Moreover, if a state takes more than one event in response to the stimulus, it is considered as more than one response. A richer way of thinking about responses is required. Therefore, it would be desirable to create a scale of re-
sponses. Such a scale should be sensitive to the number of events taken in response to a stimulus, the time span in which those responses occurred, and the intensity of those responses. Armed with such a measure, powerful research could be done on the impact of behavior on third parties and on the international system.
APPENDIX A

CODING RULES FOR THE CREATION OF
THE STIMULUS-RESPONSE DATA SET

The RESPONSE variable in the CREON descriptive data set provides information on the prior occurrences which led to the event abstracted and coded for the CREON Project. All of the information on those prior occurrences is presently in non-numeric form and, therefore, relatively inaccessible to analysis. The codebook which follows will enable the reduction of that information to numeric codes.

In the codebook the prior occurrence is referred to as the stimulus. Much of the information sought concerns the nature of the stimulus. The primary elements of an event will be coded for the stimulus. Those will be clearly labelled in the codebook as elements of the stimulus event (for example, "stimulus actor"). Other references to the elements of an event refer to the CREON event for which the RESPONSE is coded. For example, in this event

**DESCRIP** U.S. Sec. of State Herter condemns use of force to settle border dispute by PRC; with India

**RESPONSE** Coder infers India (external) announces PRC troops attacked India troops 40 miles inside Kashmir (10-23-59)(no request); U.S. displeased (descriptive similarity)

U.S. would be the actor and India would be the stimulus
actor. The PRC would be a target or object of the stimulus. The United States would be a third party to the stimulus because it responded to the stimulus but was not a target or object.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Columns</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-12</td>
<td>Event ID#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-14</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Basis for linkage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Actor relates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Source relates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Coder infers—descriptive similarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Coder infers—subject of goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Coder infers—logical inference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Internal or external stimulus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. External</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-18</td>
<td>Columns 1 and 2 of SAS coded for stimulus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-21</td>
<td>Revised WEIS code for stimulus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-23</td>
<td>Month of stimulus—leave blank if no data (ND)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-25</td>
<td>Day of stimulus—&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-27</td>
<td>Year of stimulus—&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Request fulfillment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. No request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Rejects request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Ignores request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Partially fulfills request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Fulfills request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Actor orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Actor pleased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Actor indifferent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Actor displeased</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Relationship of actor to stimulus—This variable seeks to determine how the actor was involved in the stimulus event, if at all. If the stimulus event did not involve the actor as either a target or object, then the actor was a third party to the event.

1. Target or object
2. Third party

Regional focus—To what extent is the interaction sequence of stimulus and response confined to a single region? That question can be answered by examining the stimulus actor and targets, and the actor and targets and objects for the CREON event. If all those participants are from the same region, code the relevant region. If not, leave the item blank.

Two of the regions (Western hemisphere and Europe) are subdivided into subregions. If the subregions contain all the participants, code it. If not, but the more general region does, then code the more general region.

Membership in regions is that given in the CREON Supplemental and Descriptive Manual, Appendix 8, Table B, with these exceptions:

- Turkey is to be considered part of Europe.
- Oceania is to be considered part of Asia.
- The Eastern European nations are: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Albania, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union.

If the action involved an international organization with world membership and interests (U.N. General Assembly, I.B.R.D., F.A.O., for example) leave the item blank.

1. Western Hemisphere
2. North America
3. Latin America
4. Europe
5. Western Europe
6. Eastern Europe
7. Middle East
8. Sub-Saharan Africa
9. Asia
Crisis context--Code which of these crises the stimulus was involved with. A short narrative of the crisis is presented in Appendix B. If the stimulus addressed the issues or was between the main participants of the crisis then the relevant crisis should be coded.

1. Algerian civil war (1961)
6. Cyprus (1964-1965)
8. India-China (1959-1962)
11. Yemen (1963)

Newsworthiness of official making the stimulus

1. Internationally newsworthy individuals
   - Adenauer
   - Ben-Gurion
   - Brezhnev
   - Castro
   - de Gaule
   - Dulles
   - Eisenhower
   - Erhard
   - Ghandi
   - Gromyko
   - Johnson
   - Kennedy
   - Khrushchev
   - Kosygin
   - Mao
   - Menderez
   - Nasser
   - Nehru
   - Pearson
   - Rusk
   - Shastri
   - Tito
   - Trudeau

2. Other high government officials (Heads of State or Government, their deputies, Ministers and Ambassadors)
3. Other government officials
4. Nongovernmental entities
5. Officials of international organizations
6. Not determined
35-37 Stimulus actor--Record the 3 column country code for the actor of the stimulus event. If it is identified as an international organization in the RESPONSE variable, record the code for the organization. Do not explode these events. Repeat this variable up to three times. If there were more than three nations acting in the stimulus, choose those which were the largest and most "powerful" first. If there is any doubt on which to choose, consult a graduate student.

44-46 Stimulus targets and objects--Apply essentially the same rules as those applied above.

SPECIAL RULE ON CASES WHERE SAME COUNTRY CODE COULD BE USED AS BOTH TARGET AND ACTOR.

1. When different parts of the entity are the actor and the object (target) of the stimulus event, enter the country code as both actor and target. These should primarily be cases of interaction between subunits of entities, such as rebellions, internal political opposition, communication between leaders and other members of organizations, etc.

Example--Source relates E.E.C. Commission (external) calls for speed-up in putting E.E.C. into full operation

Since the E.E.C. Commission was addressing the government members of the organization, the E.E.C. code should be entered as both actor and object of the stimulus event.

2. When the same part or element of the entity is both the actor and the target of the stimulus event (that is, the same individuals or agencies or departments), do not code the country code target. Only code as actor. Such cases should probably be those involving collaborative international activity.

Example--Source relates Guatemala, Honduras, and ElSalvador (external) sign treaty forming economic association to guarantee free movement of people, products and capital among the three countries

Since the relationship of the three nations was simultaneously one of actor and target, do not code as target, only as actor.
APPENDIX B

CRISES IDENTIFIED FOR CREON QUARTERS

Algerian Civil War (1961)—The crisis during the first quarter of 1961 was one of movement away from military solutions. In December, 1960, the French indicated their willingness to grant Algerian independence. A referendum was held in January 1961 on deGaulle's policies. Later both sides indicated their desire for negotiations and on March 16 the French proposed peace talks without a prior ceasefire.

Arab-Israeli Crisis (1967)—The crisis of 1967 can appropriately be said to have begun on May 18, when the United Nations pulled the Emergency Force out of the Sinai at the request of Egypt. The crisis then continued through the Six Day War in early June.

Berlin (1961-1962)—The Berlin Wall crisis began in June, 1961 with various statements by Soviet leaders threatening to disturb the status quo in that city. On August 13, the border between East and West Berlin was sealed and construction on the Wall began. The main Berlin Wall crisis ended on May 8, 1962 when General Lucious Clay left Berlin. However, the Berlin crisis heated up in late September when the Communist forces began to harass Western troop movements to Berlin. The harassments continued through November, 1962. That phase of the crisis ended on December 15, 1962 when Ulbricht gave a speech which explicitly devalued the political problems of Berlin, giving them second priority to economic problems.
Congo (1961-1964)—The crisis in the Congo began in July, 1960 with the secession of Katanga and Kasai provinces. The military struggle continued through 1962. The Katanga rebellion ended in January, 1963; the Kasai rebellion on March 1, 1963. However, internal matters were not routin-ized. Between May 24 and June 14 the central government and the United Nations forces in the Congo foiled another secession plot by Tshombe. In March, 1964, a new constitution was adopted. In July, due to continuing unrest and the inability of the government to govern, Tshombe was asked to form a new government. This provoked a large scale rebellion by Lumumbist forces, which intensified until the United States and Belgium intervened in November to free white hostages of the rebels held in Stanleyville.

Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)—The Cuban missile crisis began on October 22 when President Kennedy announced the blockade of Cuba. It continued until October 28, when Chairman Khrushchev said that the missiles in Cuba would be dismantled and returned to the Soviet Union, thus ending the danger of a military confrontation.

Cyprus (1964-1965)—Violence had broken out between the Greek and Turkish communities in late 1963. In March, 1964, the United Nations sent a peace-keeping force to the island. However, a civil war broke out in April and lasted through June. In June, General Grivas returned to Cyprus to take command of the Greek Cypriote forces. Severe fighting again broke out in August of 1964, and continued until the United Nations imposed a ceasefire in December.

Haiti (1963)—This crisis grew out of reactions to the internal despotism of the Duvalier regime. On April 17 a plot to overthrow him broke down and some Haitians fled to the Dominican Republic embassy to seek asylum. The regime adopted some extremely repressive measures, and refused safe passage for the persons in the Dominican embassy. On
April 28, the Dominican Republic issued an ultimatum, and on May 3 it threatened to invade. The crisis continued through June.

India-China border disputes (1959-1962)—In the 1959-1961 years, the Indian-Chinese border was the source of almost constant tension due to conflicting territorial claims. The tension was punctuated by occasional military clashes. On September 20, 1962 the border problem became intense with some severe military clashes. On October 20 the Chinese launched fierce attacks on Indian positions. The military confrontation continued until November 21, when the Chinese announced a ceasefire and withdrawal plans. But the crisis continued through December in the form of intense diplomatic activity on the problem.

Laos (1959-1962)—An intense crisis began around July 30, 1959 when fighting broke out between government forces and the Pathet Lao. North Vietnam sent forces to serve as cadres for Pathet Lao forces, the U.S. increased military assistance and Thailand mobilized forces on the Laos border. The fighting led to a state of emergency called throughout Laos. The United Nations sent in a fact-finding group to Laos which asserted that the North Vietnamese had intervened in the conflict. That judgement caused the fighting to stop and Laos was relatively quiet until August 9, 1961, when neutralist forces under Kong Le overthrew the rightist government in a coup d'etat. The rightists fought back, taking Vientiane in December, 1961. The neutralist forces then sided with the Pathet Lao in fierce warfare against the government forces. Communist nations heavily supplied the Pathet Lao, and the United States and S.E.A.T.O. prepared for possible intervention. In May, 1962 the Geneva Conference was reconvened as a result of heavy diplomatic activity and a ceasefire was agreed upon.
Vietnam (1959-1968)—The 1959-1962 period was one of continuing conflict between government forces and Viet Cong guerrillas. In May, 1963 a severe crisis broke out between the Diem regime and Vietnam's Buddhist community. That crisis continued unabated until a coup overthrew the government in November, 1963. On August, 1964 the United States claimed that its destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin were attacked by North Vietnamese destroyers. Retaliatory air raids were launched against the North and the U.S. Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The crisis subsided on August 7 when the U.S. announced that it would withdraw its destroyers from the Tonkin Gulf in a few days. The war then settled down again to fairly routinized warfare until February 7, 1965. Then the Viet Cong attacked the base at Pleiku, which provided a rationale for regular bombing of the North. That change in tactics produced a crisis with the U.S.S.R. and China threatening to intervene and reportedly sending troops into North Vietnam.

Yemen (1963)—Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. were carrying out a proxy war in Yemen, each side backing a party in that civil war. On April 30, 1963, U Thant announced a ceasefire and the beginning of negotiations to send U.N. forces to oversee the troop disengagements. Military tensions continued, though, with the U.A.R. replacing withdrawn troops with fresh ones and, in early June, launching air attacks on Saudi forces.
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