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SEMIO蒂CS AND PHENOMENOLOGY IN THE ETHNOGRAPHY
OF EVERYDAY ACTIVITY: A CLASSROOM CASE.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1975
Anthropology

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To my wife, Joan, I offer apologies for all of the frustration and work spent on the dissertation; she was supportive and helpful throughout.

Lastly, I wish to dedicate the complete volume to Dr. Ojo Arewa my advisor and friend. To him I owe years of good advice and a future of fruitful collaboration.
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation represents an attempt to formulate an adequate micro-ethnographic analysis of the everyday activity that constitutes the classroom setting in Urbancrest, Ohio. The focus of this dissertation is on the nature of the various routines that are enacted by teachers and students in the course of creating the patterns of activity that characterize teaching and learning in the ethnically homogeneous Black classroom. In addition, it seeks to discover the nature of routine social scenes as they are enacted between the varied participants. In his article "The Logic of Non-Standard English" (Labov 1973) William Labov made an important argument for the logically consistent structure of the Black English Vernacular. The approach of this dissertation is to pursue a similar project for the interactional patterns in Black Classrooms.

Culture can be partially defined as learned behavior. This dissertation takes the view that cultural knowledge is a knowledge of the rules for valid (meaningful and culturally synchronous) action. Such a knowledge of the rules can be otherwise thought of in the linguistic sense of competence. This dissertation will seek to outline a provisional means of constructing a model of the competence that is necessary to carry out classroom activity. Leonard Hawes, in a recent paper on the enactment of routines (Hawes n.d.) had defined rule as a behavioral regularity; we wish, in this dissertation, to examine the possible bases for the production of such regularity as a function of an actor's construction of reality. A behavioral regularity, such as a teacher repeatedly constructing a certain environmental order in the classroom through desk rearrangement, must be attached to an interpretation of the meaning of such a pattern. The linguistic notion of performance captures the essence of the idea of patterns of regular behavior. A knowledge of the rules is a knowledge of the meanings such behaviors have in social situations; it is a knowledge of the meaningful connections such patterns of behavior may exhibit.

In the study of the Urbancrest classroom certain behavioral regularities were observed. This regular behavior could be characterized as rule-governed. That is to say, the students and teachers acted as if there were rules which prompted them to act regularly and thus produce classroom activity. Although we do not make the case that the personnel of the classroom actually hold or cite formal rules, we do make the assertion that actors have expectations concerning the appropriateness or normality of actions performed in the social world. In the Urbancrest classroom we have a case where the rules for the
construction of behaviors, and, hence, for determining their normality, may differ from the rules used by the wider society. Thus, the conduct of ethnographic description is tied to the ethnographic description of the systems of rules used to construct a given cultural reality.

The purpose of education is at least partially to disseminate the values of the dominant society. This is very often accomplished through the presentation of materials oriented to the dominant society. However, an important means of fulfilling this function is through the influence of the teacher. An ethnographic study of the classroom must deal with the relation of the cultural style of the teacher to the culture of the students she teaches. Since the style of the teacher can be characterized through the behavior displays she manifests, we can approach the study of teaching through the notion of rule-governed activity. Insofar as the teacher enters the classroom from a different cultural system, from a training situation stressing dominant culture contexts and values, we must think of the Urbancrest situation as the intersection of rule-systems. The expectations that teachers and students have concerning the behaviors to be enacted in the social scenes of the classroom may differ widely. The analysis of cultural difference, then, is consonant with the micro-ethnographic analysis of the intersection of patterns of behavior and the separate cultural systems of knowledge which are thought to produce them.

Classroom participants enter into interaction as a matter of routine. The social scenes whose sum total composes the everyday activity of the classroom are enacted and interpreted as "taken-for-granted" manifestations of unspoken and unexamined schemes of producing and interpreting (Garfinkel 1972). The activities of the classroom are conducted as part of the ongoing business of everyday life. Participants in classroom activity initiate, maintain and terminate classroom interactions according to a logic of the routine. This logic of natural activity is a function of culture. What is thought to be natural, expected, appropriate, correct or grammatical is interpreted through a culture-bound scheme of reference—the productive and interpretive rule systems of the culture. An ethnographic approach to routine activity must seek to uncover the rules behind everyday pursuits. In the Urbancrest classroom the ethnography must deal not only with the rule-governed activity manifested by the students, emerging as it is from a background of sub-cultural difference, but also with the manner in which it connects to the activity of the teacher—whose rules belong to the wider society. Our ethnography must seek to account for the amount of conflict, convergence or accommodation between rule-systems. If education is to succeed among the culturally varied we must have some means of knowing when rule-systems are not congruent. We must have a means of describing and analyzing the differences and similarities in the routine social behavior enacted in the relatively small, well-defined context of the classroom.

This dissertation will attempt to accomplish four main sets of objectives as part of its general programme:
1. It will attempt to present general information on the ethnographic setting of the field study. The study was carried out over a nine-month period during which observation and data-gathering took place. This observation was primarily conducted in the classroom; however, any study which concentrates on micro-ethnographic settings must first specify the relationship of the smaller setting to the larger cultural context. Section I of Chapter I places the research in the broad context of a northern, ethnically homogeneous Black, rural, non-farm community. From the community we move to focus on the school, the focus of micro-ethnographic concern. We attempt to place the school in its perspective as part of an institutional setup whose network of relationships extends into the realm of the subculturally different from the realms of the culturally dominant. In order to place the school in a proper relationship to the schools which exhibit patterns of cultural dominance, which are White and middle-class, we must outline a number of the major cultural parameters along which Urbancrest may be distinguished from culturally normative schools.

From a general focus on the community and the school we move to a specific focus on the classroom. In this important section of Chapter I we attempt to outline in descriptive terms the general patterns of interaction and behavior we observed and recorded during the field study. As a means of presenting the data I utilize the elements of a Hymesian "ethnography of communication" (Hymes 1967). The data presented here are meant to provide a cultural context for some detailed applications of an analytic method for uncovering rule-structures in classroom activity. The emphasis in this ethnographic section is on general information about the settings, participants, and events which compose the classroom. The chapter is broad in its scope and descriptive in character.

2. The dissertation will seek to formulate a means of dealing with concepts of meaning and motivation in conjunction with the analysis of behaviors. The classroom data, in the form of examples of actual social scenes, will be subjected to an adapted form of subjective interpretation, or Verstehen. Alfred Schutz, in his Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt proposed an approach to social science whose purpose was to try to come to terms with an important question: "what does this social world mean for the observed actor within this world and what did he mean by his acting in it?" (Schutz 1970:269). A form of Verstehen based on phenomenology was developed by Schutz to deal not only with patterns of behavior but with the meanings actors attribute to them. This dissertation will strive to show that certain phenomenological concepts can inform the ethnographic enterprise. Through the phenomenological principles and concepts set forth by Schutz and others who have followed his lead (Harold Garfinkel and Aaron Cicourel) we shall try to show how the social scenes of the classroom can be given an extra dimension of meaningfulness in the literal sense of the term. Of course, the scientific approach to the study of either meanings or behaviors demands criteria of verifiability and of construct validity. Although this dissertation emphasizes the process of application, and does not have sufficient scope to deal fully with
the process of validation, it nevertheless addresses some of the pre-
requisites for empirically valid phenomenological constructs. Chapter
II, then, deals with the possible subjective dimensions of classroom
activity. It attempts to formulate a vocabulary for the phenomenology
of the classroom experience and link it to the actual data derived from
ethnographic information. The anthropologist has always been interested
in both ideal and actual culture; he has studied both the stated prefer-
ences and purposes of the actors as well as the behaviors they actually
manifest. A phenomenological ethnography will seek to add philosophical
and methodological substance to the ethnographer's longstanding commit-
ment to the method of participant observation (which he shares with the
phenomenological social scientist.)

In this chapter on phenomenological approaches to the interpre-
tation of classroom social scenes, transcripts and descriptions of re-
corded data will be used in two ways. First, the social scenes them-
selves will be interpreted, and, hence, clarified and expanded in mean-
ing. Second, the concepts themselves will emerge more clearly when
explicated in actual application. Schutz has defined the approach of
a subjective empirical social science as one which uses the concepts
of motive, reciprocity of perspectives, project and typification to
formulate general testable hypotheses about the intersubjective typi-
calities of human social interaction. In this chapter some general
hypotheses about the nature of classroom social scenes are developed
and stated in the form of rules. These rules are hypothetical state-
ments about classroom regularities and the competence that might have
produced them. The subject of this chapter, then, is the classroom
both as a locus for regular patterns of sensory behavior and as a soc-
ially constructed and shared everyday reality.

3. Included in Chapter II is a formulation of a model of a rule-system
based on symbolic logic. Earlier in this Introduction it was stated
that classroom activity could be interpreted as the product of a culture
bound system of rules or expectations, which are shared or not shared
by participants. This chapter attempts to define formally the nature
of the rule system being used by teachers and students to mutually
construct the reality of the everyday classroom.

Using the concept of logical calculus as an analogue to the
notion of rule system we attempt to show how classroom activity is
a reality constructed through a natural or common-sense logic. The
chapter explicates the structure of activity in the Black classroom
much in the same fashion that Labov proved that Black English was logi-
cal—by showing that it is so. The use of a logical calculus in this
attempt constitutes an entrance into the domain of semiotics. A semi-
otic is a study of signs and symbols (behaviors), the combinations they
can make, the meanings those combinations can have, and the relations-
ships that speakers and their contexts have to them. As such, our
ethnography of communication becomes an exploration into cognitive
anthropology. Tyler has defined cognitive anthropology as the study
of what one has to know to operate as a member of the culture (Tyler
1969). Our semiotic study is an explicit laying out of the knowledge
necessary for certain social scenes to be enacted and understood by actors as part of their everyday life.

4. Chapter III takes the substances of the first two chapters and relates them to the conduct of the field study and the methodological rationale of this type of research. This chapter explains the problems and advantages of this type of research; it also addresses the status of the logical analysis of Chapter II as a hypothesis generating device rather than as a construct validating device.

The dissertation is both a field study in which the patterns of behavior were recorded in their cultural context, and an analysis of the field data. This analysis is micro-ethnographic in its focus—the individual classroom as a reality constructed by its participants. We attempt to show what that reality is and what its internal logical structure might possibly be like.
CHAPTER I

GENERAL ETHNOGRAPHIC CHARACTER OF THE CLASSROOM

The Ethnographic Setting

The subject of this volume is the ethnography and analysis of the routine activities which take place in an elementary school classroom in the small Ohio town of Urbancrest. As such, it is an ethnography of communication of the type first described as the ethnography of speaking in (Hymes 1967). However, before the description and analysis of microethnographic data can be adequately accomplished we must place the classroom in its wider ethnographic setting. Thus, we must speak of the community of Urbancrest and or rural Black Culture, and of Black Culture as a whole.

Urbancrest is an all-Black hamlet of about 800 individuals lying about fifteen miles southwest of Columbus, the state capital, along a major interstate highway belt route. It abuts on the the municipality of Grove City, population (1960) 13,911, including only eleven Blacks. Urbancrest, whose property line is contiguous with Grove City's northern boundary, represents something of an embarrassment and an anomaly. Some attempts have been made in recent years to annex Urbancrest; Grove City has experienced a period of growth in recent years, undergoing a 71.6% increase in population in a ten-year period. The attempts to absorb the hamlet of Urbancrest probably represents expansion ambitions arising as the result of demographic pressures. Urbancrest, to date, has successfully resisted these expansion attempts, although pressure to succumb may be quite strong. An example of such pressure involves the installation of utilities. Urbancrest has only recently installed its own water system and is to be commended for resisting the temptation to be annexed and have another polity undertake such construction.

Urbancrest and a very few other towns in Ohio represent a small segment of Ohio's Black population. The Black population of Ohio is approximately one million individuals, of this, only 26,593 are rural or semi-rural. Of this rural and semi-rural population an even smaller percentage reside in hamlets of the size of Urbancrest. The Black population of such hamlets state wide is only 2,172 individuals. Clearly Urbancrest represents an uncommon occurrence. The total rural population is three percent of state Black population; the population of Blacks residing in small towns and hamlets (1,000-2,500) is one percent
Socioeconomically, Urbancrest follows the gross pattern of Ohio rural and semi-rural Blacks. Most of the Black rural population do not support themselves by operating farms or working as farm labor. Thus, the term rural might be best specified as rural non-farm. We use the term semi-rural to indicate that small population centers (hamlets) exist in a situation where there is little established industry or real estate development. These hamlets exist as small islands in the midst of farmland. Urbancrest, however, does abut Grove City on one side; nevertheless, the general flavor of life remains definitely non-urban. We have said that most of the population support themselves through non-farm labor. Statewide approximately fifty percent of the Black rural work force engages in manufacturing labor, generally through commuting to installations in neighboring larger municipalities or in suburban areas. Urbancrest follows this pattern and many of the workers travel into Grove City and Columbus. A gas station and a couple of small stores represent indigenous enterprise. It might help our description of the ethnographic setting if we displayed some general characteristics of Black rural populations in comparison with their urban counterparts.

<p>| TABLE 1 |</p>
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<th>SO Socioeconomic Indicators</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
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<tr>
<td>Individuals Collecting Public Assistance</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals Below Poverty Level</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorces and Separations</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matrifocal Families</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Education</td>
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</table>

Rural Black families tend to be more stable and the heads of households are less transient. The higher rates of matrifocality and divorce for urban contexts are characteristic of the economic pressures of contemporary American life and the pattern of corporate locations. Information gathered on the particular situation in Urbancrest supports the conclusion that rural Black families in the northern United states are more stable. In addition to the general statement that the urban situation favors disrupted marriages and an emphasis on matrifocality, we may also point out that Urbancrest may have achieved some stability as a result of the expansion of Grove City and the corresponding decrease in the number of Black males forced to leave their families in search of work. The pattern of matrifocality in some Black populations in the Caribbean is just the opposite. There rural families exhibit high incidences of matrifocality (Gonzalez, 1970). This disparity may
be explained through two factors: 1. the separation of domestic and jural domains in the Caribbean follows an urban/rural pattern whereas in the United States the pattern of urbanization is such that rural dwellers, in most cases, have ready access to a labor market. 2. Only in the largest United States cities has the domestic/jural separation caused matrifocality to an exaggerated degree. This is due to a pattern of corporate location which favors suburban or semi-rural locations. Thus, inner city dwellers lose ready access as the rural dwellers gain it. We generalize here only about rural northern Blacks, since the situation in the rural South is not as clear although one may expect the same correlation of urban matrifocality to appear along with industrialization and the corporate exodus to the smaller towns and cities and their various hinterlands. The hamlet of Urbancrest exemplifies, in some ways, this general trend; not only is its population of families stable, but the overall population has increased by 25% in the past quarter century when one might have expected the opposite to be true.

This last observation raises some questions about Black Culture in a rural setting as compared to Black Culture in an urban setting. By looking at Table 1 we can see that although the number of individuals collecting public assistance is twice as high for urban populations, both have the same percentage of individuals below poverty level. This disparity has led me to posit that individuals living in hamlets like Urbancrest are poor in a different way than urban dwellers. The conditions of rural life are such that poverty subsistence has greater material reverberations than poverty subsistence in the rural context. The people of Urbancrest live in single family houses, generally have gardens and I have observed men carrying shotguns and game on a number of occasions. Clearly, in many inner city contexts a person making the same amount of real income as the rural dweller has much less and has access to much less. Property values, even in the fable ghetto are much higher in cities than in semi-rural hamlets; thus, rents, mortgage rates, loan availability and land costs rapidly become prohibitive of a comfortable existence in the city. Let us make a distinction here, however, between rural and urban Black Culture and rural and urban cultures of poverty. It is not at all clear whether Black Culture is separate from or synonymous with a generalized culture of the poor or lower class. In Afro-American Anthropology today two separate opinions exist. It is my contention that Black Culture is a generalized phenomenon comprising a separate ethnic identity; in the dissertation I will outline certain characters of the Black classroom that represent cultural or subcultural difference. However, it is still legitimate to say that there is a difference between being Black and poor in certain rural contexts (such as Urbancrest) and being Black and poor in certain urban contexts.

Robert Blauner speaks strongly for the position which holds that Black Culture is more than a generalized lower class culture. In Blauner, 1970 he opposes the view that Blacks are merely "white men with black skins" (a view held and espoused in Myrdal, 1944; Stamp 1956 and Frazier 1957) with the view that what anthropologists and
sociologists studying Black communities are finding comprise "distin-
ctive institutions and unique ways of looking upon life and society
that begin to read like the depiction of an ethnic culture" (Blau-
ner 1970:39). Even if we accept the latter view, it is perhaps legiti-
mate to think of separate cultural styles associated with the urban
and rural contexts. Thus, even though we find a general social and
linguistic pattern to contemporary Afro-American communities there is
variation as a function of the particular demographic setting. Charles
Keil, in his book Urban Blues, has constructed two ideal types represent-
ing this urban-rural differentiation of style. Keil opposes the rural
"preacher" to the urban "bluesman." This typology represents the con-
temporary split in Black Cultural styles. The preacher type represents
the Black Culture of the rural South while the bluesman label stands
for the Black Culture of the urban North. In Urbancrest Keil's distinc-
tion is especially useful because we find that much of traditional
community life is based on the preacher template. Two particular
correlates of this type—the strong community role of fundamentalist
religion and local community solidarity—are reflected in Urbancrest.
However, at the same time we see the children of Urbancrest being pre-
vented with the bluesman template. Through media such as television,
film, even local speakers that come to the school to speak, the Urban-
crest child is being presented with a view of Black Culture that tends
to be at odds with the template held by their parents. Strong evidence
for this generational gap exists in the form of sociodramatic play.
On some fifteen minutes of color footage I captured a sociodrama in
which the preacher image was specifically satirized as part of a public
display. I shall discuss more of the implications of this shortly.
Brown, 1965, however, mentions the same generational gap occurring be-
tween the more traditional older people of Harlem and their children
who were being absorbed into the particular cultural style of the Urban
North. One of the primary components of the bluesman or urban style
is a trend toward individualism. Keil chose the label bluesman to indi-
cate the tendency of the urban Black to live an intense personal life
that included a large dose of fatalism. Of course he was drawing on
the intense personal subject matter of the Black musical form of the
blues which flowered during the Black urban migration. The preacher,
on the other hand, exemplifies the social, community aspect of the Black
South. From evidence gathered in Urbancrest it is possible to make a
strong case for the survival of much of this rural southern heritage.

The survival of much of this cultural style in Urbancrest might
best be explained by some of the particulars of the history of the ham-
et. Urbancrest is one of the few surviving representatives of a class
of communities which once existed in greater numbers in the state. Many
communities were established in Ohio as a result of the operation of
the underground railroad during the Civil War. A number of communities
of escaped and freed slaves dotted the countryside all the way from Cin-
cinnati to the Akron-Canton area. Urbancrest represents a group which
travelled north on what was the old Harrisburg Pike. Most of these
towns have now disappeared as the result of various economic pressures;
Urbancrest's survival might be seen as partially due to its location in
an area whose development did not mitigate against its survival. The
important point is, Urbancrest was established before the great urban migration of the earlier parts of this century, and which continues today. These later migrants came to work in the cities and bypassed communities like Urbancrest. Thus, while migrants bring their traditional rural southern values with them to the North, their children gradually shift into the style of the urban subculture. The descendants of Urbancrest founders did not until recently face the same types of acculturative pressures; it is not until recently that the urban image is coming to play an important role in the evolution of a new self concept for the younger generations of Urbancrest. As we have mentioned, the media play an important role in the evolution of this new concept. However, at least in the case of Urbancrest, we can see that the educational process itself can contribute to the change. This is accomplished in two ways: 1. the presentation of an image of Black Culture developed with reference to the urban rediscovery of roots and 2. the experience that the children have when they leave the locally situated elementary school for the "middle school" where they meet peers whose lifestyle has evolved in the urban context. From interviewing my main informants it appears that the middle school experience represents a shock to the system of the individual schoolchild. This is not to say that the child has not been re-evaluating his image prior to his entry into the new context, but that it is his first real entry into actual intercourse with individuals who are "the same but different." Urbancrest has experienced a small population growth in the last quarter century; it may be that the population will stabilize and then decrease as the rural Black adolescent succumbs to the same pressures that have led many Appalachian youths to forsake the country and the small town for armed service or the city. If there is no replacement from the South, as there does not appear to be, then Urbancrest must face an outflux of population that can only be balanced by a corresponding influx of Northern Blacks. It appears unlikely that this will happen.

That there is some sort of split between older rural values and newer urban values in Urbancrest is highly probably. Informants have stressed the fact that the adult population takes great pride in the community. This pride was cited as a primary factor in Urbancrest's successful resistance of Grove City's expansion ambitions. At the same time, the youth of Urbancrest have used the word "swamp" to describe their home. It has also been reported that many of the children in the elementary school express the ambition of leaving the community. Although the use of perjorative slang terms reveals something of the community concept of the young, the sociodrama we reported previously reveals much more about the psychosocial roots of a new generation's attitude toward tradition. Melragon, 1973, did a study of sociodramatic play among low socioeconomic status Black schoolchildren and defined the function of such dramatic presentations as:

an assimilation-accommodation framework. The child is constantly assimilating or taking in knowledge and experience. At the same time he is accommodating or adjusting his responses to events around him in terms of assimilated information...In play,
assimilation takes precedence over accommodations; it is the child's way of taking in the reality of the world around him (Melragon 1973:5).

Thus, the sociodrama recorded during the field experience captured a representation of community life and the child's assessment of its relation to his life. The play captures their experience of community life; although Melragon points up the integrative functions of much of this play "to develop flexibility in their approach to real situations" (Melragon 1973:19); we might also point to its function as an expression of ambivalence and change.

The enactment took place during the presentation of a short skit which had been the project of a number of weeks of preparation. This skit was a two-act playlet in which a number of the girls in the class I was observing were acting out the roles of tourists in Japan. The use of skits as a teaching tool was a favored method of the class' teacher; she told me that they had been fairly successful as a way of teaching Social Studies. In any case, the two act play was highly amusing; the rest of the class, the audience, was reacting with laughter, clapping, loud hoots, and so on. They called for an extension of the play, and the actors asked the teacher if they could perform another act. The next act was a representation of baptism as it occurs in the religious life of the community. One of the girls played the preacher, and the others played sinners come to be cleansed of sin in the "waters of the Jordan." The preacher waved his hands about, and shouted "Jesus is a nice man!" very loudly, to which the other actors (the sinners) replied equally loudly, "Jesus, Jesus!" A couple of the sinners shook their bodies as if possessed and fell to their knees to receive a laying on of hands from the preacher.

Although such an enactment could have been a serious expression of a socially meaningful experience the context and style of the performance, as well as its reception, leads me to believe that it was instead a parody of community life. The actors exaggerated their movements and voices, as if for comic effect; many of them giggled during the performance. The audience responded more favorably to this spontaneous dramatic rendition than to the tourist skit which had preceded it. We must conclude that what, in fact, was occurring was a representation of the gap between an aspect of traditional community life—a strong church, a powerful preacher image, an important community rite—and an evolving image of self among the young of the community. This new image of self does not include the community pride and respect for community symbols that is a mark of the tradition of the older members of the community. Thus, as Melragon argued, the sociodrama is a means of assimilating and accommodating social experience; however, it functions not only as a means for the child to learn new roles and behaviors, but also to express his attitudes toward old ones. In the Urbancrest case dramatic self-representation functions to express the gulf between a model of behavior learned in the home, and one learned through the media and in the school.
Culture and School in Urbancrest

The main focus of this volume is classroom behavior, everyday routine activities which manifest the reality of schooling as it is carried out in one Black classroom. However, the classroom is one unit in the larger system known as the school which is itself a sub-component of a wider cultural context. Thus, the ethnography of classroom activity stands as part of the ethnographic description of the school and its cultural context. In the subdiscipline of Anthropology known as "Educational Anthropology" these two concerns devolve about two primary activities: 1. the study of schools as agents of culture (Shinn 1972) that is, as gateways through which a wider cultural situation is made familiar to the young of some group, and 2. the study of the patterns of activity which characterize the actual process of schooling. Although we concentrate in this work on (2) we cannot address it properly without first dealing with (1). In an important sense the two studies cannot be broken up; for instance, the study of teacher behavior can be considered as falling under concern (2). However, an adequate understanding of teacher behavior cannot be obtained through mere structural description or analysis of form. It is equally important to determine what it is that is being dealt with as the content of such activity. When a teacher performs a certain type of action--such as correcting a grammatical error--it is important to see the activity of correcting as also carrying information about the cultural background of the teacher and about the stress placed upon appropriate verbal performance according to cultural norms.

Thus, teaching activities and the study of schools as agents of culture are related; it is through teaching and teachers that the child is exposed to cultural materials beyond those he or she may get at home. These materials, in many cases, comprise culturally approved products--writing, speaking, reading, computational, interactional--that the child is expected to absorb and utilize. The behavior of the teacher and his reaction to the behavior of his students cannot be separated from what meaningful materials are being expressed in that behavior, and, more widely, what cultural norms are being favorably emphasized as models of behavior. The concern about cultural norms is especially important in the study of Black majority schools, both in the inner city urban context and in the rural context. In our discussion of the general ethnographic setting of the school we emphasized the fact that young and old were facing one another across a culture gap that the schools may have had a part in creating. It should be pointed out that it is the function of schools in all complex societies to adjust the young to the worldview of the wider culture. In a middle-class school such adjustment is relatively minor. In an inner-city school adjustment is major--or, it does not take place at all and the school is cut off from the society and culture dominant values are not transmitted (Foster 1974). Urbancrest represents an interesting case in that not only is a generally White, middle-class value system being presented, but, in addition, a Black Culture image is being presented as
part of the rediscovery of heritage that gained such impetus among Blacks in the Sixties. Thus, the Black child is being asked to adjust to a predominantly White, high socioeconomic status life-style (accepted as a cultural norm) but he is also being asked to adjust to another image of himself as a Black person.

We should point out that the inclusion of Black studies and topics, and the sponsoring of Black history weeks or heritage months, does not necessarily mean that the school has shifted from its main task of adjusting youth to a White-dominated society. Very often, precisely those images of Blackness which are most acceptable to White and middle-class values are the images utilized in the education and indoctrination of Black youth. Let us specify, using examples from the field research. An example with great generalizibility is the use of Martin Luther King as the symbol of Black social and cultural aspirations. In Urbancrest very frequently Dr. King's picture would be displayed on bulletin boards, in the hall or in the library. A Martin Luther King day has recently received the approval of the Ohio Senate. At many schools he is the subject of essays and papers, book reports and projects. In Black traditional culture he is generally revered (often in association with John F. Kennedy). Cases similar to this are the use of various historical figures whose accomplishments are "most similar to" White figures in the same fields (i.e., scientists, politicians, or literary figures.) Contemporary, especially political figures are much less in evidence. Historical figures, in addition to being safely removed from controversial issues have also often suffered the fate of being uninspiring. The point is, many of the Black images presented to youth are those considered safe from the White viewpoint. Another example is the selection of speakers to come to schools. While I was at Urbancrest a speaker during Black History Week was a member of the Women's Army Corps. Clearly the implication is—go ahead and be Black, but do it in certain ways. Henderson, 1970, expresses the point I am trying to make with reference both to the urban-rural style dichotomy as well as to the type of image favored in the education of Black:

There was also something in the personality and background of the man— the mere fact that he was a preacher and formally educated man—which, while no obstacle to the loving, suffering black multitudes in the South, made it difficult for the Northern, urban hip young blacks to identify with him. The abstractions of brotherhood and universal love were difficult to believe in after a day with the Man, ...theology stood in the way. Nonviolence was not natural. Self defense was...Malcolm X...in some ways, his death was more tragic than King's, for the Movement had moved North and he had the potential of unifying the elements in the black community that King could not reach (Foster 1974:26).

Martin Luther King, the preacher, and Malcolm X, the bluesman, represent the urban-rural dichotomy. We should ask ourselves which image is the one presented to the Black child in his sojourn through the schools. It is not the image classified as "Politically and culturally dangerous." It is the image classified with the important qualifier
"non-violent" which, at least in our culture, means not dangerous. This emphasis on certain types of images raises some interesting questions about the education of Black youth. The rediscovery of heritage took place among American Blacks in the late Fifties and in the Sixties. This heritage was correlated with an awakening of cultural potential and political power that was future-oriented, even though based on an appreciation of the past and its connections to the Black historical experience and African roots. The political and cultural discoveries of the Sixties have filtered into the White controlled educational systems in strangely diluted and changed forms. The system has somehow managed to extract those symbols and discoveries of the Sixties which threaten the "accommodation principle" and affirm those acceptable to it. Chief among these symbols are those which are also acceptable to Blacks with the preacher template. The young, urban Black has lived a different experience, has felt the exhilaration of political power through, often, direct physical experience. In the inner city less dynamic images that do not speak in the bluesman idiom may not accomplish the indoctrination and accommodation that they were designed to accomplish. Foster, 1970, quotes the words of political activist H. Rap Brown:

The street is where young bloods get their education. I learned how to talk in the street, not from reading about Dick and Jane and going to the zoo and all that simple shit (Foster 1970:1)

Street life in the city is aggressive, physical, and oriented toward change. Life in the small town or in the country— as in Urbancrest— is, on the other hand, less dynamic, fluid and personally expressive.

The Urbancrest situation is an ethnographic context in which the school system brings the child into four intersecting lines of influence. He is influenced by his home life, by his school, by the media, and by individuals carrying the urban template. From his early years and his home experience the child receives an upbringing paralleling that of his Southern counterpart. As he grows older the first of the outside influences begin to reach him through the media. There he receives mixed images of the role of the Black in wider American society. He sees both acceptable and non-acceptable roles. When he goes to school for the first six grades (Urbancrest has only an elementary school which includes Grades on through six and a Federal Head Start program) he begins to receive the values of the White, middle-class society and images of certain types of Black role models. Where complication and confusion sets in, however, is when the child goes to the Middle School from his local community. One of my major informants expressed the opinion that the Middle School experience was one which was not totally comfortable to the child. Problems of adjustment to a new situation, of course, will account for some of the shock of change. However, another part will arise from another line of cultural influence --interaction with peers who have been raised in the urban lifestyle. Another factor which could be of importance, since many of the children I studied have older brothers and sisters, is the influence of family members who are old enough to have been urban acculturated. This last line of influence may jar with both the traditional enculturation and
the indoctrination of the first school. Table 1 shows a high number of rural Blacks have not completed high school; the median grade level achieved is less than that of urban Blacks. Perhaps problems of adjustment to the competitive lifestyle of urban-oriented schools may account for part of this total amount. (Although, certainly, various types of migrant labor also account for a portion.) In my classroom observation I did not observe most of the gross behavioral problems reported in Bailey, 1970, Foster, 1974, or other descriptive account of inner-city school behavior. The influence of urbanized Black models at the elementary school level can be assumed to be fairly low, but gradually increasing as education progresses. The primary influences on the children were those emanating from the home, from the teachers and staff of the school, and from the material presented by those personnel. Let us concentrate on the influence of the school personnel as the next phase of our discussion of the school as cultural agent.

We have attempted to show, generally, that the school operates as a cultural agent. We have concentrated specifically on some ways that the Urbancrest child receives new values that he must assimilate with those given to him in the home. One of the ways that the agency function of the school is carried out is through the control of educational material—curricula, audio-visual materials, books, graphics, etc. A discussion of these topics is beyond the scope of one interested in observing behavior in the classroom. However, another way in which culture is transmitted in the school is through the teacher—who is, in essence, the final filter through which the material is transmitted. Perhaps, in many ways, the teacher is the strongest single influence on the child in his school experience. What is presented really depends on the teacher for impact, nuance, and support. Generally the teacher is expected to "convey and cultivate the beliefs and values of the dominant culture (Shinn 1972:319). How he or she manages to act as agent in a culturally different context is an important factor in the ultimate success or failure of the child in the dominant culture. If the teacher fails to educate the culturally different, or subculturally different child, as many inner-city teachers do, then the child is forced to remain culturally and territorially restricted. A realistic approach to educating the culturally different must stress learning the important skills and behaviors of the dominant society without destroying pride in one's cultural heritage. Thus, education must teach about the wider society as well as about oneself (Hood 1973). One of the most common mistakes made by teachers is that culturally normative ways of teaching are inseparably linked to what is taught. Many teachers who fail at teaching Black students do so because they cannot get past the initial barrier of how to teach Black students. They fail because they cannot change their methods, developed in a White middle-class milieu, to suit a changed cultural circumstance. One teacher expressed to me the idea that she did not concentrate so much on the form of teaching as on getting her students to learn those things "that they would need." In the particular class that I observed this was exemplified by the teacher concentrating on teaching culturally appropriate writing skills rather than strictly standard English speaking skills. Although this particular teacher did not use Black idiom directly in her instruction method,
she did not punish or correct those children who spoke non-Standard English in the classroom. In addition, although she did not use the Black English Vernacular (Labov 1969) she did make use of certain culturally meaningful behavior patterns as a means of modifying class behavior (we shall discuss this in more detail under another heading.) Thus, the way of teaching is not necessarily bound to what is taught; the way of teaching need not obstruct the process of learning the skills and materials of a world into which the culturally different child is expected to enter.

Of course, the fact that ways of teaching do, in fact, stand in the way of teaching and learning, is a solid piece of the reality of contemporary education. In the inner city, street corner behaviors and teacher "middle-class" behaviors come into direct conflict; it is not at all uncommon for teachers in those circumstances simply to do time and wait for a transfer to schools where their culturally normative teaching styles can achieve results with students whose background is complementary to the methods and techniques of the dominant society's educational apparatus. In Urbancrest the so-called "street behavior" of the inner city is replaced by a less exacerbated variant. That is, much of the physical aggression characteristic of students in the inner-city school (Foster 1974) did not occur; however, other characteristic behaviors, such as "playing the dozens," "signifying," "jiving," and so on were a part of the everyday activity of the classroom. The way in which a teacher responds to such characteristic modes of Black interactional activity may be an important factor in his or her success in teaching the Black student. The existence of "inner-city" or urban Black behaviors among elementary school children in Urbancrest speaks to the view that Black Culture is a generalized ethnic phenomenon. By all accounts the children of Urbancrest are enacting culturally normative patterns without coming into prolonged contact with urban peers. Thus, the teacher coming to the Urbancrest classroom must learn to "play the game" or be faced with the same dilemma the inner-city school teacher faces.

Teachers educating Black children are faced with further problems of cultural difference; American culture places great emphasis on the teacher as the prime communicator in the classroom. Floyd, 1968 reports that in American "norm" schools (and, hence, in American normative teaching styles) teacher oral activity comprises seven-tenths of all oral activity. Clearly, in a cultural context where oral activity among children is a means of gaining status (and indeed is prized for this function among adults) the domination of the teacher represents a counter-cultural influence. Kochman, 1973 stresses the importance of certain types of Black American speech events for status relationships in peer groups: "The function of the 'dozens' or sounding is invariably self-assertive. The speaker borrows status from his opponent through an exercise of verbal power" (Kochman 1973:227). Abrahams, in his studies of streetcorner behavior among adult Philadelphia Blacks reports verbal facility in "signifying" and in the delivering of
oral "toasts" is a primary means, equivalent to physical assertiveness, in the building of a "reputation." Indeed, even in the rural Black context orality is highly prized, witness the tradition of the extempore Church sermon the Black "oral Bible," and the strong tradition of prose narrative. The teacher who "shuts off" this oral activity in her students is performing a disservice; indeed, she is committing the same mistake that her colleagues made in the education of the American Indian--trying to denigrate the native "language at the same time they were trying to build oral performance in the new language--Standard American English. What is accomplished is only the crushing of any oral activity.

Similarly, certain American middle-class expectations of appropriate "noise levels," uses of profanity, levels of physical activity, respect for the authority of the teacher, modes of politeness and etiquette, and discipline often come into conflict with patterns of behavior considered to be normal in Black Culture. Very often, keeping the children "quiet" or having them address you or get your attention in the proper manner become major concerns--often far overbalancing the actual transmission of important information, material and skills. In my field research I had the opportunity of observing two types of teacher styles. One was what I call "adaptive" in that the teacher made adjustments to the cultural milieu in which she was teaching. The other represented a culturally normative approach which often conflicted with the behaviors manifested by the students. During the nine months of the field study, in all fairness, the latter teacher began to develop a feel for the cultural context in which she was operating. It is exemplary, however, of the type of training teachers receive that it takes nine months of field experience to recognize the utility of an adaptive rather than a authoritative approach. Shortly, in the section on the description of classroom activity we shall contrast the behaviors correlated with these two approaches.

Expectations of appropriate behaviors are also correlated with expectations of achievement or performance. Thus, not only does the teacher expect obedience, politeness, quiet, etc. but he or she also expects certain types of cultural products. Previously we mentioned the value the dominant culture places on types of speaking, writing and reading products--as well as products of culturally biased testing systems. The teacher who comes into the classroom unaware of the cultural milieu into which she is entering, carries with her a set of expectations concerning the "goodness or badness," "appropriateness or inappropriateness of products. She may "mis-label" (Foster 1974) her students on the basis of products acceptable in their own culture, but unacceptable in her own. Judgements about the intelligence, capabilities and potential of the student are made from a culturally biased stance. Often the teacher will form a conception of a student and will construct her interactions with him or her based on that conception. The very structuring of the situation forces the child
to behave in a discretely channeled manner. The teacher "creates" the behavior in the child. This whole system of interaction is basically a "system of self-fulfilling prophecy" in which the teacher creates the context in which the child fulfills her or his expectations. This problem is especially relevant in the area of Black English Vernacular; the culturally biased teacher enters the arena of the culturally different with the notion that Black English Vernacular is deficient with respect to Standard English. When children repeatedly express themselves in the Vernacular (BEV) the teacher labels them as "unable to handle abstract speech," or "unable to utilized the logic of normal speech," etc. As Labov, (1973) pointed out in his "The Logic of Non-Standard English" BEV is as "logical" and as capable of handling abstract concepts as any language. However, the teacher's "mis-labeling" of the youngster may already have structured his responses to the classroom situation, and he may, in fact, be producing verbal performances which are deficient, or underdeveloped, both from the view point of Standard English and the fullness of expression of which BEV is also capable (Kochman 1973).

In the classroom that I observed there was a slight tendency toward this linguisto-centrism. Although most of the time there was a wide tolerance toward actual performance of BEV and few attempts were made to correct copula deletion, dropping of "to be" predicates, etc. the conception of the capabilities of the student were drawn up on a Standard English base. Thus, those students whose facility with Standard English dialect was most obvious were given in descriptions as "bright and highly verbal," or "very verbal-creative." These judgements were made in a situation where, on the face of it, most of the children were highly verbal, capable of expressing themselves in a manner acceptable to their peers. In truth, there was always a conscious attempt to refrain from ethno- or linguisto-centric behavior. That, in fact, some of it remains as an influence speaks to the persistence of culturally formed expectations. Williams and Whitehead, 1971 published a set of findings on teacher's ratings of speech performance; they argued that the findings supported the theory that teachers tend to rate Standard English performances higher than BEV performances. The really shocking part of the findings, however, was the fact that Black children, as a whole, even those who did not utilize the BEV (i.e. middle-class), were classed lower on language performance ratings than white children. The teacher responses were patterned along two dimensions: ethnicity-non-standardness and confidence-eagerness. In both dimensions Black children, regardless of actual social class, or use of BEV, were rated more ethnic and non-standard, and less confident and eager. These authors labeled the teacher pattern the "Pygmalion Effect." The teacher "expectations" concerning Black students' performance controlled their assessment of objective performance. Anyone familiar with Black English will immediately realize that the confidence-eagerness dimension is the most biased of the teacher expectations; BEV is utilized by
Black youngsters in many situations precisely as a means of expressing, and, indeed, gaining confidence. In my field experience, for example, I rarely viewed a phenomenon often observed in White middle-class schools: the offering of an answer to a question in the form of another interrogative. In the class I observed the answers were often given, even if they were wrong, as flat declarative statements. In addition, the teacher often had to practice a form of speech "control" when eliciting answers from students. I call this form of control "braking." The teacher actually has to slow a student down, to keep him from giving a whole series of wrong or irrelevant answers. Clearly, confidence and eagerness are in the eyes of the beholder more often than not. Thus, in the Whitehead-Williams study where children were rated as "hesitant," "reticent," or "unsure" in verbal performance because they were Black we see a form of the self-fulfilling prophecy—where, indeed children may become what these adjectives describe because they have been treated so often as if they were.

Kenneth Johnson describes another aspect of the Pygmalion Effect—the creation of the "non-verbal" or non-talkative Black Child:

First, from the time black children enter school they are corrected in their speech. Continued correction has the effect of shutting off speech...Second, much of the discussion in classrooms is about issues and topics that have no relevance to the needs, interests, or backgrounds of disadvantaged black children...Thus, black children are reluctant to take part in classroom discussions and they are labeled 'non-verbal' (Johnson 1973:182).

The suppression of dialectical speech has the function of shutting off all speech; the case of the "silent" Indian child reported by Vera John in her study of Navajo educational problems (John 1973) is an example of a connected case of the "speak but don't speak" double-bind that culturally different children face. The end result of the whole process is that whole classes of children are given up as not only uncommunicative—but unable to communicate. Johnson's point about the relevance of topic is also important. Much of the content of the information transmitted through the teacher has no "meaning" to the culturally different child. In my fieldwork I observed a class session in which the teacher attempted to teach the children some of the characteristics of poetry. She used a number of poems out of a text book as examples of subjects for poems. These subjects dealt with flowers, being sad, how it felt to be a cloud, etc. She asked one of the kids to construct a poem on a topic of his choosing; in response the child constructed a poem in which he was a toilet. Clearly, appropriate subjects are culture specific; the children reacted more favorably to the "toilet" poem than to the poems about flowers and crying. As a matter of fact, I had the distinct feeling that the saccharine nature of the "appropriate poems" are what prompted
the subject of toilets. Children who have not been exposed in
their home life to the amenities of "Big-Little Books" or the
"Golden Book of Clouds" will not appreciate such topics as much
as the middle-class child whose whole world is filled with nur-
sery rhyme characters, baby rabbits, fluffy clouds and talking
dolls. In the lower economic levels of Black Culture other im-
ages are likely to bring more response. During a reading session
I observed, I saw an explicit example of a clash of cultural va-
lues. The teacher was reading a tale about a "bathtub race" in
which the hero had come in first. As a first prize the winner was
to receive a "silver bathtub plug." One of the student responses
to this was: "I'd rather get cash!" The achievement-award pattern
of our middle-class educational system with its trophies, gold
stars and academic awards often has little meaning to the subcu-
turally different child--especially the Black child to whom
the achievement oriented White Culture is often foreign. In his
book Urban Blues Charles Keil specifically notes the tendency of
the Black individual to scorn the high effort-low yield pattern
of middle class achievement.

The non-verbal or "uncommunicative" Black child is of-
ten communicative in other contexts; it is important for the
ethnographer of speech to determine the types of situations in
which Black children speak or do not speak. Just because they
do not answer a teacher's questions, or participate in some struc-
tured student-teacher interchange does not mean that in
group interaction or on the playground they are not communica-
tive. In the school in which I conducted field observation I no-
ticed a great amount of talk in peer-peer interactions both in
the classroom and on the playground. The seating arrangement in
the classroom can be directly correlated with peer "conversation
groups." The so called "uncommunicative" child may in fact
"select" the situations in which he chooses to be communicative.
J. deSteffano has formulated the concept of speech "register" to
account for variation in speech activity as a function of the
child's recognition of context; the types of situations which a
child recognizes as calling for certain types and rates of activ-
ity may be culturally structured. The speech behavior in the
classroom I observed seemed to be structured in just such a
fashion--for instance, certain types of conversational activity
in reading sessions and conversational groups never take place
when the teacher is standing "center stage" as it were. We shall
discuss this "structuring" of speech situation in our account of
classroom events (de Steffano 1973).

The Urbancrest school shares many traits with the inner-
city schools described by Foster, Kochman, and others. However,
it also differs in many respects. The Urbancrest school reflects
the Black culture of the community in which it is situated, but
it is important to realize that this is a small, semi-rural commu-
nity, not a ghetto, barrio or slum. The traits that Urbancrest
shares with inner-city schools--both problems and positives--are
related to a common Black cultural heritage. Many of the specific manifestations reported from inner-city schools, however, are specifics of the crowded, urban context. The effects of poverty in the urban context create social conditions that do not seem to exist in Urbancrest. Thus, many of the symptomatic conditions reported to be endemic in the education of Blacks are not a function of the Black heritage, but of the specific urban context of that education.

The Urbancrest school, like many inner-city schools, is ethnically homogeneous—that is to say, racially and ethnically segregated. One must address here, however, the question of equivalence: is Urbancrest "segregated" because it is ethnically homogeneous? My answer to this is negative. The conditions which lead to segregation in the urban context are related to limited access to jobs, discrimination in housing and services, and planned sectioning of educational districts. Urbancrest, however, is a community with a historical base maintained not through negative "dominant culture" pressures, but primarily through community solidarity. The municipality of Urbancrest is an expression not only of independent polity—but of the possibility of voluntary and historic cultural independence. Like the black villages of the rural South Urbancrest is not maintained by negative pressures and reactions against racial and ethnic oppression. One result of the solidarity of Black community life in the non-urban context is that the relationship to the dominant society is changed; this phenomenon has some important ramifications for the school. Educators studying Black schools have reported the tendency for Black students to exhibit lack of self-concept and self-confidence in segregated situations. It is my experience in the field that this report is descriptive of inner-city education to a much greater degree. This is precisely because ethnic homogeneity does not necessarily equate with segregation. In Urbancrest ethnic homogeneity is a function of what we might call "independent ethnic-communal" solidarity, rather than "dependent ethnic-communal." One important difference between the two types is that children are not socialized in an environment where the disparities between Black and White are not as omnipresent and obvious. Another difference is that in an independent polity the interaction of individuals with white dominated bureaucracies—especially the welfare machinery—is not as degrading or as important in the social life of the group. Black-White frictions caused by disparity and discrimination result in (frequently) a hostile and aggressive interracial relationship. Many inner-city Blacks reject totally middle-class lifestyle and see "Black Culture" as totally separate from middle-class life. In Urbancrest and other non-urban situations this division is not as clear—indeed many of the citizens exhibit a tendency to accept or strive for many middle-class characteristics. A few families in the community, for instance, are Jehovah's Witnesses—a Christian sect whose creed is acceptant of middle-class values. In the urban context students
from such a background might be ridiculed for adopting a "honkie" life-style. The students I observed seemed to experience no difficulty on this account and their teacher (when questioned) reported no problems. Another example of this openness to middle-class influence is the fact that certain white-middle class school volunteers come to the school to help in a Federal Head Start program. In addition, many white mothers send their children from neighboring Grove City to participate in the program; neither volunteers, staff mothers, nor children expressed any fear of physical danger. The community does not act against these persons, nor do middle-class individuals perceive any hostility. Indeed, this is far removed from the inner-city situation where it would be stretching one's imagination to picture the program transplanted in its present form. Middle-class values and community solidarity are not perceived as mutual exclusives in Urbancrest; one can become "well-to-do" and still live in the community and be a member of it. The urge to "escape the ghetto" is more characteristic of the urban context than the rural. Of course, as we have mentioned, the young are beginning to leave; this may be a result of an increased awareness of Urbancrest's actual stature in comparison with the life of most of Ohio's Blacks. At the elementary school level, in any case, one can support the contention that segregation does not entail lack of self-confidence. The reasons for this are primarily: 1. restriction of intercourse with other socio-economic layers 2. non-rejection of middle-class values even in a context of poverty 3. restriction of contact with contexts of disparity and discrimination. It is not until later that the child acquires a working knowledge of the actual "state of affairs" in the white dominated society. There is another point to be added here. Urbancrest's contact with service programs on a daily basis is limited to the Federal Head Start Program--a program certainly run on a much different basis than most programs urban Blacks come into contact with--i.e. county, city, municipal. These programs are much more likely to reflect discriminatory feelings current in the region. Federal programs such as Urbancrest's Head Start tend to attract individuals motivated by some sort of concern for action, if little experience, rather than individuals making a career out of Civil Service.

The Urbancrest school staff is made up of both Black and White personnel. The principal of the school is an able, young Black man. During my stay I was very impressed by his personality and his way of dealing with both faculty and students. An example of his approach to administration was forcibly impressed on me one class period when a student from the class I was observing approached him as he was talking to me in the back of a class in session. This student had received a "D" on a paper and complained to him about the teacher's fairness. The principal supported the teacher in no uncertain terms, saying "probably gave you what you deserved. You should try harder next time!" He was well thought of by the staff of the school, but was not the sort of principal that could be used as a threat of punishment.
The one instance I observed where a child was sent to the principal's office for disciplining was unique, if not for its rarity, at least for the attitude of the student--whose answer to the teacher's command to go to the office was: "Be glad to!" This teacher was the one referred to previously as "authoritative." I never observed another instance where the principal was used as a threat, or where he acted directly to discipline students. This pattern is copied in inner city schools where principals are monuments of punitive authority. Perhaps this principal's most important role is that played jointly with the staff. The school personnel present the children with an integrated, in the full sense of the term, model for role-learning. The school's "top" authority, so to speak, is someone to whom the children can relate racially if not ethnically. The presence of an interracial staff of teachers establishes in the minds of the students a precedent for believing that Black people are capable of achieving a place in the world "outside" of Urbancrest. I believe the importance of such role-models should not be underestimated; part of the problem in inner city schools is that similar situations are offset by the authority relations manifested in the child's out-of-school life--the policeman, the mayor, the city commissioners, etc. are white or in white-run bureaucracies. In Urbancrest the cultural background, with its ethnic communal independence leaves the children much more open to be influenced with at least the illusion of social mobility. Some of my informants have expressed doubts about the reality of such mobility and cite the Middle School experience as one which tends to let the cold, hard light of dawn in on the aspirations of the young of Urbancrest.

The independent ethnic-communal atmosphere of Urbancrest cultural life affects not only Black-White relations, but, also the place of the school in educational planning. I am speaking here about the problem of classifying schoolchildren such as those who learn at Urbancrest as "culturally deprived." There are some important senses the concept of "deprivation" that jar with what I perceive as the ethnographic situation. Educators who use the term have in mind some sort of condition where some group of students has "less culture" than some other group. From the anthropological point of view a number of clarifications are in order. First, the idea of cultural relativity holds that "cultures" are more or less equal and alternative adaptations to different social and ecological environments. The Black culture of Urbancrest, if we accept that there is some such thing as "Black Culture" in the New World, is then not less of a culture in any sense—merely a different one. We must separate manifestations of poverty and conditions of class stratification (or, indeed of caste separation) from cultural difference. The children of Urbancrest may be economically, technologically, medically and nutritionally deprived—but certainly their culture, worldview and language is adapted to the situation in which their community exists. If we talk about relative deprivation purely on the level of the benefits available to one class over the other we are not talking
about "cultural deprivation" but of the material condition of the class of people in question. It is important to point out that in the United States it is race and ethnicity which lend themselves to social stratification; that is to say, because one is ethnic one is relegated to the bottom rungs of the social class ladder. Persons at the bottom of the class system have a full culture—that is precisely the reason that they are where they are. It is by "passing" for "White" in our society that social mobility is made possible. Black children are at a disadvantage not because they cannot reason, speak, write or compose in their Vernacular (or that such a Vernacular cannot be adapted to such purposes) but because the dominant society does not accept the products of such efforts. Skills and abilities adapted to White middle-class life are lacking in Black youngsters—not because the culture is lacking—but because access to the culture into which assimilation is expected is blocked by economics and discrimination. It is only in relation to the expectation that the children of Urbancrest must make their way in a world not enclosed by the community and its eidos that they are deprived—not of their own culture—but of the culture of the wider society.

The key to the problem of educating Blacks in Urbancrest and in the United States is not cultural deprivation—but cultural difference. It is not even difference in the sense that the Black community lacks the "Great Tradition" of American culture; the problem lies in the inability of the dominant white society to separate the white middle-class "Little-Tradition" from a Great Tradition which can be learned and utilized by Blacks without abrogating their own cultural heritage. A Black person in our society must not only read and write, discuss the stock market and party politics, but must also conform to our standards, of dress, our ways of colloquial speech, our standards of conduct—our everyday way of life. The Black child is culturally deprived of the Great Tradition—which he needs to succeed in society—but certainly he is not at all "deprived" or even in need of much of the middle-class way of life.

This notion that cultural differences in the Little Tradition, that is, in "everyday Culture" are alone responsible for failure in the schools is patent nonsense. A school of educators kin to the cultural deprivationists are the experts who relate Black child-rearing practices to educational problems. The Urbancrest context speaks eloquently against this approach. The Black experience in Urbancrest schools is an example of Black children steeped in their own cultural heritage without the burden of the urban environment’s debilitating effects. Child-rearing practices of Black mothers in the United States are not the direct cause of educational failure; it is the effects of child-rearing in certain environments that militates against educational success. The oft-cited qualities of Black child-rearing such as a strong mother influence, repression, discouragement of creative inquiry and
analytic thought, as well as a firm hand in discipline, might be
descriptive of any lower socioeconomic household—as well as of
many middle-class families. These so-called "Black" child-rear-
ing traits are in actuality part of the tradition of many ethnic
groups—especially those in the more congested areas of urban
centers. Urbancrest mothers, in fact, exhibit quite an interest
in the schooling of their young; many of them contribute their
services as volunteers in the Head Start program at Urbancrest's
school. During election month in November 1973 the mothers used
the school as a place to run a polling station. By all accounts
Urbancrest mothers are far from repressive; instead they appear
to take an interest, not only in education, but in politics and
the community. During an interview with one of my teacher in-
formants I queried her about the students and their backgrounds.
The information she gave me did not include any negative comments
about their experience with their mothers. Another piece of
confirming information comes from an unusual source. Although
I recorded instances of "signifying" and "playing the dozens"
I did not record any instance of the "playing moms" version of
the dozens. The "moms" form of the dozens is often cited as
evidence of the Black youth's strong attachment to his mother—a
cause often given for Black educational failure. Finally,
the stability of Urbancrest economically and demographically
mitigates the inner-city pattern of child-rearing by operating
against father-absent households. Father-absence is the most
frequently cited pathological condition in examining the causes
of educational failure. Even if we accept the premises of the
"child rearing school" with reference to the urban context, there
appears to be no evidence to support the conclusion that such
repressive, mother-dependent child-rearing takes place in Urban-
crest. The child-rearing hypothesis may be a criticism of the
form socialization and enculturation takes in the city, it cer-
tainly is not an indictment of Black child-rearing patterns as
a whole.

Parameters of Cultural Difference

Cultural "deprivation", the effects of poverty, and child-
rearing practices, even where they have debilitating effects on
education and the conduct of classroom activity, must be seen as
masks for the real reasons behind educational failure—the cultur-
al differences between Black Students, their middle-class teachers
and the system to which they must accommodate. At the classroom
level cultural differences manifest themselves in the communica-
tion and interaction problems which daily arise to block the edu-
cational functions of the school. The "way of teaching" of the
teacher may be "out of synch" with the "way of behaving" of the
students. The fact that teachers and students may face one an-
other over a cultural "gap" is probably even more important than
the irrelevance of much of the curricular material. In order
to understand some of the specific ways in which teachers and
students may differ in culture (including the ways classrooms as a whole may differ in culture) we should examine the differences and similarities between the Urbancrest school and middle-class schools.

Cultural knowledge is composed of sets of "ideas" about how things should be. The anthropological notion of ideal culture addresses itself to this knowledge. What people actually do is connected to their expectations about the conduct of routine social life; these expectations operate in a fashion similar to the way a rule operates in a game. It serves as a scheme of reference, orientation and interpretation. It tells people what to do, what to expect others to do, and what the meaning of what they do is. Teachers and students have certain "expectations," a "stock" of ideal culture, as it were, which informs their activities and allows them to interpret the activities of others. When the stocks of cultural knowledge do not coincide persons may not know which behaviors to display, what the meaning of another's display is, or, similarly, misinterpret the meaning of another's display. If we conceive of the reality of the classroom as a construct of activities and their meanings, and further, as a reality in which certain ends are to be accomplished, then it follows that the easiest way to accomplish those ends is to make certain that all participants are operating according to the same sets of assumptions and expectations. Cultural difference can be simply portrayed as the divergence of systems for the construction of a social reality—behavior displays and their correlated meanings.

For instance, what is "bad behavior" in the middle-class setting is not necessarily "bad behavior" in the Urbancrest setting. In most middle-class contexts the movement of children around the room during a class session is prohibited; this "rule" may be formulated in utterances: "Don't move about the room during class!" or it may simply emerge as an expectation whose presence we detect either by the absence of movement around the room, or the application of negative sanctions when it is broken. In Urbancrest movement around the room is permitted, in fact, it is more than permitted—it is normal for the students to move around the room. Clearly, the "rule" for bad behavior is different in one context. Sometimes it is possible to attribute differences in such rules or expectations to cultural difference. When we do so our ethnographies are providing data for an ethnology of comparative rule-systems. The realities of the middle-class school and the reality of the Urbancrest school emerge from different applications and interpretations of rules and behaviors; cultural difference is a difference in ideal culture (rules) as well as the activity and behavior that emerges from and is explicated by those rules (actual culture.) Let us say that students and teachers involved mutually in a common event in a classroom operate under certain sets of shared expectations which
produce regularities in behavior. An incidence of "bad behavior" is behavior which is inappropriate in the context in which it is enacted (or which is inappropriately interpreted by someone from a different cultural background.) We might want to say that the "bad" behavior violates the system of expectations governing the reality or activity in which it is enacted. The Black schoolchild enacting his culturally normative behaviors in what appears to him as an appropriate context may be interpreted by the teacher as a discipline problem, as surly, as uncommunicative, unfriendly, or just plain stupid.

In the Urbancrest classroom the rules governing classroom behavior may not yield social scenes accepted as normal in the middle-class context. Let us compare some of the parameters of cultural difference which have relevance to the Urbancrest study. Each of the examples given under the Urbancrest heading is taken from patterns observed during the field study. (See Appendix I also).

1. Urbancrest: In the Urbancrest classroom physical contact is allowed. Students regularly engage in contact situations; many of these can be termed "mock fight." In the Urbancrest classroom T1 could recognize the mock fights; she described "real" fights to me as those which were comprised of "biting, kicking and scratching." T2 intervened in some mock fight situations when it was not necessary to do so. Girls tend to get into more real fights than the boys; the boys engage in a great deal of mock aggression among themselves. Contact with the teacher in the room is mostly teacher initiated; on the playground students will initiate physical contact with the teacher. Generally aggression is lower in Urbancrest than in the classrooms described in the inner-city literature. As a matter of fact, although T1 reported that girls fought I did not observe any instance of serious fighting during my observation. I did observe various rear-slappings, arm-punchings, hair pullings and so on. Almost all of these displays lasted for about forty-five seconds and were terminated when the victim returned in kind, or enacted some other display such as an exaggerated grimace, an overloaded "Oww!" etc.

2. Middle-Class: Physical aggression and physical contact inhibited by teacher's presence and children's recognition of his expectations. Teachers (such as T2) exhibit a general inability to distinguish between real and mock fight situations. Certainly physical contact occurs in this setting, but most of it is conducted surreptitiously because interpretations which label it as either "aggressive" or "sexual" (Foster 197*).  

3. Urbancrest: In the classroom the children are allowed to congregate in conversation groups during class. Talking is allowed to occur as a part of the normal activity of the classroom. Only during situations in which T2 is using a whole-group instruction mode is talking inhibited. T1 tries to control talking only when it is necessary to inform the students of some generally applicable
news or instruction. Tj has never, to my knowledge acted as if conversation carried on among students (in a normal tone of voice) was a breach of discipline. A high level of noise is produced by banging desks and lockers or shouting; these "background" noises do not appear to be accidental and I have observed many instances where children will sit and concentrate on producing as loud a noise as possible. Tj does not discipline students for such displays, in fact, it appeared to me that I was perhaps the only person in the classroom who really paid attention to them.

4. Middle-Class: Noise levels are modulated to a great degree; a correlate of being in school is to sit at one's desk and be quiet. "Talking in class" is a punishable offense in many schools. Banging lockers or desks, and especially shouting, are prohibited. Children occasionally produce such displays in middle-class contexts; one may offer the idea that the middle-class child does it because it is forbidden while the Black child does it because it would not occur to him not to.

5. Urbancrest: Teachers and students exhibit approximately equal amounts of orality; that is to say, teacher dominance in oral communication is not a primary factor in this Black classroom. This statement requires two emendations: 1. Teacher may structure the classroom in such a way as to limit student orality— one way is to use a whole-group instruction mode. One of the teachers I observed used this mode. 2. Even where student and teacher exhibit equal amounts of orality the teacher may be the one eliciting student oral responses. However, in general the Urbancrest classroom, when not ordered in the whole-group instruction mode exhibits a high amount of student talk, both teacher directed and peer directed. The fact that the whole-group instruction mode was little used by the experienced teacher appears to be an adaptation to the Black Cultural pattern of orality in social activity. Student-Student "conversational talk" is omni-present and runs as an undercurrent to all teacher-oriented primary activity; it is rarely controlled by the teacher.

6. Middle-Class: Educational literature reports that middle-class schools tend to be at least seventy percent teacher oral. In other words, teacher dominates all of the classroom oral activity and tries to control student oral activity. Instructional modes are geared toward maximum teacher control of all oral activity. Orality in general is teacher-oriented.

7. Urbancrest: Students use verbal displays to gain status. Insulting (signifying, sounding), exaggeration, identification with curricular materials (one of the girls identified with a character in the story she was reading by saying: "See! her name is _______. That's a good name, the best.") and joking are used by students to gain prestige or standing among their peers. This is a general pattern reported for other sectors of Black Culture by Abrahams, Labov and Kochman. Foster, 1974
reports on its use in inner-city schools. Verbal displays are sometimes used by students to test teachers. This may be as simple as deliberately mispronouncing the teacher's name; this, in fact, did happen to the student teacher that I observed during her first weeks of training. The reaction of the teacher to such tests determines in part her "status" and authority in the class. A teacher may use this verbal means of "doing status" as a way of controlling the class through controlling the students who try to "do status" on her. The experienced teacher (T1) often used this means of control; an example I observed was when a student was interrupting T1 during a conversation with another student. The person who was interrupting appeared to be doing it deliberately. T1 looked around to the class and said to the rest of the students: "Look at _____ I'm sure she did her work so well that there are no mistakes and she can talk all the time!"

9. Middle-Class: Patterns of verbal status borrowing occur among middle-class schoolchildren—as in insulting. However the process does not appear to be as institutionalized as among Blacks. Those who "do status" rarely use it with adults and other authority figures; if such behaviors are enacted they are apt to be labeled in a negative fashion.

9. Urbancrest: Within the classroom peer networks based on conversational groups (see diagrams in Appendix I) are allowed to manifest themselves in physical seating arrangements. These conversational groups reflect friendship patterns which appear to hold out of school. T1 let these conversation group structures remain as a permanent part of the classroom routine. T2, on the other hand, twice shattered the student-constructed patterns for whole-group instruction of her own. During these sessions she had a difficult time controlling talk and movement around the room. Conversational groups as a whole are correlated with friendship networks in Black Culture (Abrahams 1970). It may be that the persistence of the conversation group is a specific adaptation of T1 to the role that it plays in the child's daily routine. It is in conversation that a child builds and maintains his friendships, his status—hence, his station in the classroom.

10. Middle-Class: In dominant culture classrooms the peer-group networks of the out-school situation are broken up (in most of the cases.) Alphabetical ordering or some other scheme is used to order the seating arrangements; rarely, if ever, do the students construct their own arrangements. It is not at all certain that even if students constructed their own patterns it would be primarily for the conversational purposes of the Black classroom. In other words, the group would not function to do the status-network maintenance work that the Black conversation group does—or at least not to the same extent.
11. Urbancrest: Children can gain the teacher's attention in virtually any manner they wish. Specifically, it is allowed that students move about the room in order to contact the teacher. They may call out the teacher's name, stand up, wave papers, etc. A couple of constraints do exist: 1. one must not interrupt at a point when a teacher is actually speaking and 2. one must use the correct name of the teacher; although it is acceptable to use an utterance of the form "Mrs. ______!" the name must be pronounced correctly. Mispronunciation of names is a means of testing teachers that I observed a number of times in the Urbancrest classroom. Gross forms of address are sometimes used, but were ignored by the teacher. One notable instance of this usage was when a student repeatedly used the utterance "Hey you!" to gain a teacher's attention; the teacher ignored the student until an appropriate formulation was forthcoming.

12. Middle-Class: Middle-class contexts share many of the attention getting modes with the Urbancrest classroom. One of the primary differences is that it is generally prohibited for students to move about the room to contact teachers. In addition, forms of address may be more formal, or more formally enforced. At least part of the emphasis on formal modes of address is a function of enculturation in white middle-class culture where children's relationships with adults are often governed by elaborate etiquette and status rules. White children are often more familiar with forms of "polite behavior" (Labov 1973:107).

13. Urbancrest: Urbancrest children seem to feel free to walk about the room as they wish. Entrances and exits from the room are controlled loosely; primarily it is tardy entrances of over fifteen to twenty minutes that are regarded as being worth disciplinary action. Walking patterns are correlated with movements whose purpose is to either contact the teacher or to establish contact with persons in conversation groups other than one's own. Movement around the room is sometimes correlated with a desire to display some object or behavior to others.

14. Middle-Class: In most middle-class contexts movement around the room is inhibited by teacher presence; movement around the room is considered to be disruptive behavior. Classroom seating arrangements are usually structured to mitigate against conversation grouping in the first place, making the "contact-seeking" behavior of the Black schoolroom highly unlikely.

15. Urbancrest: The Urbancrest classroom environment is one in which the student can feel some measure of control. Lack of control of his environment is an oft-cited causative factor of Black educational failure. Oral egalitarianism, student constructed participation groups, freedom of movement around the classroom and other libertarian patterns tend to give the children a more open atmosphere in which to work. I feel that such freedom of environment is important for the education of
Black children in that it probably is synchronous with group interaction patterns with which the child is already familiar. An open, less formal atmosphere probably complements the less formal interaction patterns in which status, authority—and, hence, the interactional "power" are related to achieved rather than ascribed attributes. Power in groups in Black culture is highly correlated with the amount of linguistic "work" that one does to produce it; friendship, influence, sexual conquest and the like are also established through conversational work.

16. Middle-Class: Those who cite lack of control as a reason for the failure of Black children probably intend us to understand that white children feel that they have control. I believe that this is only true for those students who can "achieve" status through the channels deemed appropriate by the system. That is to say, academic achievers are the ones who feel that they have control over the classroom. I do not think that a majority of children in the middle-class context feel that they have any more control than the Black student. I think a major difference, however, is in the relationship of the student's enculturation to the norms of the school situation. The middle-class child enters the school with the expectation that patterns already established at home with regards to interaction with adults will be continued in school. The whole concept of "in loco parentis" is middle class. Many students of Black culture (and lower class cultures as a whole) cite the evident lack of formal authority structures in enculturation. Thus, the lack of control in middle-class contexts is probably a culturally normative pattern in which status and authority are given to an adult and children acquiesce readily to a familiar pattern.

17. Urbancrest: The orientation of the Urbancrest schoolchild to commands and instructions given by the teacher can be considered a part of a Black cultural pattern. This orientation has a number of sub-components that we should consider: 1. First, how does the Black child perceive the command or instruction? 2. How does he perceive the result of the course-of-action ordered in the command or instruction? 3. Is he able to carry out the command or instruction in the form it is given? These ancillary questions are important for a consideration of the Urbancrest classroom. The children seem not to perceive commands and instructions as having strong "force" behind them. There is often a considerable time lag between the issuance of a command and the initiation of attempts at its completion (at least part of this may be due to a difference in time perception). Commands and instructions are given during task assignments but must often be bolstered by repeating the instructions to the individual students, especially if they were first delivered in a whole-group situation. Children will not ask for clarifications of instructions are not understood; I witnessed time and again the situation where a teacher would discover some student doing the assignment wrong or struggling over its beginning.
when it appeared that they knew all along that they were not following the outlined procedures. Labov, in an insightful 1969 article asks the question: do certain children have the ability to follow directions? That is to say, not because they cannot have the capacity to do so, but because the form and context of classroom commands assumes certain preconditions that may not be met: that is, 1. that the teacher has the right or authority to issue a command. 2. that some command is worth being obeyed (or that the topic of the command, or task is worthwhile). 3. that the student is somehow obligated to do the command. 4. that he has the means or ability to carry it out. In the Urbancrest classroom I feel that some of these considerations may be important. The value attached to task-completion as an end in itself may be negligible for the Black student; academic reward may have little positive reinforcing value in the classroom reality. If a teacher also has no "status" her commands have no status; thus, even if a teacher could provide reinforcing experiences for her students she might not succeed in motivating them to accept the tasks seriously, and with an intent to complete them. The topics or tasks which are assigned very often are irrelevant to the everyday life of the youngster, or they may not have any connection at all to his conception of the world. Thus, the command to complete the task is at best an order to perform a meaningless manipulation of words, thoughts or symbols. Thus, a combination of cultural irrelevance of topic, perceptions of rights and obligations of command, the relative rewards of task completion, and the student's ability to perform the task required of him may lead to problems in getting children to follow directions and obey commands. Of these factors, one through three may be directly related to cultural variables.

18. Middle-Class: Command-and-response is an acceptable and normal pattern in middle-class schools. The child assumes that the teacher has the right and the authority to issue commands. The topics and tasks which children are instructed to study or complete are culturally relevant. The rewards of task-completion are part of the middle-class ethic that we imbue our children with. The child at home and in school sees himself in situations where performance is related to obedience to adult authority; rewards are related to task completions. The Black child, on the other hand, fulfills tasks at home like any other child; it is another thing to say that the pattern of home life is generalizable to the schools. Task completions at home for the Black child may have rewards of a far different nature than those given to the middle-class child. Indeed, many of them have no rewards at all.

19. Urbancrest: Related to the problem of cultural differences in perception and completion of command-and-response is the area of reward, value and need gratification. Cultural variables may play an important role in this area of classroom activity. Academic rewards were very little in evidence in the Urbancrest
classroom. The teacher did not appear to praise or criticize academic work publicly; the children did not appear to rank themselves on scales of academic performance. Therefore, the so-called "rewards" of learning (excitement, satisfaction of curiosity) do not seem to be sufficient to motivate academic pursuits for their own sake. (It is debatable whether such rewards motivate middle-class students either.) The classroom teacher will often reward task-completion regardless of quality—that is, the fact of completion will be rewarded publicly. Anything wrong with it academically is discussed privately at the teacher's desk. The public reward of task-completion may be an attempt to set up an operable peer-valid system of status-reward. In non-academic situations where the teacher was trying to control the students she often used a method of withholding some gratification situation such as leaving the room, going to the gym, going to the playground etc. Such threats had more affect than simple commands to be quiet; I believe it is because the rewards are more tangible. The rewards, hence the value, of much of the other classroom work is cloudy to the Black student. Abrahams, Keil and Foster have stated that lower-class Black culture as a whole is present-oriented and that the delayed gratification response of middle-class culture is given over in favor of the immediate gratification of needs. This pattern may at least partially explain the lackadilisackal attitude of the Urbancrest students to the academic work many of them were instructed to perform. The teachers I observed, especially T1, tried to adapt themselves to such patterns. This is one reason, I believe, that T1 used small group instruction; by doing so she created a system where the motivation for academic work could be related to "doing status" on other students by competing for answers. She found a way, in other words, of doing academic status borrowing. The rewards were consonant with the culture, they were immediate, and they were relevant.

20. Middle-Class: Academic performance is used as a form of peer ranking to a much greater extent; Black culture is more apt to place a higher price on "wit" rather than formal academic achievement. Delayed gratification is something the middle-class child learns very early—or is at least taught to view as desirable; possibly delayed gratification is easier for someone who does not want in the immediate present. In any case the pattern of achievement and reward in the schools is consonant with patterns reinforced in the child's out of school culture (save your allowance, work a paper route and save for college, etc.)

21. Urbancrest: Small-group instruction had a high success rate in the Urbancrest classroom. These small-group structures were used a majority of the time by the experienced teacher. She told me in interviews that the small-group instruction mode had been highly successful; she said that the students competed more, took more interest in the subjects, were eager to learn and
were easier to control. I think, at least in part, that the importance of conversational groups in Black culture is a primary factor in the success of small group instruction.

22. Middle-class: Classrooms are not very often run on small-group bases. Partly, this is due to the teacher's oral dominance in classroom situations. Whole-group instruction is much more in evidence.

23. Urbancrest: Non-verbal interaction between adults and children is similar to middle-class in most gross comparisons. The major cultural difference is in eye-contact. Urbancrest children follow a general pattern of avoiding eye-contact with elders. This data is in agreement with data reported from other students of Black culture. Levels of non-verbal, physical activity appear to be quite high in the Urbancrest classroom; non-focused non-verbal displays are quite frequent. These are things such as playing with pencils, rearranging one's desk, flapping one's arms, doing a small dance across the room, scratching one's head and so on. These little displays occur frequently and spontaneously. I have observed students doing these behaviors even when talking to a teacher. In combination with eye aversion it almost seems as if the student is not paying attention to the teacher. I think it speaks for the teacher's acquisition of her children's culture that she continues her instruction to them.

24. Middle-Class: Eye-contact is normal between children and adults, in fact, it is impolite not to look at someone when they speak to you. I believe that non-verbal activity is probably the same on a qualitative basis as in Black culture; I believe that quantity as a result of boredom is greater in the Black classroom. (I am not saying that Blacks are more non-verbal, but that they may be more bored when topics are irrelevant.)

25. Urbancrest: Non-standard speech styles are used in the Urbancrest classroom. The BEV is in use in Urbancrest classrooms; such phenomena as double negation, th to d, deletion of "to be" predicates have been observed. In general the BEV of Urbancrest is not as non-standard as some BEV forms that have been reported. However, I did hear parent's speech during my fieldwork and it exhibited many features of what has been called "country" BEV. Perhaps the sixth-graders I observed had shifted dialectically as a function of the classroom register (context.) There is a slight, probably unconscious, tendency to rank students on Standard English facility scales. However, the whole, I do not think that BEV use represents a problem in this classroom, mostly due to the efforts of Tj who explicitly recognizes the problems teacher linguisto-centrism can cause. She concentrates on writing skills in Standard English instead. A longitudinal study in this school may show that an open policy toward BEV may produce more success at Standard English performance, especially if it is approached as a "second" or alternative language or dialect.
26. **Middle-Class**: Teachers and students share the same language form; instructional emphases of the curriculum are synchronous with the language forms used out-of-school. Deviations in everyday language are slight compared to BEV. Linguisto-centrism is not a problem primarily because of language conformity rather than teacher awareness.

27. **Urbancrest**: Co-operative work among students is fairly rare. I observed a skit and a couple of persons working on a joint art project, however, this was about the extent of co-operative work situations. The classroom emphases were on individual instruction. I do not know what cultural pattern this represents; sources such as Hood, 1973 report an emphasis on individual work situations in other Black classrooms. Teachers seem to use part-group instruction as a partial adaptation to this phenomenon.

28. **Middle-Class**: Co-operative work is more common; some recent approaches in education have stressed teamwork learning. Whole-group instruction may succeed partially as a function of the ability of students to formulate co-operative responses to teacher's whole group instruction.

29. **Urbancrest**: Discipline and control is largely a function of controlling individuals; the class as a whole can be controlled through controlling individual disruptors. This may be accomplished by using them as examples, for instance, by "sounding" on them. This "sounding" is a means for the teacher to gain status in the classroom hierarchy. By sounding on someone misbehaving the teacher is converting individual power into social status. In the Urbancrest classroom this teacher sounding was used as a means of control; in order for it to be effective, however, it had to be "public." It was insufficient to privately sound on the student—and, indeed, it is doubtful that the teacher did anything of the kind in private. It appeared to be a specific adaptation to the Black classroom. In the Urbancrest classroom only a limited number of individuals required control in this way; it was the only effective method the teacher had of controlling their attempts at gaining status at her expense. This is similar to the cases cited by Foster, 1974 in which he makes the statement that the teacher in the inner city can control the classroom by controlling the student who exhibits "street-corner behavior" that is, status-borrowing behavior. I think we can see a cultural continuity between the Urbancrest and inner-city examples.

30. **Middle-Class**: The use of public sounding or ridicule is much more rare; when it does occur it is most often seen as a humiliating experience for the child. In the Urbancrest classroom it is more of a status game. The middle-class teacher structures the class in such a way as to facilitate group control on the principle that "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." Disruptors are very often isolated or sent from
the room. This, of course, is because misbehavior is generally not part of (and not seen as part of) a culturally normative system of status achievement. No function of any social value is served by keeping the student in the room. On the other hand, the Black child who is sent from the room may gain in status among his peers; he is more likely to lose status if the teacher sounds on him.

31. Urbancrest: Concepts of duration and time seem to be culturally relative. The time taken in task initiation or response to commands appears to be longer than the middle-class norm. Such a conclusion is borne out by the teacher frequently having to repeat her commands to begin; I have observed occasions where a teacher had to repeat herself as often as four times in order to get students to initiate some action. This took place in circumstances where the students had both heard and understood the teacher. Smith, 1973 reports a general time perspective referred to idiomatically as "African People's Time." Whites often refer to it perjoratively as "Coloured People's Time." It refers to a general difference of perspective on what constitutes appropriate response time, tardiness, urgency of task completion etc. Teacher's repeating of commands without anger can be adaptive.

32. Middle-Class: Teachers and Students share concepts of time perspective. Command and response are synchronized to the same internal clock.

This list of comparisons serves as a general outline of some of the major ethnographic differences I observed between Urbancrest and middle-class classrooms. The Urbancrest data is given in the form of broad generalizations supported by some examples. Such broad description does not address the main focus of the dissertation. That focus is not primarily on ethnographic descriptions per se but on the structure of the social scenes which provide the basis for the comparisons given above. We are asking, in fact, the question: "How does the activity of the Urbancrest classroom get produced, and how does it become a constituted and accepted part of the reality of everyday life for the teachers and students enacting it?" The descriptive statements above capture certain apparently culture-bound regularities; we want to ask how these regularities might be accounted for. The answer to such a question involves the ethnography of culturally normative (or micro-normative) patterns, but also an investigation of the system that might produce such patterns. Before we continue into Chapter II and a discussion of systems that can produce regular "meaningful" activity we must first expand our discussion of ethnography. We do so by now adopting an ethnographic form proposed by Dell Hymes. Hymes termed this ethnographic form a "model" for the interaction of language and social setting. Without discussing whether or not it is a model, let us say that it serves admirably as a framework for the presentation of ethnographic material.
In a 1967 article entitled "Models of the Interaction of Language and Social Setting" (Hymes 1967) Dell Hymes outlined a step-by-step procedure for conducting a general ethnography of communication. Although it was oriented primarily toward the study of speech in its social contexts I feel that it is quite a useful outline for presenting materials on the ethnography of everyday activity in the classroom. "Communication" and "Activity" are not concepts so very different from one another, especially if we view "interaction" as the common link; ethnographies of communication and ethnographies of activity may be congruent activities. We can define activity, for now, as a coherent set of events participated in and enacted by actors, and, further, conceived by them as meaningful sequences of behaviors in space time contexts. An ethnography of activity would attempt to provide a descriptive account of types of activities, their contexts, their constituent behaviors and personnel for particular cultures or cultural situations. In this dissertation the Black elementary school classroom is a focused cultural situation.

Although the Hymes "model" does not represent more than a taxonomic level of analysis, it is a valuable descriptive tool for this very reason. It presents and defines certain concepts of value for ethnographies of the sort we are attempting to present. Hymes himself labeled the "model" a descriptive theory:

An adequate descriptive theory would provide for the analysis of individual communities by specifying the technical terms required for such analysis, and by specifying what form the analysis should take (Hymes 1967:15.)

Hymes presented a useful set of technical terms as well as a discussion of the form future analysis should take; his suggestions on this latter topic are along the lines of the "rule-governed" approach we will present later in the dissertation. The following technical terms are those terms presented by Hymes which we have decided to use as headings for the description of classroom activity: Speech community, speech situation, participants or personnel, speech event and speech act. Certain other terms that he presented will be discussed and redefined in Chapter II as part of a discussion of the contribution of phenomenology to the ethnography of rule-governed activity.

Let us now look at a descriptive outline of the "activity" observed in the classroom at Urbancrest. Where Hymes uses the prefix speech with his technical terms let us understand the prefix "activity." This, of course, is with the understanding that activity includes speech activity.) Using the components that Hymes focuses upon, the next series of pages presents an
ethnographic description of the general patterns of communication and activity that I observed in the classroom. The information presented was derived from data observed and elicited from interviews.

I. Speech Community/Activity Community: The term community applies to a social group within which certain modes of activity performance can be seen to occur. This may include use of a common language, style of activity performance, modes of interaction and of interpretation. With reference to the rule-system approach we shall introduce later, the "community" is a social group which can be said to share "common knowledge of the rules for valid cultural action." These rules include not only rules for producing and interpreting language, but also rules for producing and interpreting connected sequences of meaningful behaviors, singly and in concert with others.

Speech community is a technical term which outlines a social or cultural unit. With respect to the field study there are three separate notions which we must first define. Urbancrest itself represents the primary "activity" community (including speech). Within the community certain styles or modes of conducting activity are shared with others. This may include local slang (such as the children's use of certain insult terms such as "Morris," "Boy," or "Garbage Mouth") patterns of pronunciation such as nasalization of initial bilabial consonants, substitution of "d" for "t" and rising inflections on the terminal words of imperative sentences. Commonly accepted modes of church behavior, playground behavior, interaction with non-school adults, etc. may also be included in a description of an "activity community." Urbancrest is at least partially defined by the existence of certain normative patterns among its population. However, many of these normative patterns can be seen as a function of general patterns of Black Culture. This general "Black Cultural Community" is the second notion with which our idea of community must deal. Hymes suggests that we use the notion of speech field to explicate the concept of such a "wider community" within which general normative patterns are shared. Urbancrest, then, can be seen as a speech or activity community whose inhabitants retain certain specific patterns of conducting their activity but share others with a wider range of communities with more or less the same modes of activity performance. Thus, the specific mode in which children insult one another in the classroom shares certain general features with the way it is done in the urban context. In both Urbancrest and in the inner-city "sounding" (insulting) is performed as a means of gaining status, it is performed on those whose personal characteristics leave them open to insult. Yet, in Urbancrest I never witnessed the types of "topics" reported by Labov and Kochman in their studies of Black modes of insulting. Thus, the "activity community" is defined relative to the most coherent set of actors sharing patterns of producing and interpreting behaviors in activity. However, Black Cultural speech "fields" and the Urbancrest
"community" exist within a third notion of community—that of the dominant society within which the Black activities, and Urbancrest's particular modes of activity performance take place. This third notion is of particular importance to a study of the school for the reasons we pointed out previously. The Urbancrest school represents a focus for sets of intersecting lines of world-view, life-styles and activity patterns. The Black schoolchild belongs to the activity community in which he was raised and which is part of a wider pattern of Black culture whose extent he becomes aware of in school and through contacts which he makes in his Middle School experience and in his excursions into other Black communities. However, in the school the child is also receiving, through instruction and instructional materials, modes of activity performance which are representative of the dominant White middle-class culture. Possibly the greatest single influence in this situation is the teacher. In the field study I observed two teachers, both White, one experienced in the education of Black children, the other a student teacher. In the classroom the child is at the center of an intersection of "communities" and it may be that a general definition of "bicultural education" is that it is the attempt to perform teaching and learning activities in a context where the modes of activity production and interpretation do not intersect. In the Urbancrest situation the "home community" representing a rural-Black lifestyle, and the "school community" representing an urban-North-White and an urban-White-interpreted-Black image, come into direct conflict and raise interesting questions about education in circumstances where rules for conducting activity do not coincide.

It is primarily with reference to conducting the activities of the classroom that we must address the notion of activity community. A general ethnography of behavior in Urbancrest would address a wider class of behaviors. The activity we are interested in, however, focuses on teacher and student "ways of acting." Insofar as the student and the teacher share or do not share certain expectations we may delineate cultural and activity community distinctions.

II. Speech Situations/Activity Situations: The notion of activity situation is related to the notion of a context recognized as "calling for" a certain type of activity. Or, from an observer's point of view, the "situation" is a context which seems to be correlated with a set of behaviors whose configuration seem to be meaningfully connected to the situation in which they are observed. We may say that a situation is a context plus courses-of-action (types of action or behavior) which "bound" it as a particular situation.

This notion is especially important for an ethnography of classroom activity since the number and type of situations is directly related to the type of activities and the modes of behavior observed. Specifically, we wish to bring up here the notion of
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"register" as described by deSteffano; the notion of register describes the switching of "styles" of speaking or interacting as a function of social situations. To understand some of the courses of action we have observed in the classroom in Urbancrest we must first outline the major "types" of activity situations. The outline presented is founded on observations garnered over a nine-month period. The determination of whether a situation was "bounded" as an activity situation was made on objective grounds—that is through comparison of types of activities occurring in different contexts. These determinations were checked with the teacher's observations to determine whether or not such distinctions were meaningful with at least one member of the set of classroom personnel.

II. A. General School Situation: This is the most general of the types of situations relevant to our discussion. The school itself, or rather, "being in school" is set off against being "at home" or in non-school situations. Courtney Cazden, (Cazden 1972) separates these two as the most important divisions that the child makes in his acquisition of the knowledge for appropriate behavior. Behavior "in school" is, in general, separated from behavior in other contexts—going to movies, going to Grove City, going to church, etc. Physical aggression in peer-group interaction (or in teacher-student interaction) is on a much lower level "in school" than out of "school." An informant stated to me that the most physical fights in which there was biting, kicking or scratching took place "out of school." Similarly, the level of noise, amount of profanity, and vigour of physical movements are depressed in the school situation. From objective criteria alone an observer can differentiate between "in" and "out" school behavior. In Urbancrest these general factors differentiated between the two situations: 1. Amount of aggression and agonistic display was higher out of school. 2. Use of profanity at a fairly low level in school rather than out. 3. A marked constraint in complexity of interaction with adults on a one-to-one basis in school situations as a whole. 4. A marked increase in communal or group activity formulated as responses to all adults in school situations. 5. A marked increase in what could be termed "shyness" as the result of cultural difference between authority figures and Black schoolchild. 6. A phenomenon cited by Houston, 1970, the foreshortening of utterances was observed in interaction with teachers although the correlated notion of "simplified syntax" was not observed (although the general trend for Urbancrest children to address the teacher in short sentences may have artificially inhibited any observations on the grammatical construction of school speech.) 7. A high amount of what might be termed "non-focused activity" arising as a result of generalized "boredom" or irrelevance of topic of activities in school as compared to activities enacted by the child pursuing his own activities out of school. Urbancrest schoolchildren manifested numbers of such "non-focused displays" during time periods when they were supposed to be pursuing completion of tasks. We shall discuss this phenomenon later and discuss its possible relation to cultural difference in task
completion motivation. 8. A largely unique situation occurring "in-school" is the restricted channelization of communication activities into "types" of specially constructed events. That is, only certain types of interaction situations are preferred or are allowed to occur "in school." Cazden has termed many of these communication structures "participant structures." In participant structure communication the child interacts with the teacher, or pursues certain goals in formally organized groups such as "work groups" or "reading sessions." In the Urbancrest class there were a number of types of participant structures. A generalized classroom participant structure also observed in other schools is the teacher addressing the students as a body; in Urbancrest this mode of group communication was played down in favor of "partial group" participant structure. However, a large amount of "teaching was actually carried out in a form of participant structure where the teacher treats with individual children. This one-to-one form of communication does not contradict the statement made in (3) above since the communication is mainly controlled by the teacher and the student responds (to my observation) only in answer to question or commands. Of the three types of participant structures I observed the third type mentioned above occurred most often while the first type occurred least often. Type one occurs, in fact, only as a mode of interaction initiated by the student teacher whose activities I observed. A point which I will pursue later is that type one may not be culturally synchronous with communication patterns preferred by Black children. An important point to remember is that the "out-school" situations with which the child is familiar and for which "he knows the rules" do not include participant structures of type one. In white middle class society, for instance, church behavior is generally of participant structure one where the preacher, pastor or priest plays the role of the teacher. In Urbancrest's rural-south cultural background, the mode of church behavior is one in which the "audience" plays an important, dynamic and vocal part. The children of Urbancrest in general have no experience with the white middle-class form of participant structure that is used by most teachers. It is telling that the teacher with the most experience avoided using this structure with the children. When I questioned her about the reason she said that she "had more success" in smaller groups or in individual instruction. 9. The in-school situation adds a parameter within which children must compete; that is, in addition to personality or social acceptance and ability to influence others (Elder; 1972) children are ranked according to facility in performing school tasks and in interacting with teacher. 10. There are certain types of events participated in and enacted in the school that either do not occur or occur with less frequency outside the school. We shall enumerate the number and nature of these events under a separate heading.

II.B The Classroom Situation: Within the overall case of "being in school" the child may be alternatively in his classroom, out in the playground, in the hallway, principal's office or
library. The classroom is the most important of the types of situations that might occur "in-school." The classroom is the place in which the business of instruction is carried out; both the teacher and the child enter into the physical room with the expectation that certain social rules will be in operation. Although we will specify what those rules might be we shall enumerate the most important of them here as a means of establishing the classroom as the major sub-part of general school situations. 1. Although children seem to generally differentiate between "in" and "out" school situations they also make distinctions between various situations which can occur within the "in school" category. Certain behaviors are allowed, let us say, in the classroom that are not allowed in the hallway. Teachers in all schools exert control over whether or not children exit the room. In Urbancrest the "classroom" is a physical context to which socially meaningful behaviors are attached. Thus, as in activities I observed, one may move freely around the "classroom" but one must have permission to move from the classroom into the hallway. 2. Participant structure activities occur primarily within the classroom; only when children go to hear speakers in the gymnasium is a participant structure used for educational purposes outside the classroom. However, even in these cases it is interesting to notice that the children never exhibit the same spontaneity in teacher-student interchange out of the classroom context. Out-classroom instruction situations are almost always of type one. 3. Non-verbal contacts between students and teachers are limited in the classroom; when they occur they are primarily teacher initiated; on the playground, however, it is not unusual for students to initiate physical contact. I was never approached in the classroom, but on the playground the children would come and pull my hair, try to take my camera, and generally create a feeling of physical intimacy through non-verbal means. 4. Sexual stratification/differentiation occurs as a function of situation. In playground activities children would separate on sex lines to utilize different portions of the area; in the classroom, however, divisions along sex lines were less in evidence. 5. The in-class situation is one in which age differentiation is institutionally "built-in." In other in school contexts the children are age integrated. A possible result of the in-class segregation is that children come to associate age level with status, achievement and prestige. In out-school, or in out-class situations such differentiation may remain. Because one-year age distinctions are correlated with grade-level distinctions segregation of peer groups is much finer than might otherwise be the case. In Urbancrest the classes were run in a "tandem-grade" system. The students I observed were a mixed fifth and sixth grade class. On the playground these same children would play with one another rather than with children of other age-grade levels. Teacher information gathered in interview tends to show that friendships in out-school situations are correlated with patterns of friendship observable in the classroom; thus, age-grade class distinctions may have a wider cultural function in
structuring peer-groups than might be the case, let us say, in an urban context where other forms of peer socialization operate at as high a level—that is, gangs, community centers, etc. where age-grade-performance do not structure interaction groups as much as peer influence or physical ability, or verbal fluency (Foster 1974). Verbal facility is placed at a premium in-class rather than out-school, or in other out-class situations. We must separate facility in Standard English from fluency in the Black English Vernacular. In peer-group interaction outside of the classroom BEV is used as a primary means of gaining status; it may also be used in this manner in the classroom as in a number of cases I witnessed and recorded. However, facility in Standard English may operate as a means of gaining "classroom status" rather than "peer status" since the teacher enters the scene as a figure able to bestow the marks of status. In the Urbancrest classroom facility in Standard English was not consciously used as a means of differentiating students, but as we shall show from some interview data there are certain evidences which show that class status is partially based on Standard English fluency. Socially acceptable means of gaining status outside the classroom are played down inside the classroom. Teasing, insulting, mock aggression and other means utilized in the playground or in the out-school situations occur in the classroom but are generally characterized by a surreptitious quality; when the teacher witnesses certain instances of such status gaining devices she generally intervenes. This is especially true of the mock fight situation and it may be an appropriate interpretation to say that teachers do not recognize mock fight situations as such. Peer group networks are placed under an institutional strain in the classroom. I observed two different teachers during my fieldwork. One of them allowed peer group "conversation groups"—groups of friends whose contacts remained stable outside of school—to structure the seating arrangement in class. The other, a less experienced teacher, arranged the desks in a way which destroyed these conversation groups. The children, essentially, were placed in a double-bind; they had established a pattern of interaction which was "acceptable" in the classroom situation. When this pattern was disrupted they attempted to carry on their conversational activity by moving around the room and trading desks. The teacher's attempts to control this caused more problems than would have arisen if the original structures had remained unviolated. As we stated with the general "in-school" situation, the classroom situation calls for specific types of behaviors, and carries with it expectations of appropriate action. Under a listing of events and activities in this list we shall outline those that we have observed in the classroom. Most of the events which occur in the classroom are those which occur infrequently, if at all, in out-school contexts. The activities which occur most regularly in the classroom are those which characterize the in-school situation as a whole; it is the classroom and the behaviors enacted in it that is at the furthest remove from out-school situations—the playground, the hall, the gymnasium are all much closer to out-school contexts.
II.C. In-Class Sub-situations: Within the classroom the activity observed may vary according to three types of sub-situations. These three sub-situations correspond to the three types of participant structures outlined earlier. Behavior displayed by teacher and student within each of these is sufficiently different to make distinctions useful. The experienced teacher of the class I observed utilized two of the participant structures for explicit reasons, hence, these distinctions are not arbitrary but serve to distinguish meaningful situations from the teacher's point of view.

II.C.1. Participant Structure #1-Teacher addresses class as a group, they respond and fulfill teacher-set tasks as a group. This structure characterized the "way of teaching" of the student teacher. This type of structure necessarily places the teacher in the central role of "communicator." It is the teacher who gives instructions, initiates tasks, controls student communication and selects topics and modes of procedure. Students in this role are essentially passive. In Urbancrest this type of situation implies not only various types of interactional behaviors but certain physical room arrangements. The majority of times I witnessed this mode of instruction I also observed two related physical spacing phenomena: 1. The teacher arranged all of the desks in a row, facing a black board. 2. The teacher stood in front of the board, facing all of the students at once, as a means of giving instruction. The teacher I observed utilizing this participant structure (let us designate her as $T_2$) did not utilize smaller groups as instruction situations. The teacher who had been working in the school and with Black children for some years utilized small groups most of the time. Where $T_2$ utilized whole-group structures to give instruction $T_1$ utilized small group structures. The tendency for $T_2$ to use whole-group structures is correlated with courses-of-action we will later describe as "environmental ordering." On one of the first occasions where I observed $T_2$ I saw her move around the room straightening pillows in the reading corner, making shades on the windows a uniform height, putting books in stacks, and arranging desks in straight lines. All of this was accomplished before the children came in to the classroom from recess. There is a definite tendency for $T_2$ to operate in a teacher "authoritative" mode; the arranging of physical objects in the room, especially the desks, marks the fact that the "classroom" is being set up for teacher controlled activities.

During a seminar in the Department of Education here at Ohio State graduate students in Education were discussing teacher strategies, including desk arrangement. I brought up the case that I had observed in my fieldwork of $T_2$ arranging desks. The students observed that such an arrangement was a clear case of "planning", a class presentation. Subsequently a visual aid display showed the arrangement I had observed and correlated it with a teacher dominant instructional arrangement. Such a structure places emphasis on the teacher's communicative role and allows her to select those students with whom she wishes to interact. Also, it raises
important questions about student perceptions of teacher "availability." There appeared, during the course of observation, a marked disparity between courses-of-action whose purpose was getting attention and those oriented toward responding to commands. Participant structure oriented toward whole-group instruction placed an emphasis on student-passive roles. I rarely saw students initiate interaction or request teacher's aid in whole-group situations.

There was objective evidence to support the assertion that T2 was not comfortable in whole-group structures. When I observed her in contact with students on a one-to-one basis in the so-called "aid search" (which I shall describe shortly) she seemed much more in rapport with the students. They initiated interaction with her and used her as a resource in the completion of their tasks. During whole-group presentations she would repeatedly add the utterance "O.K.?" to the end of instructions. At the end of the whole-group presentation the students would immediately ask for clarifications of procedure. T2 would then go around the room and clarify for at least one-third of the students the subject material and the task previously presented to the whole class. During whole-group presentation she was unsure of the success of the mode of instruction. The use of the interrogative "O.K." repeatedly supports such a conclusion. Cazden, 1972, lists this type of participant structure as one of those used most commonly in white-middle class educational settings—hence, as one taught to most student teachers. It appears that the success of whole group structures is limited in the Black classroom; from the observational evidence I gathered it appears that much of the instructional "work" done in whole-group structures must be immediately repeated on a one-to-one basis afterward. I asked T1 about the efficacy of whole-group instruction in the context of T2's presentation and received a statement to the effect that: "I don't think it works but she is supposed to handle the class on her own." During the course of the fieldwork T2 exhibited a shift away from whole-group structures—perhaps as a recognition of their limited use in the Black classroom.

II.C.2. Participant Structure #2-Teacher addresses small group while the remainder, the majority of the class pursue individual tasks. This type of in-class situation took the form of "reading sessions" or "math classes" where T1 would move the children to a corner of the room, sit them down on floor pillows and have them read to her or answer questions she would pose to them. When I questioned her about the use of such a participant structure I prefaced my question with the observation that the children seemed to be much more verbal and open in their interaction with her. She affirmed this and added that she had not begun to use it as a matter of principle but because she had experienced success using it. It also allowed her to deal with students at different achievement levels without alienating the quick students and
forcing the slower ones to drop behind. One of the most characteristic features of this structure is the high amount of teacher-oriented behavior. In the whole-group structure the teacher must spend a large amount of time exercising control over the attention of the students. There was a drastic difference in attention focus in the small-group structure. This shift in attention focus was readily observable in proxemic patterns. At the initiation of the small-group lesson students would sit or recline in positions which allowed them to face one another. Within five minutes of the beginning of the lesson each of them had shifted their positions in such a way as to facilitate interaction with the teacher. Correspondingly, the amount of "side-sequence" conversation carried on with peers dropped as the lesson proceeded. All of this occurred without explicit teacher instruction; it appears that the mere fact of teacher presence in a small group, in an arbitrarily delimited space (the corner of the room) creates appropriate student orientations. The difference between student behaviors in this part-group situation and in the whole-group context is marked. Much less control over student-student interaction must be exercised in the part-group structure; in addition, the students exhibit much more of a willingness to address themselves to the central subject matter and the teacher-oriented interaction sequence. A partial explanation for this may have to do with "channelization" of the means of gainings status. In the small-group situation the teacher's presence inhibits student-status-seeking behavior. In consequence, students seek to create status by vying with each other in answering questions about the reading or mathematics lesson. Answers to questions were not prompted by the teacher, in fact, students often corrected one another and offered alternative answers spontaneously. In the whole-group situation this spontaneity rarely exhibited itself. Further research should be done into the apparent cultural synchronicity of the part-group structure in Black classrooms. In conclusion, where the whole-group structure appears to emphasize student-passive roles the part-group structure emphasizes student-active roles. The importance of orality in Black culture may be an important factor in the success of the part-group structure.

II.C.2. Participant Structure #3-Teacher treats with individual students pursuing individual tasks. This participant structure was used by T1 in conjunction with participant structure two, or by itself. T2 always used the structure in combination with a whole-group lesson; the individual structure was used as the structure in which whole-group instructions were to be completed by individuals. Student "conversation groups" operated in this structure; movement around the room was common when T1 ran the classroom. Freedom of movement was restricted in this structure when T2 ran the classroom. T2 tended to control student-student interaction in this structure by re-arranging the seating arrangements so as to destroy student-created configurations allowed by T1. Consequently, she created a discipline
problem for herself because she had to control action-seeking behavior on the part of students trying to re-constitute the shattered interaction patterns. Both teachers utilized a teaching method I call the "aid search." This method appears to be correlated only with the individual participant structure; the aid search is essentially a process of action-seeking behavior on the part of the teacher. He or she will move about the room seeking to contact students in need of clarification, further instruction or other types of aid. \( T_1 \) used the aid search only when student action-seeking behavior did not bring problems to her attention; \( T_2 \) restricted action-seeking behavior on the student's part unless it was conducted in an appropriate manner—i.e. remaining at one's desk and raising one's hand.

II.D. The Conversation Group—Student structured participant patterns. The conversation group is a student-constructed and student maintained participant pattern. It is correlated with a certain physical arrangement of desks occupied by particular personnel. If someone from another group tries to intrude in the arrangement she is resisted. I witnessed an incident where a person tried to enter a group to which she did not belong. This person \( S \) was known in the class as a domineering sort. She was named as the person the other children would least like to sit next to. Her entrance into the group was strongly resisted on personality factors alone. Other persons seeking entrance into a group other than their own must enact appropriate behaviors. They cannot, as \( S \) did, display dominance behaviors during entrance. Instead, they must approach the outskirts of the group, pull up a desk or chair and wait until an already engaged member introduces them into the group. Group membership is by invitation, not by intrusion. During the nine months I observed the class there were at least four stable conversation groups. Not every individual in the class belonged to one of these groups; there were a number of isolates. These isolates were primarily individuals whose personality problems not only operated against their academic work, but their social interaction as well. Conversation group composition follows closely the pattern of playground play and out-of-school partnerships; it is impossible to say which peer friendship network determines which other.

III. Participants and Personnel of the Classroom—The Classroom as the setting on which we are focusing in our micro-ethnographic study contains two major types of personnel—the teachers and the students. Principals, librarians, guidance counselors and others may have contact with the child in and out of the classroom on a regular basis, but it is the teacher with whom and through whom the student acquires knowledge. During the field work I had the opportunity of observing the teaching styles (alternative ways of teaching) of two different teachers already referred to as \( T_1 \) and \( T_2 \). Each of these teachers exhibited different behaviors in their approach toward the enactment of teaching displays and their responses to student activity.
III. A.I. The Experienced Teacher-Adaptive Mode. This teacher \( T_1 \) informed me that she had had a number of years of experience teaching Black schoolchildren. When I questioned her about her apparent success in dealing with the children, that is, whether she had tried consciously to change her style to suit the cultural context, she replied that she had not consciously tried to do so. Her "adaptive" teaching style seemed to be a product of learning to cope with a new educational context, in a new cultural environment. The striking aspect of this teacher's style is that it makes use of Black cultural norms--i.e. orality as a status gaining device, small-group participant structures, present-oriented gratification etc.--to diffuse the normative products of the white middle-class society.

\( T_1 \) does not try to control the students in every aspect of their classroom routines. There appears to be almost an agreement that \( T_1 \) will allow certain student control over the classroom in exchange for compliant behavior in certain activities. When disciplining a student she rarely extends the punishment over a long period of time; she will make some sort of verbal statement to the transgressor and then try to fit them into the sequence of activities they should have been involved in. The students seem to understand this. An example of this occurred when two students R and C come into the classroom late. \( T_1 \) asks: "Where have you been for fifteen minutes?" The students answer: "Bathroom." \( T_1 \) does not question this statement. There does not appear to be any concern over where the students actually were. The message carried in the question was one which asserted that \( T_1 \) had the right to question R and C, and further, that she was displeased with their tardiness. Their answer was just an answer, whose truth value made no difference. \( T_1 \) sent them to their seats to accomplish the task she had previously set for the class. The incident was closed. Clearly discipline for \( T_1 \) is not a matter of what the student did as much as it is a matter of how that behavior or event affects her control over certain classroom activities. The purpose of her questioning the tardy youths was not to punish them for being late--but to assert some sort of control over them as they entered the classroom. As such, she was doing linguistic work to gain status over them. In return for this "doing of status" the students are not punished; they are free from retaliatory action and may engage in the appropriate classroom activities. Such an interpretation is born out by the apparent nonchalance with which the students and \( T_1 \) enacted the whole sequence.

\( T_1 \) will not punish students for enacting behaviors which are used for the purpose of "performing." Performing is a type of student display which is used to gain status through the creation of entertaining or humorous events. I observed one instance where the student R mentioned above walked up to \( T_1 \) and looked at her through a pair of "glasses" made by circling his eyes with his fingers. \( T_1 \) ignored him while he did this.
and in a short while he stopped. The class, however, laughed a
good deal at this performance. In fact, the reaction to this type
of display is an "overreaction" relative to the response given to
student-student performances. Perhaps a case can be made for the
student's recognition of this means of gaining status as more
"worthwhile" or at a higher level since it was enacted in front
of a person whose authority is higher. In any case, Ti did not
react in any disciplinary fashion. The few other instances of such
a performance that I witnessed were handled similarly; during some
of these Ti would make a comment such as: "R is so smart that he
has time to do this!" Of course, the rest of the students realize
that Ti has just achieved status at the expense of the performing
student. The playing of such "status games" has been reported by
Foster, 1974 in which teachers were ngaged in "testing" by
their students.

Ti frequently uses "ignoring" as a means of maintaining
control over the classroom. If we accept the oft-cited contention
that Black classrooms are run by those with highest status then
Ti's use of selective ignoring is a highly synchronous style of
teaching. Certain breaches of discipline that would be singled
out by most middle-class teachers (and were in fact singled out
by T2) were ignored by Ti. From Ti's point of view, we hypothe-
size, what is being ignored is not bad behavior, but attempts at
creating status situations. By ignoring a great many, and turning
the rest to her own advantage by utilizing verbal repartee she is
controlling the class in a manner synchronous with the culture of
the students. The white teacher (and Ti is white) faces a unique
problem in a school such as Urbancrest. Like all teachers she is
administratively prohibited from using corporal punishment. The
white middle-class teacher at a white middle-class school has a
pre-defined status as an older, adult white female or male which
gives him authority. The white teacher in a Black school must
prove to the students that she has authority, she must not assume
it. One way of doing this is to "play the game" and pass the
status "tests" that the students pose. They will accord the teach-
er the compliance she wishes. If the teacher attempts to control
the "testing" situations as breaches of discipline she creates
problems where there are none, and, in addition, she fails to
create a status image that she can utilize to facilitate her
"way of teaching." However, since it is impossible to engage in
all of the testing situations and still teach (since status is
apparently "done" whenever an opportunity arises) selectively ig-
noring certain situations acts as a means of control without los-
ing status.

Ti also exhibits her adaptation to the Black classroom
by accepting the difference in time perspective between herself
and her students. Let us illustrate this point with an example.
Four girls are in the corner of the room painting. Ti wishes to
assemble the children preparatory to dismissing them for the class
period. The girls ignore Ti's first request to quit painting.
Four minutes later T₁ reissues her request. The girls continue to paint, acting as if they had not heard her. Two minutes later, the request is again reissued, this time T₁ points at the girls and calls their names. The girls ignore the request. Finally, after two or three minutes they begin to clean up the paint and sit down. The whole of this scene was enacted without the girls making the slightest move to affirm that T₁'s request had been received. What leads me to believe that T₁ recognizes such occurrences as culture normative is that she did not get angry at the students, or act as if what they were doing was a form of misbehavior. Other student activities exhibit a similar time perspective; for instance, when a teacher calls one of the students to her desk the time taken to get there seems rather extended. I have never seen T₁ act as if this were inappropriate.

T₁ uses a small-group participant structure mode almost exclusively in her instruction. Although such a structure is better for the control of individual students I find that the students are much more verbal and subject-oriented in these groups. That is to say, teacher control is passive, a sort of "monitoring" of student activity. It is within participant group structures of this sort that I have observed T₁ using a monitoring form that I call "braking." Braking is a means of guiding student responses to questions when those responses are given in haste, or when a child tries to give a number of possible answers in sequence. T₁ used braking as a way of making the children slow down and think about their answers; also, it served as a way of getting them to move from humorous and trivial answers to the answers she wanted them to figure out. The appeal of the part-group structure for the children is at least partially the opportunity to "perform" in front of an audience that resembles the peer conversation group. I think T₁'s use of the mode is evidence of her "adaptiveness." She uses a teaching method which complements culturally normative student patterns. Then she adapts (through a method like braking) the pattern to instructional purposes.

T₁ appears to be considered quite a "wit" to her students. This is not only because of her ability to pass the status tests, but also because she does make some quite witty comments. One form of humor she often uses is what I call "reflexive sounding." One example of this is contained in the following scene: T₁ had been out of the room giving blood at the Red Cross. When she returns during the class the children ask her where she has been. She told them she had been to give blood but that she had wasted her time because she was underweight and they wouldn't take it. Then she said: "Your skinny teacher wasn't good enough for them!" The class fairly howled at this remark. At first the great humor of this remark did not strike me. It was only later, in some reading on Black Culture that I noticed a fat-skinny dichotomy. In Black circles being skinny is more often a subject of humor than being fat.
By using her own "skinniness" as an object of humour she was adapting to a pattern of Black humour. Another time when T1 had been out of the room and the student teacher had been running the class the children were fairly subdued. When T1 returned the class began to laugh and make loud noises. She asked them: "Why does everyone go insane when I come into the room?" The children laughed even louder, and T1 smiled as if she were sharing a joke with them.

There seems to be quite a rapport between T1 and the students. She jokes with them often, and they do not hesitate to make jokes about her size, or some of her mannerisms.

Although there is a rapport, and T1 uses behaviors which integrate her with the cultural patterns of her students, she also knows how to manipulate the symbols of power. An outstanding example of this is her use of the teacher's desk. Most of the time T1 uses an "egalitarian" method of instruction such as individual instruction or part-group instruction. However, when it is necessary to confer with a student about something more important—such as a failure to perform some task correctly, or gross mistakes in his work—then she will not go to the student's desk, instead she will call him to her desk. The symbolism of having the student go to her and separate himself from the all-important group is important. By separating the student from his peers she marks the occasion and impresses the seriousness of it on him; I found that even the most mischievous, action-seeking student listened intently to T1 when he was called to her desk. It must be noted that she used the method sparingly, and never used it, to my knowledge, for behavioral problems. Most of these she dealt with in the public manner I have already outlined. The unique thing about T1's teaching style is that she uses a very "situational" mode of interaction. Depending on the context or situation which arises she will utilize different behaviors. I have seen her shout at students when it is necessary, I have also seen her apologize publicly, especially if she feels she has been too curt with someone. These positive characters counterbalance the disciplinary methods she must sometimes use by providing positive image signals in place of the negative image signals produced when she has to shout or publicly criticize some student's behavior.

T1 appears to be explicitly aware of her "fit" with the class. She is aware that the student teacher, for instance, is acutely aware of the high noise level in the class. A number of times I have seen her attempt to quell the noise when T2 was attempting to teach. She rarely bothered with this type of control when she was teaching by herself. At one point I saw her go and confer privately with a student who was walking around the room. He went and sat down after they talked. It appeared that the boy's walking about the room had disturbed T2 and T1 had intervened to correct it. If she had been alone it is doubtful she would have paid it any mind. T1 is aware of certain noise level and physical activity "cycles" within the room. She only attempts to modulate
the periodicity of the cycles. The cycle follows a pattern much like the following: initiation—rise—peak/rebuke—dormancy—rise—peak/rebuke. T₁ has very little problem controlling the cycle. The children seem to have some conception of the cycle themselves. T₁'s rebukes have an immediate effect even though they are mild and are not maintained.

T₁ is not afraid to initiate physical contact with the students. I never saw students initiate contact with her, but they did not seem to feel awkward when she clasped them or put her arms about them. Generally T₁'s behavior seemed to fit with their perceptions of what it was appropriate for her to do. One interesting aspect of T₁'s nonverbal and proxemic behavior was that she never knelted when speaking to a student (although she would sometimes put her knee on a student's desk.) T₂, on the other hand always knelt when speaking to students. To be frank, I was confused by this apparent difference in approach. I had assumed that kneeling when speaking to the students would be appropriate for T₁ to establish a feeling of rapport. However, after some thought it came to me that kneeling to talk to students is probably correlated with the middle-class pattern of looking into someone's eyes. Therefore, T₁, with her recognition of Black interaction patterns, did not find it necessary to kneel. The placing of a hand on the student's shoulder, or her knee on his desk served the necessary function of establishing rapport. T₂, on the other hand, was vainly trying to make contact through an inappropriate pattern—she was succeeding only in making her students uncomfortable. In Black Culture it is considered disrespectful to look into the eyes of an older person.

There are numerous other examples of T₁'s teaching style but I think some of the ones I have mentioned make the point that she is using what I have been calling the "adaptive mode." This is a mode of instruction which utilizes cultural patterns of the students as a component of teaching. The positive aspect of such an adaptive mode is that it allows the content of another culture to be disseminated through message forms and communication patterns familiar to one's own culture. Thus, the way of teaching adapts to the cultural circumstance, even while the teacher is fulfilling the main function of the school—to spread the values and forms of the wider culture.

III. A.2. The student teacher—Authoritative Mode: This teacher, T₂, represents a teacher type I am labelling "authoritative." She entered the classroom context at Urbancrest from a training situation at a professional school. Emerging as she has from a situation in which the dominant mode of teaching is that adapted to the middle-class, it is not too unexpected that we find numerous instances in which her communication and joint construction of activity with the students is impaired. Her teaching style distinctly contrasts with that of T₁; there is a marked difference in preferences for participant structures, teacher oral content and amount of formality in interaction.
T₂, as I have said, is an interesting contrast to T₁. Where T₁'s way of teaching is an adaptation to cultural difference, T₂'s way of teaching is often maladaptive. In part, this is because of the authoritarian character of her style. The word "authoritarian" is meant to indicate that classroom behaviors are seen as "controlled" by the teacher. Student activities should be initiated, monitored and evaluated by the teacher at all times. Thus, the teacher dominates oral activity, seeks to control student movement in the classroom, restricts free access to teacher information except through appropriate request behaviors, and views student status-seeking behaviors as a threat to authority. A number of T₂'s activities exemplify such a style. The authoritarian mode is the teaching style taught in most professional training programs; it is a style adapted to the cultural patterns of the dominant society. When an authoritarian teacher enters a Black classroom she is apt to find that student classroom styles and teacher classroom styles will conflict. Now, by the term "authoritarian" I do not mean to imply that the "adaptive" teacher does not discipline or correct her or his students, rather I mean to point out the rigidity of a culture-bound way of behaving in the face of a situation to which it is clearly unsuited.

A most noticeable aspect of the "authoritarian" mode is the tendency for the teacher to try to physically structure the environment so as to facilitate teacher control. T₂, prior to beginning a class lesson on those days she was to teach "solo" would enter the classroom and put all of the desks in rows. She would also go around the room straightening books, picking up paper, etc. However, the desk rearrangement was the most important part of her ordering of the environment; the rearrangement effectively broke up the conversation groups that had been formed by the students. T₂'s new arrangement faced the students toward the front of the room, in order that they might all face her as she was presenting a whole-group lesson. Such a physical arrangement predisposes the classroom personnel toward communication structures which can be monitored and controlled by central control. This central control is the teacher; from the point of view of her own training such central control is not only right and proper, but culturally adaptive and necessary for the process of instruction. Professional classes on teacher instruction strategies (one of which I attended as part of the field research) often explicitly stress the physical layout of the room as a factor which the teacher can control. The layout that I observed being used by T₂ was adapted toward teacher control of whole-group instruction.

This emphasis on whole-group instruction carries with it a corresponding stress on teacher-dominant oral activity. Because of the way the teacher structures the classroom she is called upon to exercise "control." I noticed that T₂ was more prone to directly "command" students to do things. A great portion of whole group instruction is necessarily devoted to the task of spelling
out procedural steps in the accomplishment of tasks. T₁, on the other hand, rarely used whole-group structures as a means of giving procedural information; such information was given in individual conferences at the student's desk. T₂'s whole group instruction concentrated on three areas: 1. To dispense the same information to all the students at the same time, this includes both content information as well as procedural information. 2. To control student response to this material in such a way as to get them to affirm their knowledge or understanding of the material in a public fashion. 3. To, in some way, ascertain that all students are learning the subject whose content comprises the instruction. (2) and (3) are obviously connected, since the public affirmation of comprehension serves the purpose of assuring the teacher that instructional goals are being met.

We run into certain problems with this instructional mode in the Black classroom; these problems were evident in an observation of the student response to T₂'s attempts to carry on classroom instruction. We mentioned previously that whole-group instruction is probably not suited to the Black classroom; this may have to do with communication groups utilized in the out-school context, for instance, the type of whole-group participation characteristic of religious observance. What we have in the classroom is a whole-group circumstance whose premise is not egalitarian; the teacher disseminates and controls information. The child is familiar with a form of whole-group communication where all of the participants can exercise control over the flow of the communication process. This control is a form of "situational response." It can be observed in the spontaneous audience reaction at blues concerts (Haralambos 1970) or in the phenomenon of "testifying." T₂, on the other hand, controls student response; the child is placed in an untenable position. He or she recognizes the form of communication structure that the teacher is using, what is not recognizable is the set of rules the teacher is using to operate it. We can place T₂'s use of whole-group instruction in direct contrast to T₁'s part-group instruction where the "rules" are rules very similar to those used in gaining status in peer groups. In the part group instruction the teacher exercises minimal control over who responds, and when; control of what is said is accomplished by the "braking" method. What is said, in addition, is generally part of "sequences of answers" that the teacher allows the students to formulate. She then lets the students decide which is the correct one (with suitable cues from the teacher.) T₂'s whole-group instruction controls who responds by allowing the teacher to select respondents; it controls when someone responds by allowing the teacher to vary the amount of time it takes her to choose the respondee. It controls what is said by virtue of the fact that a student giving a "wrong" answer is forced to relinquish a position in the communication structure while the teacher moves on to another student. Thus, where sequences of answers, some irrelevant or humorous, are permissible in part-group modes, they are militated against in whole
The students in the Urbancrest classroom appeared much less willing to actively involve themselves in whole-group instruction. They did not readily volunteer answers (in direct opposition to their willingness to do so in part-group instruction.)

$T_2$, nevertheless, used whole-group instruction as her primary means of teaching the class. It was obvious, at least to an observer, and from comments I recorded from the other teacher, that whole-group instruction was not successful. Most of the procedural information, and, indeed, much of the content information of the instruction had to be reviewed on an individual basis after the whole group presentation. Thus, function (1) of the whole-group method was essentially a failure. I have one idea about why this might be so. Whole-group instruction breaks up the student-structure conversational groups; when it does so it forces the students to seek to re-establish peer contacts destroyed by the teacher. They expend a lot of time and activity seeking to do this, during the time that they should be imbibing the teacher disseminated information. Function (2) of whole-group instruction fails also; a primary reason for this is that "public affirmation" of knowledge is a middle-class device for gaining status. If we accept the notion that verbal facility and, or, wit is the Black peer norm for gaining status then we can see that the child is risking status by publicly giving academic answers. Function (2), then, cannot be achieved because the Black child does not see any incentive for risking status by giving a wrong answer in front of everybody. In addition, since whole-group instruction is teacher dominated the interchange also risks the student's losing status to the teacher in front of everyone. In part-group instruction as $T_1$ carried it out, such risks were mitigated because there was a possibility of gaining status (since wit was allowed) and there was also the added informality of an instructional mode patterned on the conversational group. Function (3) fails because the teacher interprets silence, or the fact that only a few students respond either as evidence that the students understand, or that they are slow or stupid. Thus, the whole-group mode is not interpreted as a "failure" but rather as a system which because of a failure of part of its personnel, can be bolstered by remedial activity--which in $T_2$'s eyes must be the function of individual instruction. The point we wish to make in this context is this: the authoritarian teacher will cling to ways of teaching adapted to her own cultural circumstance. When these fail she most often will attempt to bolster them on the assumption that it is not the system which fails--but the students.

$T_2$ also exhibits traits of the authoritarian mode in the way she reacts to the student "test" of status. Where $T_1$ will either ignore such tests, or use them publicly to increase her own status, or as a means of discipline, $T_2$ will either get
angry or will deal with the student by ignoring her or him. Where ignoring can serve the function of freeing the teacher from responding to all test situations, it can also give a negative impression (Foster 197*) because it makes the students think that the teacher cannot respond in kind. I have two examples that characterize the two different responses. In the first example T2 was attempting to explain something to one of the students; T2 said something to the student and the student replied with: "Say what?" T2 repeated herself and the student again replied "Say what?" This happened two more times. Finally T2 said, "You get up and go to see Mr. _______" (This was the principal.) The student rose, went out of the door, and, as he slammed it said "Be glad to." Now, when this happened every student in the class made appreciative noises at the student's display. T2 had not gained by sending the student out of the room; in fact the rest of the class appeared to view the whole performance as a status gaining device on the student's part. Certainly no disciplinary goals were met by sending the student from the room since it is doubtful whether he was chastised or whether the example he set for the other students was what T2 intended. The second example involves a student trying to get T2's attention by saying in a loud voice "You, come here!" The student repeated this command three times. T2 ignored her. Then, the student said: "Come here, Ms. _______" while she kept the same tone of command in her voice and used a beckoning gesture of the finger. T2 turned to her then and asked: "Do you have a question?" T2 would not respond to the initial "test" that had been performed on her, but she did react to the second "test" which was in essence only a toned down version of the first. It was sufficiently mild enough, however, for T2 to feel that the student had been "put in her place." It is doubtful, however, whether the student or the rest of the class saw it this way. It would have been more useful for the student to have been used as a means of showing the class that such incidences of testing would not be successful as a means to gain status. Instead, T2 showed the class that she 1. heard the original test, and 2. chose to accept it after only a minimal change. From the middle-class point of view, of course, the fact that the student might really need help was the overriding consideration; from the student's point of view the teacher showed that she might be "sounded" upon by those seeking status. An interpretation like this is supported by the fact that I repeatedly observed the students mispronouncing T2's name; she never corrected them although it was obvious that everyone knew what her real name was. She was essentially established as an "open target" for the students. I never witnessed T2 using the "sound" as a means of keeping students in line. Where T1 would use the device of public announcement to keep the offending student disciplined (for instance, by announcing publicly "_______ doesn't care that I'm talking!") T2 would either give in to the sound or try to chastise the student privately. It appeared to me that she was very distraught by these student behaviors and did not perceive them as the devices they were. When privately chastising a student her tone of voice seemed very bitter and hostile; for
instance I saw her turn to a student and say "I was talking to not you!" in a surprisingly (to me, at least) hostile tone of voice. The student sat down immediately and T2 appeared rather embarrassed after she had said it. The amount of culture difference between student and teacher in this case is quite noticeable; not only does it interfere with the teaching process but it also appears to cause quite a bit of emotional and personal trouble for the teacher who is confused by an apparent lack of success and rapport in the classroom.

The students react with some warmth and spontaneity to Tj. With T2 the amount of misbehavior in a real sense begins to rise. It almost appears as if the students purposefully try to upset her. I noticed that the noise level of the classroom always rose when T2 was the only teacher in the room. This occurred in spite of the fact that she tried to control it much more than Tj. I never saw a student exhibit any kind of behavior to Tj that expressed dislike or disrespect. However, I did witness instances where students would mimic T2 or would stick their tongues out at her. It is my belief that the students, in truth, did not co-operate with T2 because her cultural patterns were so different from theirs. She did not instruct them in a fashion that could involve them in the subject according to their own normative patterns, she could not pass or use status testing for her own purposes. She allowed negative emotions to manifest themselves to her students; she created repressive atmospheres by trying to control student activity (for instance, she controlled movement around the room and student talk) and she could not enact appropriate displays as her role position demanded. It is my belief that the authoritarian mode is characterized by such patterns; although such patterns are acceptable in middle-class contexts they do not lead to a creative and educating situation in the Black classroom. Since T2 was a student teacher I did not have as many different situations as I did Tj. However, from what I have seen, and what I have reported, it seems to be a valid conclusion that there is a divergence in teaching styles that is a function of adaptation to cultural difference.

III.B. The Students: The students themselves, of course, form the largest group of participants. Obviously, it would be impossible to explore each student's individual way of behaving and personality in as much detail was we have attempted to do with the teachers. However, there are some important data to be presented that will act to give an indication of the types of students present in the classroom. This information will operate primarily to inform the analyses of Chapter II and also will serve as the basis for some comments on teacher assessments of individual students. The information reported here is based on observational data and, where noted, on teacher interview information. Each student will be notated by a symbol; such a notation will be helpful in Chapter II; it stands beyond the scope of this paper to give more than a brief account of each student so only the information necessary for some understanding of reported scenes is
given in the Table which follows. Information on some dyadic relationships is given following the Table.

### TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STUDENT SYMBOL</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.1</td>
<td>A.1 is mentioned as the person the other students would least like to sit next to. T₁ characterizes her as a &quot;big problem.&quot; She wants to be accepted by the others, but the mistrust her because she often plays tricks and &quot;hustles&quot; her supposed &quot;friends.&quot; She is considered clever by the teacher but is thought not to use her wits for academic purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.2</td>
<td>A.2 is described by the teacher as an angel. She dresses attractively and appears to have a good social personality. She interacts well with the other students; all of the other girls in the class want to be friends with her.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.3</td>
<td>This student is well-liked. He doesn't involve himself in physical fights but appears to be very good at non-physical means of gaining status--i.e. by sounding or displaying to others. In the class I often observed him sitting at his desk amusing himself by performing various non-focused non-verbal activities--swinging his feet, tapping the desk with a pencil and so on. He is a fairly good student but often accused of wasting time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.4</td>
<td>A.4 is the person labeled as smartest in T₁'s evaluation. She is also the person who, objectively, appears to perform best verbally in Standard English. She is also described as interesting and mature. One must ask whether this is a cause or effect of her verbal facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.5</td>
<td>This student is quite popular in the classroom. T₁ thinks he is smart but she often is exasperated with him because he pretends ignorance to get her attention (a form of hustling.) He is a discipline problem of sorts because he is forever profiling (putting on a performance) in order to make the other students laugh. He uses non-verbal over verbal means of gaining status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.6 &amp; A.7</td>
<td>These two individuals are twins, but they like to be separated. A.6 has a poor self-concept (T₁'s evaluation) and spends a lot of time alone.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 2-CONTINUED

A.6 & A.7  
She does not belong to any conversation group but sits alone near the teacher's desk. A.7 is inclined to be quieter than her sister but is considered to be superior academically. T₁ uses the word refined to describe her.

A.8  
This child is the youngest of seventeen in his family. He is thought to be bright, but has been a problem in school for the past two years. T₁ thinks it is because he was pushed around at home; she describes him as an interesting case.

A.9  
A.9 is described by T₁ as very negative. There is poor teacher-student interaction. The family is part of a Jehovah's Witness congregation. In class he appears surly and quiet. He does not use verbal status games; in fact, he interacts poorly with all but A.8. The other children call him odd.

A.10  
This student is called "sweet boy" by T₁. He fits into the classroom well. He is friends with a number of individuals from different cliques. He is physically small but mentally quick. He is adept at knowing how far to go in gaining status in verbal games before the larger boys react negatively.

A.11  
This girl is described by the teacher as having a superiority complex. She is popular with the other girls and she always has the nicest clothes. She is described as spoiled by T₁, or, alternatively, as sophisticated; she likes to play tricks on people.

A.12  
She is the sister of A.2, but she likes to emulate A.11. The word sophisticated is used to describe both of them.

A.13  
This is a student who used to go to a Catholic school. She is considered by T₁ to be creative, but, in T₁'s words, cannot channel to academics. She is very verbal and a tomboy.

A.14  
T₁ calls her bright, but "spaced out." She is very verbal in all types of interaction but always seems to be preoccupied.
TABLE 2-CONTINUED

A.15  This student is easy to get along with in interaction; T₁ used the adjective easy-going.

A.16  This person is the major classroom isolate. She was neurologically handicapped and spent one year at a special school. She sits alone and other students do not interact with her. Sometimes she is protected by A.2.

A.17  She tries to act grownup. She and A.1 are friends and sit in a common conversation group. They often give trouble to other groups of friends.

There are some major friendship and enmity patterns in the classroom. The smallness of the community is a factor in this, since the number of children it is possible to form peer relations with is rather limited. Kinship does not appear to be much of a factor even with the size limitation. In the two cases of sibling relationship the individuals are not friendly to one another in the classroom context. T₁ stated that it was her observation that the friendship patterns of the boys were most stable; the girls tended to shift their patterns of friendship rather quickly and frequently. My informant told me that the girls got into more frequent fights and were known to kick and scratch at one another when involved in them.

A.5 and A.3, sometimes including A.10, form a stable friendship group. T₁ expresses the opinion that they have good complementarity. This so-called "fit" may have something to do with the fact that all of them are good at performing status games. A.3 and A.10 use verbal games and A.5 is good at non-verbal performing. They often carry on with one another. This is probably the reason that they sit together. We may have evidence in this relationship of a causative factor in the formation of particular conversation groups. A.8, as a rule, forms less intense friendships. He likes to joke around, but he also exhibits exaggerated agonistic behavior. This may explain the reason that the friendships he forms are not as stable. "Joking relation friendships" that are stable probably preclude actual hostility when playing the dozens or playing status games. If A.8 cannot follow expectations he may have difficulty establishing relationships. A.8 is friends with another behavior problem, A.9; both of them isolate themselves from the class. Sometimes A.9 will seek out younger children; this may be because it is easier to convert a passive taciturn classroom role into a dominant role when the partners are in a junior status group. A.9 and A.8 probably maintain a friendship because they have agreed not to play the "games" with one another; in fact, they very rarely make contact with A.5 or A.3 who are most astute at the games. Their tendency toward passivity also has negative repercussions with their teacher-student interactions.
Among the girls, A.1 is closest to A.17, but A.17 tends to be fickle. This, however, may be part of the reason that they get along so well together. T1 feels that A.1 has a need for acceptance. A.17 represents someone with whom it is easy to be friends. A.4 and A.1 have problems with each other because A.1 tends to be jealous of her. They have gotten into some very real and very physical fights. T1 says that A.4 has undergone a change of attitude that reflects a willingness to get along— which may be indicative of the type of criteria that teachers use to judge students. She deems this type of attitude change "maturation." A.4 and A.7 are good friends; she does not interact with A.1 and A.17 either. A.2 does not get along with these latter individuals either; this is partly because they have a habit of creating rumours about her. A.1 and A.17 can be considered the class rumormongers; it may be that this activity represents a sort of "female status game." Foster 1974 reports that girls are adept at the dozens and other verbal games. I did not see the girls in this class use them on each other, although I did see them use them on the teacher and in reaction to the boys. A.12 likes to emulate A.11, but she is also a very volatile force in the classroom. She is very sensitive to insults and is the first person to call other people names. There is a tendency to be physical and hit people when she gets upset.

These very general descriptions of the students and their patterns are not very valuable in themselves since they are not supplemented by more detailed biographical and psychological data. However, we can see a few general patterns that are of some interest:

1. Students who are good at the status games form friendships.

2. Those who, for various reasons, cannot or do not indulge in the sounding or performing games form counter-groups.

3. Students who are described in positive terms by the teacher (studious, refined, angel) pair together.

4. Students who are avoided by other students may pair together.

The most important aspect of this discussion of student personnel, however, may lie in a consideration of the structure of the teacher's assessments. If we examine T1's comments on the various students we see certain general patterns. One major pattern is that those students who are the most verbal and fluent in Standard English are those students who are described as "bright" or "smart," or some other adjective that stresses intellectual prowess. In the group of seventeen listed, A.4, A.14 and A.13 are described this way; in my objective opinion, from observing their performance, they were also the most adept at Standard English performance. In addition, A.7 who was described as "reading a book in her spare time" (a culturally approved middle-class product) was given the adjective "studious" and "intelligent." Generally, even BEV verbality raises teacher ratings; A.14 and A.13 who have other traits which prevent them from performing academically (one "cannot
Those students who have the poorest objective ability to interact with the teacher verbally (in either BEV or SAE), such as A.9, are rated as "big problems." Those students who are best at the status games are often called "exasperating" or are looked on as pests and nuisances, (A.3 and A.5). The teacher appears to construct role-types primarily on individual personality assessments and interaction style assessments. The most positively rated students have not only good personality ratings (gets along well, is mature, etc.) but are also verbal (preferably in Standard English). These persons, like A.4, emerge as the teacher's idea of a model student. Other students who may be equally verbal, but use BEV and use status games, are not rated as bright, or if they are, are also considered to be discipline problems who "waste a lot of time." The teacher appears to place emphasis on verbal facility although she told me explicitly that she did not mitigate against Black speech in the classroom; there is some evidence that student assessments utilize middle-class standards. I would however like to state that more information would have to be gathered to substantiate what is only an indication; in addition, it is obvious that if such assessments do occur in this classroom they are much less obvious and harmful than in some of the reported cases (Williams and Whitehead 1971).

IV. Types of Courses-of-Action observed in the Classroom.

This last section of my Hymesian ethnography will attempt to present in a brief form some of the main types of action sequence (which I shall call courses-of-action) that I observed. In the classroom, courses-of-action are communicative behavior displays that are comprised of connected sets of acts. They are performed mutually, although in some instances one partner may be most passive, as, for example, in an audience role. On the following pages I list the major types of events I observed; I have divided these up into two types, those where the students play the major part, and those where the teacher plays the major part. The descriptions are based on observation; the labels are my own, or are based on phenomena reported and labels used by other students of Afro-America. In the case of the course-of-action entitled "jiving" I actually have recorded instances of this label in use by the students. Some of the teacher labels are derived from sequences of transcribed conversations I obtained from T1.

Some of the courses-of-action listed here have already been given as examples in the preceding pages of this work; others will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter II. The list given here is meant to serve only as a descriptive list of the major types of action sequences occurring regularly in the Urbancrest classroom. Although many other types could be listed, these represent "major" types of sequences; the criteria for their listing here include both their relative interest and the unique relations to Black culture of a number of them. I have left of breaking each sequence down into constituent parts; this is done for selected examples in Chapter II.
1. Capping: Capping is a course-of-action comprised of a set of at least two acts. The initial act is a statement/utterance and the second act is a statement/utterance which is intended to "outperform a person by improving on his verbal insult" (Kochman 1972:211). The label can also be applied to any sequence in which the second statement is to "outperform" (be funnier, more silly, more risque) the statement of a previous speaker.

2. Jiving: Jiving is any set of acts in which the verbal activity is oriented toward putting on an act, in order to achieve some purpose to the advantage of the person"jiving." Non-verbal activity operates to support the verbal performance. Jiving is a form of "putting someone on." There are two types of jiving, one directed at authority figures (Kochman 1972:221) and another directed at peers or members of some in-group. (Also, "shucking," "tomming," "puttin' it on" etc.) A person jiving is also sometimes said, in youth culture and Black parlance to be "talkin' shit." See also: (Abrahams 1970).

3. Mimicing: This is a set of acts which is characterized not so much by content, as by the mode of delivery (vocal and non-verbal cues.) Mimicing occurs as the correlate of some other act which provides the model for the imitation. The features of the modeled act are selectively exaggerated to increase the ability of the audience to recognize the source. Generally thought of as humourous.

4. Profiling: Profiling is (in this paper) a set of primarily non-verbal acts which are intended as a "public performance." Profiling can be considered as a non-verbal equivalent of "rapping" which is a Black speech event in which the display of verbal facility and style is used to attract attention to oneself, or some aspect of oneself (Kochman 1972:217). Profiling may involve wearing flashy clothes and parading about (strutting your stuff--although this also has overtones of sexual display,) or it may involve presenting yourself as daring, nonchalant, "hip," "foxy," etc. In the classroom it also involved presenting oneself as an object of humour. Although this was sometimes accomplished by "being silly" the performance of the act actually increased status rather than decreased it. See also (Hannerz 1968), (Foster 1974).

5. Interrupting: Interrupting is a course-of-action which involves disrupting or interfering in the sequence of acts being mutually performed by a set of interactants. This can involve
intervening in dyadic or small group interaction, or intervening when one person is addressing an audience. It is characterized by the fact that when it occurs it is perceived as an undesirable occurrence, as rude, or as hostile. It is a violation of what Sacks has called "turn-taking."

6. Sounding: Sounding (signifying, playing the dozens, etc.) is a course-of-action characterized by insulting. Abrahams, 1964 reported the "dozens" version of this speech act which involves insulting someone's mother, sister, father etc. Kochman reports a distinction between sounding and signifying; signifying is simply insulting a person and getting "points" on him by doing so. Sounding is a "chaining" event in which members of some group signify on each other in a performance game. (Kochman 1972). In white youth culture "cutting" someone is an equivalent to signifying. Also: (Labov 1972).

7. Strutting: A form of profiling that involves more of a "showing off." A person who is strutting is displaying some feature in order to gain status within a group. Unlike some forms of classroom profiling, classroom strutting does not involve making oneself (intentionally) the object of humour. In white youth parlance "cruising" is a form of motorized strutting. See also (Brown 1968).

8. Finking: In the classroom "finking" was the action which involved telling on someone who had done something wrong or against the rules. This action is equivalent to "telling," "ratting," or being a "tattle-tale."

9. Getting Attention: This is a general category subsuming a number of modes of acting which involve getting the teacher to give individual attention. The purposes for this are varied: a.) to get help on some assignment problem b.) to turn in some piece of completed classwork c.) to clarify a procedural ambiguity d.) to get the teacher's attention for display or psychological reasons. Raising hands, calling out, jumping up and down, rattling paper are all acts which are components of this course-of-action.

10. Separating: Separating is a sequence of acts which involves breaking away from one situation and moving into another. There are two primary forms of this which were observed in the classroom: a.) leaving a student interaction or previous assignment etc. to respond to the teacher's request to come to the desk, come over here, etc. b.) leaving the classroom as a whole by separating from the other students. c.) Leaving as a
group at the end of the period, day, etc. Separating, espe-
cially type a; is characterized by a stylized set of non-
verbal acts.

11. Mock Fighting: Mock Fighting is a set of non-verbal acts which are mutual-
ly engaged in and which involve contact activities such as
pinching, hitting, swatting, shooting things or throwing
things at someone else. These activities, however, are
not taken seriously, are rarely painful, and are carried out
between those who are more or less friendly. (Foster 1974).

12. Teasing: Teasing is similar to sounding, but involves the repeated
enactment of verbal or non-verbal "taunts" which cannot be
described as insults. They pick on qualities of a person
which might be sensitive to them. Teasing often provides
humour for the audience (it is very often publicly done)
but the victim takes it seriously; its irritating quality is
one of its marks.

13. Obeying/Complying: These sequences involve following instructions, reacting to
commands or imperatives, completing assignments, responding
to questions, requests etc. On the student's part complying
involves the initiating or responding and the fulfilling
or finishing. Obeying/complying, then is a fairly inclusive
sequence, and occupies an important place in the structure
of the classroom. These sequences form a large part of the
Student reaction to various teacher courses-of-action.

14. Questioning/Answering: Courses-of-action whose purposes are soliciting types of in-
formation or complying to a solicitation to give information.
A question seeks to elicit or solicit, "answers" from the
teacher (about a subject matter, procedure, etc.) and an
answer is a "compliance" to a question.

15. Volunteering: A course-of-action which is characterized by its being a
response to a general request for some (unspecified) indi-
vidual to perform a certain task. The student "selects
himself" to perform or fulfill the teacher's unspecified
call for aid.

16. Delaying/Wasting Time/Fooling Around: A set of interrelated courses-of-action involving procrasti-
nation in fulfilling instructions or commands. The acts
performed are generally characterized by their non-directed-
ness. "Fooling Around" also involves acts performed for
their noise or nuisance value, also non-directed, insofar as
actions comprise a response to some direction, command or display by another individual. It is not profiling since it often appears unimportant whether or not any one is watching. It is "directed" only in the sense that the individual does the act for his own benefit; often, however, such acts will commute to profiling if the actor notices that someone is paying attention.

**TYPICAL COURSES-OF-ACTION (TEACHER)**

17. Disciplining:
This is a course-of-action whose purpose is to change or halt some action on the part of a student. We use the term to signify such action on the part of the teacher that is oriented toward making changes in displays which are "structural" rather than "topical." It has the connotation of chastising, scolding, etc.

18. Correcting:
Correcting is the counterpart of disciplining with reference to topical displays. That is, corrections are changing or halting actions taken with respect to the performance of instructional activities (answering questions on subject matter, performing a prescribed subject activity etc.)

19. Instructing:
This is the general category of actions which deal with the giving of information on subject-matters. It is what is generally conceived of as "teaching the material." There are a number of sub-routines under this category; the category may include or connect with other courses-of-action—such as asking and answering questions etc.

20. Directing:
Directing is the procedural corollary of instructing. It involves giving the "plans" for the student to accomplish the "instructional" goals the teacher has set, the performance of some tasks, the imbibing of some subject-matter, and so on.

21. Commanding:
Commanding is associated with directing. As a general category, it involves those courses of action which concern achieving obedience and compliance from students. We use the term here to mean "structural directing" as distinct from the commands/directions of instructional nature. It is largely composed of imperative-mode actions.
22. Ascertain: This is a sequence which involves actions on the part of the teacher which seek to elicit information about some past activity of the student. Ascertain may manifest as a questioning, if so, it is distinguished by its focus.

23. Giving Help/Responding to Attention Getting: These sequences are the teacher's correlate to students' call for attention, requests for aid, attempts to turn in work etc.

24. Asking Questions/Supplying Answers: Teacher asks questions to ascertain, to elicit topical information etc. She may answer student questions, supply answers to her own questions if students do not reply.

25. Braking: Braking is a course-of-action which involves the teacher intervening in a student's answering process. It is comprised of verbal acts which "brake" the student and force him to slow down and think about his answers.

26. Ignoring/Selectively Attending: Deliberate, studied ignoring of certain types of disruptive behaviors, or wrong answers etc. It is considered to be a course of action because the "doing of ignoring" appears to be comprised of a number of separate acts.

27. Reflexive Sounding: A particular form of insulting where one "sounds" on oneself. One of the teachers was seen to display this type of behavior as a means of achieving rapport with the students.

28. Environmental Ordering: Re-arranging the objects in the classroom: straightening shades, ordering desks, piling books, etc.

29. Aid Search: This term signifies the course-of-action which is characterized by the teacher "wandering" around the room "looking" for those who need help, have made mistakes, are on the wrong track, etc.

This descriptive outline concludes the ethnography of activity of the Urbancrest classroom; in the next chapter a theoretical base for a model of the classroom situation is offered. This model will be used to take examples of some of the courses-of-action just listed and analyze them for their internal structure; in addition, some of the constituent parts and the rules for their connection will be offered up as hypotheses. The logical analyses of Chapter II are offered in fulfillment of Hymes' (1967) call for a study of the rules of activity.
CHAPTER II

SEMIOTICS AND PHENOMENOLOGY IN THE CLASSROOM STUDY

Important Concepts

In the first chapter I introduced the idea that classroom activity can be understood as the manifestation of structured expectations held by the participants. I suggested, in fact, that the notion of rule-governed activity was a useful way of characterizing the regularity of the behavior enacted in the classroom setting. In the present chapter I wish to explore more fully the implications of the metaphor of rule-governed activity. This involves, in part, an exploration into the nature of a rule and its function in the construction of routine social scenes. In order to accomplish this objective I will utilize some of the ideas formulated in the areas of phenomenology and semiotics. Social scientific studies using phenomenology have previously been accomplished by such men as Alfred Schutz, Harold Garfinkel, Maurice Natanson and Aaron Cicourel. The results appear published under such various headings as phenomenological sociology, ethnomethodology and cognitive sociology. Social scientific work in semiotics is, to my knowledge, limited and in this dissertation I attempt to adapt work in logic and linguistics to social scientific-ethnographic purposes.

Earlier in the first Chapter the phrase "everyday activity" was used as a label for the behaviors and interactions which occur regularly in the classroom. It is everyday activity—that is to say—routine activity that we characterize as rule-governed. Everyday activity takes place in the world of everyday life; by this I mean that the activity takes place in a context in which it is accepted not only as routine but as a paramount and unquestioned fact of life. The world of everyday life is the world of cultural meaning "which existed long before our birth, experienced and interpreted by others, our predecessors, as an organized world...All interpretation of this world is based upon a stock of previous experience of it, our own experiences and those handed down to us by our parents and teachers, which...functions as a scheme of reference" (Schutz 1970:72). Our orientation to the experience of everyday life is a product of two processes, the synthesis we make of our own past experience, and the already accomplished syntheses passed on to us by our fellow-men.
These syntheses, or typifications, act as the schemes of reference through which we conduct our activities in the routine scenes of everyday life. Our self-typifications, and the typifications passed on to us by our predecessors and contemporaries, are formed from our past experience. However, as the quotes from Schutz indicate, they also act as schemes of reference, hence, as schemes for interpretation. The structure of our typified past experience is the basis for our expectations about the future. Persons enculturated in a common cultural context share many of these typifications; the schemes of reference and of action are intersubjectively valid. Garfinkel has called them "standardized" and standardizing agreements." Shibutani has pointed out their function in the routine activities of social life in this way: "In recurrent and well-organized situations men are able to act together with relative ease because they share common understanding as to what each person is supposed to do" (Shibutani 1961:40).

The world of everyday life in which everyday activity takes place is a world understood in common with one's fellow-men. The intersubjective agreements, however, are not explicit, but, rather, tacit. They are the result of common enculturation and of the synthesis of past experience which has had intersubjective regularity. Rarely does everyday man stand back from his routine activities and question their status; rather, he takes-for-granted their condition as natural facts of life. Garfinkel summarizes the orientation of everyday man as follows:

A society's members encounter and know the moral order as perceivedly normal courses of action, familiar scenes of everyday affairs, the world of everyday life known in common with others and with others taken for granted (Garfinkel 1972:1).

The taken-for-granted typifications of experience through which persons construct "perceivedly normal courses of action" or "familiar scenes of everyday life" have been called recipes by Alfred Schutz. Speaking of these recipes he has said:

The recipe works, on the one hand, as a precept for actions, and thus serves as a scheme of expression: whoever wants to obtain a certain result has to proceed as indicated by the recipe provided for this purpose. On the other hand, the recipe serves as a scheme of interpretation; whoever proceeds as indicated by a specific recipe is supposed to intend the correlated result (Schutz 1970:81).

In this dissertation we are interested in connecting the notions of typification and recipe to the concept of rule. By doing so we hope that the phenomenological implications of the former will help to explicate the latter. If typifications or recipes serve both as precepts for action and as schemes of interpretation for
action then they are performing the functions that we wish to at-
ttribute to the concept of rule. If we say that classroom activity
is rule-governed activity we are saying, in some sense, that class-
room activity is produced and interpreted in a regular fashion be-
cause individuals share the same typifications about it. A typifi-
cation, as a summary of past experience, can operate as an expecta-
tion of future experience. Individuals who share the same typifi-
cation because of common enculturation share the same general expec-
tations about what the future will be like. It is this common
structure of expectation that we may say produces the regular
activity that we call everyday or routine.

The world into which we are born is a social world in
which our fellow-man shares with us a "stock of experience" which
has been, in part, handed down to him by his predecessors. During
socialization the persons we contact act toward us, and toward ob-
jects and people in regular fashions. We are told about the mean-
ings of actions and objects, about the features we may expect from
events not yet experienced. Our past experience is structured and
from this experience we construct the typifications spoken of in
Schutz's phenomenological sociology. These typifications are
called "thought objects," in this way we are reminded of their
status as constructs formed out of the synthesis of regularities
in past experience. In fact, it is the structured way in which
experience is presented to us in childhood that literally forces
us to form these typifications. Our childhood and adolescence is
a period in which formally and informally our elders and peers
strive consciously and unconsciously to structure our experience.
The typifications thus formed become part of our stock of know-
ledge about the world; we do not question the status of this know-
ledge--it is all that we know. Schutz calls such a knowledge of
the world common-sense knowledge. We take for granted that others
undergo the same experiences we undergo; when we can act in con-
cert with them we take for granted that they operate from a per-
spective similar to ours. The things that we do in social inter-
action are socially meaningful things. They are behaviors that
"everybody knows" the meaning of; the structure of the event
is one produced as a function of socially shared common sense.
The assumption that the other acts in the world typically as we
do is called the "reciprocity of perspectives." It is the reci-
procity of our perspectives that is at the root of social inter-
action; the principle of reciprocity allows us to make assumptions
about the other that will enable us to deal with him "as if" he
had the contents of our own minds. Thus, in him are mirrored our
own interpretations, goals, motives and plans. The other, simi-
larly, makes the "as if" assumption on my part; this mutual as-
sumption allows us not only to act in concert, but to mutually
expect that certain courses-of-action, certain familiar scenes
will, when they appear, be appropriately constructed. In rule-
governed activity it is a common set of rules that is recipro-
cally shared. In fact, we may say that the rule is an expres-
sion of the fact that individuals are acting "as if" they
were using the same typifications to construct the social scene or activity they are mutually engaged in.

The thought objects or typifications used in common sense thought are designated by Schutz as first-level constructs. They are formed directly by actors in social life by synthesizing the recurrent features of experiences. This synthesis is a process which takes place through the phenomenon of retrospective cognition. That is to say, we reflect back on our experiences and integrate them into our stock of knowledge; the manner in which we integrate them involves synthesizing those experiences with similar features together in a single thought object. Meanings are thought objects formed in just this way. However, rules, or the structured expectations about the appropriate construction of a social scene, may also be formed in this way. Thus, all rules are typifications but not all typifications are rules. Some typifications are categories or types. They may be categories of motives, of emotional states, of tables, musical instruments, or students. A rule is the typification which connects these categories together. When we speak of rule-governed activity, such as classroom activity, the type of rule we are using is one that serves to connect behaviors to meanings; further, the rule connects these to typical motives, ends, goals, roles and plans. A rule of an activity is the typification which connects all of the relevant categories.

An important point must be made here, however. The word "rule" really designates a second-order construct. That is, it represents an analyst's or scientist's generalization about the regularity of social activity. The first-order constructs can only be called regular expectations about the way relevant categories may appropriately connect to form a normal social scene. The rule is a theoretical account of the way that actors appear to string together categories of physical and meaningful experiences to construct activity.

Typifications are constructed through a process of retrospective cognition; all meanings are constructed this way. Hawes, however, has raised a fundamental question on this account. "If we don't know what we've done till we've done it, is it possible to plan our behavioral displays in advance?" (Hawes n.d.:33). What he is asking, essentially, is how can we act meaningfully if we cannot constitute meaning through reflection until after the experience is past? The answer to this question lies in the property of a typification to act as an expectation. Schutz answers the question this way: "it is important to realize that our actual experiences are not merely referred to our past experiences. Any experience refers likewise to the future" (Schutz 1970:137). Because of the phenomenon of typification the events that have not yet occurred to me are anticipated to be basically of the same typical nature as those already integrated into the stock of knowledge. Although anything can happen we assume that only the
familiar scenes of everyday life will occur, and that the stable or typical features which have served us in the past will also serve us in the future. The past-future extension of typifications is important because it allows us to intend to conduct activity. Because we expect that the world will continue in a typical fashion we can plan activities before they occur. We can pre-conceive an activity. Such a pre-conception is called a project in Schutz's phenomenological language. All meaningful behavior is behavior accomplished through a pre-conceived project. In other words, it is behavior enacted by a consciousness which intended to enact it for some purpose—the project. We do not know exactly what the experience we are planning will mean when we reflect on it, but we do have information enough because of our knowledge of the past to project the typical shape of future experience. With respect to activity we project the possible goals, motivations, ends and means which might be associated with the individuals we are enacting it with. This projection takes on the shape of a plan; this plan represents our reflection in the mind's eye of the outline of an event or social scene—we live through it as an anticipation. We apprehend its outcome as the culmination of a possible course-of-action composed of certain possible behavioral acts. In a sense we conceive of the act as if it had already been enacted. We do this in order that we may in actuality enact it. Schutz speaks of the envisionment of the act in the Future Perfect Tense: "I place myself in my phantasy at a future time, when this action will already have been accomplished" (Schutz 1963:307). This conception of project and R. MacIver's definition of purpose have much in common; in MacIver's words "the image of what is yet to be informs the process of its becoming" (MacIver 1964:8).

If we use the past to construct anticipations of the future we do so to some end. Actions are behaviors which we plan in advance and also intend to carry out (Schutz 1970:125). When we perform actions rather than merely undergo experiences we do so "with ends in mind." We may call the "intent to realize" the plans or projects of action the motivation of the action. Schutz's phenomenology informs us here, however; he issues a caveat with respect to motives. It is not only the intent to realize the project that is motivated; the project itself may be motivated. If we conceive of two types of motive we can distinguish between these two cases. We have one form of motivation which leads to the establishment of a project—and we may label this accurately as a form of "social causation"—and we have another form which leads to the realization of the project. Schutz has labeled these two types of motive "because" and "in-order-to" motives respectively. These two motives refer to two different time dimensions. Because motives lie in past experience and in-order-to motives lie in the special tense structure of the project. The in-order-to motive is a kind of teleological force (in the sense of MacIver's definition above) that takes us from the mere
fancying to the completed act. Schutz aptly describes this type of motive as "the 'voluntative fiat,' the decision: 'Let's go!'" which transforms the inner fancying into a performance or an action gearing into the world (Schutz 1970:127). The in-order-to motive and the project are inextricably connected; an action is accomplished because of their conjunction—that is, a desired state of affairs and the decision to move toward the accomplishment of that state. The project is the end and the motive is the vector of force which moves us to that end; it is the vector of intent and the decision to begin a performance which will "gear" our project into the world.

Because motives, on the other hand, refer to the origin of the projection itself; they represent the grounds of the action being projected. Because motives are what "bring us" to project. The grounds of our projecting are not always available to us; in-order-to motives, on the other hand, are always before our consciousness as the answer to the question: "What is the purpose of this action?" The because motive, however, asks the question: "What are the reasons for projecting this action?" The answers lie in two different time dimensions. Because motives may only be discoverable to the actor if he reflects on his past experience; it is not necessary that he know his because motives. In most cases he does not. Because motives refer to determining conditions and may be understood as a nexus of causal factors which bring about the motive which is the "intent to." Thus, in a sense, in-order-to motives are embedded in because motivation; that is to say, a teleological causality is embedded in a determining causality. MacIver distinguishes between the "Why of Objectives" and the "Why of Motivations." Although we interpret the meaning of these two words differently his distinction yields a valuable lesson. The Objective is the project brought about by the causal nexus; the Motive is the orientation we take toward the project.

We might not want to say that the because motive caused the in-order-to motive, but only that the because motive, due to its originary role in the project shapes the conditions for the presentation of the project to consciousness.

Because motivations as causal nexi are the conjunction of two main lines of determinants. These are the causal conditions which are represented in spatial-social-temporal situations and the causal conditions which are represented in the make-up of an individual's biographically determined stock of knowledge. The project that is motivated is motivated by the conditions of the situation as well as the content of our past experience. In fact, one would be hard pressed to say which set of determinants had precedence since the situational factors call up the contents of the stock of knowledge but the stock of knowledge and its structure determine the orientation we take to them. Thus, the reasons for our projecting constitute both objectively reconstructable grounds—such as place, time, personnel, etc.—
and subjectively determinable elements of the biography—our past experiences in situations of this type, with persons of that sort, and so on.

The stock of knowledge, then, can carry predispositions to the experiences of the social world. At any given time in a situation our stock of knowledge helps us to select "the elements relevant to (our) purpose at hand" (Schutz 1970:150). Our stock of knowledge contains a system of interests and relevances which allow us to orient to the elements of the situation in which we find ourselves. Generally these systems are connected to sets of typical social roles; the culture in which we live has "socially approved systems of typification and relevance" (Schutz 1970:120,121) which establish typical orientations toward experience. Our social roles are associated with sets of typical motives and typical objectives by virtue of a system of interest and relevance. How we orient to the causal nexus, then, is partly a function of who we are and what we have experienced. Who we are and what we have experienced is generally dependent on the social roles we play at any given time. Thus we are led to use given typifications to project typically approved acts from typically understood motives related to typically attributed social roles. Of course, connected with the system of typical social roles and its relevances is our own "self-typification" or "self-role" which plays its own unique part in determining the finer points of how we play any given typical role. The other, however, generally understands us according to our socially approved role—unless he knows us well.

In social interaction we impute such things as motives, interests, meanings or projects as a function of the indications the other gives us by using his body as a "field of presentation." His physical behaviors—words, movements, gestures—are given meaning through our systems of typification which interpret them. Our stock of knowledge provides us with the means for interpreting. Our typifications can function as "recipes" to let us know what the other means, intends, plans, etc. The reciprocity of perspectives allows us to connect our typifications to his by imputation. Thus, as Schutz has said: "we can reduce the other's act to its typical motives, including their references to typical situations, typical ends, typical means, etc."(Schutz 1970:130). In face-to-face social relationships where we both see one another I speak to you and you interpret my words and gestures. From those bodily displays you formulate imputations which give meaning to the displays—that is, projects and motivations. I reciprocate on your part; it is the quality of the face-to-face interaction that we see the effects of our actions in the other and that he sees his in us. Thus, we may influence his motivations, projects and meaning-formulations. Although each of us proceeds to fulfill our projects according to our own in-order-to
motives, the other may display the appropriate indications and we may impute certain meanings which may act as causal factors or because motivations for our own in-order-to motives. The other may have indicated those meanings "in-order-to" influence our plans; our in-order-to may, likewise, act as a because motivation for the other's act. In rule-governed activity such processes of mutual influence can be called negotiation; actors mutually engaging in face-to-face interaction use each other's displays as evidence that rules are being followed--and that a certain rule should be used in formulating one's next behavior (Hawes n.d.).

Behavior displays in the communicative situation are assumed to be typically meaningful. We reduce them to their typical meaning by referring to our typified stock of knowledge. Empirical displays are taken by us to indicate that mutual "as if" assumptions are in use; in other words, we do not see rules but we see the regular behavior that is their indication. We assume and reassume in repeated interactive experience because our assumptions have been proven valid in past experience. The world of social interaction takes on a negentropic structure which is a structure of typifications; the social world is a world of common-sense in which "as if" assumptions are made and validated regularly. Of course, when two members of different cultures come into contact these "as if" assumptions are made but do not result in behavior displays which are mutually satisfactory or appropriate. The ability to operate under the principle of the reciprocity of perspectives assumes that the typificatory system--and by implication the biography of the individuals--is similar enough to provide experiential validation for the assumption.

Members of the same culture can be said to share common rule-sets. Common enculturation structures experience in such a way that similar past experience produces similar expectations of the future. Such structured expectations may be seen as rules. Hawes suggests that we think of a rule as a behavioral regularity (Hawes n.d.:24). However, Black suggests that we might think of rules as statements about regularities. In the conduct of everyday life, however, there are other senses of the word rule that must be taken into account. One of these is that the rule is internalized, and in the form of a typified expectation, operates as a precept or instruction for acting in the world. The other involves the taken-for-grantedness of most typifications. Thus, Hawes' statement alone does not suffice as a definition of rule; neither does Black's "formulated rule." Another consideration, one that I have mentioned previously, is that the rule itself is simply the scientist's second-order account of the actor's expectation of regular behavior and the regular behavior itself. Thus, Black's criteria of formulation suffices for the second-order notion of rule, but not for the first-order constructs that we account for with the idea of rule. It may be useful to outline the characteristics of rules as a preliminary to attempting to use them in empirical analyses of the classroom.
1. Rules emerge into the life-world as behavioral regularities, conversely, they are founded on the perception of regularity in conscious experience.

2. A rule is a statement about regularities, but the form of the statement varies as a function of the level of the statement. A scientific or second-level statement of a rule is a formal and theoretical account of objective and subjective regularities. The first-order correlate of statement, however, can consist in the statement of which behaviors or interpretations conforms to expectations and which do not. That is, we can state a rule by stating that such and such a regular activity does or does not proceed as "expected." The essence of first-order constructs, then, is the recognition of conditions of well-formedness or appropriateness. Common-sense man does not usually cite his expectations in the form of a rule, but he does recognize whether or not his expectations are realized or not.

3. The expectations attached to typifications, that is, that the world will proceed as usual, are learned from our predecessors and contemporaries. This points out an important character of rules: they are learned. This learning takes place, as far as everyday activity is concerned, informally. Our fellow-men provide us with means of recognizing the differences between appropriate and inappropriate behavior. The operation of sanctions against ill-formed behavior is an important aspect of the learning of rules. A sanction consists of the fact that certain types of behavioral displays, or interpretation leading to them, will not operate to help us achieve the in-order-to motives we set for ourselves. The operation of sanctions and of expressions of the normalcy of behaviors explain how rules can be inculcated without being explicitly stated as rules.

4. Rules are not mandatory, they are permissive (Hawes, personal notes). Raymond Gumb has used the term deontic to describe the status of rules as "ought" statements. Rules are not necessities; we use rules if we wish to accomplish some end; if we do not use rules we may suffer the normative sanctions which attach to rule-violations. The rules of rule-governed activity differ from empirical rules or regularities on the criteria of necessity; empirical rules are obligatory—all mammals have warm blood pumped through a four-chambered heart. However, there is a caveat to be issued at this point. Although Black and others make a great deal of the fact that a rule is not a "law" and may be broken, we must keep in mind that rule-systems or rule-sets as a whole are necessary for organized human life.

5. Rules are normative in that they are associated with socially distributed expectations about appropriate social behavior and interpretation. Black, in speaking about linguistic rules, says: "Linguistic rules are normative; they state what is and is not to be done when the language is used; and so departures from or violations of the rules evoke complaint and demands for correction. (Black 1962:67). The violation of expectations, that is, of our projection of some possible behavior display, by the occurrence
of an unanticipated display puts us at a loss. The taken-for-
granted attitude that we adopt in the everyday world is abro-
gated. The social world has been made problematic. It is when
the rules operate that we do not question the status of the social
reality in which we are embedded. Of course, the normative status
of rules does not imply that knowledge of them is explicit; know-
ledge of rules is tacit—and is existent only in the form of var-
ious expectations about events. They are socially distributed in
the sense that common socialization produces common typical expec-
tations.

6. The violation of a rule produces a situation about
which we may say: that's not correct, that's not normal, appro-
priate, right, polite and so on. When a rule is correctly used
we say nothing. Black speaks at length about the connection of
rules and rule-formulations. A rule-formulation, according to
Black, is "the set of words by which the rule is stated." (Black
1962:100). There are a number of provisos we must attach to our
understanding of Black's definition. Black himself distinguishes
between the rule and its formulation by pointing out that the
rule is not any one of its formulations. Black considers that
it is best to take rule formulations as a group and see what it
is that they formulate—he emerges with the following general
form: "Such and such actions in such-and-such circumstances,
done by such-and-such persons (done by anybody), forbidden,
(required, permitted)" (Black 1962:108). However, if we are to
use the concept of rule in a study of everyday activity, such
as occurs in the Urbancrest classroom, we must deal with the
tacit nature of the socially distributed rules. Garfinkel has
used the phrase "seen-but-unnoticed" to describe the stable
features of everyday activity (Garfinkel 1972); it is, in a sense,
the behaviors that are seen and the rules that are unnoticed.
How, then, can Black's formulation be of any use? Is it common
for the man on the street to make reference to the rules which
produce his greeting behavior, allow him to interpret leave-taking
behavior, or conduct conversation? Even if the common-sense man
can formulate a rule of the form suggested by Black, but as a
rule does not even think of them, where does formulating take us?
Black himself provides a partial answer in speaking about linguist-
ic rules:

It still remains true that in learning a language one also
learns the all-important notions of relevant controlling
rules of usage (and so 'proper' and 'improper' ways of talk-
ing and writing). Some of these rules are explicitly formu-
lated and can be checked by anybody who will take the trouble
to consult dictionaries...But many more are shown in the beha-
vior of the speakers of the language—in their readiness to
correct themselves and others, their willingness to believe
there is a rule even if they do not know what it is and their
endorsement of rules after they have been formulated by an on-
looker, adequately formulating the guiding principles of their
previous conduct (Black 1962:136).
A number of relevant points are raised in this passage. First, in relation to everyday activity we must be concerned with behaviors which show rule-governed characteristics—that is, which operate as if they were rule-governed. This concern must exist whether or not the actors reflexively identify formal rules. The fact that a member of a culture distinguishes between right and wrong behaviors is sufficient for us to use the rule-governed metaphor. Thus, we must consider that a formulation of a rule can consist of a set of words provided by a social scientist or other observer. The formulation is a theoretical account and does not necessarily describe a thought object to which the behaver attends.

It is important in considering this list of characters to attend to Black's comment on the acceptance of the observer's rule formulations by actors. Schutz's postulate of adequacy (a second-order construct must be translateable to a first order construct) bears on this point; if the common sense man accepts a formulation by an observer we are reasonably assured that the observed behavior operated according to some kind of subjective regularity. Nevertheless, the rule-formulation represents a second-order construct. As such, it typifies typifications, but it also makes explicit constructs which are "questionable but unquestioned" by the everyday actor. The second-order construct is much more articulate than the first-order construct. We must not make the mistake of translating the precision of the second-order construct onto the first-order construct. The first-order construct may be a diffuse set of expectations and retentions about persons, actions and contexts; they are not seen as formal rules, but as the "way things are supposed to be." First level articulate formulations are infrequent possibly because occasions where we are called upon to articulate our expectations or guiding "principles" are rare. In addition, the very manner in which we learn rules, that is, without hearing them formulated, adds to their taken-for-granted nature. This implicitness of rules is a primary characteristic of everyday activity.

Even if we use rules as analogues to explicate certain types of regular activity, the question remains: What do rules do? The first thing that we may say that rules do is that they not only produce regular behavior by acting as prescriptive guidelines, but they also constrain the forms that activity can take. That is to say, who it is performed by, in what contexts, with what behaviors and with what ends in view. (Hawes n.d.:26). This idea of the rule as a prescriptive guideline is similar to the sense of Schutz's recipe. Prescriptive guideline rules are rules that we use in conjunction with in-order-to motives; when we project an act we construct our action with reference to the rules that would produce the outcome we envision. The resultant act conforms to the rules we used (Gumb 1972:69). Or, in other words, our expectations fulfill themselves. The rules allow us to construct acts because they connect behavior displays to
persons, contexts and modalities. They "map out" the means to accomplish our ends. If we wish to achieve such and such and outcome we know in what circumstances we may achieve it, in which role-orientation it is to be achieved, and which actions ought to be used in-order-to achieve it. Of course, such prescriptive guidelines may function as interpretive devices as well.

If rules tell us how to construct the action we envision in our projects, or let us interpret someone else's actions, then another function of rules emerges. Rules, in a sense, constitute activities. That is, rules allow us to string together the relevant categories to construct an appropriate social act. The constitutive function is also a regulative function; the regulative rule is the constitutive rule operating as an interpretive device. An incorrectly constructed (constituted) act or activity is perceived as such in comparison to the interpretive rule which regulates it. A regulative rule can be said to function to keep the activity regular, normal, well-formed or well-constructed. The regulative rule acts to keep the activity in some configuration; of course, this is exactly the function of the constitutive rule. The distinction between them may be purely heuristic; it may serve only to distinguish the productive and interpretive facets of the same construct. That is, the same rule being used to both build and police the activity; the same rule tells us how to do something, as well as how that thing has been done.

We have said that rules produce activity; we have also used the term rule-set to indicate that a number of rules constitute or govern activity. Since rules act in concert to produce activity it may be best to introduce the notion of rule-system. A rule-system is a group of rules which relate to some activity. The system can "account" for the activity in a complete and precise sense. The rules act to regulate the activity (or, conversely, constitute it) by operating to produce only those acts relevant to the activity. The activity is defined, then, as a group of acts occurring in some regular fashion and conceived of as being relevant to one another (Spier 1974:60,61). We may think of the knowledge of the system of rules required to "do" some activity as the "competence" required for the activity. The idea of competence, formulated originally to deal with the knowledge of language rules, deal with the knowledge of "what it takes" to speak a language, do an activity, read a book (Greene 1972:106). When our competence gears into the world to do social "work" we are "performing." Chomsky opposed performance to competence and most linguists have followed him in making a strong distinction between knowing and using rules; in this dissertation the distinction is not held as strictly. All rules are subject to change through experience--hence, necessarily, through performance. What we know and what we do inform one another. Indeed, cultural contact and the exchange of ideas and ways of behaving rely on this property of competences to develop and change. If the quality of experience changes so do the rules.
Performance is man acting in the world of experience; it is the channel through which competence changes, and through which it, indeed, arose.

It is only recently that discourse analysis, ethnography of speaking, folklore, ethnomethodology and sociolinguistics have begun to use the metaphor of "rule-governed" to explicate activity. The proliferation of these disciplines marks a transition from the study of idealized knowledge to a study of the rules behind the uses to which we put this knowledge. The semantic and syntactic concerns of linguistics are complemented by a concern about pragmatics—the study of the relationships of speakers, contexts, motives and goals to the use of signs. Scholars interested in the rule-governed nature of social activity other than language were especially interested in the possibility of constructing a systematic, or grammatical, account of pragmatics. The word system has been used in conjunction with the word rule; competence has been described as the knowledge of the rule-system. The term system is taken to indicate a "set of interdependent units" (Hawes 1974:206). The interdependency of the units is governed by rules in a rule-system. The units which compose the activity are connected through the use of rules into appropriate configurations in time, space and social context. The rules are the instructions which show us how to connect the units of activity together so as to produce an integrated phenomenon. That is to say, the activity itself can take on meaning as a coherent "object" of perception. Hawes says of this unifying function of a system: "It is the interdependence that enables a cluster of individual units to function as one. This is defined as the wholistic principle of systems" (Hawes 1974:203).

The minimal units of a rule-system for everyday activity would be typifications or typical expectations about objects, persons, roles, actions, motives and so on. A rule-system would also contain typical understandings about the way these other "types" connect. Thus, a rule-system has two components: 1. a set of basic units, terms or variables 2. a set of relations between the units determined by interdependency conditions. Peter Monge has written of the nature of systems:

Common to all definitions of system, however, is the notion of a set of variables together with rules of transformation which define the relations among the variables...It is this feature of systems, that they are based on a logical calculus, which can generate entailments for the system, i.e., warranted expectations (Monge 1973: ).

A system, it must be noted, is not a model, but is a theory about theories. In the study of everyday activity the application of systems ideas constitutes a third level of analysis. On the first level are the common-sense constructs, on the second level are scientific constructs, and on the third level is the systems ordering
of the second-level constructs. To clarify this further it may be helpful to think of common-sense constructs as "mundane theories." Scientific theories are theories about mundane theories; when we use systems theory to order our scientific theories we are acting on a third level of constructs.

The application of systems ideas is defensible within the confines of Schutz's postulate of adequacy. The interaction of variables in rule-governed systems is reflected in the acceptance or rejection of outputs thought to be produced through them. The structure provided by the system can be meaningfully adequate for actors. Monge's use of the words entailment and expectation in the same context supports this contention; that is to say, the interaction of variables in the system is controlled by expectations. On the common-sense level expectations connect the variables; on the third order level we express these expectations in terms of entailments. An entailment can be taken to indicate "the set of conditions which specifies or constrains the outcome of a set of constitutive operations." An entailment is a specification produced by the interaction of the variables in the system; the common-sense man acting in the everyday world has expectations about the normalcy of the actions he projects and interprets. The normalcy of an activity is a measure of its adherence to the specifications produced by the interdependency relations among its constituent behaviors.

Monge suggests that we view the system as a logical calculus which produces such entailments. The calculus is composed of a set of variables and a set of transformation rules which govern their combination. In linguistics such a calculus is called a grammar; the set of basic variables or units is called the lexicon. The analogue of the lexicon that we will use in applying the rule-system to the study of activity contains sets of typifications of contexts, motives, persons and their roles, acts, activities and other relevant elements of social events. The lexicon of which we are speaking here is actually the typified contents of the stock of knowledge of a socialized individual. This lexicon might more appropriately be called a "semanticon" since it is a dictionary of typified meanings. The semanticon is the dictionary of the types of constituent features of everyday activity. We may provisionally define a type as a form of theory which deals with the meaningful connections between observable regularities and meanings. This is a particularly useful definition for this dissertation since it will allow us to more appropriately use the suggestion that we view the system as a logical calculus. We can use the concepts of extension and intension from the field of logical semantics. Carnap defines the two terms for us:

We shall call the property the intension of the predicate...
By the extension of a predicate we shall understand the class of individuals having the property designated by the predicate. (Carnap 1958:40).
We can view the type as being analogous to the predicate; the indi­
viduals belonging to the type would be the extension of the type.
The individuals in our system would be physical acts, situations
or displays which could be connected to meanings held by actors.
The type-token distinction captures the essence of the idea we are
proposing here.

For instance, a proposition which emerges into an actual
performance is an utterance. The proposition is the intension;
the utterance is the extension. Farber underlines this distinc­
tion when he speaks of two orders of meaning:

The so-called world of meanings, or of propositions, exists
in so far as it is experienced...all experience is signifi­
cant in that it is experience of something whether that some­
thing be an external object or a subjective state...The pri­
mary experiences themselves may be called meanings of a first
order. Secondly, propositions about primary experiences may
be expressed, and such propositional meanings may be said to
exist when they are experienced as meanings of a second order
(Farber 1968:138).

The notion of type is integral to the success of the analytic
portion of this dissertation. Farber's words clarify the re­
lation­ship of the type to actual experience; the type is a
sort of proposition about primary experiences--either of ex­
ternal events or subjective states--which comprise the ex­
tension of the proposition. The type itself can then be ex­
perienced as part of the stock of knowledge, and, thus, becomes
itself meaningful. The type connects meanings to acts; if we
think of the function of the type in terms of set theory then
we can define the type as we do a predicate. That is, we may
define it as the set of individuals which satisfy its truth
conditions. The truth conditions of a predicate are those sets
of individuals which fulfill it. The extension of a type/pre­
dicate in its tokens is the definition of a set of individuals
for which certain truth condition hold (Lakoff n.d.:1).

The structure of the semanticon consists of intensional
entities which relate to objects such as bodily displays, con­
texts, persons and so on. The type is a synthetic construct of
such intensional entities; it is a meaning which categorically
includes other meanings. The extension of the type categorically
includes the individuals of the meaning sets contained in it.
The semanticon is the intensional dictionary; bodily displays
and subjective imputations of bodily displays (motives, plans)
are the extensions of the contents of the semanticon. The con­
cept of ideal types in the Weberian sense (connecting the mean­
ing of the act to the act from the actor's point of view) is
captured adequately in the intension-extension dichotomy. In
addition, Hawes' definition of communication as space-time be­
vior with symbolic referent also points out the utility of the idea.
All manner of items are contained in the semanticon; for the purposes of this dissertation I shall consider only those types which are integral to the project at hand—understanding everyday activity in the classroom. The contents of the semanticon are structured in certain ways; of course, if the contents of the intensional dictionary are ordered then this order is reflected in the sets of individuals which are their extension. Thus, relationships of set inclusion, set equivalence, set intersection or set disjunction are functions of various types of relations between meanings in the semanticon. Set inclusion is a particularly important structure since most rule-systems make accommodation for the property of recursiveness; thus, higher order predicates may dominate lower-order predicates in hierarchically structured type lists. Members of a culture learn about the structure of such type lists; in fact, the analysis of semantic domains in componential analysis does just this. The following table reflects the structuring of the semanticon:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meanings (Intension)</th>
<th>Referents (Extension)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lexical Meanings</td>
<td>Individuals fulfilling the meanings. Phonetic representations. Properties and attributes of empirical world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Verbal Meanings</td>
<td>Individuals fulfilling the meanings. Gestural representations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texts (Discourses)</td>
<td>Utterances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motives</td>
<td>Displays of the other to which motives are imputed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act</td>
<td>Production relation between actor, display time and place (Van Dijk 1972).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roles (Personal Types)</td>
<td>Actual or fictive entities displaying certain attributes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Each of these listed components of the semanticon is a typification; however, as we have said, hierarchical set relations may exist within the type categories. Thus, the activity type may be a higher-order category within which the course-of-action is included as a constituent. Similarly, the individual behavior is a constituent of the course-of-action. Individual acts or behaviors comprise courses-of-action when they are performed in certain configurations. Certain characteristic sets of courses-of-action comprise a coherent activity.

Within the semanticon a number of kinds of rules operate. Syntactic and semantic rules of language, for instance, are a part of the stock of knowledge. In the study of rule-governed activity, however, we are primarily concerned with the relational conditions obtaining between propositions, their behavioral extensions, time, place, contexts and speakers. These rules are pragmatic rules of activity, not rules of language per se. The pragmatic rules of the activity connect the variables in the semanticon. In so doing they generate expectancies for acting in the world. These expectancies can be thought of as entailments; if we do so, the rule-system can be explicated through the use of an analogue—the logical calculus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meanings (Intension)</th>
<th>Referents (Extension)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event (Course-of-Action)</td>
<td>Connected space-time sequences of the production relations which are tokens of acts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affect (Emotive Types)</td>
<td>Actual subjective states experienced or imputed to individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication Situations</td>
<td>Environment (context) plus actors, associated behaviors, time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>A macro-sequence of production relations of a certain configuration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects</td>
<td>The empirical state of affairs fulfilling the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject Matters</td>
<td>Discourse or activity contents fulfilling topic conditions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The second-order calculus will be a means of accounting for the "natural logic" or common-sense of individuals conducting everyday activity. In the classroom the calculus will help us to represent the logic, and differences in logic, which operate in the classroom. The construction of a logical calculus can represent an ethnographic tool whose purpose is to show the structure of various types of cultural knowledge. According to Monge a system is a "formal logical structure which says nothing about the empirical world" (Monge 1973:10). The variables of the system, and the rules that relate them, however, are capable of being tied to the empirical world by rules of correspondence. This empirical grounding is called the interpretation of the system. Thus, entailment statements in the system may be empty or "loaded" with empirical reference; in its loaded form the entailment embodies "a relational proposition" (Monge 1973:10) which can be tested as a theoretical formulation. The purpose of loading the system is to "determine isomorphism" (Monge 1973:10). The logical framework is manipulated to become isomorphic with certain propositions emergent in our observations. According to Monge: "when isomorphism between the logic of the system and the logic of the event (its behavior) is obtained explanation is taken as complete" (Monge 1973:12). A logical calculus, then, can generate expectancies or entailments, although we may see such entailment as a weakened form of logical entailment. It is important that the connection between entailment and expectancy be established. Monge shows cause why we should use the systems explanation:

I have argued that human communication is not characterized by universal patterns. If this is so, then it suggests that similar communication phenomena occurring in different cultural situations may operate according to differing logics. Further, if we are to recognize patterns in rather than impose patterns on human action, then we need an explanatory form which (1) admits to a variety of logics and (2) permits changes in the choice of logic until one is found which is isomorphic with the phenomenon we seek to explain (Monge 1973:9).

The premise of the dissertation is congruent with Monge's argument. If, in the classroom, there is a situation in which the rules used by teachers differ from those used by students we would benefit by an explanatory device that would allow us to express that difference. Further, since we are interested in the idea that it is differing cultural knowledge--emic knowledge--that informs the actor's behavior, and since we are interested in the nature of that knowledge as ethnographers, then the recognition of rather than the imposition of patterns is in order.

The logical calculus is of the second-order; this means that it is a scientific description or analysis of what we might call the natural logic of the people. The natural logic is not a formal system; it exists in its manifestations--patterned behaviors
and appraisals by actors of what is correct, grammatical or normal. The second-order system seeks to represent the patterns and relations observable or elicitable from actors in an articulate and formal fashion. However, what is it, exactly, that I mean when I say "logical calculus?" In its simplest definition the calculus is a "symbolic language." It is also a meta-system for the study of an object system. In the context of this dissertation the calculus is a symbolic language being used as a meta-system for the study of natural interactional competence and its component features. Rudolf Carnap, in his Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications (Carnap 1958), states:

In the investigation of languages either historical natural ones or artificial ones the language which is the object of study is the object language...the language we use in speaking about the language is the metalanguage (Carnap 1958:78).

The nature of a calculus is, at base, very simple. It is a set of various types of signs and rules for combining them, rearranging them and extracting them from one another. These sets of signs and rules are so constructed as to be translatable into the sentences of any empirical theory by appropriate correlation of signs with empirical referents. Signs are used because they provide an abbreviated form for the representation and analysis of ideas (Carnap 1958). Any calculus manipulates its variables through its rules; these variables are the "individual terms" of the system. The totality of individuals treated in the system is the domain of individuals of the system—or its universe of discourse. When the meta-system speaks about the variables it constructs sentences using two types of signs: names for the individuals of the domain and designations for the properties and relations predicated of the individuals. The former are known as constants, the latter as predicates. A third type of sign is the variable; a variable is a sign for which other signs are substitutable. Any predicate constant or variable in conjunction with any individual constant or variable is called a full-sentence of the predicate. A sentence is equivalent to a proposition. If F equals the property of the interrogative and (a) equals the constant utterance, then F(a) is a full-sentence stating that the utterance is a question. We speak of the individual term of the sentence as its argument; sentences may have predicates with one argument or n-arguments. Such predicates are monadic, dyadic or n-adic. Full sentences of the calculus can be connected by logical signs; these signs, known as logical constants, are analytic in nature. In the dissertation the following signs will be indicated thus: & (and), # (or), % (if...then) and * (not). Most calculi also use symbols which act as quantifiers over sentences; these quantifiers specify over domains of individuals in a sentence. The universal quantifier, A preceding a sentence operates to specify that the proposition holds for all individuals of the domain. The existential quantifier states that the proposition holds for at least one individual. We shall designate this quantifier as E. The particularity quantifier states
that the proposition holds for just one individual. The identifi-
cation quantifier is related to the particularity quantifier, but
further specifies that the individual is one which can be identified
with a name (Van Dijk 1973:34). We shall designate the former as
$e$ and the latter as $n$.

Certain calculi also contain operators which function to
indicate that a statement is logically possible or logically neces-
sary, impossible or contingent. Since we are dealing with a cal-
culus interpreted for use with empirical theory most of the opera-
tors we would be interested in using are those indicating possibility
and contingency. The most important concepts in this respect are
presuppositions and consequences. A presupposition is defined in
the following manner:

$$P_i \text{ presupposes } P_{i-1}, \text{ if the truth of } P_{i-1} \text{ is a necessary condi-
tion for } P_i \text{ to have truth value (e.g. to be true/false, satisfied/non-satisfied, app}
$$

A consequence is defined as the proposition that "is the logical
consequence of, logically (necessarily) follows from, or is entailed
by" another proposition (Van Dijk 1973:56). In this dissertation
those definitions are adapted to the weakened forms of entailment
that are required. Thus, the notions of possible presupposition,
probable presupposition and cause are tied to the notions of pos-
sible consequence, probably consequence and effect. These
non-logical relationship imply that the truth of propositions is
contingently entailed by other propositions. Causes are defined
as the following: "a causes b just in case a is a sufficient condi-
tion for b" (Van Dijk 1973:62). Causes, then, are essentially
a subset of possible presuppositions of a proposition; effects
are a subset of possible consequences.

Since our calculus deals with causes or presupposition
that may be intentional there is a call for operators to signify
what Kummer, 1973 calls "propositional attitudes." These opera-
tors are necessary in a language that hopes to deal with pragmatics.
If the language hopes to take into account pragmatics then "to pre-
suppose a proposition is to take its truth for granted, and to as-
sume that others involved in the context do the same" (Kummer 1973:
97). Stalnaker, 1972, states that we can conceive of taking the
truth of a proposition for granted as forms of believing, inten-
ding or knowing. Following Hintikka, 1962 and Kummer, 1973 it
is possible to adopt the following operators: $B$, the doxastic
or belief operator, $K$, the epistemic or knowledge operator, $I$, 
the intentionality operator, and $H$ the compatibility operator.
$H$ signifies that a proposition is compatible with the inten-
tions of any speaker. (Kummer 1973:109). These operators are
concerned with the area of pragmatic implication and are invalu-
able in a calculus oriented toward the study of pragmatic object
systems.
The calculus to be used in this dissertation assumes the normal syntax of uninterpreted systems. The syntax of the system which specifies the mechanical formation rules for the uninterpreted sentences. Since we are not interested in purely analytic manipulation the semantic system is of more concern. The semantic system maps content onto the unloaded calculus. Carnap speaks of the semantical system as follows:

The semantical system furnishes and interpretation of language B, since it contains rules which yield for each sentence G of B a truth-condition p such that G is true if and only if p. Once this truth-condition p is obtained, we understand G... what its meaning is" (Carnap 1958:101).

The well-formed sentences of the syntactic language are given meanings. These meanings are "propositions." In an interpreted language it is the case that well-formedness is not only a function of the formation rules but also of the semantic rules which attach propositions to the sentences. The syntactic language is given a valuation in the following manner: to variables from the universe of discourse are assigned values, and to each n-adic predicate are assigned appropriate n-tuples of the universe of discourse. That is to say, if U is the universe of discourse there is a value assignment V which assigns to each variable a member of the set or domain of U and also assigns members of U to n-adic predicates. Associated with the pair U,V is the notion of World; a world is the set of possible or alternative states of affairs (Van Dijk 1973:34). A statement is logically necessary if it is true in any member of W, w. It is possible, probable, impossible if V assigns to it at least one member of W, most members of W, or no members of W. The notion of possible world is important since it concerns our attempt to represent the nature of planning.

Since our calculus deals with the occurrence of events in the real world as they are performed by actors our semantical system which attaches meanings to strings of symbols would be more useful if expanded to include an attachment to "context of use" or pragmatics. Cresswell, 1973, suggests that "it is possible to regard a possible world itself as part of the context and the meaning of a sentence as a function from a context and (or including) a possible world" (Cresswell 1973:110). The possible world can be construed as the "contextual package of a time, place, utterer etc. and a possible world" (Cresswell 1973:110). Obviously, pragmatics is concerned with context, and as such, with use in context. It is concerned with the interpretations propositions may have when they are used in specific contextual packages. Important concerns of pragmatics are time, place, speaker, doer, indicated or intended objects and states of affairs, and, importantly, presuppositions. We said before that a presupposition could be a propositional attitude, an attitude that people take toward propositions—believing, knowing, intending. Such a presupposition, as distinguished from purely semantic presuppositions, are called pragmatic presuppositions. We wish explicitly
to draw a connection between a set of presuppositions, a context and a possible world. Stalnaker states: "The set of all the presuppositions made by a person in a given context determines a class of possible worlds, the ones consistent with all the presuppositions" (Stalnaker 1972:388). Thus we have a means of formulating semantical rules for the valuation of an uninterpreted formula which takes account of possible worlds which are contexts. In this way our rules may be seen as pragmato-semantic since the proper interpretation of a formula, the valuation of it by the supplying of a proposition is dependent not only on semantical rules but also on rules relating to pragmatic considerations.

The events which we wish to study using the calculus represent sets of bodily displays occurring in a space-time context. These bodily displays have a symbolic reference (Hawes 1973). The space-time behaviors link up with their symbolic referents in complex ways, ways that can be influenced by the specifics of the situation, the attitudes of the actors or their roles. The concrete phenomena a scientist observes in some social scene have meanings which go beyond those which are capable of being "read" off of the spatio-temporal occurrence. The verbal and non-verbal items do not represent the complete amount of information introduced into or recovered from their production in the social scene. Each actor means more than he does or says, and each interpreter of an act understands more than is given. An example of this is the presupposition; a proposition capable of being read off of a produced utterance is related to sets of unstated but related propositions. The pragmatic component of the calculus tells us that any act embodying a meaning is produced and interpreted in a context. Its meaning is a meaning according to a certain set of presuppositions—a bounded possible world. We can call this bounding of the interpretations of a proposition "context-restriction." The production and interpretation of acts, such as utterances, is actual social scenes is not context-independent. The readings for lexical items, gestures and other displays must be made with reference to the particulate construction of the scene—and not just with reference to the dictionary meaning of the items. In the social scene certain assumptions, understandings, role-status expectations and other normative constructs exist as a stock of knowledge socially distributed among the participants. We have discussed this social distribution previously; we now use Stalnaker's suggestion about presuppositions as the basis for equating social distribution with the notion of presupposition: "presupposition involves not only taking the truth for granted, but also assuming that others do the same" (Stalnaker 1972:386). Thus, at least partially, the stock of knowledge contains presuppositions known in common with others and taken for granted. Cicourel calls this stock the realm of normal forms. Here, of course, we must stress the similarity between normal forms, typifications, and shared presuppositions. These interconnected concepts deal with typified notions of the meanings of individual roles, motives, lexical items, gestures and so on.
The production and interpretation of any item within the confines of a spatio-temporal context occurs as a particular instance. The construction and interpretation of the instance is accomplished with respect to the socially distributed set of normal forms. The particulars of the social scene emerging at the moment are related or referred to the contents of the stock of knowledge. Such referral takes place in the restricted context of the social scene—for instance various situations in the classroom. The stock of knowledge assumes the social distribution of normal forms; the production and interpretation which takes place in the setting must articulate with these sets of typified rules, protocols and so on. Items occur in situations and their interpretation is context-dependent as special cases of general categories and rules. A context-free proposition has a broad range of interpretations; many of them may not have an appropriate truth value in a context (vide Stalnaker 1972 on pragmatic ambiguity.) In actual scenes actors must decide the proper meaning of displays with reference to the world contained in the contextual package in which the interpretation occurs. This decision making is accomplished by a process of articulating the experienced particulars of a situation with the normal form constructs. The articulating process is what Cicourel, 1973, has called an interpretive procedure. The particular of the social scene is noted and the interpretive procedure aids in the search for the correct interpretation to be given to the proposition implied by the particular. Interpretive procedures allow interactants to attach situated or context-dependent meanings to the items in actual social scenes. The procedures allow an indefinite range of possible interpretations to be bounded; in part this is accomplished by a process of selecting the relevant presuppositions for the consequences—the particulars of the situation. In other words, the proposition carried in the particular is bounded by bounding the presuppositions which could have entailed it.

Actors use particulars selectively to invoke the rules which can justify or specify their actions; a particular can be attended to and used as the basis for constructing a context-dependent (sensitive) meaning which a member can attach to the social scene. Members of an interaction attend to certain items in order to fill in the meanings of the items produced in the event. Such particulars are given the name "indexical" by Cicourel. The label implies that the particulars in question provide instructions for recovering the meanings that a member must have in order to justify his interpretation of the event as it occurs, as it has occurred and as he projects that it will occur. The use of the word index has certain relations to the pragmatic languages of Scott, Tarski and Montague; in these works index is used as the term which indicates "complexes of relevant aspects of possible contexts of use" (Montague 1972:114). Montague's usage points up the important character of "relevant features" of contexts which are used in the interpretation of propositions. The indexical properties of particulars permit access to the realm of
common knowledge; one might say that the particulars provide "points of reference" (Scott 1970) for the interpretation of propositions. Thus, the contextual package we mentioned earlier in our discussion of worlds, is synonymous with the configuration of relevant points of reference in a situation. Cresswell suggests that: "A sentence then can be assigned a set of indices...This means that the value of the sentence (1) will be the set of complete contexts for which it is true" (Cresswell 1973:110). We may say that the contents of a contextual package are particulars and that these constitute a complex of points of reference which are indices which allow us to evaluate the meanings of propositions in context. Garfinkel has suggested a more picturesque way of viewing the process utilizing the metaphor of the index of a book, or the card catalogue of a library as a way of evaluating the contents.

The indexical particulars provide instructions for filling in meanings; this is the common-sense equivalent of evaluating the truth function of a proposition. These filled-in meanings go beyond the dictionary senses of the particulars to pragmatically interpreted senses. Thus, the indexicality of certain procedures is interpretive since it is a process or property which articulates the situated feature with the normal forms in order that a situated meaning may be achieved—and the proper rules be selected from the stock of knowledge to justify mutual behavior. Actors use the indexicality of particulars to link the meanings of actions to real time, to the context, to the speaker or listener and his biography, and the other relevant aspects of the situated event (Cicourel 1973:88). The indexical features with their links to the realm of normative constructs constitute a set of operations that can be described as generative in the sense that they are a "set of procedures interacting together so as to produce instructions for the speaker-hearers for assigning infinitely possible meanings to unfolding social scenes" (Cicourel 1973:87). We do not use the term generative to indicate that the system is deterministic; generative systems do not produce meanings or lexical items or utterances. The systems only operate to produce sets of conditions for their choice. The generative system involved in the pragmatic valuation of propositions produces sets of expectancies into which the meanings are fit—that is, a set of constraints on interpretation or valuation. McCawley speaks of this quality of generative systems:

"a grammar is taken not to generate a set of sentences or a set of surface structures but a set of derivations and to consist of a set of derivational constraints on what combinations of elements may occur in surface structure." (McCawley 1971:12).

Now, the generative system allows for an infinite number of pragmatic valuations, but produces for each specific context a set of instructions for the specification of the interpretation. The system generates constraints on the choice of valuation which can be given to the normal form propositions. The system can do this for an infinite number of novel situations in the same cultural context.
As a generative process indexicality operates to assist members to retrieve not all, but only some relevant ethnographic information which will provide them with a means of constructing meanings for the concrete situation. The reciprocity of perspectives and the ability of members to fill-in unstated or ambiguous information during an event operate in conjunction with interpretive procedures to produce normative, socially agreed situated meanings. The meanings of the emerging social scene are constructed in concert; the articulation of particulars with the general rules of the normal forms insures the possibility of negotiating a mutual interaction. General rules, policies or protocols must be connected with particular objects or events in order that the features experienced in real time settings can be claimed to be cases of the general rules. Interpretive procedures connect meanings with these general rules so that agreement can occur between members of a mutual social situation.

The articulation of particulars with the general rules produces specifications or constraints on interpretations. Monge's suggestion that the logical calculus produces entailments provides us with a means to represent the production of constraints. We can interpret the articulation of situated particulars with the set of normal forms as an analogue of the process of tying empirical referents to a set of terms and properties in a logical calculus. The interpretive procedure for the articulation would be equivalent to the idea of "correspondence rules" suggested by Monge. The concept of interpretive procedure as used by Cicourel may be defined as the configuration of rule-applications which leads to the interpretation of the observable events in the social scene. A particular derivational history represents the way in which the articulation of the concrete with the normal forms occurs. It is the history of the applications of the rules as well as a history of the changes in the relationships between the units in the realm of normal forms. If we interpret rules as logical transformation rules and variables as meanings or propositions, then the configurations of these propositions produces entailment conditions which specify the truth value for the construction of situated meanings. The contents of the stock of knowledge are tied to the social scene by indexicality and interpretive procedures--equivalent to the correspondence rules of Monge's paradigm. Thus is the realm of typified constructs made isomorphic with the configuration of the actual social scene.

The scientific description of this process uses the metaphor we have just described. By representing the realm of typifications as a formal system of meanings (a semanticon) and pragmatic rules as rules of correspondence for actual empirical events we can utilize the logical calculus. Normal forms or typifications can be represented in a logical language--as constants or propositions. Rules, semantic and pragmatic, connect the propositions and then tie them to actual contexts. Certain propositional complexes or configurations are recognized as valid or true or normal
by interactants. The complete set of sentences producing an interpretation of an event could be represented as a set of entailment conditions producing a context-sensitive reading for the particulars of the scene. The surface structure interpretation is the end product of a set of entailments which produce the expectancies upon which we justify our action in the scenes of everyday life.

Interpreting Classroom Cases Through The Semiotic

The first section of this present chapter was an attempt to give a theoretical background for a mode of analysis that I will apply to the ethnographic information set out in Chapter I. In the first chapter it was said that classroom activity could be thought of as rule-governed; in the initial pages of this second chapter a theoretical outline of the meaning of the metaphor was given. It remains to show how the ideas and the facts can mutually illuminate one another.

What is the utility of a systems paradigm interpreted as a logical calculus? Further, what is the utility of such a paradigm adapted to phenomenological or subjectivist research? The answer to the first question is indicated in these words by Monge:

The system paradigm is not constrained by the inductive process. Rather it focuses on "...the web of relations surrounding a single event, and examination of other members of the class does nothing to increase the power of the explanation...." Thus, in the systems paradigm any given event may be explained without examination of all other events" (Monge 1973:11).

Aside from cultural anthropological and ethnographic interests in the classroom, this dissertation also concerns itself with the problematic nature of interaction and activity in the classroom. As such, the dissertation concerns itself with micro-ethnography. The type of machinery that sufficed in Chapter I, the Hymes model, does not suffice here. Hymes, for instance, uses the term "rule" but does not show how his descriptive model explicates the term. The system paradigm, which we have explored, gives us a way of ordering the classroom data; if it is seen as a logical system then we also have a symbolic means of expressing ethnographic regularities, especially rules. The beauty of the paradigm is that it allows us to make ethnographic statements about a relatively isolated group of activities. Of course, anthropologists have done similar things before in their studies of rituals, initiations and so on. Here there is an attempt to approach micro-ethnography from another standpoint; in this attempt it is hoped that some of the rigour and ease of expression of semiotics and systems theory will explicate traditional anthropological concerns with cultural sub-systems. The answer to the second question lies in these words by Maurice Natanson; the phenomenological philosopher and interpreter of Schutz:
Here it is maintained that what is needed above all is a way of looking at social phenomena which takes into primary account the intentional structure of human consciousness, and which accordingly places major emphasis on the meaning social acts have for the actors who perform them and who live in a reality built out of their subjective interpretation (Natanson 1963:273).

Thus, the utility of the systems paradigm for the study of the ethnography of particular activities is added to phenomenological social science; the purpose is to explicate and express in a systematic manner the way in which the actors in the classroom—the teachers and students—come to construct the social reality which is the medium in which their acts and activities take on meaning. Phenomenology may help us to handle an old anthropological concern about the relationship of ideal culture to actual culture; we have a way of connecting ideal and actual by studying concrete classroom occurrences phenomenologically.

In the Urbancrest classroom both teachers and students enter with a prior history of cultural experience; as Schutz would say, they enter with a "biographically determined situation." It is important to note that in the Urbancrest case an activity is to be mutually constructed when the individuals constructing it have divergent biographic situations. The teachers, from their white-middle-class experience and training, enter the circle of interaction of individuals from another world of experience. The education of the subculturally different then is at least partially a problem of the stock of experience shared by the participants in educational situations. Since the stock of experience is the source of typified knowledge—hence, of what we have called expectations and rules—divergent stocks will cause individuals to construct different sets of expectations about the conduct of social activity. When this happens a number of problems arise; the major problem is the failure of the principle of the reciprocity of perspectives. We may, in fact, say that one definition of cultural difference is that it is the presence of a different perspective on the world—a different existential modality, if you will. The schemes of reference and interpretation used by the teachers and students are not congruent, and from the perspective of divergent biographic situations, the social reality of the classroom may be, in fact, two realities. Complicating the problem of divergence in the Urbancrest classroom is the fact that education is bicultural; that is, the culturally different child must adopt a new culture while either retaining or abandoning his own. He must do this without any explicit knowledge of the fact that the situation is divergent; the teacher, from her perspective, may commit the same error and interpret a bicultural situation—essentially an acculturative situation—as a mono-cultural situation. That is to say, she will place the blame for problems of reality failure on the individual (or his race) rather than on cultural difference and the bicultural education context. Because of the taken-for-granted nature of most social
activity students and teachers engage in mutual interaction without examining the assumptions, presuppositions, expectations or motivations which govern the manner in which they do so. We may call "reality failure" the phenomenon which occurs when actors suddenly realize that the supposedly mutual apprehension of meanings is unsupported. In the Urbancrest classroom the teachers go through this process as part of learning to cope with the bicultural situation; a number of reality failures--such as finally realizing that misbehavior is not misbehavior at all, but a status game--must be lived through before the teacher can truly mutually construct classroom activity with his students. And of course, the way the educational system is constructed places the burden of this change on the teacher.

Cultural difference implies that teacher and student share different schemes of reference and interpretation. The same physical acts or sequences of acts may have different meanings attached to them. Foster, 197^* points this out in a discussion of slang vocabularies--the so-called "jive lexicon" of inner-city schools. Because the rule or recipe represents a culturally valid standardized and standardizing means of producing and interpreting, and because all such schemes are taken-for-granted, teachers and students may engage in interaction with one another all the while using different sets of recipes. In my field experience I saw a student teacher send a student to the principal's office for playing a status game; I saw her respond incorrectly in a status game and lose status to the student. All of this occurred because the bases for understanding the patterns of behavior being enacted were not shared between the participants. In Chapter I I listed some parameters of cultural difference between the Urbancrest and Middle-class situations; many of these parameters can be discussed in terms of rule differences. When a teacher from a middle-class background learns to operate in a subculturally different setting in order to provide a bicultural educational opportunity--he or she is acquiring knowledge of the student's rules in order to facilitate their enculturation. I say enculturation because the minority child is not merely acculturating--he is bicultural-- and is, in a sense, fated to be enculturated twice.

Rules govern the production and interpretation of behavioral displays; they govern the content and the form of the displays, as well as the connection to place, speakers/actors and time. Each set of displays occurring in a context we may call a social scene; the rules for classroom activity must be described and, indeed, discovered through analyses of such scenes. Through the semiotic and phenomenological machinery discussed in the first part of this chapter will emerge an outline of the logical structure of everyday activity in the classroom; it is only through micro-ethnographic analysis of this sort that the system of expectancies that produces social scenes can be understood. Because of the taken-for-granted nature of social scenes such analysis is necessary, otherwise the logic of common-sense remains implicit.
Social Scene 1: The student teacher has taken over the class for the day. Desks are arranged in rows facing the front of the classroom. The teacher is standing in front of the blackboard next to a map of the state of Ohio. The regular teacher introduces the lesson:

T₁: Mrs. ______ has a really nice lesson plan for us today.

St: Ohhh! (Numerous groans)

T₂: What we are going to do this afternoon is get a map.

St: Ohh! (Numerous groans)

T₂: Look at the area on the map. All you need to do is look. All you need is ______ you need several things. This is a key. It has symbols---this stands for cows. Make up your own symbols. What you can do is cut out and mount it on construction paper. We can mount it with masking tape.

In our examination of the logical structure of this scene let us examine the semantic structure of the text underlying the utterance of T₁:

1. n(x) (Mrs. ______(x)& have(x,y)& lesson plan(y)& today(y)& nice (y)).

The utterance itself operates as what Ervin-Tripp has called "offering information." Hawes, 1972 offers a distinction between sentences with objective topics, structural topics and subjective topics; this particular utterance fits into the category he describes as Objective. A combined definition is that it is an utterance Offering Objective Information. On the grounds of a purely objective meaning context we may establish this as its utterance type. What information is the utterance offering? We may receive some clue by reconstructing a possible project of the utterance. Now, the project is related logically to the utterance because the utterance is a possible presupposition for the consequence envisioned in the projection. Now, a reconstructed project for the single utterance reads like this:

2. n(x) (ego(x)& utter(y)& OOI(y)) FUT PERF

Unfortunately, we see that the semantic consequence of which (1) could be a presupposition is not necessarily sufficient to supply it with a topic. Such singular utterance projects could better be interpreted as illocutionary projects. This label indicates that individual acts within a sequence of connected acts have projects which are related to what they do; thus, using Austin's term, their projects are formal. The topic of (1) must lie in the project of the course-of-action as a whole. We may reconstruct this project as follows (using the transcript as an objective meaning context for our interpretation):

3. n(x) (Mrs. ______(x)& instruct (x,y)& students(y)& instruct about(y) .
(3) is sufficiently general that we do not know exactly how (1) is derived. (3) constitutes, essentially, a project which yields the project of (1); it does this because of hierarchical ordering relations within speech events. Thus, a course of action "instructing" such as was described in the first chapter, may contain within it connected sequences of lesser or constituent acts--such as the OO1. Thus, (2), an illocutionary project can be yielded by (3); (2) is what we can call the Formal Project of Social Scene 1. The topic of (1) can be yielded through the following operation: offering a lesson plan can "count as" (is a possible member of) the category of offering instruction. Thus, the topic of (1) is a statement about the form of (3). Thus, (1) is yielded as a formal type of utterance because OO1 can be entailed by (3). What we mean by this is that such an utterance as (1) may be recognized as counting as (Nofsinger 1975:1) a possible presupposition of (2) which, in turn, can count as a possible presupposition for (3). Now, (1) and (2) are related by direct entailment. That is, (1) can count directly as a presupposition of (2). However, we may say that (1) and (3) are related through what can be called implied sequence entailment. What this means is that (1) can count as part of a well-formed sequence which does not yet exist, but which is implied. Now, both of the teachers involved know the projected state of affairs for the entire class, represented in (3). (1) operates as an offer of objective information. The information it offers is what can be called Project Disclosure. The content of (1) is yielded by choosing set inclusive lexical items for (3). Thus, lesson plan, has, today and Mrs.____ are produced because they are tokens of the proposition expressed in (3) and (2). The lexical items really and nice seem to constitute embedded offers of subjective information; it is beyond the scope of the dissertation to deal with production rules for all sentential items.

Now, since (1) discloses the project of a course-of-action by virtue of the sequence: (1 $ 2) $ 3, the next utterance is also obliged to be part of the course-of-action. The course-of-action implied in (1) is a teacher mode; primary acts in the instructing mode will be teacher-performed. Student roles can be seen as essentially passive; thus, the student reaction can be read as an act of passive recognition. What is recognized is a teacher-performed course-of-action in progress. Thus, we may represent the response of the students as:

4. \[ A(x) \text{ (passive}(x)\& \text{recognize}(x,y)\& \text{instruction mode}(y), \]

where "Ohhh!" counts as a token of the proposition contained in (4).

Now, (5), which we can represent as follows, is obliged to be part of a course-of-action implied in (1).

5. \[ A(x) \text{ (make}(x,y)\& \text{map}(y)\& \text{today}(y) \]
(5) is an utterance whose function is the same as (1), that is, offering objective information. However, there are differences between the two. (1) offers information about the form of the course-of-action, thus, the project is disclosed; (5) offers information about the subject of the course-of-action introduced in (1). Thus, if we call (1) the Formal Project Disclosure, then we may call (5) the Topic Project Disclosure. The content of (5) is a possible presupposition of the latter half of my representation of (3). It is important to note the two uses of the word topic; it is used to indicate what any particular utterance is about, as well as to indicate subject matter—as in Topic Project. In (1) the lexical item lesson plan is a particular which is attended to in order to yield the entailment sequence which informs the children that what is to follow is a formal course-of-action known as instruction; in (5) the verb phrase make a map fills the same function for the subject of the course of action.

We said previously that (4) was a recognition utterance on the part of the students; this is due, in part, to the recognition of a teacher-dominant course-of-action. However, another particular which would indicate a student-passive role is the seating arrangement. In Chapter I I pointed out that the whole-group seating arrangement was objectively associated with teacher dominant orality. (6), then, as both a recognition of the form of the course-of-action, and the subject, has the same basic logical nature as (4).

Since utterances (1) and (5) disclosed the form and topic of the project, (7) is a series of utterances which serves to expand the form of the course-of-action, or on the subject matter. Thus, (7a) "Look at the area on the map," (7b) "All you need to do is look," and (7c) "All you need is—you need several things," are utterances which serve as what Ervin-Tripp has called "mands" (Ervin-Tripp 1973). Hawes' category of "structural" utterances seems also to capture the function of these utterances. We may, in fact, say that they serve as protocol utterances, and, as such, serve to "map" the procedures to be followed in the student's portion of the lesson plan. Because they are formal they can be yielded as presuppositions of the course-of-action project's Formal Project. Each also has its own illocutionary project; these are of the form we give for (7a):

7a. $A(x) (students(x) \& look\ at(x,y)\& map(y))FUT\ PERF$

Utterances (7d) and (7e) are content utterances, and insofar as they complete the disclosure of project begun in the Topic Project Disclosure they are offering objective information. In the Hawes' category system this is denoted as Objective Extension; the content utterances extend the information disclosed in the project disclosure just as the protocol utterances extend the information disclosed in the project disclosure associated with form. Utterances like (7d) and (7e) have logical structures like the following:

7d. $e(x) (key(x))$ 7e. $n(x) (contains(x,y)\& (symbols(y))$
Utterances, (7f), (7g) and (7h) are "mands" like the first three utterances of the sequence; they perform the protocol functions of structuring the student response to the course-of-action outlined in (5). They essentially tell the student what to do; thus, when we examine their logical form the predicates are dyadic, with the first term being a reference to the students, the predicate being a verb with imperative form, and the second term being an object of the command. The content utterances, on the other hand make reference to objects in the semantic domain of the content of the course of action (maps, keys, symbols) not to objects in the semantic domain of the form of the course-of-action (students, we,). In the protocol utterances objects from the content universe of discourse take on the form of objects (in a subject-object form) of actions by the students.

Now, what does the logical analysis of this sequence of utterances reveal? In this analysis the main point has been to show that the speech event we call instructing in Chapter I is a course-of-action. All courses of action take place within contexts, performed by actors, with reference to projects and motives. However, each of them is composed of smaller units, what we call "acts," or in the case of the above analysis of discourse, utterances. The act or individual utterance is a minimal unit of a course-of-action. The utterance is a semantic text plus a pragmatic interpretation; that is, it is a bounded semantic proposition or set of propositions. The course-of-action of which the utterance is a part is a sequence of these propositions. In the retrospective glance these sequences are synthesized into what Schutz has called the monothetic object—the meaning of the course of action. However, the course-of-action, as it occurs, is polythetic. It is only in the retrospective glance that the constituents are synthesized into a single object of consciousness. Just as each course-of-action type is associated with a motivation and a project, so we may suppose that each act is also associated with an intentionality and a project within the framework of the course-of-action. Thus, the Formal Project Disclosure, the Topic Project Disclosure, the Optional Student Response, and the Protocol and Content Statements can be seen as the acts which make up the sequence of acts which we call a course-of-action. Each of these acts is connected to the others by virtue of their derivability from the course of action project, either through direct entailment from their associated act projects, or implied sequence entailment from the course-of-action project. Each act making up the sequence of acts would have a purpose and would play some part in the achievement of the project of the course-of-action. Let us conceive of the minimal unit of intent as the in-order-to of the act. The future-purposive vector of the act is the completion of the course of action; the vector of the course-of-action is the completion of the project. Acts, then, function in courses of action. Hawes, in speaking of the enactment of routines, speaks of "patterns of mutually displayed behaviors." Those behaviors, meaningful because they
function in a routine which has a project, are the "acts" that we are speaking of (Haves n.d.:21). If we conceive of the course-of-action as a sequence of events fulfilling a plan, then the acts are individual operations operating to fulfill the completion of the sequence; in other words, the acts "compose" the course-of-action (Miller, et. al.:1972:52).

In the preceding analysis we have attempted to show that sequences of behaviors occurring in the Urbancrest classroom, which can be given the name "instructing" (purely on objective grounds) can be shown to have a logical structure and to be composed of a set of logically related constituent units. Now, the thesis of the dissertation is that we can express the logical relationships in terms of rules and that these rules account for the behavior observed. Now, we have left aside the question of the emic status of the propositions, or even of the label "instructing." The analysis simply tries to make explicit a possible structure; generally testable constructs can be yielded through the analysis. The testing, however, must be accomplished through another set of operations. Pursuing the metaphor of "rule-governed" let us see how one can account for the structure of the piece of discourse represented in Scene 1.

If we examine the initial situation we see that the classroom is structured in a certain way environmentally. We also know that the teacher, T, regularly exhibits behaviors associated with the teaching of middle-class children. Thus, although we do not know what she will do, we have expectations (and so may the children) about the course of action to follow. Thus, a rule relating a situation type to a personal type can account for the initiation of the course-of-action if both of these are then related to a project. Thus, we have: (where if...then is weak entailment):

Rule 1: *(PS1 & T-AUTH) % W-G INSTR*

Rule 2: *(W-G INSTR % TEACH DOM) % TEACH INIT UTTER*

Rule 3: *W-G % w-g1#w-g2#w-g3#.w-gn* (by set inclusion)

Rule 4: *W-G % FPD # TPD or W-G % FP # TP and FP % FPD etc.*

Rule 5: *FPD % PROTOCOL*

Rule 6: *TPD % CONTENT*

Rule 7: *W-G % STU PASS RESP*

Now, each of these rules may be put in relation to the propositions we outlined previously. The rules follow the definition I gave earlier which was that they control the relations between units. Rule 1 yields the project of the course of action by implication. That is, the environment/context which we defined in Chapter I as
Participant Structure 1, plus the teacher whose personal type is "authoritative" yields the project "whole-group instruction." If we state the rule in Black's formulation it would appear as: The accomplishment of whole-group instruction by an authoritative teacher in a Participant Structure 1 setting is expected (probable).

Now, Rule 2 states that if W-G is the project then the teacher is dominant orally. If this entailment is satisfied then the teacher will utter the initial utterance. Rule 2 accounts for teacher active initiating phenomena. Now, in the actual social scene the initial utterance was given by T₁; we may account for this by simply saying that T₁ was "acting in place of" T₂. In fact, if T₁ implicitly accepted Rule 1 she, too, was acting according to expectations.

Rule 3 can be used to yield course-of-action constituent parts--such as "having a lesson plan" or "making a map" if those can "count as" instructing in the cultural group. Rule 4 states that proposition (1) can be yielded by proposition (3) or that proposition (5) can be yielded by (3). However, these would be by implied sequence entailment through their projects, which as illocutionary projects directly entail them--as (2) entails (1). Rules 5 and 6 state that if either the FPD or TPD have occurred then it is expected that protocol or content statements will occur. Rule 7 states that if whole-group instruction is being carried out, then student response is passive. Now, the alternation of teacher-student responses in the transcript can be yielded by a turn-taking rule such as that outlined by Sacks--that is, current speaker (teacher) selects speaker, or lets speaker select himself at a transition point in the discourse.

These seven rules plus a turn-taking rule can yield the propositions behind the utterances; they can give their functional attributes, and, at least partially, a rationale for their sequence. In this analysis the focus has been on the structure of a course of action. In the next sequence let us examine the structure of a sequence of discourse in which there is more mutual communication activity.

Social Scene 2: The teacher is going over the symbols on the map used in Scene 1. She questions the students about some of the meanings:

T₂: Agricultural Products. What's this mean?

ST: Farms?

ST: Cows?

T₂: What comes from cows?

ST: Milk, meat.

Utterance (1) has a semantic structure similar to the following:
The project of these two connected utterances is involved with a course-of-action known as questioning-answering. In this analysis, however I am concerned not only with the structure of the sequence but also with some situational particulars that operate to bound the interpretations the students give to the teacher's displays. First, however, let's represent the project of (1):

2. \text{n}(x) \text{(teacher}(x)& I \text{elicit}(x,y,z)& \text{teacher}(x) \& \text{answer}(y) \& \text{students}(z) \& \text{milk,meat}(y))

The project of (1) informs us that the function of a question (obviously) is to elicit an answer; however, in comparison with the structure of the course-of-action in Scene 1 we see that the project of the initial utterance—that is, what it does is synonymous with the project of the course-of-action. Therefore there is no distinction between illocutionary and course-of-action projects. However, this must be tempered with the recognition that the project of (1) also announces the project of the envisioned answer. The logical relationship between the two is such that the production of the answer is sufficient to fulfill the project. In scene one we had a case where the utterances were possible presuppositions of a long-range consequence; the project disclosures did not complete the course-of-action. In this scene the answer automatically discloses the project—both formally and in content.

However, if we examine the transcript of the answers that the students gave to the question represented in (1) we see that only the third one is accepted by the teacher. The structure of the first two answers is similar to:

3. \text{n}(y) \text{(farms}(y) \& \text{x}(y))

Now, formally (3) constitutes an answer; the formula \text{n}(y) ( \text{farms}(y) \& \text{x}(y)) which is the underlying structure of the answer is sufficient in form to count as an answer to the question "What y equals x in (1)?" However, it is not sufficient in content to count as an answer. Thus, formally the statement x equals y is a consequence of the project of (2); "farms" however, does not constitute (in the teacher's project) a consequence of the presupposition x equals y and y equals an agricultural product which is a subset of the category x.

Now, after giving the formally correct answer "farms" the students give another answer—"cows." In the tape of the transcript it is significant that after the answer "farms" there is a silence on the part of the teacher. It is my opinion that the period of silence is an indexical particular whose purpose is to bound the range of propositions that could count as the consequence of (2). This particular essentially operates to negate (3); since the teacher did not say or do anything after (3) was offered the silence was seen as an indication that the set of possible propositions filling
the slot of consequence must be limited. Thus, the silence operates as a point of reference in the social scene; the possible world in which "farms" and its proposition could be true is not this possible world. The contextual package surrounding "farms" includes the lexical items "agricultural products." These lexical items are what is known as discourse context; the period of silence may operate as a particular which focuses attention on the fact that (3) now takes on the value; in a sense (4) is the "meaning" of the silence:

4. \[ n(y) \text{ (farms}(y) \& x(y)) \]

In other words, we may say that the contextual package is re-evaluated and another utterance is to be considered which is compatible with its discourse context. Of course, this also means that it must be a possible consequence of (2), both formally and in content. Thus, the students answer (1) again; this time they offer:

5. \[ n(y) \text{ (cows}(y) \& x(y)) \]

Again, this is formally correct. The content of (5) is not technically sufficient to count as an example of what is called for in (1), and what is envisioned in (2). However, the cow has a certain relationship to agricultural products in that it is an agent in their production; thus, the teacher, in an effort to help the students bound the range of possible consequences of (1) gives:

6. \[ n(y) \text{ (comes from cows}(y) \& \text{tell } (a,y,b) \& \text{students}(a) \& \text{answer}(y) \& \text{teacher}(b) } \]

The idea of indexicality helps us again here; the discourse context for the lexical item which could substitute for y in (6) has been limited. The search of the contextual package has been limited as to content; it is clear now that the consequence which fulfills (1) is a proposition which fulfills the pragmatic criteria of the discourse context. Now, the teacher envisioned the answer, in some form, in (2). We do not know if she envisioned milk or meat. Indeed, beets, hay, or other products may have sufficed. She herself seized on the particular "cows" as a means of creating a discourse context which could bound the set of propositions which the students had to search in order to fulfill (1). Thus, the answer of "milk, meat" is well-formed both as to logical structure and content:

7. \[ n(y) \text{ (milk, meat}(y) \& x(y)) \]

On the video-tape the teacher nodded her head and began a new sequence of questions about symbols on the map. Thus, (7) is marked in this way as the correct consequence for the presupposition (1). Indeed this simple question-answer sequence is a simple presupposition-consequence relationship; the indexical particulars intervened as a means of guiding the students to the selection of the right consequence after two successive wrong content answers. It is in this social scene that we get some idea of the concept of negotiation.
Negotiation involves the mutual construction of a social scene by its participants. In this example the children co-operate with the teacher in arriving at the outcome of the course of action. In this example the teacher produces items which force the students to consistently reevaluate the propositions they are offering in fulfillment of the question offered in the teacher's first utterance. The students co-operate with her by indexing the discourse context and drawing from their stocks of knowledge the proposition which is satisfied in the contextual package of the questioning sequence. The fact that the teacher uses the indexical qualities of particulars to "guide" the answers the students given is indicative of a type of negotiation that may be characteristic of teachers.

What rules can we formulate which will account for the patterns of behavior and their underlying semantic content? First, for the general form of question-answer sequences we can state:

Rule 1: \((\text{utter}(x,y) \& \text{teacher}(x) \& \text{question}(z) \% (\text{utter}(a,b) \& \text{student}(a) \& \text{answer}(b) \& \text{obligatory}(b)))\)

Of course, this rule is probably a specific case of a more general rule which would state that "if someone asks a question then it is expected that someone will answer." In the classroom, from observation of objective patterns it appears much more probably, and, indeed, required that a teacher's question entail a student's answer. It may be, however, that a rule such as "the whole-group instruction-teacher dominant orality rule" of the previous scene would operate with "a question entails answer rule" to produce an obligatory student response. Given that Rule 1 yields the expectation that a question implies an answer, and that a student is to give it, how do we decide when a given question-answer sequence is over? Perhaps a sequence-closing rule is needed:

Rule 2: \((\text{close}(a,b) \& \text{answer}(a) \& \text{sequence}(b) \iff (\text{proj}(b) \% (a)) \)

This rule states that \((a)\) can close the sequence \((b)\) if and only if \((a)\) is a possible consequence for the project of the sequence. Thus, utterance \((3)\) in our example is ill-formed because "farms" is not a possible consequence of \((2)\) in our example. That proposition restricts the utterances which can count as consequences of it. Now, the teacher did not respond to \((3)\) as a well-formed answer; in fact, she remained silent. In question-answer sequences a wrong answer can be indicated by a rule which ties a lack of response to attempted closure with an ill-formed utterance.

Rule 3: \(\approx (\text{proj}(b) \% (a)) \% \approx (\text{close}(a,b) \& \approx \text{approve}(x,a) \& \text{teacher}(x) \& \text{answer}(a))\)

Such a rule would indicate to the student that the sequence is not closed; this rule with another predicate and argument for the last conditional clause would also yield the interpretation of \((6)\) where a complete utterance served the purpose of indicating that closure
had not been achieved. The rule through which "milk" and "meat" is yielded in (7) however, involves more than just trying to fit another proposition to (2). The period of silence through rule 3 indicated that the students had to try to articulate their next response to (2). After the production of (6), however, the students had to produce an utterance which accounted for (2) and (6). Now, this utterance can be defined as the consequence which fills the satisfaction conditions of (2) and (6) (both operating as presuppositions. The rule which tells the students to combine (2) and (6) would probably be a general rule for all situations in which the constraints on possible answers are increasingly specified by the introduction of limiting utterances in the discourse context:

Rule 4: 

\[ \text{contains}(a,b) \land \text{contains}(a,c) \land \text{sequence}(a) \land \text{questions}(b,c) \land \text{answer}(d) \]

This rule essentially states that if a question-answer sequence is not closed after an initial question then all following questions are to be interpreted as additional presuppositions of the answer. These four rules essentially can account for the form of the question and answer sequence, how it is close, how one knows when it is not closed, and how one recognized additional constraints and their effect on the proper answer. In this scene we have concentrated on how negotiation might occur, and on how particulars may function to index the contextual package—as for instance, the discourse context. Before continuing on to the next scene it is important to point out the difference in the way the rules of Scenes 1 and 2 were notated. This was done on purpose; the intent was to show that the style of notation is relatively unimportant as long as the conditional status (if...then) remains to indicate that the relationships are forms of weak or natural entailment. In the next social scene I shall examine an instance where rule systems are not congruent and what I call "reality failure" occurs; in this analysis the rules will be formulated using the schema suggested by Max Black.

Social Scene 3: T2, the student, teacher is talking to a student, the one designated as A3 in Chapter I.

T2: _______ did you finish what I gave you to do?
A3: Say What?
T2: Did you finish?
A3: Say What?
T2: Did you finish? (a somewhat louder tone of voice)
A3: Say What?
T2: You go right to the principal's office!
A3: Be glad to! (Walks to the door, opens it, slams it hard.)

Class: The students laugh and make various vocal comments indicating that A3 has really done it (sort of like "ohhhs" of appreciation.)

The initial utterance of the sequence is a question from the teacher; the project of the question entails that the student give an answer, under Rule 1 from our previous analysis. The project of the utterance assumes that a student reply is obligatory. However, Rule 1, as we said, may have to operate in concert with "the whole-group-teacher dominant orality rule." In this case, where the interchange is taking place in a face-to-face situation such may not be the case. In fact, in Chapter I it was noted that students generally use individual interaction or part-group instruction to enact status games. We cannot, then, assume that Rule 1 operates outside its conjunction with the whole-group dominance rule formulated in Scene 1. However, let us first represent the

1. \( n(x) \wedge (A3(x) \wedge \text{tell}(x,a,y) \wedge \text{teacher}(y) \wedge \text{state previous sequence}(a)) \)

Now, as we pointed out in the previous scene the project of a question answer sequence specifies those answers which can "count as" answers. The teacher assumes, when she formulates the question that the student's reply will be a well-formed consequence of the presupposition stated in (1). By Rule 1--given that we are operating in the teacher dominant mode--the student's reply is obligatory. The social reasons behind the fact that the modality of the rule requires an answer have to do with middle-class expectations of teacher's status. In fact, it appears that we might interpret \( T_2 \) as applying Rule 1 globally, when in fact it is a context sensitive rule. It must appear in conjunction with a whole-group situation rule; that is to say, from objective observation we see that teacher dominance varies with the situation in the Urbancrest classroom. From the student's perspective, then, Rule 1 applies only locally to other situations. In the face to face interaction, situation rules for status, hence for enforcing or expecting obligatory response is much more limited. The student may have perceived the situation as an opportunity to do status on the teacher because it was a face-to-face situation; he played the game in-order-to gain status. Thus, the student's answer to her question operated to violate the conditions specified in her project. Lexical items such as "Yes," "sure," "certainly," and so on, would have fulfilled the satisfaction criteria. Instead he produced an utterance operated to deny the initiation of the course-of-action represented in the utterance acting as a token of (1). This was accomplished by uttering a phrase which did two things; the phrase initiated a question-answer sequence in which the teacher was obliged to respond and also made it appear as if the student's inversion of role was a communication performance problem.
Now, by the time the third "Say What" has been given, 
the assumption of performance problems gives way to an assumption 
that the student is purposefully abrogating the sequence initiated 
in (1). The phenomenon I am going to call "reality failure" oc­
curs when a teacher realizes (or objectively appears to realize) 
that her assumptions may not be congruent with those of the student. 
Further, she may realize that her motives in any given activity may 
not be the motives of the student. If (1) is the project of the 
teacher's utterance/course-of-action, her in-order-to motivation 
can be represented as the vector of intent which moves her to com­
plete the act. This vector of intent intersects, and is cut by 
the in-order-to motivation of the student; we can represent this 
motivation as follows:

2. In(x) (A3(x) & borrow(x,a,y) & teacher(y) & status(a))

The utterance. "Say What" can count as a particular which fulfills 
the project represented in (2). The \$ operator indicates that 
A3 intends to complete the proposition; and, indeed, has initiated 
its completion through the voluntative flat. Say What may count as 
such an utterance (and although I make the statement purely on 
unverified grounds, such a statement may be verified through methods 
outlined in Chapter III) because it operates to invert, through 
direct abrogation of the teacher's dominance, the normal sequence 
of events. The student, in fact, is producing utterances which 
require the teacher to find satisfaction conditions. After three 
tries the teacher decides that she cannot satisfy the conditions 
set by the student.

Now, the teacher's response to the fact that the student 
has successfully borrowed status from her is to interpret the occur­
rence as misbehavior. This is primarily due to the interpretation 
that the student was misbehaving through non-cooperation; since 
the teacher probably applies Rule 1 of Scene 2 globally--under the 
assumption that it can operate out of the context of whole group 
settings--the fact the the student does not fulfill expectations 
counts as misbehavior--the violation of classroom norms. The stu­
dent, on the other hand, sees Rule 1 as locally relevant. Thus, he, 
in face-to-face interaction, sees that it is allowable to attempt 
doing status work. The fact that their regular teacher never ap­
plied sanctions for such attempts may also contribute to his moti­
vation. A classroom typification may have emerged which stated 
that status games with teacher in face-to-face interaction were 
permissible. The teacher, however, has no insight into the student's 
motives, projects or rules. Her rule, operating as a scheme of 
interpretation, led her to believe that the rule-violation was 
connected with the abrogation of teacher dominance. It was thus 
connected with insubordination--that is, bad behavior. Her response 
was to send him to the principal to be punished. The "reality" 
of the social scene failed after the third "Say What." In an attempt 
to reconstitute it she used her rule of obligatory response as 
a way of categorizing the violation as misbehavior. The distortion
of reality was repaired by referring the situation to another type category—that of misbehavior. However, the only reality that was repaired was that of the teacher. When the teacher responded to the status game with a punishment, rather than with a retort as the other teacher might have done, the student himself was forced to create another set of relevant circumstances around his acts. He chose the option that Foster, 1974 calls "louding." Louding, essentially is a form of Black speech activity where bravado, a loud voice and a sense of the dramatic is used to cope with authority situations. Another option might have been to "jive" the teacher in an attempt to fabricate extenuating circumstances for one's behavior. Thus, when the teacher utters:

3. "You go right to the principal's office!"

the student responds with a speech act which is, in reality, a verbal unit—a constituent of a course-of-action which includes stalking to the door very dramatically, raising one's voice level, and slamming the door. Thus, (4) marks a phase in a course-of-action "louding" which was initiated as a response to (3). We may represent the project of this course-of-action as an attempt to keep from losing status because the teacher, more or less through cultural blindness, would not "play the game." Louding functions as a form of intimidation, where the body is used as a field of presentation and the intent is to extricate oneself from the situation by super-exaggerating status; as such, it is the opposite of jiving, where so-called Uncle-Tom behavior is the norm. The student's verbal response:

4. "Be glad to!"

is indicative, by its very content, of this speech function. If we consider that (3) for the middle-class teacher represents the ultimate in threat of punishment, then (4) is a suitably fitting answer if one were attempting to "loud" on the teacher.

In some sense, the course-of-action louding and the course-of-action which involved the status game are contiguous as far as their projects are concerned. It is the configuration of the acts that fulfill the projects that differs; both forms utilize displays as a means of building status. What sort of rules can account for the structure of this speech event; in addition, which rules were not shared by the participants and whose non-compatibility led to the distortion of social reality (Natanson 1974) that we call reality failure?

Rule 1: When a teacher asks a student a question in all classroom participant structures it is obligatory that the student answer.

Rule 1': When a teacher asks a student a question in whole-group participant structures it is obligatory to answer; in face-to-face participant structure response is optional.
Rule 2: If a student wishes to play a status game in a face-to-face participant structure he is required to enact displays of any of the following types: a. role-inversion b. project abrogation c. louding d. inappropriate address e. insulting f. playing the dozens...

Rule 3: If a student in any way reacts as if teacher dominance is in question the reaction is to be interpreted as misbehavior. If so, the teacher is obliged in classroom situations to apply institutionally permitted sanctions.

Rule 4: The student is permitted to enact status games in participant-structure settings other than whole-group instruction; he is permitted to enact them with all participants in the classroom.

These four rules can account for many of the features of transcript. Rule 1 accounts for the teacher's reaction to the student's attempt to abrogate the question-answer sequence; the violation of the expectation this rule expresses can bring on the sanctions we spoke about in our discussion of Black's view on rules. The fact that I never observed the regular teacher apply sanctions (other than to play the game in return) for playing the game may speak to the development of Rule 1' which expresses the student's formulation of the necessity of responding to a teacher-initiated course-of-action. Of course, my formulation of Rule 1 was made from a situation in which the course-of-action was abrogated because the student was playing a status game. I never saw T1 apply sanctions for the game itself—but she did apply sanctions for other course-of-action abrogations such as interrupting. The reason that I maintain Rule 1 as a rule applicable to other than status game abrogations of question-answer sequences is that objective patterns seem to confirm the rather loose enforcement by the regular teacher of teacher dominant orality.

Rule 2 sets forth a rule for the possible accomplishment of a status game; it connects a situation to types of courses-of-action which would fulfill the project of the status-game (which we might want to call an activity.) Indeed the rule specifies which types of courses-of-action might count as instances of the coherent activity of doing status. Rule 3 explains the teacher's general reaction to the violation of Rule 1; Rule 3 takes up where Rule 1 leaves off. After rules are violated other rules act to categorize the violation, in this case, violation of the teacher's expectation of receiving a required response, and then they act to connect the appropriate sanctions to the appropriate categories. Variations on Rule 3 would involve different types of violations and different sanctions. A Rule which would apply to T1 might not include the specification of violation of teacher oral dominance; the sanction specification might not include sending children to the principle, but, rather, beating them at their own status games. Thus, rule-substitutions can allow us to represent the system which characterizes authoritative and adaptive teachers.
Rule 4 can account for the fact that the students generally appear not to enact status games in whole-group contexts. This may be purely a function of the difficulty of doing so, or, as I mentioned in Chapter I, the high risk factor involved in doing so. Thus, the small-group or individual situation is chosen as a setting for the enactment of status games. Such situations can be seen as extensions of the settings the child uses to perform status games with his peers. In the example I gave it is interesting to note that the first portion of the transcript represents face-to-face interaction. When the teacher told the student to leave the room she did so in a loud voice; what she accomplished, probably unwittingly, was the public announcement of the violation. The student, involved in a face-to-face status enactment is suddenly shifted to a public situation; we may correlate the adoption of the loudlying tactic as an adaptation to that circumstance.

In this example the purpose was to show how differing rule-systems might intersect; it tried to show how reality failure can occur, and how one student and one teacher reacted to that failure. An interesting note before the next example is that the teacher, in the end, seemed to lose the game. The student's adoption of the loudlying tactic after the shift from private-to-public engendered a response in the newly apprised audience that seemed to indicate that he had, indeed, gained status from the interchange.

**Social Scene Two:** Two students are engaged in painting a model of a house; during the painting they have spilled some dry tempera powder on the floor. The student referred to as A.8. approaches the two students; he initiates the interaction by walking by, stopping to watch the two try to clean up the paint, scuffing the powder with his shoe and then making his first utterance. One of the two girls makes a reply to his utterance. The two laugh at A.8.

A.8.: All she has to do is open that nose and sniff it all away like a vacuum cleaner.

A.14.: You a garbage can.

This social scene is initiated when A.8. stops as he walks by the two students (A.14. and A.6.). He saw both of them trying to clean up the paint on the floor. He scuffed the paint with his foot as a prelude to selecting a primary addressee for his utterance. Both addressees notice that he has stopped; when he delivers his utterance it is understood to be addressed to A.6., but it is A.14. who replies. All participants recognize when the scene is closed.

Let us examine the logical structure of this scene. As a starting point let us examine the semantic structure of the text underlying the first utterance:

1. \[ n(a) \land (she(a) \land (have to(a) \land open nose(a) \land sniff(a,b) \land paint(b) \land all away(SNIFF) \land like a vacuum cleaner(SNIFF)) \]
(SNIFF) notates the fact that a complete full-sentence of the language is acting as an argument--thus it is being used as a sentential constant. The original sentence/utterance started with the word ALL. I take this to read that "it is sufficient that (insert sentence) in order to clean up the paint." As such, the word ALL operates to convert the sentence notated above into a possible presupposition for the condition of having the paint cleaned up. The lexical item may, in fact, have indexical qualities which are bounding the interpretation which can be given to the sentence. Let us represent the previous text as the sentence S1. S1 is the possible presupposition of the condition represented by the statement "there is some paint that is cleaned up." Let us notate this as S2; thus, we have the relationship S1PPS2.

However, let us go back for a moment to the beginning of scene when A.8 is walking by. Let us notate this condition as:

2. n(a) (A.8(a)& walking by(a))

Furthermore, this person is walking by a certain environmental/situational occurrence; that is, some persons are cleaning paint up off of the floor. Let us notate this as:

3. ...walking by (a,b)& cleaning up paint(b)

Furthermore, let us say that this person notices who the persons cleaning up the paint are:

4. ...K n(a) (A.6(c)& A.14(d)& cleaning up paint(c)& cleaning paint(d)).

Now, he sees that they are cleaning paint off of the floor; he has noticed this on his way past. We have notated his recognition of the situation "two people cleaning paint" in sentences two and three immediately above. He recognizes that the occurrence counts as a certain type of occurrence, i.e. two people cleaning up paint. When he stops and scuffs the spilled paint with his shoe he indicates to the observers a shift from one activity to another. For the actors in the social scene it initiates an interaction. It is at the point of stopping (breaking away from the course of walking by) and scuffing the paint (entrance into the activity of the two other actors) that the social scene is initiated as a mutual construction. The three sentences above mark a part of a configuration of variables which are a "causal nexus" for the initiation of Actor A.8's project. It is during the time period of stopping and scuffing that the subjective decision to embark on a course-of-action is made. The actions serve as a form of bodily presentation; that is, Actor A.8 announces his intention to involve himself, in some way, in the activity before him. This next logical sentence marks what A.8 is doing and what A.6 and A.14 perceive him as doing:

5. I n(a) (A.8(a)& involve(a)& involve in(e)& situation(e))

The first utterance of the new course-of-action is made after this. A.8 knows what he is going to do; he has formulated a project motivated by
the nexus of events notated above. The utterance is performed with respect to the project. We do not know the project except as it is reconstructed after the performance. However, the performance, when complete, can serve as the basis of the course-of-action assessment and a corresponding project construction. The utterance corresponds to the course-of-action type "sounding." In this case only a single act constitutes the course-of-action. The utterance is classed as an insult by the observer, and, ostensibly, by the participants. The project calls for the performance of a certain course-of-action; if the course-of-action is produced with the intention of sounding, that is, the in-order-to motive is to insult someone, then the project is equivalent to the Future Perfect proposition describing the state of affairs the course-of-action is intended to bring about. This state of affairs is retrospectively typified as an instance of the course-of-action sounding. We can represent the project as the sentence:

6. \( n(a) \ (A.8(a) \& \text{sound}(a,c) \& A.6(c)) \)

This sentence has the time relationship to the course-of-action and the moment of projection as follows: we call the moment of projection the Pragmatic Time Point (Van Dijk 197284) and we call the relation of the proposition/project to the moment of projection the Time Indic­ator. In a simple past tense the proposition would be: \( t_1 \) is less than \( t_0 \) (the time Point). We call the point in time with reference to which other points are described the Time Focus. The sentence just written would then look like: \( t_1 \) is less than \( t_f \) which is equal to \( t_0 \). A future perfect tense would look like the following: \( t_i \) is less than \( t_f \) which is greater than \( t_0 \). That is to say, the proposition is thought of as already having been accomplished at the time focus (past) but the time focus is greater than the pragmatic time point (the actual time of the occurrence of the projection). Thus, if we notate project as \( P \), the moment of projection as \( MP \), then we have the statement \( E(x)E(y) \ (Earl(x,y) \& Earl(y,x) \& P(x) \& MP(y)) \), which is a logical description of the time status of projecting with respect to a pragmatic time point which is empirically ascertainable.

In-order-to motivation is the vector of intentionality which moves the actor from the projection point to the completion of his act. If the project is represented by the sentence above the in-order-to motive can be represented as the project sentence plus the operation sign \( I \). However, the operator which attaches to the project subsumes that attaching to the sentence describing a phase in the course-of-action. We may say that the \( I \) operator preceding a phase sentence is a derivation of the \( I \) operator of the project. There is a relation between them such that the \( I \) of the phase stage is a presupposition of the \( I \) of the course-of-action. Motivation is not represented except as a vector of what is being done; we represent what is being done (initiating, sounding, concluding) as a full-sentence of the language; \( I \) marks the fact that "x intends doing y" where y is the sentence describing that being done. The in-order-to motivation of A.8's project is notated as the sentence:

7. \( I n(a) \ (A.8(a) \& \text{sound}(a,c) \& A.6(c)) \)
Given that A.8 has the project and, hence, the intent to carry it out, and given that he does, in fact, produce an utterance in the world as a step toward fulfilling that outcome, what are the relations of that utterance to the causal nexus and the project? To answer this question let us examine the structure of the presuppositions and consequences which surround the proposition behind the utterance. First, the utterance which we have notated as $S_1$ is a possible presupposition of the statement which have notated as $S_2$. $S_2$ is itself a possible consequence of the sentence describing the course-of-action perceived by A.8 as he initially walked by the other two actors. If $S_2$ is a consequence of the sentence $S_3$ (§4) and if $S_1$ is a possible presupposition of $S_2$, then both $S_3$ and $S_1$ are presuppositions of $S_2$. $S_2$ is also the sentence which represents the project of the course-of-action represented in the causal nexus— that is that two individuals are cleaning up some paint.

However, given that A.8's own project is to sound on A.6 then we have the condition that $S_4$ (his project) and $S_1$ (the utterance) are also related: $S_1$ is a presupposition of $S_4$. However, the presuppositional relationship here is on of pragmatic presupposition (if X intends the course-of-action $y$, then he also intends the sub-portions of that action as presuppositions of its fulfillment) where the relationships in the above paragraphs are the semantic presuppositions of the first perceived object course-of-action. Thus, the content (semantic meaning) of $S_1$ is a possible semantic presupposition that can be constructed by the actor's interpreting the course-of-action of cleaning up paint as having the project $S_2$. The interpretation of the intent, the pragmatic presupposition, however, is made with reference to $S_4$, a project given to the course-of-action emerging from A.8. This project is a possible pragmatic consequence of $S_1$. Now, the question remains, how do the observers, A.6 and A.14 apprehend $S_4$ as a possible consequence when the semantic consequence implies only $S_2$? If $S_3$ had been the English sentence: "You could clean that up with a broom and a dust pan!" would this problem have been solved? I think not, since in the latter case $S_4$ would be represented by the pragmatic consequence "giving advice." We must suggest that actors separate semantic and pragmatic presuppositions and consequences in the interpretation of acts. Thus, while the semantics of $S_1$ are produced with reference to its function as a possible presupposition of the project of the observed act $S_2$, its pragmatics, what it is seen as doing, is produced with reference to the project $S_4$. The sentence $S_1$ is seen as a semantic presupposition of $S_2$ by the actors but can also be specifically seen as "doing something?" They construct $S_4$ as the possible consequence of $S_1$. Thus, they understand what the sense of the sentence is as well as what it means in doing what it does. Or, in other words, not only what the text means, but what the utterance means.

Given that the actors A.6 and A.14 construct $S_4$ it is possible to represent the retort to the sentence $S_1$ as a meaningful proposition even though its semantics do not relate either to $S_1$, $S_2$ or $S_3$. We may represent the retort as the following sentence:
The project of the retort can be represented by the following sentence:

which has the correlated intentionality vector I and the Future Perfect Tense structure of all projects. Now, the causal nexus which surrounded the production of the retort can be given by the English sentence:

A.14 knows that A.8 has just made an utterance, she believes it to be an insult and she believes it is directed at A.6. We may notate this as the following full-sentence:

The relation of the retort (S₂) to the sentence S₁ is the same as the relationship of the project of S₅ which we shall notate as S₆ to the project S₄. That is, S₁ is a pragmatic presupposition of the outcome fantasied in S₆. S₆ was constructed with reference to the interpretation of the causal nexus we outline previously. The project S₅ was constructed with reference to the production of the utterance S₁ and its interpretation as a possible presupposition of the project S₄. Thus, the retort was produced as an "equivalence" statement to the pragmatic attitude expressed in S₁. Its semantics is unrelated to the semantics of S₁, but its pragmatics are derivable as the output of an equivalence rule. We may state this rule as follows:

Rule 1: A retort or countersound is permissible by a member of the group addressed if the circumstances are such that one member has produced an utterance that has been interpreted as an insult to a member of the group.

We have, then, in this particular circumstance, the formula: If S₁ and if A.8 and if A.8 insult A.6 through S₁, then S₅ probable. We may, in fact, see S₅ as a probable pragmatic consequence, to an empirically specifiable degree of entailment, of the production of S₁.

After the production of S₅ all of the interactants laugh; this occurrence may be seen as the mark of the completion of a mutually constructed social scene. The recognition of S₅ as the completion of the scene would reflect some general conception that a sound-counter sound dyad would represent the minimal complete mutual course-of-action. Laughter would mark the end of a completed social scene in which all projects have become outcomes; it would be a mutual display marking a termination phase. We can notate such an occurrence as follows:

Let us examine the logical meta-sentences we have written and try to show how they are connected to one another in a description of the semantic and pragmatic structure of the activity:
$S_1$: n(c) (she(c)& have to(c)& open nose(c)& sniff(c,b)& paint(b)& all away(SN1FF)& like a vacuum cleaner(SN1FF))

$S_2$: e(x) (paint(x)& cleaned up(x)) FUT PERF

$S_3$: n(a) (A.8(a)& K_a cleaning up paint(c)& cleaning paint(d)& A.6(c)& A.4(d))

$S_4$: n(a) (A.8(a)& I_a sound(a,c)& A.6(c)) FUT PERF

$S_5$: n(a) (garbage can(a)& A.6(a))

$S_6$: n(d) (A.14(d)& I_d sound(d,a)& A.8(a)) FUT PERF

$C N_1$: n(a) (A.8(a)& walking by(a)& walking by(a,b)& cleaning up paint(b))

$C N_2$: n(d) (A.14(d)& K_d utterance(a)& A.6(a)& B_d insult(a,c)& A.6(c))

$P H_1$: n(a) (A.6(a)& I_a involve(a)& involve in(e)& situation(e))

if e equals $S_3$

$P H_2$: A(x) (laugh(x)& terminate(x,y)& actors(x)& scene(y))

In some sort of sequential ordering we have the sentences as follows: $C N_1--S_3--P H_1--S_2--S_4--S_1--C N_2--S_6--S_5--P H_2$. Let us look at some of the pragmatic and semantic rules that will help us explicate this simple syntagmatic structure and account for the occurrences of its various sentences. The rules shall be of the type we formulated from Max Black's definition. Starting at the beginning of the string structure let us examine the occurrences. $C N_1$ is the environment in which A.8 acts; from it he attends to a particular of the nexus. He focuses on the actors and their activity. Using the idea of an indexical particular it is clear that something in $C N_1$ was eligible for sounding. In $C N_1$ two actors are specified. One is specified in the role catalogue of Chapter I as "highly verbal" and the other is specified as "poor self-concept." The actor sounded upon in the actual scene was the latter. We may construct a rule for sounding which states:

Rule 2: It is permissible, and is preferred, to sound on those whose role types indicate that such sounding will be successful.

$P H_1$, $S_2$ and $S_4$ are obviously on subjectively ordered; we cannot determine the precise temporal order objectively. Nevertheless we may explain the occurrence of the phase $P H_1$ as a manifestation of a general rule for courses-of-action which states:

Rule 3: It is necessary for an actor to join an interaction through entrance procedures before one can produce an utterance which will become an object of interpretation.

$S_2$ is derived from $S_3$ by a semantic rule which relates to physical perception to a possible consequence of the rule (a set of act
which might satisfy the conditions of the entailment). $S_h$ is the project of the actually observed utterance. We see that it is a possible consequence of the utterance $S_j$; it represents our construction of the project as well as the addressee's hypothetical construction of the project. We derive $S_h$ by the following rule:

Rule 4: If an activity such as $S_3$ which includes and actor such as $A_6$ occurs then it is probable that a course-of-action (sounding) will occur with its manifestation in $S_j$.

The recognition of some context, or situation as a "good one" for the enaction of a "sounding" occurs as a function of emic categorization. We may say that one of the relevant categories is the type of the participants. In our example $A_6$ has a type that counts as a "good one" for the role of victim in a sounding. The actual semantic structure of the insult is tied not only to the desire to insult, but importantly to the character of the situation and the actor to whom it is directed. It derives its form from its project, but its content from situational specifics.

Thus, $S_j$ is a semantic proposition interpreted in a possible world in which it is counted as doing something. In this case the particulars of the scene provide the semantics with an interpretation. That interpretation is given by the presence of a particular actor, with given psychological, social or physiological characteristics which can be attended to to fill in the content of the actual insult. The pragmatic rules of the situation give a sense to the proposition that converts it from a set of untrue or nonsensical statements (garbage can) to one that is true in the possible world that sees it as a sound. The description of a state of affairs "proposed to be true" is taken as true only if the situation of its production is seen to be part of a course-of-action known as sounding.

The actor $A_1$, recognized this and interpreted $S_j$ with reference to the consequence $S_h$. She recognized the course-of-action initiated by $A_8$. Now, recognizing that the other actor was $A_6$ she decided to retort, perhaps according to the rule:

Rule 5: It is preferable for an interaction partner to retort in the place of a victim if the action of retorting is (hard to do, impossible) for the said victim.

She constructs a project following a rule which states that in mutually construed course-of-action when an actor makes the first insult it is expected that a retort be performed by that person able to do so. Thus, $S_6$ is constructed and $S_6$ uttered. The semantics of this statement and its project are equivalents to the statements of the original insult and its project.

$P_{h2}$, the terminating phase act, is yielded by a rule which might state that a terminating act is necessary if the conditions of a course of action have been fulfilled, or if the action is curtailed.
These four social scenes have been analyzed using some of the concepts and tools of phenomenological sociology and of semiotics—especially the realms of semantics and pragmatics. The purpose has been to show that phenomenology and semiotics can inform the student of rule-governed activity. In the ethnography of activity in the classroom I have attempted to show how logical/phenomenological analysis can help to break the social scene into certain constituent units. Our understanding of the construction of the social scene can be enhanced if we have a better understanding of its internal structure.

In Chapter I, I made statements about the apparent regularity of classroom activity—the fact that it appeared to me as if the activities could be characterized as rule-governed. In the present chapter the idea of rule was defined and applied. In each of the four social scenes "rule" was used as a means of accounting for semantic and pragmatic regularities. In each of the four examples I tried to use the method to show something different, in order to reveal the ways in which phenomeno-semiotic analysis is helpful to our understanding.

In Social Scene 1 the purpose was to show how courses-of-action (defined on purely objective grounds) could be shown to have constituent parts. It was further intended that these parts be shown to be connected in a logical fashion. Thus, when the word "instructing" is used we have some idea of the constituents of the course-of-action it entails. Further, if we know how the parts hang together we can tell if courses-of-action are well or ill-formed. Studies in the education of Black children have concentrated in the past on the fact that "deprivation," child-rearing or personality disorders are the causes of educational failure. I am attempting to show that courses-of-action pursued in the classroom are, in part, bound up with the particular rules one uses to construct them. In Scene 1 I analyzed a course-of-action dominated by teacher activity to show that teacher activities are structured in a logical fashion.

In Social Scene 2 the intent was to show how students and teachers could negotiate a social scene—in this instance a question and answer sequence. I wanted to show how negotiation, indexicality and discourse context could be used in constructing a social scene. By outlining teacher and student rules I hoped to show that Black education is not characterized by failure, but by a systematics. Through the analysis of a successful venture I wanted to show how a teacher and her students can successfully manage social scenes.

In Social Scene 3 the idea was to illustrate an unsuccessful social venture. Scene 3 revealed the full meaning of bicultural education by showing what happens when expectations or rule-systems clash in the classroom. The scene also illustrated how individuals attempt to salvage shattered realities through the alteration of plans, categories and interpretations. In this scene the main interest was in the problems of bicultural education as they were manifested in one example.
In Social Scene 4 the goal was to show how students enact patterned behavior among themselves. In this scene, especially, were employed some of the concepts mentioned in the earlier part of this Chapter. Thus, the logical analysis of context and situation were introduced into the analysis of discourse relationships. In Scene 4 it was important to show that Black children can act logically. As in Scene 3, the Black child can be shown to construct coherent, though culture specific, social scenes. Just as Labov tried to show that Black English is coherent and logical—a system, So I have tried to show, through the unique tools of phenomenology and semiotics, that Black classroom activity can be logically interpreted.

In all of the social scenes the concept of rule was used. At the conclusion of each example I offered some rules which could account for various regularities. I obviously did not offer all of the rules which could be applicable—those, for instance, dealing with sentence-formation, semantic relations among lexical items and so on. The ones I did offer were to deal mostly with gross pragmatic regularities and observable regularities of the course of action as interpreted through the analysis. The rules were notated in different ways to express the idea that the notation is less important than the fact that a rule relates various elements of social scenes to one another.

In the next and final chapter I address the problem of construct validity. The analyses offered here with their semantic interpretations and rules are unvalidated. I perceive the analytic system itself as a question-generating device. It is a device that yields structures and forms which then become problematic and should be put to the tests that subjective material is subject to. In the next chapter I discuss some ways in which that might be accomplished.
CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS OF THE RESEARCH

Character of the Field Study

The field study upon which this dissertation is based was accomplished through a combination of field methods traditional to anthropology, as well as methods developed in some other disciplines. It is important to note that these other disciplines, in my view, extend the power of anthropological field research—they are not replacements for it.

The field research was accomplished during a nine-month period—an academic year in the school system, hence, an appropriate unit of field research. Much the same rationale that has selected a twelve-month cycle for agricultural societies operates in this case. The nine-month period is useful for certain field studies in the educational system; for other problems it is much too short a time. Studies of institutional or community change, for instance, might require longitudinal studies of greater length. A study which emphasizes the acquisition aspects of the rules I discussed in the dissertation would require a more extended research. However, for a pilot study whose purpose was essentially to study some system—namely, the classroom—at a certain point in time and describe it as it appeared at that point, the nine-month period appears to suffice. One advantage of the nine-month period for specific system studies in classrooms is that personnel, materials and patterns of behavior remain relatively stable over the duration. Studies extending over more than one academic year might run into problems of comparison before an adequate data base had been developed from the intensive study of a single time frame. In the school context gross changes in expectations, curriculum and peer relations might occur as a result of the age-grade system. In the particular Urbancrest circumstance the children I studied were slated to attend a different school altogether—a junior high termed the middle school. Thus, for the selected focus of the dissertation the nine-month field period seems to be relevant and synchronous with normal administrative cycles and policies.

The study relied on two main forms of data-gathering techniques. The first, traditional among anthropologists, is a form of participant observation. However, in the context of this particular study the connotations of the adjective "participant" must be critically examined. There are few senses in which the observation I did
can be considered participant. Even if we accept the notion that anthropologists normally are participants in the cultures they observe (to greater or lesser degrees) the classroom context places some important restrictions on participation. In the first place, the situation I was observing was composed of a majority of personnel who were separated from me not only by race/ethnicity, but also by age. If the readily distinguishable physical characteristics of skin color or hair form did not bar participation, then certainly the physical correlates of a thirteen to fifteen year age difference did. It could be said that even though identification with the students is barred by a number of characteristics that it is possible to participate in the activities of the classroom by adopting the aegis of the teacher role. Certainly this is true, since neither age nor sex nor race/ethnicity stand in the way of this. However, such a participation might have important ramifications for the types of behaviors that might have been displayed toward me. The focus of the dissertation was on the ethnography and micro-ethnography of classroom activities—much of it on a descriptive, some of it on an analytic level. It appeared to me important not to place myself in a role into which it would be easy to fit; I do not feel that it would have been difficult to participate in a teacher role. There are some important considerations, however, that kept me from adopting such a role. These words of Schutz provide part of my rationale for refusing such an easy identification:

the observer does not participate in the complicated mirror-reflexes involved by which in the interaction pattern among contemporaries, the actor's in-order-to motives become understandable to the partner as his own because motives and vice versa. Precisely this fact constitutes the so-called 'disinterestedness' of the observer...his system of relevances differs... and permits him to see at the same time more and less than what is seen by them. (Schutz 1963:325).

Even if one could assume that I could play the role of teacher—that is enact the proper behavior displays associated with the systems of typification and relevance she has imbibed during his training—it would be at the cost of the perspective which lets the observer see how the behaviors of interacting individuals connect. Thus, I could see more of what it would be like to be a teacher, but less of the student's perspective. By taking the stance of the disinterested observer I play the role of neither; thus I can have the "manifested fragments of the actions of both partners" accessible to my view (Schutz 1963:326). This consideration is important for a number of reasons. First among these is the fact that communication comprises a large part of the patterns of activity under study; communication from my present perspective is in large part an activity mutually engaged, maintained and pursued. In fact, the important concepts of Chapter II implicitly rely on an assumption of mutuality—or typicality. The focus of the dissertation was on the classroom case, not the contents of the teacher's role. Tyler's concise definition of emic anthropology expresses my view of the ethnographic task I was faced with:
Each individual member may have a unique unitary model of his culture, but he is not necessarily cognizant of all of the unique unitary models held by other members of his culture. He will be aware of and use some, but it is only the anthropologist who completely transcends these particular models and constructs a single unitary model (Tyler 1969:5).

By focusing on only one unitary model within the classroom—a model descriptive of the teacher's role perspective—I disallow any success at grasping a model of the whole system. Where Tyler speaks of individual and cultural models, I speak of individual and classroom models, yet, I think Tyler's insight holds true.

One of the focuses of the dissertation was on biculturality and sub-cultural differences that might lead to non-congruent rule systems; to adopt straightaway—or even to be labeled as—the role of "teacher" would narrow the transcendent perspective which I hoped to have in the field study. The stance of the disinterested observer that Schutz mentioned raises questions in addition to that involving the ease of identifying with teacher. There is also the question of categorizing or being categorized by virtue of race. In some schools the "disinterested" observer, however hard he might try, would probably sooner or later become interested; this might arise as a reaction to behaviors enacted toward him or as a reaction to behaviors he observes and cannot remain disinterested about. In a survey of the literature it becomes apparent how much polarization takes place in inner-city schools among so-called objective observers. The white researcher in a Black field setting is probably the most extreme example of a situation where forces would operate to involve the observer in the communicative context he is observing. In the field setting of this particular research, however, there were a number of mitigating influences. Primary among these was the fact that the school was in a non-urban context. In Chapter I some of the attributes of this context are listed; however, the importance of the non-urban context for my role as researcher was that I was not placed in a heavily polarized situation. Black-White animosities which so often act themselves out in the congested inner-city are played down or are peripheral in the ethnically homogeneous community. A second mitigating influence lay in the fact that the staff of the school was composed of a mixed group of Black and White teachers; in addition most of those I met appeared to be well-trained and cognizant of biculturality and its problems. The school itself seemed to express a philosophy in which co-operation and painless bicultural education of quality was stressed. The curriculum, class structure and age-grade systems were progressive and experimental. The end influence on the children was to give them an exciting and creative atmosphere in which their interactions with both Blacks and Whites were friendly and essentially normalized. Thus, my presence in the classroom did not seem to be perceived as a particularly alien occurrence, nor as one which called for any kind of hostility or expressions of competitiveness, solidarity and so on. The particular classroom I studied was run by a White teacher; this fact, probably
more than any other helped make my advent in the classroom uneventful and easy. In Chapter I I also raised the point that urban role influences do not impose themselves on the students until after the Urbancrest school experience; thus, the image of self that forces confrontation and conflict—or even misunderstanding or mutual intolerance—is not developed.

Overall, my experience as a White researcher in Urbancrest was without serious problem. If anything, the students tended to react very little to me. I believe that this may have to do with the fact that my role was never particularly well defined to them. I was introduced to the teacher through the principal; both of them were fairly familiar with my intentions and my function. The teacher presented me to the class simply as "someone from Ohio State who has come to look at the way we do things." My function, ambiguously defined at best, was outlined to the students as a passive one. It is my opinion that this definition of passivity facilitated the adoption of the stance of the disinterested observer. In the classroom the children rarely interacted with me as an individual; only rarely, for instance, during a Valentine's Day party when someone approached me with a valentine because I didn't have one, was I interacted with as a member of the ongoing situation. During the videotaping sessions the students would perform for the camera; these performance were for the camera, however, since they did not occur after the first week when I was merely observing and taking notes. In all, I feel that my experience as an observer in a sub-culturally different context proceeded exactly as I would have wished it. From my perspective, due to the influences I have outlined, it did not appear to be important that I was of a race different from the majority of those I was observing.

The passage from Schutz that I quoted before has especial relevance for the dissertation; since the dissertation focuses on communication activity it was important to see how the behavioral patterns of students and teachers interlocked. I did not wish to adopt a role which would force me to intrude on the activity I was observing. I have called this form of observation "non-interventionist." The policy of non-intervention involves two separate activities: 1. The activity which comprises the subject of study should be studied as a natural situation in which the observer plays as little a part as possible. 2. The analysis of the natural situation through a variety of techniques which deal with the content of observational data, but which are intruded into the situation itself as little as possible. The intent of a "natural" study is to observe "the ongoing stream of observable behavior" (Speier 1973:3). This stream of behavior is a stream of routine activity governed by a socially distributed common sense. An observation of this stream should not divert it, or should attempt to disturb it as little as possible; any other course of action runs the risk of making one into an artifact of one's own observational data. By intervening in, disrupting or participating in the activity one becomes a participant; when one becomes a participant one's own goals and motives become influences in the stream of behavior. It is
no longer possible to approach the stream as a scientific problem. If one is involved in common-sense or first-level activity the difficulty of making the translation to scientific or second-level observation is all the more increased. The stance of the disinterested observer assumes that the behavior displays of the observer do not affect and are not affected by the behavior displays of the personnel observed. Non-interventionism is a policy of ethnographic research whose goal is to preserve the everyday character of the activity which is the focus of study.

On the initial page of this chapter I mentioned that two main forms of data-gathering techniques were used. The first of these was observation—naturalistic observation. The second made use of videotaping. The use of such a data-gathering device can be justified on a number of counts: 1. Video-tape provides replay. 2. Video-tape preserves. 3. As a function of (1) and (2) video-tape keeps the data a fresh source of insight. 4. It can be used as a tool in the elicitation of more data, as in Hawes' use of video data for stimulated recall elicitation of the meanings of observable behavior patterns. 5. Video-tape captures all levels of activity—verbal, vocal, visual, proxemic for use in micro-analysis. 6. Video-tape is a potential source of retest for other scientist's interested in checking the data base and the conclusions drawn from it. During my field study I used the video recorder to capture the activity I had been recording in my notebook; the video data is much richer than notebook data. This very richness, however, causes its own problems; the video data is unprocessed in any way. Notebook data has gone through at least one level of perception and interpretation. Video data captures all and is still, in a sense, waiting for interpretation. This disadvantage is an advantage for the kind of research espoused by phenomenological scientists since one of the tenets of such scientific research is that the data must be made "strange." There is nothing quite like constant replay of video sequences to make the "commonplace strange." When the observer begins to notice the "seen but unnoticed features" that the actors accept unequivocally then he is halfway toward the goal of outlining the structures of the life-world of culture. All too often notebook data is data "run through the mill once;" many of the judgements and perceptions contained in the notebook cannot be re-evaluated and re-questioned properly because the original stimulus—the behavior stream is no longer accessible to scientific scrutiny. So, in the field research I used the video recorder to capture approximately one hundred and fifty minutes of activity. From an initial worry that this would not be enough data I arrived at the conclusion that it was almost too much. The type of analysis formulated in Chapter II yields much more information "per minute" so to speak, than one expects. Of course, micro-ethnography is essentially involved with the anthropological perspective on the details of various settings and activities within the scope of a culture. The micro-analysis of micro-ethnographic settings can be expected to yield large amounts of detailed information. The technical aspects of the use of video-equipment—that is, its disrupting potential in the classroom—are relatively less important
than one might expect. Children posture for the camera initially but after a short period of time, some ten to fifteen minutes, they actually do not even look at it. I found the camera to have more advantages than disadvantages although the lack of stop-frame capabilities and of slow-motion playback were missed in the analysis. A few hundred feet of color 8mm footage that I shot were better in this respect but, of course, were less reliable in lighting conditions of the classroom and did not capture audio data.

Observational and video-data were supplemented by unstructured or informal interviews with some of the participants. Actual interviews were carried out with the principal and a number of the teachers. Others on the staff were engaged in conversations about various topics in an attempt to gain some insight into their roles and perceptions of the school's functioning. Such a data-gathering device is not strictly an interview but I found it to be valuable as a means of gaining information which would enable me to "block in" a sketch of the community and the school. The most intensive interviews were carried out with a major informant—the classroom teacher. Throughout the course of the research she remained a valuable source of information. Not only did she provide interviews which gave background information on the students, on her background and on the school, but she also was available to me after each observation session to answer questions which arose in my mind about the interpretation of some occurrence.

In engaged some of the students in conversation but in all I found that conducting interviews with them would be unfruitful and perhaps counterproductive. There are problems with conducting interviews with children; one of these is that the level of interest and of sustained attention is low. The teacher or other staff members have a professional interest in my questions; the students do not even have much interest in the teacher's questions much less my own. However, another, perhaps, more important consideration is that the descriptive portion of the dissertation in Chapter I did not require me to interview them—since part of the focus was on bicultural education—a teacher function. The analytic portion did not attempt to outline emically valid categories of analysis, therefore the elicitation of student information was not necessary. However, if the rules and categories I have outlined were to be construct validated then some sort of access to student interpretations would be necessary. I think, overall, the dissertation expresses a focus on educative functions; as such, the interest is in institutional and programmatic concerns of education as it relates to the culturally different. Just as I was not interested primarily in the teacher role, so I am not interested primarily in the student role. As far as the description and analysis was intended to go, access to native categories was not vital; in truth, the dissertation really represents only half of an analysis and half of a research design. What is represented in the research design is only half of a complete project; it is the half concerned with ethnographic description of manifestly observable patterns, and with a method of making implicit some of the subjective rules or assumptions which underlie those patterns. In the next section I discuss some of the details of validating those rules.
A Methodological Rationale

This dissertation has attempted to utilize an approach which I have entitled the "conjunctive" approach. The idea of conjunctivity was laid out by Leonard Hawes in his "Elements of a Model for Communication Processes" (Hawes 1973). In this work it was suggested that in order for student to fully understand social behavior it would be necessary to deal with both behaviors and meanings. He asked the following question and then gave his own reply to it:

To understand fully human activity is it sufficient to study externally manifested behaviors or is it necessary to tap internally formulated meaning...As it stands, however, the question forces a disjunctive answer. One's data are either objective and directly observable or subjective and inferential. This paper suggests that the question, at least viewed from one perspective, is more appropriate to the study of human communication if phrased conjunctively...the study of 'behavior' and 'meanings' need not be separate activities (Hawes 1973:11).

The anthropologist's ethnographic and analytic tasks, can, I feel, benefit from such an approach. Anthropologists have traditionally been interested in such approaches; their interest in the relationship of the ideal and actual in culture is evidence of this. Current concerns in cognitive anthropology, emic anthropology and anthropological linguistics are also reflective of conjunctive emphases. This dissertation is an attempt to formulate at least one conjunctive model that can inform the ethnographic enterprise. Placed in a larger perspective Hawes' conjunctivism is proposing a wedding of a type of science which concentrates on physical or sensory data to the type of science proposed by Alfred Schutz or Max Weber--a science of Verstehen. In the language of current anthropological argument it is an attempt to bring together emic and etic concerns.

Subjective social sciences, such as emic anthropology, have attempted to make the subject and his apprehension of the social problematic. Subjective science focuses on an attempt to study the cultural world as it is experienced by subjects conscious of the objects of the social world Critics of subjectivism or of disciplines with an interest in the subjective have often accused the proponents of subjectivism of "intuitionism." Manners and Kaplan, in a critique of emic anthropology, for instance, have defined Verstehen as a "process of individual understanding, empathy...Verstehen may generate fruitful concepts and hypotheses...it cannot function to validate such hypotheses publicly" (Manners and Kaplan 1972:27). Most of these criticisms of the attempt to approach meaning have attacked Verstehen as a non-public, non-verifiable form of empathic intuition performed by a scientist and offered as a scientific product. Indeed, if we accept such a definition as is offered by these authors such a conclusion is foregone. However, it is by no means certain that Verstehen sciences cannot produce empirically verifiable results.
A reason for this misunderstanding lies in a form of subject object confusion. Critics often cite subjective or emic science for its lack of objectivity. Yet, objectivity is an ambiguous term. We can take it to mean that the scientist is objective when he undertakes to search for facts through some sort of methodology and that he uses methods which others can use to discover and verify the same facts. It can also be understood as the adoption of the methods of the physical sciences and the view that what is capable of objectivity is that which is observable through the senses. The first term of this double proposition speaks of an objective method—it defines the mode of discovery. The second term goes further and makes a statement about the universe to which objectivity may apply. Alfred Schutz in a definition of empirical science has said that:

all empirical knowledge involves discovery through processes of controlled inference, and...must be statable in propositional form and capable of being verified by anyone who is prepared to make the effort to do so through observation (Schutz 1963:235).

Schutz's view, which I share, is that the form of discovery, and consequently, of verification that can be modified by the adjective objective. The objective-subjective dichotomy in the sciences is not a true dichotomy since the term objective in "objective social science" refers to a method and the term subjective in "subjective social science" refers to a field of study. We can define subjective science as an "objective science of the subjective." An objective science is one which takes an objective attitude. Lundberg has said in definition of objective science that "objectivity is not...a characteristic of things, but...those ways of responding which can be corroborated by others" (Lundberg 1964:43). We can show the relations between the various types of science in this manner:

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<td>Objective</td>
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<td>Objective</td>
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<td>Objective</td>
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Critics like Manners and Kaplan fail to understand that the type of methodology to be utilized in a subjective science such as emic anthropology is a methodology which is objectively interested in subjects. Criticisms of empathy or intuition are criticisms of strawmen. Most scientists sympathetic to subjectivism, such as Schutz, also believe in objective method. Any empirical science must use a method-idea to ground its symbols and statements in the empirical world. Every empirical science must make statements about regular connections between elements of the world of observation. The process of going from the isolation of a problematic portion of reality to the statement of a theory about that reality, is the process of empirical research. Subjectivist science seeks to accomplish all of the procedures called for by empirical method. Thus, it seeks to state its theories according to the stipulations of the method.
The difference of opinion which occurs among social scientists—as between etic and emic anthropologists—is concerned with whether or not empirical sciences can deal with facts that are not sensory or otherwise constituted as "strong" facts (Machlup 1961). Thus, there is debate over the possibility of grounding non-sensory facts in the empirical realm; further, the debate extends to the possibility of verifying the constructs formed to connect non-sensory facts. A successful defense of subjective science as methodologically objective and empirical hinges on the possibility of showing that the realm of actor's meanings can be made explicit, constituted as facts, connected in theoretical statements and subsequently verified.

Stephan Strasser, 1963 maintains that a study of social action from the viewpoint of actors can be scientific in a broad sense because there exist methodological and critical systems of thought which can lead to intersubjectively verifiable conclusions without reference to the methods of the natural sciences. It can be objective because one can take the stance of the disinterested observer; it can be empirical because it is possible to ground it in forms of observation and validation. A major necessary change, however, is that actor's meanings—as formulated by actors—be accepted as empirical data. This data must be filtered through a system of criticism and verification before it can be used in a validated theory. Thus, subjective science involves the translation of common-sense thought to critical or scientific knowledge; the subject matter of subjective science is common-sense knowledge, but its critical system is scientific. Verstehen, or the postulate of subjective interpretation, is subjective not because it refers to the constitution of a science through the unverified empathic intuitions of a scientist, but because it refers to the subjective content of an actor's experience of social reality. Cognitive Anthropology, of which this dissertation represents an example, when it is defined as the study of "what one has to know to operate as a member of the culture" can be placed as a discipline adhering to subjectivist principles. In the dissertation the emphasis on outlining "rule-systems" which can account for regular behavior is an emphasis in line with subjective concerns. The study of competences or rule-systems is a study of "what one has to know" to perform cultural activities. The construction of rules and generative accounts of activities is a theoretical activity in a subjective science.

The "expectations" that I posited lay behind the regularity of activity in the classroom were expressed as rules. These rules are theoretical formulations. In this dissertation they are unverified, thus, are not complete products of a Verstehen methodology. However, and this is the important point, they are capable of verification. The rules I formulated are valid in one sense and potentially valid in another. In a relevant article the anthropologist R. Burling spoke about the function of a grammar: "Any decent grammar, in other words, should provide for (generate) a larger amount of data than it contains itself...A grammar accomplishes its task by a system of rules. These rules account for or predict back to the known data, but beyond this they also predict or 'generate' new data that are not contained in
in the original body of information with which a linguist begins" (Burling 1972:87). Burling was speaking about parallels of the notion of grammar with the concern of emic anthropologists with the study of ethnographic rules. He establishes, essentially, that one criteria for the validation of a theory or a rule-system is its predictive-retrodictive ability; a theory can have such abilities whether or not it deals with subjective or objective data. Thus whether a rule-system deals with the connections of lexical items with one another--or with the contents of my semanticon--it's function is to account for observed empirical regularities in terms of its rules--which are forms of theories. The rules are second-order constructs founded on observations and the regularities actors themselves may perceive. The system accounts for actual behavior by providing a how and a why; this account may not be psychologically real, but nevertheless can predict and retrodict the meaningful discriminations an actor will make and the behaviors he will perform. As such, a rule-system is like a hypothesis or a theory and its aim is to produce generalizations which will also predict the attributes of future specific cases (Greene 1972:24,25). A generative system in cognitive anthropology accounts for empirical behavior such as classroom activity, naming or diagnosing diseases or classifying colors through a process of gathering data, manipulating it in some conceptual scheme (such as the one I constructed) and producing statements which purport to be generalizable, and, hence, predictive. Now, some of the data manipulated are not purely observable behavioral regularities but imputed subjective content. There are two ways of formulating second-order constructs in a subjective science. One is in the way suggested by Schutz in this passage:

He (the scientist) begins to construct typical course-of-action patterns corresponding to the observed events. Thereupon he coordinates to these typical course-of-action patterns a personal type, a model of an actor whom he imagines as being gifted with consciousness. Yet it is a consciousness restricted to containing nothing but all the elements relevant to the performance of the course-of-action under observation and relevant, therewith, to the scientist's problem under scrutiny. He ascribes, thus, to this fictitious consciousness a set of typical in-order-to motives corresponding to the goals of the observed course-of-action patterns and typical because motives upon which the in-order-to motives are founded...(Schutz 1963:340).

This method of formulating a model of the social world is one which places observation first, to be followed a process of subjective interpretation through which the regularities are explained by recourse to phenomenological concepts. However, the "typicality" of the motives, goals and contents of the types is itself still problematic. A second way of formulating such constructs—or a scientific model of social reality—is to use the concepts as a way of eliciting the actor's own ideas about their content. That is to say, the actor defines the content of the personal type, the structure of the course-of-action, the sets of motives. Then the model is
built up out of these emically elicited components. The first mode, that suggested by Schutz actually represents a stage of Verstehen hypothesis formulation. That is to say, the model of social reality formed using the fictitious consciousness is actually a hypothesis which can be tested. It differs from the other method of model construction only in the placement of the testing of the construct. Mode 1 tests the model after subjective interpretation has linked up the components; mode 2 tests the components and their linkages as a means of building up the model. Using either method one can obtain a validated picture of social reality as the actor sees it.

Schutz has proposed three postulates that all models and theories (scientific constructs) must meet if they are to be objective ways of dealing with the subjective dimensions of human action:

1. The second level constructs or interpretations must meet with the criteria of objective validity and must have a character consistent with the principles of formal logic. They must be logical in the sense that the "clarity and distinctness of the conceptual framework" be accessible to and replicable by the group of research peers.
2. The second level construct must be formulated after an inquiry in which the observed facts are related to any possible model of a mind and its contents. Thus are observed facts related to subjective meanings; this postulate is echoed by Hawes' suggestion that conjunction is a profitable approach to communication activity.
3. The second level constructs must remain empirically grounded. That is, given that the empirical field under study is "the meaning an act has for an actor" the second level construct must be capable of being translated down or back to the level of common-sense constructs. What this means is that the scientific construct and the common-sense constructs are related as the typical is to the specific manifestation; in other words, the second level construct is a typification of a typification.(Schutz 1970:278,279).

The analyses in this dissertation adhere to criteria one and two; however, criteria three is the postulate which involves construct validation. Thus, while adherence to postulates two and three will yield a model of acts and their meanings to actors such a model is hypothetical until it meets postulate three--the so-called postulate of adequacy. The research pursued in the dissertation attempted to set up constructs which were the product of a clear and distinct conceptual framework capable of being used by others. This is the reason for setting out the calculus, its rationale and a mode of representing the production and interpretation of activity in a symbolic form. Hopefully, then, criteria one is met. The research meets criteria two as an adjunct of traditional ethnographic method and the concern of the New Ethnography with the conceptual apparatus of informants. My ethnographic observations, described in Chapter I represent the observed factual patterns of activity; in Chapter II I related them to a possible model of a mind and its possible contents. That is to say, I related the authoritative and
adaptive personal types to various imputed typical contents of their stock of knowledge. Observed regularities are related to subjective regularities which could have accounted for them.

It is important to point out, however, that the rule-system I constructed does not adhere to the postulate of adequacy. Although some of the courses-of-action, and a few of the other elements received emic confirmation there was no effort to elicit native categories across the board. The model itself was not re-presented to the actord in order to run the "normalcy test." The study, then, did not focus on constructing a validated system, but rather on constructing a hypothetic system which had the potential for validation. There are a number of reasons why this is so. Some of these reasons have to do with the relative shortness of the research time, lack of ready access to individuals at times when they could have been available to meet to help fulfill postulate three. The validation of my constructs would have required the use of the video-tape data in the "stimulated recall" sessions described in Hawes, 1972; the linking of relevant informants with accessible equipment proved to be an almost impossible task. A certain amount of validation could have been achieved through verbal description of the model to the actors and eliciting their comments, but the problems of analyst contamination are much greater. In view of the technical difficulties in using stimulated recall techniques to validate the video-derived data I concentrated on the form of the model itself, and on the nature of the rules which could account for the activity I observed.

In emic anthropology the course I have pursued has been discussed by Hymes, Wallace and Atkins, and Lounsbury (Hymes 1969, Wallace and Atkins 1969, Lounsbury 1964). These men have recognized the difficulty of achieving psychologically real representations of actor's conceptual apparati. Early programmatic statements for cognitive anthropology emphasized the actual description of psychologically real systems. However most of the people just mentioned now interpret the goal of cognitive anthropology as the construction of theoretically adequate accounts of how members of a culture organize the phenomena (including the social) around them. Early works by Frake and Goodenough emphasized psychological reality, however there is evidence that Goodenough has since accepted the goal of achieving only structurally valid descriptions (Goodenough 1967). A structurally valid description is one which adheres to postulates one and two of Schutz, and, in addition, has predictive cabability. The review of the problem of psychological reality contained in Tyler's excellent book Cognitive Anthropology shows that most componential analysts, cognitive anthropologists, ethnosemanticists and New Ethnographers have moved to the position that the achievable, feasible goal for cognitive anthropology is the production of empirically verifiable theoretical accounts that accurately represent relations between various meaningful activities and can predict how culture members will behave. The research contained in the dissertation represents an attempt at the production of a structurally valid representation of how the social distribution of rules/expectations in a classroom
might be shown to produce the regular activity I observed. I, then, assumed much of the meaningful content of my rules without validating them through postulate three.

Wallace, in a 1969 article speaks to the problem of validating structurally valid systems. He asserts that psychological validity "must be established by means independent of the mechanics internal to componential analysis." The fact of the matter is, that it is now of great concern in cognitive anthropology that two or more accounts of equal theoretic value may apply to the same data (Wallace and Atkins 1964). Some programmes have been presented in anthropology to deal with the problem of deciding between alternative solutions, either through their economy and conceptual elegance (Burling 1964 and Lounsbury 1964) or psychological tests. I would suggest stimulated recall, in that it may act to fulfill Schutz's third postulate, and can be used in some field situations. The point that I wanted to raise has to do with Wallace's thought that psychological (or in our case, socially real) validity must be established through a means independent of that which produced it. What Wallace is saying, in essence, is that Schutz's postulate of adequacy cannot be fulfilled through the same research procedure that produced a model through postulates two and one. I tend to agree with this assessment, using my own research framework as an analogy to componential analysis. The mechanics of my analysis yield hypotheses—they cannot yield socially real validation. Such validation must be achieved through other means—research designs set up to re-attach second-order constructs to the first-order constructs they purport to represent and/or account for. This dissertation, primarily descriptive of regular patterns of behavior, and only partially analytic, could not accomplish the complete design required by Schutz's three postulates. My model of the classroom then, is a structurally valid, hypothetical account. It may be that the analytic method of analyzing presuppositional and propositional structure is useful as a means of hypothesis-generating. Its products can then be operated on by methods designed to validate hypothetic emic constructs.

Given that the "rules" I have formulated are actually not yet validated through the postulate of adequacy we can still address questions about their relationship to first-order constructs. Those first-order constructs are the "data" with which the second-order construct must contend when it is validated. It must conform to them. Schutz explicitly relates the common-sense and scientific constructs: "the thought objects constructed by the social scientists refer to and are founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thought of man living his everyday life among his fellowman" (Schutz 1970:305). Theories, then, in a subjective science are constructs of the second degree based on constructs of the first degree formulated in commonsense life. In order for the Rules I posit in Chapter II to be more than structurally (predictively) validated their connection to actor's formulations and concepts must be shown. One method to show this connection lies inside the comprehensive methodology of Verstehen. The goal of Verstehen is the outlining
and identification of the process and components which establish and maintain the intersubjective world of meanings, that men call social reality. As such, my calculus and its semanticon attempt to outline and identify such processes and components. However, where Verstehen continues to outline and clarify the actual typifications of common-sense knowledge my method stops. I have only representations of possible structures. Nevertheless, my methodology is distinctly a Verstehen methodology by reason of its potential for validation through a complete process of subjective interpretation. In discussing Verstehen Schutz offers these words:

The scientific constructs formed on the second level, in accordance with the procedural rules laid down for all empirical sciences, are objective ideal typical constructs, and, as such, of a different kind from those developed on the first level of common-sense thinking which they have to supersede. They are theoretical systems embodying general testable hypotheses (Schutz 1970:275).

Schutz is suggesting that it is possible to construct a type-system which is at the same time an empirical theoretical system. It is his contention that ideal-typical constructs can be used to explain relations between sets of variables, and that they can be tested as hypotheses. The dissertation research, in that it makes extensive use of the concept of "type," can also be seen as a form of Verstehen research. The ideal type is a theory which deals with the connections between acts and meanings—according to Weber's original definition of a type. The ideal part of the phrase ideal type deals with the formulation of general interpretations or rules to subsume particular cases; the type part deals with the formation of a construct which stands as a representative of the synthesis of a set of perceived regularities associated with acts or events. In the dissertation my "rules" represent such ideal types, as do the type names for courses-of-action, roles and so on. The postulate of adequacy operates on these as a mode of verification. My ideal types must be represented to the actor's to see whether or not they are meaningfully adequate representations of common-sense life.

The dissertation research, then, represents an attempt to take some ethnographic patterns of classroom behavior, view them as the product of actors' consciousness of social reality, represent the consciousness as a system of rules and analyze a set of social scenes using those rules as my own interpreting devices. The research is ethnographic with a concern for the social reality of the scene of the ethnography. The analysis in Chapter II is an attempt to come to grips with the structure—a structuring—of that reality; the system developed there represents a theoretical account of how certain social scenes might be produced. Such an account is structurally adequate in that it will account for behavioral regularity, and, will, I believe predict it; the account, however, is not meaningfully adequate since actors constructs have not been tied to it through the postulate of adequacy.
Conclusions of the Research

The foci of this dissertation were twofold. One portion of the project concerned itself with the ethnographic description of the ethically homogeneous classroom and its setting. The other portion concerned itself with a way of viewing those patterns as rule-governed in their regularity. In summing up and providing conclusions for the dissertation I shall address each portion separately.

The ethnographic research placed the Urbancrest classroom in perspective. From various evidences it was possible to place the activity of the classroom in a cultural setting which approximates the traditional culture of the rural Black South. However, the process of education itself brings the children into contact with other cultural influences. The dominant values of the White, Middle-Class society are being disseminated daily to subculturally different students. The behavioral patterns of teachers, the content of books and the expectations of the administrative system as a whole are predominantly middle-class in nature. The Urbancrest child is a child who is forced into a bi-cultural experience; he carries with him knowledge garnered in his home and community life. When he goes to school that knowledge intersects the patterns of expectation held by the educational establishment.

We can represent the stock of cultural knowledge held by the child and his teachers as a system of rules; through the metaphor of rules we can express the way in which classroom activity appears to be regular. In the classroom we can say that there are rules which actors use to produce classroom activity. In the bicultural situation the subculturally different child may construct the reality of classroom activity differently than his teacher; he is further expected to give up his set of rules--his cultural knowledge--in favor of the rules presented as normative by the dominant society. The bicultural child comes into contact with individuals--primarily teachers--who carry sets of expectations about the conduct of classroom activity which are not part of the student's knowledge of the rules. All too often the child may be mis-labeled as a troublemaker, a problem child, or a dunce. Many teachers cannot separate what is taught from the way it is taught. Normative "ways of teaching" adapted to middle-class circumstances are carried over into a context where they no longer can operate synchronously with the cultural milieu of the classroom. The middle-class way of teaching in the subculturally different classroom may not only cause problems for the teacher as she seeks to perform an educative function, but it may further deprive the child of the opportunity to learn skills of the wider society which are valuable for his future existence.

In bicultural education it need not be the case that the child adopt all of the teacher's middle-class perceptions about classroom activity in order to learn. We must separate the child's knowledge of the important skills of the dominant society from the necessity of abdicating his cultural heritage. One can learn of the
culturally approved products of the larger society while still remaining a member of one's own culture. It is not necessary to be middle-class and "pass" for White in order to read, write, or create productively, intelligently and successfully. It is possible for the school to fulfill its function of conveying the values and beliefs of the wider society (Shinn 1972:319) without destroying in its students a pride in their own culture's values and beliefs. Bicultural education stresses the compatibility of these two lines of influence. Much of traditional education has been mono-cultural; the child has been expected to conform completely to a middle-class lifestyle as an necessary first step toward acquiring a knowledge of the culturally approved products of the wider society. In Urbancrest I saw examples of both mono-cultural and bicultural types of education (Valentine 1971).

I observed two teachers, each conducted the classroom in a very different fashion. One mode I have called the authoritative and the other I have called the adaptive; their differentiation is along the parameter of cultural synchronicity. An authoritative teacher uses the "ways of teaching" adapted to a middle-class classroom. The patterns of culture manifested in the middle-class context are synchronous with the patterns of behavior manifested by the teacher. Student and teacher share a knowledge of the "rules of the game." This teacher becomes authoritative when she brings her middle-class expectations into another cultural setting; she is forced to compensate for the lack of fit by punishing students, by mis-labeling them, or by simply giving up and failing to educate them. In the field research I cited some examples of the problems caused when middle-class expectations are rigidly held in the face of a changed circumstance. This type of teacher is "authoritative" not because she is severe or strict, but because the adaptation of her rule-system is slow and difficult to achieve, if it is achieved at all. An authoritative teacher often experiences "reality failure" with students; in Chapter II an example of one such failure is given. A reality failure occurs when two interactants who have entered a situation with the understanding that the reciprocity of perspectives holds, find out that it does not. The rules or expectations they have about the situation they are supposed to mutually construct and negotiate are not congruent.

The other type of teacher, the adaptive teacher, uses many of the patterns of the milieu of the classroom—that is, the rules and expectations of her students—to conduct educational activity. The adaptive teacher conforms her "way of teaching" to the ways of behaving of the students. The success of bicultural education, in my estimation, depends on the proper training of teachers so as to inform them of the nature of biculturality. They should be made aware of the differences between their middle-class backgrounds and the backgrounds of the sub-culturally different students they may be called upon to teach. It should be made part of the professional code of teachers to educate their students, not to make them conform to relatively trivial expectations about classroom noise, amount of
talk, physical movement about the room and appropriate contents for speech, literature and composition. A separation should be made between relatively important cultural products, and those which are not more than the preference of middle-class individuals. Much interest has arisen lately concerning the use of Black English and other languages or dialects in instruction; these other forms of language are used to teach English as a second language. Here we have a clear instance where the child's own cultural product is used as a device to educate him about the cultural product of a culture with which he must contend as an adult. Is it not also possible to use the child's own expectations about the conduct of activity as a means of providing him with a knowledge of the dominant culture?

The success of bicultural education depends on the dispersion of notions about the intrinsic negative traits of Black children and Black culture. The adaptive teacher recognizes that her students are not culturally deprived, genetically inferior, or personally unstable because of home influence. Although this may be true of any one individual, to lay this at the foot of an entire culture is tantamount to blatant ethnocentrism. The adaptive teacher takes a stance of cultural relativity—she then tries to provide the child with a means of bridging the distance between the rules of his native culture or subculture, and that of the dominant society. The teacher may even try to teach the child about the patterns of behavior of the middle-class—but not in such a way that the middle-class lifestyle is seen as intrinsically better. It should be presented as what it is, a way of life adapted to a certain situation.

The fact that classrooms differ can be shown on a purely ethnological basis; a comparison of middle-class and Urbancrest classrooms shows that there is variance in perception of permissible behaviors, amount of talk, expression of aggression, sexuality, noise levels, amounts of teacher orality, means of gaining status and so on. The adaptive teacher must be aware of the specifics of these parameters of difference. In Chapter I some of the most important cultural differences which emerged in the fieldwork are listed; the parameters I list are those with which teachers, in my experience, should be most familiar with in the Black classroom. A clear understanding of the child's cultural perspective would make the teacher's job much easier.

If a teacher understands the cultural patterns of the classroom she is operating in then she will tend to use those ways of teaching which facilitate her main tasks, rather than hinder them by alienating, boring or offending her students. Thus, she must know something about the differences between the child's out-school and in-school activity, she must know something about the child's perceptions of school, the classroom and of herself. Particularly important is that the teacher know which instructional patterns fit the culture of the students. A major conclusion of the dissertation is that participant structures which utilize small group or individual instruction are well adapted to the Black classroom. Further,
the amount of teacher orality in instructional processes must be re-evaluated to take account of the orality of Black classrooms. Particularly important for the teacher to understand is the role of the "status game" in the everyday experience of the Black school-child. A teacher may need to be able to recognize when such a game is being played, she may learn to play the game herself as one of my informants did. The status game, like the conversationally oriented seating structure, is a product of the intensely stable peer organization of the Black classroom; this peer organization tends to remain operative in the classroom unlike the peer configurations of the middle-class setting where the teacher seeks to effectively dissolve them.

The teacher in a bicultural situation must know her students and must be able to assess the personalities and capabilities of each of them on a culturally relative basis. Some of the assessments the teachers I observed made show how cultural factors may enter into a teacher's assessment of ability, intelligence and personality. The bicultural teacher must also know and recognize the way her students carry out activity; that is, she must be able to recognize when a student is "jiving," "louding," "sounding," or playing a status game. If the teacher is not to misinterpret the activities around her it is necessary that she understand their structure, their motivations and their goals. The Black classroom, as I have attempted to show in Chapter I, has its own style of activity, its own courses-of-action and motivations. The teacher styles of activity, and their correlated courses-of-action can either be complementary to, or antagonistic to those of the students.

In the second portion of the dissertation the ethnographic patterns were explicated against a background of concepts from semiotics and phenomenology. The "taken-for-granted" nature of expectations about everyday activity can, for instance, explain how students and teachers may find it difficult to recognize disjunction when it occurs. The concepts of phenomenology give some insight into the structure of the patterns of activity which comprise the ethnographic data. Among the main insights which phenomenology yields are the following:

1. Phenomenology gives an understanding of the routine, nature of everyday experience. The experience of the classroom can be seen as an experience produced and interpreted in the world of "commonsense."
2. The routine world of the classroom can be seen as a structure—a reality construction—built up out of typifications used as the building blocks of categories and as the means of linking up categories. These latter we call rules.
3. Phenomenology gives a clearer understanding of what it means to say that classroom activity is regular and that it is rule-governed.
4. Phenomenology explicates the connection between common-sense typifications, such as student and teacher concepts and scientific concepts which are on a second level. Thus, the ethnographic analysis of the classroom is a second-level study of regular first-level acts.
5. Phenomenology explicates the nature of motivation and planning. In the analysis of classroom social scenes such concepts help to clarify the structure of mutually engaged activities.

In the dissertation the concept of rule was linked to the phenomenological concept of typification, both were linked to logical concepts—such as entailment. The use of semiotic concepts offers both an explication of phenomenological concepts and a means for performing analyses on ethnographic scenes. The semiotic performs the following functions in the research:

1. It provides a formal interpretation for the concept of rule and for the concept of rule-system.
2. Thus, notions of "competence" and of systems of expectation and typification can be explicated.
3. Ideas like intension and extension allow one to connect meanings to behaviors and provide a formal account of the idea of a "type."
4. Research variables and theoretically posited connections can be expressed in a formal system capable of empirical interpretation. Such a system is suited to the study of communication activity such as that observed in the classroom.
5. Concepts of entailment, such as presupposition and consequence, can be used to explain the structure of recorded transcripts of courses-of-action; we are then able to understand more about the nature of the activities we observe.
6. Semiotics helps to define such concepts as "indexicality," context and particular. In the interpretation of social scenes such concepts can be logically represented and manipulated in an attempt to make explicit implicit regularities of social scenes.
7. The notions of rule, rule-system and generation are connected in a semiotic system. Thus, the idea of a theory (or theoretical system) "accounting" for some phenomena can be logically expressed.

A number of actual interpretations of recorded social scenes was carried out. The purpose was to utilize phenomenological and semiotic concepts to show that classroom activity has an internal logical structure—one that could be characterized as rule-governed. For each of four social scenes, detailed logical analyses were given; for each of the four scenes, rules were given which account for the regularity of the activity in a theoretical sense. These rule purport to represent subjective regularities (emic rules) but their status is not proven. Nevertheless, the system of logical analysis has as its goal the generation of hypotheses—tentative rules—which can later be tested through other means, such as stimulated recall and other forms of actor re-presentation.

In social scene 1 I showed how an instructional sequence has a logical structure. In scene 2 I attempted to show how a teacher and student negotiate a social scene. In scene 3 I showed how a reality failure occurs and what its internal composition is. In scene 4 a student-student activity was examined to show that the
idea of rule-governed activity extends to cover all forms of classroom activity—not just teacher activity. The conclusions that must be reached after an examination of these analyses is that classroom activity in Urbancrest, as exemplified by the analysis of its social scenes, is logical, can be said to be rule-governed, and can be shown to be accounted for through a set of operations which represent subjective processes.

The preceding paragraphs have attempted to sum up the dissertation and its accomplishments; some conclusions and recommendations have been tendered. If one were to sum up four main conclusions as a termination for the dissertation I feel that these four would be the most appropriate and important:

1. Classroom activity in Urbancrest is produced through cultural knowledge; the intersection of different sets of knowledge contents—rules, expectations, or understandings—produces a bicultural situation which can best be handled through teacher awareness.
2. An adaptive mode of teaching utilizes behavioral rules adapted to the situation as a means of educating students about culturally approved products of the wider society.
3. Classroom activity in Urbancrest can be explicated through phenomenological concepts; these concepts can be adapted to a logical model and used for a type of formal analysis.
4. Black classroom activity, like Black English, is the result of logical—or, as Schutz would put it—rational models of action.
### List of Parameters of Cultural Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Urbancrest</th>
<th>Middle-Class</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Physicality</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Conversation Groups</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Noise Level Permitted</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Orality</td>
<td>Egalitarian</td>
<td>Teacher Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Status Mechanisms</td>
<td>Status Games</td>
<td>Academic Awards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Seating</td>
<td>Conversation Group Orders</td>
<td>Teacher Ordered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Attention Getting</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>More Constraint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. In-Class Movement</td>
<td>Allowed</td>
<td>Prohibited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Environment Control (Student)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Command/Instruction</td>
<td>Teacher Problem Area</td>
<td>Cultural Norm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Rewards/Gratification</td>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>Delayed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Interaction Groups for Instruction</td>
<td>Small Group</td>
<td>Whole Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Eye-Contact</td>
<td>Prohibited with Elders</td>
<td>Allowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Non-Verbal Activity</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Speech Style</td>
<td>BEV</td>
<td>SAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Co-operative Work</td>
<td>Infrequent</td>
<td>More Frequent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Discipline</td>
<td>Control Individuals Publicly</td>
<td>Control Individuals Privately</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Time Concepts</td>
<td>African People's Time</td>
<td>White Norm Time</td>
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GLOSSARY

ACT: A single use of the body or voice as a field of presentation for semantic content. Acts are intentional uses.

ACTION: A set of connected acts which are thought to count as a larger sequence. Known as course-of-action.

BECAUSE MOTIVE: That causal nexus of factors which brings about the projection of a course-of-action.

BEHAVIOR: A use of the body which may be either habitual or intentional.

BICULTURAL: A situation in which a child or other person has to act in two different cultural settings one of which may dominate the other. The person is expected to give one over in favor of the other.

CALCULUS: A logical language which may be used to "speak about" object languages.

COMMON SENSE: The attitude of the actor living in the world of everyday life; it presupposes the taken-for-grantedness of experience.

COMMUNICATION: Space-time behavior with a symbolic referent (Hawes 1973).

COMPETENCE: A knowledge of the rules for correct (normal) cultural action.

COMPONENTIAL ANALYSIS: A method of cognitive anthropology based on the discovery of distinctive differences in semantic domains.

EMIC: Modes of classification or categorization based on actor's categories.

EVERYDAY: The Life-World in which a man is wide-awake and interacting in the natural attitude.

EXPECTATIONS: The ability of our stock of knowledge (retention) to provide for us "protentions" or indications of the typical shape of the future.

EXTENSION: The denotation of a symbol. The individuals of a set.

INDEXICAL: A particular which functions to tie the situation to the realm of normal forms by "indexing" the context.
IN-ORDER-TO: A form of motivation equivalent to the conscious purpose of an act held by the actor.

INTENSION: Connotation or meaning. The property of a set.

MATRIFOCALITY: A form of family in which the father is absent or transient and the family focuses around the mother.

NEGENTROPIC: Randomness reducing.

PROJECT: The subjective envisionment of an outcome of a course-of-action conceived of as if it already had occurred.

PHENOMENOLOGY: A philosophy whose purpose is to outline the essence of experience and whose primary tenet is that consciousness is intentional. Here it is used as the basis for a social science aimed at discovering the essence of social experience.

SEMIOTICS: Logical investigations which use syntactics, semantics and pragmatics.
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