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The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1975
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PROPOSALS FOR THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF BELIEF CLAIMS IN ART EDUCATION: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF BELIEF APPLIED TO FOUNDATIONAL ISSUES IN ART EDUCATION.

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Margaret Klempay DiBlasio, B.S.E., M.A.

The Ohio State University

1975

Reading Committee:

Dr. Arthur D. Efland
Dr. Ross A Norris
Dr. Richard N. Pratte

Approved By

Adviser
Department of Art Education
So here I am, in the middle way, having had twenty years--
Twenty years largely wasted,...--
Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt
Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure
Because one has only learnt to get the better of words
For the thing one no longer has to say, or the way in which
One is no longer disposed to say it. And so each venture
Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate
With shabby equipment always deteriorating...

T. S. Eliot
Four Quartets: East Coker
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In presenting this study, the author gratefully acknowledges the formative influence and stimulation provided over the years by many of her companions in inquiry:

The students with whom I risked my beliefs in the dialogue of teaching.

My colleagues in art education, who demonstrate the variety and richness of belief.

Professors Efland, Norris and Pratte, whose commitment to inquiry provides a model of professional behavior.

My husband, Raymond, with whom the dialogue continues and the excitement is shared.
VITA

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM: THE NEED FOR CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF BELIEF CLAIMS IN ART EDUCATION

Introduction:

Belief claims are encountered at every level of Art Education, whether in the form of art theories, basic definitions, descriptions of existing circumstances in schools and communities, formulations of needs and goals or of justifying principles cited in curricular rationales. Beliefs are transmitted within the content of art instruction. Art educators employ beliefs as justifications for choosing particular teaching strategies or student activities, as motives for undertaking research or service projects, or as criteria for evaluating programs, instructional materials and student outcomes.

Belief claims are not always acknowledged and identified as beliefs in being stated; they are frequently confused with claims of knowledge. In conversation the words 'believe' and 'know' are often used indiscriminately and inappropriately, as in the following exchange:

"Pardon me, Miss, but I do believe your dog has sunk his teeth in my leg."
"I knew you were a dog hater the moment I set eyes on you!"

The experienced fact of being bitten is expressed above as a belief; in response, an unverified belief is claimed as knowledge. The confusion of belief and knowledge is troublesome to the professional art educator, if not in his own use of language, in the language of others with whose belief claims he must deal.

In distinguishing belief from knowledge, one may neglect to distinguish among beliefs of different kinds; in this event, whatever fails to attain the status of knowledge or fact may be dismissed as "just a belief," like all beliefs, subjective and unreliable. Beliefs, not excluding the uniquely personal and intimate beliefs of art educators, can be at once bizarre, arbitrary, eccentric, unwarranted, unexamined, and incapable of modification.

On the other hand, beliefs can be held on the basis of good reasons which fall short of the evidential adequacy required for public verification. Beliefs can be evidentially based in varying degree; they can be rationally supported, reasonably held, respectable, widely accepted, critically examined, and subject to modification in the light of further evidence. In responding to the belief claims of others, as well as in presenting belief claims of his own, the art educator needs to recognize these differ-
ences in how a belief is held and supported.

It is important also to recognize that the methods of verification appropriate to factual beliefs do not apply to value beliefs, which have their own means of being rationally supported. Art educators, as may be expected in their discipline, most often deal with value beliefs, representing appraisals, i.e., value judgments made in reference to some non-arbitrary criterion. These interpersonal judgments of value are sometimes mistaken for purely subjective expressions of personal taste. As a result the maxim De gustibus non est disputandum is sometimes applied to value beliefs in art education; in declining to make judgments about values, one might excuse himself by saying, "After all, it all depends on what you happen to believe."

Unsupported belief claims or assumptions, are almost always called "necessary" assumptions, although in some cases "convenient" is a more appropriate designation. The foundational assumptions commonly made within a discipline are necessarily made, since they exceed the current boundaries of research within the discipline. Beliefs imposed by virtue of allegiance to an organization can be necessary assumptions, as are those which define the limits of a particular study within a larger field of inquiry. These necessary assumptions, made in observance of social and academic conventions, are not always distinguished from
arbitrary assumptions, which are nothing more than personal beliefs held without regard for evidence. Arbitrary assumptions, i.e., non-evidentially based beliefs, offer convenient refuge from the heat of inquiry; one who holds his belief in this non-evidential fashion can place himself, if he likes, beyond the reach of argument and the rules of argument.

If some belief claims in Art Education are not often examined, it is because they are not often noticed. These are suppressed premises of belief contained within many of the "loaded" terms, like creative process or aesthetic response, which art educators commonly employ in discussing the "basic concepts" of their discipline. Individuals may differ widely in what they believe creative process is, has, is related to, does, or should have done to it, possibly by them; any one of a great many variant beliefs could be packed into one's use of the term 'creative process'. The art educator whose concern is to address primary issues does well to raise prior questions of concept in these cases, so that the explicit belief claims formed in "unpacking" vaguely used terms may be critically examined and judged on their own merit.
Preliminary Considerations: Belief and Inquiry in Public Education

If it is intended that a curricular program in Art Education be pursued within the present settings and traditions of public education, and that its accomplishment be of benefit to public education, it is necessary that its general goal be capable of being subsumed under the even more general goals of the total educational enterprise. It is in this way that the curricular programs identify the value of their particular contributions to the public system of education; to be lacking in demonstrated compatibility of goals is to lack justification for public support.

Educational goals, taken in the most general sense of goals, are commonly and metaphorically designated as educational aims. Dewey was able to criticise the metaphor even as he promoted its use:

It is well to remind ourselves that education as such has no aims. Only persons, parents, teachers, etc., have aims, not an abstract process like education.¹

Dewey argues in an earlier passage that an aim includes not only direction to an end, but a selection from available means to that end, and a structuring of means to facilitate that end.²

²Ibid., pp.119-120.
Clive Beck not only concurs with this description of aims, but also points out the practical consequences of its neglect:

And if in formulating educational ends, one disregarded the question of educational means, it would be impossible to progress beyond affirming the value of happiness, health, material possessions, and a few other general goods. Even this would not really provide one with educational goals at which to aim, for perhaps a high degree of happiness, say, is impossible in our contemporary world, and should not be sought after... 

It seems that an educational aim is something more complex than the announcement of some final educational destination; it is more appropriately described, according to Philip Smith as a means-end process: "At every step along the way our selection of means progressively determines the total means-end process and thus the over-all aim of education." 

Peters, after stating that "'aim' suggests the structuring of an activity in a certain direction" reasons to the impossibility of making any absolute separation between content and procedure, matter and manner, in the case of education." Aim is described as representing a


"fusion of content and procedure."\textsuperscript{5}

The procedural element of this fusion is described as a principle immanent in educational procedure; like respect for evidence:

As the forms of knowledge and understanding defining the outlook of an educated man are inseparable from the principles of procedure which characterize the public situations in which they are acquired, developed, and transmitted to others, there is no inappropriateness in emphasizing as 'aims' of education the procedural aspects of this situation. For principles immanent in them, such as freedom, or respect for evidence, can be treated as priorities and can structure the activities of educational as well as more usual aims.\textsuperscript{6}

The element of content, according to Peters, is supplied by the prevailing notion of what it means to be educated. He declines, however, to describe this content in terms more specific than formal criteria or modes of thought and conduct:

But no substantive pronouncements were made about the content to be given to the concept of 'being educated'. It was, however, suggested that this involves certain formal criteria - commitment to modes of thought and conduct that are regarded as worth while in themselves, which involve some depth of understanding and which are not pursued with cavalier disregard for other ways of looking at the world.\textsuperscript{7}


\textsuperscript{6}ibid., p. 26.

\textsuperscript{7}ibid., p. 28.
In identifying the aim of education or in specifying what it means to be educated, many authors, whether they speak of reflective thinking, healthy scepticism, open-mindedness, self-directed learning, intellectual curiosity, critical outlook, scientific imagination, or independent judgment, emphasize the cultivation of rationality, that is, the development of critical skills of inquiry:

It is the job of education in a free society to teach people how to achieve self-realization through engagement in the intellectual life. (Barkan) 8

The aim of education is to enable individuals to continue their education by organizing the powers that insure growth.10

... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Modes of thought, of observation and reflection enter as forms of skill and desire into the habits that make a man an engineer, an architect, a physician, or a merchant. . . . There are habits of judging and reasoning as truly as of handling a tool, painting a picture, or conducting an experiment.11


9 Dewey, op. cit., p. 117.
10 ibid., p. 60.
11 ibid., p. 57.
The human being acquires a habit of learning. He learns to learn. (Dewey)\textsuperscript{12}

Whatever we do, we ought, I believe, to keep uppermost the ideal of rationality, and its emphasis on the critical questioning, responsible, free mind. (Scheffler)\textsuperscript{13}

The critical skills of inquiry to be developed in public education are not likely to be exercised with the rigorous objectivity and detachment that characterize the formal inquiry of scientific research, for public education is also required to develop commitment to a set of sociopolitical values which characterize the twentieth century American milieu. It would be misleading to suggest that the value beliefs currently espoused in public education correspond with traditionally held values. Some modification and diversification of these "traditional" or given values can be observed as public education shifts its political or philosophical orientation.

In recent years, the "consciousness raising" efforts of racial, ethnic and ideological minorities have

\textsuperscript{12}ibid., p. 54.

promoted the interpretation of American culture as a hegemonic arrangement of diverse subcultures and their respective value systems. As this interpretation comes into wider acceptance in public education, some "traditional" values are subject to modification according to the demographic circumstances of a particular school system. In the process of modification, the dominant subculture's "traditional" value beliefs may be supplemented or in part replaced by the distinctive value beliefs of one or more subordinate subcultures.

If the aim of public education is to develop critical skills of inquiry, it cannot be claimed that this aim is pursued uniformly under guidance of the philosophical movement of Deweyanism and of the scientific method as formalized in the practice of empirical science.\(^{14}\) The dominant influence of pragmatism and logical positivism on conceptions of rational development is yielding to the value beliefs of existentialism, or of some facet of contemporary American humanism, particularly the human potential movement.\(^ {15}\)


\(^{15}\)The movement collectively designated as *humanistic* is a disparate aggregation of movements including classical philosophical humanism, humanistic psychology and the corresponding human potential movement, and those educational theories termed neo-romantic
The existentialist movement assigns value to development of moral dispositions like commitment, autonomy, authenticity, or responsibility, which are said to constitute an existential posture or life style. The influence of existentialist belief may be seen in educational value beliefs which identify the educated person as a committed person, a real person, or an authentic person. Some of these existential value beliefs are described by J. D. Wild:

Words like authentic, genuine, real, and really ... express these more basic "existential values," as we may call them, which underlie all the valuable things we do or say. Since they characterize our ways of existing in the world, they are universal in scope and apply to every phase and region of our care.16

Many of the value beliefs espoused within the human potential movement bear strong resemblance to the values characterized above as "existential." Among the educational values identified as "humanistic" are the attainment of genuine personhood, empathetic understanding, self-realization, self-actualization, etc. These slogan words are equivalent descriptions of a greater development of human potential or, to use the favored expression, of becoming more human. Robert Mason, for example, cites the following value belief under the heading Purpose of Education:

Thus, there is a sense in which we can say that the best-educated person is the most human person. To be sure, the rest of us are also human, but we are inferior in our humanity to the person who has been more completely, more fully, educated. The purpose of education is self-realization, for if the self can be made real through expert cultivation by a master teacher, then we can most completely express our humanness.17

The above example demonstrates a problem of vagueness and ambiguity frequently encountered in expressions of humanistic belief. Since it is not determined what counts as human, more human, or most human, the sequence of statements is a tautology: to be more educated is to be more human which is to be more educated. The ambiguity might be removed by providing instances of being more human and of being less human, while showing how these differ from instances of what is commonly recognized as simply being human.

It appears that any aim of public education necessarily embodies a number of value beliefs. Without these values, the aim would be so general as to be impractical; it would state, according to O'Connor, nothing more than the primary social function of education, which function would be the same in all societies.18

---


Given this circumstance, public education concomitantly promotes inquiry skills and value beliefs. It is expected that students will exhibit intellectual curiosity, open-mindedness and healthy scepticism, even as they believe that "Democracy is the best form of government," that "Progress is best achieved through the competitive spirit of free enterprise," and perhaps also that "Black is beautiful," or that "The environment must be preserved for posterity," or that "It is important to do your own thing, without surpressing or denying your feelings."

The development of rational skills of inquiry and the inculcation of particular value beliefs are sometimes described as polarities in unresolvable conflict: rationality versus commitment; open-mindedness versus closure; healthy scepticism versus compliance with societal norms; disinterested inquiry versus empathy for the feelings and beliefs of others; objectivity and abstraction versus personal expression. William Frankena, for example, describes this perceived conflict as "one of the crucial problems of our culture:"

If we try to combine rationality and commitment - the first without the second being empty and the second without the first blind - we must find some teachable kind of union of open-mindedness and belief, of objectivity and decision.19

19 William K. Frankena, "Educational Values and
In an earlier passage, Frankena had placed conceptual analysis on the "rationality" side of his polarization, while conceding that, since analytic philosophers had certain "logical values" or "values in speaking and thinking" to offer, "... it seems clear that their values should be among our goals of education at all levels." As embodied in philosophical methodology, these "logical values" are a set of analytic procedures of value in achieving clarity of thought and expression; as goals of public education, "logical values" are the corresponding critical skills of value in facilitating the student's participation in inquiry.

Although Frankena reports a conflict between rational inquiry and belief, it should be noted that he is not reporting a complete dichotomy of logical exclusion between rational inquiry-in-general and belief-in-general. Since Frankena's viewpoint is that of moral education, his concern is that the cultivation of inquiry skills and of rationally-guided moral conduct would be incompatible with prior commitment to some particular moral principles (beliefs), or with prior acceptance of religious beliefs. In other words, inquiry could be in conflict with belief


20 ibid., p. 4.
15

only under certain conditions:

1. If inquiry is directed to a belief which one has already accepted, or which one would feel obliged to accept because of his general commitment to a doctrinal system of beliefs.

2. If the belief is assumed to be true with such subjective confidence that inquiry would be regarded as useless.

3. If the content of the belief is in principle inaccessible to rational investigation, e.g., a claim that the nature of the art experience is intuitively known.

Apart from these instances there is no "problem of inquiry" posed by the critical examination of belief. On the contrary, it is necessary that inquiry should deal with belief, if only to distinguish between known facts, (beliefs that have been verified), and hypotheses, opinions, conjectures, assumptions, etc., (beliefs that are rationally supported in various degrees). The process of inquiry entails belief decisions, belief distinctions, and belief determinations. In seeking to know the truth, one may distinguish several possibly true alternative explanations (beliefs); after determining how well each alternative belief is supported, one decides to reject all but one belief, which is accepted (unless subjective considerations
prevail) because it is best supported.

The above description of inquiry as a process of making a number of decisions about belief corresponds with Bertrand Russell's definition of a "rational man as one who always proportioned the degree of intensity with which he held his various beliefs to the amount of evidence available for each belief." 21

When inquiry is identified as critical activity, by means of which one develops a critical outlook, 'critical' is used to refer to the decision-producing and decision-expressing characteristics of the inquiry process; inquiry is in this context considered to be a sequence of decisive moves which are summarized and expressed as a critical judgment. As was described above, some of these decisive or critical moves necessarily deal with belief. It is concluded that no cognitive activity which in principle excludes the examination of belief claims can be taken as an instance of that methodical and critical exercise of reason which is identified as 'inquiry'. A similar judgment is expressed by O'Connor, who identifies the development of critical examination of belief as one of the value beliefs which has been embodied in an educational aim:

21 Bertrand Russell, as quoted in O'Connor, op. cit., p. 27.
Since to make men critical is only to teach them to proportion the degree of their various beliefs to the weight of the evidence in their favour it is difficult to understand how it can properly be deprecated as an educational aim.\textsuperscript{22}

The critical examination of belief is similarly described as an "educational value" in the analysis of educational concepts presented by Brown, Green and Scheffler:

Ideally an undogmatic, curious, open mind continues to search for the truth about human beliefs or viewpoints regardless of obstacles or the force of convention or tradition, does not hesitate to make independent judgments and constant self-appraisals, and is ready at all times to reconstruct untenable beliefs or opinions.\textsuperscript{23}

Rather, it (a due regard for truth) places upon us the difficult and tortuous task of weighing with great care whatever beliefs we may regard as true, holding them always as open to challenge, and to change in the light of further evidence and fresh reasons.\textsuperscript{24}

The person engaged in teaching does not merely want to bring about belief, but to bring it about through the exercise of free rational judgment by the student. In teaching the teacher is revealing his reasons for the beliefs he wants to transmit and is thus, in effect, submitting his own judgment to the critical scrutiny and evaluation of the student; he is fully engaged in the dialogue by which he hopes to teach,

\textsuperscript{22}ibid., p. 11.


and is thus risking his own beliefs, in lesser or greater degree, as he teaches. 25

It has been shown that the critical examination of belief is a value embodied in the aims of public education. On this basis it could be argued that critical examination of belief is a given value to be honored and promoted by art educators within their general commitment as public educators. This line of argument was employed in 1963 by Ecker, who wished to emphasize that art educators could not in good conscience ignore the superordinate goals and values of general education:

If we can't justify art classes as well as those who would support, say, classes in elementary space science, there may be serious doubts as to whether art should be in the curriculum at all.

Second, any argument for art in the schools should be offered and evaluated in view of the full range of problems and practices of schools in our society. To fail to work within the broad educational context is, I believe, to be professionally irresponsible. 26

In addition to considerations of loyalty to the aims of public education, the enlightened self-interest of art education remains to be considered. Since critical examination of belief has been shown to be an indispensable component of the process of inquiry, it can be argued that critical examination of belief claims is required for the


26 David W. Ecker, "Research and the Future of Art in the Public Schools" Western Arts Association Bulletin (January, 1963), Vol. 47, No. 2
development of inquiry in art education, which is to say, the development of the discipline itself.

The development of art education by extending its inquiry to matters of belief is clearly stated as Ecker's concern in 1971, when he offers four guidelines for building an art curriculum for the seventies. Two of the four guidelines are explicit calls for the critical examination of belief as a formal objective of art instruction:

- First, it seems clear to me that we must make a major effort to understand the characteristic attitudes, feelings, values, and beliefs of the young...

- Second, a knowledge of today's youth should not only be reflected in teaching strategies in the art room; the discovery of each individual's beliefs, attitudes, and feelings--including those of the teacher--should be a formal objective of art instruction.\(^{27}\)

It is shown above that the critical examination of belief is an indispensable component of the process of inquiry, and that development of inquiry skills is a task imposed by the aims of public education. This task can be facilitated by the art educator's willingness to demonstrate and promote critical examination of personally held beliefs. Although curricular problems can be resolved by prescription, inquiry is in any case required to promote

the development of the discipline. Curricular problem-solving, as well as developmental inquiry, can be assisted by critical examination of the belief claims that are presented, accepted and put to use at all levels of Art Education.

Statement of the Problem

Art educators, particularly curriculum developers, rely on foundational assumptions, make judgments which are presented as belief claims of their own, and cannot avoid assessing and dealing with the beliefs of others.

Many of the identified curricular problems of Art Education are occasioned by confused or vague use of language in presenting "key concepts" and "basic definitions;" problems of this sort require for their resolution that prior questions of concept be raised, so that the suppressed premises of belief contained within the terminology may be explicitly formulated and examined.

Other curricular problems in Art Education are occasioned by belief claims representing doubtful, unconventional or arbitrary judgments. Many art educators find it difficult to designate such belief claims as true or false, acceptable or unacceptable; the difficulty is compounded when all belief claims are treated as if equal in evidential status, or when factual beliefs and value beliefs, together with the methods of verification appro-
appropriate to either, are confused.

In conceptualizing, communicating, developing and implementing curricula, the art educator who lacks facility in discriminating among belief claims of various kinds and of various levels of rational support is hampered in making his evaluations and presentations. The art educator's need to develop critical skills in examining and dealing with beliefs is particularly evident at the foundational stage. The drafters of curricular guidelines must determine which assumptions are necessarily made; in setting forth key concepts and basic definitions they may unwittingly present suppressed premises of belief within their choice of terminology. The prerequisite condition for improved facility in dealing with belief is to engage oneself in critical examination of belief, particularly of personally held beliefs and of the beliefs that one is professionally required to present or promote.

In consideration of the perceived need for critical examination of belief claims in Art Education, two tasks are set for accomplishment in this study:

1. To demonstrate the usefulness of the methodology of conceptual analysis in directing the critical examination of belief claims in Art Education, by undertaking an analysis of the concept of belief with special reference to
the context of Art Education.

2. To assist the critical examination of belief claims in Art Education by offering procedural recommendations, derived from the analysis, to guide art educators in examining, evaluating and presenting beliefs about Art and education.

Organization of the Study

The study is arranged in four chapters. The introductory chapter identifies the presentation and acceptance of inadequately or uncritically examined belief claims as a problem in Art Education, particularly at the foundational stage of curriculum development. In response to that problem, two tasks are generated as goals to be observed in undertaking this study.

In Chapter Two additional support is provided for the description in the present chapter of critical examination of belief as needful and useful to art educators. In reviewing the literature of Art Education, authors who refer to foundational issues of Art Education are selected for citation. Some authors are cited because they concur with the claimed need for critical examination of belief. Other citations either point out or exemplify conceptual problems involving unidentified, unexamined or unsupported belief claims. In a review of the literature of conceptual
analysis, a number of analyses of 'belief' are considered; selected points of explication are compared and related to the development of the writer's own analysis of belief.

Chapter Three, which consists in its entirely of an analysis of the concept of belief, undertakes the performance of the first task mentioned above. In addition to demonstrating many of the procedures that are followed in using the tools of analysis, the explication of belief provides a basis for distinguishing belief from knowledge, and for differentiating verified, evidentially based and non-evidentially based belief claims. The methods of verification appropriate to factual beliefs are contrasted with those applied to value beliefs. The purely subjective aspects of belief as a psychological state are examined in regard to the feelings of confidence and certainty often associated with belief. Verbal expressions of belief are explicated in relation to performative and emotive exercises of belief. Problems of vague, ambiguous or improper use of language are examined throughout the analysis.

Chapter Four pursues the accomplishment of the second task or goal specified in the statement of the problem. Examples are first considered of belief claims expressed in Art studio, Art history and Art criticism. The reliance of Art Education curriculum development on
foundational belief assumptions is examined; the use of inquiry to test foundational belief assumptions or to extend the boundaries of Art Education is described as constrained by the imposition of certain value beliefs as fundamental to the discipline.

Procedural elements, abstracted from the analytical moves and points of explication of the completed analysis, are synthesized in five formulations of procedure recommended to art educators for guidance in critical examination and presentation of belief claims about Art and Education. The use of the recommended procedures in Art Education is exemplified by their application to statements excerpted from the literature of the foundational stage of art education curriculum development. The clarification of conceptual issues at the foundational level is shown to have consequences throughout the continuum of curricular activity.
Chapter Two

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Need for Philosophical Inquiry in Art Education

A number of Art Educators working at the foundational level of Art Education (Ecker, Kuhn, Barkan, Kaelin) have called for additional philosophical inquiry in order that some of the more troublesome conceptual issues might be resolved. In a state conference address to art teachers, Ecker emphasized this need: "Philosophic inquiry, I'm arguing, is the only rational basis of securing the future of art in the public schools."

Kuhn noted that a false dichotomy has been observed between empirical and philosophical modes of inquiry, for both are needed. Unless some philosophical tasks of clarification are accomplished prior to empirical testing, the objectivity of many empirical studies is questionable:

The pluralism of constructs about art as well as education make it desirable that philosophical positions form the basis for research models, especially when the clusters of theories represented by epistemology, psychology and

---

sociology do not clearly provide criteria for theoretical constructs.

In art education little philosophical analysis undergirds the refinement of operational definitions and measurement instruments. . . . There are more empirical studies being developed than there are philosophical, historical and critical ones.  

In one of the "Penn State Papers" Barkan acknowledged a need for greater reliance in curricular development on the philosophical inquiry of aestheticians:

To the detriment of art education . . . we have anchored curriculum almost entirely in relation to the artist. . . . Art curriculum is faltering, not because of the efforts to attend to art history, but rather, because we have not learned to use the aesthetician and critic, nor do we properly use the historian.

In a collaborative study of the limits of aesthetic inquiry, Ecker and Kaelin propose metacriticism and metatheory as philosophical "first steps" to be taken toward a broadened concept of art education research and art education curricula:

More instruction must be provided in metacriticism in colleges of education if better courses in criticism are to be provided in the public schools; more courses in methodology and metatheory must likewise be provided there if, on the lower levels, we are to be able to supply defensible methods and theories for all those students whose experience within the educational pro-


cess leads them to be skeptical or overly dogmatic about what they are learning.⁴

Responding to papers presented at the 1973 National Art Education Study Institute, Heussenstamm noted a discrepancy between claims and results in recent projects, and suggests a remedy:

My advice, . . . is to stay at the conceptual level of operation until the philosophical and theoretical groundwork for a project is so well plowed that consensus [sic] and understanding of all aspects of anticipated operations are understood.⁵

Madeja, speaking for the CEMREL Art Education Program, claims that a philosophical base for curricular development is acquired in the organization of elements of the Arts disciplines into the whole work of Art:

The whole work itself becomes the basis for a curriculum in aesthetic education. It is the most appropriate example of aesthetic phenomena, and the context in which this work is used and valued becomes the philosophical dimension of the content base.⁶

Madeja does not indicate whether the above cited "philosophical dimension" is a vague "philosophy of life"


⁵Frances Heussenstamm, "Commentary" Evaluating The Total School Art Program (Papers presented at the N.A. E.A. Study Institute, San Diego, April, 1973), p. 7.

or a set of principles formulated and supported by philosophical methodology. In other words, it is not clear that any useful directive principles have been abstracted from the vast and unwieldy "context" of the whole work of art. Although any area of human experience has philosophical potential, the effectiveness of its directive function in curricular development is dependent on the prior accomplishment of philosophical tasks of analysis and criticism.

**Doctrinaire Belief Assumptions in Art Education**

Some writers (Hobbs, Eisner, Arnstine) report that a number of belief claims about Art Education are on occasion accepted uncritically, in much the same way as other unexamined beliefs (e.g., political doctrines, cultural myths, religious dogmas) are sometimes unquestioningly accepted out of loyalty and gratuitously assumed to be true. Hobbs refers to these unsupported beliefs as the *myths* endemic to Art Education, suggesting "that art educators may have to take stock of their own aesthetic myths before they can begin to educate others for the aesthetic":

The ideologies of the Bauhaus, the exemplars of 20th century art history selected from the lineal descendents of Post Impressionism, and the rhetoric of whatever avant-garde is currently in charge have become the fundamentals of faith for all of us who have been trained
at the college level in art including everyone in art education. To suggest that this background is insufficient or even to question it at all seems heretical; but designing a future aesthetic education out of this material alone would be like using blacksmith technology in an age of super highways.  

Eisner emphasizes the practical consequences of doctrinaire acceptance of unexamined and uncriticized beliefs by art teachers-in-training:

"We should be careful not to utilize doctrine or language that gives implicit and at times explicit endorsement to practices that are, at the least, questionable, which are clearly oversimplifications of what art education might be, and which can in fact be deleterious to students and teachers alike. When such unexamined and uncriticized doctrine is used in the education of students preparing to become teachers of art, it is yet another way of polluting the stream at its source."

In a study of the aesthetic as a context for general education, Arnstine seeks to account for the ineffectiveness of some aesthetic education programs. Arnstine begins the study by locating the radical problem in the unquestioning acceptance as aesthetic doctrines of certain beliefs about art and the aesthetic. These beliefs, if not in principle unsupported, are presently unsupported and are necessarily accepted without support;

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hence they are designated as *untenable* assumptions:

Aesthetic education (in the visual arts) is currently promoted in schools by setting aside a specific time of day for the study of works of art and for practice in a variety of art media and techniques. This arrangement makes it clear to the student that what is pursued in the art course is a quite different sort of affair from what is pursued in other school courses. I will try to show that art courses so organized are not likely to contribute very much to aesthetic education. The reasons why this is so stem from certain untenable assumptions about art and the aesthetic which are usually implicit in art courses.9

Arnstine claims that these untenable doctrines can provide little, if any justification for the inclusion of special courses in the Arts within the general curriculum of public schools. In demonstrating how fundamental belief assumptions can be critically examined, he shows that such critical examination also could lead to their modification, or to their replacement by foundational beliefs that have better support. In either case, change would be expected in the direction that the development of aesthetic education might take: "... A critical examination of some of the assumptions which underlie art teaching can result in the adoption of a quite different approach to aesthetic education."

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10ibid., p. 19.
Belief Claims in Art Education

As might be expected, writers in Art Education have almost exclusively been concerned with value beliefs. Only one of the following citations refers to a factual belief, which is in principle capable, unlike value beliefs, of empirical proof and public verification. Ecker asserts that Art Educators have invited problems by mistakenly identifying some value belief assumptions as verified facts:

... Our central beliefs, our basic premises, our relatively unquestioned assumptions about the teaching of art have at least one feature in common; they confuse facts with values. I shall argue that these doctrines are inadequate primarily because of this confusion.11

It would be misleading to infer from the instances of explicitly designated belief claims to be given below that these are rarely presented or considered in Art Education. The problem is that few of these claims are acknowledged or identified as matters of belief. Additional difficulties are presented by many Art Educators' persistence in ambiguous use of 'value'. In a notable paper on problems in teaching values Arntzine does much to resolve the ambiguity by stipulating definitions of two species of value activity: A value is "the direct

feeling of liking or disliking, of approving or disapproving" whereas an *evaluation* is stipulated as a "conscious intellectual, discursive process in which consequences of choices or actions are consciously weighed."\(^\text{12}\)

Arnstine's stipulations correspond to the distinction between value beliefs expressing the mere affective response of "prizing" and those expressing a value judgment, or "appraisals." The designation 'value' is, however, ambiguous, referring either to a verbal statement expressing the content of a value belief or to a disposition, not only to verbalize a value belief, but also to act in accord with the value belief. Thus, in reporting that "the most direct way of teaching values, then, is to bash in the head of the learner until his values are those of his teacher,"\(^\text{13}\) 'value' would be used in the sense of a statement of value content; the same observation would apply to the assertion that 'values'... are immediately held, need no support, and brook no criticism."\(^\text{14}\)

Considering that formation of a disposition to act in accord with value beliefs is most often the desired end of those who call for teaching values, it is difficult to


\(^{13}\)ibid., p. 7.

\(^{14}\)ibid., p. 10.
explain why many teachers are content, as Arnstine observes, "... To dispense knowledge about values..." in order to elicit "... correct verbal responses on examination questions." Although Arnstine does not make the inference in his paper, the possibility of discrepancy between particular verbal response and specific personal belief disposition would seem to pose a similar problem in the construction of attitudinal surveys and behavioral objectives.

Apart from these considerations, Arnstine unhesitatingly recommends that value statements be treated as hypothetical (i.e., that the value beliefs be critically examined) in order to promote their reconstruction as the personal beliefs of the student:

If considering the consequences of acts is educative then teaching values, which is an educational endeavor, must involve the questioning of values.16

Wilson argues that effectiveness will not be achieved in the art classroom until classroom experience begins educating in the way the culture does. To this end he recommends an integration of the complex of beliefs and belief-motivated behaviors (life style) characterizing the "world of art in the classroom" and the "outside world":

15 ibid., p. 9.
16 ibid., p. 6.
Intensive aesthetic experiences within art classrooms must appear to most students to have little or no use or worth on the outside. Artistic values and attitudes are not integrated into students' life styles. It is most important to recognize that the goals of art teaching are not superficial, nor are they so easily acquired as art educators have believed. These goals are not amenable to being tacked onto the old life style, since they are not consistent with the life styles of many students. They constitute life styles in themselves. (Life style refers to the particular pattern of behaviors, attitudes, values and beliefs held by an individual. . . .)\(^{17}\)

Day asserts that the particular choice of teaching strategy and of student activity is determined by the art teacher's "justifying" value beliefs about art and education, that is, a "general rationale for Art Education (which) significantly affects the nature of that teacher's art classes":

A teacher's "general rationale" refers to his basic set of beliefs regarding the purpose and goals of art education within his classroom or teaching situation. When an art teacher answers questions such as "Of what value is art education?" or "What should students gain from art classes?", he is explicating his general rationale. A general rationale is a value position concerning expected outcomes of art education. It is an "operational philosophy" which justifies practice.\(^{18}\)


Day emphasizes that the art teacher must examine these value beliefs, in order to determine whether his rationale is compatible with those of other art teachers and consistent with the program rationales. To this end, he proposes the Day Art Rationale Assessment Instrument, in which teachers are invited to select from a list of rationales representing "... The essence of their own previously unverbalized beliefs concerning art teaching." Use of Day's instrument would be advantageous in that some teachers would become aware of their justifying principles as beliefs. The format of the instrument, however, provides no means of determining which of many possible forms of personal belief was being expressed in the selection of a particular rationale exemplar; neither would the instrument distinguish between rationally supported and unsupported personal beliefs.

The need is not only to determine what teachers believe, but also, as Efland notes, to determine how or on what basis their beliefs are held:

Teachers will build different kinds of arguments for their choices, and we can look at these to see if the reasons are arbitrary and expedient, or are based upon a system of beliefs that takes into account the nature of students, the subject field, the school and the society.

19 Ibid., p. 66.

20 Arthur D. Efland, "Normative Evaluation in Aesthetic Education" Evaluating the Total School Art
In commentary on the curriculum development model used by the Aesthetic Education program of CEMREL, Madeja and Kelly describe the development of aesthetic education materials into an extensive system of packaged units of instruction. The rationale for developing this package system is given as the need to provide the school or community with planned choices, so that value conflicts might be resolved:

... Conflict between the teacher and the community was inevitable because of disparate value systems. Teachers were inclined to view education as cultural advancement, whereas the community was apt to view education as a means for community indoctrination. ...

The problem for the curriculum developer in aesthetic education, then, is to create materials that reflect the cosmopolitan values of the disciplines while accommodating to local values.21

It may be noted concerning the description cited above that value conflicts are not resolved simply by using materials in which the conflicting values are juxtaposed. If the "accommodation" of cosmopolitan and local values is expected to be evidenced in the students as an enduring disposition of belief rather than as an ephemeral feeling, the students will require guidance in the comparative examination of value beliefs. In addition

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Program (Papers presented at the N.A.E.A. Study Institute, San Diego, April, 1973), p. 40.

to the development of the skills identified as "artistic", development of basic critical skills of inquiry would be needed in order to resolve the value conflict.

Hubbard and Rouse offer the following comment on their structured art program for elementary schools:

The particular approach of the program grew out of what we know about the people who would use the program and the conditions under which they work. The result, again, is austere yet practical, and defensible in view of what we currently know about educating people.\footnote{Guy Hubbard and Mary J. Rouse, "Art - Meaning, Method, and Media: A Structured Art Program for Elementary Schools" in Al Hurwitz (ed.) Programs of Promise (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972), p. 20.}

The above passage presents two claims of knowledge concerning areas of human behavior that have not yet been adequately explained by evidentially determined theories or by any set of verified principles. In other words, knowledge, in the "strict sense" (knowing something to be true because adequate evidence for truth is understood) is in this case not attainable; for the same reasons, one may not claim knowledge in the "weak sense" (holding a true belief without having adequate evidence for its truth). The substitution of 'believe' for 'know' would have the advantage of not presenting a stronger truth claim than is warranted in these circumstances.
In the preceding sections, some belief assumptions in art education and the belief assertions of some art educators were selected for citation. Some of the more troublesome problems in art education were described as having their source in unidentified, unexamined, or unsupported belief claims. It is not intended that one should infer from the above survey that art educators, by virtue of some distinctive qualities of art education, exhibit a higher or lower incidence of "belief problems" than do any other educators. That uncritical acceptance of belief constitutes a problem for teachers in general is a claim which Pratte suggests may be at least in part warranted:

"Teachers, like some, but not all, men are credulous by training and inclined to accept whatever beliefs are first urged upon them strongly, clearly, and repeatedly. Also, they are too commonly dogmatic; that is, their claims to certain knowledge run ahead of the proofs they are asked to offer."\(^{23}\)

Explications of Belief in Analytic Philosophy

Ackerman gives reasons to approach the conceptual problem of the nature of belief with caution. Considering that belief is sometimes attributed to household pets and laboratory animals, Ackerman argues that human belief seems

to be conceptually related to linguistic competence, that is, associated with conscious formulation of a belief sentence.²⁴ Some human beliefs, however, are revealed in action without being accompanied by any conscious formulation of the belief.²⁵ If these behavioral beliefs - and the unconscious beliefs of psychoanalytic theory - were set aside, an adequate goal of analysis would be to show how conscious beliefs could be incorporated in consistent rational belief structures.²⁶ Yet even the beliefs of a lunatic can be a logically consistent set of beliefs; it is possible to maintain consistency even though available information is being interpreted in an arbitrarily strange way.²⁷

It is difficult to place limits, Ackerman notes, on what an individual may choose to believe:

Someone may believe something whether it is true or false, and it may be that someone does not believe something no matter how obviously true it is or how much evidence he has for its truth. This is what is meant by saying that beliefs can be crazy as hell. The more well informed and rational a person is, the more likely his beliefs are to be true, but we cannot infer that his beliefs are true because he holds them.²⁸

²⁵ *ibid.*, p. 5.
²⁶ *ibid.*, p. 10.
²⁷ *ibid.*, p. 31.
In almost every work surveyed in this section, the analysis of belief is presented as an adjunct of the analysis of knowledge. There is no general agreement, however, on the relationship of belief to knowledge.

Although Scheffler lists a belief condition as one of the three conditions jointly defining propositional knowledge, 29 he differentiates sharply between knowledge and belief. Since "knowing, unlike believing, has independent factual reference", Scheffler denies that knowing can be in any sense a species of believing, or that knowing and believing are classified as cognitive acts along the same continuum. 30 Similar differentiation is asserted by Austin 31 and Brown, 32 who state that knowledge and belief must be distinguished on some basis other than the purely psychological criterion of feeling sure.

Price takes the position that knowledge is by definition infallible, representing a situation in which some fact is directly present to consciousness, whereas belief is always fallible and possesses a certain indirectness.

20 ibid., pp. 25, 26.
Consequently, he claims that it is impossible to know and believe the same thing at the same time.\textsuperscript{33}

Prichard states that knowing and believing differ in kind, not as species and genus (knowledge is not a special kind of belief), nor as two species of a common genus (knowledge is not a better kind of thinking, nor belief a worse kind). "Their relatedness," according to Prichard, "consists rather in the facts (A) that believing presupposes knowing, though, of course, knowing something other than we believe, and (B) that believing is a stage we sometimes reach in the endeavour to attain knowledge."\textsuperscript{34} Prichard's recommendation is that "we should only say that we know something when we are certain of it", whereas "when we believe something we are uncertain of it."

Given this stipulation and Prichard's acceptance of introspection as a means of clear, distinct, and direct knowledge, it is not surprising that he should conclude that everyone is capable of distinguishing personal knowing from personal believing: ". . . We cannot mistake belief for knowledge or vice versa."\textsuperscript{35} Prichard's account, it should be noted, relies on the claim of privileged access, and fails to provide non-subjective criteria for distin-


\textsuperscript{35}ibid., p. 88.
guishing between justified and unjustified subjective convictions of certainty. This failing is significant, in view of the fact that irrational and rationally unsupported beliefs are commonly held with the same confident conviction of certitude.

The confusion of knowledge and belief is compounded by a number of overlapping uses of the terms. Scheffler concedes that knowledge in the "weak sense" (lacking the evidence condition) is nothing more than "true belief," that is, belief which happens to be true, but is not understood on adequate evidence to be true. In support of this usage, Scheffler cites Hintikka, who in this regard prefers the term 'true opinion'.

Cook Wilson, as reported by Griffiths, recognizes three forms of belief corresponding to (1) direct and unmistakeable knowledge, (2) opinion supported by some evidence, and (3) taking for granted (believing something without doubt, without having evidence for it). Philip Smith employs as a section heading in a chapter on the nature of knowledge, the phrase "Knowledge as Intense

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36 Scheffler, op. cit., p. 9.


38 Cook Wilson, paraphrased by A. Philips Griffiths, "On Belief" in Griffiths, op. cit., p. 133.
Belief"39; in the summary of that chapter, knowledge is described as belief "... that has a settled quality. It is a belief that has gone beyond reasonable doubt."

In regard to the nature of belief, Smith describes belief as "a psychophysical state" involving more than linguistic expression or "a state of mind": "It seems, therefore, that believing is physical as well as mental - believing is willingness to act."41 Similar description is given by Rokeach: "Any expectancy or implicit set is also a belief, which is also to say that it is a predisposition to action."42 Although Rokeach acknowledges the hazards of "taking at face value what a person says he believes,"43 his study of belief systems nevertheless relies on interpretation of verbal assertions of belief.

Scheffler describes belief as a theoretical state "characterizing, in subtle ways, the orientation of the person in the world."44 Griffiths asserts that "we cannot

40ibid., p. 99.
41ibid., p. 73.
43ibid., p. 32.
44Scheffler, op. cit., p. 90.
say that belief is necessarily a feeling. On the other hand, it is a mode of consciousness."^45

Apart from the analytic literature surveyed, 'belief' is used to refer to psychological conditions of confidence, trust, conviction and commitment, to unidentified feelings, to continuing states of belief, and to the activity, process, or function of believing. Some of these uses refer to beliefs as conscious occurrences, in the tradition of Hume's account of belief as a vivid idea associated with a present impression.

Of the analytic works examined, Gilbert Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* has provided much of the critical framework for the development of an analysis of 'belief'.

The frequently exhibited tendency of some authors and educators to regard belief as a mysterious, unfathomable, or inaccessible "mental operation" can readily be explained as symptomatic of the entrenched Cartesian myth which Ryle identifies as a category mistake and which he designates as 'the Dogma of the Ghost in the Machine'.^46 According to the "para-mechanical hypothesis"^47 of the

^45 Griffiths, op. cit., p. 142.


Cartesian myth, an individual is considered as living through two parallel histories; a private history in the "inner world" of mind, and a public history in the "outer world" of body. Minds are "spectral machines", the spiritual counterparts of the complex organization and causal processes of the body. A mental conduct word like 'belief' is supposed to denote the occurrence of specific modification in an occult stream of consciousness, and at times, the "mental cause" of some behavioral effect.

It often happens that one regards the beliefs of others as mysteries, while claiming no such difficulty in understanding his own beliefs. This hypothesis, which Ryle designates as an (unfounded) theory of "privileged access", involves a twofold claim of infallible knowledge: (1) a claim of consciousness, through which the mind is constantly aware of all that occupies its inner stage, and (2) a claim of introspection, a non-sensuous kind of perception by means of which the mind scrutinizes its own states and operations. Ryle argues against privileged access by showing that imputed objects of consciousness

\[48\textit{ibid.}, \text{p. 20.}\]
\[49\textit{ibid.}, \text{p. 15.}\]
\[50\textit{ibid.}, \text{p. 22.}\]
\[51\textit{ibid.}, \text{p. 154.}\]
and introspection (e.g., "mental" faculties, causes and processes) are myths; moreover, the conventional explanations of privileged access are logical muddles, which present additional logical problems in attempting to resolve logical problems associated with self-knowledge.

To be deprived of privileged access is not as much of a handicap as might be imagined; rather parity is established between self-discovery and discovery of similar things in others. One finds out most of what one wants to know about others by observing how their overt behavior is conducted, especially their speech and writing.\textsuperscript{52} In this regard Ryle observes that:

The sort of things that I can find out about myself are the same as the sort of things that I can find out about other people, and the methods of finding them out are much the same. A residual difference in the supplies of the requisite data makes some differences in degree between what I can know about myself and what I can know about you, but these differences are not all in favor of self-knowledge. In certain quite important respects it is easier for me to find out what I want to know about you than it is for me to find out the same sort of things about myself.\textsuperscript{53}

In consequence of the above observation, the critical examination of belief which is recommended in this

\textsuperscript{52}\textit{ibid.}, p. 61.

\textsuperscript{53}\textit{ibid.}, pp. 155, 156.
paper can be regarded as a practice which is in no way unusual or exceptionally demanding. It is recommended that one should continue to develop (and apply to the beliefs of others) the same means which have already been employed in whatever discovery has been made of one's personal beliefs.

In place of the previously mentioned characterization of belief as an occult mental process or "mental faculty", Ryle provides a dispositional account of belief, by which the writer has been guided in preparing for the analysis of the following chapter. In Ryle's account, belief, like other higher grade dispositions of people, is not a single-track disposition having uniform or "nuclear" exercises that can be identified as a special kind of activity called "believing". Rather, belief is a multi-track disposition "the exercises of which are indefinitely heterogeneous."\(^{54}\)

There is no single pattern of believing activity. 'Belief' is a determinable dispositional word signifying proneness "to do, not things of one unique kind, but things of lots of different kinds."\(^{55}\) 'Belief' denotes "a propensity not only to make certain theoretical moves but

\(^{54}\text{ibid.}, \text{pp. 44-45.}\)

\(^{55}\text{ibid.}, \text{p. 118.}\)
also to make certain executive and imaginative moves, as well as to have certain feelings."  

Scheffler, considering the complexities represented in the "overt circumstances" of an attributed belief, suggests that Ryle's dispositional account is in need of certain refinement:

A single belief therefore cannot be attributed to a person simply on the basis of his response dispositions under given overt circumstances, no matter how varied these dispositions are taken to be. For the single belief is judged, in part, by reference to the other beliefs and the goals we assume the person to have; these other beliefs and goals color the circumstances under which the particular response is taking place. Relative to overt circumstances alone, therefore, we typically need to consider attributing a complex of beliefs and goals to the person.  

Scheffler's emendation of Ryle, i.e., a "broadened dispositional account" of belief, is accepted for the purposes of the analysis in the following chapter. Belief is taken as a disposition to act in certain ways given appropriate overt circumstances, appropriate goals, and the influence of appropriate other beliefs.

Austin, noting the different ways in which claims of knowledge and belief are challenged, that is, 'How do you know?' and 'Why do you believe?', observes that "we seem never to ask 'Why do you know?' or 'How do you

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56 ibid., p. 135.

57 Scheffler, op. cit., p. 86.
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believe?"^{58} Granted that to ask "How do you believe?"
is not common parlance, Green suggests that anyone whoaccepts the responsibilities of teaching is required toask this question of himself and of his students:

Teaching has to do, in part at least, with theformation of beliefs, and that means that it has to do not simply with what we shall believe, but with how we shall believe it.^{59}

Green divides beliefs, in regard to whetheracceptance is supported by good reasons, into evidentiallyheld and non-evidentially held beliefs. These beliefs,once accepted, are described as capable or incapable ofreceiving (further) evidential support, critical examination or modification.

A spatial metaphor of belief systems^{60} is constructed by Green in his explication of belief. Much of Green's terminology is employed in the analysis, as is hisconceptualization of belief systems, or "clusters", e.g., other beliefs influencing the circumstances in which a particular belief disposition is exercised. The spatial metaphor itself is not employed as a device in the analysis.

^{58}Austin, op. cit., p. 46.


^{60}ibid., pp. 41-55.
Chapter Three
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF BELIEF

I.

As introduction to what is entitled "An Analysis of Belief," it is helpful, in the writer's judgment, to set limits for the scope and intent of this undertaking.

The present chapter is not an epistemological treatise on the nature of belief. Hume wrote in 1739 that "This act of the mind [viz., belief] has never yet been explained by any philosopher."¹ After almost two hundred years—and much epistemology—had elapsed, Bertrand Russell wrote that "belief . . . is the central problem in the analysis of mind."² Although epistemological controversy concerning belief persists unabated, it does not serve the purpose of this paper to attempt critical analysis and accommodation of conflicting theories, or construction of a new theory of belief.

The theory of belief which informs the following analysis is a dispositional account of belief as set forth by Ryle\(^3\) and as emended and amplified by Scheffler\(^4\): To believe that \(P\) signifies that, given appropriate overt circumstances (and appropriate goals and the motivation of appropriate other beliefs), one is disposed to act or react (verbally and/or non-verbally, overtly or covertly) in a particular manner.

One of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment, Wittgenstein warns, is that "a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it."\(^5\) Against the urge to posit some real referent for the substantive 'belief' (i.e., some mental occurrence, activity or faculty), the dispositional account summarized above identifies the referent as an abstraction: A "theoretical state,"\(^6\) or a general hypothetical proposition\(^7\) explaining the occurrence of a number of different behaviors, which behaviors are characterized as exercises or actualizations of the disposition.


\(^6\)Scheffler, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

\(^7\)Ryle, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
In proposing to analyze the concept of belief, there is no expectation - given the character of 'believe' as a so-called "cognitive" verb - of discovering characteristic features common to all instances of use. According to Wittgenstein, 'believe', like 'think' and other "psychological" verbs, is a word of extremely ramified and extended uses; its use often appears confused. "Nor with such verbs," says Wittgenstein, "can we expect anything else."

In keeping with the stated purpose of this work, the present analysis of belief is pursued within the social context of art education. Instances of belief expression are most often excerpted from the professional discourse of art educators. Although the analysis does not exclude cases of capricious and unwarranted (yet strongly held) belief, primary consideration is given to reasonable belief, particularly in reference to belief claims that are made by professionals in educational settings.

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9*ibid.*, Sec. 113.
II.

In attributing belief to others we sometimes describe an individual as being disposed to act in a certain way. 'Believe', as it is used in the following descriptive phrases, refers to an individual's willingness to act:

1. Shopper \( x \) believes in paying cash for all purchases.
2. Voter \( x \) believes in being loyal to his party.
3. Philosopher \( x \) believes in raising prior questions.

When an individual formulates and expresses the content of his belief as a proposition,\(^{10}\) 'believe' describes the individual as asserting that something is the case:

4. Skydiver \( x \) believes that his parachute is correctly packed and ready to open when the cord is pulled.

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\(^{10}\)In the examples of belief descriptions given, the proposition is consciously formulated - and so expressed - by the individual who is being described. In other cases of belief description, the person who makes the description may hypothesize a formulation to be attributed. The problems posed by belief attribution, especially those of establishing procedures and criteria for validly attributing and interpreting belief from observed behavior, are not germane to this analysis, which limits its concern to explicitly asserted belief claims, specifically, the curricular claims of art educators.
5. Militant consumer \( x \) believes that her breakfast cereal is deceptively packaged.

6. Child \( x \) believes that handling toads causes warts.

For the sake of convenience in pursuing the analysis, the use of 'believe' which is illustrated in the latter three cases is designated propositional; that of the first three is designated the non-propositional, or broadly dispositional use.\(^{11}\)

It is noted that neither use illustrated above can alone account for the complexity of a person's belief. An adequate dispositional account takes into consideration both verbal and non-verbal exercises of the belief disposition, so that the belief to be attributed to another may be revealed more fully in word and deed, i.e., in the pattern of consistency - or inconsistency - obtaining between word and deed in a given social context.\(^{12}\) Thus it would not be thought unusual if the

\(^{11}\)Although the cases of propositional and dispositional use given above employ respectively the constructions believe that and believe in, it does not seem advantageous at this early stage of analysis to confront a problem associated with the two constructions. A point of controversy among some writers in philosophical analysis concerns the claim that all cases of 'believe in' can (in principle) be interpreted so as to be reduced to the believe that construction. A reductive effort of this kind is demonstrated in Section V of the analysis.

\(^{12}\)Scheffler writes: "Where these latter two [word and deed] diverge, we may need to decide whether
cash-paying shopper in (1) were disposed also to talk about his belief on some occasions of purchase. Similarly, it might be expected of the sky diver in (4) that, being disposed to make his assertion, he would be disposed as well to exercise his belief by wearing the parachute on his next jump. "In typical circumstances," Scheffler writes, "we appeal to evidence beyond verbal response altogether, as to what a person's beliefs really are; we look to the way these beliefs are revealed in action."¹³

In further examination of the case of belief attributed to the sky diver, it is helpful to consider the social setting in which such belief would be exercised. A parachutist, through constant reminders of the possibility of fatal accident, learns to appreciate life-or-death dependency on the proper functioning of properly maintained equipment; in response to danger he is trained to be, not more fearful, but more careful. To characterize the sky diver's belief simply as a "willingness to assert propositions about his parachute" may seem inadequate, especially when applied, as in to postulate weakness of will, or irrationality, or deviant purpose, or ignorance, or bizarre belief, or insincerity, and the choice may often be difficult." op. cit., p. 90.

¹³ibid., p. 83.
this context, to asserting a belief of great consequence to the individual.

In order to entertain questions concerning the subjective circumstances that may attend an assertion of belief, it is helpful to construct a first-person statement of belief from the belief description of (4):

7. "I believe that my parachute is correctly packed and ready to open when the cord is pulled."

It is clear that in (7) the sky diver asserts a proposition concerning his parachute, i.e., he is making a claim about a particular state of affairs in the world outside himself. However, in prefacing the proposition with the first-person 'I believe that', he also expresses something about his private experience, i.e., about the psychological state, or "frame of mind," in which the claim is made.\(^{14}\)

In earlier explication of (4) and (7), the sky diver's belief (considered in both linguistic\(^{15}\) and social

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\(^{15}\)The expression "ready to open when the cord is pulled" in (7) is a contextual clue that the speaker is
context) was interpreted as likely to include his being prepared to use the parachute in jumping. In consideration of the above, it seems likely that the sky diver's "I believe that" expresses his *feeling sure* that his parachute is correctly packed.

It appears to be the case that "feeling sure," i.e., a subjective condition of confidence or conviction of certainty, is characteristic of the psychological state we call "believing." Few would disagree with H. H. Price's observation that "when we believe something, we feel a feeling of sureness or confidence with regard to it. As we say, we feel comfortable about it."\(^{16}\)

If "feeling sure" is characteristic of all believing, it seems that in some instances one feels considerably less sure about his belief, for example:

8. "I believe that the paper clips are in the middle drawer, but don't count on it."

9. "I believe I locked my car, but I'm not sure."

aware of the grave consequences of his being mistaken.

The degree of confidence one experiences in believing is sometimes indicated by use of adverbs and adverbial phrases or clauses like "firmly," "positively," "more or less," "absolutely," "you might say," "beyond a shadow of a doubt," for example:

10. "I believe very strongly that most of news reports are pure propaganda; I'm inclined to believe the report that Americans actually landed on the moon, but only because that particular television broadcast would have been very hard to fake."

11. "I firmly believe with everything that's in me that the world will end on December 31, 1999."

12. "I certainly believe that the earth is round: an oblate spheroid, to be precise."

13. "I absolutely believe, and always will believe, that my dog has emotions."

If one compares both the propositional content and the expression of personally experienced confidence in belief assertions (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) and (13), it can be observed that:

A. The propositions asserted in belief can
range from the universally accepted to the patently idiosyncratic and absurd.

B. The subjective confidence attending one's belief can range from invincible convictions of certainty to insecure guessing.

C. No necessary correspondence can be be established between the status of a proposition (in terms of public acceptance) and the degree of subjective confidence. Intense confidence concerning beliefs of low public credibility is illustrated in (11) and (13); the converse relationship obtains in (10).

What we are accustomed to report simply as "feeling sure" or "feeling confident"¹⁷ may more fittingly (albeit less specifically) be described as the total psychological effect of accepting a belief, which effect, as observed above, is logically independent of whether most people

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¹⁷Although a great many expression of "feeling" are associated with belief, it is important to note that the affective components of belief are conventionally described, not as necessary and/or sufficient conditions of belief, but rather as the (contingent) consequents of belief. If the affective consequents were to be taken as constituting the whole of believing, or as collectively
would agree that things are as the belief asserts them to be.

Informing others that a particular belief is strongly or confidently held may elicit nothing more than their respectful toleration of what one firmly chooses to believe; subjective confidence does not of itself give others good reason to accept that belief for themselves and to govern their actions in accord with the belief. If the invitation to share in the security and confidence of believing is declined by some, it is perhaps because they appreciate how often people are mistaken in their confident beliefs. For many others, the desirability of security and confidence outweighs in their judgment the risk of being mistaken.

An important point in this regard is made by representing the essential quality of belief behavior, many educators might surmise that the personal belief behavior of students was not related to their rational development, or that students' beliefs could not respond to rational treatment. The widely used *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives* promotes this view, perhaps unwittingly, by categorizing all belief as "emotional acceptance" (p. 140), by inadequately distinguishing other forms of believing from valuing, and by emphasizing personal feelings of certitude and commitment apart from the possession of rational grounds. (pp. 140, 149). Cf. David Krathwohl, (ed.) *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: Affective Domain* (New York: David McKay Co., 1964), pp. 139-185.
Prichard, who takes care to explain that certainty is considerably more than the absence of doubt. In matters of belief, *feeling* certain is not the same as *being* certain. An unquestioning frame of mind, in which it does not occur to one to doubt something (e.g., being "under the impression" that daylight savings time is still in effect) may easily be confused with a state of certainty, simply because one is not aware of entertaining any doubts. In the state of feeling certain one is frequently mistaken in his belief; however, one cannot be certain that something is the case and at the same time be mistaken in his belief.¹⁸

Propositional belief is described on the first page of this section as a disposition to assert (a proposition) that something is the case, i.e., to assert a proposition as true, or to assert the truth of a proposition. "In short," Green writes, "when a person believes something, he believes it to be true or to be a reasonable approximation of the truth."¹⁹ In subsequent explication it is shown that the truth of the asserted proposition is not established by virtue of simply being claimed, or asserted; neither is this accomplished by confident claiming, nor by


¹⁹Green, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
the intensity of one's feeling sure. In Scheffler's words, "... the effects of a belief on the believer are altogether irrelevant to the question whether or not the belief is true."20

III.

In the dialogue of art instruction, countless belief assertions are exchanged, among which one might include the following:

1. "I believe that the primary colors for pigments are not the same as those for transmitted light."

2. "I believe that it's VanGogh's left ear that was cut off."

3. "I believe that you need acetone to dissolve that kind of stuff."

4. "I believe that El Greco's homeland is the island of Crete."

It may very likely be observed that the statements presented above do not "ring true." i.e., that they do not observe the conventions of contemporary conversational style. An observation of this sort is not unwarranted, for the words 'believe' or 'belief' are not essential to the language in which beliefs are commonly expressed. In

20Scheffler, op. cit., p. 45.
colloquial use "I believe that" in (1) (2) (3) and (4) could be replaced by any one of a great many substitute expressions, for example: "I imagine that," "I feel that," "All I can say is that," "I'm convinced that," "I suspect that," etc. As was suggested in the previous section, the selection of a particular expression is likely to be influenced by the degree or quality of one's subjective confidence.

In many, if not most instances, beliefs are asserted without the use of "I believe," or of any of the substitute expressions above. In asserting a first-person belief claim one need not employ - in everyday discourse one most often does not employ - any special language publicly acknowledging or identifying one's assertions as a belief claim. Using "I believe" in some conversational settings would have the effect of giving one's claim a special force or emphasis, for example, as if one were proselytizing. In a typical art instruction setting, individuals on many occasions may have reason to prefer asserting their beliefs in the format of (1) (2) (3) and (4); however, the dialogue in general is much more likely to include elliptical belief statements like the following:

5. "The primary colors for pigments are not the same as those for transmitted light."

6. "It's Van Gogh's left ear that was cut off."
7. "You need acetone to dissolve that kind of stuff."
8. "El Greco's homeland is the island of Crete."

Each of the above statements expresses the "substance," or propositional content of a belief claim. In other words, (5) (6) (7) and (8) represent in each case a proposition-which-is-asserted-as-true. Belief statements of this kind are hereinafter designated belief content sentences, to be distinguished from first person belief assertions and third person belief descriptions (attributions), both of which take the form of a proposition within a proposition, i.e., a belief-content sentence imbedded within a larger statement. Statements (1) (2) (3) and (4) of this section are belief assertions; a belief description corresponding to (2) is "Myron believes that it's Van Gogh's left ear that was cut off."

In the preceding paragraph three different structures of belief statements are designated. Structural classification of language does not of itself accomplish analysis of the use of language. Moreover, there is no necessary correspondence between the structural features of language units and their logical function in use. This cautionary principle is to be applied to the description of belief-content sentences as being imbedded or included...
within belief assertions and belief descriptions: the structural inclusion of belief content sentences does not warrant assumption of their logical inclusion, or implication.

In practice, a given belief-content sentence $Q$ observes a logical function when imbedded in first-person assertions that cannot be ascribed to it when imbedded within third-person assertions (descriptions).

When John asserts "I believe that $Q$," he thereby asserts that $Q$. By virtue of asserting it to be the case that he believes that $Q$, John commits himself to asserting the truth of $Q$.

However, when John asserts a third-person belief statement like "Mary believes that $Q$," the belief-content sentence $Q$, though imbedded in a statement asserted by John, is itself not asserted by John. It may be helpful to stipulate the content of $Q$ as "Babies are delivered from heaven by storks," which Mary mistakenly, but sincerely, believes to be the case. John, however, knows $Q$ to be false. In this context, John, by asserting that Mary is truly described as believing that $Q$, clearly does not commit himself to asserting the truth of $Q$.

When we talk about the beliefs of some individual or social group, we may refer to a collection of statements
of quite different kinds, for example:

9. "He spent twenty years researching the cosmological beliefs of the Havasupai indians."

10. "Bernard Berenson was not one to keep his beliefs about art to himself."

11. "Allowing everyone to air his beliefs left no time in the seminar for examining those beliefs critically."

The "cosmological beliefs" in (9) would most likely include verified factual statements like "The Grand Canyon was formed by the Colorado River" as well as metaphysical statements accepted in religious faith, like "The Colorado River is a living divinity." (The Havasupai reservation is located within the Grand Canyon.) Although some of Berenson's beliefs in (10) could be subjective expressions of personal taste, others could be well-documented judgments of the authenticity of a painting. The beliefs in (11), if critically examined, could include statements of verified fact as well as disputed personal opinions.

To summarize these observations: a person's beliefs are commonly said to include not only the things he is subjectively convinced of (and concerning which he may be mistaken) but also the things he knows. The English language provides no word which stands in relationship to 'knows' as 'belief' stands in relationship to 'believes'. 
Consequently, 'belief' has to do duty for both verbs, referring to that-which-is-known as well as to that-which-is-believed.

Although 'belief', in a peculiarity of English usage, refers indiscriminately to things known and things believed, this oddity of language can offer no warrant for the indiscriminate use of 'know' and 'believe'.

Believing that $P$ in some instances excludes knowing that $P$, as can be seen in the belief description, "Mary believes that babies are delivered from heaven by storks." Even though one might recognize Mary's sincerity and strength of conviction, one could not properly say "Mary knows that babies are delivered from heaven by storks." Neither can Mary be described as knowing that the earth is flat. Although people can believe falsehoods, we do not speak of people knowing falsehoods.

On the other hand, believing that $P$ seems always to be included in knowing that $P$. One would not say that the surgeon, having completed the operation, knows that his patient had a tumor but does not believe that his patient had a tumor. We would be puzzled by the announcement "I know that I have two children but I don't believe it." \(^{21}\)

\(^{21}\)Green claims three meanings for the ambiguous statement "A does not believe that Q": 1. "A disbelieves that Q." 2. "A believes that Q is false." 3. "A is in such certainty concerning Q that he does not believe that Q,
The manner in which we customarily speak of our knowing and believing recognizes that one who knows that something is the case also believes that this thing is the case.

Believing that is cited as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of knowing that in a widely accepted definition of propositional knowledge, which definition is explicated with great thoroughness and distinction by Scheffler in Conditions of Knowledge. This definition sets three conditions for knowing that: the belief condition, the evidence condition, and the truth condition. In Scheffler's formulation:

\[ X \text{ knows that } Q \]

if and only if

(i) \( X \) believes that \( Q \),

(ii) \( X \) has adequate evidence that \( Q \)

and (iii) \( Q \).\(^{22}\)

As formulated above, all three conditions are taken as jointly defining knowing that, in what is called the strong sense of 'know that'. The omission of condition (ii)

rather, he knows that \( Q \)." The use of cases in the argument of the text allows for the meaning of either (1) or (2). Despite Green's claim for (3), this meaning seems plausible only in a limited academic context. Acceptance of (3) as applicable to the cases used in the text might challenge or modify the argument that knowing always includes believing. Cf. Green, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

\(^{22}\)Scheffler, op. cit., p. 21. For summary of Scheffler's explication of "having adequate evidence that \( Q \)," Cf. second page following (footnote 24).
produces a formula for the definition of 'know that' in the weak sense of having true belief. 23

In the interest of clarifying the relation of belief claims and knowledge claims, several cases can be constructed on the basis of statement (8), and a context stipulated for each:

12. At the end of the lecture Dr. A says, "El Greco's homeland is the island of Crete."  
Dr. A is an art historian whose professional specialty and favorite pastime is researching the life of El Greco; his summers are spent tracing El Greco's path from Crete to Venice to Toledo, in pursuit of primary sources.

13. Dr. B, who overheard Dr. A's statement while passing by the classroom door, later remarks to his fellow chemists, Drs. C and D, that he has never taken the slightest interest in art. "However," says Dr. B, "Thanks to the famous Dr. A, I now know that El Greco's homeland is the island of Crete."

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23 'True belief' is not used here in the sense of truly (i.e., sincerely) believing something, but in the sense of believing something that happens to be true, without having adequate evidence to support the truth of that belief.
14. Dr. C, after acknowledging a similar lack of interest in art, says, "Nevertheless, I'm sure El Greco's homeland is Spain."

15. Dr. D informs his colleagues that he has read Dr. A's latest El Greco book. "I am convinced," says Dr. D, "that El Greco's homeland is the island of Crete."

The proposition asserted in cases (12) (13) and (15) is designated P; that asserted in (14) is designated Q.

Both Dr. A in (12) and Dr. D in (15) are entitled to claim that they know that P in the strict sense of 'know'. Dr. A has good reasons in support of his belief that P, by virtue of his personally conducted investigation; the evidence is adequate to constitute a good case for P, as "good cases" are measured against the norms of historical methodology.

Although Dr. D engaged in no investigative activities comparable to those of Dr. A, in reading Dr. A's book he was given access to the reasons which constitute Dr. A's evidential argument, or good case in support of believing that P. It should be noted, however, that Dr. D is not said to have adequate evidence simply by reason of being aware of a number of "pieces of evidence," or by reason of having read the argument. Adequate evidence refers not
merely to the accumulation of adequate evidential data, but additionally to the arrangement of evidential data in the formal pattern of an argument or proof; one is said to have adequate evidence only when he understands the argument, i.e., sees its point. If Dr. D understands the evidential argument, he is said to know that P.

In (14), Dr. C, although mistaken in his belief that Q, characterizes his psychological state as one of being sure that Q. It is not unlikely that Dr. C would choose to say, "I know that Q," as an expression considered appropriate to his subjective condition; his knowledge claim would not for this reason be validly made. Subjective confidence, as was noted in the previous section, can be a feature of true beliefs or false, well supported or unsupported. Dr. C's being sure that Q does not amount to having the right to be sure that Q, since there are no adequate grounds, by public standards of acceptability, for believing that Q.

It can be said of Dr. B in (13) that what he believes to be true (p) is in fact true. Although Dr. B has true belief, he does not have proper credentials for


that true belief: he is unable to justify or support or evaluate his belief in an appropriate manner. In accepting P on the considerable authority of Dr. A, Dr. B did not consider any of Dr. A's authoritative evidential argument in support of P. Although Dr. A's authority might be cited by Dr. B as the reason why he holds the belief that P, it does not itself constitute a good reason, capable of supporting or justifying Dr. B's belief. Dr. B's claim to know that P must be taken in the weak sense of 'know'.

In examining the above four cases, some important differences can be observed between claims of knowing and claims of believing. Believing that is always included in knowing that, as a necessary but not sufficient condition of one's knowing that. The belief that Q represented in an instance of knowing that Q is not simply true belief: in knowing that Q, one not only is assured of the truth of Q, but also has good reasons which constitute adequate evidence for Q; one understands, by virtue of grasping the evidential argument, why Q is said to be true.

26 "Dr. A's authority" is better described as "Dr. B's belief concerning Dr. A's authority." Thus a second belief may be cited as a "reason" explaining why an individual holds a given belief. Green warns that just because an individual gives a reason for holding a belief, it does not follow that his reason is a good reason, i.e., a supportive reason. Cf. Green, op. cit., p. 49.
It does not follow from these observations that knowing is no more than a species of belief, albeit a very strong or warranted kind of believing. We recognize in our use of language that for one to know is in some way different than for one to believe: for one thing, we do not apply to knowing the descriptive predicates that we apply to believing. "A man can be said to believe firmly or reluctantly, or hesitatingly, but no one can be said to know firmly, or reluctantly, or hesitatingly."

The difference between believing that Q and knowing that Q is best described in terms of task and achievement. Scheffler writes "one may say, not too misleadingly, that believing aims at the truth, while knowing that succeeds in this aim." According to Ryle, "... In applying an achievement verb we are asserting that some state of affairs obtains over and above that which consists in the performance, if any, of the subservient task activity."

27 ibid., p. 72.
28 ibid., p. 137
29 R. M. Chisholm, as quoted in Scheffler, op. cit., p. 25.
30 Scheffler, op. cit., p. 25.
31 Ryle, op. cit., p. 150.
To know that Q is to assert a relationship between the proposition Q and the state of affairs appropriate to Q, which relationship we characterize as "truth." Believing that Q, as described in the previous section, need have only a psychological reference, i.e., an appropriate state of mind in relation to Q. Knowing, on the other hand, has independent factual reference: knowing that Q requires not only an appropriate state of mind concerning Q, but an appropriate state of the world corresponding to Q.

In the examination of cases (12) (13) (14) and (15) presented above, the proposition P, for reasons of convenience, is an empirical statement for which empirical evidence is appropriate. Moreover, the canons of research methodology observed by historians prescribe what is needed for verification of P; in the situation of Dr. A's evidence-gathering, there are clear standards of evidential adequacy. In many domains of inquiry the standards of evidential adequacy for verification are not rigidly set. In these situations, the evidence condition of knowledge amounts to having good reasons to support one's belief, which "good reasons" are not restricted to empirical data. One's evidence may include logical proofs or, in appropriate settings, moral reasons. 32

It is not intended that the manner in which cases (12) (13) (14) and (15) are presented should be taken as suggesting that only "verified" beliefs can be reasonably held. A belief that falls short of knowledge can nevertheless be an evidentially held belief, supported in some degree by good reasons, and readily distinguished from beliefs that are held without regard for evidence. The "middle ground" between knowledge and purely subjective, rationally unsupported belief is occupied by beliefs that are reasonably held because they are in some degree based on evidence, open to the consideration of further evidence, and subject to modification in the light of evidence.

IV.

In deciding which of the many belief claims that others present for consideration are worthy of being accepted, it is necessary, in order to decide wisely, to consider the reasons that are produced (or that can be found) in support of each belief. Before decision can be made, however, two prior tasks may need to be performed. The process of deciding whether a statement is acceptable as true is described by Wilson as requiring the performance of three operations:
(i) Discover the meaning of the statement, i.e., what its use is and what sort of thing it is intended to communicate.

(ii) Agree about how to discover whether it is true or not, i.e., about what is to count as acceptable evidence and what is not.

(iii) Consider the evidence and decide.33

In order to appreciate the usefulness of these recommended procedures, one may consider that there are different kinds of statements, just as there are different methods of verification to be employed. Evidence is to be admitted and considered according to the method of verification appropriate to the kind of statement represented in the belief claim.

The following belief claims are presented for consideration:

1. This painting is an authentic Rembrandt.
2. The oil medium is more permanent for application to canvas than the acrylic medium.
3. Establishing Artists-in-residence programs in public schools is the most efficient way to insure quality Art education.
4. Art is the major means of transmitting our cultural heritage.

5. Artists are the most highly creative people in our society.

6. Aesthetic experience is self-fulfilling.

Cases (1) and (2) are instances of statements that are sometimes called a posteriori or empirical, but are more commonly designated factual statements or statements of fact: they state facts about the world of our sense experience. A factual statement is one that can in principle be verified empirically, i.e., by tests conducted in terms of sense experience. Belief claims (1) and (2) can be supported and (at least in principle) verified by empirical evidence. Beliefs of this kind are designated in the present analysis as factual beliefs.

As was observed at the end of the previous section, standards of evidential adequacy for empirical verification are set by various domains of inquiry. Factual belief claims, once they have met the evidential standards for verification in a domain of inquiry, may be designated simply as facts.

Cases (3) and (4) are identified as value statements, specifically, value judgments, or judgments of appraisal. Belief claims consisting in value judgments are hereinafter designated value beliefs.

It is important to note that, although value judg-
ments frequently include evaluative or mixed words whose purpose is to commend, they are nevertheless judgments made on the basis of grounds of some kind. In judgments of appraisal, value is assigned to something on the basis of certain criteria; something is said to be valuable by virtue of its characteristics that fulfill some requirements posted by a standard.

Value judgments, by virtue of being judgments grounded in criteria, are to be distinguished from prizings, or expressions of personal preference, which do not represent true judgments made on the basis of some extra-subjective grounds. Value judgments are interpersonal, asserting valuation with reference to non-arbitrary norms, whereas prizings are entirely personal, serving only as expressions of an individual's attitudes in bestowing value. In value judgments, not only is something prized, but the grounds for the prizing are specified by criteria that indicate what is worthy of being prized. If (3) did nothing more than bestow value, conveying only personal preference (for example, "I like the idea of Artist-in-residence programs"), the expression of prizing would be identified as an attitude statement expressing one's feelings and desires.

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34 Green, op. cit., p. 183.
Value beliefs, unlike factual beliefs, cannot be verified by observation. Even if the thing valued can be observed and described, its value cannot be observed. Two people who agree in accepting a description of the Artist-in-residence programs in (3) could disagree about the value of the programs if they did not share a common set of criteria for judging their value. The proper method of justification for value beliefs entails securing common agreement about the appropriate criteria.

In consequence of this lack of agreement concerning criteria, there is disagreement about the meaning of value beliefs. The evaluative or mixed words included in value beliefs are used by each individual in accord with his criteria; and different people have different criteria.

Those who agree on the meaning of 'most efficient' in (3) are likely to have the same criteria for assessing quality in Art Education.

If it should happen to be the case that agreement is achieved concerning the criteria of a particular value belief, empirical methods could then possibly be used to assist in determining whether the subject of the value judgment satisfies a given criterion: whether the thing or quality declared to be valuable has, with reference to the

35Wilson, op. cit., p. 69.
criterion, the qualities assigned to it.

In light of the above considerations, it seems that the acceptance of value beliefs is facilitated by clear identification of criteria, and by avoidance of egregiously "loaded" terms.

Case (5), which appears to be cast in the form of a value judgment, could be a disguised analytic statement, or rather a statement which is used analytically. If it is the case (as might be suspected, considering the character of the claim when placed in social context) that by 'creative' the speaker means "artistically creative," the statement would be tautological, or trivially analytic. In this event, it is likely that (5) functions as an attitude statement expressing "Artists are great!" or "I like my way of being creative." The difficulties presented by (5) are occasioned for the most part by the loaded term 'creative', which needs to be unpacked before one could know what to make of the claim. As long as the suppressed premises of belief concerning what counts as 'creative' remain suppressed, this statement remains vague and unwieldy.

Case (6): gives the appearance of being a factual statement. However, there seems to be no way of dealing with the vagueness of its terms, and no way of deciding what would count as good evidence for its truth. Since its meaning is obscure, and its method of verification is
problematic, statement (6) may be considered a metaphysical statement, which is not to say that it is nonsense, but only that it is meaningless.

Statement (6) may also be regarded as having the status of an a priori assumption, in that it has been rendered independent of experiential testing. In using terms of such vagueness, one effectively fortifies himself within an assumption against which no argument can be made and against which no evidence will count. It may be that (6) represents an "institutionalized" assumption, i.e., one that is commonly accepted in allegiance to the superordinate goals of some discipline or organization. In any event, (6), like (5), is made unmanageable, both in meaning and in verification, by the use of loaded terms.

V.

In the three previous sections, analysis is directed to cases of believing that something is the case, i.e., the propositional use of 'believe'. On some occasions, however, 'believe' is followed by the preposition in, for example:

1. "Mary believes in creative potential."
2. "John believes in Abstract Expressionism."
3. "Heather believes in Andy Warhol."

It may be asked if the contrasting grammatical
constructions *believe that* and *believe in* are to be taken as indicating a corresponding contrast of use and meaning. This is to ask if the grammatical feature is significant, that is, if the two grammatically distinct constructions are logically distinct as well. In noting the contrast between the *believe in* construction and the *believe that* construction, some writers, notably Scheffler, Green, and Hartland-Swann assume that there can be complete reduction of the former to the latter, that is, that every instance of *believe in* can with the help of contextual clues be converted to a logically equivalent *believe that*. Scheffler, for example, suggests that "To believe in Democracy is to believe that democracy is good or that it has a future." Ackerman notes that "believing in things seems to be a useful construction for describing various

36 Cf. Israel Scheffler, *op. cit.* , pp. 14-15. In these pages Scheffler is comparing usage of 'know' and 'believe'. In view of the continuing controversy concerning the reducibility of knowing *that* to knowing *how*, it is understandable that a similar tactic of reduction should be applied to believing.

37 Green, *op. cit.*, p. 130.


kinds of unknowable or indeterminate beliefs." Although contextual analysis may be employed to convert "A believes in God" to "A believes that God is as Martin Luther describes Him," Ackermann observes that contextual analysis has not removed the indeterminacy, but has shifted the indeterminacy into the believe that clause. The properties that God has are not described or enumerated; rather, the clause alludes to a characterization of them that could not easily be summarized.

It may most often be the case, as Green states,\(^\text{41}\) that believe in expressions are elliptical for believe that expressions; the content of believe that may be summarized and abbreviated in a believe in expression. To honor Ackermann's cautionary suggestion, it may sometimes be the case concerning belief about something relatively indeterminate that no additional descriptive content can be produced for a meaningful believe that clause; in such cases, one might argue that the believe in construction is appropriately employed, and forego attempts at reduction.

Considering the enthusiasm displayed by some in pursuit of logical reduction, it needs to be kept in mind that reduction is but one of many tactics or instruments to be employed effectively or ineffectively in analysis:

\(^{41}\)Green, \textit{loc. cit.}\)
performance of a complete reduction is not necessarily an achievement of explication or clarification.

In attempting to convert cases (1) (2) and (3) to the believe that construction, belief-content sentences need to be constructed from the phrases which simply label, or "locate" these beliefs as being placed in creative potential, abstract expressionism, and Andy Warhol:

4. "Mary believes in creative potential" could be identified with "Mary believes that creativity is \underline{x} (comprises given elements) and does \underline{y} (is elicited in given circumstances.)"

5. "John believes in Abstract Expressionism" might be considered equivalent to "John believes that Abstract Expressionism is \underline{x} (has given features) or "John believes that Abstract Expressionism does \underline{y} (performs given functions, espouses certain principles, etc.)"

6. "Heather believes in Andy Warhol" may conceivably be converted to "Heather believes that Andy Warhol is \underline{x} (is perceived to have given personal characteristics), does \underline{y} (exhibits given behavior or performs given functions in society), or will be \underline{z} (will be assigned a given reputation and place in history.)"
To attempt the conversion in this fashion, by arbitrarily supplying $x$, $y$, or $z$ predicates, is to produce nothing more than conjectural statements of propositional belief.

Without contextual clues, one can only assume what it is that Mary has in mind when she speaks of creativity, or what Mary would have to say, if anything, about creative potential. It is not known what Mary believes should be done in consequence of her belief about creative potential; neither does one know which other beliefs motivate her believing or influence the manner in which she exercises her belief.

John may not be able to identify the Aesthetic qualities of Abstract Expressionism with any accuracy, though he may be disposed to paint in a style that he, at least, considers to be Abstract Expressionism. It is likely that John holds further beliefs that he has chosen not to express in (2). His beliefs about art, for example, would influence his willingness to paint in this style, as well as to identify the style as "Abstract Expressionism." John's beliefs about himself would further condition the exercise of this particular belief.

Heather's professed belief in Andy Warhol may be conjectured as representing nothing more than an unexamined feeling or set of feelings which she experiences in response
to Andy Warhol. If Heather were pressed to support her belief, she might have nothing to say apart from reaffirming the strength of her belief. In this case, Heather's belief expression may logically admit the *believe in* construction, and no other. Were someone to insist that a corresponding *believe that* be produced, the sort of reduction that might be made would more closely resemble reduction to absurdity: "Heather believes that Andy Warhol is the Andy Warhol she believes in."

Another conjecture is that Heather's preponderantly emotional expression of belief in Andy Warhol manifests feelings which she has identified, however vaguely, as confidence and trust in his continued good fortune. In other words, Heather holds a number of (quasi-logically) related beliefs about Andy Warhol and people like Andy Warhol: their valued personal traits, life style, social standing, success, etc. In this case, Heather's belief could be reduced to "Heather believes that Andy Warhol will continue to enjoy good fortune in his endeavors." The resulting *believe that* statement, even if validly attributed to Heather, is not necessarily to be considered an adequate dispositional account of Heather's belief; for one thing, it does not describe what Heather is prepared to do in consequence of her belief.

In the preceding brief venture in reductionism one
is denied the satisfaction of achieving reduction. The examination of cases for attempted reduction is not for that reason any the less instructive in the exploration of belief. As beliefs (1) (2) and (3) are considered in the circumstances of their conjectural contexts, it is seen that a particular belief is likely to be held in conjunction with, and subject to the influence of, a number of other beliefs. The belief disposition is seen as being exercised in behaviors of various kinds, e.g., John's painting activity and Heather's feeling episodes.

In consideration of the cases examined, a number of belief-exercising or belief-expressing behaviors can be designated:

A. *Performative belief-expressing behaviors* are activities performed in such a manner or circumstance as to exercise and manifest a belief disposition.

B. *Emotive belief-expressing behaviors* are feeling episodes which by their occurrence in given circumstances exercise and manifest a belief disposition. 42

42Cf. Gilbert Ryle, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-85, 100, 114-115. In accord with Ryle's cogent argument in resolving the ambiguity of 'emotion', these belief expressing behaviors are not described unqualifiedly as emotions. Neither are such dispositional words as 'mood' or 'motive' employed,
C. **Verbal belief-expressing behaviors** are verbal utterances of any kind, which by their occurrence in given circumstances exercise and manifest a belief disposition.

D. **Propositional belief-expressing behaviors** are particular verbal belief-expressing behaviors in which a belief disposition is exercised in asserting a proposition as true.

VI

One of the points of distinction between belief and knowledge noted in Section III is that, while it is not possible to know what is false, it is possible to believe what is false. If Martha claims to know that the earth is flat, her knowledge claim is rejected by others. Martha's friends may allow that Martha believes the earth to be flat; they are likely as well to consider her unreasonable in holding that belief. Reasonable belief, as conceptualized for 'belief' is itself dispositional. Only an occurrence, event, or act can represent the exercise or actualization of a belief disposition. Hence, 'feeling', representing an occurrence, is chosen as the only "emotional" word appropriate to this use. At first glance it may seem that Ryle's cautionary example was not faithfully observed, for the first word of the description is 'emotive'. However, any ambiguity is removed in context: 'emotive', taken as modifying 'behavior', is associated with actuality and occurrence rather than with potentiality and disposition.
by Martha's friends, is true belief; they, unlike Martha, are reasonable in believing what is true.

On the other hand, if the reasonableness of belief is considered to be dependent on truth, it becomes difficult to account for the fact that in past centuries "the earth is flat" was believed, not only by the ignorant and untutored, but also by those regarded to this day as eminently reasonable people. Although one might be reluctant to say that Martha's belief is reasonably held, it seems that it may sometimes be reasonable to believe what is false.

In undertaking appraisals of belief, one needs to observe a distinction made by Scheffler:

It is, thus, important explicitly to distinguish the question of the adequate grounding of a belief from the question of appraisal of the believer. Just as it is important to separate the appraisal of an action (in terms of its objective consequences) from appraisal of the agent's acting (in terms of its relevant motives and intended consequences), so we need to separate the appraisal of a belief (in terms of its credentials) from appraisal of a given person's believing (in terms of its background and circumstances).\(^43\)

In taking up the specific question of appraising reasonableness, Green writes:

The central distinction we must adhere to is the distinction between the reasonableness of a belief as opposed to the reasonableness of a believer. We cannot assess the reasonableness of a man by assessing the reasonableness of his beliefs. We must assess the

\(^{43}\)Scheffler, op. cit., p. 64.
reasonableness of the believer by examining the relation between his beliefs and the evidence available to him.\(^44\)

In explicating this distinction of reasonable belief and reasonable believer, Green designates an object sense and a subject sense of the phrase "what is reasonable to believe."

In the object sense (i.e., reasonable belief), what is reasonable to believe is a function of the knowledge, experience and evidence available to mankind at large.\(^45\)

In the subject sense (i.e., reasonable believer), what is reasonable for a particular person to believe is a function of the knowledge, experience and evidence available to that person.\(^46\)

Applying these descriptions to the activities of education, Green points out that teaching is "aimed not simply at transmitting reasonable beliefs, but at transmitting them in such a way that they become reasonable to believe for this or that particular person."\(^47\) Although some may argue that Green is presenting an idealization, rather than a description of the act of teaching, it can be noted that descriptions of educational aims commonly - and

\(^{44}\) Green, op. cit., p. 102.

\(^{45}\) ibid., p. 103

\(^{46}\) Green, loc. cit.

\(^{47}\) Green, loc. cit.
appropriately - exhibit an ideal quality. To elaborate this aim or ideal: the educator fulfills his mandate to teach by intending to develop the student's capacity to assess what is reasonable (subject sense) to believe; he aims to cultivate the development of reasonable believers.

A reasonable believer, as described above, may appropriately be called an evidential believer: he holds his belief on the basis of some evidence that is available to him, although that evidence may not be adequate for public verification of his belief. His belief, since it is evidentially held, can be critically examined; it can be modified in consideration of further evidence, or it can be abandoned in favor of another belief for which there is better evidence.

Evidential believers hold their beliefs with varying degrees of evidential support. To be included among them is the "verified" evidential believer, who holds his belief on the basis of evidence that is adequate for appropriate public verification; his belief, having been verified, is entitled to be called reasonable belief (object sense), just as he is entitled to be called not only a believer but a "knower."

In contrast to reasonable believers, the non-evidential believer holds his belief contrary to evidence,
or without regard to evidence or the accepted procedures for dealing with evidence. His only "reason" for holding a particular belief may be that it appears to support some other belief he already holds; if he subsequently gives the appearance of accepting evidence, he may be selectively accepting only those pieces of evidence that happen to support the belief he already holds.\footnote{Green, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 49.}

The following case may be examined as an instance of evidential believer:

1. Mrs. Stella takes special interest in Unidentified Flying Objects. Several years ago, after searching out all the available popular literature and news reports, Mrs. Stella announced her belief that "unidentified flying objects are physical objects, either natural or artificial, and possibly extra-terrestrial in origin." Since that time, she has conducted her own campaign, in letters to editors and television interviews, soliciting public support in demanding "a federally financed, full scale, definitive study." As a result of her correspondence with public officials, Mrs. Stella eventually was able to
obtain official reports of the Air Force U.F.O. investigation. Having studied these reports, Mrs. Stella in her most recent interview says, "To summarize my position, I believe that the reported sighting of Unidentified Flying Objects by so many people is, if nothing else, a psychological phenomenon that calls for some explanation."

It can be noted that Mrs. Stella several years ago comes to hold her belief on the basis of some "good reasons" derived from the information that is available to her. At that time, neither the physical nor the psychological sciences claim the phenomenon as an appropriate subject of investigation; consequently, there is no common agreement about what should count as evidence for or against Mrs. Stella's belief claim.

By seeking public exposure, Mrs. Stella submits her belief to critical scrutiny and evaluation from many sources. By engaging in dialogue she obliges herself to give her reasons for holding the belief. By demanding investigation, Mrs. Stella shows her willingness to consider further evidence.

The strongest argument in support of Mrs. Stella's identification as an evidential believer is that, as further evidence becomes available to her, she is willing to modify
her belief appropriately.

The case of Mr. Gulliver illustrates the style of believing that is associated with the non-evidential believer:

2. Mr. Gulliver encounters Mr. Hilker in the Y.M.C.A. locker room. Mr. Gulliver, British by birth and a health faddist by inclination, expresses his conviction that "virtually all the health problems of Americans can be traced to overuse of motorcars and overheated homes." Mr. Hilker responds by telling of his "discovery" that the human soul is a "cold white light" which after death "leaks out of the body," unless the temperature is too warm, in which case it is trapped and perishes with the body. Mr. Gulliver is intrigued by this notion; by the end of the conversation he acknowledges his belief that "for the good of their souls, people must be refrigerated immediately after death." After Mr. Hilker has given him a business card imprinted with "Hilker Refrigerated Casket Co., Inc.", Mr. Gulliver eagerly signs a contract of lease for a refrigerated casket, and writes Mr. Hilker
a check in deposit. 49

In making his statement of belief to Mr. Hilker, Mr. Gulliver is not merely expressing polite agreement for the sake of sociable conversation; he accepts the belief, as is revealed by his willingness to act in accord with his assertion of belief.

Mr. Gulliver not only lacks good reasons in support of his belief; he also holds his belief contrary to evidence and the procedures for testing evidence. Mr. Hilker's business card constitutes probable evidence that Mr. Hilker is exercising his business acumen as much as he is exercising his beliefs: it is evidence that would be considered and tested by an evidential believer.

In the context of the conversation, Mr. Gulliver's "reason" for accepting the belief can be identified as another belief he already holds; Mr. Hilker's belief claim is accepted because it appears to be compatible with, or

49In this example Mr. Hilker (but not Mr. Gulliver) is taken from life. To summarize Mr. Hilker's convoluted sequence of beliefs, the soul is a given quantity of ectoplasmic light suffusing and animating the body. Mr. Hilker claims that on repeated occasions he has seen this "cold white light leaking out" after death. He has determined in some undisclosed manner that the leakage is accomplished within seventy-two hours of death, provided that the body is kept quite cool, preferably just above freezing; otherwise the soul is trapped and perishes with the body. As owner and proprietor of the Hilker Refrigerated Casket Company of Cincinnati, Mr. Hilker invites one to speculate that his spiritualist convictions may be tempered by business enterprise.
supportive of, a prior belief that warm temperatures are unhealthy. Although the prior belief is perceived to be logically related to the present belief, it does not follow that the prior belief is a good reason that supports Mr. Gulliver in holding his belief.

The analysis of belief presented in the six sections above is intended to demonstrate by example how some of the techniques of conceptual analysis may be employed in clarification of any of a number of basic conceptual problems confronted in the first stages of planning Art Education curricula. The goal of the following chapter is to indicate the manner in which a completed analysis may be applied with advantage to various curricular problems and tasks in Art Education.
Chapter Four

PROCEDURE FOR CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF BELIEF CLAIMS IN ART EDUCATION CURRICULA

The analysis presented in the preceding chapter provides a framework for the critical examination of belief in each of the three "modes of inquiry" in art education, which were identified by Barkan as art studio, art history and art criticism. As the first section of that analysis acknowledged the pervasive use of the concept belief, it is presently acknowledged that art educators are confronted at every turn by verbal or performative expressions of belief.

Personal belief is expressed performatively by the artist in the production of his work; factual or value beliefs are expressed verbally, though not always explicitly, in the particular judgments of the art historian and art critic, as well as in the foundational principles and definitions employed by each. These beliefs are often not identified, acknowledged or examined as beliefs: neither by the believing artist, historian or critic, nor by art educators

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and others who make use of their statements or their work.

The above situation may be replicated in the continuum of curricular activity, through which unexamined or unidentified beliefs about art can be transmitted from curricular rationale to curriculum planner to teacher to student. Hopefully, the demonstration in this chapter of belief analysis in application to curricular activity will exemplify the critical examination of belief as advantageous both to the development of art education and to the professional development of the individual art educator.

Not every artist expects that his artistic experience will be re-created in the aesthetic experiencing of his work. However, some notably articulate artists, in public statements about the personal experience of producing a particular work, have given verbal expression to a personal belief expressed performatively in the work. Some, like Fellini, are concerned that the work is not being recognized as an expression of personal belief, or that the belief is being misinterpreted. Others, like Tony Smith, wish to account for the belief as evolving from a personal history of experience.

Federico Fellini identifies his movie Amarecord as expressing his belief that society comes to deserve a better future by accepting full awareness of the incon-
sistency and trauma of past and present change:

They say that I have made a political movie. Actually, *Amarecord* conveys mostly the emotive, psychological part of being fascist - fascism as mental sluggishness, as a loss of imagination. But the movie is also nostalgic. Nostalgia for the past is just as valuable for us as rejection of its mistakes. In order to change, we have to assimilate the past and de-mystify it.

If ours is truly an apocalyptic time, it may promise a new beginning rather than an end. We could not go on living with stale ideas. Certainly, we are faced with an extreme psychological test. The way to pass it is to accept the idea that life has rebelled and plunged us into such uncertainty because we have too long humiliated it. A season of change does not necessarily mean the collapse of civilization.

Tony Smith relates the origin of his belief, first expressed in *Generation*, that contemporary monuments for contemporary cities should be artificial landscapes, impersonally conceived without regard for cultural precedent:

Someone told me how I could get onto the unfinished New Jersey turnpike. . . . This drive was a revealing experience. The road and much of the landscape was artificial and yet it couldn't be called a work of art. . . . It seemed that there had been a reality there that had not had any expression in art. . . . Later I discovered some abandoned airstrips in Europe -abandoned works, Surrealist landscapes, something that had nothing to do with any function, created works without tradition. Artificial landscape without cultural precedent began to dawn on me. . . . *Generation* is the first piece I thought of as a citified monumental expression. I don't think of it as personal or subjective. I attempted to make it.

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as urbane and objective as possible.  

Whether factual beliefs or value beliefs are being expressed, the judgments of the art historian and art critic are measured against the canons presently honored in their respective scholarly communities. Value beliefs are distinguished from factual beliefs in that they cannot in principle be rationally supported to the degree of adequacy required for public verification, that is, they are not the sort of beliefs that may eventually attain the status of facts. In recognition of this ineluctable distinction, clarity would be served by explicitly designating value judgments as the author's beliefs, and by indicating the criterion of judgment.

In the following historical excerpt Wolfflin expresses a hierarchy of beliefs, that is, a value belief which is supported by a further set of unannounced value beliefs. Wolfflin's value judgment employs as criterion that set of beliefs which is held by the Formalist school of art history, and it is presented in a matter-of-fact style which does not serve to identify it as a matter of belief:

It is a mistake for art history to work with the clumsy notion of the imitation of nature, as though

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it were merely a homogeneous process of increasing perfection. All the increase in the "surrender of nature" does not explain how a landscape by Ruysdael differs from one by Patenir, and by the "progressive conquest of reality" we have still not explained the contrast between a head by Frans Hals and one by Durer. The imitative content, the subject matter, may be as different in itself as possible, the decisive point remains that the conception in each case is based on a different visual scheme - a scheme which, however, is far more deeply rooted than in mere questions of the progress of imitation.  

Foundational Belief Assumptions in Art Education

Curriculum Development

The art critic, like the art historian, makes his particular judgments about art in reliance on a number of basic principles and definitions which represent belief assumptions about art. The same belief claims relating to art are taken as given principles or foundational assumptions by theorists and curricular developers in art education. This is recognized, for example, by Arnstine and Walker:

The very existence of an art course is predicated on certain beliefs assumed to be true.  

The system of beliefs and values that the curriculum developer brings to his task and that guide the

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In justification of this reliance on foundational assumptions about art, it can be argued that there is no practical alternative to this practice: that art educators would dissipate their energies in "endless" philosophical quests, to the neglect of the development of their discipline. The further premise contained within this argument is that these questions would be pursued endlessly because they are so basic as to be impenetrable, that is incapable of resolution. To paraphrase the argument, taking some basic principles as \textit{given} is a "necessary evil" common to all disciplines.

It may be helpful to consider how some other disciplines determine the point at which investigation ceases and assumption begins, that is, how a principle is identified as being so basic as to be impenetrable. To designate a belief claim (or principle) as \textit{given} is to acknowledge that the claim cannot be examined adequately by means of any of the procedures of investigation available to a discipline in its present stage of development. Acknowledgment of the limits of inquiry recognizes only that a number of investigatory approaches have been attempt-
ed and that all of these approaches have thus far failed. The limits of investigation are not to be considered as necessarily fixed; in recent history some disciplines have notably extended the limits of inquiry.

By developing new procedures (often by adapting some procedure that was "borrowed" from another discipline) these fields of inquiry are now subjecting their former givens to critical examination. Physics, for example, has thrust its inquiry into sub-atomic levels; archeological anthropology has extended itself through use of radio-isotopic dating; special education, having adopted some techniques from the behavioral sciences, is in the process of testing many of the old assumptions concerning learning disabilities and disadvantaged children; some biological research, by accepting the critical outlook of moral philosophy, has initiated a broader, ecological inquiry.

It seems that the decision that some belief statements should go unexamined is not made arbitrarily, but in necessary consequence of the lack of appropriate investigatory "tools." As this criterion has come to be applied to those belief claims which are the givens of art education, attempts are being made to extend the range of inquiry within the discipline through the use of "borrowed" investigatory techniques. Perceptual studies of recent years, for example, employ the research method-
ology of behavioral science. As was noted in the introductory chapter, it is the writer's belief that the methodology of conceptual analysis has yet to be employed widely within the inquiry of art education.

Although conceptual analysis can be employed in examining the foundational beliefs of art education, it is not to be expected that when the critical examination of beliefs has run its course no given or assumed beliefs would remain. As is true for all disciplines, new ventures in inquiry can produce new support for some foundational belief assumptions; on the other hand, contrary evidence also can be produced, requiring that some foundational beliefs be modified or rejected in favor of others.

In addition to those belief claims for which no adequate support can yet be found, the acceptance of some value beliefs is necessarily imposed, that is, the value beliefs embodied in the goals of particular institutions or of society at large.

Given these constraints, art educators whose contribution is made at the foundational stage of curricular development, that is, the drafters of curricular guidelines, deal with belief expressions of several kinds:

1. Assumed, or non-evidentially based belief statements.
2. Evidentially-based belief statements, varying in degree of rational support.

3. Verified evidentially-based belief statements supported by adequate evidence.

4. Suppressed premises of belief contained in "loaded terms" like 'expressive qualities' or 'creative potential.'

Recommendations for Critical Examination of Belief Claims in Art Education Curricula

Many of the identified curricular problems of art education require for their resolution some critical examination of conceptual issues, that is, prior questions of concept need to be entertained. Efland, speaking to the National Art Education Association study institute in 1973 emphasizes this point:

In short, I would support the view that evaluation properly conceived should include an assessment of the quality of the conceptualization undergirding a curriculum prior to its implementation, mind you, prior to the moment when the effects of a curriculum as conceived by its makers could become confused with the accidents of personnel, settings, and other confounding variables.  

The foundational conceptualization to which Efland refers is for the most part not an expression of empirically verified facts or analytic truths; it is

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almost exclusively an expression of beliefs, whether expressed in explicit judgments as belief claims or expressed in terminology as suppressed premises of belief, whether expressing a value belief or one of those descriptive factual beliefs often designated as theories. Hopefully it is demonstrated in the previous chapter that the philosophical tools of conceptual analysis can be employed effectively in explicating matters of belief; the completed analysis of belief can be applied to the particular judgments and conceptualizations which are employed at the foundational stage of curricular development. At this stage, belief claims (beliefs expressed in propositional form) are often presented as basic definitions, as descriptions of current circumstances in schools or society, as assessments of discrepancy between is and ought, as formulated goals, or as the justifying principles of the general rationale.

Belief claims are also employed in art education as instructional content, as criteria for evaluation, as motives for action, or as justification for decisions. If the influence of personal belief on one's performance is to be considered, critical examination of belief will be pursued throughout the curricular continuum: in the presentation of guidelines and curricula, in the structuring of events and instructional materials, in evaluation
of student outcomes, and in strategies of teaching.

At every level of curricular activity in art education, hidden premises of belief are presented in many of the emotive, evaluative or vague expressions serving as "basic concepts" or slogan words, whose meaning may be arbitrarily defined by some, and be vaguely defined or be considered indefinable by others, for example, creative process, aesthetic response.

If people consider it important to estimate the belief premises of the physician who employs such phrases as minor surgery, critical condition and reasonable recovery, and if it makes any practical difference what the accountant may believe when he identifies low risk investments or permissible income tax procedures, there is similar reason to be concerned with specifying the particular belief premises of any art educator, whether theorist or practitioner, who speaks of creative process or aesthetic response.

The argument of the present chapter has been that art educators, particularly curriculum developers, rely on foundational assumptions, present belief claims of their own, and cannot avoid assessing and dealing with the beliefs of others. In other words, the effectiveness of art educators in conceptualizing, communicating, developing and implementing curricula is promoted by clarity of
language in expressing matters of belief, and by ability to determine the evidential status of particular beliefs. The prerequisite condition for improved facility in dealing with belief is to engage oneself in critical examination of belief, particularly of one's personal beliefs and of the beliefs that one is required to present or promote.

Although the analysis which comprises the previous chapter is formally structured and attempts to be comprehensive, it nevertheless may serve as an example, or a compendium of examples, of the critical examination of belief. Accordingly, the writer has reviewed the various stages of explication in order to identify and synthesize those procedural elements and considerations which would provide, in the writer's belief, suitable direction for art educators in critical examination and presentation of belief claims. From these elements, five procedural recommendations have been formulated. Particular applications of portions of the analysis to instances of belief claims or belief expression in art education curricula have been provided, in order to suggest how the recommended procedures might be accomplished.

FIRST RECOMMANDATION

In stating belief claims, the terms 'believe' and 'belief' would ordinarily be used, with appropriate qualifiers to
indicate the evidential status of the belief claim.

In stating value belief claims, descriptive language would be employed, if necessary, to remove ambiguity concerning 'value'. In this event the Art Educator would indicate whether his use of the verb 'value' refers to making a value judgment or to prizing; he would indicate whether the noun 'value' refers to a value belief-content sentence or to a disposition to act in accord with a value belief.

The term know would appropriately be used only in presenting statements of publicly verified beliefs or of the facts of one's personal experience. In belief claims of any other evidential status, the use of 'know' is not recommended.

Vague or ambiguous colloquialisms like 'notion', 'view', 'suspect that', 'feel that', 'conviction that' would not be used as if they were equivalent cognitive expressions, that is,
expressions of this sort would not be substituted for any use of 'belief' or 'believe'.

Unless the belief claim is verified the Art Educator would state it in form of a belief assertion rather than of a belief-content sentence.

Application 1A

If teachers are able to be the least bit specific in their directive, most students will do as indicated and "learn" as desired. When evaluation time comes, they again demonstrate that they are able to replicate the behaviors and even values and attitudes they believe desired in that context. But most leave these attributes in the classroom when they head for the outside world.8

The meaning of 'value' in this passage is not clear; the context has not supplied clarity but has added some puzzlement of its own. The fact that values are said to be left in the classroom argues for their being mere verbalizations of value sentences. On the other hand, 'replicate' argues for duplication in kind, or being disposed to act in accord with a value belief, unless one is to assume that the teacher is only verbalizing and for

that reason only verbalizing is replicated in the students.

One might linger interminably in speculation concerning
how the author might know when covert valuing is taking
place and when it ceases, or if value beliefs are measured
by their (presumed) attitudinal counterparts.

Apart from the observation that a few well-chosen
words would eliminate the possibility of confusion, it seems
unlikely that the formation of students' personal value
judgments could be promoted by teachers who are merely
"the least bit specific" in their directives.

This point is taken up by the author in a subsequent
passage. After giving attention to the students whose
prizing is as ephemeral as it is emotional, the author
challenges the teachers' assumption that values are
known to be inculcated. To this it might be added that, if
values are not inculcated by accident, neither are they
inculcated rationally without having the students examine
the value beliefs they are expected to accept.

Application 1B

In designing experiences for children the decisions
made by art teachers usually evolve from their
knowledge about the nature of the child and the
type of art. Central to their concerns is the
question of whether their art instruction and
activities are indeed consistent with the growth
and development of the pupil.9

9Jessie J. Lovano-Kerr, "Readiness, Research,
and the Art Classroom". Art Education, Vol. 24, No. 5, (May,
Since in the latter part of this statement there is indication of the teachers' concern about the consistency of their activity with the pupil's growth and development, it is unlikely that 'knowledge' in the former part would be a knowledge supported by appreciable evidence. This point is reinforced when it is noticed that the "knowledge" concerns the nature of the child and the nature of Art - topics of such breadth and complexity and controversy that "strict" knowledge could not now be acquired. There is no way that most statements about the nature of children and art (apart from the trivial) could be publicly verified.

Since the evidentially based belief in this case is not especially well supported, and is easily confused with strict or "true" knowledge, the term 'knowledge' would best be avoided.

**Application 1C**

A social hierarchy that posits all knowledge and authority in the teacher and all knowledge-seeking and dependence in the pupil denies the self-realization and self-responsibility for learning through orderly release of the innate need to know and master life that is the birthright and obligation of individuals in democratic society.10

This especially ambitious unidentified belief

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claim, or belief-content sentence, attempts unqualifiedly to formulate some universal relationships. The claim is not only matter-of-fact but authoritative in style.

Even if this were a verified belief it would be appropriate to indicate the verifying evidence in some way. Inclusion of supporting matter would be difficult, considering the complexity of the statement; moreover, such inclusion would reduce the force of the statement from definitive pronouncement to mere descriptive report.

The statement, however, is not likely to be verified, or even well-supported, considering its generous use of generalization and of words like 'all'.

The "truth-delivering" style of rhetoric here employed suggests that the belief statement is not evidentially based; certitude concerning relationships of this scope and complexity can be gained only by assumption. If this statement were to be salvaged, it would need to be carved into several less global fragments to be imbedded in assertions of belief.

Application 1D

The major issue amid all of the prescriptions concerning behavioral objectives is not an issue that rests merely upon determining the best techniques in curriculum development or teaching or evaluation. The major issue is one of educational values. Under the rug of technique lies an image of man. The specificationists and behavioral engineers simply hold a view of education that differs in fundamental ways
from those who think of teaching and learning as organic in character and who see discovery and surprise as central values to be sought for in educational practice. 11

'Hold a view of' seems to be considered an equivalent expression to 'believe' as is indicated by the earlier use of 'educational values'. Although this expression might be intended as a "change of pace" to avoid monotony in style, it presents certain disadvantages. In the visual metaphor of 'view' there is one basis, one mode, one strength for each person's vision at any one time. It would be awkward, therefore, to convey the status of belief by finding suitable adverbs for 'hold' or adjectives for 'view'. Although 'belief' is not free of ambiguity, its ambiguities are more widely acknowledged and more easily remedied.

SECOND RECOMMENDATION

A non-evidentially based belief claim of fact or value, if it is a given or foundational assumption of Art Education, would be identified as such. Foundation- al assumptions may be imposed by logical

necessity, i.e., by the limits of Art Education inquiry, or imposed in consequence of one's allegiance to some superordinate goal, for example, the value beliefs embodied in the aims of public education. The latter beliefs, though commanding acceptance, need not in every case be accepted as assumptions. Some of the imposed value beliefs of public education, for example, may be rationally supported within the limits of support that apply to all value judgments. In other words, a belief can be both imposed and evidentially held.

The belief claim would be acknowledged as an assumption which the art educator sees fit to stipulate. The art educator would indicate the source of his assumption; he would indicate some justifying reason (other than purely personal motives) for his reliance on assumption in the particular circumstances. Although he could not in principle provide support and justification for the assumption itself, he could show that this or
similar assumptions are in such circumstances conventionally employed by others in his discipline.

Lacking even the support of convention, the Art Educator would identify and accept responsibility for the belief claim as his gratuitous assumption or arbitrary judgment. Since most of the assumptions of Art Education are value belief claims, special care would be taken to identify value beliefs of this sort as expressions of personal preference and taste. Arbitrary "judgments" of value (those made in reference to a purely subjective or subjectively biased criterion) do not have an interpersonal function, and should not be considered true value judgments or appraisals. The most moral support or justification that could be offered for value beliefs of this sort is personal consistency in holding a value belief for an extended time.
Esthetic education for young people begins with joy. The feelings and concepts associated with everyday experience can be translated through art and become significant because true learning is joy.12

The primary value belief claim in this passage, 'true learning is joy', is troublesome because 'joy' is vague and 'true' is ambiguous. One is not told what counts as 'joy', or how 'joy' is measured, or how much 'joy' must be experienced in order for aesthetic educators to know that their efforts have been successful. Neither is it known whether joy results from learning truth, learning with sincerity, or learning in the "one correct and proper way."

Because of this ambiguity and vagueness, no criterion is indicated beyond the author's unexpressed - and perhaps subjective - criterion. This expression of the author's bestowal of value, being ungrounded, is not a judgment or appraisal, but rather a prizing of joy.

What seems likely, considering certain similarities of language, is that this value belief is accepted as a consequence of allegiance to the Human Potential Movement. Since there seems to be no way of resolving the meaning of

the statement as quoted, and no way of deciding what would count as good evidence for its truth, it is regarded as a metaphysical statement.

The particular content of this belief might possibly be determined by observing the particular things the author would do in aesthetic education as a consequence of his belief. For the time being, the belief claim may be considered a "borrowed" assumption: a non-evidentially held metaphysical -therefore unarguable- belief claim.

Application 2B

The belief that making art had a direct influence on appreciation has no more evidence to support that claim today than it had then. (1926)\(^{13}\)

The author, using the word 'belief', reports a commonly-held assumption in Art Education which, even if it is not to be considered foundational, has nevertheless been imposed by many institutions and honored by many individuals in Art Education. The author does not identify the quoted belief as an assumption, i.e., as a presently unsupported or unsupportable belief. He may be using a rhetorical device, 'no more evidence' which is equivalent to 'none then, and none now'; on the other hand, he may be reporting that the level of evidence possessed in 1926 is not yet surpassed. In either case, the status of the

\(^{13}\)Brent Wilson, op. cit., p. 256.
belief is not clearly stated.

What seems strange is that the author should even speak of evidence or suggest that verification would not soon be achieved. As long as 'art' is open-ended and there are no instruments adequate to measure appreciation (as distinct from measuring information about art or limited attitudinal responses to highly selected stimuli), any attempt at evidence gathering would require, in effect, that something vague be tested as a possible outcome of something contextually ambiguous. Affirming such a belief, however, does not get it verified, but only perhaps more widely honored.

Even though the belief claim as presented seems to observe a bare descriptive style, it nevertheless has the function of a value belief, by virtue of the value-laden terms 'art' and 'appreciation'. Were the author aware of this, he might think to show the extent of its common use among art educators.

Application 2C

First, it was assumed that the most important contribution that can be made by the visual arts to the education of the child is that which is indigenous to art.

Second, we believed that artistic action is the produce of a complex form of learning and it not an automatic consequence of maturation.

Third, we believed that the curriculum offered to children in the public school should extend well beyond the traditional range of art activities.
Fourth, we assumed that to teach art well requires not only a curriculum that is well thought out with respect to aims, objectives, and content but one that also supplies instructional support media useful for illuminating the visual qualities and ideas that makers of curriculum hope to help children perceive and understand.

Fifth, we assumed that both formal and informal evaluation might prove useful for enabling both student and teachers to understand the progress they make in pursuit of artistic goals.

Finally, we assumed that elementary school teachers untrained in art, working in self-contained classrooms would increase their effectiveness as teachers of art if they could use a sequentially ordered curriculum accompanied by specially designed instructional support media.14

Although the six statements above are listed by the author with explicit designation as assumptions, it should be noted that "packages" of assumptions set by any author are not necessarily homogeneous. The belief assumptions may represent an assortment of beliefs ranging in public evidential status from unsupportable non-evidential to possibly verified, as is true of the six exemplified above.

Even though these six belief claims differ in public evidential status (and even if the author holds each appropriately to its public status), they are nevertheless presented as assumptions, that is, presented without accompaniment of rational support. Consequently they function as

assumptions and are likely to be employed or accepted by others as assumptions. Non-evidential presentation elicits non-evidential acceptance.

Given the context in which the author presents the assumptions, he is not to be faulted for defining the boundaries of his research and setting up assumptions to summarize whatever needs to be summarized in his discipline beyond those boundaries. Another consideration is that assumptions made for purposes of inquiry are, like the inquiry itself, directed to those who have already gained some familiarity with the "basics" of the discipline.

**THIRD RECOMMENDATION**

Evidentially based belief claims would be presented by the Art Educator as beliefs supported by inquiry and subject to modification in the light of further inquiry. Specifically, each belief claim would be identified as supported by evidence, though not to the point of public verification. If evidential support is not provided in the context of presentation, the Art Educator would indicate the degree of support
available and/or where support might be found.

Evidentially supported value beliefs, that is, value judgments, would be presented as rationally supported judgments made in reference to a given criterion, even though there may be public disagreement concerning the suitability of the criterion. In each case the criterion of judgment would be identified.

Although head-counting is no substitute for rational support, in some instances the acceptance of a value belief claim would be facilitated if, in addition to providing supporting reasons, an appreciable number of Art Educators of equal or greater reputation were shown to concur in acceptance.

Application 3A

In my opinion, the unique role of the visual arts is that they provide visual aesthetic experience.\textsuperscript{15}

The belief claim asserted in the above example may

\textsuperscript{15}Vincent Lanier, as quoted in Brent Wilson, op. cit., p. 250.
not receive its due of attention because of certain encumbrances presented by the introductory phrase 'in my opinion'. Support is not provided with the statement; neither is a company of art educators enlisted in his support; rather 'in my opinion' could have the force of isolating the author from others, including many who share the belief that he claims as his own.

In common parlance 'opinion' can mean a number of things, depending usually on the source of opinion, for example rumor, factual report, quasi-religious faith, tentative, irresponsible or capricious, statement, and what-you're-obliged-to-say-when-asked. To use 'opinion' especially 'my opinion' is to increase greatly the risk of being misunderstood.

Application 3B

Schools exist to improve the social order. We believe that it is possible to shape a more humane, just, and rewarding environment. . . . Art programs serve the function of schools by helping students understand the power of visual forms to shape the feelings of people.16

At least four belief claims are contained in this quotation:

1. The value belief, embodied in an aim of education,

16 Laura H. Chapman, "Curriculum Planning in Art Education", Address presented to the OAEA Conference, Columbus, Ohio, November 1969.
concerning the social order as good in itself and worthy of being improved. For anyone working in public education, this would be an imposed value of such generality as to be assumed without questioning.

2. The belief claim of the author that 'social order' had been adequately paraphrased in more humane, just, and rewarding environment.

3. The primary value belief claim that art programs, by facilitating the performance of certain tasks, are means to the educational end expressed in (1) above.

4. The prior claim, contained within the primary claim, that "visual forms have the power to shape the feelings of people."

The first belief claim is a given, or institutionally imposed assumption requiring no present explanation, especially since the example is placed in the context of public education.

Although the three descriptive terms applied to 'environment' cannot be challenged individually as inappropriate, there is doubt that together they comprise an adequate or nearly adequate equivalent description of the aim. To consider one instance of disparity, the three terms concentrate emphasis on individualistic moral aspects of
the social order; the common good is not honored by means of personal traits like 'responsible' or societal traits like 'future-oriented'. It is not clear that fulfilling the second claim necessarily implies fulfilling the first.

The fourth claim, being a prior question, must first be examined. To say that visual forms have the "power to shape the feelings of people" is to describe a distinctive philosophical position. It is not the position of biopsychology or transactional psychology, which describe human beings and environment as caught up in the continual interplay of reciprocal feedback and adaptation that is called physical or personal growth. Rather, as was observed in an earlier example, the phrase in question appears to be a reformulation either of existential phenomenology or of Marshall McLuhan's second dictum, *The Medium Is the Message*.

Without pursuing the phrase to its source, it can be noted that the meaning of the phrase is unclear. To select some of the questions that might be pursued: Is the power an effective power? What is required in the beholder as a condition for its effectiveness? Is the shaping of feeling transitory, enduring or permanent? Is the shaping experienced in like manner by all people? Which feelings are shaped? Since feelings are momentary occurrences, is it some affective disposition which is shaped?
The crucial question to which all these prior questions lead is this: Are shaping people's feelings and shaping people's environment connected by some logical necessity?

Unless these prior questions can be resolved, it is fruitless to deal with the third or primary belief claim, which can only be related to the educational end of the first claim by means of the fourth and second.

As a result, the primary value belief claim, even though it may possess support for each of its elements, is not yet (if taken as a whole) demonstrated to be a valuable means to the desired end (1) by possessing the attributes (4) to satisfy the criterion (2). The belief claim as presently worded is a weakly supported instance of evidentially based value belief.

If it is noted that the most troublesome claim in the logical sequence of end-criterion-personal attributes-means (art education) is the fourth or "attributes" claim, it may be expected that substitution of a less vaguely worded claim (or of a different philosophical base) would immediately strengthen the support - and general acceptability in other disciplines - of the primary claim.
FOURTH RECOMMENDATION

Verified evidentially based belief claims may appropriately be identified either as factual knowledge or as belief. By either designation, they would be presented as claims that are evidentially supported to the degree of adequacy required for public verification. The Art Educator would present selected evidence or indicate where adequate evidence might be found. In either case, he would emphasize the importance of dealing with evidence and conclusion as a logical whole.

Strictly speaking, no value beliefs can claim to be verified, since public verification of a value judgment would require prior public agreement on the criterion of judgment. Widely held and securely held value beliefs would be presented with indication of a near-unanimous scholarly consensus within Art Education concerning the affirmation of these value beliefs.
The research cited implies that some degree of form perception is innate . . .

The research studies cited give evidence supporting the efficacy of structured art experience even for the preschool child.

The data also indicated that most children performed in a self-consistent manner when processing visual and cognitive information into graphic expression.\(^{17}\)

The three belief claims above are the author's summations of the results of several empirical studies. As is observed in Section III of the analysis, having "all the evidence" for a belief claim does not necessarily imply knowledge. One can fail to understand the collected evidence in its logical relationship to the belief claim. Conversely, one can be aware of the truth of a particular belief claim without being able to give evidence or apply the evidence correctly in support. This latter circumstance may be explained by lack of sufficient motive or opportunity, and consequently of sufficient understanding. One can also be expressing a verified belief unwittingly.

The author's choice of verbs in each statement does not seem to correspond with the evidential strength of the three belief claims, but rather with the author's varying response to, or intended use of, the subject matter of the

\(^{17}\)Jessie J. Lovano-Kerr, \textit{op. cit.}, p.
three studies and three statements. In no instance does the author explicitly acknowledge the belief claim as verified: 'implies', 'gives evidence' and 'indicated' do not approximate "verification words" like 'prove', 'demonstrate' or 'conclusively show'.

As for the first claim, research in general, or a research report taken as a whole, does not imply, although particular concepts employed therein may imply others, and people are free to infer and interpret at will. If the author has unpacked some loaded term in order to derive the first claim, it would be fitting for the author to take credit for discovering a hidden belief premise in the research report. What seems to indicate that the author is giving a personal interpretation to the report is the use of 'innate', a term more likely to be used in art instruction than in conducting empirical studies. Since the innate, however it may be conceived, is for the present beyond the reach of scientific inquiry, the first belief claim cannot have been verified by this or by any other empirical study observing the conventions of public verification.

Although the content of the second claim (except for the unresolved vagueness of 'efficacy') is in principle capable of verification, the use of 'gives evidence' fails to distinguish between verified belief (or fact) and any
other evidentially-based belief claim which "gives evidence" in some degree.

In similar fashion, 'indicated', as used in the third belief claim, does not serve to identify the claim as verified.

Some of the inconsistencies of presentation thus far noted could be remedied in other portions of the text, professional dialogue or classroom presentation, provided that the author had become aware of inconsistency or of things yet to be done in clarifying the belief claims.

In the interest of employing preventive rather than remedial procedures, and of offering no encouragement to students who exhibit a propensity for misinterpretation, it would be recommended that verified belief-content statements derived from formal research observe the language of the original report. In other words, it may be less hazardous to split long sentences into two or three more manageable constructions, or to supply a sub-text, than to paraphrase or adapt the statements to a "more compatible" form.

FIFTH RECOMMENDATION

Loaded terms would first be 'unpacked', that is, their hidden belief premises would be explicated, after which any belief claim produced in explication
would be explicitly presented in a manner appropriate to its evidential status, as indicated above.

Application 5A

A loaded term containing a suppressed premise of belief is employed in the following goal statement:

The general goal for aesthetic education is to cause the student to increase his capacities to experience aesthetic qualities in man made and natural objects and events in his environment. (italics added)¹⁸

In the context supplied by the general rationale for the curricular guidelines from which the above statement was taken, the belief premise contained in aesthetic qualities in objects could readily be explicated as a particular belief about perception supported by a prior value belief concerning the philosophical tenets of phenomenology. The belief claim is that aesthetic qualities have a phenomenological objectivity or, conversely, that aesthetic attention is to the phenomenal object. Broudy makes the same claim explicitly and succinctly: "Whatever meaning or quality we experience is seen or heard or felt as being in the object, not in ourselves. . . . Whatever may be the cause of this objectification, that's the way

we experience it as."\textsuperscript{19}

If the statement quoted above were presented to art education students without explication and were considered without reference to its context, the belief premise of \emph{aesthetic qualities in objects} would be apparent only to those who had already accepted that particular belief claim, or who had at least learned the corresponding belief-content statement. Given these circumstances of presentation, it is doubtful that the belief premise of \emph{aesthetic qualities} would be communicated or inculcated; it is no less doubtful that the term 'aesthetic qualities' would thereafter be meaningfully employed.

Even if the art education students to whom the statement is presented claim to believe in the reality and desirability of aesthetic qualities and use the phrase quite often, some of the students might possibly be disposed merely to verbalize a valuable phrase, that is, valuable for use in examinations and casual conversation with instructors. These would express their belief in 'aesthetic qualities' as a \textit{label}, which is to say they would employ a \textit{meaningless expression which was assumed to be valuable}. Lacking the understanding that might have

been elicited by explication of the hidden premise, others might possibly believe that aesthetic qualities are distinctive properties residing in physical objects, that is, that the object possesses height, width, depth weight, form, etc., and some other properties that are called 'aesthetic qualities'.

The status of the beliefs exhibited in the two cases above would most likely be revealed, if not in their discussions and test scores, at least in their performative belief-expressing behavior as students and teachers. A student's lack of concern for developing a personal aesthetic style (in attire or environment) would be one such indication.

Application 5B

In order to illustrate the variety of belief claims that might be concealed in the use of a loaded term, it will be helpful to expand the explication occasioned in Section V of the previous chapter by the case of Mary's belief in creative potential. Mary is stipulated to be an art education student teacher.

Mary's expression of belief in creative potential is troublesome because she uses the loaded term 'creative potential', whose suppressed premise could represent a belief claim of any evidential status.

Mary's belief could be a merely verbal disposition.
If as a student she accepts 'creative potential' as a cliché (that is, if Mary had vaguely conceptualized creative potential as "something that art teachers are supposed to believe in," without considering what precisely is to be believed about creative potential), Mary could be disposed to verbal behaviors of uttering and responding affirmatively to expressions of creative potential, without being disposed to act in accord with her verbal expressions of belief. In this case, it seems that verbalizing is all that Mary would accomplish. Although Mary might use emotively expressive language in asserting her cliché, this in itself does not demonstrate that Mary experiences the corresponding feelings, or that Mary is willing to do certain things in consequence of uttering her belief in creative potential.

Mary's belief could be held non-evidentially. If Mary were indoctrinated by an instructor who specifies a number of features and functions as predicates of 'creative potential' (e.g., flexibility, spontaneity, openness) without presenting rational support for the predication of these qualities (and without indicating that support was available or that support should be sought), her non-evidentially based belief in creative potential could have a detailed content. Mary's belief would be an assumption of doubtful usefulness in directing her teaching activity because in accepting a proposition about creative potential
Mary does not acquire understanding of the predicated qualities in their relationship to 'creative potential'.

As is shown in the case of Mr. Hilker and Mr. Gulliver in Section VI, non-evidential presentation elicits non-evidential acceptance. It would not matter if the belief in question were personally held by Mary's instructor on the basis of evidence, so long as the belief is presented non-evidentially to Mary.

It could be the case that no support is presented nor critical examination encouraged because the instructor possesses no rational support and has not yet examined his own belief; one might prefer in this case to describe the teacher as ineffective or unprepared, rather than to call him an "indoctrinator." Whatever designation or motive might be assigned to the teacher, Mary's belief response would not for that reason be changed; it is a response appropriate to a particular instructional style. She accepts a belief claim without regard for evidence or the procedures for testing evidence. In accepting the teacher's message under these non-evidential conditions Mary might assume that she is being taught, if not the whole truth, at least "as much truth as anyone needs in order to teach art."

If Mary now believes that she "has all the answers about creative potential," presumption of self-sufficient
truth may have the effect of isolating her from inquiry; she may consider inquiry superfluous. Once fixed in her non-evidential belief, Mary could become defensive whenever creative potential is discussed. What is more detrimental to her development as an art teacher is that Mary would continue to ignore new sources of understanding and opportunities to test her belief in practice. Since her belief is not held with the support of good reasons, Mary is incapable of critically examining or modifying her belief as more information becomes available.

Mary's belief could be evidentially based and verified. It is possible, for example, that Mary's belief is limited to particular features of creative potential, that these features have been empirically tested and accepted, and that Mary not only understands the verified belief-content statements (findings) and the various descriptive statements (observations) produced in their support, but also understands the logical necessity of their evidential relationship. In these circumstances Mary would express her verified belief; her true belief is justified by means of her understanding of adequate evidence. By virtue of understanding, Mary participates in the inquiry activity of others; her belief is no less verified than if she were personally conducting the empirical studies, although she may lack the researcher's comprehensive understanding.
It should be emphasized, however, that if Mary's belief were restricted to acceptance of nothing more than the summary conclusion of some empirical study on creative potential, she would in this case be asserting a belief which happens to be a true belief, although she does not have adequate evidence for its truth. As was noted concerning the "weak sense" of knowledge in Section III, Mary's true belief would not be an evidentially gained achievement but a fortuitous acquisition; she does not understand why her belief is true.

Mary's belief could be evidentially based, though not yet verified. It may be that Mary has a definite understanding of what she believes concerning creative potential, and has some rational support for her belief, as may be indicated by particular qualities of her verbal and performative expressions of belief. She may, for example, exhibit both flexibility and decisiveness in dealing with low performance students; she may exercise deliberate caution in her comments on the art work of students; on being questioned, she may confess that "there is so much I'm not sure about when it comes to creative potential."

If Mary's style of behavior can in these instances be characterized as open, critically directed, receptive, or not-yet-fully-resolved, the same characteristics may probably be attributed to her evidential style of believing.
Whether the rational support for Mary's belief is presented by an instructor or is accumulated through her own efforts, Mary in either case is initiated into the process of examining, supporting and modifying her beliefs. With reinforcement, she may develop both her critical skills and her commitment to the evidential style of believing. Such development would constitute a general disposition of belief; a "belief about believing," or more accurately, a value belief concerning how or in what style believing is to be exercised. Once critical examination of belief comes to be valued in this fashion, one has reason to continue in inquiry concerning even those beliefs which are verified.

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20 Green refers to this as an enabling belief, or a "due regard for truth." Cf. Green, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-55.
Chapter Five

SUMMARY

Critical examination of belief is described in the introductory chapter both as a procedure useful for resolving curricular problems in Art Education and as a value to be promoted at all levels of Art Education. It is proposed that examination of these beliefs, in order to be a critical examination, would employ the methodology of conceptual analysis. In an explication of educational goals and aims, it is shown that critical examination of belief is a value embodied in the aims of public education, hence a given value to be honored and promoted in Art Education.

A review of the literature of Art Education and of conceptual analysis is summarized in the second chapter. In the survey of Art Education literature, it is found that many writers call attention to unresolved conceptual problems (representing unidentified belief claims) at the foundational level of Art Education curricular development. On the other hand, the literature of conceptual analysis contains few extensive analyses of 'belief', particularly in the context of education.
An analysis of the concept of belief is pursued in chapter three. One of the distinctions explicated in the analysis is that of factual beliefs and value beliefs, neither of which cease to function as beliefs merely by being designated elliptically as "facts" or "values". To paraphrase the explication, personal valuing is an instance of personal believing, and dealing adequately with the values of others involves dealing also with their beliefs. The term 'value belief' is employed frequently in this paper, in recognition of the fact that examination and transmission of aesthetic and cultural values are predominant concerns of education in the Arts.

In the concluding chapter, five procedures for critical examination and presentation of beliefs are derived from the analysis and recommended for use by art educators. A number of curricular statements are examined in order to illustrate the application of conceptual analysis, as exemplified in the procedures, to Art Education. Although the locus of application is the foundational stage of curriculum development, critical examination of belief is shown in some examples to have consequences throughout the continuum of curricular activity. Just as unexamined beliefs have on occasion been communicated from theorist to practitioner in Art
Education, so also can examined and supported beliefs be transmitted from curricular rationale to curriculum planner to teacher to student.

Through use of the five recommended procedures it is hoped that the evidential style of dealing with belief would be exercised collectively, as well as individually: not only that a greater number of Art Educators would professionally exercise an evidential style of believing, but also that critical skills of inquiry would be developed and applied to belief in all the curricular activities of Art Education.

It is suggested that the development of an evidential style is advantageous to the practice of teaching in the arts as well as to clear thinking and talking about art. The art educator - or art student - who functions as an evidential believer is not simply a "better" believer, but one who is disposed to believe more realistically. The evidential believer is disposed to continue to explore and to support his belief, to relate his belief to prior beliefs and to the beliefs of others, and to modify his belief in later circumstances. He is, in other words, a believer who remains open to the world around him and sensitive to the differing beliefs of others. For these reasons, the cultivation of an evidential style of belief is proposed as advantageous
both to the development of inquiry in Art Education and to the personal and professional development of those who participate in art education.
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