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A STUDY OF THE NATURE AND THE ROLES
OF THE FORCES
INFLUENCING THE PROCESS OF CHANGE IN IRAN

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Abbas Sadrai Nadjafi, B.S., M.P.A.

*****

The Ohio State University
1975

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Approved By

Advisor
Department of Educational Development
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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The writer is extremely indebted to his wife, Wilma, without whose consistent assistance and diligent encouragement this would never have been a complete dissertation.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

For centuries Europeans considered the Third World—Africa, Asia, The Middle East, and Latin America—as vast sources of wealth. But, today, the vast majority of the people in that World—two thirds of the world's population—are living in such a stage of underdevelopment that their food ration is below the minimum required to sustain life. From Marco Polo to Lyauty, navigators and colonists, explorers and merchants discovered "fabulous treasures" where today immense poverty is dominant.

What is astonishing is not that two-thirds of humanity is still hungry, but, rather, that one-third is well-fed. Although this contrast is drastic, it is not a new phenomenon. The life of the huge majority of men has always been dominated by the phenomenon of scarcity while a minority of men has lived a life not much affected by the burden of this phenomenon. The role which scarcity has played in the history of mankind is what allows us to distinguish two types of human societies: the first characterized by fixed techniques and permanent scarcity; the second marked by an accelerated progress of scientific techniques and continuous economic growth.

Today, modern men can escape from scarcity—which seemed inevitable—by learning to increase productivity, and, simultaneously, to limit his offspring.¹ Men who live in societies marked by scarcity and fixity remain

practically ignorant of these two ways. Consequently, dangers such as natural mortality, disease, hunger, overpopulation still characterize life in such societies.

The societies of scarcity and fixity are now planning to transform into creation and progress. Modernization has now affected large areas of Africa, Asia, the Middle-East and Latin America. What is often described as the "anticolonial revolution" is more than an attempt to assert political autonomy and to end foreign policy. It is also a social and economic movement brought about by the attempts of the members of the underdeveloped societies to bring their countries into the modern world; to create modern states and industrialized economies to replace traditional cultures and subsistence production.

To explain to themselves and to others the nature and justification of the changes they wish to induce, the leaders of these societies have been compelled to give more specific content to the general goal of development to which they all subscribe. In doing so, they have been able to draw upon ideologies developed earlier in Europe, and, thereby, to pursue the same types of development experienced by modernized societies.

Since their doctrines include different elements drawn from ideologies such as Socialism, Christianity, or Utilitarian Liberalism, the leaders of developing societies differ from one another in the kinds of beliefs they hold and the ways in which they express those beliefs. But, as the debates in the United Nations have demonstrated, the leaders of nations variously described as "new," "uncommitted," "emerging," or "developing" share many political, economic and social ideas; rapid economic development; national independence; creation of a nation state governed by a regime based on a
populist identification of leader, party, and people; regional cooperation; and nonalignment in disputes between the great powers.\textsuperscript{2}

In spite of the similarities among their problems and goals, Third World nations are deluged with panaceas, formulas, proposed laws, ways out, and myriads of solutions. But, most of them are means to one major goal: economic growth. The basic principle of the leaders of the Third World is that economic development through industrialization is the primary goal.\textsuperscript{3} When they perceive the benefits of economic growth these leaders consider it the primary object of their cares. They are acutely aware of the galling contrast between the poverty, illiteracy, and disease of their own countries and the affluence of the economically developed areas. For them, the crucial division in the world is not between the rival political faiths of Communism and Liberal Democracy, but between the rich and the poor, the economically developed and the underdeveloped, the technically competent and the technologically backward areas of the world. These leaders believe that the key to the eradication of this difference in living standards lies in economic development through industrialization.\textsuperscript{4}

The point is that the leaders of the developing nations aim to reach economic growth by the same means experienced by the developed nations without taking into account some of the ill-effects suffered by those nations. Such a point can be illustrated through the two following examples.

Liberal Theory, the catalytic agent of the first Industrial Revolution, 


\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Ibid.}
has been advocated by some leaders of the developing nations as a means for creating democratic economic systems regardless of some of its consequences. Liberal Theory is based upon the "rational conduct" of economy: real needs, expressed through the market, command production; consumers decide and production adapts itself in order to execute the orders.\textsuperscript{5} But, the experiences of the early industrialized societies who applied Liberal Theory shows that the process of development is accompanied by ill effects when spread beyond the market to be set above all other values. Rationality, which was a prerequisite of industrialization, at no point remained limited to markets. It came to be seen in virtually all institutional forms of social activity. The industrializing societies had to develop institutions performing through application of such rationality—self-regulating market economy—and adjust themselves and their members to its requirements. Consequently, as development continued, the whole economic system, instead of being an instrument in the service of men, exerted its own power over men's behavior and their social relations.\textsuperscript{6} Today, those who have critically observed the outcome of economic development based on rationality, find it hard to imagine rational man happy to submit under all conditions to so mechanistic an expression of rationality as a self-regulating market economy.\textsuperscript{7}

Another example of the developing societies' imitation of the develop-

\textsuperscript{5}Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book IV.


\textsuperscript{7}Herring Pendleton, Public Administration and Public Interest, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936.
mental approach experienced by the developed nations can be observed in the importance that their leaders attach to industrialization. These leaders give less attention to the need for agricultural development than to the requirements of industrialization, although the present agricultural difficulties of the Soviet Union and China are an indication of the importance of the balanced development of the agricultural section of economy. A steel mill is a more dramatic symbol of economic development and national prestige than is a fertilizer producing factory, and it seems to promise a much more immediate effect on economic growth. The leaders of the developing societies believe that it will be possible to achieve social equality, educational opportunity, and minimum standards of health and sanitation only after the country is industrialized. Therefore, they consider industrialization as the major step for any kind of progress. They hold such a belief regardless of the fact that the experiences of the developed nations have not suggested a necessary relation between industrialization and improved citizen welfare.8

Many who have critically observed the consequences of industrialization and economic growth in the developing nations—whether under socialist or liberalist methods—believe that the developing societies should conceive an alternative approach: the kind of approach to economic growth which takes into account the experiences of the developing nations who suffered some ill effects from their developmental approaches such as those discussed above. The main point of the critics is that the industrialized nations, regardless of their types of approach to development, have forgotten that the importance of development in any society is secondary in relation to

the importance of its people. These critics find it significant that almost all of the solutions and approaches to development have merely dealt with the structure of the society rather than the substance—the people. For example, they point out that in those liberal societies where economies have grown beyond the wildest dreams of last century's visionaries, man is subjugated by economic imperatives: Man's training, his culture, his way of life, are treated as factors of production; he is educated and trained according to the laws of profitability in spite of the different types of frustrations, aggressiveness, and violence that ensues. In the communist societies, the critics point out, where industrialization and economic growth are, often arbitrarily, based upon government choice, the fact that the importance of economic development is secondary in relation to the importance of the people has been almost forgotten. Political freedom, individual rights and psychological needs are ignored and—in short—the human being has lost his entity as an individual. The rationale behind such an approach to economic development is mechanistic; man should be trained to qualify as the factor of production—input—for a better output.

The critics suggest that, during the course of development of a society, the welfare of the people of that society must be considered as the main goal of any developmental effort. Industrialization and economic growth should only be considered as the means for reaching such a goal; they should be turned into a supportive framework for improving the

10 Ibid.
11 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1942.
welfare of the people.

Could the developing societies avoid some ill effects suffered by those countries? How such a state can be attained is the question which some groups in the world have been asking themselves. In fact, some solutions have been proposed to this question. The French Radical Party (F.R.P.) is one of those groups who have addressed themselves to such a question and proposed a plan as the solution (the plan is discussed fully in Chapter III).

Assuming that the implementation of a plan such as the one proposed by the F.R.P. could help the developing societies to avoid some ill effects of rampant industrialization, a fundamental question yet remains to be answered. Will the leaders of the developing societies consider the implementation of such a plan? The question suggests a need for research into the matter. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to seek out an answer in a developing country. By questioning eighty governmental officials who are involved in formulation and implementation of national plans for Iran, this study will seek an answer to whether the Iranian government will be inclined to consider the implementation of plans such as the one proposed by the F.R.P., and if it will, to what extent? The answer to such a question, of course, will lie in the readiness of that country to implement such a plan, and, such readiness, in turn, will lie in the forces acting in that country to assist or to resist such a plan. Making such an attempt requires identification of the forces acting in Iran. Once the acting forces are identified, the participants, by responding directly to each force, can better contribute to the recognition of the nature and the roles of those forces concerning the implementation
of a new plan.

The planning experts for the developing countries categorized the forces which affect the implementation of plans in those countries in a model called "The Web of Implementation." According to these experts, although the problems of the developing countries vary in accordance with their situations, the types of their acting forces and their roles and reaction to change are similar in theoretical content and practical application. They emphasize that it is the assistance or the resistance of political, financial, administrative, socio-cultural and educational forces acting in the developing countries which determines the success or the failure of any plan for change. Thus, due to this researcher's acceptance of the aforementioned model, this study will seek out the responses of the participants in respect to those five forces (See Appendix A for definition of the forces).

Statement of the Problem

The plan proposed by the French Radical Party is designed for the purpose of enabling a developing nation like Iran to avoid ill effects of industrialization and economic development suffered by the developed nations. This plan suggests the kind of programs which, if attempted, will arouse the assistance or the resistance of the acting forces in Iran. Therefore, assuming that Iran proposes to implement this plan, the purpose of this study is to assess the expert opinions of the governmental officials involved in national planning in Iran about the likelihood of operationalizing a plan proposed by the French Radical Party in order to determine the nature and the roles of the existing forces in that country which would assist or resist the implementation of such plans.

The assessment of the expert opinions of the participants of this study—eighty governmental officials involved in formulation and implementation of national plans in Iran—will be made in respect to the political, financial, administrative, socio-cultural and educational forces acting in that country. This study, through content analysis of the responses obtained through an open-ended questionnaire (Appendix A) will identify some specific features of those forces and will assess their impact as they relate to plans of the type selected for this study.

Significance of the Study

One of the characteristics of the developing countries, according to the national planning experts, is that the problems on their way to development vary in respect to the nature of the forces acting in those countries. Therefore, this study is important to the national planners in/for the developing countries because, as it seeks to determine the nature and the roles of the forces which assist or resist developmental change in a developing country, it contributes to further recognition of possibilities and obstacles which enhance or impede the formulation and implementation of plans for change in the developing countries.

As described in the introduction section of this study, the developing nations seem to be undergoing the same general process of industrialization and economic development as was experienced by the developed nations, although their leaders are holding different goals, aspirations, and doctrines. To determine whether the leaders of these nations can be systematically oriented toward some alternative developmental plans for the purpose of avoiding some ill effects of industrialization and economic
growth, it is necessary to examine their reactions to such alternatives. The plan proposed by the French Radical Party, which aims at substituting the conscious and political man—who is in control of economy—for the economic man—who is subservient to the rationality of the economic laws—suggests such an alternative. Therefore, another significance of this study is that, as it assesses the opinions of the governmental officials involved in national planning of Iran, a developing country, it will examine their reactions to an alternative plan.

Furthermore, this study is important because of its expert opinion about the likelihood of operationalizing a plan which purports to maintain and strengthen human values through the course of industrialization and economic growth in a developing country.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE

The plan proposed by the French Radical Party was drawn upon the assumption that reform, as opposed to violent revolution, is the best instrument for fundamental change in a society. According to this assumption, reform is the process which transforms the nature of the social contract and, therefore, the only true reform is a revolutionary one. But, if revolution is to be an advancement towards progress, it must not be confused with regression by violence. At a time when many schools of political thought consider violent revolution as the best, or as the only way for fundamental change, it is significant to see that one of the radical schools such as the French Radical Party, with a revolutionary background, began to attack its own heritage and became reformist. Therefore, in this chapter, the transformation of the French Radical Party from revolutionary radicalism to compromising reformism will be discussed. Since the plan proposed by the French Radical Party was drawn upon the party's doctrine, the significance of such a discussion is that it will provide an understanding of the factors which contributed to the formation of the new doctrine of that party upon which the plan had been formulated.

Introduction

In 1840 the term "socialism" was commonly used throughout Europe to connote the doctrine that the ownership and control of the means of
production—capital, land or property—should be held by the community as a whole and administered in the interests of all. Within 134 years after the term became known in Europe, the doctrine had spread so widely that one could find regimes in Sweden, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, Eastern Europe, Cuba, Algiers, Egypt, Syria, Israel, Kenya, Tanzania, Burma, Ceylon, etc., calling themselves socialists, and the labels of Arab Socialism, African Socialism, and Asian Socialism are used to describe the grafting of indigenous traditions onto socialist doctrine.

Rarely, in the history of the world, has an ideology taken hold so deeply and diffused so quickly. One would have to go back to the spread of Islam, the century and a half following the death of Muhammad, to find a comparable phenomenon. The analogy is not without relevance, for one finds in both instances the premise of a perfect community, the effort to create a solidarity larger than that of tribe or class, a reaction to the meaninglessness of existing religious beliefs, a militant proselytizing spirit, and leadership by new elites. In fact, the comparison with Islam is meant to suggest that the spread of socialism cannot wholly be accounted for in economic or class terms.¹ The socialist movements have (or had) the character of a secular religion, and only from this view can one explain its beginning, growth and differentiations.

This review of literature will discuss the formulation of early socialist doctrine, the differentiations of the socialist movement, and varieties of socialist beliefs, in order to provide a background for

the doctrine upon which the French Radical Party's plan has been formulated.

Beginning

The meaning of socialism, both logically and sociologically, can only be understood as a contrast to individualism. The Enlightenment, English political economy, the French Revolution, and the Industrial Revolution had all combined to produce what in 1826 became known as individualism. In this doctrine, society existed to serve the individual and the pursuit of his own satisfaction; natural rights inhered in each individual, and government was not to regulate the economic life of the society. Even the French Revolution, with all its passion for virtue and its defense of popular sovereignty, fostered the idea of economic individualism.

According to Manuel:

The attack on individualism drew its strength from a catholic and a socialist point of view. Bonald and de Maistre, both theocrats, were militantly against "political protestantism" and asserted that man exists only for society. Particularly after the revolution of 1830, many French writers of a conservative bent--Lamartine, Balzac, Saint Beuve, Lammenais, and Tocqueville--expressed their alarm about L'Odieux individualisme and held it responsible for the disintegration that they felt was occurring in their society.

While the conservatives attacked the political philosophy which they

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2Emile Durkeim, Socialism and Saint-Simon, Yellow Springs, Ohio, Antioch, 1958.


linked to the French Revolution, the socialists were appalled by the economic doctrine of laissez-faire; this, Louis Blanc declared, was responsible for man's ruthless exploitation of man in modern industry. Under industrialization, the socialists alleged, the individual had been torn from old moorings and had no anchorage.

As Hardie stated:

Against the atomization and "egoism" of society, as Saint-Simon called it, the social critics proposed a new order based on association, harmony, altruism, and, finally, the world that superseded all of these—socialism. The idea of socialism has a long history in utopian tradition; one can trace its roots back to the dream of returning to a golden age of social harmony or to the radical theological creed--expressed most vividly by Anabaptists of the sixteenth century and the Levellers and Diggers of the seventeenth—of the equality of all men. But equality alone is not the essence of socialism. The heart of socialism is to be found in the idea of community and in the doctrine that men can realize their full potential and achieve human emancipation in community. By this touchstone, the seeds of modern socialism are to be found in Rousseau.

The theme of community is also the central theme of Fourier, Owen, Saint-Simon, and Marx. The first three sought to achieve it through the a priori elaboration of theoretical elements of community. Marx, on the other hand, sought to realize it through the sphere of philosophy and what he held to be its material embodiment, the proletariat. It is in the phrase "the realization of philosophy," the end point of a process of history, and not in any alleged distinction between utopian and scientific descriptions of socialism, that the difference between Marx and the

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As Landauer emphasized:7

Both Owen and Fourier sketched socialist utopias that were enormously attractive to individuals whose sensibility was repelled by the evils of industrialism. Each wanted to establish a small agrarian community that science could make practical—in effect, a withdrawal from society. Neither man had a sense of history or any realistic awareness of the politics of his time.

But, according to Durkeim:8

Saint-Simon was a very different sort. John Stuart Mill clearly recognized Saint-Simon's contribution, remarking, in Principles of Political Economy (1848), that in the few years of its public promulgation, Saint-Simon's thought had sowed the seeds of nearly all the socialist tendencies.

Durkeim considered Saint-Simon to be the father of socialism as well as positivism. Although in the Communist Manifesto Marx dismissed Saint-Simon as a utopian, Engels in his later years remarked that Saint-Simon's "breath of view" and "genius" contained in "embryo" all the ideas of later socialists which are not strictly economic.9 For what he presented is what we know today as the theory of industrial society, and his discussion of the nature of solidarity outlines the theory of occupational community


7Ibid.

8Emile Durkeim, Socialism and Saint-Simon, Yellow Springs, Ohio, Antioch, 1958.

which Durkheim later elaborated. Saint-Simon's contribution was considerable, and it was belief in Marxism which gave that doctrine its command over so large a part of the world. Marxism: The Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels, 1848), and the writings done in the thirty years following it make up the corpus of work that later socialists drew upon and associated with Marx. Relying on the political activities of Marx as well as on his judgments, the diverse socialist factions sought to justify their own policies. Thus, Lenin and the Bolsheviks found in Marxism the justification for their revolutionary and insurrectionary tactics.

Marx envisioned a two-stage development in industrial countries that presaged the victory of socialism; the first was the democratic revolution; the second, the social revolution. By the "democratic revolution" Marx meant the victory of the middle classes over the remnants of the aristocracy and the clearing away of feudal remains to achieve the successful development of capitalist production and of political rights for all in the society. By the "social revolution" Marx meant the economic victory of the proletariat, who will take over the ownership of the means of production.

The Russian Marxists—Axelrod, Plekhanov, and Lenin—argued that socialism in Russia would have to await the development of capitalism and the creation of a sizeable working class. Only at the beginning of the twentieth century did the thought occur to some Russian Marxists, notably Parvus and Trotsky—and later Lenin himself, when he was converted to the idea—that they could use the impending Russian revolution to wrest power from the bourgeoisie and thus spark revolution in the advanced
Before 1917, no Marxists thought that socialism would be possible in pre-industrial or underdeveloped countries. The West was expected to lead the way.

What kind of socialism was supposed to emerge? What would the society be like the day after the revolution? And what were Marxists supposed to do while waiting for revolution? No political party can exist without a program that holds out the promise of immediate benefits. Marx and Engels discouraged programs that involved constructive policy within the capitalist order because they smacked of bourgeois radicalism. However, when they faced the problem in 1847, as Schumpeter put it, "they resolutely listed a number of immediate objects of socialist policy, simply laying the socialist barge alongside the liberal liner."

Now that a number of immediate objects were listed, the problem was to recur constantly throughout the political history of most of the European socialist parties. Should one make immediate demands or not? This issue was fought out, for example, within the American Socialist Party at the turn of the century; and, it resulted in such factions as the Reformists, and the Impossibilists, who declared themselves against any such program on the ground that it would dilute the revolutionary

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11Ibid.

More important, the problem of reforms, and of what kind of reforms, had to be confronted by the various socialist parties of Europe in the 1930's—such as the British Labour Party, the German Social Democratic Party, and The French Socialist Party—when they entered the government and even took over sole responsibility for running it in a capitalistic society.

**Differentiation of the Movement**

The period from 1870 onward in Western Europe saw the swift growth of industrialization and urbanization, the two crucial elements of modern society. This expansion of industrial power and of economic growth and wealth, which was due largely to two technological innovations—the improvement of steel metallurgy and the application of electrical energy to factory, city, and home—seemed to confirm a number of Marx's predictions regarding the development of capitalism. Capitalism was undergoing remarkable changes. The expansion of the joint stock company (the prototype of the modern corporation) was forcing a separation of ownership and management, which in many areas resulted in the industrial manager's taking the place of the capitalist as the central person of the organization, and the large-scale enterprise began employing hundreds and

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even thousands of workers under a single roof. More important, the "amal-
gamation" movements of the 1880's and 1890's—the rise of trusts, cartels
and monopolies—and the consequent elimination of hundreds of smaller
businesses seemed to bear out Marx's predictions about the centralization
of capital and the socialization of the processes of production.

With the assiduous publication and spread of Marx's works by the
growing socialist movements, Marxism suddenly became a vogue as no other
socialist doctrine had ever been. The doctrine itself assumed a canonical
status that was unprecedented in the history of secular writing. For example, by 1914, socialism had become the single most important
political force on the continent. In 1912 the German Social Democrats
assumed 4.5 million votes (over 30 per cent of the total), and 110 seats
in the Parliament which made it the largest single party in Germany. In
France one of the socialist groups, the SFIO, garnered 1.4 million votes
and 103 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In Italy the socialists held
over seventy seats in the Parliament, and efforts were made to invite the
party, or at least its right wing, into the government.

But, the rise of the socialist parties was not only a simple matter
of winning large numbers of votes primarily among the working class. With-
in a new and growing system of universal political suffrage, it trans-
formed the nature of the party system and the political structure of each
country. What the socialists did was to introduce the disciplined and
centralized mass party, with formal machinery for enrollment. But the
socialist movement did more than build the first mass political party.

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It tried, in most of the European countries and to lesser extent in England, to build a complete working-class culture, a social world of its own, independent of the official culture of the society. For example, the German Socialist movement, the model for all other socialist parties, built large consumer cooperatives (with a large wholesale organization and its own processing plants) as well as housing developments.

**Revisionism and Reformism**

The socialist movements at the turn of the century may have felt sure about inheriting the future, but, there was considerable uncertainty as to when and how that inheritance would be realized. Marx and Engels, throughout their lifetime, insisted simply on the necessity of revolution, by which they, as well as Kautsky who became the leading spokesman for orthodox Marxism after the 1890's, meant a complete overturn of society once the socialists were in power—the abolition of private property, the end of social privilege, the breaking of the political and police power of the old ruling classes. But the question whether this aim could be achieved by peaceful means was never settled. And this ambiguity was responsible for the major doctrinal conflicts that preoccupied the socialist movements from 1890 to 1914.16

The major issue had to do with the themes of revisionism and reformism. Although their belief in socialism was never shaken, some individuals were skeptical the socialist society was actually heading in the direction Marx had predicted. The standard of living was evidently rising rather than falling, and though some of the old middle class was

was disappearing, an emerging class of white-collar workers was taking its place. In many countries this new class did not wholly identify itself with the manual workers (with whom socialism was identified) or with the socialist parties. Most of all, the socialists' increasing success in parliament posed practical problems, such as entering the cabinets in coalition with other parties (and trying to put through social legislation rather than just waiting for capitalism to fall) and making alliances with non-working class parties such as the Liberals in England, the Catholic Center in Germany, or the Radical Party in France. By the end of the nineteenth century, no socialist party could escape the difficulties presented by its own existence as a mass party, forced, for the moment at least, to function within a political system which at the same time it was seeking to destroy.

Polarization of Belief

The period between the two world wars saw Europe torn apart by the conflicting ideologies of communism and fascism. In the process, democracy and the socialist movement were the losers. Italy, Germany, Austria, and Spain came under fascist or authoritarian leadership. Even earlier, right wing dictatorships took over Portugal, Hungary, and Rumania. Belgium and France were threatened by strong fascist movements. Only Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries were relatively free of these storms, though a small fascist group arose in England.

The October Revolution in Russia had brought before the European socialist movement the insurrectionary idea of the seizure of power. For more than forty years the idea had been an abstraction to the socialist movement. Within Marxian theory there were actually some successive
versions of the theory of taking power. The first, later presented in Lenin's What Is to Be Done? (1902), conceived of the proletariat as directed by a small group of professional revolutionaries drawn from the middle-class intelligentsia; the working class would support the middle-class revolution in the faith that there would be a second round wherein the proletariat--supported in Germany by a peasant revolt--could take over. But, as industrialization and a new appraisal of the nature of factory life and the role of the proletariat emerged, a second version appeared. Now the emphasis was placed on the building of mass political parties led by workers who had achieved theoretical competence. It was now felt that socialism need not come through insurrectionary tactics or coups led by small bands of professional revolutionaries, but peacefully, through parliamentary means or even simply in a show of strength.

During the war against fascism, almost all the socialist parties had joined the governments of national unity, either at home or in exile. The sense of the nation and democracy took priority over the ideas of class and capitalism. In the Western countries, the labor and socialist parties had become completely of their societies, as well as in them. To theorize this new practice and doctrine, five features can be identified:


1. The complete abandonment of the idea of revolutionary methods and violence as a means to power; the complete acceptance of parliamentary means; and the complete readiness to participate in non-socialist coalition governments.

2. The transformation of the socialist and labor parties from class parties, speaking only for working-class interests, to people's parties seeking a more inclusive concept of general welfare.

3. The recognition that the definition of socialism as a social and economic ideal was inseparable from the idea of democracy, both as a means and as an end. The Marxist concept that lingered through the 1930's—that democracy was a "bourgeois" concept and only a mask for class rule—was rejected. By democracy as a means, the socialist parties meant the full guarantee of the rights of free speech and free assembly, and the maintenance of political rights for the opposition. As an end, democracy was defined as the free consent of the governed.

4. The surrender of the idea of nationalization or state ownership of the means of production as a "first principle" of socialism, and the substitution of public control of enterprise and planning as the means of achieving economic growth and equitable incomes. The sectarian orthodoxy that within a capitalist state one could not plan for social ends was replaced by the theory that governmental powers could be used for the gradual transformation of the economy and that a "mixed economy" of public and private enterprise was the most desirable solution.

5. A complete opposition to totalitarianism. While the socialist movements had long been in ideological opposition to communism, what the new attitude meant, in practice, was support of the military and political aspects of the Atlantic Alliance against the Soviet bloc and an identification with the national interests.  

It was based upon the five features of the theory mentioned above that the French Radical Party, by recognizing reform as the instrument of revolution, formulated and proposed a plan for fundamental change in society (the plan is discussed fully in Chapter III).  

20Daniel Bell, Socialist, Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, page 507.
CHAPTER III

THE PLAN

In October, 1969, the members of the Reform Committee of the French Radical Party (F.R.P.), met and throughout subsequent debates, proposed a plan for change: the kind of plan which could enable the developing societies to avoid some ill effects of industrialization and economic growth suffered by the developed nations during their course of development.

According to the theoretical content of the plan proposed by F.R.P., the evolution of society and of social relations can be summed up in three essential stages:

The Stage of Coercion: nature in power

This stretched from the very origin of life to the Industrial Revolution of the last century. Man was faced with hunger and scarcity while his purchasing power was constant and miserable. Societies were narrowly hierarchical, and human activity was based upon the fear of penalties and social sanctions. These societies of coercion, those of yesterday and those of today, intolerant and indifferent, impose, in all fields, subjection to a quasi-military discipline.

The Stage of Liberalism: economics in power

At this stage, according to the theoretical content of the plan proposed by the F.R.P., while each one works in his interest, the organized interplay of oppositions between individual and classes will allow a certain
collective well-being to be attained (Adam Smith's invisible hand). But, such a regime institutes a necessary domination of the stronger over the weak. By treating man essentially in accordance with economic laws, such a regime gives a scant share to the truly human values of solidarity, equality, and generosity: when economic growth is the major goal, man's training, his culture, and his destiny are treated as factors of production; he is educated and trained for output; he is treated with the same laws of profitability; he is considered "depreciated" as he becomes less profitworthy.

According to the plan proposed by the F.R.P., man in a society where economics is in power lives in a world that is insufficiently politicized: it is a world in which the economic laws determine man's way of life rather than man's laws determining and controlling economic functions; in that world, while the private citizen does not have an effective say in the decisions which determine his future, the government itself has less and less. This is because industrial firms can now establish world-wide empires above national political power; while within the country the dense bureaucratic hierarchy cuts off those in power from local problems and their basic requirements. In other words, the "invisible hand", in the society where economics is in power, has become as visible as possible.

The Stage of Politics: man in power

According to the F.R.P., this stage is the stage to be reached. Man should gradually become reconciled with himself through active labor and with others by sharing in different activities. This would mean aiming at a point in the horizon where, by continual improvement of social organizations and an incessant effort of himself, each person would find, in
accordance with his vocation, a certain capacity to bloom. The essence of this stage is that man would be concerned with how to use science, technology and economics to insure human freedom—when the tendency seems to be just the reverse. The training, development, and utilization of human intelligence are the real resources for reaching such a stage, and its weapons are the use and systematic perfection of all the instruments of reason.

The Plan proposed by the Reform Committee of the F.R.P., which consists of four sections, is drawn upon four following processes for reaching the third stage; each section includes a number of programs to carry out one of the processes:

I. Separation of political power and economic power
II. Access to social equality
III. The end of hereditary private power
IV. Redistribution of public power

Discussion of the Plan

Section I: Separation of Political Power and Economic Power

According to F.R.P., private wealth and public power are united today in a social nexus through a system of interlocking interests. Their roles are continually being confused but they are in the same hands. The F.R.P. suggests that by eliminating costly and ruinous state aid, by applying to the business firms the rigor of the laws of competition and profitabil- ity, considerable resources can be released which can be used for all those social groups which are the victims of development. In this way, they will accelerate the transformation of the society by investing money in man. The F.R.P. stresses that if political power remains the auxiliary or the guardian of business enterprises, who will look after the interests
of individual human beings? In this way, any diminution of the futures of the human beings who earn their living from the private wealth can be refused undeservedly. To do less, F.R.P. emphasizes, would be both morally intolerable and of doubtful economic effectiveness, since the anger, or more simply, the passivity, of the victims delays all modernization. Thus, what is pure waste for the community shall be replaced with the most productive possible investment.

To do so, F.R.P. suggests the following programs to be operationalized:

Program 1:

According to F.R.P., the community shall cease to subsidize those undertakings, whether industrial or agricultural, privately or publicly owned, which do not develop human resources. The vast state subsidies shall be replaced by pre-eminently profitable investment in safeguarding and development of human capital. The resources made available in this way—a considerable part of the state's budget—shall be used to transform the human conditions of economic development. This, according to F.R.P., will reintegrate into the community millions of men and women who today are either crushed or by-passed by the process of economic growth.

Program 2:

According to F.R.P., economic development and the acceleration of technological progress requires an increasingly more rapid redistribution of jobs between the indifferent sectors of activity. In order to run the economy effectively, therefore, the professional mobility shall be facilitated—not necessarily geographical mobility—that is to say the continued readaptation of the employment structure and individual promotion.

Program 3:

According to F.R.P., freedom of initiative in economic matters shall be supported only on two conditions: the existence of a high degree of competition and true risk taking by the business undertaking. Regardingly, F.R.P.
suggests that it is necessary in the public interest to eliminate any capitalist undertaking incapable of developing the most open competition. The owner of the undertaking, not the state, shall bear all the risk and its consequences. Regardingly, F.R.P. suggests the abolition of all direct or indirect subsidies of any kind whatever for the operation of capitalist undertakings except for those which can improve urban and rural areas in regard to their needs identified by the local authorities. Nationalized and mixed undertakings shall be subject to the same rule of open competition. Their obligations to provide a public service alone shall be the subject of specific contractual remuneration.

Program 4:

As a direct consequence of the principle indicated in Program 3, F.R.P. suggests that any wage earner, farmer, artisan, or shopkeeper who might lose his livelihood through technological change shall be entitled to the fullest possible support from his country. Accordingly, F.R.P. suggests the following: material losses inherent in this change shall first of all be covered by compensation from the community. The priority development of vocational training institutions for adults and institutions of permanent education shall allow those involved to find, in the long run, a better paying occupation than the one they have lost in order that professional mobility can be secured in the least painful way.

Program 5:

According to F.R.P., a vertical redistribution from the richest to the poorest shall be insured through the agency of the state which shall finance the institution of a guaranteed minimum wage by means, especially, of progressively graduated tax deduction from income. It shall pay an income, replacing all other forms of financial assistance, to all those whose resources do not exceed a certain threshold and who receive practically nothing from the system.

Program 6:

According to F.R.P., many people, especially of the working class, start work from the age of sixteen—because their family cannot manage without an extra wage. These people are often exhausted physically around the age of fifty. To them, F.R.P. suggests, there shall be paid a pension at the age of physical exhaustion. It means that the age of retirement shall be flexible.
Program 7:

According to F.R.P., the real condition and aspiration of women belonging to different social classes shall be taken into consideration. F.R.P. suggests that those women who wish to stay home and bring up their children at the age between twenty and forty—when they are equipped to do so—shall be allowed to do so. Society shall help them to do this by paying them a substantial allowance throughout this period, varying according to particular circumstances. But, if they resume working later, they shall be trained to relearn a trade. The tax liability of business undertakings, according to F.R.P., shall be modified to induce them to employ minimum percentage of women aged over forty.

Section II: Access to Social Equality

According to F.R.P., if there is to be a world freed from the laws of economic "inevitability," from cheap technological change; from the tyranny of output; and, from social predestination which transmits class handicaps in a hereditary manner, then this undertaking necessarily implies a searching re-examination of education; in search of an education which allows men to dominate change; an education that can be the instrument that gives the future adults the means of expression, communication and creation that they will require all their lives; an education which will aim towards the development of the entire personality, not only of those faculties useful in the battle for employment; an education which its purpose will no longer be to adapt man to the needs dictated by the economy, but to renew for him the understanding of things in their entirety, which is the key to personal autonomy, thus he too can participate in the in the creation of wealth; in brief, an education which demolishes the wall separating "study" from "life." According to F.R.P., having such an education requires the operationalizing of the following programs:

Program 1:

According to F.R.P., there shall be massive investment in
prescholastic establishments in order to prepare future generations to be more capable than our own. This is a bigger problem in the lower classes, where children are deprived of a natural cultural environment. It requires that the highest possible rates of enrollment in prescholastic establishments be achieved in areas of cultural poverty, in working class suburbs of the cities, and the least-advanced rural areas.

Program 2:

According to F.R.P., as far as the origin of the school career is concerned, the social handicap is a decisive one. Much can be done to reduce it while on the way, but essentially the die is cast before school begins. At the age of six, on the day when he crosses for the first time the threshold of the school, the worker's sons are already less well equipped than the bourgeois' sons in aptitude for both reasoning and communication. He will bear the consequences all his life. There are exceptions, of course, but from the statistical point of view it can be said that six-year old children are socially predestined and classified. According to F.R.P., actually there are two sorts of families; those which have the time and the means to give their children an education allowing them to build intelligently on the universe of audio-visual productions, and those which do not. The government, suggests F.R.P., shall compensate for the deficiencies of those families which cannot.

Program 3:

According to F.R.P., there shall be introduced freedom of initiative and a certain degree of competition within the public education system and also an overall cultural policy in which, for instance, the national TV service could find a new raison d'être and in which youth and popular education movements will receive financial resources in proportion to the importance of their task. Every job, suggests F.R.P., shall include training elements. Every man shall, in his turn, be both teacher and taught.

Program 4:

In the area of education, F.R.P. further suggests that the system of higher education shall also be changed; for instance through autonomy and competition, throughout the entire system, primary, secondary, and tertiary. The system of higher education shall be changed in such a way which will demolish the hereditary transmission of power from the certain classes of one generation to the same classes of the next generation. For this purpose, emphasizes F.R.P., there is a need for an alternative method of selection to replace
that of competitive entry examination into the universities. There shall be, according to F.R.P., no entrance examination, and the selections shall be made on the basis of marks, school teachers' recommendations, and other qualifications. Whatever may be the inevitable risks of arbitrary treatment, they are obviously less than the haphazardness and oppression of the entrance examination.

Section III: The End of Hereditary Private Power

According to F.R.P., in an enterprise the critical distinction is between three participants; wage earners who are the suppliers to the enterprise; capital which supplies financial resources to the enterprise; and the management. There are, of course, conflicts of interest among these three elements. Regardingly, F.R.P. has formulated the following programs for ending the hereditary private power. These programs, according to F.R.P., consist of creating and strengthening the trade unions, the irreplaceable compensating power for the interest, the defense, and the dignity of wage earners; opening a way for an alternative to ownership as a source of legitimacy of private authority; and, finally, accelerating the renewal of the employer's group through the abolition of the principle of heredity. The programs suggested by F.R.P. to be operationalized for such purposes are as follows:

Program 1:

According to F.R.P., the starting point for any democratization of economic power is to extend the role of the trade union inside the enterprise itself. Trade unions shall be created, and if they already exist, united and helped to be extricated from the condition of poverty and underequipment, so that they could negotiate everything that affects the conditions of the workers.

Program 2:

According to F.R.P., there shall be participation of representatives of all the employees, first in the choice of management, and second, in regular deliberation. The
F.R.P. further emphasizes that, in those cases where they have applied themselves to an understanding of the constraints of competition, there is no reason why giving a vote to the employees should lead to an undermining of authority.

Program 3:

According to F.R.P., under the law of averages, the heir to a business enterprise is unlikely to be its best pilot. In all societies endowed with great dynamism, business success is increasingly the work of salaried employees chosen for their competence, outside the circle of hereditary owners of capital. Besides, each generation needs to challenge all acquired positions, to redistribute wealth, and to renew its leaders. Regardingly, F.R.P. suggests that the hereditary transmission of the ownership of the means of production shall be abolished.

Program 4:

According to F.R.P., death duties, or estate duties, allows the full right to property. But the aim shall be to put an end to the hereditary ownership of capitalistic power. The F.R.P. suggests the following steps to be taken to achieve this end: the great bulk of population shall be entirely and finally released from all fear of death duties. Ordinary family inheritances, which represent the huge majority, shall in fact be totally exempted, whatever the origin of the inheritance, within a limit which could be set as the total income which a wage earner at the bottom of the scale could earn throughout his life. On the other hand, the hereditary transmission of larger fortunes, in whatever form they may be invested (especially where the means of production are involved), shall, under this process, be altered once and for all. The heirs shall be entitled to a life interest only. Thus, at the end of one generation, hereditary private ownership of the instruments of production will be abolished. The object of this program, according to F.R.P., is not fiscal, but economic (fluidity of ownership, capital, and the means of production). It is also moral and social (equality of opportunity). The revenue obtained from death duties shall be allocated by the government entirely to cultural and health projects.

Section IV: Redistribution of Public Power

According to F.R.P., no one can counter any longer the strategy of large firms, dictated by their own interests, with their own body of doctrine, general and intangible, fashioned a century before the problems
facing today's societies. The F.R.P. explains the above statement as follow-
ning. As the level of economic development rises, society acquires an
increasingly greater freedom of choice to apply to the changing conditions
which necessitates continual adjustments. Also, as society becomes com-
plex and more mobile, the foundations of rational actions are reversed.
In the simple, hierarchical societies of scarcity, efficiency required
respect for orders sent down from above. Now it rests upon surging in-
novations and solutions are possible only with the concurrence of those
who will have to implement them. According to F.R.P., revolution, in this
field, consists of a radical change of legitimacy. In the last resort,
the judge can no longer be a "guardianship authority" of any sort. It
must be the entire people, simultaneously called upon to rid itself of
archaic behavior and to embody the profound hierarchy of values it carries
within itself. It is within such a framework that F.R.P. suggested the
following programs to be operationalized in order to bring about an op-
timal localization of centers of decision so that the reality of democratic
power in its various forms could be established.

Program 1:

According to F.R.P., circumstances made the limits
of the urban commune those of the agglomeration itself.
Similarly, rural communes can no longer be kept inside of
a framework which is often only the current version of those
of the Middle Ages. Therefore, according to F.R.P., it
shall be left to those communes to regroup themselves in
accordance with their wishes, the state helping them or
deputizing for them. The local representatives of people
such as rural mayor and his town-hall secretary must be
honored and preserved. These tribunes of the people, ami-
able mediators, are the human face of the administration.

Program 2:

According to F.R.P., traffic jams, pollution, noise,
lack of open space in the cities; monotony, isolation, boredom in the rural areas, these are the key problems with which local authorities are concerned. They are also primarily concerned with making available facilities for relaxation and celebration, for sport and entertainment. According to F.R.P., the government's efforts for resolving these problems shall be made in a decentralized manner (at the local and regional levels); local authorities resolving the problems, state coordinating their efforts and helping them financially and technically if needed.

Program 3:

According to F.R.P., freedom of initiative and real responsibility shall be given to elect representatives at the regional and communal level, and therefore, they shall be free from paper work and the need to obtain prior authorization from the central authorities. This innovation shall necessarily be translated into financial terms.

Program 4:

According to F.R.P., local authorities shall be in a position to equip themselves with their own technical services because without these they are doomed to impotence and irresponsibility. Therefore, an end shall be made of the quasi-monopoly of technical services by the nation in the helping and implementation of regional investments. The F.R.P. further suggests that some of the officials belonging to these services shall be assigned to the various regions, departments, and communes and placed under the exclusive hierarchical authority of their responsible, elected representatives.

Program 5:

As far as the tax system is concerned the F.R.P. suggests the following: The tax system shall radically be modified Local authorities shall have wide freedom of choice concerning optional taxes and dues. As for compulsory taxes, it is important that those which affect the pockets of taxpayers most closely—especially the income tax payable by the individual taxpayer—be employed to finance expenditures which are immediately apparent and clearly identifiable. This means that the income tax shall become a regional and communal tax.

Program 6:

According to F.R.P., the very conception of financial relations between the state and local authorities shall be
reversed. The undergrowth of piecemeal state subventions, which poison civil life, shall be swept away. A single global subvention shall be paid by the state to all the local authorities in a single region, its amount to be determined largely in terms of the policy of territorial development. It shall be set sufficiently high to counter the natural tendency toward increased inequalities of development between various regions of the nation.

Program 7:

According to F.R.P., the vitality of local authorities is not enough to counter the natural aggressiveness of industrial firms and bureaucratic centralization. Regardingly, the citizenry must find new reasons for living by participating in various sorts of voluntary groups and organizations. Spontaneous groups and organizations, born out of free initiative, whether they are concerned with art, sport, or mutual aid, the progress of ideas will increasingly become the schools of personal autonomy and seedbeds of active citizens. Their multiple networks of influence will establish the bases of a functional democracy, inserted into the daily realities of life, and also the system of values, outside economics, of the new society. Regardingly the F.R.P. suggests that these groups and organizations shall be persuaded to widen the range of their action and take an active part in all sorts of associations. The representatives of these groups shall have the possibility of active participation in the programs of the government.
CHAPTER IV

PROCEDURE

The purpose of this study is to assess the expert opinion of the governmental officials involved in national planning in Iran to determine forces assisting or resisting changes in her social, economic, and political institutions. The twenty-two programs of the plan proposed by the French Radical Party were used as specific cases for assessing the likelihood of operationalizing such plans in Iran in respect to the political, financial, administrative, socio-cultural and educational forces acting in that country.

In order to begin this study, which was conducted in Teheran, Iran, two problems had to be overcome: first, development and validation of an instrument that would permit the analysis of the objective of this study, and, second, identification of the appropriate respondents (sample population) and procedures for data analysis.

Development and Validation of Instrument

In order to develop and validate an instrument it was necessary to take the following preliminary steps:

1. Convert the proposed programs to research questions
2. Develop an instrument
3. Validate the instrument
4. Revise the instrument

Convert the Proposed Programs to Research Questions

The twenty-two programs of the plan proposed by the French Radical
Party were converted into twenty-two questions. Since the plan consisted of four sections for achieving four different objectives, the questions were divided into four sections as follows:

- **Section I** 7 questions
- **Section II** 4 questions
- **Section III** 4 questions
- **Section IV** 7 questions

**Development of an Instrument**

The instrument, which was developed by this researcher, was an open-ended questionnaire utilizing the twenty-two programs of the four sections of the plan proposed by the French Radical Party as twenty-two questions. The respondents were asked to respond to the questions in two parts: first, to rate, on an ordinal scale ranging from very likely to very unlikely, the likelihood of operationalizing each program in Iran in respect to the political, financial, administrative, socio-cultural and educational forces acting in that country, and, second, to state specific reasons why each force would assist or resist adoption of the program. The definition of these forces were given in the questionnaire (See Appendix A).

**Validation of the Instrument**

In order to validate the instrument a pilot study was done to see if the questionnaire would be clear enough to the respondents. A panel of ten graduate students were selected to respond to the questionnaire, and, then, to answer the following questions:

1. Approximately how much time have you spent to respond to the questionnaire?

2. Considering the fact that the questionnaire should cover the whole plan proposed by the French Radical Party, have you found it too long?
3. Was the instruction of the questionnaire clear enough to you, if not, why?

4. What are the major weaknesses of the questionnaire in general?

5. What modification do you suggest to be done in order to make this a better questionnaire?

The panel consisted of ten graduate students from the developing countries assuming that, in regard to their national background, their views of the programs proposed by the questionnaire would be close to those of the respondents in Iran.

Revision of the Instrument

The result of the pilot testing indicated the length of the questionnaire as its only weakness in need of modification. Accordingly, with the assistance of the chairman of the researcher's doctoral committee, the needed review and revision occurred and the questionnaire was made ready for distribution.

The Study

In order to conduct this study, it was necessary to take the following steps:

1. Selection of the respondents
2. Determining procedures for data collection
3. Determining procedures for statistical treatment and analysis of data

Selection of Respondents

A panel of respondents was selected with the assistance of four prominent administrators in the Plan and Budget Organization of Iran who were well qualified to identify the individuals with a major role in making decisions concerning national planning in that country. The panel consisted of eighty government officials: ex-ministers, deputy ministers, deputy directors of the Plan and Budget Organization, high-ranking public admin-
istrators, national plan designers, national plan implementors, and the like. The respondents were all educated abroad and knew the English language, and, therefore, were capable of responding to the research instrument. According to those four administrators who assisted the researcher, this panel was representative of those individuals whose views, regardless of the official positions they hold, determine the approval or disapproval of major decisions to be made in terms of national planning.

Data Collection

Procedures for distributing the instrument to the selected respondents are discussed in this section.

Distribution of the questionnaires took place in two phases. (a) The questionnaires were mailed to the respondents accompanied by a letter soliciting their cooperation and response (See Appendix B). In this phase only seventeen respondents returned completed questionnaires, and they requested that their names and positions remain anonymous in the study. The remainder of the respondents refrained from responding due to the political nature of the content of the questionnaire. (b) As a result of such a low rate of return, the second phase of data collection process occurred. The researcher had to travel to Teheran, Iran, in order to solicit more responses. The researcher found out the reason why the sixty-three selected respondents had not completed the questionnaire. They were apprehensive of who might view the data and, therefore, would not personally write their opinions in the questionnaires.

After the researcher's personal contact, thirty-three of the remaining sixty-three selected respondents agreed to give their responses to the questionnaire on two conditions: first, that they would only respond to
the questionnaire verbally in a private meeting with the researcher writing
the responses by his hand so that there would be no evidence of their par-

ticipation, and, second, that their names and positions should remain anon-
ymous. Agreement was made and the researcher wrote the exact responses in
the questionnaires during thirty-three separate sessions. The remaining
respondents would not cooperate under any condition. Consequently, the
number of completed questionnaires amounted to fifty. In other words,
62.5% of the selected panel responded to the instrument.

The selection of the eighty respondents was made based on their in-
fluential roles in national policy making without consideration of the
degree of influence that each respondent could exert. Therefore, this
researcher cannot confidently recommend that if the remaining thirty re-
spondents had responded, the findings of this study would remain the same.
In other words, the responses of the remaining thirty respondents could
have reflected a more supportive or a more resisting position on the part
of the five prospective forces acting in Iran in respect to the proposed
plan.

Statistical Treatment of Data

The statistical treatment of data consisted of two parts: first,
computing the likelihood of operationalizing the proposed plan in respect
to the five prospective forces and, second, subjecting the reasons stated
by the respondents to content analysis.

Part 1. Computing the Likelihood. In order to compute the likelihood of
operationalizing the proposed plan which was rated by the respondents on
an ordinal scale, median was used. Median was chosen based on the recom-
mendation of the research counseling unit at the Department of Educational
Development of the Ohio State University. Accordingly, in order to treat the data collected by this researcher, it seemed advisable to use the statistical procedures that are based on the ordinal properties of the data in preference to procedures that incorporate all the particular values of the variable and may be grossly affected by atypical values.

Besides, from the point of view of purely descriptive statistics, as apart from inferential work where mean—due to its mathematical tractability—is superior to median, the median is a most servicable measure. Its property of representing the typical (most nearly like) score makes it fit the requirements of simple and effective communication better than the mean in many contexts.\(^1\) Accordingly, median was preferred for this study.

The formula for computing the median was:\(^2\)

\[
\text{Median} = L + \frac{N/2 - F}{fm} h
\]

when

- \(L\) = exact lower limit of interval containing the midpoint
- \(F\) = sum of all frequencies below \(L\)
- \(fm\) = frequency of the midpoint interval
- \(N\) = number of cases
- \(h\) = class interval

**Application of the Formula for Computing the Median**

In the questionnaire, the respondents were asked to rate the likelihood of operationalizing each program on an ordinal scale ranging from Very Likely to Very Unlikely as follows:


The application of the formula for computing the medians of the likelihood of the programs took place through substituting the elements of the formula with the relevant data resulted from the respondents' rating. Such a substitution was made as follows:

\[ L = \text{lower limit of one of the intervals of the above scale (5, 4, 3, 2, or 1) whichever happened to contain the midpoint} \]

\[ F = \text{sum of all frequencies below the midpoint interval} \]

\[ fm = \text{frequency of the interval which happened to contain the midpoint} \]

\[ N = \text{number of respondents} \]

\[ h = \text{class interval which, due to the rating scale ranging from five to one, was 1.} \]

The application of the formula for computing the median can be demonstrated in the following example:

If the result of rating of a program were

\[ \begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c|c}
  \text{Very Likely} & \text{ Likely} & \text{ Neutral} & \text{ Unlikely} & \text{Very Unlikely} \\
  \hline
  5 & 4 & 3 & 2 & 1 \\
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c|c}
  f & f = 2 & f = 29 & f = 11 & f = 1 & f = 7 \\
\end{array} \]

the following steps would be taken to compute the median:

\[ L = \text{lower limit of the interval containing the midpoint (29), which is 3.5} \]

\[ F = 11 + 1 + 7 = 19 \]

\[ fm = 29 \]

\[ N = 50 \]

\[ h = 1 \]
Therefore, the median would be

\[ \text{Md} = 3.5 + \frac{50/2 - 19}{29} \]

\[ 1 = 3.5 + .2 = 3.7 \text{(Likely)} \]

Part 2. Content Analysis. In order to analyze the reasons stated by the respondents for their rating of the likelihood of operationalizing the proposed plan, content analysis was applied. The researcher found content analysis useful because the study required precise and replicable methods of analysis for those aspects of the data which could escape casual scrutiny. More specifically, the researcher, while searching for the method of analysis, found out that content analysis is likely to prove especially useful for at least three general classes of research problems. Content analysis may be helpful when there are technical advantages because the volume of material to be examined is such that the researcher must confine his study to some sample of the total universe of communication. Content analysis may also prove useful when data accessibility is a problem; the data are limited to the messages produced by individuals and restrictions of time or space do not permit the researcher to gain sufficient access to his subjects if necessary.

Finally, some content analysis is often necessary when the subject's own language is crucial to the research problem. For example, to analyze open-ended questionnaires, the researcher often requires information of a subtlety or complexity which renders casual scrutiny inadequate, even if undertaken by a skilled reader.³

Therefore, in light of the above points, this researcher chose content analysis as the method for data analysis. Prior to such analysis the following selections were made:

a. Subcategories
b. The size of the unit of analysis to be recorded
c. A system for recording the units of analysis
d. Procedure for reliability check

Selection of Subcategories. Before conducting this study, by considering each one of the five prospective forces as a category, some specific subcategories were designed (See Appendix C). But, after collection of the data, the number of subcategories was increased as required by the variety of the subjects rendered by the data (See Appendix D).

The subcategorization was designed to proceed in steps from the general to the specific, so that the material could be examined in terms of detailed subcategories appropriate to the purpose of the study. An attempt was made to make the subcategories mutually exclusive so that each subcategory would have its own set of content units. Furthermore, subcategorization was based on a comprehensive outline of the situation as a whole—an outline containing the main elements in the situation which could facilitate the understanding and the predicting of the situation.

Selection of the Size of the Unit of Analysis. As defined by Berelson, "A theme unit is a sentence, a proposition about a subject." Accordingly, in this study, each specific reason given by the respondents explaining why each force might assist or resist the proposed program, was considered as a theme unit to be utilized for the purpose of content analysis.

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Selection of a Recording System. Since the instrument was designed in such a way that required the respondents' direct responses to each category (to each one of the five forces) separately, the process of recording the theme units into their specific categories took place accordingly. But, for recording theme units into the subcategories of each category the following system was applied.

Each theme unit presented some attributes in relation to the selected subcategories. But, some attributes were not presented in an explicit manner. Whenever they were not, the system of subordination and superordination relations was applied for recording the theme units in their subcategories. Some words more readily suggested to the researcher such relations than others, and they suggested them in a deeper, more immediate and sensible way. But, for those which did not suggest such relations as readily, the similarity was obtained by judgment. In order to avoid false judgment in ascertaining similarities, more than one attribute was considered.

Selection of Procedure for Reliability Check. In order to check the reliability of the subcategorization, the assistance of a professor and a Ph.D. candidate from The Ohio State University was secured; subcategorization was done by the researcher, compared with subcategorization done by the Ph.D. candidate, and discussed with the professor for affirming the reliability.

After making the above selections, content analysis of the data took place. By applying the selected recording system described above, the reasons—theme units—given by the respondents to explain their rating of each force were recorded in their related subcategories as follows:
The subcategories of each force were recorded on a number of cards equal to the number of the subcategories of each force (category); each card bearing the name, definition and the numerical code of each subcategory. After reading each reason given by the respondents in respect to each force, the researcher made the judgment and recorded that reason into its related subcategory. The same procedure was followed by the Ph.D. candidate who assisted the researcher in content analysis. After following the same procedure for each force in each program, both recordings were compared and differences were discussed with the professor whose assistance had been secured for making the final judgment.

The percentages of disagreement between the researcher's and the Ph.D. candidate's recordings of the theme units of each force into their related subcategories were as follows:

- Political Force 18%
- Financial Force 7%
- Administrative Force 8%
- Socio-Cultural Force 13%
- Educational Force 7%

The disagreements in recording were taken for discussion to the professor whose assistance had been secured for making the final judgment. For the political and socio-cultural forces where the two recorders had the highest percentages of disagreement, the professor recorded the same theme units in their related subcategories. The percentages of disagreement between this recording and the previous ones were ten per cent. Then, each recorder explained his position and the final judgment was left to the researcher to make. In no case, the number of disagreements settled in this manner was enough to change the findings of the study.
Analysis of Data

The analysis of data was made through three steps.

Step I. Analysis for Each Program.

This step was taken in two parts as follows:

Part 1. As a result of the respondents' rating of the programs, the frequency counts, percentages, and medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing each program in respect to the political, financial, administrative, socio-cultural, and educational forces were computed (See Table 1 in Chapter V).

Part 2. The respondents' reasons given to explain their rating of each force were content analyzed and recorded into their related subcategories. The result of this part, which was made for all twenty-two programs, was a number of subcategories explaining the medians of the likelihood of operationalizing each program in respect to the five prospective forces as computed in Part 1.

By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of the subcategories of each force, their importance to the likelihood of that force in operationalizing each program was determined. And, then, by considering the responses for Very Likely and Likely as Supportive and Very Unlikely and Unlikely as Resisting, the supportive or resisting roles of the subcategories were identified (See the last four columns of Table 2 in Chapter V).

Step II. Analysis for Each One of the Four Sections of the Plan.

This step was taken in two parts as follows:

Part 1. As a result of the respondents' rating of the programs of each one of the four sections of the plan, the frequency counts, percentages and
the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing each section in respect to the five prospective forces were computed (See Table 133 in Chapter V).

**Part 2. In this part, the classification of the subcategories obtained in Step I for the programs of each of the four sections of the plan took place. Such a classification was made to determine the total contribution of the subcategories of each force to the likelihood of that force in operationalizing each section of the plan as computed in Part 1. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of the subcategories of each force, their importance to the likelihood of that force in operationalizing each section was determined, and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See Table 134 in Chapter V).

**Step III. Analysis for the Overall Plan.**

This step was taken in two parts as follows:

**Part 1.** As a result of the respondents’ rating of the twenty-two programs, the frequency counts, percentages and medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing the overall plan in respect to the five prospective forces were computed (See Table 157 in Chapter V).

**Part 2.** In this part, the classification of the subcategories of the five forces obtained in Step II for the four sections of the plan took place. Such a classification was made to determine the total contributions of the subcategories of each force to the likelihood of that force in operationalizing the overall plan, as computed in Part 1. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of the subcategories of each force, their importance to the likelihood of that force in operationalizing the overall plan was determined, and, then, their supportive or resisting roles
were identified (See Table 158 in Chapter V).

The Results of the Analysis of Data

The result of Step I of the analysis was utilized to provide an answer to the following question:

What do the respondents perceive to be the likelihood of operationalizing each individual Program, and why?

The result of Step II of the analysis was utilized to provide an answer to the following question:

What do the respondents perceive to be the likelihood of operationalizing each Section of the Plan, and why?

The result of Step III of the analysis was utilized to provide an answer to the following question:

What do the respondents perceive to be the likelihood of operationalizing the Overall Plan, and why?

The results of Steps I, II, and III were also utilized to provide answers to the following questions:

What force(s) do the respondents perceive as most assisting to such a plan?

What force(s) do the respondents perceive as most resisting to such a plan?

The following chapter contains a presentation of data analysis and the findings.
CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS OF DATA

The purpose of this study was to assess the expert opinion of the governmental officials involved in national planning in Iran to determine forces assisting or resisting changes in her social, economic and political institutions. In order to identify the roles of the forces acting in Iran, the twenty-two programs of the plan proposed by the French Radical Party were used as specific cases for assessing the likelihood of their operationalization in that country in respect to political, financial, administrative, socio-cultural and educational forces.

This study was conducted in Teheran, Iran. For the purpose of gathering appropriate information two problems had to be overcome: development and validation of an appropriate instrument that would permit the analysis of the objective of this study, and second, identification of the appropriate respondents.

The first problem was overcome by constructing a questionnaire. By converting the twenty-two programs proposed by the French Radical Party into twenty-two questions, an open-ended questionnaire was constructed (See Appendix A). The revision of the questionnaire was made after a pilot study. A panel of ten graduate students from the developing countries was selected to respond to the questionnaire. As a result, the review and the revision of the instrument took place.

The second problem that had to be overcome was the selection of the
respondents. Such a selection was made with the assistance of four prominent administrators in the Plan and Budget Organization of Iran. A panel of eighty governmental officials were selected as respondents for the study (See Chapter IV for complete description of the procedure).

The information gathered through the questionnaire was subjected to content analysis (See Chapter IV for full description of the method of analysis). This chapter is a presentation of the analysis of data which was made through the three following steps:

1. Analysis for each one of the twenty-two programs.
2. Analysis for each one of the four sections of the plan.
3. Analysis for the overall plan.

**Step 1. Analysis For Each One Of The Twenty-Two Programs**

This step which was made for each program separately took place in two parts. The following is a presentation of this step for each one of the twenty-two programs.

**Analysis For Program 1 (Human Resource Development) of Section I**

The Program

The community shall cease to subsidize those undertakings which do not develop human resources. The state subsidies shall be replaced by investment in safeguarding and development of human capital in order to transform the human conditions of economic development.

**Part 1.** Table 1 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for human resource development.
TABLE 1

THE RESULTS OF THE RESPONDENTS' RATING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF
OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 1 OF SECTION 1 OF THE PLAN IN RESPECT TO 5 FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Like Likely (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Un Likely (2)</th>
<th>Very Un Likely (1)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood
% = percentage
M = number of respondents
Md = median

Table 1 presents the computed frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the five prospective forces.

PART 2. Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force, as shown by the medians in Table 1, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

Category I - Political Force.

Subcategories:

National Leaders

Reasons for Very Likely:

This is the Shah's new order.

The Shah has been calling the attention of the private sector to this program.

For safeguarding their power and monopoly system.
Reasons for Likely:

They are for it especially because it can have a great publicity effect.

Our community is not in favor of paying for human resources. Therefore, only government will subsidize such a program.

Parliament and the Law
Reasons for Likely:

Some enterprises are required to do so by law.

The high level governmental officials and their families are barred from share ownership in the economic undertakings. This will eliminate their influence in favor of the proposed program.

Political Parties
Reason for Likely:

Investment in the development of human resources will meet with the approval of almost all political factions as the country as a whole benefits from this program.

Reason for Neutral:

Political groups do not interfere in such cases.

Conditional and Uncertain
Reasons for Likely:

Some resolutions are under study.

Such a dialogue is going on.

Reason for Neutral:

A careful study of such a program is under consideration.

Interest Groups
Reasons for Very Unlikely:

The politically and administratively influential people provide such subsidies and there is little legal provision now to punish them.

Due to the influence of the economic elite.

Public Demand
Reasons for Very Likely:
This will reduce the public blame on government for inefficiency and maladministration.

To increase public satisfaction.

Reasons for Likely:

Private undertakings are having more sense of purpose and concern for the public interest.

Because of demand pressure.

Consideration of Social and Economic Development

Reasons for Very Likely:

Decision makers try to invest for manpower due to the lack of specialized people.

Development of human resources has been a main goal of government activities in recent times and has been incorporated in national plans.

The financial constraints do not exist, besides, physical development will increase much demanded supplies. Therefore, this is good politics.

Reason for Likely:

The existing political system needs skilled manpower to achieve its goals and what it has promised.

The Degree of Conformity With the Present Trend and Existing Policies

Reasons for Very Likely:

Due to the present policy of the government.

The government's policy is in line with this.

The Fifth Plan has big room for this program.

Reasons for Likely:

This has the top priority.

Because of recognition of such a need by the Iranian Government.

Since it is a state program, the political force as a whole most probably helps the program. But, some individuals might resist.

Due to the present tendency of the government.
The state has in recent years expressed its concern to invest in human capital.

This force encourages such a tendency.

There has begun a move to broaden the human face of the Iranian industry.

The regional offices are required to take their management and staff from their respective cities so that the local educated force will be better acquainted with local problems.

Government considers it very important.

It is the trend.

Is in favor of this policy.

According to the new policy, the gap between profit-seeking and social responsibility of the enterprises is to be narrowed.

This is emphasized in government's new policy.

This is being done in Iran.

Measures are being taken to improve this situation.

The gradual public ownership of industry will amount to such a program.

Government subsidies now require such conditions.

Government is pinning them down on this program through its subsidies.

Private sector is offered to have a valuable platform in respect to public needs.

Private sector is being encouraged to assert itself more in such affairs.

Government is starting to give a way to a systematic campaign in this direction.

The new ruling in Iran is to stop influential officials from using their authority to influence decisions such as those in the above program.

Reason for Neutral:
Our political system is always for the betterment of human resources.

Reason for Unlikely:

Government's human resources are limited and the experience shows that the private sector is much more efficient in mobilizing resources, organizing undertakings, launching new projects and making them pay. Therefore, government can not press them to implement such a program.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to Political Force are presented in Table 2.

**Table 2**

The percentages of contribution of the subcategories of Political Force to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 of Section 1 of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Very Unlikely</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Leaders</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament &amp; the Law</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Demand</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of Social &amp; Economic Development</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trends &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ f = \text{frequency} \]
\[ \% = \text{percentage} \]
\[ N = \text{number of respondents} \]
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for human resource development was computed to be 4.0 or Likely (See Table 1). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 2).

Category II - Financial Force.

Subcategories:

Financial Capacity of Public Sector

Reasons for Very Likely:

Large sums of funds have been allocated to this end.

Due to financial prosperity of government, funds are available (Stated by eighteen respondents).

Due to the great rise in national income due to oil and gas revenues (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Due to oil income funds are available and incentives are provided (Stated by four respondents).

Financial Cooperation of the Private Sector and Financially Powerful

Reasons for Neutral:

The private sector may not agree.

Government finds it hard to push it through single-handedly.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Small industries can not afford this.

Resistance of the private sector.
Reason for Very Unlikely:

Big business won't invest for safeguarding of the human capital.

**Conditional and Uncertain**
Reasons for Likely:

Only if government persist, funds will be available.

There is some attention being paid to such a program.

Reason for Neutral:

If industrialists are convinced of the satisfactory impact of such a program, they will find it.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**
Reason for Unlikely:

It is difficult to change the direction of the investment money in a short run.

**Economic and Investment Concerns**
Reason for Very Likely:

Government will fund it because it will play a great role in country's future economy.

Reasons for Neutral:

Government cannot push an infant industry too far.

This might disperse investment.

The government's withdrawals of subsidies might endanger the economy.

**Major Interest Groups**
Reason for Unlikely:

Due to the fact that politically and administratively influential people provide such subsidies and there is a little legal provision to punish them.

**Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies**
Reasons for Very Likely:

There is no constraints and government subsidizes such programs (Stated by three respondents).

A huge sum of funds is allocated in the Fifth Plan.
Reasons for Likely:

State will provide funds (Stated by two respondents).

Government would pay for skilled worker training and regards with special favor the investment proposals that include provision for providing or training the necessary manpower.

Investors with training programs receive government subsidies.

Regional industries are ordered to develop human capital.

Reason for Neutral:

This may change the nature of goods production in Iran.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 3.
### Table 3

**The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Financial Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program I of Section I of the Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Unlikely (2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (1)</th>
<th>Percent Distribution</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resisting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial Capacity of Public Sector</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial Cooperation of Private Sector &amp; Financially Powerful</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity of Financial Management Agencies</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic &amp; Investment Concerns</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Interest Groups</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Priority Concerns</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disinterest</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Irrelevance</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Miscellaneous</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*f = frequency  
%= percentage  
N = number of respondents*

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program I for human resource development was computed to be 4.5 or Very Likely (See Table 1). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Political Force was determined and, then,
their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 3).

**Category III - Administrative Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Personnel Practice and Staff Adequacy**

**Reason for Neutral:**

Expert and trained personnel is not adequate to meet the needs of such a program. However, steps are being taken to remove the deficiency.

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

There is a chronic shortage of trained personnel in the administrative body as a whole.

Lack of qualified and competent staff (Stated by two respondents).

Weak personnel practice.

**Reason for Very Unlikely:**

No sufficient staff.

**Administrative and Management Talents**

**Reason for Very Unlikely:**

Acute shortage of management.

**Coordination**

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Lack of efficient coordination.

**Organizational Sufficiency**

**Reason for Neutral:**

At the present it does not have the necessary organizations but it will do as ordered.

**Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation**

**Reason for Very Likely:**

Lack of incentives.

**Reasons for Neutral:**
Indifferent and neutral (Stated by four respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

The administrative system still lacks the will power to adapt itself to change and quite often seems to hold a negative attitude.

It is indifferent.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns

Reason for Neutral:

Even though the public administration in this country has to carry out the political system's demand, it is not capable and technically equipped to do the job.

Reasons for Unlikely:

The administrative power of the government is poor and limited (Stated by two respondents).

Cannot administer and manage this program effectively with good results (Stated by three respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

No capability.

Responsibility and Awareness

Reason for Neutral:

Human resource development has not really been viewed in terms of community responsibilities.

Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise

Reason for Neutral:

Indifferent, due to scarcity of specialized manpower.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Bottlenecks in manpower availability.

Shortage of skilled manpower and ingenuity.

Does not have enough administrative skills to carry out such a program.

Scarcity of trained manpower, skills, techniques, methods and flexibility (Stated by four respondents).
This program requires the kind of knowledge which is lacking.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Shortage of professionally trained personnel.

Availability of Facilities
Reasons for Unlikely:

Most of the people live in the rural areas where administrative facilities are quite poor.

No special equipments and facilities are available.

Capacity for Training and Managing Manpower
Reason for Likely:

Labor force constraint exists and managerial skills are low.

Reasons for Unlikely:

No training experience or workshop available (Stated by two respondents).

Experience
Reasons for Unlikely:

Such a program has never been experienced (Stated by two respondents).

Bureaucracy Concerns
Reasons for Neutral:

Our administrative structure is not modern enough and suitable to affect any modern programs (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Weak administration.

Such an acting needs extraordinary flexibility which is alien to the rigid administrative system of our country.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Due to the primitive and also complicated state of administrative system.

Flexibility of Rules and Regulations
Reason for Very Likely:
Government's administrative capabilities have been oriented toward this goal through various laws and regulations.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category III</th>
<th>Administrative Force</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Very Unlikely</th>
<th>% in Supportive</th>
<th>% in Neutral</th>
<th>% in Resisting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories:</td>
<td></td>
<td>f</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Practice &amp; Staff Adequacy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative &amp; Management Talents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Sufficiency</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1th</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Willingness, Motivation &amp; Initiation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1th</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

f = frequency  
% = percentage  
N = number of respondents
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for human resource development in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 2.1 or Unlikely (See Table 1). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 4).

Category IV - Socio-cultural Force.

Subcategories:

Willingness of Social Force in General

Reasons for Very Likely:

The Majority of social groups favor this program and support it by considering it as a means to better the present situation (Stated by five respondents).

The social groups are bothered by carelessness of the big business about people's conditions. Therefore they will consider this program desirable (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Social system will welcome such initiations and will support them (Stated by five respondents).

Socio-cultural force is in favor of the government subsidies rather than the community's.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Due to social resistance.

Intellectual Groups

Reason for Likely:

Pressure from the educated groups.

Major Interest Groups

Reasons for Unlikely:
This program needs too much money and industrialists will resist it for being least economical (Stated by three respondents).

**Organized Groups**

Reason for Very Likely:

Social and cultural groups are governmental, so, they always support political forces.

Reason for Likely:

All social forces except the big business will support it.

**Diversity of Interests, Attitudes and Priorities**

Reason for Unlikely:

Prevalent individualistic tendencies have created an indifferent attitude which fails to promote favorable changes.

**Religious, Traditional and Cultural Concerns**

Reason for Unlikely:

So far, cultural emphasis for development of human resources has been modest.

**Public Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction**

Reason for Very Likely:

This program will be appreciated by majority of people.

**Public Demand and Need**

Reasons for Very Likely:

This program has been demanded by people for too long (Stated by four respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

The society demands more use of physical resources.

Social force is not progressed because organized social groups as such do not exist in Iran.

**Labor Force and Labor Market Concerns**

Reasons for Very Likely:

This will help the working force to master specific techniques.

This program is very ideal to the working people.

Because workers need more than routine care.
Because of the shortcoming of labor market due to the lack of skills.

A great number of unskilled workers who are unemployed will benefit from it (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Labor force will support this program because it will create specialization, and, therefore, a more secure work climate which is needed due to the huge bulk of unskilled workers (Stated by five respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

In the rural areas, the role of specialization is not clear especially with a look on the traditional culture. But, it can be improved.

Economic and Income Concerns

Reason for Very Likely:

Because this program will be a better source of income for the families.

Reason for Likely:

They are always willing to bet on something that promises them more than what they have.

Conditional and Uncertain

Reason for Likely:

This force agrees if understands.

Degree of Public Awareness

Reason for Likely:

The people of this country who historically loved to be educated now realize the economic importance of education and skilled manpower.

Reason for Neutral:

For the masses of people, this is a contemporary approach to development, thus, it has been fully recognized.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns

Reason for Neutral:

People may be educated freely, and there will always be some groups to support education. But, beyond more education may rise implementation problems.
The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the Socio-cultural Force are presented in Table 5.

**Table 5**

**THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 1 OF SECTION 1 OF THE PLAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category IV</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Unlikely (3)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (1)</th>
<th>% in Supportive (7)</th>
<th>% in Neutral (7)</th>
<th>% in Unsupportive (7)</th>
<th>Subcategories</th>
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f = frequency  
X = percentage  
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for human resource development in respect to the Socio-
cultural Force was computed to be 4.3 or Likely (See Table 1). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Socio-cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 5).

**Category V - Educational Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence.**

Reason for Likely:

Our educational institutions are going to develop for having the necessary capacity.

Reasons for Neutral:

The educational institutions feel that it is within their capacity.

Capacity of educational institutions is being increased to provide required conditions.

Unfortunately the existing educational system is not capable and, therefore, cannot meet the growing demand of the people for better and more education, especially meaningful education.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Educational system lacks capability to train more skilled workers, technicians and middle-level managers.

Our educational standard is quite low.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Cannot assist this program due to the lack of training capacity (Stated by three respondents).

**Capacity of Schools for General Education**

Reasons for Likely:
Due to the establishment of educational institutions almost everywhere, and also due to the free education (Stated by two respondents).

**Willingness and Demand of Educational Institutions**

Reason for Likely:

Educational institutions have always been spokesmen for change of this kind.

Conditionally Uncertain

Reason for Likely:

This force will agree if understands the program.

Reasons for Neutral:

- It remains indifferent until it is ordered.
- It would respond positively but won't be capable of taking its part in implementation.
- Can contribute only in long-run.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reason for Neutral:

The educational institutions have not taken the initiation to create the required manpower skills.

Reason for Unlikely:

Inability to meet the need for producing qualified manpower.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Unprepared, unqualified, and incapable to play a major role in implementation of this program (Stated by six respondents).

**Instructional Concerns**

Reasons for Unlikely:

Country does not have enough qualified teachers and instructors, and the quality of instruction is well below international standards (Stated by three respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Lack of teachers and educational projects.
Awareness, Expertise and Experience
Reason for Very Unlikely:

Shortage of expertise in manpower training.

Orientation Toward National Development
Reason for Neutral:

The new programs of the Fifth Plan are to increase the ability of this force.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Educational institutions are not service-oriented.

Educational power is poor to back such programs.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

No efforts have been made to incorporate this philosophy into our educational establishment.

Is not oriented toward the development of the country (Stated by four respondents).

General education is its major function.

Facilities, Techniques and Finance
Reasons for Unlikely:

Lacks the needed facilities (Stated by two respondents).

In Relation With Other Forces Acting In Iran
Reason for Unlikely:

It has no significant relationship with the economy.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Is not socio-economic oriented.

Disinterest
Reasons for Neutral:

This force is indifferent and has no concern with the development of the country (Stated by seven respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the Educational force are presented in Table 6.
### Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category V Educational Force</th>
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<th>Neutral Like-ly (3)</th>
<th>Very Un-like-ly (4)</th>
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<th>Percentages</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
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<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
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Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for human resource development in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 1.9 or Unlikely (See Table 1). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the
Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 6).

**Analysis For Program 2 (Job Distribution) of Section I**

**The Program**

Economic development and acceleration of technical progress requires an increasing redistribution of jobs between different sectors of activities. Therefore, professional mobility shall be facilitated through continued readaptation of the employment structure and individual promotion.

**Part 1.** Table 7 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for job distribution.

**TABLE 7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE RESULTS OF THE RESPONDENTS' RATING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 2 OF SECTION I OF THE PLAN IN RESPECT TO 5 FORCES</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FORCES</strong></td>
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<td>Financial</td>
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<td>Socio-cultural</td>
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<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
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</table>

f = frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood

% = percentage

n = number of respondents

Md = median

Table 7 presents the computed frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the five prospective forces.

**Part 2.** Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by
the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force, as shown by the medians in Table 7, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

**Category I - Political Force.**

Subcategories:

**National Leaders**
Reason for Very Likely:

The Shah has shown his interest in strengthening the employment structure and individual promotion.

Reason for Unlikely:

Some individuals on the top job resist according to their benefits or losses.

**Political Parties**
Reason for Very Likely:

No opposition from political groups.

**Priority Concerns**
Reason for Likely:

The government has given priority to creating schools for agricultural and industrial training in the Fifth Plan.

**Conditional and Uncertain**
Reason for Likely:

Continued readaptation of civil service code is necessary to keep pace with the changes. The party in power can operationalize this program once convinced of its importance.

Reasons for Neutral:

Government, and more often the political forces, tend to secure technological progress. But, according to the internal policies, they avoid principal help and involvement.

Such a mobilization needs a great deal of efforts and risk that I do not believe the political system is ready to undertake in this stage of the game which stability is its name.
Reason for Very Unlikely:

The leaders of our political forces are not actually sure of our administrative organizations to provide for this program.

Major Interest Groups
Reason for Neutral:

If private sector cooperates with the public sector, this program can be implemented.

Consideration of Social and Economic Development
Reasons for Likely:

Economically, this is the goal of the government.

The unparalleled economic growth of Iran has made the need for strong professional mobility noticeable.

Due to the expansion of administrative, commercial, industrial and social organizations which had resulted in management of manpower assuming great importance in Iran.

Government is trying to meet the bulk of its manpower needs by expanding the education institutions.

The increasing complexity of business necessitates skilled manpower training with a caliber bigger than the existing one.

A comprehensive program for training of manpower at all levels from managerial to simple skills is on the way.

Because such a mobility will raise the efficiency of the workers as well as the productivity of the economy.

Reasons for Unlikely:

There is recognition of the need for such a mobility but the transitional state of the economy does not require this.

With a high rate of unemployment, the government does not favor professional mobility by considering it as a source of instability in labor market.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Still a lot of people are jobless and there does not seem to be a need for several specialization.

Degree of Conformity With the Present Trend and Existing Policies
Reason for Very Likely:
Because the government has fully appreciated the importance of this factor and its necessity for further development.

Reasons for Likely:

With the program of "job classification", the government is going in the line of this program, but not seemingly a program at the level of private sector or all over the country.

Economic mobility is the goal of Iranian government.

Government's apparent policies seem to be in favor of such programs especially in the big cities (Stated by three respondents).

Government is concerned with social and cultural aspects of the life of the working class.

Implementation of the new policy of decentralization of economic activities is hoped to create new employment opportunities throughout the country.

The Fifth Plan is to create about 3/4 of a million jobs to be filled by trained manpower.

Government's basic policy is to create 500,000 new jobs in next two years and train manpower for them.

Guidance project, adapted by the government to help to orient students toward a career for which they have potential and will best satisfy the need of the country, is getting off the ground.

Government is trying to expand vocational training in Iran.

Government is establishing vocational training centers to produce 3000 blue-collar workers per year.

In conformity with the programs of the Fifth Plan (Stated by seven respondents).

A new system of offering scholarship is created for providing manpower for different sectors of activities.

Reasons for Unlikely:

The political system does not like instability of job structure.

Iran's policies are not shaped in response to long-run needs.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns

Reasons for Unlikely:
It causes problems of implementation.

Due to poor management practices in the government.

Due to the fact that Iran had almost no tradition in business studies until a decade ago.

Cannot create enough mobility to keep up with the speed of Iran's growing economy.

Since big national and multi-national corporates are rapidly emerging in the country, it is hard to keep up with professional mobility.

Expansion of industry has created need for trained manpower in transportation, communication and telecommunication which is scarce. This indicates the lack of professional mobility.

Miscellaneous
Reason for Likely:

Professional mobility, to some extent, can be achieved.

Reason for Neutral:

This has a little political implications.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 8.
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for job distribution in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 3.7 or Likely (See Table 7). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 8).
Category II - Financial Force.

Subcategories:

Financial Capacity of Public Sector

Reasons for Very Likely:

Favorable reaction due to the government's financial capability (Stated by nineteen respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Availability of financial resources (Stated by three respondents).

Financial Cooperation of Private Sector and Financially Powerful

Reasons for Unlikely:

Investors in the private sector will resist this program by considering it as a source of instability (Stated by two respondents).

Conditional and Uncertain

Reason for Likely:

Funds are available although the results are unpredictable.

Reasons for Neutral:

Such programs are being assessed to estimate their cost.

Quantitative analysis of labor market is needed for answering such a question.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns

Reasons for Very Likely:

Financial sources are available but most programs are indifferent.

Reason for Likely:

There is need for the funds to pay the qualified personnel.

Reason for Neutral:

It is too complex to be appropriately funded.

Reasons for Unlikely:

The rising number of workers makes the funding of this program difficult.
No real skills classification to identify needs for funding purposes.

**Economic and Investment Concerns**

Reasons for Unlikely:

- It is too costly (Stated by two respondents).

**Major Interest Groups**

Reason for Likely:

- There is demand-pull factor.

**Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies**

Reasons for Very Likely:

- The Fifth Plan has allocated a large sum for such a program (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

- Professional mobility is a new phenomenon in Iran which receives government's financial assistance.
- Positive reaction due to the government's recognition of the need (Stated by two respondents).
- Such programs are being funded especially at the provincial level.
- Government gives loans to the private sector for such programs.
- Loans for development projects have such conditions.
- Private sector is being required to pay attention to this program.
- State owned corporates are ordered to fund such programs.
- Negotiations are taking place to tackle such programs.
- The Ministry of Labor is planning quite a few projects on this.

Reason for Neutral:

- Due to the need for infrastructural and industrial investments and inability to use the money, they are indifferent to this program.

Reason for Unlikely:

- The continuation of today's progress of Iran to certain degree depends on less mobility on the part of the skilled government officials.
Disinterest
Reason for Unlikely;

They usually do not fund programs with unpredictable outcome.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Vary</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
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<tr>
<td>Financial Capacity of Public Sector</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>44</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Miscellaneous</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* * *

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for job distribution in respect to the Financial Force was
computed to be 4.3 or Likely (See Table 7). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were identified. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Financial Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 9).

**Category III - Administrative Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Personnel Practice and Staff Adequacy**

*Reason for Neutral:*

The number of well-versed and sufficiently expert personnel appears to be inadequate.

*Reason for Unlikely:*

Due to scarcity of specialized staff.

**Administrative and Management Talents**

*Reason for Very Unlikely:*

No knowledge of methods of personnel management and deployment of available resources.

**Organizational Sufficiency**

*Reason for Neutral:*

Our administrative functions are quite limited in rural areas and small towns.

*Reason for Unlikely:*

There is need for institutions to manage such programs for Iran's growing economy.

**Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation**

*Reasons for Neutral:*

Lack of enthusiastic management and the indifference of the authorities (Stated by two respondents).

*Reason for Unlikely:*


Lack of skill and desire on the part of Iran's administrative system.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reasons for Neutral:

Lack of coordination and, therefore, efficiency (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

The administrative power of the government is poor and cannot handle a dynamic labor market, mostly because it is not resource-oriented (Stated by three respondents).

Such a program needs new services to be rendered, but this force is lacking the necessary capability.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Ten years ago they tried to set down an employment structure but have not done anything ever since.

No standard of proficiency is recognized.

Such an adaption to change is beyond its capacity.

**Responsibility and Awareness**

Reason for Likely:

There is need for people who have more sense of responsibility.

Reason for Neutral:

This force has no idea, and does as is ordered.

Reason for Unlikely:

They are afraid this might create uncertainties.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

This force is unaware of the importance of transforming human potential into competence.

**Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise**

Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of suitable administrative skills (Stated by two respondents).

No ability to anticipate such professional changes.
Their technical know how is usually very limited and, therefore, it will take for this force some time to be acquainted with the new system.

Vocational school graduates usually leave the country.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Has no professional expertise and modern approach to implement this program (Stated by two respondents).

Capacity for Training and Managing Manpower

Reasons for Unlikely:

Because our speed of developing skilled work force has not been adequate in the past.

No careful control of labor force and its mobility.

Cannot identify the needs of market for skills in case of industrial change.

Does not exactly know what kind of skills should be imparted to different workers.

The management of Iran's growing economy is getting too complex to handle.

Workshop conditions for vocational training are not proper.

Incapable of providing a coherent program of vocational training, or on-the-job training which is needed for implementation of this program.

Incapable of introducing new techniques.

Incapable of creating new channels of training to upgrade persons with experience and low priority occupations.

Incapable to acquire new training.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

No ability for analysis of human resource necessary for careful study of allocation of scarce skills.

Has no educational channels for transfer of information and training (Stated by two respondents).

Corruption

Reasons for Unlikely:
Will be a source of bribery, graft and corruption (Stated by two respondents).

Experience
Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of experience in industrial specialization program.

Lack of experience in stimulating manpower mobility.

Bureaucracy Concerns
Reasons for Unlikely:

This force is not very practical due to bureaucratic complexity.

Bureaucracy is one of the essential problems in Iran.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

The demand has already been felt, but the administrative force has no way of undertaking and doing something to meet it.

Degree of Flexibility of the Rules and Regulations
Reason for Likely:

Due to flexibility of regulations.

In Relation With Other Forces Acting in the Country
Reason for Very Likely:

The Shah has shown his interest in strengthening the employment structure and individual promotions.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 10.
### Table 10

The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Administrative Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 2 of Section 1 of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories</th>
<th>Very Likely (1)</th>
<th>Like (2)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>In Order</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Sup-</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Res-</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<td>Personnel Practice &amp; Staff Adequacy</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Sufficiency</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6th</td>
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<td>Degree of Willingness, Motivation &amp; Initiation</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>32.5</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>78</td>
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<td>Responsibility &amp; Awareness</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Skills, Methods &amp; Expertise</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3rd</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity for Training &amp; Managing Manpower</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>1st</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>6th</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5th</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting In the Country</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| f | 1 | 2 | 7 | 29 | 11 | 50 | 100X |

*Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for job distribution in respect to Administrative Force was computed to be 1.9 or Unlikely (See Table 7). In Part 2, the subcategories*
contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 10).

Category IV - Socio-cultural Force.

Subcategories:

Willingness of Social Force in General
Reasons for Very Likely:

This force is favorable and will well support the program (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

People, with all their attachment to family life, are willing to change jobs because they are seeking material returns.

Will hardly face any resistance on the part of social forces (Stated by seven respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to the feel of insecurity (Stated by two respondents).

Diversity of Interests, Attitudes and Priorities
Reasons for Neutral:

Due to conservative and individualistic attitudes of the people involved (Stated by two respondents).

Religious, Traditional and Cultural Concerns
Reason for Neutral:

Regardless of traditional elements, cultural forces do not affect this program.

Reasons for Unlikely:

This force weakens the program because, culturally, families are willing to stay together (Stated by two respondents).

Public Demand
Reasons for Very Likely:
This is a national demand and the people are very eager to see such a change happen (Stated by two respondents).

**Labor Force and Labor Market Concerns**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

- Due to the need for mobility of this kind.
- This program will be a big contribution to the employment opportunities.
- This program will provide skills for new jobs.
- Because this will increase manpower efficiency and the national income per capita (Stated by two respondents).
- This program will open new job opportunities for different professions (Stated by three respondents).
- This will be an unemployment insurance to protect the displaced workers.
- Such a program takes into account the importance of raising the standard of skills to be utilized by the working force.
- Such a program is certainly welcomed in the labor market of a traditional economy.

**Reasons for Likely:**

- This program will make a preparation for manpower needs and employment opportunities.
- This will tend to maintain a balance between job demand and job opportunities.
- Such a program will be a solution to the problem created by diversified labor market.
- This will offer employment opportunities for new skills and reduce the uncertainties of the labor market (Stated by two respondents).
- This will provide a mobile labor market.

**Economic and Income Concerns**

**Reason for Very Likely:**

Implementation of any program which will improve the welfare of the working force will be socially supported.
Reasons for Likely:

Because diversification of labor force market is in fact the most formidable challenge that the Iranian economy faces.

Will provide more benefit and security for working men.

Reason for Neutral:

The society may more than welcome changes which result in greater benefit to it.

Reason for Unlikely:

They want more jobs not more people who do different jobs.

Conditional and Uncertain

Reason for Likely:

If this program comes through, it will affect the acceptance of organized groups toward welfare of other people.

Reasons for Neutral:

The set order will still work.

No essential effect.

They are willing but how successful the adaptation of the employment structure will depend on the approach taken by the political force which is unwilling in this case.

Reason for Unlikely:

Such a mobility (unless forced by the executive branch of the government) very much depends on the willingness of the individuals. If they would decide to do so, then, the low income would be the problem.

Degree of Public Awareness

Reason for Unlikely:

With 65 per cent of the population being illiterate, teaching a trade to each individual is a blessing by itself.

In Relation With Other Forces Acting In Iran

Reason for Very Unlikely:

They are not sure of this program because they are afraid of the incapability of the administrative forces.
The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Socio-cultural Force are presented in Table 11.

### Table 11

**The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Socio-Cultural Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 2 of Section I of the Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category IV Sociocultural Force</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Unlikely (3)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (1)</th>
<th>Z in Rank Order</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
<td>Willingness of Social Groups in General</td>
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<td>Major Interest Groups</td>
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<td>Diversity of Interest, Attitudes &amp; Priorities</td>
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<td>6th</td>
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<td>Religious, Traditional Cultural Concerns</td>
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<td>5th</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Satisfaction &amp; Dissatisfaction</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Demand &amp; Need</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Force &amp; Labor Market Concerns</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic &amp; Insecure Concerns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12th</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2th</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| f = frequency | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 |
| Z = percentage | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| N = number of respondents | 50 | 100% |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for job distribution in respect to the Socio-cultural Force was
computed to be 4.0 or Likely (See Table 7). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Socio-cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table II).

Category V - Educational Force.

Subcategories:

Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence
Reason for Neutral:

The present educational system does not prepare graduates for this kind of mobility.

Reason for Unlikely:

Limited capacity.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Lack of capacity for such a program (Stated by two respondents).

Capacity of Vocational and Technical Schools
Reasons for Unlikely:

The acute shortage of vocational schools (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Vocational training is very limited in Iran.

Conditional and Uncertain
Reason for Likely:

It is inevitable for any educational system to affect the ability of labor force positively and I hope this will be the case in Iran.

Reasons for Neutral:

Simply because increasing the capacity of educational centers do not increase professional mobility.
Necessary training and other methods concerning development of human resources need too much time.

The Fifth Plan's educational programs might serve this purpose in the future.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reason for Neutral:

Has no essential effect.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Incapable to play its role in human resource development (Stated by five respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Lack of sufficient capacity to introduce specialization.

Educational system cannot contribute to professional mobility (Stated by four respondents).

Educational system does not have the required qualifications.

Development in Iran has always been short of its educational systems contribution.

Has no effect.

**Instructional Concerns**

Reason for Unlikely:

The country simply does not have sufficient teachers it needs to resolve such problems.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Lack of efficient instructional cadres.

**Awareness, Expertise and Experience**

Reasons for Neutral:

They have no possible idea about this program.

We have not tried out of town education yet.

**Orientation Toward National Development**

Reason for Likely:

This force recognizes the needs of the country for development.
Reason for Unlikely:

Educational institutions are not market-oriented.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

The general curriculum of the educational system cannot serve the labor market and economic development (Stated by four respondents).

Degree of Flexibility
Reason for Likely:

There is flexibility in the educational system to contribute to the implementation of this program.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Unable to produce flexibility required by this program (Stated by three respondents).

Facilities, Techniques and Finance
Reason for Neutral:

Shortage of qualified personnel may be an obstacle, however the situation improves as the time goes on.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Does not have enough facilities to accelerate professional mobility (Stated by two respondents).

Diversity of Interests, Attitudes and Priorities
Reason for Neutral:

Individualistic attitudes of the educational institutions are the main problems.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran
Reason for Very Likely:

The Shah has shown his interest in strengthening the employment structure and individual promotions.

Reason for Unlikely:

The role of the educational force, compare to the other acting forces, is not significant.

Disinterest
Reasons for Neutral:
This force is indifferent (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

always remains in different.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Educational Force are presented in Table 12.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category V</th>
<th>Very Like-ly</th>
<th>Very Un-likely</th>
<th>% in Rank- ed</th>
<th>Neutr- al</th>
<th>Res- ection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Educational Force</td>
<td></td>
<td>All Subcate-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Existing Trained</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manpower</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity to Transfer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Potential Into</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Competence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Schools</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>for General Education</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity of Vocational</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Technical Schools</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity of Higher</td>
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<td>Education Institutions</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness &amp; Demand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>of Educational Institutions</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Concerns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Instructional</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Concerns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness, Expertise</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; Experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation Toward</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Development</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Faculties, Technical</td>
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<td>Diversity of Interests &amp;</td>
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<td>Priorities</td>
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<td>Educational Elite</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(educated &amp; educator)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces Acting in Iran</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

f = frequency  \( \times 1 \) 4 11 16 18 50 100%

X = percentages
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing program 2 for job distribution in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 1.9 or Unlikely (See Table 7). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Educational Force were determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 12).

Analysis For Program 3 (Open Competition) of Section I

The Program

The capitalist undertakings incapable of developing the most open competition shall be eliminated except those which can improve urban and rural areas in regard to their needs identified by the local authorities. Nationalized and the mixed undertakings shall be subject to the same rule of open competition.

Part 1. Table 13 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for open competition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE RESULTS OF THE RESPONDENTS' RATING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 3 OF SECTION I OF THE PLAN IN RESPECT TO 5 FORCES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| FORCES       | Very Un- | Like- | Neutral | Un- | Like- | Very Like- | Total |
|--------------|---------|-------|---------|     |       |           |       |
|              | ly(1)   | ly(2) | ly(3)   | ly(4)| ly(5) |          |       |
| Political    | 4       | 13    | 3       | 5   | 12    | 49        | 100   |
| Financial    | 12      | 21    | 3       | 5   | 15    | 48        | 100   |
| Administrative| 0       | 21    | 2       | 4   | 15    | 48        | 100   |
| Socio-cultural| 15      | 10    | 3       | 5   | 15    | 48        | 100   |
| Educational  | 1       | 9     | 4       | 2   | 2     | 43        | 100   |

*f* = frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood

| 2 | percentage |
| W | number of respondents |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Md</th>
<th>median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Table 13 presents the computed frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the five prospective forces.

Part 2. Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force, as shown by the medians in Table 13, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

**Category I - Political Force.**

Subcategories:

**National Leaders**

**Reason for Very Likely:**

The national leaders support this program in order to have the most control.

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Government decides what is needed not the people.

**Parliament and the Law**

**Reason for Likely:**

Since most of the politically influential people own the capitalist undertakings, the new law which prohibits high level civil servants from having shares or interests in private business is enacted to stop this tendency.

**Priority Concerns**

**Reason for Neutral:**

Government is mindless of free competition. What it considers important is the investment.

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Such a need is not considered urgent.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

**Reasons for Likely:**

Government sector has monopolies, but in some of the industries (light industries) tends to free competition.
There is no evident resistance on the part of government to promote competition except for some of the enterprises engaged in public utilities.

This matter is under serious consideration.

Reason for Neutral:

Some practical suggestions are under study.

Major Interest Groups
Reasons for Unlikely:

Because of the facilities of the capital city, the industrialists demand to have their firms in Teheran (Stated by two respondents).

Public Demand
Reason for Unlikely:

Due to the shortage of strong and significant local voices.

Consideration of Social and Economic Development
Reasons for Likely:

In order to bring about a more fair distribution of income.

The political system's great desire for rapid industrialization requires more more of the free competition in Iran's market and I believe, with all the difficulties, the political system favors it and will enhance it.

Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies
Reasons for Very Likely:

Political forces tend to help free competition.

There is monopoly in some public enterprises. But, the government's policy is in line with such a competition.

Government is subsidizing operations to the promoters of technical schools and other service industries to train skilled labor to be employed by the capitalist undertakings who would serve the purpose of the above program.

Reasons for Likely:

Government has been encouraging the private sector to locate new enterprises in the provinces and away from the major cities (Stated by seven respondents).

The political atmosphere seems to be shaping up to allow freedom of economic initiatives.
Government provides tax and credit incentive to make the private sector more responsible to the public needs (Stated by four respondents).

There are some schemes for regional and local development that depend to a larger extent on local participation (Stated by six respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

Medium-sized industries are being subsidised to help such programs.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Free competition is not liked by the political system at this moment.

The political system is interested in capitalistic system and any change from this will seem as a disruption in the established economic system.

Need assessment process has not been recognized in Iran.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Open competition requires a democratic system.

"Most open competition" does not exist in most - and major - areas of our undertakings.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reason for Unlikely:

Due to the red tape, it takes the industrialists several months to obtain permission to establish new plants in the provinces.

Miscellaneous
Reason for Neutral:

This force does not interfere very much.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 14.
### Table 14

**The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Political Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 3 of Section I of the Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Very Like-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Neutral Like-</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
<th>% in Rank-</th>
<th>Supporting</th>
<th>Resisting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Force</td>
<td>Like(I)</td>
<td>Like(II)</td>
<td>Like(III)</td>
<td>Unlike(IV)</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Leaders</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament &amp; the Law</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Political Parties</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Demand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of Social &amp; Economic Development</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>57.5</td>
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<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
- *f* = frequency
- *%* = percentage
- *N* = number of respondents

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for open competition in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 3.6 or Likely (See Table 13). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were
identified (See the last four columns of Table 14).

Category II - Financial Force.

Subcategories:

Financial Capacity of Public Sector

Reasons for Very Likely:

By twenty-three billion dollars in oil income in this year versus five billions last year, now the government is rich enough to undertake the development of the rural and urban areas.

Funds and financial means are available (Stated by six respondents).

Reason for Likely:

Government subsidies can be available.

Cooperation of Private Sector and Financially Powerful

Reasons for Unlikely:

This is not in line with the interest of the big capitalist undertakings and, therefore, they will resist it. The main reason is that they are afraid of losing their profits (Stated by four respondents).

Conditional and Uncertain

Reason for Likely:

Financial means are available on the condition that they do not interfere with the government's political programs.

Reason for Neutral:

Only if government compensate for the probable loss of private sector, they will implement this program.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Free competition may endanger the domestic market.

Only the service producing industries can be persuaded.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns

Reasons for Unlikely:

Major industries are state-owned which are hard for the private sector to compete with.
Industrial units located in the local areas cannot compete with those in the capital city.

The private sector undertakings are too young to tolerate such a free competition.

**Economic and Investment Concerns**

**Reason for Neutral:**

Because, at least in the short-run, the drive for real free competition may lower the desirability to invest.

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

National investment may face problems due to incorrect distribution of income.

It may run the small industries out of business.

It will deflect the supply of goods (Stated by two respondents).

The system is mixed economy where the private sector cannot afford free competition (Stated by two respondents).

**Major Interest Groups**

**Reason for Unlikely:**

There will be more monopoly due to the financial power of the financial elite.

**Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

No financial problems and constraints (Stated by five respondents).

**Reasons for Likely:**

Government is encouraging the business firms through incentives (Stated by four respondents).

Competition among middle-sized industries is stimulated through government incentives.

**Reasons for Neutral:**

Competition is very limited (Stated by two respondents).

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

Ten per cent of the people controlling forty per cent of the wealth makes them financially a strong power capable of resisting such a motion.
Since political forces are not separated from financial forces, they cannot be expected to impose free competition upon capitalists.

Even import of several goods has been prohibited in Iran in order to save the domestic industries from competition.

Government is not exerting pressure on the businessmen.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

The trend is reverse (Stated by three respondents).

Disinterest
Reason for Neutral:

I believe the government will remain inactive about this program due to the power of financially powerful people.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 15.
### TABLE 13

**THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF FINANCIAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 3 OF SECTION 1 OF THE PLAN**

<table>
<thead>
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</table>

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for open competition in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 2.5 or Unlikely (See Table 13). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Financial Force was
determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 15).

**Category III - Administrative Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Personnel Practice and Staff Adequacy**  
Reasons for Unlikely:  

Shortage of trained, qualified and technically experienced personnel (Stated by four respondents).

**Administrative and Management Talents**  
Reasons for Unlikely:  

Lack of managerial talents to manage sound competition in an established monopoly system (Stated by four respondents).

**Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation**  
Reasons for Neutral:  

This force is indifferent, neutral and unconcerned about such a program (Stated by twenty respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:  

Due to the profit-seeking attitudes of the decision makers in the private sector as well as public sector, this program will not be supported (Stated by two respondents).

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**  
Reasons for Neutral:  

Administrative system could serve such a purpose if ordered (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:  

The administrative force is poor and cannot contribute to implementation of this program especially because it is not service-oriented (Stated by four respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:  

Administrative system suffers from incapability.

**Responsibility and Awareness**  
Reasons for Neutral:
The administrative system at this moment neither realizes the importance of this program nor has the know how to implement it.

Reason for Unlikely:

Local governments do not know how to use authority with a sense of responsibility.

Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise

Reason for Unlikely:

Lack of trained and specialized manpower.

Bureaucracy Concerns

Reason for Neutral:

The free competition will influence a profound transformation in the administrative system.

Reasons for Unlikely:

They regard any change of this kind as a potential source of due to complicated bureaucratic system.

The administrators evade right decisions of such.

In Relation with the Other Forces Acting in Iran

Reason for Likely:

The government may sometimes interfere on the behalf of this program.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 16.
### TABLE 16

THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 3 OF SECTION I OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Unlikely (2)</th>
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<th>f = frequency</th>
<th>N = number of respondents</th>
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</table>

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for open competition in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 2.5 or Unlikely (See Table 13). In Part 2, the subcate-
categories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Administrative Force was determined, and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 16).

**Category IV - Socio-cultural Force.**

Subcategories:

**Willingness of Social Groups in General**

Reasons for Very Likely:

Social groups are enthusiastic and will strongly advocate free competition (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Most of the social groups, especially local groups, will favor this program (Stated by five respondents).

**Intellectual Groups**

Reason for Very Likely:

The intellectual elite argues that, as far as development projects are concerned, government should use cost-effectiveness measures rather than cost-benefit.

Reason for Likely:

The intellectuals believe that profit yardstick should not be applied to human needs.

**Major Interest Groups**

Capitalist undertakings are from such a level that the socio-cultural forces cannot affect them.

Only big subsidies could provoke the big industrial units to implement this program.

Reasons for Unlikely:

The big business concerns who are influential will resist this program (Stated by four respondents).

The urban enterprises always produce for the market only, not for social service purposes.
Religious, Traditional and Cultural Concerns
Reason for Unlikely:

Our cultural forces are for individualistic approaches.

Disinterest and Cynicism
Reason for Neutral:

Indifferent.

Reason for Unlikely:

Lack of social concern for the welfare of the society as a whole.

Development Concerns
Reasons for Very Likely:

The broader such a program the higher the rate of industrial growth in local areas.

Due to the fact that absorptive ability of the urban and rural areas has been underestimated.

This will mean spread of development activities in a local sense.

Reason for Likely:

This will stimulate local development.

In Relation to Government's Influence
Reason for Unlikely:

This force wants the government lower the high prices.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

This force likes dependence on the government.

Public Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction
Reasons for Very Likely:

Because their rights have been overlooked by the big business.

This program will secure the satisfaction of the people.

Public Demand and Need
Reason for Very Likely:

Due to the rising public demand.

Reasons for Likely:

The public demand is powerful.
They would like to see the government need-oriented rather than profit-oriented.

People of this country, having paid expensive prices for domestic products which are supported by tariff regulations on the exports for preventing foreign competition, are now strongly in favor of more free competition.

**Labor Force and Labor Market Concerns**

*Reasons for Very Likely:*

- Demand pressure of the blue-collar workers.
- This will provide a broad market demand for labor in local areas.
- Implementation of such a program means a higher responsibility on the part of industrial units concerning the local labor market.

**Economic and Income Concerns**

*Reason for Very Likely:*

- The social forces are in favor of earning more and being given a more responsible role to play.

*Reasons for Likely:*

- Such a program will bring more income to the local people in the urban and rural areas (Stated by two respondents).

**Conditional and Uncertain**

*Reason for Likely:*

- The city councils have been talking about this program.

*Reason for Neutral:*

- Only big financial incentives might make the big business implement this program.

**Degree of Public Awareness**

*Reason for Very Likely:*

- Public considers this as a rational choice.

*Reason for Likely:*

- The general public is aware that such an opportunity can be provided.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

*Reason for Neutral:*

There is no competition among the provinces to attract industries.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to inability of this force to produce competition, this program will increase the prices of the consumer goods.

Does not enjoy managerial ability.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran

Reason for Likely:

This force has a little influence over the whole change.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

The system of pure capitalism has no place in Iran (Stated by two respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the Socio-cultural Force are presented in Table 17.
### TABLE 17

THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 3 OF SECTION I OF THE PLAN

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<th>%</th>
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*f = frequency  
% = percentage  
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for open competition in respect to the Socio-cultural Force was computed to be 3.9 or Likely (See Table 13). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were identified. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories
according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Socio-cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 17).

**Category V - Educational Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence**

Reasons for Unlikely:

Incapable of personnel and management training (Stated by two respondents).

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reasons for Neutral:

There is not such an aggregate force to oppose such a program (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

Educational system is too weak to help the implementation of this program (Stated by four respondents).

Due to the deficiencies of the educational institutions to cope with change.

**Awareness, Expertise and Experience**

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Open competition needs continual research and high level expertise, but the educational system is not in this line.

**Orientation Toward National Development**

Reason for Neutral:

Necessary techniques and education required for management of reasonable competition are barely taught in the schools.

**Diversity of Interests and Priorities**

Reason for Likely:

Due to the capitalistic patterns in the higher education institutions.

**Educational Elite**

Reason for Likely:
Rising expectation of educated class and their demand for free competition.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran
Reasons for Unlikely:

Educational forces are not strong in the direction which the economic enterprises are (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Because our political system is not in favor of free competition the educational force will take the same position.

Disinterest
Reasons for Neutral:

The educational force, in respect to such programs, is indifferent, neutral and unconcerned (Stated by twenty-three respondents).

Educational forces have never expressed their feelings in this respect.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the Educational Force are presented in Table 18.
### Table 18

The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Educational Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 3 of Section I of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category V</th>
<th>Very Like- ly(5)</th>
<th>Neu- Un- Like- ly(4)</th>
<th>Very Un- Like- ly(3)</th>
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<th>ly(1)</th>
<th>% in Rank- Order</th>
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<td>Diversity of Interests &amp; Priorities</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>In Relation With Other Forces Act in Iran</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| f = frequency | 1 | 2 | 27 | 9 | 4 | 43 | 100% |
| X = percentages |       |       |       |       |       |       |      |
| N = number of respondents |       |       |       |       |       |       |      |

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for free competition in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 3.0 or Neutral (See Table 13). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Educational Force...
was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 18).

**Analysis For Program 4 (Unemployment Insurance) of Section I**

The Program

Any wage earner who might lose his livelihood through technological change shall be entitled to the fullest support from his country; material losses inherent in this change shall be compensated, and vocational training shall be provided for those involved in order to have qualification for a better occupation.

**Part 1.** Table 19 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for unemployment insurance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>Very Likely(5)</th>
<th>Likely(4)</th>
<th>Neutral(3)</th>
<th>Unlikely(2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely(1)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Financial</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood

% = percentage

N = number of respondents

Md = median

Table 19 presents the computed frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the five prospective forces.

**Part 2.** Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by
the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force, as shown by the medians in Table 19, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

Category I - Political Force.

Subcategories:

National Leaders
Reasons for Very Likely:

The Shah favors this kind of attention on the people of the country.

Since the greatest base of the political system comes from such a category, I am sure that the national leaders will aid to see such regulations are enacted.

Parliament and the Law
Reason for Very Likely:

Because of the recent change in the relevant laws and regulations concerning the workers.

Reasons for Likely:

Compensation law after five consecutive years of work exist in Iran.

New employment laws are being made for such matters.

Political Parties
Reason for Very Likely:

Political groups make no problem in this respect.

Reason for Likely:

Supporters of such a program will be manifesting their full humanitarian attitude which will increase their popularity.

Conditional and Uncertain
Reasons for Likely:

Government has introduced funds for jobless people and supports this program, but, other political forces (capital holders) are against it.

This will take place in near future.
Such a compensation law and labor insurance scheme is likely to be endorsed especially that it has been newly introduced in Iran (Stated by two respondents).

**Reasons for Neutral:**

Iran is not a welfare state and although is moving in that direction its scope is limited (Stated by two respondents).

**Major Interest Groups**

**Reason for Very Likely:**

They will support this program to avoid workers grouping and regrouping in the political activities.

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Organized groups and some individuals might resist; they cannot really see the importance and the validity of the matter for the troubled workers.

**Public Demand**

**Reason for Likely:**

Due to demand pressure from the wage earners.

**Consideration of Social and Economic Development**

**Reason for Unlikely:**

This is too costly for an economy which is in a transitional stage.

**Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

This is the government's new policy (Stated by four respondents).

The new social security program insures workers against unemployment, disability and paying damages to their survivors in case of death (Stated by two respondents).

**Reasons for Likely:**

Government has recently established the Ministry of Labor for pursuing the objective of coping with technological change in the labor market.

Government has called upon the planners to take care of this aspect of the working class and the Fifth Plan is providing necessary provisions (Stated by two respondents).
Government has started policies for expansion of different types of compensation for labor force (Stated by eight respondents).

Workers or government employees who are exposed to changing fortunes are being provided with medical care, employment insurance and disability pensions.

Out of fifty-seven per cent of population who are farmers only thirty per cent work. Therefore, the Ministry of Cooperatives is designing a plan to teach the victims of mechanized agriculture a new trade.

Reasons for Neutral:

Ministry of Labor is in favor of this program (Stated by two respondents).

There is no coordinated policy between the public and the private sectors in this respect.

Reason for Unlikely:

This is a high expectation.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reasons for Neutral:

There is not a precise account of labor force in Iran.

By the end of the Fifth Plan (1978), there will be 3.5 million workers which will make the implementation of this program more difficult.

Unnecessary
Reasons for Unlikely:

Some political forces believe that such tolls must be paid for industrialization because technological changes, and therefore, damages, are inevitable (Stated by two respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 20.
TABLE 20
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF POLITICAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 4 OF SECTION 1 OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Political Force</th>
<th>Very Like-ly(5)</th>
<th>Neutral Like-ly(4)</th>
<th>Very Un-like-ly(3)</th>
<th>Un-like-ly(2)</th>
<th>Like-ly(1)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>X in Rank</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resisting</th>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament &amp; the Law</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5th</td>
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<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
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<td>5th</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>3rd</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency  
X = percentage  
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for unemployment insurance in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 3.9 or Likely (See Table 19). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 20).
Category II - Financial Force.

Subcategories:

Financial Capacity of Public Sector
Reasons for Very Likely:

Financial means and funds are available (Stated by ten respondents).

Cooperation of the Private Sector and Financially Powerful
Reason for Likely:

Some industrial units retain their workers.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Businessmen are reluctant to handle the cost except for lower pay jobs (Stated by three respondents).

Conditional and Uncertain
Reason for Very Likely:

Such a program can only be implemented if sufficient funds are provided.

Reasons for Likely:

Attempts are being made but there are two problems: inflationary effect, and the private sector's reluctance (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Neutral:

In the past it has been difficult, although the government is implementing it (stated by four respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

It needs great investment and in regard to the need for other investments it is difficult to pursue (Stated by two respondents).

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reason for Neutral:

Such an attempt has been made several times but has always fallen short of its aim.

Reasons for Unlikely:
The financial strain and scarce human resources needed for expansion of vocational institutions and other career development sources would comprise against this program.

Due to financial burden which it will impose upon the private sector (Stated by four respondents).

There is no classified workers and occupations to indicate workers' need for compensation or for losing the livelihood of their jobs.

**Economic and Income Concerns**

**Reason for Likely:**

The social security program can manage this.

**Reason for Neutral:**

Not enough money is spent on this program.

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Too costly for newly established industries.

**Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

No financial constraint; in the Fifth Plan a considerable sum of money has been allocated to this end (Stated by four respondents).

**Reasons for Likely:**

The new welfare program calls for the employees as well as employers contribution to this aim (Stated by five respondents).

**Reason for Neutral:**

This program is too costly to be nationwide.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 21.
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for unemployment insurance in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 3.8 or Likely (See Table 19). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Financial Force was determined and, th., their supportive or resisting roles were
identified (See the last four columns of Table 21).

**Category III - Administrative Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Personnel Practice and Staff Adequacy**

Reason for Neutral:

They lack capable personnel for implementation.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of sufficient trained personnel.

This force is handicapped by a shortage of trained personnel.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Most administrators think that such a training is much too complex a function to be subjected to detailed planning.

The main problem is the lack of specialized staff which is still imported.

**Coordination**

Reason for Very Unlikely:

They cannot coordinate their efforts because of mal-distribution of resources.

**Organizational Sufficiency**

Reason for Unlikely:

Due to shortage of technical institutions.

**Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation**

Reasons for Neutral:

This force will remain indifferent (Stated by nine respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

They won't take any initiation because this program might impose some undesirable constraints upon the administrative body (Stated by two respondents).

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reasons for Neutral:

Is indifferent due to the lack of efficiency (Stated by two respondents).
Reasons for Unlikely:

Administrative system is weak and cannot carry out this program (Stated by six respondents).

The inefficiency of the administrative body makes it hard for social security and workers organizations to extend their jurisdiction throughout the country.

The agencies responsible for the enforcement of the social welfare programs have succeeded in achieving only forty per cent of their target so far.

Actual enforcement of the projects of social welfare presents some administrative deficiencies.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Lack of efficiency (Stated by two respondents).

Responsibility and Awareness
Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to the attitudes of the administrative members who always run away from responsibility (Stated by two respondents).

Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise
Reason for Neutral:

Due to little awareness of the issue, lack of skill and know how to carry out such a program.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Unable to use the recently accumulated bodies of knowledge and know how (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Lack of specialists in technological training (Stated by two respondents).

Capacity for Training and Managing Manpower
Reason for Neutral:

Capable planners and instructors are needed for vocational training, but this force can not make the provisions.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Administrative of labor management is poor.
Many skilled trades become rendered obsolete by the growing of the modern factory methods of production. Providing new trades every time will be beyond the capacity of this force.

Quick conversion of the raw manpower into useful competence is beyond the managerial and training capacity of the administrative force.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

No capabilities for converting unskilled individuals into specialists or craftsmen.

Experience
Reason for Neutral:

Our administrative force is very inexperienced in this area.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

This force has no experience at all.

Bureaucracy Concerns
Reason for Neutral:

It has a complicated system but act as is ordered.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to bureaucratic bungling, red tape and rigidity (Stated by two respondents).

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran
Reason for Very Likely:

The shah favors this kind of attention on the people of the country.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 22.
### Table 22

**THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 4 OF SECTION I OF THE PLAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category III Administrative Force</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Unlikely (2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (1)</th>
<th>% in Rank Order</th>
<th>Supporting</th>
<th>Resisting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories:</td>
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<td>f</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel Practice &amp; Staff Adequacy</strong></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4th</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative &amp; Management Talents</strong></td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Degree of Willingness, Motivation &amp; Initiation</strong></td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</strong></td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td><strong>Responsibility &amp; Awareness</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>7th</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Professional Skills, Methods &amp; Expertise</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Capacity for Training &amp; Managing Manpower</strong></td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>7th</td>
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<td>6th</td>
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<td><strong>Degree of Flexibility of the Rules &amp; Regulations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>In Relation With Other Forces Acting In the Country</strong></td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| f = frequency | X = percentage | N = number of respondents |

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for unemployment insurance in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 2.1 or Unlikely (See Table 19). In Part 2, the subcate-
gories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 22).

Category IV - Socio-cultural Force.

Subcategories:

Willingness of Social Groups in General
Reasons for Very Likely:

The social groups will overly support such a protective measure for the small man (Stated by five respondents).

The majority of population being wage earners, this program will have the support of the social groups (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Likely:

This program is socially desired.

Major Interest Groups
Reasons for Unlikely:

The big business groups in the private sector and all the affiliated groups will resist this program (Stated by six respondents).

Religious, Traditional and Cultural Concerns
Reasons for Very Likely:

They are very much for it especially due to their religious background.

The existing paternalistic tradition in Iran, plus the fact that government has enacted many laws and regulations to support the labor force are the reasons.

Public Demand and Need
Reasons for Very Likely:

Due to the rising demand for welfare (Stated by three respondents).
Reasons for Likely:

The social forces have frequently expressed interest in such a program (Stated by two respondents).

**Labor Force and Labor Market Concerns**

Reasons for Very Likely:

Due to the expectation of millions of workers in Iran who want a direct stake in the economy and a better welfare (Stated by seven respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Because such a program will give the working people a sense of security, job insurance, and new skills in case of technological changes (Stated by seven respondents).

**Economic and Income Concerns**

Reasons for Very Likely:

The working people who want to have a better standard of living will support it in order to benefit from it (Stated by five respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

The social and cultural forces will support compensation for technological displacement which will better the life of the working class (Stated by two respondents).

**Conditional and Uncertain**

Reason for Unlikely:

Hesitance to change may hinder the implementation of such a program. Therefore, those affected should be convinced that the change in job is to their benefit which is hard to accomplish.

**Degree of Public Awareness**

Reason for Very Likely:

There is a great awareness and endeavor in our country to reduce the ill-effects of technological change.

Reason for Unlikely:

Socially, we are not trained that way.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Due to infamiliarity with modern technology and its consequences.
Capability and Efficiency Concerns

Reason for Neutral:

This force can neither help nor resist the program.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in the Country

Reason for Very Likely:

This will reduce the ugly face of industrialization and automation.

Reason for Unlikely:

The present bureaucratic system is not on the side of workers and this program will mean greater tax rates.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Socio-cultural Force are illustrated in Table 23.
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for unemployment insurance in respect to the Socio-cultural Force was computed to be 4.5 or Likely (See Table 19). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Socio-cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting
roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 23).

**Category V - Educational Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence**  
Reasons for Unlikely:

The educational system's training capacity is weak and the educational institutions are very slow in training the necessary manpower especially in the vocational areas (Stated by four respondents).

**Capacity of Vocational and Technical Schools**  
Reason for Likely:

Vocational training projects are being prepared.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Limited vocational schools (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Very insufficient vocational schools (Stated by two respondents).

**Willingness and Demand of the Educational Institutions in General**  
Reason for Very Likely:

They are very willing and will help the program.

Reason for Likely:

Our educational forces are for such an undertaking.

**Conditional and Uncertain**  
Reasons for Neutral:

These forces are not in the state of readiness for such a program. But, since they consider it as a means for expanding their area of activities, they will welcome it.

Career education has just been introduced in Iran and vocational capacity will be created during the next decade (Stated by two respondents).

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**
Reasons for Unlikely:

Incapable to keep up with technological change (Stated by four respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

This force is very incapable and unprepared (Stated by five respondents).

Instructional Concerns
Reason for Neutral:

To provide the needed vocational training requires capable planners and instructional body which are inadequate in Iran.

Reason for Unlikely:

Shortage of instructional power.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Scarcity of teachers instructors and facilities (Stated by two respondents).

Awareness, Expertise and Experience
Reason for Neutral:

Due to the lack of experience and direction.

Reason for Unlikely:

Due to infamiliarity of the majority of educational institutions with modern technology.

Orientation Toward National Development
Reason for Neutral:

This force is rather unaware of its economic impact.

Facilities, Techniques and Finance
Reason for Very Unlikely:

Lack of training units.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran
Reason for Very Likely:

The Shah is in favor of this program.

Reason for Very Unlikely:
This force has an insufficient role.

**Disinterest**

Reasons for Neutral:

This force is indifferent due to the lack of relation with the national development (Stated by fourteen respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

This force is not responsive to the needs of the country.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Educational Force are presented in Table 24.
TABLE 24
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF
EDUCATIONAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING
PROGRAM 4 OF SECTION I OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category V Educational Force</th>
<th>Very Like-Likely (5)</th>
<th>Neutral-Likely (3)</th>
<th>Very Un-Likely (1)</th>
<th>Ranks %</th>
<th>Supportive %</th>
<th>Resisting %</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories:</td>
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<td>g</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>g</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>g</td>
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</tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Awareness, Expertise &amp; Experience</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilities, Techniques &amp; Finances</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
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<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency  
% = percentages  
N = number of respondents

Program 4 for unemployment insurance in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 2.5 or Unlikely (See Table 19). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were
identified (See the last four columns of Table 24).

Analysis For Program 5 (Income Redistribution) of Section I

The Program

A vertical redistribution from the richest to the poorest shall be insured; through the agency of the state which shall finance the institution of a guaranteed minimum wage by means, especially, of progressively graduated tax deduction from income. It shall pay an income to all those whose resources do not exceed a threshold and who receive practically nothing from the system.

Part 1. Table 25 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 for income redistribution.

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Forces} & \text{Very Likely(1)} & \text{Likely(2)} & \text{Neutral(3)} & \text{Unlikely(4)} & \text{Very Unlikely(5)} & \text{Total} \\
\hline
\text{Political} & 4 & 8 & 24 & 48 & 5 & 10 & 6 & 12 & 11 & 22 & 50 & 100 & 3.6 \\
\hline
\text{Financial} & 14 & 28 & 12 & 24 & 3 & 6 & 13 & 26 & 8 & 16 & 50 & 100 & 3.5 \\
\hline
\text{Administrative} & 1 & 2 & 1 & 2 & 9 & 19 & 14 & 30 & 22 & 47 & 47 & 100 & 1.6 \\
\hline
\text{Socio-cultural} & 25 & 52 & 11 & 23 & 2 & 4 & 8 & 17 & 2 & 4 & 48 & 100 & 4.6 \\
\hline
\text{Educational} & 2 & 4 & 3 & 6 & 37 & 76 & 4 & 8 & 3 & 6 & 49 & 100 & 2.9 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

\(f = \text{frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood}\)

\(\% = \text{percentage}\)

\(N = \text{number of respondents}\)

\(M_d = \text{median}\)

Table 25 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 in respect to the five prospective forces.

Part 2. Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force,
as shown by the medians in Table 25, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

**Category I - Political Force.**

Subcategories:

**National Leaders**

Reason for Very Unlikely:

There is a lot of lip service on this program.

**Parliament and the Law**

Reason for Likely:

A good tax system is being provided.

**Priority Concerns**

Reason for Neutral:

This is a negative income tax and does not have a priority with the political force.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

Reason for Likely:

Does not object to this program but considers the benefits of the big capital holders.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Only under a different system where a new and effective tax system could be applied such a program can be implemented (Stated by two respondents).

**Major Interest Groups**

Reason for Neutral:

Although the government is willing, the traditional and conservative forces are against this program.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Redistribution of wealth in a capitalistic economy is difficult because it is very hard to reduce the influence which the economic powers impose upon the political system (Stated by two respondents)

Most of the people who have influence and authority in decision making and implementation of the programs are rich and do not want to lose their own situation.
Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Since the wealth of the country is mostly in the hands of a few people, it is very unlikely that they will accept a program which calls for a redistribution of their wealth unless the political force would provide them with some sort of security (Stated by two respondents).

Public Demand
Reason for Likely:

Due to the demand pressure of the poor.

Consideration of Social and Economic Development
Reason for Likely:

Per capita income is rising with a wider distribution.

Reason for Neutral:

While the political system is willing to distribute the national income more fairly, it does not want to do it in such a way as above because it frightens private enterprises and impedes industrial progress.

Reason for Unlikely:

Increase in taxation may not result in an increase in revenue to the extent anticipated. High or exorbitant tax rates may lend to lesser investment and idle capital.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

The government does not want to scare away the private investors.

Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies
Reasons for Very Likely:

More equitable distribution of income and public protection is the government's policy. In last three years, for example, at least eighty-six industrial concerns have given public by selling their shares to the general public (Stated by four respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Due to the welfare program and the attempts to wipe out the gap between classes through free education, medical care and tax reductions.

The government has been in favor of this program; the present projects for guaranteed minimum wage, free education and free health are good examples (Stated by five respondents).
There exists, at the present, a progressive tax system with the intention to implement such a program (Stated by two respondents).

The aspiration of working class has been receiving quite a lot of attention recently.

The government has announced that the firms whose total fixed assets amount to 100,000 dollars shall offer at least forty-nine per cent of their shares to the public.

The state owned industrial credit banks are launching a personal loan service to enable ordinary people to buy shares in industrial concerns. This will broaden the base of industrial ownership.

Government has increases the salaries and pensions of its own employees to encourage private industry to share revenues through higher salaries and bonuses.

The private sector has been given orders to implement such a scheme and the government has retained the last word in every respect.

By making the stock market available, ordinary people are acquiring a direct interest in the industrial growth.

Widening the ownership of industry in Iran has been started to achieve such a purpose.

The well-being of salaried and wage earning class in low income groups is a concern of the government (Stated by three respondents).

The basic social aim of the government in the Fifth Plan is to create a more reasonable balance between the income of the lowest and the highest income groups.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Minimum wage is guaranteed and raised annually, but, it is not sufficient.

This is a socialistic and a radical method which the government does not favor (Stated by three respondents).

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reasons for Unlikely:

Government does not have an efficient taxation system to be used for more equitable distribution of wealth.
Government machinery is not strong enough to tip the balance in favor of social development while programs on economic development are continuing.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

If this program is to be implemented, the tax authorities will end up taxing themselves.

Unnecessary
Reason for Very Unlikely:

Government does not consider the tax system as an effective means for redistribution of income in Iran.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 26.
TABLE 26
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF
POLITICAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING
PROGRAM 5 OF SECTION I OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Political Force</th>
<th>Very Like (5)</th>
<th>Like (4)</th>
<th>Neutral Like (3)</th>
<th>Unlike (2)</th>
<th>Very Unlike (1)</th>
<th>% In Supportive</th>
<th>% In Neutral</th>
<th>% In Resisting</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Leaders</td>
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<td>Parliament &amp; the Law</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>5th</td>
</tr>
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<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Consideration of Social &amp; Economic Development</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
% = percentage
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part I, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 for income redistribution in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 3.6 or Likely (See Table 25). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Political Force was determined, and then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See
the last four columns of Table 26).

**Category II - Financial Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Financial Capacity of Public Sector**  
Reasons for Very Likely:

Government has enough financial resources to implement this program (Stated by nine respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Funds can be available by the government due to the oil and gas income (Stated by four respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

This program will be costly for the government.

**Financial Cooperation of Private Sector and Financially powerful**  
Reason for Neutral:

Government cannot impose such a program upon the private sector severely.

Reasons for Unlikely:

The cost will not be tolerated by the private sector (Stated by two respondents).

Due to the lack of labor organizations to request such a program from the private sector.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

The financial powers already have a way to dodge taxes; they do not even publish their balance sheets (Stated by two respondents).

Giving money to the workers simply because they need it does not appeal to the private sector.

**Capacity of Financial Management Agencies**  
Reasons for Unlikely:

The present tax collection indexes which are sixty years old hardly represent the income of the big business (Stated by three respondents).
There has not been any indication of increase in the collection of direct taxes while the profit of industries have apparently increased in the last few years.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Corporate profits are judged by a national growth rate of industrial production which is neither a correct nor a fair indicator.

Conditional and Uncertain Reasons for Likely:

Only the state can help the wage-earners in this respect not the private sector.

Assessment of the net income of corporations is being made for such an aim.

Saving programs for workers are being encouraged.

Reason for Neutral:

Such programs take time to be fully implemented in Iran.

Reason for Unlikely:

Gradual taxation will have its loopholes.

Economic and Investment Concerns

Reason for Unlikely:

This program may slow down the process of capital formation and investment.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

The new industries in the private sector will run off the market and paralyze the economy.

Major Interest Groups

Reason for Unlikely:

Due to the growing powers of financial elite.

Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies

Reasons for Very Likely:

The government is willing to take measures to insure fair income distribution and there is no financial constraint (Stated by five respondents).
Reasons for Likely:

Government spends at least fifty per cent of its provincial capital in the slums and villages.

Some new social security projects are provided for this purpose (Stated by three respondents).

Employers are required to share with government and the workers to create social security funds.

Reasons for Unlikely:

This program sound too progressive for Iran's industry (Stated by two respondents),

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Government does not desire to use tax system as a means for more equal distribution of income especially that it might worry the private investors (Stated by three respondents).

Priority Concerns
Reason for Neutral:

The number of persons in the higher income level is limited and therefore higher taxation may not bring in sufficient funds. However, to implement this program, funds obtained otherwise can be utilized.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 27.
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 for income redistribution was computed to be 3.5 or Neutral (See Table 25). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Financial Force was determined and, then,
their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 27).

**Category III - Administrative Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Personnel Practice and Staff Adequacy**

*Reasons for Unlikely:*

An appraisal of personnel reveals that they have less ability than required by such a program (Stated by two respondents).

There is need for short-run as well as long-run training to match the present personnel and the modern functions (Stated by two respondents).

*Reasons for Very Unlikely:*

The present tax staff which does not accept any change in the present operation patterns is unqualified to implement such a program (Stated by six respondents).

**Administrative and Management Talents**

*Reason for Unlikely:*

Technical know how, devoted and honest personnel are not available.

**Coordination**

*Reason for Unlikely:*

Uniformity, or at least consistency of action in the operating units is missing.

**Organizational Sufficiency**

*Reason for Neutral:*

Insufficient taxation institutions.

*Reason for Unlikely:*

A strong and dedicated tax collection system is needed.

**Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation**

*Reasons for Neutral:*

They won't be reluctant to support this program if ordered (Stated by four respondents).
Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reason for Unlikely:

The administrative ability for supporting this program is quite weak.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

They are not prepared even for current undertakings, let alone the modern programs.

Due to their lack of competence, the outcome of their functions has never been harmonious with the expected outcome (Stated by two respondents).

Responsibility and Awareness
Reasons for Neutral:

This force has no effects on the program (Stated by three respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

This force has no sense of obligation and duty.

Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise
Reason for Neutral:

Due to the scarcity of specialized manpower.

Reason for Unlikely:

Due to the lack of techniques needed for implementation of this program.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Lack of technical expertise (Stated by four respondents).

Capacity for Training and Managing Manpower
Reason for Very Unlikely:

Needs training to overcome the gap between the present performance and what such a program requires.

Corruption
Reason for Very Unlikely:

This is an area of function, anywhere in the world, in which opportunities for graft are great.

Reasons for Unlikely:
Will encourage red tape and corruption (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

This program will be a source of bribery, corruption and graft (Stated by three respondents).

Experience
Reason for Very Unlikely:

Due to lack of experience and existence of corruption in the system of taxation.

Bureaucracy Concerns
Reason for Unlikely:

Due to the administrative bottlenecks.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Due to the incapability of the bureaucratic system.

Degree of Flexibility of the Rules and Regulations
Reason for Unlikely:

Change in the organizational structure of the taxing system is needed.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Such a program creates special problems which will require alteration in the financial organizations which is difficult to perceive.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting In Iran
Reason for Likely:

Due to the pressure of the poor people.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Due to the influence of the interest groups on this force.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 28.
### Table 28

The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Administrative Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 5 of Section 1 of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories</th>
<th>Very Like</th>
<th>Like</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Like</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
<th>% in</th>
<th>Superior</th>
<th>Resilient</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Practice &amp; Staff Adequacy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Administrative &amp; Management Talents</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Availability of Facilities</td>
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<td>Capacity for Training &amp; Managing Manpower</td>
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<td>Corruption</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>8th</td>
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<td>Bureaucracy Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7th</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility of the Rules &amp; Regulations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7th</td>
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<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting In the Country</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*F = frequency

% = percentage

N = number of respondents

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 for income redistribution in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 1.6 or Unlikely (See Table 25). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing
and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 28).

**Category IV - Socio-cultural Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Willingness of Social Groups in General**

*Reasons for Very Likely:*

Public opinion is most favorable and will help to achieve this aim (Stated by five respondents).

*Reasons for Likely:*

This force is favorable and supportive (Stated by six respondents).

*Reason for Neutral:*

Most of the people like this program except the rich ones who are in minority.

*Reasons for Unlikely:*

Socio-cultural forces are not in favor of this program (Stated by two respondents).

**Major Interest Groups**

*Reasons for Unlikely:*

The rich people especially the big businessmen are too greedy to allow this program to be implemented (Stated by three respondents).

*Reason for Very Unlikely:*

Business giants will resist it at any rate.

**Professional Groups**

*Reason for Unlikely:*

Middle class, especially the professional groups, will resist such a taxation.

**Religious, Traditional and Cultural Concerns**

*Reason for Very Likely:*
Because this program is in conformity with their religious and cultural beliefs.

Reason for Likely:

Religiously and culturally acceptable.

In Relation to Government's Influence
Reason for Very Unlikely:

Public opinion helps the program but the socio-cultural groups resist since they are the tools of the government.

Public Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction
Reason for Very Likely:

People are highly sensitive in favor of such a program.

Public Demand and Need
Reasons for Very Likely:

Due to the expectation and immense need of the poor people who make the biggest section of the population (Stated by five respondents).

Reason for Likely:

Demand pressure exists.

Labor Force and Labor Market Concerns
Reasons for Very Likely:

Working people will highly support it due to the high rate of unemployment (Stated by two respondents).

Economic and Income Concerns
Reasons for Very Likely:

The low class people who make the largest portion of the population will support any scheme for minimum wage guarantee and redistribution of income (Stated by five respondents).

As people become more educated, they demand more equity in income. The shift from agricultural society to industrial and from rural to urban life enhances such a demand.

Reasons for Likely:

People are in favor of tax relief and guaranteed job (Stated by two respondents).
Conditional and Uncertain
Reason for Unlikely:

Redistribution of wealth will meet with the resistance and/or reluctance. Carefully thought plans and gradual implementation are essential.

Class Concerns
Reasons for Very Likely:

Due to the bad conditions stemmed from class differences (Stated by three respondents).

Reason for Likely:

Due to the vast masses of people belonging to the lower classes this program will be supported.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting In Iran
Reason for Neutral:

People are distrustful of the performance of the political and economic agencies.

Miscellaneous
Reason for Very Likely:

Workers already enjoy the net factory profits.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 in respect to the Socio-cultural Force are presented in Table 29.
### Table 29

**The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Socio-cultural Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 5 of Section X of the Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories</th>
<th>Very Like (5)</th>
<th>Neu-tral Like (4)</th>
<th>Un-Like (3)</th>
<th>Var-y Un-Like (2)</th>
<th>Very Un-Like (1)</th>
<th>% in Sup-portive Stating</th>
<th>% in Favorable Stating</th>
<th>% in Possible Stating</th>
<th>% in Ineffective Stating</th>
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<tr>
<td>Willingness of Social Groups in General</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Religious, Traditional &amp; Cultural Concerns</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Development Concerns</td>
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<td>In Relation to Government's Influence</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Public Satisfaction &amp; Dissatisfaction</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6th</td>
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<td>Public Demand &amp; Need</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Economic &amp; Income Concerns</td>
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<td>Class Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5th</td>
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<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>6th</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*F = frequency

P = percentage

N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 for income redistribution in respect to the Socio-cultural Force was computed to be 4.5 or Likely (See Table 25). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Socio-
cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 29).

**Category V - Educational Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence**  
Reason for Unlikely:  

There is no educational capacity to carry out this program.

**Willingness and Demands of Educational Institutions in General**  
Reason for Very Likely:  

They sure would help the implementation of this program

Reasons for Likely:  

The educational institutions will appreciate this objective (Stated by three respondents).

**Conditional and Uncertain**  
Reason for Very Likely:  

More education means more income. As more people of this country secure free education, such a program will be demanded by them.

Reasons for Neutral:  

It will not go far into the educational circles.

This force will not have any effect on this program in the short-run. But, in the long-run, it can be most useful if the system could be able to provide the common understanding of the causes of poverty.

Reason for Unlikely:  

This is too much to expect from this force.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**  
Reasons for Neutral:  

This force will have no impact (Stated by three respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:  

Due to the incapability of the educational system.
Awareness, Expertise and Experience
Reason for Neutral:

More men of understanding and devotion with a deep knowledge of the society and its way of life are needed.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Due to the poor recognition of needs.

In Relation with the Other Forces Acting in Iran
Reason for Very Unlikely:

Most educational institutions are governmental and the rest are run by the capital holders.

Disinterest
Reasons for Neutral:

As far as this program is concerned, this force remains indifferent, neutral and unconcerned (Stated by twenty-eight respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

The educational institutions fail to develop a sense of social responsibility (Stated by two respondents).

Irrelevance
Reasons for Neutral:

This force has no role concerning this program (Stated by three respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 in respect to the Educational Force are presented in Table 30.
TABLE 30
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF EDUCATIONAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 5 OF SECTION I OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category V Educational Force</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (1)</th>
<th>Neutral (4)</th>
<th>Unlikely (3)</th>
<th>Likely (2)</th>
<th>% in Rank Order</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutralizing</th>
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<td>Capacity of Professional Schools</td>
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<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>75 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrucational Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness, Expertise &amp; Experience</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation Toward National Development</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities, Techniques &amp; Finances</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of Interests &amp; Priorities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Elites (educated &amp; educator)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
\% = percentages
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 for income redistribution was computed to be 2.9 or Neutral (See Table 25). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive
or resistive roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 30).

### Analysis: Program 6 (Flexible Retirement Age) of Section I

#### The Program

Many people, especially of the working class, start work from the very early age. These people are often exhausted physically around the age of fifty. To them shall be paid a pension at the age of physical exhaustion. It means that the age of retirement shall be flexible.

**Part 1.** Table 31 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 for flexible retirement age.

#### Table 31

**The Results of the Respondents' Rating of the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 6 of Section I of the Plan in Respect to 5 Forces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Un-Like</th>
<th>Very Un-Like</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f</td>
<td>z</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>z</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*f* = frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood  
*Z* = percentage  
*N* = number of respondents  
*Md* = median

Table 31 presents the computed frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 in respect to the five prospective forces.

**Part 2.** Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force,
as shown by the medians in Table 31, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

**Category I - Political Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**National Leaders**  
**Reason for Very Likely:**

The Shah has announced that the five pillars of social welfare will be education, employment, health, housing and nutrition.

**Parliament and the Law**  
**Reason for Very Likely:**

The new pension law aims at providing a way for earlier retirement date.

**Reason for Likely:**

The means of livelihood for aged, disabled and unemployed are being designed in Iran.

**Reason for Very Unlikely:**

The present regulations and laws have lasted for years with no change.

**Political Parties**  
**Reason for Very Likely:**

Political forces will make no problem in this respect.

**Priority concerns**  
**Reason for Unlikely:**

Programs like housing have priority.

**Conditional and Uncertain**  
**Reasons for Likely:**

Social security is an infant concept in Iran.

The tendency of the individuals is important.

**Reasons for Neutral:**

The planners are not sure about the exact definition of social welfare programs needed in Iran.
Such a comprehensive program can only be implemented in a long run.

Reasons for Unlikely:

An employment policy with social objective will be the guiding point in Iran's policy planning in long-run (stated by two respondents).

**Major Interest Groups**

Reason for Likely:

The organized groups support this program and they will gain more popularity.

**Public Demand**

Reason for Likely:

I believe the political system would like to implement such regulations because it sees the working forces as its greatest base of power.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Because the government is faced even with many pensioners who still want to find a new job.

The early retired will be demanding a training for getting another job.

**Consideration of Social and Economic Development**

Reasons for Unlikely:

There is not enough labor force and trained manpower and, therefore, the government finds it necessary to use all available human resources for implementation of the magnitude of the developing projects (Stated by three respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

The politicians cannot afford taking labor out of the labor force at the time when there is a great demand for skilled labor.

**Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies**

Reasons for Very Likely:

This program has been recognized as an important social stimuli to the working class and is incorporated in our planning (Stated by two respondents).
Reasons for Likely:

Due to the recent consideration given to the workers insurance and retirement, and the new social welfare programs in Iran (Stated by three respondents).

Providing social welfare programs for those segments of the population most vulnerable to changing fortunes is in the process and about 900,000 workers are covered by pension policy so far (Stated by sixteen respondents).

The new Ministry of Welfare has been created with special tasks to protect vulnerable strata of the society and by the end of the Fifth Plan (1978), eighty per cent of the rural and ninety per cent of the urban people will be covered by insurance policies (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

Pension program to certain degree exists.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reasons for Likely:

This force is in favor of the program but cannot do much about it, however, partially flexible retirement system exists, at least for the government employees (Stated by three respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

The government finds it difficult to establish the state of physical exhaustion.

Unnecessary
Reasons for Neutral:

This is not yet a serious issue in Iran.

A program to this extent belongs to the welfare states.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 32.
**TABLE 32**

THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF POLITICAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 6 OF SECTION 1 OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category I</th>
<th>Very Like</th>
<th>Neutral Like</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
<th>Rank-</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Resistant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Force</td>
<td>Subcategories</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Leaders</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament &amp; the Law</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Demand</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of Social &amp; Economic Development</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnecessary</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ f = \text{frequency} \]
\[ \% = \text{percentage} \]
\[ N = \text{number of respondents} \]

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 for flexible retirement age was computed to be 3.8 or Likely (See Table 31). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of
Table 32).

Category II - Financial Force.

Subcategories:

Financial Capacity of Public Sector
Reasons for Very Likely:

Due to the increase of oil income, financial resources are available and, the lack of funds which used to be a limiting factor in enlarging the scope of social welfare is not a problem anymore (Stated by fifteen respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

For improving the standard of living, special welfare programs for the less privileged groups are funded (Stated by five respondents).

Cooperation of Private Sector and Financially Powerful
Reasons for Unlikely:

This program might find some difficulties on the part of the capital holders in the private sector who may consider it too costly to their interests (Stated by three respondents).

Capacity of Financial Management Agencies
Reasons for Very Likely:

This program is financially manageable (Stated by two respondents).

Conditional and Uncertain
Reason for Very Likely:

Studies are on the way for such fundings.

Reason for Likely:

This certainly depends on the financial ability of the government to provide funds for exhausted people.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reason for Very Likely:

The funds allocated to this programs are little, but financial resources are available.

Reason for Unlikely:

This program will be too costly to implement.
Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies

Reasons for Very Likely:

Due to the increase in the oil income, there is no financial constraints, besides, war against poverty is fully funded in the Fifth Plan (Stated by ten respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

The politically initiated programs such as the program for humanization of development, at least in theory, are funded. Therefore, the proposed program is likely to be funded by three respondents).

In the Fifth Plan, there is a shift from physical and economic aspects of development to the social and human needs (Stated by four respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

This force is not really concerned with the non-economic aspects of development.

Priority Concerns

Reason for Neutral:

Pension program, although a different one, already exists. Therefore, such a program will not be resisted.

Irrelevance

Reason for Neutral:

This program has not been taken seriously in Iran (Stated by two respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 33.
### Table 33

The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Financial Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 6 of Section 1 of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Like Unlikely</th>
<th>Very Unlikely</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Order</th>
<th>% in Max</th>
<th>% in Min</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Capacity of Public Sector</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Cooperation of Private Sector &amp; Financially Powerful</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Financial Management Agencies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic &amp; Investment Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Interest Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*f = frequency  
*X = percentage  
*N = number of respondents*

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 4.6 or Very Likely (See Table 31). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Financial Force was determined,
and then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 33).

**Category III - Administrative Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Personnel Practice and Staff Adequacy**

**Reason for Very Likely:**

There is enough manpower resources for this program.

**Reason for Unlikely:**

This force has no tolerance for the kind of ambiguity which this program might create.

**Reasons for Very Unlikely:**

Insufficient trained staff to undertake this program (Stated by two respondents).

**Administrative and Management Talents**

**Reason for Unlikely:**

There is need for management to run such a program.

**Reason for Very Unlikely:**

The managerial and administrative factors which most effect the feasibility of this program are very weak.

**Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

The administrative forces will highly welcome this program especially if it includes the white collars as well (Stated by two respondents).

**Reasons for Likely:**

Because the whole administrative body will benefit from this program (Stated by three respondents).

**Reasons for Neutral:**

This force is indifferent to this program (Stated by thirteen respondents).
Reason for Unlikely:

Due to unwillingness to learn, unlearn and take responsibility plus lack of desire to admit its inefficiency.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Their potential and actual support for such a program are both lacking.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reason for Neutral:

Due to the slowness, partiality and inefficiency.

Reasons for Unlikely:

The administrative system is very weak (Stated by three respondents).

The existing pension procedures are not properly working.

Despite socially progressive laws on welfare, the country's administrative foundations are not sound enough to carry them out.

Responsibility and Awareness
Reason for Neutral:

Unaware of the significance of this program.

Reason for Unlikely:

This force is not problem solving-oriented.

Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise
Reason for Neutral:

Due to the lack of skill and technical know how.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to the limitation of expertise, specialists and techniques necessary for implementation of this program (Stated by four respondents).

Capacity for Training and Managing Manpower
Reason for Unlikely:

Incapable of producing manpower to substitute the retired ones.
Bureaucracy Concerns

Reason for Unlikely:

This program will face a large number of bureaucratic obstacles.

Degree of Flexibility of the Rules and Regulations

Reason for Neutral:

Yardsticks and/or rules and regulations should be clear cut to the possible extent in order to be subject to proper interpretation by the people involved.

Reason for Unlikely:

They cannot adapt to the conditions of such a program without giving up its most important objective.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

The traditional system of retirement is very weak and will let down the different retirement basis in different levels.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting In Iran

Reason for Neutral:

This is not an issue in Iran, yet.

Reasons for Unlikely:

The number of the retirees will increase and exert a great pressure on this system (Stated by two respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 34.
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 2.5 or Unlikely (See Table 31). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to
such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 34).

**Category IV - Socio-cultural Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Willingness of Social Groups in General**

The social groups favor such a program and support its implementation (Stated by fourteen respondents).

**Reason for Neutral:**

Social groups will not make any problems in this regard.

**Intellectual Groups**

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

The intellectual groups do not see this program to be implemented in Iran (Stated by two respondents).

**Major Interest Groups**

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

The industrialists will find this program too costly to support (Stated by two respondents).

**Organized Groups**

**Reason for Likely:**

Because the organized groups can influence the welfare of the others.

**Diversity of Interests, Attitudes and Priorities**

**Reason for Neutral:**

There has never been such a tradition.

**Religious, Traditional and Cultural Concerns**

**Reason for Likely:**

Culturally speaking, people are for early retirement.
Reasons for Unlikely:

Economic, cultural and religiously people prefer to work until the very old age (Stated by four respondents).

Public Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction
Reason for Very Likely:

Because improvement in the living conditions of working class in Iran has always been in limelight.

Reason for Unlikely:

They are already unsatisfied with the way they receive their pensions.

Labor Force and Labor Market Concerns
Reasons for Very Likely:

Due to the bulk of manual workers and their premature physical exhaustion.

Workers, especially women, will support this program because it prevents underemployment (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Likely:

Labor force will welcome it.

Reason for Unlikely:

Because the workers will benefit from this program, but if the pension is not sufficient, they will be facing economic problems.

Economic and Income Concerns
Reasons for Very Likely:

Because this program will be of a major benefit to the income earners who do not enjoy a comfortable life (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Any program which aims at the welfare of the aged, needy or the like will meet the approval of the majority of people who would be the main beneficiaries (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:
Workers, especially the farm workers, would rather work than retire early which is due to the large size of families and the poor economic condition (Stated by three respondents).

Usually one person is provider for a family and the pension money will not suffice.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

Reasons for Likely:

Public is for it, but, due to the cultural poverty, won't be able to get the right benefit from it.

The public will support if the pension is sufficient.

Reasons for Unlikely:

The working people will be uncertain of the future of their families in case of early retirement (Stated by two respondents).

**Degree of Public Awareness**

Reason for Neutral:

This is not an issue in Iran, yet.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 in respect to the Socio-cultural Force are presented in Table 35.
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 for flexible retirement age in respect to the Socio-cultural Force was computed to be 3.8 or Likely (See Table 31). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those sub-
categories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Social-cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 35).

**Category V - Educational Force.**

Subcategories:

**Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence**

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Due to limitations of training skilled manpower.

Willingness and Demand of Educational Institutions in General

Reasons for Very Likely:

They have always been in favor of such a program (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

They are in favor of such a program which helps the students not to quit school early because of financial reasons (Stated by three respondents).

The teaching body of the educational system will cherish such a program.

This force can have a positive effect in this regard in the long-run because the willingness exists.

Conditional and Uncertain

Reasons for Neutral:

This system of education cannot help at the present time. But, if they provide special training, they will be able to give the retired people some know how for additional earning.

More experience in organized social work is needed for this system in order to become supportive of such a plan (Stated by two respondents).

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reasons for Neutral:

This force has no impact and cannot effect this program (Stated by two respondents).
Reasons for Unlikely:

There is no educational reservoir to carry out this program, as far as training is concerned.

This program requires rapid training and the educational system is incapable to undertake it.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Due to the incapability of this system (Stated by two respondents).

Awareness, Expertise and Experience

Reason for Neutral:

Due to the inexperience and the lack of understanding of the importance of the cause.

Disinterest

Reasons for Neutral:

This force is indifferent, neutral with no concern (Stated by twenty-two respondents).

Irrelevance

Reasons for Neutral:

This force has no role to play because the political force is the decisive factor in this area (Stated by five respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

Majority of the private enterprises still exploit the working people and training those people will not make too much difference.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 in respect to the Educational Force are presented in Table 36.
### Table 36

**The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Educational Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 6 of Section 1 of the Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories</th>
<th>Very Like-Likely (5)</th>
<th>Very Un-Likely (1)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Very Un-Likely (2)</th>
<th>Very Like-Likely (4)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Rank Order</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Existing Trained Manpower</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Schools for General Education</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Vocational &amp; Technical Schools</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Professional Schools</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness &amp; Demand of Educational Institutions in General</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Instructional Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness, Expertise &amp; Experience</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation Toward National Development</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Degree of Flexibility</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities, Technical bases &amp; Finances</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of Interests &amp; Priorities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Elite (educated &amp; educator)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency  
\( \% \) = percentages  
N = number of respondents

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 for flexible retirement age in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 3.0 or Neutral (See Table 31). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories
according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 36).

Analysis For Program 7 (Women's Employment) of Section I

The Program

The real condition and aspiration of the working women shall be taken into consideration; those women who wish to stay home for the purpose of bringing up their children shall be allowed to do so between the age 20 and 40. Society shall pay them a substantial allowance throughout this period. But, if they resume working, they shall be trained to learn a trade. The tax liability of business undertakings shall be modified to induce them to employ minimum percentage of these women.

Part 1. Table 37 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 for women's employment.

TABLE 37
THE RESULTS OF THE RESPONDENTS' RATING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 7 OF SECTION I OF THE PLAN IN RESPECT TO 5 FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Un-Likely</th>
<th>Very Un-Likely</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>12 25</td>
<td>14 29</td>
<td>13 27</td>
<td>48 100</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>8 17</td>
<td>15 32</td>
<td>15 32</td>
<td>47 100</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>3 6</td>
<td>15 32</td>
<td>15 32</td>
<td>44 100</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
<td>7 15</td>
<td>11 23</td>
<td>20 42</td>
<td>48 100</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
<td>14 30</td>
<td>12 25</td>
<td>15 32</td>
<td>47 100</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood
% = percentage
N = number of respondents
Md = median
Table 37 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 in respect to the five prospective forces.

Part 2. Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force, as shown by the medians in Table 37, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

**Category I - Political Force.**

Subcategories:

**National Leaders**

Reason for Unlikely:

Women's right in Iran is only a political gesture.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

To bribe the women and making act in line with the government's policies has been the purpose of women's movement for women right in Iran.

**Parliament and the Law**

Reason for Unlikely:

Only the working women are covered by compensation law.

**Priority Concerns**

Reason for Neutral:

Other important matters, particularly the conditions and aspiration of the male workers have been given priority.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

Reason for Likely:

A similar program is already under consideration.

Reasons for Neutral

Despite government's concern for expansion of welfare, the possibility of putting such a program to action seems remote.

Employment opportunities are expanding but not in this direction.
Women's situation has changed in Iran in thought, aspiration and productivity with the realization that new avenues of endeavor had been opened to them. But the proposed program seems to be premature.

Formation of women's literacy corps has changed their old function of housekeeping, but such a program is too early to be fully implemented (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Although women have been given equal rights with men, time for such a program does not seem right except in the rural areas where women have a crucial role (Stated by two respondents).

The political forces will not let the women enjoy such an opportunity at the moment.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Women emancipation is newly introduced in Iran and still has a great number of obstacles to overcome, especially their centuries-old inaction (Stated by three respondents).

Major Interest Groups

Reason for Likely:

By having the female members of the Royal family with them, women organizations could push this program through.

Public Demand

Reason for Likely:

Due to the rising demand of women.

Reason for Unlikely:

Women's movement is taking off the ground but very slowly.

Consideration of Social and Economic Development

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

This will be considered as an economic burden because at the time of demand for labor, it will be a bad policy to pay the women for staying at home (Stated by two respondents).

Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies

Reason for Very Likely:

They consider this kind of program as progressive not radical.
Reasons for Likely:

Women are moving toward new opportunities (Stated by two respondents).

Improving the welfare of the working women is under planning.

Women in Iran now climb ministerial and high administrative positions, and seats in the congress.

Women are very active in cultural, educational and health activities. For example, the educational institutions have 933,300 active women (Stated by three respondents).

Plans for educational and vocational training of women are being implemented gradually.

Reason for Neutral:

Political force won't bother with such a program.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Such a revolutionary action may cause certain instability and the political system would not take any measures which might cause this.

Women do not enjoy the opportunities to maximize their potentials to such an extent in Iran. Even in the field of higher education only 12,100 women make the face of 140,000 higher education students in Iran (Stated by three respondents).

Due to the lack of insurance for unemployed women.

Since the choice of staying home rather than working will be an individual's choice, the political forces are unlikely to accept it.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Government will not grant its cooperation to women in this regard because its policy tends to introduce more women into the labor market (Stated by three respondents).

Capability and Efficiency Concerns

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Such efforts will fall short of achievement.

Unnecessary

Reason for Unlikely:
This program is too drastic for the woman in Iran who until eleven years ago had a fear of activity which extended beyond her home.

This is not accepted in a society where people still persist their traditional belief that women should not enjoy equal rights.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Since this program is too progressive for Iran's economy, it is not considered needed (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Likely:

There won't be a major rejection.

Reason for Neutral:

This force remains inert concerning this program.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 38.
### Table 38

The percentages of contribution of the subcategories of Political Force to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 of Section I of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category I Political Force</th>
<th>Very Like-Ly (5)</th>
<th>Like-Ly (4)</th>
<th>Neutral Like-Ly (3)</th>
<th>Very Un-Like-Ly (2)</th>
<th>Very Un-Like-Ly (1)</th>
<th>% in Supportive Order</th>
<th>% in Resisting Order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories:</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Leaders</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament &amp; the Law</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Demand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Consideration of Social &amp; Economic Development</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnecessary</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| f = frequency |
| z = percentage |
| W = number of respondents |

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 for women's employment in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 2.2 or Unlikely (See Table 37). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See
the last four columns of Table 38).

**Category II - Financial Force.**

Subcategories:

**Financial Capacity of Public Sector**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

Financial resources are available due to the oil income (Stated by two respondents).

**Reasons for Likely:**

There is sufficient financial ability to meet the need (Stated by three respondents).

**Reason for Neutral:**

There is enough funds.

**Financial Cooperation of Private Sector and Financially Powerful**

**Reason for Likely:**

Because women make cheap labor force, also, because the industrialists will enjoy tax advantages by hiring women.

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

This program will be too costly for the private sector and, therefore, its burden will fall on the government's budget (Stated by three respondents).

**Reason for Very Unlikely:**

Financial powers will not agree.

**Capacity of Financial Management Agencies**

**Reason for Unlikely:**

This is beyond national planners financial capacity.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

**Reasons for Likely:**

If the political system wants to take some measures in this respect, the financial system could act (Stated by two respondents).

**Reason for Neutral:**
Could be funded if ordered by the political forces.

Reasons for Unlikely:

It is hard to determine the need and risk the money.

Only some limited programs are funded for teaching a trade to women workers.

Funds are available but the decision must be made by the political system.

**Economic and Investment Concerns**

Reason for Very Likely:

This program will not face any financial problem.

Reasons for Unlikely:

It is difficult to get the government or the private sector to finance such a program because even the tax liability will not be high enough to compensate for inefficiency of the women over forty years of age.

Economically, this program is too sophisticated for Iran and, therefore, it is unprofitable (Stated by four respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Neither private nor the public sector will accept such a cost for being uneconomical (Stated by two respondents).

**Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies**

Reasons for Very Likely:

No financial constraint (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Supportive (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Sufficient funds will not be allocated because the female workers are not favored by businessmen (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

No allocation has ever been made for such a purpose (Stated by seven respondents).
**Priority Concern**

Reason for Neutral:

This program is beneficial only politically not economically.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

This program does not have priority.

**Irrelevance**

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

This program is too early and too advanced for Iran (Stated by two respondents).

**Miscellaneous**

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Will not be supported (Stated by two respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 39.
TABLE 39

THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF
FINANCIAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING
PROGRAM 7 OF SECTION 1 OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category II</th>
<th>Very Like-</th>
<th>Neutral Like-</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
<th>% in</th>
<th>Support-</th>
<th>Neutral-</th>
<th>Resis-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Force</td>
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<td>ly(4)</td>
<td>ly(3)</td>
<td>ly(2)</td>
<td>ly(1)</td>
<td>Rank-</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories:</td>
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<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>ed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Capacity of Public Sector</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Cooperation of Private Sector &amp; Financially Powerful</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Financial Management Agencies</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Concerns</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6th</td>
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</table>

f = frequency
% = percentage
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 for women's employment in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 2.0 or Unlikely (See Table 37). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Financial
Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 39).

**Category III - Administrative Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**The Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation**

*Reasons for Neutral:*

Women already have the choice of work or staying home. But, problem arises when they are compensated for staying home.

This force will remain indifferent (Stated by twenty-eight respondents).

*Reasons for Unlikely:*

This will be opposed to for being impractical (Stated by two respondents).

*Reason for Very Unlikely:*

This will mean an unacceptable additional work.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

*Reasons for Unlikely:*

There is no administrative power to carry out this program (Stated by two respondents).

**Responsibility and Awareness**

*Reasons for Neutral:*

This force is unconcerned with this program (Stated by three respondents).

**Professional Skills, Methods, and Expertise**

*Reason for Unlikely:*

This force is not capable of listing, recording and controlling the accounts of the labor force.

**Capacity for Training and Managing Manpower**

*Reason for Neutral:*

At the present time the scarcity of specialized manpower and what they are in need of does not need too much hardship.
In Relation with Other Forces Acting In Iran

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

There are political and financial constraints and since the administrative system is an agent of government it will not support this program (Stated by two respondents).

Women organizations are not effective enough to lobby this program.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 40.
### Table 40

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THQ PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 7 OF SECTION 1 OF THE PLAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category III Administrative Force</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subcategories:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Practice &amp; Staff Adequacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative &amp; Management Talents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Sufficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Willingness, Activation &amp; Initiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Responsibility &amp; Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Skills, Methods &amp; Expertise</td>
</tr>
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<td>Availability of Facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity for Training &amp; Managing Manpower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy Concerns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility of the Rules &amp; Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in the Country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| f = frequency | 1 | 0 | 33 | 4 | 44 | 100% |
| Z = percentage |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| N = number of respondents |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 for women's employment in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 2.7 or Neutral (See Table 37). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking
the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 40).

**Subcategory IV - Socio-cultural Force.**

Subcategories:

- **Willingness of Social Groups in General**
  - Reason for Very Likely:
    
    They will show positive reaction.
  - Reason for Likely:
    
    The wish is there.
  - Reason for Neutral:
    
    Our society as a whole is against such an undertaking.
  - Reasons for Unlikely:
    
    In General, this program will not be welcomed by socio-cultural groups (Stated by two respondents).
  - Reasons for Very Unlikely:
    
    This force resist such a program because, culturally speaking, women are supposed to stay home anyway (Stated by five respondents).

- **Intellectual Groups**
  - Reason for Neutral:
    
    Only the educated elite will support this program.

- **Major Interest Groups**
  - Reason for Very Likely:
    
    Due to the high expectation of women.
  - Reason for Likely:
    
    Women would rather work in order to have a voice in the community.
Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Business concerns favor the made workers (Stated by two respondents).

Organized Groups
Reasons for Likely:

Due to acceptance of the idea by the organized groups especially the women organizations (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

The women organization could help this program to be considered by demanding it from the government.

Religious, Traditional and Cultural Concerns
Reasons for Very Likely:

They are against working of people due to their cultural and religious beliefs and, therefore, they prefer to see them at home raising children (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Likely:

Society expects women to raise children rather than work.

Reasons for Neutral:

Traditionally and religiously unacceptable.

Traditionally, women have a greater role in the rural areas than men. But, in the urban areas, they are far away from having such a program implemented on their behalf.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Culturally, people are reluctant to accept this program (Stated by three respondents).

Except for the big cities, women are still considered as the secondary citizens in Iran.

Based on Iranian tradition and cultural backgrounds, such a reform, if so, will not be supported by people.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

This program is culturally unacceptable (Stated by four respondents).

This program is too western for Iran's culture.
Women's lack of employment opportunities is not considered as a disadvantage to them in the Iranian society.

Women's role have not been tet known and taken seriously in the Iranian culture.

Disinterest
Reason for Neutral:

This force will neither assist nor resist the implementation of this program.

Development Concerns
Reason for Very Unlikely:

The time has changed and now many believe that women should share the burden of the development with men.

Labor Force and Labor Market Concerns
Reason for Very Unlikely:

Where men are unemployed, such a program for women will be premature.

Conditional and Uncertain
Reason for Likely:

The rural women who work only three months a year can be provided with various vocational careers to be productive all year round.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Although the women's role is expanding, this is too remote a choice to be supported by the cultural and traditional force (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Most people including women agree with this program, however, they are afraid of its implications. Social groups disagree since they are the tools of the government.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reason for Unlikely:

Only the women organization will support this program but it is not strong enough.

In Relation with Other Force Acting in Iran
Reason for Very Unlikely:
Women's right in Iran is only a political facade.

**Miscellaneous**

**Reason for Neutral:**

A similar program is already under consideration.

**Reason for Unlikely:**

This force does not see any necessity to implement this program.

**Reason for Very Unlikely:**

This program will not stand a chance.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 in respect to the Socio-cultural Force are presented in Table 41.
### Table 41

**THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 7 OF SECTION I OF THE PLAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Like</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Un-Like</th>
<th>Very Un-Like</th>
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<th>% in Category</th>
<th>% in</th>
<th>% in</th>
<th>% in</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>f</td>
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<td>f</td>
<td>Order</td>
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<td>33.5</td>
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</table>

- \( f = \) frequency
- \( t = \) percentage
- \( N = \) number of respondents

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 for women's employment in respect to the Socio-cultural force was computed to be 1.8 or Unlikely (See Table 37). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories...
according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Socio-cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive and resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 41).

**Category V - Educational Force.**

Subcategories:

**Capacity to Transfer Human Potential Into Competence**

Reason for Neutral:

There is not enough educational reservoir to carry out this program.

Reason for Unlikely:

Due to insufficient training capacity.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Lack of capacity for adult training.

This will be an extra load for the educational system.

**Capacity of Vocational and Technical Schools**

Reason for Unlikely:

Technical institutions do not have capacity for such trainings.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

Reason for Likely:

By providing educational facilities for women and introducing equal employment opportunities, this program can be implemented.

Reasons for Neutral:

Gradual efforts are being made but they are not sufficient and effective (Stated by three respondents).

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reasons for Neutral:

This system is incapable of teaching women the necessary trades (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:
The educational institutions cannot tolerate the demand for adult training, especially vocational training, due to their incapability and low capacity (Stated by seven respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Unable to help the implementation of this program (Stated by nine respondents).

**Degree of Flexibility**

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Educational system is too rigid to undertake such a program.

**Facilities, Techniques and Finance**

Reason for Very Likely:

Regarding the new establishments, this force can be helpful.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to the limited centers and facilities for adult training (Stated by two respondents).

**Educational Elite**

Reason for Likely:

The increasing demand of the educated women.

**Disinterest**

Reasons for Neutral:

This force remains indifferent with no effective role to perform (Stated by five respondents).

**Irrelevance**

Reason for Neutral:

This force is not a crucial factor in respect to this program.

Reason for Unlikely:

It will be a problem for the educational system.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 in respect to the Educational Force are presented in Table 42.
TABLE 42
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF
EDUCATIONAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING
PROGRAM 7 OF SECTION 1 OF THE PLAN

<table>
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<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Like (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Likely (2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (1)</th>
<th>% in Rank</th>
<th>% in Portfolio</th>
<th>% in Natural</th>
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<td>Diversity of Interests &amp; Priorities</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Elite (educated &amp; educator)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Active in Iran</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
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<td>Irrelevance</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
Z = percentages
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 for women's employment in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 2.2 or Unlikely (See Table 37). In part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Educational Force was determined.
was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 42).

**Analysis for Program 1 (Early Childhood Education) of Section II**

**The Program**

There shall be massive investment in prescholastic establishments. This is a big problem in the lower income classes where children are deprived of natural cultural environment. Therefore, the highest possible rates of enrollment in prescholastic establishments shall be achieved in the areas of cultural poverty, in working class suburbs of the cities, and the least-advanced rural areas.

**Part I.** Table 43 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for early childhood education.

**TABLE 43**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>Very Like (5)</th>
<th>Like (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Un-Like (2)</th>
<th>Very Un-Like (1)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( f = \text{frequency of respondents' rating for each likelihood} \)

\( X = \text{percentage} \)

\( N = \text{number of respondents} \)

\( Md = \text{median} \)

Table 43 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the five prospective forces.
Part 2. Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force, as shown by the medians in Table 43, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

Category I - Political Force.

Subcategories:

National Leaders
Reason for Likely:

This is the order of the Shah and the national policy.

Political Parties
Reason for Very Likely:

Political groups will help to achieve this aim.

Reason for Likely:

Some political forces (minorities) would like to see a program such as this.

Priority Concerns
Reasons for Neutral:

Abolition of cultural poverty is the aim of the government but not at prescholastic level because it does not have priority (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

This has no priority due to the need of rural people for school (Stated by two respondents).

Conditional and Uncertain.

Reason for Likely:

Any organized group will support such a program if funds are provided by the government.

Reason for Neutral:

Only if this program could guarantee some degree of publicity, it will be accepted by the government.
Major Interest Groups
Reasons for Unlikely:

Only certain wealthy classes enjoy this all the time (Stated by two respondents).

Public Demand
Reason for Neutral:

Due to the lack of demand on the part of parents.

Consideration of Social and Economic Development
Reason for Very Likely:

This will increase the number of competent labor force.

Reason for Likely:

This will bridge the gap between the rich and the poor.

Reason for Neutral:

This force could persuade the private schools to do so but it will be very expensive for the low class children.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Too costly to provide teachers and facilities.

This is considered too costly with no tangible output.

Due to its lack of economic yield.

Because it does not yield help to the immediate shortage of manpower.

Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies
Reasons for Very Likely:

The objective of the political force is to abandon illiteracy and the main program is the free education (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Teaching through satellite system and audio-visual methods is in line with this program (Stated by four respondents).

Lately, this has been expressed as one of the government's objective and the sum allocated to education should mean the government's approval (Stated by six respondents).
This program will have no political consequences on the social stratification.

Reason for Neutral:

This is not a part of educational program.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Such a fundamental education is not recognized.

Political forces do not favor raising demand on the part of the individuals from the early age (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Such a program is outside of the present educational programs.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns

Reason for Unlikely:

Fails to recognize the need.

Unnecessary

Reason for Likely:

This is considered as a luxury for the middle and upper classes.

Reasons for Neutral:

Indifferent (Stated by two respondents).

Free education is provided for everyone but prescholastic establishments are not considered vital for the time being.

Reasons for Unlikely:

This is considered a luxury and thus unnecessary for Iran (Stated by four respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Government does not bother with what is not demanded.

Miscellaneous

Reason for Very Likely:

No opposition at all.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to
the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 44.

### Table 44

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories</th>
<th>Very Like-ly(5)</th>
<th>Neu-tral ly(4)</th>
<th>Very Un-like-ly(3)</th>
<th>% in Rank-ed Order</th>
<th>Supporti ng</th>
<th>Resis-t ing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Leaders</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament &amp; the Law</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Political Parties</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Demand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of Social &amp; Economic Development</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnecessary</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*f* = frequency  
*%* = percentage  
*N* = number of respondents

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for early childhood education in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 3.1 or Neutral (See Table 43). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By com-
puting and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 44).

**Category II - Financial Force.**

Subcategories:

**Financial Capacity of Public Sector**

Reasons for Very Likely:

Funds are available due to the oil and gas income (Stated by four respondents).

Reason for Likely:

Due to the ability for meeting the demand.

There is not enough fund for such a program.

**Capacity of Financial Management Agencies**

Reasons for Very Likely:

Due to the rise in the educational budget by fifty-one per cent in last year (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Likely:

Fifty million dollars are allocated to such programs in the Fifth Plan.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

Reason for Very Likely:

If accepted, there will be no financial shortage.

Reasons for Likely:

Could be available if decided by the government (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Neutral:

This could be considered in the Sixth Plan if the Shah ordered (Stated by three respondents).
Reasons for Unlikely:

Could not be funded so massively.

Could be funded only in the future.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**  
Reasons for Unlikely:

It is very difficult to purchase facilities especially for the culturally deprived areas.

Too costly to operate in the poor areas.

Free education cannot be expanded to such an extent.

**Economic and Investment Concerns**  
Reason for Likely:

Such an investment will not only help the individuals themselves, but also the productivity of the country in the future.

Reasons for Unlikely:

It will be too costly in terms of its results,  
Economically, it will not have a significant outcome.

**Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies**  
Reasons for Very Likely:

Government owns the schools and could subsidize this program as well (Stated by eight respondents).

Reason for Likely:

Financially, the state can support this program.

Reason for Neutral:

This program has no political effects for the system to fund it.

Reason for Unlikely:

Will not be subsidized.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

The Fifth Plan does not have any allocation for such programs.
Will not be subsidized by the government.

Priority Concerns
Reason for Neutral:

No priority.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Poor children's other needs have priority (Stated by four respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Priority has been given to the basic schooling.

Disinterest
Reasons for Unlikely:

Is not considered important enough to be funded (Stated by two respondents).

Irrelevance
Reason for Very Unlikely:

Funding the prescholastic establishments will be denied as being premature.

Miscellaneous
Reason for Unlikely:

Allocation of funds to this program is hardly possible.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 45.
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for early childhood education in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 3.0 or Neutral (See Table 43). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Financial
Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 45).

**Category III - Administrative Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Personnel Practice and Staff Adequacy**
Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to the insufficient staff (Stated by four respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

The output of the trained kindergarten teachers is only 300 a year.

**Coordination**
Reason for Neutral:

Very unorganized.

**Organizational Sufficiency**
Reason for Neutral:

Lack of administrative units to administer this program.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to the shortage of teachers and training centers (Stated by five respondents).

**Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation**
Reason for Likely:

Will be supported.

Reasons for Neutral:

This force is indifferent but does as ordered (Stated by eleven respondents).

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**
Reasons for Likely:

Can be helpful if decided (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Neutral:
So far as prescholastic training is concerned, the reaction of this force will be entirely positive in theory. But practically, it will be doubtful (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Education with any purpose will be difficult to administer due to the incapability and inefficiency of the educational system (Stated by three respondents).

Due to the inadequacy of the educational administrators.

Responsibility and Awareness
Reasons for Neutral:

Due to their lack of concern (Stated by four respondents).

Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise
Reason for Likely:

There will be need for experts to implement the program.

Reason for Neutral:

To install a program of this nature and magnitude will require more men of devotion, knowledge and expertise which are scarce.

Reason for Unlikely:

Due to the shortage of teachers and schools.

Capacity for Training and Managing Manpower
Reasons for Unlikely:

Recruitment of qualified and devoted teachers and their training seem to be the main difficulty.

Due to the deficiencies of the instructing body.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

No sufficient teaching cadres.

Experience
Reason for Unlikely:

Has a limited experience with prescholastic education.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting In Iran
Reason for Very Likely:
This is the order of the Shah to be implemented in the future.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Priority has been given to other aspects of education by the government.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 46.
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING
PROGRAM 1 OF SECTION II OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category III Administrative Force</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Very Unlikely</th>
<th>% in Rank Order</th>
<th>Supporting</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Practice &amp; Staff Adequacy</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative &amp; Management Talents</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Sufficiency</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree of Willingness, Motivation &amp; Initiation</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility &amp; Awareness</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Skills, Methods &amp; Expertise</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of Facilities</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity for Training &amp; Managing Manpower</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility of the Rules &amp; Regulations</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting In the Country</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency  
% = percentage  
M = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for early childhood education in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 2.5 or Unlikely (See Table 43). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By
computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 46).

**Category IV - Socio-cultural Force.**

Subcategories:

**Willingness of Social Groups in General**

Reasons for Very Likely:

Social groups favor this program and will support it (Stated by twelve respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

The social groups are for it (Stated by seven respondents).

**Major Interest Groups**

Reason for Very Likely:

Parents will fully support this program.

**Professional Groups**

Reason for Unlikely:

There is not enough concern on the part of young teachers to go to the rural areas.

**Religious, Traditional and Cultural Concerns**

Reason for Neutral:

Traditionally, people are not too enthusiastic about such a schooling.

Reason for Unlikely:

Cultural barriers are strong, too much affection on the part of parents to let their children depart (Stated by two respondents).

**Development Concerns**

Reasons for Very Likely:

This program will change the inadequacy of the culturally deprived children in the future (Stated by five respondents).
This program will give a conscious choice to the children to promote their values in the future.

This will expand the cognitive range of the children.

Reason for Likely:

These forces are in favor of educational programs of this kind.

Public Demand and Need
Reasons for Very Likely:

Due to the fact that it will cover a large percentage of the population which are poor (Stated by two respondents).

Economic and Income Concerns
Reason for Very Likely:

Both our culture and the society will welcome this program which aims to minimize poverty and its drawbacks.

Reason for Neutral:

Earning a living is paramount.

Degree of Public Awareness
Reasons for Very Likely:

Regarding the great publicity over literacy, people are completely ready for this program.

Eliminating illiteracy at all levels is the will of the people.

Reasons for Neutral:

The importance of this program has not been recognized in Iran except in the major cities (Stated by four respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

Due to the lack of awareness of the need.

Class Concerns
Reasons for Very Likely:

This program could fill the gap between the poor and the rich children (Stated by three respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the Socio-cultural
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operational-
izing Program 1 for early childhood education in respect to the Socio-
cultural Force was computed to be 4.6 or Very Likely (See Table 43). In
Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories to according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Socio-cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 47).

**Category V - Educational Force.**

Subcategories:

**Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence**

Reason for Unlikely:

This force is not prepared to train necessary staff and instructors in a short-run.

Willingness and Demand of the Educational Institutions in General

Reason for Very Likely:

The educational institutions are willing.

Reason for Likely:

Everyone is in favor of such an education.

Reasons for Neutral:

No particular effort has been made because they do not see this program as a crucial one (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

This is not a crucial issue and thus is not on the agenda (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

This is not dealt with as if it were important (Stated by two respondents).

**Conditional and Uncertain**

Reason for Likely:

Due to the importance of this program, educational system can be somehow helpful.
Reasons for Neutral:

The number of children in kindergarten is to increase only by ten per cent in the next four years (Stated by two respondents).

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**
Reasons for Neutral:

Due to the lack of inefficiency plus carelessness and indifference (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Incapable due to its limited capacity (Stated by four respondents).

This program is too difficult to manage.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Lack of readiness (Stated by three respondents).

**Instructional Concerns**
Reason for Neutral:

Some teachers are available but not sufficiently.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Shortage of teachers and instructors (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Due to the woeful shortage of teachers (Stated by two respondents).

**Awareness, Expertise and Experience**
Reason for Very Likely:

The literacy corps are doing this program.

Reason for Neutral:

Attempts are already being made to train individuals who can implement sociological programs.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of recognition, vision and attention (Stated by three respondents).
Facilities, Techniques and Finance
Reason for Likely:

Due to the increase in the number of schools in the less-developed areas.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to the shortage of teacher training centers.

Due to the scarce facilities for prescholastic schools (Stated by three respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Facilities for this program are not available.

Educational Elite
Reason for Likely:

There is a lot of encouragement in the academic communities.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran
Reason for Very Likely:

This is the order of the Shah to the educational system.

Reason for Unlikely:

Due to the discriminatory policy which is applied to the children in the rural and urban areas.

Disinterest
Reasons for Neutral:

Indifference (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of concern (Stated by two respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the Educational Force are presented in Table 48.
### Table 48

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories of Educational Force</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Very Unlikely</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Z in Rank Order</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%ile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Existing Trained Manpower</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Schools for General Education</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Vocational Technical Schools</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Higher Education Institutions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Professional Schools</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness &amp; Demand of Educational Institutions in General</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructional Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness, Expertise &amp; Experience</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation Toward National Development</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities, Techniques &amp; Finances</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of Interests &amp; Priorities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Elite (educated &amp; educator)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| f = frequency | 3 | 4 | 10 | 23 | 8 | 48 | 100 |
| X = percentages | | | | | | | |
| N = number of respondents | | | | | | | |

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for early childhood education in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 2.1 or Unlikely (See Table 43). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories
according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 48).

**Analysis For Program 2 (Strengthening Families) of Section II**

**The Program**

Actually, there are two sorts of families; those who have the time and the means to give their children an education and those who do not. The government shall compensate for the deficiencies of the latter.

**Part 1.** Table 49 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for strengthening families.

**TABLE 49**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>Very Likely(5)</th>
<th>Like-Ly(4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Un-Like-Ly(2)</th>
<th>Very Un-Like-Ly(1)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood

N = number of respondents

Md = median

Table 49 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the five prospective forces.

**Part 2.** Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the
respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force, as shown by the medians in Table 49, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

**Category I - Political Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**National Leaders**

*Reasons for Very Likely:*

- Due to the Shah's decree in September 1974 in this respect (Stated by two respondents).
- Due to the purpose of satisfying the low income groups who would protect the government politically.

**Political Parties**

*Reason for Very Likely:*

- Political parties are for this program because it helps the progress of the political opinion.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

*Reason for Very Likely:*

- Government's decision can help the program but we have to know at least a priority list of the government projects.

*Reason for Likely:*

- They will help but not much. They will most probably provide extra facilities for the rich at the same time so that the gap will always remain.

**Consideration of Social and Economic Development**

*Reason for Likely:*

- They will agree in order to materialize mass education.

**Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies**

*Reasons for Very Likely:*

- Government owns the schools and education is free up to the eight grade throughout the country (Stated by twenty-five respondents).

- Education and short-term vocational training are free for children.
Literacy corps are combating illiteracy in the rural areas and so far 1.5 million rural children and adults have been made able to read and write (Stated by four respondents).

Government is even providing exclusive private schools in the poor areas.

More tax benefits and equipments are going for the authorities operating schools in the poor areas.

Reasons for Likely:

This is the present policy; free education is provided in order to narrow the gap between rich and the poor (Stated by nine respondents).

More attention is being paid to the education of the rural children who are the poorest in the nation.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reason for Likely:

Our Educational facilities are not so vast to absorb much greater load.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 50.
The percentages of contribution of the subcategories of political force to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 of Section II of the plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category I Political Force</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Unlikely (2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (1)</th>
<th>% in Rank</th>
<th>Suppor-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resis-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Leaders</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament &amp; the Law</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Demand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of Social &amp; Economic Development</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unnecessary</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
\( \% = \) percentage
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for strengthening families in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 4.8 or Very Likely (See Table 49). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting
roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 50).

**Category II - Financial Force.**

Subcategories:

**Financial Capacity of Public Sector**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

- Financial resources are available (Stated by three respondents).
- Due to the oil revenues (Stated by eleven respondents).

**Reasons for Likely:**

- Funds are sufficient (Stated by four respondents).

**Reason for Neutral:**

- Funds are available especially for the agricultural schools in the poor areas.

**Capacity of Financial Management Agencies**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

- Sufficient funds have been allocated to the free education in the Fifth Plan (Stated by nine respondents).
- All poor families receive aid for books, school supplies and clothing of their children plus free education.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

**Reason for Very Likely:**

- The ability of the government to finance is the crucial factor.

**Reason for Likely:**

- Financial allocation has cautiously been made to this end.

**Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

- There is no financial constraints (Stated by eight respondents).
- Due to the free education in the country (Stated by seven respondents).

**Reasons for Likely:**
Deficient families are being subsidized for the education of their children.

Thirty-four vocational centers are being established to train poor children.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 51.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category II Financial Force</th>
<th>Very Like-Like-Neutral Like-Like-Unequal</th>
<th>% in Rank-order</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Capacity of Public Sector</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Cooperation</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financially Powerful</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Financial Management Agencies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Economic &amp; Investment Concerns</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Interest Groups</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
I = percentage
N = number of respondents
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for strengthening families in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 4.8 or Very Likely (See Table 49). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Financial Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 51).

Category III - Administrative Force.

Subcategories:

Personnel Practice and Staff Adequacy
Reason for Neutral:

The same teaching body will be working.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Shortage of trained personnel (Stated by two respondents).

Coordination
Reason for Neutral:

Lack of coordination.

Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation
Reasons for Likely:

Favorable, because as a public policy it will also serve the children of the civil servants.

Reasons for Neutral:

Indifferent and neutral (Stated by twenty-one respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of initiative and proper motivation and orientation in this direction (Stated by two respondents).

Organizational Sufficiency
Reason for Likely:
A total of eighty teacher training centers will be set up by 1978 for such a program.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reasons for Neutral:

The institutions are very poor to handle this program.

The administrative machinery needs some time to be able to run such programs effectively.

Reasons for Unlikely:

The administrative capacity is not sufficient for implementation of this program (Stated by two respondents).

**Responsibility and Awareness**

Reasons for Neutral:

Not too much concerned (Stated by five respondents).

**Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise**

Reason for Likely:

Understanding of the educated people of this issue is a requirement for operation of this program.

Reason for Neutral:

Administrative facilities and specialized manpower for this purpose are not needed as such.

**Availability of Facilities**

Reason for Likely:

Eighty per cent of the rural and all children of the urban areas will be provided with educational facilities by 1978.

**Capacity for Training and Managing Manpower**

Reasons for Likely:

Instructional capacity is being expanded for this purpose.

Literacy corps teachers are to be absorbed at the instruction and management levels after two years of teaching in rural areas.

**Corruption**

Reason for Unlikely:

Removing the tendencies toward favoritism and encouraging the teachers to do as well a job in the public schools as in the private ones remains as a problem.
In Relation to Other Forces Acting In Iran

Reasons for Very Likely:

Free education has become a tradition in Iran in form of government schools (Stated by three respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

This force does as the government orders.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 52.
### Table 52

**The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Administrative Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 2 of Section II of the Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories</th>
<th>Very Like</th>
<th>Very Unlike</th>
<th>Very Unlikely</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Total %</th>
<th>Overall %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Practice &amp; Staff Adequacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative &amp; Management Talents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Sufficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Willingness, Motivation &amp; Initiative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility &amp; Awareness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Skills, Methods &amp; Expertise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of Facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity for Training &amp; Managing Manpower</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Bureaucracy Concerns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility of the Rules &amp; Regulations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting In the Country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**
- \( f \): frequency
- \( \% \): percentage
- \( N \): number of respondents
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for strengthening families in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 3.0 or Neutral (See Table 49). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 52).

Category IV - Socio-cultural Force.

Subcategories:

Willingness of Social Groups in General
Reasons for Very Likely:

Social forces are very much in favor of this program (Stated by eight respondents).

Reason for Likely:

Positive reaction.

Major Interest Groups
Reason for Likely:

Due to the demand of the young groups.

Professional Groups
Reason for Unlikely:

Profit orientation of the private schools has been and probably remains as a problem.

Religious, Traditional and Cultural Concerns
Reasons for Very Likely:

Our culture is help-oriented, especially if funds are provided by the government.

This idea has always been respected in the Iranian culture.

Reason for Likely:
They cherish aid to the culturally deprived children.

**Development Concerns**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

This program will increase the development of the human resources through reducing the rate of illiteracy and lessening the waste of talents (Stated by three respondents).

This program will reduce the gross discrepancies in the educational opportunities.

This program will render skilled people to the process of industrialization.

This will secure the future of the culturally deprived children.

This program will result in the spread of innovation throughout a society that has more educated people.

**Public Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

People will be pleased with this program because it will be a great success for the community (Stated by two respondents).

**Public Demand and Need**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

This program which will cover a great percentage of the population will be considered as the people's right (Stated by two respondents).

**Labor Force and Labor Market Concerns**

**Reason for Very Likely:**

This will create sufficient supply of manpower in the future.

**Economic and Income Concerns**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

This will increase the economic yield of the poor in the future.

This will make the families to raise their children with more financial security.

This will create more equitable income distribution through increasing the productivity of the poor families in the future (Stated by two respondents).
In this case the families won't have to struggle to provide school for their children by sacrificing their other interests in life.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

**Reasons for Likely:**

They are for this program, but, so far the cultural barriers have been enormous.

Understanding of this program by the whole community is necessary for its success.

**Degree of Public Awareness**

**Reason for Likely:**

People are aware that such a program exists elsewhere.

**Reason for Neutral:**

This idea has not yet received great publicity and the necessary attention by the masses.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

**Reason for Neutral:**

This force can neither help nor resist the implementation of this program.

**Class Concerns**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

This program will give the poor a sense of identity and survival by reducing their cultural poverty (Stated by two respondents).

Due to the great difference among the classes and the lack of educational opportunities for the poor.

This will narrow educational gap between the socio-economic classes by creating more balance (Stated by two respondents).

This will encourage the future immigration of the poor into a better socio-economic situation.

**Miscellaneous**

**Reason for Very Likely:**

The results of such programs are utterly admired by the social groups.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the
likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Socio-cultural Force are presented in Table 53.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category IV</th>
<th>Very Like (2)</th>
<th>Like (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Very Unlike (1)</th>
<th>% in Rank</th>
<th>% in Support</th>
<th>% in Resistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Willingness of Social Groups in General</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>Intellectual Groups</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Major Interest Groups</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Professional Groups</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>Organized Groups</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diversity of Interest, Attitudes &amp; Priorities</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious, Traditional &amp; Cultural Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disinterest &amp; Cynicism</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10th</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development Concerns</td>
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<td>In Relation to Government's Influence</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Satisfaction &amp; Dissatisfaction</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Demand &amp; Need</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>6th</td>
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<td>Labor Force &amp; Labor Market Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10th</td>
</tr>
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<td>Economic &amp; Income Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>10.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Public Awareness</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>10th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3rd</td>
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<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency  
% = percentage  
N = number of respondents
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for strengthening families in respect to the Socio-cultural Force was computed to be 4.8 or Very Likely (See Table 49). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Socio-cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 53).

Category V - Educational Force.

Subcategories:

Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence

Reasons for Very Likely:

Schools are to have capacity for five million children by the end of the Fifth Plan (1978).

Education from the age of 10 to 44 is being available to the rural and culturally poor people.

Reasons for Likely:

The literacy corps are teaching in the rural areas (Stated by two respondents).

The high school graduates are hired and trained to be sent to the poor areas for teaching (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Neutral:

Educational programs could be undertaken to combat this problem (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

The educational capacity is insufficient at this time (Stated by three respondents).

Willingness and Demand of the Educational Institutions

Reasons for Very Likely:
Every element of the educational system is for this program (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Likely:

The Educational institutions will appreciate this program.

Conditional and Uncertain
Reasons for Very Likely:

This force is planning to erodicate illiteracy by 1983.

The capacity of the educational institutions is planned to increase by forty-four per cent by the end of the Fifth Plan.

By providing more schools the deficiencies of the poor families can be reduced (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Likely:

In the close future, it will be capable of implementing this program successfully.

Reason for Unlikely:

Some extra efforts are needed to implement this program and there are some deficiencies.

Children at the rural level do not have equal chance to receive educational and vocational training, but, such capacity can be provided.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reason for Neutral:

While willing, this force is incapable to fulfill its required mission in this respect.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Incapable to expand its activities (Stated by three respondents).

Educational system is in need of reform (Stated by two respondents).

Instructional Concerns
Reason for Neutral:

The number of instructors is inadequate. More effective men of talent should be encouraged to join the teaching profession.
Awareness, Expertise and Experience

Reason for Very Likely:

Literacy is considered as a foundation for a host of moves toward improvement of both rural and urban areas in the Fifth Plan.

Reasons for Likely:

Because of their direct contact with the children, educational forces have awareness of such a need (Stated by two respondents).

Facilities, Techniques and Finance

Reason for Very Likely:

The number of teacher training centers is increasing to improve the educational capacity for the poor.

Satellite system for education is being used to pursue such an aim.

The activities of the private and the public schools are funded by the government.

Reasons for Likely:

Facilities for the education of the poor children is being provided (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

Educational resources have hardly been allocated for this purpose in the past.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to the shortage of staff schools and other facilities (Stated by two respondents).

No sufficient means available.

Diversity of Interests and Priorities

Reason for Neutral:

The private educational institutions will not favor this program since the government will not be lavish enough.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran

Reason for Very Likely:
This is the order of the Shah and the national policy.

Reason for Neutral:

Due to the educational system's lack of relation with the community.

**Disinterest**
Reason for Neutral:

This force is indifferent.

Reason for Unlikely:

This force neither objects nor helps.

**Irrelevance**
Reason for Neutral:

This program is welcomed by all, therefore, this force cannot by very important.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Educational Force are presented in Table 54.
### Table 34

The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Educational Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 2 of Section II of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Type of Subcategories</th>
<th>Very Like (5)</th>
<th>Like (4)</th>
<th>Neutral Like (3)</th>
<th>Very Un-Like (2)</th>
<th>% in Sup-Ranked</th>
<th>% in Neutral-Ranked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Existing Trained Manpower</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity of Schools for General Education</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Capacity of Vocational &amp; Technical Schools</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Higher Education Institutions</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Professional Schools</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness &amp; Demand of Educational Institutions in General</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructional Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness, Expertise &amp; Experience</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation Toward National Development</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities, Techniques &amp; Finances</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of Interests &amp; Priorities</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Elite (educated &amp; educator)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| f = frequency | 13 | 11 | 10 | 14 | 0 | 48 | 100% |
| N = number of respondents |

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for strengthening families in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 3.0 or Neutral (See Table 49). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories
according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 54).

Analysis For Program 3 (Universal Public Education) of Section II

The Program

There shall be introduced freedom of initiative and a certain degree of competition within the public education system and also an overall cultural policy in which youth and popular education movements will receive financial resources in proportion to the importance of their task.

Part I. Table 55 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for universal public education.

| TABLE 55 |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| THE RESULTS OF THE RESPONDENTS' RATING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 3 OF SECTION II OF THE PLAN IN RESPECT TO 5 FORCES |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>Very Like- (5)</th>
<th>Like- (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Un- Like- (2)</th>
<th>Very Un- Like- (1)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood
Z = percentage
N = number of respondents
Md = median

Table 55 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the
five prospective forces.

Part 2. Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force, as shown by the medians in Table 55, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

**Category I - Political Force.**

Subcategories:

**National Leaders**

Reason for Very Likely:

Is the order of the Shah and the national policy.

Reason for Likely:

Priority Concerns

The cultural and social development has the priority.

Conditional and Uncertain

Reason for Likely:

Only if it is in accord with the general educational policies.

Reason for Neutral:

The government will be hesitant to encourage such a competition because of the current experience.

Reason for Unlikely:

The educational system needs more flexibility; in the offer of different forms of degree and non-degree, in the time period required for securing a degree, and in the types of training undertaken by the universities.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Free education is a newly introduced program.

**Major Interest Groups**

Reason for Unlikely:

Students are interested primarily in degree and they believe that it will automatically entitle them to a job and social standing.
Consideration of the Social and Economic Development
Reason for Very Likely:

Government is interested in such a program in order to meet the country's rapidly expanding needs for trained manpower.

Reasons for Likely:

It is the policy of the government to improve the shortage of manpower in the country. (Stated by two respondents).

Due to the necessity of strengthening the management and the training of the manpower required for the development of the country.

Reason for Unlikely:

Most people have low incomes, therefore, to prevent any disagreeable feelings, government will oppose this program.

Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies
Reasons for Very Likely:

Schools have been receiving huge sums of funds to increase the absorption by the universities of modern science and technology parallel with their rising application in industries.

The Ministry of Higher Education with the cooperation of the universities is seeking solutions to the educational problem in Iran (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Government is aiming at improving the quality and the scope of the education (Stated by seven respondents).

Student-teacher program and counselling centers have been recently established in order to create a link between schools and the universities for such a purpose (Stated by four respondents).

Close coordination between school teachers and university professors both at the educational planning and operational levels is being pursued by the Ministry of Education (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

They would rather see an equality.

Reasons for Unlikely:
Reasons for Unlikely:

The political system does not favor the outcome of freedom of initiative of any sort (Stated by two respondents).

The political system, by overlooking the schools, has been aiming toward uniformity of the educational system.

The political force does not encourage difference between school units, their programs, and eventually, their students.

One of the obstacles is that in an attempt to shift from traditional to modern methods of education, we have lost our respect for learned and learning.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

The government's policy is directly opposite to this aim (Stated by four respondents).

Education is an infrastructural and vital problem for a country. It is through education that preparation for development can be made. In this country only the political force decides for the educational system and, therefore, competition is of no importance.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reason for Unlikely:

Cooperation cannot be made between schools and the universities to improve the condition of the former.

**Unnecessary**

Reason for Unlikely:

The experience has shown that competition in the field of education has led to profiteering.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 56.
Table 56

The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Political Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 3 of Section II of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Neutral Likely (3)</th>
<th>Unlikely (2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (1)</th>
<th>X in Order</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resistant</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Leaders</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4th</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Political Parties</td>
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<td>Priority Concerns</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Consideration of Social &amp; Economic Development</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trends &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
X = percentage
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for universal public education in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 3.7 or Likely (See Table 55). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resistant roles were identified (See the last
Category II - Financial Force.

Subcategories:

Financial Capacity of Public Sector
Reasons for Very Likely:

Financial resources are available due to the oil and gas revenues (Stated by twelve respondents).

Capacity of Financial Management Agencies
Reasons for Very Likely:

Due to the large sums of funds allocated to education in the Fifth Plan (Stated by six respondents).

Conditional and Uncertain
Reasons for Very Likely:

Education is one of the areas where investment has been made vastly although it has not fetched good results.

Financial resources have been allocated to education without expecting any particular results.

Reasons for Neutral:

Funds are available, but, since it is the political force which decides, the will of the financial force cannot be very helpful.

If cultural activities and movements are genuine and result-oriented, financial help should be given.

Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies
Reasons for Very Likely:

Government owns the schools and funds their activities (Stated by fourteen respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

No financial constrain because this sounds like the present policies (Stated by three respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

No financial problem involved (Stated by two respondents).
Reasons for Unlikely:

Government who owns all the schools in the country won't fund this program because it does not favor it (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Government is moving directly opposite to this aim in Iran.

Disinterest
Reason for Neutral:

This force neither helps nor resists the program.

Miscellaneous
Reason for Very Likely:

All schools are state-owned.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 57.
TABLE 57

THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF FINANCIAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 3 OF SECTION II OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Like</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Very Unlikely</th>
<th>% in Supportive</th>
<th>% in Neutral</th>
<th>% in Supportive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Financial Cooperation of Private Sector &amp; Financially Powerful</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity of Financial Management Agencies</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic &amp; Investment Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ f = \text{frequency} \]
\[ \% = \text{percentage} \]
\[ N = \text{number of respondents} \]

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for universal public education in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 4.8 or Very Likely (See Table 55). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of the subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Financial
Fore was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 57).

**Category III - Administrative Force.**

Subcategories:

**Personnel Practice and Staff Adequacy**

Reason for Neutral:

*If this program is ever to be introduced, more knowledgeable and expert personnel will be needed.*

Reasons for Unlikely:

*Lack of sufficient staff; there are only 34,000 teachers and 1,100 counsellers in the guidance cycles for 300,000 students involved (Stated by two respondents).*

**Administrative and Management Talents**

Reasons for Unlikely:

*Due to the shortage of qualified school administrators (Stated by five respondents).*

*The system of higher education cannot provide sufficient administrators for the schools.*

**Coordination**

Reason for Unlikely:

*Due to the lack of coordination among schools.*

**Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation**

Reason for Very Likely:

*If there is a free competition, the private sector can easily undertake it.*

Reason for Likely:

*Because in any kind of free system of education the administrative system will benefit.*

Reasons for Neutral:

*This idea will be welcomed although with some reservation and resistance.*

*Indifferent (Stated by two respondents).*
Reason for Unlikely:

This force is against any freedom in respect to the personal initiation.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reasons for Unlikely:

The educational administration is very weak to play its role (Stated by four respondents).

Due to the insufficiency of teachers and training officers schools are only the diploma printing factories (Stated by three respondents).

**Responsibility and Awareness**

Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to the irresponsibility, carelessness and lack of concern on the part of the school administrators (Stated by two respondents).

Carelessness of the schools to secure the cooperation of the students' families.

**Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise**

Reason for Likely:

Skills, methods and know how will be provided by 1978.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to the limitation of specialists, knowledge and practical approach (Stated by four respondents).

**Availability of Facilities**

Reasons for Likely:

A variety of educational facilities such as close-circuit T.V. are planned to be utilized for such a purpose (Stated by three respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

The overcrowded classrooms, inadequate number of teachers and unsatisfactory physical conditions are the problems.

**Capacity For Training and Managing Manpower**

Reason for Likely:

The teacher training centers are seeking to introduce more modern teaching methods.
Reson for Unlikely:

Programs to train necessary staff are needed.

**Corruption**

Reason for Unlikely:

Favoritism will make the implementation of this program difficult.

**In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran**

Reason for Very Likely:

This is the Shah's order.

Reasons for Likely:

The Government is preparing a ten year perspective for educational improvement (Stated by five respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

For the public schools, some improvement in the methods is foreseen.

Reasons for Unlikely:

They always fail to assess and announce their needs to the government.

This force has no relation with the economic need of the country.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

The government controlled administrative system will resist moving in this direction.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 58.
### Table 58

**The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Administrative Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 3 of Section II of the Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Very Unlikely</th>
<th>% in</th>
<th>Suppor-</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Rank -</th>
<th>Por-</th>
<th>Neutra-</th>
<th>Ed</th>
<th>ative</th>
<th>tral</th>
<th>ting</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>7th</td>
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<td>66.5</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Responsibility &amp; Awareness</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>Availability of Facilities</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting In the Country</td>
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<td>10</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**f = frequency**  
**X = percentage**  
**N = number of respondents**

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for universal public education in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 2.2 or Unlikely (See Table 55). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By
computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 58).

**Category IV - Socio-cultural Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Willingness of Social Groups in General**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

All social groups are for such a program (Stated by three respondents).

**Reasons for Likely:**

The social groups are favorable, supportive and ready to assist such a program (Stated by eleven respondents).

**Intellectual Groups**

**Reason for Very Likely:**

This idea has always been reflected in the demands of the social groups, especially the intellectuals.

**Religious, Traditional and Cultural Concerns**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

Culturally, educational initiatives are respected and admired in Iran (Stated by three respondents).

**Reason for Likely:**

Culturally this idea is cherishable.

**Development Concerns**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

This program will raise the quality of education, provide more enthusiastic students, give the youth a better sense of goal setting and goal achievement, and provide a place of showdown for different talents due to its competitive characteristics (Stated by seven respondents).

**Reasons for Likely:**

This will improve the outcome of the schools and will be a better
Means for the students to serve the development of their country (Stated by two respondents).

This will increase the productivity and efficiency of the next generation (Stated by two respondents).

**Public Satisfacation and Dissatisfaction**

Reason for Very Unlikely:

The masses frown upon the privately run educational institutions for being purely established for profit making.

**Public Demand and Need**

Reason for Very Likely:

Because this program will cover a large percentage of the people especially the lower class who make the major portion of the population.

Reason For Likely:

Due to the public demand for quality education.

**Labor Force and Labor Market Concerns**

Reason for Very Likely:

Because this program will create better social servants.

Reason for Likely:

Due to the fact that this will create challenges and opportunities.

**Economic and Income Concerns**

Reason for Very Likely:

Because a better education can do much to reduce the risks taken in the time of economic transition.

Reason for Unlikely:

The schools have profit motive rather than social concerns.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

Reason for Very Likely:

Positive reaction if the free competition is to be controlled by the government.

Reason for Neutral:

The idea will be welcomed although with some resistance.
Reason for Unlikely:

The success of this program in Iran seems doubtful.

Degree of Public Awareness
Reason for Unlikely:

Unawareness of the society of the significance of competition and initiation in this area.

Miscellaneous
Reasons for Very Likely:

Quality education will certainly be supported by the social groups.

Such a program will reduce the existing deficiencies.

Reason for Likely:

This is an acceptable social proposal.

Reasons for Unlikely:

They are against this program and would rather to see all the schools the same.

This will prevent special credits for the rich.

Unlikely, regarding the existing institutions.

This force will function as a brake to this program.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the Socio-cultural Force are presented in Table 59.
### Table 59
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 3 OF SECTION II OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories</th>
<th>Very Likely(5)</th>
<th>Very Likely(4)</th>
<th>Neutral Likely(3)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely(2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely(1)</th>
<th>% in Rank</th>
<th>Order</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>In Relation to Government's Influence</td>
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<td>Public Satisfactions &amp; Dissatisfactions</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>9th</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Demand &amp; Need</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6th</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labor Force &amp; Labor Market Concerns</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Economic &amp; Income Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6th</td>
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<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>15</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency  
% = percentage  
N = number of respondents  

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for universal public education in respect to the Socio-cultural Force was computed to be 4.2 or Likely (See Table 55). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood
of the Socio-cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 59).

**Category V - Educational Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence**

**Reason for Likely:**

More attention is being paid to the infrastructural fields of education such as teacher training, school management and research institutions.

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

Due to the lack of sufficient capacity (Stated by three respondents).

**Willingness and Demand of Educational Institutions**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

Due to the demand of schools for more independence (Stated by two respondents).

Because, with free competition, there will be rapid educational improvement.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

**Reasons for Likely:**

They can help by creating specialization and improving talents.

They will aid but not necessarily toward this aim.

If financial aids are considered for such a competition they will accept it.

The capacity of this system will increase by 1978 (Stated by two respondents).

The number of guidance schools is increasing by 167% in 1978.

The number of secondary schools and universities will increase by 92% in 1978.

**Reason for Neutral:**
The quantity of the educational system increases but its quality is not known.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**  
**Reason for Neutral:**

The experience has shown no significance in competition.

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

Has not reached such an stage yet (Stated by two respondents).

If the basic role of education is to stimulate independent thinking and to encourage initiatives, such a role is beyond our educational system.

**Reasons for Very Unlikely:**

Is capable of undertaking this program only at a primitive level (Stated by two respondents).

**Instructional Concerns**  
**Reasons for Unlikely:**

The shortage of teachers, educators and specialists in the technological fields is acute (Stated by three respondents).

**Awareness, Expertise and Experience**  
**Reasons for Neutral:**

Quality education is not quite known by the Iranian educational system (Stated by two respondents).

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

Shortage of school administrators and technologically advanced methods and facilities (Stated by two respondents).

**Orientation Toward National Development**  
**Reason for Unlikely:**

Incapable of satisfying the needs of the country.

**Degree of Flexibility**  
**Reasons for Unlikely:**

Due to the rigidity and reluctance of the educational system to change for the fear that change will bring uncertainties (Stated by two respondents).
Facilities, Techniques and Finance
Reasons for Likely:

Educational technology is being provided through the Fifth Plan (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Shortage of teaching training centers, laboratories, suitable text books and other facilities is significant (Stated by six respondents).

Diversity of Interests and Priorities
Reasons for Unlikely:

There is not a uniform educational policy in Iran.

They are against a climate which imposes competition.

Over-expansion of institutions of higher education has been the result of the freedom of initiation mainly in the private schools.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran
Reason for Very Likely:

This is the order of the Shah and the national policy.

Disinterest
Reasons for Neutral:

They are not necessarily in favor of one or another policy.

This force can neither assist nor resist such a program.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the Educational Force are presented in Table 60.
TABLE 60
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF EDUCATIONAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 3 OF SECTION II OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category V</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Like-Likely</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Un-Likely</th>
<th>Very Un-Likely</th>
<th>% in Rank Order</th>
<th>Suppor-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resis-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Educational Force</td>
<td>ly(5)</td>
<td>ly(4)</td>
<td>ly(3)</td>
<td>ly(2)</td>
<td>ly(1)</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>tive</td>
<td>tive</td>
<td>tive</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Capacity of Vocational &amp; Technical Schools</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Capacity of Professional Schools</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>10.5</td>
<td>6th</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>6.5</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>33.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilities, Techniques &amp; Finances</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>33.5</td>
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<td>Diversity of Interests &amp; Priorities</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8th</td>
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<td>Educational Elite (educated &amp; educator)</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10th</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency | 4 | 11 | 6 | 25 | 2 | 48 | 100%
| I = percentages | | | | | | | |
| N = number of respondents | | | | | | | |

Results. In part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for universal public education in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 2.3 or Unlikely (See Table 55). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according
to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 60).

Analysis For Program 4 (Open College Education) of Section II

The Program

The system of higher education shall be changed in such a way which will demolish the hereditary transmission of power from the certain classes of one generation to the same classes of the next generation. Therefore, there is a need for an alternative method of selection for entering the universities. Accordingly, there shall be no entrance examination, and the selections shall be made on the basis of marks, school teachers, recommendations and other qualifications.

Part I. Table 61 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for open college education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 61</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE RESULTS OF THE RESPONDENTS' RATING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 4 OF SECTION II OF THE PLAN IN RESPECT TO 5 FORCES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>Very Like-ly(5)</th>
<th>Like-ly(4)</th>
<th>Neutral(3)</th>
<th>Un-Like-ly(2)</th>
<th>Very Un-Like-ly(1)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Md</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>68</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood

\% = percentage

N = number of respondents

Md = median
Table 61 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Problem 4 in respect to the five prospective forces.

Part 2. Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force, as shown by the medians in Table 61, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

Category I - Political Force.

Subcategories:

Priority Concerns
Reason for Unlikely:

The present system is preferred.

Conditional and Uncertain
Reasons for Likely:

Through improving the higher education institutions, the political system can be helpful (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Neutral:

Some higher education institutions are conducting a pilot project by applying the proposed method (Stated by two respondents).

The authorities still believe that the present admission system is the best system available but they do not rule out other alternatives (Stated by two respondents).

Interest Groups
Reason for Likely:

Due to the demand of high school graduates.

Reason for Unlikely:

Under any admission system, the private school graduates who get a better education will have a better chance.
Consideration of Social and Economic Development

Reasons for Likely:

- A different system of admission will increase the students' educational quality in the future (Stated by three respondents).

- The present admission system has no place for qualities such as strength of character, diversity of interests or practical skills.

Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies

Reasons for Very Likely:

- Government is concerned with this program (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

- A greater flexibility is being gradually introduced into the present entrance examination (Stated by eight respondents).

- The government realizes that only the upper and middle classes who can afford private schools secure their entrance into the universities (Stated by two respondents).

- State is willing to change the present regulations if a better alternative is available (Stated by three respondents).

- A technical committee is now looking into the possibility of revising the present admission method (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Neutral:

- Some private colleges are ordered to have a new method of selection (Stated by three respondents).

- This method has been suggested but has not been approved to be applied totally.

Reasons for Unlikely:

- The present system of admission is favored with all its deficiencies (Stated by four respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

- It does in reverse; the free education program of the government has distorted any kind of personal initiation (Stated by two respondents).
Capability and Efficiency Concerns

Reason for Unlikely:

The present system makes no provision for a better geographical distribution of the students accepted into the universities; most of them come from the central province which has the best high schools in the nation.

Unnecessary

Reason for Unlikely:

Economically, the country is not yet ready to accept a policy of school expansion and open college education as this program may produce an overflow of graduates with unsuitable market to hire them.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 62.
TABLE 62
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF POLITICAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 4 OF SECTION II OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category I Political Force</th>
<th>Very Likely (1)</th>
<th>Likely (2)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Unlikely (4)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (5)</th>
<th>% in Rank order</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Resisting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Leaders</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament &amp; the Law</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>Interest Groups</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4th</td>
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<td>Public Demand</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Consideration of Social &amp; Economic Development</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>70</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
I = percentage
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for open college education was computed to be 3.6 or Likely (See Table 61). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last
Category II - Financial Force.

Subcategories:

Financial Capacity of Public Sector
Reasons for Very Likely:

Funds are available (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

The state has the ability to meet the need (Stated by two respondents).

Conditional and Uncertain
Reason for Very Likely:

No financial problem if needed.

Reason for Likely:

Can be provided if needed.

Reason for Neutral:

Funds are available.

Economic and Investment Concerns
Reason for Likely:

No much problem concerning the investment possibilities for this aim.

Interest Groups
Reason for Neutral:

Prevalent forces may not favor it.

Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies
Reasons for Very Likely:

Finance is no problem as far as education is concerned (Stated by four respondents).

Reason for Likely:

Government will pay for any alternative chosen.
Reasons for Neutral:

Finance is not a major factor.

Disinterest
Reasons for Neutral:

Indifferent and neutral (Stated by seven respondents).

Irrelevance
Reason for Neutral:

Finance is an irrelevant factor to the implementation of this program (Stated by twenty-one respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 63.
### Table 63

The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Financial Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 4 of Section II of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Very Ly(5)</th>
<th>Like Ly(4)</th>
<th>Neutral Ly(3)</th>
<th>Unlikely Ly(2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely Ly(1)</th>
<th>% in % Ed Rank Order</th>
<th>Supportive %</th>
<th>Neutral %</th>
<th>Resisting %</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Capacity of Public Sector</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial Cooperation of Private Sector &amp; Financially Powerful</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>6 (5th) 66.5 33.5 0</td>
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<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**f = frequency**  
**% = percentage**  
**N = number of respondents**

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for open college education in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 3.2 or neutral (See Table 61). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Financial Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting
roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 63).

**Category III - Administrative Force.**

Subcategories:

**Personnel Practice and Staff Adequacy**

Reason for Likely:

There are enough educational staff for this program.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to the insufficient technically qualified personnel in the universities and, the old practicing style (Stated by five respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Has a history of rigidity.

**Administrative and Management Talents**

Reason for Unlikely:

There is no capable administrative force to carry out this program.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of professional administrators in the guidance capacity (Stated by three respondents).

**Coordination**

Reasons for Unlikely:

There exists no collective efforts and coordination among the higher education institutions. (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

No affiliation with pre-college schools (Stated by two respondents).

**Organizational Sufficiency**

Reason for Unlikely:

Due to the organizational inadequacy.

**Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation**

Reason for Very Unlikely:
Personal initiation is not favored by this system.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reason for Likely:

The higher education institutions are actively involved in this program.

Reason for Neutral:

They have a very poor way of administering.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of capability, efficiency and qualification; the more the system of higher education expands, the worse it gets (eight respondents).

Its major role has always been to produce diploma.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Cannot handle modern programs with old procedures (Stated by two respondents).

**Responsibility and Awareness**

Reason for Neutral:

May accept the responsibility of administering a new method.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Higher education institutions are not in touch with the reality (Stated by two respondents).

**Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise**

Reason for Unlikely:

Is not too familiar with the modern approaches to educational development.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Is not capable and innovative; cannot draw long term plans (Stated by three respondents).

**Availability of Facilities**

Reasons for Unlikely:

Universities have room for only one of every ten applicants.
Universities have capacity for only 140,000 students.

Capacity for Training and Managing Manpower
Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of strong arms and educators (Stated by three respondents).

Degree of Flexibility of Rules and Regulations
Reason for Unlikely:

This force is too formal and too traditional.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran
Reasons for Unlikely:

Cannot expand according to the needs of the nation (Stated by two respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 64.
The percentages of contribution of the subcategories of administrative force to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 of Section XI of the plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories:</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>g</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>5</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Bureaucracy Concerns</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>Degree of Flexibility of the Rules &amp; Regulations</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>9th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting In the Country</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ f = \text{frequency} \]
\[ X = \text{percentage} \]
\[ N = \text{number of respondents} \]

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for open college education in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 1.8 or Unlikely (See Table 61). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By
computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 64).

**Category IV - Socio-cultural Force.**

Subcategories:

**Willingness of Social Forces in General**

*Reasons for Very Likely:*

The social forces are for the change in the selection system of the universities (Stated by five respondents).

*Reasons for Likely:*

The social forces are in favor of another system replacing the old and outdated entrance examination (Stated by eleven respondents).

**Interest Groups**

*Reason for Very Unlikely:*

Open admission to the universities will mean a doorway to the families who are already ever present in this country.

**Diversity of Interests, Attitudes and Priorities**

*Reason for Unlikely:*

Due to the lack of social responsibility and the presence of individualistic attitudes.

**Religious, Traditional and Cultural Concerns**

*Reason for Likely:*

Cultural forces will not resist this program.

**Disinterest and Cynicism**

*Reasons for Neutral:*

Indifferent (Stated by six respondents).

*Reason for Unlikely:*
This force is more concerned with other major problems.

Public Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction
Reasons for Very Likely:

Because the present entrance examination neglects too many qualified applicants (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

The present selection system gives choice only to those students who can afford better high schools (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Neutral:

People are used to the present selection method (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

People prefer the entrance examination because it seems to avoid recommendations.

Public Demand and Need
Reasons for Very Likely:

People would like to see a selection method which considers good high school performance as the standard for entering the universities (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Likely:

Public demand exists.

Economic and Income Concerns
Reason for Very Unlikely:

Cultural poverty and low level of income causes the people to accept government's educational programs. Otherwise, they cannot afford it.

Conditional and Uncertain
Reasons for Neutral:

Unconcerned, uncertain, and mixed feelings (Stated by four respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Uncertain whether the new method of selection would yield better results (Stated by two respondents).
Class Concerns

Reason for Likely:

This method will make allowance for those good talents who have not had a good high school education due to their geographical and economic conditions.

Reason for Unlikely:

The problem of class system is not solved in Iran and the idea of getting to a higher class is very idealistic.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Socio-cultural Force are presented in Table 65.
The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Socio-Cultural Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 4 of Section 11 of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category IV Socio-cultural Force</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Neutral Likely (4)</th>
<th>Unlikely Likely (3)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely Likely (2) or (1)</th>
<th>% in Rank Order</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>E</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Organized Groups</td>
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<td>Diversity of Interest, Attitudes &amp; Priorities</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Public Satisfaction &amp; Dissatisfaction</td>
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<td>Public Demand &amp; Need</td>
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<td>Class Concerns</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
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</table>

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for open college education in respect to the Socio-cultural Force was computed to be 3.6 or Likely (See Table 61). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Socio-
cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 65).

Category V - Educational Force.

Subcategories:

The Existing Trained Manpower
Reason for Unlikely:

The educational reservoir of the state is not enough to handle this program.

Capacity of Higher Education Institutions
Reasons for Neutral:

By the end of the Fifth Plan, the capacity of the higher education institutions is to increase to 200,000 (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

The outcome of the higher education institutions is not in accord with the needs of Iran's technological change (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Higher education system is not capable of working out policies with reference both to obtaining social conditions and the future scope of the society (Stated by two respondents).

Universities are not able to build a degree of knowledge to enable the country to make the best of its human resources.

Willingness and Demand of Educational Institutions in General
Reasons for Very Likely:

The educational institutions have always demanded the equality of opportunities in higher education be given to all Iranians (Stated by three respondents).

Conditional and Uncertain
Reason for Very Likely:

All preparations have been made to implement this proposition as from the next two years.

Reason for Unlikely:
This force is able to help but does as the government orders.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Due to existence of chaotic atmosphere at the higher education establishments.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reason for Neutral:

Does not have much effect.

Reason for Unlikely:

This system produces thousands of high school graduates who are over-qualified for manual work and under-qualified for even average clerical positions.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

This system cannot produce what the country is in need of (Stated by four respondents).

Instructional Concerns
Reason for Very Unlikely:

Shortage of faculty and facilities is acute.

Awareness, Expertise and Experience
Reason for Very Likely:

This program will increase academic standards.

Reason for Neutral:

Lack of defined aim and objectives for expansion.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Lack of objectives (Stated by three respondents).

Orientation Toward National Development
Reason for Likely:

This program will improve the educational achievement.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Intellectual advancement of the country does not seem to be the major objective of the higher education system.
Educational system is more concerned with theory than practice (Stated by two respondents).

Degree of Flexibility
Reason for Unlikely:

They do not favor procedural change.

Diversity of Interests and Priorities
Reason for Likely:

They can aid the people to get familiar with this idea through showing good will and not introducing personal ideas.

Reason for Neutral:

Due to the difference in choices.

Reason for Unlikely:

They favor the old system and the old style.

Reasons for Unlikely:

There are individualistic and uncoordinated approaches in the higher education institutions (Stated by two respondents).

Educational Elite
Reason for Likely:

There are enough forces in the academia to insist on standard of excellence for entry into the universities.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Due to the inefficiency of the faculty members in general.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting In Iran
Reasons for Unlikely:

The economic market has no relation with the output of the universities (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Failure of the higher education institutions in showing the realities to the students and the general public (Stated by two respondents).

This system has no touch with the outside world.
**Disinterest**

Reason for Neutral:

Lack of concern for quality education.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

This force is indifferent to such a program.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to Educational Force are presented in Table 66.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category V Educational Force</th>
<th>Very Likely (1)</th>
<th>Very Uncertain (3)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (2)</th>
<th>% in Rank-</th>
<th>Sup-</th>
<th>Neut-</th>
<th>Re-</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories:</td>
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<td>f</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity to Transfer Human Potential Into Competence</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity of Vocational &amp; Technical Schools</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Professional Schools</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Willingness &amp; Demand of Educational Institutions in General</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructional Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<td>Awareness, Expertise &amp; Experience</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Orientation Toward National Development</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities, Techniques &amp; Finances</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of Interests &amp; Priorities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Elite (educated &amp; educator)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Force Acting in Iran</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>Disinterest</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Irrelevance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency

% = percentages

N = number of respondents
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for open college education in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 1.5 or Very Unlikely (See Table 61). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 66).

Analysis For Program 1 (Strengthening Trade Unions) of Section III

The Program

The starting point of any democratization of economic power is to extend the role of the trade union inside the enterprise itself. Therefore, trade unions shall be established, and if already exist, shall be united and helped to be extricated from condition of poverty and underequipment, so that they could negotiate everything that affects the conditions of workers.

Part 1. Table 67 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for strengthening trade unions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>Very Un-Like-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Un-Like-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ly(5)</td>
<td>ly(4)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>ly(2)</td>
<td>ly(1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood
Z = percentage
N = number of respondents
Md = median
Table 67 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the five prospective forces.

Part 2. Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force, as shown by the medians in Table 67, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

Category I - Political Force.

Subcategories:

National Leaders
Reason for Neutral:

This is a good policy to talk about trade unions only. Thus, they exist without having the said power.

Reason for Unlikely:

Some trade unions exist for window dressing purposes.

Parliament and the Law
Reason for Likely:

The new profit sharing law increases the wages of workers and gave them a stake in the industry which might open the way to the trade unions.

Reason for Unlikely:

There is law for guild' election but not trade unions in the proposed sense.

Political Parties
Reasons for Very Likely:

Decision makers for the political groups can create trade unions in the form of party powers so that they could manipulate the workers (Stated by three respondents).

Conditional and Uncertain
Reason for Likely:
The representatives of the workers negotiate agreements with their employers to certain extent.

Reasons for Neutral:

Government has recently tried to give authority to the representatives of the working unions but it takes time before they can become efficient. Yet, even in case of having such authority, a limit to the extent of the bargaining power of the unions is foreseen.

What type of trade unions should be established in Iran and how active it should be is open to conjecture.

Reasons for Unlikely:

The role of the trade unions as a supportive agent for the working class is doubtful (Stated by two respondents).

Interest Groups
Reason for Very Likely:

The major interest groups will get a great support from the unions's government body.

Reason for Unlikely:

Trade unions have only a ceremonial role in Iran.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

The organized interest groups, especially the labor organizers, are extremely opposed to this program (Stated by two respondents).

Public Demand
Reason for Likely:

Due to the demand of the working class.

Reason for Unlikely:

The government does not feel too much demand pressure exerted by the workers.

Consideration of Social and Economic Development
Reason for Likely:

Through the profit sharing law, the government is planning to increase the productivity, efficiency and, consequently, the income of the workers.
Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and the Existing Policies

Reasons for Likely:

Government is willing and in giving some directives for offering a participation incentive to the workers in the industrial units (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Neutral:

There is a tendency to do so in Iran for political reasons (Stated by three respondents).

The government plays the role of the trade unions, i.e., the workers of the government factories who do not enjoy profit sharing are given annual bonuses equal to the share of the workers in similar private industries (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Although trade unions exist to some extent, the government practically controls their function and in fact decides for them; the Ministry of Labor manages the affairs between the workers and the industrialists (Stated by ten respondents).

The workers are used to looking upon the government for their rights and, therefore, their attitudes are gravitating more towards the government as much more than the trade unions (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Trade unions might become a source of unrest and the political forces do not favor it (Stated by two respondents).

Trade unions as a force for equitable engagement in economic enterprises are feared because they might become a political power in the future (Stated by three respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program I in respect to the Political force are presented in Table 68.
TABLE 68

THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF POLITICAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM I OF SECTION III OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Very Like</th>
<th>Neu-</th>
<th>Un-Like</th>
<th>Very Un-Like</th>
<th>% in Rank Order</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Resisting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories:</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Leaders</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament &amp; the Law</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Demand</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of Social &amp; Economic Development</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnecessary</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ f = \text{frequency} \]
\[ \% = \text{percentage} \]
\[ N = \text{number of respondents} \]

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program I for strengthening trade unions in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 2.2 or Unlikely (See Table 67). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were
identified (See the last four columns of Table 68).

**Category II - Financial Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Financial Capacity of Public Sector**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

Financial means are available (Stated by two respondents).

**Reasons for Likely:**

Funds are sufficient (Stated by three respondents).

**Reasons for Neutral:**

No financial difficulty (Stated by two respondents).

**Cooperation of Private Sector and Financially Powerful**

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

If trade unions mean giving more income and service to the workers, the financial powers, by securing the support of the political forces, will resist it (Stated by four respondents).

**Conditional and Uncertain**

**Reasons for Likely:**

The workers profit sharing program can be their financial resource to manage the trade unions, if they are allowed to have them (Stated by five respondents).

**Reason for Neutral:**

If trade unions are established, the government will fund them in order to control them.

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Hard to be supported.

**Economic and Income concerns**

**Reason for Unlikely:**

It is assumed that trade unions will stop the workers from improving the quality of their work which will increase the loss and the waste.

**Major Interest Groups**
Reason for Likely:

Workers will subsidize this program.

Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies
Reasons for Very Likely:

Could be implemented (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Neutral:

No financial obstacles (Stated by five respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

The financial forces are traditionally against the trade unions.

Disinterest
Reasons for Neutral:

This force neither can help nor resist the proposed program (Stated by two respondent).

Irrelevance
Reason for Very Likely:

Money does not have an important role in this respect but, if needed, will be available.

Reason for Likely:

Too much fund is not neede.

Reasons for Neutral:

Finance is not a crucial factor to the implementation of this program (Stated by twelve respondents).

Miscellaneous
Reason for Unlikely:

Due to the lack of financial support.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

They want to keep their powers to themselves.

The percentages og contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the Financial Force
are presented in Table 69.

**Table 69**

**The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Financial Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 1 of Section III of the Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category II</th>
<th>Very Unlikely</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>% in 1st</th>
<th>% in 2nd</th>
<th>% in 3rd</th>
<th>% in 4th</th>
<th>% in 5th</th>
<th>% in 6th</th>
<th>% in 7th</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Capacity of Public Sector</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Cooperation of Private Sector &amp; Financially Powerful</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Financial Management Agencies</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic &amp; Investment Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Interest Groups</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>4.5</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **f** = frequency
- **%** = percentage
- **N** = number of respondents

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for strengthening the trade unions in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 3.1 or neutral (See Table 67). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories
according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Financial Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 69).

Category III - Administrative Force.

Subcategories:

Personnel Practice and Staff Sdequacy
Reason for Unlikely:

Lackes sufficient staff.

Administrative and Management Talents
Reason for Likely:

If assisted, the workers can recruit management.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Workers are lacking the management talent necessary to handle their affairs (Stated by thirteen respondents).

Coordination
Reason for Neutral:

The workers affairs are unorganized often without leadership.

Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation
Reasons for Likely:

Workers are very willing (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Neutral:

Administrative forces are no obstacles (Stated by sixteen respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

There is no administrative power to support this program.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Since the trade unions have been ineffective in the country, their administrative machinery does not seem to be active.
Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reasons for Unlikely:

Workers are not too serious about efficiency (Stated by three respondents).

Responsibility and Awareness
Reason for Unlikely:

There are not many people with the power of knowledge among the working class.

Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise
Reasons for Unlikely:

The workers, due to the level of their education, will not know how to manage the trade unions (Stated by three respondents).

Capacity for Training and Managing Manpower
Reasons for Unlikely:

Still a lot of training and hammering of social responsibility is needed before the trade unions can be effective with a reasonable function (Stated by two respondents).

Experience
Reason for Likely:

Regarding their familiarity with the experiences of other countries.

Reason for Unlikely:

Lack of experience.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran
Reason for Neutral:

The working force does as the government dictates.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 70.
### Table 70

The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Administrative Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 1 of Section III of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category III Administrative Force</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Neutral Likely (4)</th>
<th>Unlikely Likely (3)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely Likely (2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (1)</th>
<th>% in Suppositional Range</th>
<th>% in Neutral Range</th>
<th>% in Inadmissible Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Practice &amp; Staff Adequacy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>6th</td>
</tr>
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</table>

f = frequency  
% = percentage  
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for strengthening the trade unions in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 2.4 or Unlikely (See Table 67). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By
computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 70).

**Category IV - Socio-cultural Force.**

Subcategories:

**Willingness of Social Forces in General**

Reason for Very Likely:

Social forces are supportive.

Reasons for Likely:

Social reaction will be positive (Stated by two respondents).

**Major Interest Groups**

Reason for Likely:

Due to the rising number of workers.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Private enterprises will quash such efforts (Stated by four respondents).

**Religious, Traditional and Cultural Concerns**

Reasons for Neutral:

Such institutions are not traditionally known and the workers are not used to claiming their rights (Stated by four respondents).

**Disinterest and Cynicism**

Reasons for Neutral:

Similar institutions have never proven to be able to settle disputes between the workers and the employers. Therefore, social groups are indifferent to the role of trade unions (Stated by three respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

Usually the social groups prefer not to have such a system.
In Relation to Government's Influence

Reason for Neutral:

Workers look upon the government as their source of security.

Economic and Income Concerns

Reason for Likely:

Because the inequalities in income have widened in the last fifteen years.

Conditional and Uncertain

Reason for Very Likely:

Public opinion is for it but social groups oppose since they perform in line with the government policies.

Reasons for Likely:

Workers do demand such opportunities but the government is in no hurry to grant them (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Neutral:

Workers will not take initiative unless the government permits the establishment of the trade unions. Because the working class is apprehensive of the consequences of political activities (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Workers are afraid of being the target of political accusations because participation in any kind of activity such as the trade unions will make them politically insecure (Stated by three respondents).

Degree of Public Awareness

Reason for Likely:

The working class in Iran does not enjoy political understanding.

Reasons for Neutral:

Workers does not have awareness of the merits of the trade unions (Stated by seven respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

The illiteracy among the majority of the workers has denied them the awareness of the significance of the trade unions (Stated by two respondents).
Capability and Efficiency Concerns

Reason for Neutral:

There is a history of failure in this area.

Reason for Unlikely:

Workers cannot exert pressure due to their political incompetence (Stated by three respondents).

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran

Reason for Likely:

Government is creating such a tendency.

Reason for Neutral:

The workers are aware of such a need but cannot initiate such a program unless other forces, especially the political force, join in.

Reason for Unlikely:

Fear of the political force's reaction.

Miscellaneous

Reason for Likely:

Workers see this as a foundation for safeguarding their rights.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the Socio-cultural Force are presented in Table 71.
### Table 71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories</th>
<th>Very Like-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
<th>Un-</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
<th>% in</th>
<th>Sup-</th>
<th>Neut-</th>
<th>Res-</th>
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<td>ly(3)</td>
<td>ly(2)</td>
<td>ly(1)</td>
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**f = frequency**

**% = percentage**

**N = number of respondents**

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for strengthening the trade unions in respect to the Socio-cultural Force was computed to be 2.8 or Neutral (See Table 67). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according
to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Socio-cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 71).

**Category V - Educational Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**The Existing Trained Manpower**

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Due to the dominance of illiteracy among traders and craftsmen as well as their representatives.

**Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence**

**Reason for Very Unlikely:**

Labor training is at its lowest possible stage.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

**Reason for Likely:**

They will go along with this idea as long as it does not decrease the efficiency of the labor force.

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Only if the political force agreed with this program this force will be cooperative.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

This force is incapable of training competent authorities for the trade unions (Stated by three respondents).

**Awareness, Expertise and Experience**

**Reason for Likely:**

This force can help through familiarizing the workers with their rights.

**Orientation Toward National Development**

**Reason for Neutral:**

Trade unions and their importance have not been emphasized in our educational system.
In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran

Reason for Neutral:

Lack of relation of the political forces to the problem.

Reason for Unlikely:

It is difficult to expect the educational force to be active in political affairs.

Disinterest

Reasons for Neutral:

Indifferent, neutral and unconcerned (Stated by thirty-one respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

This force has always been indifferent to such issues.

Irrelevance

Reason for Neutral:

Not applicable to this force.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the Educational Force are presented in Table 72.
### Table 72

The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Educational Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program I of Section III of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category V</th>
<th>Educational Force</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>4th</td>
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</table>

**f** = frequency  
**X** = percentages  
**N** = number of respondents

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program I for strengthening the trade unions in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 2.9 or Neutral (See Table 67). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according
to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 72).

Analysis For Program 2 (Participative Management) of Section III

The Program

There shall be participation of the representatives of all the employees, first in the choice of management, and second, in regular deliberation.

Part 1. Table 73 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for participative management.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>Very Likely(5)</th>
<th>Likely(4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Unlikely(2)</th>
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<th>Md</th>
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<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
<td>9.19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood
% = percentage
M = number of respondents
Md = median

Table 73 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the five prospective forces.

Part 2. Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force,
as shown by the medians in Table 73, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

**Category I - Political Force.**

Subcategories:

**National Leaders**

Reason for Very Likely:

The Shah is in favor of this program.

**Parliament and the Law**

Reason for Likely:

By law, industrial agencies must open their books to their workers and employees as well as to the public.

**Political Parties**

Reason for Very Likely:

Political forces encourages this tendency.

Reason for Likely:

Political forces will agree with this program to enjoy the publicity involved.

Reason for Unlikely:

Only the minority political groups will support this program. The established political forces will resist it by all means.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

Reasons for Likely:

Government is trying to direct enterprises in this direction but with caution in order to avoid disappointment of the private enterprises and the abuse of such power (Stated by two respondents).

Only in the rural areas this is the case; the agricultural corporations which are run by the rural people cover 2.5 million farmers.

Reason for Neutral:

It can be implemented some time in the future, but, now many in position of power will resist it.
Reason for Unlikely:

This force would rather see some management training first.

Interest Groups
Reasons for Unlikely:

The industrialists will resist this program because they are afraid of losing power and facing waste due to the mismanagement on the part of employees and workers (Stated by six respondents).

Industrialists do not find themselves socially responsible enough to appeal to the workers for managerial assistance (Stated by two respondents).

Public Demand
Reason for Likely:

Due to the demand of the working class.

Reason for Unlikely:

This might raise some further demand on the part of employees.

Consideration of Social and Economic Development
Reasons for Likely:

Government considers the professional management as a growing need of the country's private and public sectors.

Government believes that this program will increase the productivity of the private sector (Stated by two respondents).

Degree of Conformity with Present Trend and Existing Policies
Reasons for Likely:

The new policy of the government stresses the management of the factories be entrusted to the especially trained personnel (Stated by six respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

They do not want to encourage so that it could not create disaster due to the employees' lack of managerial know how.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Allowing the affairs of the people to be turned over to the people is a premature idea at the time being (Stated by two respondents).
Workers are allowed to enjoy participation in the factory profits, but not in the choice of management, because the government does not favor collective activities of any sort (Stated by six respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

The present political system opposes any program leading to democracy (Stated by three respondents).

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of management talents is paramount (Stated by three respondents).

Insufficient management talents among the employees will make such a program undesirable.

Due to the lack of coordination among the profit seeking attitudes of the capitalist undertakings, employees and the political force (Stated by two respondents).

Unnecessary
Reason for Very Unlikely:

This is an idealistic assumption. Even in the most developed countries employees do not play an important role in the choice of management.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 74.
### TABLE 74

**THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF POLITICAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 2 OF SECTION III OF THE PLAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Very Likely (3)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Unlikely (2)</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% in Total</th>
<th>Percentile</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Sup-</th>
<th>Neut-</th>
<th>Pos-</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Leaders</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament &amp; the Law</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33.5</td>
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<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>Interest Groups</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>2nd</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>100</td>
</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of Social &amp; Economic Development</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8th</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnecessary</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*f = frequency

% = percentage

N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for participative management in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 2.3 or Unlikely (See Table 73). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Political
Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 74).

**Category II - Financial Force.**

**Subcategories:**

*Financial Capacity of Public Sector*

Reason for Very Likely:

Funds are available.

*Financial Cooperation of Private Sector and Financially Powerful*

Reasons for Unlikely:

Fear of the employees having an eventual voice in budgeting will make the industrial powers undermine the implementation of this program (Stated by seven respondents).

*Capacity of Financial Management Agencies*

Reason for Neutral:

Sufficient funds for such a program will not be allocated.

*Conditional and Uncertain*

Reason for Neutral:

Only if political forces allow this can be implemented.

Reason for Unlikely:

Industrialists may not take such a risk.

*Economic and Income Concerns*

Reason for Unlikely:

This could be risky for the enterprises.

*Interest Groups*

Reasons for Likely:

This program will be funded by the employees if needed for securing such rights (Stated by three respondents).

*Degree of Conformity with Present Trend and Existing Policies*

Reasons for Very Likely:

The Shah is in favor of this program, thus, there is no problem (Stated by two respondents).
Reason for Likely:

Financial force is not a problem.

Reasons for Neutral:

Finance is available (Stated by eight respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

This program will be resisted by all means to support the status quo (Stated by two respondents).

Disinterest
Reasons for Neutral:

This force is indifferent, unconcerned and will neither resist nor support this program (Stated by two respondents).

Irrelevance
Reasons for Neutral:

Finance is not a relevant factor to this program (Stated by sixteen respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 75.
Results. Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for participative management in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 2.9 or Neutral (See Table 73). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Financial Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identi-
Category III - Administrative Force.

Subcategories:

Personnel Practice and Staff Adequacy
Reason for Unlikely:

Due to the inadequacy of the employees technical know how.

Administrative and Management Talents
Reasons for Unlikely:

There are not any administrative talents to assist such a program and, therefore, its implementation may create managerial and administrative ambiguity (Stated by four respondents).

Coordination
Reason for Neutral:

Lack of coordination

Reasons for Unlikely:

Will create duplication of efforts because coordination is hard to come about (Stated by five respondents).

Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation
Reason for Likely:

Creates no problem.

Reasons for Neutral:

Administrative forces are indifferent to this problem (Stated by four respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

The fear of employees replacing some administrators makes this program be considered as a challenge to their authority (Stated by six respondents).

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reason for Very Likely:

Important administrative steps are being taken in Iran to facilitate the implementation of such a program.
Reasons for Neutral:

Will be relatively easy to administer (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

This force is week and will create more problem than it can solve (Stated by three respondents).

Responsibility and Awareness
Reason for Neutral:

This force is indifferent,

Reason for Unlikely:

Lack of the familiarity of labor representatives with this issue.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

It will be hard to get the work done since there is misunderstanding on both sides.

Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise
Reasons for Unlikely:

Limited awareness of the management procedures (Stated by two respondents).

Shortage of men of experience and know how who can devise the steps to be taken is seriously felt.

Corruption
Reasons for Unlikely:

Will facilitate corruption and increase red tape (Stated by two respondents).

Experience
Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of experience in representation and decision making (Stated by two respondents).

Bureaucracy Concerns
Reasons for Unlikely:

Decision makers and top executives will resist this program because it will endanger their old patterns of functions (Stated by five respondents).
Due to the rigidity of the authoritarian system (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Lack of specialist management at all levels of the old bureaucratic system is the major problem.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran

Reason for Very Likely:

The Shah is in favor of this program.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to Administrative Force are presented in Table 76.
### TABLE 76
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 2 OF SECTION III OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Very Like- (5)</th>
<th>Like- (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Un- Like- (2)</th>
<th>Very Un- Like- (1)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Order</th>
<th>% in Percentage</th>
<th>Neut- ral Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Practice &amp; Staff Adequacy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>3rd</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative &amp; Management Talents</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>Coordination</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Sufficiency</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Willingness, Motivation &amp; Initiation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility &amp; Awareness</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Skills, Methods &amp; Expertise</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of Facilities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity for Training &amp; Managing Manpower</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility of the Rules &amp; Regulations</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting In the Country</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9th</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>f = frequency</th>
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<th>8</th>
<th>34</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>47</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% = percentage</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = number of respondents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for participative management in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 2.1 or Unlikely (See Table 73). In Part 2,
the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 76).

Category IV - Socio-cultural Force.

Subcategories:

Willingness of Social Groups in General
Reasons for Very Likely:

They are in favor of such a communication with the working class (Stated by four respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Legitimate participation of the employees in decision making process is socially desired (Stated by six respondents).

Intellectual Groups
Reason for Neutral:

Only the intellectual groups have expresses such a necessity.

Interest Groups
Reasons for Likely:

This will make the employers more open to the employees' needs (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

No positive attitude expected from the employers.

Reasons for Unlikely:

The big business will resist this program by claiming that the employees do not have the managerial know how necessary for their participation in the decision making (Stated by five respondents).

Diversity of Attitudes, Interest and Priorities
Reason for Likely:
Mixed feelings and conflict of interests and opinions exist among social classes on this subject.

**Disinterest**

Reason for Neutral:

This force cannot make any difference.

Reason for Unlikely:

The employees do not want to get involved in the complexity of the organizations they work for.

**Development Concerns**

Reasons for Likely:

This will ensure people's confidence in the industry (Stated by two respondents).

**In Relation to the Government's Influence**

Reasons for Very Likely:

The Shah is in favor of this program (Stated by two respondents).

**Public Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction**

Reasons for Very Likely:

Because it will give the employees an incentive to perform more effectively (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Likely:

Because the working people has never had a voice in their affairs.

Reason for Neutral:

Status quo is more secure.

**Public Demand and Public Need**

Reason for Very Likely:

This has been a latent demand for years.

Reasons for Likely:

Due to the rising demand for participation (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:
There is no trade unions to demand this.

Conditional and Uncertain
Reasons for Neutral:

They are for this program but find themselves incapable to puppress the political and financial powers (Stated by three respondents).

Degree of Public Awareness
Reason for Unlikely:

This society does not seem to be prepared yet to comprehend the effects of this program.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reason for Neutral:

The working people cannot apply any pressure to ensure such rights.

Reason for Unlikely:

The working class is not educated enough to reasonably use such a choice if given to them.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

No collective action can be taken by the social groups to raise such a demand.

Class Concern
Reasons for Likely:

This program will make class and cast less important in the organizations (Stated by two respondents).

In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran
Reasons for Unlikely:

This is too ambitious to be expected in a system where the limits of participation and representation is decided by the political system (Stated by two respondents).

Miscellaneous
Reason for Likely:

This will be a source of conflict resolution.

Reason for Unlikely:
They will be against it.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Socio-cultural Force are presented in Table 77.

**Table 77**

THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 2 OF SECTION III OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category IV Socio-cultural Force</th>
<th>Very Likely(1)</th>
<th>Likely(4)</th>
<th>Neutral(3)</th>
<th>Unlikely(2)</th>
<th>% in Rank Order</th>
<th>Supportive(6)</th>
<th>Resistant(7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Willingness of Social Groups in General</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>Intellectual Groups</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13th</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>Major Interest Groups</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>2nd</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organized Groups</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Variety of Interest, Attitudes &amp; Priorities</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>Religious, Traditional, &amp; Cultural Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest &amp; Cynicism</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7th</td>
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<td>Development Concerns</td>
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<td>7th</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Satisfaction &amp; Dissatisfaction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</table>

\[ f = \text{frequency} \]
\[ \% = \text{percentage} \]
\[ N = \text{number of respondents} \]
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for participative management in respect to the Sociocultural Force was computed to be 3.6 or Likely (See Table 73). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Socio-cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 77).

Category V - Educational Force.

Subcategories:

Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence
Reasons for Unlikely:

The educational force is incapable to support this program (Stated by two respondents).

Willingness and Demand of the Educational Institutions in General
Reason for Very Likely:

They are on the side of this idea.

Reason for Neutral:

They are not resistive to this issue.

Conditional and Uncertain
Reason for Neutral:

Can assist if its capacity is expanded.

Reason for Unlikely:

A start is made to shift from academic education to a diversified education. Thus, shortage of experienced men in all field is expected to be removed in the future.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reason for Neutral:

This force cannot contribute although is willing to.
Reason for Unlikely:

Incapable to assist (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

This force is very much incapable.

Instructional Concerns
Reason for Unlikely:

Lack of necessary educational staff to even prepare the new generation for demanding such programs.

Awareness, Expertise and Experience
Reason for Very Likely:

Emphasis has been placed on the merits of the above system in our educational circles.

Reasons for Likely:

Educational force can familiarize people with their rights as such (Stated by two respondents).

Educational Elite
Reason for Likely:

Rising expectation of the educated groups.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran
Reason for Very Likely:

The Shah favors this program.

Reason for Neutral:

Does not possess an effective role in relation to other forces.

Disinterest
Reasons for Neutral:

Neutral and indifferent (Stated by twenty-three respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

Educational Force does not preach the principle of free choice.

Irrelevance
Reasons for Neutral:
This is an apolitical force.

Has no role in this respect and this program is out of its domain (Stated by two respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Educational Force are presented in Table 78.

**TABLE 78**

THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF EDUCATIONAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 2 OF SECTION III OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category V Educational Force</th>
<th>Very Like-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
<th>Un-</th>
<th>% in Rank-</th>
<th>Sup-</th>
<th>Res-</th>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency  
% = percentages  
N = number of respondents
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for participative management in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 3.0 or Neutral (See Table 73). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 78).

Analysis For Program 3 (No Inherited Ownership) of Section III

The Program

Under the law of averages, the heir to a business enterprise is unlikely to be its best pilot. Besides, business success is increasingly the work of the salaried employees for their competence, outside the circle of hereditary owners. Furthermore, each generation needs to challenge all acquired positions to redistribute wealth and to renew its leaders. Accordingly, the hereditary transmission of the ownership of the means of production shall be abolished.

Part 1. Table 79 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for no inherited ownership.
TABLE 79

THE RESULTS OF THE RESPONDENTS' RATING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF
OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 3 OF SECTION III OF THE PLAN IN RESPECT TO 5 FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>Very Likely(5)</th>
<th>Likely(4)</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Un-Like(2)</th>
<th>Very Un-Like(1)</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>Political</td>
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<td>22 46</td>
<td>10 21</td>
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<td>19 42</td>
<td>4 9 45</td>
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<td>6 13</td>
<td>29 63</td>
<td>9 20 46</td>
<td>100 1.9</td>
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</tr>
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<td>6 13</td>
<td>2 4 46</td>
<td>100 3.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
<td>0 0 3 6</td>
<td>29 63</td>
<td>10 22</td>
<td>4 9 46</td>
<td>100 2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood
% = percentage
N = number of respondents
Md = median

Table 79 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the five prospective forces.

Part 2. Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force, as shown by the medians in Table 79, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

Category I - Political Force.

Subcategories:

National Leaders
Reason for Likely:

Because the existing hereditary system is not capable of meeting the challenge put forward by the leaders of this country.

Priority Concerns
Reason for Very Unlikely:

They prefer to appoint those whose thoughts are in line with it and those who are better than the sons of the present high staff.
Conditional and Uncertain
Reasons for Neutral:

If the number of competent managers could be increased this program will have a good chance to be implemented (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Until capable executives and technically trained managers are provided, this program will not be favored (Stated by three respondents).

What kind of management can the labor force provide is yet to be known.

Interest Groups
Reason for Neutral:

Political forces are indifferent.

Reasons for Unlikely:

The owner-managers in the private sector will not delegate authority to the employees to take over managerial positions. Therefore, if this program is to be implemented, appointments and promotions through unofficial means will be encouraged (Stated by six respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Transmission of power of ownership by heredity is a practice which the vested interests are very much in favor of it (Stated by two respondents).

Consideration of Social and Economic Development
Reason for Unlikely:

Such a trend will face the shortage of industrial management.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Government wants to support and protect the private investment.

Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies
Reasons for Very Likely:

Now, government is ordering the industrialists to realize the need for employee-managers.
Reasons for Likely:

Government has a long term policy to train professional managers in order to make the implementation of such a program possible (Stated by three respondents).

State is beginning to realize the distinction between the ownership of industries and their management (Stated by six respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

We are getting mentally prepared for such programs.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Government believes that increase in salaries and benefits of the lower level employees presents a more direct intervention toward a more equal distribution of income than nationalization of the means of production (Stated by two respondents).

Employees and the workers are now offered 49% of the shares of the private industries that they work for and 99% of the share of the state corporations. But, they have no participation in the management.

The new study has indicated that distribution of income tends to be unbalanced with a small percentage of the top income earners accounting for the largest share of purchasing power (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Politically, it is a bad act because it is a communistic idea.

The system is against such meddling by the unqualified people in the business of the private enterprises (Stated by Three respondents).

Regarding the inheritance law in Iran, this program will not be accepted (Stated by two respondents).

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reasons for Unlikely:

Shortage of managerial ability and skills will undermine such efforts (Stated by six respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the
likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 80.

TABLE 80
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF POLITICAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 3 OF SECTION III OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories</th>
<th>Very Like (5)</th>
<th>Neutral Like (4)</th>
<th>Very Un Like (3)</th>
<th>Very Un Like (2)</th>
<th>Very Un Like (1)</th>
<th>X in Rank</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resisting</th>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| f = frequency                     | 1             | 10               | 5                 | 22               | 10              | 48        | 100%       |         |           |           |

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for no inherited ownership in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 2.1 or Unlikely (See Table 79). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing
and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 80).

**Category II - Financial Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Financial Capacity of Public Sector**

*Reasons for Very Likely:*

Government can afford to forego a reduction in its revenues through tax incentive for this end (Stated by three respondents).

*Reasons for Likely:*

Sufficient funds are available (Stated by two respondents).

**Financial Cooperation of Private Sector and Financially Powerful**

*Reasons for Unlikely:*

The big business will kill the attempt because of its profit-seeking attitude (Stated by eight respondents).

*Reasons for Very Unlikely:*

Financial powers are absolutely against it and will not let it happen (Stated by three respondents).

**Conditional and Uncertain**

*Reason for Likely:*

Government funds can play a drastic role.

*Reasons for Neutral:*

Only nationalization of industries can open the way for such a program (Stated by two respondents).

Enterprises owned by the "public", at least partially, as opposed to "hereditary ownership" are being established and stocks have been on sale for the general public.

*Reason for Unlikely:*

If political system allows this, it can be implemented.
Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reason for Unlikely:

They seem to avoid serious scrutiny of their operations.

Economic and Income Concerns
Reason for Likely:

Government is moving in this direction with caution in order to avoid disappointment of the entrepreneurs who own the capital necessary for running the relatively infant industry of this country.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Could be very costly to the private industries (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Due to the fear of loss of interest.

Interest Groups
Reason for Unlikely:

Because the employee-managers will have some further demands.

Degree of Conformity with Present Trend and Existing Policies
Reason for Very Likely:

In line with the present trend.

Reasons for Likely:

Government's financial incentives could encourage such a program (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Neutral:

Financial powers are no problem since they have to follow government's directives (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Since it is a radical measure, the government does not exert too much pressure on the private sector (Stated by three respondents).

Disinterest
Reason for Neutral:
Financial forces are indifferent.

Reason for Unlikely:

Funds could be available but there is not such an intention.

Irrelevancy

Reason for Likely:

Finance is not a problem.

Reasons for Neutral:

This is not much of a financial issue (Stated by four respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 81.
TABLE 81
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF FINANCIAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 3 OF SECTION III OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category II Financial Force</th>
<th>Very Like-ly(5)</th>
<th>Not Un-like-ly(4)</th>
<th>Very Un-like-ly(3)</th>
<th>Rank-ed</th>
<th>% in Supportive</th>
<th>% in Neutral</th>
<th>% in Resisting</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories:</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
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<td>2</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| f  | 4  | 7  | 11 | 19 | 4  | 45 | 1002 |

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for no inherited ownership in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 2.4 or Unlikely (See Table 79). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Financial Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified.
(See the last four columns of Table 81).

Category III - Administrative Force.

Subcategories:

Personnel Practice and Staff Adequacy
Reason for Unlikely:

The owner-managers do not want the employee-managers who are not profit-oriented.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

They do not find them qualified.

Administrative and Management Talents
Reason for Neutral:

The owner-managers are gradually realizing the importance of management-minded personnel, although the number of such personnel is not adequate.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Great demand for trained managers on one hand, and the reluctance of the industrialists to delegate authority to unqualified personnel on the other, are the major reason for the failure of the proposed program (Stated by six respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

There are almost no professional managers in Iran.

Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation
Reasons for Neutral:

The owner-managers feel more secure with their present situation (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

The industrialists do not measure concern for price and profit against the needs of their employees.

Some industrialists do not trust academically trained managers (Stated by three respondents).
The owner-managers do not consider the professional managers to their benefit (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

The industrialists will challenge this by all means.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reason for Likely:

There is demand for more efficiency.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to the weakness of the owner-managers.

**Responsibility and Awareness**

Reasons for Neutral:

The administrative force does not have much concern with this program (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Some owner-managers believe that managers should be born in their families.

Only in the future when the complexity of industrial management is really felt, this program might be really accepted (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

The present administration of the industries cannot afford a balance between profit and humanity.

**Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise**

Reason for Likely:

Due to the lack of management specialists.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Better technical education in management is needed (Stated by three respondents).

**Capacity to Train and Manage Manpower**

Reasons for Unlikely:

There is a huge demand for management training schools (Stated by two respondents).
If the industrialists offer supplementary courses of management to the employees, they will qualify for the positions which this program has to offer.

**Corruption**

*Reason for Neutral:*

Administration of such programs has not been successful so far. Many owners sell their shares to their relatives just to keep the ownerships to themselves.

*Reasons for Unlikely:*

Corruption must be stamped out first because it will undermine the implementation of any program of this sort (Stated by two respondents).

**Bureaucracy Concerns**

*Reasons for Very Unlikely:*

The present business bureaucracy is difficult to challenge (Stated by two respondents).

**Degree of Flexibility of Rules and Regulations**

*Reason for Unlikely:*

There is no well-defined terms of reference for subordinate's participation in the management of the industries.

*Reason for Very Unlikely:*

Any change of this sort will be rejected by considering them as radical.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 82.
TABLE 82
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING
PROGRAM 3 OF SECTION III OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category III Administrative Force</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Neutral (4)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (3)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% in Rank</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Personnel Practice &amp; Staff Adequacy</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting In the Country</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for no inherited ownership in respect to Administrative Force was computed to be 1.9 or Unlikely (See Table 79). In Part 2, the subcategories for such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking those
percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 82).
Category IV - Socio-Cultural Force

Subcategories:

Willingness of Social Force in General

Reasons for Very Likely:

Social opinion is completely in favor of this program (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Favorable, supportive and positive reaction (Stated by eight respondents).

People would like to see the government implementing such a program sincerely and continuously.

This force will see it as an application of law to all.

It will be an upset for the big business which will be welcomed by other social forces.

Intellectual Groups
Reason for Unlikely:

Intellectual groups and academia have always indicated such a need.

Major Interest Groups
Reasons for Unlikely:

The greedy owners do not like the idea of their enterprises being run by outsiders.

Big business will stop this effort.

Financial powers will not permit this.

Organized Groups
Reasons for Likely:

The workers organizations and most of the social groups will support it.

Some minority political groups have already expressed such a necessity.

Cultural, Traditional and Religious Concerns
Reasons for Likely:
Traditionally and culturally acceptable and desirable (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Cultural factor will weaken the implementation.

Due to the respect for religious traditions.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

They are against it because of religious feelings.

Disinterest and Cynicism
Reasons for Neutral:

No difference.

Cynicism and pessimism.

They know that each blueprint of such, even if approved by the government, will not be enforced successfully.

Reason for Unlikely:

Do not accept the idea yet.

Development Concerns
Reason for Likely:

This will enhance their progress.

Public Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction
Reason for Likely:

In order to echo their voice.

Public Demand and Need
Reason for Likely:

Demand for more fair participation.

Economic and Income Concerns
Reason for Very Likely:

Since lower income groups spend all their earnings while upper income groups are able to save, the maldistribution of wealth is increasing.

Reasons for Likely:
Because of the present unequal distribution of wealth these forces will view this program as a means for a fair distribution and participation.

Due to the tendency of distribution of income which has been growing unequally.

Because this program will assist to narrow the income distribution gap.

Conditional and Uncertain
Reasons for Unlikely:

They are for it especially if they are trained.

It will be too good to believe by this force.

If government permits this, all social groups except the big business concerns will welcome it.

Reasons for Neutral:

The society is gradually moving towards accepting non-owner management.

Uncertain of the cost of such a change.

Capability Concerns
Reason for Neutral:

Does not find itself in the state of readiness for such a change.

In Relation to Other Forces Acting in Iran
Reason for Very Unlikely:

A bad act because it is a communistic idea.

Miscellaneous
Reason for Very Likely:

Because this program will change their structure of life.

Reason for Likely:

They will assist such a program.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to Socio-Cultural Force are presented in Table 83.
### Table 83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category IV</th>
<th>Socio-cultural Force</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Neutral Likely (3)</th>
<th>Unlikely (2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (1)</th>
<th>I in Rank</th>
<th>Supportive (%)</th>
<th>Resisting (%)</th>
<th>Order</th>
<th>N</th>
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<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>9th</td>
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</table>

f = frequency
%
= percentage
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to Socio-Cultural Force was computed to be 3.8 or Likely (See Table 79). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Socio-Cultural Force was determined, and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 83).
Category V - Educational Force

Subcategories:

The Existing Trained Manpower
Reason for Unlikely:

There are not enough professional managers being trained. A shortage of good managers is obviously felt.

Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence
Reason for Neutral:

Its managerial training capacity is very limited.

Capacity of Professional Schools
Reasons for Unlikely:

Limited and insufficient management training capacity (Stated by four respondents).

Willingness of Educational Institutions in General
Reasons for Likely:

This force has a positive attitude toward this kind of program and pushes in this direction (Stated by two respondents).

Conditional and Uncertain
Reason for Neutral:

The pattern and/or system of education is undergoing changes and it is expected that sufficient number of institutions will be established to provide capable and qualified men to bring about the program in question.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reasons for Neutral:

Lack of capacity and effects to contribute (Stated by four respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Weak and incapable of training (Stated by five respondents)

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Unable to help since it is one of the builders of the present bureaucracy.
There is no educational capacity to support this program.

It is an incapable force.

**Awareness, Expertise and Experience**

Reasons for Neutral:

Do not see the merit of it due to the lack of awareness (Stated by two respondents).

**Diversity of Interests and Priorities**

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Because it is a communistic idea.

**Educational Elite**

Reason for Likely:

Demand from the educated people.

**Disinterest**

Reasons for Neutral:

They are indifferent, neutral and unconcerned (Stated by eighteen respondents).

Regarding the traditional system of heritage it is indifferent.

They are only onlookers in this respect.

**Irrelevance**

Reason for Neutral:

This force is not concerned with such programs.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to Educational Force are presented in Table 84.
The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Educational Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 3 of Section III of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Neutral Likely (3)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (1)</th>
<th>X in Rank Order</th>
<th>Supporting</th>
<th>Resisting</th>
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<td>2</td>
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</table>

f = frequency
Z = percentages
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for no inherited ownership in respect to Educational Force was computed to be 2.8 or Neutral (See Table 79). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 84).
Analysis for Program 4 (Limited Inheritance) of Section III

The Program

Death duties, or estate duties, allows the full right to property. But, there is a need to put an end to the hereditary ownership of the means of production. In order to achieve this end, the ordinary family's inheritances shall be totally exempted within a limit which could be set as the total income which a wage earner at the bottom of the scale could earn throughout his life. The hereditary transmission of larger fortunes shall be altered once and for all. The heirs shall be entitled to a life interest only. Thus, the hereditary private ownership of the means of production will be abolished and the revenue obtained by the government can be allocated to the cultural and health projects.

Part 1. Table 85 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for limited inheritance.

TABLE 85

THE RESULTS OF THE RESPONDENTS' RATING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 4 OF SECTION III OF THE PLAN IN RESPECT TO 5 FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>Very Like-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Un- Like-</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
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<td></td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood
Z = percentage
N = number of respondents
Md = median
Table 85 presents the computed frequency counts, percentages and medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the five prospective forces.

Part 2. Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force, as shown by the medians in Table 85, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

**Category I - Political Force**

**Subcategories:**

**Parliament and the Law**

Reason for Very Likely:

Regarding the power to pass the law the government can be helpful.

**Political Parties**

Reason for Unlikely:

Not enough political support.

**Priority Concerns**

Reasons for Unlikely:

The gap between poor and rich is being narrowed through some other means.

Government is more concerned with consumers' daily interests than their ownership of the industries.

The government channels its gigantic revenues with extravaganza. This money can be used for development programs without needing the implementation of the proposed program.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

Reason for Neutral:

Such an approach can be adopted only if government decides to force it.
Interest Groups
Reason for Unlikely:

Especially because it confronts the benefits of big capital holders.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

It is a threat to the property of some politically influential people who are involved in capital investment.

It is seriously questionable that the vast interest would permit the operationalization of the policy which tends to displace their power.

Such a means would take away their property which I do not think they would agree to give up.

The prevailing multi-national corporations will resist such a program.

The affiliation of the big business with the political forces will stop such a measure.

Consideration of Social and Economic Development
Reason for Unlikely:

Major industries such as oil, petro-chemical, gas, steel, etc. are already nationalized. Some smaller industries owned by the government could not be run efficiently and often incurred losses. Small industries and production units are beginning to develop. It is preferable to let private owners run these units, the state exercising sufficient controls.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Wants to maintain and protect private investment.

Degree of Conformity with Present Trend and Existing Policies
Reasons for Likely:

A new taxation policy is being made as a means of advancing a policy for more equal distribution.

Under the new terms of the public sharing, the workers of each industrial unit will get priority and assistance in subscribing to the shares of the unit.

All the vital resources and major industries have been nationalized for such a purpose.
Few measures have been devised in this respect.

The workers enjoy profit-sharing and are the shareholders as well.

Only those industrial units who display a sense of social responsibility—in paying taxes, in giving decent wages, and in widening the base of ownership—are allowed to remain in private sector.

The great industrial complexes are owned by the state rather than being in private hands.

Industrial units are required to sell their shares to their workers and the public in order to have a more just distribution of wealth.

The government has taken the responsibility of providing those who cannot afford certain basic services with their needs.

The pattern of ownership in which workers and the public are given a chance to own shares in industries has the same kind of aim.

A host of small industries are being created around the large industries which are owned by the general public.

Reason for Neutral:

Government's policy is designed not to let cartels and trusts take root in Iran.

Reason for Unlikely:

The government's new strict policy which requires the capital holders to make a correct annual declaration of their assets for gradual taxes is the most radical step ever taken in this direction.

The existing system cannot support the implementation of this program.

As far as losing power is concerned some individuals will resist.

Adoption of such a policy will kill the initiative, to invest, and this does not seem in accord with the development policies of government.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:
Government policy is in line with empowering great private investments and big capital holders do not want to lose their big revenues.

Politically, a bad act because it is a communistic idea.

Government does not wish to upset the hereditary private ownership of the means of production yet. This is too much a revolutionary action.

Almost impossible for traditional reasons.

Political forces will never apply such methods (Stated by two respondents).

Trend is the reverse.

The landlord-peasant relationship which led to basically unfair distribution of wealth has been destroyed through land reform, which gave peasants the land they were working on. But, the government has no intention of such concerning in ustries.

Business units are getting larger and are moving more towards conglomerates (Stated by two respondents).

Too radical and too soon for Iran's political system.

The government will not apply such a radical socialist measure.

Government does not believe in the ultimate takeover of the means of production by the public.

Not willing to overcome the power of the big business.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reason for Unlikely:

These efforts need a coordinated web of foresighted objectives which is lacking.

**Unnecessary**

Reason for Neutral:

Lack of interest.

Reason for Unlikely:

No need.
Reason for Very Unlikely:

Expansion of social services such as health, nutrition, low cost housing and physical training among low classes have been heavily funded in the Fifth Plan. Such efforts will make implementation of this program unnecessary.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 86.

### Table 86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Very Unlikely</th>
<th>% in Rank-Order</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resisting</th>
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</thead>
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<td>0</td>
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</table>

f = frequency
% = percentage
N = number of respondents
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for limited inheritance in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 1.7 or Unlikely (See Table 85). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Political Force was determined and then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 86).

Category II - Financial Force

Subcategories:

Financial Capacity of Public Sector
Reasons for Very Likely:

No financial problems due to the oil and gas revenue (Stated by two).

Financial Cooperation of Private Sector and Financially Powerful
Reason for Very Likely:

No problem as far as financial forces are concerned.

Reason for Likely:

The private sector is offering forty per cent of its shares to the workers and employees.

Reasons for Unlikely:

This program cannot be supported financially.

Due to the power of financial elite.

The tendency toward tax evasion and false documentation of inheritances.

Financial forces will not allow such a takeover.

Government cannot encourage private sector to go along with this kind of program.
Reasons for Very Unlikely:

The financial powers will resist this by all means (Stated by four respondents).

The power of the financial giants cannot be undermined so easily.

**Capacity of Financial Management Agencies**

Reason for Likely:

Although the funds needed are very much, there is no budget problem.

**Economic and Investment Concerns**

Reasons for Unlikely:

Financial loss of the country will be immense, capital formation will stop drastically, money will drain out of the country and economic activities will slow down which will damage the economy (Stated by four Respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Will be a financial disaster for the country.

**Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies**

Reasons for Likely:

Accepting the profit sharing of the workers by the private sector is in this direction.

New welfare measures to be taken by the private sector have the same purpose.

Reasons for Neutral:

Does according to the government's directives (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

This is a very radical measure to this force.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

This is a very radical measure (Stated by two respondents).

It is a impossible and will not stand a chance (Stated by two respondents).
They consider this as a disaster and impractical (Stated by two respondents).

It is a revolutionary action and won't be applicable in a non-socialist country (Stated by two respondents).

Too drastic to be expected from this regime.

Beyond imagination of this force.

Priority Concerns
Reasons for Unlikely:

Government's financial prosperity makes such programs needless.

Health and other projects are funded without implementing such a program.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Government prefers other means for more just distribution of income (Stated by three).

Disinterest
Reason for Neutral:

This force is in line with what government orders.

Miscellaneous
Reason for Unlikely:

No agreement.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Won't let this happen.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 87.
### Table 87
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF FINANCIAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 4 OF SECTION III OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Very Like-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Neutral Like-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<th>Resisting</th>
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<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Order</td>
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<td>Capacity of Financial Management Agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
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<td>Major Interest Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
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</table>

f = frequency  
X = percentage  
N = number of respondents

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for limited inheritance in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 1.6 or Unlikely (See Table 85). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Financial Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 87).
Category III - Administrative Force

Subcategories:

Personnel Practices and Staff Adequacy
Reason for Unlikely:

Lack of technically trained personnel especially at local levels.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Incapable petty officialdom will impede this.

Administrative and Management Talents
Reason for Unlikely:

Due to managerial ineffectiveness.

Degree of Willingness, Motivation, and Initiative
Reason for Very Likely:

No problem as far as administrative forces are concerned.

Reason for Likely:

Favorable.

Reasons for Neutral:

Indifferent and neutral (Stated by twelve respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

Lack of initiative.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reason for Likely:

Can implement it with some problems in short run.

Reason for Neutral:

Supports the program but cannot handle it properly.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Because of its weak and poor way of handling, the administrative power cannot help the implementation of this program without difficulty (Stated by four respondents).
Is not prepared for appointing capable managers.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Due to its incapability.

**Responsibility and Awareness**

Reasons for Neutral:

Due to lack of interest and concern cannot have an effect (Stated by six respondents).

Does according to the government's order.

**Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise**

Reason for Unlikely:

Unaware of the methods of taxation needed for such a program.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

No advance procedures available to handle this program.

**Capacity for Training and Managing Manpower**

Reason for Likely:

May be helpful through improving specialized manpower.

**Corruption**

Reasons for Unlikely:

Such efforts will be bogged down in red tape and corruption which this program will increase (Stated by two respondents).

Corruption and bribery are precluding factors in proper implementation of the proposed tax system.

**In Relation with Other Forces Acting in the Country**

Reason for Neutral:

Tries to remain apolitical.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Because they are strongly influenced and controlled by the political power.

This is a revolutionary action.

This force is a tool of government.
Loose administrative system of capitalist countries rules their everything, and their systems are naturally obedient to the government.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 88.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category III Administrative Force Subcategories:</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Unlikely (3)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (2)</th>
<th>% in Rank Order</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>4 5th</td>
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</table>

f = frequency  
% = percentage  
N = number of respondents
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for limited inheritance in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 2.6 or Neutral (See Table 85). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See Table 88).

Category IV - Socio-Cultural Force

Subcategories:

Willingness of Social Groups in General

Reasons for Very Likely:

This is an admirable action which will appeal to the conscience of the majority of the poor and ordinary people who will support it by all means (Stated by four respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Public emotion exists for it, and the public, especially the poor people, who favor getting something they feel entitled to will stand behind it (Stated by five Respondents).

Major Interest Groups

Reasons for Unlikely:

This will be stopped by big business groups who will create active resistance and bring counter plans into existence (Stated by three respondents).

The leaders of interest groups who are related to the political forces will not permit this (Stated by two respondents).

Due to the tendency towards tax evasion and false documentation of inheritances.
Reasons for Very Unlikely:

The opposition of private sector and business concerns who are too powerful will undermine it (Stated by two respondents).

Organized Groups
Reason for Unlikely:

Only some ideological groups will support this openly.

Religious, Traditional and Cultural Concerns
Reasons for Unlikely:

The influence of religious institutions who consider this as a communist plot upon the culture will repel the public support (Stated by five respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Due to unawareness and religious belief (Stated by three respondents).

Public Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction
Reason for Very Likely:

People will be moved by such a program.

Public Demand and Need
Reasons for Very Likely:

Because its benefit will cover the largest section of the population and the majority of people who belong to the low classes will enjoy it (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

To the poor people this is a realistic action to be taken and they will derive satisfaction from it due to their past needs (Stated by three respondents).

Economic and Income Concerns
Reasons for Very Likely:

The less the income differences the more satisfied the social groups who will be the real gainers of this program (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Likely:
They find themselves as the main beneficiaries because this program will minimize the gap between poor and rich (Stated by two respondents).

**Conditional and Uncertain**

**Reason for Neutral:**

This force must be trained because at the present it has religious feelings and therefore will oppose it.

**Degree of Public Awareness**

**Reason for Neutral:**

Such an action is not known in Iran.

**Class Concerns**

**Reason for Very Likely:**

Because this program will reduce class differences.

**Reasons for Likely:**

Socio-economically low class people will certainly support this program.

Conflict of interests between the poor and the rich will promote the cause.

**Reason for Neutral:**

This idea is beginning to find increasing support among the masses particularly low and middle classes.

**In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran**

**Reason for Very Unlikely:**

A bad act because it is a communistic idea.

**Miscellaneous**

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Socially it is not accepted.

**Reasons for Very Unlikely:**

The social factors are against it (Stated by two respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Socio-Cultural Force are presented in Table 89.
### TABLE 89

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category IV</th>
<th>Very Like-Likely (5)</th>
<th>Like-Likely (4)</th>
<th>Neutral-Likely (3)</th>
<th>Un-Likely (2)</th>
<th>Very Un-Likely (1)</th>
<th>X in Rank</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Resistant</th>
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f = frequency  
% = percentage  
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for limited inheritance in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 3.1 or Neutral (See Table 85). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Socio-Cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See Table 89).
Category V - Educational Force

Subcategories:

Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence
Reason for Unlikely:

The educational capacity is not enough to carry out this program.

Willingness and the Demand of Educational Institutions in General
Reasons for Likely:

They favor this program and every educational push is in this direction (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Neutral:

They are agreeable and will not resist the program (Stated by two respondents).

Conditional and Uncertain
Reason for Very Unlikely:

This force is not ready yet.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reason for Neutral:

Cannot be effective in this respect.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Incapability of training and failure of the educational institutes to really train morally obligated citizens for the country (Stated by two).

Awareness, Expertise and Experience
Reason for Likely:

Could help through training people.

Reason for Neutral:

Recognition, to some extent, has recently been given to this new phenomenon.

Diversity of Interests and Priorities
Reason for Unlikely:

Religious groups which are very strong in schools will oppose it.
Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Because it causes the present status quo to abolish
and prepare for a new system.

A bad act because it is a communistic idea.

Educational Elite
Reasons for Likely:

Due to the support of educational elite that would like
to see the fall of economic elite (Stated by two respondents).

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran
Reasons for Neutral:

Will have no role to play in such a decision (Stated by
two respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

This force is a tool of the government.

Disinterest
Reasons for Neutral:

Indifferent, neutral, unconcerned and impartial
position (Stated by twenty-three respondents).

Irrelevance
Reason for Neutral:

This is not the concern of this force.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the
likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Educational Force
are presented in Table 90.
The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Educational Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 4 of Section III of the Plan

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<tr>
<th>Category V</th>
<th>Educational Force</th>
<th>Very Like ly(5)</th>
<th>Very Un lik ely(2)</th>
<th>Very Unli kely(1)</th>
<th>Neu tral Like ly(4)</th>
<th>Neu tral Un lik ely(3)</th>
<th>Neutral Unlikely(1)</th>
<th>% in Rank ed Order</th>
<th>% Sup portive</th>
<th>% Re sisting</th>
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<td>Capacity of Vocational &amp; Technical Schools</td>
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<td>Educational Elite (educated &amp; educator)</td>
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<td>0</td>
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f = frequency
% = percentages
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 2.9 or Neutral (See Table 85). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 90).
A STUDY OF THE NATURE AND THE ROLES
OF THE FORCES
INFLUENCING THE PROCESS OF CHANGE IN IRAN

"Volume II"

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Abbas Sadrai Nadjafi, B.S., M.P.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1975

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Dr. Virgil E. Blanke
Dr. Delayne Hudspeth

Approved By

William W. Wayson
Advisor
Department of Educational Development
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<tr>
<td>164</td>
<td>Percentages of Responses Indicating How Much the Subcategories of the Socio-Cultural Force Would Influence the Likelihood of Operationalizing the Overall Plan</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>The Result of the Respondents' Rating of the Likelihood of Operationalizing the Overall Plan Would Be Influenced by the Educational Force</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166</td>
<td>Percentages of Responses Indicating How Much the Subcategories of the Educational Force Would Influence the Likelihood of Operationalizing the Overall Plan</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis for Program 1 (Decentralized Government) of Section IV

The Program

The urban and rural communes shall be permitted to regroup themselves in accordance with their wishes, the state helping them or deputizing for them. The local representatives of these communes shall be able to make the human face of the administration.

Part 1. Table 91 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for decentralized government.

### TABLE 91

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>Very Like-ly(5)</th>
<th>Like-ly(4)</th>
<th>Neutral(3)</th>
<th>Un-like-ly(2)</th>
<th>Very Un-like-ly(1)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>0.27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood
p = percentage
N = number of respondents
Md = median

Table 91 presents the computed frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the five prospective forces.

Part 2. Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force, as shown by the medians in Table 91, the following subcategories were
obtained for each force (category).

**Category I - Political Force.**

Subcategories:

**Political Parties**  
Reasons for Very Likely:

Since the organized political groups like it, they can be very helpful (Stated by two respondents).

**Conditional and Uncertain**  
Reason for Likely:

The rise of modern industrial section will improve wages of the modern sector workers but will leave traditional sector workers behind.

Reasons for Neutral:

Does not seem very probable that such a program will not create conflict with the tendency for central leadership and decision making.

Is not sure of its destiny.

They believe that only by raising the level of education and industrialization this program will be understood and accepted.

Reasons for Unlikely:

To some degree it accepts, but opposes in actual greater levels.

They are distrustful of decentralization.

It might receive support only in the long run.

**Degree of Conformity with Present Trend and Existing Policies**  
Reasons for Very Likely:

Government is willing and this idea is reflected in all recent plans for Iran's development (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Establishment of cooperatives for consumers, distribution
and farmers cooperatives are instances of what government has done in this line.

Delegation of more authority to the local governments is being encouraged.

Officials are beginning to realize that rural and provincial areas will not experience development without more local participation.

Certain important steps toward a certain type of decentralization of such activities have been taken already.

Government agencies are being encouraged to draw upon local people for low level executive posts (Stated by four respondents).

A project began to integrate sixty-six thousand Iranian villages into eighteen thousand agro-industrial centers.

Local governments are to receive experts, devices and supporting staff from the central government if needed.

An increasing amount of money for local development projects is being channelled through local councils and bodies.

Educational and health affairs are being turned over to local bodies.

The equity courts which permit villagers to settle minor legal problems among themselves through locally elected village courts are in line with this program.

The aim of the government policy is to save small villages and communities from economic, industrial and social isolation by transforming them into bigger settlements.

A better geographical distribution of economic activities through public participation is the aim of the government.

Commercial centers are being established in the rural and small communities.

Decentralization and popular participation is the ultimate goal of the government.

Local councils are created for more popular participation.

Widening the scope of activities of the rural people who are most vulnerable in the society is the major policy of the government.
Equity courts—village courts composed of popularly elected citizens—to solve rural problems indicate such a trend.

Reasons for Neutral:

Government plans to let the people participate or take over some part of the administration. Houses of equity in rural communes are examples of this.

Individuals might resist afraid of leaving power.

Reasons for Unlikely:

The system is distrustful of decentralization and will not favor it (Stated by two respondents).

This kind of decentralization reduces the central power which the political system is not in favor of.

This might increase the volume and the extent of the political demand of those communes.

Taking people into account is just an act of charity on the part of the government.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

There is scant evidence of any shift toward such a democratic idea.

No tolerance for people's regrouping according to their wishes (Stated by two respondents).

Such freedom of thought and democratic needs are not allowed in Iran (Stated by two respondents).

It will attract people toward political activities.

This kind of regime which allows everyone to think as they wish is not wanted by the political forces.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reasons for Unlikely:

Ordinary people are assumed incompetent and unreliable.

If such decentralization, besides delegation of authority, means drawing upon indigenous resources and people and training local inhabitants, it is difficult to be successful.
The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 92.

### Table 92

**The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Political Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 1 of Section IV of the Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category I</th>
<th>Very Like-</th>
<th>Neutral Like-</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
<th>% in Rank-</th>
<th>Sup-</th>
<th>Re-as-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Force</td>
<td>Like- (5)</td>
<td>Like- (4)</td>
<td>Like- (3)</td>
<td>Like- (2)</td>
<td>ly(1)</td>
<td>ed</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency  
% = percentage  
N = number of respondents

**Results.** In Part I, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for decentralized government in respect to the Political Force
was computed to be 3.5 or Neutral (See Table 91). In Par 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 92).

**Category II - Financial Force**

Subcategories:

**Financial Capacity of Public Sector**

Reasons for Very Likely:

Financial resources and funds are available (Stated by five respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Finance is no problem due to financial capability of the government (Stated by three respondents).

**Financial Cooperation of Private Sector and Financially Powerful**

Reason for Likely:

Different cooperatives will provide funds if needed.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

Reasons for Likely:

Funds can be provided, especially by political groups, if needed (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

Only if political system supports it.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reason for Unlikely:

It is hard to manage.

**Economic and Investment Concerns**

Reason for Unlikely:
Fear of wastefulness.

**Degree of Conformity with Present Trends and Existing Policies**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

No financial problem; large funds are being spent by government to encourage this new development (Stated by four respondents).

**Reasons for Likely:**

Money is available; provision of funds does not appear to be a problem nowadays (Stated by six respondents).

**Reasons for Neutral:**

No financial strings (Stated by two respondents).

**Reason for Unlikely:**

They are distrustful of local powers and decentralization of their authority.

**Disinterest**

**Reasons for Neutral:**

Indifferent, neutral and unconcerned position due to the lack of interest (Stated by twelve respondents).

**Irrelevance**

**Reasons for Neutral:**

This force has no particular role or effect because the implementation of this program does not require financial factor (Stated by eight respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 93.
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF
FINANCIAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING
PROGRAM 1 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category II</th>
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<th>Very Like</th>
<th>Neutral Like</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
<th>Rank</th>
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<th>Resistant</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Ly(3)</td>
<td>Ly(2)</td>
<td>Ly(1)</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity with Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
z = percentage
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for decentralized government in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 3.4 or Neutral (See Table 91). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Financial Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified.
(See the last four columns of Table 93).

**Category III - Administrative Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Personnel Practice and Staff Adequacy**

Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to shortage of trained manpower and skilled personnel at local level (Stated by seven respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Shortage of specialized staff in local and rural areas (Stated by two respondents).

**Administrative and Management Talents**

Reason for Neutral:

Lack of management, i.e., the country was able to graduate only fifty-eight business management students this year.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of administrative and managerial talents for group management (Stated by five respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Shortage of management ability which is around zero (Stated by three respondents).

**Coordination**

Reason for Unlikely:

Lack of coordination.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Lack of coordination among such activities.

**Organizational Sufficiency**

Reason for Unlikely:

Organizational inadequacy for pursuing such goals.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Operating units are not available.
Degree of Willingness, Motivation, and Initiation

Reason for Likely:

Such a program will give them a concrete raison d'être.

Reason for Unlikely:

Lack of interest.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Lack of initiatives.

Efficiency and Capability Concerns

Reason for Very Likely:

There are capable people to undertake this program in both rural and urban areas.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to the weak and incapable administration and being the tool of the government (Stated by seven respondents).

Competence has not been manifested so far to identify and pursue these goals (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Completely incapable of handling crucial issues of the moment (Stated by two respondents).

Responsibility and Awareness

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Does not have awareness of the vitality of such objectives.

Professional Skills, Methods, and Expertise

Reason for Unlikely:

Due to technical inefficiency.

Capacity for Training and Managing Manpower

Reason for Unlikely:

Lack of skilled manpower.

Corruption

Reason for Very Unlikely:
The old time-consuming practices of local authorities will lead to corruption.

Experience
Reason for Neutral:

The change should be gradual. As time goes on men will gain experience to cope with the requirements of the change.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Such efforts have never been dealt with properly, due to the lack of experience (Stated by two respondents).

Bureaucracy Concerns
Reasons for Unlikely:

A highly centralized system is difficult to be changed drastically.

Demand for central power.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in the Country
Reason for Very Likely:

Under serious pressure from above, administrative machinery is being provided for this purpose.

Reason for Neutral:

Does in line with government policies. Some organizations have been established for this purpose.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 94.
### TABLE 94

**THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 1 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category III</th>
<th>Administrative Force</th>
<th>Very Like-Ly</th>
<th>Neutral Like-Ly</th>
<th>Very Un-Ly</th>
<th>% in Rank-Order</th>
<th>% 2nd</th>
<th>% 1st</th>
<th>% 6th</th>
<th>% 4th</th>
<th>% 3rd</th>
<th>% 5th</th>
<th>% 10th</th>
<th>% 3rd</th>
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<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Personnel Practice &amp; Staff Adequacy</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
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</table>

*f = frequency  
% = percentage  
N = number of respondents*

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for decentralized government in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 1.8 or Unlikely (See Table 91). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By comput:
and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Administrative Force was determined, and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 94).

**Category IV - Socio-Cultural Force.**

Subcategories:

**Willingness of Social Groups in General**

*Reasons for Very Likely:*

Social forces are very much in favor of this program and will help it (Stated by two respondents).

*Reasons for Likely:*

Social Forces are favorable and will show positive reaction to such possibilities for participating (Stated by six respondents).

Because they are more interested in local government than a centralized one.

**Intellectual Groups**

*Reasons for Likely:*

Intellectual groups will support this (Stated by two respondents).

**Professional Groups**

*Reason for Likely:*

Professional groups will strongly advocate this because it will give them a more active role.

**Organized Groups**

*Reason for Likely:*

Local political groups will favor this.

**Religious, Traditional and Cultural Concerns**

*Reason for Very Likely:*

Due to cultural diversity.
Reason for Likely:

Cultural differences among provincial people have always raised such a demand.

Reasons for Neutral:

Culturally and religiously indifferent (Stated by three respondents).

They are used to the central government's management.

Reason for Unlikely:

Due to the habit of having central government managing their affairs.

Disinterest and Cynicism
Reason for Neutral:

People are cynical and indifferent.

Reason for Unlikely:

Due to chronic pessimism of Iranians.

Development Concerns
Reason for Very Likely:

Because it will result in emergence of local powers.

Reasons for Likely:

It will give them a chance to exercise democracy.

Because it attaches more importance to the local people.

In Relation to Government Influence
Reason for Likely:

Social groups will support it if government pushes it.

Public Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction
Reason for Neutral:

They enjoy the present situation.

Public Demand and Need
Reason for Likely:

Demand of the communities.
**Conditional and Uncertain**

**Reason for Likely:**

In rural areas the cooperatives have been welcomed but in cities the results have not been very good.

**Reasons for Neutral:**

Not totally accepted; the idea of this sort of self-government and communes are not yet known by people. (Stated by two respondents).

With the passage of time, our community is getting prepared to have a hand in administration of its affairs.

It depends on the type of activities; if they are political the social forces will avoid them.

**Degree of Public Awareness**

**Reasons for Neutral:**

People, especially in rural areas and small communities, do not have awareness of such activities (Stated by three respondents).

Only middle class urban people are aware of its importance and will support it.

**Capability Concerns**

**Reasons for Neutral:**

They have no experience in this line and realize the incapability of the local authorities (Stated by two respondents).

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Is not trained in the first place; they would not know how to deal with it.

**Class Concerns**

**Reason for Very Unlikely:**

Society is almost a cast system and cannot support this idea.

**In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran**

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

Public servants do not like public influence.
Local office authorities will resist this.

**Miscellaneous**

**Reason for Likely:**

*It will reduce their sense of insecurity.*

**Reason for Unlikely:**

*Resistance of institutions.*

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the Socio-Cultural Force are presented in Table 95.
### Table 95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category IV</th>
<th>Socio-cultural Force</th>
<th>Very Like</th>
<th>Like (3)</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Un- Like (2)</th>
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</table>

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for decentralized government in respect to the Socio-Cultural Force were computed to be 3.4 or Neutral (See Table 91). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories...
according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Socio-Cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 95).

**Category V - Educational Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence**

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Could help the local government with on-the-job training, but does not have sufficient capacity.

**Willingness and Demand of Educational Institutions in General**

**Reason for Very Likely:**

Every educational effort is in that direction.

**Reasons for Likely:**

They consider it as a means to reduce red tape (Stated by two respondents).

**Conditional and Uncertain**

**Reason for Very Likely:**

Great publicity has been made for this system in our educational literature and mass media.

**Reason for Neutral:**

It is hoped that the shift from academically-oriented system of education to a more diversified system will provide the community with capable men to affect the change of this kind.

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Dissemination of democracy depends on the right kind of education provided for the society.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

**Reasons for Neutral:**

Makes no effect because does not have its role (Stated by four respondents).
Reasons for Unlikely:

Is not able to give primary understanding to the students in this line.

At the present, this system is not ready yet (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Incapable to have a role (Stated by two respondents).

Awareness, Expertise and Experience
Reason for Very Likely:

Through educational programs, it can be helpful.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Lack of knowledge impedes the implementation.

Orientation Toward National Development
Reason for Unlikely:

Incapable of training for such representation. Furthermore, the role to prepare people for development programs is not within their responsibilities.

Facilities, Techniques and Finance
Reason for Very Unlikely:

Lack of sufficient staff.

Educational Elite
Reason for Likely:

Due to the support of the educated people.

Disinterest
Reasons for Neutral:

Indifferent, unconcerned and neutral position due to the lack of interest (Stated by twenty-two respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 in respect to the Educational Force are presented in Table 96.
### TABLE 96

**The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Educational Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 1 of Section IV of the Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Educational Force</th>
<th>Very Like (5)</th>
<th>Neutral-Like (4)</th>
<th>Very Un-Like (3)</th>
<th>Very Un-Like (2)</th>
<th>Very Un-Like (1)</th>
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</table>

f = frequency  
x = percentages  
N = number of respondents

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 1 for decentralized government in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 2.9 or Neutral (See Table 91). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their value, their importance to the likelihood of the Educational Force was determined,
and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 96).

Analysis for Program 2 (Decentralized Problem Solving) of Section IV

The Program

Government's efforts for resolving problems such as traffic jams, noise, pollution, lack of open space, and providing facilities for sport and entertainment shall be made in a decentralized manner (at the local and regional levels); local authorities resolving the problems, state coordinating their efforts and helping them financially and technically if needed.

**Part 1.** Table 97 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for decentralized problem solving.

**TABLE 97**

THE RESULTS OF THE RESPONDENTS' RATING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 2 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN IN RESPECT TO 5 FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>Very Like-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Un-</th>
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<th>Very Un-</th>
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<td>%</td>
<td>ly(3)</td>
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</table>

*f* = frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood

% = percentage

N = number of respondents

Md = median

Table 97 presents the computed frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the five prospective forces.
Part 2. Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force, as shown by the medians in Table 97, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

**Category I - Political Force**

Subcategories:

**National Leaders**

Reason for Neutral:

These programs are mostly propaganda and the political force will benefit from it anyhow.

Reason for Priority Concerns:

The political forces have been concerned about such a program but they have not reached a conclusion whether decentralization would be more efficient than centralization.

Reason for Reasons for Unlikely:

Local authorities are more concerned with the economic needs than recreational.

Problems like housing are more crucial to the local authorities than recreation and pollution.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Government has proved to be extremely inefficient in these areas. This has received a low priority by the government so far.

Reason for Conditional and Uncertain:

Central government could assist.

Reasons for Likely:

So far as it is a daily matter, it is for it. But, in high levels, it is against it.
Will agree except for some individuals in the top jobs in the centers.

Reason for Neutral:

Such a tendency is under consideration.

Reasons for Unlikely:

The question is whether administrative and political institutions exist at the local level to sustain such an autonomy.

Decentralization has been moving very slowly.

Advanced technical training to provide skilled manpower for local governments is needed.

It takes years for Iran to become self-sufficient in skilled personnel necessary for such localization of efforts.

Public Demand

Reasons for Likely:

The government is carrying out intensive training programs to meet the rising demand of the local people for industrial skills.

Attention is being paid to technical training of the local people to satisfy their fast growing need for technical know how.
Setting up provincial councils, city councils and regional planning bureaus could facilitate the implementation of such programs.

Attaining a leading position in the regions through "moving off-center" is the new national policy (Stated by three respondents).

A new program has just been approved for building playgrounds and parks for the low class people throughout the country.

Recreational facilities are expanding but mostly in the large cities (Stated by two respondents).

Since government's dominance over the civic administration causes overcrowding and environmental, cultural and mental problems plus inharmonious distribution of services, the government is ready to decentralize its activities.

Since most of the urban and rural areas lack public centers, the government is purchasing the idle land in the towns to establish such centers.

Protection of environment in the urban and rural areas and providing recreational facilities are placed on the government's agenda.

Government is planning to provide the cities with green space, parks, playground, commercial centers and other facilities.

Government is drawing upon various plans to remove the problems plaguing city and rural life in Iran.

Reasons for Neutral:

Centralization of power in the central government is being challenged.

This problem is not taken serious by the government.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Solution to such problems are determined by the central government which does not enjoy decentralization (Stated by three respondents).

Local governments won't play an active role in the process of decision making under any circumstance.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reasons for Unlikely:
Due to shortage of technical training, technological know how and qualified manpower at the local level (Stated by three respondents).

Government thinks of solutions to these problems after they get out of hand.

Decentralization in Iran will mean centralization of progress in provincial capital instead of pursuing it throughout the province.

**Unnecessary**

**Reasons for Neutral:**

There are not too many problems of this kind, such as pollution, in Iran (Stated by two respondents).

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

Shortage of the green space, park and problems such as pollution are serious only in Teheran not throughout the country.

Such problems are not crucial in the local areas.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 98.
TABLE 98

THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF POLITICAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 2 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Very Like-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Neutral Like-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Un-</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
<th>ED</th>
<th>Rank-</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Resisting</th>
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<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
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</table>

Notes: 5 = frequency  
X = percentage  
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for decentralized problem solving in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 3.3 or Neutral (See Table 97). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were
identified (See the last four columns of Table 98).

**Category II - Financial Force.**

Subcategories:

**Financial Capacity of Public Sector**

Reasons for Likely:

Funds are available (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Due to government's financial ability to meet the need (Stated by four respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

No problem as far as financial means are concerned.

**Capacity of Financial Management Agencies**

Reasons for Very Likely:

Big sums of money have been earmarked for regional development (Stated by two respondents).

There is a basic reform in budgeting for such a purpose.

Last year the volume of funds and projects handled directly by the local governments was one billion dollars. This year, it will be three billion and could raise to four billions.

Reasons for Likely:

Regional banks are instructed to assist regional governments in urban and regional development.

Recreational efforts in the provinces are supported by government subsidies.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Only sophisticated approaches to budgeting have this kind of efficiency (Stated by two respondents).

**Conditional and Uncertain**

Reason for Very Likely:

There will be no financial problem if accepted by the government.
Reasons for Likely:

If this program is ready to propose, they will fund it to certain extent (Stated by two respondents).

Possibilities concerning such programs are under study.

Reason for Neutral:

If decided by the government, funds could be available.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns

Reasons for Likely:

This is difficult to be pursued throughout the country, but it is being done in the provincial capitals (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

What region should be given what amount needs statistics which is lacking.

Reason for Unlikely:

Due to the lack of financial know how at the local level.

Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies

Reasons for Very Likely:

Financial constraint does not exist and the government is already funding these programs; due to the oil income (Stated by eight respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Regional departments are being given more spending power and the local authorities are having control and supervision over such programs (Stated by three respondents).

The state has recently announced a program under which the city councils will be provided with government funds for local development (Stated two respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

Such a tendency is already on the way but a little has been done for the small towns and rural areas.

Disinterest

Reason for Neutral:

This program will not make too much difference.
This program will not make too much difference.

Irrelevance
Reason for Likely:

Such programs do not take too much money.

Reason for Neutral:

Financial force has no effect on the implementation, besides, pollution is not a problem yet to need a big sum of funds.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 99.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category II</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Neutral Likely (3)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely</th>
<th>% in Order</th>
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<th>Neutra</th>
<th>Re-positive</th>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>f = frequency</th>
<th>% = percentage</th>
<th>N = number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for decentralized problem solving in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 4.1 or Likely (See Table 97). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Financial Force was determined, and then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 99).

Category III - Administrative Force.

Subcategories:

Personnel Practice and Staff Adequacy

Reason for Neutral:

The number of qualified experts will increase as this program is implemented in stages.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of zealous and specialized personnel will cause this force not to undertake this program (Stated by three respondents).

Little has been done as far as recruiting skilled personnel for the provinces is concerned.

Administrative and Management Talents

Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to the lack of management capability to control and guide the involved personnel and handle frictions among various institutions (Stated by three respondents).

Coordination

Reasons for Unlikely:

Cannot provide uniformity of policies due to the individualistic approach of each agency (Stated by two respondents).

Organizational Sufficiency

Reason for Likely:
A group of enthusiastic employees are trying to push this program through, although they are limited in number.

Reason for Unlikely:

This program needs a strong professional organization at the local level to be implemented. But, such organizations do not exist.

Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation

Reason for Very Likely:

The administrative system is in favor of decentralization, therefore, it will help this program.

Reason for Neutral:

This program won't proceed more than talking.

Reason for Unlikely:

Administrative system is reluctant in taking such responsibilities.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

So far an extremely weak administrative support has been given to such programs.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns

Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to the weak and inefficient administrative system (Stated by six respondents).

Due to the decision making inefficiency; they cannot affect the implementation of this program by making proper decisions (Stated by two respondents).

The local departments are manifestly incapable of shouldering such responsibilities.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

The local governments have been least successful in implementation of such programs.

The administrative system is not capable of handling this program; the larger the number of decisions to be made, the less their capability (Stated by two respondents).
Responsibility and Awareness
Reason for Neutral:

They will support it if ordered by the government.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Petty officialdom in Iran has a way of evading the right decisions.

They think that such programs are important in the future.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

No awareness of the multiplicity of their roles in case of such decentralization.

Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise
Reasons for Unlikely:

There is no planning force at the local level.

Their decisions will be very costly to carry out. The reason is their lack of knowledge.

This program takes appropriate division of labor which is difficult to do in Iran.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Does not enjoy technical know how to handle such programs.

Due to the old procedures.

Availability of Facilities
Reason for Unlikely:

The local facilities are very poor.

Capacity for Training and Managing Manpower
Reason for Likely:

The capacity of the specialized manpower is very limited. Maybe the government can provide the technical aids for the local departments.

Experience
Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to the tradition of depending on the central offices of government for guidance.
The provincial governments cannot handle this program since they have never had any experience in this field. (Stated by two respondents).

**Bureaucracy Concerns**

**Reason for Neutral:**

They are skeptical of significance of decentralization in a society with an old tradition of centralization.

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Even at the local level a centralized power will be established which will monopolize the authority.

**In Relation to Other Forces Acting In Iran**

**Reason for Likely:**

This is the government's policy and the administrative force has to implement it.

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Civil servants will confuse their personal interests with those of the public.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 100.
### Table 100

**The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Administrative Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 2 of Section IV of the Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category III Administrative Force</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Unlikely (2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (1)</th>
<th>% in Supportive Tendency</th>
<th>% in Permissive Tendency</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
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</table>

The results of statistical analysis are as follows:

- In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 for decentralized problem solving in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 1.9 or Unlikely (See Table 97). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By
computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 100).

**Category IV - Socio-Cultural Force**

**Subcategories:**

**Willingness of Social Groups in General**
**Reasons for Very Likely:**

People will favor such a decentralization of authority which will give them self-determination authority, especially that it is a long due demand (Stated by five respondents).

**Reasons for Likely:**

Favorable, positive and supportive position (Stated by nineteen respondents).

**Major Interest Groups**
**Reasons for Likely:**

Private sector and business powers will fully support it (Stated by two respondents).

**Diversity of Interest, Attitudes and Priorities**
**Reason for Neutral:**

Conflict of interests of different groups is still a problem to be solved.

**Disinterest and Cynicism**
**Reasons for Neutral:**

Indifferent with not much concern (Stated by two respondents).

**Development Concerns**
**Reason for Very Likely:**

Because this will avoid the historical drift away from proper use of resources.

**Public Demand and Need**
Reasons for Very Likely:

This is the best way of expressing opinions which is long due (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

This has been an ever increasing demand of the people (Stated by five respondents).

The local people have always considered decentralized system of problem solving as a means for reducing red tape.

Conditional and Uncertain

Reason for Likely:

They are for it on the condition that government gives training, financial and technical aids.

Reasons for Neutral:

Not very favorable; they want government to do everything for them from the center. They need training first.

Society does not seem to be giving the attention that such a matter deserves (Stated by two respondents).

Degree of Public Awareness

Reason for Likely:

There is awareness of the need.

Miscellaneous

Reasons for Likely:

Because this reduces the burden of centralization.

Locally, it is accepted.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to Socio-Cultural Force are presented in Table 101.
TABLE 101
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF
SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING
PROGRAM 2 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Unlikely (2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (1)</th>
<th>Rank Order</th>
<th>% Contribution</th>
<th>% Substance</th>
<th>% Resisting</th>
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<td>Public Demand &amp; Need</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capability Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Class Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
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<td>4.5</td>
<td>20th</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
% = percentage
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Socio-Cultural Force was computed to be 4.0 or Likely (See Table 97). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their
importance to the likelihood of the Socio-Cultural Force was determined, and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 101).

**Category V - Educational Force**

Subcategories:

**The Existing Trained Manpower**

Reason for Unlikely:

Lack of education impedes the plans for implementation.

**Capacity to Transfer Human Potential Into Competence**

Reasons for Likely:

Has an informal role in exerting pressure on such programs to be implemented.

Regarding the role it can play in making the people familiar with this program.

**Capacity of Vocational and Technical Schools**

Reason for Unlikely:

Cannot provide technical training assistance.

**Capacity of Higher Education Institutions**

Reason for Likely:

Provincial colleges can play the role of the research agencies.

**Capacity of Professional Schools**

Reason for Likely:

Institutes of regional planning have been recently established to train required administrative force.

**Willingness and Demand of Educational Institutions in General**

Reason for Very Likely:

They will certainly help.

Reasons for Likely:

They will contribute within their capacity and support to promote the cause (Stated by four respondents).
Reasons for Neutral:

Does not seek such goals but will not mind implementation of this program (Stated by two respondents).

Raises no demand in this respect but will not resist (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

Lack of persuasion.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Lack of motivation and initiative (Stated by two respondents).

Conditional and Uncertain
Reasons for Neutral:

The change in the system of education which produced men of academic tendencies rather than men of action in various fields, will eventually provide the number of men needed to run the affairs of communes effectively and efficiently.

If its institutions expand for training purposes, this force will assist the program.

Some local training can be undertaken.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reasons for Neutral:

Does not have a helping role and much effect in this respect (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Cannot facilitate such endeavors, apply pressure for its approval, play a scholarly role and give feedback while being implemented (Stated by four respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Incompetent, incapable, with no initiative nor helping hand in this regard (Stated by four respondents).

Awareness, Expertise and Experience
Reason for Very Likely:

Educational indications are for it.
Reason for Very Unlikely:

Unawareness of such matters characterizes the role of our educational machinery.

Degree of Flexibility
Reasons for Neutral:

Inflexible (Stated by two).

Educational Elite
Reason for Likely:

Due to the demand and support of the educated.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran
Reason for Very Likely:

It is the government policy.

Reason for Likely:

Because the society wishes it.

Reason for Neutral:

Has no role in such activities like other forces.

Disinterest
Reasons for Neutral:

Indifferent and unconcerned with no commitment (Stated by six respondents).

Irrelevance
Reason for Neutral:

This force is not active in this respect.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Educational Force are presented in Table 102.
TABLE 102
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF EDUCATIONAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 2 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category V</th>
<th>Educational Force</th>
<th>Very Like Ly(5)</th>
<th>Like Ly(4)</th>
<th>Neutral Ly(3)</th>
<th>Un-Like Ly(2)</th>
<th>Un-Like Ly(1)</th>
<th>% in Rank</th>
<th>% in Order</th>
<th>% in Supportive</th>
<th>% in Neutral</th>
<th>% in Resisting</th>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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<td>4.5</td>
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<td>10th</td>
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<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting In Iran</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>10th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency 3 10 19 7 8 47 100%

% = percentages

N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 2 in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 2.9 or Neutral (See Table 97). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Educational Force was determined and, then,
their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 102).

Analysis for Program 3 (Localization of Authority) of Section IV

The Program

Freedom of initiative and real responsibility shall be given to elect representatives at the regional and communal levels, and, therefore, they shall be free from paper work and the need to obtain prior authorization from the central authorities. This innovation shall necessarily be translated into financial terms.

Part 1. Table 103 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for localization of authority.

**TABLE 103**

THE RESULTS OF THE RESPONDENTS' RATING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 3 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN IN RESPECT TO 5 FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>Very Like (1)</th>
<th>Like (2)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Un-Like (4)</th>
<th>Very Un-Like (5)</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>Administrative</td>
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<td>Socio-cultural</td>
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<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
<td>2 5 2 5 29 72.5 5 12.5 2 5 40 100 2.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( f \) = frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood

\( \% \) = percentage

\( N \) = number of respondents

\( Md \) = median

Table 103 presents the computed frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the five prospective forces.
Part 2. Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force, as shown by the medians in Table 103, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

**Category I - Political Force**

Subcategories:

*Parliament and the Law*

Reason for Unlikely:

The law gives the local governments limited power.

*Political Parties*

Reason for Unlikely:

A dominant major political part precludes the possibility of an unprejudistic election.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

This type of system is too early for here. But, if applied, the politicians will make all five forces just be deceptive.

*Priority Concerns*

Reasons for Unlikely:

Political forces believe that political freedom for the time being must take second place to economic growth (Stated by two respondents).

*Conditional and Uncertain*

Reasons for Neutral:

This economically profitable but not politically.

Not sure of their ability to do the job.

The more capable men come out of educational institutions, the more is the likelihood of this program to be operationalized.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Central government is hesitant to provide such degree of freedom for fear of abuse and mismanagement by the local authorities due to their lack of social conscience and responsibility.
The judicial machinery of the system of laws operating in Iran must be harnesses for such programs.

Only if the old local planning bureaus who depend on the central government offices are revamped.

**Interest Groups**

**Reason for Unlikely:**

This motivation could be appealing only to the educational elite.

**Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

Political forces will help it and the government is moving in that direction; through stopping bureaucracy this program is being implemented (Stated by three respondents).

A big part of the Fifth Plan is concerned with such programs, two-hundred thousand dollars in developing projects is being spent on a regional basis under the new budget (Stated by two respondents).

**Reasons for Likely:**

A similar program is under execution (Stated by three respondents).

The nucleus of advocates of decentralized system is very slowly coming into being inside the government.

People affected by development projects are being given opportunities to make their suggestions.

Development supporting system of communication is being established for such purposes.

Some properly planned programs are being implemented in this respect.

Such political showpieces are favored.

Wider participation of local people and greater delegation of authority and decision-making power is the new policy of the government.

Thousands of villages have been reduced into settlements through consolidation. The settlements are run by the farmers themselves who receive assistance from provincial governments.
In the rural areas people elect officials for the corporations and cooperatives.

In order to reinforce the policy of decentralization of budget spending, planning bureaus in the provinces are being strengthened.

Since fifty-seven percent of the population still live in the villages, efforts to spread social services and welfare in the rural areas are being made.

A large share of authority for implementing projects is being shifted to provincial officials.

Government is trying to create development capacity not only at the provincial centers but also down at the bottom where low class people live.

Local governments now receive funds for their regional projects.

A new policy for local planning and training the local people to perform a variety of tasks is being implemented.

To reduce administrative obstacles, red tape and uncertainties over government policy in particular areas will be reason for accepting of this program.

Tradition favors the reverse; tendency for centralization (Stated by two respondents).

The system, especially some individuals, will not support this (Stated by two respondents).

Since it permits participation at lower level, it is not in accordance with the government policy.

Government believes that a democratic society based on rule of law will not be efficient at this time.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

All regional and local representatives have to act in the framework decided by central government.

On the whole, the government opposes decentralization as such.

All kinds of representations should be controlled by the central government.
Capability and Efficiency Concerns

Reasons for Unlikely:

Communication between the central government and local authorities is not efficient enough to secure coordination.

The local authorities do not understand the purpose of this kind of scheme.

It is hard to coordinate them in efficient way.

Such a program requires close cooperation between branches of government, local decision making and much delegation of authority which is difficult to create.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 104.
The percentages of contribution of the subcategories of political force to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 of Section IV of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category I Political Force</th>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Very Like-ly(5)</th>
<th>Like-ly(4)</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Like-ly(3)</th>
<th>Very Un-likely(2)</th>
<th>Un-likely(1)</th>
<th>X in Order</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Resisting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Leaders</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament &amp; the Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
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Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for localization of authority in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 3.3 or Neutral (See Table 103). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 104).
Category II - Financial Force

Subcategories:

Capacity of Public Sector
Reasons for Very Likely:

Availability of financial resources due to oil and gas revenue (Stated by seven respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Ability to meet the need (Stated by two respondents).

Capacity of Financial Management Agencies
Reason for Likely:

Regional funds are allocated in large sums.

Conditional and Uncertain
Reasons for Likely:

Funds are available. The responsibilities of these funds are being delegated to regional authorities. It is hoped that this will continue even further ahead if the local authorities could spend it fast enough (Stated by two).

Reasons for Unlikely:

It is not an appealing idea—maybe in the future (Stated by two respondents).

It is doubtful how such innovations can be translated into financial terms.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reason for Neutral:

Due to the lack of experience.

Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policy
Reasons for Very Likely:

No problem (Stated by five respondents).

In line with the policy of the Fifth Plan which is already funding such programs (Stated by nine respondents).

Very supportive and will fund the program favorably with no reservations (Stated by eleven respondents).
Local authorities have such power already.

Reason for Neutral:

Is obedient to the government.

Reason for Unlikely:

This program won't be supported.

Disinterest
Reason for Unlikely:

It is not an appealing idea.

Miscellaneous
Reason for Neutral:

They have proved their adaptability to such a program.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 105.
**TABLE 103**

The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Financial Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 3 of Section IV of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Unlikely (2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (1)</th>
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\( f = \) frequency  
\( % = \) percentage  
\( N = \) number of respondents

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for localization of authority in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 4.3 or Likely (See Table 103). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Financial Force was deter-
mined, and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 105).

**Category III - Administrative Force**

**Subcategories:**

**Personnel Practices and Staff Adequacy**

Reasons for Unlikely:

Not enough experienced staff to start with but in the long run it will be fine.

It is not possible to pursue development with a few hundred experts and a few thousand civil servants.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

It will lead into administrative anarchism.

**Administrative and Management Talents**

Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of trained executives and confidence in them (Stated by two respondents).

**Coordination**

Reasons for Unlikely:

Duplication of services will be costly because of the lack of coordination.

Will create conflict among different local departments.

Sufficient organizations.

Reason for Unlikely:

Very poor institutions.

**Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation**

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Insecurity of the unqualified administratc

No personal conviction and active desire which could make this force development oriented.
**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

**Reason for Neutral:**

Cannot be very important. It is thought that local authorities can independently decide.

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

Due to the poor and weak administration (Stated by two).

It needs more time, at the moment local governments are not particularly efficient and well staffed (Stated by two).

This is hard to manage because the poor performance is difficult to change (Stated by two).

Decision making authority cannot be truly accepted and exercised at local level.

The present local governments are mostly a merely ceremonial and political figure.

Lack of control over such programs.

The management cannot handle the large number of subordinate needed for such a program.

**Reason for Very Unlikely:**

This force is very poor, qualitatively.

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**Responsibility and Awareness**

**Reason for Neutral:**

Local governments do not want to realize the importance of such programs.

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

No administrative steps have been taken in this direction in practice.

No awareness of such objectives while the implementation of such programs takes labor, sound outlook, and deep sense of responsibility (Stated by two respondents).

---

**Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise**

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

Is not equipped with new managerial techniques and applicable knowledge needed for such programs (Stated by three).
It will enlarge the size of complexity of operation because of their lack of knowledge.

No proper means to measure performance and enforce standards.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Lack of understanding of decision making methods which results in lack of capacity to make sound decisions in the majority of cases (Stated by two).

Organizational structures, relationships, policies and measurement for developmental goals are not known by local levels.

**Capacity for Training and Managing Manpower**

Reason for Unlikely:

Local government are often recruiting necessary manpower but the shortage is damaging.

**Corruption**

Reason for Neutral:

Increase in local authorities will increase corruption if eliminates red tape.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Might create more red tape because of the lack of know how.

Due to the poor economic status of the employees such a program will impose corruption.

**Experience**

Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of experience of local officials in such democratic endeavors (Stated by two respondents).

**Bureaucracy Concerns**

Reason for Neutral:

A start has been made towards shifting from centralized to decentralized operation and administration of the community affairs.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Actual decentralization will never take place because
the local governments will in turn avoid decentralizing their authority.

Due to bureaucratic red tape which is the result of the lack of skills.

The formal walls between decision makers and the implementors at the local level.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

The ruling bureaucracy won't let such a program act.

Degree of Flexibility of the Rules and Regulations

Reason for Likely:

Such an adaptation is possible.

In Relation to Other Forces acting in the Country

Reason for Likely:

Authorities are influential in election of representatives.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 106.
TABLE 106
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 3 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category III</th>
<th>Administrative Force</th>
<th>Personnel Practice &amp; Staff Adequacy</th>
<th>Administrative &amp; Management Talents</th>
<th>Coordination</th>
<th>Organizational Sufficiency</th>
<th>Degree of Willingness, Motivation &amp; Initiative</th>
<th>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</th>
<th>Responsibility &amp; Awareness</th>
<th>Professional Skills, Methods &amp; Expertise</th>
<th>Availability of Facilities</th>
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Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for localization of authority in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 1.9 or Unlikely (See Table 103). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing
and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined, and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 106).

**Category IV - Socio-Cultural Force**

Subcategories:

**Willingness of Social Force in General**

*Reasons for Very Likely:*

People will welcome and help it because they have always been for it (Stated by three respondents).

People in each region will go after what their local representatives decide.

*Reasons for Likely:*

Favorable and supportive (Stated by five).

This is very appealing and promising to the social forces and they will support it because it will promote their role in socio-economic activities and give them a hand in local affairs (Stated by five).

**Interest Groups**

*Reason for Likely:*

Business firms will have a faster way of handling their legal problems.

**Diversity of Interests and Priorities**

*Reasons for Unlikely:*

Resistance and reluctance of people to participate in collective activities (Stated by two respondents).

**Cultural Concerns**

*Reason for Very Likely:*

This is culturally admirable.

*Reason for Likely:*


Cultural minorities will have a bigger voice.

Disinterest and Cynicism
Reasons for Neutral:

Low class people are indifferent and will not affect the implementation (Stated by four respondents).

Election is just a concept to the people.

Since they have never experienced free election, people do not consider representation as a serious matter.

Development Concerns
Reasons for Very Likely:

Because it will reduce territorial inequalities and increase local development (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Will increase the level of their activities in local affairs (Stated by two respondents).

In Relation to Government's Influence
Reason for Likely:

They are for it, but are not ready because they are used to dictated policies from the government.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

They are looking up to the government which will object.

Public Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction
Reasons for Very Likely:

Because it will give them a sound voice in their affairs and they will be living under the rules of the laws that they had a voice in their creation (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

They will see it as a better way of law enforcement because it will reduce their useless and wasteful involvement with the central government (Stated by two respondents).

Public Demand and Needs
Reasons for Likely:
It will make local authorities' decisions more in line with the local needs.

Due to the demand of the public.

**Economic and Income Concerns**

Reasons for Very Likely:

*They will see a better chance for equality.*

**Conditional and Uncertain**

Reason for Likely:

*People are genuinely looking for such a degree of independence but with caution.*

Reasons for Neutral:

*Only urban groups understand and appreciate it.*

*Men in the community are being prepared by stages to feel and recognize their responsibility.*

*People are not very optimistic about their role in voting in election.*

Reason for Unlikely:

*They are not trained this way but won't object.*

**Degree of Public Awareness**

Reason for Very Likely:

*Because they will be able to observe the execution of the decisions more closely.*

Reason for Likely:

*They will sense their government more closely.*

**Capability Concerns**

Reason for Neutral:

*They could not follow the institutional regiments.*

**Class Concerns**

Reason for Likely:

*Disadvantaged groups will have a better voice.*
In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran

Reason for Neutral:

Social groups appear to have accepted the priorities set by the political force; economic gain for the loss of political expression.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to the Socio-Cultural Force are presented in Table 107.
TABLE 107
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF
SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING
PROGRAM 3 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category IV</th>
<th>Very Like-ly(5)</th>
<th>Neu-tral Like-ly(4)</th>
<th>Un-Like-ly(3)</th>
<th>Un-Like-Ly(2)</th>
<th>Un-Like-Ly(1)</th>
<th>% in Sup-er-por-tive</th>
<th>% in Neu-tral</th>
<th>% in Re-sist-ing</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Order</th>
<th>X</th>
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<tr>
<td>Willingness of Social Groups in General</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>Religious, Traditional &amp; Cultural Concerns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Satisfaction &amp; Dissatisfaction</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>Labor Force &amp; Labor Market Concerns</td>
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<td>11th</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>3rd</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>11th</td>
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<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
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</table>

f = frequency  
X = percentage  
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for localization of authority in respect to the Socio-Cultural Force was computed to be 3.9 or Likely (See Table 103). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories
according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Socio-Cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 107).

Category V - Educational Force

Subcategories:

The Existing Trained Manpower
Reason for Unlikely:

Lack of sufficient educational reservoir will impede the implementation.

Willingness and Demand of Educational Institutions in General
Reasons for Likely:

Demand for less red tape and reduction in delaying procedures (Stated by two respondents).

Conditional and Uncertain
Reasons for Neutral:

Could be appealing to this force.

In the long run this force should work towards the empowerment of the staff involved.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reason for Neutral:

Has no effect.

Reason for Unlikely:

It is weak.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Due to the incapability of this force (Stated by two respondents).

Awareness, Expertise, and Experience
Reasons for Very Likely:

This is an accepted philosophy.
Encouragement is provided for such a philosophy through the educational machinery.

**Educational Elite**

*Reason for Neutral:*

This motivation could be appealing especially to the educational elite.

*Reason for Unlikely:*

Educational elite will support this program.

**In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran**

*Reason for Unlikely:*

They will not be permitted by government to involve themselves in such a program.

**Disinterest**

*Reasons for Neutral:*

Unconcerned, neutral and indifferent position (Stated by twenty-four respondents).

**Irrelevance**

*Reason for Neutral:*

There is no educational aspect in this program.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 in respect to Educational Force are presented in Table 108.
TABLE 108

THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF EDUCATIONAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 3 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category V</th>
<th>Educational Force</th>
<th>Very Un</th>
<th>Neut- Un</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
<th>% in</th>
<th>Sup-</th>
<th>Re-</th>
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<td>Subcategories:</td>
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<td>like</td>
<td>Order</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Awareness, Expertise &amp; Experience</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Orientation Toward National Development</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>60</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ f = \text{frequency} \]
\[ \% = \text{percentages} \]
\[ N = \text{number of respondents} \]

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 3 for localization of authority in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 2.9 or Neutral (See Table 103). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Educational Force.
was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 108).

Analysis for Program 4 (Regionalization of Services) of Section IV

The Program

Local authorities shall be in a position to equip themselves with their own technical services. Therefore, an end shall be made of the quasi-monopoly of technical services by the central government. Some of the officials belonging to these services shall be assigned to the various regions, departments, and communes and placed under the exclusive hierarchical authority of their responsible elected representatives.

Part 1. Table 109 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for regionalization of services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>Very Like-(5)</th>
<th>Like-(4)</th>
<th>Neutral-(3)</th>
<th>Un-Like-(2)</th>
<th>Very Un-Like-(1)</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Political</td>
<td>5 11</td>
<td>29 62</td>
<td>2 4</td>
<td>10 21</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>47 100</td>
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<td>16 35</td>
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<td>5 11.5</td>
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<td>45 100</td>
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<td>3 7</td>
<td>20 43</td>
<td>5 11</td>
<td>46 100</td>
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<td>25 56</td>
<td>10 22</td>
<td>5 11</td>
<td>0 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
<td>3 7</td>
<td>11 25</td>
<td>20 45</td>
<td>8 18</td>
<td>2 5</td>
<td>44 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ f = \text{frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood} \]
\[ \% = \text{percentage} \]
\[ N = \text{number of respondents} \]
\[ \text{Md} = \text{median} \]

Table 109 presents the computed frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the five prospective forces.
Part 2. Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force, as shown by the medians in Table 109, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

**Category I - Political Force**

Subcategories:

**Conditional and Uncertain**

Reason for Very Likely:

Government can help through mobilization of specialized manpower and their classification.

Reasons for Neutral:

Though the government has been preaching this idea, no major move has been made in this direction.

Despite government's policy regarding decentralization, there is still a tendency for central decision making; a lot of preparations are needed for launching this policy

Reasons for Unlikely:

Consensus does not exist among people in various positions about how decentralization should be done.

Problem with the use of fiscal policies to achieve the goal of regionally balanced economic growth is complicated.

**Consideration of Social and Economic Development**

Reason for Likely:

The complexity of the economic development efforts requires more decisions be made at the local level.

**Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies**

Reasons for Very Likely:

It is the national policy and the political forces which will help it; recent measures explain this point (stated by three respondents).
Due to the significance of increase in technological power in regions and decentralization of specialized staff.

Reasons for Likely:

Government is willing and will support; the present policy of regionalization is in line with this program (Stated by four respondents).

The Fifth Plan, in addition to technical know how, envisages provisions of financial assistance to the provinces; one billion dollars has been allocated to local governments for their rural projects (Stated by two respondents).

Government has plans to set up industries in the provinces in order to move capital and technology from Teheran to the provinces.

Government is pushing the Teheran dominated industries to eventually have local partners and branches.

Government is helping to set up industries in the provinces and then float their shares for public subscription through the local capital market.

The government is spreading industries throughout the depressed areas by tax exemption policy.

Government considers decentralization in commercial offices as a means to help provincial centers develop into trading and commercial areas.

The new policy of development of economy and finance calls for an equitable distribution of investment throughout the country.

The government's new policy concerns provision of technical assistance to the local investors.

Government is concerned with the welfare of the small local industries and the share holders.

The improvement of the rural areas and small communities is under serious consideration.

This is under planning. For example, in the rural areas government is considering a proposal to hire high school graduates as village headmen in sixty thousand villages.
Banking system and other financing institutions are ordered to cooperate with territorial development.

Decentralization of commercial activities is being pursued hoping that it will cope with congestion of activities in Teheran.

The Plan and Budget Organization is training cadres necessary for decentralization of development efforts.

Government has recently called attention to its rising interest in provincial affairs.

Government is developing a whole new approach to the solutions of villages and rural areas' problems of health, education and administration.

Decentralization of development projects to the provinces is one of the policies of the Fifth Plan.

Greater authority is being delegated to governors and other provincial officials to carry out development projects.

Departments to be in charge of the task of regionalization are coming into existence.

Few industrialists and some groups might resist.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Delegation of authority is not favored and there is even tendency for more centralization; they do not want to relax their power to the (Stated by three respondents).

Despite lip service being paid to the idea of local participation in decision making, officials in Teheran still seek to control provincial activities.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reasons for Unlikely:

Due to the difficulty of attaining such targets and complexity of the problem.

The present manpower shortage at the regional level makes it difficult.

Decentralization of development planning and the transfer of more authority to the provinces have long been talked about. But, it has always proved to be difficult to materialize.
For a traditionally centralized government, it is difficult to decentralize with effective coordination.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 110.

**TABLE 110**

THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF POLITICAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 4 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Very Like</th>
<th>Like</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
<th>Un-</th>
<th>% in Rank</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resistant</th>
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<td>(3)</td>
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<td>(1)</td>
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<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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f = frequency  
X = percentage  
N = number of respondents
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for regionalization of services in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 3.8 or Likely (See Table 109). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 110).

Category II - Financial Force

Subcategories:

Financial Capacity of Public Sector

Reasons for Very Likely:

Financial capability of the government, due to the oil and gas revenues, now allows this (Stated by seven respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Ability to meet the need (Stated by three respondents).

Reason for Very Likely:

Eleven per cent of total development expenditures is set aside for utilization of the local authorities.

Reason for Likely:

Enough funds have been earmarked for this program.

Conditional and Uncertain

Reason for Very Likely:

Government is planning to complete such a program in 1978.

Reasons for Neutral:

Government is spending cautiously (investing) money for this purpose in the provinces.
Training staff for such decentralization is very costly but the government is pursuing this purpose.

Reason for Unlikely:

Fear of local authorities' inefficiency in handling money which will slow down such efforts.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reasons for Likely:

Decentralization of financial activities is being strongly encouraged because the central government finds itself incapable of handling the whole financing process alone (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

Local authorities are exercising such a program but not very effectively.

Reason for Unlikely:

Local people do not have the know how.

Economic and Investment Concerns
Reason for Very Likely:

Due to the complexity of economic efforts in the country.

Reason for Unlikely:

Scarcity of financial resources in the local areas.

Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies
Reasons for Very Likely:

No financial problem or constraint (Stated by six respondents).

This is one of the main features of the Fifth Plan and is being heavily favored and funded (Stated by two respondents).

The more regions can spend the funds the more they will receive.

Reasons for Likely:

Local authorities are already enjoying such regionalization because more money is being poured into outlying areas (Stated by three respondents).
Government's policy is in this line and ministries are having provincial branches (Stated by five respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

They do not like dependence on local authorities.

Only eleven per cent of all national investments is earmarked to be handled by the provincial governments during the next four years.

Disinterest
Reason for Neutral:

This factor will remain inactive.

Irrelevance
Reason for Likely:

Shortage of manpower is the problem not financial shortage.

Reason for Neutral:

There is no need for much money for this program.

Miscellaneous
Reason for Likely:

Financial monopoly of the central government is being abolished.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table III.
### TABLE III

THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF FINANCIAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 4 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category II</th>
<th>Financial Force</th>
<th>Very Like-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Neutral Like-</th>
<th>Very Unlike</th>
<th>% in Rank-</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Resisting</th>
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<td>Subcategories:</td>
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<td>ly(4)</td>
<td>ly(3)</td>
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<td>ly(1)</td>
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<td>6th</td>
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Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for regionalization of services in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 4.2 or Likely (See Table 109). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Financial Force was determined and then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table III).
Category III - Administrative Force

Subcategories:

Personnel Practice and Staff Adequacy
Reasons for Likely:

Through allocating specialized manpower to local authorities.

Local offices are receiving more techniques and skilled personnel sent by the central government to familiarize them with various activities (Stated by three respondents).

The local officials who know local conditions are being trained to implement local projects.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of technology and trained staff make them want the technological aids from the central government.

Shortage of skilled men and women at virtually all levels of local government is one of the major obstacles (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Incapable of sending such staff to the regions or recruiting them.

Administrative and Management Talents
Reason for Unlikely:

Tendency for keeping status quo.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Lack of effective local management.

Coordination
Reason for Unlikely:

What is lacking is coordination on a national level among different activities which is necessary for such a program.

Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation
Reason for Likely:

Enough local authority can be delegated to the people especially in the rural areas.
Reasons for Unlikely:

The state lacks the administrative support for the implementation.

Lack of devotion and enthusiasm.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Administratively this is a very difficult task to do because of the resistance of the administrative staff (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

Projects are under way to meet specific local requirements to generate local administrative efficiency.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Incapable, poor, inefficient (Stated by three respondents).

Local authorities can not handle concrete tasks and responsibilities without the help of experienced staff (Stated by two respondents).

A reasonable effect seems doubtful.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

This force is weak.

Responsibility and Awareness
Reasons for Likely:

Local governments are now implementing projects concerning schools, roads, clinics, water supply and other responsibilities (Stated by two respondents).

Provincial governments are now being given more power and assistance.

Reason for Neutral:

Local administrators do not have enough awareness.

Professional Skills, Methods, and Expertise
Reason for Likely:

In few instances the Plan and Budget Organization has
assigned some of its top people for service in the provincial offices.

Availability of Facilities
Reason for Likely:

Local authorities consider this as the best way for being fully equipped to handle their responsibilities.

Reason for Unlikely:

Local authorities are not well equipped to implement their own projects.

Capacity for Training and Managing Manpower
Reasons for Likely:

The Plan and Budget Organization has established a center for training and regional planning in order to help train staff for and to encourage thinking about regional planning; planning and budget writing techniques, evaluation methods are being taught to the local officials (Stated by three respondents).

It is the national policy but there is labor constraint.

Reason for Unlikely:

Training of the local staff is a long term task that can only be achieved in stages over a period of time.

Corruption
Reason for Unlikely:

The local civil servants will utilize the office for personal enrichment and advancement.

Experience
Reason for Likely:

The volume of local development projects handled by the local governments in the last year was three hundred thousand dollars.

Bureaucracy Concerns
Reasons for Likely:

In the areas of planning and economic development, decentralization is proceeding along several fronts (Stated by two respondents).
Reason for Neutral:

The process of regionalization is only now getting off the ground.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Authoritarian administrators seem to be clinging to their central powers.

Regionalization must take place prior to decentralization of the development activities.

To ask a bureaucracy to divert itself from its power is like asking a magnet to repel rather than to attract.

The ministers are urged to transfer more of their power to the local authorities but it is still more talk than action.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 112.
TABLE II2

THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 4 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category III Administrative Force</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Unlikely (2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (1)</th>
<th>% in Rank Order</th>
<th>% Contributing</th>
<th>% Low Likelihood</th>
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<tr>
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<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>19.5</td>
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<td>Availability of Facilities</td>
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<td>19.5</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>19.5</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>90.5</td>
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</table>

Total: 18  3  20  5  46  100%

f = frequency
% = percentage
n = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalization of Program 4 for regionalization of services in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 2.4 or Unlikely (See Table 109). In Part 2, the sub-
categories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Administrative Force was determined, and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 112).
Category IV - Socio-Cultural Force

Subcategories:

Willingness of Social Groups in General
Reasons for Very Likely:

People like the available technical possibilities in all regions and therefore, will support decentralization (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Favorable and supportive (Stated by eleven respondents).

Diversity of Interests, Attitudes and Priorities
Reason for Neutral:

Due to heterogeneity of interests.

Reason for Unlikely:

Due to tendency of people to work in Teheran.

Disinterest and Cynicism
Reasons for Neutral:

Indifferent with not much effect (Stated by six respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

Communities do not take much interest in participating in the local affairs and development.

Development Concerns
Reasons for Likely:

They will consider this as a long due promise which will level inequalities among the provinces, give them a better chance of goal formation and goal attainment at the local levels (Stated by three respondents).

They see this as the only way for local authorities to be fully equipped for responsibilities.

Because this will reduce the present problems stemming from centralization and will promote local competence (Stated by two respondents).
In Relation to the Government's Influence
Reason for Neutral:

Despite talk of local autonomy, they still see the central government controlling the local affairs.

Public Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction
Reason for Likely:

This will increase their social involvement.

Public Demand and Need
Reason for Very Likely:

They have need for understanding their socio-economic roles.

Reasons for Likely:

There is an urge and demand for more participation (Stated by two respondents).

They consider this as a long due promise which will give them more hand in their socio-economic life, so that their local needs will receive more attention (Stated by three respondents).

Conditional and Uncertain
Reason for Unlikely:

People do not genuinely feel localization is the best for them and thus give only half-hearted support.

Public Awareness
Reason for Neutral:

Unaware of its importance.

Capability Concerns
Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of dedication and education of the local people with whom the job is to be entrusted.

Are not trained and want all the aids—even technological aid—to be given by the central government.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran
Reason for Likely:

They view this as a step toward a more responsible government.
Miscellaneous
Reason for Very Likely:
No constraint.

Reason for Likely:
It will be a new challenge.

Reason for Neutral:
Social barriers.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Socio-Cultural Force are presented in Table 113.
TABLE 113
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 4 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Neu-</th>
<th>Un-</th>
<th>Very Un-Like-ly(3)</th>
<th>Like-ly(4)</th>
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<th>por-</th>
<th>Neu-</th>
<th>Epis-</th>
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<td>f</td>
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<td>Order</td>
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f = frequency
I = percentage
N = number of respondents
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for regionalization of services in respect to the Socio-Cultural Force was computed to be 3.8 or Likely (See Table 109). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Socio-Cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 113).

Category V - Educational Force

Subcategories:

The Existing Trained Manpower
Reason for Unlikely:

Lack of sufficient educational reservoir will impede the implementation.

Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence
Reason for Unlikely:

Incapable of preparing the needed staff.

Capacity of Schools for General Education
Reason for Unlikely:

Low level of general education is a barrier.

Capacity of Higher Education Institutions
Reason for Likely:

Training can be provided for people in the college towns.

Capacity of Professional Schools
Reason for Likely:

More job oriented schools are being established.

Willingness and Demand of Educational Institutions in General
Reasons for Very Likely:
Educationally, it is an accepted thought with no constraint (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Favorable and supportive (Stated by six respondents).

**Conditional and Uncertain**

Reasons for Neutral:

They will welcome this although they are skeptical of reliance on local authorities for their efficiency.

If some educational reforms which have been introduced succeed this force can be stimulating the public in this direction.

Reason for Unlikely:

Teaching in schools must be revised to give more emphasis to socially required skills.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reasons for Neutral:

Cannot play a supportive role (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Lacks readiness and cannot have a constructive role (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Due to incapability.

**Awareness, Expertise and Experience**

Reason for Very Likely:

Help is provided through educational system to make the proposed system universal.

**Orientation Toward National Development**

Reason for Likely:

Technical needs of every region will better educational program.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Lack of development orientation.
Facilities, Techniques and Finances
Reason for Likely:

It can contribute if its operating scope expands.

Educational Elite
Reason for Likely:

Demand and support of educated.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran
Reason for Neutral:

Unrelated to such social needs.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Is not in touch with such needs.
Too political for this force.

Disinterest
Reasons for Neutral:

Indifferent, neutral and unconcerned position (Stated by fourteen respondents).

Irrelevance
Reason for Neutral:

Does not have a supporting role.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 in respect to the Educational Force are presented in Table 114.
### Table 114

**The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Educational Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 4 of Section IV of the Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category V Educational Force</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Semi-Like (4)</th>
<th>Neutral Likely (3)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (2)</th>
<th>Z Score</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Order</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Capacity of Schools for General Education</td>
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<td>Educational Elite (educated &amp; educator)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>number of respondents</td>
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</table>

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 4 for regionalization of services in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 3.1 or Neutral (See Table 109). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their
values, their importance to the likelihood of the Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 114).

**Analysis for Program 5 (Regional Income Tax) of Section IV**

The Program

The income tax shall become a regional and communal tax. The local authorities shall have wide freedom of choice concerning optional taxes and dues. As for compulsory taxes, those which affect the pockets of taxpayers most closely—especially the income tax payable by individual taxpayer—shall be employed to finance expenditures which are immediately apparent and clearly identifiable.

Part 1. Table 115 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 for regional income tax.

**TABLE 115**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>Very Likely(5)</th>
<th>Likely(4)</th>
<th>Neutral(3)</th>
<th>Unlikely(2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely(1)</th>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>63</td>
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</table>

f = frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood
z = percentage
N = number of respondents
Md = median

Table 115 presents the frequency counts, percentages and medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 in respect to the
five prospective forces.

Part 2. Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force, as shown by the medians in Table 115, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

**Category I - Political Force**

**Subcategories:**

**Political Parties**

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Domination of the local governments by the political forces and groups steps up the cause of local autonomy to be unsuccessful.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

**Reason for Very Likely:**

Government along with local authorities, can help.

**Reason for Likely:**

Some decentralization of financial activities has been implemented but its implication has yet to be evaluated.

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

I do not believe that the central government will welcome granting the choice of taxes to the local authorities except in limited cases, as they might overuse such a power.

Unless the local departments are capable of running their affairs with effectiveness, the central government may show reluctance.

**Public Demand**

**Reason for Very Unlikely:**

Fear of abuse (due to corruption) of taxpayers' money is a predominant fear among the masses.

**Consideration of Social and Economic Development**

**Reason for Very Likely:**
Plans for regional development are considered as a good vehicle to carry out such reforms as more equitable distribution of social services and welfare programs as well as achieving balanced regional growth.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Most of the taxpayers in the regions are the farmers who cannot pay their taxes.

Teheran with only nineteen percent of the population accounts for nearly forty-three of the gross regional product and fifty-two percent of gross regional formation.

Even a tax reform won't serve the purpose because the majority of the taxpayers are not capable of paying.

Reason for Unlikely:

Poverty in most regions and the great oil revenue are reasons for government to oppose this program.

Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies.

Reasons for Very Likely:

It is a long range plan and political forces try in this direction (Stated by two respondents).

Although this might not have any serious consequences, it has not been resisted yet.

Reasons for Likely:

A comprehensive policy of decentralization of development projects is introduced in the Fifth Plan; they offer incentives to the business men to go to the provinces (Stated by seven respondents).

A great variety of projects are to be implemented to influence the present distribution of economic activities in Iran.

The policy of the government is to have more equality distributed among different geographical areas in country (Stated by two respondents).

Rendering social services at the communal and regional levels is being encouraged and measures are being taken (Stated by four respondents).

The central government is in charge of health, education
and other welfare services instead of the taxpayers.

More equitable distribution of income and welfare is taking place through regionalization.

Reason for Neutral:

Communal taxation is limited. For example, the municipalities have authority to collect taxes for subsidizing housing projects for the poor people.

Reasons for Unlikely:

The system will not support the idea due to the tendency for keeping the central power (Stated by two respondents).

Central government needs all the money it can get to carry out the national plans.

Regions are not all the same, some are very poor.

Such a program has been suggested very many times but has never won the support.

They do not like to yield their power and authority to the local governments.

Government's main purpose is to keep each province to develop its hitherto untapped sources for development rather than getting more money which cannot be significant anyhow.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Since it will decrease the central power and create financial independence which may lead to political independence.

The political system does not favor such an accountability to the taxpayers.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns

Reasons for Unlikely:

Taxation system of Iran is very inefficient (Stated by two respondents).

Incapable of defining the duties of the private and public sectors.

Tax system has no role in capital formation in Iran.
Government cannot rely on the local tax money for development.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Poor local authorities; not enough force in the regions to implement the idea or have the necessary influence (Stated by two respondents).

Unnecessary
Reason for Neutral:

No difference.

Reasons for Unlikely:

It is the government funds not the tax money which can finance development projects; central government plays the role of taxpayer in Iran (Stated by two respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 116.
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 for regional income tax in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 2.4 or Unlikely (See Table 115). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 116).
Category II - Financial Force

Subcategories:

Financial Capacity of Public Sector
Reasons for Very Likely:

State Income is good enough to cover any charge to help all regions (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Funds are available and the central government takes care of the local expenditures (Stated by two respondents).

Financial Cooperation of Private Sector
Reason for Likely:

Leading industries will assist because it will reduce the red tape.

Capacity of Financial Management Agencies
Reason for Likely:

Because, now even the local offices' bills are paid by the central government.

Reason for Unlikely:

Generally, Iran does not have a tax auditing system.

Conditional and Uncertain
Reason for Very Likely:

Money is available but all centralized.

Reasons for Likely:

If ever this program is to be implemented the government has the sufficient funds.

Municipality experts are assigned to revise regulations concerning taxation power of the local authorities.

Establishment of regional and communal tax is under consideration.

Is moving in this direction very slowly and gradually (Stated by two respondents).

Plans are under study to set tax rates according to local decisions.
These affairs are planned to be dealt with by local offices.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

Big projects cannot be handed over to the local authorities to be funded by communal tax income due to shortage of such funds (Stated by two respondents).

**Economic and Investment Concerns**

**Reason for Very Likely:**

It is good financing.

**Major Interest Groups**

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Guilds' chamber will contribute to the mismanagement of the local financial authorities by influencing and bribing them.

**Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies**

**Reasons for Likely:**

New measures taken by the government are in this line; local offices are being given more power in this regard (Stated by two respondents).

Recently an increasingly larger volume of development funds has been placed at the disposal of the local governments.

It will be a timely decision.

Government is planning to give up some of its sales tax in favor of municipalities. By having this authority the local powers will be able to fund their programs for their own services (Stated by two respondents).

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

They prefer dealing with a centralized administration (Stated by two respondents).

The local authorities do not have power to even collect commercial benefit tax in their communities.

Local authorities depend on the central government for finance.

Local financial power is even less than what people think.
Local authorities depend on the central government to make their financial endorsement.

Communal taxation is unknown in Iran.

Municipalities are not authorized to collect excise and levy city taxes.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Government is not introducing a communal tax policy and the local municipalities are not allowed to collect city taxes (Stated by two).

Plans are usually designed nationally not locally.

Priority Concerns
Reason for Unlikely:

They prefer their present procedures.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

They much prefer this immense task to be done by the central body of government.

Disinterest
Reasons for Neutral:

Will remain inactive and indifferent (Stated by two).

Irrelevance
Reason for Neutral:

No effect in the present financial state of the government.

Miscellaneous
Reasons for Unlikely:

The degree and amount of these resources differ greatly from one region to another; some are very poor. Therefore, this program cannot be of importance (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

They resist the idea very much.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 117.
### Results

In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 for regional income tax in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 2.6 or Neutral (See Table 115). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Financial Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 117).
Category III - Administrative Force

Subcategories:

Personnel Practices and Staff Adequacy
Reasons for Unlikely:

There are not enough trained manpower, experienced staff, administrative strength and tax experts in the regions to handle such a responsibility (Stated by four respondents).

Administrative and Management Talents
Reason for Unlikely:

The administrators are powerless.

Coordination
Reason for Unlikely:

If such efforts are decentralized, the lack of coordination will weaken the taxation system.

Organizational Sufficiency
Reason for Unlikely:

The establishment of industrial accounting system is needed for success of such a program.

Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation
Reason for Very Likely:

It is good power for the local government.

Reasons for Neutral:

They have not resisted similar ideas very much.

They have hardly ever expressed any preference.

No problem, doesn't make any difference (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

It will change but will also create problems.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reasons for Unlikely:

Will weaken the program.

Complicated, incapable and weak (Stated by three respondents).
They can't even manage the local utilities and small tasks (Stated by two respondents).

If this means to let them manage their local tax offices, it is an unrealistic expectation because they cannot function properly (Stated by two respondents).

Their inefficiency in case of being in charge of collecting and spending communal tax for developmental purposes will lead to a total interruption of government funds for urban affairs.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

In all provincial towns people look up to municipalities as the main authority on civic affairs, but, they are not able to accomplish their duties to produce least satisfaction.

Responsibility and Awareness

Reason for Neutral:

They have never been serious about what they were supposed to do.

Reason for Unlikely:

Not aware of their duties.

Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise

Reasons for Unlikely:

Formulation of effective policies and efficient administrative procedures call for a high degree of expertise and trust. But, expert personnel is not adequate.

Communal offices need more speciality and wider knowledge of their duties.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Due to the old and antequated methods of taxation, lack of experienced taxation specialist cadres (Stated by four respondents).

No awareness of the new taxation methods. Even taxes from municipalities are taken on no basic forms (Stated by two respondents).

Capacity for Training and Managing Manpower

Reasons for Unlikely:

Special classes and short term training courses shall be
set up for the unexperienced local tax officials
(Stated by two respondents).

Corruption
Reasons for Unlikely:

Will be a source of corruption and will make loop-holes easier (Stated by three respondents).

Local civil servants will bind the law and abuse the money and authority and get away with it.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Corruption will increase.

Experience
Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of experience; they have collected taxes only from cinema houses and transportation, therefore, have limited experience (Stated by two respondents).

Bureaucracy Concerns
Reason for Unlikely:

Central government makes the decisions for the locals.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Due to tendency for centraliz

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in the Country
Reason for Neutral:

They support this if government approves it.

Reason for Unlikely:

Local finance agencies are under influence of several local offices especially guilds'

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

The idea of localized taxation system has been dismissed by government authorities.

They are influenced by the wealth of the communal businessmen.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 in respect to the Administrative Force are
presented in Table 118.

### Table 118

**The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Administrative Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 5 of Section IV of the Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category III</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
<th>Neu-</th>
<th>Un-</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
<th>% in Sup-</th>
<th>% in Res-</th>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Force</td>
<td>Like(5)</td>
<td>ly(4)</td>
<td>ly(3)</td>
<td>ly(2)</td>
<td>ly(1)</td>
<td>ed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Practice &amp; Staff Adequacy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5th</td>
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<td>Administrative &amp; Management Talents</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Sufficiency</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Willingness, Motivation &amp; Initiation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility &amp; Awareness</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Skills, Methods &amp; Expertise</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Availability of Facilities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity for Training &amp; Managing Manpower</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility of the Rules &amp; Regulations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in the Country</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **f** = frequency
- **%** = percentage
- **N** = number of respondents

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 for regional income tax in respect to the Administrative Force was...
computed to be 1.9 or Unlikely (See Table 115). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Administrative Force was determined, and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 118).

**Category IV – Socio-Cultural Force**

**Subcategories:**

**Willingness of Social Groups in General**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

Social forces, especially the individual taxpayers will appreciate this (Stated by four respondents).

**Reasons for Likely:**

Social support will be immense.

Favorable position (Stated by three respondents).

They would rather be involved with local representation.

**Intellectual Groups**

**Reason for Likely:**

Intellectual circles have been suggesting this strongly.

**Major Interest Groups**

**Reason for Neutral:**

Due to private sector's influence.

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

The big business concerns will resist the implementation (Stated by five respondents).

The intimate relationship between financial powers and local officials is the reason.

The resistance of big businesses will balance off the assistance of the individual taxpayers.
Professional Groups
Reason for Very Unlikely:

Professionals such as doctors, engineers and technologists who tend to command high salaries, often equal to international level, will undermine the efforts.

Religious, Traditional and Cultural Concerns
Reason for Likely:

Culturally desirable.

Disinterest and Cynicism
Reason for Neutral:

Indifferent.

Development Concerns
Reasons for Likely:

They are much concerned with immediate results of the program and I believe that local government is quicker.

They believe that it will change the effectiveness of the taxation system and the tax money.

Public Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction
Reasons for Likely;

Since people see what they pay is paid for themselves.

Those who already pay income tax will find this as a means of accountability.

Public Demand and Need
Reasons for Likely:

Demand from the regional groups.

Social groups have expressed their willingness very often.

Labor Force and Labor Market Concerns
Reason for Likely:

Workers and farmers are for it.

Economic and Income Concerns
Reason for Likely:

Poor people who make the majority of the taxpayers will support this.
Reason for Unlikely:

Objects because of regional poverty.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

Reasons for Neutral:

The community will adopt this program once the establishment of local government is well on the way to success.

The lack of modern taxation methods at local level might create disorder.

Uncertain of the difference which it might make.

Reason for Unlikely:

They are afraid that this kind of tax may reduce the central government's subsidies.

**Capability Concerns**

Reason for Unlikely:

Taxation system will remain ineffective under either communal or global system.

**In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran**

Reason for Very Likely:

This is a good way of distribution of government services.

Reasons for Likely:

They see this as a means of having a responsible government.

They will consider this as a measure of accountability to the taxpayers and the tax money.

Reason for Unlikely:

They do not find the local tax authorities capable of applying justice in regard to their submissiveness to the local financial powers.

**Miscellaneous**

Reason for Likely:

Social institutions will welcome this.

Reason for Neutral:
Taxation has no impact on low class people.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Tax is not a favorite concept to the social groups. Thus, these groups, especially the social groups, will resist this (Stated by three respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 in respect to the Socio-Cultural Force are presented in Table 119.
 Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 for regional income tax in respect to Socio-Cultural Force was computed to be 3.5 or Neutral (See Table 115). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Socio-Cultural Force was
determined, and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 119).

**Category V - Educational Force**

**Subcategories:**

**The Existing Trained Manpower**

Reason for Unlikely:

The system lacks the educational reservoir for implementation of this program.

**Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence**

Reason for Likely:

Can help through training the local people.

**Willingness and Demand of Educational Institutions in General**

Reason for Very Likely:

These forces are for it.

Reasons for Likely:

Will welcome and support the program (Stated by two respondents).

**Conditional and Uncertain**

Reason for Neutral:

It is hoped that capable men with sufficient know how will emerge from the recently altered educational system.

Reason for Unlikely:

In this case, education might not receive as much funds from the local authorities.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

May be effective for the coming generation but not for the present.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reasons for Neutral:

Will have no effects because it is beyond its capacity due to the lack of influence (Stated by three respondents).
Reasons for Unlikely:

Is weak and does not have an instructive role in this respect (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Incapability.

**Orientation toward National Development**

Reason for Very Likely:

All the efforts are in the direction of development.

**Facilities, Techniques, and Finance**

Reason for Likely:

Will support hoping to get a bigger budget from the local taxpayers.

**Educational Elite**

Reason for Likely:

Demand and support of educated.

**In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran**

Reason for Very Unlikely:

They will lose central protection and their possibilities will decrease.

**Disinterest**

Reasons for Neutral:

Indifferent, neutral and unconcerned position (Stated by twenty-five respondents).

**Irrelevance**

Reason for Neutral:

This force has no role to play.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 in respect to the Educational Force are presented in Table 120.
### TABLE 120

THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF EDUCATIONAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 5 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category V</th>
<th>Educational Force</th>
<th>Very Like</th>
<th>Like</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Un-Like</th>
<th>Very Un-Like</th>
<th>% in Rank</th>
<th>Order</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Resistant</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories:</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Existing Trained Manpower</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1st</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1st</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity of Schools for General Education</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Vocational &amp; Technical Schools</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>Capacity of Higher Education Institutions</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Professional Schools</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness &amp; Demand of Educational Institutions in General</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructional Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness, Expertise &amp; Experience</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Orientation Toward National Development</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities, Techniques &amp; Finances</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of Interests &amp; Priorities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Elite (educated &amp; educator)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>In Relation With Other Forces Active in Iran</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
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<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* f = frequency  
* % = percentages  
* N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 5 for regional income tax in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 3.0 or Neutral (See Table 115). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 120).
Analysis For Program 6 (Global Subvention) of Section IV

The Program

The under growth of piecemeal state subvention shall be swept away and a single global subvention shall be paid by the state to all the local authorities in a single region, its amount to be determined largely in terms of the policy of territorial development with the purpose of countering the inequalities of development between various regions of the nation.

Part I. Table 121 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 for global subvention.

**TABLE 121**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCES</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Like (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Un-Like (2)</th>
<th>Very Un-Like (1)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Financial</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*f = frequency of the respondents' rating for each likelihood*

*\(\% = \text{percentage}\)*

*M = number of respondents*

*Md = median*
Table 121 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the
medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 in respect
to the five prospective forces.

Part 2. Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by
the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force,
as shown by the medians in Table 121, the following subcategories were
obtained for each force (category).

Category I - Political Force.

Subcategories:

Political Parties
Reason for Likely:

This can be implemented through deciding the priorities
and centralizing the government's aid in the territories
and the political groups are in favor of it.

Conditional and Uncertain
Reason for Very Likely:

If government decides it is relatively easy to be done.

Reasons for Likely:

The process of handing power back from the center to the
periphery may become reality in the long run (Stated by
two respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

It can be successful only in long run.

Reason for Unlikely:

Local authorities are being created with considerable authority
to make decisions and act on the projects of a regional nature.
But, it is just a beginning.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Neither the government nor the majority of people are for such
a program mainly because of the lack of trust in regional
Consideration of Social and Economic Development:
Reasons for Likely:

On one hand, difference between urban and rural areas has grown more sharply. On the other hand, the size of the economy and the scale of development spending make it impossible for the government to direct all developmental efforts from the center. Therefore this program will be welcomed (Stated by four respondents).

Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies
Reasons for Very Likely:

Territorial development is a big concern of the Fifth Plan (Stated by five respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Regional planning is considered as the means for bringing about the equalization of the regions. The amount of funds allocated to this purpose in the Fifth Plan is three times larger this year than it was in last year (Stated by seven respondents).

Government has decentralized implementation of the programs in the rural areas in the fields of education, health, medical services and sanitation (Stated by two respondents).

Government is launching a social and physical development project at the regional level (Stated by three respondents).

At least on the paper, this program answers many of the problems that have cropped up in Iran's planning system.

Planning and technical affairs of regions are being delegated to the local authorities (Stated by five respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Many authorities reject the idea because they are against releasing their power (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Because this will decrease the central power and create financial independence which might lead into political independence.
Most programs of the government in the recent years have not been economically correct and the funds have been allocated for political considerations.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reasons for Unlikely:

We are still a long way from a plan and budget drawn upon a regional basis with reasonable success. Such efforts may be truly made in 1980's.

The attempts made in the past for decentralization of this kind proved to be very difficult.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Providing self-sufficiency in the regions is almost impossible.

**Miscellaneous**

Reason for Very Likely:

This program will not be rejected.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 122.
### TABLE 122

THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF POLITICAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 6 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category I: Political Force</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Neu-Tral</th>
<th>Very Un-Likely</th>
<th>% in Sup-Rank</th>
<th>Re-Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories:</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Leaders</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament &amp; the Law</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Demand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of Social &amp; Economic Development</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnecessary</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 11 | 23 | 15 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 47 | 100% |

*f* = frequency  
*%* = percentage  
*N* = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 for global subvention in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 4.0 or Likely (See Table 121). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Political Force was
determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 122).

Category II - Financial Force.

Subcategories:

Financial Capacity of Public Sector
Reasons for Very Likely:

Sufficient funds are available for such development due to the windfall oil income (Stated by four respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Due to the financial ability to meet the need (Stated by two respondents).

Capacity of Financial Management Agencies
Reasons for Very Likely:

Government subsidies to the territorial development are immense (Stated by two respondents).

State-owned banks already have programs for this aim.

Reason for Likely:

The Ministry of Finance has already started operating in a decentralized fashion.

Conditional and Uncertain
Reasons for Very Likely:

The share of total development funds handled by the local governments will rise by fifty per cent by the end of the Fifth Plan in 1978 (Stated by three respondents).

New projects are being started to assess such needs.

Reasons for Likely:

Regionalization of spending is being encouraged (Stated by two respondents).

Government can draw upon the domestic banking to assist such a program (Stated by two respondents).

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reasons for Unlikely:

Lack of sufficient funds will impede the implementation of this program (Stated by two respondents).

Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies

Reasons for Very Likely:

This is a focal point in the Fifth Plan's budget (Stated by seven respondents).

Reasons for Likely:

Decentralization of authority and budgeting is the new policy (Stated by nine respondents).

More credits are being given to the private sector for such activities.

Reason for Neutral:

No financial problem involved.

Reason for Unlikely:

Although this program will remove some of the financial red tape and will ease financial transactions, the financial authorities are reluctant to release their power.

Irrelevance

Reason for Very Likely:

Government subsidies to the regions are so huge that the local tax money seems too small.

Miscellaneous

Reason for Likely:

This program can stop a lot of waste

Reason for Unlikely:

The degree and amount of these revenues will differ greatly from one region to another; some are very poor.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 in respect to the Financial Force are presented in Table 123.
The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Financial Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 6 of Section IV of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Very Like-Ly(5)</th>
<th>Neu-Un-Like-Ly(4)</th>
<th>Very Un-Like-Ly(3)</th>
<th>% in Rank-Order</th>
<th>Sup-Per-Neu-Res-</th>
<th>Re-Order</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Capacity of Public Sector</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Cooperation of Private Sector &amp; Financially Powerful</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Financial Management Agencies</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic &amp; Investment Concerns</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Interest Groups</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 for global subvention in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 4.3 or Likely (See Table 121). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Financial Force...
was determined and, the, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 123).

**Category III - Administrative Force.**

**Subcategories:**

**Personnel Practice and Staff Adequacy**
**Reasons for Very Unlikely:**

Distribution of trained and specialized staff is not in line with the needs of the regions.

The need for profit and stability will give rise to the need for central control of such funds.

**Administrative and Management Talents**
**Reasons for Unlikely:**

Due to the insufficient technical ability and managerial talents of the financial authorities at the local level (Stated by two respondents).

Managerial gap will reveal if the financial authorities are to control the cost and to evaluate the effectiveness.

**Coordination**
**Reason for Unlikely:**

Lack of unified and efficient system of routing decrees among various units involved.

**Reason for Very Unlikely:**

Lack of uniform procedures for local spending.

**Organizational Sufficiency**
**Reason for Very Unlikely:**

Organizations at the local level are very poor.

**Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation**
**Reason for Very Likely:**

They find it very good for the local development.

**Reasons for Neutral:**

This force is indifferent and make no problem (Stated by two respondents).
Reason for Unlikely:

The local authorities will not shrug off the centralizing mentality, and will not stop leaning on the crutches provided by the central government.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

**Reasons for Likely:**

This will ease financial transactions for implementation of regional development (Stated by three respondents).

**Reason for Neutral:**

Due to the lack of efficiency of the local authorities.

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

Local authorities cannot even get their provincial priorities right and still need vast supervision of the central government (Stated by ten respondents).

**Reasons for Very Unlikely:**

Financial functions are the last things to be decentralized successfully. The incapability of this force at the local level can be wasteful to the government (Stated by two respondents).

**Responsibility and Awareness**

**Reason for Likely:**

Detailed control over the activities of spending already exists.

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Officials must be thinking in terms of integrated planning and development rather than in terms of traditional ways.

**Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise**

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

Technical help is more important than financial.

Faulty implementation due to the lack of foresight and scientific approach (Stated by two respondents).

**Capacity for Training and Managing Manpower**

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

Local authorities must be taught how to control funds and budget,
and how to spend them. Such changes cannot come over night (Stated by two respondents).

**Experience**

**Reason for Very Unlikely:**

Centralized efforts of such has always been more successful than decentralized ones.

**Bureaucracy Concerns**

**Reason for Likely:**

This requires many changes in the administrative body.

**Reasons for Very Unlikely:**

Structural changes in the administration are necessary prior to implementation of this program.

The system suffers from stronghold of centralized authority even at the local level (Stated by two respondents).

**Degree of Flexibility of Rules and Regulations**

**Reason for Unlikely:**

This program seems to be against the grain of habit and tradition which exist.

**In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran**

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

The local administrative authorities do not establish the right kind of working relationship with the local people.

Local authorities are used to thinking of their external economic, trade and administrative relationships in terms of Teheran.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 124.
### TABLE 124
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 6 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN

| Subcategories: | Very Likely (5) | Likely (4) | Neutral (3) | Unlikely (2) | Very Unlikely (1) | % in Rank | Personnel Practice & Staff Adequacy | Administrative & Management Talents | Coordination | Organizational Sufficiency | Degree of Willingness, Motivation & Initation | Capability & Efficiency Concerns | Responsibility & Awareness | Professional Skills, Methods & Expertise | Availability of Facilities | Capacity for Training & Managing Manpower | Corruption | Experience | Bureaucracy Concerns | Degree of Flexibility of the Rules & Regulations | In Relation With Other Forces Acting In the Country |
|----------------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------|------------------|----------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Personnel Practice & Staff Adequacy | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 6th | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Administrative & Management Talents | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 4th | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Coordination | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 6th | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Organizational Sufficiency | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 11th | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Degree of Willingness, Motivation & Initation | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 9 | 2nd | 25 | 50 | 25 |
| Capability & Efficiency Concerns | 0 | 3 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 16 | 37 | 1st | 19 | 6 | 75 |
| Responsibility & Awareness | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 6th | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| Professional Skills, Methods & Expertise | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 4th | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Availability of Facilities | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Capacity for Training & Managing Manpower | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 6th | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Corruption | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Experience | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 11th | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Bureaucracy Concerns | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 9 | 2nd | 25 | 0 | 75 |
| Degree of Flexibility of the Rules & Regulations | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 11th | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| In Relation With Other Forces Acting In the Country | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 6th | 0 | 0 | 100 |

f = frequency  
% = percentage  
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 for global subvention in respect to the administrative Force was computed to be 1.9 or Unlikely (See Table 121). In Part 2, the
the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 124).

Category IV - Socio-cultural Force.
Subcategories:

Willingness of Social Groups in General
Reason for Likely:
Positive reaction is expected.

Development Concerns
Reasons for Very Likely:
This will help the government to identify the backward areas and contribute more to their development (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Likely:
This program will reduce the inequalities among different provinces. Besides, this will help the local governments to gain experience in a more accurate sense (Stated by seven respondents).

Public Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction
Reasons for Likely:
This is the only way for the people to see a responsible government. Furthermore, this will stop the people in the backward regions from thinking that they have been neglected by the central government (Stated by two respondents).

Public Demand and Need
Reasons for Very Likely:
This has always been a public demand because it will make the government projects more accessible to the local people and their problems will be dealt with by more technological means (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Likely:
This program will be broadly appreciated to the full spectrum of local needs (Stated by three respondents).

In this case, people will find the developmental projects more reflective of their needs (Stated by four respondents).

**Economic and Income Concerns**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

Especially because incomes differ sharply from one part of the country to another; the figures show that the average income of a worker in a large industrial unit is eight times greater than the average income of a villager (Stated by two respondents).

**Reason for Likely:**

The backward regions will really support this program.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

**Reason for Neutral:**

The local people are for it on the condition that the necessary staff are continuously available.

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Local authorities prefer the central government's services.

**Degree of Public Awareness**

**Reason for Very Likely:**

This program will make the people an "information switchboard" for need assessment to be made by the government.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

**Reasons for Neutral:**

Local authorities such as city councils are not well equipped to best utilize such allocations (Stated by two respondents).

**Class Concerns**

**Reason for Likely:**

The culturally deprived people will sincerely support this goal.

**In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran**

**Reason for Very Likely:**

This will indicate the concern of the government programs with the needs of the people.
Reasons for Likely:

They are in favor of a change in which the corporations influence the government (Stated by three respondents).

It will reduce the burden of the private sector which now has to deal with an overcrowded central government (Stated by two respondents).

Miscellaneous

Reason for Likely:

They can adapt themselves to such a change.

Reasons for Neutral:

They are not against it and will make no problem (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

These factors will not favor the implementation of this program.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 in respect to the Socio-cultural Force are presented in Table 125.
### TABLE 125

The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Socio-Cultural Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 6 of Section IV of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category IV</th>
<th>Socio-cultural Force</th>
<th>Very Likely(3)</th>
<th>Neutral Likely(2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely(1)</th>
<th>% in Supportive</th>
<th>% in Neutral</th>
<th>% in Resistant</th>
<th>Order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Willingness of Social Groups in General</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Interest Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of Interest, Attitudes &amp; Priorities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious, Traditional &amp; Cultural Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest &amp; Cynicism</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Concerns</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation to Government's Influence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Satisfaction &amp; Dissatisfaction</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Demand &amp; Need</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Force &amp; Labor Market Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic &amp; Income Concerns</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Public Awareness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15th</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16th</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17th</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18th</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19th</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*f = frequency  
% = percentage  
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 for global subvention in respect to the Socio-cultural Force was computed to be 4.0 or Likely (See table 121). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according
to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Socio-cultural
Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were
identified (See the last four columns of Table 125).

Category V - Educational Force.

Subcategories:

The Existing Trained Manpower
Reason for Unlikely:

Educationally, this is an accepted matter, but, manpower is lacking.

Willingness and Demand of Educational Institutions in General
Reason for Likely:

There is the willingness but no educational reservoir
to help the program.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reasons for Neutral:

This force is weak with no capacity to train local people
for handling local projects (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Due to the incapability of educational system at this time
(Stated by two respondents).

Orientation Toward National Development
Reason for Very Likely:

This program will be to the benefit of the educational
system as well.

Reason for Neutral:

They are in favor of a change which counters the inequalities
of development between various regions of the country.

Educational Elite
Reason for Likely:

Due to the demand of the educated groups.

Disinterest
Reasons for Neutral:
This force is indifferent, unconcerned, uncommitted and neutral to this program (Stated by twenty-six respondents).

**Irrelevance**

**Reasons for Neutral:**

Educationa force does not have a big role (Stated by two respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 in respect to the Educational Force are presented in Table 126.
### Table 126

The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Educational Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 6 of Section IV of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category V Educational Force</th>
<th>Very Like (5)</th>
<th>Like (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Very Unlike (1)</th>
<th>% in Rank</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resisting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Existing Trained Manpower</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to Transfer N. on Potential into Coherence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Schools for General Education</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Vocational &amp; Technical Schools</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity of Higher Education Institutions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Professional Schools</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness &amp; Demand of Educational Institutions in General</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructional Concerns</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness, Expertise &amp; Experience</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation Toward National Development</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities, Techniques &amp; Finances</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of Interests &amp; Priorities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Elites (Educated &amp; Educator)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency  
% = percentages  
N = number of respondents

**Results.** In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 6 for global subvention in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 3.0 or Neutral (See Table 121). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories
according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 126).

Analysis For Program 7 (Voluntary Association) of Section IV

The Program

The vitality of the local authorities is not enough to counter the natural aggressiveness of industrial firms and bureaucratic centralization. Accordingly, the citizens shall be free to find new responses for living by participating in various states of voluntary groups and organizations born out of free initiatives. Their multiple networks of influence will establish the bases of a functional democracy.

Part 1. Table 127 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 for voluntary association.

Table 127 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 in respect to the
five prospective forces.

Part 2. Through content analysis of the reasons (theme units) given by the respondents explaining their rating of the likelihood of each force, as shown by the medians in Table 127, the following subcategories were obtained for each force (category).

Category I - Political Force.

Subcategories:

**Political Parties**
Reasons for Very Likely:

Because the political groups can better utilize the already organized groups. (Stated by two respondents).

**Priority Concerns**
Reason for Very Unlikely:

Providing material needs of people has the priority.

**Conditional and Uncertain**
Reason for Very Likely:

Has the capacity if needed.

Reason for Unlikely:

Only if these organized groups are supervised by the government their establishment will be allowed.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

Political forces are afraid that this might divert people's attitude from government policies and there is no tolerance for that.

**Interest Groups**
Reason for Neutral:

Only the profit making businessmen involved in local affairs enjoy such programs.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Only the middle class wealthy individuals and local bourgeoisie
who are affiliated with the local authorities enjoy such establishments (Stated by four respondents).

Public Demand
Reason for Unlikely:

Government gives as much as the level of education of the people requires.

Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies
Reason for Likely:

It is already allowed in the rural areas.

Reason for Neutral:

At the moment, the government, and naturally the government agencies in localities, prefer to lead activities of the citizens.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Government believes that this kind of collective activities will result in social disaster (Stated by eight respondents).

This kind of democratic activities are considered as a western type of social and eventually political disorder (Stated by two respondents).

Collective efforts of such are not welcomed by the government. Traditionally, the political forces favor direct control over collective activities. Therefore, such a program will be considered as a means of losing control over the citizens collective activities.

Reasons for Very Unlikely:

Political system considers this kind of activities as a source of anarchy and social disorder, therefore, all collective activities are prohibited (Stated by eight respondents).

The political system believes that only the most strict authoritarianism can insure development.

Government opposes the actions leading to political democracy.

All civic and social activities must be guided under government's umbrella.
Such democratic activities need the support of the government which is strongly against them.

Such a freedom to the political system means unbridled disobedience and lawlessness of the people.

Government suspects that such a freedom may be used to betray its political interests.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Will cause difficulty in administration.

**Unnecessary**

**Reasons for Neutral:**

Low income and fringe groups in the local areas have not desire for such programs.

Farmers and workers that make the major part of the face of the citizenry in local areas are not familiar with these activities.

**Reason for Unlikely:**

There is not much interest for this idea.

**Reason for Very Unlikely:**

Political system finds such activities unnecessary for economic development.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 in respect to the Political Force are presented in Table 128.
TABLE 128
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF POLITICAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 7 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category I Political Force</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Unlikely (2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (1)</th>
<th>X in Rank Order</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Leaders</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament &amp; the Law</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2nd</td>
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<td>Public Demand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of Social &amp; Economic Development</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnecessary</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
% = percentage
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 for voluntary association in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 1.7 or Unlikely (See Table 127). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of
Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 128).

**Category II - Financial Force.**

Subcategories:

- **Financial Capacity of Public Sector**
  
  Reasons for Very Likely:
  
  Financial aids are available if required (Stated by two respondents).

  Reason for Likely:
  
  No financial constraints.

- **Cooperation of Private Sector and Financially Powerful**
  
  Reason for Unlikely:
  
  Due to the influence of the political force upon the financial powers.

- **Capacity of Financial Management Agencies**
  
  Reason for Neutral:
  
  No financial problem.

- **Conditional and Uncertain**
  
  Reasons for Neutral:
  
  Depends of the form of activities and participation.
  
  Depends on the industrial potential.

- **Degree of Conformity with the Present Trend and Existing Policies**
  
  Reasons for Very Likely:
  
  No problem as far as financial forces are concerned (Stated by three respondents).

  Reasons for Neutral:
  
  Financial forces are indifferent (Stated by three respondents).

  Reason for Unlikely:
  
  Social inequalities have not been overcome in Iran, yet.
Disinterest
Reasons for Neutral:

This force is uninterested (Stated by sixteen respondents).

Irrelevance
Reasons for Neutral:

Finance is not applicable (Stated by twelve respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 in respect to the Financial Force are illustrated in Table 129.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category II Financial Force</th>
<th>Very Like</th>
<th>Neutral Unlike</th>
<th>Very Unlike</th>
<th>% in Rank</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Resilient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Capacity of Public Sector</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Cooperation of Private Sector &amp; Financially Powerful</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Financial Management Agencies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic &amp; Investment Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Major Interest Groups</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
Z = percentage
N = number of respondents
Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 for voluntary association in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 3.0 or Neutral (See Table 127). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Financial Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 129).

Category III - Administrative Force.

Subcategories:

Organizational Sufficiency
Reason for Very Unlikely:
Lack of relevant institutions.

Degree of Willingness, Motivation and Initiation
Reasons for Very Likely:
They are eager for such a program (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Likely:
They are supportive and will express positive reaction (Stated by four respondents).

Reason for Very Unlikely:
Inadequate and objective to the program.

Capability and Efficiency Concerns
Reason for Likely:
They will not be very efficient in the short run.

Reason for Neutral:
Cannot contribute.

Reasons for Unlikely:
Cannot influence the process of implementation of such programs effectively which is mainly due to its incapability in administration (Stated by seven respondents).

**Reason for Very Unlikely:**

This force cannot influence such functions.

**Responsibility and Awareness**

**Reason for Likely:**

Administrative forces are already active members of such activities.

**Reasons for Neutral:**

No important role to play (Stated by two respondents).

**Reasons for Unlikely:**

Has no constructive role in this respect (Stated by two respondents).

**Bureaucracy Concerns**

**Reason for Unlikely:**

Is not prepared for any kind of change in the system.

**In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran**

**Reason for Neutral:**

As far as this kind of program is concerned government has given people more talk than action.

**Reason for Unlikely:**

This force has no social orientation.

**Reasons for Very Unlikely:**

Would make no deliberation due to government's strict control.

Local authorities, private institutions and corporations have to act as ordered by the government.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 in respect to the Administrative Force are presented in Table 130.
Table 130

The Percentages of Contribution of the Subcategories of Administrative Force to the Likelihood of Operationalizing Program 7 of Section IV of the Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category III Administrative Force</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Neutral Likely (3)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (1)</th>
<th>% in Rank Order</th>
<th>% Supportive</th>
<th>% Neutral</th>
<th>% Resisting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Practice &amp; Staff Adequacy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative &amp; Management Talents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Sufficiency</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Willingness, Motivation &amp; Initiation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility &amp; Awareness</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Skills, Methods &amp; Expertise</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of Facilities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity for Training &amp; Managing Manpower</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Experience</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy Concerns</td>
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<td>Degree of Flexibility of the Rules &amp; Regulations</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4th</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

f = frequency
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 for voluntary association in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 2.8 or Neutral (See Table 127). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By
computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 130).
Category IV - Socio-Cultural Force

Subcategories:

Willingness of Social Groups in General
Reason for Very Likely:

Most favorable.

Reason for Neutral:

This force would like it.

Intellectual Groups
Reason for Likely:

Because it will provide better opportunities for intellectual circles to express themselves.

Religious, Traditional and Cultural Concerns
Reasons for Likely:

Culturally and traditionally, only favored by middle and upper classes (Stated by two respondents).

Reason for Neutral:

Culturally unimportant.

Disinterest and Cynicism
Reasons for Neutral:

Free initiation according to the experience of the people is just a political concept.

Skeptical, because government always promises such freedom only for political reasons, without allowing people to start it.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

People do not look at such activities with optimism because of their past bitter experiences.

Development Concerns
Reason for Very Likely:

To improve all necessary initiations.

Public Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction
Reason for Very Likely:
This will help social well being of the people.

**Public Demand and Need**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

They recognize people's need for freedom of action.

There has always been such a desire because people are lacking such freedom (Stated by two respondents).

Such freedom, if granted, will be the achievement of an old goal.

Will give people their rights which have been neglected.

**Reasons for Likely:**

They appreciate the need and have demand for more diversity. (Stated by two respondents).

This will make different people aware of the needs of others.

Social institutions will have a higher voice in the social affairs.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

**Reason for Likely:**

Because it could be the beginning of some other democratic freedom.

**Reason for Neutral:**

Is not quite prepared.

**Reason for Unlikely:**

It is difficult to purge the people of their sense of insecurity in case of such involvements.

**Degree of Public Awareness**

**Reasons for Very Likely:**

Such opportunities are unprecedented but can be a source of social awareness (Stated by two respondents).

Such interrelations will provide more awareness of the social activities.

**Reasons for Likely:**

It will provide the people with a better understanding of their affairs.
It can develop a social concern especially among pessimistic groups and individuals.

Reason for Unlikely:

Due to unfamiliarity of people with such programs and also lack of experience.

Class Concerns

Reason for Very Likely:

It will make the class composition of the society more homogenous.

In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran

Reason for Likely:

Freedom of action of people is expressed only through controlled groups.

Reason for Neutral:

The middle class who usually enjoys such programs avoids any sort of gathering of such for the sake of security.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Powerless to confront the present system (even the thought of it).

Low class people are afraid of the political consequences of such activities.

Only the groups supervised by the political system manage to undertake such actions.

Reason for Very Unlikely:

They are fearful of such activities because they might be the target of political suspicion.

Miscellaneous

Reasons for Very Likely:

Faces no problem.

Will able different groups to harness their social activities.

Could bring about more social concern among different groups.

Reason for Likely:

This is a good practice of democratic life.
Reason for Neutral:

It could be a good experience of democracy.

Reasons for Unlikely:

Resistance of the institutions.

These factors will not help the implementation of this program.

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 in respect to the Socio-Cultural Force are presented in Table 131.
THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 7 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category IV</th>
<th>Very Likely(5)</th>
<th>Neutral Likely(4)</th>
<th>Very Un-Likely(1)</th>
<th>X in Rank-</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Resisting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Professional Groups</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diversity of Interest, Attitudes &amp; Priorities</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious, Traditional &amp; Cultural Concerns</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Development Concerns</td>
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<tr>
<td>In Relation to Government's Influence</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Satisfaction &amp; Dissatisfaction</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Demand &amp; Need</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Force &amp; Labor Market Concerns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Public Awareness</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Capability Concerns</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Active in Iran</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
% = percentage
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 for voluntary association in respect to the Socio-Cultural Force was computed to be 3.9 or Likely (See Table 127). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Socio-Cultural Force was
determined, and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last four columns of Table 131).

**Category V - Educational Force**

**Subcategories:**

**Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence**

Reason for Unlikely:

The educational capacity for implementation of this program is quite insufficient.

**Willingness and Demand of Educational Institutions in General**

Reason for Very Likely:

Makes no problem.

Reasons for Likely:

This is an accepted phenomenon.

This force is supportive (Stated by five respondents).

Because of expecting to play a significant role.

Due to the rising expectation for more diversity.

**Conditional and Uncertain**

Reason for Very Likely:

Through training people can prepare them to undertake such great programs.

Reason for Unlikely:

Until the whole context of the educational system changes, it would not be very helpful.

**Capability and Efficiency Concerns**

Reasons for Neutral:

Does not have much effect (Stated by three respondents).

Reasons for Unlikely:

Weak and ineffective (Stated by two respondents).

Reasons for Very Unlikely:
Due to its incapability (Stated by two respondents).

**Orientation towards National Development**

Reason for Unlikely:

Educational system does not encourage and advocate such participating role for people in the hope of future development.

**In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran**

Reason for Neutral:

Educational force could have a great role but stays out of political and social affairs.

Reason for Unlikely:

Wants to avoid political involvement.

**Disinterest**

Reasons for Neutral:

A neutral, indifferent, uncommitted, unconcerned position (Stated by fifteen respondents).

Has no active role to play (Stated by three respondents).

Reason for Unlikely:

Lack of concern.

**Irrelevance**

Reasons for Neutral:

This is an irrelevant and unrelated factor (Stated by four respondents).

The percentages of contribution of the above subcategories to the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 in respect to the Educational Force are presented in Table 132.
### TABLE 132

THE PERCENTAGES OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SUBCATEGORIES OF EDUCATIONAL FORCES TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING PROGRAM 7 OF SECTION IV OF THE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category V Educational Forces</th>
<th>Very Like-Likely (5)</th>
<th>Very Like-Unlikely (3)</th>
<th>Very Un-Likely (2)</th>
<th>Like-Likely (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (1)</th>
<th>Un-Likely (0)</th>
<th>T in Rank</th>
<th>Supportive (5)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Resisting (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>The Existing Trained Enpower</td>
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<td>f 0</td>
<td>f 0</td>
<td>f 0</td>
<td>f 0</td>
<td>f 0</td>
<td>N 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence</td>
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<td>0 1 1</td>
<td>2 0 0 100</td>
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<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity of Professional Schools</td>
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<tr>
<td>Willingness &amp; Demand of Educational Institutions in General</td>
<td>1 8 0 0 9</td>
<td>20 0 0 2</td>
<td>3 0 0 2</td>
<td>20 0 0 2</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>1 0 0 1 0 2</td>
<td>4 3 5 0 50 50</td>
<td>1 0 0 1 5</td>
<td>1 0 0 1 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0 0 3 2 2 7</td>
<td>16 0 4 3 57</td>
<td>0 0 3 2 2 7</td>
<td>16 0 4 3 57</td>
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<tr>
<td>Instructional Concerns</td>
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<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness, Expertise &amp; Experience</td>
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<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation Toward National Development</td>
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<td>7th 100 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>7th 100 0 0</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility</td>
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<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities, Techniques &amp; Finances</td>
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<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of Interests &amp; Priorities</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Elites (educated &amp; educator)</td>
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<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
<td>0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>4 5 0 50 50</td>
<td>0 0 1 0 0 0</td>
<td>4 5 0 50 50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>0 0 10 1 0 12</td>
<td>42 0 95 5</td>
<td>0 0 10 1 0 12</td>
<td>42 0 95 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>0 0 4 0 0 4</td>
<td>9 0 100 0</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*f = frequency  
% = percentages  
N = number of respondents

Results. In Part 1, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Program 7 for voluntary association in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 3.0 or Neutral (See Table 127). In Part 2, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their value their importance to the likelihood of the Educational Force was determined, and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See Table 132).
Step 2. Analysis For Each One Of The Four Sections Of The Plan

Step 2 of the analysis of data involved analysis for each one of the four sections of the plan. The proposed plan consisted of four sections, each section including a number of programs to achieve the following goals:

Section I. Separation of political power from economic power.
Section II. Access to social equality.
Section III. The end of hereditary private power.
Section IV. Redistribution of public power.

The following is a presentation of the results of Step 2 of the analysis.

Analysis For Section I

Table 133 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Section I which consists of seven programs for separation of political power from economic power.
**TABLE 133**

THE RESULT OF THE RESPONDENTS' RATING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING SECTION I OF THE PLAN FOR SEPARATION OF POLITICAL POWER FROM ECONOMIC POWER IN RESPECT TO THE 5 FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Force</th>
<th>Very Like-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Un-</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programs:</td>
<td>ly(3)</td>
<td>ly(2)</td>
<td>ly(1)</td>
<td>ly(3)</td>
<td>ly(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Human Resource Development</td>
<td>11 22 33 44</td>
<td>3 6 1 2</td>
<td>2 4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Job Distribution</td>
<td>3 4 20 33</td>
<td>3 6 1 2</td>
<td>2 4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Open Competition</td>
<td>4 6 24 48</td>
<td>5 10</td>
<td>6 12 11 27</td>
<td>3 5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Employment Insurance</td>
<td>11 22 23 50</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7 14</td>
<td>9 9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Income Redistribution</td>
<td>6 24 48</td>
<td>5 10</td>
<td>6 12 11 27</td>
<td>3 5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Flexible Retirement Age</td>
<td>5 10 24 50</td>
<td>5 10</td>
<td>6 12 11 27</td>
<td>3 5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Women's Employment</td>
<td>1 2 12 23</td>
<td>8 17</td>
<td>1 2 11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>39 112 174 31</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>117 67 47</td>
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**Financial Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs:</th>
<th>Median (median) = 3.7</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Human Resource Development</td>
<td>27 34 11 22 7 14 4 8 1 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Job Distribution</td>
<td>44 16 32 4 8 5 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Open Competition</td>
<td>12 25 7 13 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Unemployment Insurance</td>
<td>13 31 13 27 7 15 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Income Redistribution</td>
<td>14 28 12 24 3 6 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Flexible Retirement Age</td>
<td>29 58 13 26 3 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Women's Employment</td>
<td>6 13 8 17 3 6 12 32 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>122 372 92 232 32 92 78 231 28 3</td>
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</table>

**Administrative Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs:</th>
<th>Median (median) = 4.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Human Resource Development</td>
<td>2 4 1 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Job Distribution</td>
<td>4 4 16 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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**Socio-cultural Force**

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**Educational Force**

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f = frequency
N = number of respondents
Md (median) = 2.6
Table 133 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Section I of the proposed Plan in respect to the five prospective forces.

Through classification of the subcategories of the five forces, obtained in Step 1 of the analysis for the seven programs of Section I, the percentages of the total contribution of the subcategories of each force to the likelihood of that force in operationalizing Section I were determined to be as follows:

**Political Force.** The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Political Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of that force in operationalizing Section I are presented in Table 134.
TABLE 134

THE PERCENTAGES SHOWING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SUBCATEGORIES OF THE POLITICAL FORCE IS PERCEIVED AS INFLUENCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING SECTION I OF THE PLAN FOR SEPARATION OF POLITICAL POWER FROM ECONOMIC POWER

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f = frequency
X = percentage

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Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section I of the Plan in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 3.7 or Likely (See Table 133). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Political Force was determined, and then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 134).

Financial Force. The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Financial Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section I are presented in Table 135.
TABLE 135

THE PERCENTAGES SHOWING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SUBCATEGORIES OF THE FINANCIAL FORCE IS PERCEIVED AS INFLUENCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING SECTION I OF THE PLAN FOR SEPARATION OF POLITICAL POWER FROM ECONOMIC POWER.

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\[ f = \text{frequency} \]
\[ \% = \text{percentage} \]
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section I in respect to Financial Force was computed to be 4.2 or Likely (See Table 133). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Financial Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 135).

Administrative Force. The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Administrative Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section I of the Plan are presented in Table 136.
TABLE 136

THE PERCENTAGES SHOWING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SUBCATEGORIES OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE IS PERCEIVED AS INFLUENCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING
SECTION I OF THE PLAN FOR SEPARATION OF POLITICAL POWER FROM ECONOMIC POWER

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Category III Administrative Force</th>
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<th>Pro-gram 3</th>
<th>Pro-gram 4</th>
<th>Pro-gram 5</th>
<th>Pro-gram 6</th>
<th>Pro-gram 7</th>
<th>Rank-Order</th>
<th>Sec Order</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Availability of Facilities</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12th</td>
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<td>Bureaucracy Concerns</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7th</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>37.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>8th</td>
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f = frequency
\% = percentage
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section I in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 2.3 or Unlikely (See Table 133). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 136).

Socio-Cultural Force. The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Socio-Cultural Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section I of the Plan are presented in Table 137.
TABLE 137

THE PERCENTAGES SHOWING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SUBCATEGORIES OF THE SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCE IS PERCEIVED AS INFLUENCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING SECTION I OF THE PLAN FOR SEPARATION OF POLITICAL POWER FROM ECONOMIC POWER

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<tr>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Pro-gram</th>
<th>Pro-gram</th>
<th>Pro-gram</th>
<th>Pro-gram</th>
<th>Pro-gram</th>
<th>Rank-Sec.</th>
<th>Order</th>
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<tr>
<td>Willingness of Social Groups in General</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<td>Professional Groups</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Diversity of Interest, Attitudes &amp; Priorities</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Religious, Traditional &amp; Cultural Concerns</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>Disinterest &amp; Cynicism</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
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</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>Labor Force &amp; Labor Market Concerns</td>
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<td>6.5</td>
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<td>Economic &amp; Income Concerns</td>
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<td>6.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.5</td>
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<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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</table>

f = frequency
I = percentage

100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section I in respect to the Socio-Cultural Force was computed to be 3.9 or Likely (See Table 133). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Socio-Cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 137).

Educational Force. The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Educational Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section I of the Plan are presented in Table 138.
TABLE 138

THE PERCENTAGES SHOWING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SUBCATEGORIES OF
THE EDUCATIONAL FORCE IS PERCEIVED AS INFLUENCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING
SECTION I OF THE PLAN FOR SEPARATION OF POLITICAL POWER FROM ECONOMIC POWER

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<th>Category V</th>
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<th>Pro- Program</th>
<th>Pro- Program</th>
<th>Pro- Program</th>
<th>Sup- Rank-</th>
<th>Re- Rank-</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories:</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Professional Schools</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Awareness, Expertise &amp; Experience</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of Interests &amp; Priorities</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>37</td>
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<td>61</td>
<td>47</td>
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</table>

f = frequency
I = percentages

100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section I in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 2.6 or Neutral (See Table 133). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 138).

Analysis for Section II

Table 139 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Section II which consists of four programs for access to social equality.
TABLE 139
THE RESULT OF THE RESPONDENTS' RATING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING
SECTION II OF THE PLAN FOR ACCESS TO SOCIAL EQUALITY IN RESPECT TO THE FIVE
FORCES

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Political Force</th>
<th>Very Like</th>
<th>Like</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Un-Like</th>
<th>Very Un-Like</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programs:</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Early Childhood Education</td>
<td>6 12</td>
<td>15 31</td>
<td>16 33</td>
<td>4 9</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Strengthening Families</td>
<td>37 74</td>
<td>13 24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Universal Public Education</td>
<td>7 14</td>
<td>22 47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11 23</td>
<td>6 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Open College Education</td>
<td>3 6</td>
<td>26 54</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>53 27</td>
<td>77 32</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<th>Financial Force</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Early Childhood Education</td>
<td>16 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Strengthening Families</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Universal Public Education</td>
<td>35 71</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Open College Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Administrative Force</th>
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</thead>
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<td>1. Early Childhood Education</td>
<td>1 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Strengthening Families</td>
<td>3 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Universal Public Education</td>
<td>1 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Open College Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Early Childhood Education</td>
<td>29 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Strengthening Families</td>
<td>39 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Universal Public Education</td>
<td>20 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Open College Education</td>
<td>9 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Educational Force</th>
<th>Md (median) = 4.56</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programs:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Early Childhood Education</td>
<td>3 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Strengthening Families</td>
<td>13 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Universal Public Education</td>
<td>4 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Open College Education</td>
<td>5 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>25 13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
N = number of respondents
Table 139 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Section II of the proposed Plan in respect to the five prospective forces.

Through classification of the subcategories of the five forces, obtained in Step I of the analysis for the four programs of Section II, the percentages of the total contribution of the subcategories of each force to the likelihood of that force in operationalizing Section II were determined to be as follows:

**Political Force.** The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Political Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section II of the Plan are presented in Table 140.
## Table 140

The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the political force is perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section II of the Plan for Access to Social Equality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category I</th>
<th>Political Force</th>
<th>Subcategories</th>
<th>Program 1</th>
<th>Program 2</th>
<th>Program 3</th>
<th>Program 4</th>
<th>Rank Ordered for Sec. Order</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Resistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Leaders</td>
<td>National Leaders</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament &amp; the Law</td>
<td>Parliament &amp; the Law</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Demand</td>
<td>Public Demand</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of Social &amp; Economic Development</td>
<td>Consideration of Social &amp; Economic Development</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unnecessary</td>
<td>Unnecessary</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency

# = percentage
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section II of the Plan in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 3.9 or Likely (See Table 139). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 140).

Financial Force. The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Financial Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section II of the Plan are presented in Table 141.
TABLE 141

THE PERCENTAGES SHOWING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SUBCATEGORIES OF THE FINANCIAL FORCE IS PERCEIVED AS INFLUENCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING SECTION II OF THE PLAN FOR ACCESS TO SOCIAL EQUALITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Program 1</th>
<th>Program 2</th>
<th>Program 3</th>
<th>Program 4</th>
<th>Rank (Ed)</th>
<th>Neutrality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Capacity of Public Sector</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Cooperation of Private Sector &amp; Financially Powerful</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Financial Management Agencies</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic &amp; Investment Concerns</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Interest Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
% = percentage
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing
Section II of the Plan in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be
4.7 or Very Likely (See Table 139). Second, the subcategories contributing
to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the per­
centages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values,
their importance to the likelihood of Financial Force was determined and
then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last
five columns of Table 141).

Administrative Force. The percentages showing the degree to which the
subcategories of the Administrative Force are perceived as influencing
the likelihood of operationalizing Section II of the Plan are presented
in Table 142.
### Table 142

The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the administrative force is perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section II of the Plan for Access to Social Equality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Program 1</th>
<th>Program 2</th>
<th>Program 3</th>
<th>Program 4</th>
<th>Rank-Order</th>
<th>Program 5</th>
<th>Program 6</th>
<th>Program 7</th>
<th>Program 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Practice &amp; Staff Adequacy</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative &amp; Management Talents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Sufficiency</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Willingness, Motivation &amp; Initiation</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility &amp; Awareness</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Skills, Methods &amp; Expertise</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of Facilities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity for Training &amp; Managing</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility of the Rules &amp; Regulations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in the Country</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Z = frequency 100 100 100 100 100*
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section II of the Plan in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 2.4 or Likely (See Table 139). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 142).

Socio-cultural Force. The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Socio-cultural Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section II of the Plan are presented in Table 143.
TABLE 143

THE PERCENTAGES SHOWING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SUBCATEGORIES OF THE SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCE IS PERCEIVED AS INFLUENCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING SECTION II OF THE PLAN FOR ACCESS TO SOCIAL EQUALITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category IV Socio-cultural Force</th>
<th>Pro-gram 1</th>
<th>Pro-gram 2</th>
<th>Pro-gram 3</th>
<th>Pro-gram 4</th>
<th>X %</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Order</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Willingness of Social Groups in General</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Interest Groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of Interest, Attitudes &amp; Priorities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>16th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious, Traditional &amp; Cultural Concerns</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest &amp; Cynicism</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Concerns</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation to Government's Influence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Satisfaction &amp; Dissatisfaction</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Demand &amp; Need</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Force &amp; Labor Market Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic &amp; Income Concerns</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Public Awareness</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>16th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Concerns</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
Z = percentage

100 100 100 100 100
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section II of the Plan in respect to the Socio-cultural Force was computed to be 4.56 or Very Likely (See Table 139). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Socio-cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 143).

Educational Force. The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Educational Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section II of the Plan are presented in Table 144.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category V Educational Force</th>
<th>Pro-gram 1</th>
<th>Pro-gram 2</th>
<th>Pro-gram 3</th>
<th>Pro-gram 4</th>
<th>% Rank</th>
<th>Neutr-al</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Re-ports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Existing Trained Manpower</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>15th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Schools for General Education</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Vocational &amp; Technical Schools</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Higher Education Institutions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Professional Schools</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness &amp; Demand of Educational Institutions in General</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructional Concerns</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness, Expertise &amp; Experience</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation Toward National Development</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities, Techniques &amp; Finances</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of Interests &amp; Priorities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3th</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Elite (educated &amp; educator)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>15th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
%

TABLE 144

THE PERCENTAGES SHOWING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SUBCATEGORIES OF THE EDUCATIONAL FORCE IS PERCEIVED AS INFLUENCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING SECTION II OF THE PLAN FOR ACCESS TO SOCIAL EQUALITY
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section II of the Plan in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 2.3 or Unlikely (See Table 139). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 144).

Analysis for Section III

Table 145 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Section III which consists of four programs for ending the hereditary private power.
TABLE 143
THE RESULT OF THE RESPONDENTS' RATING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING
SECTION III FOR ENDING HEREDITARY PRIVATE POWER IN RESPECT TO THE FIVE FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Force</th>
<th>Very Like-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Un-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Very Un</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ly(5)</td>
<td>ly(4)</td>
<td>ly(3)</td>
<td>ly(2)</td>
<td>ly(1)</td>
<td>ly(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs:</td>
<td>f %</td>
<td>f %</td>
<td>f %</td>
<td>f %</td>
<td>f %</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Strengthening Trade Unions</td>
<td>4 8</td>
<td>5 13</td>
<td>8 17</td>
<td>21 43</td>
<td>5 17</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Participative Management</td>
<td>3 4</td>
<td>16 33</td>
<td>2 4</td>
<td>25 51</td>
<td>6 8</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No Inherited Ownership</td>
<td>1 3</td>
<td>16 31</td>
<td>5 10</td>
<td>22 46</td>
<td>19 21</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Limited Inheritance</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>11 23</td>
<td>3 6</td>
<td>12 25</td>
<td>22 46</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>8 4</td>
<td>43 22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>43 80</td>
<td>43 80</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Force</th>
<th>Md (median) = 2.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programs:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Strengthening Trade Unions</td>
<td>5 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Participative Management</td>
<td>3 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No Inherited Ownership</td>
<td>5 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Limited Inheritance</td>
<td>5 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>15 18 23 14 25 14 25 14 25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Force</th>
<th>Md (median) = 2.7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programs:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Strengthening Trade Unions</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Participative Management</td>
<td>2 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No Inherited Ownership</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Limited Inheritance</td>
<td>1 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>3 25 10 55 53 28 100 54 20 11 196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-cultural Force</th>
<th>Md (median) = 2.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programs:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Strengthening Trade Unions</td>
<td>2 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Participative Management</td>
<td>9 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No Inherited Ownership</td>
<td>5 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Limited Inheritance</td>
<td>10 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>26 142 65 35 38 100 74 47 34 12 61 193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Force</th>
<th>Md (median) = 3.6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programs:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Strengthening Trade Unions</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Participative Management</td>
<td>3 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No Inherited Ownership</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Limited Inheritance</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>3 22 13 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
N = number of respondents
Md (median) = 2.9
Table 145 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Section III of the Plan in respect to the five prospective forces.

Through classification of the subcategories of the five forces, obtained in Step I of the analysis for the four programs of Section III, the percentages of the total contribution of the subcategories of each force to the likelihood of that force in operationalizing Section III were determined as follows:

**Political Force.** The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Political Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section III of the plan are presented in Table 146.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category I</th>
<th>Political Force</th>
<th>Program 1</th>
<th>Program 2</th>
<th>Program 3</th>
<th>Program 4</th>
<th>Rank-Order</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Tralting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Leaders</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament &amp; the Law</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Demand</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>66.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of Social &amp; Economic Development</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnecessary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*f = frequency*

*Z = percentage*
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section III in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 2.1 or Unlikely (See Table 145). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Political Force was determined, and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 146).

Financial Force. The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Financial Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section III of the Plan are presented in Table 147.
TABLE 147

THE PERCENTAGES SHOWING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SUBCATEGORIES OF THE FINANCIAL FORCE IS PERCEIVED AS INFLUENCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING SECTION III OF THE PLAN FOR ENDING HEREDITARY PRIVATE POWER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category II Financial Force</th>
<th>Pro-</th>
<th>Pro-</th>
<th>Pro-</th>
<th>Pro-</th>
<th>Sup-</th>
<th>Ra-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Program 1</td>
<td>Program 2</td>
<td>Program 3</td>
<td>Program 4</td>
<td>Rank-</td>
<td>Tem-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories:</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Capacity of Public Sector</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Cooperation of Private Sector &amp; Financially Powerful</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Financial Management Agencies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic &amp; Investment Concerns</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Interest Groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity with Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
x = percentage

| | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

---

The table above provides a detailed analysis of the perceived influence of various financial categories on the likelihood of operationalizing Section III of the plan for ending hereditary private power. Each subcategory is rated on a percentage scale, indicating the degree to which each is perceived as influencing the likelihood, ranging from 1st (most influential) to 11th (least influential). The table also includes rank and percentage values for each category, with frequency counts where applicable.
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section III in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 2.7 or Neutral (See Table 145). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Financial Force was determined, and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 147).

Administrative Force. The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Administrative Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section III of the Plan are presented in Table 148.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories: Category III Administrative Force</th>
<th>Program for Section</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Supporting</th>
<th>Resistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Practice &amp; Staff Adequacy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative &amp; Management Talents</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Sufficiency</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Willingness, Motivation &amp; Initiative</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility &amp; Awareness</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Skills, Methods &amp; Expertise</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of Facilities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity for Training &amp; Managing Manpower</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility of the Rules &amp; Regulations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting In the Country</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency  
\( \% = \) percentage
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section III in respect to Administrative Force was computed to be 2.2 or Unlikely (See Table 145). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Administrative Force was determined, and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 148).

Socio-Cultural Force. The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Socio-Cultural Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section III of the Plan are presented in Table 149.
TABLE 149

THE PERCENTAGES SHOWING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SUBCATEGORIES OF
THE SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCE IS PERCEIVED AS INFLUENCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING
SECTION III OF THE PLAN FOR ENDING HEREDITARY PRIVATE POWER

| Category IV Socio-cultural Force | Pro- Program | Pro- Program | Pro- Program | Rank- ed | Re- neral Ne- | |
|---------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------|---------| |
| Subcategories:                 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | for Sec. | Order |
| Willingness of Social Groups in General | 6 | 23 | 30 | 20 | 27 | 1st | 98 | 2 | 0 |
| Intellectual Groups | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 17th | 50 | 50 | 0 |
| Major Interest Groups | 10.5 | 17 | 7 | 17 | 13 | 2nd | 11 | 3.5 | 85.5 |
| Professional Groups | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Organized Groups | 0 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 14th | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| Diversity of Interest, Attitudes & Priorities | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | .5 | 18th | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| Religious, Traditional & Cultural Concerns | 8.5 | 0 | 12 | 17 | 9 | 4th | 17 | 13 | 50 |
| Disinterest & Concerns | 8.5 | 4 | 9 | 0 | 5.5 | 6th | 0 | 66.5 | 33.5 |
| Development Concerns | 0 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 1.5 | 16th | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| In Relation to Government's Influence | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 14th | 66 | 17 | 17 |
| Public Satisfaction & Dissatisfaction | 0 | 8.5 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 12th | 91.5 | 8.5 | 0 |
| Public Demand & Need | 0 | 8.5 | 2 | 11 | 5 | 7th | 87.5 | 0 | 12.5 |
| Labor Force & Labor Market Concerns | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Economic & Income Concerns | 2 | 0 | 9 | 9 | 3 | 7th | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| Conditional & Uncertain | 19 | 6.5 | 11 | 2 | 10 | 3rd | 23 | 68 | 9 |
| Degree of Public Awareness | 21 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 5th | 3.5 | 56.5 | 40 |
| Capability Concerns | 10.5 | 6.5 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 7th | 0 | 51 | 49 |
| Class Concerns | 0 | 4 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 12th | 87.5 | 12.5 | 0 |
| In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran | 5 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 3.5 | 11th | 11 | 11 | 78 |
| Miscellaneous | 4 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 7th | 50 | 0 | 50 |

f = frequency
X = percentage

100 100 100 100 100
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section III in respect to Socio-Cultural Force was computed to be 3.4 or Neutral (See Table 145). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Socio-Cultural was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 149).

Educational Force. The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Educational Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section III of the Plan are presented in Table 150.
TABLE 130

THE PERCENTAGES SHOWING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SUBCATEGORIES OF
THE EDUCATIONAL FORCE IS PERCEIVED AS INFLUENCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING
SECTION III OF THE PLAN FOR ENDING HEREDITARY PRIVATE POWER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category V</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Resistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Educational Force</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Existing Trained Manpower</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Education</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Schools for General Education</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Vocational &amp; Technical Schools</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Capacity of Higher Education Institutions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Professional Schools</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness &amp; Demand of Educational Institutions in General</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructional Concerns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>13th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness, Expertise &amp; Experience</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation Toward National Development</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>13th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities, Techniques &amp; Finances</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of Interests &amp; Priorities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Elite (educated &amp; educator)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency

100 100 100 100 100

Z = percentages
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section III in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 2.9 or Neutral (See Table 145). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Educational Force was determined, and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 150.

Analysis for Section IV

Table 151 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing Section IV which consists of seven programs for redistribution of public power.
TABLE 151
THE RESULT OF THE RESPONDENTS' RATING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING SECTION IV OF THE PLAN FOR REDISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC POWER IN RESPECT TO THE 5 FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Force</th>
<th>Very Likely (5)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Unlikely (2)</th>
<th>Very Unlikely (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programs:</td>
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<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Decentralized Government</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Decentralized Problem Solving</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Localization of Authority</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Regionalization of Services</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Regional Income Tax</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Global Subvention</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Voluntary Association</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
<td><strong>113</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>77</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
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</table>

**Fiscal Force**

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>f</th>
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<th>f</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>f</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1. Decentralized Government</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Decentralized Problem Solving</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Localization of Authority</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Regionalization of Services</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Regional Income Tax</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Global Subvention</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Voluntary Association</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>94</strong></td>
<td><strong>302</strong></td>
<td><strong>103</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>77</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Administrative Force**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Programs:</th>
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<th>f</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>f</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1. Decentralized Government</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Decentralized Problem Solving</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Localization of Authority</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Regionalization of Services</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Regional Income Tax</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Global Subvention</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Voluntary Association</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>94</strong></td>
<td><strong>302</strong></td>
<td><strong>103</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>77</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Socio-Cultural Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>f</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>f</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Decentralized Government</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Decentralized Problem Solving</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Localization of Authority</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Regionalization of Services</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Regional Income Tax</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Global Subvention</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Voluntary Association</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
<td><strong>197</strong></td>
<td><strong>150</strong></td>
<td><strong>47</strong></td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Educational Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs:</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>f</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Decentralized Government</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Decentralized Problem Solving</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Localization of Authority</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Regionalization of Authority</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Regional Income Tax</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Global Subvention</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Voluntary Association</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>58</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
<td><strong>148</strong></td>
<td><strong>305</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I = frequency
\(N\) = number of respondents
Md (median) = 3.8
Table 151 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing Section IV of the proposed Plan in respect to the five prospective forces.

Through classification of the subcategories of the five forces, obtained in Step I of the analysis for the seven programs of Section IV, the percentages of the total contribution of the subcategories of each force to the likelihood of that force in operationalizing Section IV were determined to be as follows:

**Political Force.** The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Political Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section IV of the Plan are presented in Table 152.
TABLE 152

THE PERCENTAGES SHOWING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SUBCATEGORIES OF THE POLITICAL FORCE IS PERCEIVED AS INFLUENCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING
SECTION IV OF THE PLAN FOR REDISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC POWER

| Category I Political Force | Pro-gram | Pro-gram | Pro-gram | Pro-gram | Pro-gram | Rank- port | Neut- sis-
| | gram | gram | gram | gram | gram | for ed | tive tral tine
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

| Subcategories: | Nat- | ional | Lead- | ers | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | .5 | 10th | 0 | 100 | 0 |
| | Par- | li- | ment & | the | Law | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | .5 | 10th | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| | Poli- | ti- | cal | Par- | ties | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 6.5 | 3 | 4th | 53 | 0 | 47 |
| | Priori- | ty | Con- | cerns | 0 | 8 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 7th | 0 | 5.5 | 91.5 |
| | Con- | di- | tional & | Uncer- | tain | 15 | 17 | 12 | 13 | 8 | 13 | 6.5 | 12 | 2nd | 31 | 22 | 47 |
| | Inter- | est | Groups | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 2 | 7th | 0 | 10 | 90 |
| | Pub- | lic | Dem- | and | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 9th | 33.5 | 0 | 66.5 |
| | Consid- | eration of | Social & | Econ- | omic | Development | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 10 | 9 | 0 | 3 | 4th | 73 | 0 | 27 |
| | Degree of Conformity | 52.5 | 50.5 | 68 | 77 | 58 | 68 | 62 | 65 | 1st | 30 | 4 | 6 |
| | Wth Present Trend & | Exis- | ting | Policies | 4 | 10.5 | 8 | 8 | 14 | 6 | 2 | 7 | 3rd | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| | Capa- | bi- | lity & | Effi- | ciency | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 4th | 0 | 44.5 | 55.5 |
| | Unnec- | essary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2nd | 100 | 0 | 0 |

f = frequency
Z = percentage
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section IV of the plan in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 3.4 or Neutral (See Table 151). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 152).

Financial Force. The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Financial Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section IV of the Plan are presented in Table 153.
TABLE 133

THE PERCENTAGES SHOWING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SUBCATEGORIES OF THE FINANCIAL FORCE IS PERCEIVED AS INFLUENCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING SECTION IV OF THE PLAN FOR REDISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC POWER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category II Financial Force</th>
<th>Pro-Program 1</th>
<th>Pro-Program 2</th>
<th>Pro-Program 3</th>
<th>Pro-Program 4</th>
<th>Pro-Program 5</th>
<th>Pro-Program 6</th>
<th>Pro-Program 7</th>
<th>Rank-</th>
<th>Por-</th>
<th>Neu-</th>
<th>sis-</th>
<th>tive</th>
<th>tine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Capacity of Public Sector</td>
<td>17 16.5 20 22 9 14</td>
<td>7 15 2nd</td>
<td>97 3 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Cooperation of Private Sector &amp; Financially Powerful</td>
<td>2 0 0 0 2 5 0 2 5 1</td>
<td>9th 66.5 0 33.5</td>
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\[f = \text{frequency}\]

\[Z = \text{percentage}\]
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section IV of the Plan in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 3.8 or Likely (See Table 151). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Financial Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 153).

Administrative Force. The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Administrative Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section IV of the Plan are presented in Table 154.
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f = frequency
x = percentage
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section IV of the Plan in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 2.06 or Unlikely (See Table 151). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 154).

Socio-cultural Force. The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Socio-cultural Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section IV of the Plan are presented in Table 155.
TABLE 155

THE PERCENTAGES SHOWING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SUBCATEGORIES OF
THE SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCE IS PERCEIVED AS INFLUENCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING
SECTION IV OF THE PLAN FOR REDISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC POWER

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| I = frequency | 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
| X = percentage | 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section IV of the Plan in respect to the Socio-cultural Force was computed to be 3.8 Or Likely (See Table 151). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Socio-cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 155).

Educational Force. The percentages showing the degree to which the subcategories of the Educational Force are perceived as influencing the likelihood of operationalizing Section IV of the Plan are presented in Table 156.
TABLE 156

THE PERCENTAGES SHOWING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SUBCATEGORIES OF
THE EDUCATIONAL FORCE IS PERCEIVED AS INFLUENCING THE LIVELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING
SECTION IV OF THE PLAN FOR REDISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC POWER

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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities, Techniques &amp; Finances</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of Interests &amp; Priorities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Elite (educated &amp; educator)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>14th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation with Other Forces Acting in Iran</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>11th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f = frequency
X = percentages
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing Section IV of the Plan in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 2.9 or Neutral (See Table 151). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 156).

Step 3. Analysis For The Overall Plan

The proposed Plan consisted of twenty-two programs, in four sections, for bringing about change in the society (See Chapter III for full discussion of the Plan). In Step 3, the final step in analysis, responses for the overall Plan were analyzed. The following is a presentation of the results of Step 3 of the analysis.

Analysis For The Overall Plan In Respect To The Political Force

Table 157 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing the overall Plan which consists of twenty-two programs in respect to the Political Force.
## Table 137

The result of the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing the overall plan would be influenced by the political force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section I Programs</th>
<th>Very Like (1)</th>
<th>Like (2)</th>
<th>Neutral (3)</th>
<th>Un-likely (4)</th>
<th>Very Un-likely (5)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Human Resource Development</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Job Distribution</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Open Competition</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Unemployment Insurance</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Income Redistribution</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Flexible Retirement Age</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Women's Empowerment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section II Programs:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Early Childhood Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Strengthening Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Universal Public Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Open College Education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section III Programs:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Strengthening Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Participative Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No Inherited Ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Limited Inheritance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section IV Programs:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Decentralized Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Decentralized Problem Solving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Localization of Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Regionalization of Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Regional Income Tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Global Subvention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Voluntary Association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total: | 138 | 133 | 47 | 427 | 40% | 100 | 92 | 275 | 26% | 131 | 12% | 1071 |

f = frequency
N = number of respondents
Md (median) = 3.37
Table 157 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the median concerning the likelihood of operationalizing the Plan in respect to the Political Force.

Through classification of the subcategories of the Political Force, obtained in Step 2 for the four Sections of the Plan, the degree to which the respondents felt that those subcategories influenced the likelihood of having the Plan adopted was determined which is shown in Table 158.
### TABLE 158

**PERCENTAGES OF RESPONSES INDICATING HOW MUCH**

**THE SUBCATEGORIES OF THE POLITICAL FORCE WOULD INFLUENCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING THE OVERALL PLAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category 1 Political Force</th>
<th>Sec. I</th>
<th>Sec. II</th>
<th>Sec. III</th>
<th>Sec. IV</th>
<th>Support-Order</th>
<th>Miscellaneous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Percent</strong></td>
<td><strong>Percent</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Leaders</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament &amp; the Law</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>11th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Demand</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of Social &amp; Economic Development</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnecessary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = responses in subcategory/total "Political Force" responses for Section
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing the overall Plan in respect to the Political Force was computed to be 3.57 or Likely (See Table 157). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of the Political Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 158).

Analysis For The Overall Plan In Respect To The Financial Force

Table 159 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing the overall Plan which consists of twenty-two programs in respect to the Financial Force.
### TABLE 159

**THE RESULT OF THE RESPONDENTS’ RATING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING THE OVERALL PLAN WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY THE FINANCIAL FORCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section I</th>
<th>Vary</th>
<th>Like</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Unlike</th>
<th>Very Unlike</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programs:</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Human Resource Development</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Job Distribution</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Open Competition</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Unemployment Insurance</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Income Redistribution</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Flexible Retirement Age</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Women’s Employment</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Section II | Programs: |
| ——— | ——— |
| 1. Early Childhood Education | 16 | 33 | 6 | 12 | 6 | 12 | 17 | 34 | 4 | 8 | 49 |
| 2. Strengthening Families | 41 | 82 | 8 | 16 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 |
| 3. Universal Public Education | 35 | 71 | 10 | 20 | 5 | 10.5 | 10.5 | 21 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 49 |
| 4. Open Colleges Education | 8 | 17 | 7 | 15 | 32 | 64 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 47 |

| Section III | Programs: |
| ——— | ——— |
| 1. Strengthening Trade Unions | 3 | 6 | 10 | 20 | 22 | 44 | 7 | 14 | 2 | 4 | 46 |
| 2. Participative Management | 3 | 5 | 4 | 8 | 9 | 18 | 29 | 58 | 11 | 22 | 11 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 47 |
| 3. No Inherited Ownership | 4 | 9 | 7 | 14 | 11 | 22 | 19 | 38 | 4 | 8 | 1 | 2 | 45 |
| 4. Limited Inheritance | 3 | 7 | 4 | 8 | 9 | 18 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 14 | 3 | 6 | 21 | 42 | 17 | 34 | 17 | 34 | 17 | 34 | 17 | 34 | 17 | 34 | 17 | 34 | 17 | 34 |

| Section IV | Programs: |
| ——— | ——— |
| 1. Decentralized Government | 9 | 19 | 12 | 24 | 23 | 46 | 23 | 46 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 47 |
| 2. Decentralized Problem Solving | 16 | 33 | 22 | 44 | 8 | 16 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 49 |
| 3. Localization of Authority | 21 | 43 | 17 | 34 | 3 | 6 | 5 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 46 |
| 4. Recreation of Services | 19 | 40 | 16 | 32 | 3 | 6 | 11 | 22 | 5 | 10 | 5 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 45 |
| 5. Regional Income Tax | 4 | 9 | 17 | 34 | 3 | 6 | 17 | 34 | 6 | 12 | 6 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 47 |
| 6. Global Subvention | 21 | 42 | 18 | 36 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 8 | 9 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 44 |
| 7. Voluntary Association | 4 | 10 | 1 | 2 | 36 | 72 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 10 | 1 | 2 | 36 | 72 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 10 | 1 | 2 | 36 | 72 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 10 | 1 | 2 | 36 | 72 |

| Total: | 334 | 668 | 234 | 468 | 218 | 436 | 187 | 374 | 66 | 132 | 1039 |

- **f** = frequency  
- **N** = number of respondents

**Md (median) = 3.7**
Table 159 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing the Plan in respect to the Financial Force.

Through classification of the subcategories of the Financial Force, obtained in Step 2 for the four Sections of the Plan, the degree to which the respondents felt that those subcategories influenced the likelihood of having the Plan adopted was determined which is shown in Table 160.
TABLE 160

PERCENTAGES OF RESPONSES INDICATING HOW MUCH
THE SUBCATEGORIES OF THE FINANCIAL FORCE WOULD INFLUENCE THE LIKELIHOOD
OF OPERATIONALIZING THE OVERALL PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category II</th>
<th>Financial Force</th>
<th>Sec-</th>
<th>Sec-</th>
<th>Sec-</th>
<th>Sec-</th>
<th>Sup</th>
<th>Re-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories:</td>
<td>Financial Capacity of Public Sector</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Cooperation of Private Sector &amp; Financially Powerful</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity of Financial Management Agencies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic &amp; Investment Concerns</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major Interest Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degree of Conformity With Present Trend &amp; Existing Policies</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Priority Concerns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>11th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*= responses in subcategory/total "Financial Force" responses for Section
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing the overall Plan in respect to the Financial Force was computed to be 3.7 or Likely (See Table 159). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Financial Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 160).

Analysis For The Overall Plan In Respect To The Administrative Force

Table 161 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing the overall Plan which consists of twenty-two programs in respect to the Administrative Force.
TABLE 161
THE RESULT OF THE RESPONDENTS' RATING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING THE OVERALL PLAN WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE

| Section | Programs | Very Like | Like | Neutral | Unlike | Very Unlike | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | f | % | N |
|---------|----------|-----------|------|---------|--------|------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| I       | Human Resource Development | 2 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 11 | 22 | 19 | 38 | 7 | 14 | 50 |
|         | Job Distribution             | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 7 | 14 | 26 | 52 | 11 | 22 | 50 |
|         | Open Competition             | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 26 | 49 | 21 | 43 | 2 | 4 | 49 |
|         | Unemployment Insurance       | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 32 | 23 | 46 | 10 | 20 | 50 |
|         | Income Redistribution        | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 9 | 19 | 16 | 33 | 2 | 4 | 47 |
|         | Flexible Retirement Age      | 3 | 7 | 3 | 7 | 18 | 36 | 15 | 30 | 5 | 10 | 48 |
|         | Women's Employment           | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 66 | 6 | 12 | 4 | 8 | 44 |
| II      | Early Childhood Education    | 1 | 2 | 4 | 8 | 20 | 40 | 20 | 40 | 3 | 6 | 58 |
|         | Strengthening Families       | 3 | 6 | 7 | 14.3 | 15 | 30 | 27 | 54 | 9 | 18 | 49 |
|         | Universal Public Education   | 2 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 10 | 26 | 52 | 1 | 2 | 48 |
|         | Open College Education       | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 26 | 52 | 13 | 26 | 6 | 12 | 46 |
| III     | Strengthening Trade Unions   | 0 | 0 | 4 | 8 | 18 | 36 | 25 | 50 | 1 | 2 | 48 |
|         | Participative Management     | 2 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 12 | 24 | 8 | 16 | 47 |
|         | No Inheritance               | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 12 | 29 | 58 | 9 | 18 | 48 |
|         | Limited Inheritance          | 1 | 2 | 3 | 7 | 21 | 42 | 12 | 24 | 8 | 16 | 45 |
| IV      | Decentralized Government     | 2 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 26 | 52 | 12 | 24 | 47 |
|         | Decentralized Problem Solving| 1 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 9 | 31 | 62 | 9 | 18 | 48 |
|         | Localization of Authority    | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 9 | 18 | 33 | 66 | 9 | 18 | 48 |
|         | Regionalization of Services  | 0 | 0 | 18 | 36 | 3 | 6 | 9 | 18 | 16 | 32 | 46 |
|         | Regional Income Tax          | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 12 | 24 | 48 | 10 | 20 | 50 |
|         | Regional Subvention          | 1 | 2 | 5 | 10 | 9 | 18 | 24 | 48 | 10 | 20 | 50 |
|         | Volunteer Association        | 2 | 5 | 6 | 12 | 9 | 18 | 47 | 94 | 23 | 46 | 50 |
| Total   |                         | 25 | 50 | 22 | 44 | 78 | 156 | 26 | 52 | 502 | 1004 | 159 | 318 | 1038 |

f = frequency  
N = number of respondents  
Md (median) = 3.2
Table 161 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing the Plan in respect to the Administrative Force.

Through classification of the subcategories of the Administrative Force, obtained in Step 2 for the four sections of the Plan, the degree to which the respondents felt that those subcategories influenced the likelihood of having the Plan adopted was determined which is shown in Table 162.
TABLE 162

PERCENTAGES OF RESPONSES INDICATING HOW MUCH
THE SUBCATEGORIES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE WOULD INFLUENCE THE LIKELIHOOD
OF OPERATIONALIZING THE OVERALL PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category III</th>
<th>Administrative Force</th>
<th>Sec-</th>
<th>Sec-</th>
<th>Sec-</th>
<th>Sup-</th>
<th>Re</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subcategories</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Practice &amp; Staff Adequacy</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative &amp; Management Talents</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
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<td>7th</td>
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<td>.5</td>
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<td>.5</td>
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</table>

I = responses in subcategory/total "Administrative Force" responses for Section
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing the overall Plan in respect to the Administrative Force was computed to be 2.2 or Unlikely (See Table 161). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentage of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Administrative Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 162).

Analysis For The Overall Plan In Respect To The Socio-cultural Force

Table 163 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing the overall Plan which consisted of twenty-two programs in respect to the Socio-cultural Force.


**TABLE 163**

The result of the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing the overall plan would be influenced by the socio-cultural force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Programs</th>
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<th>Un-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Like-Un</th>
<th>Like-Lik</th>
<th>Likel-Very</th>
<th>Very-Very</th>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>342</td>
<td>147</td>
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<td>171</td>
<td>172</td>
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</table>

f = frequency
N = number of respondents

\[ \text{Md (median)} = 3.9 \]
Table 163 presents the frequency count, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing the Plan in respect to the Socio-Cultural Force.

Through classification of the subcategories of the Socio-Cultural Force, obtained in Step 2 for the four Sections of the Plan, the degree to which the respondents felt that those subcategories influenced the likelihood of having the Plan adopted was determined which is shown in Table 164.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Category IV Socio-Cultural Force</th>
<th>Sec-</th>
<th>Sec-</th>
<th>Sec-</th>
<th>Sec-</th>
<th>Sup-</th>
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<td>Section II</td>
<td>Section III</td>
<td>Section IV</td>
<td>Rank</td>
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<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
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<td>.7</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>15th</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>24th</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7th</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12th</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X = responses in subcategory/total "Socio-Cultural Force" responses for Section
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing the overall Plan in respect to the Socio-cultural Force was computed to be 3.9 or Likely (See Table 163). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Socio-cultural Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 164).

Analysis For The Overall Plan In Respect To The Educational Force

Table 165 shows the respondents' rating of the likelihood of operationalizing the overall Plan which consisted of twenty-two programs in respect to the Educational Force.
TABLE 165
THE RESULT OF THE RESPONDENTS’ RATING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF OPERATIONALIZING THE OVER-ALL PLAN WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY THE EDUCATIONAL FORCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section I Programs:</th>
<th>Very Like-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Un-</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
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<td>2. Job Distribution</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Open Competition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Unemployment Insurance</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>5. Income Redistribution</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>7. Women’s Employment</td>
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<table>
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<th>Like-</th>
<th>Un-</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Early Childhood Education</td>
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<td>8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Strengthening Families</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Universal Public Education</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Open College Education</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
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</table>

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
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<td>1. Strengthening Trade Unions</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
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<td>2. Participative Management</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>3. No Inherited Ownership</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<table>
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<th>Like-</th>
<th>Un-</th>
<th>Very Un-</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>54</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>3. Localization of Authority</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Regionalization of Services</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Regional Income Tax</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Global Subvention</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Voluntary Association</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total: | 53 | 56 | 110 | 112 | 94 | 94 | 207 | 212 | 143 | 143 | 1007 |

f = frequency  
N = number of respondents  
Md (median) = 2.8
Table 165 presents the frequency counts, percentages and the medians concerning the likelihood of operationalizing the Plan in respect to the Educational Force.

Through classification of the subcategories of the Educational Force, obtained in Step 2 for the four Sections of the Plan, the degree to which the respondents felt that those subcategories influenced the likelihood of having the Plan adopted was determined which is shown in Table 166.
### TABLE 166

PERCENTAGES OF RESPONSES INDICATING HOW MUCH
THE SUBCATEGORIES OF THE EDUCATIONAL FORCE WOULD INFLUENCE THE LIKELIHOOD
OF OPERATIONALIZING THE OVERALL PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Educational Force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategories:</th>
<th>Sec-</th>
<th>Sec-</th>
<th>Sec-</th>
<th>Sec-</th>
<th>Sup-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Rank-Port-Neu-sist-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plan</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Existing Trained Manpower</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to Transfer Human Potential into Competence</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Schools for General Education</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Vocational &amp; Technical Schools</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Higher Education Institutions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Professional Schools</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness &amp; Deming of Educational Institutions in General</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional &amp; Uncertain</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability &amp; Efficiency Concerns</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructional Concerns</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness, Expertise &amp; Experience</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation Toward National Development</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Flexibility</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities, Technical &amp; Finances</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of Interests &amp; Priorities</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Elite (educated &amp; educator)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Relation With Other Forces Active in Iran</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* X = responses in subcategory/total "Educational Force" responses for Section
Results. First, the median for the likelihood of operationalizing the overall Plan in respect to the Educational Force was computed to be 2.8 or Neutral (See Table 165). Second, the subcategories contributing to such a likelihood were determined. By computing and ranking the percentages of contribution of those subcategories according to their values, their importance to the likelihood of Educational Force was determined and, then, their supportive or resisting roles were identified (See the last five columns of Table 166).
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter VI summarizes the purpose, procedure and results of the study. In addition, conclusions and recommendations are made.

The Study

In order to determine the nature and the roles of the acting forces in Iran which bear upon comprehensive reforms, this study was undertaken to assess the expert opinion of governmental officials of Iran about the likelihood of operationalizing a specific set of reforms, those in the plan proposed by the French Radical Party. The proposed plan is designed to enable a developing nation like Iran to avoid ill-effects of industrialization and economic development suffered by the developed nations.

The proposed plan suggests the kind of programs—twenty-two programs in four sections—which, if attempted, will arouse the assistance or resistance of the acting forces in the country. According to national planning experts, it is the assistance or the resistance of the five political, financial, administrative, socio-cultural, and educational forces acting in the developing countries which determines the success or the failure of any national plans. Therefore, this study was designed to assess the degree to which these forces bear upon reform in Iran. The particular plan was chosen as a focus for the study because its components cover a wide range of social, economic and political factors; thus, it caused respondents to think broadly about many issues related to reform in any...
developing nation. The study did not advocate this particular plan, but utilized it as a stimulus for eliciting "open-ended" responses to a comprehensive set of issues impinging upon social change in the developing nations.

More specifically, the objective of this study was first, to provide answers to the following questions:

What do the respondents perceive to be the likelihood of operationalizing each one of the twenty-two programs?

What do the respondents perceive to be the likelihood of operationalizing each one of the four sections of the plan?

What do the respondents perceive to be the likelihood of operationalizing the overall plan?

and second, as a result of the answers to the above questions, provide answers to the following:

What force(s) do the respondents perceive as most supportive to such a plan?

What force(s) do the respondents perceive as most resistant to such reforms?

Procedure

This study was conducted in Teheran, Iran. For the purpose of gathering appropriate information, two problems had to be overcome: development and validation of an appropriate instrument, and second, identification of the appropriate respondents.

The first problem was overcome by constructing a questionnaire. By converting the twenty-two programs of the plan proposed by the French Radical Party into twenty-two questions, an open-ended questionnaire was constructed. The questionnaire was revised after a pilot study.

The second problem was overcome with the assistance of four prominent administrators in the Plan and Budget Organization of Iran.
A panel of eighty governmental officials were selected as respondents for the study (See Chapter IV for full description of the procedure).

The information gathered through the questionnaire was subjected to content analysis (See Chapter IV for complete discussion of the method of analysis).

Findings

The analysis of data yielded these findings:

1. The likelihood of operationalizing each one of the twenty-two programs in respect to the five prospective forces was as follows:


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Force</th>
<th>Financial Force</th>
<th>Administrative Force</th>
<th>Socio-Cultural Force</th>
<th>Educational Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Like- ly(4.0)</td>
<td>Like- ly(4.5)</td>
<td>Unlike- ly(2.1)</td>
<td>Like- ly(4.3)</td>
<td>Unlike- ly(1.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Job Distribution</td>
<td>Like- ly(3.7)</td>
<td>Like- ly(4.3)</td>
<td>Unlike- ly(1.9)</td>
<td>Like- ly(4.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Open Competition</td>
<td>Like- ly(3.6)</td>
<td>Unlike- ly(3.5)</td>
<td>Unlike- ly(2.5)</td>
<td>Like- ly(3.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Unemployment Insurance</td>
<td>Like- ly(3.9)</td>
<td>Like- ly(3.8)</td>
<td>Like- ly(2.1)</td>
<td>Unlike- ly(4.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Income Redistribution</td>
<td>Like- ly(3.6)</td>
<td>Neutral ly(3.5)</td>
<td>Unlikely ly(1.6)</td>
<td>Like- ly(4.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Flexible Retirement Age</td>
<td>Like- ly(3.8)</td>
<td>Very ly(2.5)</td>
<td>Unlike- ly(3.8)</td>
<td>Neutral ly(3.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Women's Employment</td>
<td>Unlike- ly(2.2)</td>
<td>Unlike- ly(2.0)</td>
<td>Neutral ly(2.7)</td>
<td>Unlike- ly(1.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Section II
**Objective:** Access to Social Equality.

**Programs:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Early Childhood Education</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Unlike-</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Unlike-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.1)</td>
<td>(3.0)</td>
<td>(2.5)</td>
<td>(4.6)</td>
<td>(2.1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Strengthening Families</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Like-</td>
<td>Like-</td>
<td>(4.8)</td>
<td>(4.8)</td>
<td>(3.0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Universal Public Education</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Unlike-</th>
<th>Like</th>
<th>Unlike-</th>
<th>Very Unlikely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Like-</td>
<td>(3.7)</td>
<td>(4.8)</td>
<td>(2.2)</td>
<td>(4.2)</td>
<td>(2.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Open College Education</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Unlike-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Very Unlikely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Like-</td>
<td>(3.6)</td>
<td>(3.2)</td>
<td>(1.8)</td>
<td>(3.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Section III
**Objective:** The End of Hereditary Private Power.

**Programs:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Strengthening Trade Unions</th>
<th>Unlike-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Unlike-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.2)</td>
<td>(3.1)</td>
<td>(2.4)</td>
<td>(2.8)</td>
<td>(2.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Participative Management</th>
<th>Unlike-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Unlike-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.3)</td>
<td>(2.9)</td>
<td>(2.1)</td>
<td>Like-</td>
<td>(3.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. No Inherited Ownership</th>
<th>Unlike-</th>
<th>Unlike-</th>
<th>Unlike-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.1)</td>
<td>(2.4)</td>
<td>(1.9)</td>
<td>Like-</td>
<td>(3.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Limited Inheritance</th>
<th>Unlike-</th>
<th>Unlike-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.7)</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
<td>(2.6)</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>(3.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Section IV
**Objective:** Redistribution of Public Power.

**Programs:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Decentralized Government</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Unlike-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.5)</td>
<td>(3.4)</td>
<td>(1.8)</td>
<td>(3.4)</td>
<td>(2.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Decentralized Problem Solving</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Unlike-</th>
<th>Like-</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.3)</td>
<td>(4.1)</td>
<td>(1.9)</td>
<td>(4.0)</td>
<td>(2.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. The likelihood of operationalizing each one of the four sections, of the plan in respect to the five prospective forces was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Political Force</th>
<th>Financial Force</th>
<th>Administrative Force</th>
<th>Socio-cultural Force</th>
<th>Educational Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Like-ly(3.7)</td>
<td>Like-ly(4.2)</td>
<td>Unlike-ly(2.3)</td>
<td>Like-ly(3.9)</td>
<td>Neutral (2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Like-ly(3.9)</td>
<td>Very Like-ly(4.7)</td>
<td>Unlike-ly(2.4)</td>
<td>Very Like-ly(4.56)</td>
<td>Unlike-ly(2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Unlike-ly(2.1)</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Unlike-ly(2.7)</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Neutral (3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Neutral (3.4)</td>
<td>Like-ly(3.8)</td>
<td>Unlike-ly(2.06)</td>
<td>Like-ly(3.8)</td>
<td>Neutral (2.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The likelihood of operationalizing the overall plan in respect to the five prospective forces was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Overall Plan</th>
<th>Political Force</th>
<th>Financial Force</th>
<th>Administrative Force</th>
<th>Socio-cultural Force</th>
<th>Educational Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Like-ly(3.57)</td>
<td>ly(3.7)</td>
<td>ly(2.2)</td>
<td>ly(3.9)</td>
<td>Neutral (2.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discussion of Findings

The findings permit tentative answers to the following questions:

What force(s) did the respondents perceive as most supportive to the proposed plan?

What force(s) did the respondents perceive as most resistant to the proposed plan?

Among the five prospective forces, socio-cultural and financial were the most and political was somewhat supportive of the proposed plan. The educational force was neutral and the administrative force was most resisting. The following is a presentation of the degree of assistance or resistance of the five forces.

**Socio-Cultural Force.** With a median of 3.9 (Likely) socio-cultural force was perceived by the respondents as providing greatest support for operationalizing the proposed plan. Sixty-four per cent of the respondents reported this force as supportive, fourteen per cent neutral and twenty-two per cent resisting.

Based on the findings, the major elements of the socio-cultural force in respect to the proposed plan were identified and ranked in the following order in terms of the power they exert. It may be seen from the percentages of respondents who reported those elements as "supportive" or "resisting" (shown on the right) that not all of them are supportive of the plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resistant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainties</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The willingness of the socio-cultural force as a whole as reported by the respondents:

2. Uncertainties concerning the outcome of implementation of the proposed plan:
3. The role of financial interest groups in implementation of the proposed plan: 8.5 33.5 58

4. The role of religion, tradition, and culture: 32 17 51

5. Reaction of the social groups in respect to the need of the country for development: 99 0 1

6. The degree of public demand for the changes proposed by the plan: 96 0 4

7. Reaction of the social groups, especially, the salary earners, in respect to the present state of economy and income: 80 4 16

8. Reaction of the social groups, especially the workers and farmers, in respect to the present conditions for labor force and labor market: 95 0 5

9. The degree of public awareness of the need for change: 37 43 20

10. Reaction of the social force in respect to the degree of public satisfaction and dissatisfaction of the present state of affairs: 80 11 9

11. In capability of the social groups to contribute to implementation of the proposed plan under the present circumstances: 0 48 52

12. Need for changes in the present socioeconomic class stratification as suggested by the proposed plan: 88 4 8

13. Reaction of the social groups to the proposed plan with respect to the influence of other forces, especially political and financial forces, upon it: 44 8 48

14. Disinterest and cynicism of the social groups toward change, due to their pessimistic view of the ongoing state of affairs: 0 80 20
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resistant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15. Reaction of the intellectual groups:</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Reaction of the organized groups</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Reaction of the different social groups in respect to diversity of their interests, attitudes and priorities:</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Reaction of the social groups in respect to the influence of the government upon them:</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Reaction of the professional groups:</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It seems that the intellectual groups (item 15), organized groups (16), and the general public (1), especially the working people (3) who make up the largest segment of the population, are most supportive of the proposed reforms. The reasons seem to be the public dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs (10), need of the country for development (5), the state of the economy and the level of income (7), the socio-economic class stratification (12) and the conditions of the labor force and the labor market (8) which raise demand for change on the part of socio-cultural groups in Iran (6).

The findings also indicate that the major interest groups (3), professional groups (19) and the religious, traditional and cultural boundaries (4) are most resisting to the proposed reforms. Such resistance seems to be enhanced by the influence of other forces, especially political and financial (13) and the ruling government (18), upon the social groups. This makes the groups incapable of initiating or proposing ideas for the process of change in the country (11).

As the percentages of "neutral" position of the social groups indicate,
it seems that the willingness and the demand of the public for change encountered by the aforementioned resisting elements, have resulted in public cynicism and disinterest (14), and lack of public awareness of the process of change (9). Such disinterest, in turn, seems to have amounted to diversity of public interest, attitude and priorities (17) which resulted in uncertainties among the social groups concerning the outcome of plans for change (2).

Furthermore, as the ranked order of the elements of the socio-cultural force indicates those elements, such as general public and intellectual groups, with the highest support for change, have the least important roles to play in making decisions concerning socio-cultural affairs.

Financial Force. With a median of 3.7 (Likely) the financial force was perceived by the respondents as providing the second greatest support for operationalizing the proposed plan. Fifty-five per cent of the respondents reported this force as supportive, twenty-one per cent neutral and twenty-four per cent resisting.

Based on the findings, the major elements of the financial force in respect to the proposed plan were identified and ranked in the following order in terms of the power they exert. It may be seen from the percentages of respondents who reported those elements as "supportive" or "resisting" (shown on the right) that not all of them are supportive of the plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Resisting</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of conformity of the present financial policies with those proposed by the plan:</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial prosperity of the Iranian government, especially due to the oil and gas revenues:</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Uncertainties concerning the outcome of the implementation of the proposed plan: 53 25.5 21.5

4. Role of financial powers in the private sector in formulation and implementation of the financial policies: 9.5 4.5 86

5. The interest of the financial policy makers in changing the present financial system: 0 92 8

6. Capacity of financial management agencies of the government in allocation of funds for new national plans: 69 14 17

7. Reaction of financial advisors in respect to the impact of the proposed plan upon the economic system and investment: 19 11 70

8. Reaction of financial system in respect to its capability and efficiency for proper fundings of the modern programs: 15 31 54

9. Reaction of the financial forces in respect to their priorities for allocation of funds: 0 25 75

10. The role of different interest groups in formulating financial policies proposed by the plan: 45 10 45

Based on the findings, the financial force seems to be supportive of the proposed plan. But, such support is mostly due to the financial prosperity of the government (2) rather than its efforts to fund programs for reform in a proper manner (8). The government enjoys financial prosperity—mainly due to oil and gas revenues—(2), the financial management agencies (6) have capacity to allocate funds for developmental plans (6), and the degree of conformity of the present financial policies with those suggested by the plan indicates such a capacity (1). But, the priorities of government in financial policy making (9), the economic system and investment
concerns (7), and the financial powers in the private sectors (4) are elements which resist the proposed plan. Such resistance, in turn, seems to make the financial management agencies incapable of proper allocation of funds (8) which makes the outcome of implementation of the proposed plan uncertain (3).

Furthermore, the financial force seems to be uninterested in implementation of the proposed plan (5) which is mostly stemmed from disinterest of the different interest groups (10), especially the financial interest groups (4), in such a plan for change in the financial system.

**Political Force.** With a median of 3.57 (Likely) the political force was perceived by the respondents as somewhat supportive of operationalization of the proposed plan. Fifty-three per cent of the respondents reported this force as supportive, nine per cent neutral and thirty-eight per cent resisting.

Based on the findings, the major elements of the political force in respect to the proposed plan were identified and ranked in following order in terms of the power they exert. It may be seen from the percentages of the respondents who reported those elements as "supportive" or "resisting" (shown on the right) that not all of them are supportive of the plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suppor-</th>
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<tr>
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<td>%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The degree of conformity of the present national policies of the Shah with those suggested by the proposed plan: 70 5 25

2. Uncertainties concerning the outcome of implementation of the proposed plan: 35 35 30

3. The role of the major interest groups in the political system in respect to national policy making: 9.5 9.5 81
4. Concern of the government, especially the Shah for socio-economic development of the country: 45 10 45

5. The degree of capability and efficiency of the executive branch of the government in pursuing implementation of the national plans: 7 3 90

6. National planners view of the programs of the proposed plan in respect to their necessity: 3 35 62

7. Reaction of the political parties to implementation of such a plan: 72 4 24

8. The role of the national leaders in the executive branch of the government, especially the shah, in implementation of such plans: 68 8 24

9. Reaction of national decision makers in respect to their priorities: 8 29 63

10. Reaction of the ruling government to such a plan in respect to the public demand for change: 57 5 37

11. The role of the parliament and the law in implementation of such a plan: 75 0 25

Although the median indicates a supportive position for the political force, it seems that this force is not capable of pursuing reforms such as those suggested by the proposed plan. Based on the findings, the national leaders (item 8), particularly the Shah who solely initiates the current national policies and has the last word on all the major decisions (1), are supportive of the proposed plan. The political parties (7) and the parliament (11) are also for reform in the country, however, as the ranked order of the elements of the political force indicates, their roles are not significant.
The interest groups, especially the financial powers (3), in respect to their priorities, are most resisting to the proposed plan. This seems to cause uncertainties concerning the outcome of the implementation of the proposed plan (2) and incapability of the political system in pursuing it (5).

Based on the findings, it seems that consideration of socio-cultural development of the country is not the major reason for the political system's supportive or resisting role concerning the proposed plan (4). But, it is the influence of the major interest groups (3) in/on the government in maintaining their present position which is the decisive factor concerning change in the country (9). Thus, any reform which could not endanger such interests would secure the support of the political system. On the other hand, any reform which could be in conflict with such interests would be rejected.

Educational Force. With a median of 2.8 (Neutral) the educational force was perceived by the respondents as a neutral force in respect to the proposed plan. Sixteen per cent of the respondents reported this force as supportive, forty-nine per cent neutral and thirty-five per cent resisting.

Based on the findings, the major elements of the educational force in respect to the proposed plan were identified and ranked in following order in terms of the power they exert. It may be seen from the percentages of the respondents who reported those elements as "supportive" or "resisting" (shown on the right) that not all of them are neutral.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Suppor-</th>
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</table>

1. Disinterest of the educational policy makers in implementation of the proposed plan: 0 95.5 4.5
2. Incapacity and inefficiency of school administrators and educational policy makers to contribute to implementation of the proposed plan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resistant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The degree of willingness and demand of the educational institutions for change in the present situation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resistant</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
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</table>

4. Uncertainties of the educational planners concerning the outcome of the proposed plan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resistant</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>19</td>
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</table>

5. The capacity of the educational system to train competent teachers, technicians and skilled manpower as required by the proposed plan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resistant</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>62.5</td>
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</table>

6. The degree of awareness, expertise and experience on the part of educational decision makers and school administrators necessary for implementation of the proposed plan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resistant</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

7. The degree of sufficiency of facilities, techniques and finance in the educational system for contributing to the implementation of the proposed plan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resistant</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Reaction of the educational system, especially the Ministry of Education in respect to the influence of the other forces, particularly the political force, upon it:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resistant</th>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
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</table>

9. Insufficiency of instructional cadres in the educational institutions:

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<tr>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resistant</th>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>90</td>
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</table>

10. Orientation of school programs toward development in terms of their contribution to implementation of national plans:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resistant</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>64.5</td>
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</table>

11. Diversity of interests, attitudes and priorities among the school administrators, especially those in the private schools:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resistant</th>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
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</table>
12. Demand of the educational elite (educated and educator) for change: 76 6 18
13. The degree of sufficiency of the existing trained manpower produced by the educational system to contribute to implementation of national plans: 0 0 100
14. Capacity of vocational and technical schools: 10 0 90
15. Capacity of higher education institutions in terms of both the size and the quality of education for providing the graduates with the knowledge suitable for implementation of national plans: 22.5 22.5 50
16. The capacity of professional schools in terms of providing professionals with regard to the country's needs: 30 0 70
17. The degree of flexibility of educational institutions to change: 9 18 73
18. Capacity of the schools for providing basic education for all people: 66.5 0 33.5

Although the median of the likelihood indicates a neutral position for the educational force, the discussion of the findings seems to reveal a rather resisting position for this force. The reason for neutrality of this force seems to be the incapability and inefficiency of educational system to contribute to the process of national development (item 2) such incapability causes disinterest which results in the educational system assuming a neutral stand in respect to the process of change (1). This, in turn, makes the outcome of its contribution to implementation of national plans uncertain.

Based on the findings, the educational institutions (3) and the educational elite—educated and educator—(12) are willing to change, but the following seem to be the obstacles. The findings indicate a sufficient capacity for basic education (18), but an insufficient capacity for vocational and
technical, professional (16), and higher education (15) on the part of educational system. Such insufficiency seems to be due to the shortage of teaching and training cadres (9), competent school administrators, expert educational policy makers (6), facilities, techniques and finance (7).

Incapability and insufficiency of the educational system, compounded by its inflexibility to change (17), mainly due to the influence of the political force (8), seems to have resulted in diverse interests and attitudes among the educational institutions (11) which imposes a neutral position upon it in respect to the process of national development (5). As a result, the educational system is not oriented toward national development (10), and cannot produce sufficient trained manpower to contribute to the national development (13).

Administrative Force. With a median of 2.2 (Unlikely) the administrative force was perceived by the respondents as most resisting to operationalization of the proposed plan. Ten per cent of the respondents reported this force as supportive, twenty-six per cent neutral, and sixty-four per cent resisting.

Based on the findings, the major elements of the educational force in respect to the proposed plan were identified and ranked in the following order in terms of the power they exert. It may be seen from the percentages of respondents who reported those elements as "supportive" or "resisting" (shown on the right) that not all of them are resisting to the plan.

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1. The degree of willingness, motivation and initiation for change in the administrative institutions of the government: 11 65 24
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resistive</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Incapability and inefficiency of administrative units in implementing the proposed plan:</td>
<td>6 10 84</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Insufficiency of professional skills, methods and expertise in the executive departments:</td>
<td>6 6 88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Personnel practice and staff adequacy:</td>
<td>19 6.5 84.5</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The degree of awareness and responsibility of the executive departments concerning implementation of the proposed plan:</td>
<td>8 55 37</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Insufficient administrative and management talents:</td>
<td>2 3 95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Insufficient capacity to manage skilled personnel for implementation of national plans, and to provide provision for their training:</td>
<td>9 4 77</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Inefficiency of the administrative departments due to the influence of other forces, especially political and financial, upon it in respect to implementation of national plans:</td>
<td>35.5 14.5 50</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Inefficiency due to complexity of the bureaucratic system:</td>
<td>6 14 80</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Lack of coordination among different bodies of the administrative system:</td>
<td>0 17 83</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Existence of corruption in the administrative system and its impact upon implementation of national plans:</td>
<td>3.5 6.5 90</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Insufficient qualified organizational units to undertake the activities for implementation of national plans:</td>
<td>10 19 71</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Insufficient experience of the administrative units in implementation of national plans:</td>
<td>8.5 8.5 83</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Insufficient administrative facilities to carry out the implementation of national plans:</td>
<td>41.5 0 58.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Inflexibility of the rules and regulations of the administrative system:</td>
<td>23 7 70</td>
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</table>
The administrative force seems to be most resisting to the process of change in Iran. None of the fifteen elements of the administrative force was supportive of the proposed plan. Based on the findings, the low degree of willingness, motivation and initiation (1), compounded by the lack of awareness and interest in assuming responsibility (5), seems to give the administrative system a resisting position in respect to implementation of national plans.

What makes this force incapable to contribute to the process of change is the insufficiency of facilities (14), experience (13), skilled staff (4), organizational units (12), professional administrative and management talents (6), expertise (3), and lack of ability to provide them (7). Such poor conditions, along with bureaucratic complexity (9), rigidity of the rules and regulations (15), and the lack of coordination (10) seem to impose a resisting position upon the administrative system in respect to implementation of national plans (2).

Another reason seems to be the influence of other forces acting in the country, especially political and financial forces (8), which makes the administrative system less efficient and more susceptible to change through corruption, graft, favoritism and bribery (11).

Conclusions

Based on the analysis of data and the findings of the study, several conclusions may be drawn. The conclusions are as follows:

1. The socio-cultural groups in Iran seems to be most willing to undertake reforms such as those suggested by the proposed plan.

2. The financial force in Iran enjoys prosperity, mainly due to
oil and gas revenues, which could provide the implementation of national plans with sufficient funds.

3. The political force, although with reservations about some of the programs of the proposed plan, seems to be incapable of implementing fundamental reforms.

4. The educational force, due to its inadequacy and insufficiency, seems unable to contribute to the implementation of national plans. Therefore, assumes a neutral position.

5. The inept administrative force seems to be the most unqualified to contribute to the implementation of national plans. Therefore, it seems to be a major resistance to implementation of national plans.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are suggested for utilization of this study and for further research using similar data.

This study utilized a questionnaire as the instrument for the collection of data. It seems that, in respect to some possible political consequences, most respondents in the developing nations are apprehensive of who might view the data, and, therefore, won't personally write their opinions in the questionnaire. Accordingly, in conducting similar studies, it is recommended that other methods of data collection, preferably interview, be used.

In order to select appropriate respondents involved in national policy making in nations like Iran, it is recommended that respondents should not be selected solely from those who hold official positions. Because the national policy makers are not usually those who hold official positions. Others who contribute to making national policies should be identified prior to the selection of the respondents for the study.

At this point, there are two cautions to be considered in interpreting
the findings of the study.

First, although the respondents were selected from among those who are influential in the national policy making, it is important that their responses should not be necessarily considered as reflective of the total national policy making body in Iran. Because, this study utilized the opinions of only a particular stratum of decision makers who were selected by being considered as representing the views of the total policy makers in Iran. And, therefore, the findings reflect only the point of view of that particular segment. Thus, the generalizability of the findings of this study should be regarded with some degree of caution.

Second, the types of programs used in this study are only a few of the variety of reforms that might be instituted in the developing nations. Therefore, it is possible that the manner in which the forces influence those reforms would have differed sharply from the findings of this study.

The findings also seem to support the following conclusions and recommendations:

1. It appears that the financial prosperity which is considered as the major factor for national development of Iran does not necessarily guarantee the achievement of developmental goals. The findings of this study further indicate that, although there is financial prosperity and the political and socio-cultural forces are conducive to implementing national plans for change, the inadequacy and inefficiency of the administrative system can impede the process of development. Therefore, administrative reform seems crucial to the success of national reforms in Iran and perhaps in other developing nations.

2. Although the role of education could be immense in contributing to national development, the findings of this study suggest that education in Iran can not perform its function due to its insufficient capacity and its inadequacy. Therefore, it is recommended that educational reform should take place in order to support developmental goals.

3. Based on the findings of this study, the major deficiency of the administrative system is its lack of skilled and trained
personnel. Therefore it is recommended that the educational system could contribute much to national development by developing competent administrative personnel.

4. As far as the process of change is concerned, it is recommended that the willingness and the readiness of the socio-cultural groups combined with the available financial prosperity could maximize the capacity and efficiency of the educational system, hence, the administrative system. Such capability and efficiency then would minimize the influence of those elements in the political system which are resisting to change.
APPENDIX A

THE INSTRUMENT
QUESTIONNAIRE

A STUDY OF THE NATURE OF THE FORCES
THAT AID OR RESIST DEVELOPMENT IN
IRAN

INTRODUCTION: This is a study to determine the nature of the forces that exist in Iran to aid or to resist development in several dimensions of social, economic and political life. You can help more than other people because of your knowledge of your country. Will you help by completing this questionnaire?

INSTRUCTION: This questionnaire consists of 22 questions relating to the programs to be implemented for further development in Iran. The questions are divided into four sections. Each question has four parts as shown in the following sample:

A. The description of a program
B. A list of five forces in the country
C. A box in which you use to assess the likelihood of each force aiding or resisting the program
D. The line on which you are to list reasons why you feel the force will aid or resist the adoption of the program

Here is what you are asked to do:

First, read the program.

Second, use the following definitions for the five forces, and decide how each one might influence the adoption of the particular program IN YOUR COUNTRY.

Political Force. The tendency of the political system - individuals, organized groups, and the policymaking structure of government - towards change.

Financial Force. The ability of national government to fund the implementation of reformative programs.

Administrative Force. The reservoirs of trained and technically expert personnel in the political, commercial and industrial institutions to manage the change.

Socio-cultural Force. The reactions of purposefully organized groups towards the welfare of others - either the welfare of the whole society or its less privileged members - in regard to their normative and cognitive patterns.

Educational Force. The capacity of educational institutions to provide the community with capability for adapting to the change by enabling its members to meet the requirements that change demands.
Third, using the following scale, put a number in each box to show the likelihood of that force aiding or resisting the adoption of the program IN YOUR COUNTRY:

5- very likely to aid
4- likely to aid
3- neither aid nor resist
2- unlikely to aid(likely to resist)
1- very unlikely to aid(very likely to resist)

Fourth, on the line after each box, write specifically why you think the force will aid or resist of adoption of the program IN YOUR COUNTRY.

The questionnair takes some of your time, but your knowledge is most useful. Thank you for helping with this research into the forces that influence social and economic development in Iran.
SECTION I

Program 1: The community shall cease to subsidize those undertakings which do not develop human resources. The state subsidies shall be replaced by investment in safeguarding and development of human capital in order to transform the human conditions of economic development.

Question. What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the five following forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Why?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
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<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Program 2: Economic development and acceleration of technological progress requires an increasing redistribution of jobs between the different sectors of activity. Therefore, professional mobility shall be facilitated through the continued readaptation of the employment structure and individual promotion.

Question. What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the five following forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Why?</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
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<td>Administrative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
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<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Program 3: The capitalist undertakings incapable of developing the most open competition shall be eliminated except those which can improve urban and rural areas in regard to their needs identified by the local authorities. Nationalized and mixed undertakings shall be subject to the same rule of open competition.

Question: What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the five following forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Why?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Financial</td>
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<td>Socio-cultural</td>
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<td>Educational</td>
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</table>

Program 4: Any wage earner who might lose his livelihood through technological change shall be entitled to the fullest support from his country; material losses inherent in this change shall be compensated, and vocational training shall be provided for those involved in order to have qualifications for a better occupation.

Question: What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the five following forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Why?</th>
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</table>
Program 5: A vertical redistribution from the richest to the poorest shall be insured through the agency of the state which shall finance the institution of a guaranteed minimum wage by means, especially, of progressively graduated tax deduction from income. It shall pay an income to all those whose resources do not exceed a threshold and who receive practically nothing from the system.

Question. What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the five following forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
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Program 6: Many people, especially of the working class, start work from the very early ages. These people are often exhausted physically around the age of fifty. To them shall be paid a pension at the age of physical exhaustion. It means that the age of retirement shall be flexible.

Question. What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the five following forces:

<table>
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<th>Forces</th>
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Program 7: The real condition and aspiration of the working women shall be taken into consideration: those women who wish to stay home for the purpose of bringing up their children shall be allowed to do so between the age of 20 and 40. Society shall pay them a substantial allowance throughout this period. But, if they resume working, they shall be trained to learn a trade. The tax liability of business undertakings shall be modified to induce them to employ minimum percentage of these women.

Question. What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the five following forces:

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SECTION II

Program 2: There shall be massive investment in prescholastic establishments. This is a bigger problem in the lower classes where children are deprived of natural cultural environment. Therefore, the highest possible rates of enrollment in prescholastic establishments shall be achieved in areas of cultural poverty, in working class suburbs of the cities, and the least-advanced rural areas.

Question. What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the five following forces:

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</table>
Program 2: Actually, there are two sorts of families: those who have the time and the means to give their children an education and those who do not. The government shall compensate for the deficiencies of the latter families.

**Question.** What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the five following forces:

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Program 3: There shall be introduced freedom of initiative and a certain degree of competition within the public education system and also an overall cultural policy in which youth and popular education movements will receive financial resources in proportion to the importance of their task.

**Question.** What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the five following forces:

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Program I: The system of higher education shall be changed in such a way which will demolish the hereditary transmission of power from the certain classes of one generation to the same classes of the next generation. Therefore, there is a need for an alternative method of selection for entering the universities. Accordingly, there shall be no entrance examination, and the selections shall be made on the basis of marks, school teachers' recommendations, and other qualifications.

Question. What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the following forces:

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SECTION III

Program II: The starting point of any democratization of economic power is to extend the role of the trade union inside the enterprise itself. Therefore, trade unions shall be established, and if they already exist, shall be united and helped to be extricated from condition of poverty and underequipment, so that they could negotiate everything that affects the conditions of workers.

Question. What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the following forces:

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Program 2: There shall be participation of representatives of all the employees, first in the choice of management, and second in regular deliberation.

Question. What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the following forces:

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Program 3: Under the law of averages, the heir to a business enterprise is unlikely to be its best pilot. Besides, business success is increasingly the work of salaried employees for their competence, outside the circle of hereditary owners. Furthermore, each generation needs to challenge all acquired positions to redistribute wealth and to renew its leaders. Accordingly, the hereditary transmission of the ownership of the means of production shall be abolished.

Question. What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the following forces:

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Program 4: Death duties, or estate duties, allow the full right to property. But there is a need to put an end to the hereditary ownership of the means of production. In order to achieve this end, the ordinary families inheritances shall be totally exempted within a limit which could be set as the total income which a wage earner at the bottom of the scale could earn throughout his life. The hereditary transmission of larger fortunes shall be altered once and for all. The heirs shall be entitled to a life interest only. Thus, the hereditary private ownership of the means of production will be abolished and the revenue obtained by the government can be allocated to the cultural and health projects.

Question: What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the five following forces:

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SECTION IV

Program 5: The urban and rural communes shall be permitted to regroup themselves in accordance with their wishes, state helping them or deputizing for them. The local representatives of these communes shall be able to make the human face of the administration.

Question: What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the five following forces:

| Forces          | Likelihood | Why?
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Program 2: Government's efforts for resolving problems such as traffic jams, noise, pollution, lack of open space, and providing facilities for sport and entertainment shall be made in a decentralized manner (at the local and regional levels); local authorities resolving the problems, state coordinating their efforts and helping them financially and technically if needed.

Question. What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the five following forces:

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Program 3: Freedom of initiative and real responsibility shall be given to elect representatives at the regional and communal levels, and therefore, they shall be free from paperwork and the need to obtain prior authorization from the central authorities. This innovation shall necessarily be translated into financial terms.

Question. What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the five following forces:

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**Program 4**: Local authorities shall be in a position to equip themselves with their own technical services. Therefore, an end shall be made of the quasi-monopoly of technical services by the central government. Some of the officials belonging to these services shall be assigned to the various regions, departments, and communes and placed under the exclusive hierarchical authority of their responsible elected representatives.

**Question**: What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the five following forces:

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**Program 5**: The income tax shall become a regional and communal tax. The local authorities shall have wide freedom of choice concerning optional taxes and dues. As for compulsory taxes, those which affect the pockets of taxpayers most closely - especially the income tax payable by individual taxpayers - shall be employed to finance expenditures which are immediately apparent and clearly identifiable.

**Question**: What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the five following forces:

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Program 6: The undergrowth of piecemeal state subventions shall be swept away and a single global subvention shall be paid by the state to all the local authorities in a single region. Its amount to be determined largely in terms of the policy of territorial development with the purpose of countering the inequalities of development between various regions of the nation.

Question. What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the five following forces:

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Program 7: The vitality of local authorities is not enough to counter the natural aggressiveness of industrial firms and bureaucratic centralization. Accordingly, the citizens shall be free to find new reasons for living by participating in various sorts of voluntary groups and organizations born out of free initiative. Their multiple networks of influence will establish the bases of a functional democracy.

Question. What is the likelihood of operationalizing this program in your country in respect to the five following forces:

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Dear Gentlemen:

As you certainly know, design and implementation of programs for reform are essential to the development of the developing countries. But, the implementation of such programs is usually impeded or enhanced by different forces which exist in those countries. Therefore, it is important that the nature of those forces be recognized and their roles be considered in any national planning.

As a Ph.D. candidate at the Ohio State University, U.S., I am undertaking a study to determine the nature of the political, financial, administrative, socio-cultural and educational forces acting in Iran. Because of your knowledge of our country, you can help me with this endeavor more than other people.

Enclosed is a questionnaire to be completed and returned to me not later than September 30, 1974. The questionnaire will take some of your time, but your response will be most useful to this study.

I hope that my endeavor, with your cooperation, will result in a better recognition of the nature of the forces acting in Iran. It is needless to mention that such recognition is crucial to the national planning of any developing country such as Iran.

I hereby extend to you my appreciation for your most useful cooperation. Thank you very much.

Sincerely Yours,

Abbas Sadraei
The Ohio State University
Room 211 Oxley Hall
1712 Neil Avenue
Columbus, Ohio 43210
U.S.
APPENDIX C

SUBCATEGORIES DESIGNED PRIOR TO THE STUDY
SUBCATEGORIES DESIGNED PRIOR TO THE STUDY

Category I
Political Force

Subcategories:

1. National Leaders
2. Parliament
3. Political Parties
4. Country's Political, Ideological and Military Alliance
5. International Relations

Category II
Financial Force

Subcategories:

1. Financial Capacity of Public Sector
2. Financial Cooperation of Private Sector
3. The Capacity of Financial Management Agencies
4. Foreign Aid

Category III
Administrative Force

Subcategories:

1. Personnel Practice
2. Dilatory Procedures
3. Coordination
4. Public Administration and the Public
5. Inadequate Organizations

Category IV
Socio-Cultural Force

Subcategories:

1. Trade Unions
2. Religions
3. Intellectual Associations
4. Major Interest Groups
5. Professional Organizations
6. Private Social Institutions
7. General Satisfaction with the Existing State of Affairs
8. Cultural Diversity

Category V
Educational Force

Subcategories:

1. Existing Trained Manpower
2. The Human Potential to be Transferred into Competence
3. The Proportion of GNP Spent on Education
4. The Capacity of Vocational and Technical Schools
5. The Capacity of Higher Education Institutions
6. The Capacity of Professional Schools
APPENDIX D

SUBCATEGORIES DESIGNED DURING THE ANALYSIS
SUBCATEGORIES DESIGNED DURING THE ANALYSIS

Category I
Political Force
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Subcategories:

1. National Leaders
2. Parliament and the Law
3. Political Parties
4. Priority Concerns
5. Conditional and Uncertain
6. Interest Groups
7. Public Demand
8. Consideration of Social and Economic Development
9. Degree of Conformity With Present Trend & Existing Policies
10. Capability and Efficiency Concerns
11. Unnecessary
12. Miscellaneous

Category II
Financial Force
---
Subcategories:

1. Financial Capacity of Public Sector
2. Financial Cooperation of Private Sector & Financially Powerful
3. Capacity of Financial Management Agencies
4. Conditional and Uncertain
5. Capability and Efficiency Concerns
6. Economic and Investment Concerns
7. Major Interest Groups
8. Degree of Conformity with Present Trend & Existing Policies
9. Priority Concerns
10. Disinterest
11. Irrelevance
12. Miscellaneous

Category III
Administrative Force
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Subcategories:
1. Personnel Practice and Staff Adequacy
2. Administrative and Management Talents
3. Coordination
4. Organizational Sufficiency
5. Degree of Willingness, Motivation & Initiation
6. Capability and Efficiency Concerns
7. Responsibility and Awareness
8. Professional Skills, Methods and Expertise
9. Availability of Facilities
10. Capacity for Training & Managing Manpower
11. Corruption
12. Experience
13. Bureaucracy Concerns
14. Degree of Flexibility of the Rules and Regulations
15. In Relation With Other Forces Acting In the Country

Category IV
Socio-Cultural Force

Subcategories:

1. Willingness of Social Groups in General
2. Intellectual Groups
3. Major Interest Groups
4. Professional Groups
5. Organized Groups
6. Diversity of Interest, Attitudes and Priorities
7. Religious, Traditional and Cultural Concerns
8. Disinterest and Cynicism
9. Development Concerns
10. In Relation to Government's Influence
11. Public Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction
12. Public Demand and Need
13. Labor Force and Labor Market Concerns
14. Economic and Income Concerns
15. Conditional and Uncertain
16. Degree of Public Awareness
17. Capability Concerns
18. Class Concerns
19. In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran
20. Miscellaneous
Category V
Educational Force
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Subcategories:

1. The Existing Trained Manpower
2. Capacity to Transfer Human Potential Into Competence
3. Capacity of Schools for General Education
4. Capacity of Vocational and Technical Schools
5. Capacity of Higher Education Institutions
6. Capacity of Professional Schools
7. Willingness and Demand of Educational Institutions in General
8. Conditional and Uncertain
9. Capability and Efficiency Concerns
10. Instructional Concerns
11. Awareness, Expertise and Experience
12. Orientation Toward National Development
13. Degree of Flexibility
14. Facilities, Techniques and Finances
15. Diversity of Interests and Priorities
16. Educational Elite (educated and educator)
17. In Relation With Other Forces Acting in Iran
18. Disinterest
19. Irrelevance
REFERENCES


