INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeen Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
ROSE, Patricia Terpack, 1948-

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1975
History, modern

Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

© Copyright by
Patricia Terpack Rose
1975
DESIGN AND EXPEDIENCY: THE OHIO STATE FEDERATION
OF LABOR AS A LEGISLATIVE LOBBY, 1883-1935

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Patricia Terpack Rose, A.B., M.A.

The Ohio State University
1975

Reading Committee:
Robert H. Bremner
Warren Van Tine
K. Austin Kerr

Approved By

Robert H. Bremner
Advisor
Department of History
I would like to acknowledge my debt to Robert H. Bremner and Dr. Warren Van Tine for their invaluable guidance and assistance in the preparation of this work. I would also like to thank the countless individuals who have helped me throughout my academic career and who must remain nameless because of their numbers. And finally, I wish to acknowledge my husband, Michael, who has been my greatest and most devoted supporter, and the working people of Ohio, who have contributed so greatly to making the lives of all Ohioans better.
October 9, 1948.................. Born - Youngstown, Ohio

1970.......................... A.B., Miami University, Oxford, Ohio

1970-1971...................... University Fellowship, The Ohio State University

1971........................... M.A., The Ohio State University

1971-1973...................... Graduate Assistant, Department of History, The Ohio State University

1973-1974...................... Dissertation Year Fellowship, The Ohio State University

1974-1975...................... Senior Researcher, Inter-governmental Personnel Program, State of Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: American History

American Social and Intellectual History, Professor Robert H. Bremner

American Urban History. Professor Richard Hopkins

The Emergence of Modern America. Professor Warren Van Tine

East Central Europe. Professor Carol Rogel
PREFACE

Today, the power and presence of the national A.F.L.-C.I.O. and the international unions tend to obscure from the general public the role of state federations of labor in the American labor movement. Since the New Deal, the lobbying activities of state federations relative to the national organizations have diminished as legislative initiative shifted from the states to the federal government. Yet before the "Roosevelt Revolution" and the abandonment of Samuel Gompers' philosophy of "voluntarism" by the national union leadership, labor's political clout was most often felt on the state and local level. This work examines labor's lobbying power through the early years of one state labor body, the Ohio State Federation of Labor.

While the study of a lobby might appear to the uninitiated to be a simple matter of determining what lobby represents what group and how effectively, to anyone who has ever acted as a lobbyist or examined the activities of a lobbyist, the real complexities of such an examination are immediately apparent. George Groat, an early student of labor's legislative work, stated in 1917,

So numerous and interwoven are the various interests represented in the legislative halls that to
single out any one of them and make a mathematical calculation of its force is impossible.¹

The complexity of determining the effectiveness or the power of a legislative lobby is compounded by the difficulty of measuring the role of public opinion, monitoring constantly shifting lobbying coalitions, discovering the personal quirks of individual legislators and deciding what is "interest" legislation and what is "other" legislation.

In light of these complexities, the problem of the student of lobbying is to discover how the lobbying group itself deals most effectively with these variables, how it brings order out of seeming chaos. From its establishment in 1883 through 1935, the Ohio State Federation of Labor sought to formulate such a plan to represent the interests of organized labor in Ohio's General Assembly. To a great extent, this search mirrors the common experiences of American labor in this early period. After flirtations with political partisanship, third parties and permanent coalitions, the Ohio Federation chose to follow a policy of enlightened self-interest, a philosophy of partisanship to principles, not to politics, and a program of expediency by design. This history of the Ohio State Federation of Labor is the history of the establishment and maturation of this philosophy and this program.
PREFACE: NOTES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table of Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. THE EARLY YEARS: 1883-1897</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THE LOBBYING CONTEXT: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHIO POLITICS: 1883-1935</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. TRANSITION AND TURMOIL: 1897-1909</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. DECADE OF TRIUMPH: 1910-1919</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE LEAN YEARS: 1920-1929</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. OPPORTUNITY AND DILEMMA: 1930-1935</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ohio’s Population Growth, 1880-1930............................</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Population of Ohio Ten Years and Over Engaged in Gainful Occupations.............</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ohio Senate, Party and Occupation, 69th to 91st Sessions...............</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ohio House, Party and Occupation, 69th to 91st Sessions...............</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Labor Supported Bills, 1909-1936..................................</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Senate Affirmative Votes By Party..................................</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Senate Affirmative Votes By Occupation..............................</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. House Affirmative Votes By Party....................................</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. House Affirmative Votes By Occupation................................</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Use of The Initiative And Referendum in Ohio........................</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ohio, prior to the Civil War, was primarily an agricultural state whose population lived overwhelmingly on family farms or in small towns which served the farming hinterland. While there were several large cities and small-scale iron and coal mining industries in the state, rapid urbanization and industrialization did not begin until after the War. Spurred by the vast influx of immigration, the presence of abundant natural resources and the manufacturing demands of the War, Ohio, by 1880, had become heavily urbanized and industrialized. In 1880 the value of manufacturing in the state was $348,298,390 while the value of farm products was $156,777,152. Since the decade preceding the War, the value of manufacturers had increased 5.5 times.¹

This growth was not limited to one industry or to particular geographic portions of the state. In the southwest, Cincinnati became a center for men's clothing, carriage and wagon making, brewing and saddlery and Dayton and Springfield, for agricultural implements; in the northwest, Toledo, for its glassmaking industries and as a major Great Lakes port; in the northeast, Cleveland, for transportation, oil refining and iron and steel production and Akron, Canton and
Youngstown, for iron, steel and rubber. Finally, virtually the entire southeastern portion of the state became a major supplier of coal for the nation.  

With this marked post-War growth, Ohio experienced not only the benefits of industrialization and urbanization but their attendant problems as well. Congestion, slums, crime and the demand for services increased in the cities as in an almost cyclic fashion people migrated seeking jobs and industries located near or in the cities to tap this labor pool. As the portion of the state's population employed in industry grew, industrial accidents, worker exploitation, unemployment, economic recession and depression and the political influence of employers on state and local government likewise grew. Ohioans became acutely aware of the extent of their dependence on industry when the nationwide industrial depressions of 1873-1874 and 1881-1884 severely crippled the state's economy.

As industrialization and its attendant problems increased, Ohioans, like their counterparts throughout the country, sought to respond to these changes. The resurgence of unionization in the state was particularly marked. Although there had been sporadic interest in unions prior to the Civil War, particularly in Cincinnati, this interest was short-lived. But by the mid-1870's membership, particularly under the Knights of Labor, again realized steady growth. During this period of the Knights ascendancy in the American
labor movement, their influence was especially significant in Ohio. In 1880, Ohio ranked fifth among the states in membership in the K of L, with heavy concentrations of Knights in Cleveland, Cincinnati and especially among the miners in the southeastern portion of the state.⁴

This growth of the Knights was complemented by the establishment of city central labor bodies or trade councils in the state's major cities. According to John R. Commons, "The first symptom of the upward trend in the labor movement was the rapid multiplication of the trade councils."⁵ The first council in Ohio, the Cincinnati Trades Assembly, was established in 1864 and within two decades there were city centrals in Columbus, Dayton, Cleveland and Portsmouth.⁶ These centrals or councils typically contained Knights' locals, independent workers' organizations and locals of the international trade unions. These bodies, in Ohio as in other cities throughout the nation, functioned initially as economic, political and legislative representatives of labor's interests.⁷ Gradually, however, as the number of union members increased, group functions became more specialized. With larger memberships, locals of the Knights of Labor and locals of the international trade unions, composed usually of workers in a common trade or industry and with common economic interests, increasingly assumed the role of the workers' economic advocates while the broader base of the city centrals made political and legislative activity their logical province. The concentration of power in the
state government, however, soon made these localized legislative and political activities inadequate.

The control of the states over the lives of their citizens was growing steadily throughout the 1870's and 1880's. In this period, before the emergence of big government on the federal level and before the spread of municipal home rule, the state was the most important governing body for most Americans. Special interest groups, in turn, were often the controlling powers in the state legislatures. The need for some group to represent labor on a state-wide basis was obvious.

Although some of the international labor brotherhoods were relatively large and powerful organizations by this time, they generally lacked the human and financial resources needed to lobby effectively in all state capitals. And the city centrals, while they might be influential, were limited in resources and geographic extent. The increasingly popular solution to this need for an effective labor lobby was the formation of state federations that would be the vehicles for concentrated and unified action.

The first state federation of labor in the United States was established in 1865 by unionists in New York to prevent the passage of an anti-strike bill in that state's legislature. The next federations were not established until 1879 in New Jersey and Massachusetts, but, in the next two decades, state labor federations multiplied rapidly. By
the early 1880’s, sentiment for the formation of a federation in Ohio was strong. A major factor in this movement was the increasing interest of the state in labor legislation. In 1874, the Ohio General Assembly had enacted a law forbidding employment of children under 18 in mines and in 1877 it established a state Bureau of Labor Statistics. By the early 1880’s the General Assembly was also seriously considering legislation requiring factory inspection and further limiting child labor. Labor needed some group to represent its views on this legislation before the Assembly.

Another factor was the failure of collective bargaining and strikes as labor tools. Many labor leaders and rank-and-file, like many of their non-union contemporaries in the late nineteenth century, feared powerful government and chose instead to rely upon collective bargaining and, in extreme situations, strikes to force employer compliance with their demands. In the late 1870’s and the early 1880’s, however, this belief was shaken by depressions and serious strike losses. The depressions of 1873-1874 and 1881-1884 put thousands out of work in Ohio and these unemployed would often replace recalcitrant or striking workers. Labor’s strike record was also increasingly dismal, particularly in the loss of the Hocking Valley miners’ strike and the Cincinnati Cigar Makers’ strike in 1884. Thus, labor in Ohio, despite its preference for voluntarism, was forced by necessity to turn to the government for help.
A final factor in the growing sentiment for a state federation was the influence of the Knights of Labor and the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions, the predecessor of the AFL, in Ohio. As noted earlier, the Knights had a large membership in the state and the several city centrals in the state were active in the establishment and support of the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions; both of these organizations encouraged the formation and activities of state political organizations.¹¹

The first concrete action toward this organization came from a city central body, the Columbus Trades Assembly. On March 12, 1883, the Assembly decided that the time for formation of a state-wide central body had come and that Columbus, as the state capital and a centrally located city, was ideal for a founding convention. On April 12, 1883, the Columbus Assembly issued a call to "The Organized Working People of Ohio," summoning each labor organization of whatever type in the state to send one representative to an Ohio State Labor Convention to meet June 24, 1883, in Columbus. The city trade and labor assemblies, because of their role in the early agitation for a state body, their strong position in the state labor movement and their previous experience in politics, were allowed three representatives each. On June 25, 1883, after a two day meeting, the Ohio State Trades and Labor Assembly, the OSTLA, was established in Union Hall in Columbus. Its chief function was to be as labor's lobby before the General Assembly.¹²
The OSTIA’s philosophy and methodology were based on non-partisanship and its structure was designed to carry out this focus. The rationale for this non-partisanship was simple. By the early 1880’s, all attempts to form labor third parties had been dismal failures, particularly because of the still predominantly agricultural character of American society and the similar lack of common interests between the farmers and the workers.\textsuperscript{13} In addition, unlike the situation in many other Western nations which developed labor parties, the American worker had gained his franchise early in the country’s history and had developed allegiances to the two major parties before he developed a strong labor consciousness. If the OSTIA were to support one party over another, it might well cause a serious splintering of the state labor movement.

To prevent politicking, the founding convention declared that any person who held any elective or appointed office under a political party would be ineligible for office in the labor assembly.\textsuperscript{14} The official policy would be one of rewarding the friends of labor and punishing its enemies whatever their political allegiances.

The OSTIA’s constitution provided for a governing body composed of a President, a Secretary and a Treasurer elected from the entire state, supplemented by a Vice-President chosen from each federal Congressional district in the state. The reason offered by the OSTIA’s founders for this vice-presidential structure was that this distribution of
officers insured that different occupations were represented. This rationale, however, was not entirely correct. Although coal mining was concentrated in the southeastern portion of the state, most types of industry were heterogeneously dispersed and no Congressional district could be characterized by any one industry. The probable reasons for this divided leadership structure were the desire of the founders to keep any one officer or coalition of officers from becoming too powerful by dividing their bases of support and the desire of the city central bodies to prevent centralization of power in one part of the state and their own loss of power locally. Thus, this governing structure was "due in part to the desire of the local power elite to maintain control, in part to fear of allowing outsiders lacking knowledge of local conditions to interfere in their (the city centrals) affairs, and in part to a belief that the problems did not warrant centralized control."

In this same vein, the OSTIA's constitution provided for a legislative board composed of one member from each of the seven state judicial districts, again supposedly representing different occupations. This board was to meet periodically and prepare and direct the passage of laws favorable to labor in the Ohio General Assembly.

Finally, the financial basis of the OSTIA was provided for through a yearly assessment on each member organization. Where a delegate represented more than one organization,
a fairly common occurrence, the assessment was levied per delegate.

Paralleling the unsure structural and financial bases of the new organization, its philosophy wavered between the demands of practicality and idealism. Dual currents of "pure and simple" unionism and broad reformism jockeyed for dominance in these early years, setting a pattern followed throughout the present—should labor seek a new society or a more equitable place in existing society.

With this untried structure and financial basis, guided by a general philosophy of non-partisanship and advocating a mixture of narrow economic and broad social reform, the OSTIA began its career as a legislative agent in the General Assembly. But while it was somewhat unsure of how to pursue its ends, it was sure of the ends to be pursued—the basic areas of labor's legislative concern from 1883 to 1897 set the pattern followed for succeeding years.

A primary goal of the OSTIA was the establishment of some control over the character and size of Ohio's labor force. The intent of this legislation was two-pronged, to protect certain segments of society, women, children and convicts, from employer exploitation and to limit the labor supply and protect union labor against cheap competition.

Child labor offered the most obvious need and best opportunity for regulation. Legislation regulating child labor, in fact, was the first form of labor legislation
enacted in most states. Such legislation could be justified on humanitarian and legal grounds. Critics argued that long hours and poor working conditions seriously impaired the health of children and threatened the future of the "race." Organized labor particularly objected to child labor because it prevented the education of the youth of the working class and their enjoyment of a "carefree" childhood. Legislation regulating child labor was sound even within the strict legal interpretations of the late nineteenth century. Children as minors were viewed for many purposes as wards of the state and thus the state could act for their protection. In addition, since minors were also legally incapable of entering into a free contract, state regulation of child labor did not abridge "due process of law," the freedom to dispose of labor, the argument used to nullify many labor laws applying to consenting adults.

Although the legal soundness of the position was not as secure as with child labor, the OSTLA also advocated the regulation of women's labor. As Ohio became an increasingly industrialized state, the number of women employed in industry rose. In 1880, more than 9% of all Ohio females ten years of age and over worked outside of the home; by 1890, the number had risen to over 13%; by 1900, to 15%. As early as 1852, the Ohio General Assembly had enacted legislation limiting women's hours but the law was seldom enforced and was finally repealed in 1879. From its establishment, the OSTLA campaigned for the enactment of new and
stricter women's hour laws with arguments mirroring the growing nation-wide demand for such legislation. According to the advocates of restrictive legislation, excessive and hard labor by women outside of the home allegedly seriously impaired the health of women and the chances of healthy childbearing and led to the neglect of the family and the weakening of the home, the basis of all American institutions.20

Convicts in penal institutions presented another exploited laboring group. Work by convicts was traditionally seen as a means of social rehabilitation, yet too often convicts labored in sweat shop conditions with little or no pay. A particularly glaring abuse, current in many states at the end of the 1880's, was the leasing of convicts to private employers as cheap labor.

Coupled with the Labor Assembly's desire to remedy exploitation of certain groups was the obvious desire to protect the wages and working conditions of union labor. Because women, children, convicts and immigrants frequently worked, whether willingly or not, for wages much lower than the prevailing union rate and performed many of the same jobs as unionists, their presence in the labor force hurt union labor. Convicts, particularly, since they worked for little or no pay, produced goods that could be sold for prices substantially below those of goods produced by "free" labor; recently arrived immigrants would often gladly work
for wages which were below the union scale but frequently above what they had earned in their native countries.

Although the unionization of these groups was the solution most compatible with "pure and simple" unionism, it was often impossible. Convicts could not be legally organized and immigrants, although some came from areas with a tradition of unionism, were shackled by problems of language and adjustment to a new way of life. With unionization of these groups at best difficult, the OSTLA sought to regulate the state's labor force through law.

To solve the problem of child labor, the Trades and Labor Assembly advocated a bill prohibiting the employment of children under fourteen years of age. In 1892, the Ohio legislature, under pressure from employer groups, passed a weakened bill prohibiting children under fourteen from working in manufacturing establishments. Although labor wanted merchantile establishments included under the law's provisions, the OSTLA accepted this compromise rather than see the sure defeat of its original proposal. The Assembly's advocacy of compulsory education for all children between the ages of six and fourteen was also intended to undermine child labor. Enemies of child labor legislation argued that if children were not working they would have too much leisure time and that this excess leisure would start them on the road to crime. Compulsory education answered this objection.
For women workers, the Ohio Trades and Labor Assembly from its establishment demanded legislative guarantees of equal pay for equal work and the establishment of an eight hour day but its efforts were totally futile.23

Convict labor was a particular problem for the OSTLA. Convict-produced merchandise from Ohio's penal institutions and prisons in other states, as well as from private firms leasing convict labor, was competing with union-made merchandise, particularly clothing. Finally, in 1892, the Trades and Labor Assembly asked the Ohio legislature to appoint a five-man panel, composed of three members of the legislature and two private citizens associated with organized labor, to investigate employment of convict labor in Ohio's penal institutions, profits from convict labor, wages paid and convict goods from other states shipped to Ohio. The federation proposed that convicts be limited to an eight hour work day and that they be paid a fair wage directly or that a portion of their earnings be credited to their account or sent to their families for support.24 The federation also asked for a law prohibiting Ohio from contracting convict labor to private interests. Again, its requests were virtually ignored. The state legislature in this period limited its actions to passage of a bill requiring the labeling of all convict-made goods from June 1, 1893.25

Another aim of the Labor Assembly was the provision of a favorable legal climate for unions in Ohio through legislation. Ironically, a favorable or at least neutral legal
environment was of greatest importance to the success of union initiative and the philosophy of "voluntarism." Unions could not operate or survive shackled by oppressive legal restraints. In the late nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth century, American labor struggled constantly against such a hostile environment. Although unions were recognized as legal, workmen were severely hampered by the law from organizing and, once organized, from acting effectively. In Ohio, yellow-dog contracts, in which employees agreed not to belong to a union as a condition of employment, were enforceable in court. Ohio also allowed the employment of private police and detective agencies within the state. These groups often were used by employers to forcibly discourage unionization and strikes. The granting of injunctions curtailing the use of strikes on the grounds that they were illegal restraints of trade and blacklisting, the compilation and sharing of lists of "undesirable" workers, were also accepted anti-labor tools.

The OSTIA supported bills in the General Assembly prohibiting blacklisting, limiting the injunction granting power of the courts, outlawing the yellow-dog contract and effectively prohibiting private police and detective agencies from operating in the state by placing all police power solely and exclusively under municipal authority. These bids for a more favorable legal environment, however, were unsuccessful until well into the twentieth century.
One area in which the OSTLA achieved some success was the improvement of the work environment through state law. As with child labor laws, the Trades and Labor Assembly's advocacy of legislation regulating working conditions was bolstered by the public popularity of such reforms. The killing and maiming of workers, by the end of the nineteenth century, was too blatant an abuse to be ignored and public outcry soon made factory safety legislation one of the earliest forms of labor legislation in the country. In Ohio, with OSTLA support, the number of factory inspectors and safety regulations grew. With this increase, at least theoretically, the safety of the work place increased, although the state inspection force remained understaffed and many factories could easily evade compliance with safety laws.

The Ohio Trades and Labor Assembly further sought to reinforce and extend the basis of labor's political power. If the Assembly was to be a lobbyist, it would need a meaningful constituency and effective tools to make its influence felt. To these ends, the Assembly advocated the direct popular election of United States Senators and the initiative and the referendum and became a primary mover in the campaign for a state constitutional convention. The election of women to school boards was also sought as an opening wedge to complete women's suffrage. Women's suffrage was especially important to the OSTLA because disenfrancised women were often disenfrancised workers.
An official statement by the Assembly convention of 1894 said in part,

...in the rendering and application of the provisions of our State Constitution a large element of labor is disenfranchised and restrained from demanding just treatment and honest representation in our law-making bodies, and thereby in the aggregate is deprived in corresponding ratio of its power of resistance, or aggressiveness, in behalf of its natural rights and interests,...

Control of the character and size of the work force and the improvement of the legal, work and political environments of labor by legislative enactment were examples of labor's practical concerns, but throughout these early years the OSTLA sometimes supported other laws that apparently had no ties to laboring interests or that were patently beyond "pure and simple" unionism.

From its establishment, the OSTLA called for the abolition of capital punishment. Capital punishment was not only inherently inhumane, but it also failed to really deter crime and seemed to be a punishment aimed particularly at the working class. The growing influence of socialism in the Assembly was felt in 1892 when the Assembly's convention demanded government ownership of the telephone and telegraph and the redistribution of wealth through a tax on all incomes over $4,000 a year. The financial panic and depression of 1893 caused the OSTLA to deviate further from its fear of government and policy of non-partisanship and ask for public works to provide employment. It also endorsed the Democrats' platform of free and unlimited coinage of silver as a remedy
for the contraction of the currency and shortage of money causing the depression.31

By 1897 the OSTLA presented overall a dismal record as a lobbyist. While it had sought the enactment of a host of laws effecting the labor supply and the legal, work and political environments of labor in Ohio, it had achieved little in the actual passage of legislation beyond a weak child labor bill and a bill requiring the labeling of convict-made goods.

Much of the OSTLA’s poor showing in the years from 1883 to 1897 can be explained by its naivete in the role of lobbyist. As with most groups, the development of expertise required time and experience. The OSTLA initially faced real problems in staffing, financing, support and tactics. First, the professional staff necessary to successful lobbying was virtually non-existent. The founding convention of the federation established a seven man legislative board to recommend legislation to the body’s annual convention, but this board was only a temporary body. The OSTLA instead relied upon the delegates to the annual convention to do the actual lobbying in the legislature. As Thomas Donnelly, the federation’s chief lobbyist from 1913 through 1935, describes these early years,

For the purposes of bringing the greatest influence to bear upon the legislature it was thought advisable to hold the annual convention of the Federation in Columbus on the first Monday in January, which was also the time for the convening of the General Assembly. This
provided the opportunity for the delegates to meet and interview their representatives and senators on the measures labor desired introduced and enacted into law, as well as register opposition to proposals which labor did not favor.  

Once their week-long convention had adjourned, the federation's position on legislation was to be represented by whatever federation officers or members of the legislative board happened to be in Columbus. Because the OSTIA did not pay salaries to these men, they were of necessity required to hold full-time jobs and were often unable to be present in the legislature. Thus, without a full-time, salaried representative before the General Assembly, the OSTIA was slow to develop any real expertise or clout as a lobbyist. In addition, it had no permanent headquarters. This lack of a full-time lobbying representative and a headquarters helped make the federation a very low-profile and ineffective force in the legislature.

Another major factor contributing to the general weakness of the OSTLA as a lobby was its shaky financial structure. Lobbying, simply, requires money—for staff, for office space, for printing and mailing, for traveling expenses. The OSTIA's financial position was characteristically dismal throughout this period. Even by 1894, eleven years after its founding, the federation had a balance of only $3.30 in its treasury. It had collected $561.02, $164.08 of this sum by a special additional levy, and had spent $557.72, $412.00 of this sum on legislative expenses.
The OSTIA's shaky finances arose primarily from a basic weakness of the federation. Assessments were levied on members and the OSTIA simply did not represent a significant or sizeable membership. For a variety of reasons, many unions within the state did not join the OSTIA: the fear of centralization, a local lack of funds, the fact that although the federation admitted affiliates of both the Knights of Labor and the AFL, the K of L district assemblies served as a central organization for K of L locals. Many unions that did join remained members for only a short time. A common complaint of the federation's officers during this period was that unions would affiliate before the annual convention and lose interest soon after its adjournment. This problem resulted, to a great extent, from the political partisanship of the OSTIA. Despite the founding convention's avowal of non-partisanship, in reality, political partisanship dominated these early years. According to Thomas Donnelly,

In the early and middle eras of the federation the same mistakes were made politically by it as were made by other labor organizations; the annual conventions engaged in the endorsing of candidates for public office. As a result thereof the conventions were made up in large part of delegates more concerned with the advancement and success of candidates for public office than they were with the advancement and success of the organized labor movement...There was no stability to the membership of the Federation for the reason that organizations would affiliate after the calling and convening of the conventions, and be represented by delegates...During the years in which there were political campaigns there were a large number of affiliations just before and during the conventions of the Federation...Following the conventions these organizations
paid no dues and ceased to be members of the Federation until political interests dictated a repetition of the scheme. 34

Another factor that seriously impaired the membership growth in the OSTLA was the severe nationwide depression beginning in 1893. 35 During this period union membership stagnated or fell because of the rise in unemployment that made paying dues impossible for many workers and because of the determination of employers to withstand unionization, coupled with severe competition for the jobs that were available. The number of unemployed tripled between 1894 and 1898; in 1894 and 1896, at least 15% and possibly 20% of the nation's workers in industry were unemployed. 36

A final factor in the OSTLA's dismal lobbying record from 1883 to 1897 was simply that the OSTLA had not developed a sound tactical approach. In addition to a lack of skilled personnel, sufficient financing and a meaningful constituency, it did not know how to utilize effectively what limited resources were available. The federation, as with all novice lobbying groups, had to learn the intricacies of Ohio statehouse politics, the political context in which the legislature operated, how to punish and reward, how and when to compromise, how to curry allies and how to develop and employ favorable public opinion, knowledge that would come through time and experimentation.

Although in 1897, the future of the Ohio Trades and Labor Assembly looked bleak, the Assembly was in reality entering one of its most successful eras. From 1897 to
1919, the Assembly would help make Ohio one of the most progressive states in the country in the field of labor, improve its financial resources, increase its constituency, acquire allies and become a skilled and successful practitioner of non-partisan politics.
CHAPTER I: NOTES


2 Ibid., pp. 217-218.


4 This information was extracted from the membership columns included in the Journal of United Labor, the official publication of the Knights of Labor, May 15, 1880, pp. 341-346.


6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.


13 Ware, The Labor Movement in the United States, p. 309.
Proceedings of the Fiftieth Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, p. 29.


Ibid., p. 61.


Ibid., p. 403.


Ninth Annual Session of the Ohio State Trades and Labor Assembly (1892), p. 7.

Ibid., p. 3.

Eleventh Annual Convention of the Ohio State Trades and Labor Assembly (1894), p. 21.

Ninth Annual Session of the Ohio State Trades and Labor Assembly, p. 8.


Ibid., p. 13.

Ohio's last constitutional convention was held in 1873. Law provided for the next convention to be held in 1912.

Eleventh Annual Convention of the Ohio State Trades and Labor Assembly, p. 22.

Ninth Annual Session of the Ohio State Trades and Labor Assembly, pp. 5-6.


33 Eleventh Annual Convention of the Ohio State Trades and Labor Assembly, p. 7.

34 Donnelly, "Methods and Accomplishments," p. 551.


CHAPTER II
THE LOBBYING CONTEXT: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF OHIO POLITICS: 1883-1935

To a great extent, the success of any legislative lobby depends not only upon its internal structure but also upon the context in which it operates. An effective lobby must represent some meaningful segment of society, whether in numbers or in power, and must understand and employ to advantage the character and structure of the legislative system it seeks to influence. In a broad context, a significant portion of Ohio's general population and, in a narrower context, organized labor in Ohio potentially offered such a viable constituency for a state labor federation. The role of the state federation was to make these groups aware of their real interest in the activities of the federation and to weld this interest into support for the federation's program in the Ohio legislature.

The increasing urbanization and industrialization of Ohio in the years following the Civil War were favorable trends for the state federation. The table below (Table 1), based on federal census returns, illustrates the tremendous growth in the absolute number and relative percentage of urban dwellers in the state between 1880 and 1890.
Table 1: Ohio's Population Growth, 1880-1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>% Urban</th>
<th>% Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>3,198,062</td>
<td>1,030,769</td>
<td>2,167,929</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>67.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>3,672,329</td>
<td>1,504,390</td>
<td>2,167,939</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>4,157,545</td>
<td>1,998,382</td>
<td>2,159,163</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>4,767,121</td>
<td>2,665,143</td>
<td>2,101,978</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>6,646,697</td>
<td>4,507,371</td>
<td>2,139,326</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The increasing urbanization of Ohio was important for the state federation because industrialization and urbanization usually accompany and complement each other. Industry tends to concentrate where labor is most available, typically in cities, and industrialization is the obvious environment for the growth of organized labor.

In Ohio, however, these federal census statistics are somewhat misleading. A significant portion of the state’s rural population was not farm population but engaged in pursuits outside agriculture. The federal censuses of 1920 and 1930, which differentiated between rural-farm and rural non-farm, show that in 1920, out of a total rural population of 2,082,258, 948,346 were not farm-dwellers and that in 1930, out of a total rural population of 2,139,326, 1,135,038 were not farm-dwellers. This breakdown of rural population was particularly true in the southeastern part of the state where a sizeable portion of the rural population was engaged in mining, not farming. These miners typically lived in small, frequently unincorporated towns which were not
eligible for the census classification as urban. This mining population, like the urban population, formed an important part of the state federation's available constituency.

The overall trend of industrialization in Ohio, whether urban or rural, was one of steady growth. The table below (Table 2) indicates the absolute and percentage increase in the population ten years and older engaged in gainful occupations from 1880 to 1930, except for a slight percentage drop in 1930 during the Depression when serious unemployment was a negating factor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Ten Years &amp; Over</th>
<th>In Gainful Occupations</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>2,399,367</td>
<td>994,475</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>2,858,659</td>
<td>1,272,786</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>3,289,921</td>
<td>1,546,015</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>3,848,747</td>
<td>1,919,055</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>4,624,456</td>
<td>2,301,516</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>5,434,261</td>
<td>2,615,764</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although these statistics include those engaged in both agriculture and industry, further census figures illustrate that the percentage of Ohio's population ten years of age and over engaged in gainful occupations who worked in agriculture or the related areas of forestry and animal husbandry steadily decreased while the relative percentage
in industry increased. In 1880, 40% of Ohio's work force was in agriculture; in 1890, 32%; in 1900, 27%; in 1910, 22%; in 1920, 16%; in 1930, 12%. This steady industrialization of the state's labor force had several effects on the state federation. The growing number of industrial workers increased the need for labor legislation, particularly in the area of the work environment. In addition, it increased the numbers that might be organized into unions or, if not organized, that might support legislation favorable to the working man. This industrial population also represented potential electors.

In a narrower sense, any increase in the number of organized workers in Ohio was a potential increase in the state federation's support. Statistics indicating the growth of unionization in Ohio are extremely limited. Ohio's Bureau of Labor Statistics has issued an Annual Report since 1877, but in the period from 1884 to 1935, few statistics on numbers of union members are included. The Annual Report for 1900 is the only volume which provides any information on the number of unions in Ohio, but even this report has questionable validity since results were obtained by voluntarily returned questionnaires. This report shows that in 1900, there were 782 reporting local unions in the state, representing at least 58 different trades. Of these 782 locals, 74% or 578 had been established between 1890 and 1900, an amazing growth figure for
This mirrors the growth of unions nationally. Not only was organized labor growing in numbers, but also in distribution throughout the state. Union power was not concentrated in any one area but around several core locations. In the northeast, labor power centered around Cleveland in Cuyahoga County; in the northwest around Toledo in Lucas County; in the southwest, around Dayton in Montgomery County, Hamilton in Butler County and Cincinnati in Hamilton County; in the southeast, through the multi-location mining areas.

The growth in the number and geographic extent of unions, like the growth in the industrial population, increased the state labor federation's possible constituency as well as the potential numbers of favorably inclined electors. The affiliation of the Ohio labor federation with the AFL in 1897, however, altered the character of this potential labor support. The AFL ruled that "...no local union suspended, expelled or seceded from its national union could retain its affiliation with a central body of the AFL." This requirement effectively eliminated many groups, particularly in the early years, from membership in the Ohio federation. This, however, did not seriously effect the Ohio body until the early 1900's.

Whatever the groups represented by the state federation, such support alone does not guarantee success for a legislative lobby. The truly effective lobby must know how
to weld this power within the legislative context.

In the three-branch system of government in Ohio, the legislative power traditionally lies in the state legislature or General Assembly, a bicameral body composed of the House and the Senate. Until 1851, the General Assembly met annually but the state constitutional convention of that year changed the sessions to biennial meetings.\(^7\)

Qualifications for candidacy for the General Assembly are relatively few, allowing in theory a wide latitude of candidates. Each candidate is required one year residency in his respective county or district preceding the election, unless he is absent on state or federal business, and each candidate cannot hold an incompatible office or be guilty of the embezzlement of funds. There are no limitations because of color, race or religion, although before the passage of the Women's Suffrage Amendment, there was a limitation based on sex. General Assembly members take office in January of the year following their November elections and serve for two year terms.\(^8\)

The apportionment of representation in both houses of the General Assembly is based on the state's population. The Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1851 established apportionment based on the federal census or some other like tool as directed by the legislature. In the House, after each census, the population of the state is divided by 100 to determine a ratio for representation. Each county with
a population equal to at least half the ratio is given one representative in each legislative session throughout the succeeding census period: a full ratio and three fourths over, two representatives; three times the required ratio, three representatives, and so on. After the first two representatives, a full ratio is required for each additional representative. Until 1902, if the population of a county was too small, it was combined with another county or counties until population size met the representation requirements. In 1902, an amendment passed in a popular election granting each county, regardless of population, a representative. This proved to be the major flaw in the apportionment pattern. As the population of some of the rural counties steadily decreased their ratio of representation and consequent influence in the legislature increased, upsetting the relative equality of House apportionment.

The formula of apportionment for the state Senate is very similar to that for the House. After each federal census, the population of the state is divided by 35. The counties of the state are then grouped into districts based on population and each district is given one Senator.

The Convention of 1851 also provided a complicated formula for the readjustment every ten years of the numbers of representatives or senators, based on population increase or decrease.
...when any county or district has a population fraction over that required as a ratio, equal to one fifth of a ratio, one representative or senator is added to the delegation from that county or district in the fifth session of the decennial period. If the fraction is equal to two fifths of a ratio, an additional member is added in the fourth and third sessions; if there is three fifths there is an added member in the third, second and first sessions; and if there is four fifths there is an addition to the representation in the fourth, third, second and first sessions.

The preceding is only a structural outline of legislative activity in Ohio, necessary but secondary knowledge for a legislative lobbyist. A truly effective lobbyist must know how to approach and influence individual legislators. The following tables (Table 3 and Table 4) show the political affiliations and occupations of members of the Ohio Senate and the House from the 69th to the 91st General Assemblies, 1890 to 1936.
Table 3: Senate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>Rep.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69th</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70th</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71st</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72nd</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73rd</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74th</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77th</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78th</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79th</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80th</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81st</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82nd</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83rd</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86th</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87th</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88th</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89th</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91st</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: House Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>Rep.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69th</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70th</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71st</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72nd</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73rd</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74th</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77th</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78th</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79th</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80th</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81st</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82nd</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83rd</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84th</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86th</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87th</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88th</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89th</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91st</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5, below, is a tabulation of the number of bills successfully backed by the Ohio federation in the 79th to the 91st General Assemblies, 1909 through 1936.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assembly</th>
<th>Labor Bills Passed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>78th, 1909-1910</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79th, 1911-1912</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80th, 1913-1914</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81st, 1915-1916</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82nd, 1917-1918</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83rd, 1919-1920</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84th, 1921-1922</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th, 1923-1924</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86th, 1925-1926</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87th, 1927-1928</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88th, 1929-1930</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89th, 1931-1932</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th, 1933-1934</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91st, 1935-1936</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing the tables of the party affiliations and occupations in each General Assembly with the enactment of labor legislation in each Assembly session, a simple pattern emerges—that there is no pattern. Apparently, at least from this limited comparison, successful lobbying by the state labor federation was not dependent on what party or occupational group dominated either house of the General
Assembly. The number of professionals, farmers, laborers and businessmen remained fairly constant from the 69th through the 91st General Assemblies while the number of labor bills passed each session varied considerably. Party domination in the Assembly likewise had little real influence on labor's success. Whether the Democrats or the Republicans controlled the houses of the Assembly, neither was consistently responsive to labor. Although the Democratic-controlled 79th General Assembly passed 24 bills, the Democratic-controlled 90th passed only six. The same inconsistency is characteristic of the Republicans. The Republican-controlled 83rd General Assembly enacted 15 bills favorable to labor, the Republican-controlled 8th, only four.

This apparent lack of party or occupational patterns in voting on labor legislation is further delineated by an examination of voting records for individual bills. Table 6 below shows the percentage of Republicans and the percentage of Democrats in the Ohio Senate that voted affirmatively on four proposals supported by the federation. Table 7 shows the percentages of Professionals, Farmers, Laborers, Businessmen and "Others" in the Senate that voted affirmatively on these same bills. Finally, Table 8 and Table 9 illustrate the same for the House.
Table 6: Senate Affirmative Votes By Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 hr. day on public works-1913</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5/5)</td>
<td>(18/21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 hr. day for women-1917</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9/10)</td>
<td>(14/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension of Workmen's Comp.-1921</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(35/35)</td>
<td>(1/1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-yellow dog legis.-1931</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>92.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13/13)</td>
<td>(13/14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Senate Affirmative Votes By Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bill</th>
<th>Prof.</th>
<th>Farmer</th>
<th>Bus.</th>
<th>Labor</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 hr. day public works</td>
<td>88.2%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15/17)</td>
<td>(4/5)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2/2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2/2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 hr. day women</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9/13)</td>
<td>(3/3)</td>
<td>(7/10)</td>
<td>(3/3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1/1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workmen's Comp.</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14/14)</td>
<td>(6/6)</td>
<td>(16/16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow-</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>93.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dog-1931</td>
<td>(10/10)</td>
<td>(14/15)</td>
<td>(1/1)</td>
<td>(1/1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: House Affirmative Votes By Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 hr. day on public works-1913</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>84.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20/30)</td>
<td>(65/77)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 hr. day for women-1917</td>
<td>76.0%</td>
<td>63.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(31/41)</td>
<td>(46/63)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension of Workmen's Comp.-1921</td>
<td>99.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(98/99)</td>
<td>(11/11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-yellow dog legis.-1931</td>
<td>60.7%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(37/61)</td>
<td>(45/54)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The only patterns which emerge from these tables are that Senate and House members who were laboring men tended to vote consistently affirmative on labor-supported bills and that farmer members tended to vote affirmatively not as frequently as the other occupational groups. Otherwise, no real pattern of party or occupational voting is apparent.

The accuracy of this simple comparison between the party affiliations and occupations of the members of the General Assembly and their support of labor legislation is open to criticism and question. In several instances, the numbers of legislators in Tables 6 through 9 are small and the resulting percentages may present a weighted picture. In addition, the amount of legislation supported by labor obviously varied in each session of the General Assembly, affecting the validity of Table 5 listing the number of labor supported bills enacted from 1909 through 1936. There is also no simple way to accurately tabulate the number of labor bills that failed somewhere along the steps of the
legislative process, never even reaching the final voting stage, or to gauge the effort labor expended for passage of individual bills. But although these comparisons are somewhat simple or flawed, they do indicate the wisdom of the state federation's policy toward legislators of non-partisanship and the rewarding of friends and punishing of enemies despite their party or occupation. Further, the state federation's or any lobby's success in the General Assembly could not depend on any one group, but rather on a coalition of groups and individuals. Success in building and controlling such a coalition is often the ultimate mark of the skilled and effective lobbyist.

One final consideration in any examination of legislation in Ohio is the introduction of the initiative and referendum. In 1912 the General Assembly's traditional power over legislation was co-opted by an amendment to the Ohio Constitution providing for the public right of the initiative and referendum. Theoretically, this action returned the control of the law making process to the people. Both the initiative and the referendum, however, were in reality tools that could be used most effectively by special interest groups, not the general mass of citizens. The procedures and often the cost of employing both limited their use to well-organized and well-financed groups.

The constitutional provision for the initiative amendment of the state constitution required that all petitions of initiative be signed by 10% of the electorate and be
filed with the secretary of state. If the secretary of state judges these signatures sufficient, the proposed amendment is placed on the ballot at the next regular or general election occurring at least 90 days after the filing of the petition. If it is approved by the majority of the voters voting, the amendment is enacted. In the case of initiative enactment of ordinary law, the procedure is more indirect. These petitions must be signed by $\frac{3}{4}$ of the electors and filed with the secretary of state at least ten days before the opening session of the General Assembly. Each petition is then laid before this opening session. If the General Assembly fails to act on a petition within four months or passes a proposed law in a form unacceptable to the petitioners, these petitioners may file another petition signed by an additional $\frac{3}{4}$ of the electors. This action will force the original proposal at issue to a vote in the next election. If this law is then approved by a majority of voters, it goes into effect in 30 days. Any such law enacted by initiative cannot be vetoed by the governor.

The referendum, in turn, can force the submission of any law or section or item of a law passed by the General Assembly to a popular vote. According to statute, every law passed by the Ohio General Assembly, except those providing for tax levies or appropriations for current state operating expenses and emergency laws dealing with the immediate preservation of the public peace and health, cannot take effect until 90 days after it is filed by the governor with
the secretary of state. This time delay allows for the filing of referendum petitions. If a petition is filed, the questioned law does not go into effect until an election vote decides its fate. If the law is approved by a majority of those voting, it becomes operative; otherwise, it does not become law.

Two additional provisions for both the initiative and the referendum state that the basis used to determine the absolute number of signatures required on petitions is the votes cast for the governor's office at the preceding election and that all petitions must have the signatures of not less than half of the electors from each of at least half of the state's counties.\textsuperscript{19}

This final provision, especially, illustrates that, although theoretically the initiative and referendum returned the state's legislative power to the people, the real benefactors were special interest groups. The very nature of both the initiative and the referendum required organizations with personnel and financial resources and the popular influence to campaign for and acquire the necessary petition signatures. Beyond even this limitation in the use of the initiative and referendum, the basic fact is that the real power of law making remains with the General Assembly. The following table (Table 10), although it goes beyond the time period of this study, illustrates the relative neglect and lack of success in the use of both the initiative and the referendum.
Table 10: Use Of The Initiative And Referendum In Ohio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Petitions Filed 1912-1950</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Adopted</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional amendments</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statutes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First stage</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second stage</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referenda</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These initiative and referendum procedures were simply too difficult to employ frequently, even for powerful interest groups. These special interests found it easier to lobby day to day within the legislature; the complicated and costly initiative and referendum processes were employed only when the legislative wishes of a sizeable part of the state's population were thwarted by the General Assembly. The real role of the special interest group remained as a lobby within the legislature.

Although the Ohio Trades and Labor Assembly had not been able to act as an effective lobby for the workers of the state in its early years, 1897 marked the beginning of a new era. From 1897 through World War I the state federation emerged as a powerful proponent of labor's special interests in Ohio. It learned to rally support in both the general population and in organized labor and to wield this power effectively within the legislative process.
CHAPTER II: NOTES


2U. S. Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census... Population Bulletin, Ohio, p. 3.

3In 1920 and 1930, the Census Bureau defined urban population as that residing in cities and other incorporated places having 2,500 or more inhabitants. The remainder were classified as rural.


5Ibid.


10 Ibid., p. 56.

11 Ibid., p. 55.


13 Ibid.

Ohio State Federation of Labor, Achievements of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, State Branch American Federation of Labor, 1907-1948 (1948), pp. 5-23.


16 Ibid.

Table 4, p. 34, of this text.

18 Ibid.


20 Ibid., p. 67.
The growth of state labor federations in the late nineteenth century was paralleled nationally in the establishment of the Knights of Labor in 1869 and the American Federation of Labor in 1881. Although the Knights were relatively powerful in the 1880's, the AFL eventually emerged as the dominant labor organization in the country. Unlike the Knights, who sought mitigation of the wage system only as an interlude in the long-range goal of replacing capitalism with cooperation, the AFL believed that the workers' chief need was to improve their immediate working conditions in this system through their own economic efforts, as far as possible. Samuel Gompers, first president of the AFL, stated that the role of the government was to be limited to securing for the worker "...by law, the right to exert and exercise the normal human activities of self-development and associated effort, to bear the burdens of the struggle for industrial improvement and freedom... freedom to fight and freedom to achieve."¹ In reality, however, this basic fear of government intervention was tempered by the realization that some labor goals could be
achieved only through government action. Even in its early years, the AFL asked government to limit child labor, to regulate convict labor, to enact a mechanic's lien law and school laws, to limit the use of injunction in labor disputes and to restrict immigration. To achieve these legislative demands, the AFL formulated a policy of non-partisanship, the rewarding of friends and punishing of enemies, whatever their political party.

In the hierarchy of international brotherhoods, state and city central bodies and local unions that constituted the membership of the AFL, the role of the state federations was to lobby in the state legislatures in the interest of union labor. But first, the AFL had to establish these central bodies where none existed and to affiliate those already extant.

From its establishment in 1883, the OSTIA had admitted members from a variety of labor groups, city centrals, Knights of Labor assemblies and locals of international unions. Because of this mixed membership of both Knights assemblies and locals of AFL internationals, the OSTIA remained independent of any national affiliation while recognizing both the Knights and the AFL. The city centrals from Cincinnati, Cleveland and Dayton that had played a major role in the formation of the Ohio federation were also active in the establishment of the AFL's predecessor, the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions, and in the
establishment of the AFL itself. The miners and brewers, both with sizeable representation in the OSTLA, were major segments within the Knights. By the 1890's, however, this equilibrium within the OSTLA was seriously disturbed by the struggle between the Knights of Labor and the AFL for national leadership of the labor movement.

The influence of the Knights was eroding throughout the country because of their loss of important strikes, the influx of farmers into the organization and, perhaps most important, because of their desire to organize all workers against the wishes of the increasingly powerful trade unions. In 1870 there were twenty-nine national trade unions. By 1920 this number increased to 163, with most of this growth taking place after 1890. Unlike the Knights, the AFL as a traditionally trade organization benefitted from this growth and was particularly successful because of its emphasis on a looseness of federation, which left the international unions virtually autonomous and at the same time, by virtue of their large memberships, dominant in the national organization.

The first concrete evidence of the changing fortunes of the Knights and the AFL within the OSTLA was the growing sentiment for affiliation with the AFL. At the Ohio federation's annual convention in 1892, a heavy concentration of delegates who were members of the Carpenters and Joiners, the Typographical Union, the Machinists, the Plumbers and the Bakers, all AFL affiliates, proposed that the OSTLA
join the AFL. This resolution, however, was opposed by a sizeable delegation from the Miners and the Brewers who retained memberships in both the AFL and the Knights, as well as by the Columbus Central Body whose membership was heavily composed of Knights. In voting against affiliation, the OSTLA stated that the AFL was "...foreign to the objects for which the Assembly was instituted," probably referring to the AFL's limited membership policy.

Despite this negative vote, agitation for affiliation continued in succeeding conventions. Finally in 1896, with the split between the Knights and the AFL complete, the Ohio State Trades and Labor Assembly voted in convention to join the AFL and, on April 19, 1897, the Assembly officially became the Ohio Federation of Labor and a member of the AFL.

The proponents of affiliation within the OSTLA were ultimately successful for a number of reasons. First, by the mid-1890's, both the Miners and the Brewers had broken with the Knights and then owed allegiance only to the AFL, leaving a severely crippled K of L in Ohio. Secondly, the Miners, Brewers and other international unions like the Cigar Makers and the Typographical Union controlled most of the OSTLA membership and all of the officers. At the 1896 convention that voted affiliation, the OSTLA President, T. L. Lewis, although formerly active in the Knights, was one of three Miners elected to attend the AFL convention.
that year; the Vice-President, S. S. Carnahan, was a Potter and an AFL organizer for the Akron district; the Secretary, August Smith, was a member of the Carpenters and Joiners and an AFL organizer for his district; the Treasurer, S. P. Ewing, was also a member of the Carpenters and Joiners and an organizer for the AFL.

Finally, the "Era of Good Feeling" between the AFL and many manufacturers enhanced the position of the AFL for the Ohio union rank-and-file and their leadership. The manufacturers found it particularly convenient to court the AFL to help maintain worker stability to meet the high production demands and the obvious possibilities for profits during the period of the Spanish-American War. In addition, the AFL helped insure a stable and uniform work force for the large monopolies, through negotiation of trade-wide agreements. In the late 1890's and early 1900's, collective trade agreements were negotiated for the building and printing trades, the bituminous and anthracite mining industries, newspaper publishing, brass polishing, iron molding, stove mounting, the railroads, pottery production, Great Lakes shipping, machine shops and overalls manufacture. 11

The newly named Ohio Federation of Labor, with 39 member organizations, held its first convention as an AFL affiliate in December, 1897. This signaled the beginning of an era of transition and turmoil for the Ohio central body.

The initial action by the Ohio Federation of Labor was
the adoption of a new internal structure and means of finance. The former Trades and Labor Assembly's dismal legislative record proved the need for change. First, the basis of vote allocation in the Federation was changed from the number of organizations to the number of members in each organization. In previous years each delegate had one vote for each organization he represented. Under the new system, each delegate had one vote for every 100 members or less that he represented and one additional vote for every 100 members or fraction thereof beyond the first 100. The number of members was determined by the per capita assessments paid. All local unions continued to get at least one vote and no delegate could have more than five votes. This arrangement helped to protect the perogatives of the local unions. It also placed the controlling vote in the Federation in the hands of the big international brotherhoods that had sizeable memberships.

The state federation also strengthened its legislative lobbying apparatus. A Legislative Board of three members, elected annually, was to watch all legislation directly affecting labor in the state and to propose laws to be enacted. This Board was to report to the secretary of the Federation on all such legislation and the secretary, in turn, was to maintain close ties with the unions in the state and to report to them on all Labor legislation. Again, however, the Federation failed to provide for a salaried or full-time staff. Both the members of the
Legislative Board and the secretary of the Federation were unsalaried and were forced to hold full-time employment elsewhere.

The Federation, in line with its own previous position and the official position of the AFL, maintained its policy of non-partisanship and the rewarding of labor's friends and punishment of its enemies, but called upon labor to vote where possible for card-carrying trade unionists.

...We deem it the duty of organized labor to vote as a unit at each election in favor of such candidates, being known to be qualified for the position which he seeks and has, regardless of past or present partisan affiliations, shown himself in the past to be an unswerving champion of the rights for which we are battling.14

Internal structural changes and statements of philosophy would not be sufficient to reverse the Ohio Federation's dismal past lobbying record. The real success of the Federation would depend upon a strong and active constituency and a skillful and effective wielding of influence in the state legislature. The Federation hoped to build this constituency by encouraging the organization of more of the state's unorganized workers and by affiliating already existing unions.

For several years after affiliation, the Ohio Federation of Labor, the OFL, conducted a relatively successful membership drive but by 1902 organized labor in Ohio, like organized labor throughout the country, again faced a concerted employer anti-union drive. The end of the "Era of
Good Feeling" between the employers and the unions resulted from the decline of the economic boom occasioned by the Spanish American War, the growth of powerful unions, the increasing association of small manufacturers who had been particularly vulnerable to the unions' divide and conquer techniques and the emergence of the powerful trusts that were often anti-union. 15

The genesis of this anti-union campaign was in Dayton, Ohio, where unionism was strongly entrenched and where a series of strikes for higher wages and better working conditions throughout 1900 immediately precipitated the anti-union drive. In 1901, thirty-eight firms throughout the city decided to form a united front and prosecute a concerted attack on organized labor. The group began by locking out members of the Machinists until they agreed to leave the union as a condition of employment. After this initial success, the employers used these same tactics against other unions successively. The number of participants in Dayton's Labor Day parades is a fair index of the employers' success against that city's unions. In 1900 there were approximately 9500 marchers; in 1901, 7500; in 1902, 1242; in 1903, 1914. 16

This anti-union movement spread quickly and became embodied nationally in the National Association of Manufacturers. The NAM had been founded in 1895 to promote foreign trade and was traditionally dominated by the large manufacturers, but in 1902 it was captured by the small
manufacturers, who had been particularly hard-pressed by the unions. These small manufacturers elected David M. Parry as president of the NAM and turned the organization's program into an anti-union crusade. The NAM encouraged the use of the lockout, the blacklist, yellow-dog contracts and other direct means of intimidation and was particularly active in campaigning against legislation favorable to labor by seeking the defeat of pro-labor legislators.

After 1906, employer anti-unionism began to wane, paradoxically, because of the success of employer anti-union efforts which significantly reduced the number of union forces to be opposed and because of the emergence of political progressivism which tended to direct the public toward a more liberal stance on labor questions. In response to this lifting of the siege, the fortunes of organized labor throughout the country began to improve after 1906.

The position of labor nationally throughout the early 1900's was mirrored by the fledgling Ohio Federation of Labor. In 1905, the Federation represented only 50 member organizations. Its membership included only eight of the state's 48 city and county central bodies and no Miners or Cigarmakers, although these groups had been active earlier in the Federation and although they retained sizeable representation in Ohio. By 1909, the Federation's organizing efforts, complemented by the parent AFL's
assistance and the gradually changing attitude toward unionism, began to effect a marked change in the OFL. Its membership had grown to 403 organizations, an increase of 197 since 1908 alone. These affiliated unions represented over 40,000 workers or 20% of the estimated total membership of trade unions in Ohio. As the number of affiliations with the OFL grew, its financial resources grew as well. As late as 1907, the Federation's treasury had a deficit of $19.28 but by 1909 increased membership brought a cash balance of $1,187.46. Although its membership and finances were still not ideal, the Federation had begun a period of real, healthy growth.

The OFL also began to wield its influence in the Ohio General Assembly more effectively. In 1906, prodded by the AFL, it initiated the practice of sending circular letters detailing legislation beneficial to labor to labor groups throughout the state, to seek unity of effort with the city central bodies on proposed laws and to publically single out members of the General Assembly for their pro-labor stance. These efforts were intended to mobilize Ohio's unions and to direct their interests to unified goals. In 1908, the Federation replaced its legislative board with a legislative agent, elected annually, whose sole job was to be labor's advocate in the General Assembly. This agent received a salary plus hotel and transportation expenses. This would provide a permanency and, hopefully, a professionalism in lobbying representation that was lacking in the
haphazard system of the sometime legislative board.

With these changes in structure, methods and membership, the major legislative goals of the Ohio Federation of Labor after 1897 remained virtually the same as in the past, control of the work force and the improvement of labor's legal, work and political environments.

The problem of controlling the character and size of the labor force was increasingly important by the turn of the century, particularly because of the vast influx of immigrants into the country. In this period, the OFL, motivated by both job preservation and racism, took an especially strong stand for immigration restriction. Although the OFL had sought immigration controls since its establishment, its chief aim had been to prevent too much competition in the labor force and the lowering of labor's standards. In the early 1900's, the Federation's stand on immigration reflected the racism endemic throughout the country, as well. Labor opposed immigration not only because of economic necessity but also because the new immigrants were thought to be an inferior breed who would eventually, if left unchecked, destroy the "American way of life." These were "...not the sturdy people who came before the sixties...but (those) from the pauper districts of Southern Europe and the Oriental Countries..." less than 20% were "desirable immigrants" from England, Ireland, Scotland, Wales, France and Germany. Such undesirables crowded the country's charitable institutions, hospitals
and prisons; brought the seeds of anarchy, crime, degeneracy and disease; changed the character of the country by driving out the old-stock, loyal Americans; became the tools of corporations, ignorant voters and political pawns. Because immigration was the legal jurisdiction of the federal government, the OFL lobbied to influence the Ohio legislature to, in turn, pressure Congress to act. In 1909, with labor's support, the Freiner Resolution asking Congress to enact more-stringent immigration laws was passed in the Ohio General Assembly with only two dissenting votes.

This attraction of the OFL to racism was a short-lived phenomenon, virtually disappearing by World War I. In this connection, it must be noted that such racism was rampant throughout the United States in this period, even to the point of being "scientifically" established. Although this fact does not excuse the actions of the Federation, it does mitigate the guilt somewhat.

In a more humanitarian vein, the OFL continued its efforts to control the character of the labor force by improving the state's child labor laws. In 1901, the General Assembly passed a labor supported bill to bring current school attendance laws into line with the child labor laws already enacted. The new law required that no child under 15 years of age could be employed in a working establishment when the schools in the district were in session and gave greater enforcement powers to truant officers. Labor's ultimate goal, however, was to pass a
stringent law raising the age at which youth would be permitted to work and limiting the hours and times of work. After a labor sponsored bill embodying these provisions was defeated in 1906, the OFL recognized the need to unite the efforts of the many organizations in Ohio seeking similar legislation. To this end, in 1907, the Federation's Executive Board called a meeting of all persons and groups interested in the passage of a new child labor law to plot a united strategy. After extensive campaigning addressed to both the public and the members of the legislature by the OFL, the DAR, Women's Clubs and the Consumers' League, the Ohio General Assembly in 1908 passed H.B. 714, sponsored by James A. Reynolds, a representative from Cuyahoga County and a national officer of the Machinists' Union. Labor was especially active in defeating the concerted attempts of the manufacturing interests to discredit the Reynolds' bill.

The Reynolds' Child Labor Law placed Ohio in the forefront of state child labor legislation. The provisions of the new law stated that no child under 14 could be employed under any circumstances, that no boy under 16 or girl under 18 should be permitted to work more than eight hours per day or more than 48 hours per week with a proper schooling certificate and that they should not work after 6 P. M. or before 7 A. M. In addition, the law listed several categories of dangerous or immoral occupations in which children could not be employed under any circumstances and provided eight additional women factory inspectors to enforce the
law. The Reynolds' bill marked a major legislative success for the OFL and set a lobbying pattern to be followed in the future.

The Federation's successful advocacy of the Reynolds' bill was somewhat mitigated by its failure to secure legislation providing free school books and supplies and a minimum salary for teachers. The Federation also lobbied unsuccessfully for a women's hour bill limiting women's labor to eight hours per day and 48 hours per week and regulating working conditions. The members of the General Assembly, however, did not feel that working women could legally be regulated by the state.

The Federation did secure another, although limited, victory in its campaign to regulate convict labor. The Bramley Bill to abolish convict labor where it conflicted with free labor passed the House in 1898 but was defeated in the Senate. In 1904, the OFL strongly supported the enactment of the Pollock Convict Labor Bill. This bill abolished contract prison labor, provided for the employment of convict labor only when it did not compete with free labor and limited convict labor to eight hours per day and no work on Sundays and public holidays. The Pollock Bill's far-reaching provisions, however, met fierce opposition from both manufacturers and officials within the state government.

Ultimately, in 1906, a modified bill, the Wertz Convict
Labor Law, abolishing the use of contract convict labor in Ohio passed the General Assembly with the Federation's compromise support. The Wertz Law, however, was emasculated by a favorite legislative ploy. The General Assembly provided no funds to carry out its provisions. Three years later, in 1909, after constant pressure from the OFL, the legislature enacted the Ritter Law providing enforcement funding for the Wertz Law. Ohio law now outlawed contract convict labor as well as requiring the labeling of convict-made goods, but convict labor continued to compete with free labor within Ohio and from across state lines. Like other legislative issues, however, convict labor remained an on-going concern for the Ohio federation.

The OFL's legislative record in improving labor's legal environment in Ohio remained dismal through 1909. Throughout the entire country the law typically was on the side of the moneyed and business interests, common law traditionally favored property. The OFL's attempts to sponsor or support legislation limiting injunctions and outlawing blacklisting and the yellow-dog contract were repeatedly unsuccessful against the determined opposition of the business interests and the force of legal precedent.

The Federation did continue successful advocacy of laws regulating working conditions in businesses and manufacturing establishments and providing an increased inspection staff, particularly in the so-called dusty trades where tuberculosis was a major problem. But while
these limited gains were being achieved, the OFL was laying the groundwork for one of its greatest accomplishments in bettering the quality of the working and living environment of labor, the model Ohio Workmen's Compensation Law of 1911.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, throughout most of the United States, the question of employer and employee liability was settled according to the common law precepts of assumption of risk, fellow servant and contributory negligence. These precepts placed the onus of liability on the worker. Assumption of risk held that the employee, or the servant, assumed virtually all the risks of his employment, and the employer, or master, almost none. Further, fellow servant declared that any injury caused by the negligence of any other employee was not chargeable to the employer and contributory negligence, that any deviation from the rules of caution, prudence and safety placed the blame for an accident and the loss caused entirely on the employee.30

By the turn of the century, sentiment for reversal of these common law precepts and for the passage of legislation providing compensation for injured employees began to spread throughout the country. The impetus behind this interest was the U. S. Department of Labor's publication of John Graham Brook's Compulsory Insurance in Germany, an examination of the first European compensation law enacted by Bismarck in 1884.31 A compensation bill was introduced in 1898 in the New York legislature but was not reported
out of the reference committee. The first actual enactment providing benefits for work related injuries without a suit or proof of negligence was passed in Maryland in 1902.

Under this law, an employer in mining, quarrying, steam or street railroads could exempt himself from all liability for accidents by paying an annual premium, half of which he could recoup from his workers, into a fund administered by the state insurance commissioner...This act was declared unconstitutional after less than two years of operation on the ground that it deprived both parties of trial by jury and conferred judicial functions upon an executive officer.32

Victor Berger, a Socialist representative, introduced a resolution in Congress calling for a national disability insurance in 1902. Many states, as well, now began studying the question of employer liability and workers' compensation. In 1902, the OFL, following the national trend, supported a law in the Ohio General Assembly altering the fellow servant law in favor of the workingman. According to this bill the employer was held responsible for damages in any injury caused by an employee, "...who is himself in the exercise of due care and diligence at the time, by reason of any defect in the machinery or appliance."33 In 1904, the OFL helped secure passage of the Williams Bill altering the provision of assumed risk. The Williams Bill stated that, "...in any action brought by an employee, or his legal representative, against his employer, to recover for personal injuries, when it shall appear that the injury was caused in whole or in part by the negligent omission of such employer to guard or protect his machinery or appliances, or the premises or place where said
employee was employed, in the manner required by a penal statute of the state or United States in force at the date of the passage of this act, the fact that such employee continued in said employment with the knowledge of such omission, shall not operate as a defense.

Finally, 1907, the Federation composed a comprehensive bill making the employer liable for all injuries resulting from the negligence of his officers and fellow employees and from defects in machinery and totally eliminating assumed risk by employment. This bill, however, failed to pass in the legislature.

The OFL met marked resistance from business interests and from the inertia of legal tradition in this campaign to change employer liability. But although the Federation's successes were limited, they did set the stage for major achievements after 1909.

This same situation held in the OFL's campaign for reform in the political environment. In the first decade of the 1900's, the Federation helped lay the foundation for the Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1912. Labor nationally was a prime advocate of many Progressive reforms. The OFL supported home rule, the direct election of U. S. Senators, the direct primary and, especially, the initiative and referendum and women's suffrage. In 1904, the Federation, following the lead of the AFL, advocated the Winnatka system giving the initiative and referendum to cities without state legislative approval. This system had already proven successful in both Detroit and Toronto; it was
regarded as a first step in proving the workability of the initiative and referendum and in establishing both on all levels of government. The AFL also instructed the Ohio federation to work for a federal initiative and referendum amendment, but the OFL's major efforts were concentrated on an Ohio law. The OFL, allied with the Ohio Direct Legislation League and several other Citizen groups, managed by 1907 to get a bill enacting the initiative and the referendum for Ohio into the state legislature. The bill was tied up in committee but this only increased the determination of the OFL and its allies to press for enactment. The OFL, allied again with progressive citizens' groups, also began to pressure the General Assembly to adopt a resolution asking Congress to support a federal amendment outlawing disenfranchisement because of sex, "...as a matter of justice and as a necessary step towards insuring and raising the scale of wages for all..."36

Despite these concerted efforts, from 1897 through 1909, the OFL and its allies in the campaign for progressive changes in government remained unsuccessful against the recalcitrance and inertia of the political system and its supporters. Because it is an uphill struggle to force a long established system to willingly enact internal changes, the OFL then turned to agitation for a state constitutional convention through which the voters could enact change in government. As with employer liability, and workmen's compensation, the OFL between 1897 and 1909 achieved few
concrete changes in the political environment but did act as a major force in preparing for the accomplishments of the next decade.

In the years from 1897 through 1909, the OFL continued to support improvements in labor's condition by other than legislative means and legislative enactments that had only tenuous ties to labor's needs. As in its early years, the OFL advocated the eight hour day for all workmen to allow "...more time for social enjoyment and intellectual improvement,...to reap the advantages conferred by the labor-saving machinery which their brains have created," the use of union label and the abolition of capital punishment. The Federation now also opposed military conscription in general and, in particular, the federal enactment of the Dick Military Law allowing the conscription of every able-bodied citizen between 16 and 45. Opposition to conscription was particularly fierce because labor in Ohio increasingly saw the military as a major tool of the capitalist class in suppressing the working class. The OFL also endorsed the newly formed Producers' and Consumers' International Equity Union and Cooperative Exchange and called for co-operation between farmers and the trade unions in a position reminiscent of the Knights of Labor.

By the turn of the century, the Federation had also become increasingly involved in the question of prohibition, but OFL members were unable to agree on a common position. Prohibition's opponents argued that prohibition was
detrimental to labor, particularly to the Brewers and the Cigarmakers, and contrary to the citizen's rights and liberties. Its proponents, in turn, argued that it was socially and medically necessary or that it was a question lying outside of labor's province. In convention after convention, the struggle over Ohio Labor's official position on Prohibition remained unsettled and each year the opposing forces shelved the question in the interests of continued unity. Finally, at the Federation's convention in 1908, a heated fight erupted over the question, resulting in a walkout by the Brewery Workers, Firemen, Engineers, Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Glass Bottle Blowers, all opponents of the measure.

Although these dissidents eventually returned to the convention, the struggle over Prohibition only pointed up the internal problems that plagued the OFL through 1909. While the years from 1897 to 1909 were years of transition and progress, they were also years of internal turmoil that threatened to ultimately destroy the Federation. Prohibition was only one part of the larger picture; the OFL's major problems were the questions of political partisanship and personalities and an almost schizophrenic attitude toward the AFL. Although the OFL officially was non-partisan and a member in good standing of the AFL, these two certainties were, in reality, uncertain.

An internal power struggle built around the question of political partisanship remained unsettled through the decade.
At the Ohio federation's 1901 convention, Vice-President Theis of Dayton led forces leveling accusations of fraud, crookedness and Republican party domination in the Federation. On the last day of the convention 54 delegates walked out in protest. The major cause of this upheaval was the refusal of the convention to pass a resolution condemning the Republican state administration for using a non-union printing office for official state business. Unity was restored before the next annual convention but the so-called partisan Republican faction continued to dominate the Federation. Internal dissatisfaction with the leadership of the Federation, likewise, continued to grow.

At the 1907 convention, the struggle finally came to a head. The insurgents, led by the powerful Dayton and Cleveland coalitions, accused the Federation leadership of secrecy, citing the refusal of Treasurer McConnell to make a report or even appear at the 1906 convention. Following several days of campaigning, the insurgents ousted all of the "old guard" officers, re-electing only William Cope whom they considered an honest man. The fight over the question of Prohibition in the 1908 convention reflected the apparent settlement of this question of partisanship. Although the Brewery Workers, Firemen, Engineers, Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Glass Bottle Blowers who walked out had ties with the Personal Liberty League, a supposed front for the brewers, distributors and Republicans, and their walkout threatened to resurrect the power struggle of
the previous year, "level-heads" prevailed and unity was restored, at least temporarily.  

At the Federation's 1909 convention, the problem of partisanship was again resurrected but it was now further complicated by the troubles between the Federation and the AFL. Although the OFL had affiliated voluntarily with the AFL in 1897, it did not always adhere to all AFL dictates. The AFL membership policy was especially troublesome. The AFL required that no central body affiliated with it could admit delegates from any organization hostile to the AFL or any of its unions but did not require its affiliates to join their respective central bodies. Prior to affiliating with the AFL, the OFL had admitted delegates from the Knights of Labor, the Patrons of Husbandry and other non-AFL affiliated groups and after affiliation it remained unsure of its compliance with the AFL membership rule. In 1902, the Federation's annual convention voted to admit delegates from organizations not affiliated with the AFL; in 1903, a faction sought an amendment to the Federation's constitution to prevent the seating of such delegates; in 1906, the Federation refused to admit the Stogie Makers until the AFL had decided on accusations of dual unionism and called for the AFL's suspension of the New York City Central Labor Union because of its acceptance of dual unionism and its showing of contempt for the AFL; in 1908, another resolution was introduced that only delegates representing unions chartered by an international or national
union affiliated with the AFL could belong to the OFL.

While it appeared that the OFL was in compliance with the AFL membership requirement, appearances were deceiving, the OFL's compliance simply had not been seriously tested. The real problems came at the 1909 convention over which faction of the Electrical Workers should be seated. The Electrical Workers had split earlier over the alleged ineptitude and malfeasance of duty of its officers into the so-called Reed faction, which had the majority of members, and a much smaller group, led by the old officers and recognized officially by the AFL. By the time of the OFL's convention in October, 1909, the AFL had expelled the Cleveland, Toledo and Fostoria central bodies for refusing to expel the insurgent Electrical Workers. The OFL itself now faced the question of which faction to seat, and the delegates voted 194 to 158 to seat all of the Electrical Workers and the expelled central bodies. This vote only compounded an already volatile situation.

Dissension had arisen among the delegates to the convention over the question of independent political action. The Socialists, led by Max Hayes, editor of the labor-oriented Cleveland Citizen and a leader in the Cleveland Central Labor Assembly, carried a resolution favoring partisan political activity by the OFL. The opposition to this resolution was led by a Catholic priest, the Reverend Peter E. Dietz and his Militia of Christ for Social Service, a nationwide group dedicated "...to combating socialist
influence in the labor movement and to directing the trade
unions along the line of 'pure and simple' unionism." Father Dietz and his Militia members refused to compromise
their position and ill feelings grew among the delegates.
The seating of the Electrical Workers was the final move
amidst growing dissension. Finally, one-third of the
delegates at the convention, representing an estimated 106
unions and led by the Reverend Dietz, walked out in protest
of the passage of the partisanship resolution and the
seating of the Electrical Workers. On the fourth day, the
charter of the OFL was revoked by Secretary Morrison of the
AFL, who was acting in Gompers' place during the latter's
absence in Europe. The Ohio federation, however, refused to
comply and sought to appeal to the AFL convention meeting
in Toronto. The AFL supported the revocation and granted a
charter to the new Ohio State Federation of Labor, already
being formed by the delegates who had seceded.

Now two state bodies existed in Ohio, the unchartered
Ohio Federation of Labor and the Ohio State Federation of
Labor recognized by the AFL. The split had been in the
making for some time, it was not a sudden or unexpected
occurrence. Despite the Federation's official position of
non-partisanship, it had been troubled by partisanship
since its establishment. In addition, a strong current of
dissatisfaction with the AFL had been growing for several
years, particularly over that body's membership require-
ments. Since the Ohio federation's affiliation, the AFL
had antagonized some by its demand that all locals of the Flint Glass Workers be expelled from the OFL because of their jurisdictional problems with the Green Glass Bottle Blowers. In addition, many members of the OFL felt that the AFL membership policy overall was harmful to state central bodies. This position was stated by the OFL's President Lewis in an address after the vote on seating the Electrical Workers at the 1909 convention.

"There should be no objection on the part of any member to obey the laws of an organization under which we are chartered, I am firmly of the opinion, however, that when the American Federation of Labor can compel a state branch to suspend certain local unions that are affiliated, it should be in a position to compel all local unions of affiliated, international and national organizations, to be attached to the state branches, otherwise the authority of the American Federation of Labor is used to weaken the state branch and is not in a position to strengthen it."49

With the establishment of dual state labor bodies in Ohio in 1909, the internal conflicts that had affected the OFL finally came to a head. But even more important, the progress that the labor lobby had made from 1897 in Ohio was now threatened. An era that had begun in a spirit of optimism now ended on a bleak note. But although the existence of dual bodies presaged a long period of internal conflict in the Ohio labor movement and the subsequent neglect of legislative lobbying, the opposite was ultimately true. Within a year, the two state federations would unite and begin a decade of unprecedented legislative success.
CHAPTER III: NOTES


4 Ibid., p. 164.


6 Ibid., p. 7.

7 Ninth Annual Session of the Ohio State Trades and Labor Assembly (1892), p. 5.


10 Proceedings of the First Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation of Labor, pp. 33-34.


18 Perlman and Taft, History of Labor in the United States, IV, p. 137.


21 Cleveland Citizen, October 16, 1909.

22 Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation of Labor (1907), p. 34; Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation, p. 65.


24 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation of Labor, p. 11.

25 Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation of Labor, p. 61.

26 Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation of Labor, pp. 41-42.


32 Ibid., p. 571.


34 Mengert, "The Ohio Workmen's Compensation Law," p. 5.


36 Ibid., p. 30.


38 *Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation of Labor*, p. 48.

39 Ibid., pp. 82-95.

40 *Cleveland Citizen*, January 26, 1901.

41 *Toledo Union Leader*, August 24, 1907.

42 *Toledo Union Leader*, October 23, 1908.

43 *Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation of Labor*, p. 3.

44 *Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation of Labor* (1903), p. 32.


46 *Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation of Labor*, p. 58.


48 *Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation of Labor*, p. 52.

49 Ibid., p. 37.
In the months immediately following the split in the Ohio Federation of Labor and the formation of the dual state body, the possibilities of reunification appeared slight. Both the old Federation of Labor and the new Ohio State Federation of Labor, the central recognized by the A.F.L., attempted to act as legislative lobbies while seeking to discredit each other and to establish their own position in the Ohio labor movement. But there was strong sentiment for reunification on both sides and within the A.F.L. Both the A.F.L. and the Ohio State Federation of Labor probably sought reconciliation because they recognized that the old Federation held the allegiance of a sizeable segment of organized labor in the state and this split would seriously impair the position of the A.F.L. in Ohio and throughout the nation. Successful rebellion by any member body might be interpreted as an indication of weakness within the A.F.L. In this same vein, the Ohio Federation of Labor probably recognized that its position outside of the major stream of American organized labor might become untenable, particularly with the loss of membership, financial resources and the support of the A.F.L.
By December, 1909, only two months after the split, the Executive Board of the old Federation proposed the first serious offer of reunification. Its proposal called for the resignation of both sets of officers and the formation of a committee selected by Gompers or by the A.F.L. convention to hold a referendum election. The A.F.L., however, rejected the plan, probably fearing a majority vote favorable to the old Federation.\(^1\) The next serious attempt at reunification was not made until nearly six months later. On June 13, 1910, the Executive Board of the Ohio Federation of Labor met in Columbus and again appointed a unity committee. This new committee, composed of William Groeniger, Secretary of the State Association of Plumbers and Steamfitters, Val Knouse, Machinists Union, and G. W. Savage, Secretary of the Ohio United Mine Workers, met with Gompers and the A.F.L. Executive Council at its June meeting to present yet another plan. This new plan entailed the seating of all unions not hostile to the A.F.L. at the coming Hamilton convention of the officially chartered Ohio State Federation of Labor. Each union would also pay three months per capita tax to the new body and all books, money and property of both bodies would be handed over to an auditing committee at the convention. During this meeting, Gompers and the Executive Council assured the unity committee that any efforts toward amalgamation would not only be satisfactory but that the Council was anxious for their completion.\(^2\) The chartered state body, however, rejected
this proposed plan, fearing the dominance of the old Federation in any amalgamated central body. Gompers and the Executive Council then directed Val Knouse to call the two Federations together again for a meeting in Dayton on September 25 and sent A.F.L. Secretary Frank Morrison to direct this conference. The delegates from the dual state bodies, under Morrison's prodding finally agreed to a compromise solution after debating throughout the day and into the early morning. According to the terms of settlement, the unaffiliated state body withdrew its circular call for a convention and President Gompers issued a call to all Ohio locals and central bodies to meet in the convention of the affiliated Ohio State Federation of Labor. The re-unification agreement also required that all union per capita taxes up to and including September 30 go to Secretary Harry Thomas on or before noon, October 10, and that all union members of the old Federation pay a $2.00 affiliation fee to the new federation. On October 10, the once again united Ohio State Federation of Labor met in convention in Hamilton. Although the Ohio Federation accepted the name of the affiliated Ohio State Federation in amalgamation and although the insurgent Electrical Workers were excluded from the new state body, there were no real losers in the reconciliation. Both Federations, simply, realized that to be effective, labor in Ohio had to be united.

Although the split in the state federation had lasted less than a year, the extent of damage done to labor unity
and labor's legislative influence in Ohio was difficult to
gage immediately. The real test would be the new
federation's effectiveness in rallying support and its
success in advocating legislation. The new federation
didn't wait long for this test; it was faced almost
immediately with two major opportunities, employers'
liability and workmen's compensation and the state con-
stitutional convention.

While the state federation had been split, both seg-
ments had continued to actively support the passage of state
employer liability laws reversing the traditional common
law precepts of fellow-servant, assumed risk and con-
tributory negligence. Early in 1910, the Norris-Mathews
Employer Liability Law, abolishing the fellow-servant rule
and assumed risk and establishing employer liability, was
introduced in the Ohio House. Because this bill was one of
labor's chief demands, both state federations actively
campaigned before the House and the Senate for enactment
and, despite strong opposition from business interests,
helped force the bill's passage in the Senate and the
House. 5

Now that employer liability was established by state
law, labor's next campaign was for the enactment of some
form of workmen's compensation law and the establishment of
machinery to administer this law. This would guarantee
that injured workmen or the survivors of workers killed in
industrial accidents would receive compensation without extended and expensive litigation. In response to the combined demands of labor and business interests and following the national trend—three commissions were appointed in 1909, eight in 1910, twelve in 1911 and seven in 1912—the Ohio General Assembly on May 17, 1910, set-up a Workmen's Compensation Commission to investigate the need for comprehensive legislation. In a familiar ploy, the legislature failed to approve any money for the Commission but Governor Judson Harmon advanced his personal funds. The Commission was composed of five members, an attorney, James Harrington Boyd of Toledo; two employer representatives, George W. Perk of Springfield and John P. Smith of Cleveland; two labor representatives, William H. Rehr of Cincinnati and William J. Winans of Galion. The employers, as much as labor, sought enactment of some form of workmen's compensation. Because the new employer liability law overruled the old common law defenses of fellow-servant, assumed risk and contributory negligence and effectively placed the onus of liability on the employer, it was to the employers' advantage to support state workmen's compensation to remove some of the need for expensive private insurance and court litigation in liability cases. In addition, the "...largest corporations were instituting it (workmen's compensation) in their plants; public agitation for relief had created a good political climate; compensation was paternalistic and would probably reduce somewhat the appeal
of unionism to workers, yet the unions could be induced to support it." Necessity made strange bedfellows of the employers and labor on this occasion.

The initial action of the Workmen's Compensation Commission was to study the economic effect of industrial injuries occurring in Cleveland in the previous five years. By January, 1911, the majority of the Commission members had agreed on a bill, written in great part by Attorney George B. Okey of Columbus, establishing a state compensation fund to receive 75% of its money from employers and 25% from employees. At the same time, William Winans, one of labor's representatives on the Commission, filed a minority report embodying the Ohio State Federation's objections to the proportional division of assessments. By April, a compromise bill requiring workers to pay only 10% of the funding and employers to pay 90% had been formulated by the Commission and introduced in the General Assembly with the sanction of both labor and employer interests.

While the bill was before the legislature, a decision by the New York Supreme Court ruled that that state's law was unconstitutional because it was compulsory. To avoid this possible pitfall with the proposed Ohio law, both the employers and labor agreed to amend the workmen's compensation bill, making compliance with it elective but providing advantages for those contributing to the state fund.
Section 20-1 of the proposed Ohio law stated that,*

...any employer of five or more workmen, who had paid premiums...should not, save in certain expected cases, be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for injuries to or death of an employee, provided the employee remained in service after notice of the employer's contribution to the fund.*9

Section 21-1 further stated that an

...employer of more than five who had not contributed...should not in the event of personal injury litigation on the part of an employee "avail himself of the following common law defenses: The defense of the fellow-servant rule,...the assumption of risk,...contributory negligence."10

The law's coverage excluded employers of less than five because businesses of this size might find it difficult to pay the insurance premiums and too time consuming to administer the law. The OSFL, at the same time, was willing to accept this limitation because workers in establishments of this size were frequently difficult to unionize. The Federation would compromise to insure coverage of the larger, already unionized or more unionizable companies. Finally, this exemption was based on a belief held by many business and labor leaders that establishments with few employees had a lower risk of accident.11

After compromise and constant support by labor and business, the Workmen's Compensation Law was passed, to go into effect in March, 1912. Significantly, the final proposal had been introduced by William Green, a member of the U.M.W. and the Ohio State Federation of Labor and Gompers'
future successor as president of the A.F.L. Although the Ohio law was not the first enacted state workmen's compensation law, it was immediately hailed as the best in the nation. The A.F.L. particularly praised the law and adopted it as the model to be actively sought by other state labor federations in their respective legislatures.

The Ohio Compensation Law first established a State Liability Board of Awards with officers in Columbus, the state capital, to administer the law. The Board was composed of three members who were appointed by the governor to six year terms at a salary of $5,000.00 a year and who were to devote their time exclusively to this position. Hopefully, this would insure professional and effective administration and prove the law's workability in the face of its detractors. The law further granted the new Board power to name a secretary, actuary and other employees and to make necessary procedural rules. In accepted practice, the members of the Board and its employees usually were chosen to provide a balance of business, labor and the public's interests.

Other portions of the law provided for a classification of employees, based on the degree of hazard in their work, to establish equitable assessment rates for the compensation fund. These rates would be cheaper than those charged by private companies because the state would bear the overhead expenses, a 45% factor in private insurance. These assessments would be placed in a fund administered by the
Secretary of State. The first payments to this fund, 10% by employees and 90% by employers, were due on or before January 1, 1912. The Board, with money from this fund, would pay a portion of the medical, nursing and hospital services required for an injured worker, funeral expenses and death awards to dependents and compensation to injured workers at the rate of two-thirds of the individual's average weekly wage for temporary or partial disability, with a minimum of $5.00 per week and a maximum of $12.00 per week, and, for permanent disability, these same awards for life. Finally, the worker was granted the right to appeal any decision of the Board denying an award to a common pleas court of the county in which the injury occurred. In this case, the Board would be the defendant.12

Even with the successful passage of Workmen's Compensation and the establishment of the necessary machinery to administer the law, the Ohio State Federation of Labor's struggle for Workmen's Compensation had only just begun. The initial awards and the extent of coverage provided by the bill would need to be constantly expanded in light of changing needs and much of the guidance and pressure for this expansion would have to come from labor. Even more important, labor would be forced to act as one of the law's chief defendants against its enemies. The OSFL was becoming increasingly aware that lobbying required continual activity and interest in legislation far beyond its initial enactment. Lobbying, simply, often demands a constant holding action.
A first step in insuring the successful continuance of Ohio's Workmen's Compensation was the establishment of the law's constitutionality. Early in 1912, with the agreement of both labor and business interests, the state initiated a test suit. D. S. Cramer, the Treasurer of State, held up an award granted by the State Liability Board of Awards. The Board then brought suit in the Ohio Supreme Court to compel him to honor the award and Cramer argued as his defense the alleged invalidity of the compensation law. In ruling on the case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the law and later the United States Supreme Court, in another case, in effect sustained this decision.\(^{13}\)

In 1911, when the Green Workmen's Compensation Law passed the General Assembly, there was no basis for such a legislative enactment in the Ohio Constitution. To further insure the constitutionality of this law, beyond the state Supreme Court decision, labor vigorously campaigned for passage in the November, 1912, election of an amendment to the state constitution giving the state the right to establish a compensation plan and allowing the plan to be compulsory, a provision not included in the initial law. This amendment was carried by a vote of 321,558 for and 211,772 against, a majority of 109,786 votes.\(^{14}\)

Ohio Workmen's Compensation was still not secure despite the firm establishment of its constitutionality.
Its enemies, led by private insurance interests, tried to repeal it in 1913 through a referendum sponsored by the Equity League, a front organization. Because of fraud in obtaining the necessary signatures, however, Ohio Secretary of State Charles H. Graves rejected the League's petitions and his action was upheld by the state Supreme Court.

Workmen's Compensation, however faced yet another major test. In January, 1914, the Ohio General Assembly enacted legislation making Workmen's Compensation compulsory, in line with the provisions of the recently passed constitutional amendment. This legislation, however, also provided that individual employers could choose to pay compensation benefits directly to workmen instead of through the state fund. The Ohio State Federation of Labor, while whole-heartedly supporting the compulsory feature of this new bill, feared that the provision for private payment would allow a reentrance of private insurance companies into Workmen's Compensation. This fear proved correct. In 1915, Judge Taggart ruled that private insurance companies could write insurance for employers who assumed to carry their own risks. With this decision, the insurance companies sought to secure the cream of business and left the state fund to assume the poorer risks.

This new activity by the insurance companies was immediately met by a strong counter offensive by the State Federation of Labor. To insure organized labor's support
for his re-election, Ohio's Governor Cox made the elimination of private insurance companies from participation in Workmen's Compensation a major issue in his campaign in 1916. To supplement Cox's pledge, the OSFL also announced that it would propose a similar bill expelling the private insurance companies, to the General Assembly by initiative and, if the General Assembly refused to act, that the Federation would take the law to the public through the referendum.17

In November, 1916, a General Assembly favorable to labor's position was elected, after intense campaigning by labor on the local level supporting pro-labor candidates, and by February 19, 1917, Governor Cox signed the Federation's initiated H.B. 1 eliminating, finally, the private insurance companies from Workmen's Compensation in Ohio.18

The State Federation of Labor's success in establishing Workmen's Compensation was complemented by its success in improving Ohio's political environment. Since its early years, the Federation had taken a particularly active role in seeking a state constitutional convention for Ohio. This would allow changes in the political process without the constant prodding of a recalcitrant or self-satisfied legislature. The state's last constitutional convention, held from 1873 through 1874, provided for the submitting of the question of another convention to a popular vote in 1911. Strong pressure from a coalition of citizen's groups, including the OSFL, forced the state legislature to call for this vote a year earlier, in 1910. The final vote is
illustrative of the extent of public interest, 693,263 voted for a convention and 67,718, against.\textsuperscript{19} The General Assembly then provided that the election of delegates to the convention to be held on November 7, 1911, and that the convention, only the fourth in the state's history, meet in Columbus in January, 1912.

The State Federation of Labor, aware of the need for immediate and concrete action, even prior to the popular vote on the constitutional convention, began to plot its strategy. In an address to the 1910 OSFL convention, President John Voll declared, "It is an opportunity that we have long been waiting for, because through unified and concerted action, the wage earner can help draft a constitution that will make for greater progress and afford relief from some of the obnoxious clauses under which we are now governed."\textsuperscript{20} At its convention in early October, 1910, the Federation adopted as its official platform a list of proposed amendments framed by its Legislative Committee. The list of amendments included,

1. Direct legislation through the initiative, referendum and recall...

2. Home rule for cities and towns and express statutory power to own and operate all public service utilities...

3. Limitation of Working Hours. The right of the legislature to enact laws limiting the hours of labor. Eight hours to constitute a day's work in all cases of employment by and on behalf of the state or any county or municipality.
4. Regulating the proceedings in the issuance of injunctions and punishment in matters of contempt...

5. Reaffirmation of the bill of rights and amendments thereto, so that no two or more men shall be considered as guilty of conspiracy within the meaning of the law, when doing by mutual agreement what each one had a legal right to do as an individual.

6. Contracting of convict labor to be prohibited.

7. The right of the legislature to make laws regulating the employment of children and women.

8. Taxing incomes and inheritances.

9. A non-partisan judiciary to be elected by separate ballot.

10. United States Senators to be elected by direct vote of the people.

11. Employers liability for personal injuries and death...

12. Providing that every citizen, irrespective of sex, and of legal age, shall be a qualified elector.

The State Federation also advocated the election of delegates to the constitutional convention on a non-partisan ballot. This measure would prevent the convention becoming the vehicle of any one political party; thus alienating possible segments of public support. To this end, the Federation helped draft S.B. 151, introduced by William Green, providing the non-partisan nomination and election of convention delegates. To insure passage of this bill, the OSFL, with the Ohio Progressive Constitution League, the Grange, the Direct Legislation League and other citizen's groups, pressured individual legislatures. This
lobbying was made a great deal easier because of the already “Progressive” bent of many of these legislators.

After the successful enactment of S.B. 151, the Federation and its allies sought to rally public support for the proposed constitutional amendments and the election of favorable delegates. The Federation's activities revolved around a grassroots campaign, involving public meetings, canvassing and the like, to stimulate voter interest, conducted locally through its affiliated unions. The success of these efforts by the Federation and its allies was obvious in the outcome of the November, 1911, delegate election. Of 119 delegates chosen, at least two-thirds were classed as "progressives" and 15 were card-carrying union members, including the Secretary of the State Federation. In addition, the Reverend Herbert Bigelow, who had already worked closely with Ohio labor and who was chairman of the Ohio Progressive Constitution League, was elected to the powerful chairmanship of the Convention. 22

The Constitutional Convention, with the “progressives” firmly in control, began its work in January, 1912, and, after six months of intense activity, presented a slate of 42 amendments to be decided by popular vote. The State Federation of Labor and its allies again intensified their grassroots efforts to get out the vote for the special election on September 3 and again their efforts were rewarded. Of the 42 proposed amendments, 34 passed. Only two in which labor was vitally interested, the abolition
of injunctions and equal suffrage, were defeated.²³

Labor's victory, however, was mitigated by the fact that constitutional amendments do not always constitute enforceable laws. In many instances, an amendment merely gives the General Assembly the power to pass a law. In the case of the amendments passed in September, 1912, several, like that dealing with Workmen's Compensation, simply established the legal basis for already enacted law while others gave the legislature grounds on which to pass new legislation if it chose. Unfortunately for the State Federation and its allies, the General Assembly didn't choose to enact much of this allowed legislation. Although the Federation and its allies among the progressives were significant factors in the legislature advocating these constitutional enactments, other vested interests like segments of the judiciary and the business community frequently offset their influence. Despite this lack of overall cooperation by the General Assembly, labor did achieve limited immediate successes as in the passage of provisions for the initiative and referendum and, perhaps even more important, in laying the groundwork for future progressive laws.

The Ohio Federation of Labor's successful roles in Workmen's Compensation and the state Constitutional Convention of 1912 overshadow much of its other activity during this period. But the Federation did accomplish other important lobbying victories. In seeking further control
of the state's labor force, the Federation supported a series of bills, passed in 1910, strengthening the enforcement of the existing compulsory education laws and lobbied for mothers' pensions to provide an income for widows while their children attended school and could not work to provide support.

The movement for mothers' pensions had gained tremendous popularity throughout the country as a result of a national conference in Washington on the care of dependant children convened by President Theodore Roosevelt in January, 1909. This conference, in turn, was spurred by the demands of social workers and a variety of progressive groups, particularly women's organizations, who felt that "...the children of widows were being committed to institutions for no reason except that their mothers were poor and without the means of rearing them in their own homes." Mothers' pensions would allow "suitable" mothers to keep their children and raise them in the supposedly healthier environment of the home. Support money that would have been spent in institutions would then be given directly to needy mothers for care of their children. The new law provided extensive coverage, including women who were poor, with children of school age and morally fit and whose husbands were dead, permanently disabled, physically or mentally, prisoners or deserters of three years standing. This would eliminate, particularly, the objection to compulsory education and child labor laws that some children
must be allowed to leave school and work to support their
widowed mothers. In October, 1914, after pressure from the
State Federation and other interested citizens' groups, the
Ohio General Assembly passed the bill establishing a
Mothers' Pension program.

The Federation also proposed that convict laborers be
paid a minimum wage and that the federal government enact a
bill to allow the states to legislate to prevent convict-
made goods from one state being shipped to another state,
but both of these propositions were temporarily defeated.

The Federation, following the nation-wide pattern in
women's hours laws in the period from 1909 to 1917, did
achieve a major victory in women's hours legislation.26 In
1911, William Green introduced S.B. 11 providing a ten hour
work day and a 54 hour work week for women. Despite the
vehement opposition of many employers who brought women
employees to the legislature to testify that they did not
want to have their hours shortened, the Green Bill was
enacted. This bill, however, despite the manuevering of
the Federation and allied groups both in committee and in
the full legislature, fell far short of the original pro-
posal. It did not include women who worked in hotels and
department stores, where some of the most flagrant abuses
occured, and its allowed hours were still too long, labor
and its allies wanted the eight hour day. In addition, they
wanted female employment completely eliminated in some
industries, particularly those involving occupational
diseases. Finally, the spirit of even the weakened law was ignored by many employers. The law provided for a work week of five full days and one half day, with the intent that the half day would be Saturday. But, because this intent was not legally spelled out, many employers forced their female employees to take the half day during the week.  

The State Federation's immediate concern after passage of the Green Women's Hour Bill, however, was to defend its constitutionality in court. The Federation's case was argued before the state Supreme Court by several state labor lawyers assisted by Louis Brandeis, already famous for his defenses of labor and progressive causes. The Green Bill was upheld in 1912.  

By 1913, in response to the constant pressure from labor and progressive groups, the General Assembly extended coverage of the Green Law to women working in department stores. By 1917, the General Assembly passed labor-supported H.B. 327 establishing a nine hour day and 50 hour week for all women workers except those employed in establishments producing perishable goods.

In the area of general work environment, the Ohio State Federation of Labor continued its traditional success in pressuring for legislation protecting individual occupations. The Federation, again allied with concerned citizens' groups, also succeeded in forcing state investigation of occupational diseases. In 1913, the General Assembly formed a commission, funded by $14,000.00 for two years, to
investigate occupational diseases, but the commission's work did not spur any immediate action by the legislature.\textsuperscript{29} The proponents of legislation for compensation of occupational diseases, including the State Federation, were themselves unable to agree whether Workmen's Compensation should be extended or a new "Sickness Insurance" established.

The Federation, in a reversal of its former policy, also came to advocate some forms of hours legislation beyond that for women and children and public employees. Labor sought an eight hour work day in all industries that were in operation 24 hours a day and, at the Federation's annual convention in 1914, one delegate introduced a resolution calling for Federation support of an eight hour day and a 48 hour week, with time and a half for overtime, for all workers.\textsuperscript{30} These proposals, however, were unsuccessfully advocated in a society and a legislature that often had trouble accepting even women's and children's hours legislation.

Despite an overall successful lobbying role from 1909 to 1919, the State Federation's record in improving labor's legal environment remained generally dismal. The Federation continued to demand, unsuccessfully, legislation outlawing yellow-dog contracts and blacklisting and regulating and limiting the use of the injunction. In October, 1915, the U.S. Congress passed the Clayton Act which held that labor was not a commodity, effectively eliminating, at least on the federal level, one of the legal grounds used
in granting injunctions. The Ohio State Federation of Labor sought the repeal of all Ohio laws that were not in line with the spirit of this act, but these attempts failed because of strong opposition from many employers and particularly from the judiciary. The judiciary especially resented this effort to curb its power and prerogatives.

The Federation's efforts improving labor's legal environment were not totally unsuccessful, however. It was able to prevent the establishment of a state constabulary. The Federation particularly feared that such a constabulary would be modeled on the Pennsylvania state police, known popularly as the "Iron and Coal" police because of their effective use in breaking strikes in that state in those industries. The OSFL also prevented the enactment of legislation requiring compulsory arbitration. The Federation opposed compulsory arbitration as "...class legislation in the interest of property rights as against human rights, and a serious blow at democratic government." It held that if business could close, workers could strike.

In the decade from 1909 to 1919, the Ohio State Federation began to increasingly devote its resources to another lobbying goal, legislation improving the quality of the average citizen's life. Although the Federation had always been, at least in principle, socially aware, it had felt in its earlier years that the workers' primary needs and organized labor's major province lay in legislation controlling the work force and the legal, work and political
environments. Whether the Federation's position was changing because its growing legislative success gave it new boldness or because of the influence of socialism among the organized workers in the state or the general progressive spirit of the time or the influx of new members with new ideas, the Federation was increasingly concerned with social issues. In 1913, it was one of the chief supporters of the radical Vollmer Social Insurance Bill, then before the General Assembly. This bill proposed comprehensive state insurance covering accident, sickness, old age, unemployment and life. Although the bill was defeated, it was a ground-breaking precedent for labor's support of social legislation in the 1930's.

After defeat of the Vollmer Bill, the Federation became active in a more limited campaign for a state old age pension system. This agitation for old age pensions was led by Herbert Bigelow, the minister who chaired the state constitutional convention in 1912. Reverend Bigelow had already formed a state-wide Old Age Pension Committee and actively sought the Federation as a powerful ally. The Federation, however, chose to move cautiously on this pension proposal, in a retreat from its bold advocacy of the much more radical Vollmer Bill. In an exchange of letters with Reverend Bigelow, Federation President John Voll stated the Federation position that any action on old age pensions would require extraordinary thought and preparation as had been done with Workmen's Compensation. If the
Federation had acted too quickly in Workmen’s Compensation, Voll reasoned, it would not have been as good a law as it was. In addition, Voll stated that Ohio labor had several other interests besides old age pensions. The Federation did not rule out helping the Bigelow Committee, it simply carried consideration over to a later time.

With or without the Federation's full assistance, however, the Bigelow Committee continued agitation for state old age pensions. In response, the General Assembly in 1917 passed H.B. 461 establishing a special Health and Old Age Insurance Commission to conduct a thorough study of sickness and old age insurance. The Commission was funded by a $25,000.00 grant and was composed of seven members to serve without salary. Two Commission members were officers of the State Federation, Second Vice-President, O. B. Chapman and Secretary-Treasurer Thomas Donnelly, and, as such, dedicated to cautious support of the proposed legislation. After months of activity, the Commission released its report endorsing both compulsory old age pensions and health insurance. While agreeing in principle with the Commission's findings, Donnelly and Chapman issued a Minority Report against making health insurance compulsory. The Report stated their opposition on the grounds that compulsory health insurance was, in reality, the germ of industrial feudalism, that it would destroy the independence of the worker and retard the development of his character and responsibility and, finally, that it was an
"...interference with the rights of the individual and com-
pulsion should be the last resort of free government, and
not the first." What exactly caused this retreat in the
Federation's position on the role of government is a
difficult question. Probably the Federation simply felt
that it had strayed too far from the dictates of traditional
union voluntarism.

Whatever its position on old age and health insurance,
the Federation from 1909 through 1919 experienced a decade
of significant legislative successes and attained maturity
as a respected and effective lobby. There were several
prominent facets of this new position. A major aspect was
the Federation's development of an effective, non-partisan
system for activating and using labor's political clout in
electing pro-labor candidates and in advocating labor's
position on legislation. Thomas Donnelly, Secretary-
Treasurer and Legislative Agent for the OSFL from 1913
through the early 1940s and a chief architect of this
system, described it in an article in the *American
Federationist* in 1926,

The first step is taken every two years for the
organization of the nonpartisan political con-
ferences and commit' s by the Executive Board
of the Federation issuing a letter to the central
labor unions requesting them to each select two
representatives to attend a conference in the
state capital on a given date. A similar letter
is sent to the state organizations of labor
representative of unions belonging to national
and international unions affiliated with the
American Federation of Labor, and including the
Ohio State Building Trades Council. When the
conference meets, which is usually on Sunday, the Executive Board submits a report on the candidates for state offices, United States Senator and Congressmen, giving a history of them, with their records on labor matters if they have held public office. The Executive Board also submits to the conference a tentative draft of a questionnaire covering matters in which labor is interested and concerned. Such questionnaires are subject to amendment by the delegates in attendance.

When agreed upon they are sent to the candidates for state offices by the officers of the Federation, and to the candidates for the Legislature by the local and central labor unions in the respective counties and districts. The answers received by the State Federation of Labor are reported to a second state conference, following which they are printed in pamphlet form, with the candidates' records, etc., and sent to all local and central labor unions for distribution among their membership previous to the primary election.

Following the primaries the candidates nominated on the Republican and Democratic tickets, with their history, records and answers to the questionnaire, are listed under their party designations and again issued in pamphlet form to the membership.35

The State Federation, as an increasingly successful special interest group, was also able to attract allies and, in turn, to be courted as an ally by other groups, further multiplying labor's clout in the legislature.

The new maturity of the Ohio State Federation of Labor was also evidenced by its increasing professionalism. This professionalism was a facet of the rise of business unionism. The growing acceptance of "pure and simple" unionism, the increase in union membership and expansion of union activities and the increasing American allegiance to the belief that "...efficiency (was) a guide to action.
expertise a necessity for the solution of social problems, and regulation and structure a requirement of social order and stability," led to the conducting of union activity professionally and by professionals. 36

By 1911, the Federation decided to establish a permanent headquarters in Columbus to handle its lobbying activities more effectively. This proposition was delayed for several years because of a lack of sufficient funds but, on the eve of World War I, permanent headquarters were finally established. This action mirrored the Federation's belief in the professionalism and permanency of its lobbying role. The establishment of these headquarters was complemented by a growing permanency and professionalism among the Federation's officers. Both the Federation's president and its secretary-treasurer were now paid substantial salaries as well as generous expense accounts and were expected to devote their time exclusively to the affairs of the Federation.

The Federation also showed a remarkable continuity in leadership. In 1912, 1913 and 1918, there were no changes in officers and, in the other years of the decade, only one or two changes. Between 1909 and 1919, the Federation had especially capable and honest officers, particularly in President John Voll and Secretary-Treasurers Thomas Donnelly and Harry Thomas. Because these men held office for extended periods of time, they were able to become skilled in the art of lobbying, well known to other
lobbyists and legislators, and thus, often more powerful and influential. This is particularly true in the case of Donnelly who succeeded Harry Thomas as the Federation's Secretary-Treasurer, after the latter's death in 1913. From 1913 through the 1940's, Donnelly became especially shrewd in dealing with individual legislators, committees and other interest groups, often the real centers of legislative power and activity.

Another sign of organizational maturity was the steady increase of the Federation's membership and thus its financial resources throughout the decade. In 1910, 151 local unions belonged to the Federation; by 1919, the number increased to 1033, a phenomenal growth rate.37

The Federation's maturity was also exhibited by its ability to peacefully settle internal disputes. Unlike the previous decade, internal squabbles were few and quickly settled. Perhaps this might be particularly attributable to the increased power of the officers and the growing centralization of the decision making process. Internal disputes no longer significantly disrupted the Federation's external activities.

Finally, in addition to the favorable position of the Federation within the lobbying context and its internal stability, the position of the Federation within the A.F.L. in the decade after 1909 was considerably enhanced. After the reunification of the dual state bodies in 1910, the
new Federation became a staunch supporter of the A.F.L. It was squarely against both the formation of a third political party and industrial unionism, problems which plagued the A.F.L. throughout the decade. The Ohio Federation was also recognized by the A.F.L. as a pioneer and leader among the state federations. Ohio was conceded to be the most progressive state in the Union in the matter of labor legislation.38

Beyond this new position and maturity, however, the crowning point of the decade for the Federation was the role it played during World War I. For the first time, organized labor throughout the country was recognized as an important and "respectable" part of society. Government, especially, realized the extent of labor's power and, concomitantly, the importance of its demands. A successful war effort would require cooperation from all segments of the nation's power structure, including labor.

The Ohio State Federation of Labor, immediately after the outbreak of the War, pledged its support and made its demands upon the state's war effort. Labor in Ohio was in a particularly important position because of the heavily industrialized character of the state and the subsequently vital part the state would play in the national war effort. On May 1, 1917, Governor Cox called a meeting of representatives of the state's Chambers of Commerce, employer organizations and unions to meet at the State Capital to discuss mobilization and other problems of the War.
Federation Secretary-Treasurer Donnelly sent letters throughout the state to affiliated bodies and was able to seat 32 labor representatives. At this meeting, Cox assured organized labor of no lowering or loosening of work standards during the War and labor representation on all official commissions and committees. Labor later also demanded and received the state government's assurance of the establishment of a commission to make provisions for the employment problems of returning soldiers, to prevent flooding of the labor market at the War's end.39

Labor responded to this new recognition and respectability by whole-hearted cooperation in the war effort. But labor's responses were not totally unselfish, the War offered a real opportunity to enhance labor's position and labor, while fulfilling its responsibilities, sought to take advantage of this opportunity.

For the OSFL, the War years were an excellent period of union organization but, primarily, they became a time to insure the passing of "industrial autocracy." Like most segments of American society, organized labor viewed the War optimistically as a catharsis of the old way of life and the establishment of a new and better system. Labor's own vision was one of equality between business and labor. In a speech to the Federation's annual convention in 1917, President John Voll expressed these sentiments.
With the ending of this war and the establishment of democratic principles of government throughout the world, the wage-earners of all nations will be in a stronger position to gradually reform industry, so that industrial liberty will be just as sacred to the masses as is political and religious liberty.

The key to the achievement of this liberty was measured through the cooperation of labor and government. The War made labor increasingly aware of government's power, despite the dictates of voluntarism. But measured change did not involve radicalism. In 1919, the Ohio State Federation, following the pattern of organized labor nationally, condemned both the I.W.W. and Bolshevism, although blaming their spread on the capitalists.

The changes that labor demanded for post-war society encompassed a broad range. In October, 1918, the Ohio State Federation of Labor became the first state federation to propose a concrete plan for "reconstruction." The reconstruction plan, introduced by Max S. Hayes, a Socialist member of the Typographical Union and a leading personality in both the State Federation and the A.F.L., called for, 1. democratization of the land; 2. graduated income taxes on individuals and corporations; 3. government ownership of railroads, telephone and telegraph, the merchant marine and docking facilities; 4. government ownership of coal mines, oil wells, metallurgical mines, pipelines and refineries; 5. government ownership of steam and water produced power; 6. government construction of roads, especially to cut unemployment, and government reforestation.
7. home rule for municipalities; 8. a standard eight hour work day; 9. just wages and profit sharing; 10. unemployment compensation for returning servicemen and civilians idle during reconstruction; 11. old age pensions and health insurance. 42

This national reconstruction program embodied the Ohio State Federation's War years optimism and marked the crowning point of a successful decade of activity. Labor had already been able to accomplish so much, Workmen's Compensation, child and women's labor laws, political reforms, that it seemed only a matter of time until labor's reconstructed society would be a reality. But 1919, rather than marking the beginning of a period of even greater achievement, marked the beginning of a bleak decade for organized labor. Progressivism in Ohio, which had been a valuable ally for labor, had waned steadily throughout the War years and by 1919 was increasingly replaced by political and social conservatism. Labor became a major target of the anti-radicals and the powerful business interests of the 1920s. The years from 1919 to 1929 were "lean years" for the Ohio State Federation of Labor and all of American organized labor.
CHAPTER IV: NOTES

1. The Toledo Union Leader, December 3, 1909.


4. The Toledo Union Leader, September 16, 1910.

5. The Cleveland Citizen, May 7, 1910.


7. Ibid., pp. 49-50.


9. Ibid., pp. 10-12

10. Ibid.


14. Ibid., p. 16.

15. Ibid., p. 21

16. Ibid., pp. 30-31

17. Ibid., p. 34.


Ibid., p. 53.

The Cleveland Citizen, November 11, 1911.

The Cleveland Citizen, September 28, 1912.


Ibid., p. 18.


Ibid., p. 30.

Ibid., pp. 34-35.


37 Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, p. 17; Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, p. 37.

38 Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, p. 81.


41 Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, p. 9.

CHAPTER V
THE LEAN YEARS: 1920-1929

For most of the American people the decade beginning in 1920 was filled with hopes for a golden era. Although the country was deep in a post-war depression, optimism prevailed that this depression was merely a dislocation and that soon the country would experience an unprecedented economic boom. American labor, however, would not share significantly in this promise. For organized labor, the 1920's were not a golden era but rather a prelude to the Great Depression. According to Irving Bernstein in The Lean Years, "Although on the surface American workers appeared to share in the material advantages of the time, the serious maladjustments within the economic system fell upon them with disproportionate weight."¹

Initially, organized labor shared in the nation's optimism. During the War, labor at last had been recognized as a respected and important part of American society. It had achieved significant advances in organization, membership and legislation and, following these trends, it foresaw no impediment to further gains after the War. By the War's end, however, it was all too obvious that organized
labor would again face determined opposition from business interests and, at best, apathy from the government.

Although business and labor had apparently cooperated during the War, a significant number of employers following the War joined in a concerted effort to destroy organized labor in America. Whether these employers were afraid of the growing power of the unions or genuinely concerned over any manifestation of domestic "radicalism," they became firm advocates of the so-called "American Plan." This called for the establishment of the open shop, replacing the "un-American" union shop. The union shop required that all employees of a firm or company or a particular trade section of a firm or company join a union; the open shop had no such requirement. The open shop effectively broke the backbone of union organization since it allowed non-union laborers to work with union laborers, thus destroying worker unity. To achieve this open shop, the employers declared a total war on unions. And to the employers' advantage, many of their actions were sanctioned or at least not condemned by the law. The employers could and did rely on a variety of overt techniques, strike-breaking, company police and industrial espionage and more subtle weapons, the injunction, the establishment of company unions, yellow-dog contracts and blacklisting. A classic example of these activities was the Steel Strike of 1919.

In the early months of 1918, the Chicago Federation of Labor, led by John Fitzpatrick and William Z. Foster,
proposed the organization of the nation's steel workers under the auspices of the A.F.L. After several months of discussion, a meeting of the officers of the fifteen international unions which had jurisdiction in the mills was convened, presided over by Samuel Gompers, and from this meeting the National Committee for Organizing the Iron and Steel Workers emerged. Committee members would contribute personnel and funds to organize workers into their respective trades and these trades would then be united into informal central bodies, the Iron and Steel Workers Councils.

Initially, the Committee was plagued by distrust and disunity among the internationals and by a lack of funds but it was helped by wartime conditions. The steel companies first could not afford to antagonize their employees because of the shortage of labor amidst heavy production demands and so showed no overt hostility to the unions. In addition, the unions' program for better working conditions appealed to the mill workers, while government's seeming pro-labor policy added legitimacy to the drive. Finally, probably the most important factor working to benefit the steel organizers was the obvious connection that could be made between the war being waged in Europe for political democracy and a campaign being waged at home by unions for industrial democracy. This appeal, while it had limited attraction for the Negroes recruited in the South to work in Northern mills, had tremendous appeal to the foreign born workers who comprised a sizeable segment of the steel
Initially, the efforts of the Committee for Organizing the Iron and Steel Workers were successful in organizing workers in the Indiana, Colorado and Ohio steel regions and, after determined campaigning, in the western Pennsylvania region as well; the steel companies were forced to a holding action because of wartime conditions. The major ploy of the companies was to steal some of the unions' appeal by granting improved working conditions unilaterally and by establishing company unions to satisfy the workers' demand for industrial democracy. These activities, however, did not stem the tide of organization. With the War's conclusion, the situation changed for both the unions and the companies.

The Committee for Organizing, spurred by the growing militancy of workers disillusioned by the unkept promises of the manufacturers, the worsening conditions in the mills and the threat of layoffs, approved a strike call for September 22, 1919. During the early days of the strike, the unions appeared bound for success, especially with public opinion favorable to the strike. But the Committee was not totally prepared for a long strike and for the concerted opposition the companies offered. The steel companies, freed from the watchdog activities of the disbanded War Industries Board and the War Labor Policies Board and now regulated only by the powerless War Labor
Board, determined to fight an all out campaign to defeat the unions.

In the classic patterns of the American Plan, the companies used private police forces, strike breakers, company unions, injunctions, the control of civic officials, fear of radicalism and race and ethnic hatreds to squash organizing attempts and already established locals. The companies were particularly successful in breeding distrust between the skilled workers who were primarily of native stock and the unskilled workers who were primarily of Southern and Eastern European heritage and in whipping up public fears over the so-called radical elements of leadership in the Committee for Organizing, particularly Foster who was a Bolshevick. By November 21, the concerted company attack had effectively destroyed the Committee for Organizing the Iron and Steel Workers and, perhaps most important, had proven the effectiveness of the American Plan and its methods in combatting unionization.

This employers' American Plan campaign against organized labor was aided or at least not condemned by the government, by a significant segment of the American public and, to some extent, by labor itself. For the federal government and many state and local governments after the War, the business of America was business. Because business was seen by many as the key to the nation's future, anything or anyone which jeopardized business success was an enemy. This view in government was frequently a reflection of
popular attitudes. Post-war America, perhaps as a reaction to the wartime crusading spirit, saw a resurrection of conservatism. Labor was too radical or "foreign" for a society that dreaded any influx of "undesirable" immigration, witch-hunted Communists and supported the Ku Klux Klan, although ironically labor was frequently an outspoken supporter of this immigration restriction and anti-Communism. Besides those who feared organized labor as too radical, there were those who were successful in Jazz Age America and who simply had no concern for labor.

Labor itself was partially responsible for its weak position in the 20s. It was hamstrung by its firm commitment to organization on a trade basis, while the greatest growth in business was in the mass-production industries, like autoes, rubber and steel, that could be most effectively organized on an industrial basis, not on a trade basis. But the A.F.I. refused to sanction such industrial unionism. Organized labor was also prey to a spirit of elitism. Many trade unionists traditionally viewed themselves as skilled craftsmen and looked down upon the unskilled and semi-skilled. This philosophy, as well, weakened attempts to organize in the mass-production field. The labor movement was further hampered by a lack of dynamic, innovative leadership.

Finally, labor's economic troubles were already serious by the beginning of the decade. On the eve of the decade of prosperity, there was an obvious maladjustment of
the nation's wealth and a number of important industries were sick, coal, construction and agriculture.

The condition of organized labor in Ohio reflected the condition of labor nationwide. Initially, the pronostication, particularly for the state federation, was optimistic. Despite the disastrous Steel Strike of 1919, the Federation's membership continued to increase significantly through 1920. In that year, from June 30 to September 30 alone, with the addition of 122 locals and five central bodies, membership had grown to 1,155 unions. The Federation felt secure and strong enough in 1920 to demand a comprehensive legislative program. It asked the Ohio General Assembly to defeat all attempts to establish a state constabulary and a state industrial court and to require the incorporation of labor unions. It also called for enactment of broader Workmen's Compensation, compensation for occupational diseases and old age pensions. But, despite this optimism, organized labor in Ohio too already faced serious problems.

Employer opposition to organized labor and the American Plan were already firmly entrenched in the state. As early as 1900, a local businessman, John Kirby, had organized an association of manufacturers to make Dayton an open shop city. Between 1901 and 1905, he spread this gospel to Elmira, Detroit, St. Louis, Indianapolis, Chicago, Akron and Columbus and even sought to establish a national open-shop association. With this early beginning, Ohio
had 17 open shop organizations by the fall of 1920. The Steel Strike of 1919 had shown the effectiveness of these organizations in the state.

In addition to employer opposition, the Federation began to face a hostile or, at least an unsympathetic General Assembly. The Progressives who had been labor's allies in the General Assembly throughout the previous decade were gone and the business interests like the Chamber of Commerce and the NAM had further developed into powerful and efficient lobbyists. Throughout the 1920's, the Federation would compile a dismal record. In the four legislative sessions held from 1921 to 1929, only 19 bills sponsored by the Federation were enacted, compared to 15 enacted in the single session of 1919 alone.

Finally, adding to the Federation's problems, the character of the state's working force had changed significantly. Increasingly, Ohio workers were employed in the automobile, steel and rubber industries as unskilled or semi-skilled labor. Because these mass production industries were difficult to organize effectively on a trade union basis and because the A.F.L. frowned upon industrial unionism, the Federation and its affiliates lost a great deal of their potential membership and, consequently, its lobbying strength. Ohio had also experienced a heavy influx during the War of Negro workers from the South who were difficult to organize because of the discriminatory policies of employers, as well as the national and international
unions, their lack of trade skills and their unawareness of union organization and purpose. For the Ohio State Federation of Labor, the Jazz Age promised to be at best a period of weathering the storm and holding its own, protecting gains already made and preventing unfavorable legislation.

Throughout the latter part of 1920 and 1921, the Federation's chief concern was the winding down of the War effort and its attendant problems. On the domestic front, the Federation unsuccessfully called for a state program to provide rehabilitation for veterans. This program was to be financed by state and matching federal funds and to follow a plan effective in Pennsylvania in 1920. The Federation also sought Ohio's support of a proposed federal constitutional amendment granting compensation to World War I veterans.

The Federation's demands also mirrored its disenchantment with the nation's militarism and domestic intolerance. In a rare peacetime statement on foreign affairs, it called for the U.S.'s support of worldwide arms limitation, citing statistics that 92.83% of all government revenues were spent on maintenance of the army and navy and only 7.17% for peacetime purposes. The Federation further adopted resolutions at its 1921 convention condemning the activities of the Ku Klux Klan and demanding a fair trial for Sacco and Vanzetti and the freeing of Eugene V. Debs and all other wartime political prisoners.
By 1922, with the country well on its way to normalcy, the State Federation began to turn increasingly to its traditional legislative concerns. For control of the labor force, the Federation continued to support a further reduction in women's working hours but, in a pattern followed by the state legislature throughout the 1920's, these demands were ignored and the Federation's fight for women's hours eventually became simply a holding action.

The renewed influx of immigration after the War resurrected labor's concern that immigrants were flooding the labor force. The State Federation successfully supported national legislation, the Quota Laws of 1921 and 1924, limiting the number of immigrants. This Federation action mirrored the nation's renewed racism. A further example of this was the Federation's support in 1925 of the following resolution by the Cleveland Federation of Labor, commonly one of the most liberal groups in the state, against the colonization of Japanese.

"Through the Ohio Farms Co., the Japanese about 600 strong...have purchased or got control of 1500 acres of farmland at Celaryville, Ohio, or near Willard...These people have been driven from California because of the laws are such as not to allow this class of cheap labor to own or even lease land, and when or wherever they have settled, have caused trouble in the community. The Board, after a consideration of the subject of colonization, placed itself unanimously on record as opposed to any colonization scheme, and in particular when the attempt is made to introduce the colonization of people from countries whose institutions and traditions are in marked variance with those of the United States."
The Federation's legislative efforts in regulating convict labor were also successful. In 1925, the Federation pressured the General Assembly to tighten the law requiring the marking of all prison-made goods sold by merchants. The Federation also successfully advocated Congress' passage of the Cooper-Hawes Bill in 1928. This bill, slated to go into effect on January 19, 1934, placed control of all prison-made products under individual state supervision and allowed each state to determine whether or not prison-made goods from within or without could be sold within its borders.

Throughout the decade, the Federation's lobbying activities for improvement of the workers' environment centered around individual occupational safety laws, Workmen's Compensation, general industrial safety laws, and the question of hours and wages. The enactment of Workmen's Compensation was the Federation's major legislative achievement in the preceding decade and throughout the 1920's, it sought to prevent any weakening of this law and secure the extension of its provisions. Fortunately for the Federation, these efforts were usually successful, they met little employer opposition. Workmen's Compensation was one of the few areas in which most Ohio employers and unions held common views. The state administered compensation program not only benefitted workers but also the state's employers by saving them significant amounts of money. H. DeWire Martin, Medical Director of the Pollock Steel Company in
Cincinnati, in an address before the Federation's 1921 convention, stated that in the year from July 1, 1918, to June 30, 1919, alone, Workmen's Compensation saved Ohio employers nearly seven million dollars. The cost that year of the state compensation program was only $16,474,096.00 as compared to a projected liability insurance company cost of $17,328,498.0022

Although most employers favored labor's position on state Workmen's Compensation, the private insurance companies did not. In 1922, the League for Workmen's Compensation, a front organization for the insurance companies, organized a campaign against Workmen's Compensation in Ohio.23 The Federation was successful in this instance in preventing any alteration of the law but it was forced to fight a continual holding action against the law's enemies throughout the 20s.

In addition, the Federation, with employer approval, attempted to extend the law's provisions. In 1923, the General Assembly enacted legislation extending Workmen's Compensation to include employers with three of more employees, in place of the old minimum of five, and extending the value of death awards, weekly payments and payments for permanent partial disability.24 A 1924 amendment allowed workers to sue for further compensation on the grounds of an employer's failure to meet a lawful safety requirement.25 Compensation coverage was also extended to more occupational diseases.
In the courts, favorable rulings by the Ohio Supreme Court in Williams vs. Industrial Commission of Ohio and Mary F. Rudd vs. Industrial Commission of Ohio strengthened the Federation's stance on Workmen's Compensation. These decisions established that "...the payment of compensation to injured workmen and the dependents of killed workmen will not depend upon the solvency of the employer or his continuance in business." 26

But, by 1929, even the Federation's program for Workmen's Compensation began to show the tremendous growing animosity between the employers and the unions that was obvious in other areas. For the first time since the passage of the Workmen's Compensation Law, the joint labor-employer committee on compensation failed to agree on a proposed change in the law. The employers wanted the amendment of Section 1465-90 of the law, a provision granting workers the right of appeal to the courts; labor wanted this provision left intact. 27

There remained, however, one area of Workmen's Compensation in which employer-union cooperation extended throughout the 20s, industrial safety. The state-wide campaign for industrial safety was a natural outgrowth of Workmen's Compensation. If compensation for injury was good, the prevention of injury was even more desirable. With the combined support of the unions and the employers, the Ohio General Assembly by 1925 established a new state
department for the prevention of industrial accidents and diseases, the Department of Safety and Hygiene under the Industrial Commission. Through popular education, use of the media and the holding of conferences throughout the state, the Department hoped to educate the general public and particularly employers and employees to the necessity for and the means to industrial safety. Both employers and the unions were urged to conduct similar individual campaigns. In line with this request, the Federation asked all of its member locals to establish their own safety committees.

Finally, the Federation began to seriously consider a demand for enactment of wage and hour laws to improve the work environment. But the Federation was still on unsure grounds. Immediately following the War, at the 1921 convention of the Federation, a resolution calling for a minimum wage law similar to those already in existence in more than a dozen states was introduced and discussed at length. Although the idea of government regulation of hours and wages was rejected as too idealistic or an unnecessary impingement on the province of collective bargaining, the question continued to be raised throughout the decade, particularly as the country moved further into the Depression.

The legal environment, traditionally one of the Federation's chief concerns, assumed even greater importance during the 1920s when change became a matter of basic
survival. Limiting injunction granting powers and eliminating the yellow-dog contract were especially vital because employers were consistently using both as highly effective weapons in their total campaign against the unions. Although the Federation was consistently successful in defeating the annual attempts to establish a state constabulary, its efforts to control injunctions and eliminate the yellow-dog contract were failures.

In 1922, the Federation's annual convention called for the impeachment of U.S. Attorney General Harry Daugherty on the grounds that he had violated the Clayton Act by seeking an injunction against the railroad shopmen, preventing them from encouraging workers to leave or stay away from railroad employment. But Daugherty was already doomed by his involvement in the Teapot Dome scandal and nothing came of this impeachment attempt. By mid-decade, the Federation decided to devote its major efforts to the enactment of a state law limiting the injunction granting power of the equity courts. In 1925, a Federation sponsored bill was introduced in the General Assembly, but because of the opposition of business interests and the judiciary who resented any infringement of its powers, it remained tied up in committee throughout the session. In 1929, because of the continued recalcitrance of the Ohio legislature, the Federation again turned to federal legislation and joined actively in the A.F.L.'s attempts to have labor exempted from the conspiracy sections of the Sherman and Clayton Laws.
and other anti-trust legislation. But this campaign against the injunction was fruitless.

The Ohio Federation also conducted a concerted drive throughout the 20s to legislate the illegality of yellow-dog contracts. In 1925, a Federation anti-yellow-dog measure was introduced to the Ohio House but the chairman of the Committee on Reference, responsible for the further committee assignment of proposed bills, refused to refer the bill on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. Pressure from the State Federation finally forced its referral but the receiving committee never reported the bill out to the full House. In the next legislative session in 1927, a Federation sponsored anti-yellow-dog bill was introduced in the Ohio Senate. Following traditional procedure, this proposed bill was then referred to the Senate Committee on Labor and public hearings set. The Federation immediately rallied nearly 350 labor representatives from throughout the state to support the legislation in these hearings. After this tremendous show of labor pressure, the Committee members unanimously voted the bill out and recommended it for passage. It was then placed on the Senate's March printed calendar for full action. The Senate Rules Committee, responsible for these calendars, then attempted to sidetrack the bill by switching to a daily typewritten calendar. In this way, passage of the yellow-dog bill could be postponed indefinitely and its proponents would have little time to rally support when and if it did come to a
vote before the full Senate.

In a further delaying tactic, the Republican floor leader raised a question whether the bill was constitutional and decided that the Senate could not hear the bill until the Senate Attorney General rendered an opinion. It appeared that the Federation's anti-yellow-dog proposition had finally been effectively hamstrung in the Senate by pressure from the business lobby, but the Attorney General quickly ruled that the law, if passed, would be constitutional. In a final ploy, the opposition in the Senate protested that the Attorney General's opinion was not sufficient to guide the Senate and forced another referral of the bill, this time to the Judiciary Committee. Finally, with intense pressure from the Federation lobby led by Thomas Donnelly, the Judiciary Committee, in a surprise decision, also ruled that the bill was constitutional and sent it to the full Senate for a vote. There it passed by a vote of 29 to three. 35

After the long battle for passage in the Senate, the Federation's next hurdle was the House. The anti-yellow-dog proposition was introduced in the House and referred to the Judiciary Committee, but here it was effectively tied up when the Committee refused to vote it out. The Ohio Federation, foreseeing this problem, had already built a core of support in the House, with sufficient votes to raise the question of the bill, forcing it out of the
Judiciary Committee. It was then placed in the Rules Committee where the opposition again side-tracked it. The Federation next tried to force the bill's referral out of the Rules Committee, but the action was too late, it was the last day of the legislative session and the Federation couldn't muster the necessary two-thirds vote. The Federation's proposed anti-yellow-dog contract bill, after passing the Senate, was again effectively killed for another session in the House.

Despite this defeat, the State Federation remained optimistic about the bill's future. Constant lobbying had insured passage in the House over concerted employer opposition; now the Federation saw final enactment as only a matter of time and a product of renewed effort. Although, these Federations efforts to improve labor's legal environment were quashed, they were a strong beginning, even more remarkable because it was made in the 20s.

The State Federation had only limited input in improving the political environment during the decade. Most of labor's demands had been achieved by the 1912 Constitutional Convention; labor's major problem was learning how to most effectively employ new tools like the initiative and the referendum. The Federation, however, did become involved in several political matters, particularly the question of state primary elections. Although direct primaries were already firmly established in Ohio, in the mid-20s some members of the state Republican Party proposed an amendment
to the State Constitution eliminating primary elections and reestablishing the old party convention nominating plan. Although this plan would effectively eliminate public input into the nominating process, its advocates were able, whether because of public cynicism or genuine citizen sentiment, to rally considerable support. The State Federation feared that an end to the direct primary would seal labor's political fate. Both parties were now seen as unfavorable to labor and both would probably choose unfavorable candidates in the convention procedure. In this light, the Federation activated its local grass-roots organizations and joined with interested citizens' groups to work against passage of the proposed amendment. In the election of November, 1926, the amendment was defeated by a majority of 338,161, with 743,313 against and 405,152 for, marking one of the Federation's few successes during the decade.

During the 20s, the Ohio State Federation of Labor again campaigned for legislation improving the general quality of life. The Federation was especially concerned over the question of old age pensions. While it had tacitly supported the efforts of Herbert Bigelow and his Old Age Pension Committee in the previous years, by 1922 it decided to play a more active role. A major impetus for the bill's passage now came from the Fraternal Order of Eagles. Because many members of the Federation were likewise members of the Eagles, there was a firm basis of support for the proposal within the Federation. After
several meetings, the Eagles and the Federation agreed to jointly finance and staff the new campaign for a state old age pension law. \(^39\)

The Federation-Eagles Old Age Pension Bill was similar to the earlier Bigelow proposition. The new bill would apply to any person 65 years or over who was without resources. It provided that he could draw $1.00 a day and, if he were married, his spouse could also draw $1.00 a day. Anyone with $2,500.00 or more in property would be disqualified from benefits unless he transferred title to the property to the state. After this transfer, the man or woman and his or her spouse could continue to live on the property rent free. After the pensioners' deaths, the state would return the balance of the property value to the heirs, after receiving or deducting whatever moneys had been paid out for the pensions. The bill also provided that any pensioner might receive up to $5.00 each week from a mutual benefit organization without suffering a decrease in his state pension. This clause was aimed particularly at protecting the interests of benevolent societies and unions that had membership supported old age funds. Finally, the proposed bill set up stiff state residence requirements for eligibility and provided funding for the pension plan through state inheritance and income taxes. \(^40\)

After the combined efforts of the State Federation
and the Eagles were unable to gain passage of this proposed program in the General Assembly, the Federation and the Eagles turned to a referendum petition. With grass-roots work by local unions and Aeries, enough signatures were obtained to place the question on the ballot in the November, 1923, state elections. Despite this intensive work, the proposition was defeated 777,351 to 390,599. In evaluating this defeat, the Federation believed that the law had been defeated in the general backlash against increasing state taxation.

After this initial defeat, both the Federation and the Eagles continued to work for enactment of an old age pension bill but as the 20s progressed the Federation became less active in the campaign. It turned its efforts increasingly to its work against the injunction and the yellow-dog contract, as employer anti-union activities grew. While an old age pension system was an important and desirable end, the injunction and the yellow-dog contract were life and death matters to organized labor. In a climate of intense anti-union activity, it was a question of basic survival for the Federation. By 1928, the major impetus for state old age pensions in Ohio, again, came from the Reverend Herbert Bigelow and his newly organized Ohio Old Age Pension League. The Federation's Executive Board agreed to support Bigelow's efforts, but made it clear that this support could not be labor's only concern. In an address to the Federation's 1929 convention, Bigelow explained the position
taken by its officers.

The officers said they were interested in old age pensions, and also they were interested in things that had a more fundamental importance to the Labor Movement, like the yellow dog contracts, and so forth. They have said that they would cooperate with us on the basis that our organization use its influence and power to fight for the entire legislative program of the Ohio State Federation of Labor and on that basis we will cooperate.43

The Federation also joined in the nationwide labor movement for workers' colleges in the 1920s. This movement was conducted under the auspices of the A.F.L.'s Workers' Education Bureau and was based on organized labor's traditional belief that education must be a major factor in its struggle for recognition and achievement. The concept of workers' colleges received its first impetus in the Ohio State Federation of Labor from a resolution at the 1921 Federation convention calling for "...educational institutions for the proper training and educating of the officers and leaders of our movement;..."44 In 1924, this idea was put into effect when John Frey, editor of the International Iron Molders' magazine, and the Cincinnati central labor assembly established Ohio's first workers' college.45 By October, 1925, there were seven such colleges in the state and the Federation, at its convention that year, recommended that every central body in the state organize its own workers' college.46

These workers' colleges were not colleges in the common definition of the term. They consisted of courses
in "special" areas of interest to workers offered on week-
day evenings during the winter and taught by experts in
their respective subjects. The subjects offered included
courses designed to make better union members, like labor
history, and courses to improve the quality of the workers'
lives, like home management.

By 1926, the workers' colleges had become so successful
in Ohio that Federation members began to call for the
appointment of an "Educational Director for the State."47
Finally, in 1929, the Federation did appoint Lloyd M.
Crosgrave, a college instructor, to the post. Crosgrave,
however, because of the increasing austerity forced upon
the Federation by the Depression, was hired to act as a
statistician and publicity agent as well as an educational
director. Within six months, the Federation released
Crosgrave because of further financial problems. In later
years this position was handled by a member of the Federa-
tion as an in-house duty.

The uncertainty and the dismal record of the Federa-
tion's legislative activity during the 20s was matched by
its internal affairs. After the tremendous success of the
previous decade, the Federation had difficulty coping with
its now repeated failures; it began to seriously consider
and, for a time, adopt positions that were held unacceptable
earlier. In desperation, the Federation even turned to the
taboos of industrial unionism and partisan politics.
As Ohio's work force became employed increasingly after the War in the mass production industries, the Federation began to effectively lose significant numbers of possible members because of its firm adherence to trade unionism. The loss of these members was especially important because it also represented a real loss of legislative clout. In 1922, the sentiment for Federation support of industrial unionism, against the dictates of the A.F.L. was especially strong. At the Federation's convention that year, several delegates introduced a resolution supporting in particular the amalgamation of the building trades and in general the amalgamation of related unions and their organization into industrial unions. The referal committee voted non-concurrence but, after a tremendous floor battle, the majority of the delegates voted to ignore the committee report and adopted the resolution. The Federation's boldness was soon squelched, however, by the parent A.F.L. The Ohio Federation received a letter from the A.F.L. Executive Board chastising their action. A.F.L. Secretary Duffy demanded,

"What right has the Ohio State Federation of Labor to interfere with the internal workings of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, and what right has a State federation of Labor to adopt a resolution that the parent body, the A.F.L., at its Cincinnati Convention of this year, turned down?" 49

By 1924, the Ohio Federation, having learned the lesson, returned to the fold, eschewing in succeeding years all
resolutions favoring industrial unionism. 50

For a time in the early 20s, the Federation, with little significant membership opposition, also abandoned its strict non-partisan stance. In December, 1922, it sent a delegate to the Second Conference for Progressive Political Action. This Conference, composed of unions, agricultural organizations, the Farm-Labor Party and other political parties, was not strictly partisan toward any political party. 51 Rather, it was, ...

...created for the purpose of securing the nomination and election of Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the United States, United States Senators, Representatives to Congress, members of State Legislatures and other State and local public officers who are pledged to the interests of the producing classes and to the principles of genuine democracy in agriculture, industry and government. 52

The Federation was particularly pleased with the Conference's plan to establish state conferences to handle local affairs and even tacitly accepted the plan that these state conferences, in compliance with individual state law, might where necessary set up a new political party. 53 This Federation action, however, was far from unique. Several state labor bodies throughout the country were members of third parties; the Chicago Federation of Labor was one of the prime movers in the Farm-Labor Party. Many felt that such parties were increasingly necessary because both the Republicans and the Democrats were seldom favorable to labor and its demands and, in many instances,
were blatantly anti-union.

The erosion of non-partisanship had progressed so far by 1924 that even the A.F.L., staunchly non-partisan, endorsed Robert LaFollette and Burton K. Wheeler, the Farm-Labor Party candidates, in the presidential race. Most state federations, including the Ohio Federation, followed the A.F.L. lead. When LaFollette and Wheeler were defeated, however, the A.F.L. and most of its affiliates returned to non-partisan stances.54

The Ohio Federation now sought to strengthen its statewide non-partisan network of local committees. These committees, established before World War I, gathered and disseminated information about individual political candidates for office and their positions on labor-related issues and campaigned for the election of union members, where possible, to public office. By 1929, this non-partisan network had increased to 336 local member organizations and 1,164 committeemen.55 In an otherwise unsuccessful decade, the continued growth of this network was a major achievement, filled with promise for the future.

The Federation was also plagued by internal structural problems during the 20s. Although the Federation's membership continued virtually every year to reelect its incumbent officers, there was a high attrition rate among the leaders, particularly in the president's office. John Moore, a district officer of the U.M.W. and Voll's successor as Federation president, died suddenly in 1925 after a brief
illness and Moore's successor, John Frey of the Iron Molders, left the presidency in 1928 to become Secretary of the A.F.L.'s Metal Trades Department. For several years after Frey's departure, there continued to be a marked turnover in the president's office. This instability contributed further to the weakness of the already threatened Federation.

The Federation suffered an even more severe blow from the serious economic conditions in the Ohio coal fields. After joining the Ohio Federation in 1900, the U.M.W. contingent continued to grow until it constituted a significant portion of the Federation's membership. Following the War, a severe depression hit these coal areas. This depression was worsened by the coal operators determination to destroy union organization among the miners of Ohio and western Pennsylvania at any cost and by any means. By 1924, the unemployment and economic situation in the coal areas was so bad that the Federation's U.M.W. affiliates were excused from paying dues.  

By 1926, over one half of all Ohio coal miners were unemployed.  

By 1927, the members of Ohio's District Six of the U.M.W. had been pushed to the breaking point by employer recalcitrance and opposition. The employers refused to negotiate a new contract for better wages and working conditions and instead demanded that the Ohio miners accept lower wages that would be competitive with wages in the non-union Kentucky and West Virginia fields. In response, the U.M.W. miners went out on strike
in April but the employers still refused to negotiate. In a determined effort to break the union, they prepared for as long a strike as necessary. By September, 1928, conditions in the coal fields were so serious that between 35,000 and 36,000 persons were dependent on union and public relief and the governor was forced to issue a call for aid; $38,607.68 of assistance was given by the public alone.58 This coal strike cut deeply into the membership and finances of the State Federation, further weakening its legislative resources and political clout. Throughout the 20s, the Federation saw much of the financial and membership gains made in the previous decade wiped away by economic attrition and employer hostility, as in the coal strike.

As for organized labor throughout the century, the 1920s was a dismal period for the Ohio State Federation of Labor, as a legislative lobby, made even more galling by comparison with the successes of the previous decade. Society in general was often more concerned with other affairs; government was unconcerned or anti-union; many employers were active in the fierce open shop movement; the character of industry was changing; the economy at base was weak and shaky; the labor movement, itself, was often conservative. By 1929, however, all of these factors were overshadowed by the increasingly obvious fact that the nation was moving quickly and irrevocably into a major depression. But while the future of American organized
labor looked dim in 1929, in reality, labor was again on the verge of a new and better era.
CHAPTER V: NOTES


^Ibid., pp. 219-224.

4 Ibid., p. 233.

5 Ibid., pp. 248-249.

6 Ibid., p. 262.

For a fuller discussion of the labor movement paralysis see Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years, pp. 83-143.


9 Ibid., pp. 102-103.


11 Bernstein, The Lean Years, p. 148.


15 Ibid., p. 54.

16 Ibid., pp. 67-68
17 Ibid., p. 76; Ibid., p. 161.


20 Ibid., p. 31


22 Proceedings of the Thirty-Eights Annual Convention, pp. 113-114.


28 Proceedings of the Forty-Second Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, p. 76.

29 Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, p. 73.


31 Proceedings of the Forty-Second Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation of Labor, p. 36.


36 Ibid., p. 22.
41 Ibid.
43 Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, pp. 48-49.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., p. 39

55 Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, p. 29.


CHAPTER VI
OPPORTUNITY AND DILEMMA: 1930-1935

At the outset of the 1930s, a significant number of Americans remained unconvinced of the severity of the Depression. Although there were bread lines and "Hoover-ville," idle smokestacks and financially troubled charitable institutions, many Americans subscribed to the belief that "prosperity is just around the corner." America had weathered such economic set-backs before. But as the months passed, it became all too obvious that conditions were worsening; that this depression, now virtually world-wide, was the worst America had ever experienced. By March, 1930, estimates of unemployment ranged from 3,250,000 to over 4,000,000; by March, 1931, the number of unemployed had doubled to between 7,500,000 and 8,000,000.¹

The shock was especially pronounced because the previous years had been ones of heralded economic promise and because this depression, more than any before it, struck at a cherished American ideal, the middle class. Previous depressions had effected primarily the working classes, the already poor and, sometimes, the newest members of the middle class. But this Depression, besides these traditional victims, was producing another group of sufferers, the
formerly safe and secure members of the middle class. Carolyn Bird, in The Invisible Scar, describes this phenomenon; the trauma of the established small businessman, the banker and the professional man forced to rely for the first time on public and private charity, to realize that they were no longer the vaunted backbone of society.

The new poor would give a definite character to both the Depression and its proposed remedies.

In 1931 and 1932 talk of social revolution became common. Surely, thought thousands of people, the dispossessed and the hungry will revolt against the government and the economic system that had brought them to their desperate situation. But no revolution came. At least, there was no revolution such as many anticipated, with rioting, blood in the gutters, and violent overthrow of government. The revolution that did occur was one conducted within the system. Although there were outbreaks of violence and brief flirtations with Fascism and Communism, most of the Americans affected by the Depression, workers aspiring to the middle class and the already established middle class, believed in the basic soundness of the society and the system. Obviously change was necessary but this change would be achieved through "respectable" channels. This sentiment was especially favorable for organized labor because organized labor, particularly the A.F.L., would come to be viewed as a respectable channel for worker discontent. Even after the establishment of the more militant C.I.O. in 1935, this view would persist. In the 30s,
organized labor would achieve a social legitimacy only hinted at during World War I.

Organized labor was well aware of the possibilities of this situation. President John McLaughlin of the Ohio Federation of Labor succinctly described labor's position, "Is it not better to deal with good American conservative labor and leadership than to deal with Bolshevists and Communists? And that is what is bound to follow if we are overthrown." Some would argue that by posing and acting as a conservative influence, labor lost a remarkable opportunity for truly radical change. But the A.F.L., then the foremost labor organization in the nation, had traditionally opted for the respectable and conservative reform of society. But whatever the agent or the means, as the Depression worsened, change became inevitable.

As in the other heavily industrialized states, the Depression struck especially hard in Ohio. In 1930, the state had 214,566 unemployed, or 8.2% of the available labor force. These figures, however, reflected only those totally unemployed and did not include the many working only a few hours or days a week or those working at other than their regular trade or occupation. In addition to this business depression, Ohio was hit in 1930 by a costly agricultural draught, compounding the state's already dismal economic picture.

But the most visible and, probably, the worst manifestation of the Depression remained in the heavily
populated cities and coal mining regions of the state. Incorporated places of 50,000 and over had an unemployment rate of 10.1% of the available work force. By 1932, Cleveland city officials estimated that over one third of that city's inhabitants were out of work and that city relief was carrying at least 20,500 families. Because of this increase in relief demands and a reduced property tax rate, cities throughout the state were on the verge of bankruptcy.

In the May, 1932, issue of The Atlantic Monthly, Joseph Heffernan, mayor of Youngstown, described the situation in that Ohio city. In 1931, over 14 months after the initial economic collapse, Youngstown was still dependent on private charity for employment relief; the community had taken no action. But according to Heffernan, this situation was not unique to Youngstown among Ohio cities.

...there was no way in which the city government could embark upon a programme of its own. We had no funds available for emergency relief, and without specific authorization from the people we could not issue bonds. To get around that obstacle we urged the state legislature to amend the law so as to modify our bond limitation, but that body was reluctant to pass a relief bill. Finally, after a long delay, it agreed upon a halfway measure which permitted the cities to sell bonds for the limited purpose of providing relief for their indigents. It made no pretense of supplying new employment for the jobless, but it furthered this end to some degree by indirection. Up to this time all funds for poor relief had been appropriated from general receipts such as taxes. The new bonds removed this strain...so that the money which had formerly been set aside for this
The state government, at best unaware of the real extent of suffering or unwilling, like so many others, to face an unbalanced budget, did little more to help the cities and the cities, in turn, could do little. Private charity, too, after two years of depression, was virtually bankrupt. This descent from respectability became a perilous and humiliating fall for many Ohio residents.

The Depression initially also took a heavy toll in the state's organized labor movement. The precipitous rise in wages paid to those employed seriously reduced the finances and membership of many unions. In addition, at a time when almost any job was at a premium, many workers were willing to scab, to take employment at wages below union scale or to sign yellow-dog contracts. The work force was also again flooded by women and youth who would work for low wages and who were traditionally more difficult to unionize.

By the early 1930s, the position of the Ohio State Federation of Labor was already weakened by employer attacks and the disastrous strikes in the state's coal mining regions. The Depression added further to these problems. In 1931, a significant portion of the Federation's funds were tied up in two Columbus banking institutions closed by government assessors. Fortunately, however, Secretary-Treasurer Donnelly had enough money in bonds and a sound
bank to conduct the Federation's affairs, although on a reduced financial base. But the money situation was further tightened by the inability of many member locals to pay their per capita taxes and by the drop in actual membership forced by growing unemployment. For the fiscal year ending in June, 1932, the Federation's dues receipts were $4,740.57 less than those for the year ending June 30, 1931. Membership and monetary problems were so serious that the Federation was unable to hold its 50 year convention in 1933, postponing it until the following year.

Despite these problems, the Federation followed the philosophical lead of the A.F.L. and remained basically conservative. Matthew Woll, in an address before the state federation's 1931 convention, stated this position.

There are those who believe that men's decisions yield only to force, and that labor must rely solely upon militant tactics. American Organized Labor believes that it is better to develop a strategy that will avoid a fight by concentrating on gathering facts and following policies that will enable the workers to sustain their proposals in the conference and merit public approbation.

In 1934, William Green, President of the A.F.L. addressed the 50th convention and stated that "...our welfare, our economic and industrial welfare depends upon our economic solidarity."

Despite this solid front of self-reliance and conservative policy, there were dissident voices in the organized labor movement. Within the Ohio State Federation
there was a small but determined call for labor and its allied to form a new political party and an even more persistent demand for the Federation to adopt and advocate in the A.F.L. a program of industrial unionism. This campaign was led by the U.M.W. representatives, who pressed for the adoption of resolutions calling for industrial unionism as the form of organization to be used by the A.F.L. in organizing the unorganized and demanding the maintenance of already existing industrial unions like the U.M.W. In this same vein, other delegates in less radical and wide-reaching solutions called for at least the amalgamation of the metal trades. A growing faction within the state federation was coming to feel that industrial unionism, militant organizing activities and increased reliance upon government were the only hopes for labor to survive and ultimately to take advantage of the situation created by the Depression. But the State Federation, throughout the first half of the 1930s, was able to keep these U.M.W. led dissidents in check and to pursue a relatively conservative and increasingly successful lobbying program.

The Federation, in its early reactions to the worsening Depression, called in 1930 for a nebulous economic cure involving government stimulation of private industries and public works. Initially, the Federation like many other Americans was unaware of the seriousness of this economic "downturn," but as its severity became more inescapable, the Federation turned to concrete legislative measures. In
continuing attempts to control the labor force, it demanded stricter enforcement of existing child labor laws and laws restricting the hours of labor in government employment and a further reduction in the hours of state and federal employees. It particularly hoped that this legislation would serve as an example and an impetus to industry action. Following the A.F.L. lead, it also endorsed state eight hour legislation for women. Finally, in 1933, the Federation successfully lobbied for passage of H.B. 23, "...prohibiting the sale on the open market or exchange of goods, wares or merchandise manufactured or mined in any other State by convicts or prisoners, and providing for the punishment of violations..." This law, following the provisions of earlier federal legislation, was the crowning achievement of the Federation's long efforts to force state regulation of convict labor.

Although it might appear that regulation of working conditions would be a relatively minor concern for organized labor in a period when actual employment was sharply curtailed, by necessity the opposite was true. Because of the cost of repairing machinery and maintaining safety programs, some employers might have been tempted to ignore safety legislation or abandon safety practices. Workers, in turn, because of the serious unemployment problem and concommitant competition for jobs, might be willing to work under unsanitary or unsafe conditions and employers might take advantage of this situation. To prevent these problems,
the Federation increased its lobbying activities in support
of legislation for the protection of employees from
industrial hazards. The Federation particularly wanted
the General Assembly to increase the value of awards granted
and to bring all diseases arising from employment under
Workmen’s Compensation. In 1935, the legislature passed
Federation supported H.B. 495, placing a substantial number
of these diseases under compensation coverage.

The Federation also continued to support the Division
of Safety and Hygiene’s campaign for industrial safety.
Although the Division’s activities remained primarily
educational, relying on the dissemination of literature, and
the conducting of conferences and an annual assembly, by
1934 it was also involved in a proposed compilation of
safety codes already strongly advocated by the Federation.

In the early 1930’s, however, the Ohio State Federation
of Labor’s major efforts were devoted to improving labor’s
legal environment and the quality of life. The legal
environment had traditionally been the area of least success
for the Federation, but the 30s marked a significant change
in this pattern. After continual disappointments in the
previous decade, the Federation achieved passage of its
anti-yellow-dog contract bill in the 1931 session of the
General Assembly. This law, S.B. 108, guided through the
legislature by pro-labor members, declared all such contracts
to be null and void.
This marked a tremendous victory for Ohio labor and, removing one of the major blocks to unionization, inspired a new campaign for organization among the state's workers. By 1935, the Federation was also successful in staving off renewed efforts at establishment of a state constabulary and in laying a firm groundwork for the enactment of a state law, based on the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act, curtailing the powers of injunction. The General Assembly's change of heart on legal legislation came with a general change in public opinion toward labor nationally, the increasing number of pro-labor legislators and militant lobbying by the Federation.

The major thrust of the Federation's efforts to improve the quality of life was for enactment of unemployment insurance and old age pension legislation. Several delegates to the Federation's annual convention in 1930 introduced a resolution calling for Federation sponsorship of compulsory state unemployment insurance. They argued that this legislation was the only means to remedy the increased unemployment caused by technological and mechanical advances. After extended floor discussion, the question was referred to the Executive Board where it was effectively tabled. The Federation refused to take concrete action because of the parent A.F.L.'s stated opposition to such laws. The A.F.L. argued that "...unemployment insurance might encourage workers to continue in declining industries and in obsolete trades." Unemployment
insurance would provide industry with a crutch to keep it from solving its real problems.  

With the worsening of the Depression, the question of state unemployment insurance was reintroduced in the Ohio Federation's 1931 convention but was again shelved because of A.F.L. opposition. In 1932, however, the A.F.L. Executive Council reversed its negative position on unemployment insurance. Although the Board favored a national law, it was willing to support state systems supplemented, if possible, by federal laws. Because the Constitution placed the regulation of manufacturing and industry in the state's sphere of activities, state unemployment insurance was viewed as the only legal possibility. The Ohio Federation, following the A.F.L. position, then proposed a compulsory state unemployment insurance bill but this initial attempt met defeat in the General Assembly because many legislators feared the establishment of an official "dole." The OSFL's support of old age pension legislation was a resurrection of its program of the early 20s. After the Federation-Eagles initiated bill was defeated by popular vote in 1923, the Federation had turned its attention to other issues like the injunction and yellow-dog contract, but the economic plight of the elderly in the Depression renewed its interest in old age legislation. In an initial move, the Federation adjourned an Old Age Pension Conference on March 26, 1930, in Cincinnati to plan a new campaign. The new proposal provided for a pension of $1.00 a day to
begin at age 65. This bill was introduced early in the General Assembly's 1930 session and reported out of committee favorably, but it failed passage in the full Assembly. The Federation, although discouraged by this defeat, did not give up the campaign.

Despite the action of the Legislature, support for some type of old age pension ran high throughout the state. The Federation began a new drive on January 1, 1931, with the expert assistance of Meigs B. Russell, the field secretary of the nationwide, reform, American Association for Old Age Security, a New York based organization. On January 15, the Federation, with strong support from the clergy of the state, Herbert Bigelow and his allies and the Fraternal Order of Eagles, established a permanent Ohio Old Age Pension Conference with officers in the same building as the Federation's. With funding and a permanent staff from the various support groups, the Conference began to deluge all of the major organizations and newspapers in the state with material on the proposed pension plan. With this groundwork laid, the pension plan was again introduced to the 1931 session of the General Assembly. When the bill came to public hearings before the House Committee on Insurance, representatives supporting the bill appeared from the Federation, the Pension Conference and a host of other organizations as diverse as the Montgomery County Old Age Assistance League and the Superior Slovene Lodge. But the old age pension bill had enemies. The heaviest opposition
to enactment of the bill came from the Manufacturers' Association, the Cincinnati Industrial Association, the Ohio State Chamber of Commerce and the State Grange and Farm Bureaus, all of whom feared that the cost of such legislation would be too high. The bill was subsequently voted out of committee but the House Calendar Committee refused to place it on the calendar. A "gag rule" stopped all discussion on this action of the Committee when the House Speaker refused to recognize the representatives supporting the rule.  

Because of this defeat, the Ohio Old Age Pension Conference began laying the groundwork to enact an old age pension plan through the initiative. A legal advisory board, headed by George B. Okey, one of the Federation's regular counsels, drafted a new, legally airtight bill embodying the same provisions as the earlier proposed legislation. The Federation's Secretary-Treasurer, Thomas Donnelly, as an expert and seasoned lobbyist, was chosen chairman of the Ohio Old Age Pension Conference. With the major costs shared by the Federation and the Eagles, the Conference began a campaign to obtain signatures on the initiative petitions. The Conference, however, limited this work to specified precincts or sections of a city or county, allowing for the possibility that the General Assembly still might not pass the law and that the referendum procedure would then have to be employed. The Conference also tried to pin individual representatives down on their
positions on old age pensions.32

After a successful initiative campaign, the old age pension proposal again appeared before the General Assembly but, despite the obvious popular support for passage, the General Assembly again failed to act favorably. The Old Age Pension Conference reacted immediately with a referendum drive. As with the initiative, the Conference was able to easily obtain enough signatures, on the referendum petitions and, in November, 1933, the question of a state old age pension was finally decided in a popular election. The bill carried by 862,639 votes, 1,388,860 for the measure and 626,221 against. With this vote, Ohio became the 26th state to enact such legislation.33 Even after passage of this bill, the Federation continued to seek amendments improving the law's provisions, particularly an amendment providing medical care for the aged.34

By 1934, the Federation also began to show increased concern with international problems. Although the Federation had strongly supported Wilson's proposed League of Nations after World War I, its major interests traditionally lay in the domestic arena and, even more narrowly, in Ohio. But in 1934, the Federation issued a strongly worded statement condemning Fascism at home and abroad. Perhaps this stance mirrored to some extent the nation's growing concern with the rise of Hitler and Mussolini, but the Federation's position arose more from a desire to express world-wide labor solidarity. The Federation's resolution stated that,
"In Italy, Germany and Austria, as a result of Fascism, the Labor Movement was trampled upon and crushed under the heel of Fascist dictatorship;" that this Fascism shatters "...every vestige of the very democratic institutions within which labor hopes to gain its objectives." The Federation also feared the rise of Fascism in the U.S. as a "...result of crisis which capitalism has brought about." It called for all people to turn for redress not to Fascism but to democratic institutions, to form an organization of all groups opposed to fascism, to agree upon a common program and to boycott all German, Austrian and Italian goods. But despite these proposals, the Federation's taut opposition to Fascism, like the opposition to Fascism of many other Americans, did not extend to the ultimate of armed conflict or material and military support of the enemies of Fascism. The Federation, mirroring American organized labor's traditional distrust of military actions, supported the Nye Neutrality legislation pending before Congress.

By 1935, the question of militancy in foreign affairs was overshadowed by the problem of militancy within the domestic labor movement. Throughout the early 30s, a significant minority within the A.F.L., led by John L. Lewis of the U.M.W. and Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, renewed steady agitation for A.F.L. organization of the mass-production industries into industrial, not trade, unions. The cautious A.F.L.
leadership, however, led by President William Green, himself a member of the industry-based U.M.W., held fast to the Scranton Resolution which allowed a union to use any form of organization best suited to its needs, qualifying this position "...with the warning that no structural changes could take place in organizations without the consent of all the unions involved." 39

While on paper this position appeared equitable, in reality it was disastrous. As an example, different segments of the auto industry were claimed for organization by different trade unions, the Tool and Die Makers, the Machinists, etc. This system might have been successful had these unions worked together but they frequently refused to cooperate, jealously guarding their own perogatives. Thus, when one trade went out on strike, another trade might choose or be required by its contract to continue to work. Unified action, and subsequently union effectiveness, were often virtually impossible. Further, the trade unions did not organize the majority of auto workers who were unskilled or semi-skilled production line workers. For Lewis, Hillman and their followers, the only viable alternative to this trade plan was organization on unified, industrial bases.

On November 9, 1935, three weeks after the adjournment of the A.F.L. national convention, Lewis called a meeting of representatives from the national and international unions favoring industrial unionism in the mass-production
industries. At this meeting held at the United Mine Workers headquarters, those present voted unanimously to establish a permanent Committee for Industrial Organization to work within the A.F.L. for industrial unionism.\footnote{40} According to Philip Taft, there is no evidence that the C.I.O. wanted to secede or sought to be expelled from the A.F.L. The C.I.O. wanted, rather, to stay in and negotiate for some program to carry out industrial unionism.\footnote{41} Lewis had said that,

\begin{quote}
...his union and the other unions of the C.I.O. regarded themselves as members of the A.F.L. and wanted to stay in it but that the A.F.L. had to negotiate and suggest a program upon which the mass-production industries, especially the steel industry, could be organized.\footnote{42}
\end{quote}

But the A.F.L. leadership reacted differently. William Green, tied to traditional trade unionism, sought a legal loophole to expel the C.I.O. unions. The denouement came when the A.F.L. issued a degree of expulsion stating that,

"Any union now affiliated with the Committee for Industrial Organization not announcing its withdrawal therefrom on or before September 5, 1936, shall thereupon by this order automatically stand suspended from the American Federation of Labor and from enjoying all and any privileges and benefits of membership and affiliation with the American Federation of Labor.\footnote{43}"

The A.F.L. central bodies were caught in the middle of this split. In many state federations and city and county centrals, C.I.O. unions constituted a major or at least a sizeable segment of the membership. The loss of the C.I.O. would deal a real blow to the effectiveness and strength of
many of these central bodies. But, at the same time, many centrals were afraid to anger the parent A.F.L. Among the state federations, the immediate responses were almost evenly divided. The state bodies in Alabama, California, Kentucky, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, W. Virginia, Wisconsin and Minnesota either endorsed industrial unionism or condemned the suspension of the C.I.O. or at least suggested compromise. The federations of Ohio, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Washington and Vermont supported the official A.F.L. position.

Despite its official alignment with the A.F.L., the Ohio State Federation of Labor at its 1936 convention decided to let the situation ride and seated a sizeable contingent of Miners and Rubber Workers. The expulsion order had only been in effect a few weeks and the Ohio Federation hoped and sincerely believed that peace and unity would be restored.

This hope was destroyed, however, when the A.F.L. decreed the revocation of the charters of those member groups which continued to maintain friendly relations with the C.I.O. or its member unions. As evidence that this was no hollow threat, the A.F.L. "reorganized" the state federations of W. Virginia, Kentucky and Pennsylvania and, soon, the other state federations, including Ohio's fell in line. With the Ohio State Federation of Labor firmly committed to
the trade unionism of the A.F.L., the way was open for the establishment of an Ohio C.I.O. state body, utilizing the support and political power of the growing number of newly unionized auto, rubber and steel workers, coupled with the expertise of the older C.I.O. unions. For the second time in less than 30 years, the Ohio State Federation of Labor again faced a dual federation fighting for the leadership of organized labor in Ohio.
CHAPTER VI: NOTES


2. Ibid., x.


13. Ibid., p. 72.

14. Ibid., pp. 77-78.


Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, p. 16.


Proceedings of the Forty-Seventh Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, p. 78.


Ibid.


Taft, The A.F. of L. From the Death of Gompers to the Merger, pp. 36-37.

Proceedings of the Forty-Seventh Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, p. 64.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Proceedings of the Fiftieth Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, p. 57.


36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Proceedings of the Fifty-First Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, p. 147.

39 Taft, The A.F. of L. From the Death of Gompers to the Merger, p. 57.

40 Ibid., p. 145.

41 Ibid., p. 155.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., p. 178.

44 Ibid., p. 179.

CONCLUSION

In the later part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century, a period in which much of American organized labor was characterized by a philosophy of voluntarism, state central bodies represented a major part of the political thrust of the labor movement. Even within the A.F.L., with its stated creed of voluntarism, the state bodies were officially designated as political agents whose job was to lobby representing the working class before state legislatures. Although Gompers and the A.F.L. leadership declared that workers would better their lives through their own efforts and that government interference was both unnecessary and undesirable, they were forced, as well, to face realities.

Government's increasing activity and interest in business and industry and the growth of special interests seeking to influence this activity, showed the need for a representative of labor's position, particularly on the state level. In the late 1800's and through the early 1930's and the "Roosevelt Revolution," most governmental actions occurred on the state level and the most logical and efficient way to deal with this situation was through a state central body. Such a central body would have a greater knowledge of the overall situation.
in the state than an international union or city body, it
could represent the common interests of diverse labor groups
and it could tap significant and diverse personnel and
financial resources.

Students of lobbying traditionally have attempted to
examine labor lobbies like state federations by measuring
their success in forcing enactment of legislation favorable
to labor. But as George Groat recognized over 50 years ago
in 1917, mathematical formulas, at least those currently in
use, are not wholly reliable indicators of labor's lobbying
activities. They frequently fail to take into account or
measure a number of vital variables: the strength of
opposition to legislation; the number of labor measures
supported or introduced in each legislative session; the
strength of the state federation's advocacy of or commitment
to a proposed bill, the procedures followed and the actions
taken; the influence of public opinion; the formation of
coalitions; the personalities of individual legislators.

This study of one state body's, the Ohio State Federa­
tion of Labor's, early years as a lobbyist, while employing
mathematical formulae where useful, attempts to examine in
particular, how a state federation acts and reacts within a
lobbying context, how it deals with multiple variables and
seeks to bring order out of chaos.

As with most special interest groups that are novice
lobbyists, the OSFL underwent a maturation process in many
ways similar to that of other state centrals but in other
ways unique because it involved adaption to particular situations. In this movement toward maturity, the Ohio federation developed a meaningful constituency, professional personnel and financing and solid bases in procedure and policy, but all within the context of Ohio politics.

Within this context, probably the most significant aspect in the development of the OSFL into an effective and efficient lobby was the clarification of a policy of non-partisanship and the establishment of effective lobbying procedures based on this position. After a series of struggles, the federation firmly established its commitment to the rewarding of labor's friends and the punishing of its enemies whatever their political affiliations.

An examination of the Ohio General Assembly in the years from 1883 to 1935 shows the wisdom of this position. Overall, voting records in the General Assembly in this period show that no consistent pattern, based on party or occupation, of voting on labor measures emerges, with the exception that unions members did vote consistently for labor-supported bills. Thus, the identification of the federation with any party would weaken its position; effective lobbying would require the influencing of individuals legislators.

In this context, the OSFL eventually developed an extensive and efficient network to sway the members of the General Assembly. While the federation's annual convention dealt with the organization's internal affairs and its general legislative position, the permanent staff personnel
and a network of local political committees conducted the
day to day lobbying. The secretary-treasurer, the federa-
tion's chief lobbyist, assisted by the members of the
Executive Board, monitored legislative voting records,
directly pressured legislators on a day to day basis and
drafted or arranged for the drafting and submission of
desired laws. The local political committees, in turn,
could be called upon by the secretary-treasurer and Executive
Board to add weight to the federation's position by bombarding
legislators with letters or personally visiting individual legislators. In addition, these committees disseminated voting information to voters and voiced the grassroots demands of members to the Executive Board.

With this basic policy and these procedures based on
non-partisanship, the Ohio State Federation of Labor emerged
in the years from its establishment in 1883 to the split in
the A.F.L. in 1935 as a mature lobby operating effectively
and efficiently within the context of Ohio politics. Perhaps,
the greatest proof of its success is that it brought an order
out of the chaos of politics and helped make Ohio a pro-
gressive state in labor legislation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Manuscript Materials

Letterbooks of the Presidents of the American Federation of Labor. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Washington, D.C.

Max S. Hayes Papers. Ohio Historical Society. Columbus, Ohio.

United States Documents

Twelfth Census of the United States in the Year 1900:

Twelfth Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1900:


**State Documents**


Ohio Secretary of State. Federal, State and County Officers. Columbus, 1890.

Ohio Secretary of State, Federal, State and County Officers. Columbus: The Westbote Co., State Printers, 1895.


Ohio Secretary of State. Federal, State and County Officers. Columbus: Fred J. Heer, State Printer, 1900.

Ohio Secretary of State. Federal, State, County and Township Officers. Columbus: F. J. Heer, State Printer, 1902.


Ohio Secretary of State. Official Roster: Federal, State and County Officers. No Publisher, 1919.


Other Primary Sources

Eleventh Annual Convention of the Ohio State Trades and Labor Assembly. Cleveland: Cleveland Citizen Print, 1894.

Ninth Annual Session of the Ohio State Trades and Labor Assembly, 1892.

Proceedings of the First Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation of Labor and the Fourteenth Annual Convention of the State Trades and Labor Assembly of Ohio, 1897-1898.

Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation of Labor, 1901.
Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation of Labor, 1903.

Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation of Labor, 1904.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation of Labor, 1905.


Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation of Labor, 1908.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Convention of the Ohio Federation of Labor, 1909.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, 1910.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, 1911.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, 1912.

Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, 1913.


Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, 1918.

Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, 1919.

Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, 1921.


Proceedings of the Forty-Second Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, 1925.


Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, 1929.


Proceedings of the Fiftieth Annual Convention of the Ohio State Federation of Labor, 1933.


SECONDARY SOURCES

Books


**Articles**


Donnelly, Thomas J. "Methods and Accomplishments in Ohio." *American Federationist*, (May, 1926), 550-556.


"The Hungry City: A Mayor's Experience with Unemployment."

The Atlantic Monthly, CXLIX (May, 1932), 538-546.

Journal of the Knights of Labor, 1890-1897.


Macarthur, W. "Political Action and Trade-Unionism." Annals, XXIV (September, 1904), 316-330.


Unpublished Materials


Newspapers

Cleveland Citizen
Ohio State Journal
Toledo Union Trade