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The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1974
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NEW FEDERALISM AND SOCIAL WELFARE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PLANNERS AND CONSUMERS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

James Hubert Ward, B.S., M.S.W.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University

1974

Reading Committee:
John Behling
Samuel Dixon
June Hopps
Milton Rosner

Approved by:
Milton Rosner
Advisor
School of Social Work
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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VITA

April 8, 1937 .................. Born, Lawndale, North Carolina

1960 .......................... B.S., North Carolina A & T State University, College of Education and General Studies, Greensboro, North Carolina

1960-1962 ..................... Commissioned U.S. Army Officer, Fort Benning, Georgia and Fort Knox, Kentucky

1962-1964 ..................... Teacher, Fairfield School for Boys, Ohio Youth Commission, Lancaster, Ohio

1964-1966 ..................... Youth Counselor, Community Services Division, Ohio Youth Commission, Dayton, Ohio

1967-1968 ..................... Social Work Assistant, Citizen Participation Branch, National Institute of Mental Health, Chevy Chase, Maryland

1968 ......................... M.S.W., University of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland

1968-1969 ..................... Program Developer, Community Action Agency and Adjunct Instructor, University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio

1969-1971 ..................... Executive Director, Community Action Agency, Dayton, Ohio

1971-1973 ..................... Member and Deputy Director for Community Services, Ohio Youth Commission, Columbus, Ohio

1973 ......................... Assistant Professor, Central State University, Wilberforce, Ohio
FIELDS OF STUDY

Social Welfare Policy - Professors Leonard Schneiderman and Milton Rosner

Social Work Education and Practice - Professors Richard Medhurst and James Billups

Social Work Research - Professor Merriss Cornell, John Behling and Rocco D'Angelo

Social Functioning - Professors William Sze and Joseph Parnicky

Special Studies in Public Administration and Criminal Justice - Professors Arthur Lynn and Harry E. Allen
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Research Issue

The new federalism purports to create within the federal government a new grant-in-aid policy for financing social services in states and local communities. That policy is expected to embody a cluster of block grants to be awarded to state governments, which, in turn, will distribute them among their local communities for the operation of social programs. The essence of this plan is the consolidation of some 130 existing categorical grants into some four to six broad purpose block grants of national interests. In addition, it purports to incorporate the ongoing Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) as one of those block grants, and as the forerunner or prototype for the other categories of this policy. With these funds the federal government can help states and local communities to finance social programs in such national interests categories as education, manpower training, urban community development and law enforcement and criminal justice.

The relevance of this policy change to consumers and planners of social welfare services is that it purports to
modify the role of the federal government as an equalizer of opportunity and the distributor of services, and as the supporter of reforms in public social service delivery (Schneiderman, 1974). Also, implicit in this change is the discontinuation of the practice of establishing national priority commitments to any specific category of "needy" or "disadvantaged" members of society. Instead, the states would assume responsibility for establishing the social priorities for the distribution of federal funds (p. 2-3). Therefore, if helping professions, such as social work, are to be effective in helping their clients balance needs with appropriate resources, there appears to be a definite need for them to know more about the implications of new federalism for both the planners and beneficiaries of the services.

An approach to attaining of such knowledge may proceed on basis of three underlying assumptions. The first of them is that future grant-in-aid policy in this country will be closely patterned after the block grant model introduced in the 1971 special revenue sharing proposal by the executive branch of the federal government, and of the ongoing LEAA program which the 90th Congress created under Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. The basis for this assumption is that some 77 percent of the American Society, plus such institutions as the Governors' groups, and the executive and legislative branches of the federal government favor the block grant as a desirable

The second assumption is that Title I of the 1968 Safe Streets Act conforms to a model of national social policy, closely associated with a new evolutionary stage of American Federalism. The basis for this assumption is that this Act emerged in response to the social problem of an increasing rate of crime and delinquency and a deteriorating criminal justice system. Faced with management problems in the categorical grant system and the problem of a rising rate of crime, the 90th Congress seized this opportunity to create within the federal government a new and different set of principles and procedures to facilitate federal intervention in and support of social programs in the criminal justice field. In effect, the 90th Congress created a grant-in-aid experiment to influence the character of grant-in-aid policy in other fields (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 1968; Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1971; Mogulf, 1973; and U.S. News and World Report, 1971: 29-34).

The third assumption is that all social welfare policy embody a "goal mix," of system control, system maintenance and system change goals (Schneiderman, 1969). One or more of the three categories of goals tend to receive disproportionately more emphasis during the policy implementation stage,
based on the existence of environmental factors that are similar to those that undergirded congressional debate during the policymaking process. As such, one community may emphasize system control goals—that is, it may seek to bring under control the behavior that is believed to be out of conformity or threatening to existing norms or values of that community; in other communities, programs emanating from the same policy might emphasize system maintenance goals—that is, they may attempt to preserve and perpetuate existing community norms, structures, and functions; and other communities might place comparatively more emphasis on system change goals than on maintenance or control—that is, they may attempt to promote change and innovation in the direction of increased system effectiveness for all members of society (p. 1-14).

The general problem statement, together with these assumptions, provide the basis for the following research question: In what ways are the rates of poverty and minorities related to the distribution of new federalism funds among the goals of control, maintenance and change? An answer to this question may be obtained through a systematic analysis of some of the actual experiences gained from new federalism programs. With such knowledge, a determination can be made of the implications of new federalism for both the beneficiaries and deliverers of public social services.
It is the objective of this research, then, to seek an answer to this question by examining the grant-in-aid actions of the LEAA program—as an ongoing specimen of new federalism. Such an examination should generate fund of valid and reliable results on which generalizations can be reached regarding the implications of new federalism for planners and consumers of social welfare services. Such knowledge should enhance the potential for professional intervention and helping people with problems find appropriate solutions to them.

Background to the Research Problem

This research is concerned with the new federalism plan for converting more than 100 existing categorical grants into a group of new block grants under a special revenue sharing policy. Implicit in that grant policy is the plan to modify intergovernmental roles, responsibilities and perhaps commitments for intervening in and supporting programmatic efforts directed toward the eradication of nationwide social ills. In order to understand the full essence of this policy change, a brief review of some of the salient theoretical and historical factors relating to it are presented in the following pages.

The theoretical basis of federalism are essentially economic and political. These bases are deeply rooted in the views expressed by the framers of the United States' Constitution during the 1700s. They argued that "... (1) a
strong national union was necessary for internal monetary order; (2) a federal compact was needed to enable the young nation to make its influence felt in the world; (3) this compact was expected to lessen the ominous 'spirit of faction' that was already stirring among states; and (4) national authority would not supersede local sovereignty--the rights of the states--in matters essentially local in character" (The Publius Symposium, 1972:99).

Subsequent political and economic conceptions of federalism have embraced the need for a system of government that embodies both centralized and decentralized components. From the political perspective, for instance, Bernstein (1955) views federalism as "... a division of political power between a central government, with authority over the entire territory of a nation, and a series of local governments called states in America . . ." (p. 78). To Holloway and Alder (1959) a "... federation is a single state in which the powers of the functions are divided between a central government and several local governments, each having a sphere of jurisdictions within which it is supreme" (p. 13). "The essential relationship involves a division of activities between autonomous parts and the common central organ of a composite whole" (MacMahon, 1937: 173).

The economic bases of federalism, on the other hand, embody a concern for efficient uses of resources, equitable distribution of income, a high level of employment and
reasonable price stability (Oates, 1972). Federalism to economists comprises "... a public sector with both centralized and decentralized levels of decision-making in which choices are made at each level concerning the provision of public services of the residents of (and perhaps others who carry on activities in) the respective jurisdictions" (p. 17).

These two conceptions diverge and converge around certain factors. Those factors around which they diverge are "power" and "choice," as the basis for determining which functions within the public sector should be decentralized. The political conception considers power to be the key element in the political equation, without which there can be no formula for federalism (The Publius Symposium, 1972). The underlying assumption here is that if power is allowed to flow "naturally" to its most efficient outlet, then, both the centralized and decentralized components would naturally assume responsibility for those functions for which they are best suited to perform (p. 98-125). On the other hand, Oates (1972) argues that a choice must be made to determine which of its principal functions should be decentralized. A given choice is determined by matching functions under consideration for decentralization with the appropriate level of decision-making. As a consequence, each level within the governmental system will gain access to certain functions based primarily on its ability to deliver services (p. 2-20).

Both of these conceptions converge around the view that centralized and decentralized components of government
are necessary. They agree that, under norms of rationality, the central components would be responsibility for such functions as giving clear directions to social goals, stimulating and stabilizing the economy, and furnishing a single voice in world affairs. The decentralized components, on the other hand, would reflect flexibility in administration, respond to local customs and idiosyncrasies (Grodzins, 1960: 265-82; The Publius Symposium, 1972:98-145; Oates, 1972:3-20). Based on these conceptions, federalism connotes a system of government that embodies both centralized and decentralized components, with each level making appropriate decisions regarding the provisions of public services within its jurisdiction. Rather than for any one level of government to perform all functions of the public sector, each one would do essentially what it does best.

Federalism in America can be characterized as an evolutionary process whose character at any point in history tends to be reflective of the conditions and predominant ideologies that are extant in society (Ink, 1973). Because conditions and ideologies of the American society are constantly changing, structures and function of the federal system of government tend also to change, in order to adapt and respond to the emerging, and often new needs of society (p. 29).

Historically, there have been five different stages of American federalism, including the present one (Friedrich,
1968). They were: "... first, a marked 'dualism' which could be called 'state merchantilism' (1970-1860); second, a centralizing federalism (1860-1933); third, the New Deal's 'cooperative federalism, extending until recently; and fourth, 'creative' federalism ..." of the 1960s (p. 8).

New federalism is now evolving as the fifth evolutionary stage to symbolize the conditions and predominant ideologies of the 1970s (Brand and Watts, 1969).

Prior to the New Deal's cooperative stage in federalism, the federal government's role in social affairs was relatively limited. Except for its involvement in postal services, land grant college movement and issues relating to the expansion and complexities of big business, it had played a relatively insignificant role in both domestic affairs, in general, and social welfare, in particular (Ink, 1973).

The crisis during the Great Depression led eventually to federalism in the delivery of social services (Schottland, 1970). That occurred only after unsuccessful attempts by local social agencies and those of states to resolve the crisis (p. 23-33).

The years of the Great Depression were characterized by widespread human suffering and destitution. Millions of people lost their homes, jobs, farms, credit and some even lost their lives during this era (Schottland, 1970). Initial attempts to mitigate against this crisis were undertaken by
the local private and public agencies. It soon became obvious that these agencies were ill-prepared, both with skills and resources, for the task of remedying a social ill, that was caused by a national economic failure (p. 23-22).

The landmark year for intervention into social welfare by state government was 1931 (Trattner, 1970). Under the leadership of Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt, the legislature of the State of New York enacted the first state Unemployment Relief Act (also known as the Wick Act), ever to be enacted in this country. The Wick Act, in turn, created within the State of New York, the TERA—Temporary Emergency Relief Administration, which, under the direction of Harry Hopkins—a social worker—began to distribute emergency relief to the millions of suffering citizens of New York, on a state-local matching formula (p. 228-45).

In addition to providing relief to the suffering population, TERA also generated other significant externalities for society. One such externality was the establishment of the constructive value to relief-giving to the destitute, and the concomitant reversal in conception, which tended to associate relief-giving with pauperizing and demoralizing the beneficiaries. A second externality generated by TERA was that it modified the settings and roles of social workers; by virtue of circumstances surrounding them at the time, social workers were obliged to shift the emphasis of their practice, at least temporarily, away from merely dealing with individualized problems of emotional
adjustment to social action and social reform, in order to help enhance the well-being of millions of destitute and suffering persons. A third externality generated by TERA was that it represented the forerunner or prototype for other state, and eventually national, relief programs. As such, some 24 states followed TERA's example in establishing similar relief programs, in less than one year from TERA's inception (Schottland, 1970; and Trattner, 1974).

Federal intervention in social welfare began in 1933, thereby marking the origin of the New Deal's cooperative federalism. Shortly after the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, as President of the United States in 1933, the federal government began to exemplify a similar pioneering image to that which had characterized the state of New York, when F.D. Roosevelt was its Governor. Underlying this federal action was the ideology,

that man had a responsibility for the well-being of his fellow man, that public assistance was not a matter of charity but a matter of justice that rested upon man's right to a minimum standard of living in a civilized society, and that liberty and security were synonymous and, thus, the very existence of a democratic state depended upon the health of its citizens (Trattner, 1974:234).

Under the leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the federal government transformed this philosophy into several categories of national public policy which directed services toward the resolution of the problem of destitution and human suffering. Among several of the earlier and perhaps more significant New Deal policies was the Federal
Emergency Relief Act of 1933 which was closely patterned after its prototype—the Wick Act of 1931—and it, too, was instituted as a federal emergency relief measure. That Act created the FERA—Federal Emergency Relief Administration—which, again, under the direction of Harry Hopkins, and several social-work-staff members, began the delivery of assistance for various kinds. Grant-in-aid was determined at the federal level, and administration was a state and local responsibility (Trattner, 1974).

In 1935 the Social Security Act created relatively a permanent national program to deal with the problem of destitution (Cloward and Piven, 1971). It was enacted as a sort of omnibus measure whose purpose was to deal with the national problem of social insecurity. As such, it was designed to render such services as old-age insurance and pensions to the needy aged, unemployment insurance, public assistance to dependent mother with children and the cripple and blind (p. 44-177).

From its inception, the social security Act represented an object of widespread criticism, which eventually led to two U.S. Supreme Court decisions in 1937 regarding the constitutionality of its provisions for unemployment insurance and old-age insurance (Schottland, 1970). Opponents of this Act had filed charges with the U.S. Supreme Court to the effect that (1) taxes were levied arbitrarily rather than
uniformly, (2) "it [the Act] invaded the reserved power of the state," and (3) "the states had abandoned governmental functions which they had no power to abandon." Responding to these charges the Supreme Court held that both the unemployment insurance and old-age insurance provisions of the Social Security Act were indeed constitutional (p. 32).

In announcing these decisions, Justice Cardoza also articulated Court's philosophical views regarding this Act. He stated that:

... The concept of general welfare [is not] static. Needs that were narrow and parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the times (quoted from Schottland, 1970:32).

Expounding further upon the Court's philosophy, Justice Cardozo viewed the problem confronting the aged as:

'plainly national in area and dimension and that laws of separate states cannot deal with it effectively ... Congress may spend money in that for general welfare' and that 'only a power that is national can serve the interests of all.' (Quoted from Schottland, 1970:32).

These legal and philosophical views of the U.S. Supreme Court, as articulated by Justice Cardozo, not only enunciated the federal interest in old age and unemployment insurance, but also acknowledge the Court's awareness that under changing conditions, often policies and programs may also have to change (Schottland, 1970). In addition, these views helped in defining intergovernmental relations and responsibilities in responding to national social ills, and
elimination of a traditional principle which viewed relief-giving to the destitute as solely a local responsibility (p. 32-33).

Although, social workers, throughout the Great Depression, increasingly shifted their practice emphasis from the individualized approach to social action and reform, the emergence of the Social Security Administration helped to accelerate that shift (Trattner, 1970). The underlying premise of the shift, was that social workers did not have time to handle the traditional emotional problems when the major social problem confronting society was that of destitution which emanated from national economic and political failures, rather than from personal weaknesses. As a result, most of the people in need of help were hungry, homeless, ill-clothed and in need of medical care, and so on. It became obvious to social workers that a shift in and/or an expansion of their practice focus was necessary in order to help the "needy" to cope with the national crisis affecting them. On recognizing this need, together with an awareness of the inability of state and local programs to handle the national problem of destitution, social workers, increasingly, turned to social action and reform, as had been exemplified by the founders of the social work profession (p. 228-45).

In addition to responding to the problem of destitution, the Social Security Act, along with other New Deal policies and programs contributed significantly to an
increase in the demand for and status of social workers (Trattner, 1974). Social workers began to play significant and diversified roles in national, state and local programs, while these programs relieved others of social action and reform responsibilities so that they could return to traditional methods of practice with individualized cases of emotional and psychological maladjustment. On the whole, however, social workers were no longer viewed as merely "outside" reform agitators, but were placed in a variety of roles within government—such as policy-making, administration, and direct service delivery—where their broad base of professional knowledge and values could be more effectively utilized in the nation-wide efforts to improve the well-being of millions of suffering Americans (p. 288-45).

During the "stability" years of 1940 through 1960, the emphasis in social work practice gradually reverted back to the individualized approach (Trattner, 1974). The significance of this change is that social work, again, lost touch with the broader social issues which tended to impinge upon social functioning and well-being of people (p. 248-64).

Several reasons were given for this change in social work emphasis, but five of them appear salient (Trattner, 1974). One of those reasons was predicated on the belief that programs of the New Deal were already appropriately dealing with the problem of destitution and that social workers could be of greater value to society by directing their practice
toward cases of emotional and psychological maladjustment. Another reason for this change was that an increasing number of self-supporting clients had begun to turn to social workers for help in managing problems of stress and anxiety due to their relationships with the war; furthermore, these clients tended to respond more favorably to social work treatment than did those with whom they worked during the Depression years. A third reason for the resurgence of emphasis on case work was attributed to the conditions and ideologies that were extant within society during that era; that era was marked by war, Cold War, fear of communism threats and so on, which created a political climate that tended to discourage social criticism. A fourth reason for the change was due to the demise of the Survey Magazine which had kept the social work profession informed about the issues confronting it and the need for reform; the Survey ceased to exist with the death of Paul Kellogg, its editor-in-chief of nearly one half century. Finally, social work returned to case work because of the widespread belief that destitution in this country was no longer a significant national issue (p. 248-64).

Beginning with the 1960 decade, many of the widely held conceptions of social well-being of society were altered along with program approaches for dealing with social problems (Cloward, and Piven, 1971). These changes were in part related to the emerging ideological perspectives
held by the national elected leadership, and by other signif-
ificant social, intellectual and political events of that his-
torical period. The election of John F. Kennedy as
President, and later the designation of Lyndon B. Johnson as
his successor to the office of President, set the stage for
an expansion and acceleration of the potential for economic
and social progress for the nation in general and for the
poor and disadvantaged in particular. In turn, the work of
such social critics as Michael Harrington (1962), James
Morgan (1962), Dwight McDonald (1963), along with several
others, plus the multifaceted civil rights movement under
the leadership of Martin Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X, James
Farmer, Whitney Young, Stokely Carmichael--to mention a few--
assisted greatly in elevating to national recognition the
plight of millions of Americans. In effect, they brought
into national focus the fact that, in the midst of unprece-
dented prosperity, millions of Americans were experiencing
disproportionately high rates of unemployment, poverty, poor
housing, crowded living conditions, economic exploitation,
racial discrimination, desperation and hopelessness (Trat-
tner, 1974).

Once elevated to national recognition, these issues,
along with other related ones, became the focal concern for
the expansion and intensification of federal intervention
and action during the 1960s. First, under the New Frontier
philosophy of the Kennedy Administration and later under the
Great Society and Creative Federalism philosophy during the Johnson years, an unprecedented number of national policies and programs were created to mitigate against the various categories of social ills. In fact, the number of such policies and programs increased from 44 to 430, for an increase in federal spending from 6 billion to 30 billion dollars (U.S. News and World Report, March 15, 1971:32). Among these policies and programs were the Economic Opportunity Act, Civil Rights Act, Voting Act, Community Mental Health Act, Medicare, Medicaid, Housing and Urban Development Act, and so on. These policies and programs were designed to reform human institutions and behavior toward the end of social justice for all people. By focusing on specific categories of need, people and services, the federal government sought the national social goals of (1) equalizing opportunities, (2) increasing the level of public and private services, (3) equalizing the distribution of services and (4) innovations in public service delivery. In effect, these goals were assumed by the federal government because the state and local governments did not equitably render services to various segments of society and support politically unpopular ventures—especially those relating to the poor and minorities (Based on Fried, et al., 1973; Trattner, 1974; Cloward and Piven, 1971; Wheeler, 1972; and Ginzberg and Solo, 1974).

As the federal role in social welfare expanded, the demand for social work and other professional and paraprofes-
sional and paraprofessional service deliverers also increased (Trattner, 1974). Since the primary focus of most of these programs was on social change and reform, the practice emphasis of the personnel implementing them needed also to be prepared to render services in social action and reform. A substantial number of professional social workers acknowledged the importance of social action and reform to the well-being of society, but continued to view themselves primarily as clinicians, whose first responsibility was to their clients. Both indigenous persons and paraprofessionals were placed in various administrative and service delivery roles of these programs to help respond to the wide variety of individual, social and manpower needs of that era. However, as the 1960 decade passed on, the social work profession began increasingly to expand its educational and practice emphasis to include more social policy, social action, social reform emphasis to complement the clinical emphasis (p. 248-64).

As new categories of social and economic issues and problems evolved during the 1960s, the federal government attempted increasingly to respond to them either by use of existing programs or by creating new ones. The underlying premise for this was that the government is expected to support and encourage scientific and technological developments and also to eradicate the social and economic problems generated by them (Elzar, 1973:1-16). The 1960s, for instance, was characterized by "... war and fear of attack,
revolution in technology, advances in communication and trans­
portation, increasing specialization and interdependence . . .
and domestic unrest." (The Publius Symposium, 1972). In
responding to both of these sets of societal expectations, the
federal government tended increasingly in the direction of
direct federal leverage or central power, which exemplified
both advantages and disadvantages for society.

The advantages of the highly centralized form of gov­
ernment were to (1) upgrade and extend public services to
meet human needs and vulnerabilities on an unprecedented
scale; (2) stimulate innovations in public service delivery;
(3) more nearly equalize opportunities for the disadvantaged
members of society; and (4) equalize the distribution of ser­

The disadvantages of this overly centralized system
of government were reflected by: (1) the dehumanization of
government due to its vastness in size and its complexity;
(2) a separation of some people from the centers of decision­
making affecting their lives; (3) the undercutting of state
and local elected leadership; and (4) the decrease in the gov­
ernment's credibility among constituents due to the practice
of overcommitments, and under funding of programs (Wright,

Though the centralized form contributed significantly
to the well-being of the poor and minorities, it also upset
the status quo within society and aroused expectations among
another segment of people who wanted from the government assistance on scale comparable to that which had been rendered to the poor and disadvantaged (Schrag, 1967). This body of people comprise approximately 40 percent of the American population, whose annual income range is between 5,000 and 10,000 dollars; they are middle-class, middle-aged, and "middle-minded" people who tend to cast their voting ballots in opposition to the "social issue" of rising crime rates, student demonstrations, drug abuse, pornography, student busing, and racial dissent (Watternberg and Scrammon, 1970). This segment of society is commonly referred to as the "Silent Majority" or "Real Majority," to whom elected officials and aspirants to public office theoretically must listen to and heed in order to gain access to a given office (p. 280-305).

The rising expectations among the Silent Majority, created for the federal government a major dilemma in its efforts to respond to them simultaneously with its efforts to pursue already established national social goals. Based on the analysis by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1967), the existing categorical grant system was ill-suited to the task of pursuing concurrently both the established national goals and the rising expectations among the Silent Majority, with any degree of effectiveness. Specifically, ACIR reported that the categorical grant system embodied too many special purpose programs, that many of
them were overlapping in emphasis and frequently worked at
cross-purposes. Furthermore, that system was highly complex,
inflexible and in need of reform (p. xxi).

Toward the end of the 1960s, the shortcomings of the
categorical grant system began to manifest themselves in
various ways. For instance, the Governors' organizations
began campaigning for some sort of block grant or revenue
sharing policy which would facilitate the distribution of lump
sums of federal funds among the states to be used at the dis­
cretion of the states. The underlying premise for this action
was that their authority had frequently been undercut and
circumvented by grant-in-aid actions under the categorical
grant policy. Under that policy federal officials could
exercise the option of dealing directly with state officials
or bypassing them altogether in financing local programs;
and frequently they were by-passed (Wright, 1972:8-68).

Initial federal efforts to deal with the problems
noted in the categorical grant system and those plaguing the
Silent Majority, led to attempts at grant consolidation. For
instance, one grant consolidation effort emanated with the
creation of the comprehensive Health Planning and Service
Program which emanated in 1966 under Public Law 89-749.
That policy abolished more than a dozen grants for specific
categories of diseases and consolidated them into a single
grant program to cover health service delivery. This effort
was later solidified by the passage of the Partnership
As the problem of rising rates of crime and delinquency emerged to the national policy-making agenda, this gave Congress an opportunity to experiment with a new and different approach for financing programs within states and local communities. It created this nation's first block grant policy under Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as a national response to the problem of rising crime and delinquency and to reform the nation's criminal justice system (Murphy, 1970). Unlike other legislation enacted by Congress during the 1960s, the Safe Streets Act facilitates the channeling of lump sums of federal funds directly from its administrative agency—LEAA—to states. The states, in turn, became responsible for the planning, administration, coordination and innovation of programs designed to pursue the national criminal justice goal (p. 309). In effect, the 90th Congress created under Title I a grant-in-aid experiment, which, at present, is already influencing the course of grant-in-aid policy.

The Nixon Administration actually inherited the LEAA program in a form that already conformed to new federalism (Turner, 1973). Shortly after his inauguration, President Nixon began enunciating the LEAA program as the new federalism prototype for some six other broad purpose block grants he had hoped Congress would enact (p. 450).
In his March 2, 1971 Message to Congress, President Nixon requested that Congress reduce some of the control over and remove most of the federal requirement imposed on the grant recipients and convert LEAA into special revenue sharing. In doing so, LEAA would constitute the block grant for the law enforcement and criminal justice category and the model for proposed block grants in the other national interests categories of the new policy (p. 412-3).

While the 91st Congress failed to take any action on the President's 1971 special revenue sharing proposal, it did give careful consideration to his revised version of that proposal in 1973 (Turner, 1973). But Congress again failed to change the program's title from LEAA to special revenue sharing for essentially two reasons. One of those reasons was attributed to the widespread criticism that had been directed at LEAA over the years for its failure to provide leadership in designing and implementing LEAA programs and in spending federal funds. The other reason was that Congress could not envision how any substantive change would be achieved by merely changing the program's title from LEAA to special revenue sharing, since already it was granting lump sums of federal funds to states along with the discretion to use them ("Law Enforcement: 3-Billion Through 1976," 1973:359-66). However, the 90th Congress did reaffirm its commitment to the block grant concept by extending LEAA through 1976, substantially increasing its budget and adding
to the basic Act several major provisions designed to improve its overall performance (p. 359-66). Furthermore, Congress is already in the process of enacting other public policies that are patterned closely after the LEAA block grant—the Manpower Training Act of 1973 and Better Community Act of 1974.

The new federalism plan, together with its group of block grants, promises to correct the deficiencies noted in the categorical grant system during the 1960s. It also purports to return from the agencies of the federal government to those of the states, the funds, decision-making and discretion to decide how the federal funds would be used. The underlying premise for this change is that the people at the state and local communities are closer to the day-to-day problems and are in the best position to establish the social priorities for the distribution of federal funds, on basis of their own values and definitions of need. The fundamental issue here is whether new federalism programs will give more emphasis to voters than to need, and whether one group's progress under it will be another group's repression, or whether it will seek social justice for all of mankind.

The Purpose of the Research

This research seeks to ascertain the implication of new federalism for planners and consumers of social welfare services. This objective is sought by examining the grant-in-aid actions of the LEAA program, as a specimen (or
specific case) in new federalism programming. As such, it seeks an answer to the research question of: "In what ways are rates of minorities and poverty related to the distribution of new federalism expenditures among the goals of control, maintenance and change?

In order to objectively pursue this objective, some rational investigative approach is needed that will do more than merely focus on the motivation of the framers of public policy, and the administrators and deliverers of public services. Such an approach should preclude the pitfalls of subjectivity and speculation that could conceivably accompany attempts to understand individual and social behavior.

In response to such a need, modern sociology, Freudian psychology and recently social work, have as a result, shifted their attention to analyzing the consequences of man's behavior (Bell, 1965). By doing so, new insights can be gained regarding the nature of that action and its significance for affected citizenry and social systems, regardless of whether that action is individual or social, conscious or unconscious, intended or unintended (p. v-ix).

The work of Robert K. Merton (1957) on manifest and latent functions, underlies this investigative model. Merton argues that planned and acknowledged goals of an action are manifest functions or goals. Conversely, the unplanned or unacknowledged goals are the latent functions or goals (p. 19-85). Complementing, Merton, Bell (1965), for instance,
argues that both of these functions are salient to efforts to understand the significance of a particular human action (p. vii). Thus, this investigative model has utility for examining not only the nature of and reasons for the establishment of certain funding priorities under a given program, but also their full range of implications for its principal criminal justice consumers, planners, and implementers, but also what Merton refers to as "functional equivalents"² (p. 19-85).

Therefore, without the benefit of further sociological terminology, the purpose of this research is to examine the funding priorities established under LEAA in relation to rates of minorities and poverty in given populations, for new insight into the nature and implications of new federalism for planners, and consumers of social services in the criminal justice field, and in other social welfare fields that are patterned after the LEAA block grant model. This purpose is operationalized by testing the following six hypotheses:

\[ H_1 \]

The higher the proportion of minorities, the larger the proportion of expenditure for system control priorities.

²The term "functional equivalents" in this study refers especially to any and all of the remaining five categories of national interest embodied in the President's 1971 and 1973 special revenue sharing proposal. It also refers to any future grant fields of social services funded under the block grant model.
As minority populations tend toward a moderate rate the larger the proportion of expenditures for system maintenance priorities.

The lower the proportion of minorities, the larger the proportion of expenditure for system change priorities.

The higher the poverty rate, the larger the proportion of expenditure for system control priorities.

As poverty tends toward a moderate rate, the larger the proportion of expenditures for system maintenance priorities.

The lower the poverty rate the larger the proportion of expenditures for system change priorities.

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Scope, Limitations and Value

Premises of the Research

The scope of this research is characterized as an initial inquiry into a grant-in-aid policy and program operating under new federalism. It focuses on the Title I provision of the 1968 Safe Streets Act, as a new federalism specimen (or case), and examines the funding priorities established by State Planning Agencies (SPA) in four states and their combined 56 planning regions, within the Greater Lakes Region of the United States. It does not include a detailed analysis of expenditures under LEEP—Law Enforcement Education Program—nor those under the Institute—the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. Furthermore, no
attempt is made in this research to evaluate the overall performance or effectiveness of the LEAA program. Rather, it examines the funding priorities established under LEAA during fiscal 1969-73, in relation to the rates of minorities and poverty within certain population groups, for new knowledge and insight regarding the implications of those priorities for beneficiaries and deliverers of public services in the criminal justice field, and in other similarly funded fields of social service.

There are essentially two limitations of this research. First, the data for this research was drawn only from the Greater Lakes Region, which might not be fully representative of the entire universe served by LEAA. Therefore, generalizability of its results is limited to the Greater Lakes Region. Second, even though the specimen (or case) examined in this research was officially created to remedy a problem in criminal justice, this research does not, in any way, purport to refine or extend existing knowledge in crime prevention, or amelioration of criminal behavior.

Finally, since the subject of this research is obviously value-laden, it may perhaps be beneficial to potential audiences if those value premises were stated which underly this research and may be reflected in its conclusions. Five such value premises appear to be crucial:

a. A belief in the worth and dignity of every human being, and their "rights to the greatest degree of self-
determination, consistent with the same rights of other people" (Ginsberg, 1973:129);

b. That the crime problem, like other social problems, is multi-causal and cannot be solved merely by a strengthened criminal justice system (Neumeyer, 1968:75-98; and NASW, 1969:3-16; and Lawyers' Committee on Civil Rights Under Law, 1972);

c. That in a democratic society, all available alternatives should be explored before expanding the role of the police (Yette, 1972:289-98; and NASW, 1968:3-16; and Lawyers' Committee on Civil Rights Under Law, 1972);

d. That programs within and related to the criminal justice system should be subjected to broad public review and participation (National Advisory Commission on National Standards and Goals, 1973:38-9); and

e. That the criminal justice system is characterized by widespread discrimination against the poor and minorities (Young, 1968:21; and Yette, 1972:289-98; NASW, 1969:3-4; NASW, 1973:31-36, and Martin and Fitzpatrick, 1970:3-25).

Significance of the Research

The significance of this research has been emphasized throughout the development of this Chapter. It may, perhaps, be beneficial to potential users to reiterate its principal focus and projected utility for social workers and other persons engaged in planning, policy-making, administration
and direct delivery of social welfare services.

This research originated out of a professional concern over the implications of new federalism for the planners and consumers of social welfare services. Precipitating this concern is a plan to convert the existing categorical grant-in-aid policy into block grant under a special revenue sharing policy. That policy would incorporate the already existing LEAA Program and pattern after it other broad purpose block grants of national interests. As such, LEAA would become the forerunner or prototype of the remaining special revenue sharing categories and would enable the federal government to help states and local communities finance social services in such broad national-interest categories as education, manpower training, urban community development, law enforcement and criminal justice.

Inherent in the policy change is a modification in intergovernmental roles and responsibilities for establishing social priorities for the distribution of federal revenue. The role of the federal government as an equalizer of opportunity and the distribution of services, and the supporter of reforms in public service delivery, will be modified; it presumed that the federal government will no longer establish national priority commitments to any specific categories of needy or disadvantaged member of society. This responsibility will be relegated to state governments.

Therefore, this research is quite significant for contemporary planners and consumers of public services, for at
least two reasons. First, the rationale for the expanded and intensified federal involvement in social concern, particularly during the 1960s, was predicated on the belief that, without strict federal guidelines, state and local governments could and would not equitably respond to the needs of all of its residents, especially disadvantaged groups such as the minorities and the poor (Schneiderman, 1974; Fried, et al., 1973). This research purports to generate a fund of new knowledge regarding the nature and implications of prevailing grant-in-aid practices of state and local governments under federally funded programs that are afforded relatively limited federal guidance and regulation. Such knowledge should be useful in guiding the selection of interventive strategies for enhancing the well-being and social functioning of people who are dependent upon social services.

Second, since the LEAA block grant is favored by a large proportion of society, as a desirable grant-in-aid model for financing social services at the state and local levels, and is already under consideration by Congress for such a purpose, there appears to be a high probability that future grant-in-aid policy in social service fields will continue to be closely patterned after the LEAA block grant (Turner, 1973; Law Enforcement: $3-Billion Through FY 1976, 1973; and Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1970). Knowledge gained from experiences with LEAA, offer utility, not only for improving the performance of the LEAA program, reducing
crime and reforming the criminal justice system, but also for other new federalism programs, as they emerge.

Thus, knowledge generated by this research should be of major significance for (1) influencing the character of future grant-in-aid policy in other social fields (2) stimulating further social research for gaining additional insight into new federalism for planners and consumers of social welfare services, and (3) influencing the course of professional education and practice of social workers and other planners of public services. Of primary significance, it should furnish encouragement and stimulation to policy makers, public administrators, educators and social workers, in undertaking appropriate actions to bring past ideas into accord with present day realities in order to prevent and correct discrepancies in the social order, and to help create a truly just society, for all mankind.
OPERATING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT TITLE I OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968 CONFORMS TO A MODEL OF A NATIONAL SOCIAL POLICY, ASSOCIATED WITH A NEW EVOLUTIONARY STAGE OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM, THIS CHAPTER IS DEVOTED TO A DISCUSSION OF IT AS A NEW FEDERALISM SPECIMEN IN THOSE TERMS. AS SUCH, THE SIX ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS AROUND WHICH PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING MODELS SHOW GENERAL CONSENSUS PROVIDE THE BASIC ORGANIZING FRAMEWORK FOR THIS DISCUSSION. THOSE ELEMENTS ARE: (1) PROBLEM CONCEPTION, (2) FASHIONING THE POLICY-MAKING AGENDA, (3) IDENTIFICATION OF THE ISSUES FOR CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE, (4) NATURE OF CONGRESSIONAL DISPOSITION, (5) TYPE OF ACTION PRESCRIBED, AND (6) CONSEQUENCES. IN FACT, THESE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTE THE BASIC THEME OF THIS CHAPTER.

**Problem Conception for Policy-Making Attention**

Policy makers are usually not faced with a clearly defined problem. Rather, all problems, both new and old, have to be identified and formulated in such a way as to make them accessible and attractive to the policy-making process.
(Lindblom, 1968:12-3). There are a number of ways in which a problem can be identified and formulated, but, in contemporary times, most of them are identified either directly or indirectly by the office of the chief executive officer (p. 86-7). Thus, the crime problem which led to the enactment of the Safe Streets Act was no exception to the tradition.

The issue confronting society during the 1960s was the increasing incidence of crime and delinquency. That issue emerged during the 1964 Presidential campaign as a nationwide "problem" that needed the attention and assistance of the federal government ("Anti-crime Program Presented to Congress," 1965). Reports indicate that between 1958 and 1964 crime was increasing at a rate five times as fast as the growth rate of the population (p. 628-29; and U.S. President's Message to Congress, March 8, 1965:1394-7). In spite of this, the Administration and much of the Congress expressed reluctance to involve the federal government in the crime issue (U.S. President's Message to Congress, March 8, 1965, 1394-7). Three reasons were given for this reluctance ("Anticrime Program Presented to Congress, 1965). One of them was related to the belief that a federalized effort against crime would not blend well with the philosophical underpinnings of the Great Society programs of the 1960's. Another one was predicated on the belief that such an effort would be inconsistent with the traditional practice of treating
crime as, essentially, a state and local matter. The third reason for this reluctance was based on the apprehension that the general public might be in opposition to the creation of a national police force (p. 628-9). These three reasons, then, substantially limited the number of role options available to the federal government in responding to the crime issue.

The year of 1965 actually marked the origin of federalism in criminal justice in America. That was the year in which the federal government, for the first time in its history, actually incorporated the problem of crime and delinquency into its domain as a federal responsibility (U.S. President's Message to Congress, March 8, 1965). Emanating from that action were two separate but related courses of action which the federal government undertook in order to more appropriately understand and deal with the crime issue. One of those courses of action involved a comprehensive study of the crime and delinquency situation plaguing Americans. The other one consisted of furnishing federal support to experimentations that possibly could generate new approaches and techniques for dealing with the spreading crime and delinquency (p. 1395-6).

Both courses of action commenced with the President's Message to Congress (March 8, 1965). First, he announced the establishment of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, together with the
fact that he had charged it with responsibility for conducting a comprehensive study of crime and delinquency to determine their nature, causes and conditions, and for recommending ways of improving their prevention and control. The second course of action announced by the President was a proposal for Congress to enact a Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965. The expressed purpose for that request was to make provisions for the creation of a new grant-in-aid program that would provide financial assistance to states and localities to assist them in improving their crime reducing capabilities (p. 1395-6).

While announcing these actions, the President also articulated his philosophical views regarding an appropriate federal role in an anti-crime effort and the concomitant intergovernmental relations. In the (March 8, 1965) Message, the President stated:

This message recognizes that crime is a national problem. That recognition does not carry with it any threat to the basic prerogatives of the state and local governments. It means, rather, that the Federal Government will henceforth take a more meaningful role in meeting the whole spectrum of problems posed by crime. It means that the Federal Government will seek to exercise leadership and assist local authorities in meeting their responsibilities. It means that we will make a national effort to resolve the problem of law enforcement and administration of justice—and to direct attention of the nation to the problem of crime and the steps that must be taken to meet them (p. 1396-97).

The first milestone in the process of problem conception occurred approximately six months subsequent to the
President's (March 8, 1965 Message to Congress. That milestone was characterized by the enactment of the 1965 Law Enforcement Assistance Act. The major thrust of that Act was reflected in its provisions for the development of new approaches and techniques designed to improve practices, resources and capabilities for dealing with crime and delinquency at the state and local levels. It vested within the office of the Attorney General authority to make grants and to enter into contracts with public and private non-profit agencies. The purpose of these grants and contracts was to assist participating agencies in improving the law enforcement and correctional personnel, and increasing the ability of state and local agencies to protect persons and property from lawlessness. These grants and contracts also purported to help instill within society a greater respect for the law. In essence, the 1965 Law Enforcement Assistance Act was a sort of pioneering attempt by the federal government to improve the nation's criminal justice system and to stimulate innovations by funding a variety of experimental--research, training and demonstration--projects (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1970:9).

The second milestone in the problem conception process occurred relatively early in 1967 (President's Commission, 1967). That was the year in which the President's Commission issued its official report on the causes and conditions of crime in America. That report--reflecting some 18 months of
work and involving the efforts of 19 Commissioners, 63 staff
members, 175 consultants and hundreds of advisors—found
crime and delinquency to be essentially "... a social
problem that was interwoven with almost every aspect of Amer­
ican life." It advised that "... efforts to improve the
crime problem would involve improving the quality of life—
the way schools are run, the way cities are planned, the
workers are hired." In effect, the Commission viewed crime
as a concern of every American citizen and institution
(p. v-xi).

In addition, the President's Commission (1967) of­
fered some "... 200 specific recommendations—concrete
steps that it felt could lead to a safer and more just soc­
ociety. These recommendations called for a greatly increased
effort on the part of the federal government, the States,
the counties, the cities, civic organizations, religious in­
stitutions, business groups and individual citizens." Those
recommendations "... also called for basic changes in the
operation of police, schools, prosecutors, employment agen­
cies, defenders, social workers, prisoners, housing author­
ities, probation and parole officers ..." in order to
deal effectively with the crime problem (p. v).

Among its 200 or more recommendations, the Commission
identified the following eight areas in which it believed
federal assistance was urgently needed: (1) state and local
planning; (2) education and training of criminal justice
personnel; (3) surveys and advisory services concerning organization and operation of criminal justice agencies; (4) development of coordinated national information systems; (5) development of a limited number of demonstration programs in agencies of justice; (6) scientific and technological research and development; (7) institutes for research and training personnel; and (8) grant-in-aid for operational innovations (p. 285-88). The Commission also recognized that the prevention and control of crime was basically a state and local matter. However, it urged that the federal government consider making it a national responsibility in order to help bolster state and local capabilities in allaying the crime problem within their jurisdictions. Along with this request, the Commission also stressed that additional resources should be made available to support new approaches for improving all components of the law enforcement and criminal justice system at the federal, state and local levels (President's Commission, 1967). Thus, the principal contribution of this Commission was not to solve the crime problem, but rather to find out what it was.

**Fashioning the Policy-Making Agenda**

As the need for organization, delegation, specialization and leadership has led to the creation of the committee system in the Legislative branch of government, it has
likewise led to heavy dependence upon the chief executive officer for leadership in the policy-making process (Lindblom, 1968). The result of such dependence is that approximately 80 percent of the bills enacted into law originate in the executive branch (p. 86). The specimen of this study followed the traditional pattern.

The crime problem was introduced to the national policy-making agenda by President Johnson on February 6, 1967 (U.S. President's Message to Congress, February 6, 1967). The agenda was fashioned through an Administrative Proposal (or Bill) (HR 5037, S 917) entitled, "Safe Streets and Crime Control Bill of 1967." That Bill reflected the Administration's response to the Commission's report and built on the "creative federal partnership" that was established under the 1965 Law Enforcement Assistance Act (PL 89-197). Its major provisions were that: (1) the federal government would cover 90 percent of the cost for preparing comprehensive law enforcement and criminal justice plans; (2) it would also cover 60 percent of the expenditures for innovations or improvements in public protection, manpower, equipment, operations and facilities, community relations, public education, organization and management with the jurisdictions; (3) personnel compensation could not exceed one third of any action grant; (4) the Attorney General would be authorized to make grants to eligible applicants to cover 50 percent of construction costs of buildings designed to fulfill
a significantly innovative function in the anti-crime effort;
(5) the federal government would make grants for planning
and action to states and localities that conformed to the
following conditions:

-- encompassed a population of 50,000 or more;

-- increased its outlay of expenditures annually
by five percent;

-- filed a comprehensive law enforcement and crim­
inal justice plan or a unit of local government
or a combination thereof, encompassed a popula­
tion of 50,000 or more, and reflected innova­
tions, advanced techniques, and so.

The Administration's Bill also included other major
provisions. In addition to repealing the 1965 Law Enforce­
ment Assistance Act, it authorized the President to appoint
a director to assist the Attorney General in managing these
additional responsibilities. It also proposed the author­
ization of $50 million with which to fund planning, action
and research activities during Fiscal Year 1968 (HR 5037,
S 917).

In his (February 6, 1967) Message to Congress, the
President requested that Congress enact his 1967 Safe Streets
and Crime Control proposal into public law in order to imple­
ment the Commission's recommendations. Again, the President
articulated the intergovernmental implications associated
with his proposal as an effort involving stimulation and
support rather than control and coercion:

The Federal Government must not dominate the
system. It could not if it tried. Our
system of law enforcement is essentially local based upon local initiative generated by energies and controlled by local officials. But the Federal Government must help strengthen the system and encourage the kind of innovation needed to respond to the problem of crime in America (p. 43-7A).

The Administration's agenda for dealing with the crime problem (HR 5037, S 917) actually symbolized another instance of "direct federalism" in grant-in-aid programming. It would have authorized the Attorney General to either make grants to states or by-pass them entirely in establishing direct relationships with local governments; or he could make grants to or contract with a combination of state and local governments at his own discretion toward the end of dealing with the nationwide problem of crime.

Issues for Congressional Debate

Theoretically the policy-making system does not merely formulate policy in a vacuum. Nor does it merely assimilate the exogenous preferences, opinions, wishes and attitudes of its potential beneficiaries and, in turn, design policy to meet those values. Rather, the policy-making system "manufactures" both values and policy, primarily through Congressional debate (Lindblom, 1968:102-3).

As the Administration's Safe Streets and Crime Control proposal was one of the more controversial Bills confronting the Congress during the 1960's, it was the subject of acrimonious debate in both houses of Congress during its
formation. Hearings were conducted by the House during March and April 1967 on HR 5037 (U.S. House Hearings, 1967), and by the Senate on S. 917 during March through July, 1967 (U.S. Senate Hearings, 1967). Some of the debate during those hearings centered around issues pertaining to a desirable administrative structure for the proposed program but most of it focused on the desirability of the block grant approach for financing state and local crime reduction and systems improvement efforts. The following discussion of the hearings and debate, in both Houses of Congress, exemplifies some of the more salient issues debated in connection with this policy during the process of its formation.

**Issues Undergirding House Debate on HR 5037**

Essentially, there were three issues that undergirded debate in connection with HR 5037 in the House of Representatives (U.S. House Hearings, 1967). One of those issues pertained to the role of the states (specifically the role of the Governor) in implementing the anti-crime program. Another issue focused on the proposed 50,000 population limit criteria that must be met in order for jurisdictions to participate in a direct relationship with the federal government under this program. A third issue debated was the requirement for each participating jurisdiction to increase its annual expenditures for criminal justice activities by five percent in order to remain eligible to receive federal
funds under this program.

State governments, under HR 5037, were to be treated essentially the same as their jurisdictions with populations of 50,000 or more. Both state governments, and their jurisdiction—individual or some combination thereof—would be required to prepare and submit a law enforcement and criminal justice plan in order to receive federal funds under this program. There was no requirement for those plans to be comprehensive to such an extent that they would incorporate state and local police, corrections, courts and prosecutors. Furthermore, there was no requirement for the Governors to review, approve or disapprove plans developed and submitted by their local jurisdictions. However, HR 5037 did encourage applicants to include in their plans the entire surrounding metropolitan area (U.S. House Hearings, 1967).

The rationale expressed by the Administration for by-passing the states was twofold (U.S. House Hearings, 1967). First, it reasoned that states' financial contributions to crime and delinquency reduction and control efforts had been less than that of their jurisdictions. Second, it believed that states lacked sufficient experience in the various phases of law enforcement and criminal justice to provide the necessary leadership in this undertaking. The Attorney General's reply to a question regarding the desirability of granting Governors authority to approve or
disapprove applications submitted by their jurisdictions more clearly explains the Administration's position regarding this issue. His response was:

I don't think that would be desirable. I think it would really impair the potential effectiveness of the Act. When you look at their involvement in local law enforcement, you will see that it is almost nil. . . . They don't give money and they have potential. They just establish an office, in fact with two or three people in it, to try to correlate criminal justice information for smaller jurisdictions. But the state doesn't have experience, it doesn't have the people, it does not make the investment in law enforcement and police that local governments make. So they could not contribute. (U.S. Hearings, 1967:65).

Representatives of municipalities shared the views expressed by the Attorney General. They opposed statewide planning and grant-making in law enforcement and criminal justice planning. They believed:

A number of states had restricted their law enforcement activity to the highway patrol and other traffic control work, and rarely do states become deeply involved in urban law enforcement problems. For this reason many states do not have the historical interest, the personnel, the appropriations or the expertise to cope with the complex problem of law enforcement. Perhaps the States should be more deeply concerned but it would be unfortunate if planning so urgently needed for a total attack on crime in our cities was delayed while the States expended their personnel and developed the expertise necessary to deal in the areas in which they have not previously been involved. (U.S. House Hearings, 1967:383).

As the issue of 50,000 population limit criteria was being debated in the House, the Administration gave a two-fold rationale for including that provision in its Bill
The first of them was predicated to the Administration's desire to regulate the number of direct federal-local contacts it would be required to contend with during the duration of the program. The other one was related to its desire to promote and stimulate coordination amongst jurisdictions, and, if possible, consolidate their planning and resources under a joint application submission. Under this arrangement, the federal government would have made grants to approximately 80 percent of the nation's population and 75 percent of its law enforcement personnel (p. 34-35).

The third and final issue debated in the House was the requirement for jurisdictions to increase their annual expenditures by five percent over the amount spent the preceding year. The base year for this provision was to have been 1967. In succeeding years, jurisdictions would have been expected to increase their expenditures for law enforcement and criminal justice activities by five percent in order to remain eligible to receive federal funds under this program. The purpose of this provision was to stimulate greater outlays of expenditures than would otherwise normally be made by states and local governments. In effect, it was to have served the function of "pump-primers," as well as a provider of annual improvement standards (U.S. House Hearings, 1967: 46).
Witnesses representing municipalities opposed this view, arguing that the formula was unrealistic. They reasoned that already nearly one-fifth of the total local government's budgets was used for crime control activities. If they were required to increase their expenditures over and above the amounts spent in preceding years, by a margin of five percent, plus meet the federally required local-matching share, the actual return of federal dollars for each local dollar invested would be substantially less under this program than under the other federally funded programs operating within their jurisdictions. In the opinion of these representatives, this program was more likely to stiffle rather than stimulate innovations. Furthermore, they thought it probably would have had a "splintering effect" on the "area-wide" nature of the plan. As an alternative to this requirement, the municipal representatives suggested that the federal government lower the amount of the non-federal matching requirement, from 40 to 10 percent for action programs and from 50 to 33 percent for construction programs (U.S. House Hearings, 1967: 46).

Issues Undergirding Senate Debate on S. 917

Debate in the Senate also centered around the role of state governments under the Administration's Bill, S 917. Specifically, it focused on the practicality of the 50,000 population criteria as a condition for a jurisdiction to
participate with the federal government in a direct grant-in-aid relationship, and on the feasibility of the five percent improvement standard. Unlike the house debate, the Senate Subcommittee conducting the hearings, extended its inquiry onto some other issues that were not explored during House hearings. These issues included the probable effects of adopting the personnel compensation ceiling, the scope of the Attorney General's authority and the desirability of adopting a block grant approach in funding and administering the proposed crime reduction and control program (U.S. Senate Hearings, 1967).¹

During the hearings on the role of the state government under S. 917, the Senate Subcommittee focused upon three dimensions of this issue. They were: 1) whether or not local jurisdictions should be encouraged to by-pass state agencies in their dealings with the federal government, 2) whether or not Governors should be given veto power over local projects, and 3) whether state and local applications for action grants

¹The issue involving the desirability of a block grant—grant-in-aid approach for allocating funds on a broad program basis, with few or no "strings" attached by the federal government— as an alternative to the direct approach as proposed by the Administration, was explored during hearings on HR 5037. However, that exploration was relatively less involved than the one in the Senate. The block grant exploration in the House, essentially, amounted to an appendix to Congressman Richard Poff's statement, to which there were attached letters from seventeen governors whom Congressman Poff had asked to comment on HR 5037. Of the 17 states responding, seven—Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, Washington, Missouri, and Wyoming—expressed support for the block grant approach (U.S. House Hearings, 1967: 1422-43).
should be made a part of a statewide comprehensive plan. The Administration's position remained much the same as the one expressed during house hearings on H.R. 5037 regarding the first of these three dimensions. That position was that states and local jurisdictions with populations of 50,000 or more would be dealt with by the federal government on an equal basis in planning and applying for funds (House Hearings, 1967:63-6).

With regards to the second (and possibly the third) dimensions of the issue regarding the role of the state and its Governor, the Administration was opposed to the idea of granting state governors veto power over local projects. The rationale for this position was that states lacked experience in law enforcement and had historically contributed limited financial assistance to this function. As argued by the Attorney General, there "... is no real basis for the Governor of a state in the exercise of his functions to say that a particular program is not sound since he has no experience in the field" (U.S. Senate Hearings, 1967:382).

Governors disagreed with the Administration's position on this issue; one Governor expressed the basis of this disagreement in writing to the Subcommittee conducting the hearings. Essentially, their position was that S. 917 should be amended in such a way as to make provisions for a state agency, designated by the Governor of each state, to formulate a comprehensive plan that would embrace the individual
plans developed by all of its jurisdictions. The basis for such a provision, as expressed by this governor, was that "... it would be most unfortunate if local communities were allowed to develop applications that were inconsistent with the statewide plans as presently being developed," (U.S. Senate Hearings, 1967:931).

The Administration opposed the inclusion of a mandatory provision in S. 917 that would require plans developed by local jurisdictions to conform to a statewise comprehensive plan. The reasoning behind its opposition was that police protection was handled mainly by localities and that considerable time and effort would be required to get states ready to deal effectively with law enforcement activities. Conversely, it favored statewide criminal justice planning on the basis that courts and corrections were handled primarily by states. As espoused by the Attorney General:

We hope that each state will make plans that will be comprehensive to all parts of criminal justice in State. But the plan need not include all jurisdictions in it. We think that in most States, the State government has primary responsibility for corrections and for courts. That is where planning should be predominant . . . to require a compulsory State plan involving local law enforcement would create many problems . . . . The place where the State would be the most effective in police areas is in getting standards and providing training opportunities for local police in your smaller jurisdictions—where there is not the opportunity or sufficient manpower to engage in either. I would suspect a lot of police departments have much greater experience in law enforcement work than the State itself does (U.S. Senate Hearings, 1967:367).
The 50,000 population limit was then debated. The Senate subcommittee questioned the ability of local jurisdictions over 50,000 to develop comprehensive plans since they lack experience in courts and correctional activities. Relative to this point the subcommittee chairmen argued:

I would like to see coordinated plans to cover a whole State. The municipalities submit plans to the State authority and let them relate the plans to a state-wide program. I would grant exceptions, certainly, where exceptions could be made by the Attorney General, for example if he found a State was not acting, not interested, not aggressive in trying to submit a plan. I would not deny a municipality or other entity from securing the benefits of this act. But if we would get them coordinated on a state-wide basis as a rule that would be far better. (U.S. Senate Hearings, 1967:365).

The Administration's response to the Senate Subcommittee's view was that in some instances jails, courts and law enforcement agencies were all operated by localities. Where this arrangement existed, planning should address the interrelationships between these components of law enforcement and criminal justice systems. In those situations where comprehensive planning cannot be undertaken, those "... plans that provide for only certain aspects of the process of criminal justice are acceptable" (U.S. Senate Hearings, 1967: 640).

Under S. 917, the Administration wanted states to handle the planning activities for courts and corrections while localities, with populations of over 50,000, handled the planning for law enforcement. It argued that any attempt to
mesh these activities into comprehensive approaches, that would deal with state and local level law enforcement and criminal justice issues would be desired, but not mandatory. Furthermore, Governors should not be granted veto power over plans developed by local cities for action programs. The Administrations, on the other hand, favored an arrangement that would require localities with populations less than 50,000 to work through their states. In this regard, states would provide them with support and technical assistance, as the need arose, to enable them to participate fully in the crime reducing and control program (U.S. Senate Hearings, 1967).

The proposed scope of the Attorney General's authority constituted a second major issue for Senate debate. The Senate subcommittee expressed concern that under S. 917 the Attorney General would be granted substantial "unbridled authority" in approving action plans, granting or withholding funds from applicants, and granting waiver requirements of the Act. Having access to such extensive authority, in dealing directly with local jurisdictions and in making grants to them, would, in effect, be vesting in the office of the Attorney General authority to supervise and even control the operations of police departments throughout the country (U.S. Senate Hearings, 1967:198-500).

The Administration's position regarding the Attorney General's authority differed from that of the Subcommittee.
The former argued that S. 917 reflected a reasonable balance between flexibility and accountability, and that the Bill, ... makes very clear that any exercise of control over local law enforcement would violate the statute. For any Attorney General to attempt to do so would involve an abuse of his authority under the statute. Moreover, as a practical matter, it would be impossible for the Attorney General to try to control the 40,000 different police jurisdictions that function in the United States. These jurisdictions have consistently maintained a strong independence in local law enforcement (U.S. Senate Hearings, 1967: 829).

A third issue debated in the Senate was the restriction on the proposed amount of funds to be used for personnel salaries and compensations under S. 917. The amount set by the Administration for that purpose, for any grantee, was limited to one-third of any action grant awards. The rationale given for this formula was that a restriction on salary would more likely encourage innovations and improvement in law enforcement and criminal justice than if these funds were used primarily for salaries and personnel compensation. Opposing views, advanced by municipalities and other witnesses, stressed that the Administration's view was unrealistic, since already approximately 90 percent of local law enforcement expenditures were used for personnel salaries and wages. These witnesses reasoned that this restriction would inhibit efforts on the part of localities to obtain and retain employees, and may even encourage localities to substitute equipment for essential personnel reform (U.S. Senate Hearings, 1967).
A fourth and final issue of Senate debate was the desirability of block-grant approach for financing the national anti-crime program at the state and local level. The subcommittee's concern was whether or not a block-grant approach to states—with a few or even no "strings" attached and under which funds could be allocated for broad functional purposes—would be a more desirable grant-in-aid approach than the proposed (categorical) approach on a project-by-project basis, programs within states and local communities. The Subcommittee's rationale for the block-grant was that the objectives of the legislation would be more fully realized if the federal funds were apportioned among states on a population basis and then distributed to localities by the states. The Administration's response was contrary to this view, arguing that:

... once the tax funds come into Federal hands, Federal responsibility attaches to see that they are properly utilized. More importantly, there would be no particular advantages in having the funds administered by the States. The major responsibility for law enforcement in this country is handled at the local level. State governments in most States have little involvement in control over or responsibility for local law enforcement. Local jurisdictions would be opposed to states attempting to assume control over the law enforcement operations and the possibility that the states would use control over their law enforcement operations and the possibility that the States would use control of the purse strings for such a purpose is significantly greater than that the Federal Government would do so. Thus, the threat to local autonomy under such a proposal would be considered more serious than the "threat" of Federal control under the bill (U.S. Senate Hearings, 1967:835-37).
Nature of Congressional Disposition of the Crime Problem of the 1960's

The crime problem which rose to national recognition and concern during the 1960's was disposed of by Congress as a national public policy (U.S. Congressional Record, June 6, 1968). That policy actually reflected a revised version of the Administration's proposal (HR 5037, S 914) and was renamed "Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968" (p. 16271-300). The process by which this dispositional action is as follows:

House Action. The judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives issue its report on HR 5037 along with six significant amendments (House Report No. 488, July 17, 1967). The attached amendments were as follows:

1. Local units were required to submit copies of their applications for planning and action grants to the Governor of the state involved;
2. The 50,000 population eligibility standard was deleted;
3. The 5 percent annual improvement formula was dropped;
4. All authority to use Federal funds for direct compensation of law enforcement personnel was dropped;
5. The discretionary authority of the Attorney General was curbed;
6. The "open" appropriation was deleted and funds were only authorized for 1969. (p. 24-47; and U.S. Office of General Council, 1973:1).

HR 5037 was further debated on the floor of the House of Representatives in August, 1967. During those sessions, two amendments were introduced and accepted by the House. One of them was introduced by representative William T. Cahill, which later came to be known as the "Cahill Amendment" (Congressional Record, August 8, 1967). The Cahill Amendment required:

1. The creation of a State planning agency;
2. Requirements that Federal planning and action grants be made to the State planning agency;
3. Allotment of a flat grant of $100,000 to each state and allocation of 75 percent of the annual appropriation to states on a population basis, with the remaining 25 percent left to be used on a discretionary basis by the Attorney General;
4. That at least 50 percent of all federal funds for action programs be "passed through" to localities;
5. The Attorney General to make planning and action grants to local governments in the event states failed to establish SPA's.

The second significant amendment was introduced by Congressman McClory. It made provisions for the establishment of the National Institute on Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice to conduct research and training programs. After a lengthy discussion on August 8, 1967, both the Cahill and the McClory amendments were approved by an overwhelming majority (378-23) (U.S. Congressional Record, August 8, 1967: 21812-61). For all intent and purposes, this action completed the work for the House relative to HR 5037.

**Senate Action.** The Judiciary Committee of the Senate submitted a favorable report on S. 917 to the full Senate on April 29, 1968, after making some significant organizational changes in it (U.S. Senate Report No. 1097, April 29, 1968). Two major modifications were made in the original Safe Streets Bill. They were as follows:

It deleted the provision for the appointment of a Director of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and added a provision for the establishment of a three member bi-partisan Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

Changed the maximum federal share of eligible cost for planning to 80 percent; for action grants to 60 percent; for organized crime, riots and civil disorders prevention and control grants to 75 percent; and for research, education, training and demonstration grants to 100 percent (p. 2-9 & 27-37).

A slightly modified version of the Cahill Amendment was introduced in the Senate by Senator Dirksen (U.S. Congressional Record, May 23, 1968). That amendment required the SPA's to "pass through" a minimum of 40 percent of all federal planning funds and 75 percent of all federal action funds to general units of government or some combination thereof (p. 14751-71). In conjunction with this amendment, Senator
Dirksen presented an appraisal of the different intergovernmental relations as reflected by the Cahill Amendment and the Administration's Bill as the rationale for his amendment. That appraisal was as follows:

There is going to be the so-called law enforcement assistance division, under the Attorney General. . . . [under the Administration Bill] . . . that will look at these plans as they are submitted. The state can submit plans, a locality can submit a plan, but before it goes to the assistance division, it has to go to the Governor to give him a look. But the interesting thing is that the Governor cannot either approve or disapprove. He is just a vegetable, so far as all power is concerned. And that seems rather strange. . . . So through the power of the Federal purse and the mechanism in Title I, we could inadvertently federalize all of law enforcement in America . . . the system is outmoded, and to dump $500 million into the system with its fragmentation and its weaknesses is going to be a waste of the people's money. This has to be planned and the place to plan it is at the State level. That is the reason for this so-called block grant amendment. We still have some flexibility, namely 15 percent, but the emphasis and the focus is upon the State, where it ought to be. We are never going to do a job in this field until we have a captain at the top, in the form of the Governor, and those he appoints, to coordinate the matter for the State because crime may be committed in a spot, but before it gets through its ramifications it may spread over a very considerable area . . . if we are going to do a job it has to be unfragmented, and the one way it can be done is to make certain that this goes from top down and that it goes through the hands of the Governors of the States. . . . We have impaired the Federal-State partnership to the point where now we see that what was creeping federalism is now almost galloping federalism. This is a good place to put the chocks on the wheels before we go much farther down the road. That, then, is the purpose of the block grant on an 85 to 15 basis (U.S. Congressional Record, May 23, 1968:14753).
The Senate approved the Dirksen Amendment on May 23, 1968, by a vote of 48-29. Without the use of a conference Committee, the House of Representatives submitted a resolution some two weeks later agreeing to the Senate's Amendments. (p. 16271-300). On June 19, 1968, President Johnson signed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 into law (U.S. President's Statement Upon Signing the Bill, Together with His Objections to Certain of Its Provisions, June 19, 1968, 981-4).²

In conclusion, the Safe Streets Act of 1968, then, reflects a congressional response to the nationwide social problem of crime and delinquency. As defined by Congress the high incidence of crime was threatening the welfare of the nation and that law enforcement and criminal justice systems needed to be better coordinated, intensified and made more effective at all levels of government. It also found crime to be essentially a local problem that must be dealt with by state and local governments, if it was to be dealt with effectively (p. 197).

Embodied in the Safe Street Act is this congressional-ly declared purpose which is "... to assist state and

²Though the President was displeased with the block grant concept inherent in Title I, 1968 Safe Streets Act, the preponderance of his dissatisfaction was with Title III, which pertained to, among other things, wiretapping and invasion of privacy.
local governments in strengthening and improving law enforce-
ment at every level by national assistance." The Act also
created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)
within the office of the Attorney General to implement the
following threefold purpose of the Act through the states:
1) encourage states and units of local government to prepare
and adopt comprehensive plans based on their evaluation of
state and local problems; 2) authorize grants to states and
units of local governments in order to improve and strengthen
law enforcement; and 3) encourage research and develop direc-
tions toward the improvement of law enforcement and develop-
ment of new methods for the prevention of crime and the detec-
tion of criminals (p. 189-209).

The Safe Streets Act also contains other important pro-
visions for LEAA to implement. It required LEAA to initiate
and implement programs in organized crime and civil disorder.
It established the Institute--National Institute of Law En-
forcement and Criminal Justice--to conduct research that would
stimulate innovations and new developments, and an academic
assistance program to further education among law enforcement
personnel. It also directed LEAA to collect, evaluate, pub-
lish and disseminate pertinent information pertaining to the
progress of law enforcement and criminal justice in the
nation, and it authorized the expenditure of $100,000,000 for
the first two years--that is, for the remainder of fiscal
year 1968 and all of fiscal year 1969. Though substantially
different in style and substance than the Bill proposed by the Administration in 1967, the Safe Streets Act created the nation's first large-scale comprehensive program designed to deal with the crime and delinquency problem (189-209).

**Type of Action Prescribed by the Safe Streets Policy**

Under Title I of the Safe Streets Act the threefold purpose is to be achieved through three different but related levels of action. These three levels of action, in turn, involve an inter-governmental effort, consisting of the federal, state and local governments. With each of these levels of fulfilling responsibility for one of these levels of action, the LEAA program is expected to function in a comprehensive manner in planning, implementing and evaluating effective program aimed at the prevention and control of the spread of crime in each of the 55 participating jurisdictions.

The federal responsibilities of the LEAA program were expected to be relatively major ones. However, by comparison to the ones it fulfilled in other social welfare programs in preceding years, it is decreasing in responsibilities. In fact, its level of responsibility is substantially less than the Administration had proposed for it in its Crime Control and Safe Streets Bill of 1967 (HR 5037 and S. 917). Under Title I, the Department of Justice, through a three member bi-partisan administration and its central and regional office
staff, was required by Congress to ensure that federal funds were wisely and properly spent. In effect, LEAA was responsible for infusing the state's expenditure with leadership and direction. It was expected to encourage and assist state law enforcement and criminal justice planning agencies in planning and implementing effective and innovative programs. This was to be achieved by the establishment of broad program guidelines and through review and approval of comprehensive plans submitted by states for conformance with statutory and administrative standards. If necessary, the federal government could intervene directly or indirectly in behalf of an applicant (Part E, Sec. 510 and 511). Through the Institute—its research unit— and discretionary funding capability, LEAA was mandated by the 90th Congress to generate new approaches for handling criminal activities and improving the operation of the criminal justice system. Through these mechanisms, LEAA was equipped to elevate the state of the art in law enforcement and criminal justice and to generate data and analysis on which to base decisions regarding the distribution of both discretionary and state action grants (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 1968:197-209).

The states are expected to hold a pivotal position in fulfilling its responsibilities under the Safe Streets Act. They are relied upon for planning, coordinating, administrating and innovating programs designed to reduce crime and
improve the criminal justice system within their jurisdictions. In their multi-faceted role, states are expected to establish broadly representative State Planning Agencies (SPA), which in turn would prepare comprehensive plans, review and approve applications for financial assistance submitted by their established planning regions and political subdivisions. They are also expected to distribute planning and action funds to local jurisdictions and provide technical assistance to applicants. The states, then, are expected to perform the catalytic function of bringing together, into a single network, those components of the law enforcement and criminal justice system that were previously isolated from one another. Once together, the SPA's are expected to coordinate, direct and support their efforts in an innovative and comprehensive thrust against crime (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 1968:198-209).

The responsibilities of local jurisdictions under this Act (PL 90-351) are related but somewhat separate from those of the federal and state governments. As such, the local jurisdictions are responsible for actually formulating innovative plans and project proposals for crime prevention and control. These activities are expected to be integrated with those of other localities, regions and multi-jurisdictional units and their state governments. Once in operation, localities are expected to evaluate the impact of the action programs serving their domains (Omnibus Crime Control and

Some of Its Consequences

Though much of the succeeding chapters is devoted to the discussions of the consequences of this specimen, there are three separate but related ones that seem relevant to the discussion in this Chapter and are, therefore, presented here. Their relevancy stems from the fact that the Safe Streets Act of 1968 originated as another categorical grant-in-aid policy designed to respond to the problem of crime that was plaguing the nation during the 1960's (U.S. President's Message to Congress, 1967:43A-47A). However, primarily through floor action in both Houses of Congress, the Bill was changed to a block grant policy. Emerging from this action are the three following consequences of the 1968 Safe Streets Act:

1. It federalized a "social problem" of crime and delinquency (President's Commission, 1967:v-xi) which had traditionally been viewed as a state and local matter and made available substantial financial assistance from the federal government for its reduction and control.

2. It established an experiment in intergovernmental administrative and fiscal relations which, over time, could influence future federal grant-in-aid policy (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1970:18).

3. It shifted the locus of controversy from federal-state and federal-local relations to essentially that of state-local relations (Wright, 1972:49-52). These
consequences, along with others, are more thoroughly elaborated upon in succeeding chapters of this research.
CHAPTER III

ISSUES AND PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE SPECIMEN

Like the 1968 Safe Streets Act, its program has also been characterized by controversy and criticism during every phase of operation. This controversy and criticism has centered essentially around the same issues that underlay Congressional debate during the formation of the original Act. Those issues pertained to roles, responsibilities, performance of state governments in planning and awarding grants, and the desirability of the block grant approach—versus the categorical grant approach—for financing criminal justice programs. Similar issues have undergirded the controversy and criticism relating to the development and operation of the LEAA program.

As counter measures to the mounting criticism and controversy of LEAA, seven significant policy and administrative actions have been undertaken to improve its performance and effectiveness. They included the: (1) passage of the 1970 Omnibus Crime Control Act; (2) 1971 reorganization of LEAA; (3) 1971 Presidential proposal for converting LEAA into a special revenue model for a six-category fiscal foundation for new federalism; (4) establishment of a Criminal Justice and Goals Commission in 1971 and the issuance of its
report in 1973; (5) 1973 resubmission of a revised special revenue sharing proposal; (6) Congressional rejection of the President's second special revenue sharing proposal; and (7) passage of the 1973 Crime Control Act. The object of this Chapter is to present a review of literature on some of the salient issues and problems relating to those actions, along with a conception of LEAA's funding capability during its first five years.

The LEAA program consists of essentially four operational functions (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 1968). They are: (1) comprehensive planning, (2) awarding of block action grants, (3) special supportive programs, and (4) administration. The first two of these four functions are primarily the responsibility of state and local governments, which are managed and operated under the leadership and direction of the 55 participating jurisdictions (or states). The second two functions have nationwide responsibility and are, therefore, managed under the leadership and direction of the national LEAA agency, with the direct assistance of its 10 decentralized regional offices. Though separated conceptually for discussion, these four functions are designed to be interdependent and interlocking in their combined effort

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1The LEAA domain embodies 55 jurisdictions--the 55 states and American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands. In this study, as in the literature, these 55 jurisdictions are referred to as states (PL 90-351).
to promote the establishment and implementation comprehensive of interagency and interjurisdictional programs of crime reducing and system's reform (p. 189-209).

States are statutorily required to establish State Planning Agencies (SPA), and may also designate planning regions, along with Regional Planning Councils (RPC). Under the policy guidance of supervisory boards, the SPAs are required to function as grantees in receiving and distributing LEAA funds for the development and implementation of criminal justice programs. The RPCs, on the other hand, are expected to assist in the process of developing and implementing state plans by identifying local problems, establishing priorities, receiving and expending LEAA funds toward the end of eradicating the problems identified (p. 189-209).

Both SPAs and RPCs are required to involve citizens in decision-making relating to program design and implementation (LEAA Third Annual Report, 1971). Balanced representation would involve representatives from all three components of the criminal justice system (police, courts and corrections), all levels of state and local government and the general public.²

²Though the legislation requires that representation on SPAs and RPCs comprise "law enforcement agencies of the state and units of government within the State," (PL 90-351), the LEAA guidelines specify seven categories from which representation should be drawn in order for representation on decision-making boards to be "balanced" (LEAA Guide for State Planning Agency Grants, 1968). The categories are: (1) state law enforcement agency representation; (2) elected policy
Comprehensive Planning

Assisted by federal planning grants, each state is required to develop a comprehensive criminal justice plan (LEAA Safe Streets, 1971). These plans are expected to embody programs designed to improve all phases of the criminal justice system and give emphasis to "high crime areas." The actual development of state plans is the responsibility of SPAs, with assistance from RPCs, when they exist, or from city and county units of governments in the absence of RPCs. To insure that local citizens are represented on state and regional decision-making boards, each SPA is required to apportion among its jurisdictions planning grants, which amount to 40 percent of each state's planning budget; these grants are to be used, among other things, the stimulation of citizenry involvement in criminal justice decision-making\(^3\) (p. 1-2).

From its inception through fiscal 1973, the LEAA program has been subject to widespread controversy and criticism \(^2\)(Continued)

making or executive representation from units of general government; (3) representation of local law enforcement officials and administrators; (4) representation of each major law enforcement function, policy court and corrections; (5) representation from the area of juvenile delinquency prevention and control; (6) representation of community or citizen interests; and (7) representation that offers reasonable geographical and urban-rural balance and regards for the incidence of crime (p. 8).

\(^3\)This requirement may be waived in instances where local efforts appear to be inconsistent with the development of a comprehensive state plan (LEAA Safe Streets Act, 1971:1-12).
from various vantage points. Among several sources, essentially, seven special interest groups and governmental organizations, have contributed the preponderance of the critical dialogue toward LEAA's planning performance. They are: National League of Cities (NLC), U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCM); Urban Coalition, Inc., National Association of Counties (NACO), International City Management Association (ICMA), Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), and National Governors Conference (NGC). These seven sources, then, constitute the primary references for the discussion of issues, problems and actions relating to LEAA's planning performance. Other sources have also contributed to the barrage of criticism directed toward LEAA and are therefore referred to from time to time in this chapter to complement the major sources, as well as the overall discussion.

The National League of Cities (1969) was among the first of these seven sources to analyze LEAA's planning process. Its study elicited responses from Mayors and city managers and also analyzed 31 state grant applications. On the basis of its data analysis, NLC concluded that:

... The Safe Streets Act, as currently administered by LEAA and most of the states, will fail to achieve Congress' primary goal of controlling crime in the streets of urban high-crime areas. Instead of focusing dollars on critical problems of crime in the streets, local planning funds are being dissipated broadly without regard to need and are being used to finance third levels of bureaucracy as a matter of state administrative convenience. Though the original intent of Congress in accepting the approach of the block grants
to states was to prevent federal bureaucratic control of law enforcement activities and to encourage local planning and innovation, state administrative practices would appear to thwart this objective (p. 1).

To elaborate, NLC expressed concern that: (1) under the regionalized planning structure, the role of cities in the planning process was being diluted; (2) rural areas were not receiving their proportionate share of LEAA funds; (3) cities were not adequately represented on SPAs; and (4) LEAA was not making provisions for policy-making officials of cities to play an effective role in LEAA decision-making (p. 1-28).

In June 1969, the U.S. Conference of Mayors announced its position regarding LEAA's performance. The essence of its position was that the cities' authority was being diluted as a consequence of state control of the LEAA program. It "argued that states . . . [were] . . . simply not equipped to respond to the needs of cities," and that the LEAA program was symbolic of merely a "dismal trickling down of funds for big cities" (Asher, 1969). The Administration's response to this position was that the prevailing LEAA was more desirable than creating "another bureaucracy" (p. A-4).

Third, the Urban Coalition (1969) reported on results of its analysis of the way in which LEAA plans were actually being developed. Based on data obtained from residents, federal officials, Mayors, SPA staff and public document of a sample of 12 states, it reported that: (1) planning was

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4The Urban Coalition is a District of Columbia-based, national focused urban affairs interest group. In its 1969
being done by a small number of criminal justice professionals, with only limited representation from the poor and minority groups; (2) many states were planning separately for each segment of the criminal justice system, rather than in a comprehensive fashion; (3) although the concept of regional planning had been adopted by most states, they had not carefully determined the roles the regional planning councils should play in the planning process; and (4) competent criminal justice planning—especially the kind that integrates crime with other social problems—was spread thinly among the states. As a result, the Urban Coalition recommended that LEAA require future state plans to be submitted in sufficient detail so that many of the noted deficiencies might be corrected (p. 23-37).

Fourth, the National Association of Counties (NACO) announced results of its analysis of the LEAA planning process (1969). After analyzing data obtained from elected officials within urban counties, NACO reported that a substantial number of the respondents were dissatisfied with the relatively lengthy time period required for SPAs to disseminate planning funds to units of county government.

*4* (Continued) and 1970 studies of LEAA it focused on the following 12 states because each of them embraces large urban concentrations: California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Texas (Urban Coalition, 1969 & 1970).
NACO expressed concern about the possibility of undesirable program effects occurring from an over-balanced representation of police on decision-making boards; it also expressed displeasure about the underbalanced representation of local policy-making officials on SPAs. NACO suggested that membership on planning boards be expanded and balanced according to the guidelines (National Association of Counties, April 10, 1969).

Douglas Harman (1970) considered NACO's recommendations to be relatively "mild" compared to its overall findings and the recommendations made by the preceding critical sources. He attributed this to the nature of relationships that exist between counties and proponents of the block grant approach. As a rule, he argues, "counties tend to have better relations with state governments than do cities and under regional planning they often serve as the planning districts" (p. 44).

Fifth, in 1970 the International City Management Association (ICMA) reported in its analysis of LEAAs planning performance. Basing its analysis on data obtained from SPA directors, other chief administrative officials of 859 cities with populations of 25,000 or more, and on a systematic review of 50 state plans, it was found that: (1) Governors had indeed taken the leadership in criminal justice planning, and had played a significant role in establishing 49 SPAs prior to September 1969; (2) attempts were
being made to promote interjurisdictional cooperation, although 58 percent of the respondents noted difficulties in achieving such cooperation; (3) 60 percent of the respondents from cities with populations of 100,000 or more expressed "traditional antagonism" toward state governments, while only 13 percent of those from cities with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 expressed such antagonism; (4) average representation on SPA supervisory boards was 43 percent from local governments, 35 percent from state governments and the remainder came as representatives of the general public; and (5) as the composition of RPC and supervisory boards was under-represented by elected officials and over-represented by police; as a result the latter tended to dominate grant-in-aid decision-making. Therefore, ICMA concluded that, although city officials are still expected to play a significant role in crime reduction programs, the grant-in-aid power for such was vested with state governments (p. 1-6).

Six, the Urban Coalition released the results of Part Two of its "Law and Disorder" study (1970). On basis of data obtained from the same sample used in its 1969 study, it found that: (1) those cities not specifically designated as planning regions had been denied funds by SPA's for planning and enhancing their representation in regional planning processes; (2) in some cities police chiefs, prosecutors, and other criminal justice officials served on regional
planning boards and lobbied directly for LEAA funds from SPAs without the cities' consent; (3) frequently, both state and regional plans failed to reflect the availability of other community resources, the nature of action to be performed, or the extent to which actions under these plans could be expected to reduce crime and stimulate reform; (4) some state plans were quite detailed, which preclude cities from including their priorities in them, while others were so vague and general that almost any kind of jurisdictional plan could be included in them once they had been funded by LEAA. The Urban Coalition concluded that these deficiencies were the result of limited leadership within the program, inadequate LEAA and SPA guidelines and insufficient participation by representatives of cities. This latter was attributed to the limited role designated for cities by SPAs, together with the relatively low priority ranking given this program by the cities. The Urban Coalition, therefore, recommended that cities begin to exercise a more aggressive role in administering the LEAA program, in order to preclude a recurrence of such noted deficiencies in the future (p. 5-12).

Seventh, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) released the results of its evaluation of LEAA's development and planning (1970). Focusing primarily on intergovernmental problems and issues among 50 states, ACIR found that: (1) the average SPA staff size was 89.3; (2) average representation on SPA supervisory boards varied
widely from 12 to 43 members, for a national average of 23 members, and with no significant correlation between the number of board members and the crime rate surrounding them; (3) supervisory boards had not embraced balanced representation from all categories specified by the guidelines; (4) first year action plans had placed disproportionately higher emphasis on law enforcement programs than on court and corrections programs, but 1970 plans showed a more proportionate distribution of program emphasis; (5) forty-five states had selected existing regions as criminal justice planning regions, while the remainder had created new ones for that purpose. ACIR made four recommendations for correcting noted deficiencies in LEAA's planning capability. They were that: (1) no change should be made in the guidelines pertaining to representation on boards nor in composition of supervisory boards; (2) regional systems should be retained and strengthened; (3) future state plans should be required to reflect allocations of an "adequate share" of their funds to "high crime areas" as a condition for receiving LEAA approval; and (4) future state plans should give increased attention to improving all components of the criminal justice system rather than just some of them (p. 20-63).

Reflecting on the results of several of these studies, Goulden (1970) made this observation:

The result is that reform of the criminal justice system has become the responsibility of persons with loyalties to the existing system.
Few outside voices are present to suggest fundamental changes in the way things are done. Cop rule does not contribute to developing a meaningful comprehensive plan, but it does insure that rural counties and hamlets enjoy disproportionate access to the police pork barrels (p. 425-6).

Finally, the Governors offer their response to this critical dialogue. Their assessment of LEAA's performance differs considerably from that presented in preceding studies. Its response is, in part, related to the increase in influence that had accrued to it during the formation of the 1968 Safe Streets Act. As expressed in a 1967 Wall Street Journal article:

The National Governors Conference Office of Federal-State Relations—to use the lobby's formal name—has scored several Capitol Hill successes since opening its doors just six months ago. The biggest triumph came early in August when the House altered President Johnson's anti-crime to give the state an important say in the use of Federal money to train city police (Large, September 1, 1967).

On gaining this intergovernmental "victory," and the concomitant increase in influence in national policy-making, the Governors have since been devoting substantial effort to the administration of the LEAA program and to helping other state governments strengthen their programs. They have also sought to protect SPAs from their critics, minimize federal control over state and local criminal justice matters and preclude the subjugation of state discretion under the LEAA program (National Governors Conference, February 17, 1969).
In response to this criticism the 91st Congress instituted in the 1970 Crime Control Act several provisions designed to reduce the criticism directed at the LEAA program and for enhancing its overall effectiveness. Among those provisions, the following three for planning specified that: (1) cities be represented on both regional planning boards and supervisory boards; (2) planning funds be shared with "major cities and counties" to help them develop input for state plans; (3) state plans indicate that "adequate assistance" will be given to areas with "high crime incidence and high law enforcement activity" (p. 1881-2).

The 1971 reorganization of the national LEAA agency was intended to complement the new provisions of the 1970 Crime Control Act in enhancing LEAA's efficiency and effectiveness (LEAA Third Annual Report, 1971). By the end of fiscal 1971, the agency's operational activities had been decentralized among 10 regional offices that corresponded with the 10 Federal Council Districts. These 10 offices had been given responsibility for assisting states in the development of state spending plans and for approving those plans once submitted (p. 10-13). The essence of this decentralized

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5 Headquarters for both the Federal Council Districts and 10 LEAA regional offices are as follows: I-Boston, II-New York, III-Washington, D.C., IV-Atlanta, V-Chicago, VI-O Dallas, VII-Kansas, VIII-Denver, IX-San Francisco, and X-Seattle. Together these ten Regions serve all 55 participating jurisdictions.
structure, from a planning perspective, was to place greater emphasis on the planning process than on the plans themselves (Turner, 1973:455-7).

In conjunction with the policy amendments and administrative reorganization, the Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973) introduced a proposal to increase LEAA's effectiveness in anti-crime and system's reform efforts. It offered the following recommendations for planning:

. . . that SPAs develop by 1978 a general system of multiyear planning that takes into account all funds directed to crime control activities within the state (p. 47).

. . . that all major cities and counties establish criminal justice coordinating councils under the leadership of local executives (p. 50).

. . . that at least one third of the membership of state and local planning agency supervisory boards and councils be from officials of non-criminal justice agencies and from private citizens (p. 50).

. . . that criminal justice planning agencies request direct written communication from operating agencies to assist them in defining the jurisdiction's objectives, needs, problems, and priorities. Temporary exchanges of personnel between criminal justice planning agencies and operating agencies should be undertaken on a regular basis (p. 51).

In concert with these policy and administrative actions, the President announced his proposals for converting LEAA into special revenue sharing (U.S. President's Messages to Congress, March 2, 1971:412-3, and March 14, 1973:30A-1A). As the 92nd took no action on the President's 1971 proposal, a revised version of that proposal was drafted and resubmitted
before the 93rd Congress a few months prior to the June 30, 1973 expiration date of the original Safe Streets Act (U.S. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1973:359). During the re-drafting process of the revised proposal, several planning issues were introduced and discussed among all levels of the federal system of government (Turner, 1973). Those issues focused primarily on two separate but related dimensions of the comprehensive planning process--separate funding for planning and representation in LEAA decision-making. The issue of separate funding for planning emerged as a proposal from the three levels of state government. It requested that planning funds to be awarded to SPAs in specified block grants rather than in undifferentiated special revenue sharing grants. The Administration initially opposed this proposal on grounds that it was inconsistent with the philosophy of "new federalism," which considers decisions pertaining to state and local expenditures to be essentially a state and local responsibility, thereby making a federal requirement for such a purpose virtually unnecessary. However, the Administration's position changed after learning that state and local units of governments would withhold their support on the special revenue sharing proposal pending the inclusion of such a provision in its Bill. Accordingly, the Administration "capitulated to expediency" and included in its Bill provisions for separate planning grants for SPAs (p. 457-9).
Issues pertaining to planning-board representation were as follows. (1) Several special interest groups wanted SPA guidelines to be included in the Bill; (2) NACO complained about the disproportionately high number of criminal justice specialists serving on LEAA planning boards, compared to elected officials, and therefore, argued for a legislative provision that would enable elected officials to constitute 50 percent of the total composition of criminal justice decision-making boards; (3) members of the Judiciary wanted their representatives on these boards to be selected by "responsible judiciary leadership" rather than by Governors; (4) Police complained that they were under-represented on basis of the proportion of LEAA funds allocated for law enforcement programs; (5) Representatives of the Congressional Black Caucus expressed concern about the under-representativeness of Black Americans and other minorities on these boards. The Administration acceded only to NACO's proposal, thereby including in the Bill a provision for elected officials to constitute 50 percent of LEAA planning board representation (p. 459).

Provisions under the 1973 Crime Control Act were intended to further improve the performance of LEAA. These provisions required that: (1) minimal state planning grants be increased from $100,000 to $200,000 per year, and that these grants also be awarded to interstate metropolitan regional planning boards; (2) future comprehensive plans be
more specific, and to include comprehensive programs for juvenile justice, as well as other treatment programs for narcotics and alcoholism in correctional facilities; (3) SPAs permit jurisdictions with populations of 250,000 or more to include in state plans comprehensive plans for their entire domains, instead of the traditional project-by-project approach; (4) funding incentives be awarded to local jurisdictions for coordinating and consolidating their program activities; and (4) LEAA approve or reject state plans within 90 days after their submission.

Block Action Grants for Program Implementation

The term "block action grant" refers to a broad purpose grant awarded by the federal government to states for financing programs designed to reduce crime and reform the nation's criminal justice system (LEAA Third Annual Report, 1971). They are referred to as "block" because they are awarded in "lump sums" for broad program purposes, with limited federal control over their use. They are called "action" because they are intended to stimulate actions designed to reduce crime and reform the criminal justice system as specified by Part C of the basic Safe Streets Act (p. 4).

The concept of block action grant is not new in American Federalism. It was first introduced for policy consideration by the Hoover Commission in 1949. That Commission recommended that a block grant policy, embracing broad
functional categories, be instituted as a means of channeling federal funds to states and localities for such programs as highways, public health and education. The basis for that recommendation was that such a policy could possibly reduce the tendency toward increased fragmentation in the categorical grant system. That recommendation was not implemented, however.

In 1955, the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations reconsidered the block grant concept as a possible way of making available to state and localities lump sums of federal money with which to finance state and local programs of national significance. After a careful review of the concept, it was again rejected by CIR on grounds that there was no visible way of insuring that federal funds under it would be used for significant needs and for pursuing national goals. As a result, it recommended the retention of the categorical grant-in-aid system (p. 121).

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations reviewed the categorical system in 1967. It found system to be complex, inflexible, fragmented and in need of reform. As a remedy to this situation, ACIR recommended that some kind of "new federal mix" was needed to help consolidate the categorical grant system, rather than abandoning it. The block grant approach was, therefore, recommended as an approach for helping to manage the proliferation of categorical grants (p. xxi).
The actualization of a block grant policy in American Federalism occurred with the passage of the 1968 Safe Streets Act (Murphy, 1970). Originating as another instance of direct federalism or a categorical grant, the Administration's "Safe Streets and Crime Control" proposal was rewritten into a block grant policy by the 90th Congress, along with significant input from the Governors (p. 309). Its primary goals are to simplify intergovernmental relations—"reduce federal dominance" over state and local affairs—and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness in financing state and local programs. It is significant for observation at this time because it is favored by both the present Administration, Congress, and a large portion of society. It may, therefore, influence future patterns in intergovernmental relations in other grant fields (Harman, 1970:141).

Under LEAA, block action grants are awarded to states for implementing criminal justice programs as specified in written state plans. These grants are awarded under an interdependent process involving state's submission and LEAA approval of a comprehensive plan. Grants are, then, awarded directly to states, which, in turn, apportion them as subgrants among their cities, counties and other eligible recipients.

Fifteen percent of the total action grant may be used by LEAA as discretionary grants to finance projects that focus on "special criminal justice problem areas" and other special
experiments with national implications. The federal-state matching formula for most grants is 75-25 respectively; it is 50-50 for construction projects; and the federal share for corrections can be as high as 75 percent. Beginning with fiscal 1972, the amount to be "passed through" to localities was to be in direct proportion to the amount spent by local jurisdictions for programs of law enforcement, court reform and corrections, rather than the initial requirement of 75 percent of all action grants. Criminal justice programs funded by these grants are now and have been in the past, accounted for both by LEAA and SPAs according to the following 12 categories: (1) law enforcement, (2) detection and apprehension of criminals, (3) riot and civil disorder control, (4) construction, (5) organized crime, (6) correction and rehabilitation, (7) prevention and diversion, (8) juvenile delinquency, (9) systems development, (10) community relations, (11) improvement of the judicial system, and (12) research and development. Each of these categories is in some way associated with the crime and delinquency problem and the nation's criminal justice system (LEAA Third Annual Report, 1971:4; and 267-8).

Like the LEAA planning function, the block action grant function has also been the subject of widespread criticism during its first five years of operation. The International City Management Association (1969) was among the first to examine LEAA's block action grant program. It reported that cities with populations of 250,000 or under strongly supported
the block action grant on grounds that it was likely to be more responsive to their needs than the categorical system had been; nonetheless, they speculated that, under the block grant, the larger cities would probably continue to receive disproportionately more of the federal funds. Conversely, cities with populations over 250,000 expressed comparatively less enthusiasm for the block grant, because they believe states tend to favor smaller units of government and would, thereby, allocate disproportionately more money to them, than they would otherwise receive under the pre-existing categorical system. The ICMA study concluded that by virtue of competitive practices under the block action grant, it was steadily succeeding in shifting the locus of controversy and conflict away from the federal level to states (p. 10-11 and Wright, 1972:52).

The Urban Coalition's (1970) study represented a second analysis of LEAA block action grant function. It reported that: (1) action programs embodied relatively insignificant emphasis on reform; (2) expenditures for law enforcement programs were being spent for traditional practices rather than for innovations; (4) of the small percentage of action funds allocated to courts most of it was actually being used to conduct studies of existing procedures and for developing prosecutor and defense resources; (5) only seven percent of action grants was allocated for corrections programs, even though there existed substantial evidence suggesting the need
for increased expenditure in this area; and (6) only six percent of action funds went for juvenile delinquency prevention and rehabilitation and two percent for rehabilitation of narcotic offenders. As a result, the Urban Coalition Coalition recommended that expenditures for corrections be increased, and that linkages be established between correctional facilities and public, private and community groups possessing education, job training, counseling and other supportive resources (p. 13-5).

As viewed by Goulden (1970) the block action grant actually represented a viable, unrestricted fiscal resource for police officials. The premise for this assertion relates to the prevailing practice of giving disproportionately more emphasis to law enforcement programs than to programs for courts and corrections. He states that:

In the name of 'law and order,' LEAA . . . [was] . . . providing local police with sophisticated 'crime prevention' hardware and with techniques developed by the same specialists who put men on the moon. The purpose . . . [was] . . . to curb robberies, burglaries and violent street crimes. The results, however, enables police to keep citizens--innocent and guilty--under electronic and photographic surveillance while they are shopping, walking public streets, driving automobiles and visiting both public and private buildings (p. 520).

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations reported the results of a fourth analysis of the block action grant in September, 1970. ACIR differed with the preponderance of criticism regarding the states' inability to handle
money and their lack of interest in crime problems of the large cities. Instead, ACIR argued that states had indeed been both concerned about the crime problem within their jurisdictions and also equipped to handle the new grant-in-aid responsibility that was thrust upon them by Title I of the 1968 Safe Streets Act. Evidence of their readiness and concern had been demonstrated by the rapidity with which the LEAA program became operational after passage of its enabling legislation. The Act had required all states to establish SPAs within six months subsequent to its passage in order to develop comprehensive plans, receive block grants and disburse subgrants. Within the specified time period, every state had succeeded in forming SPAs. On basis of this performance, ACIR recommended the retention of the block action grant as a significant policy for achieving interagency and interjurisdictional cooperation in dealing with the crime problem within states and local communities. In doing so, ACIR was cognizant of many of the deficiencies in the block grant as noted in preceding studies, but it urged that "states make further improvements in their operations under it" (p. 57-67).

In the Crime Control Act (1970), Congress attempted to reduce basis for criticism of the block grant. It added to the basic Act six provisions that provided for: (1) establishing community-based delinquency prevention programs and Criminal Justice Coordinating Councils for units of local
government, with populations over 250,000; (2) raising the federal share on block action and discretionary grant from 60 to 75 percent effective 1973; (3) no more than one third of any action to be used for salaries of policemen, but that more than one third of such grants could be used for salaries of other personnel involved in training--to include research, demonstrations and other short term projects; (4) reallocation of unexpended action funds; (5) a new grant program for corrections, with particular emphasis on community-based programs, as well as correctional facilities; and (6) the amount to be passed through to localities to be in direct proportion to the amount spent on law enforcement, corrections and court programs. The expressed purpose of these provisions was to improve the performance of LEAA's block action grant function (Omnibus Crime Control Act, 1970:1881-92).

But the criticism of the block grant continued even after passage of the 1970 Crime Control Act. Vorenburg (1972), for instance was one of the critics who posited that funds under the block action grant had been used primarily to maintain the "status quo." He attributed this deficiency to the premise on which LEAA had been established. That premise was to award lump sums of federal funds to states and permit them to determine how these funds should be apportioned among their localities. However, the state agencies responsible for distributing the funds have been "controlled by old-line representatives of state and local police
departments, courts, prosecutors, and correctional agencies that [in and of themselves] need to be changed" (p. 67).

The Lawyers' Committee on Civil Rights Under Law (1973) reported on the results of its study of the implementation of the LEAA block grant. Based on data obtained from the same 12-state sample, used in both the 1969 and 1970 Urban Coalition studies, and by focusing on the rights of minorities and the poor, the Lawyers' Committee reported the following findings and recommendations. It found that discretionary funds had been used for such things as "communication equipment, information and intelligence systems, helicopters, night vision equipment, new training facilities, crime labs and even night sticks, helmets and street lighting." While acknowledging the importance of these items of equipment for efficiently and effectively operated police departments, the Lawyers' Committee reasoned that these things are basic items of equipment that ought to be purchased with state and local funds, since LEAA funds are appropriated for innovations and reform. Of course, it found some exceptions to this pattern. For instance, there were some states that were actually using LEAA funds for highly innovative programs, such as community treatment facilities for youth, police community relations, court reform and so on. However, such innovations had been limited in number and scale compared to equipment programs and, in effect, represented a relatively small return for an investment of nearly two billion dollars.
The study concluded that, after five years of operation, a substantial portion of LEAA funds had gone for "traditional" criminal justice activities, with only a few of them going for experiments in reforms (p. 7-11).

In effect, then, critics of the block grant believed its primary purpose was "to subsidize racial discrimination, to finance misdirected spending and to keep money away from where the need is" (Frank, 1972:181).

Widespread criticism notwithstanding, the block action grant constituted the basic model for both the 1971 and 1973 Presidential special revenue sharing proposals (U.S. President's Messages to Congress, March 2, 1971:412-3 and 1973: 30A-1A). The essence of those proposals was a request for Congress to reduce a federal control over and remove most federal requirements imposed on grant recipients, thereby converting LEAA into special revenue sharing. As such, LEAA was to represent the "forerunner" for the remaining five of the following six categories of national interest included in the President's 1971 proposal. These categories were education, urban community development, rural community development, transportation, manpower training and law enforcement (p. 412).

Though retaining its original focus and philosophy, the President's 1973 revised special revenue sharing proposal included only four of the original six national interest categories (U.S. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1973).
Both transportation and rural community development were to have been assigned to other legislative proposals, leaving within the 1973 proposal, the categories of education, urban community development, manpower training and the expanded category of "law enforcement and criminal justice" (p. 222-3). The expressed aim of the President's proposals was to increase LEAA's effectiveness in the war on crime by increasing both the resources of the state and local law enforcement judicial agencies as well as their freedom to use these resources at their disposal (U.S. President's Message to Congress, March 2, 1971).

During hearings on the President's proposal, the 93rd Congress acknowledged that some conceptual similarity existed between LEAA and special revenue sharing, as reflected by their capacity to award lump sum grants to states along with the authority and discretion for using them. But Congress questioned whether the President's proposal really represented any substantive change since already LEAA was moving in the direction of heightened power and discretion for states in grant-in-aid decision-making (Law Enforcement: $3.25 Billion Through FY 1976, 1973). This unanswered question, together with noted deficiencies in LEAA's performance, persuaded Congress to again reject the special revenue sharing proposal, and to simultaneously reaffirm its commitment to the block grant model. Its reaffirmation was exemplified by the passage of the Crime Control Act (1973) which extended LEAA
through 1976, substantially increased its budget, and instituted within the original Act two provisions for alleviating the basis for future criticism of the block action grant. These latter provisions allowed for: (1) easing the financial burden for localities with limited fiscal resources by reducing the matching share requirement from 25 to 10 percent, and (2) giving LEAA authority to award discretionary grants to private organizations for criminal justice purposes—"in addition to states and localities" (p. 359-60). In effect, the passage of the 1973 Crime Control Act (PL 93-83) gave states another opportunity to demonstrate their capability for effectively utilizing its grant-in-aid power and discretion in pursuit of the national criminal justice goals.

Supportive Functions

Both the President's Commission (1967) and the 90th Congress recognized the shortage of available knowledge and expertise in this country concerning the most effective ways of reducing crime and reforming the criminal justice system. In an attempt to remedy this deficiency, the 90th Congress created within the LEAA agency some special supportive functions to help "elevate the state of the art" in the criminal justice field. These supportive functions included: (1) the Law Enforcement Education Program (LEEP); (2) National Institute of Criminal Justice; (3) Special Programs including statistics, technical assistance and so on. The purpose of LEEP is to award funds to colleges and universities to be
used as loans and grants for college level education by persons pursuing criminal justice careers (LEAA Safe Streets, 1971). The Institute--National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice--on the other hand, is required to perform a research function for LEAA by supporting research, training and experimental projects around the country that exemplify the potential for producing new knowledge and advanced techniques in designing and implementing effective criminal justice programs. Finally, other special supportive functions are jointly required to handle such tasks as collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information and statistics on crime and criminal justice and to provide technical assistance in improving state and local criminal justice capabilities. These supportive functions are operated and managed by the national LEAA offices (p. 2-3).

Comparatively less criticism has been directed toward the supportive functions than toward the other three operational functions of LEAA. This is perhaps due, in part, to their relatively short-term and low-visibility nature, and, in part, to their relatively low rate of productivity over the years. The Lawyers' Committee on Civil Rights Under Law (1973) claimed that LEAA had devoted insufficient "attention to research efforts and to developing new tools for combatting crime or for measuring or understanding the crime problem." It further claimed that until recently these functions had operated as an isolated adjunct of the overall
program. It further claimed that:

It's research findings have not been relied upon as guides for federal or state programs. Action grants have been given for programs that are under review by the institute or that the institute has shown to be of dubious value. The results of the institute often are not distributed and most state planning officials are unaware of the institute's work much less guided by it. More importantly, Institute research has come up with effective ways for improving the manner in which the agencies of the criminal justice system execute responsibilities (p. 8).

Prior to 1971, the supportive functions had been concerned primarily with developing sophisticated "prototype systems" for electronic analysis and retrieval of criminal histories and other equipment for establishing and maintaining surveillance over various kinds of suspicious human behavior (Turner, 1973). Beginning in fiscal 1973, the emphasis of that function was shifted in the direction of: (1) assisting the national agency in overall planning in criminal justice; (2) performing the "catalytic" function of retrieving pertinent information for improving program operation; and (3) evaluating innovative LEAA programs and disseminating those results to other participating agencies (p. 452).

The Crime Control Act (1973) also added three provisions to the basic Safe Streets Act for the purpose of enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the supportive function. They charged the Institute with responsibility for (1) conducting a detailed survey within the next three years of criminal justice personnel needs and developing guidelines for LEAA education, training and manpower programs; and (2)
evaluating LEAA programs. They also upgraded LEEP by increasing student loans to $2,200 per academic year and inservice-training grants to $250 per quarter or $400 per semester. Finally, these provisions required confidentiality and protection of civil liberties in statistics, research information and criminal histories. Congress intended for these provisions to increase the capability of the LEAA program in helping state and local agencies improve their capabilities in efforts of crime reduction and reforms in criminal justice (LEAA Fifth Annual Report, 1973:3).

LEAA Administration

From its inception through 1973, LEAA's administrative structure has been unique in the federal government. The original Safe Streets Act prescribed that LEAA was to be headed by a three-member administration (or troika). No more than two of the members could belong to the same political party, and all three of them were required to act unanimously on administrative and policy matters.

Congress charged the LEAA administration with responsibility for providing the program with leadership and direction in order for its programs to pursue comprehensively the national goals. To assist LEAA in fulfilling that responsibility, Congress vested in the troika, the above mentioned supportive functions, plus authority for reviewing and approving state plans (p. 189-209). These functions,
together with Title IV of the pre-existing Civil Rights Act of 1964—denouncing discrimination under federally funded programs—gave LEAA the requisite authority to administer an effective program.

Like the other three operational functions of LEAA, its administrative function has also been the subject of critical review and analysis. The Urban Coalition (1970) presented results of one of the earlier analyses of LEAA's administration. It showed that LEAA had "provided little leadership in establishing priorities, the proper structuring of regional and local planning mechanisms or the development of sound action programs," nor had it established a clearinghouse for sharing pertinent information with program participants. The lack of leadership had resulted in "confusion" among states and localities as to which of LEAA's provisions were mandatory or optional, or whether certain private, as well as public agencies, were also eligible to receive LEAA funds; it had also resulted in gross overlapping and duplication of program efforts within jurisdictions. Thus, the Urban Coalition recommended that LEAA: (1) begin immediately to provide technical assistance in planning and program development to states and localities; (2) initiate the statutory provision for reviewing and approving funding plans; (3) develop some valid and reliable evaluation procedures; and (4) establish guidelines by which programs could be designed and implemented (p. 7-17).
As the troika structure had been established to prevent LEAA from forming a national police force (or in Samuel Yette's (1972) terms, a "police state" (p. 290)) that structure was criticized as an obstacle to real progress. In the interest of basic management capabilities that would facilitate clarity in administrative responsibilities and expeditious decision-making within LEAA, ACIR recommended that the basic Act be amended to create a position for a single administrator. That administrator would be one of the three existing members of LEAA who, in turn, would be appointed by the President and would act as Director of the agency, under the authority of the Attorney General (p. 52-55).

The Crime Control Act (1970) eliminated the requirement of unanimity which allowed a single administrator act unilaterally on most administrative and policy matters. But, it required concurrence of at least one of the other associates in order for the administrator to award grants to states and localities (p. 1887-9). This amendment, together with the 1971 reorganization, represented policy and administrative actions designed to reduce noted ambiguity within the administration of LEAA (LEAA Third Annual Report, 1971:10-14).

Shortly after the passage of the 1970 Act, the results of analyses of LEAA's administration were reported by the House Government Operations Committee (HGOC), Council for Economic Development (CED), and Lawyers' Committee on Civil
Rights Under Law (Lawyers' Committee). In May, 1973, for instance, HGOC reported that the LEAA program had been characterized by:

... inefficiency, waste, maladministration, and in some cases, corruption. They [LEAA programs] have had no visible impact on the incidence of crime in the United States. Moreover, state and local governments have not received meaningful leadership or direction from LEAA to enable them to find new ways to reduce crime and improve operations of the system of criminal justice (p. 257).

Similar results were reported by the Council on Economic Development (1972). CED stated that LEAA had not been:

... well designed and its programs have been poorly administered. One mistake was to place LEAA under the triumvirate that could act only unanimously, leaving differences unresolved and vacancies unfilled until corrective action was enacted. Another mistake, even more damaging, was to channel most local aid through state governments, despite the lack of state agencies qualified to manage the distribution. Most states allocated much of the money to jurisdictions with relatively few problems and for indefensible uses, while central cities with greatest need received proportionately less. Most of the money appropriated was never spent (p. 64).

CED further claimed that LEAA had been "remiss in failure to define objectives and goals, to prescribe priorities, to enforce standards and to audit performance." Compounding these deficiencies is the fact that the "crime rates have not fallen; they have risen alarmingly, continuously in urban, suburban and rural areas." CED, therefore, recommended that LEAA be terminated and a "Federal Authority to Ensure Criminal Justice" be instituted in its place. It suggested that
extensive statutory and budgetary authority be given the
new "Federal Authority" so that the anticrime program could
more effectively pursue the national criminal justice goal
(p. 64-74).

Finally, the Lawyers' Committee on Civil Rights Under
Law (1973) reported that LEAA had "failed to exercise lead­
ership" in accordance with its statutory requirements. Aside
from devoting insufficient attention to its research and
training requirements, it had also "failed to pay adequate
attention to its civil rights obligation," even though the
"criminal justice system of all public agencies is the sys­
tem that deals most directly and most harshly with the poor
and minorities." Further, it noted that LEAA had actually
become a fiscal relief program rather than an agency to stim­
ulate innovations and reforms as mandated by the Act. As
a consequence, it had succeeded merely in reinforcing defic­
iencies within the criminal justice system through expend­
itutes for prevailing "material needs" rather than for exper­
iments in reform. In the interest of being objective and
giving credit where it was due, the Lawyers' Committee ascer­
tained that many of the noted deficiencies may have been due
to inherent shortcomings of the basic Safe Streets Act
itself. It made special note of the ambiguous language per­
taining to law enforcement, criminal justice, and of its per­
formance standards. In effect, the Lawyers' Committee felt
that Congress had given the Justice Department billions of
dollars to spend as it chose.

Therefore, the Lawyers' Committee recommended that: (1) the program be restructured according to the original concept with all levels of governments jointly pursuing the national criminal justice goals, (2) it cease the practice of distributing funds merely as budgetary relief for states and localities, and (3) it begin to concentrate on restructuring and upgrading the criminal justice system according to Congressionally defined standards (p. 7-11).

Current perspectives on the state of crime and criminal justice, as reported in the preceding three reports, are consistent with others in the literature. For instance, Vonerberg (1972) believes the crime problem is "far worse for the country than it was five years ago, and [that] our system of criminal justice . . . seems less capable of coping with it" (p. 63). Nearly one year later, Costin et al. (1973) continued to view the criminal justice system as being fraught with serious problems, which emphasized law enforcement as the principal means of social control for the underprivileged. Complementing these views, NASW (1973) contends that "the process of taking citizens into the system is so discriminatory that it guarantees gross over-representation of Blacks, members of other minority groups and the poor," even though behavior that violates the law probably permeates the entire social structure (p. 31-6). Social work has therefore selected criminal justice reform as one of its focal concerns for the 1970 decade.
The problem of an increasing rate of crime has been recognized and reported by the Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973). This phenomenon was especially evident in suburbia and rural areas and was readily apparent among five of the more serious crimes—homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, robbery, and burglary. As a result, this Commission recommended that for the next ten years, LEAA should concentrate its attention on reducing the incidence of these five target crimes by 50 percent. It also suggested the following areas for priority action in reducing these five target crimes: (1) prevention and rehabilitation of juvenile delinquency, (2) delivery of social services, (3) prompt determination of guilt or innocence under the judiciary system, and (4) citizen participation. The essence of this six volume report is for LEAA to shift the emphasis away from efforts directed primarily at strengthening the criminal justice system to those of improving the quality of life through community action, social service delivery and other reform approaches. In so doing the federal government should be actively involved in setting and enforcing the standards and goals, by which states and localities may design and implement programs to achieve them (6 Vol., 1973).

In contrast to the philosophical stance introduced by the Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and goals, the President's special revenue sharing proposal embodied a
request for Congress to: (1) eliminate the requirement for state and local governments to contribute a matching share in order to receive special revenue sharing funds; (2) eliminate the requirement for state and local governments to specify that the federal funds would not be used to displace their own spending; (3) eliminate the requirement for prior approval by the federal government in order to receive federal funds; (4) eliminate the requirement for a portion of block action funds to be spent on correction programs; and (5) extend pre-existing civil rights protection prescribed, by Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, to the special revenue sharing program (U.S. President's Messages to Congress, March 2, 1971:412-3 and March 14, 1973:30A-1A). The passage of special revenue sharing, as proposed, would have meant not only a creation of a grant-in-aid foundation, for one of six categories of new federalism, but also elimination of existing requirements for prior federal approval in awarding money to state and local communities.

During the legislative process relating to special revenue sharing, Congress carefully examined the desirability of relaxing the federal role in LEAA in face of the dominate theme (of "lack of leadership") that permeated the criticism of LEAA. On concluding that conversion of LEAA to special revenue sharing would merely represent a name-change only, the 93rd Congress again rejected that proposal and enacted the 1973 Crime Control Act instead.
Administrative provisions of the Crime Control Act (1973) purport to: (1) speed the flow of federal funds and technical assistance to all state and local governments; (2) clarify administrative roles and responsibilities by eliminating the troika structure and replacing it with one that requires one administrator, as sole director, who is to be assisted by two deputies—one for policy and one for administration; and (3) authorize appropriations at an annual level of $1 billion for each of fiscal 1974 and 1975, increasing to $1.25 billion in 1976.

**LEAA Funding**

Funding for LEAA has steadily increased during its five years of existence. From its inception in 1969 through 1973, LEAA planning funds have increased from $19 million to $48.5, and action grants from $24.7 million to $480.2 million per year. Total appropriations for the program have increased from $63 million in 1969 to 850.6 million in 1973, a growth rate of more than 1000 percent in five years (see Table 1).

Thus, increased funding, plus other significant actions undertaken in behalf of LEAA, suggest that both Congress and the present Administration favor the block grant model. It also reveals some inconsistency in views of these two branches of federal government as to what constitutes an appropriate federal role in the LEAA program. In view of this, one can
# TABLE 1

**LEAA FUNDING, 1969-73**

(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$60,000</td>
<td>$267,937</td>
<td>$528,954</td>
<td>$698,723</td>
<td>$841,166</td>
<td>$2,396,780</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>48,535</td>
<td>142,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Grants</td>
<td>24,650</td>
<td>182,750</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>413,695</td>
<td>480,180</td>
<td>1,441,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discretionary</td>
<td>4,350</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>73,005</td>
<td>86,887</td>
<td>266,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrections</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>47,500</td>
<td>97,500</td>
<td>103,264</td>
<td>248,264</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manpower Development</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>43,934</td>
<td>121,934</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>31,598</td>
<td>70,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Systems &amp; Statistics</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>9,700</td>
<td>21,200</td>
<td>35,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>21,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>4,487</td>
<td>7,454</td>
<td>11,823</td>
<td>15,568</td>
<td>41,832</td>
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</table>

merely speculate on the answer to an essential question: . . . "whether, in the end, LEAA will change in law, in fact or at all" (Turner, 1973:450).
CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

The primary objective of this research was to produce a fund of empirically based knowledge that would help explain the implications of new federalism for the planners and consumers of social welfare services. This objective was sought by exploring the grant-in-aid actions that occurred under the Title I program of the 1968 Safe Streets Act--LEAA--as an actual specimen of new federalism. The process entailed testing six hypotheses that were introduced in Chapter I above, to determine the nature of LEAA grant-in-aid priorities and their implications for those who plan and consume such services.

Research Design

This exploration employed the cross-sectional research design (Behling, 1973:21-2), using the single case approach. Under this design all criminal justice planning regions\(^1\) of the sample population were organized into two major groupings; each of the groupings conformed to one of two

\(^1\)Hereinafter, the term planning region will be used to mean "criminal justice planning region," under the LEAA Program.
significant variables—poverty rate and minority population rate—introduced in the statement of hypotheses. Within each of the two major groupings all planning regions in the sample were ranked from high to low, based on the poverty rate in one grouping, and on the minority population rate in the other grouping. The arrays of planning regions within each grouping were divided into three nearly equal subgroups under classifications of high, moderate, and low. Planning regions within the subgroups were matched with data pertaining to their actual expenditures during the inclusive period of fiscal 1969-73. Statistical comparisons were then made between the three subgroups, of the two major groupings, for a measure of significant difference between rates of poverty and minorities and proportions of LEAA funds allocated for programs emphasizing goals of system control, maintenance and change, as hypothesized. (See Figure 1.)

Types and Sources of Data Collected

Quantitative data was collected for testing the hypotheses in this research. It was supplemented by a collection of other descriptive and demographic data that was referred to during various phases of the research, especially in data analysis.

The input data consisted of both actual numbers and proportions of persons living below the federally defined poverty level. It also comprised actual numbers and proportions of minorities inhabiting the planning regions. Other
UNIVERSE
Greater Lakes Region

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Rates of Poverty or Minority Groupings

DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Rates of LEAA Expenditures

SIGNIFICANCE
3-W Comparisons

Difference or No Difference

LEGEND
H = High Subgroup of poverty rate or minority population grouping.
M = Moderate Subgroup of poverty rate or minority population rate grouping.
L = Low Subgroup of poverty rate or minority population rate grouping.

Control = Proportion of expenditures for System Control goals.
Maintenance = Proportion of expenditures for System Maintenance goals.
Change = Proportion of expenditures for System Change goals.

FIGURE 1
CONCEPTUAL RESEARCH STRATEGY UNDER THE CROSS-SECTIONAL DESIGN
supplemental data collected consisted of rates of unemployment and per capita income for each planning region in the sample. All input data was collected from the U.S. Census reports (1970).

Output data, on the other hand, comprised primarily brief program descriptions (or indicators) that conformed to the 12 standard categories under which LEAA programs are funded and their program funds accounted for *(LEAA Third Annual Report, 1971: 267-87)*. These 12 standard categories were introduced earlier in Chapter III of this research as the way in which both SPAs and LEAA categorize program expenditure among all 55 participating jurisdictions. During data collection for this research, these categories were accompanied by quantitative data indicating actual amounts of LEAA funds spent by each participating region in each of the 12 standard categories during fiscal 1969-73. *(See Table 2.)*

The other descriptive and demographic data collected from SPAs were as follows: (1) the number of urban concentrations embracing populations of 250,000 or more; (2) the number of planning regions within each state in the sample; (3) the process employed by SPAs in designating planning regions; (4) the composition, structure and function of planning regions; (5) the staffing patterns of both SPAs and RPCs; (6) the procedures used by SPAs in distributing LEAA planning funds to their jurisdiction; and (7) other demo-
TABLE 2  
THE TWELVE STANDARD LEAA CATEGORIES FOR OUTPUT DATA COLLECTION  
FISCAL YEARS 1969-73

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law Enforcement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prevention of Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>Juvenile Delinquency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detection &amp; Apprehension of Criminals</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Judicial Reform</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Corrections and Rehabilitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Organized Crime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Riots and Civil Disorder</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction of Facilities</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other—specify</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Regional LEAA Budget</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

graphic data regarding population, social, economic and political characteristics relating to the LEAA planning and service delivery system within participating states and their planning regions. This data was useful throughout the conduct of this research, especially in data analysis and interpretation. (See Appendix B.)

**Sampling Procedure**

The non-probability sampling procedure was utilized in collecting data for this research. This procedure involved the selection of a universe and then a sample within that universe without the use of statistics. The microcosmal universe selected was the Greater Lakes Region, which corresponds with the fifth Federal Council District of the mid-western sector of the United States of America.

The sample for this research comprises all six states (or all states in the universe) and their combined 71 planning regions of the Greater Lakes Region. Those six states were Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin. However, since only four of the six states agreed to participate in this research, the data analysis was based on responses from the four states and their combined 56 planning regions. Thus, the regional response rate was 77.5 percent. (See Table 3.)

The Greater Lakes Region was selected as the universe and sample of this research for essentially two reasons.
TABLE 3
SAMPLE POPULATION RESPONSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Planning Regions</th>
<th>No. of Responses</th>
<th>Regional Response Rates</th>
<th>States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>Indiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals 71 56 77 4 percent
First, its Regional office, like the other nine LEAA Regional offices, is structurally and functionally comparable to the National LEAA office. As such, it is responsible for reviewing plans and awarding planning and action grants to states and localities whose social, economic and political characteristics are quite similar to those of other states and localities throughout the country. For instance, the planning regions of any state are either predominantly rural, urban, suburban or some combination of the three; they are either predominantly poverty stricken, affluent or a combination of the two; and they are populated by people from various racial and ethnic backgrounds. Therefore, the probability appears high that research findings of a study of the Greater Lakes Region may even have significance for other parts of the country; although, in this research, generalizability is limited to the Greater Lakes Region.

Second, the Greater Lakes Region and its six states are geographically contiguous to the research base of operation. This helps make the research project more administratively manageable and economically feasible than of one that embraces a representative sample of the entire United States.

Data Collection Instruments

Two different instruments were utilized in collecting data for this research. One of them was referred to as a Data Collection Schedule and the other one was called a two-part Questionnaire.
The Data Collection Schedule was designed for the collection of input data (or the data base for the independent variables) from existing written records. Data collected by this instrument pertained to the planning regions in the sample and corresponded to the following five categories: (1) total planning region population; (2) minority population rates; (3) per capita income; (4) unemployment rates; and (5) poverty rates. In effect, this data was to be drawn from statistical tables of the U.S. census reports for counties and then apportioned among appropriate planning regions in the sample. (See Appendix A.)

The Questionnaire (Parts I and II) represented the principal instrument used in collecting output data for this research. Part I of that questionnaire was actually a modified version of the questionnaire used by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations during its study of the LEAA program (1970:68-76). In this research, Part I was used to obtain descriptive and certain other demographic data pertaining to the participating states and regions, and the LEAA planning and service delivery systems within those states and regions, as discussed in section B above. (Also see Appendix B.)

Part II of the Questionnaire was designed to collect specific output data needed for testing the hypotheses. It collected from participating SPA's brief program descriptions, together with the actual sums of LEAA funds spent by
Administration of the Data Collection Instruments

Data collection instruments were administered in two different ways. The two-part questionnaire was mailed to SPAs for their independent response to data needs of the research; the Data Collection Schedule, on the other hand, was administered personally by the researcher, in collecting input data from U.S. Census reports.

Parts I and II of the questionnaire were administered in two separate phases. One phase represented a sort of pre-test experimental phase; the second phase was undertaken specifically for collecting data needed for conducting this research.

With the support and assistance of the Ohio Youth Commission and the Program for the Study of Crime and Delinquency of The Ohio State University, phase one of the data collection process commenced during the summer of 1973. The primary purpose of that phase was to ascertain the feasibility of collecting the kind and quantity of output data needed to conduct such a research project on a nationwide basis. Further, if such data could actually be obtained, what kinds of categories and items should be included in the data collection instrument(s), in order to facilitate expen-
Parts I and II of the original two-part questionnaire were mailed to a quota sample of 14 states that was widely distributed among the 55 jurisdictions served by LEAA. (See Appendix D.) Though the response rate was slightly above 50 percent, several of the responses failed to include much of the essential data needed for conducting this research. The caliber of these responses, the distance between the sample and the research base of operation, the administrative cost involved, together with explanations given above, led to the selection of the Greater Lakes Region and its six states as the universe and sample for this research.

The second phase of the questionnaire-mailing process occurred during autumn 1973. This phase closely followed the actions of redesignating the universe, selection of the sample, and refinement of data collection instruments and the research design.

In phase two, both parts I and II of the questionnaire were mailed to the sample of six states and their 71 planning regions. By Winter 1974, four of the states--Illinois, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin--had favorably responded to the questionnaire. Two states--Indiana and Minnesota--had failed to make such a response. Follow-up action with those states disclosed both their positive expressions of interest in the research project, together with their inability to furnish the research data needed for conducting it, since their record-keeping systems had not yet been computerized.
The administration of the input data collection instrument began during the first two weeks of August 1974. The Data Collection Instrument (in Appendix A) was personally administered by the researcher in the collection of following types of statistics from U.S. Census reports: (1) population rates and totals from Table 16; (2) poverty and unemployment rates and totals from Table 41; (3) per capita income rates for urban areas from Table 89; and per capita income rates from Table 124. (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1970:Parts 10, 14, 24 and 51).

Definitions of Variables and Basic Units of Analysis

Many of the terms defined here have appeared numerous times before in preceding chapters of this research. However, since occasionally the meanings of terms vary according to the context in which they appear, they are defined here to reflect their actual meanings in this research. This section is therefore devoted to the presentation of definitions of the independent and dependent variables and other salient terms which underly this research.

The independent variables are (1) poverty rate, and (2) minority population rate. The dependent variables, on the other hand, are (1) system control goals, (2) system maintenance goals, and (3) system change goals. Other terms that are significant to this research are:
(1) planners and (2) consumers of social welfare services. Each of these terms is defined below, following a brief explanation for their inclusion in this research.

The rationale for selecting these variables and terms is as follows: The terms poverty rate and minority population rate were selected because they have traditionally constituted the bases for extensive federal intervention into social welfare concerns and for the intensification of the federal role in social service delivery over the past two or three decades (Fried et al., 1973; Ink, 1973; and Atlantic Monthly, 1971). The underlying premise for this caliber and extent of federal involvement in social welfare is that state and local governments, in the absence of strict federal regulations, could not or would not equitably provide needed services to various segments of society—especially to the poor and minorities.

The dependent variables, on the other hand, were selected because they tend to symbolize the mixture of goals inherent in all national social welfare policy—including Title I of the Safe Streets Act—which tended to manifest themselves during program implementation. As such, they constitute significant indicators against which analysis can be made regarding the choices of LEAA program priorities and their full range of implications for the planners and consumers of its services and that of other similar block grant programs.
Finally, the terms planners and consumers were selected because of their significance to both the proposed grant-in-aid policy change and the objective of this research. The lack of valid and reliable knowledge of the implications of the proposed grant-in-aid policy change, for those who plan and benefit from social welfare services, actually undergirded this exploration. Therefore, these terms are of major importance to the overall conduct of this research.

Definitions of the Independent Variables

1. Poverty Rate. Conceptually, the term poverty rate refers to the proportion of persons whose economic resources fall below an index which the federal government defined as being below the poverty level. This definition provides for a "range of poverty income cutoffs adjusted by such factors as family size, sex of family head, number of children under 18 years old and farm and non-farm residence. The index allows for differences in cost of living between farm and non-farm families by setting the poverty threshold for farm families at 85 percent of corresponding levels for non-farm families." The poverty income cutoffs are revised annually; the range of poverty income during the compilation of the 1970 Census report was $1,487 to $6,116 for an average of $3,745 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1970:Vol. 1, Part 1).

Operationally, the term poverty rate refers precisely to the statistical mean of all poverty rates for the counties
within each of the planning regions of the sample. These rates are drawn from Table 41 of the 1970 U.S. Census reports for Illinois, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1970: Parts 15, 24, 10 and 51).

2. Minority Population Rate. Conceptually, the term minority population rate refers to that proportion of people who were obliged to move from another society to the American society for such reasons as economic, political, religious, coercion, and so on. These migrant groups that have not yet been assimilated into the American society because of certain observable characteristics—such as biological or social differences between the two groups—are usually categorized as minorities. Their rate represents a statistical comparison between the migrant group and the assimilated members of the American society (Popenoe, 1971: 265-302).

Operationally, the term minority population rate refers precisely to the statistical mean of all minority population rates of counties within each of the 56 planning regions of the sample, as reflected in Table 16 of the U.S. Census reports for Illinois, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1970: Parts 15, 24, 10 and 51). The minority population rate for the entire sample is the statistical mean of 56 planning regions. (See the following section on Data Analysis and Chapter V for further elaboration on how the minority population rate is determined among the various statistical units in this research.)
Definitions of Dependent Variables

The dependent variables of system maintenance, system control and system change are also defined both conceptually and operationally.\(^1\)

1. **System Maintenance.** Conceptually, the term system maintenance refers to the:

   . . . preservation and perpetuation of existing society norms and arrangements including those related to: (1) definition of the meaning and purpose of life; (2) motivation for individual and group survival; (3) norms for age-sex role preferences; (4) norms related to production and distribution of goods and services; (5) norms of conflict resolution, etc. In the social welfare system, activity to achieve such an objective could include: (1) activities designed to socialize members to acceptable norms; (2) increasing accessibility to existing resources and opportunities through provision of information, and advice and guidance (e.g., maximizing the utilization of existing resources by the general

\(^1\)The operational dependent variables were established by matching the 12 standard categories used by LEAA and its 55 jurisdictions with the conceptually defined dependent variables of control, maintenance and change to constitute measurable indicators with which output data can be associated for testing the research hypotheses. There can be no assurance that these indicators will always be clearly discrete and mutually exclusive, insofar as quality and philosophy of program performance among the different participating jurisdictions are concerned. However, since they were constructed on the basis of information that has been clearly defined, standardized and commonly used by LEAA and its 55 jurisdictions, they are believed to be sufficiently valid and reliable for testing the hypotheses in this research. (Based on LEAA's 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Annual Reports, 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1973; Urban Coalition, 1970; Lawyers' Committee on Civil Rights Under Law, 1973; and Administration of Justice (of Ohio) Fiscal Control Guidelines, 1971.)
population, facilitating ad hoc transfers, etc.); (3) compensation and a residual basis for system deficiencies; (e.g., supplementing or replacing other social arrangements such as the family, the market place, the education system, the health system, etc.) while leaving basic social arrangements essentially unchanged . . . (Schneiderman, 1969:2-3).

Operationally, the term system maintenance refers precisely to the amount of LEAA funds allocated by SPAs to all planning regions during fiscal 1969-73 for programs classified in the following four of 12 standard categories: (1) Juvenile Delinquency; (2) Adult Corrections and Rehabilitation; (3) Police-Community Relations and (4) other programs, including system development.

2. System Control. Conceptually, the term system control refers to actions designed to:

. . . bring behavior which is out of conformity with, and seen as threatening to, existing societal norms, under effective control. Social welfare activity to achieve such a goal includes: (1) intensification to the maintenance function of compensation, (re)-socialization, and accessibility for population groups manifesting high levels of 'deviant' behavior (e.g., youth and racial minority groups) in order to promote self-control (e.g., through meeting legitimate grievances, cooperation, cooling out, etc.); (2) manipulation of legal procedures and restraints to promote external controls of 'deviant' behavior, (e.g., the mentally ill and retarded, neglecting and abusive parents, suicide prevention, crime and delinquency, etc.); and (3) some combination of (1) and (2) (Schneiderman, 1969:3).

Operationally, the term system control refers precisely to the amount of LEAA funds allocated under SPAs to the planning regions during fiscal 1969-73 for implementing programs that are classified in the following four of 12 standard
categories: (1) Law Enforcement, (2) Apprehension of Criminals, (3) Construction of Facilities, and (4) Riot and Civil Disorder Control.

3. System Change. Conceptually, the term system change is defined as the promotion of change:

... in the direction of increased effectiveness for all members of society. The social welfare system attempts this [objective] by being an instrument for the removal of obstacles to: (1) fuller and more equitable participation in decision-making; (2) fuller and more equitable distribution of resources; (3) fuller and more equitable access to system's opportunity structure. (Schneiderman, 1969:8).

Operationally, the term system change, refers to the amount of LEAA funds allocated under SPAs to planning regions during fiscal 1969-73 for programs that are classified in the following four of 12 standard categories: (1) Research and Development, (2) Prevention and Diversion of Crime and Delinquency; (3) Organized Crime, and (4) Judicial Reform.

Definitions of Other Salient Terms

1. Social Welfare. In this research, this term refers to "... all organized social arrangements which have as their direct and primary objective the well-being of people in a social context." More specifically, it means "... the broad range of policies and services which are concerned with various aspects of people's lives--the income security, health, housing, education, recreation, cultural tradition and so on." (International Conference on Social Welfare, 1970:4).
2. Planner. The term "planner refers to a "person who has direct access to the policy-making body in government and voluntary organizations" (Mayer, 1972). This person may be the executive officer of such agencies, or a staff member whose primary responsibility is to plan new programs, or make recommendations on questions of policy. He may be the mayor's assistant, the planning staff of a municipality, the planning staff of a private agency, or the planning staff of a direct service agency, such as departments of juvenile corrections, child welfare, public health, and public housing authorities or boards of education (p. 4). The primary role of a planner is to influence policy choices, and design programs for delivering services in "the light of facts, projections and application of values" (Kahn, 1969:1-27).

3. Consumer. The term consumer refers generally to the total American society, who benefit either directly or indirectly from social welfare services. But more specifically, it refers to those persons within society whose personal, social and economic capabilities and resources are insufficient to enable them to establish and maintain an adequate standard of health, decency and social well-being without external intervention and the receipt of some form of social service.

Data Analysis

With the assistance of staff and facilities of the Division of Statistics and the Computer of the Information
Science Research Center of The Ohio State University, data analysis began immediately upon completion of data collection.

The data analysis process was performed in the following six phases: (1) the summarization and organization of the data for analysis; (2) ranking the 56 planning regions into two different arrays under each of two major groupings—conforming to the poverty rate variable and minority population rate; (3) dividing the two arrays of planning regions into three subgroups each; (4) matching the subgroups of planning regions with their actual expenditures data during fiscal 1969-73; (5) ranking and subdividing expenditure data into three subgroups; and (6) computation of data in testing research hypotheses.

Phase One of Data Analysis

Phase one was employed to summarize and organize the data so that certain essential features (such as expenditures for change, control and maintenance) could be emphasized. This was also done to facilitate the computation of the data by use of various statistical tests.

Phase one began by tabulating frequency tables of expenditure data in relation to variables of control, maintenance and change. A frequency table was established for each of the dependent variables during the period of fiscal 1969-73. The object of this phase was to ascertain the distributional patterns of LEAA funds for control, maintenance
and change priorities for each of the five years covered by this research.

**Phase Two of Data Analysis**

In order to test the six hypotheses, the data was organized into two major groupings. In one of those groupings, all 56 planning regions were ranked from high to low based on the rate of poverty that existed within each of them. In another grouping the 56 planning regions were ranked from high to low according to the proportion of minorities inhabiting each of them. These two major groupings provided conceptual and operational arrangements of input and output data so that systematic analysis of it could be conducted.

**Phase Three of Data Analysis**

In phase three of data analysis, the two arrays of planning regions were subdivided into three nearly equal subgroups. These subgroups were classified as high, moderate, and low within each of the two major groupings. This phase of data analysis arranged the data for statistical computations which measured the degree of association between the independent and dependent variables, based on degrees of variation among the poverty rate and minority population rate variables.

**Phase Four of Data Analysis**

Phase four of the data analysis process consisted of
matching the planning regions with their actual expenditures data. The matching process was employed for both the poverty rate and minority population groupings and included each year during the period of 1969-73. The end result of this phase was a compilation of both input and output data into a single format so that statistical computations could be made of it.

Phase Five of Data Analysis

The fifth phase of data analysis entailed ranking and subdividing the expenditure data for each planning region into three subgroups under each of the three dependent variables—control, maintenance, and change. Like those of the two major groupings above, subgroups under each dependent variable were classified as high, moderate and low, and were established for each year of the five year period studied. The end result of this phase was an arrangement of input and output data that facilitated statistical analysis regarding the way in which the independent variables correlated with the dependent variables.

Phase Six of Data Analysis

This statistic was used for intra-grouping statistical analysis. It measured the relationship between the independent and dependent variables within each of the two groupings. As such, it measured both the extent and direction of association between variables of poverty rates and minority population rates and amounts of money spent on programs emphasizing control, maintenance and change goals. The principal yield of this statistic was a measure of the extent to which the independent and dependent variables were related and also the trends of relatedness between them over the cumulative five-year period studied.

Results of these computations are interpreted in relation to the six hypotheses. In turn, they are reported from the vantage points of how variations in poverty and minority population rates are correlated with the distribution of LEAA funds among the dependent variables of control, maintenance and change.
CHAPTER V

PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

In this chapter, the research findings are presented in two separate but related phases. The first phase is devoted to describing the essential characteristics of the research population which encompasses the poverty rates, minority population rates and expenditure for control, maintenance and change programs within the sample population. The second phase focuses on the results derived from statistical tests of the six research hypotheses of this research.

Characteristics of the Research Population

The principal characteristics of the planning regions are described on basis of essential features of the sample population and its LEAA expenditures. Population characteristics pertain to the actual amounts, rates and distribution of poverty and minorities that exists among the planning regions in the sample. The expenditure characteristics, on

1Of the 56 regional response, only 55 reported expenditures for the period of fiscal 1969-73. Data analysis is based on 55 rather than 56 as indicated in Chapter IV of this research.
the other hand, pertain to the amounts, rates and distribution funds among the variables of control, maintenance and change within the planning regions in the sample.

Rates of Minorities and Poverty

Minority and poverty rates constituted the essential criteria around which the planning regions were grouped, ranked and subgrouped. The planning regions were ranked twice—once according to minority rates and once according to poverty rates. They were ranked from high to low in each of the groupings, and then divided into subgroups under classifications of high, moderate and low.

Analysis of the data revealed that the minority population rate, in most of the 55 planning regions, was either 5 percent or lower. Thirty-eight of the 55 planning regions possessed minority population rates within the percentage range of 0 - .5. The minority population rates of the remaining three planning regions fell within the range of between 10 and 20 percent. Thus, the mean rate of minorities in the total sample was 5.2 percent, with a standard deviation of .052. (See Table 4.)

Subgroup analysis of the minority rate groupings showed similar characteristics to those of the overall sample population of minorities. In the high subgroup the mean rate was 11.9 percent, with a standard deviation of .047 and a variance of .002. The minority population rate of the moderate
TABLE 4
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS AND CENTRAL TENDENCIES OF MINORITY POPULATION RATES AMONG PLANNING REGIONS DURING FISCAL 1969-73

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Planning Regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 and above</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Central Tendency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Minority Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
subgroup was 4 percent with a standard deviation of .012 and a variance of zero. Finally, the minority population rate of the low subgroup was one percent, and its standard deviation was .006 with zero variance. (See Table 5.)

The mean poverty rate for the entire sample was found to be 9.2 percent. Of all 55 planning regions, 35 of them embodied poverty rates within the range of between 6 and 10 percent. Thirteen of them had poverty rates between 11 and 15 percent, and the remaining 7 were distributed among the percentage ranges of 0 to 5 and 16 to 21. (See Table 6.)

Poverty rates were distributed among the three subgroups as follows. The mean poverty rate of the high subgroup was 13.5 percent, with a standard deviation of .0347 and a variance of .0014. Within the moderate subgroup, the mean poverty rate was 8.1 percent, the standard deviation was .135 and the variance was .027. For the low subgroup, the mean poverty rate was 5.9 percent, with standard deviation of .009 and a variance of zero. The combined mean poverty rate for all three subgroups was 5.9 percent. (See Table 7.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgroup</th>
<th>Sum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>3,630,582</td>
<td>.0525</td>
<td>.0518</td>
<td>.0027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>3,143,582</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>437,662</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>49,338</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=55

TABLE 5
CENTRAL TENDENCIES OF POVERTY RATES AMONG
SUBGROUPS OF PLANNING REGIONS
DURING FISCAL 1969-73
TABLE 6
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS AND CENTRAL TENDENCIES OF
POVERTY RATES AMONG PLANNING REGIONS
DURING FISCAL 1969-73

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Planning Regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 and above</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Poverty Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 7

**CENTRAL TENDENCIES OF POVERTY RATES AMONG SUBGROUPS OF PLANNING REGIONS DURING FY 1969-73**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgroup</th>
<th>Sum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>2,735,337</td>
<td>.0917</td>
<td>.0374</td>
<td>.0014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>663,081</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>1,091,195</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>981,061</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=55</td>
<td>N=55</td>
<td>N=55</td>
<td>N=55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Characteristics of Expenditure Data

Between fiscal 1969 and 1973 most of the funds were allocated for programs pursuing system control goals. Expenditures for such programs ranged from 64 percent in 1969 to 34.6 percent in 1973, for a combined five-year mean of 54.5 percent. Further, during the entire five-year period of fiscal 1969-73, proportionately more planning regions spent between 81 and 100 percent of their budgets for control than in any of the other four percentage ranges reflected in Table 6. Conversely, proportionately fewer planning regions spent between 1 and 20 percent of their funds for control than in any other single percentage range among the four remaining ranges. However, of the 239 cumulative funding allocations analyzed, expenditures for control, by the majority of the planning regions, were distributed among the three middle percentage ranges whose upper limit was 21 percent and its lower limit was 80 percent. (See Table 8.)

1Theoretically, the total number of observations (or cases) analyzed in this research should be 275 for the cumulative five year period of 1969-73. However, because in some years, planning regions either did not report according to the 12 standard categories, or their boundaries could not clearly be defined, they were excluded as observations from this research. As such five-year analysis was based on 239 observations for computations of actually dollars spent, and on basis of 221 observations for computations of rates of expenditures. This difference of 18 observations resulted from the fact that some of the observations actually reported zero expenditures in some years and those observations were excluded from variability analysis, in order to attain a relatively accurate approximation of the actual rates of expenditures.
### TABLE 8
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS AND CENTRAL TENDENCIES OF EXPENDITURES FOR CONTROL DURING FISCAL 1969-73

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N (N=221)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
<td>N=37</td>
<td>N=49</td>
<td>N=50</td>
<td>N=54</td>
<td>N=31</td>
<td>N=221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>1-20</td>
<td>21-40</td>
<td>41-60</td>
<td>61-80</td>
<td>81-100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Regions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-40</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-60</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-80</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-100</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Tendency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.640</td>
<td>.607</td>
<td>.548</td>
<td>.535</td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>.545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>.666</td>
<td>.649</td>
<td>.495</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>.512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>.304</td>
<td>.291</td>
<td>.291</td>
<td>.301</td>
<td>.359</td>
<td>.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Central Tendency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum*</td>
<td>$2,782,489.00</td>
<td>$157,083.00</td>
<td>$19,146,448.00</td>
<td>$25,208,304.00</td>
<td>$6,145,003.00</td>
<td>$68,990,256.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean*</td>
<td>54,585.61</td>
<td>308,005.88</td>
<td>375,420.50</td>
<td>458,332.75</td>
<td>198,225.88</td>
<td>288,662.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation*</td>
<td>96,935.25</td>
<td>727,514.00</td>
<td>913,586.50</td>
<td>1,171,364.00</td>
<td>281,650.69</td>
<td>794,342.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

♦Numbers rounded to nearest 100th.
Trends of expenditures within the minority rates and poverty-rate groupings generally compared favorably to those of the overall sample population. For instance, the highest proportions of expenditures for control in the poverty-rate grouping occurred in 1969 and decreased steadily each of the four succeeding years thereafter. The mean rates of expenditures for control within this grouping ranged from 62.7 percent in 1969 to 18.3 percent in 1973, for five-year subgroup averages of 64.5 percent, 54.1 percent and 45.4 percent, respectively for the high, moderate and low subgroups. (See Table 9.)

On the other hand, trends of expenditures for control within the minority-rate grouping compared favorably to those in the poverty-rate grouping in some ways but differed from them in others. Like the poverty-rate grouping, these trends revealed decreasing expenditures for control over the cumulative five-year period. Unlike the poverty-rate grouping, the trends in the minority-rate grouping does not reflect a steady decreasing pattern from high to low. Rather, rates of expenditures tended to fluctuate among the years during fiscal 1969-73. Nonetheless, the five year mean range of expenditures for control in the minority-rate groupings extended from 61.5 percent in 1969 to 18.1 in 1973. Thus, the five-year subgroup means were 46.5 percent, 51.8 percent and 64.1 percent, for the high, moderate and low subgroups respectively. (See Table 10.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Subgroup</th>
<th>Mean Dollars</th>
<th>Mean Rate/ Dollars</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>$ 53,089.555</td>
<td>.627</td>
<td>.324</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>62,244.266</td>
<td>.518</td>
<td>.212</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>49,622.941</td>
<td>.493</td>
<td>.306</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>$276,747.563</td>
<td>.741</td>
<td>.256</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>421,629.438</td>
<td>.650</td>
<td>.274</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>244,577.813</td>
<td>.447</td>
<td>.272</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>$270,918.188</td>
<td>.627</td>
<td>.324</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>669,019.875</td>
<td>.518</td>
<td>.212</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>235,256.750</td>
<td>.493</td>
<td>.306</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>$357,245.500</td>
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<td>.373</td>
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Expenditures for maintenance over the five-year period were proportionately lower than those for control. The mean range of expenditures ascended from 27.8 percent in 1969 to 48.3 percent in 1973, culminating into a five-year mean expenditure rate of 34.5 percent of its budget for maintenance. Though comparatively large numbers of planning regions spent within the percentage ranges of both 1 to 20 and 81 to 100, the majority of them spent within the three percentage ranges between the 20 percent and 80 percent for maintenance. Over the entire five-year period, the trend was found to be gravitating in the direction of annual increases for maintenance programs. (See Table 11.)

Among the subgroups of the poverty-rate grouping, the trends exemplify increases in expenditures for maintenance. The mean rate of maintenance expenditure for the total five-year period was found to be 26.7 percent, 35.6 percent and 41.1 percent respectively for the high, moderate and low subgroups. (See Table 12.)

Among the three subgroups of minority-rate grouping, expenditures for maintenance also revealed an increasing trend. However, there was comparatively more fluctuation in rates of expenditure among subgroups of this grouping than was found in the poverty-rate grouping. For instance, variations in rates of minorities in planning regions were often found to be inconsistent with variations in rates of expenditures for maintenance. However, for the cumulative five-year period,
TABLE 11
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS AND CENTRAL TENDENCIES OF EXPENDITURES FOR MAINTENANCE DURING FISCAL 1969-73

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<tr>
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Central Tendency Proportion of Expenditures for Maintenance

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</thead>
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<td>N=50</td>
<td>N=54</td>
<td>N=31</td>
<td>N=221</td>
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<td>.331</td>
<td>.344</td>
<td>.483</td>
<td>.345</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.373</td>
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<td>.280</td>
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<td>.071</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.071</td>
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<td>.084</td>
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Cumulative Central Tendency Dollars Spent for Maintenance

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<td>N=50</td>
<td>N=54</td>
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<td>$15,871,742.00</td>
<td>$620,607.00</td>
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<td>291,586.06</td>
<td>288,577.12</td>
<td>278,084.06</td>
<td>215,456.81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation*</td>
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<td>298,272.25</td>
<td>573,297.69</td>
<td>393,860.56</td>
<td>370,671.12</td>
<td>390,844.94</td>
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</table>

*Numbers rounded to nearest 100th.
TABLE 12
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURES FOR MAINTENANCE FOR THE POVERTY-RATE GROUPING AND ITS SUBGROUPS DURING FISCAL 1969-73

<table>
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<th>Mean Rate/Dollars</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<td>High</td>
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<td>39,750.000</td>
<td>.263</td>
<td>.310</td>
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<td>Low</td>
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<td>.262</td>
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<td>High</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>$163,302.250</td>
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<td>239,519.563</td>
<td>.411</td>
<td>.282</td>
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the expenditure rates followed an orderly high, moderate, and low increasing trend. Thus, the five-year mean rate of expenditures for maintenance was 39.5 percent, 36.3 percent and 28.5 percent, respectively, for the high, moderate and low sub-groups. (See Table 13.)

Proportionately fewer dollars were spent for change than for control and maintenance during fiscal 1969-73. The mean rate of expenditures for change ranged from 6.7 percent to 17.0 percent over the five-year period. However, the five years over which this range extended were not in chronological order (that is, they did not begin in 1969 and extend through 1973) since the lowest expenditure rate occurred in 1970 rather than in 1969.

The majority of the planning regions spent between 1 and 20 percent of their budgets for change, while a comparatively small portion of them spent within the remaining four percentage ranges in the frequency table below. The five-year trend exemplified annual increase expenditures for change from 1970 through 1973. (See Table 14.)

Among the subgroups of the poverty-rate grouping, the trends also exemplified increases in expenditures for change. The mean rate of expenditure for this variable ranged from 4.5 percent in 1969 to 24.5 percent in 1973. The subgroup mean rates, for the entire five years, were found to be 8.8 percent, 10.4 percent and 13.5 percent respectively for the high, moderate and low subgroups. (See Table 15.)
### TABLE 13
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURES FOR MAINTENANCE FOR THE MINORITY-RATE GROUPING AND ITS SUBGROUPS DURING FISCAL 1969-73

<table>
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<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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Cumulative

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## TABLE 14
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS AND CENTRAL TENDENCIES OF EXPENDITURES FOR CHANGE DURING FISCAL 1969-73

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<td>.011</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Central Tendency</td>
<td>Dollars Spent for Change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum*</td>
<td>$1,050,612.00</td>
<td>$2,477,163.00</td>
<td>$8,319,532.00</td>
<td>$6,875,923.00</td>
<td>$7,101,620.00</td>
<td>$258,248.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean*</td>
<td>2,060,023.00</td>
<td>48,571.82</td>
<td>163,128.06</td>
<td>125,016.75</td>
<td>229,084.50</td>
<td>108,053.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation*</td>
<td>56,481.34</td>
<td>115,252.50</td>
<td>496,114.93</td>
<td>259,376.06</td>
<td>440,672.75</td>
<td>316,120.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers rounded to nearest 100th.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Subgroup</th>
<th>Mean Dollars</th>
<th>Mean Rate/ Dollars</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>$29,190.941</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>22,542.332</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>.147</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>10,391.109</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>$33,560.500</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>73,266.563</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>.134</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>43,004.164</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>$223,623.375</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.167</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>151,118.813</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>112,640.438</td>
<td>.166</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>$57,234.684</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td>.253</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>198,250.375</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>130,822.875</td>
<td>.131</td>
<td>.186</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>$110,000.375</td>
<td>.130</td>
<td>.204</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>343,007.688</td>
<td>.131</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>233,776.250</td>
<td>.245</td>
<td>.245</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>$88,460.313</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>.179</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>145,154.875</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.154</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>96,195.750</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>.186</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Expenditures for change among minority-rate subgroups showed similar characteristics to those of maintenance in the minority-rate grouping. As inconsistencies existed in variations between rates of minorities and variations in expenditure rates for maintenance, similar patterns were found in expenditures for change, among the subgroups in the minority-rate grouping. However, the mean rates of expenditures for change were found to be 14.0 percent, 11.9 percent and 7.4 percent, respectively for the high, moderate and low subgroups during the entire period of fiscal 1969-73. (See Table 16.)

Findings Relating to the Hypotheses

The findings are reported in this chapter on basis of yearly analysis and according to their antecedent hypotheses. Thus, the six hypotheses, introduced in Chapter I above, are re-stated, after which the corresponding results derived from the data as computed by the Pearson product-moment Correlation Coefficient (r) statistic are then presented. The yearly analysis only revealed trends in relationships between the independent and dependent variables, while the cumulative five-year analysis discloses whether or not these variables were associated as hypothesized. (See Appendix E.) Results of these analyses are accepted as being significant only when their probability values (P) are found to be equal to or less than .05.
TABLE 16
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURES FOR CHANGE IN THE MINORITY-RATE GROUPING AND ITS SUBGROUPS DURING FISCAL 1969-73

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Subgroup</th>
<th>Mean Dollars</th>
<th>Mean Rate/ Dollars</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>$28,919.938</td>
<td>.146</td>
<td>.171</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>3,994.500</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>27,577.945</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>$76,917.063</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>17,059.563</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>.102</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>51,238.789</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>$179,963.375</td>
<td>.152</td>
<td>.191</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>104,370.563</td>
<td>.165</td>
<td>.253</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>198,431.000</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>$235,006.625</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>.122</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>87,634.125</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>.168</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>71,743.875</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>.273</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>$110,000.375</td>
<td>.232</td>
<td>.248</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>343,007.688</td>
<td>.205</td>
<td>.230</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>233,776.250</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>.161</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>$173,719.688</td>
<td>.140</td>
<td>.173</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>69,758.875</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.183</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>85,338.313</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>.165</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
$H_1$ - The higher the proportion of minorities the larger the proportion of expenditures for system control priorities.

Results produced by the product-moment statistic revealed support for the first research hypothesis.

On basis of yearly analysis, it disclosed a significant correlation between the variables of minority rates and expenditures for control for four of the five year period included in the research. Conversely, 1969 was the only year in which this statistic failed to find a significant correlation between these variables.

However, cumulative five-year analysis found a highly significant relationship between the variables of rates of minority and rates of expenditures for control as hypothesized by $H_1$ above. It found them to be significantly correlated at the .001 probability level. (See Table 17.)

$H_2$ - As the minority population tends toward a moderate rate, the larger the proportion of expenditures for system maintenance priorities.

The product-moment statistic disclosed support for this hypothesis.

On basis of yearly analysis this statistic found a high correlation between variables of rates of minorities and expenditures for maintenance in the years 1970, 1971 and 1972. It found no significant relationships between these variables for the years 1969 and 1973. (See Table 18.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Coefficient (r)</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>0.1613</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0.5764</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0.7306</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0.7507</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>0.4014</td>
<td>0.013*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>0.5543</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Denotes significance at and below the .05 level of probability.
TABLE 18

MEASURES OF CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MINORITY RATES AND EXPENDITURE RATES FOR MAINTENANCE DURING FY 1969-73

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Coefficient (r)</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>.0451</td>
<td>.377</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>.3655</td>
<td>.004*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>.7103</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>.5186</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>.1528</td>
<td>.206</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>.4176</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Denotes significance at and below the .05 level of probability.
But on basis of analysis for the cumulative five-year period, the product-moment statistic disclosed highly significant relationships between the variables of rates of minorities and rates of expenditures for maintenance programs as hypothesized by H₂ above. It found them to be significant at the .001 level of probability. (See Table 18.)

\( H₃ \) - The lower the proportion of minorities, the larger the proportion of expenditure for system change priorities.

Again, this statistic found support for this hypothesis.

This statistic disclosed a significant correlation between the variables of minority rates and rates of expenditure for change in the years 1969, 1970 and 1972. It failed to find a significant relationship between these two variables for either of the years 1971 and 1973, on basis of yearly statistical computations. (See Table 19.)

Again, when the data was subjected to a cumulative five-year analysis, the product-moment statistic found the relationship between the variables of minority rates and expenditures rates for change to be highly significant as hypothesized by \( H₃ \) above. They were found to be significant at the .001 level of probability. (See Table 19.)

\( H₄ \) - The higher the poverty rate, the larger the proportion of expenditures for system control priorities.

Statistical results also revealed support for \( H₄ \). On a yearly basis the product-moment statistic found the
### TABLE 19
MEASURE OF CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MINORITY RATES AND EXPENDITURE RATES FOR CHANGE DURING FY 1969-73

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Coefficient (r)</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>.3120</td>
<td>.013*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>.5857</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>.1136</td>
<td>.214</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>.4490</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>.1564</td>
<td>.200</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>.2086</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Denotes significance at and below the .05 level of probability.
variables of poverty rate and rates of expenditures for control to be significantly correlated for four years of the five-year period—1970, 1971, 1972, and 1973 (see Table 20).

It found a highly significant relationship between the variables of poverty rates and expenditures for control by computing the data for the cumulative five-year period. As hypothesized by $H_4$, the product-moment statistic found a significant correlation between these variables at the .001 probability level. (See Table 20.)

$H_5$ - As the poverty tends toward a moderate rate, the larger the proportion of expenditures for system maintenance priorities.

Support for this hypothesis was found by the product-moment statistic. On a yearly basis, this statistic found a significant correlation between the variables of poverty rates and expenditures for maintenance programs, for the years 1970, 1971, 1972 and 1973. These variables were not found to be correlated in 1969. (See Table 21.)

The cumulative five-year analysis revealed a significant correlation between the variables of poverty rates and rates of expenditures for maintenance programs as hypothesized. It found these variables to be significantly correlated at the .001 probability level. (See Table 21.)

$H_6$ - The lower the poverty rate, the higher the proportion of expenditure for system change priorities.

Statistical support was also found for $H_6$. On basis
### TABLE 20

**MEASURE OF CORRELATIONS BETWEEN POVERTY RATES AND EXPENDITURE RATES FOR CONTROL DURING FY 1969-73**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Coefficient (r)</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>.1620</td>
<td>.128</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>.5502</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>.6957</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>.6713</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>.5925</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>.5291</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Denotes significance at and below the .05 level of probability.*
TABLE 21

MEASURES OF CORRELATIONS BETWEEN POVERTY RATES AND EXPENDITURE RATES FOR MAINTENANCE DURING FY 1969-73

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Coefficient (r)</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>0.0387</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0.3649</td>
<td>0.004*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0.6951</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0.5703</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>0.3776</td>
<td>0.018*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>0.4601</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Denotes significance at and below the .05 level of probability.
## TABLE 22

MEASURES OF CORRELATIONS BETWEEN POVERTY RATES AND EXPENDITURE RATES FOR CHANGE DURING FY 1969-73

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Coefficient (r)</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Degree of Freedom</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>.2764</td>
<td>.025*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>.5545</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>.1136</td>
<td>.214</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>.5212</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>.2139</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>.2400</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Denotes significance at and below the .05 level of probability.
of yearly data analysis this statistic found significant correlations between the variables of poverty rate and expenditures for change programs for each of the years 1969, 1970 and 1971. (See Table 22.)

Analysis of the data for the cumulative five-year period again disclosed a significant association between the variables of poverty rate and expenditures for change, as hypothesized in $H_6$ above. These variables were found to be significantly correlated at the probability level of .001. (See Table 22.)

In the final analysis, support was found for each of the six hypotheses of this research. As such, each of them was confirmed.
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARIZATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESEARCH

The object of this chapter is essentially twofold. First, it summarizes the overall research project from the vantage points of the research issue, method of study, and results of the study. Second, it presents a discussion and some of the salient implications of these results.

Summarization of the Research

This research originated out of concern over the implications of new federalism for planners and consumers of social welfare services in America. New federalism connotes a national philosophy which emerged during the late 1960s and early 1970s as a response to the proliferation, narrow purpose grants and growing complexities in the categorical grant system, and to rising expectations among the new plurality of American voters who had recently begun to challenge the government to direct proportionately more of its resources to their plight. Inherent in new federalism is the proposal to convert some 130 existing categorical grants into a few block grants or special revenue sharing with which to finance social program in such broad national interests categories.
as education, urban community development, manpower training, and law enforcement and criminal justice.

The essence of this policy change is to take the power, funds and decision-making from the federal bureaucracies and return them to the States, the localities and the people who, after all, know best how to apply resources to meet their particular needs and preferences (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1971:4).

Indeed this change in intergovernmental responsibilities for establishing the national social priorities for the distribution and application of federal funds constitutes a major concern for those who plan and consume social welfare services. Underlying this concern is a body of evidence suggesting that historically state and local governments have either been unwilling or unable to equitably meet the needs of certain segments of their populations—especially those with large concentrations of poverty and minorities in their midst. This research sought to contribute to a reduction in the basis for this concern by generating a fund of new knowledge regarding the implications of new federalism for planners and consumers of contemporary social welfare services.

Background to the Research Issue

Theoretically, the federal government is composed of both centralized and decentralized components. These components are supposed to jointly perform and manage all the social and economic functions of the public sector. Under normal circumstances, the centralized component is responsible for
such functions as giving clear directions to national social goals, stimulating and managing the economy and providing a clear, single voice in world affairs. On the other hand, the decentralized components are expected to respond to local diversity, customs, needs, preferences. In effect, the two-component federal system is expected to perform all the functions of the public sector, with each of them performing those functions for which it is best suited to perform, and with neither of them, alone, performing all of them to the total exclusion of the other components (Grodzins, 1960:265-82; The Publius Symposium, 1972:98-145; Oates, 1972:3-20; and Hamilton et al., 1901).

Historically, the roles among the different components of federal system have varied in relation to changing ideologies and conditions during various historical periods. For instance, during the Great Depression (of the 1930s), the federal government, for the first time in its history, intervened into social concerns within states and local communities and began to support the delivery of social services to various categories of needy people. It intervened on the premise that state and local government, if left to their own devices, could and would not equitably establish the social priorities for the distribution of state and local resources for politically unpopular ventures, even though such ventures might be in keeping with the national interests (Atlantic Monthly, April 1971; and Ink, 1973). By focusing
on specific categories of need, people and services, the federal government intervened primarily to: (1) increase the level of services that provided important national benefits to society; (2) provide more nearly equal opportunity for the disadvantaged; (3) correct maldistributions of public services; and (4) encourage reform and innovation in the way in which public services were being delivered (Fried et al., 1973: 170-232).

From the years of the Great Depression through the 1960s, the federal role in social welfare expanded and increased in intensity (Ink, 1973; and U.S. News and World Report, March 15, 1971:32-3). This structural and functional change was a result of a federal effort to respond to two diverse sets of societal expectations. One set of expectations suggested that the government should support scientific and technological advances in society. The other one mandated that it eradicate the social and economic ills--inflation, crime, delinquency, mental illness, child neglect, broken homes and so on--that emanated from such advances (Elzar, 1973).

Federal efforts to respond favorably to these diverse expectations eventually led to an over-centralized system of government which embodied both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages were to increase the level of national services to an unprecedented height, to more nearly equalize opportunity for the poor and disadvantaged members of society, to
enhance equity in the distribution of services, and to promote and stimulate reforms in public service delivery (Fried et al., 1973; and Schrag, 1967:63). Conversely, the disadvantages were that it depersonalized government, separated some people from centers of decision-making affecting their lives, circumvented the authority of state and local elected officials, and decreased the credibility of government among some segments of society (Wright, 1972:7-68; The Publius Symposium, 1972:99-140).

While this highly centralized form of government was believed to be making significant strides in improving the quality of life for the poor and disadvantaged members of society, it began during the latter years of the 1960s to be criticized by another segment of society for neglecting its plight. Principal among the new neglected groups was the so-called "Silent Majority" or "Real Majority," who, primarily through their electoral behavior, expressed dissatisfaction with the federal government's performance in responding to their plight. The Silent Majority began to cast their votes in a single block and in opposition to what Wattenberg and Scrammon (1970) called the "Social Issue"—rising crime rates, student demonstrations, drug abuse, pornography, school busing, and racial dissent. In effect the Silent Majority challenged the federal government through the ballot box to direct an increasing proportion of its resources toward their plight. This new plurality
of people, together with the Governors' organizations, requested that a grant-in-aid policy be established within the federal government that would facilitate the distribution of block grants or lump sums of federal funds to states to be used at the discretion of the inhabitants of those states (Wright, 1972:8-68).

This new issue of rising expectation, together with the problems inherent in the categorical grant system, led initially to efforts of grant consolidation. Among the first of such efforts was the passage of the Comprehensive Health Planning and Service Program of 1966, and later its companion program under the Partnership Health Act of 1967 (Wright, 1972). Soon it became obvious to the federal government, especially the legislative branch, that the categorical grant system, in its existing form, posed too much of a management and fiscal problem to permit the federal government to continue its commitment to prevailing national social goals, and to simultaneously pursue the rising expectations that were being expressed by the Governors and the Silent Majority (p. 7-68).

The emergence, during the 1960s, of the crime and delinquency problem to the national policy-making agenda, gave Congress the opportunity to experiment with an alternative model of grant-in-aid policy. Underlying this action was the belief that the success or failure of that experiment could possibly influence the character of future grant-in-aid
policy in this country (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1970:9-19).

The grant-in-aid experiment established by the 90th Congress is known as Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. It originated as another instance of a categorical grant (or direct federalism), but it was rewritten and passed by an overwhelming majority in both houses of Congress. In turn, it became known as this nation's first block grant (Murphy, 1970:309).

Unlike most of the other grant programs enacted by Congress during the 1960s, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) program of the 1968 Safe Streets Act, was created to deal with the broad area of law enforcement and criminal justice administration. It actually sought to restructure intergovernmental relations in financing state and local programs by awarding relatively large sums of federal funds to states, under provisions that they would distribute them to local jurisdictions for planning and implementing anti-crime programs. This Act gave states major responsibility for the planning, administration, coordination, and innovation of state and local anti-crime programs designed to pursue the national goals of reducing crime and improving the nation's criminal justice system. In essence this grant-in-aid experiment minimized the role of both the legislative and executive branches of the federal government in setting priorities, and allocating federal
funds. Instead it facilitates the distribution of lump sums of federal funds to states along with the freedom to decide how to use them (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968:179-209).

The Nixon Administration actually inherited the LEAA program "in a form already loosely tailored to the new federalism concept that he began enunciating in 1971" (Turner, 1973:450). In turn, LEAA was introduced as the prototype or model for other block grants of the Administration's new federalism program (U.S. President's Messages to Congress, 1971:412-2; and 1973:30A-1A).

The grant-in-aid policy that was to underly the new federalism philosophy was referred to as special revenue sharing. That policy was similar in some respects to the LEAA program but differed from it in others. The major similarities between these two grant programs was that both of them favored awarding lump sums of federal funds to states and allowing them to use their own discretion in determining how to use the funds. In a sense, both of these grants favor a minimal federal role and a heightened one for states, with the assistance of local units of governments at the discretion of states.

On the other hand, the major differences between special revenue sharing and LEAA is that the latter is subject to substantially more federal regulation than the former (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
1971). For instance, special revenue sharing would not embody such federal restrictions as state and local matching requirements, maintenance of effort requirements or requirements for prior federal approval in order for states to receive federal funds (p. 32-6).

Both LEAA and special revenue sharing provide for funds to be distributed automatically. However, under LEAA both of them, the legislative and executive branches of the federal governments retain some potential influence over the flow of federal dollars between the federal, state and local units of government. This provides the federal government with some authority to stimulate innovations, stipulate choices in national priorities, and channel funds to areas of pressing need through annual appropriations of some 15 percent of LEAA, the funds for discretionary use (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1971). By contrast, no such provision exists for federal control in the special revenue program. By comparison, then, special revenue sharing would be substantially more flexible in fiscal, programatic and accountability matters than would LEAA, as indicated by Figure 2 (p. 32-6). (See Figure 2.)

Shortly after the 91st Congress amended the basic Safe Streets Act in 1970, the Nixon Administration submitted its special revenue sharing proposal before the 91st Congress (U.S. President's Message to Congress, 1971). In that proposal, the Administration requested that Congress reduce
LEAST FLEXIBLE

Categorical --> Block grants --> Special --> General

revenue sharing

revenue sharing


FIGURE 2
COMPARISONS OF DEGREES OF FLEXIBILITY BETWEEN FEDERAL GRANT PROGRAMS
federal control over and remove most of the federal requirements imposed on grant recipients, thus converting the LEAA program into special revenue sharing. The LEAA program was then proposed as the model for the other five categories of national interests included in the revenue sharing proposal. The rationale given for this request was that the LEAA program was quite similar in format and substance to special revenue sharing and to the new federalism philosophy. Legislative actions to convert LEAA to special revenue sharing would be quite minimal, but the results of such conversion could have significant impact on the effectiveness of an already "good program" (p. 412-3). The 91st Congress only heard the Administration's 1971 proposal, but took no action on it.

A few months prior to the expiration date of the original Safe Streets Act, the Nixon Administration resubmitted its special revenue sharing proposal before the 93rd Congress. The second proposal embodied the same general provisions and philosophy as the one submitted in 1971, but it contained only four of the original six categories of national interests—education, law enforcement and criminal justice, manpower training and urban community development. The categories of rural community development and transportation had been excluded from the 1973 proposal, with the explanation that they were being included in other legislative proposals similar to special revenue sharing (U.S.
The 93rd Congress conducted hearings on the 1973 special revenue sharing proposal between the months of March and July, 1973. During these hearings, Congress heard views on both the poor performance record of the LEAA programs and the advantages of special revenue sharing. Like the criticism of LEAA's performance that preceded the enactment of the 1970 Crime Control Act, that which the 93rd Congress heard, stressed that "its fiscal controls were inadequate, its allocation of funds was misdirected, its civil rights stance was unacceptable and its internal procedures were encumbered by bureaucratic red tape" (Frank, 1972:181). The predominant theme permeating that criticism was that LEAA had failed during its first five years of operation to exercise leadership to states in the use of federal funds ("Law Enforcement: $3.25 Billion Through 1976," 1973:359-66).

The 93rd Congress carefully deliberated the views regarding the special revenue sharing proposal. This deliberation focused primarily on the Administration's views regarding special revenue sharing. The essence of those views was that special revenue sharing seemed conceptually similar to LEAA, that LEAA had been effective in curbing the rise in the crime rate and improving the criminal justice system, and that the past practices of "misusing" federal dollars would be prevented in the future through strict program evaluation, careful auditing and state accountability
under special revenue sharing. The congressional review also revealed that conceptual similarity did in fact exist between the two programs (as discussed above). In fact, the similarity between them was so close that Congress expressed its inability to envision how virtually any substantive change could be realized by merely changing the title of the program from LEAA to special revenue sharing. It reasoned that already LEAA was moving in the direction of awarding lump sums of federal funds and grant-in-aid authority to states. This fact, together with the life-long history of criticism of LEAA's poor performance, persuaded the 93rd Congress to, again, reject the Nixon Administration's proposal for converting LEAA to special revenue sharing (p. 359-66).

Though the 93rd Congress failed to reduce control over and change LEAA's title to special revenue sharing, its August 1973 action did reaffirm its commitment to the block grant model for financing state and local social programs. In the Crime Control Act of 1973, Congress extended LEAA through fiscal 1973, substantially increased its budget, and added to the basis Act some provisions designed to help enhance LEAA's effectiveness, thereby decreasing the basis for future criticism of its performance ("Law Enforcement: $3.25 Billion Through 1976," 1973:359-66). In effect, Congress gave the LEAA block grant experiment another chance to demonstrate its desirability as the grant-in-aid policy for financing future social programs in this country.
The Purpose of the Research

The purpose of this research was to examine the grant-in-aid actions of the LEAA program as a new federalism specimen to determine the implications of such a policy for planners and consumers of social welfare services. This research proceeded on basis of the following three underlying assumptions: (1) That future grant-in-aid policy in America will be closely patterned after the block grant model inherent in the proposed special revenue sharing policy and the ongoing LEAA program; (2) That the 1968 Safe Streets Act conforms to the model of a national social welfare policy, closely associated with a new evolutionary stage of American Federalism; and (3) That all public policy embody a goal-mix of control, maintenance and change goals which tend to become visible during program implementation. Information amassed from the literature gave credence to the basic premises underlying each of these three assumptions. The literature showed that some of the programs funded by LEAA sought to bring under control that human behavior which was believed to be out of conformity with or threatening to existing norms. Also, it disclosed evidence that some of the criminal justice programs funded by LEAA placed relatively heavy emphasis on preserving and perpetuating existing norms, structures and functions of planning regions. Finally, there were other programs under LEAA that sought to change and reform the criminal justice activities in the direction of
increased system effectiveness for all members of society. (See Chapter III for details.) But, the literature failed to disclose how the expenditures for control, maintenance and change were being distributed throughout the population, thereby prompting the following research question: In what ways are the rates of poverty and minorities related to the distribution of new federalism funds among the goals of control, maintenance and change? An answer was sought to this question by testing six hypotheses that emanated from grant-in-aid actions under the LEAA program during fiscal 1969-73, with the expectation that such empirical knowledge would help planners and consumers of social welfare services better understand the implications of new federalism for those policies and services that focus on the wellbeing of various aspects of people's lives--their income security, health, housing, mental health, education, liberty, cultural tradition and so on.

Method of Study

The sample selected for this research consisted of some 55 planning regions of four states in the Greater Lakes Region, the mid-western sector of the United States. From this sample, program description and expenditure data was collected as the data base for the dependent variables of control, maintenance and change. Also, from the U.S. census reports, data pertaining to those same 55 planning regions was obtained as the data base for the two independent
variables of poverty rates and minority population rates.

Using the cross-sectional research design, this data was grouped, ranked and subgrouped in preparation for statistical analysis according to the six research hypotheses outlined in Chapters I and V above. The 55 planning regions were grouped into two major groupings—once on basis of minority rates and once on basis of poverty rates. The planning regions in each of those two groupings were then divided into subgroups of high, moderate, and low, to facilitate the testing of the hypotheses.

The subgroups of planning regions were matched with the actual expenditures they made during each of the fiscal years between 1969 and 1973. The expenditure data was then categorized according to the amounts spent for control, maintenance and change by planning regions of each subgroup.

Once organized, the data was computed by measures of variability and central tendency, and by the analytical statistic of Pearson's Product-moment Coefficient of Correlation (r). The measures of variability and central tendency helped to organize and describe the data, and to produce frequency distributions, rates, variances and standard deviations of the population and expenditure data. On the other hand, the Pearson's product-moment statistic measured the relationships between the independent variables of minority rates and poverty rates, and the dependent variables of control, maintenance and change. It established not only
not only whether these variables were correlated, but also the degree and direction of that correlation. It also measured relationships between the independent and dependent variables for each of the five years, as well as for the cumulative five-year period. A relationship was accepted as being significant only when its probability value was equal to or below the .05 level of probability.

The Major Research Findings

The major research findings were of two major types. One of those types was essentially descriptive findings of the minority and poverty populations and expenditures made by planning regions for program priorities of control, maintenance and change. The other type of findings consisted of results of analysis of relationships between the independent variables of poverty rates and minority rates and the dependent variables of control, maintenance and change, as hypothesized.

The population description findings disclosed, among other things, that the mean minority population rate within the sample population was 5.3 percent. Conversely, the mean poverty rate was found to be 9.2 percent.

Within minority rate subgroups, the mean minority rate was found to be 11.9 percent in the high subgroup, 4.0 percent in the moderate subgroup and 1.0 percent in the low subgroup. And among the subgroups within the poverty-rate grouping, the mean poverty rate was found to be 13.4 percent
for the high subgroup, 8.1 percent for the moderate subgroup and 5.9 percent for the low subgroup. The standard deviations and variances for these subgroups were consistently low.

The descriptive expenditure findings showed how the funds had been distributed among the dependent variables of control, maintenance and change during fiscal 1969-73. Most of the LEAA funds (54.5 percent) were spent for programs emphasizing control goals. The second largest proportion of those funds (34.5 percent) was spent for maintenance priorities. Finally, the smallest proportion of the LEAA funds (11.0 percent) went for programs emphasizing change or reform priorities. Expenditures for control showed decreasing trends, while those for maintenance and change were increasing. But, expenditures for maintenance were increasing at a more rapid rate than were those for change.

The essential findings derived from analytical tests disclosed that significant relationships existed between the variables of control, maintenance and change and the rates of minorities and poverty as hypothesized, along with annual trends of relationships between these variables. Frequently the product-moment statistic failed to find significant correlations between these variables on basis of yearly analysis. But, it did find them to be significantly correlated as hypothesized on basis of cumulative five-year analysis.
Discussion of the Research Results

Findings relating to the association between the independent and dependent variables in the six hypotheses postulate that rates of expenditures varied among the program priorities of control, maintenance and change according to the rates of minorities and poverty in the planning regions in which the funds are designated to be spent. Stated more specifically, variations in rates of expenditure among the variables of control, maintenance and change correlated significantly with variations in rates of poverty and minorities within planning regions. For instance, as the poverty and minority rates increased, expenditures for programs designed to control certain human behavior also increased. On the other hand, as the poverty and minority rates decreased within an average or moderate range, expenditures for maintenance of the status quo tended to increase accordingly. In fact, the closer these population rates were to the mean, the higher the rates of expenditures for the preservation and perpetuation of existing norms, structures and functions within the planning regions. Finally, rates of expenditures for innovations increased inversely with increases in the rates of poverty and minorities in planning regions. Those planning regions whose poverty rates and minority rates showed decreasing trends away from the mean, tended to spend proportionately more of their funds for innovation and reform programs than for those emphasizing maintenance of the status
quo and the control of certain human behavior.

In effect, these results suggest, among other things, that differential priority consideration is indeed being given to programs emphasizing control, maintenance and change in relation to the rates of poverty and minorities in planning regions. This appears to be the prevailing practice even though there is increasing evidence in contemporary literature suggesting a need for other pertinent factors to be taken into consideration in connection with action of designing, financing and implementing crime reducing and criminal justice reform programs. For instance, despite the expenditure of approximately $2 billion dollars by LEAA during fiscal 1969-73 for crime reduction and reforms in criminal justice, the crime rates are still rising and the criminal justice system continued to be fraught with problems of overbalanced emphasis on law enforcement control, rather than on prevention and treatment (Costin et al., 1972). Furthermore, the rates of increase among the five most serious crimes—robbery, murder, forcible rape, burglary, aggravated assault and homicide—have been greater among the residents of the suburban and rural areas than among those of urban areas (National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1973). But because the process of taking people into the criminal justice system is so discriminatory, it results in an over-representation of the poor and minorities (NASW, 1973) (See Chapter III for details). These factors together
with the underlying value premises of this research give rise to some salient research, policy and planning implications.

**Research Implications.** The results of this inquiry disclosed, among other things, the need for further research in the area of new federalism and social welfare. The research question that underlies this research might have utility for explorations of other aspects of this research issue. This question, together with the single-case approach and cross-sectional research design, may prove useful in exploring relationships between other variables that are specifically germane to the sample population utilized in this research. For instance, it might guide an examination of the relationships between such independent variables as annual incomes of $5,000 to $10,000, annual incomes of $10,000 and above, per capita income, unemployment rates, and rates of families receiving aid for dependent children, in relation to the dependent variables of control, maintenance and change. More specifically, it could seek to measure the relationships between these independent and dependent variables as a means of expanding upon, substantiating or refuting the knowledge generated by this research.

A similar exploration on a state-by-state basis may prove useful also. Such an exploration could conceivably answer the question whether or not the grant-in-aid practices under new federalism vary from one state to another, and if so what is the extent and direction of that variation. The
significance of this knowledge would be to apprise planners and consumers of each state of the implications of these grant-in-aid actions for them.

The need for further research in this area notwithstanding, the results of this inquiry offer some relatively valid and reliable evidence from which generalizations may be made regarding the implications of new federalism for social welfare in among this particular sample population. In the event future grant policies for social welfare services are actually patterned after the LEAA block grant model, it is quite probable that the grant-in-aid practices under them are likely to be quite similar to those disclosed by this research.

Hence, if the poverty and minority population rates of planning regions are known, one can predict with some certainty how the new federalism funds will be distributed among the goals of control, maintenance and change. With this knowledge, planners and consumer social welfare services can begin to employ the necessary strategies, within the purview of their capabilities, to influence an equitable distribution of social priorities and revenue for the enhancement of the well-being of the inhabitants of their domain.

Policy Implications. Implicit in the rationale for federalism in social welfare in this country is that the market and/or some units of state and local government have failed--either due to shortage, lack, monopoly, discrimination, political expediency and so on--to equitably meet the
individual and social needs of national importance. Moreover, explicit in that rationale is the view that those services that are designed to help every needy citizen attain and maintain liberty, security and an adequate standard of health and decency are constitutional rights or entitlements of such citizens and a governmental responsibility (Schottland, 1970; and Trattner, 1974). Since its inception during the years of the Great Depression through the 1960s, federal efforts to actualize the philosophical stance have emerged a categorical grant policy (Fried et al., 1973). That policy has enabled the federal government to focus on specific categories of needs, people and services in pursuing the national social goals of: (1) increasing the level of service that provide important national benefits; (2) correcting the maldistribution of public services; (3) equalizing opportunities for the poor and minorities; and (4) promoting and supporting reforms in public service delivery (p. 170-232).

The results of this research suggests that these pre-existing social goals are of relatively limited significance under new federalism programs. Indications are that no further national priority commitment exists for the poor and minorities, and that these pre-existing national social goals are not being emphasized. In sense, new federalism may be viewed as an arrangement for giving priority consideration to pluralities of voters rather than to needs or the pre-existing national social goals.
Planning Implications. The planning implications of this research prescribes that increasing planning attention and efforts need to be directed toward influencing the decision-making within the political system. Implicit here is the notion that consumers and "professional" planners of social welfare services might find it counter-productive to remain aloof from political processes affecting their lives, especially when the social priorities for the distribution of public resources and services are based primarily on political considerations. Therefore, planners and consumers might find it beneficial to direct proportionately more of their interventive actions toward decision-making at the national, state and local levels of government. The focus of such actions should be on the design, financing and implementation of programs, whose primary purpose would be to balance individual and social needs with both newly established and existing resources. The predominant aim of such actions would be to change individual and social conditions in order to enhance social functioning among the needy and disadvantaged members of society, with need constituting the principal basis for professional intervention.

Intervention at the federal level might seek to elevate to national policy making attention the contemporary plight of the poor and minorities. This would entail actions designed to clearly define the social issues and problems affecting their lives, in conjunction with an assessment of
prevailing resources for the prevention and eradication of such social ills. In addition, these consumers might find it beneficial to them to call upon their elected officials to formulate policies and programs whose manifest goals are to give priority consideration to individual and social needs among residents of all races and socio-economic statuses. The probability of these consumers receiving from their elected officials a positive response to their plight is likely to be contingent upon the extent to which they supplement their requests with clearly defined plurality of electoral behavior.

Intervention at the state and local levels, appears to be needed in order to maximize the possibility of existing public policies and programs responding favorably to individual and social needs in an equitable manner. The fundamental issue here is that a need exists for efforts designed to reduce the probability of new federalism policies and programs making one group's progress another one's repression. If all persons—especially the powerless and disadvantaged ones—are to indeed fulfill their potentials, realize themselves and "balance this with equal effort to help others do the same. . .(Gordon, 1962), then the public interests might well be served by concerted—rather than separate—actions by segments of society in attaining governmental attention to their plight. Moreover, rather than for the poor and minority consumers to compete with, for example,
the Silent Majority, for governmental attention, support and resources, they might find it to be both democratic and mutually beneficial if they were to identify those social issues common to both of them and jointly seek solutions to these issues. Pending the formation of national policies that focus primarily on need, the overriding planning implication, at the state and local levels, appears to be in the direction of extracting the constructive elements from those policies which, to some, may appear to be unresponsive and even repressive, and to jointly convert them into strategies designed to enhance the social well-being and social functioning of all people in a socially just manner.
APPENDIX A

DATA COLLECTION SCHEDULE
DATA COLLECTION SCHEDULE

Date ______________

SIZE OF STUDY UNIT ____________________________

STATE OF STUDY UNIT ________________________________

TITLE OF STUDY UNIT ________________________________

MAJOR CITIES AND METROPOLITAN AREAS WITHIN STUDY UNIT

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<th>POPULATION</th>
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COMMENTS
APPENDIX B

PART I

QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COLLECTION OF DATA REGARDING TITLE I OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968

1. Name of State ______________________________________________________

2. Total Population ___________________________________________________

3. Number of urban centers with populations of 250,000 or more _____________

4. Indicate the following if your state is divided into regional districts for law enforcement planning:
   A. Number of districts _____________
   B. Basis for districting (check one)
      ___ (1) Existing districts were used either exclusively or with minor modifications.
         (a) Kinds of districts ____________________________________________
      ___ (2) Districts were determined by SPA Policy Board:
         (a) Tentative districting plan made available for comment by local jurisdictions. ____________
         (b) Other advance consultation was undertaken with cities and counties. ____________
            If so, explain:

      ___ (3) Local jurisdictions were requested to form districts.
   C. (1) Percent of total state planning grant allotted to general units of local government or combinations thereof.
   (2) Of the amount allotted to units of local government, what percent was allotted to planning districts?
5. Functions performed by regional districts for law enforcement planning in your state: (Please indicate "yes" or "no").

- (a) Performs planning for area of jurisdiction.
- (b) Coordinates planning by units of local government.
- (c) Makes planning subgrants to units of local government.
- (d) Reviews applications from units of local government for action subgrants before submission to SPA.
- (e) Reviews applications from units of local government for action subgrants upon referral by the SPA or after receiving an information copy directly from the applicant.
- (f) Makes action subgrants to units of local government.
- (g) Expends action funds as ultimate grantee.
- (h) Reviews Model Cities law enforcement plan.
- (i) Reviews Highway Safety Project proposals.
- (j) Reviews Juvenile Delinquency Act proposals.

6. Staffing of Regional or multijurisdictional law enforcement units in your state: (Please indicate "yes" or "no").

- (a) Units have paid staff.
- (b) Paid staff is hired by SPA without unit's concurrence.
- (c) Paid staff hired by SPA with unit's concurrence.
- (d) Paid staff is hired by unit with SPA's concurrence.
- (e) Paid staff is hired independently by unit.
- (f) Other (explain)
- (g) Regional staff on the state payroll. If so, why?

______________________________________________________________

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Attendance at meetings of SPA Board and Executive Committee help from April 1969 - June 1973:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member's Name, Position and Affiliation</th>
<th>Type of Member</th>
<th>Date of Meeting (Check if member was present and enter an &quot;A&quot; if he was represented by an alternate. Leave blank if he was not represented.)</th>
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* LA - local appointed  SA - state appointed  P - public
LE - local elected    SE - state elected    M - minority
8. Name and tenure of each staff Director your SPA has had since its establishment

9. SPA Policy Board responsibility for approval and disapproval of action subgrant applications. (Please indicate "yes" or "no".)

(a) All approval and disapproval authority delegated to SPA staff.

(b) Policy Board approves and disapproves applications above $ 

(c) Policy Board approves and disapproves all applications, normally after discussing each of them.

(d) Policy Board approves and disapproves all applications normally without individual discussion unless a problem or controversial case.

(e) Other (Specify)

10. Indicate how, on balance, the following agencies are organized to perform their law enforcement and criminal justice functions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Pattern</th>
<th>(Check one)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specialized --</td>
<td>System-wide --</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generally by Police,</td>
<td>Such as Training,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts, and</td>
<td>Communications,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrections</td>
<td>Prevention,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juvenile Delinquency,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. SPA Policy Board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b. SPA Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>c. Regional Law Enforcement Policy Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>d. Staff of Regional or Multijurisdictional Law Enforcement Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Return to:
Program for the Study of Crime and Delinquency
1314 Kinnear Road
Columbus, Ohio 43212
c/o Harry E. Allen, Ph.D., Director
Attention: James H. Ward

State__________________________

Name and Title of Responding Officer ____________________________

__________________________________________

Date ____________________________
APPENDIX C

PART II

QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COLLECTION OF DATA
REGARDING TITLE I OF THE
OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968

Date

1. Name of State

2. Name or designation of Criminal Justice Planning Region

3. Total Regional Population


5. Estimated Expenditure for all Criminal Justice Programs in this Region for the periods:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total number of professional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>representatives on Regional Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Body</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority population</td>
<td>Total number of lay representatives on Regional Planning Body</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Region (attach a map on regions)</td>
<td>Total minorities* on Regional Planning Body</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify all urban centers and their total populations in this region.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name population</td>
<td>+attach roster</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>REMARKS:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Minorities refer to Mexican-Americans, Puerto Rican-Americans, and Black-Americans
APPENDIX D

PRE-TEST SAMPLE
Cecil S. Hargett, Jr.
Acting Administrator
Division of Law and Order
North Carolina Department of
Natural and Economic Resources
P. O. Box 27687
Raleigh, North Carolina 27611

E. Drexel Godfrey, Jr.
Executive Director
Governor's Justice Commission
Department of Justice
P. O. Box 1167
Federal Square Station
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108
(717) 787-2042

Lee M. Thomas
Executive Director
Law Enforcement Assistance Program
915 Main Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
(803) 758-3573
FIS (803) 253-6371

Mack Wallace
Executive Director
Criminal Justice Council
P. O. Box 1828
Austin, Texas 78767
(512) 476-7201
FIS Austin (512) 397-5011
APPENDIX E

EXPLANATORY FACTORS FOR LOW
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE YIELD FOR 1969
In connection with Hypothesis 1, namely, that the higher the proportion of minorities, the larger the proportion of expenditures for system control priorities, Table 17 does not indicate a significant correlation in 1969. This may be attributed to the following explanatory factors:

(i) The sheer recency of the program, with little precision of mechanisms in the distribution of funds at the national, state and local levels;

(ii) In 1969, much time was devoted to the establishment of planning regions. In many states data may not have been collated on the basis of planning region boundaries from which research data in this paper were drawn;

(iii) As a consequence, although the evidence indicates that the largest percentage of the expenditures were earmarked for control, the change and establishment of planning regional boundaries might have undergirded the failure to yield a fair measure of the rates of expenditure in relation to rates of minorities.
The statistic found a significant correlation between the independent and dependent variables in fiscal year 1969 only for Hypotheses 3 and hypothesis 6. The probable reasons obviously relate to ill-defined designs for distribution of funding at all levels, in a program which had not as yet reached its take-off point.

Four of the five years indicate significant correlations at a relatively high degree. Only one fails to reach a level of significance. Since it is the first year in a series of five, it does not discredit the pattern formed by the other years. These factors are obtained in relation to all hypotheses, although it will have been noted that patterns tend to differ.

Thus, it is submitted that yearly analysis revealed only trends in relationships between the independent variables, while the cumulative five-year analysis indicated whether these variables were associated as hypothesized.

It should be further noted that yields for cumulative evidence, holding years constant, is significant at the .001 level.
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Wright, Deil S. "The State and Intergovernmental Relations." *Publius*, 1 (Winter 1972), 8-68.
