INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
WALKER, Robert Thomas, Jr., 1936-
PRUSSO-WURTTEMBERGIAN MILITARY RELATIONS IN
THE GERMAN EMPIRE, 1870-1918.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1974
History, modern

Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

© Copyright by
Robert Thomas Walker, Jr.
1974

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.
PRUSSO-WURTTEMBERGIAN MILITARY RELATIONS
IN THE GERMAN EMPIRE, 1870-1918

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the
Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By
Robert Thomas Walker, Jr., B.A., M.A.

The Ohio State University
1974

Reading Committee:
Andreas Dorpalen
John Rule
Carl Boyd

Approved By

Andreas Dorpalen
Adviser
Department of History
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

No historian could complete his work without the assistance of archivists and librarians. I would like to acknowledge the contributions to this study which these professional people have made. The staffs of the Württembergische Landesbibliothek, the Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, and its Heeresarchiv division made available the extensive materials on Württembergian political and military affairs. In Munich the staff of the Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv showed me every courtesy during my perusal of the reports from Bavaria's ambassadors in Stuttgart. Furthermore the staff at the Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv in Freiburg im Breisgau gave me access to the pertinent collections in their repository. I am indebted also to Dr. Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen, the editor of Wilhelm Groener's memoirs, for permitting me to browse through materials in his possession derived from the Groener papers. In addition he arranged two pleasant interviews with
Dr. Wilhelm Kohlhaas and Dr. Karl Schall, two retired officers who served in Württembergian units during the First World War.

A generous scholarship from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) made possible an extended stay in Germany to conduct research and gain perspective on my topic. Thanks, too, go to the Horst Reich family of Tübingen for helping my wife and me adjust to a new environment.

Several people on this side of the Atlantic have assisted with the preparation of the manuscript. I am grateful to Mrs. Jacqueline A. Narup and Mrs. Dorothy East for typing and proofreading the final draft. I, however, assume responsibility for any errors.

Heartfelt thanks to my wife, Kathleen, for her encouragement and understanding during the long process of acquiring a graduate education.

Every student owes his adviser an enormous debt for introducing him to the world of scholarship and for preparing him to cope with its complexities. Professor Andreas Dorpalen of the Ohio State University contributed not only to this technical preparation, but he helped me to become more aware of the human condition. I have been privileged to work with a great scholar and a great teacher.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 28, 1936</td>
<td>Born, Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>B.A., Hiram College, Hiram, Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1964</td>
<td>University Fellow, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1966, 1971-1972</td>
<td>Teaching Assistant, Department of International Studies, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>M.A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1968</td>
<td>Teaching Assistant, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Certificate, Advanced German, Colby College School of Languages, Waterville, Maine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-1969</td>
<td>Instructor, Department of History, Mansfield Campus, The Ohio State University, Mansfield, Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1971</td>
<td>German Academic Exchange Service Fellow, Tübingen, Germany</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1971-1972 ............................. Teaching Associate,  
               Department of History,  
               The Ohio State University,  
               Columbus, Ohio

1972-.............................. Instructor, Department of  
               Foreign Languages, Govern­  
               ment and History, Montgomery  
               College, Takoma Park,  
               Maryland

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History

Studies in Modern Europe. Professor Andreas Dorpalen

Studies in Russian History. Professor Charles Morley

Studies in Middle Eastern History. Professor Sydney Fisher

Studies in Modern American and American Diplomatic History. Professor John Burnham
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. ........................................................... ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA ................................................................. iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS. ........................................................... vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION ............................................................. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. WAR, UNIFICATION, AND THE MILITARY CONVENTION ............ 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. REORGANIZING THE CONTINGENT. . . . . 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1875-1893 . . . 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE WILHELMINE PERIOD AND WORLD WAR I. .................. 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSIONS. ............................................................. 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................. 171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABBREVIATIONS

BHstaMü, Abt II, GehSta, MA III = Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv München, Abteilung II, Geheimes Staatsarchiv (Bayern), MA III, Die diplomatischen Berichte 1799-1918

Ba/Ma = Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv

HstaSt, E 14, Ka IV = Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Kabinetsakten, Band IV

HstaSt, E 46/48, MAA = Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Ministerium der Auswärtigen Angelegenheiten

HstaSt, E 74 I, WüGB = Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Württembergische Gesandschaft in Berlin

HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, Abt A = Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Heeresarchiv, Württembergisches Kriegsministerium, Abteilung für allgemeine und persönliche Angelegenheiten

HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, Abt Z = Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Württembergisches Kriegsministerium, Bücher der Zentral Abteilung des Württembergischen Kriegsministeriums

HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, Kra = Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Heeresarchiv, Württembergisches Kriegsministerium, Kriegsarchiv

HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAderWüKM = Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Heeresarchiv, Württembergisches Kriegsministerium, Persönliche Angelegenheiten der Württembergischen Kriegsminister

HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, WüBB = Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Heeresarchiv, Württembergisches Kriegsministerium, Württembergischer Bevollmächtigter und stellvertretener Württembergische Bevollmächtigter in Berlin

vii
NA, RG 120 = National Archives, Record Group 120, Data on German Divisions, German Files

Verhandlungen der Württembergische Kammer der Abgeordneten
INTRODUCTION

The Prussian army dominated Germany's military land forces after the foundation of the German Empire in 1871. The several military conventions between the North German Confederation and the south and east German states stipulated that each army contingent from these areas would subordinate itself to the command of the kaiser in time of war. During peacetime the Bavarians retained their status as a separate army, but even then they were to cooperate closely with the Prussians. In Württemberg, as in Saxony, the contingent was to form an army corps within the Prussian army, and each was to adopt Prussian equipment and training regulations. Prussians served as commanding generals in Stuttgart with only a few exceptions, and the chiefs of staff of the Württembergian contingent were exclusively Prussian. Furthermore, a program of officer exchanges throughout the entire period exposed Prussians and their south and east German countrymen to each other's regional differentiations.
As a result of these arrangements virtually all of the literature analyzing the army in Bismarckian and Wilhelmine Germany focuses on developments within the Prussian army. German, American, and British scholars have investigated the administrative structure of the Prussian army and have concluded that the strengths and weaknesses of that body determined the character and efficiency of the entire German military institution.\(^1\) Additional studies have examined the social structure of the officer corps during this period and concluded that changes in the social composition of the officer corps strongly influenced the outlook of Germany's military leaders.\(^2\) Recent


studies synthesize these two methodological approaches and analyze the role the army played in forging a German national consciousness.³

Further investigation into military relations between Prussia and Württemberg reveals that existing studies neglect some important aspects of this integrative process. By limiting their investigations to the officer corps scholars have passed over or only hinted at the role played by the common soldier in the ranks.⁴ Yet his role has become increasingly important in twentieth-century mass armies. In the


⁴Probably there are two reasons for focusing on the officers. Most of the extant source materials deal with the officer's point of view. Officers are usually more articulate and are more motivated and
Prussian-German army the common soldier was recruited or drafted from his local district and with very few exceptions spent his entire period of service in a unit composed of men from the same province, whose speaking and living habits were the same. In Württemberg not only common soldiers but non-commissioned and lower-ranking commissioned officers, i.e., men with command responsibility who came into closest contact with the troops, came from, trained in, and served in units whose composition was almost purely Württembergian. Attempts to introduce men from other provinces into these units during the First World War lowered morale and combat efficiency, and in October 1916 General Ludendorff ordered the reconstruction of all units according to their former regional

financially in a better position to state their case. The traditional concept of discipline in the German army may also be a reason why we know more about the attitudes and behavior of officers. A man in the ranks was to obey his superiors without question. Any other attitude was characterized as a breach of discipline. Endres makes the observation that in 1914 the German army, because of the spirit of its men, could have done almost anything. Such a spirit stemmed from the German national trait of "do your duty." By 1918, however, poor military leadership had destroyed most of this spirit, and the rank-and file no longer had confidence in its leadership. That there were those who fought on bravely to the end proves that the spirit had not been completely destroyed by the leaders' blunders, Endres concludes. See Endres, Die Tragödie Deutschlands, pp. 178-179.
Another area which scholars have slighted is the duality of command responsibility and military administration. Each of the south and east German contingents subordinated its command responsibility in time of war to the German kaiser as Bundesfeldherr, but each retained control over military administration within its own province. This duality of authority complicated decision-making within the army and impeded the process of forging a truly national armed force. Integrating men with diverse dialects, religious denominations, and life styles into one national military institution takes time, and, considering the duality of command responsibility and military administration in the German Empire, the forty-three years between the founding of the empire and the outbreak of the First World War did not provide enough time to eradicate local customs. Local control over personnel replacement, supply, and other non-command functions had to be

---

retained if morale were to be maintained.6

A factor affecting the pace of integration into the Prussian-German army which scholars have mentioned but which needs to be reemphasized is the existence of Prussian particularism. Prussian military leaders admitted that they were not keenly interested in creating a national army; they wanted Germans from Baden, Bavaria, Saxony and Württemberg to accept the Prussian system. The Prussian military establishment and crown were proud of their army and the victories of the 1860's. They attributed these successes to

the superior organization and military discipline of the Prussian army. The other contingents, they insisted, must accept the Prussian regulations before a strong, united German army could become a reality.7

These three facets of particularism, which existed in the Prussian-German army during the maturation period of the German nation, resulted in a patchwork quilt of administrative and decision-making spheres which adversely affected German military effectiveness during the First World War as much as the fragmentation of authority within the Prussian army or the contrasts between social realities and feudal traditions in German military institutions.

7This point of view is reflected in a speech which Count Helmuth von Moltke, Prussia's great Chief of the General Staff, prepared for delivery to the Zollverein parliament in 1868. In the speech Moltke distinguished between the Prussian army and the south German contingents. The former, responsible to a single supreme commander, was a school which instilled in its men the qualities of order, punctuality, loyalty, and obedience. Moltke argued that Prussia did not need the south German contingents, but the south Germans needed the Prussian army, because the fatherland needed a united army, bound together by an inner cohesiveness. Prussia, because it had forged a unified army in a series of bloody struggles, offered such a military instrument. See Count Helmuth von Moltke, Gesammelte Schriften und Denkwürdigkeiten (Berlin: Mittler, 1892), pp. 12-15.
CHAPTER I

WAR, UNIFICATION, AND THE MILITARY CONVENTION

When the French government declared war on the North German Confederation on 17 July 1870, the alliance /Schutz- und Trutzbündnis of 18667 between northern Germany and Wurttemberg faced its ultimate test. The question arose whether the south German kingdom would consider the French declaration a casus foederis and join its ally in combating a foreign power or whether Wurttemberg would remain neutral. An affirmation of the alliance was by no means assured because there existed articulate elements in Wurttemberg who preferred to remain neutral. King Karl of Wurttemberg agreed with his cabinet ministers, however, that the state should honor its alliance with the North German Confederation and declare war against France. Mobilization orders went out to the troops on 17 July 1870. But the parliament had yet to grant war credits, and it was not scheduled to meet until 21 July. The perplexing problem for the government was to convince a majority in the state legislature to grant the money needed to conduct the war. The government received
support from an unexpected source, notably from a large bloc of delegates who formerly demanded that Württemberg declare her armed neutrality in case of war between the North German Confederation and a foreign power. The neutralists changed their position because, upon France's declaration of war, public opinion in Württemberg favored supporting the North German Confederation. Support in the state parliament for the monetary request therefore confirmed the government's decision to mobilize and thereby assured Württemberg's participation in the war which was to consummate Germany's unification.¹

Within a week the Württembergian division was ready for combat. The Swabians accepted a Prussian, Major General von Obernitz, as their divisional commander, and the division became part of the Third

¹The debate lies outside the scope of this study, but its most thorough treatment to date is Paul Sauer, Das Württembergische Heer. An earlier and more general study is Adolf Rapp, Die Württemberger und die nationale Frage (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1970), pp. 380-384. See also Graevenitz, Die Entwicklung des württembergischen Heerwesens, p. 13. Graevenitz says that officers from Baden, not Prussians, were sent to Württemberg to introduce the Prussian regulations in the late 1860's. Documents in the Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart corroborate this statement. Officers from neighboring Baden were used because of friction between Swabians and Prussians. HstaSt, E12, KalII, 46, Reports of the Württembergian war minister on the introduction and utilization of the Prussian training regulations, 3 July 1867.
Army under the High Command of Prussia's Crown Prince Frederick William. Although no public send-off took place as the troops left Stuttgart, they were reviewed by the king who received the cheers of his soldiers. Morale was high, and the troops marched off to war, feeling every bit the equals of their comrades in arms from the other German states, including Prussia. The organizational talents of the recently appointed war minister, Lieutenant General Albert von Suckow, and the high caliber of commissioned and noncommissioned officers within the division gave the Württembergian troops a high degree of confidence in their ability to contribute to a German victory.²

The first test by fire for the Württembergian troops took place on 6 August 1870 in Alsace near the village of Froeschwiller (Battle of Wörth). Württembergian units were ordered by the High Command to move on Reichshoffen, a village located to the rear of the French forces defending the heights overlooking the town of Wörth. The objective was to cut off an avenue of escape, encircle the French, and annihilate Marshal MacMahon's I Corps. General von Starkloff, a Württemberger who commanded the division's second brigade, was leading his unit in the direction of

²Sauer, p. 225.
Reichshoffen when he was met by a group of Prussian officers, among them a general, who said that fresh troops were needed to support the Prussians fighting at Elsaßhausen. This little village lay several kilometers in the opposite direction from Reichshoffen. Starkloff, proud of the confidence the Prussians had in his troops, on his own initiative wheeled his brigade east towards Elsaßhausen.3

The incident, though minor, is significant, because General Starkloff was criticized later by a Prussian regimental officer, Major Keim, whose criticism reveals two dominant themes in Prusso-German military thinking during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Keim said that Starkloff's decision to help

---

3The Prussian general was Major General von Sandrart, commander of the 9th Division. During a critique of the engagement at Third Army headquarters the crown prince's chief of staff, General von Blumenthal, asked who was guilty of sending the Württembergers off on a wild goose chase. Sandrart asked his own chief of staff whether the report indicating his role in the decision had been sent off; the reply was an embarrassed affirmative. There is no indication that Sandrart was reprimanded for his action, however. See HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Lieutenant General Gerold von Gleich, 36. See also Ba/Ma, Nachlaß General Wilhelm Groener, N46/33, letter from Gerold von Gleich to Groener, 12 April 1935. The official German history of the war says that Starkloff, after the Prussian call for support, considered a divergence from the prescribed line of march justified. See Historical Department of the Prussian Great General Staff, Der deutschfranzösische Krieg 1870-71 (5 vols., Berlin: Mittler, 1874-1881), 1, pp. 273-274. For a recent and analytical account of the war see Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War
out at Elsaßhausen revealed an independence of decision-making, but it was just this independence on the part of a subordinate commander, who did not have the overall strategic situation in mind, that had destroyed the chance to complete the encirclement of MacMahon's forces and to turn the battle of Froeschwiller-Wörth into a Vernichtungsschlacht or rout. Starkloff's rebuttal is significant because it reveals tensions between the older and newer styles of army organization and between the Württemberger and his north German brother officer. Starkloff says that he was asked by Prussian fellow officers for support, a point not mentioned by Keim, and although he exercised a certain flexibility of judgment, his decision to move on Elsaßhausen shortened the battle and saved Prussian lives.

---


The obsession with encirclement and battles of annihilation has been studied by Jehuda L. Wallach, Das Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht: Die Lehren von Clausewitz und Schlieffen und ihre Wirkung in zwei Weltkriegen (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1970).

StaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Gerold von Gleich, 36, newspaper clipping from about December, 1891. As noted above much current analysis of weakness in German military thinking focuses on the strong emphasis placed by German planners on annihilation of the enemy and the increasing restrictions on the subordinate commander's decision-making power.
Nevertheless, the battle of Froeschwiller-Wörth ended in a German victory, and both Swabian and Prussian soldiers were pleased with the performance of the Württembergian division. Crown Prince William of Württemberg, who was attached to Third Army headquarters, said that the victory at Froeschwiller-Wörth was one of the most brilliant ever achieved. Both their Prussian comrades and the enemy were impressed with the bravery and enthusiasm of the south German troops. Prussian Crown Prince Frederick William, cheered by both Württembergian and Bavarian troops after the victory, said that such events would bind together this army of divergent units. He hoped that his fellow Prussians would recognize the psychological significance of the occasion and would utilize such enthusiasm to forge a truly national military institution.

The Württembergian division did not see action at Sedan. Although the Third Army formed the left wing of the forces surrounding the French at Sedan, the Württembergers were held in strategic reserve.

---

6 HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Wilhelm II, King of Württemberg, 1, extract from a letter dated 7 August 1870.

just as they had been at Froeschwiller-Wörth. Encirclement of the French forces occurred without the need to call up the strategic reserves, and therefore the Württembergers sat out one of the greatest victories of the Prusso-German army. After the battle King William of Prussia visited the division and promised that it would also have an opportunity to be involved in action against the enemy. But soon after the speech he selected Württembergian units as his bodyguard, which kept the Swabian soldiers removed from action during the advance on Paris.

The Swabians did get their chance to close with the enemy, but it was fortuitous. By the time the Prusso-German armies reached the French capital, the Württembergian officers were aware that Prussian commanders and staff officers had little confidence in Swabian fighting ability and military discipline. One Württembergian officer complained that the

8HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Oberst Hugo von Kern, 1. Kern was a First Lieutenant in the 2nd Jäger Battalion during the war. He is not entirely correct when he states that Sedan was solely a Prussian show. Bavarian and Saxon units played a significant role in the battle. See Howard, The Franco-Prussian war, pp. 205-223. See also Georg Niethammer, Feldzugsbriefe von Georg Niethammer an seine Mutter (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1890), p. 33.
Swabians were allotted a poor section without adequate cover in the besieging ring around Paris. On 30 November 1870 the French chose the sector held by the Württembergian division in their attempt to break out of the German encirclement. Although pushed out of their forward positions during the initial French thrust, the Württembergers quickly rallied and by evening of the first day had regained their original positions. At no time during the battle was the heart of their defense system, the fortified villages of Villiers-sur-Marne and Coeuilly, threatened. Even though the French failed to penetrate the German ring, their attack contributed to friction within the confederate German army, a phenomenon which stemmed from the lack of confidence which Prussian officers had in the fighting qualities of their south German allies. It is true that the

9 HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Kern, 1. Kern said that General von Obernitz's staff consisted of Prussians and Württembergers, but the Prussians had very little confidence in their south German comrades. Kern notes sarcastically that Obernitz ordered the division to bivouac out in the open even when shelter was close by in order to instill "discipline" in the Swabians.

10 The details of the battle are presented in the official German history of the war, Der deutsch-französische Krieg 1870-71, III, pp. 541-577. Michael Howard, in The Franco-Prussian war, pp. 343-346, observes that Prussian concerns over the combat
Württembergers were exhausted during the battle. One division was holding over a mile of the line against repeated attacks by two French corps, reinforced by a third in reserve. Difficulties for the Swabians were compounded by the lack of cooperation between General von Obernitz and Prince George of Saxony, commander of the Saxon units who were to reinforce the Württembergians. Tensions were reduced somewhat when the High Command ordered Prussian General von Fransecky to take command of the entire section between the Marne and Seine rivers, which included both the Saxon and Württembergian sectors. Nevertheless, Prince George and General von Obernitz ordered an attack on 2 December 1870 to retake the villages of Champigny and Brie. When the order was relayed to two Württembergian regimental commanders, Major Haldenwang and Colonel von Rampacher, they considered it absurd. They argued that their men were too exhausted to attack. Adding to the friction was the desultory response of a Prussian effectiveness of the south German forces had some validity. Citing the crown prince’s war diary, he says that some of the Saxons who were to reinforce the exhausted Württembergers refused to do their part. Kern, on the other hand, criticized the Pomeranians for their timidity. HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Kern, 3.
unit, the Pomeranian 49th Regiment, to urgent requests for support from Württembergian officers. The Pomeranians arrived on the battlefield only after the Württembergians had suffered heavy losses and were almost out of ammunition. Although Moltke made plans to deal with a French breakthrough, the Württembergians and Saxons held their ground. Success, however, was due to the exhaustion of the French as much as to the brilliant defense of the Germans.

The opportunities for Württembergian units to engage the enemy were few in the short war against France. This is understandable, because the south

11 See HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Lieutenant General Ernst Reinhardt, 3a, for a criticism of General Obernitz's behavior at Coeuilly and the reaction of Württembergian officers. But one Württemberger relates that he and his comrades were confident that the Prussians in support of their attack at Coeuilly would not leave their southern comrades in the lurch. HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Oberleutnant Adolf Klumpf, 1. The recently appointed commander of the armies between the Marne and Seine rivers, General von Fransecky, at first saw little to be gained in retaking the villages of Champigny and Brie. See Friedrich III, Kriegstagebuch, pp. 208-209. General von Blumenthal noted in his diary that Fransecky thought the two villages were very much exposed to French artillery. But, according to Blumenthal, Crown Prince George of Saxony had his way, and the attack was ordered for 2 December 1870. Count Albrecht von Blumenthal, ed., Journals of Field-Marshal Count von Blumenthal (London: Edward Arnold, 1903), pp. 211-212.

12 Howard, The Franco-Prussian War, pp. 346-347.
German kingdom contributed only 42,000 men to a confederate army numbering over a million men. It was fortunate that Württembergian troops acquitted themselves well during the engagements at Champigny, Villiers-sur-Marne, and Coeuilly. The Prussians were impressed, and the Swabians were proud of their contributions to victory. Their self-esteem soared, especially among the younger officers. Older officers, however, remained sensitive to the growing "Prussian tone" of the reorganized and retrained army.

Pride in their contribution to the war effort filled the breast of even the most lowly volunteer or draftee. Georg Niethammer, an enlisted volunteer from Tübingen, wrote his mother after the victory at Sedan that the mood among Württembergian troops was one of readiness to do their share to bring victory to Germany. He added that the war would show the

13News of Württembergian tenacity made the rounds in Berlin. On 27 December 1870 Baron Albedyll, future chief of the Prussian Military Cabinet, told Baroness von Spitzemberg, wife of the Württembergian plenipotentiary to the Federal Council and daughter of a former prime minister of Württemberg, that all Prussians and especially the Pomeranians were praising the fighting qualities of Württemberg's soldiers. Rudolf Vierhaus, ed., Das Tagebuch der Baronin Spitzemberg (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960), p. 115.
south Germans that it was better to face the reality of Prussian leadership than to keep alive dreams of particularist provincialism.¹⁴ A common soldier writing home mentioned that he was no friend of Prussia when he marched off to war, but during the war his attitude changed. "I can't tell you how friendly and pleasant the Prussians are to us and to [the non-Prussian] north Germans ... and those Prussians really know what they're doing; we can learn a lot from them."¹⁵

Not all Württembergians who have written down their impressions of the war were so sanguine about relations between Swabian soldiers and their north German compatriots. One volunteer noted that those who had fought for Württemberg in 1866 against Prussia did not like the Prussians, but, he added, these older Swabians still liked "Fritzchen" better than the Bavarians. Some Württembergian officers were offended by the treatment General von Starkloff received in the official history of


¹⁵Quoted in Rapp, Die Württemberger, pp. 439-440, footnote 3. The letter was originally published in the Schwäbischer Mekur, a newspaper which supported union with the North German Confederation.
the war. Others chafed at the lack of confidence Prussian officers displayed toward south German soldiers, especially when the division commander, General von Obernitz, was not above reproach. Swabian sensitivity was perhaps best illustrated when General von Reitzenstein, commander of the first brigade and senior Württembergian officer in the division, refused to take the hand offered by General von Obernitz, a congratulatory gesture in belated recognition of the high caliber of Württemberg's troops.16

Prussian attitudes are more difficult to discern. Most Prussians who have published their impressions of the war with France make no mention of the quality of troops from the south German contingents. Perhaps the omission indicates their concentration on Prussian military affairs or their lack of contact with troops from south Germany. In his war diary Prussian Crown Prince Frederick William proposed to Bismarck's assistant, Rudolf von Delbrück, a means for solving difficulties between the northern and southern German military contingents. He suggested that the Third Army

16 HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Klumpp, 1. See ibid., Nachlaß Kern, 1, for the Reitzenstein-Obernz incident.
remain intact after the war and that he remain its commander. His popularity with the troops would obviate the need to use force to control the men from south Germany. The crown prince suggested that he would end some of the more unpopular Prussian procedures, such as military inspection, which the southerners viewed as "parades, dinners, and theater." The crown prince's chief of staff, General von Blumenthal, says very little in his diaries about fighting qualities among Württembergian troops. But he permits himself the observation that the arrival of two Prussian brigades as reinforcements during the action in late November turned the tide against the French. 17

The most important Prussian military figure who made observations on Württemberg's contributions to the war effort was Graf von Moltke, Chief of the Prussian general staff. It was under his direction that the official history of the war was to be written. In August 1871 the Prussian general staff requested from the Württembergian war ministry an

officer with staff experience to help prepare the history of the war. The war minister recommended two officers, Major von Gleich and Captain von Jaeger. The major, in turn, suggested an additional officer, First Lieutenant von Wiederhold. The Prussians, however, rejected these Württembergians and suggested that a Prussian write the portions describing the role of the Württembergian division. This proposal was not acceptable to the south German war minister, and the issue lay dormant for a year. In November 1872 the war minister once again recommended Major von Gleich and Captain von Jaeger, both of whom subsequently went to the historical department of the Prussian general staff for the purpose of preparing the sections of the official history dealing with Württemberg's role in the war. A year later Moltke transmitted to the Württembergian war ministry the Kaiser's order to terminate Major von Gleich's work on the project. The Chief of Staff added that Gleich did not have the qualifications to advance
within the Prussian general staff, and he assumed that the war minister would want Gleich to rise above the rank of major before his career ended.\footnote{HstaSt, Ha, Württembergisches Kriegsministerium, Abteilung A, 758. The Prussian commanding general in Stuttgart wrote a cover letter to Moltke's communication in which he suggested that Gleich, a former artillery officer, be transferred to a Prussian artillery regiment to learn the Prussian training regulations before returning to Württemberg. In early 1874 Gleich was sent to a Prussian artillery regiment. Gleich's work on the history, although not included in the published work, did remain in the general staff archives until the early twentieth century, but by 1905 it had disappeared. See Ba/Ma, Groener Nachlaß, N\textsuperscript{46}/33, letter from Gerold von Gleich to Groener, 3 May 1935.}{18}

Moltke's interpretation of how the German army should be organized was transmitted by the Bavarian ambassador in Stuttgart to his sovereign in Munich. The emissary reported that in 1872 the Prussian Chief of Staff had suggested to Count von Taubenheim, King Karl's Master of the Horse, that Württemberg abolish its independent war ministry and integrate its administrative apparatus with the Prussian war ministry. Count von Taubenheim, however, refused to entertain the suggestion and broke off the conversation.\footnote{BHstaMü, Abt II, GehSta, MA III, 3032, report of Baron von Gasser, 3 July 1872. Moltke's theory on the structure of the army is located in Graf Helmuth von Moltke, Gesammelte Schriften und Denkwürdigkeiten (Berlin: Mittler, 1892), VII, pp. 12-15.}{19}
During the war the south German states had signed military conventions with the North German Confederation. These conventions were to formalize the acceptance of the Prussian regulations and, while leaving certain military prerogatives to the two south German kings, were to prepare the way for the creation of the German Reich. Representing the kingdom of Württemberg in the negotiations was the war minister, Albert von Suckow. He met at Versailles, the Prussian king's headquarters, with his Prussian counterpart, Albrecht von Roon, on 25 October 1870, and after ten days of negotiations prepared a draft which he submitted to Roon and the chancellor of the North German Confederation, Otto von Bismarck. Suckow's draft was modeled after a military convention which Saxony had signed with Prussia in 1867.

Suckow advocated the forging of strong military bonds between Württemberg and Prussia. Before the outbreak of hostilities with France he had worked hard to insure the successful utilization of the Prussian regulations for training and equipping an army, which Württemberg had adopted in 1867. The Swabian war minister felt that Württemberg's fighting forces could remain effective only if they joined the Prussian army or at least patterned their organization after the Prussian armed forces. He interpreted his mission during negotiations at Versailles as bringing into being a military convention which would gradually integrate the Württembergian contingent into the Prussian army. The united army would then serve as a precursor to a united Germany.

Suckow's role during unification remains a subject of controversy. The editor of Suckow's memoirs, Wilhelm Busch, contends that the war minister considered the creation of a unified army a means to national political unification. Busch adds that Suckow adroitly steered a middle course between the particularist monarch and the democratic element who wanted to set up a militia. Albert von Suckow, Rückschau, edited by Wilhelm Busch (Tübingen: Mohr, 1909), pp. 3-7. An indication of Suckow's thinking exists in a letter which he wrote in late 1869 to Freiherr von Wagner-Frommenhausen, who preceded Suckow as war minister. Those in Württemberg who wanted to lift the army out of its decaying condition, wrote Suckow, would have to subordinate it to the
Accompanying Suckow to Versailles to negotiate the political treaty of unification was the Württembergian minister of justice and later minister-president, Freiherr Hermann von Mittnacht. During the preceding decade Mittnacht had been a proponent of the "Greater German" solution for unification of the German-speaking peoples; that is, he advocated the inclusion of Austria into a united Germany in order to balance Prussia's power. After Austria's command of a great army and accept its regulations. In addition, Württemberg must conclude a political union with the North German Confederation. To remain politically, economically, and militarily independent would subject Württemberg to foreign dominance. Internally it would be impossible to avoid democracy. If Württemberg wanted to preserve its independent monarchy, it must enter a strong, well-organized confederation. HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß von Wagner-Frommenhausen, 4. A recent biography of the Württembergian minister-president, Freiherr von Mittnacht, contends, on the other hand, that Suckow wanted to form so strong a union with Prussia that he was willing to undermine the institutions and personalities of his own state including the war ministry itself. Mittnacht's biographer depicts Suckow as a person who had the driving force to assist the historical process in overcoming obstacles, but his emotional energy would not permit him to tolerate the slow process of consolidation. See Georg H. Kleine, Der Württembergische Ministerpräsident Frhr. Hermann von Mittnacht (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1969), pp. 27-29.
defeat in 1866, Mittnacht gradually changed his position to support the eventual assimilation of the south German states into a union led by Prussia. But he pursued a middle-of-the-road strategy and struggled to protect Württemberg's independent direction of its internal affairs, including military administration. Mittnacht did not attend the negotiations of the military convention and only saw Suckow's draft just before the war minister submitted it to Roon and Bismarck for their approval. The minister of justice approved the draft, especially since it included his suggestion that any savings in the military budget should remain at the disposal of the Württembergian government rather than revert to the Imperial treasury.  

Some question exists about the source of the article concerning budgetary savings. In his memoirs Suckow states that he showed his draft to Mittnacht, who asked that the provision be inserted. The minister-president mentioned that such a stipulation would facilitate ratification of the convention by the Württembergian parliament. Suckow retorted that Mittnacht's faith in Württembergian national feeling was low, but he added that he was happy about such a minor demand from a former Großdeutscher and inserted the provision on budgetary savings. HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Suckow, unpublished edition of his memoirs, p. 78. Mittnacht, in his memoirs, rebuts Suckow's contention. The minister-president says that the first time he saw the article
No one respected the delicacy of the negotiations for military and political unification any more than Bismarck. He could appreciate the positions held by both Württembergian ministers on the issue of unification. But, aware of south German sensitivity and cautious on the issue of assimilation, the chancellor was nevertheless determined to assure Prussian hegemony in the new Reich. One of the paths to fulfillment of this objective which Bismarck pursued was the forging of a unified military

was when the war minister showed him the draft. Mittnacht remarked that such a stipulation was a good idea. See Hermann Freiherr von Mittnacht, Rückblicke (Berlin: Cotta, 1909), p. 135. But earlier Mittnacht had testified before a parliamentary commission that the war minister asked him about including a special provision concerning the use of potential savings in the military budget. The minister-president's response that such a provision would meet with favor in Stuttgart was meant to be merely an observation, but Suckow must have assumed it was a request to insert the article into the convention. VderWükderA, 146th Session, 31 October 1900, Protocol Vol. V (224), pp. 3290-3291. The evidence seems to indicate that the war minister discussed the provision with Mittnacht prior to completing his draft, and that the minister-president strongly influenced the inclusion of the article.
institution organized along the lines of the Prussian army. Therefore the chancellor was pleased with Suckow's draft of the military convention, and when he gave it his approval, he pledged to defend the draft against any attacks from Prussian particularists. Bismarck's strategy suffered a setback when on 12 November 1870 Mittnacht and Suckow informed him that they had received instructions from Stuttgart not to enter into final negotiations of the treaties. The chancellor waited a week while the Wurttembergian ministry of state debated the treaty and convention. In the end his patience wore thin and he sent a telegram to the Prussian ambassador in Stuttgart stating that the government would no longer delay convening the two houses of the north German legislature. Despite this nudge from Bismarck, particularist objections to the treaties continued to be raised in the Wurttembergian cabinet. The legislature, therefore, convened without a decision from Wurttemberg.23

23Suckow, unpublished edition of his memoirs, Aus Meinem Leben, pp. 78-81 in HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß General von Suckow. See also Becker, Bismarck's Ringen, pp. 598, 602-603, 609, 776. For Bismarck's relationship with Mittnacht see Kleine, Der Wurttembergische Ministerpräsident, p. 31.
Because the obstructionists were to have an impact on the nature of Prusso-Württembergian military relations later on, it is necessary to identify them. The particularists, including the king's chief secretary, Freiherr von Egloffstein, and the queen's lady-in-waiting, Baroness von Massenbach, grouped themselves around Queen Olga, daughter of Tsar Nicholas I of Russia and sister of Tsar Alexander II. The queen opposed unification because it would have injured her pride to slip into the ranks of petty royalty in an imperial German court dominated by the Hohenzollerns. She and Baroness von Massenbach prevailed upon King Karl to have a telegram sent to Mittnacht and Suckow on 12 November 1870 which read, "His Majesty commands that before [the agreements]⁷ are concluded without Bavaria, a report must be drafted and specific permission must be obtained; in no other way can the matter be treated."²⁴ The king, however, did

²⁴Suckow quotes the text in the unpublished edition of his memoirs, p. 79. Other particularists who exerted influence on the royal couple were the Bavarian ambassador to Württemberg and his wife, Baron and Baroness von Gasser, and the Württembergian
not need much pressure from his wife or particularist courtiers to obstruct negotiations. King Karl sought to retain much of his stature as a monarch of a sovereign kingdom. The scion of the house of Württemberg had a high opinion of his position and person, but his self-esteem and sensitive emotional makeup confounded his perspective. 25

The telegram resulted in the immediate departure of Mittnacht and Suckow from Versailles. Once back in Stuttgart the two had to contend not only with resistance from particularists in court circles, but also with the interior minister, Herr von Scheurlen. Even after the king had approved the drafts, Scheurlen demanded that Württemberg retain all previous rights in recruiting troops for the contingent. Suckow assured him that this right would be included in a protocol and appended to the convention, but the

 ambassador to the Bavarian court, Baron von Soden. See also Marquardt, Geschichte Württembergs, p. 327; Busch's edition of Suckow's memoirs, Rückschau, p. 9; Becker, Bismarck's Ringen, p. 764; and Friedrich III, Kriegstagebuch, p. 274. The crown prince attributed the main source of obstructionism to Baron von Gasser, but the editor of his diary, H. O. Meisner, notes that the most influential particularists were the queen and her lady-in-waiting.

 25 Marquardt, Geschichte Württembergs, pp. 327-328. See also Kleine, Der Württembergische Ministerpräsident, pp. 12-13 and Vierhaus, ed., Tagebuch der Baronin Spitzemberg, p. 112.
minister of the interior demanded that the stipulation be included in the convention itself. Suckow and Roon initialized the convention on 21 November 1870 at field headquarters, but Scheurlen's demands delayed the final signing until November 25. This resulted in the embarassing absence of the Württembergian delegates from the official ceremonies inaugurating the new Reich.

There was little joy at the Württembergian court upon the creation of the Reich. King Karl and his entourage considered unification a pragmatic marriage, but even though the king and queen accepted the union, they resented their diminishing role in the new imperial political and social configurations. In the military sphere, however, the king retained certain prerogatives. He remained "Chief of his Troops" (Chef seiner Truppen), the symbolic head of Württemberg's contingent, and enjoyed all the rights and honors accruing to this appellation. He also exercised the right to review judgments on the honor and behavior of his soldiers in military

---

26 HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Suckow, unpublished edition of Suckow's memoirs, pp. 80-81. See also Becker, Bismarcks Ringen, p. 764.
courts. The king continued to receive the oath of allegiance and had the right to commission, promote, and transfer officers and officials of the Württembergian contingent. Württembergian units were to keep their distinctive battle flags and standards. Uniform design would be decided by the king, as long as the cost of Württemberg's uniforms equaled the cost of the uniforms worn by the other contingents. Units of the Württembergian contingent would be stationed within the kingdom during peacetime, and no other federal troops would be stationed in Württemberg without the monarch's consent. These perquisites, included in the articles of the convention, determined the extent of the king's power over his army.

Other stipulations found in the convention indicate the nature of the reorganized army. According to the first article of the convention the royal Württembergian army was to be expanded to form a self-contained \( \text{In sich geschlossenes} \) army corps in conformance with Prussian organizational norms. The second article sets a time limit for the reorganizing process; implementation of the Prussian norms
must be completed by three years after the return of the troops from France. In the third article all of the units comprising the Württembergian army corps would be renumbered according to the federal army's continuous numbering system. Article four designates the king of Prussia as supreme commander of the field army (Bundesfeldherr) and adds to the Württembergian soldier's oath of service a clause whereby the officer or soldier pledges to render service to the supreme commander and swears to obey the military regulations. Article five reiterates the Württembergian king's right to commission, promote, and transfer officers and officials of the army corps, but adds that the king must have the prior agreement of the king of Prussia before naming a general to fill the post of army corps commander. Articles six, seven, and eight discuss the stationing of troops on Württembergian territory, the appointment of commanders to fortresses within the kingdom, and the exchanging of officers between Württemberg and Prussia for training and educational purposes. Article nine sets forth the supreme commander's right to inspect the Württembergian contingent, and
article ten specifies the exceptions to the Prussian norms to which Württemberg remained entitled. In case of war, states article eleven, the telegraph network in the kingdom was to come under the control of the supreme command. Article twelve indicates the areas in the military budget which Württembergian taxes must maintain and states that any savings which might be left over after fulfillment of all obligations to the maintenance of the army corps would revert back to the Württembergian treasury. Further arrangements concerning the distribution of funds allocated to the army corps are covered in article thirteen. Calling up the reserves and mobilization of the army corps according to Prussian procedural guidelines is stipulated in article fourteen. Article fifteen states that the supreme commander's orders would be transmitted to the Württembergian war ministry via the Prussian war ministry. The final article declares that the convention was to go into effect upon its ratification and the ratification of the federal (imperial) constitution.  

---

27HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAdelWüKM, 2.
As worked out by Suckow and approved by Roon and Bismarck, the military convention seemed to delimit clearly the spheres of authority of both the Prussian supreme commander and the king of Württemberg. Actually the convention shows signs of the haste with which it was drafted, approved, and signed. The issues of appointment of the army corps' commanding general, the spheres over which the commanding general and the war minister were to have authority, and the blatant contradiction between the convention and the imperial constitution on the issue of budgetary savings created friction in the relations between Württemberg and Prussia during the transition period and hindered the establishment of a truly cohesive army in the German nation.
CHAPTER II
REORGANIZING THE CONTINGENT

The conclusion of the military convention in November 1870 formalized Württemberg's acceptance of the Prussian regulations governing army organization and training. As is the case with the adoption of new procedures, the change-over to the Prussian regulations led to instances of friction caused by differing interpretations of the convention's provisions and by conflicts among the leading personalities involved in the reorganization process.

According to the convention Württemberg would expand its troop strength to form an army corps within the Prussian army, and it would complete the process within three years after the end of the war with France. To meet the requirements of a Prussian army corps, Württemberg would have to add an infantry division to its existing infantry division; it would have to create a cavalry brigade, increase the number of its artillery regiments, and introduce several new support units. In addition to expanding regular troop units, Württemberg was to enlarge and reorganize
its war ministry and general command corresponding to the Prussian model.

Such a rapid expansion of the contingent created problems in the south German kingdom. Financing the contingent's reorganization proved to be the major source of contention and friction between Württemberg and Prussia. It also caused disagreement between military and civilian leaders within Württemberg. Significantly the tensions were so deep that even after several changes of personnel, they did not subside, even though Württemberg completed its expansion program on schedule. The pattern of military relations between Prussia and Württemberg, set during the initial three-year reorganization period, did not change substantially during the entire imperial era. Although the Prussians were able to impose on Württemberg their interpretation of how the army was to be organized, outfitted, and trained, Swabian leaders clung tenaciously to their rights of administrative control. The weaknesses of this dual control, ignored or underestimated by the Prussians during the years of peace, surfaced during the long and arduous war from 1914 to 1918. Paradoxically local administrative control contributed to the tenacity with which Swabian soldiers fought during
the First World War, but ultimately the confusion and friction of this duality played a role in Germany's defeat.

The crux of the financial controversy was the definition of Retablissement, the reoutfitting of army units with war matériel. Württembergians considered it an Imperial matter and thought that it should be financed from the Imperial treasury. The Prussians argued, however, that reoutfitting army units was to be done by the separate states. The arguments on both sides rested on interpretations of the military convention of 1870 and the Imperial constitution. Article 10 of the military convention stated that the Prussian regulations were to be the models which Württemberg was to emulate in organizing its army corps. Article 63 of the Imperial constitution gave the German kaiser the right to determine the strength and organization of the army. Basing their position on these two articles, officials in the Prussian war ministry and the German chancellor argued that reoutfitting involved the adoption of whatever equipment was necessary to prepare the army for combat in a future war. The Prussian definition included matériel
which had been destroyed during the recent war and
equipment which the Württembergian units lacked
prior to the adoption of the Prussian regulations.¹

In reply to the Prussian position the Württem-
bergian war ministry tried to evade the issue by
saying that it had no authority over the constitu-
tional-legal question of who should fund the out-
fitting of the contingent. The finance ministry
was responsible for administering state financial
matters, and ultimately monetary issues were decided
by the state parliament, which must appropriate
the funds for financing the army's reorganization.²
Civilian ministries in Württemberg, including the
finance ministry and the justice ministry, took
the position that costs of reoutfitting the army
units which fought in the war should be separated
from the costs of equipping the new units. The
units created by the expansion of the contingent
resulted from the agreement to bring Württemberg's
army up to the strength of a Prussian army

¹See the memorandum of the Prussian war
minister, 27 June 1872, in HstaSt, E 74 I, WüGB,
109, and the note from the Prussian war minister
to the Württembergian war minister, 16 July 1872,
in HstaSt, E 46/48, MAA, 1275.

²HstaSt, E 74 I, WüGB, 109. Undated memorandum.
corps. Outfitting new units, therefore, should be considered an Imperial affair and should be included in the Imperial budget.\(^3\)

A split developed within the Württembergian government over the funding issue. In 1872 the war ministry accepted the Prussian position, but the finance, justice, and interior ministries objected to the Prussian interpretation and sought an alternative course.\(^4\) A memorandum drafted in the finance ministry questioned not only the Prussian or broad interpretation of Retablissement, but it also disagreed with Prussia's position on how the project would be funded. A third point discussed by the Württembergian finance ministry concerned the organ which controlled the allocation of funds. Prussia's broad definition of refurbishment, funded by the separate states from previously granted war credits and war reparations, ignored the circumstances of Württemberg's case. The government had to request funds from the Württembergian parliament. In

\(^3\)Ibid., memorandum by justice ministry on remarks of war minister, dated 5 September 1872. See also HstaSt, E 46/48, MAA, 1275, for the finance ministry's memorandum, dated 18 September 1872.

\(^4\)Memorandum dated 28 November 1873. HstaSt, Ha, WüKM PAder WüKM, 4.
December 1870 the parliamentarians declared that Württemberg would not shirk its obligations in the unification effort, but as legislators they would see to it that the south German kingdom did not bear any burden out of proportion to that borne by other states in united Germany. The Württembergian parliament had previously granted credits for refurbishing the prewar contingent, but it had provided none for supplying new units. The memorandum concluded that it would be difficult for the government to request additional funds because the legislators would view outfitting new units as an Imperial obligation. In order to avoid difficulties with the parliament, the finance ministry recommended that the government pursue a strategy of supporting a narrow definition of Retablissement, i.e., Württemberg would fund only the equipment used up by existing units within the contingent. Supplying the new units should be an item in the Imperial budget and should be deliberated by the Imperial Reichstag.5

5Memorandum dated 18 September 1872. HstaSt, E 46/48, MAA, 1275.
In his review of the finance ministry's memorandum, War Minister Suckow disagreed. Such assumptions led to the conclusion that reoutfitting the contingent was strictly a Württembergian affair. But the military convention and the constitution left no doubt that Prussian norms applied to all contingents, both to existing and to newly created units. Suckow interpreted the Prussian position as a federal solution, pointing out that Prussia allowed the war ministers of the south and east German contingents to determine their own costs for reoutfitting and allowed them to offset the costs with French war reparations. On the question of decision-making authority Suckow believed that the Bundesrat, not the Reichstag, should decide on the extent of reoutfitting and on how the costs should be offset. If this body's decision confirmed the Prussian war minister's or chancellor's view, Württemberg should in no way interpret it as being less binding than any decision handed down by the Reichstag.6

6Memorandum of 15 October 1872. HstaSt, E 46/48, MAA, 1275 and E 74 I, WüGB, 109. Suckow differentiated between the procedures of funding construction and resupply, and he hoped to keep the two programs separate. But he testified to the parliament that Württemberg would have to bear the costs of both. VderWüKd 1870 bis 1873, 7th Protocol Volume, p. 4100.
Bundesrat delegates debated the issue in 1873, and despite proposals by the Württembergian representatives to make the supplying of new weapons an obligation of the Imperial government, the Prussian interpretation held. Outvoted on the constitutional issue, Württemberg had no recourse but to comply with the Prussian view. Because of Prussian dominance of the Bundesrat Württembergian interpretations concerning military appropriations were also defeated. Rudolf von Delbrück, head of the Chancellor's Office, circulated a memorandum which noted the increased costs of troop maintenance and suggested that they be offset by taking from the general French reparations fund. The war ministry in Stuttgart criticized Delbrück's reasoning, and Suckow instructed Württemberg's military plenipotentiary in the Bundesrat, Colonel Faber du Faur, to object to the proposal. Faber's objections did not prevent the bill from being reported out to a plenary session. There it came under attack once more from Württemberg's chief delegate to the Bundesrat, Freiherr Karl von Spitzemberg. When the issue came up for a vote,
however, Württemberg was the only state which voted against the measure. ⁷

Württembergian leaders were more successful in their attempt to retain control of savings accruing to the contingent from the budgetary allocation of 225 Talers per man per year. This sum, as expressed in Section XI, Article 62, of the Imperial constitution, would be paid by each German state and would be used to maintain and provision the peacetime army. ⁸

Article 67 of the constitution states that any savings that might occur in this appropriation would remain in the national treasury. Under no circumstances were savings to be returned to the state governments. Article 12 of the 1870 military convention stipulated, however, that any money left over after fulfillment of its general military obligations would remain at

⁷ Delbrück's memorandum, dated 24 May 1873, is located in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, AbtZ, 13. In the same file are Württemberg's promemoria, dated 4 June 1873 and Spitzemberg's communication, dated 7 June 1873.

⁸ The constitution set the peacetime strength at one percent of Germany's population in 1867. Provisions existed for changing this percentage, but nothing in the constitution provided for increasing the per capita allocation. Subsequent governmental attempts to increase this figure caused a major constitutional crisis in the Reich.
the disposal of Württemberg. Both Prussian and Württembergian officials spent much time and energy interpreting these contradictory statements concerning the disposal of budgetary savings. The Prussian argument focused on the obligations to offset maintenance costs for the whole army. The Prussians contended that Württemberg's contingent was part of the entire army, and it must completely fulfill its obligations to the whole army. Even if Württemberg had a surplus in any given year, its savings must help offset deficits which other states might have incurred. Only in years when all of the contingents enjoyed a surplus could Württemberg lay claim to its share of the savings. Württemberg's Justice Minister Mittnacht countered the Prussian position by arguing that Article 12 of the 1870 military convention expressly granted to Württemberg the right to dispose of any savings which existed after complete fulfillment of the state's military obligations to the Reich. This article had been included in the military convention because Article 67 in the constitution

---

of the North German Confederation (essentially the same as the 1871 Imperial constitution) stated that all savings were to remain in the general treasury. 10

The controversy continued throughout the decade. Württemberg enacted legislation which allowed its government to retain control over savings in the military budget. The chancellor's office tried at first to argue against the Württembergian position, then it sought a compromise with the south German government. Württemberg would be reimbursed for construction costs of military buildings if it would rescind its legislation concerning the use of savings. Negotiations failed because neither side would accept the other's conditions. The issue became a dead letter, however, when the lump sum payment for troop maintenance was replaced by a more flexible budgeting process. 11

According to the military convention Württemberg was to retain and expand its own war ministry, whose mission was to deal with administrative

10 A memorandum on the savings controversy is in VderWüKderA, Beilage 230, 13 October 1900, pp. 962-966. For correspondence and memoranda dealing with the issue see HstaSt, E 74 I, WüGB, 105.

11 Ibid.
affairs. Command decisions, i.e., decisions concerning the troops in combat units, were to be made by the general command of the XIIIth Army Corps. According to the military convention both departments were to adopt Prussian operating procedures, and to assist in the introduction of the Prussian regulations, Prussian officers were transferred to Württemberg. They served in the war ministry, but more importantly, they dominated the general command.

The first commanding general of the XIIIth Army Corps was a Prussian, Major General Ferdinand von Stülpnagel. General Stülpnagel's mission, which he assumed on November 3, 1871, was to reorganize the Württembergian contingent along Prussian lines. Stülpnagel was a man of considerable military ability, and he used his talents effectively to mold the Württembergian units into an army corps patterned after the Prussian model. But, because of the sensitivity of the court toward Prussian domination, the position also required a high degree of tact on the part of the commanding general. War Minister Suckow claimed in his memoirs that high-ranking officials in the Prussian war ministry were aware of the need for a tactful commanding general in
Stuttgart. They assured Suckow of their full cooperation in assigning the best men for the post. On the other hand Prussian officers recognized that the post would be a difficult assignment. Prussian General von Obernitz, commanding general of the Württembergian contingent during the Franco-Prussian war, did not want to remain in the south German kingdom. Prussian General von Schwerin, a friend of Stülpnagel, wrote to him upon learning of the appointment as commanding general of the XIIth Army Corps. In his commiseration with Stülpnagel about the transfer to Stuttgart Schwerin noted that although Stülpnagel might have wished for a post in Prussia, he had to have faith in the kaiser's military assignments.¹²

General Stülpnagel did his duty and accepted his new assignment, but he did not consider tact an important aspect of that duty. He saw himself as an Imperial emissary on a special mission to one of the provinces and refused to be bound by Württembergian court protocol. He thought that his special

status entitled him to be ranked with the most important state officials at court functions. At the court ball celebrating the new year in 1871, General Stülpnagel and his wife refused to accept their appointed places in the lines awaiting to pay homage to the king and queen. They attempted to maneuver themselves into the leading positions of their respective ranks. Shortly thereafter the commanding general complained to War Minister Suckow about his placement at court social functions. Such a low ranking was an insult to him as a man, as a husband, as a Prussian general, as the commanding general, and as an "Imperial general." During the next New Year's ball General Stülpnagel refused to escort to the dining table the lady assigned to him. Instead he took the arm of his wife from her assigned escort and led her into the dining room. Prior to celebrating Easter in the garrison church in Stuttgart, Stülpnagel demanded that the service be conducted according to the Prussian rites, but the chaplain rejected his request. During the service the Stülpnagel family, seated close to the altar, created a commotion by attempting to control the order of the service. The king, offended by
Stülpnagel's arrogant behavior, contemplated replacing the general. Furthermore, the king chafed at the concessions Württemberg had to make during the reorganization process. His irritation at times erupted into outbursts against the influx of Prussian officers into his kingdom. During one audience in which War Minister Suckow was seeking approval for the transfer of some Prussian regimental commander to Württemberg the king angrily struck the table and exclaimed, "That's the last Prussian!"\(^\text{13}\)

Relations between commanding general and war minister, if no less abrasive than those between Stülpnagel and the court, were more complex and more important for the future relationship between the Württembergian and Prussian armies. To be sure, the personalities of the two men were involved, but their relationship also depended on how each interpreted the military convention of 1870 and an 1871 regulation clarifying the spheres of authority of each department. The latter document, signed by Suckow and dated

---

\(^\text{13}\)Suckow, Rückschau, pp. 199-201. See also the comments of Crown Prince William of Württemberg to King Karl, HsatzSt, E 74 I, WüGB, 177. HsatzSt, Ha, Nachlaß Suckow, unpublished memoirs, pp. 208-209. See also Suckow's note of 4 July 1872 in HsatzSt, Ha, WüKM, Abt A, 733.
21 September 1871, gave Württemberg's war minister constitutional authority over all of the state's military affairs. All royal decrees were to be issued through the war ministry; it served also as the clearing house for communications between the kaiser as Bundesfeldherr and the XIIIth Army Corps. The general command was entrusted with control over the training and discipline of the troops on active duty and those in both active and inactive reserve units. In cases of discipline, however, the general command must follow the Württembergian regulations on military discipline. If the commanding general wished to communicate with the king, he had the right to an audience, but he must first present his request to the war minister, who would notify the king. The commanding general had authority over personnel affairs of officers up to the rank of captain, but personnel affairs of higher ranking officers were the prerogative of the war ministry.14

Friction between commanding general and war minister over the limits of their spheres of authority began in January 1872, and after the first clash relations between the two were marked by increasing

14HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, Abt A, 1.
tension. Suckow and Stülpnagel conflicted repeatedly throughout the next year and a half. Each complained frequently about interference and lack of assistance from the other. Stülpnagel complained to Prussian Crown Prince Frederick William that Suckow had changed his attitude toward reorganizing the army corps along Prussian lines. The commanding general told the crown prince that he anticipated a clash with the war minister and judged that the issue of a commanding general who was considered too independent might be settled once and for all. In a letter to Kaiser William, Stülpnagel complained that he could not reorganize the Württembergian contingent because the war minister hindered him. Every time he tried to improve his relations with Suckow, he met with resistance from the war minister. The commanding general could no longer accomplish his mission and therefore asked the kaiser to relieve him of his command.

15HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Suckow, unpublished memoirs, pp. 97-98. Also Suckow, Rückschau, pp. 193-194.


17Ibid.
Suckow found himself in a difficult position. He admired the Prussian army and supported strongly the adoption of Prussian techniques by the Württembergian contingent. But Suckow served in his capacity as war minister at the pleasure of his sovereign, and his king had been offended by the behavior of the Prussian commanding general. Because it was Suckow who had convinced King Karl of the necessity of bringing Prussian officers to Württemberg, the king's irritation with Prussian arrogance caused a noticeable deterioration in relations between Suckow and the king. As early as 1872 King Karl began to turn away from his war minister. In March 1872 Suckow changed a draft from the Württembergian war ministry to the chief of the personnel department in the Prussian war ministry which requested the transfer of Prussian brigade commanders to Württemberg. Suckow was concerned that the draft implied his desire to have the officers come south with or without King Karl's permission. 18

18HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, AbtA, 733. See also the reports of Baron von Gasser, Bavarian ambassador to Stuttgart during 1871 and 1872. BHstaMü, Abt II, GehSta, MA III, 3031, 3032. Gasser supported the particularist circle at the Württembergian court,
In order to protect his vulnerable position, Suckow at first pursued a policy of keeping personalities out of his relations with the commanding general. He strove to maintain clearly delineated areas of responsibility, but by 1873 it was evident that this tactic had failed. Early in that year Suckow shifted his stance. He counseled the king to delay Stülpnagel's request for the transfer of two Prussian brigade commanders to Württemberg until a regulation could be effected which balanced the transfer of officers from one province to the other. The war minister also supported a proposal that all commanding generals of the XIIth Army Corps be transferred to service in the Württembergian army and wear the Württembergian uniform. Suckow hoped that such tactics would make the commanding general and the Prussian war ministry more responsive to King Karl's sensitivity about the transfer of Prussian officers to his kingdom.\(^\text{19}\)

\[^{19}\text{See Suckow's communication to the king, dated 14 April 1873 in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, Abt A, 733. See also a communication from Suckow to Colonel Faber du Faur, 17 April 1873 in HsatSt, Ha, WüKM, WüMBB, 33.}\]

and his reports may have overemphasized tensions in Stuttgart. But Suckow's memoirs seem to corroborate Gasser's observations. See HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Suckow, unpublished memoirs, pp. 208-209.
The personalities of the two men dominated the relationship between war minister and commanding general; however, conflicts between them continued. In the spring of 1873 Stülpnagel repeated his request to be transferred from Stuttgart. The Prussians, however, delayed his transfer because they wanted to use the general as a lever to obtain revisions of the 1871 agreement establishing areas of responsibility for the war minister and the commanding general. In essence, the Prussian war minister and Chancellor Bismarck wanted to give the commanding general direct access to the king of Württemberg and to make the king, not the war minister, the highest authority to settle complaints expressed by the commanding general.20 As early as June 1873 Stülpnagel's replacement, General von Schwartzkoppen, had been proposed by Berlin and accepted in Stuttgart, but his transfer was held up by failure to revise the 1871 regulation.

King Karl grew impatient with Prussia's delaying tactics. He complained to the kaiser on 21 November 1873 that Stülpnagel had not yet been

20Communications and reports are located in Ba/Ma, Nachlaß Stülpnagel, N 5/3.
transferred. He would accept General Schwartzkoppen or even a temporary replacement, but he must ask that the kaiser relieve General Stülpnagel from his post as commanding general. The kaiser responded on the day before Christmas that the order relieving General Stülpnagel was on its way and that General Schwartzkoppen was leaving for Stuttgart to take command of the Württembergian contingent. The kaiser followed up this notification with an urgent request that the Württemberians work out a revision of the 1871 agreement regulating the duties of the war minister and commanding general so that other Prussian officers commanded to Württemberg would not complain that the position of the commanding general was untenable. Mittnacht also received communications in late December and early January which stated that Bismarck had been able to secure Stülpnagel's recall only by promising the kaiser that he would successfully negotiate a revision of the 1871 regulation. Mittnacht responded that he would strive to adhere to Bismarck's wishes concerning the revision of the existing regulation within the framework of the 1870 military convention.²¹

²¹HstaSt, E 14 Ka IV, 1680. Mittnacht to Freiherr von Spitzemberg, 4 January 1874, in HstaSt, E 74 I, WüGB, 117.
By the end of January the Württembergian government had drafted and transmitted to Berlin its revised draft of the regulation. In the revised regulation the war minister retained authority over military affairs in Württemberg and the commanding general continued to have authority over command affairs. But the two were to communicate with each other more frequently and thoroughly about decisions within their own spheres of responsibility. Except in special cases the commanding general had to continue to submit proposals concerning officers under his command to the king through the war minister, but he could now receive royal decisions about these matters directly from the king. The war minister and commanding general were to reach agreement prior to sending their proposals to the king. In cases where a difference of opinion existed between the two, each would submit his arguments to the king for his decision. General orders from the kaiser to the commanding general continued to flow through the war ministry, where they would be published in the digest of military regulations, but the commanding general had the right to receive direct communications from the kaiser on matters of war, maneuvers,
and inspections. The commanding general was to inform the war minister of these communications. The legal basis for the relationship between war minister and commanding general continued to be grounded in Imperial law, the Prussian military regulations, and the 1870 military convention.  

On the basis of this document and Prussia's earlier draft, negotiations began in 1874, and in early 1875 King Karl approved the final draft revising the relations between Württembergian war minister and commanding general of the XIIIth Army Corps. The Prussians had gained a clearer definition of the commanding general's responsibilities and had freed him somewhat from dependence upon the war minister, but the Württembergians had retained administrative control over military affairs within their kingdom, and the 1870 military convention remained in force.  

War Minister Suckow did not witness the acceptance of the final revision. In April, 1874 he had requested King Karl to release him from his duties as war minister and asked to be placed on the military half-pay list. Suckow mentioned his poor health as the reason for his request. The pressures of the

---

22 HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAdewüKM, 2, 4, 5. See also HstaSt, E 74 I, WüGB, 117.
conflict with General Stülpnagel had indeed sapped the strength of the war minister. But Suckow had also fallen from the king's favor. Karl had accepted Suckow's interpretation of Prusso-Württembergian military relations, but he was not enthusiastic about the project. He disliked approving the transfers of Prussian officers to commands in his kingdom, especially since no corresponding numbers of Württembergian officers were assigned to Prussian units. General Stülpnagel's arrogant behavior had been a major source of irritation to the king and his court. Suckow was considered responsible for Stülpnagel's appointment, even though he had cautioned the Prussian war ministry to send a general attuned to the sensibilities of the Swabian court.23

Perhaps even more significantly, General Suckow was coming increasingly into conflict with Freiherr von Mittnacht over the course which Prusso-Württembergian relations should take. When the Prussians

tried to use Stülpnagel's recall as a lever to renegotiate the 1871 regulation, Mittnacht pursued a policy of delay. Suckow, on the other hand, wrote a memorandum in November 1873 in which he explored the possibility of relinquishing the independent Württembergian war ministry and integrating its administrative functions into an expanded Prussian war ministry.²⁴ He changed his mind, however, after Stülpnagel's departure. He observed that he could get along with General Schwartzkoppen and suggested that there was no need to give up the independent war ministry.²⁵ Mittnacht, however, had never intended to give up independent control over administrative affairs in either military or civilian affairs. It was Mittnacht's position that became accepted as state policy, and Suckow, deprived of his base of support in government and court, sought his resignation.

King Karl did not respond immediately to Suckow's request. For one thing he respected the ability of his war minister. But another

²⁴HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAdewüKM, 4. For an abstract of the 28 November 1873 memorandum see HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, Kra, 462.

²⁵HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAdewüKM, 4.
reason for the king's procrastination in relieving Suckow of his duties may have been the concern shown in Württemberg over the possible assimilation of the war ministry into Prussia's war ministry. When Suckow submitted his request, revisions of the 1871 agreement were still being negotiated, and there existed the possibility that the Prussians would press for assimilation. Some of the Prussians in Stuttgart entertained the notion that the Württembergian war ministry should be dissolved. It was not until King Karl became convinced that Mittnacht would demand the retention of an independent war ministry for Württemberg that he acquiesced to Suckow's entreaties for relief from his duties as war minister.  

Major General von Wundt succeeded Suckow as war minister. Wundt, a Swabian, had served for five

---

26 See the reports during June and July 1874 of Graf Tauffkirchen, Bavarian ambassador to Stuttgart, BHstaMü, Abt II, GehSta, MA III, 3034. See also HstaSt, E 14, Ka IV, 1669-1670 and HstaSt, E 74 I, WüGB, 117 for King Karl's letter of 18 September 1874. The Prussian position is reflected in a letter from Colonel Bronsart von Schellendorff, Chief of Staff of the XIIIth Army Corps, to General Stülpnagel, 28 May 1874, in Ba/Ma, Nachlaß General Ferdinand von Stülpnagel, N 5/4.
years in the war ministry as Chief of the Military Department. Wundt was neither the king's nor Mittnacht's first choice for the post. But there was no objection to him in Prussian military and political circles. Both king and minister-president were aware that some Prussian military figures were suggesting dissolution of Württemberg's war ministry upon Suckow's retirement. They were determined however to preserve some degree of independence for Württemberg's military administration, and they believed that any controversy over accepting a successor to Suckow would undermine their efforts.  

The new war minister assumed his duties immediately upon Suckow's retirement. His relations with Prussian officers were courteous, but his contacts with them were infrequent. Because of poor health, General Wundt spent little time actively performing his duties as war minister, but he remained at his post until 1883. Württembergian leaders were afraid that the Prussians might push their plans for

---

27 Report by Graf Tauffkirchen, 3 June 1874, BHstaMü, Abt II, GehSta, MA III, 3034. See also the following documents: Letters from Colonel Bronsart von Schellendorff, 28 May 1874, 3 December 1874 in Ba/Ma, Nachlaß General Ferdinand von Stülpnagel, N 5/4. Mittnacht to [Wagner?], 20 August 1874, 24 August 1874, and 31 August 1874 in HstaSt, E 46/48, MAA, 1309. King Karl's communication to Spitzemberg, 15 September 1874, HstaSt, E 14 Ka IV, 1669-1670.
assimilating the south German war ministry, if Wundt vacated the post through early retirement. The Prussians probably accepted the situation because they did not have to conduct business very often with the duly appointed Württembergian war minister. While Wundt was on sick leave, the chief of the Military Department, Lieutenant Colonel von Steinheil, who succeeded Wundt as war minister in 1883, carried on the business of Württemberg's war ministry. Both Prussians and Swabians appeared to be satisfied with this condition. Each side probably thought that its objectives were being served by such an arrangement.

The new commanding general, Schwartzkoppen, succeeded in reducing tensions between Prussian and Württembergian military men. His actions during his first year in Stuttgart also ingratiated him with the court. Schwartzkoppen's relations with King Karl were especially cordial, and the king granted the commanding general several special audiences. During a military review for Tsar Alexander II of Russia, Schwartzkoppen tactfully turned over command of the corps to a Württembergian division commander who was close to retirement. The gesture smoothed the way
for the king's approval of Schwartzkoppen's suggestion that a Prussian officer fill the vacancy. 28

On the other hand, relations between Schwartzkoppen and Suckow, as long as Suckow remained in office, were not friendly. Although Suckow thought that he could get along with Schwartzkoppen, the two men clashed frequently over their respective prerogatives and spheres of authority. In July, 1874 Mittnacht received complaints from Schwartzkoppen about Suckow, and the justice minister suggested that the king apprise the new commanding general of his immediate plans for Suckow. 29 Continued friction between commanding general and war minister may well have convinced Mittnacht and the king of the necessity of removing Suckow as war minister. But even after Suckow's departure General Schwartzkoppen continued the policy of passing over Württembergian officers for unit commands in favor of Prussian officers. Gradually tensions increased between court and general command. In January 1876 the king criticized Schwartzkoppen for his poor evaluation reports of

28 Letters from Bronsart von Schellendorff to Stülpnagel, 9 February 1874, 3 December 1874 in Ba/Ma, Nachlaß Stülpnagel, N 5/4. See also Tauffkirchen's report to Munich 10 May 1874 in BHstaMü, Abt II, GehSta, MA III, 3034.

29 Mittnacht to Wagner, 30 July 1874, 6 August 1874 in HstaSt, E 46/48, MAA, 1309.
Württembergian officers, and the offended commanding
general requested to be relieved of his command. King
Karl, wishing to avoid the unpleasantness of another
open confrontation with a Prussian commanding general,
refused Schwartzkoppen's request and asked him merely
to consider the Württembergian point of view in the
future.30

By 1876 the period of transition and reorganiza-
tion had ended. It had demanded major adjustments on
the part of individuals and institutions in both Prus-
sia and Württemberg. General Stülpnagel did not want
to accept the prerogatives guaranteed Württemberg in
the 1870 military convention, and he had to be relieved
of his command before the reorganization was complete.
War Minister Suckow perhaps wanted to adjust to the
Prussian way too readily, and he fell from favor in
Württemberg. There existed a great deal of tradition-
alism in the institutional arrangement at the end of
the transitional period, however. Although the 1871
regulation governing the duties of commanding general
and war minister had been revised, Württemberg

30 Bronsart von Schellendorff to Stülpnagel,
28 May 1874. Ba/Ma, Nachlaß General Ferdinand von
Stülpnagel, N 5/4. Mittnacht to Wagner?7, 18 October
1874, 28 November 1875. HstaSt, E 46/48, MAA, 1309.
Communications between King Karl and Schwartzkoppen,
25 January 1876, 26 January 1876, 27 January 1876.
HstaSt, E 14 Ka IV, 1680.
retained an independent war ministry, which continued to administer military affairs in the south German kingdom. In addition the 1870 military convention remained one of the legal foundations for determining military relations between the two states. The effect of this arrangement was to perpetuate the complexity and confusion of administering military affairs in the German Reich. This system of separate military administrations became an accepted tradition in Germany, and subsequently the nature of military relations between Prussia and Württemberg depended more on the personalities of the principal policy-makers than on institutional reform.
CHAPTER III
THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1875-1893

When the XIIIth Army Corps passed in review in December 1874, the reorganization of the Württembergian contingent officially ended. But the next decade and a half continued to be a period of adjustment in military relations between Württemberg and Prussia. During this formative period in Prusso-Württembergian military relations there arose several problems which led to a crisis in personnel affairs for the south German contingent. Solving the crisis while maintaining administrative autonomy over the contingent was the goal of Württemberg's military and political leadership.

Problem areas which had developed during the reorganization period continued to occupy the war ministry. War Minister Wundt, like his predecessor, clashed with the Prussian commanding general over spheres of authority in 1877 and 1878, even though King Karl had approved a revision of the agreement which determined their relationship in 1875. Often these disputes were very trivial. Thus General
Schwartzkoppen, the commanding general, complained to War Minister Wundt that the Pension Section of the ministry's Military Department had contacted retiring soldiers without first notifying the general command. Such matters, contended Schwartzkoppen, must go through his office. The war minister replied that he was acting in accordance with the Prussian regulations which prescribed direct notification of retirement dates by the Pension Section. Although the regulations provided for the notification of the general command if the war minister considered the matter important, Wundt did not think that such a communication was necessary.¹

The problem of control over budgetary savings and use of French war reparations also remained an area of disagreement between Württemberg and Prussia. But during the latter half of the 1870's and the ensuing decades it was Minister-President Mittnacht who determined Württembergian policy on the issue. His victory over Suckow in 1874 meant that policy formulation in Württembergian military affairs would

¹Memorandum and comments by Wundt, 30 January 1877 and January to April 1878 in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, Abt A, 1.
be in the hands of the civilian leadership. War Minister Wundt limited himself to suggesting alternatives the Württembergian government might take in case the Prussian view prevailed. In a memorandum Wundt asked whether it might not be a good idea for Württemberg to go on record in the Reichstag and Bundesrat as opponents to the Prussian plan for use of France's war reparations. Even if dissent failed to modify the Prussian point of view, Württemberg's public record could provide a basis for future arguments against Prussia's propensity to load up the individual state budgets with military costs. In addition, argued the war minister, such a strategy would help the Württembergian government argue before the state legislature that it had done everything it could to keep military costs out of the state budget, but the Prussian view had prevailed.²

Differing interpretations of what to do with budgetary savings and over spheres of authority were issues which had not been resolved during the period of the changeover to the Prussian system. As the documents show, Württemberg's leaders endeavored

²HstaSt, E 74 I, WüGB, 109.
continuously to administer independently the state's military and financial affairs. But the reorganization of the contingent introduced new problems for Württemberg's leaders. It was in the field of personnel affairs that a conflict arose which gradually developed into a crisis for the military leadership in the south German kingdom.

Expansion of the contingent into an army corps and the retirement of older officers gave younger Württembergian officers opportunities for promotion during the years immediately following reorganization. But as the situation stabilized, more and more Württembergian officers competed for the same commands within the contingent. By 1890 there were eight generals in the south German kingdom who were qualified to command an infantry division. The XIIIth Army Corps, however, had only two infantry divisions.\textsuperscript{3} This competitive situation was exacerbated by the presence of Prussian officers in Württembergian units. Originally they came south to help with the

\textsuperscript{3}War minister's report to Ministry of State, 14 September 1895 in HstaSt, E 74 I, WüGB, 105. The newspaper, Schwäbischer Merkur, reported that six generals were eligible for division commands. See Schwäbische Kronik des Schwäbischen Merkurs zweite Abteilung, 10 October 1890, p. 1.
reorganization of the contingent, but some remained after completion of the process. In 1875 the commanding general of the corps was a Prussian, as were the two division commanders. Prussian officers commanded two of the four infantry brigades, the two cavalry brigades, and the 26th Field Artillery Brigade.\footnote{With exception of Dragoon Regiment No. 26 all regimental commanders in 1875 were Württembergians, however. For a list naming all commanders of units in the XIIIth Army Corps from 1873 to 1900 consult HstaSt, Ha, WükM, PADerWükM, 2. See also Mittnacht's complaint to \textit{Wagner} on 6 December 1875 that Prussian commanders dominated the Württembergian contingent. HstaSt, E 46/48, MAA, 1309.}

Gradually Württembergian officers moved into the brigade commands, and during the next decade Württembergians commanded the 26th Infantry Division. But Prussian officers maintained their dominance in the corps' command posts. In 1890 they held the positions of commanding general, commander of the 27th Infantry Division, commanders of two infantry brigades, and commanding officers of ten of the fourteen regiments in the contingent. This continued presence of Prussians in higher command positions and the decline in opportunities for promotion within the Württembergian officer corps caused friction between the political and military leadership of the two states.
Article 8 of the 1870 military convention provided for the exchange of officers "to promote conformity in the training ... of the troops ...."\(^5\)

During the formative years in the history of the XIIIth Army Corps, Württemberg's war ministers made approximately two hundred requests to the monarch concerning the transfer of Württembergian officers to Prussia. In the same period, 1875-1890, the king considered more than sixty requests to permit Prussian officers to serve in the Württembergian contingent.\(^6\) The disparity in numbers is misleading, however. Most of the requests to send Württembergian officers to Prussia concerned their attendance at military training schools. Prussian officers, on the other hand, went south to assume command positions. Although each transferred officer temporarily entered the table of organization and payroll of the army to which he was transferred, his promotion possibilities were determined by his date of commission. If he received his commission in the Württembergian

\(^{5}\)HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAdervWüKM, 2.

\(^{6}\)HstaSt, E 14 Ka IV, 1674-1676.
officer corps, he kept that patent while serving in a Prussian unit. Because many of the Württembergian officers had advanced faster than their Prussian comrades during the years of expansion, they were younger than Prussians with the same rank. This situation caused a great deal of friction, and to prevent conflicts with older Prussian officers, few Württembergian officers were assigned to command positions in Prussia. But pressure within the south German officer corps mounted because the Swabian officers who went to Prussian training schools became more qualified for higher commands. When they returned to the XIIth Army Corps, they added to the growing backlog of officers vying for a decreasing number of command slots in the contingent.

The absence of a unified promotion policy was the result of two factors. Article 5 of the 1870 military convention stipulated that the king of Württemberg controlled the commissioning, promotion, and transfer of the officers and military officials
in the XIIIth Army Corps. Württemberg, therefore, had independent authority over promotions within its contingent. During the process of expanding the contingent into a Prussianized army corps, this independent authority worked to Württemberg's advantage. On the other hand, during the late 1870's and the decade of the 1880's this fragmented promotion and transfer policy worked to the disadvantage of Württembergian officers vis-à-vis their Prussian comrades.

The second factor affecting advancement was the Prussian war ministry and, after it gained autonomy from the war ministry, the Prussian Military Cabinet. These offices controlled the placement and transfer of Prussian officers. In addition, they had the authority to request the transfer of officers to Prussia, either to training schools or to unit commands. During the 1870's and 1880's differences of opinion over promotion and transfer of officers between the Prussian and Württembergian military

\[7\text{HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAdewüKM, 2. The king also appointed the commanding general of the contingent, but he had to consult with and obtain concurrence from the German kaiser.}\]
personnel departments were the causes of continuous readjustments in relations between the two armies.\(^8\)

In 1874 a Württembergian staff officer in Stuttgart was promoted ahead of a fellow staff officer who was serving in the historical section of the Prussian General Staff. Prussian War Minister General von Kamke complained that the incident was

\(^8\)See Mittnacht's communication to Spitzemerg, 28 November 1875, HstaSt, E 46/48, MAA, 7309. See also the report of the Bavarian ambassador, Count Tauffkirchen, 25 October 1890 in BHstaMü, Abt II, GehSta, MA III, 3050. General Groener, no foe of the Prussian army, mentioned that one Prussian officer sent to Württemberg was hated throughout the XIIIth Army Corps. He wondered how well the Military Cabinet knew the officers it was sending south. See Groener's manuscript of his memoirs, p. 68 in the family archives of Dr. Freiherr Hille von Gaertringen.

One area of agreement between the two military organizations, however, was the lack of prejudice concerning the social backgrounds of Württembergian officers. The Württembergian war ministry did not discriminate against young men from bourgeois families in its review of qualified candidates for the Prussian Cadet Corps. The Prussian General Staff accepted without prejudice nonnoble Württembergians who were qualified. This was a consistent trend throughout the period, and during World War I 39 of 89 Württembergian officers who served in Prussia came from bourgeois backgrounds. Of the ten Swabians serving on the General Staff only three were nobles. See "Übersicht über die Verwendung württemb. Offiziere und Beamten ausserhalb der württemb. Armee," in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, KrA, Band 998: Die Württembergische Armee und die heimatliche Kriegswirtschaft seit Kriegsbeginn bis Ende Juli 1918, pp. 26-28.
embarrassing to Prussia. He asked the south German war minister to prevent future cases of passing over one officer in favor of another. He also requested that Württemberg consider the time-in-grade of Prussian officers before transferring Württembergian officers to Prussian units. If a Württembergian captain were transferred to Prussia and were suddenly promoted to major by order of the king, he might outrank Prussian captains with more time-in-grade. The Prussian war minister concluded that even though the Württembergian officer had the time-in-grade to become a major, his promotion would create an intolerable situation. There would be no recourse but to transfer the Württembergian officer back to southern Germany. The Württembergian reply argued that the king promoted the officer in accordance with Article 5 of the 1870 military convention. Countering the Prussian request for consideration of the time-in-grade of Prussian officers when transferring a Württembergian officer, the war ministry official observed that promotions came faster in the Prussian army, and there was therefore no need to hold back a Württembergian officer's promotion after his transfer to a Prussian
Although he did not agree with the argument in the position paper, Colonel von Steinheil, Chief of the Military Department in Württemberg's war ministry, advised that no reply be sent to Kameke and that the war ministry place a moratorium on promotions. The subsequent reply from Stuttgart was conciliatory and stated that the Württembergian war ministry would strive to follow the Prussian wishes.

During the next decade, as more Württembergian officers were vying for fewer positions in the XIIth Army Corps, the Military Cabinet continued to request approval for transfers of Prussian officers to commands in the Württembergian contingent. Württemberg's military plenipotentiary in Berlin wrote to his superior, the war minister, in August 1884 that the Military Cabinet continued to obligate the Württembergians without fulfilling the requests coming from Stuttgart for transfers of Swabian officers to command Prussian units. The official

---

9 In July 1875 the Württembergian staff officer in Prussia received his promotion which reduced tensions between the General Staff and Württemberg. See the Pfaff-Höder incident, December 1874 to July 1875 in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, Abt A, 758.
suggested that the war minister delay sending Prussia's requests to King Karl. Taking a similar stand as war minister as he did when heading the Military Department, Steinheil replied that it was natural that Prussian military authorities would be dilatory about putting a Württembergian officer on their payroll. He therefore sent the Prussian request to the king but was careful in drafting the proposal in order to assuage his sensitive monarch.¹⁰

Steinheil continued to pursue a policy of accommodating the Prussians in their transfer policy during the 1880's. When a command vacancy occurred in the contingent's 27th Cavalry Brigade, the Württembergian war minister agreed with the Prussian commanding general that a Prussian should fill the slot. The only qualified Swabian officer was younger than most Württembergian infantry and artillery commanders, and his appointment would create a situation which would be detrimental to personal relations within Württemberg's officer corps. Though qualified, the Württembergian officer could not take

¹⁰The correspondence, dated 16-18 August 1884, is in HstaSt, Ha, WÜKM, Abt A, 734.
command of a Prussian brigade because there were fifteen Prussian generals ahead of him in line for a brigade command. The Military Cabinet worked out an arrangement whereby the Prussian brigade commander would be retransferred to Prussia as soon as the Württembergian officer reached the customary age and time-in-grade for a brigade command. King Karl, on the advice of his war minister, approved the proposal. After a ten month stay in Württemberg the Prussian officer returned to Prussia and the Swabian officer in question received command of the 27th Cavalry Brigade.11

Pressures on Steinheil and his policy of cooperation continued to build, however. They came not only from the king but also from some Swabian officers in the contingent. An incident, known as the "Miller Affair," illustrated that discontent was brewing in the Württembergian officer corps. In 1890 a former captain, Edmund Miller, wrote a brochure entitled "Documentary History of an Officer's Retirement" /"Aktengemäße Geschichte einer Offiziers Pensionierung/", which claimed that the commander of

11Communications on the issue, ranging from 14 October 1887 to August 1888 are in ibid.
the XIIIth Army Corps, Prussian General von Alversleben, had driven him out of active service because Miller refused to tolerate insults against Württemberg's king. The retired captain also alleged that there were other unjustified "retirements" of Württembergian officers and many actions favoring Prussians over Württembergians. The commanding general, obviously hurt by this and other criticisms, spoke out during his critique of maneuvers being held in Württemberg. He said that Württemberg, a beautiful land, unfortunately was infested with particularism, and he was the sworn enemy of particularism. Recognizing a certain animosity against himself and his fellow Prussians, Alvensleben defended the Prussian officers serving in the XIIIth Army Corps as the most loyal devotees of Württemberg's king. It was his duty, as the highest commander in the army corps, to suppress particularism and other manifestations of a "bad attitude." He stated that in the army absolute uniformity was necessary, especially in promotions. The retirement of older officers was necessary to

12 A copy of the brochure and its assessment by the Bavarian ambassador, Count Tauffkirchen, is in BHstaMü, Abt II, GehSta, MA, 77877.
give the army younger leadership. It was deplorable that retired officers were not satisfied. They must remember, concluded Alvensleben, that a soldier must be willing to sacrifice his post as well as his life for his king.\(^{13}\)

General Alvensleben hinted in his speech that he would soon retire from his position as commanding general and from active service in the Prussian army. In October 1890 Alvensleben retired and General von Hahnke, Chief of the Military Cabinet, hinted to the Württembergian military plenipotentiary in Berlin that Prussian General Count von Häseler would succeed Alvensleben.\(^{14}\) The young kaiser, William II, wanted Count von Waldersee, Chief of the Prussian General Staff, to take command of the XIIIth Army Corps. But Waldersee replied that he doubted whether he could be useful in Stuttgart and pointed out that every Prussian general made the Swabians uncomfortable. Waldersee suggested to the kaiser that at a time of such particularist feeling in Württemberg a Swabian

\(^{13}\)HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Lieutenant General Gerold von Gleich, 33. Gleich was at the time an ordnance officer in the 26th Division.

\(^{14}\)Communication from Major von Neidhardt to War Minister von Steinheil, 24 June 1890 in HstaSt, Ha, WÜKM, WÜMBB, 33.
general should get the post. He confessed in his memoirs that the general command of the XIIIth Army Corps was a second-class post because the commanding general had to work through the Württembergian war minister.15

King Karl, Minister-President Mittnacht, and War Minister Steinheil wanted to use the occasion of Alvensleben's retirement to place a Württembergian officer into the position of commanding general.16 Mittnacht mapped out a strategy of waiting until Alvensleben's retirement became public, at which time he would request that Alvensleben's successor come from within the Württembergian officer corps. The minister-president stressed that the king's right to name the commanding general of his own army could not be ignored merely because a Prussian general requested relief as a result of attacks on


16 Steinheil wanted a Württembergian general to assume command in Stuttgart, but he also supported strongly the candidacy of General Verdy du Vernois, Prussia's War Minister. Steinheil to Neidhardt, 18 May 1890 in HstaSt, Ha, WüKN, WüMBB, 33.
his reputation from brochures and the press.\textsuperscript{17} Crown Prince William of Württemberg became involved in the issue when he went to Berlin to argue Württemberg's case before the kaiser, Chancellor Caprivi, and the Prussian Military Cabinet. But Major Neidhardt, Württemberg's military plenipotentiary in Berlin, wrote that the possibility for a Swabian general to assume the position of commanding general was not great. The chancellor told Neidhardt that the Prussians had nothing against their countrymen in the south, but the kaiser could not let printed attacks chase out Prussian generals from command posts in south German army units. Count Waldensee, the Prussian Chief of Staff, mentions a meeting with the kaiser in which he convinced his sovereign that a Württembergian should get the post. The two sides reached a compromise during October 1890. A qualified Württemberger, General von Wölkern, was to become commanding general of the XIIIth Army.

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., Mittnacht to Neidhardt?7, 22 September 1890.
Corps, and Prussian generals were to command each of Württemberg's two infantry divisions. 18

Steinheil and Mittnacht worked energetically for the transfer of a Swabian to the post of commanding general of the XIIIth Army Corps. This was due in part to a change in strategy during the 1880's on the part of Württembergian leaders in their military relations with Prussia. Neither the minister-president nor the war minister resisted Prussia on substantive issues. The two men recognized the importance of cooperating with the Prussians in order to upgrade Württemberg's fighting forces. Yet on the procedural aspects of creating an army contingent on the Prussian model both minister-president and war minister pursued policies which would maintain local control. In 1887 Mittnacht sent a memorandum to Graf Zeppelin, Württemberg's representative to the Bundesrat, in which the minister-president

18 The correspondence concerning the compromise is in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, WüMBB, 33. See also the Steinheil-Neidhardt correspondence during September 1890 in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAderWüKM, 8. See also Waldensee, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. II, pp. 143, 147-148. Alvensleben's farewell communique, dated 23 October 1890, which repeats his earlier critique with attacks on Swabian democracy and particularism is in HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Gerold von Gleich, 33.
requested an addendum to Section 10 of the proposed military service law of 1888. The original draft of this section gave to the commanding general the right to approve the requests of individual soldiers for appointment to or release from active duty. Mittnacht added the phrase "in conjunction with the appropriate state or provincial authorities ...." At the same time the minister-president asked for an explanation of the commanding general's right to call up the inactive reserves. Zeppelin's reply argued that changes in the law proposed by the Prussians were necessary for utilizing the total military potential of Germany. With regard to the increased power of the commanding generals, Zeppelin argued that they should have such authority because they were the best judges of manpower needs. Zeppelin's remarks supported the Prussian position, and it was their position which carried the day. The ministry of state instructed Zeppelin on this and subsequent occasions to remove Württembergian reservations to the military service laws. Württemberg's leaders then changed tactics and sought
to get a Swabian general into the commanding general's post.\textsuperscript{19}

During these formative years the Württembergian contingent was steadily becoming more "Prussianized" in organization, training, and military bearing. Indications that the Württembergian contingent accepted Prussian organizational norms include the gradual transfer of specialized units from Württembergian to Prussian command authority. Out of the necessity to be centrally controlled in order to function properly Württemberg's engineer, communications, and railroad detachments, as well as its newly created heavy artillery units became assimilated into the Prussian table of organization and equipment. Moreover, the Prussians took advantage of their constitutional legal right to inspect the troops of the XIIIth Army Corps. Less direct but no less significant was the adoption of Prussian concepts of discipline and military bearing by the younger Württembergian officers who went to Prussian training schools.\textsuperscript{20} As a result retrained

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{19}HstaSt, E 74 I, WüGB, 106. Steinheil's position on the selection of a Württembergian commanding general of the contingent is found in his communications with Major Neidhardt, HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, WüBB, 33.

\textsuperscript{20}Memoranda from Steinheil to the king, 15 March 1887, 10 August 1887, 18-23 August 1888 in HstaSt, E 14, Kabinettsakten IV, 91.
\end{quote}
and reoutfitted Württembergian units won a great deal of praise from Prussian commanders and inspectors general. Because of the improved reputation of the XIIth Army Corps, the Prussians in the end acceded to Württembergian demands for a native commanding general. But the Prussians did not want their south German countrymen to be completely independent in command affairs, as the appointment of Prussian generals to command Württemberg's two infantry divisions illustrates.

Although Württemberg's military men won the struggle to place one of their own in command of the contingent, the crisis over the disparity of the promotion and transfer policies in the two states remained unsolved. Württemberg's leaders desired to coordinate promotion and transfer policies with Prussia in order to make them more equitable. In November 1888 Graf Tauffkirchen, Bavaria's ambassador in Stuttgart, reported rumors of negotiations between Württemberg and Prussia concerning a new military convention in order to remove injustices in promotion and transfer policy. Minister-President Mittnacht, however, denied the existence of negotiations and added that none were envisioned.²² Conflicting interpretations of transfer and promotion policy continued to mount during the next two years, however, and in late 1890 Major Neidhardt wrote that a Württembergian general had suggested the transfer of a Prussian officer to the war ministry in Stuttgart in order to look after personnel affairs. Neidhardt added that the Chief of the Military Cabinet approved of the project and suggested an

²²Ambassadorial report, dated 30 November 1888 in BHstaMü, Abt II, GehSta, MA III, 3048.
exchange of personnel officers between Prussia and Württemberg. The military plenipotentiary disapproved of the mutual transfer and criticized the Württembergian general for wanting to burden Swabia with another Prussian officer.\textsuperscript{23}

Crown Prince William of Württemberg seems to have supported the transfer of officers. Neidhardt worried that the prince, in conversations with the kaiser about appointing a Württembergian commanding general to the XIIIth Army Corps, would talk the kaiser into accepting the exchange of personnel officers. The military plenipotentiary observed that the crown prince should not express his personal point of view when it did not coincide with the wishes of King Karl. Neidhardt also indicated his concern that the prince would return to Stuttgart filled with notions of concluding a much broader military convention.\textsuperscript{24} But the prince was not

\textsuperscript{23}Neidhardt pointed out, however, that his predecessor, Count Zeppelin, had suggested earlier the transfer of a Württembergian officer to the Military Cabinet to handle personnel affairs. Neidhardt to /his father\textsuperscript{27}, 3 October 1890, HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, WüMBB, 33.

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid.
alone in his desire to see the personnel issue settled. War Minister Steinheil wrote to Neidhardt on 16 October 1890 that he and Minister-President Mittnacht thought that personnel matters between the two armies should be regulated. Steinheil requested Neidhardt to convey this judgment to the Chief of the Military Cabinet.  

When William ascended the throne upon the death of the king in October, 1891, he was determined to play a more active role in the affairs of his kingdom than his uncle had played. The new king, William II, was especially interested in his army and its officer corps. As a young man he had served in the army and had even spent several years in a Prussian guards regiment. His relations with Prussians had not always been smooth, however. The

25 Steinheil to Neidhardt, 16 October 1890, HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, WüMBB, 33.

26 He served in the Guard Hussars until 1875 when he transferred to the 19th Uhlans in the XIIIth Army Corps. Three years later he became commander of the Württembergian 27th Cavalry Brigade, but in 1882 he sought to be relieved of his command. The documents concerning his departure from the 27th are located in HstaSt, E 14 Ka IV, 85. Count Tauffkirchen's report of 11 March 1890 is the source that mentions William's conflict with General Schachtmayer, BHstaMü, Abt II, GehSta, MA III, 3050.
king was often disconcerted by the kaiser's arrogance and lack of sympathy for the south German mentality. Yet King William would not let his personal opinion of the kaiser and some of his generals deter him from improving promotion possibilities for his officers. When Kaiser William II invited him to send a Württembergian officer to the Military Cabinet, the king used the opportunity to open negotiations for changing Article 8 of the 1870 military convention.  

Württembergian and Prussian officials began serious negotiations in July 1893. Colonel Freiherr von Watter, Neidhardt's successor as military plenipotentiary, discussed the issue with Prussian War Minister von Goßler. Goßler thought that for political reasons it was not propitious to tie the

---

27 The invitation was dated 27 November 1892 and King William's acceptance bears the date 7 December 1892 in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PADERWüKM, 9. On the king's reaction to the kaiser see the manuscript of General Groener's memoirs, p. 47, in the family archives of Dr. Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen. See also the copy of a confidential report from the Prussian ambassador in Stuttgart to Chancellor Bismarck, 9 June 1888, in BHstaMü, Abt II, GehSta, MA III, 3043 and the Bavarian ambassador in Stuttgart, Freiherr v.d. Pforten, 12 January 1896 in ibid., 3055.
Württembergian officer corps more closely to the
Prussian officer corps, but he was aware that both
monarchs had expressed interest in the project.
General Goßler, therefore, showed Watter the Military
Cabinet's draft for expanding Article 8 of the
convention. The draft included four points: the
Military Cabinet would accept a Württembergian
officer to handle personnel affairs for the contin­
gent, there would be only one time-in-grade list
/Rang- und Quartierliste/ for both armies, officers
would receive common commissions, and those trans­
ferred to the other's army would don the uniforms
of the host army but would wear the cockades of both
kingdoms.28

At the end of July the kaiser appointed
Lieutenant General von Lindequist, the Prussian
commander of Württemberg's 26th Infantry Division,
and King William named his adjutant, Lieutenant
General Freiherr von Falkenstein, as negotiators
of a new agreement on military personnel affairs.
At the time of these appointments the Württembergian

28Communications, dated 17 July 1893, are in
HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAdernWüKM, 9 and WüMBB, 5. Corres­
pondence and drafts of the agreement are in /ibid./
and in HstaSt, E 74 I, WüGB, 105.
war minister, General Freiherr Schott von Schottenstein, transmitted to the Prussian war ministry Württemberg's proposals for amending Article 8 of the 1870 military convention. There were eleven proposals in the Württembergian draft. In addition to the four articles of the Prussian draft the Württembergian document contained provisions which spelled out just how promotions and transfers were to become more equitable. For example, as long as they were qualified, Württembergian officers were to fill posts in the contingent; otherwise a Prussian officer would take the position. If Württembergian officers could not be promoted because of a dearth of slots in the XIIith Army Corps, then they would be transferred to a promotable command in Prussia. But the draft stated also that Württembergian officers were to spend most of their military careers in their homeland.29

Negotiations continued throughout the summer and into the autumn. The major stumbling block was the position taken by officers in the Military Cabinet. They wanted their draft to be accepted without changes, and they constantly urged the south

29 Ibid.
German negotiators to make concessions. War Minister Schott began to take an active part in the deliberations during the fall. Even though pressed by his king, by the minister-president, and berated by the kaiser to conclude an agreement quickly, the Württembergian war minister continued to seek modifications in the Military Cabinet's draft. But pressures increased, and in late November the kaiser transmitted to King William an approved draft agreement. The kaiser considered adoption of the Prussian draft of such importance that he accepted King William's invitation to a hunting excursion at Bebenhausen in November. The kaiser and his advisers spent much of the time trying to persuade the king to approve the Prussian draft, without War Minister Schott's additions. Their arguments had the desired effect because on the first of December 1893 King William accepted the Prussian draft and stipulated that it would appear as a royal order. In Berlin the kaiser signed a similar order on the same day.

---

30 Schott's problems during the negotiations are documented in HstaSt, E 74 I, WüGB, 105 and in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, FAdenWüKM, 9.

31 Ibid. A copy of the agreement also appears in VderWüKderA, 1899-1900, Beilagen Band III, p. 921.
There are several plausible reasons why the agreement appeared as a royal order rather than as a convention, although historians call the document the "Bebenhausen Convention." War Minister Schott prepared a lengthy memorandum for Minister-President Mittnacht in which he discussed the advantages of publishing the agreement as an order from the king. The main reason why the agreement was promulgated as a royal order stems from the concerted efforts of German military leaders to remove military affairs from parliamentary scrutiny. There existed pockets of opposition to the military in the Württembergian Landtag just as critics of the Prussian army existed in the Reichstag. Both the Württembergian parliament and the Reichstag had to ratify treaties and conventions, and critics of the agreement made at Bebenhausen might have held up the agreement. A royal decree did not have to be approved by the legislature and therefore the king

32Bebenhausen, formerly a Cistercian monastery, was the king's hunting lodge. The agreement was promulgated shortly after the kaiser joined the king at Bebenhausen for a hunt. See Fritz von Graevenitz, Die Entwicklung des württ. Heerwesens, insbesondere im Rahmen des deutschen Reichsheeres (Stuttgart: Bergers Literarisches Büro, 1921), p. 29.
and his government could avoid opposition and delay. It would be as binding as a treaty, but such a form would leave more freedom of maneuver for the war ministers of both Württemberg and Prussia. They would not have to justify to parliamentary critics every subsequent action related to the terms of the agreement. Another possibility for announcing the agreement as a royal decree might have been the king's strong desire to complete negotiations as quickly as possible in order to solve the personnel crisis in his officer corps. After each monarch issued his respective order Prussian and Württembergian officials negotiated an addendum whose purpose was to facilitate the administration of the decrees.

War Minister Schott was concerned about Prussian interpretations of how the agreement would apply to older Württembergian officers. In his opinion Prussian interpretations seemed detrimental to these men. King William, however, pressed his war minister to reach an accommodation with the Prussians. He assumed that problems concerning older officers would work themselves out eventually. Perhaps the king's rush for approval and implementation of the
agreement stemmed from his desire to have it in force by 1 January 1894, the date when all officers were reviewed for promotion.\textsuperscript{33}

With the conclusion of the so-called "Bebenhausen Convention" the officer corps of the two armies became one institution in personnel affairs. Younger officers from Prussia and Württemberg were to receive the same commissions. They were eligible for promotion on the basis of their qualifications report and time-in-grade in the combined officer corps. Furthermore there was to be no prejudice towards either group in mutual transfers from north to south. Yet the Württembergian war minister, the minister-president, and the king had no intention of changing the nature of the 1870 military convention. Their objectives in this issue and in the case of promoting a Württembergian officer to the position of the contingent's commanding general were to provide opportunities for improvement in the terms of service of Württemberg's army officers. At no time during this formative era did the leaders of the south German kingdom consider giving up control over the administrative apparatus of the contingent.

\textsuperscript{33} The course of negotiations is in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAdwWüKM, 9.
CHAPTER IV
THE WILHELMINE PERIOD AND WORLD WAR I

The immediate results of the so-called "Bebenhausen Convention," the 1893 agreement combining the personnel affairs of the Prussian and Württembergian officer corps, benefited the younger, lower-ranking officers of the south German contingent. Gradually more and more junior officers received promotions while serving in Prussian units. They no longer had to wait until their return to Württemberg to advance in rank. During the early twentieth century increasing numbers of Württembergian officers served on the Prussian General Staff, in Prussian military training schools, and in the Prussian adjutant's department. In the XIIIth Army Corps a policy was adopted which attempted to balance Prussian and Württembergian officers in higher command posts. As depicted in Table 1, a sample of commanders from corps commandant down through regimental commander shows that between 1894
and 1900 Prussian officers continued to dominate the commanding general slot, but Swabian officers predominated in the division commands. Commanders of the four infantry brigades were mostly Württembergians, but the Prussians dominated the commands of the cavalry and artillery brigades. In four out of the seven years Württembergers filled five of the eight infantry commands. In 1897 Prussian regimental commanders outnumbered their south German comrades five to three; in 1900 there was a four to four split. The 19th Uhlans were the exclusive preserve of Prussian commanders, but the 20th Uhlans were led exclusively by Württembergian officers. Whenever a Prussian commanded the 25th Dragoons, a Swabian officer held the highest post in the 26th Dragoon Regiment. Until 1900 the artillery regiments exhibited the same balance in commanders, but in that year each regiment had a Prussian commanding officer.¹

¹Report on the results of the Bebenhausen agreement, dated July 1895, in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, Abt Z, 85 and reports of the Württembergian war ministry, 14 March 1905 and 23 October 1906, in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAdewüKM, 15. See also Ambassador v.d. Pforten's report of 8 June 1900 in BHstaMü, Abt II, MA III, 3058.
TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>1894</th>
<th>1895</th>
<th>1896</th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>1898</th>
<th>1899</th>
<th>1900</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XIIith AC</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Div</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Wü</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Div</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51st Bgd</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52nd Bgd</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53rd Bgd</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Pr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th Bgd</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Cav Bgd</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Cav Bgd</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Arty Bgd</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Arty Bgd</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119th Regt</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120th Regt</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121st Regt</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Wü</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122nd Regt</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123rd Regt</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124th Regt</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125th Regt</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126th Regt</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127th Regt</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128th Regt</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uhlan Regt 19</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uhlan Regt 20</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoon Regt 25</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoon Regt 26</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty Regt 13</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td>Pr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty Regt 29</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Wü</td>
<td>Pr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty Regt 49</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty Regt 65</td>
<td>Pr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pr = Prussian
Wü = Württembergian

(1) Created in 1900
(2) Created in 1897

See HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAdewüKM, 2.
The "Bebenhausen Convention," however, generated resistance in the south German kingdom. Criticism of the agreement came from two major sources. Older Württembergian officers, whose chances for promotion were often adversely affected by a combined date-of-rank promotion list, considered the royal decree prejudicial to their careers. They wanted to serve in the higher command positions of the XIIIth Army Corps before retirement, but the combined officer corps made available many Prussians with more time-in-grade for these commands. Increased prospects for promotions and higher commands in Prussia did not eliminate their irritation with the agreement. Many of the older Württembergian officers came from a small coterie of families who had traditionally sent their sons into the army. These families lacked the financial resources to offset the expenses of transferring their sons to Prussia or of establishing them in a different social milieu. 3

The second source of opposition to the 1893 agreement came from the Württembergian parliament. In 1895 members of the parliamentary committee on constitutional law inquired of the ministry of state and the war ministry about the nature of transfer and promotion policy within the Württembergian contingent. Later in the decade the committee became concerned whether the agreement was constitutional, i.e., whether it changed the 1870 military convention. Committee members wanted to know if the agreement reduced Württemberg's independence in the administration of military affairs and if it destroyed the self-contained nature of the XIIIth Army Corps. In all cases the war ministry prepared the memoranda which provided the government's response to the parliamentary inquiry. These memoranda traced the history of transfer and promotion policy since 1871 and indicated the increasing difficulties encountered by Württembergian officers seeking promotions prior to the agreement. War Minister Schott von Schottenstein argued in memoranda and later testified before the committee that the 1893 agreement between king and kaiser eliminated these difficulties, but in no way did it affect
Württembergian officers unfavorably nor did it reduce the self-contained nature of the contingent. He asserted that Württembergian officers were spending more time in Prussian units to help their possibilities for promotion, but they returned to local units as soon as possible in order to maintain the cohesiveness of the contingent. Satisfied with the war minister's testimony, the committee stated in its final report that the royal decree of 1 December 1893 was constitutional and that it did not change the self-contained nature of the XIIIth Army Corps. Although some members of parliament wanted to sustain the challenge, they were defeated by their colleagues who did not want to make difficulties for the Württembergian military establishment. The majority considered the advantages accruing to the lower-ranking Württembergian officers more important than theoretical notions about the agreement's constitutionality. They saw no reason to question the king's authority

---

4The inquiry also included questions about the use of savings in the military budget. Parliamentary inquiry, dated 10 July 1895, and war ministry memorandum, dated 14 September 1895, are in HstaSt, E 74 I, WüGB, 105. Schott's testimony, dated 1 June 1900 and other documents relating to the parliamentary investigation are in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAdërWüKM, 2, 7, 9, and 25. For the committee's final report see VderWü-KderA, 1899-1900, Appendices, Vol. III, pp. 921-966.
over his army, as long as the army's cohesiveness had been maintained.\(^5\)

Relations during the prewar period were not always smooth, however. Despite the 1893 agreement on personnel relations, there was no central military administration, and the atmosphere of Prusso-Württembergian military relations continued to be influenced by the personalities of policy-makers in both states. On two occasions prior to the outbreak of war in 1914 strains between Württembergian and Prussian leaders adversely influenced the degree of cooperation between the two armies. King William of Württemberg hoped that his nephew and heir to the throne, Duke Albrecht, would become commanding general of the XIIIth Army Corps as soon as the duke reached the rank and experience to be eligible. Shortly after the turn of the century the duke, commander of the 26th Division, fulfilled all of the requirements necessary to command an army corps. A man who loved his land and people, and especially its soldiers, Duke Albrecht

\(^5\)Report of Freiherr Wilhelm von Gemmingen to Schott von Schottenstein, 18 September 1900 in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAdewüKM, 9. See Count v.d. Pforten's ambassadorial reports, 8 June and 13 November 1900 in BHstaMü, Abt II GehSta, MA, 77877 and MA III, 3058. See also an article from the Berliner Tageblatt, 3 November 1900 in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAdewüKM, 25.
ardently desired to be named the XIIIth Army Corps' next commanding general by the Military Cabinet. But Emperor William was not enthusiastic about appointing the duke to the post. The Chief of the Military Cabinet said that the kaiser did not want the successor to the throne of a kingdom within the Reich to lead the local army contingent. Such a situation might divide the loyalties of the man, and this conflict would be disadvantageous to the Reich.6

King William considered the kaiser's unyielding resistance to the duke's appointment an insult to his person and to Württemberg, and in 1904 he refused to attend the kaiser's birthday celebration in Berlin, a function which he usually attended every year. Later in the year the Military Cabinet offered Duke Albrecht the command of a Prussian corps. King William's adjutant replied that the duke would accept if the kaiser would guarantee the command of the XIIIth Army Corps for the duke at a later date. To this the kaiser retorted, "Never!" Cooler heads, however,

6The kaiser was not exactly consistent in upholding this position, however. The king of Saxony, Frederick August, had commanded a Saxon army corps before he ascended the throne. See an undated memorandum /30 March 1905/ by the Württembergian ambassador to Prussia, Freiherr von Varnbüler, in HstaSt, E 46/48, MAA, 1291.
tried to effect a compromise. Württemberg's ambassador to Berlin, Freiherr von Varnbüler, communicated to the foreign minister, Freiherr von Soden, that Duke Albrecht should accept the Prussian command without conditions and thereby gain the kaiser's confidence. He surmised that the kaiser would subsequently permit the duke to command the Württembergian contingent. But there was no assurance that the kaiser would change his attitude, and Duke Albrecht feared that acceptance of a Prussian corps without conditions would remove him from the possibility of ever serving as commanding general of the XIIIth Army Corps. Varnbüler continued to counsel acceptance of the Prussian corps and at the same time pressed the Military Cabinet and Chancellor Bülow to use their influence with the kaiser to consider the duke as a future commander of the south German corps. King William also moved towards conciliation and attended the kaiser's birthday celebration in 1906. That year Duke Albrecht agreed to take over command of the XIth Army Corps in Prussia, and he remained its commanding general until 1908 when the kaiser met his wishes by appointing the duke
commander of his beloved Württembergian contingent. Yet the personal foibles of the principals—kaiser, king, and duke—contributed to a state of friction between the two German military establishments during a tense period in European international developments.

Adding to this state of friction during the early years of the twentieth century was pressure to abandon a separate war ministry which came from members of the Württembergian parliament. Seeking economy in government several Württembergian parliamentary delegates said that the state's war ministry should be abolished. During the same year similar attacks came from members of the Reichstag's Committee for the Imperial Budget. Therefore, early in 1907 there was serious discussion within the Württembergian government whether a separate war ministry was impeding the unity of German military administration. Without considering the question whether a

---

7Graevenitz, p. 45. See also Otto von Moser, Die Württemberger im Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Belser, 1928), p. 9 and Moritz Faber du Faur, Macht und Ohnmacht (Stuttgart: Hans E. Günther Verlag, 1953), pp. 69-75. Duke Albrecht remained at the head of the XIIIth Army Corps until 1913 when he became inspector general of the Sixth Army. The correspondence concerning the negotiations is located in HstaSt, E 46/48, MAA, 1291. See also the ambassadorial reports of Count v.d. Pforten and Count Moy, 6 March 1904, 23 and 25 February 1908 BHstaMü, Abt II, GehSta, NA III, 3062.
separate war ministry was desirable, a Württembergian legal expert argued that the war ministry was justifiable on constitutional and legal grounds. Even though the Imperial constitution guaranteed the unity of the German army, there existed no statute which gave the Prussian war ministry authority over Württemberg's war ministry. A Württembergian war ministry official, Major Haldenwang, presented an assessment which stressed the political significance of a separate war ministry. In a long memorandum which he prepared on the subject of the dissolution of Württemberg's independent war ministry, Major Haldenwang discussed both the pros and cons of amalgamating the south German kingdom's military administrative apparatus with the Prussian war ministry. Taking the position of devil's advocate Haldenwang argued that a separate war ministry was not economical and did not contribute materially to increasing the preparedness of Württembergian troop units. In the same vein he added that regional pride and particularism should not be the sole basis for retaining a separate war ministry and for delaying the creation of a unified central military administration. But the war ministry official
countered this argument by carrying the integrative process one step farther. Not only Württemberg, but Bavaria and Saxony should abolish their war ministries and subordinate their administrations to the Prussian ministry. He considered that even the Prussians would not wish such a move. Furthermore, argued Haldenwang, a central military administration in Berlin might not be aware of regional conditions and problems.\footnote{Both opinions, dated 20 January 1907 and 13 March 1907, are located in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAdewüKM, 50.}

Haldenwang's assessment had the strong support of General Otto von Marchtaler, who served as war minister from 1906 to the end of the First World War. In the tradition of former War Minister Steinheil and former Minister-President Mittnacht, General Marchtaler pursued a policy of cooperating closely with Prussia on the substantive issues in military affairs, such as preparing the contingent for eventual war. Marchtaler knew that the army of Württemberg was too small to give local leaders an important role in determining Reich military policy. But, like his predecessors, he combined this cooperative approach with a policy of striving to preserve or expand
administrative autonomy in the Württembergian contingent. Just prior to his retirement in 1918 Marchtaler wrote to his friend and comrade, General von Graevenitz:

Within the framework of the Imperial constitution and the military convention of 1870 I have sought during times of peace and war to attain the best possible conditions for our troops and for our state. I am proud that the High Command repeatedly recognized the ... Württembergian troops as the best cared-for in the entire army. The Württembergian war ministry, which often had been considered superfluous, has most brilliantly proved the reasons for its existence.9

Marchtaler's interpretation of the war minister's mission had support within the court in Stuttgart. Major Schroeder, representing Württemberg in the Prussian Military Cabinet, reported to General von Graevenitz, head of the military department in the Württembergian war ministry, that there was talk in the Prussian Military Cabinet about the appointment of a successor to the war minister who was leaving office in the spring of 1906. Some officers wondered whether the Württembergian war ministry would be eliminated. Others thought that General von Marchtaler would succeed to the post, but they were

9 As quoted in the introduction to Marchtaler's papers, RstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Colonel General Otto von Marchtaler, Repertorium.
concerned that the king might appoint him general à la suite and adjutant general, i.e., a close adviser to the king, at the same time that he elevated Marchtaler to the war minister's post. No Prussian war minister had ever been concurrently general à la suite and/or adjutant general, and the question arose in the Military Cabinet about the kaiser's reaction to such an appointment. Schroeder did not want to make any judgment about whether an officer in a contingent could serve without conflict his king as adjutant, the kaiser as a general à la suite, and at the same time be a minister of state with constitutional responsibility. Schroeder hoped, however, that the outgoing war minister would express himself on the subject.

The issue of the multiple appointment became so sensitive that in a later communication Schroeder wrote that he dared not discuss the issue in meetings of the Military Cabinet. He hoped that Württembergian leaders would consider the Prussian formula, which gave to the kaiser the prerogative of deciding whether one officer could hold all three ranks at the same time. Schroeder need not have worried too much about the issue, because Marchtaler became war minister and
general à la suite but not adjutant general. Yet the incident is significant because members of King William's circle of advisers were counseling the king to appoint one person as his comprehensive military adviser. 10

In order to maintain the Württembergian war minister's influence in administrative affairs, General Marchtaler, as war minister, resisted adamantly anything that he interpreted as an attack upon the Württembergian war minister's constitutional functions by the Prussian government or by Prussian commanding generals. Shortly after he entered office Marchtaler got into a conflict over the right of a regional war minister to explain and interpret new Prussian service regulations. An internal memorandum for distribution within the Württembergian war ministry argued that Prussians were not justified in contending that any interpretation of the service regulations by Württemberg was done merely to preserve the independence of the war ministry. Prussian

10 Schroeder's communications are located in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAderWüKM, 45 and 48. Schroeder blamed the king's adjutant, General Bilfinger, for wanting to centralize the positions. Schroeder considered that he had to complain to the war ministry about the tenacity with which Bilfinger held to the proposal.
regulations were introduced in different ways in the several contingents. In Prussia they appeared as issued over the signature of kaiser and Frussian war minister. In Bavaria and Saxony they appeared only after they had been edited and tailored to fit conditions within these contingents. In Württemberg the regulations had always appeared as verbatim copies of the Prussian original. But Article 63 of the Imperial constitution and Article 10 of the 1870 military convention gave the war ministry the right to change or expand the Prussian regulations to coincide with local needs. War Minister Marchtaler considered that the Prussian regulations needed clarification for application in Württemberg, but in no way did the altered regulations endanger the unity of the "Reichsheer" (Imperial Army).\[11\]

Marchtaler also worked diligently to ensure that the war ministry would play a dominant role in administering the personnel affairs of the contingent. It was in this area that Marchtaler conflicted with Prussian General von Fabeck, Duke Albrecht's successor as commanding general of the XIIIth Army Corps. The

\[11\]HstaSt, Ha, Denkschriften, Kompetenzen des WüKM, 1902-1909, 232.
two men clashed repeatedly over their respective spheres of authority. Their personalities and their concepts of the role which military institutions were to play in Germany underscored the significance of these abrasive encounters. General Fabeck was an energetic and able commander. He was dedicated to the Prussian military ideal and loyal to his monarch, the German kaiser. Either he did not realize or perhaps he did not care about the pride which Swabian military men had in the Württembergian contingent. He had convinced himself that the Württembergian war minister, along with the other independent war ministers, would be abolished. In addition his rough temper and lack of tact earned him the epithet, among Swabian soldiers, of the cross which the south had to bear /Kreuz des Südens/. During the initial attacks in the first months of the First World War more than one lower-ranking officer became aware of Fabeck's temper and his approach to combat. In one instance he ordered the two Württembergian divisions to launch a mutually supporting attack despite weather conditions which prevented the two from maintaining

contact with each other. At another time a young lieutenant of the reserves complained that Fabek had ordered a fixed bayonet charge which would have resulted in tremendous losses had not the enemy already abandoned its position. The young officer asserted that the order was an example of a "genuine Fabekian-Young German action." General von Graevenitz, Württemberg's representative at Army Supreme Command during the war, heard similar stories about Fabek's insensitivity to Württemberg's soldiers. Graevenitz went to the front and satisfied himself that many of the stories were untrue. But the general added that Fabek's constant bitter criticisms of Württembergian officers and men did a great deal of damage to morale. Fabek was not completely without support from Swabian officers. None other than General Wilhelm Groener, a Swabian who served on the Prussian General Staff and later

---

13 Letter from Lieutenant Max von Varnbüler to his parents, 25 September 1914, in HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Lieutenant General von Magirus, 2. Other letters and reports criticizing Fabek's leadership are located in HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Lieutenant General von Stein, 2 and Gerold von Gleich, 156, p. 45 and Oberleutnant von Wencher, 3.

14 Graevenitz's final report to the war ministry from his post at the Army Supreme Command, dated March 1919 in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAdewüKM, 245.
as Weimar Germany's war minister, wrote to his wife on 17 March 1915 that, say what one would in Stuttgart about Fabeck, it was his energy and ability that whipped the XIIIth Army Corps into shape and contributed to the successes of the contingent early in the war. Groener thought it was good for the Württembergian troops to have such a feisty commander, if for no other reason than to prevent the "Stuttgart softies" from having strong influence in the corps. Despite Groener's favorable impression, however, General Fabeck was not a popular commanding general in the XIIIth Army Corps.

War Minister Marchtaler, scion of an old Swabian military family and an official who was determined to prevent the complete assimilation of the Württembergian contingent into Prussia's army, clashed repeatedly with General Fabeck over administrative issues. In June 1913 the commanding general drafted a letter to War Minister Marchtaler complaining about the transfer of an infantry battalion from Stuttgart to another town. Fabeck stated that such activities came under the jurisdiction of the

---

15 Ba/Ma, Nachlaβ Groener, Briefe an seine Frau, N 46/31, N 46/32.
commanding general. He also noted that in Prussia the war minister did not concern himself with the transfer of troops. Prussian Colonel von Mutius, Fabeck's chief of staff, suggested that the complaint travel through informal channels. An official complaint would merely lead to a fruitless argument over principle. Mutius had talked with Marchtaler's adjutant and had learned that the Württembergian war minister had been transferring troops without notifying the commanding general for about a year and a half. He also learned that the war minister always discussed the transfer with the king who assumed that once he had given his approval, the task was to be completed. The complaint, nevertheless, reached Marchtaler, and the war minister answered that, like his predecessors, he had tried to cooperate with the commanding general in all cases in which the transfer of troops, the selection of new campsites, and the building of new garrisons related to relations between Württemberg and Prussia. In this case, however, the war minister would have to reserve the right to demand a free hand in exercising authority delegated to him by the king. A second garrison for troops in Stuttgart had been under consideration for
some time and had been placed in the 1913 budget. The Budget Committee of the Reichstag refused to approve construction unless the city donate the land for the project. City officials refused, but leaders in a nearby town offered to donate a parcel of land for the garrison. The situation required speedy action, for delay would have meant postponing construction until 1914. Such procrastination would have been detrimental to the men because the garrison might be located in a more remote area. Marchtaler corrected Fabbeck's statement about how transfers occurred in Prussia by noting that the commanding general did have the right to complain to the Prussian war ministry about training camp locations because the general command often had better knowledge of a specific area. Marchtaler countered that this was not the case in Württemberg where the native war minister knew the area and needs of the troops better. Marchtaler continued that as war minister of the independent royal Württembergian military contingent, he would like to prevent misunderstandings, but in this case there existed imponderables which only the war minister could treat. Fabbeck's marginal notes reveal his chagrin, but his reply
concealed his anger. He stated that he knew such matters were beyond the commanding general's judgment. He had merely wanted to be notified about the situation if it had been possible. Fabeck wrote that he wanted to avoid clashes with the war minister. Colonel Mutius approved his superior's draft, but noted that if this communication did not settle the issue, Fabeck should refuse to agree with Marchtaler's claim to independent authority over the training and needs of Württemberg's troops. 16

War minister and commanding general crossed swords over a similar issue later in the year. General Fabeck complained to King William of Württemberg that War Minister Marchtaler seemed to be trying to settle service matters /dienstliche Vorkommmisse/ through private means without contacting the general command. He argued that decisions about service matters—in this case a fireworks display provided for the enjoyment of some regiments who had just ended a period of training—were the prerogative of his office, and private inquiries into such matters by members of the war ministry must be eliminated. War Minister

16 HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAdernWüKM, 50.
Marchtaler had responded to General Fabeck's earlier communications on the issue by rejecting the commanding general's criticism about the ministry's private inquiry. As war minister he did not generally contact troop units directly, but in the fireworks incident parliamentary pressure on the war ministry to investigate charges of waste caused him to deviate from the usual pattern of communication. Marchtaler viewed this incident as a specific case and justified his activity on the grounds of expediency. 17

The incident was settled quickly after War Minister Marchtaler conceded that the commanding general's interpretation was correct and after General Fabeck withdrew his complaint. But the significance of this minor confrontation lies in the rigidity with which the commanding general viewed his authority and the sensitivity of each side to the actions and words of the other. Marchtaler complained to Fabeck that the commanding general's communications on the issue seemed to bear the tone of a teacher admonishing a pupil rather than a discussion of a problem which had arisen between two generals. Fabeck, for

17Ibid.
his part, considered the war minister's behavior insulting, because he did not inform the general command of his intentions in the case, and it was only by accident that the commanding general learned of the incident. The lack of communication and confidence between the two men seems so much more ominous because of the retention of such attitudes in the face of mounting international tensions. Lack of cooperation between war minister and commanding general could have a detrimental effect on the contingent and thereby on the unity of the entire army just as it was preparing to meet the threat of a major war. Marchtaler mentioned consistently in his arguments with Fabeck that war minister and commanding general in Württemberg had been cooperating closely for years and neither had considered it necessary to apply such a literal interpretation of the regulation governing respective spheres of authority. But in his marginal notations to Marchtaler's statements the commanding general seemed to hold a contrary opinion about the degree of cooperation. He also considered close cooperation secondary
to a clear assertion of the commanding general's prerogatives with respect to the contingent. 18

Despite the personal confrontations between War Minister Marchtaler and Commanding General Fabeck, Württembergian leaders, in line with their strategy of not resisting Prussia on substantive issues, accepted without comment or with minor suggestions the peacetime increases and changes in the organization of the army. 19 But there were officers in Württemberg who criticized the leadership of Prussian officers in both command and policy-making positions. Count Helmuth von Moltke, the nephew of the famous 19th century Prussian chief of staff, drew criticism from a Swabian cavalry officer who observed that Moltke succeeded Count Alfred von Schlieffen to the post of Chief of the Prussian General Staff merely because he bore the illustrious name. The same officer came down hard on Prussian staff officers attached to the various army corps. These sentiments were seconded by General Wilhelm Groener, the Swabian general staff officer who held the second highest

18Ibid.

19HstaSt, E 74 I, WüGB, 107.
position in the Prussian General Staff at the end of the war. Count Moy, the Bavarian ambassador, reported to his king in 1913 that Württembergian officers and War Minister Marchtaler were critical of Prussian War Minister von Falkenhayn's handling of the Zabern affair. In a private conversation with Moy the Swabian war minister stated that the Prussian commanding generals in Strassburg should make the regimental commanders adhere more closely to the laws of the land. Marchtaler mentioned the anger exhibited by most Prussian commanders whenever they had to deal with Alsatian civil authorities. The war minister's remarks seemed all the more significant to the ambassador because, at that time, Marchtaler was having his troubles with General Fabeck. Count Moy leaves the impression that Marchtaler was comparing military relations between Württemberg and Prussia to the tense relations between Prussia and the Reichsland of Alsace-Lorraine. Whether Moy's or Marchtaler's assessments were justified is questionable, but the international situation of the period

---

20 HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Gerold von Gleich, 163 and Familienarchiv, Dr. Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen, Correspondence Groener-Gleich, Groener's letter of 11 November 1937. See also Graevenitz, p. 112.
was tense enough to make any measure of friction within the Reich significant.21

War Minister Marchtaler continued to struggle to protect Württembergian military interests after the outbreak of hostilities in August, 1914. Upon learning that Bavaria was sending officers to the mobile staff of the Prussian war ministry at General Headquarters (GHQ), Marchtaler suggested that Württemberg also be represented. A few days later Württembergian and Saxon officers filled positions at GHQ. A deputy military plenipotentiary from Württemberg remained in Berlin with those Prussian war ministry officials who were not transferred to GHQ. The significance of having a military representative in both places stems from the functions of the military plenipotentiary. He was the representative of his sovereign at the Imperial court. But more importantly he was the individual from each south and east German contingent who conducted the business and carried out the policies of his respective war ministry. It was the military plenipotentiaries from Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg who looked after the

21BHstaMü, Abt II, GehSta, MA III, 3071.
interests of their contingents in Berlin, at GHQ, at the Army Supreme Command (OHL), or in any other Prussian military organizations created during the war. They strove to protect the rights of the contingents against attempts by Prussian commanders to overtake these rights. Although they did not have the power to advise on how the troops of the contingents were to be used, they were able to travel to the front and discuss with officers and troops of the contingent how they were being used and treated. Armed with this first-hand knowledge they could look after the contingent's welfare at GHQ or the Supreme Command.\(^{22}\)

Marchtaler also endeavored to expand the Württembergian war ministry in the early days of the war. Newly created or combined departments were to survey the economic potential of the kingdom and were to coordinate procurement and distribution of war matériel. The functions of other newly created sections were to look after personnel affairs, compile statistics about Württemberg's soldiers, and

\(^{22}\)Graevenitz, pp. 73-74.
to preserve state records dealing with the war.\(^{23}\) Despite his efforts and those of Württemberg's representatives at headquarters, however, the XIIIth Army Corps was dissolved in October 1914, and its two main divisions were not reunited until fourteen months later. Württemberg's plenipotentiary at GHQ and the Supreme Command, General Graevenitz, complained that the process of splitting up the contingent caused severe administrative problems and weakened the morale of both the officers and men.\(^{24}\)

The XIIIth Army Corps was too small to have its own army command at the beginning of the war. Therefore, it marched into France as part of the Fifth Army under command of the German crown prince. In October 1914 the corps was split up and the 26th Division was sent east to take part in the offensives against the Russians and later against the Serbians. It did not return to the western front to fight beside the other division of the Württembergian army corps, the 27th Division, until December 1915. From the outset of the war the Württembergian 26th

\(^{23}\text{Ibid.}, pp. 73-76.\)

\(^{24}\text{Ibid.}, p. 74. \text{See also his final report to the war minister, dated March, 1919 in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAdewüKM, 245.}\)
Cavalry Brigade served in the Prussian 7th Cavalry Division, and Württembergian Landwehr brigades were part of Prussian units until 1915. Swabian officers complained to the war ministry in Stuttgart and to each other that the Supreme Command and field commanders made exorbitant demands on Württembergian units, such as ordering attacks which sustained losses that hardly justified the objectives attained. The Württembergian plenipotentiary at the Supreme Command warned his superiors in 1914 that Württemberg would not be able to maintain the troop strength of its units if such consumption of Swabian lives continued.25

These demands seemed all the more unjustifiable because the Swabian officers did not consider their superior officers, who were Prussians, above reproach. In his assessment of the Prussian 7th Cavalry Division, a Württembergian officer said that the troops of the division would have to bear only minor responsibility for not having accomplished very much during the invasion of Belgium and France in 1914. Most of the guilt for their ineffectiveness lay with the higher, i.e., Prussian, leadership. The Supreme Command

25Graevenitz's report in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, PAdewüKM, 245.
and the division's commander, Prussian General von Heydebreck, never had a clear conception of the mission. Both were unsure whether the 7th Cavalry Division was to perform reconnaissance in northern France or whether it was to support the threatened flank of the First Army. Amid the confusion the Division's squadrons exhausted themselves riding back and forth across the French countryside. Furthermore, lives and energy were wasted because some commanders and general staff officers were so ambitious as to make unrealistic demands on the fighting units. Some disregarded the terrain when ordering a maneuver. Others ordered attacks to the last man on heavily fortified positions. In some cases the reason for such demands stemmed from an old Prussian prejudice that Swabian soldiers were unreliable. Such attitudes resulted in a dearth of comradery between Prussians and Württembergians and in the squandering of the talents of cavalry units. By October the French were able to push these exhausted and distrusting cavalrymen back toward the Belgian border.26

26HstaSt. Ha, Nachlaß Gerold von Gleich, 154, 155.
The two infantry divisions comprising the XIIIth Army Corps and the 26th Cavalry Brigade attached to the Prussian Cavalry Division, consisted exclusively of Swabian soldiers and, with few exceptions, Swabian officers. When they moved from one theater of war to another, they remained intact. But the exigencies of war made it necessary to create new divisions. Usually a cadre from an existing unit became the nucleus of the new unit. It was then fleshed out with men from local recruiting depots. In Württemberg's case there were not enough men to fill the ranks of the new units, such as the 54th Reserve Division and the 58th Division. The Prussian war ministry, therefore, ordered Saxon soldiers to enter these divisions to bring them up to strength. The Prussian order thereby created mixed divisions. In battle mixed divisions did not fight well. The 54th Division formed part of the 27th Reserve corps, and on 30 October 1914 the corps attacked the enemy near Dunkirk. The young soldiers of the divisions marched into battle singing the national anthem, but they were slaughtered. The main weakness was organizational. There were no experienced men in the ranks and the officers were too old to be useful.
for modern warfare. Yet the higher commanders and staff officers, who were Prussians and Saxons, were severely criticized by Württemberg's officers. In their opinion the subsequent removal of General von Carlowitz, the corps' Saxon commander and his Prussian chief of staff, was justified.\(^\text{27}\)

There was not much respect for Saxon troops among Württembergian officers. Lieutenant Colonel Fromm, commander of Reserve Regiment 120, complained that the 58th Division, a mixture of Württembergians and Saxons, made a poor showing at Verdun because it did not occur to the Saxons to advance. They merely lay in the trenches and stuck their helmets over the parapets on the tips of their rifles. This act provoked heavy enemy machine gun fire, and no one wanted to leave the trenches in the face of such fire. Lieutenant General von Knoerzer, commanding general of the 54th Reserve Division, wrote in late 1916 that the division would not receive the medals he requested because the other division in the 27th Reserve Corps, a Saxon unit, could not be considered

\(^{27}\)War Minister Marchtaler came under criticism from Major Gleich concerning the failure of the Württembergers at Dunkirk. Gleich said that Marchtaler, afraid to oppose the state parliament, settled for an unsatisfactory increase in the army. \textit{Ibid.}, 156. See also Graevenitz, p. 90.
for a large number of medals. Knoerzer said that he would be glad to return to a Württembergian or a Prussian division. Another officer wrote that in holding back enemy attacks in Champagne, Württembergian troops were superior to many Prussians and especially to the Saxons.28

Pride in the superior fighting prowess of one's Landsmänner may have sustained morale within units whose men came from the same region, but such strong provincial camaraderie complicated the Supreme Command's task of formulating replacement policy. Under General Falkenhayn's leadership the Supreme Command paid little attention to the ethnic composition of the fighting units of the smaller provinces. The Grand Duke of Baden wanted the troops from the duchy to remain in their own units, but Badenese replacements were distributed to Prussian units which were sent to the eastern front. The Grand Duke protested, but the practice continued. In the opinion of Württembergian General Hahn who

28HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Gerold von Gleich, 4 and 22. Knoerzer's communication is in HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß General Fritz von Graevenitz, 22.
commanded mixed units on the Somme in 1916, the mixing of officers and troops from different provinces adversely affected communication and cooperation, and it reduced the combat effectiveness of the troops.\textsuperscript{29}

War Minister Marchtaler and General Graevenitz were deeply concerned about the Supreme Command's policy of mixing troops from different parts of the Reich to form combat units. The decision to split up the two divisions of the XIIth Army Corps had created administrative problems which disappointed Swabia's leaders, but the move could be justified by the exigencies of the time. At least the separated units received their replacements from the kingdom. But mixed units not only caused administrative problems; they also did not perform well in combat and their morale was declining. The Supreme Command's continuation of these policies, such as ordering the creation of the 204th Division as a mixed unit of

\textsuperscript{29}The situation in Baden's units was reported by Count Moy on 19 February 1915 in BHstaMü, Abt II, GehSta, MA III, 3072. For General Hahn's complaint see HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Lieutenant General Eugen Hahn, 11.
Württembergians and Saxons, stirred Württemberg's leaders to press for a complete reversal of the policy. It was not until late in 1916, when the armies of the Germans were on the defensive on every front, that General Falkenhayn stepped down and the team of Field Marshal Hindenburg and General Ludendorff was named to head the Supreme Command. Falkenhayn's departure meant, among other things, a change in Prussia's policy governing the composition of combat units. To lift sagging morale among Germany's fighting men and to make military administration more efficient General Ludendorff issued a memorandum on 6 October 1916 which addressed itself to the mixing of Bavarian, Saxon, and Württembergian units. He stated that the Supreme Command objected to this policy, and henceforth the mixed units and divisions from the separate contingents which had been split up were to be regrouped and reunited into units which would contain only soldiers from their native regions. Ludendorff's communication generated feverish activity in the Württembergian war ministry to replace the non-Swabians in those

30 HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, Kra, 1041.
mixed divisions designated as Württembergian and to regroup the kingdom's ten divisions into a Württembergian Army Group. By December, 1916 Swabians replaced the Saxons in the 204th Division, and later the 54th Reserve Division became a Württembergian division. By 1 April 1917 Württemberg's divisions came once again under the command of Duke Albrecht, this time as an army group. Added to the XIIIth Army Corps, which formed the nucleus of Army Group Duke Albrecht, was a new special general command consisting of the reorganized and the newly created divisions. All of those units were recruited and staffed from the Swabian homeland because on 30 August 1917 King William of Württemberg decreed the return of all Swabian troops to Württembergian units.31

The restoration of the homogeneity of Württemberg's army contingent is highly significant when the morale factor of various divisions comes under consideration. There is evidence that the regrouping process did not take place in all divisions. The 197th Division continued to be a heterogeneous unit consisting of men from Saxony, Hanover, and Baden. Allied intelligence considered the morale of this

31 HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, Kra, 995.
mixed division to be low in the last years of the war. Similar assessments of low morale characterized the heterogeneous 1st Division and the 13th and 14th Divisions, whose men came from Westphalia, Silesia, Brandenburg, and Hanover. Morale in the divisions in the 3rd Army had been adversely affected by the introduction of Poles, Alastians, and Lorrainers into its combat units. Up until the very last months of the war, however, Allied intelligence rated Württembergian divisions as having high morale; the 26th and 27th Divisions continued to receive ratings of "first class division" and "attack division" in Allied evaluation reports. 32

As part of the reorganization effort the new supreme commanders accepted a Württembergian representative at the Prussian War Office, an administrative organ concerned with economic problems. The purpose of the post was to assure the smooth transmission of communications from the war office to the Württembergian ministry and to provide for close cooperation on all common problems. In addition the

32 NA, RG 120, Data on German Divisions, Boxes 5211, 5212. See also NA, RG 120, German Files, Box 10 as quoted in Walker, "Morale in the German Army on the Western Front in 1918," pp. 18-21.
Prussian war ministry accepted Württembergian suggestions for streamlining communications between the two ministries.\(^{33}\)

In 1917 Württemberg's military leaders considered that their concerns and efforts about the composition of the kingdom's fighting forces had been justified. War Minister Marchtaler also continued his struggle to retain an independent war ministry in Württemberg both during and after the war. He argued that an enlarged Prussian war ministry would not be able to manage the affairs of all German states. Marchtaler also thought that the costs of separate war ministries were more than offset by the benefits accruing to the several regions in the areas of contingent organization and administration. Furthermore, the Swabian war minister was convinced that independent war ministers could maintain better liaison with politicians in the state parliaments.\(^{34}\)

\(^{33}\)HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, WüMBB, 39 contains the announcement of Württembergian representation at the War Office. Materials on the communications between war ministries is located in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, Abt 2, 85.

\(^{34}\)Marchtaler's conversation with Count Moy on 13 April 1917 in BHstaMü, Abt, GehSta, HA III, 3073.
The question of creating an imperial war ministry continued to come up, however. Marchtaler prepared position papers in which he argued cogently for the retention of independent war ministries, especially under the circumstances created by the war. The functions of Württemberg's war ministry expanded greatly under the burdens of war. To cope with new administrative problems Württemberg expanded existing departments and added new ones to the ministry. Especially important was the function of controlling and reorganizing the wartime economy. The Department for Weapons and Equipment (Abteilung für Waffen und Feldgerät) increased in size. Working closely with the Prussian War Office this important unit took on the added duties of managing labor relations including female and child labor, draft deferments, auxiliary service, and agricultural problems. Through such an organization it was possible to look out for Württembergian industrial and agricultural interests. Only a military administration accustomed to the local milieu and one which enjoyed the confidence of the populace could cope successfully with the economic complexities of a wartime economy. New sections sprang up, including
those which handled raw materials for military needs /Kriegsbedarf und Rohstoffstelle/, artillery and general operational supplies /Artillerie und Train­
direktion/. Another important function of Württem­
berg's war ministry revolved around the coordination
of inducing men into military service with main­
tenance of an adequate labor force. Marchtaler was
extremely proud that the war ministry had been able
to meet increased demands for fighting men without
completely dislocating the economy of the kingdom.
Only a native and independent war ministry, aware
of local conditions, could accomplish such a task.
Furthermore, only an independent war ministry could
accomplish the mission of securing the homogeneity
of the kingdom's fighting units. Marchtaler con­
tended that the unity of Germany's armed forces was
not impaired by the existence of four independent
war ministries. He cited as proof the contributions
of each ministry luring five decades of peace and
four years of war. Regional war ministers were able
to protect the interests of their own army contingents
and local economic conditions without disturbing
the unity of combined operations. The war minister
concluded that an independent war ministry had also
been fruitful for Württemberg's political situation within the Reich. Therefore, economic, military, and political reasons justified not relinquishing the rights and advantages of the Württembergian crown's Kontingentherrlichkeit and the state's independent military administration.\textsuperscript{35}

One reason why Marchtaler could argue that an independent Württembergian war ministry had not adversely affected the unity of Germany's armed forces was the number of Württembergian officers who served in Prussian units or in posts which had little or no connection with the Württembergian contingent. Between the outbreak of war in 1914 and 31 July 1918 (the date of the last statistical analysis) 1,117 Württembergian officers of all grades had served a tour of duty in units outside the contingent. Table 2 indicates the placement and rank of these officers. Of the total number serving outside the contingent, 136 officers were field grade officers, i.e., major through field marshal. By July 1918 eighty-seven of this number continued to fill positions on the Prussian General Staff and in posts not directly connected with

\textsuperscript{35}The papers are located in HstaSt, Ha, Abt A, 1503; HstaSt, Ha, WÜKM, Kra, 1036 and HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Marchtaler, 24.
### TABLE 2

**WÜRTTEMBERGIAN OFFICERS SERVING OUTSIDE THE CONTINGENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aviators</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat units</td>
<td>Lts., Capts.</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation units</td>
<td>Lts., Capts.</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear echelon units</td>
<td>Lts., Capts.</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical formations</td>
<td>Lts., Capts.</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions &amp; Supply</td>
<td>Lts., Capts.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussian General Staff</td>
<td>Field Grade</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussian General Staff slots</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimental commands</td>
<td>Field Grade</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimental staff</td>
<td>Field Grade</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special assignment</td>
<td>Field Grade</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade commands</td>
<td>Field Grade</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division commands</td>
<td>Field Grade</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commanding generals</td>
<td>Field Grade</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the Württembergian army. Since 1917 Duke Albrecht of Württemburg had been commanding an army group named after him which consisted of the XIIIth Army Corps and General Command on Special Assignment Number 64 (Württemberg). Of the forty-eight officers who had left service in Prussia and elsewhere, fifteen had returned to command positions in Duke Albrecht's Army Group. Two of the Swabian field grade officers on the Prussian General Staff were serving under the duke's command in these last few months of the war. It is significant that during the war twenty-two

---

36 HstaSt, Ha, Kra, 998a. These statistics do not include doctors, veterinarians, military intendants, and advisers to Turkey.
of the officers from Württemberg who served in posts outside the kingdom held noncommand positions. These included military governorships, commandants of both German and occupied cities and districts, and instructors at military schools. It is also worth noting that twenty-eight of the field grade officers had been recalled from retirement to command reserve, Landwehr, or artillery units. Only one recalled Württembergian officer commanded a nonreserve unit; General von Freudenberg led the 93rd Division. Furthermore thirteen of those officers who returned to active duty from retirement filled noncombat slots. Perusal of the ninety-one command slots in Army Group Duke Albrecht in 1918 reveals ten Prussian commanders and general staff officers in the contingent. Army Group and the XIIIth Army Corps had Prussian chiefs of staff. Of the field commands six were with artillery units (one major general, one colonel, and four majors), and the remaining three were infantry commanders. A Prussian general recalled to active duty commanded the 2nd Landwehr Division, a colonel led a reserve infantry brigade, and a lieutenant colonel filled the command slot of a Württembergian infantry regiment.37

37Ibid.
This analysis of Württemberg's officers who participated in military activity outside the kingdom's army and Prussian officers who served in the contingent supports War Minister Marchtaler's assertion that Württemberg contributed to a unified military leadership. But it also indicates that in the latter part of the war for the most part Swabian officers commanded Swabian troops in the self-contained Württembergian army group. The analysis also shows that most of the Württembergian officers serving outside the contingent filled positions in specialized technical units or Prussian General Staff posts. There were few Swabian officers who served in command positions outside the contingent, and they commanded mostly reserve and Landwehr units.

A sampling of the communications written between officers serving outside the contingent and their comrades who remained in Württembergian units indicates that a measure of pride in the performance of Swabian troops existed among all Württembergian officers, regardless of where they were stationed. The letters consistently praised fellow Swabians and criticized the Saxons. But those who were serving in Prussian units also admired the fighting qualities
of their north German compatriots. Critical comments of Prussian units focused, however, on upper echelon leadership. Even someone as friendly toward his Prussian comrades as General Groener chafed at the machinations and narrow-mindedness of some Prussian officers. Groener felt that a clique of Prussian officers conspired to effect his removal from the War Office in 1917. He noted also that the Prussian war minister, General von Stein, refused him a Württembergian division because Groener tended to be too "leftist". Implied in this comment was the opinion that a Prussian command could correct such an attitude, whereas a Württembergian command would reinforce the undesirable characteristic. This same characteristic would help Groener in 1918 become Ludendorff's successor. He notes in his memoirs that Field Marshal Hindenburg's Prussian military advisers believed that a south German as First Quartermaster General would get a better reception from the parliamentarians than a Prussian general. Groener noted this Prussian particularism when he breakfasted with General Count Schmettow. This very

38 HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Marchtaler, 3a, 5, 8; Nachlaß Graevenitz, 22; and Nachlaß Magirus, 22.
conservative Prussian expressed a fear that Prussia would become assimilated into the Reich, and East Elbian influence in governmental circles would cease. Groener, himself, was a strong proponent of a tightly united Germany. His notes for a speech which he was to deliver on the king's birthday in 1918 reveal that this south German considered a closely united state with a united army the pillar of the monarchy.\(^\text{39}\)

Despite pride in one's own contingent, Württembergian admiration for the fighting qualities of Prussian soldiers, and General Groener's call for a strong united army and nation, Germany and its confederated army suffered defeat in 1918. Württembergians were among those who saw early in 1918 that the army had lost much of its spirit and combat effectiveness. General Eberhard von Hofacker noted that signs of deteriorating morale were evident in May and June, especially among those divisions classified as defensive divisions /Stellungsdivision/. When the offensive against Reims failed in July, everyone knew in his heart of hearts that ultimate victory was out of the question. Although the old

\(^{39}\)Ba/Ma, Nachlaß Groener, N 46/23, Heft 8, pp. 204, 218, 232 and Heft 9, pp. 328, 356. See also Groener, Lebenserinnerungen, pp. 440-441.
spirit flared up occasionally and although many continued to do their duty, the masses of men in the ranks fought without the customary hardiness and they abandoned positions before it was absolutely necessary. In a pamphlet entitled, "The Most Important Military and Political Aspects of the World War," General Otto von Moser asserted that by the middle of July, 1918 there was no doubt that the old spirit of the army had disappeared. Instead the atmosphere pervading the ranks expressed disillusionment and doubt about a successful outcome to the war. The army was in a poor position all along the western front because the spring offensives had resulted in several bulges in the line. These bulges were vulnerable to enemy flank attacks, and therefore more troops were needed to defend them. The homefront began to deteriorate after the attack on Reims failed in July, but there was no stab in the back. The war had slowly poisoned the German people. The military leadership in Germany had overestimated its own abilities and the capacity of the frontline soldier to endure the hardships of war. This was an error in military judgment and not the fault of the men in the trenches. 40

40 HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß General Otto von Moser, 7.
The War Office reported that morale on the homefront improved after frontline soldiers, home on leave, told of their strong confidence in victory. Yet, continued the report, there existed a certain hopelessness among all classes about the political and economic disruption. There seemed to exist among the populace feelings of confusion and lethargy. Many felt their hopes unfulfilled despite terrific sacrifices. Morale rose as the spring offensives began. It peaked in June but continued to decline soon thereafter. By September 1 the report evaluated homefront morale at its lowest ebb. The depressing situation was the result of bad news and rumors brought back from the front by furloughed soldiers. Many at home began to lose confidence in the Supreme Command and in the troops themselves.  

Württembergian General Walter Reinhardt, who became Prussian War Minister in 1919, studied the impact of American forces on the army. His thesis asserted that American troops, though inexperienced in combat, contributed to the morale of the Entente powers. The Americans brought to France a will to fight. This attitude was decisive for the victory

---

41 HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, Kra, 1019.
over Germany. Signs of exhaustion in Germany's fighting men were noticeable as early as 1 April 1918. The best replacements had been thrown into the offensives, but the men were exhausted and the attacks ground to a halt. German military leadership was not entirely ignorant of the situation, but many refused to see that the troops were at the end of their strength. When American troops entered the front lines in June, they lifted the morale of their allies. The attacks on German positions did not win much ground, but they wore down morale within German ranks. By the end of June the will of the Germans to continue the war had been broken.\(^{42}\)

Reunification and reorganization of the Württembergian contingent in 1917 boosted the morale and combat effectiveness of Swabian soldiers. Württemberg's military leaders had succeeded in preserving the regional homogeneity and thereby the fighting qualities of units from the south German kingdom. The introduction of a volume dedicated to those who lost their lives while serving in Württembergian

units during the war refers with pride to the composition of Württembergian combat units, which were not mixtures of Germans from different areas or different groups (Stämme). The ranks of Württembergian units consisted almost exclusively of natives from the kingdom. The men serving in such homogenous units benefited from having their own officers who spoke the same dialect and who understood the men they were commanding. If strangers happened to be posted to Württembergian units, they soon learned the Swabian manner of military service. Even the men from Alsace and Lorraine, soldiers not known for their enthusiasm for Germany, served loyally in units of the contingent.43

Württemberg's leaders had every reason to be proud of the reunited contingent's combat record. But their success in bringing the kingdom's soldiers together under Swabian command resulted in a paradox. Because they fought well and because their morale was often higher than that of units from other parts of Germany, the Supreme Command kept Württembergian divisions in the front lines longer or utilized them

for attacks and counterattacks more frequently than less effective units. The Supreme Command explained that Württembergers attacked more vigorously and penetrated more deeply into enemy territory than did men from other units. But such activity resulted in hardship for Württemberg's soldiers, and subsequently the effectiveness and morale of Württemberg's units declined. In order to maintain the homogeneity of Swabian units the war ministry scraped the barrel at home. It drafted and quickly trained seventeen and eighteen year old youths and men older than the prior forty-five year old age limit. Wounded soldiers who had recuperated were sent back to the front. In addition one company per battalion was dissolved, and its men were distributed throughout the larger units. But this was an act of desperation. The morale of Württembergian units began to slip. General von Erpf, commander of the 242nd Division, reported to General Graevenitz in May 1918 that two thirds of the men, three battalion commanders, and twenty-five company commanders were recent replacements. Although all were Swabians, they had not much training, nor had they had time to forge themselves into cohesive combat units. This sad situation, compounded by
the constant demands on the division to remain on the offensive, caused high losses without reaching the required objectives. In October a captain in the 119th Reserve Regiment complained that the regiment had been in the front lines for over three months with only twelve days rest. In that period the unit had lost 1,100 men; the captain's battalion itself had lost 300 men. The losses were due in part to the poor performance of several neighboring Prussian regiments. Then, too, recent replacements in the 119th, who were older men from Württemberg, were hard to control. He thought that this combination of factors was undermining the regiment's morale. The officer did not consider his observations to be a sign of cowardice; he merely wanted to indicate the reality of remaining in the trenches under such conditions. By late 1918 the combat effectiveness of the homogeneous units, Württembergian, as well as Prussian, Saxon, and Bavarian, had deteriorated to the point where requests for an armistice became necessary.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{44}See Graevenitz, pp. 109-110 for his assessment of the demands which the Supreme Command made on Württembergian units. Replacement policy is analyzed in General Reinhardt's report, HstaSt, Ha, WÜKM, Kra, 884. For examples of declining morale in Württembergian units see HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß Graevenitz, 22
Demobilization was to begin as soon as peace was assured and was to be directed by the Chief of the General Staff. The units at the front were to return to the area where they received their replacements in order to begin the demobilization process. The men were to remain organized in their units for the return to the areas where they were stationed in peacetime. Officers were to make it clear that the men must return as a unit in order for the men to receive their pay and combat benefits. Because Württembergian troops had been serving in a reunited contingent, demobilization meant that virtually all units of the contingent would be going home. Only designated border patrols were to remain stationed at the neutral zone.45

But revolution had broken out at home. Some of the soldiers who were training in Württemberg or who had been stationed in the kingdom became involved in the revolt. They had formed soldiers' councils and had become politically active. The Supreme

and Nachlaß Magirus, 34. A discussion of the factors which affected the morale and combat effectiveness of all German units on the western front in 1918 is in Walker, "Morale in the German Army."

45Instructions from the Chief of the General Staff, 16 November 1918 in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, WüMBB, 22.
Command was aware and was concerned that even the best troops were influenced by the radicals, when officers failed to prepare their men for the tense situation at home. In order to counter the growing power of the councils the Supreme Command ordered the creation of "reliable" soldiers' councils. Professional officers were to become involved in organizing such councils. Instructions to front line officers included recognition of the power of the radical councils and the use of persuasion to keep the men from joining the radicals. If persuasion failed, then the men should be disarmed. Officers themselves must not be moved by radical appeals. There would be no surer way to destroy any respect for the army returning from the front. In all cases Spartacists and other leftist elements must be resisted. Yet the councils under the authority of the Supreme Command should take a careful approach. They could not expect much assistance from the political leadership. Württemberg's combat officers, however, successfully controlled most of the troops returning from the front, and the contingent demobilized
in a fairly orderly manner despite the revolution which resulted in the abdication of King William of Württemberg.46

Demobilization of the armed forces throughout Germany was only one facet of the postwar situation. Civilian and military leaders grappled with the myriad problems stemming from the confusion of creating new state and national governments. Because he was Prussian king as well as German emperor, William II's abdication necessitated the restructuring of the Prussian state government as well as the national government. King William of Württemberg vacated his throne, and Württembergian leaders likewise had to set up a government for the south German state. It is significant that the postwar governmental system, although republican, was similar to its prewar predecessor. The major difference was the creation of a war ministry for the nation, the Reichswehrministerium. But Prussia retained its war ministry and so did Württemberg. Furthermore, the south German ministry increased its authority because it absorbed the duties of the general

46HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, WüMBB, 22. See also General Freiherr von Soden's article on the return march in HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, Kra, 995.
command. During the era of the Weimar Republic Württembergian war ministers continued to pursue a policy of protecting the interests of Württemberg's soldiers.

Württemberg formed the Vth Military District in Weimar Germany. The size of the army was reduced drastically to meet the terms of the peace treaty. Württemberg's military leaders contended with their Prussian and national counterparts and with the state's civilian leadership to maintain the Swabian character of the troop units within the Vth Military District. The war minister implored the state government in 1919 to cooperate with the war ministry's Office for Civilian Maintenance /Haupstelle für Zivilversorgung/ in providing for the large numbers of returning troops who were being demobilized. Württemberg, like other German states, also transferred some military administrative departments to the civil administration. In order to restore and maintain order and carry out police functions in the state, the war ministry created "security companies" /Sicherheitskompanien/, which consisted of former soldiers.47

47 HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, WüMBB, 2 and 11.
Württemberg’s military leaders made some of these decisions unilaterally, and this brought them into conflict with the Prussian war minister, General Walter Reinhardt, who was a fellow Swabian. Early in 1919, before the Reichswehr ministry had been created, Reinhardt responded to a Württembergian complaint that Prussia was issuing decrees without first consulting Württemberg’s war ministry. Reinhardt replied that, in the future, consultation would occur, but he also complained that the south German ministry had made decisions without first contacting Prussia. The response from Württemberg contended that actions taken in Stuttgart did not intend to impair the organizational unity of the army. General Reinhardt must not be receiving adequate information about the situation in his homeland and the need for the war ministry to make such decisions independently.48

Postwar military leaders in Württemberg, like their royal predecessors, also endeavored to cooperate with their north German counterparts on the substantive issues encountered in the reorganization

48 HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, WüMBB, 2.
process. Especially cooperative was General Wöllwarth, head of the Vth Military District. But his efforts met with irritation among some of his south German comrades. One criticized him and the "International General Staff", i.e., those Swabian staff officers who remained in Prussian service, for having lost their Swabian identity. Wöllwarth, despite his attitude of cooperation, sought to present the Württembergian case to Prussia and the nation. He exhorted local and national military and civilian leaders to consider carefully his requests for maintaining the character of the reduced army. He argued that the smaller an army was, the better its internal substance must be. Such a pronouncement had been echoing in the halls of the Württembergian war ministry for fifty years.

---

49 Wöllwarth responded angrily to this remark in a communication to Reinhardt, but he complained that not much support for combating such particularism was forthcoming from Berlin. HstaSt, Ha, Nachlaß General Walter Reinhardt, 22.

50 HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, WüMBB, 11.
CONCLUSIONS

In analyzing the instances and degrees of cooperation and friction between the armies of Prussia and Württemberg during the forty-seven years of the German Empire's existence the question arises whether these two institutions were in the vanguard of those elements which forged German national unity or whether they merely reflected the uneven, often obstructed course of German national consciousness. The issue is complex because Prussian organization, equipment, and training regulations were superimposed on the formerly independent army of the south German kingdom. Furthermore, the Bebenhausen agreement of 1893 integrated personnel affairs for the officers corps of the two armies. Despite such reforms and despite the dominant role played by the Prussian army in German military affairs after 1871, Germany's military land forces remained organized according to the confederate principle. There was no imperial German army with a single center of control and
administration. In 1914 the structure of Germany's fighting forces who marched through Luxembourg and Belgium and into France was similar to those armed forces which had taken the field against the French in 1870. They consisted of the Prussian army and its contingents from Saxony and southern Germany.

During the intervening forty years Prussia's military leadership had endeavored to "Prussify" the Württembergian contingent. As far as the technical aspects of this goal were concerned the Prussians had good cause to think that they had succeeded. Prussian generals had been pleased with the performance of the XIIIth Army Corps during prewar maneuvers. Württemberg's military leaders had accepted Prussian training and equipment regulations, Swabian officers received the same commissions as their Prussian counterparts, and Swabian soldiers performed in combat as effectively as German soldiers from the north.

But the confederate nature of the land forces was awkward. Throughout the period under investigation there was constant effort on the part of

\[1\text{See Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, Vol. II, p. 154. Ritter, however, derives his conclusion from his analysis of the Prussian army.}\]
Württemberg's kings, their advisers at court, Württembergian ministers of state, and their war ministers to preserve a role for the kingdom in the administrative affairs of the contingent. Though meager, the special privileges conceded to Württemberg in the military convention of 1870 were the subject of constant concern among the military and civilian leaders of the south German kingdom.

According to the military convention of 1870 the king of Württemberg would continue to receive the oath of allegiance from troops in the kingdom's army corps in line with the old German military tradition that the army was the king's personal regiment. More than once Württembergian war ministers relied on this personal tie between king and contingent to circumvent the authority of the corps' commanding generals, who were almost exclusively Prussian officers. Even after the "Bebenhausen Convention" created common commissions and a single time-in-grade list for promotions, the south German king and his war ministers remained the main sources of administrative authority in Württemberg. They cooperated with their Prussian counterparts on the main issues of military reform, military equipment, and training,
yet they endeavored constantly to preserve the
Swabian character of the contingent.

This tradition of strong personal ties between
king and army further complicated the confederate
nature of Germany's land fighting forces. A Prussian
officer or soldier swore allegiance to the king of
Prussia. In time of war he was to obey the German
emperor, who was the supreme commander of the field
army. There was no divided loyalty for the Prussian
fighting man, however, because Prussian king and
German emperor were the same person. On the other
hand the Swabian officer and soldier swore his
allegiance to his king and pledged to render service
to the German kaiser as supreme commander of the army
in time of war. Such a situation presented no
problems during peacetime. The question of obedience
to either king or kaiser remained a moot point for
Württemberg's peacetime soldiers. Germany's military
leaders, therefore, became so convinced of the
soldiers' unquestioning loyalty to the Reich that
they considered patriotic instruction superfluous.
But the strains and sacrifices of a long war increased
the significance of this division of loyalty. It
became necessary to instruct the men on their duty
to the fatherland. In 1917 the Supreme Command created the institution of "patriotic instruction" /Vaterländischer Unterricht/. The need for such instruction revealed the declining morale of Germany's troops. Moreover it indicated the weakness inherent in the confederate nature of the Prusso-German army.2

Another phenomenon exposed a weakness in the confederate nature of Germany's land armed forces. Through a Prussian dominated Supreme Command a Prussian king, as German kaiser, was dispersing Württembergian units throughout the army and in some cases was ordering Swabian soldiers to fill the ranks of mixed divisions. The performance in combat of Swabian soldiers declined during 1916 to the point where a reorganized Supreme Command reversed the policy of dispersing and mixing the troops and units of the contingents. Leaders at the Supreme Command realized that the state of combat effectiveness among Württemberg's troops was extremely important to Germany's overall war effort because the small south German kingdom, whose total population in 1910 approximated two and one half million, sent over one

half million soldiers (508,482) off to war between 1914 and 1918. In addition to bearing this heavy burden Württemberg also sacrificed more men in proportion to the state's overall population than any other German state. More than nine percent of the troops and 0.23 percent of the Swabian officers who saw combat were killed, wounded, or missing. The Prussian army lost 8.9 percent of its men and 0.19 percent of its officers. The percentages for Bavaria and Saxony are lower than those for Württemberg or Prussia. Significantly Württemberg had fewer men missing in action than any other German contingent.4

3Graevenitz, Die Entwicklung des würt. Heer-wesens, p. 61. His figures are based on a war ministry statistical compilation. See HastaSt, Ha, WüKM, Kra, 998a. During the war the Württembergian contingent expanded to approximately ten times its peacetime cadre. The XIIIth Army Corps, which had 30,992 officers and men just prior to the war, expanded into Army Group Duke Albrecht during the war, and its table of organization called for 248,038 men and officers. To maintain this field strength Württemberg sent over 300,000 men and more than 3,000 officers to the fighting units. It is difficult to vouch for the accuracy of the figures, however. Graevenitz notes in his study that many of the statistical records disappeared during the postwar revolution in Württemberg. If allowance is made for some possible exaggeration, these figures are not wholly implausible, given the nature of Württemberg's economy. The kingdom was primarily agricultural. In times of stress, women, children, and older people could work in the fields. Furthermore, Württemberg's industrial activity included textile manufacturing, an industry which could easily
Analysis of the performance of Württembergian units during the war, especially during the last two years of the conflict, reveals the tragic paradox of Württemberg's consistent and Prussia's changing policies on maintaining the cohesion of units from the Swabian homeland. When the Supreme Command ordered the regrouping of Württemberg's combat formations under the command of the popular heir to the Württembergian throne, Württembergian troop morale and combat effectiveness rose. By early 1917 the military leadership in both Prussia and Württemberg succeeded in attaining their immediate objectives. The reconstituted Württembergian units were rated by Allied intelligence units as being among the best in the entire Prusso-German army. But these same Württembergian units spent increasingly longer periods in the front lines. They got less rest and release men for other duties. There are also indications that some male labor came into Württemberg from other parts of Germany. See War Minister Marchtaler's request dated 6 November 1918 for reliable troops to curtail revolutionary disturbances by North German workers in the Daimler plant near Stuttgart and in various factories in southern Württemberg. HstaSt, Ha, WüKM, WüBB, 22.

4Ibid.

5National Archives, Record Group 120, American Expeditionary Forces, General Headquarters, Boxes 12, 260, 5213, 5219, 5220, 5910, 6394, 6395.
recuperation, and when they were sent to the rear, they received training for the toughest assignments. The subsequent over-utilization of Württembergian troop units in the front lines and in the offensives of 1918 decimated their ranks and resulted in greater sacrifices from the small kingdom. In turn these developments undermined Swabian morale, whose maintenance had been the reason for reorganizing the army in the middle of the war. Ultimately this decline in morale contributed to Germany's defeat. The composition of Germany's land fighting forces during the First World War, therefore, was an important factor in the outcome of the war.

Another factor stemming from the confederate nature of the Prusso-German army was the degree to which Swabian officers and common soldiers assimilated the Prussian military style and the degree of cooperation with men from other contingents. Assimilation was more easily accomplished within the officer corps than among the men in the ranks. Württembergian officers, with the exception of reserve officers, sought to make the army a career. They disciplined themselves to obey the military regulations of the kingdom, and after 1871 these regulations emulated
the Prussian model. Then, too, there were opportunities for military schooling and possibilities for advancement in Prussian military academies. Nevertheless it is significant that of the eighty-seven commanding officers, who held the ranks of major up to field marshal, in Duke Albrecht's reorganized Württembergian army corps, seventy-seven were the duke's fellow Swabians. Of this number fifteen had left combat units in Prussia and elsewhere to return to Army Group Duke Albrecht.

Swabian soldiers in the ranks retained a stronger attachment to the life style of their south German homeland. The men were trained almost exclusively in Württemberg. Their contact with men from other parts of Germany remained at a minimum prior to the war. The south German kingdom even retained its own training schools for non-commissioned officers. In addition the core of the professional enlistees was small. Men had to be drafted into the ranks or they served as one year volunteers. As a result the common soldier from Swabia, although he had accepted Prussia's

6 HstaSt, E 74 I, WüGB, 118. Fewer men from Württemberg volunteered for military service. Statistics reveal that Württemberg consistently had to draft more men to meet its manpower quota than did the other states.
training regulations and equipment and considered himself a good German, preferred to serve in units with his fellow Württembergians. During the First World War attempts to mix him with soldiers from other parts of Germany proved to be detrimental to his combat performance and morale. He simply wanted to serve in the trenches with men who understood his dialect, his eating habits, and his humor. He wanted to serve with men he trusted.

During the imperial period prior to the outbreak of war foreign political crises influenced the relationship between Württemberg and Prussia in military affairs. At the time of the war scare of 1875 there was relatively little friction between Württemberg's war minister and the Prussian commanding general. Once the crisis subsided, however, tensions between the two mounted. Commanding General Schwartzkoppen sought his resignation, but King Karl, hoping to avoid the unpleasantness of an open confrontation, refused the request and sought to reduce the tension. The international situation in the late 1880's resulted in an increase in the size of Germany's fighting forces, and during this period there was relatively little conflict between Swabian and Prussian
military leaders. Minister-President Mittnacht had tried to amend the Military Service Law of 1888, but upon the advice of his military plenipotentiary in Berlin, he removed the changes, and on this and subsequent occasions the Württembergian ministry of state did not present obstacles to the passage of military service laws. But Württembergian leaders did not give up their attempts to preserve their role in the administration of the contingent. It was shortly after withdrawal of their objections to the Military Service Law of 1888 that Württembergian leaders sought to place a Swabian general in the post of commanding general of the XIIIth Army Corps. Shortly after that the south German leadership endeavored to improve promotion opportunities for Swabian officers. This activity resulted in the so-called "Bebenhausen Convention," an agreement which accomplished the Württembergian objective. While subsequent Swabian military and governmental leaders did not take issue with the substance of Prussian military policies, they continued to struggle for the preservation of local administrative control over the contingent. Perhaps it is indicative of the effect which the constant international tensions of
the early twentieth century were having on German leaders that Württemberg's War Minister Marchtaler and Prussian Commanding General Fabeck squabbled over several minor personnel problems in 1913 and 1914. For the most part external crises contributed to increased cooperation between the two armies. But Württemberg's leaders did not interpret cooperation on matters of organization, training, and strategic planning as the complete abandonment of local administrative control over the Württembergian contingent.

Although Prussia dominated Germany's land forces during the forty-seven year existence of the Second Empire, its military leaders were unable to forge a truly national army. Indeed, they did not seem to want such an institution. Württemberg's military leaders, on the other hand, accepted Prussian dominance in the technical military sphere but made every effort to preserve the Swabian composition of the army corps which had been formed out of the old Württembergian army. Kings, ministers, and generals from both states seemed satisfied with this structural arrangement. The land armed forces remained the personal instruments of their monarchs, they were not subject to parliamentary control, and they continued
to be dominated by the traditional social groups. The conclusions, therefore, that the army was the nucleus of the collective state \( \text{Gesamtstaat} \), that it had the power to educate Germans in statehood \( \text{die staatsbildende Kraft des Heeres} \), and that it overcame the obstacles of particularism seem to exaggerate the role which Germany's land armed forces played in forging German national unity.\(^7\) The experience of military relations between Prussia and Württemberg during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries supports the contention that Germany's land armies contributed little to educating Germans in nationhood. To the contrary the structure of the Prusso-German army perpetuated a prenational concept of the Reich. Ultimately this proved to be a weakness when Germany had to fight a long war to preserve its national existence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Materials


Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv. N 5, Nachlaß General Ferdinand von Stülpnagel.


Family Archives. Dr. Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen. Selected papers from the Groener collection.

Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. E 14, Kabinettsakten, Band IV.

———. E 46/48, Ministerium der Auswärtigen Angelegenheiten.

———. E 74 I, Württembergische Gesandtschaft in Berlin.


United States. National Archives. Record Group 120. Data on German Divisions. German Files.

Public Documents


Memoirs


Secondary Sources

Books


Historical Department of the Prussian General Staff. Der deutsch-französische Krieg 1870-71. Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1874-1881.


**Articles**
