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REINTERPRETATION OF THE WORKS OF FRIEDRICH
NIETZSCHE WITH AN EMPHASIS ON NON-ASSERTIONAL
LINGUISTIC ACTS. [ Portions of Text in German. ]

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1974
Philosophy

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ON NIETZSCHE'S PURPORTED CONTRADICTORINESS:
A REINTERPRETATION OF THE WORKS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE
WITH AN EMPHASIS ON NON-ASSERTIONAL LINGUISTIC ACTS

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
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1974

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the encouragement and assistance of Professors Lee B. Brown, Marvin Fox, Richard Garner, Virgil Hinshaw, Robert Turnbull, and Morris Weitz. I appreciate, as well, the continued support of Ms. Vicky Childress, Virginia Foster, Bette Hellinger and Debbie Jadwin. Harry A. Schermer has remained an understanding and sympathetic friend throughout these five years of research and writing.
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FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Philosophy of Language and the works of Nietzsche

Studies in Philosophy of Language, Professors Morris Weitz and Richard Garner

Studies on Nietzsche, Professors Lee B. Brown, Marvin Fox and Robert Turnbull
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CHAPTER I: THE PROBLEM

1. Introduction

The central problem to which I originally addressed myself was whether or not one could find in the writings of Nietzsche what one would consider a positive moral theory. This problem, it seemed, however, required the detailed consideration of three major sub-problems: 1. What is Nietzsche's method, i.e., In what manner are we to take his writing, do we read it as poetry, as polemic, as critical philosophy, as psychology, etc.? 2. What criticisms does Nietzsche level at the major alternative ethical theories, assuming that he is at least sometimes offering such criticisms? 3. What, if any, ethical theory does Nietzsche himself propose and does it avoid the criticisms which he may have made against other theories? It now seems to me that the first issue is complex and significant enough to be deliberated upon in detail and at length. So it is this first matter which I will treat exclusively in this work; the other problems will have to remain for some other time, perhaps for some other author.

In considering the issue of Nietzsche's method I intend to argue for a fundamentally different interpretation of Nietzsche's language from which it has been previously understood. I will argue that it is more insightful into Nietzsche's writings to pose questions such as: What is the intended effect which
Nietzsche seeks in the reader? Under what conditions could those effects be realized? Could all the required conditions be met simultaneously? The supposition is that Nietzsche's language is not to be assumed to be assertional, but rather, a more useful assumption is that it is non-assertional. The important consideration regarding Nietzsche's work is the determination of his philosophical tasks.

Furthermore, I will contend that Nietzsche's actual utterances are not to be ignored nor construed as antithetical to his philosophical tasks. Rather the language which Nietzsche does use is appropriate to what it appears he attempted to accomplish.

Finally, I maintain that the success of such analysis does not show that Nietzsche was not a philosopher. It is not my intention to reject other commentaries in their details as to Nietzsche's doctrine. However, I do plan to establish that the question of Nietzsche's doctrine is secondary to a more immediate one as to the nature of his language, i.e. the connection between his philosophical task and method.

While there are other commentators who may deserve considerable attention, Morgan and Vaihinger, for example, Kaufmann, Danto, and Jaspers represent the three primary influences on Nietzsche scholarship which are particularly significant to the theses I wish to establish. Kaufmann is the foremost translator of Nietzsche's later works and revived interest in Nietzsche among English-speaking philosophers through his commentary. Danto attempts an analysis of
Nietzsche as an anticipator of contemporary analytic philosophy. Jaspers takes an interest in Nietzsche's philosophical activity as opposed to his doctrine. More importantly each of these commentators holds views about Nietzsche's language which could have been developed to that which I maintain. There is much in each commentary which is suggestive of this other view of Nietzsche's language. They could have held the non-assertional view, and by their own inclinations, they should have held that view, but they did not. There are important issues to raise, then, in connection with the way in which these analyses (Kaufmann, Danto, Jaspers and secondarily Morgan and Vaihinger) stop short of what I see to be their natural and appropriate conclusions.

Therefore, in order to examine the question of the method which Nietzsche used I will conduct two kinds of explorations. First I will critically discuss in detail these three commentators, Kaufmann, Danto and Jaspers then more briefly Morgan and Vaihinger. These commentaries will be examined especially with regard to how sentences in Nietzsche's works are classified, what is claimed to be implied by the sentences, and how the commentators deal with the charge that Nietzsche tends toward contradictions.

Second I will apply an interpretation of Nietzsche's language, developed along the line of non-assertional utterance, to two apparent contradictions in Nietzsche's writing. Both contradictions are related to the notion of eternal recurrence and hence are central to his philosophy.
The first apparent contradiction appears between the notions of overman and eternal recurrence. It is generally known that Nietzsche offered the concept of the "overman" as an ideal to be sought. To state that in more deterministic language, the development of the "overman" is one natural outgrowth of the strivings of the will to power as expressed in human life. Either way the "overman" is conceived, it is essentially developmental; some notion of progress seems to be involved. At the same time, Nietzsche espouses a view called the doctrine of eternal recurrence which is that all events in their every detail repeat themselves, histories are cyclical so that the future and the past are fully continuous and repetitive. So Nietzsche seems to hold that novelty, progress, development is possible, even sought after and that every event is repeated an infinite number of times. The contradiction is not easily stated briefly, but its rough outlines should be clear.

The second apparent contradiction emerges if one construes only the notion of eternal recurrence in terms of effects. In attempting to make intelligible the function of Nietzsche's offering the doctrine of eternal recurrence, one might shift to interpreting it as an as-if injunction -- "Consider the value of each moment as if you will experience it an infinite number of times." This view seems to rest upon a concept of a continuing ego that could remember, hence become bored by certain events upon their numerous, save infinite, repetitions. But Nietzsche's views of the ego, or mental substance, are negative. There isn't a continuant
which could be bored by an infinite repetition of any event, so if this view is correct the doctrine of eternal recurrence would have no force. Here the second conflict arises between the doctrine of eternal recurrence on a functional interpretation and the denial of a continuant, an ego. In the face of these apparent contradictions I will offer an interpretation of Nietzsche's language, illustrated by the doctrine of eternal recurrence, which will show the contradictions to be only apparent, or, at their worst, unimportant.

2. Contradictions and Assertions

A. Apparent contradictions

In order to systematically examine the question in which I am interested, "What is Nietzsche's method, i.e. in what manner are we to take his writing?", I shall examine the apparent contradictions for which Nietzsche is so infamous. To charge that Nietzsche's work includes contradictions most obviously requires a construal of his writings as assertional. Hence, should I be able to show the apparent contradictions to be only apparent I shall have to argue one of two things: 1. Nietzsche's assertions are considerably more complex than they have seemed at first glance and when one takes that complexity into account, the apparent contradictions dissolve, being replaced by a more complex assertion (this view is much like that of Kaufmann and Danto, in places), or 2. Nietzsche's writings are not assertional, i.e. it is not the case that they are either true or false, or intended as true, hence they could not be contradictory, or if there were contradictions they would be unimpor-

ant.
B. Real Contradictions

There are other views which insist upon the legitimacy of Nietzsche's work but which do so by insisting that the assertions made by Nietzsche are real contradictions (i.e. that the utterances are true or false and are uttered as true or false) and that some good results from the assertion of real contradictions. Jaspers and, to a certain extent, Morgan, and Vaihinger pursue this line of interpretation.

C. Assertions

So far, I have been using the terms "assertion" and hence "contradiction" ambiguously. Were there not such a high degree of confusion associated with the term "proposition" I would have been using it instead of "assertion." What is intended when I use the term "assertion" at this point in the discussion is the utterance of a string of linguistically normal sounds or (visual) marks which are so related as to constitute a grammatical construction which is either true or false and which is uttered as true or false. Some might prefer to call such an entity a "statement" rather than a "proposition" or an "assertion." Included among such entities would be sentences like: "The cat is on the mat.", "The present king of France is bald.", "It is raining or it is not raining." Since contradictions are sentences which are necessarily false they are a subset of the class of sentences I presently refer to as "assertions", "statements", or "propositions".1 Similarly, tautologies constitute

1 with continued hesitancy
that subset of sentences which are necessarily true, and contingencies constitute that subset of sentences which are neither necessarily true nor necessarily false but are either true or false.

The most obvious way in which Nietzsche could be subject to the accusation of contradictoriness is if he included in his writings sentences which were like "It is raining and it is not raining." or, in one place, "It is raining." and, in another, "It is not raining." This example, indeed, shows how the first type of defensive view arises. The two separate assertions may have complexities which will resolve the apparent contradictoriness. In this case, these would include temporal and spatial referents such that when they are made explicit the two sentences no longer even seem to be contradictory. "It is raining." uttered on Tuesday, April 1 in Manhattan and "It is not raining." uttered on Wednesday, April 2 in Madrid, whatever the truth values of the sentences are, they are not contradictories.

The matter is not this simple, however, and the worry about Nietzsche's apparent contradictoriness is not so easily put to rest. In attempting to interpret Nietzsche's writings one may seek to discover the implicit complexities in those explicit assertions which seem to be contradictory. Here one may begin to refer to different "senses" of a given term. "Will to power" may be implicitly complex so that in certain assertions it ought to be construed as "will to power allowed free expression" while in others it is more correctly understood as "will to power that
is suppressed." The context in which a phrase or assertion occurs would provide the ground for deciding among alternative interpretations of a text in which "will to power" appeared. Once such evidence is amassed, it may yet be the case that the implicit assertions (fully expanded explicit assertions) still are contradictory. Indeed, Kaufmann, as well as others, simply says that in some passages in Nietzsche's writing, or with regard to certain concepts, Nietzsche just does contradict himself.

D. Conditions for utterances

The pursuit of interpretations may often lead to the attempt to uncover a system of beliefs which the author had such that he wrote the sentences which he did write, although this system of beliefs is not identical with the set of his explicit assertions nor the set of implicit assertions which could be safely said to be their "expansions." In other words, it is one level of interpretation which includes spatial and temporal referents and special senses of key terms but yet another level of interpretation which identifies statements which may not in any way immediately resemble either the implicit (expansion) assertions or the explicit assertions. This system of beliefs I shall refer to as "conditions" for the utterances which do occur.

It is recognizably difficult to defend interpretation which is conducted at the level of "conditions for the utterances which do occur." Nevertheless, it is that level of interpretation which is required to grasp Nietzsche's philosophical task. It is at that
level of interpretation where the issue of contradiction is crucial. A philosophical work which suffers inconsistency at that level has a different and perhaps fatal disease. Before we reject Nietzsche's philosophical activity as contradictory it seems to me that it must be shown that he contradicts himself on the level of "conditions for the utterances which do occur."

I have not yet mentioned a group of considerations which are of great importance in what I undertake. There are many indications in Nietzsche's writings that the utterances which do occur are frequently not explicit assertions, i.e. utterances or strings of linguistically normal sounds or (visual) marks which are so related as to constitute a grammatical construction which is either true or false and which are uttered as true or false. That is to say, there are many linguistic acts in Nietzsche's works which fail to have even the grammatical earmarks of assertions. Many sentences end with question marks or exclamation marks or a trail of periods indicating incompleteness. In addition to the sheerly grammatical indicators that the linguistic acts are often not assertions, one notices Nietzsche's tendencies towards poems, songs, myths, and metaphors, that is, a variety of forms which are typical of fictional writing. Again, one is struck by the fact that large numbers of Nietzsche's linguistic utterances would not constitute grammatical constructions which are either true or false. Given these cues one is led to believe much of Nietzsche's writing is not assertional.
Most of Nietzsche's works are characteristically of a grammatical type other than that standardly used in making assertions. The work *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is clearly dominated by questions and exclamations as well as being in a mythical form of expression. Zarathustra is atypical only in the degree to which it avoids the discursive style. In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche writes of eternal recurrence as follows:

>The Heaviest Burden - What if a demon crept after thee into thy loneliest loneliness some day or night, and said to thee: "This life, as thou livest it at present, and hast lived it, thou must live it once more, and also innumerable times; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and every sigh, and all the unspeakably small and great in thy life must come to thee again, and all in the same series and sequence -- and similarly this spider and this moonlight among the trees, and similarly this moment, and I myself. The eternal sand-glass of existence will ever be turned once more, and thou with it, thou speck of dust!" -- Wouldst thou not throw thyself down and gnash thy teeth, and curse the demon that so spake? Or hast thou once experienced a tremendous moment in which thou couldst answer him: "Thou art a God, and never did I hear anything so divine!" If that thought acquired power over thee as thou art, it would transform thee, and perhaps crush thee; the question with regard to all and everything: "Dost thou want this once more, and also for innumerable times?" would lie as the heaviest burden upon thy activity! Or, how wouldst thou have to become favourably inclined to thyself and to life, so as to long for nothing more ardently than for this last eternal sanctioning and sealing? --

---

And he writes of the death of God, as follows:

Our question mark. -- But you do not understand this? Indeed, people will have trouble understanding us. We are looking for words; perhaps we are also looking for ears. Who are we anyway? If we simply called ourselves, using an old expression, godless, or unbelievers, or perhaps immoralists, we do not believe that this would even come close to designating us: We are all three in such an advanced stage that one -- that you, my curious friends -- could never comprehend how we feel at this point. Ours is no longer the bitterness and passion of the person who has torn himself away and still feels compelled to turn his unbelief into a new belief, a purpose a martyrdom. We have come cold, hard, and tough in the realization that the way of this world is anything but divine; even by human standards it is not rational, merciful or just. We know it well, the world in which we live is ungodly, immoral, "inhuman"; we have interpreted it far too long in a false and mendacious way, in accordance with the wishes of our reverence, which is to say, according to our needs. For man is a reverent animal. But he is also mistrustful; and that the world is not worth what we thought it was, that is about as certain as anything of which our mistrust has finally got hold. The more mistrust, the more philosophy.

We are far from claiming that the world is worth less; indeed it would seem laughable to us today if man were to insist on inventing values that were supposed to excel the value of the actual world. This is precisely what we have turned our backs on as an extravagant aberration of human vanity and unreason that for a long time was not recognized as such. It found its final expression in modern pessimism,... and a more ancient and stronger expression in the teaching of Buddha; but it is part of Christianity also, if more doubtfully and ambiguously so but not for that reason any less seductive.

The whole pose of "man against the world," of man as a "world-negating" principle, of man as the measure of the value of things, as judge of the world who in the end places existence itself upon his scales and finds it wanting -- the monstrous insipidity of this pose has
finally come home to us and we are sick of it. We laugh as soon as we encounter the juxtaposition of "man and world," separated by the sublime presumption of the little word "and." But look, when we laugh like that, have we not simply carried the contempt for man one step further? And thus also pessimism, the contempt for that existence which is knowable by us? Have we not exposed ourselves to the suspicion of an opposition -- an opposition between the world in which we were at home up to now with our reverences that perhaps made it possible for us to endure life, and another world that consists of us -- an inexorable, fundamental, and deepest suspicion about ourselves that is more and more gaining worse and worse control of us Europeans and that could easily confront coming generations with the terrifying Either/Or: "Either abolish your reverences or -- yourselves!" The latter would be nihilism; but would not the former also be -- nihilism?... -- This is our question mark.3

Despite what appear to me to be obvious cues that any interpretation of Nietzsche's writings which relies upon an understanding that the sentences ought all to be treated as assertional linguistic utterances is mistaken, it is the predominant form of even responsible interpretation. The lines of interpretation which consider all of Nietzsche's linguistic acts as explicit assertions or implicit assertions (of the type I first described) I shall refer to as doctrinal interpretations. In contrast to the doctrinal interpretations, I shall argue that Nietzsche's writings are best understood if we begin with the question "What was Nietzsche doing?" not "What did Nietzsche state?" If one has in mind that the writings

of this particular philosopher bear marks that continually suggest that linguistic acts are not exclusively assertional, then the interpretative effort must be directed toward the conditions for the linguistic utterances which do occur.

There is still one more aspect of the orientation which I espouse which deserves some thought. One must be aware of the generality in the phrase "conditions for the linguistic utterances which do occur." Much territory is included under this heading and some partitions should be outlined here. More will become clear as the details of others' as well as my own interpretation appear.

Basic to one's understanding of Nietzsche's work is what I shall refer to as his philosophical task. By that I mean the overall apparently intended goal of his writings. I must restrict myself to the postulation of his apparently intended goal since the intentions of individuals far more transparent than Nietzsche are matters about which I am reluctant to be specific with confidence. Furthermore, the evidence for the intended goal of Nietzsche's work is primarily "internal" evidence, i.e. not drawing upon reports of friends, diaries, etc. So the philosophical task in which I am interested is the one which is manifested in the writings themselves. So as not to prolong the suspense, I can indicate now that I believe the general philosophical task which Nietzsche undertook to be a therapeutic one, namely an act of healing analogous to that of cauterizing an infected wound.
or lancing a boil. Nietzsche seemed to see all of humanity to be in need of such therapy given his uneasiness about the influences of religion, philosophy, science, and political systems. The proposing of philosophical doctrines could be a way in which Nietzsche could accomplish this philosophical task so the doctrinal interpretation might have a range of success. It does not seem to me, however, that Nietzsche relied exclusively or even frequently upon that method for conducting his therapy. The utterance of assertions does not, therefore, seem to be the primary linguistic activity in which Nietzsche engaged.

Secondly, there may be some beliefs to which Nietzsche would need to be committed in order to undertake the philosophical tasks which I have said I believe he undertook. These presuppositions of his philosophical tasks would include beliefs such as: 1. that religion is a disease, 2. that certain forms of treatment are curative, 3. that healing is possible, etc. and so on. Hence, we can identify some assertions which Nietzsche should have been willing to make. What is not clear is whether such presuppositions, if they do exist, can be considered to be stated in the writings themselves. Furthermore, if we identify such a set of assertions which we believe Nietzsche should have been willing to make it is not obvious that we would characterize incompatibility among them as failure in the philosophical activity. It, at least, does not seem inevitable that we would say the philosophical activity was "false" or "foolish", though we might lament the difficulty, or even
the impossibility of that task. In other words, if the task which Nietzsche attempted was not exclusively the promotion of a philosophical doctrine, then failure in that task cannot be treated as failure in doctrine. Contradiction on the level of presupposition given a non-dictrinal philosophical task may well be a different sort of malady.

It needs to be said here, that, in addition to an overall philosophical task and its correlative presuppositions, there are, as well, subsidiary tasks with their own presuppositions. Relieving us of our religious ailments may well become the more specific concern of relieving us of Christianity. Preparing us for confidence in our own choices may require training us in reverence. These examples show another way in which conflict may appear within Nietzsche's own tasks. If such conflict does appear, I still maintain that the notions of "assertion" and "contradiction" are not the most helpful concepts in understanding the difficulty or in finding its remedy.


A. The views in general

It is probably obvious that my method of interpretation does not spring up ex nihilo. There are others, many others, in the past thirty or so years of Anglo-American philosophy who have become interested in linguistic behavior and have set about to map its geography (as the predominant metaphor has it). Of
these philosophers there are three who deserve some consideration now. 4

First Austin. Perhaps more than Wittgenstein, Austin influences my approach to linguistic behavior. While Wittgenstein in The Philosophical Investigations provided us all with a way of proceeding with the understanding of meaning, his analysis tended to focus upon the meaning of words. That is, he took as the linguistic elements, for a large part of his work, single words. It is true that he was concerned with the places of these words in sentences and the context of the sentences; nevertheless, the emphasis seemed to be on word-meaning. By contrast what Austin offered was an approach which assumed that the complete linguistic utterance was the element in analysis. His distinction of the linguistic act into three force components: locutionary force, illocutionary force, and perlocutionary force, is exceedingly helpful in providing an example of how to proceed with the analysis, even if those specific force-components are replaced by other classifications. What percolates through my thinking and has for some six years is Austin's How to Do Things with Words.

4I owe a debt of gratitude to Austin, Searle and Grice. To Austin the debt is for his major influence on the formation of my thoughts about linguistic behavior. Searle and Grice have only recently been the object of my study. Searle's Speech Acts and Grice's "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning and Word-Meaning" were recommended by Professor George Miller of Rockefeller University. In October, 1973, I had the opportunity of discussing my position on Nietzsche with Miller. Much of what I find in Searle and Grice are clear articulations of conceptions I have been struggling to express. There are, however, points of disagreement.
Searle is a more recent acquisition. He, also strongly influenced by Austin, conducts his analysis in philosophy of language assuming that the linguistic act is the element in the analysis. In his book *Speech Acts*, Searle writes:

> The unit of linguistic communication is not, as has generally been supposed, the symbol, word or sentence, or even the token of the symbol, word or sentence, but rather the production or issuance of the symbol or word or sentence in the performance of the speech act. To take the token as a message is to take it as a produced or issued token. More precisely, the production or issuance of a sentence token under certain conditions is a speech act, and speech acts are the basic or minimal units of linguistic communication.  

It is crucial to Searle's view that the speech act be construed as not simply a sentence token but a sentence token produced or issued under certain conditions. Speech acts are pieces of intentional behavior and, according to Searle, only certain kinds of intentions are "adequate for the behavior I am calling speech acts." It is a further feature of Searle's theory of language that he is willing for it to be considered as a "part of a theory of action," he says this is so "simply because speaking is a rule-governed form of behavior." 

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7 *Ibid*. 

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There are two points about Austin and Searle which I want to emphasize. These are quite general propositions which characterize both views. First, both Austin and Searle treat the use of language as a form of action, i.e. behavior. Since the linguistic elements are acts, some more encompassing theory of actions is implied. (Austin, re: "performatives": "The name is derived, of course, from perform, the usual verb with the noun 'action': it indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action -- it is not normally thought of as just saying something." and Searle: "...speaking a language is performing speech acts, acts such as making statements, giving commands, asking questions, making promises, and so on: and more abstractly, acts such as referring and predicating."^) The character of such a larger theory is no more than outlined by either Austin or Searle. While the specification of such a theory is certainly worthy of

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^J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, edit. J. O. Urmson, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 6-7. Austin began with the constantive-performative distinction intended to mark off performatives as utterances which were doings not just sayings, by contrast, constantives would be sayings which were not also doings. However, in his very first lecture a footnote indicates that such a distinction will not remain. There he said, "It is, of course, not really correct that a sentence ever is a statement: rather, it is used in making a statement, and the statement itself is a logical construction 'out of the makings of statements." (Ibid., p. 1) Eventually, in Lecture X, Austin says "Once we realize that what we have to study is not the sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speech situation, there can hardly be any longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is performing an act." (Ibid., p. 138)

^Searle, op.cit., p. 16.
attention I shall simply turn away that temptation for the purpose of completing this effort. Nevertheless, Nietzsche's speech acts are more suitably construed as acts of different kinds, not just as the attempts to make statements of doctrine.

The second general feature of Austin's and Searle's analyses of speech acts is that they both maintain that the nature of the speech act is a function not only of the words of phrases uttered but also the context or conditions under which it is expressed. Searle's distinction between token, description and explanation can be employed here to state this proposition as follows: The description and explanation of a speech act are a function of the occurrence of the token in a given situation (i.e. under certain conditions). In this regard, Nietzsche's concepts and thoughts need to be placed in the context of his philosophical task before they can be made intelligible.

Without laboring these two points any more I do want to restate that the direction in which we are taken in the analysis of linguistic behavior by these two observations is to an understanding of the use of language as action in context.\(^{10}\)

One function of the linguistic-act approach, which I have not yet mentioned is that it is employed to provide an analysis of

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\(^{10}\) The effect of this orientation is to raise a whole set of questions about any instance of linguistic behavior, which in the main, I hope to establish, has not been raised in interpreting Nietzsche. Furthermore, the asking of that set of questions will lead to a fuller understanding of Nietzsche's work. I might even venture to suggest that the linguistic-act orientation could open a new course in interpretation of varied forms of linguistic behavior from philosophy to literature to scientific discourse.
meaning. Austin equates sentence meaning with the **sense and reference** of the locution while Searle identifies sentence meaning with the **propositional content** of the utterance. In contrast to both Austin and Searle, Grice presents an interpretation of saying something and meaning it. When an utterer says something and means it what is meant is, in the indicative type, that the hearer should **believe** what the utterer intends him to believe, and, in the imperative type, that the hearer **does** what the utterer intends him to do. What is meant is hence analyzed in terms of **intended perlocutionary effects**. In a revision of his position, Grice later maintained that what is intended is that the hearer **think** that the utterer believes something (indicative type) or that the hearer **intend** to do something (imperative type). A table of these several views exhibits the similarities and differences among Austin, Searle and Grice (Cf. Table 1).

### B. Comparisons

It should be evident from these summaries that the overall systems of Austin and Searle are quite similar. Differences between them seem to be in the specification of the locutionary act; Austin builds "sense and reference" into the locutionary act while Searle treats "referring and predicating" as the element he calls propositional acts. This difference may well account for Austin saying: "...I want to distinguish **force** and meaning in the sense in which meaning is equivalent to **sense and reference**..."\(^{11}\) while Searle

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\(^{11}\)Austin, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
Table 1: Comparison of Austin, Searle and Grice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Austin</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A) Locution</td>
<td>Words, phrases, sentences uttered with sense and reference. Locutionary act</td>
<td>He said to me 'Shoot her!' meaning by 'shoot' and referring by 'her' to</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>divisible into: a) phonetic, b) phatic, c) rhetic acts.</td>
<td>her.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;The phonetic act is merely the act of uttering certain noises. The phatic act</td>
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<td></td>
<td>is the uttering of certain vocables or words, i.e., noises of certain types,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>belonging to and as belonging to, a certain vocabulary, conforming to and as</td>
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<td></td>
<td>conforming to a certain grammar. The rhetic act is the performance of an</td>
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<td></td>
<td>act of using those vocables with a certain more-or-less definite sense and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reference.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) Illocution</td>
<td>Conventional significance of the locution</td>
<td>He urged me to shoot her.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) Perlocution</td>
<td>Natural consequences of the performance of the locutionary or illocutionary act.</td>
<td>He persuades me to shoot her.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>He got me to shoot her.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Searle</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A) Utterance</td>
<td>Uttering words (morphemes, sentences)</td>
<td>&quot;Sam smokes habitually.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


13 Searle, op.cit., pp. 24-25.
Table 1 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(B) Propositional acts</th>
<th>Referring and predicating</th>
<th>'Sam' refers to Sam and smoking is predicated of him.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(C) Illocutionary acts</td>
<td>A and B with conventional significance.</td>
<td>I assert that Sam smokes habitually.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D) Perlocutionary acts</td>
<td>C with natural consequences</td>
<td>The hearer is enlightened by being informed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GRICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>utterance type</th>
<th>form</th>
<th>definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicative type utterances:</td>
<td>'U meant something by uttering x' 'U M-intended to produce in A effect E' E is a belief</td>
<td>1) For some audience A, 2) U intended his utterance of x to produce in A (the belief that x) E 3) by means of A's recognition of that intention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperative type utterances:</td>
<td>'U M-intended to produce in A effect E' E is A's doing something</td>
<td>1) For some audience A, 2) U intended his utterance of x to produce in A (the doing of something) E 3) by means of A's recognition of that intention.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>utterance type</th>
<th>form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicative type</td>
<td>Same as in Grice, except E = think that the utterer believes something.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>utterances:</td>
<td>a) exhibit: &quot;utterances by which the utterer U M-intends to impart a belief that he (U) has a certain propositional attitude.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) protrepic: &quot;utterances by which U M-intends, via imparting a belief that he (U) has a certain propositional attitude, to induce a corresponding attitude in the hearer.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperative type</td>
<td>Same as in Grice, except E = &quot;that the hearer should intend to do something (with, of course, the ulterior intention on the part of the utterer that the hearer should go on to do the act in question).&quot;</td>
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says "The meaning of a sentence is determined by rules, and those rules specify both conditions of utterance of the sentence and also what the utterance counts as." Grice distinguishes at least utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning and word-meaning. The first of these, utterer's meaning, Grice refers to as "occasion-meaning," which he takes to be generally analyzed in the form "By uttering x, U meant that * p." The '*' is a mark for the mood of the linguistic act, i.e. assertive, imperative, etc. Occasion-meaning is tied to the specific utterer as well as the circumstances for the utterance. Contrast with that are two ways in which words or sentences mean: "timeless meaning" and "applied timeless meaning." Timeless meaning reflects the conventional understanding of a word or sentence. Since there may be several conventional understandings of a word or a sentence, Grice designates each of those as applied timeless meaning.

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16 Searle, op.cit., p. 48.
He notes that the occasion-meaning and the applied timeless meaning may coincide and in that event it is correct to say that the utterer conventionally meant that *p, even though U may not have said that *p.

The direction of Grice's work seems to be toward the accommodation of both the idiosyncratic use (U meant that *p) and the conventional use (X means that ____). In other words, Grice is trying to provide the machinery for making connections between individual instances of linguistic acts and conventional meaning. He attempts this while also forwarding a model of the speech act which includes utterer's intention, utterance, conditions, the hearer's response. The successful speech act is where what the utterer intends to produce as a hearer's response is in fact the hearer's response. Since what is in fact the hearer's response is partially a matter of natural phenomena (the psychology of the hearer, his immediately past experiences, etc.), Grice's analysis of meaning is in terms of perlocutionary effects, or so it seems to Searle.

These three theories of utterance meaning all indicate that utterances are not all statements (assertional). The thrust of the theories is that words, though they may be rule-governed, and sentences, though they too may be rule-governed, still must be interpreted with regard to the type of linguistic act going on. And, most importantly the linguistic act need not be the making of a statement. Since the type of interpretation of a given linguistic act is in part a function of the context in which the
utterance occurs, hard and fast criteria for identification of linguistic act type will probably not be available. I have suggested earlier that there are good grammatical cues to the interpretation that Nietzsche's utterances are not primarily assertional, i.e. the sentences themselves are grammatically exclamations, questions and exhortations more often than they are statements. Furthermore, the mode of expression is frequently fictional, employing demons and such figures, as well as metaphors and puzzles. Such fictional utterances, though one might insist that they are literally false, are most usefully thought of as constructs, pictures and mental assists which rather have a function and intent which is not the saying of something true or false.

Some important passages on eternal recurrence in *Zarathustra* can exemplify the value in distinguishing kinds of linguistic acts. First in a passage where Zarathustra appears to present an argument for eternal recurrence, the text goes:

"Stop, dwarf!" I said. "It is I or you! But I am the stronger of us two: you do not know my abysmal thought. That you could not bear!"

Then something happened that made me lighter, for the dwarf jumped from my shoulder, being curious; and he crouched on a stone before me. But there was a gateway just where we had stopped.

"Behold this gateway, dwarf!" I continued. "It has two faces. Two paths meet here; no one has yet followed either to its end. This long lane stretches back for an eternity. And the long lane out there, that is another eternity. They contradict each other, these paths; they offend each other face to face; and it is here at this gateway that they come together. The name of the gateway is inscribed above: 'Moment.'
But whoever would follow one of them, on and on, farther and farther -- do you believe, dwarf, that these paths contradict each other eternally?"

"All that is straight lies," the dwarf murmured contemptuously. "All truth is crooked; time itself is a circle."

Zarathustra seems simply to be stating the doctrine of eternal recurrence. Within the text itself are indications that the import of the utterance is not in its truth or falsity but in its effects on Zarathustra, on the reader. Zarathustra remarked: "Then something happened that made me lighter..." But Zarathustra continues his "argument":

"Behold," I continued, "this moment! From this gateway, Moment, a long, eternal lane leads backward: behind us lies an eternity. Must not whatever can walk have walked on this lane before? Must not whatever can happen have happened, have been done, have passed by before? And if everything has been there before -- what do you think, dwarf, of this moment? Must not this gateway too have been there before? And are not all things knotted together so firmly that this moment draws after it all that is to come? Therefore -- itself too? For whatever can walk -- in this long lane out there too, it must walk once more.

"And this slow spider, which crawls in the moonlight, and this moonlight itself, and I and you in the gateway, whispering together, whispering of eternal things -- must not all of us have been there before? And return and walk in that other lane, out there, before us, in this long dreadful lane -- must we not eternally return?"

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18 Ibid., p. 270.
Here Zarathustra seems to be offering premises and conclusions:
"Must not whatever can happen have happened, have been done, have passed by before?... And are not all things knotted together so firmly that this moment draws after it all that is to come? Therefore -- itself too?" Eventually Zarathustra says "--must we not eternally return?"

Now, if this is an argument for eternal return its premises and conclusions are surely expressed in an unusual way. One hesitates to apply logical principles to the "argument":

Must not all men be mortal?

Must not Socrates be a man?

Therefore must not Socrates be mortal?

One might maintain that the true or correct argument can be discovered within this odd locution. So Zarathustra, nay, Nietzsche argued that:

Whatever can happen has happened.

Everything is knotted together so that even this moment draws itself after itself.

Therefore we return eternally.

If we ignore the sense that something was lost in the transformation from Zarathustra's words to this argument, the context should still provide grounds for insisting that Nietzsche is not asserting nor arguing for the doctrine of eternal recurrence. The passages just considered were preceded by the setting of the stage for the conversation:
Not long ago I walked gloomily through the deadly pallor of dusk -- gloomy and hard, with lips pressed together. Not only one sun had set for me. A path that ascended defiantly through stones, malicious, lonely, not cheered by herb or shrub -- a mountain path crushed under the defiance of my foot. Striding silently over the mocking clatter of pebbles, crushing the rock that made it slip, my foot forced its way upward. Upward -- defying the spirit that drew it downward toward the abyss, the spirit of gravity, my devil and archenemy.

Upward -- although he sat on me, half dwarf, half mole, lame, making lame, dripping lead into my ear, leaden thoughts into my brain.

"0 Zarathustra," he whispered mockingly, syllable by syllable; "you philosopher's stone! You threw yourself up high, but every stone that is thrown must fall. O Zarathustra, you philosopher's stone, you slingstone, you star-crusher! You threw yourself up so high; but every stone that is thrown must fall. Sentenced to yourself and to your own stoning -- O Zarathustra, far indeed you have thrown the stone, but it will fall back on yourself."

Then the dwarf fell silent, and that lasted a long time. His silence, however, oppressed me; and such twosomeness is surely more lonesome than being alone.19

Zarathustra presents himself as in combat with the dwarf. The battle will be won by Zarathustra's courage. The courage which is strength is the thought of eternal recurrence, the willing of eternal recurrence. Zarathustra says: "Courage, however, is the best slayer -- courage which attacks: which slays even death itself, for it says, "was that life? Well then! Once more!""20 It is also clear that the rhetoric and its psychological effects are the point of difference

19Ibid., p. 268.

20Ibid., p. 269.
between the dwarf and Zarathustra. The dwarf had already assented to the idea that "time itself is a circle," hence Zarathustra's words as an argument to prove eternal recurrence would be idle given that the dwarf had already agreed to the "conclusion."

The difference is that Zarathustra is made lighter, is more exhilarated by the thought, the willing of eternal recurrence.

Notice that the immediate context shows that Zarathustra is talking with a dwarf -- the language is fictional throughout the whole book and it is so even more obviously precisely here.

Second, the grammar even of the introduction to the expression of the "doctrine" is non-assertional in important places. Third, the significance of the thought of eternal recurrence, of the willing of eternal recurrence, is not in its truth value but in its capacity to allow us to psychologically overcome death.

The larger context, the overall task which Nietzsche's language is suited for will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter VII. It should be mentioned here, however, that that larger context leads one not to interpret these passages as the assertion of or argument for the "doctrine" of eternal recurrence. Sensitivity to the variety of uses of language is inculcated by philosophers like Austin, Searle and Grice. Their theories are not cut from one piece of cloth, however, and the complexities of their differences deserve some further study before returning to applications to Nietzsche's works.
Both Searle and Austin hold that perlocutionary effects are non-conventional, hence meaning would, if identified with perlocutionary effects, become non-conventional. Such a consequence is contrary to the efforts of both Austin and Searle. The arguments against Grice on this point, since he is a contemporary of Searle's not Austin's, are laid out by Searle in Chapter Two of *Speech Acts*\(^21\). In essence, the criticisms of Grice's view are 1) that "it fails to account for the extent to which meaning can be a matter of rules or conventions"\(^22\) and 2) that "by defining meaning in terms of intended effects it confuses illocutionary with perlocutionary acts."\(^23\) The serious import of these two criticisms seems to be a matter of whether or not Grice's view makes language non-conventional.

Searle does not object to the formulation of "U's saying x and meaning it" in terms of intention. Nor does he object to the intention being an intention to produce a specific effect in the hearer. The issue is what type of effect it is which the utterer intends to produce when he means what he says. Searle offers the following summary of Grice's analysis (1) and his own revision (2):


\(^{22}\)Ibid., p. 43.

\(^{23}\)Ibid., p. 44. It should be noted that Searle's criticism are directed at the 1957 Grice model not the 1968 one. However, the thrust of the criticism does not seem to be deflected by the revisions which Grice himself made except in the distinction between 'U meant that * p' and 'X means that ____.'
1. Grice's original analysis
Speaker S means something by X =

(a) S intends (i-I) the utterance U of X to produce
a certain perlocutionary effect PE in hearer H.

(b) S intends U to produce PE by means of the recognition
of i-I.

2. Revised analysis
S utters sentence T and means it (i.e., means literally
what he says) = S utters T and

(a) S intends (i-I) the utterance U of T to produce in
H the knowledge (recognition, awareness) that the
states of affairs specified by (certain of) the rules
of T obtain. (Call this effect the illocutionary
effect, IE)

(b) S intends U to produce IE by means of the recognition
of i-I.

(c) S intends that i-I will be recognized in virtue of
(by means of) H's knowledge of (certain of) the
rules governing (the elements of) T. 24

Again what appears to be at issue between Grice and Searle is the
rule-governed character of language. Grice's analysis does not
emphasize rules while Searle's does. Searle's criticisms of Grice,
i.e. that he fails to account for the extent to which meaning is
conventional and that he confuses illocutionary and perlocutionary
acts, seem to be just one criticism since the latter is simply another
manifestation of the former given that the illocution/perlocution
distinction rests on the illocution being rule-governed or con-
ventional.

The notion of rule needs to be examined before the full import
of Searle's insistence that language is rule-governed becomes clear.

24 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
To this point, I have been using "rule-governed" and "conventional" as though they were roughly synonymous. They are not, though both stand in opposition to "natural." The distinction between "constitutive" and "regulative" rules will provide the means for the distinction between "rule-governed" and "conventional" as Searle employs them. These distinctions in turn bear upon the degree to which Grice's purported perlocutionary effect analysis is viewed as successful by Searle. A regulative rule is a rule for behavior for which there is some "antecedently or independently existing" form of behavior. There are, willy nilly, interpersonal relationships. Rules of etiquette offer a conventional way of governing that behavior. Hence rules of etiquette are regulative rules.

"But constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they create or define new forms of behavior." Paradigm examples are the rules which establish the playing of football or chess. General formulae for these two types of rules further exhibit their differences; regulative rules are found in the forms: 'Do X,' or 'In Y do X' while constitutive rules most frequently are shown in 'X counts as Y,' or 'X counts as Y in context C.'

It seems to follow from the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules that when Searle accuses Grice of letting the rule-governed character of language, specifically illocutionary

\[^{25}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 33.}\]
\[^{26}\text{Ibid.}\]
\[^{27}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 34.}\]
acts, slip out of his grasp, Searle is concerned that the remaining alternatives for language are that it is either merely conventional, or merely natural. In other words, if linguistic acts, i.e. illocutionary acts and effects, i.e. meanings, are to be more than arbitrary (conventional) but somehow not quite in the realm of natural laws, there must be a domain of rule-governed behavior, i.e. behavior which is what it is because of constitutive rules. To insist upon the middle ground, illocutionary acts and effects, as the focus of meaning is to insist that a stimulus-response model of language is not possible. To put this in yet another way, Searle wants to maintain that institutional facts cannot be fully explicated by brute facts. So the worry is one of a reduction of institutional facts to brute facts, of intentional rule-governed behavior to stimulus-response laws. This worry of Searle's is fairly explicite in the closing two paragraphs of Chapter Three so I quote them here in their entirety:

Some illocutionary verbs are definable in terms of the intended perlocutionary effect, some not. Thus requesting is, as a matter of its essential condition, an attempt to get a hearer to do something, but promising is not essentially tied to such effects on or responses from the hearer. If we could get an analysis of all (or even most) illocutionary acts in terms of perlocutionary effects the prospects of analyzing illocutionary acts without reference to rules would be greatly increased. The reason for this is that language could then be regarded

as just a conventional means for securing or attempting to secure natural responses or effects. The illocutionary act would then not essentially involve any rules at all. One could in theory perform the act in or out of a language, and to do it in a language would be to do with a conventional device what could be done without any conventional devices. Illocutionary acts would then be (optionally) conventional but not rule governed at all.

As is obvious from everything I have said, I think this reduction of the illocutionary to the perlocutionary and the consequent elimination of rules probably cannot be carried out. It is at this point that what might be called institutional theories of communication, like Austin’s, mine, and I think Wittgenstein’s, part company with what might be called naturalistic theories of meaning, such as, e.g., those which rely on a stimulus-response account of meaning.

C. Details of the theories

It is not within the scope of this paper to undertake a complete examination of the theories of Austin, Searle and Grice. These theories do lay out some terminology and principles which assist in the specification of the method of interpretation which I am undertaking into Nietzsche’s works. The details which I have discussed so far I believe will clarify that method. There remains a final point in these views which is relevant to what I am doing and so before proceeding with interpreting Nietzsche I must elaborate on

29Searle, op.cit., p. 71. While I have tried to make clear a distinction between conventional and rule-governed as Searle seems to make it in these passages, there are many other instances where he seems to treat the two terms as if they were synonymous. The distinction I have emphasized is what, I believe, Searle meant, though not always what he said.
it. That point is what Searle refers to as the **principle of expressibility** and associated with it is the question of what must we say (utter) before it can be said that we said (stated) something.

According to Searle everything which we can mean we can express. He states the principle of expressibility in the following ways:

1. I take it to be an analytic truth about language that whatever can be meant can be said. A given language may not have a syntax or a vocabulary rich enough for me to say what I mean in that language but there are no barriers in principle to supplementing the impoverished language or saying what I mean in a richer one.\(^3\)

2. Often we mean more than we actually say...even though I do not say exactly what I mean, it is always possible for me to do so -- if there is any possibility that the hearer might not understand me, I may do so.\(^3\)

3. We might express this principle by saying that for any meaning X and any speaker S whenever S means (intends to convey, wishes to communicate in an utterance, etc.) X then it is possible that there is some expression E such that E is an exact expression of or formulation of X. Symbolically: \((S) \ (X) \ (S \ means \ X \rightarrow \ P \ (\exists \ E) \ (E \ is \ an \ exact \ expression \ of \ X))\).\(^3\)

Although the first formulation of the principle of expressibility seems to promise more, the principle really only is the claim that it is the case that there is nothing which I can mean for which it

\(^3\)Searle, *op.cit.*, p. 17.

\(^3\)ibid., p. 19.

\(^3\)ibid., p. 20.
is necessarily impossible for me to find an explicit way of saying it. Nothing, in other words, about language prevents the explicit formulation of what I mean. This principle depends upon a distinction between meaning and the intended effect in hearers. Furthermore, it especially is not claimed to hold where the intended effects in hearers are "literary or poetic effects, emotions, beliefs, and so on." 33

My objection is that the disclaimer regarding intended effects and intended non-literal effects is both misleading and unfortunate. It is misleading since Searle goes on to identify what U means with the so-called intended illocutionary effects (which appear to be the hearer's recognition that the utterance is a literal instance of the given type of illocution which the utterer intended). 34 It is unfortunate, for the very difficult and interesting cases of speech acts are those with intended non-literal effects. Those cases are not covered by the principle nor are they explored in the body of the theory. The consequence of the exclusion of those cases is that the perlocutionary ground which I wish to venture into is virtually untouched save by Grice's suggestions.

33 Ibid.

34 The distinction between illocutionary effects and perlocutionary effects depends upon the distinction between utterances which fit the form: In saying X, he did Y, as opposed to those which fit the form By saying X, he did Y. And that distinction is certainly not adequately spelled out by either Austin or Searle. It seems to be ignored by Grice who simply uses the form: By saying X...
Austin, as well, does not purport that his analysis encompasses the so-called non-literal uses of language. He says:

Finally, we have said there is another whole range of questions about 'how we are using language' or 'what we are doing in saying something' which we have said may be, and intuitively seem to be, entirely different -- further matters which we are not trenching upon. For example, there are insinuating (and other non-literal cases of language), joking (and other non-serious uses of language), and swearing and showing off (which are perhaps expressive uses of language). We can say 'In saying x I was joking' (insinuating..., expressing my feelings, etc.).

Since the joking case is formulated in the 'In saying X I was joking' pattern it seems that joking has illocutionary force. It would not then escape Scarle's analysis of meaning as illocutionary effect since the hearer could well recognize the utterance as the illocutionary act which the speaker intended him to recognize. Austin did not claim that it was not subject to such analysis though.

Another case might better show how the principle of expressibility might not hold. Let us say that I say to an inquiring traveller "The Browns' house is the third on the left." all the time intending to mislead him. Several alternatives present themselves here. First, it could be maintained that misleading is an illocutionary act since it seems to fit the general formula In saying X, I was doing Y, i.e. In saying "The Browns' house is the third on the left." I was misleading him. The fit to that formula can be supported by the observation that perlocutionary acts might further be intended. For

35 Austin, op.cit., p. 121.
example: By saying "The Browns' house is the third on the left," I made him late for his appointment, got him in a peck of trouble, or saved him from the wrath of a jealous husband. If one grants that misleading is an illocutionary act then it cannot be the case that I could explicitly say what I meant and still do it. Not even in principle.

Second, one might insist that Austin's general formulae 'In saying X, I was doing Y' and 'By saying X, I was doing Y' are not hard and fast rules for identifying illocutionary as distinct from perlocutionary acts. In fact, Austin himself did not purport that the formulae could be used to make such a distinction with any certainty. Austin found no other satisfactory criterion for making the distinction and these general formulae do seem to work in most cases. For Searle's principle of expressibility to resist such a counterexample as a case of misleading Searle would have to have provided a criterion which is adequate to make the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts (and effects). It does not appear that Searle does manage to produce such a criterion, though I cannot argue here for that claim. I can suggest that it seems that for Searle illocutionary acts are presumably convention or rule-governed while perlocutionary acts are not. It is not immediately obvious that there are no rules which govern misleading. If we could identify rules which govern misleading then it should follow that it is an illocutionary act.
However, a third alternative must be considered. Perhaps the purported counterexample to the principle of expressibility is not a counterexample because saying something and meaning it is not the same as meaning to do something in saying something (or by saying something). Saying something and meaning it is the literal use of language so if misleading is saying something and not meaning it then misleading is not within the scope of the principle of expressibility. Meaning to do something in saying something is not the meaning of the sentence which is uttered. That is, the effects which I, the speaker, intend to produce in the hearer are not the meaning of the sentence.

A quick review will remove some of the impending confusion. The words "means" and "meaning" are used in at least three ways which Searle would want to be distinguished: 1. the meaning of the sentence, which is "determined by rules" which "specify both conditions of utterance of the sentence and also what the utterance counts as,"36 2. uttering a sentence and meaning it, which is a matter of (a) intending (i-I) to get the hearer to know (recognize, be aware of) that certain states of affairs obtain, (b) intending to get the hearer to know (recognize, be aware of) these things by means of getting him to recognize i-I... and (c) intending to get him to recognize i-I in virtue of his knowledge of the rules for the sentence uttered.37

36Searle, op. cit., p. 48.

37Ibid.
The principle of expressibility is a principle regarding uttering a sentence and meaning it, i.e. achieving the intended "illocutionary effects" of the hearer understanding the sentence, knowing its meaning, knowing the rules governing its elements. That principle indicates that: "A given language may not have a syntax or a vocabulary rich enough for me to say what I mean in that language but there are no barriers in principle to supplementing the impoverished language or saying what I mean in a richer one." To return to the case of misleading, could it not be that the hearer knows the sentence meaning, knows the rules governing its elements and yet it be impossible for me to say what I mean in that language or even a richer one to that hearer? What I mean is the third use of "means/meaning" offered above. Searle, in stating the principle of expressibility employs a phrase "what I mean" which is sufficiently broad in its interpretations so as to encompass all the effects which I intend to produce. If it can be assumed that Searle can distinguish between illocutionary effects and perlocutionary effects, the principle of expressibility, though it seems to include both, cannot be correct for certain things which I might mean. In other words, though it would seem that Searle is claiming that I could, in principle, state what effects I intended to produce in the hearer, in some cases I

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38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., p. 17.
could not even in principle state what effects I intended to produce in the hearer to the hearer and still expect to achieve those effects.

This issue is not much ado about nothing. If I could in principle state explicitly what effects I intended to produce in the hearer to the hearer, there would be no reason not to try to do so. The principle suggests that utterances which cannot be translated are not literal, i.e. are not meant by the speaker. Or if they are meant, the utterances must be capable of explicit statement. This pair of assumptions has in a variety of forms led interpreters of Nietzsche either to reject his utterances as insincere, hollow, the ravings of a madman, or, when they have been possessed by a conviction of the value of his works, they have sought a systematic re-statement of that which was disguised.

These matters are also of concern since they seem to lobby in favor of an understanding of Searle, and to an extent Austin as well, that suggests that the central kind of linguistic doing is stating. Searle claims that if "the illocutionary force of an utterance is not explicit it can always be made explicit." If that is so and we enrich our language sufficiently to obtain verbs for all illocutionary acts, we could presumably always explicitly state what we were doing. According to Searle "A man who says "I (hereby) promise" not only promises, but says he does." In principle, then, we could

\(^{40}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 68.\)

\(^{41}\textit{Ibid.}\)
always, except for the unspecified exceptional cases, state what we were doing in our speech acts as well as doing whatever it was. The general form "I hereby IAI" (IAI = illocutionary act indicator) could, in principle be the beginning of every sentence. There may be nothing wrong with such a state of affairs. It surely of course would make our communication and action less surprising, except in the unspecified exceptional cases where we couldn't state what we were doing and still do it.42

What I do not like about these trends is that they suggest that the essence or heart of linguistic acts is stating -- if not in fact then in principle. All the while the "non-literal" and "non-serious" uses of language are shunted aside as not falling within the scope of the theory. What is hopeful about Grice's analysis, though the waters there are still quite muddy, is that he attempts to include perlocutionary effects in the speech act and in the intention of the speech act. Such effects are such that, as the Austin-Searle theory goes, one could not capture them in sentences such as "I hereby PAI" (PAI = perlocutionary act indicator). This observation takes us back, however, to the enormous question of whether language meaning is rule-governed if it is identified with perlocutionary effects. That confusion will remain unresolved herein.

42 What might be wrong with it is that we might get into an infinite regress: a benign one in analysis or a more troublesome one in trying to state that we were stating that we were stating etc... "I hereby IAI..."
If one could resolve the theoretical difficulties in the disagreements between Searle and Grice on this point then the discussion of Nietzsche interpretation would be a discussion of the meaning of the utterances. In other words, if Grice's view that utterer's meaning is intended perlocutionary effect, then the identification of the perlocutionary effects which Nietzsche intended to achieve in his works would be the provision of the correct interpretation of the works. If, on the other hand, Searle's insistence on the meaning of an utterance prevails, then conventions or rules which govern sentence use as found in Nietzsche's works would have to be determined. This latter course would require the identification of the type of linguistic act in which Nietzsche was engaged and the specification of those conventions or rules which are relevant to that type of linguistic act. I believe a general schema for that undertaking presents itself in Grice's most recent work and I shall come to that shortly in the discussion of commitments of utterances.

While Searle holds that in theory we can say all we mean he does maintain that in fact we do not. Furthermore, he holds that it cannot be said of us that we have asserted X if we did not assert it although we may by virtue of other utterances be committed to X. Searle makes this point in an example while dispensing with the "naturalistic fallacy fallacy":


A statement $P$ made in the utterance of sentence $S$ could entail a statement $Q$ made in the sentence $T$, even though the utterance of $S$ characteristically had one illocutionary force and the utterance of $T$ had another illocutionary force. Suppose a man gives an elaborate statement of his criteria for assessing cars. Suppose further that he gives an elaborate description of his car. Suppose also that the conjunction of criteria and description are sufficient to entail that the car meets the criteria; that is, they are sufficient to entail that, by the speaker's lights, it is a good car. Still, in giving the criteria and the description, the man still has not said it is a good car; nor, without making further assumptions about the man's intentions, can it yet be said that in giving criteria and descriptions he had even praised the car. The man is indeed committed to the view that it is a good car, for what he says entails that on his criteria it is a good car; but having such a commitment is not at all the same as actually having asserted that it is a good car.\(^{43}\)

This notion of being committed to but not asserting a given proposition is one which I have relied upon in my introductory remarks about interpretation of Nietzsche and the problem of contradiction.

A more recent and yet unpublished paper by Grice begins to draw out details of his analysis which shed some light on commitments behind utterances.\(^{44}\) In the paper, "Logic and Conversation," Grice focuses on "conditions governing conversation." He says that we might well enquire of any utterance what the utterer was implying,

\(^{43}\)J. L. Searle, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 155.

\(^{44}\)J. P. Grice, "Logic and Conversation," to be published in \textit{Phil. Review}. Professor Richard T. Garner called this paper to my attention and was quite helpful in discussing this chapter of my dissertation.
suggesting or even what he meant by what he said. \textsuperscript{45} Specifically, Grice is interested in "non-conventional" or "conversational implicatures." If we consider conversations or "talk-exchanges" it is evident that the utterances do not usually constitute a random set of sentences. The utterances reflect the direction of purpose of the talk-exchange. Grice says:

Our talk-exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are, characteristically, to some degree at least cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction may be fixed from the start (e.g. by an initial question for discussion), or it may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly definite, or it may be so indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude to the participants (as in a casual conversation). But at each stage, some possible conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable. \textsuperscript{46}

This general property of talk-exchanges is elevated to the status of a principle.

We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, viz: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk-exchange in which you are engaged." One might label this the Cooperative Principle.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{45}Grice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 4 (typescript).

\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., pp. 6-7.

\textsuperscript{47}Ibid., p. 7.
Grice's Cooperative Principle (CP) is divided into the four categories of Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner, each of which is represented by one or several maxims. The following table (Table 2) summarizes all the maxims which Grice formulates:

Table 2 Grice's Principles of Conversation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Maxim or Submaxim</th>
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| Quantity | 1. "Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)"
|          | 2. "Do not make your contribution more informative than is required". |
| Quality  | "Try to make your contribution one that is true". |
|          | 1. "Do not say what you believe to be false"
|          | 2. "Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence." |
| Relation | "Be relevant". |
| Manner   | "Be perspicuous" |
|          | 1. "Avoid obscurity of expression"
|          | 2. "Avoid ambiguity"
|          | 3. "Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)"
|          | 4. "Be orderly". 48 |

This list of maxims, according to Grice, is probably incomplete. Other maxims which insure aesthetic, social or moral characteristics might well be added. Furthermore, these maxims are "specially connected (I hope) with the particular purposes which talk (and so talk-exchange) is adapted to serve and is primarily employed

48 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
to serve. I have stated my maxims as if this purpose were a maximally effective exchange of information..."\(^{49}\)

As I have maintained in connection with Austin and Searle, it now appears reasonable to claim of Grice as well, the analysis assumes that uses of language are primarily directed toward the "maximally effective exchange of information." Although Grice does not want to construe conversations as necessarily conforming to CP and its maxims, he does say:

...I would like to be able to show that observance of the CP and maxims is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: that anyone who cares about the goals which are central to conversation/communication (e.g. giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in talk-exchanges which will be profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the CP and the maxims.\(^{50}\)

Despite this unfortunate lapse on Grice's part into the assumption that conversation has as its central purpose "giving and receiving information", he does indicate a passing interest in the use of language in "influencing and being influenced by others." The discussion of conversational implicature is addressed to the determination of ways in which what is said, p, can implicate some other proposition, q, and though restricted by Grice to the giving and receiving of information, it seems to be adaptable to the specification

\(^{49}\)Ibid., p. 9.

\(^{50}\)Ibid., pp. 11-12.
of imperative, interrogative, inspirational conversational implicatures, as well.

The notion of conversational implicature is outlined by Grice as follows:

A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that $p$ has implicated that $q$, may be said to have conversationally implicated that $q$, provided that: (1) he is to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the cooperative principle, (2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that $q$, is required in order to make his saying or making as if to say $p$ (or doing so in those terms) consistent with the presumption, and (3) that the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required.  

The identification of what $q$ is in a conversational implicature depends upon (1) the conventional meanings of words plus their references, (2) the CP and maxims, (3) context, (4) background information, (5) the fact that (1-4) are available to both participants in the conversation.  

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51 Ibid., p. 13. Grice then says that the conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out, an intuitive grasp of it is not sufficient unless that intuitive grasp is eventually replaced by argument. If such is not the case, "the implicature (if present at all) will not count as a conversational implicature; it will be a conventional implicature". It is not at all clear why Grice would take this position unless it is to suppress tendencies which readers might have to leap into sheer speculations regarding conversational implicature.

Grice summarizes the general procedures for determining what is conversationally implicated:

"He has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the CP; he could not be doing this unless he thought that q; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q is required; he has done nothing to stop me from thinking that q; therefore he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that q." \(^{53}\)

It can now be seen how Grice has provided a model for analyzing what a conversational implicatum is and the beginnings of the procedure for determining what the implicatum is in a specific case. Such a program undertaken by Grice seems to be what Searle had in mind when he wrote about what propositions a speaker is committed to even though the speaker did not say those propositions. Much earlier when I said that I believed the important question of possible contradictoriness in Nietzsche's writings was on the level of conditions for the utterance being what it was, I had in mind something analogous to Searle's utterance commitment or Grice's conversational implicature. My dismay with the limitation of their analyses to conversation as information exchange is based on my assumption that language use may not in normal cases, nor in Nietzsche's case, be dominated by information-exchange as its goal. \(^{54}\)

\(^{53}\) Ibid.

\(^{54}\) Yes, Grice does in his earlier works distinguish between indicative and imperative type utterances. The distinction apparently has remained with him in this latest paper but attention is almost exclusively on the indicative type utterance and its propositional implicatum.
My suggestion is that both Grice and Searle are trying to discover the assumptions or implications of linguistic acts. Both of them are doing so taking as the paradigm linguistic act, the act of asserting or, in Grice's terms, information exchange. There are other important types of linguistic acts which are not taken into account so far. Secondly when Searle does examine non-assertional linguistic acts he does so only to identify assertions to which the utterer is committed. The dominant linguistic act type in Nietzsche's works, if I am right, is therapeutic and the conventions or rules which govern therapeutic conversation are not yet discussed by Grice or Searle.

Before leaving Grice's paper on conversational implicature, a few examples and his list of features of conversational implicature will establish the nature of his undertaking. Grice offers three classes of example:

A. Where no maxim has been violated:

A says: "I am out of petrol"

B says: "There is a garage round the corner." B has implicated "that the garage is, or at least might be open, etc."\(^\text{55}\)

B. Where a maxim is violated but it is presumed to be violated because of a clash in maxims:

While planning a joint trip, A and B consider whether or not they can visit C who is A's friend.

\(^{55}\)Grice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 15.
A says: "Where does C live?"

B says: "Somewhere in the South of France."

What is implicated is that B doesn't know in which town C lives and it is implicated because B was caught in a clash between the two maxims Quantity\(^1\) and Quality\(^2\).\(^56\)

C. Exploitation or flouting of a maxim (figures of speech):

**Irony:** A has been friends with X who gives a secret away to A's business rivals. A says: "X is a fine friend." According to Grice "...unless A's utterance is entirely pointless, A must be trying to get across some other proposition than the one which he purports to be putting forward. This must be some obviously related proposition; the most obviously related proposition is the contradictory of the one which he purports to be putting forward."\(^57\)

**Metaphor:** "You are the cream in my coffee." Grice claims that "such examples characteristically involve categorical falsity, so the contradictory of what the speaker has made as if to say will strictly speaking be a truism; so it can't be that that such a speaker is trying to get across."\(^58\) This analysis assumes that one cannot try to "get across" a truism and that assumption is not persuasive to most who observe their own arguments with the stubborn or unenlightened. Grice goes on to say that "The most likely pro-

\(^{56}\)Ibid.

\(^{57}\)Ibid., p. 17.

\(^{58}\)Ibid.
position is that the speaker is attributing to his audience some feature or features in respect of which the audience resembles (more or less fancifully) the mentioned substance.\(^{59}\)

Many examples are offered, at least one for each case of flouting or exploiting the maxims and submaxims of the four categories of Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner. The figures of speech of irony, metaphor, meiosis and hyperbole are all instances of flouting Quality maxim\(_1\): "Do not say what you believe to be false." So, according to Grice's analysis, there may well be propositions which I seem to assert by conversational implicature which I may be presumed to believe even though it may be clear that I do not believe the proposition which I actually do assert. To recognize an utterance as irony, metaphor, meiosis or hyperbole is to recognize that the speaker need not and probably does not believe the proposition asserted to be true. In accordance with my differences with Grice, I would maintain that recognition of an utterance as irony, metaphor, meiosis or hyperbole does not legitimize the claim that some other proposition has been conversationally implicated. The speaker might certainly be attempting to achieve some other end instead of the implicature of another proposition which he does believe to be true.

A review of the features of Grice's conversational implicature should close our discussion of the concept, as it closes

\(^{59}\)Ibid., p. 18.
Grice's paper on the subject. The potential richness of the model has been adequately exhibited but the list of features only further demonstrates that this line of analysis has great promise. The features of conversational implicature are as follows:

1) The Cooperative Principle is always assumed to be observed unless the speaker indicates that he has "opted out." 60

2) Given that identification of the conversational implicatum depends upon context, background information, conventional meanings of the words and sentences employed, the locution is "non-detachable", i.e. "...it will not be possible to find another way of saying the same thing, which simply lacks the implicature in question, except where some special feature of the substituted version is itself relevant to the determination of the implicature (in virtue of one of the maxims of manner)." 61

3) Whatever the conversational implicatum is, it is not part of the meaning of the utterance. 62

4) The implicatum is not "carried by what is said, but only by the saying of what is said or by putting it that way." 63

5) The determination of the specific implicatum may not be

60 Ibid., pp. 23-24.

61 Ibid., p. 24.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid., p. 25.
decisive. This indeterminacy of analysis reflects the indeterminacy of the actual situation. 64

In connection with these features and the applicability of Grice's model to an interpretation of Nietzsche's works, I want to note briefly, that:

1) The Cooperative Principle may be assumed to be observed if the goal or purpose of the talk-exchange is adequately determined. In Nietzsche's case, one cannot assume that the goal or purpose is the maximally efficient communication of information. This does not require that the utterances are random, however. It may only suggest that we have expected Nietzsche to have been seeking a goal which he did not pursue.

2) Although the second feature, as Grice describes it, is not very clear, if it is that the success of communication of the implicatum may very well require the very locution, given the context, etc., then it points out what I have claimed and will continue to claim about Nietzsche's utterances, i.e. he may not have been able to say something other than what he did say, given the goal that he sought.

3) If Grice is right about the implicatum not being part of the meaning of the utterances then perhaps I could have avoided a discussion of theories of meaning and speech acts altogether. But since I am interested in interpretation of works, not single utterances, theories of meaning are significant. The conventional meaning

64 ibid.
of words and sentences, however, is not as pertinent to this undertaking as is the utterer's or occasion meaning of the utterances.

4) Grice's claim that the implicatum is not imbedded in or on the surface of the utterance points again to the difficulty of the interpretative task. If understanding Nietzsche's works is discovering the implicata -- or something similar -- then that implicata do not show themselves readily suggests that the straightforward assertional readings of Nietzsche's works will be far from adequate interpretations.

5) Grice's final claim, that there may be an indeterminacy in identifying implicata, gives expression to the uncertainty that grips the serious reader of Nietzsche and suggests that it is an appropriate cognitive attitude.

What I find helpful about Grice's latest work is that it provides a model along the lines of which one might well develop the schema for therapeutic conversation. Grice did not even extend his own insights into the imperative type utterance which had captured his interest in his earlier work. While his discussion of "metaphor" in "Logic and Conversation" is promising, it relies on the assumption that interest in metaphor is exclusively in the discovery of hidden assertion.

4. A Restatement of the problem to be addressed

What I hope to show in the following chapters is that the interpretation of Nietzsche's works by major commentators has relied almost exclusively upon the assumption that the utterances
which constitute those works are all assertions. Furthermore, I
will examine two purported contradictions in Nietzsche's works and
show that since certain linguistic acts are non-assertional the
works do not include those contradictions.

In pursuing the interpretation of Nietzsche's works, the
discussion of his philosophical task, I assume that I am in effect
asking the question "What does Nietzsche mean?", i.e. the occasion-
meaning, but that the question is addressed to what Nietzsche means
in his collected works not in a single sentence. It is also assumed
that the asking of that question is equivalent to asking "What is
Nietzsche doing?" since meaning is to be construed in terms of
either illocutionary acts or perlocutionary effects. Further, it
is assumed that some effects which Nietzsche intended to produce
in his readers may be such that he could not state what he was
doing explicitly and still hope to produce those effects. Finally,
some propositions to which Nietzsche may have been committed may
not have been asserted by him. If we are to worry over Nietzsche's
contradictoriness the concern should be with possible contradictoriness
among the propositions to which he was committed.
CHAPTER II: KAUFMANN'S COMMENTARY: A SENSE OF NIETZSCHE'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM

1. Introduction

If any one individual is responsible for a rekindling of interest in Nietzsche's works among English-speaking peoples it is Walter Kaufmann. His contributions to the study of Nietzsche consist of complete translations of The Birth of Tragedy, The Gay Science, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, Toward A Genealogy of Morals, The Case of Wagner, Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, Nietzsche Contra Wagner, Ecce Homo and the collection of notes and paragraphs called Will to Power. Kaufmann also has translated parts of many other works by Nietzsche as well as letters and drafts of works. But Kaufmann is not merely, though that seems significant enough, a translator of Nietzsche's works, he is a commentator as well. His Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist is a singular effort to establish serious Nietzsche scholarship after a long barren period in its history where accusation and attack related to German political movements and the First and second world wars dominated.

A spokesman for a major publishers reported that firms other than Random House, the one which handles Kaufmann's translations, are no longer even considering competing editions -- so the world awaits Kaufmann's Human-All-Too-Human, Dawn, etc. Kaufmann, however, claims no intention of translating more Nietzsche (personal communication, Dec., 1971, Cf. Appendix A). The Gay Science, Kaufmann translation, appeared in 1974.
Kaufmann devotes some twenty pages of Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist explicitly to consideration of "Nietzsche's Method" thereby indicating, what is generally conceded, that Nietzsche's unusual manner of writing calls for some explication if not justification. In this section, Kaufmann discusses a variety of features of Nietzsche's works which are indicated by the adjectives: decadent, monadologic, aphoristic, apparently contradictory, non-systematic, problematic, dialectical, experimental, pragmatic, courageous, organic, hypothetical, existential, and incomplete. These notions are not independent of each other but their exploration provides Kaufmann's position on the method he thinks we ought to attribute to Nietzsche.

2. Explicit characterizations of Nietzsche's method

A. Atomistic, decadent, aphoristic, monadologic

Nietzsche, according to Kaufmann, offered the best critique of his own writing in discussing the style of Wagner; this style was decadent.

What is the mark of every literary decadence? That life no longer resides in the whole. The word becomes sovereign and leaps out of the sentence, the sentence reaches out and obscures the meaning of the whole page, and the page comes to life at the expense of the whole -- the whole is no longer a whole. This, however, is the simile of every style of decadence: everytime there is an anarchy of atoms.2

The tendency for there to be no overall schema, no fitting together of parts, no theme, is for the work to disintegrate into "an anarchy of atoms". That Nietzsche confronted this tendency in his own writing and attempted to overcome it is substantiated according to Kaufmann "not only in the preface of his polemic against Wagner, but throughout his later works and notes--."\(^3\) In the short preface to *The Case of Wagner*, Nietzsche does say:

> Well then! I am, no less than Wagner, a child of this time; that is, a decadent: but I comprehended this, I resisted it. The philosopher in me resisted. Nothing has preoccupied me more profoundly than the problem of decadence -- I had reasons. 'Good and evil' is merely a variation of that problem.\(^4\)

It is difficult to know precisely which other passages Kaufmann considers to further show that Nietzsche troubled to overcome the style of decadence. This particular quotation however seems to indicate that Nietzsche's concern was decadence itself not the style of decadence. Nietzsche might well, however, have been concerned about the style of decadence in his own work as a symptom of decadence.

He continues the preface with "Once one has developed a keen eye for the symptoms of decline, one understands morality, too -- one understands what is hiding under its most sacred names and value formulas..." Here, rather than speaking of the style of deca-


dence however, Nietzsche appears to be speaking of morality as a symptom of decadence.

But rather than quibble about whether Nietzsche's worry was the style of decadence or decadence itself let us notice what Kaufmann takes to be the important consideration in this matter: "While the epigrams evidently come to life at the expense of the whole, we should inquire whether behind them there is a whole philosophy."\(^5\) Nietzsche's literary style of epigram and aphorism might present a shimmering, highly articulated surface which has no substance, no whole philosophy underlying it. This belief could mislead the casual reader to think it was legitimate to treat the pieces as pieces -- to read at random ignoring the sequence and context of particular aphorisms. Kaufmann cautions against this which he calls the line of least resistance.

The style which, to categorize it sheerly descriptively, is aphoristic in large measure can critically be thought of as decadent. It may also less judgmentally be termed monadologic as Kaufmann observes. By "monadologic" one means having a tendency to self-sufficient but mutually illuminating aphorisms.\(^6\) Each aphorism can be considered in isolation from the rest -- unlike sentences

\(^5\)Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 7th.

\(^6\)A slightly fuller account of the significance of "monad" as applied to Nietzsche by Kaufmann appears in Appendix A, the rough text of an interview with Kaufmann.
say from Kant or Aristotle or most other philosophers which are obviously unintelligible out of context -- but which nevertheless in place, reflecting upon the others and being reflected upon by them becomes dense with possible meanings. In Kaufmann's words what this amounts to is that:

We are confronted with a 'pluralistic universe' in which each aphorism is itself a microcosm. Almost as often as not, a single passage is equally relevant to ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of history, theory of value, psychology, and perhaps half a dozen other fields.

The interdependent significance of each aphorism according to Kaufmann makes it difficult if not impossible to organize Nietzsche's notes, for example, in the case of Will to Power, or to provide a reasonable method of approaching his writing in place of the more systematic approach appropriate to other philosophers.

Before getting into that consequence of the monadologic structure of Nietzsche's work, let me pause briefly to develop a notion Kaufmann uses in the above passage. Kaufmann says "We are confronted with a 'pluralistic universe'...". This holds in it a suggestion which Kaufmann does not make enough of, or at least he does not at this point seem to capitalize on his own astute observation. To say

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Kaufmann, op.cit., p. 75.

One might wish to argue that a philosopher's writings are not inaccessible to a systematic approach simply by virtue of being monadological. The point at least has not been established by Kaufmann that we cannot approach Nietzsche systematically.
"We are confronted with a 'pluralistic universe'..." is to say that
the structure of Nietzsche's philosophy embodies or symbolizes one
of the few metaphysical positions of which we can with some confidence
say that he was persuaded, i.e. the view that the universe is Many,
not one, two or several substances, and in flux. As partial evidence
of this:

...Evil I call it, and misanthropic -- all this
teaching of the One and the Plenum and the Un-
moved and the Sated and the Permanent. All
the permanent -- that is only parable. And
the poets lie too much. 9

Even if Nietzsche did not wish to argue for pluralism as a fundamental
truth he did forward it as the view which had to be considered as an
alternative. Either way, if Kaufmann is right about our coming face
to face with pluralism in the very structure of Nietzsche's writing
we may venture the hypothesis that one aspect of the effectiveness
of Nietzsche's writing lies in the fact that it offers presentationally
what is simultaneously being offered in argument, parable and aphorism.
What he says corresponds with what he does -- at least in terms of
what he does in literary style. 10

9Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra trans. and edit.
Walter Kaufmann In: The Portable Nietzsche (New York: The Viking

10I will return later to consider in more detail the point of
what is shown but not said by Nietzsche's writing and will there
unpack more of the distinction in its relevance to Nietzsche's
work.
As I mentioned before, Kaufmann takes the fact of Nietzsche's monadologic writing to be the reason for the problems discovered in our trying to organize his writing or the issues he was interested in with any confidence or success; Kaufmann refers to one attempt to organize *The Will to Power* as "grotesque".\(^{11}\) Not only is it difficult to systematize the writings or to approach them systematically but Kaufmann also argues that they do not constitute a philosophical system. It is his belief that Nietzsche can qualify as a philosopher, much as one would allow Socrates, despite the lack of a philosophical system in his writings. So we ought not drum him out of philosophical business on that ground. Furthermore, Kaufmann holds "that he had strong philosophic reasons for not having a system."\(^{12}\) The meaning of "system" being used here by Kaufmann and corresponding, as far as he reports, to Nietzsche's own view of system is that set of propositions which may be derived from an initial set of propositions which are accepted as premises, and which remain unquestioned. It is this latter feature of systems -- the unexamined presuppositions -- which is objectionable to Nietzsche; as a "free spirit" Nietzsche proposes to examine all unexamined assumptions. Nietzsche faults the philosopher's desire for a system as stupidity, or lack of integrity, or, most innocently, childishness.

\(^{11}\)Kaufmann, *op.cit.*, p. 76.

\(^{12}\)Ibid., p. 79.
B. Systems as autobiographical; Nietzsche not contradictory about value of systems; Nietzsche's own system as problem-thinking, dialectical

What we gain from system building as far as Nietzsche is concerned is that the systems provide an insight into the character of their authors -- so what we learn from the Critique of Pure Reason is what Kant was like, from Phenomenology of Mind what Hegel was like and so on -- we do not get at Truth nor do we discover a group of metaphysical or epistemological truths. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes:

Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir; also that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted the real germ of life from which the whole plant had grown.13

In the light of Nietzsche's observations about the autobiographical nature of systems and the unsubstantiability of the premises,14


14 Kaufmann insists that Nietzsche's fundamental objection to systems is that the premises can not be examined although on this point no passages of Nietzsche's text seem to support this opinion. In stating this view Kaufmann alludes to textual support which turned out to be disappointing, e.g.

What Nietzsche objects to is the failure to question one's own assumptions. The philosopher who boasts of a system would appear more stupid than he is, inasmuch as he refuses to think about his premises. This is one of the recurrent themes to Nietzsche's later thought, and in characteristic fashion he often formulated it in more offensive language: 'The will to a system is a lack of integrity.' (Kaufmann, op.cit., p. 80)

This reference is to an aphorism in Twilight of the Idols which in its entirety reads: "I mistrust all systematizers and I avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of integrity." Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols trans. and edit. Walter Kaufmann In The Portable Nietzsche (New York: The Viking Press, 1954), p. 470. Not much here, I would argue, about unquestioned assumptions.
Kaufmann takes Nietzsche to be justified in not having a system -- and furthermore not wanting to have one. Kaufmann quotes Nietzsche as writing:

The will to a system: in a philosopher, morally speaking, a subtle corruption, a disease of the character; amorally speaking, his will to appear more stupid than he is...I am not bigoted enough for a system -- and not even my system.15

As is Nietzsche's wont the issue of systems and their desirability is not a simple matter. While on the one hand Nietzsche objects, as Kaufmann observes, to a system as a corruption or a form of stupidity, he also, as Kaufmann again observes, urges that systems are worthy educational methods in the development of the spirit. Kaufmann cites the following text as one indication of this more generous understanding of systems:

The different philosophic systems are to be considered as educational methods of the spirit: they have always developed one particular force of the spirit best by their one-sided demand to see things just so and not otherwise.16

Nietzsche speaks of the discipline to be gained by service as a philosophical laborer -- a term he applies to Kant and Hegel in this section -- which is necessary in order to become a "true philosopher".

15 Nietzsche as quoted in Kaufmann, op.cit., p. 80.
16 Ibid.
It may be necessary for the education of a genuine philosopher that he himself has also once stood on all these steps on which his servants, the scientific laborers of philosophy, remain standing -- have to remain standing.\(^7\)

Other passages could be brought to establish that Nietzsche does, in places, refer to the participation in system building as an activity worthwhile for, if not essential to, the development of the "philosopher of the future".

We are to notice, Kaufmann argues, that the apparent ground of the charge of self-contradictoriness often leveled at Nietzsche can be seen in this issue and we can in looking at these passages discover his defense. It seems on the surface of it that Nietzsche could be said to hold that 'systems are bad', (i.e. corrupt, stupid, childish) and that 'systems are good', (i.e. instructive about men, sources of discipline). This apparent contradictoriness resolves itself when we attend to the qualifications and modifications Nietzsche attaches to these claims. According to Kaufmann: \(^8\)

\begin{quote}
The development of Nietzsche's view of philosophic systems, as here suggested, is reminiscent of Hegel's triadic dialectic. This, however, does not mean that his statements contradict each other or that he claims that reality is self-contradictory. Only unqualified judgments about reality involve
\end{quote}

\(^7\) Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 135.

\(^8\) Kaufmann refers here to his belief that the apparent contradictions in Nietzsche do not indicate that Nietzsche views reality as self-contradictory. This reference is to Jaspers' interpretation which will be considered later in some detail.
us in superficial inconsistencies: thus systems are good, but also bad. The contradiction disappears as soon as we qualify such statements and specify in what respects systems are good and bad.19

Our ability to make Nietzsche intelligible and not contradictory depends therefore upon our insistence on keeping the qualifications attached to the central claim. Kaufmann wants to save Nietzsche from illegitimate attacks which are based on oversimplifications.

Kaufmann addressed himself to an associated concern earlier in his chapter on method in connection with the characterization of Nietzsche's work as decadent, i.e. atomistic. One might think, falsely, that because of the atomistic appearance of Nietzsche's writings one could merely browse here and there taking no interest in context or sequence. This approach to Nietzsche is bound to be misleading. Jaspers, according to Kaufmann, offers an alternative to such random sampling which is different from Kaufmann's own and to his understanding constitutes another kind of unfortunate simplification.

... Jaspers tells us that the true alternative to merely nipping here and there in Nietzsche's works and notes consists in nowhere being satisfied until we have "also found the contradiction"20

19Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 80-81.

20Reference is to p. 8 in Jaspers Nietzsche: Einführung in das Verständnis seines Philosophierens. This passage can be found in the English translation by C. P. Wallraff and F. J. Schmitz on p. 10 "...it is the task of the interpreter to be forever dissatisfied until he has also found the contradiction...and then, if possible, to gain direct experience of their necessity." I will discuss the difference of opinion between Kaufmann and Jaspers at the close of the Jaspers' chapter.
...This however should not blind us to the fact that we are urged to adopt a wholly singular approach.21

One will be able, Kaufmann is persuaded, to find contradictions if that is one's interest, especially if the reader is willing to "break up sentences and carve out looked-for contradictions out of parentheses."22 Such activities are, of course, not encouraged by either Jaspers or Kaufmann (a more detailed consideration of Jaspers on "finding the contradictory" will appear in the section on Jaspers on Nietzsche's method). Nietzsche's aphoristic style seems to have invited such radical procedures and his reputation in some circles represents the "success" of this perverse approach.

These considerations about Jaspers' understanding of the contradictory in Nietzsche help indicate what Kaufmann's own position on this subject is. He wishes first of all to prevent the interpretation of Nietzsche as being self-contradictory when such a charge is based on an oversimplification of Nietzsche's claims -- as we have seen regarding systems and their value. Second, Kaufmann also wishes to avoid a reading of Nietzsche which will, while not condemning him for the presence of contradictions, sends the reader on a hunt for them. These two points show Kaufmann's general insistence that while perhaps not systematic Nietzsche nevertheless is not best characterized as contradictory. But

21Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

22Ibid., p. 75.
this issue is not so easily laid to rest and Kaufmann returns to it again in relation to his portrayal of Nietzsche as a "problem-thinker".

Unlike system-building which begins with a given set of propositions, problem-thinking$^{23}$ begins with a problem situation. The inquiry is directed then, not towards a solution but an understanding of the limits of that particular concern. Kaufmann states this portrayal of Nietzsche in this way.

Perhaps it is the most striking characteristic of "dialectical" thinking from Socrates to Hegel and Nietzsche that it is a search for hidden presuppositions rather than a quest for solutions. ...The result is less a solution of the initial problem than a realization of its limitations: typically, the problem is not solved but "out grown."$^{24}$

While it is necessary to consider in some detail what Kaufmann means by "dialectical" here, the idea of Nietzsche as a "problem-thinker" develops into his being "experimental" and that in turn leads to his being "organically" consistent. "Organic" consistency is the feature of those collected works which unfold through a series of problems and attempted solutions (experiments). Each experiment stands as a check on all the others. When, as per-

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$^{23}$The distinction between problem-thinking and system-thinking is attributed by Kaufmann to Nicolai Hartmann in Der Philosophische Gedanke und seine Geschichte, 1936. Hartmann did not apply this distinction to Nietzsche as Kaufmann does.

$^{24}$Ibid., p. 91.
chance will happen, one discovers inconsistencies between experiments one is thereby signalled that a mistake has occurred. In Kaufmann's words:

Intellectual integrity in the consideration of each separate problem seems not only the best way to particular truths, but it makes each investigation a possible corrective for any inadvertent previous mistakes. No break, discontinuity, or inconsistency occurs unless either there has been a previous error or there is an error now. Such inconsistencies, however -- which should be the exception rather than the rule -- should not go unnoticed but should become the occasion for revision.²⁵

What this seems to amount to is the third observation on Kaufmann's part about Nietzsche's apparent predilection for the contradictory, the inconsistent. Kaufmann's explication of Nietzsche's method as focusing on problems allows both for the appearance of atomism and the appearance of contradictions. That is to say, because Nietzsche shifts his attention from one problem to the next -- his concern being the adequate treatment of each problem rather than the completion of some whole system -- it may happen, indeed does happen, that the understanding derived from one conflicts with that derived from another. In simplest terms, sometimes when we are faced with what seems to be a contradiction, we are correct in judging that it is a contradiction.

C. Critical questions about this view of Nietzsche; As related to skepticism

If the reader, like this author, presently finds himself nodding

²⁵Ibid., p. 91.
in vague agreement with the notion of problem-thinking only to discover that the exact nature of the problems is not at all clear, this would not be surprising. Kaufmann speaks of a "problem situation" from which Nietzsche seeks "hidden presuppositions" rather than "solutions"; but, offers no words of what kind of problem. Kaufmann speaks of "formulating" and "out-growing" problems. Again, what kind of problem? He says Nietzsche rejects system-building for "he hopes to get to the bottom of problems." What problems? We are at most informed that whatever "problems" may be of interest to Nietzsche they must be "experienced deeply" for Nietzsche's is "a passionate quest for knowledge, an unceasing series of courageous experiments." Must we not insist upon at least some suggestions of what type of things the problems are.

The uneasiness about "problems" is not merely one of what sorts of problems they are. Surely a benevolent reader can conjecture about what general sorts of things Kaufmann had in mind -- Nietzsche was interested in the problem of the origin and significance of moralities, the problem of the nature of truth of science or philosophy or knowledge, the problem of the death of God, etc. and so on. But this sort of conjecturing as defensible as it may

26 Ibid., p. 82.
27 Ibid., p. 83.
28 Ibid., p. 87.
29 Ibid., p. 90.
be in this case will not satisfy some deeper troubles about problem-
thinking. Kaufmann, in what seems to be an explanation of Nietzsche's
tendency to apparent inconsistencies, says:

The ideal is to consider each problem on its own
merits...No break, discontinuity, or inconsistency
occurs unless either there has been a previous
error or there is an error now. 30

What strikes one as puzzling about this is that the effort called
"problem-thinking" ends not with a solution (statement? position?)
but with the realization of the nature of the problem. More pre-
cisely, Kaufmann describes it in this manner: "The result is less
a solution of the initial problem than a realization of its limi-
tations: typically, the problem is not solved but "out grown". 31

The difficulty in this matter is that of deciding, for example in
the cases of the problems we have supposed were involved, what
would constitute a "break" or "discontinuity" between them or
their limitations or the outgrowing of them, especially keeping
in mind that such an event might appear to us as an inconsistency
or a contradiction. Neither a problem, nor a problem limitation
nor a problem outgrown could come into contradiction with another

30 Ibid., p. 91.

31 Ibid., p. 82. Kaufmann refers in a footnote at this point
to a concept of C. G. Jung's (Europäische Revue, V, 1929) quite
similar to "outgrown" as Kaufmann uses it here. Jung's term is
"overgrowing" (überwachsen).
It is of course not a simple matter to be clear about Nietzsche but this particular aspect of Kaufmann's view is most troublesome in being overly general, confusing and apparently unsubstantiated by textual evidence.

The claim that Nietzsche is a problem-thinker is closely interwoven with the claim that his thinking is "dialectical". His method in this respect is likened both to Socrates' and to Hegel's:

Perhaps it is the most striking characteristic of 'dialectical' thinking from Socrates to Hegel and Nietzsche that it is a search for hidden presuppositions rather than a quest for solutions. The starting point of such a 'dialectical' inquiring is not a set of premises but a problem situation...33

What the dialectic approach yields is the identification of presuppositions of the very formulation of a problem. It is a persistent questioning of all assumptions, views, beliefs and systems. No questioning is denied the asking, no opinion is beyond the reach of the philosophy which tests all idols with the tap of a hammer.

By "dialectical" Kaufmann seems to mean two things: 1) the critical examination of all opinions, none remaining as inviolate presuppositions and 2) the uncovering of presuppositions of any

32 I will discuss this point more thoroughly later in this section with regard to the connection between problem-thinking and experimentalism. The lack of contradictoriness is a result of the entities in question not being truth-functional.

33 Kaufmann, loc.cit.
particular opinion -- or formulation of a problem. These two characteristics do indeed seem to be found in much of Nietzsche's work. Examples which spring most readily to mind occur within pages of each other in *Beyond Good and Evil*: "Suppose we want truth: why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance?" and "... it is high time to replace the Kantian question, "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" by another question, "Why is belief in such judgments necessary?"..." Many other examples could be brought to establish that it is true of Nietzsche that he did question critically some opinions previously not puzzled through -- at least not publicly -- by many philosophers and it is true of Nietzsche that he did as well direct our attention to the presuppositions contained in our very questions.

The use of the term "dialectical" for these features of Nietzsche's work seems however to naturally bring up associations with other methods also called "dialectical". Kaufmann says Nietzsche's thinking was dialectical as was that of Socrates and Hegel (as well as, by implication, Plato and Kierkegaard). However Kaufmann does not intend for all aspects of the Hegelian dialectical method to be construed as applicable to Nietzsche's work. The three steps of Hegelian method: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis are, according to Kaufmann, not to be looked for in Nietzsche. The meaning of

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"dialectical" which Kaufmann is employing is:

...that which Plato suggests when he contrasts mathematical deduction, which takes for granted its assumptions, with philosophic "dialectic" which question these assumptions, inquiring what they themselves may presuppose, and thus moves backward "reductively", to a first principle.36

If one looks at the passage from The Republic (quoted in a fair degree of completeness below in a footnote) which describes the dialectic as it was employed by Plato one is struck by the fact that it seems to be tied to a large amount of metaphysical baggage which Kaufmann would not wish to load upon Nietzsche. Though Nietzsche is most comfortable with the "hypothetical" it is quite doubtful that he would have accepted with even a small measure of good humor the additional commitment to "first principles" and "the Forms" which are involved in Plato's dialectic.

What this amounts to so far is that the two philosophers most renowned for their "dialectical" methods, Plato (Socrates) and Hegel,

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36 Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 83. Kaufmann references here The Republic (511) which in the F. M. Cornford translation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, 1956), pp. 225-6 reads as follows: Then by the second section of the intelligible world you may understand me to mean all that unaided reasoning apprehends by the power of dialectic, when it treats its assumptions, not as first principles, but as hypotheses in the liberal sense, things 'laid down' like a flight of steps up which it may mount all the way to something that is not hypothetical, the first principle of all; and having grasped this, may turn back and, holding onto the consequences which depend upon it, descend at last to a conclusion, never making any use of any sensible object, but only of Forms, moving through Forms from one to another, and ending with Forms.
are characterized in this manner with particulars which do not apply to Nietzsche. Plato's dialectic calls to mind "the Forms" to which Nietzsche is surely not committed; Hegel's dialectic suggests the tripartition: thesis, antithesis, synthesis which Kaufmann says is not descriptive of Nietzsche. Thus the core of the dialectical method as it is common to Nietzsche, Hegel and Plato seems to be the attempt to uncover and question the presuppositions of opinions or problem-statements. This more restricted sense of "dialectical" while it may be true of Nietzsche and Plato and Hegel probably is true of so many other philosophers as to not be an illuminating observation. The point is that a significant portion of philosophical consideration is precisely of the form "What must be the case such that X?" where X is anything from "there are synthetic a priori judgments" to "I know of him that he is in pain".

One further comment must be made before leaving the use of "dialectical" to describe Nietzsche's work. It is an implicit, bordering on an explicit, meaning of "dialectical" in Kaufmann's discussion that somehow different logical principles govern the uncovering of presuppositions from those that govern the spinning out of consequences of assumed premises. One activity is suggested to be worthier, requiring finer sensitivities and so on while the other is like child's play. The logic of moving backward (reduction) is taken to be different from that of moving forward (deduction). As I say it is implicit and I can only cite passages like the
following to partially substantiate that it underlies Kaufmann's 
view of Nietzsche's "dialectic":

1) "...search for hidden presuppositions rather 
than a quest for solutions..."37
2) "...instead of deducing a system..."38
3) "...thus moves backward, "reductively" to a 
first principle..."39
4) (re: Hegel) "...going back, step by step...to 
the final premise -- or first principle..."40
5) "It seems playful [to Nietzsche] to elaborate 
conclusions which must necessarily follow from 
assumed and unquestioned premises; any child 
can do that: "building systems is childishness" "41 
(re: Nietzsche's view of building systems).

If the simple can at times also be the true, it is straight-forward-
ly not the case that "reduction" is logically other than "deduction".
The "childish" philosopher reasons thusly: Assume P, then if
P⇒Q, Q must be the case. On the other hand the sophisticated
"dialectical" philosopher reasons this way: If C is held and A
is a necessary presupposition of C, (C⇒A), then for those who assume
C, A must be the case (or thought to be the case). In other words
there doesn't seem to be any significant difference between our
reasonings forward or backward although one may be more frequently

37 Kaufmann, op.cit., p. 82.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., p. 83.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p. 80.
done than the other. Hence the usefulness of "dialectical" as applied to Nietzsche has just slipped through my fingers like the proverbial quicksilver.

Perhaps in describing Nietzsche's method as "dialectical" Kaufmann intended to direct our attention not so much to a way of doing philosophy as to a level of subject matter. There are suggestions to this effect when Kaufmann distinguishes between Nietzsche and Hegel on the basis of the flaw Nietzsche saw in Hegel, the flaw of allowing books and so on to get between Hegel and the true objects of his interest. Hegel, it is argued by Kaufmann, assumed the truth of past philosophical systems while Nietzsche "was, like Socrates, a far more rigorous questioner and by no means prepared to admit that the systems of the past are overwhelmingly true."42 That is to say, what Nietzsche and Hegel share in their dialectical methods is the questioning of assumptions, or rather, the uncovering of assumptions. They differ in what they end up taking for granted. Nietzsche more zealously sought to expose presuppositions.

Could it be that Nietzsche questioned all assumptions, that there was no philosophical stone unturned? Well, Kaufmann presses Nietzsche's own metaphor into service here, referring to Nietzsche's unquestioned presuppositions (we might more ungenerously call them prejudices) as the "all-too-human elements" in Nietzsche's writings. When employing the dialectical method in its highest refinement,
Nietzsche questions all assumptions. When Nietzsche fails to question an assumption Kaufmann nods recognition and indicates that these instances are really "philosophically irrelevant". I suppose the point here is that one does not grasp Nietzsche's method by fixating upon mistakes in its application.

While I am sympathetic to the almost apologetic tone of Kaufmann's interpretation of Nietzsche's method, I believe a more serious question lurks in the background. As one considers the dialectical method of Nietzsche, loosely construed as uncovering and questioning all assumptions, one must face whether or not there is an inherent limit to the application of the method. Is it logically possible to question all assumptions? What remained unquestioned for Nietzsche may indeed reflect his own prejudices but the matter of whether or not it is possible for any philosopher to follow the method completely and to its ultimate ends of universally questioning assumptions is not so easily dismissed. The old plea "give me a place to stand on and I can move the earth" portrays the dilemma facing the method of universal doubt and it is the very dilemma which silenced the ancient skeptics. Nietzsche was not silenced into universal skepticism, nor did he violate a vow of silence by way of an occasionally embraced unquestioned assumption. What I am trying to urge here is that there is something fundamentally inadequate about the notion of Nietzsche as a dialectical philosopher who at times slips into what would in these terms be the "error" of commitment.
To present this point in another way let me refresh the memory on Nietzsche's unhappiness about universal skepticism.

...In rare and isolated instances it may really be the case that such a will to truth, some extravagant and adventurous courage, a metaphysician's ambition to hold a hopeless position, may participate and ultimately prefer even a handful of "certainty" to a whole carload of beautiful possibilities; there may actually be puritanical fanatics of conscience who prefer even a certain nothing to an uncertain something to lie down on -- and die. But this is nihilism and the sign of a despairing, mortally weary soul -- however courageous the gestures of such a virtue may look. 43

Later, also in Beyond Good and Evil in the section "We Scholars",

Nietzsche again presents the skeptic unfavorably.

For the skeptic, being a delicate creature, is frightened all too easily; his conscience is trained to quiver at every No, indeed even at a Yes that is decisive and hard, and to feel as if it had been bitten. Yes and No -- that goes against his morality; conversely, he likes to treat his virtue to a feast of noble abstinance...Thus a skeptic consoles himself; and it is true that he stands in need of some consolation. For skepticism is the most spiritual expression of a certain complex physiological condition that in ordinary language is called nervous exhaustion and sickness...Paralysis of the will: where today does one not find this cripple sitting?

As can be seen in these two extended passages, as well as in many others in his works, Nietzsche likened universal skepticism to a state of disease, a disease of the will which made one shudder in the presence of affirmations and denials. By contrast the "true

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43 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 16.

44 Ibid., pp. 129-130.
philosopher" will posit his own values with gusto and divide and classify his experiences in terms of them. What must be shown is how the dialectical method which Kaufmann argues that Nietzsche espoused stops short of universal skepticism, that inability to form a commitment or persist with an assumption with which one resolutely refuses to tamper.

Our agreement on this observation about Nietzsche's dialectical method consists in the understanding and appreciation of the radical thoroughness of Nietzsche's prying questions. I, however, maintain that when Nietzsche fails to question an assumption it would be rash to treat this as a "mistake" in applying the method. Kaufmann's examples of Nietzsche's unquestioned assumptions (prejudices) are trivial\(^{15}\) (at least to Kaufmann's thinking) and he seems to have been led to consider these as only slips in the method. If he had focused on more "significant" presuppositions his view of Nietzsche's dialectic would have been considerably complicated.

\(^{15}\) Kaufmann's example of this is Nietzsche's view about women. He says: "Nietzsche's writings contain many all-too-human judgments -- especially about women -- but these are philosophically irrelevant; and ad hominem arguments against any philosopher on the basis of such statements seem trivial and hardly pertinent." (Kaufmann, op.cit., p. 84) As far as I can tell Kaufmann's error is two-fold in this passage: 1. Nietzsche does not just slip into commitments -- as errors in his method, 2. prejudices about women are no more philosophically irrelevant than are prejudices about men!
D. Nietzsche's experimentalism; experimentalism related to the "dialectical" and "problem-thinking" methods; Implications regarding the theories of truth

Kaufmann turns from his discussion of Nietzsche's dialectical method to Nietzsche's experimentalism, unfortunately without explicitly drawing out the details of the relationship between the two. The spirit of experimentalism which Kaufmann finds in Nietzsche is the "gay science". It is the willingness to "make ever new experiments...retain an open mind and be prepared, if necessary, 'boldly at any time to declare himself against his previous opinion' -- just as he would expect a scientist to revise his theories in the light of new experiments."\textsuperscript{46} The enamorement of science found in Hegel was for its systematization; that found in Nietzsche is for science's tendency toward experiment and its attendant alteration in theory in response to experimental "evidence". Kaufmann's reference to this aspect of Nietzsche's method causes the same kind of uneasiness as that which I noted in response to his other characterizations. There is of course a measure of insightfulness in the observation that Nietzsche's method is experimentalistic. It is correct to say that Nietzsche does not blindly pursue a philosophical system wholly unrelated to one's experiences, nor does he ignore possible alternative paths. Nietzsche might even be said to deliberately seek a manifold of alternative paths. In these senses he could clearly be called an experimentalist. The

\textsuperscript{46} Kaufmann, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 85.
converse of an experimentalist in these senses however -- one who
blindly pursues a philosophical system wholly unrelated to one's
experiences, ignores or fails to seek possible alternatives --
would be a fool rather than just another sort of philosopher.
Surely Kaufmann meant to emphasize the degree of experimentalism
in Nietzsche's writings, the degree to which he attends to experi­
ence, the degree to which he seeks alternative views. Kaufmann
suggests that Nietzsche was not committed to a belief in final or
conclusive experiments, those by which a theory is confirmed for
all time. Experimentation was to continue endlessly. In these
respects it seems correct to describe Nietzsche as an expermen­
talist.

My uneasiness returns when I try to relate these insights
about Nietzsche's supposed experimentalism to his supposed
"dialectic method" and his supposed "problem-thinking" just to
take two out of the several characterizations Kaufmann has provided
of Nietzsche's method. Notice that in speaking of Nietzsche's
experimentalism Kaufmann refers to the concepts of "evidence"
and "positions".

...he (Nietzsche) had in mind the 'gay science'
of fearless experiment and the good will to accept
new evidence and to abandon previous positions,
if necessary.47

If the "dialectical method" is to be pursued indefinitely as
Kaufmann implies it ought (by referring to Nietzsche's failures

47Ibid., p. 86.
to do so) then it is only in a peculiar sense in which anything
could be evidence for a position. That is to say, the only reason
one would be committed to an ever-continuing dialectical (question-
ing) method is if one presupposed that nothing (no position, claim,
etc.) ultimately and finally was known to be true. But if no pro-
position could ultimately and finally be known to be true, the
nature of the relation of evidence to position is problematic. The
claim that a certain fact or experience, E, is evidence for a given
position, P, is itself an assertion which would either be true or
false and capable of being known to be true or false. If part of
my philosophical method -- the dialectical part -- rested on the
absence of any knowledge of truth then if another part of my
philosophical method -- the experimental part -- rested on the
known truth of certain claims, my method could only spell disaster.
I am only trying to demonstrate here that the sensibility of for-
saking positions in the light of evidence requires that I know
something to be true which I couldn't know to be true if the
presupposition of my obligation to endless dialectical question-
ing holds (namely that there is no truth and hence none which I
could know).

To make this objection clearer let me restate it in a more
condensed form: (1) The dialectical method implies (presupposes)
no known truth (D⇒¬T); (2) the experimental method implies (pre-
supposes) truth, and truth which can be known, specifically that
E is evidence for P (X⇒T); (3) either there is known truth or
there is not known truth \((T \lor \neg T)\); (4) but if \(T\) then \(\neg D\), i.e., under conditions implied by the experimental method the dialectical method cannot be satisfied or (5) if \(\neg T\), then \(\neg X\), i.e., under conditions implied by the dialectical method the experimental method cannot be satisfied.

The kind of objection which I make to Kaufmann's interpretation of Nietzsche's method as both dialectical and experimental might not hold for a variety of reasons. Those two methods may have been misunderstood and hence not dependent upon two opposing principles. Inasmuch as the notions were offered more as suggestions than as clearly explicated views a confusion of that sort is possible. More specifically one might argue that my objection is correct only on the assumption of a theory of truth other than that employed by Nietzsche or by Kaufmann in explicating Nietzsche.

If the first charge were to be levelled it seems that the point still remains that the details of the relations between dialectical and experimental methods -- as well as other characterizations of Nietzsche's method -- ought to have been included by Kaufmann and that without those details all sorts of confusion can ensue. That is, I only blunder, if indeed I do blunder, through these possible connections because Kaufmann didn't give a whit about them.

If the second charge were brought, namely that some non-standard sense of "truth" is operative in Nietzsche's method, or Kaufmann's explication of it, one would again expect that unusual features of a method especially one so fundamental as a theory
of truth should have been earmarked by the commentator. There is a suggestion of this latter consideration in Kaufmann's discussion of Nietzsche as a pragmatist but there is not much there to satisfy what is a very serious ambiguity in the course of his discussion of Nietzsche's method.48

Not only is the relation between the "experimentalism" and the "dialectical method" complex and shot through with apparent difficulties but also "experimentalism" and "problem-thinking" do not mesh well with each other. Basically the same kind of difficulty is at the base of the connection between these two latter as that which complicated the connection between two former characterizations. Specifically the difficulty is one of what theory of truth and our knowledge of it are presupposed by Nietzsche's method as understood by Kaufmann.

Problem-thinking consists of focusing on particular problems each in its greatest detail as opposed to a concern for the development of a monolithic theory. Kaufmann portrays Nietzsche as so interested in the integrity of each problem that "breaks" and "discontinuities" emerge as we examine the larger field of problems. This picture of Nietzsche's method seems to excuse Nietzsche of

48 I will discuss Kaufmann on Nietzsche's pragmatism after presenting the other objection to his account, since I desire to show here the importance and degree of the general fault of not relating characterizations to each other.
the contradictions or inconsistencies which he finds himself asserting.\footnote{A good case could be made for the use of the term "committing" here in place of "asserting" given that Kaufmann does not seem to be treating "solutions" so much as "activities" in his discussions of problem-thinking but there will be more on that later and the introduction of the term "committing" with regard to contradictions would seem odd without the buttressing of argument for its greater appropriateness.} 49

On one level of interpretation there is a quite natural compatibility between "experiment" and "problem". An experiment is a particular type of situation which can answer a particular question. For example, I might engage in an experiment of assuming a value such as complete honesty in order to see what would happen with that value presupposed. It would even be likely that I would conduct several experiments of the same type before deciding that there was evidence for the adequacy of a given value. (I think this kind of example is the sort of thing Kaufmann had in mind.)

To turn to problem-thinking, then, the problem situation would seem to be a particular situation which posed a particular question. An example of this would be, to take a fairly significant case, a situation of my recognizing my own doubt about the justification of a particular moral judgment. This situation then provides the stimulus for experiment such as was just outlined. It can also be seen how I might "outgrow" a problem, for problem-thinking progresses not by solutions but by realizations of the nature of the problem's "limitations". On its surface, however, there is
still nothing troublesome about this account. It amounts to saying I may begin with a situation which embodies a problem for me which in turn brings me to experiment with solutions which then in turn can produce a realization of the nature of my initial problem. That realization (recognition of a deeper(?) problem) then promotes a new series of experiments and so on. It is evident how this process is also describable as "dialectical" in the sense of its moving to more fundamental levels of conditions of problem situations.

It is not at all clear, however, that this account of Nietzsche's method, while an illuminating sketch, can bear much weight. I must still ask why does Nietzsche's method seem to involve him in self-contradictions? Nietzsche could only seem to be involved in contradictions given either of two possibilities: (1) Nietzsche actually asserts, either explicitly or implicitly, as per our previous example, "Honesty is an inviolate value" and "Honesty is not an inviolate value" or (2) Nietzsche utters not contradictory assertions but other sentences and other kinds of sentences which have as their conditions two incompatible or contradictory statements (facts). It seems to me that the apparatus which Kaufmann provides does not give evidence of the distinction between what Nietzsche actually asserts and what conditions are presupposed by what he asserts or otherwise utters. There is no suggestion in his discussion of Nietzsche's method that Kaufmann makes this distinction and furthermore his account seems to be addressed exclusively only to the first sort of contradiction.
With regard to how we can see that Nietzsche is not contradictory, i.e. only apparently contradictory, Kaufmann says (the case is re: systems are good vs. systems are bad), "The contradiction disappears as soon as we qualify such statements and specify in what respects systems are good and bad."\(^{50}\) This criticism of Kaufmann's portrayal of Nietzsche's method will require a more thorough substantiation and that substantiation will unfold throughout the remainder of this section on Kaufmann's commentary. However, the first point is that Kaufmann reads Nietzsche as making assertions -- through the process characterized as dialectical, experimental problem-thinking. Nietzsche is absolved of the accusation of contradictoriness in the light of how complex and specific his assertions are.\(^{51}\)

A question which illustrates a difficulty peculiar to Kaufmann's assessment of Nietzsche as a problem thinker is: How could Nietzsche contradict himself if the problems are not solved but are "outgrown"? That is to say, if Nietzsche's response to a problem-situation is a movement away from the problem itself (not its solution) then his responses to problems cannot contradict each other. I assume here, both that contradictions occur between assertions and that Kaufmann

\(^{50}\)Kaufmann, op.cit., p. 81.

\(^{51}\)Kaufmann also holds that Nietzsche sometimes makes mistakes, i.e. actually contradicts himself, in his effort to maintain the integrity of each problem he considers. Such mistakes would consist of two assertions which denied each other.
reads Nietzsche without making the distinction I just made between assertion-contradiction and condition-contradiction. Given that only assertions can contradict each other it is not at all apparent how "outgrown" problems could contradict each other. Problems do not have truth values and hence cannot contradict each other; outgrown problems, likewise, do not have truth values and hence cannot contradict each other.

The serious reader of Kaufmann's account of Nietzsche's method can only be frustrated by the fact that Kaufmann comes quite close at times to a very insightful view. What is suggested by Kaufmann is that Nietzsche is not simply stating philosophical points, he is doing something. In characterizing Nietzsche as a problem-thinker, Kaufmann indicates that Nietzsche is up to something in addition to or other than the mere presentation of a system. But Kaufmann stops short of the observation that the very fabric of Nietzsche's works is not one of assertions even though he introduces a notion of "outgrown" problems which should have signalled to him that the sentences embodying these problems were not in many places assertional (i.e., true or false).

The deeper puzzle is how Kaufmann could say of Nietzsche that his method was experimental, dialectical and problem-thinking without attending to the clash between these characterizations with regard to the commitment of each to a different presupposition about the truth of the sentences and our knowledge of that truth. Experimentalism requires possible truth and possible knowledge.
Dialectic requires no final truth (ergo no absolute knowledge).
While problem-thinking requires that the sentences be non-assertion-
al (ergo the non-truth and non-falsity of the sentences).

E. Nietzsche's pragmatism; Kaufmann's ambiguity on this claim

These difficulties may be resolved in terms of the observation
by Kaufmann of a "pragmatic" element in Nietzsche's method. In
connection with Nietzsche's experimentalism, Kaufmann says the
following:

Nietzsche's experimentalism may seem suggestive
of pragmatism, and as a matter of fact there
are in his writings -- and particularly in those
of his notes which deal with epistemological
problems -- a great number of passages which
read like early statements of pragmatic views.52

Kaufmann points out that the influences which brought about prag-
matism were already coalescing toward the end of the nineteenth
century. The "historical roots of pragmatism", Darwin and Kant,
were already present. So it is not at all surprising that there
were elements of pragmatism in Nietzsche's philosophy. The nubile
form of pragmatism which emerged, according to Kaufmann, was

...as Kant's philosophy was fused with Darwin's
theory, the doctrine...that our "truths" are
not accurate descriptions of a transcendent
reality, but simply statements which "work" and
thus fit us for survival -- in Vaihinger's
provocative phrase, "The most expedient form
of error."53

52Kaufmann, op.cit., p. 87.

53Ibid., p. 88. Kaufmann refers here to Vaihinger's, Die
Philosophie des Als-Ob which is discussed in Chapter VI.
There is some reason not to oversimplify this matter by calling Nietzsche a pragmatist. Kaufmann says that most of Nietzsche's statements which are "pragmatic" appear in notes which Nietzsche did not publish and therefore there is reason to believe he had not fully developed the ideas. Kaufmann believes that although there are suggestions of pragmatism in Nietzsche it would be misleading to label Nietzsche as a pragmatist.

While one could prove his historical priority on a number of points by quoting a considerable number of scattered statements, it seems more important to note that these utterances are really no great asset to his thought: for whatever one may think of pragmatism, Nietzsche did not think it through and failed to integrate it successfully with the remainder of his philosophy. We are thus confronted with thought experiments from which Nietzsche had not drawn any final conclusions when illness put an end to his deliberations...

...Suffice it at present to conclude...that Nietzsche's experimentalism is not to be equated with pragmatism.\(^54\)

I am not certain, but it seems probable that when Kaufmann speaks of Nietzsche as a pragmatist he is not doing so in the sense of offering a description of Nietzsche's method but in the sense of identifying a view which Nietzsche appeared to have espoused. This is an unsettling suspicion since it means that again Kaufmann has not recognized the distinction between what Nietzsche says and what he does. Kaufmann, in the tantalizing section on pragmatism, argues that one might think that Nietzsche's experimentalism

\(^{54}\)Kaufmann, op.cit., pp. 88-89.
(a characterization of Nietzsche's method) was a form of pragmatism. But Nietzsche's statements of pragmatism (a characterization of the philosophy he espoused) were not developed or integrated into his complete philosophy. So, we are to supposedly conclude that Nietzsche's method is not a pragmatic one because he did not assert pragmatism. This kind of slip, if indeed it is one, is analogous to that from Nietzsche's comments on decadence to his style of decadence (cf. an earlier discussion of this point). This kind of apparent error is most troublesome for it promises defenses for Nietzsche's works against the charge of self-contradiction but on closer examination achieves nothing of the sort. I ought also to point out that Kaufmann rests his understanding in this regard as well as others on the reading of Nietzsche as exclusively making statements or assertions.

F. Nietzsche's existentialism, organic coherence, experiments in life, incompleteness

Let me turn now to another major characterization of Nietzsche's method which is tempting and with which Kaufmann does tempt his readers. Nietzsche's method is "existential". Central to Nietzsche's existential method are the concepts of experiment, courage, organic coherence and hypothesis. Kaufmann says:

Experiment is for Nietzsche not quite what it is for most other philosophers or scientists. Its distinguishing characteristic, which we must now consider, is what we shall call its "existential" quality. The use of the word "existential" is not meant to fix Nietzsche's
position in the history of ideas, to relegate him to any school, or to imply anything more than we are about to develop explicitly.\footnote{Ibid., p. 89.}

The important sense of experiment in which Nietzsche can be said to engage in experiment is with regard to deeply felt problems or concerns. Fundamental human quandaries are the proper subjects for the experiment. The concrete human concerns are the starting point for Nietzsche's explorations into possible alternatives -- i.e., the experiment. As Kaufmann puts it, "Experimenting involves testing an answer by trying to live according to it."\footnote{Ibid. Having already spent some time pointing out the ambiguity in the notion of experimentalism in Kaufmann's interpretation, I wish only to indicate that in this passage Kaufmann speaks of experiments as having answers which are lived while in other places he speaks of problems as outgrown not answered.} Because the attempts into possible alternative types of human life are the experiments Nietzsche conducts, his philosophy is not a cold, impersonal system. It is rather a highly personal response to questions about human existence. For this obvious reason, such experimentalism is courageous. So Nietzsche's method is existential because it is the engagement in courageous experiments which we try to live by, experiments which, therefore, contain great risks.

From the live testing out of the answers to experiments, it can be inferred that certain of these are possible while others...
are not. The existential, experimental (scientific) method of Nietzsche thereby has a built in check against inconsistencies. The philosophy (or the life) which results is therefore said to have an organic coherence. What this amounts to, as Kaufmann sees it, is:

The ideal is to consider each problem on its own merits. Intellectual integrity in the consideration of each separate problem seems not only the best way to particular truths, but it makes each investigation a possible corrective for any inadvertent previous mistakes.  

This passage continues, then, with an observation which I must label as a paradigm of some sort of intellectual whitewash of Nietzsche's seeming predilection for the inconsistent.

No break, discontinuity, or inconsistency occurs unless either there has been a previous error or there is an error now. Such inconsistencies, however -- which should be the exception rather than the rule -- should not go unnoticed but should ever become the occasion for revision.

Here it becomes quite clear that Kaufmann views Nietzsche's method, despite its esoteric characterizations, as a means to particular truths. If one were to take the suggestiveness of Kaufmann's term "coherence" seriously, one might think that's Nietzsche's method presupposed a coherence theory of truth. But such an implication is not spelled out. Again, the problematic issue regarding

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57 Kaufmann, op.cit., p. 91.

58 Ibid.
method is the matter of a theory of truth which even though it lies just beneath the surface is not addressed head on. In place of the needed but difficult interpretation of Nietzsche's method is Kaufmann's reassurance that inconsistencies should be the exception rather than the rule.

"Organic coherence" means the experiencing of the possible answers to questions (i.e., experiments in human life) and the consequent emergence of answers which fit well with each other. It is as well the corrective to the threat of "anarchy of atoms" which the aphoristic style breeds.

By "living through" each problem, Nietzsche is apt to realize implications of answers which other, non-existential, thinkers who merely pose these problems histrionically have overlooked. He is constantly aware of its implications regarding other problems, and his "existentialism" is that characteristic of his thinking which maintains the coherence of his thought.

The collected works can be divided into two major groups, according to Kaufmann, in connection with the "existential" method. The first group includes all works up through Zarathustra, the second, all works after Zarathustra. Nietzsche demonstrated the mastery of a variety of styles in the works of the first group: essay, polemic, aphoristic and diathyrambic styles. Among these works Nietzsche is conducting experiments.

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59 Kaufmann quoting Nietzsche, Ibid.

60 Ibid.
After Zarathustra, Nietzsche changes from experiment to conviction, i.e., hypotheses which seem to derive from the earlier experiments. Kaufmann describes this as follows:

Philosophically, the works after Zarathustra do not any longer contain series of small experiments but the hypotheses which Nietzsche would base on his earlier works. As such, they may seem less tentative, and the tone is frequently less impassioned: but Nietzsche still considers them Versuche and offers them with an open mind.\(^{61}\)

Each experiment, according to Kaufmann, both in the varieties of style in the early Nietzsche and also in the tentative convictions of the later Nietzsche, is "essentially Nietzschean". In fact, Kaufmann says "all the experiments cohere because they are essentially not capricious."\(^{62}\) It is their organic coherence which holds together all the elements of Nietzsche's philosophy. "Their unity one might call 'existential'."\(^{63}\)

Hence, Nietzsche's existential method is existential by virtue of the fact that it is serious, not capricious, despite the surface indications of its being fragmentary. The method is existential because the experiments result in the making of hypotheses, i.e., the forming of convictions. It is existential because its impact and its origin are in Nietzsche's very life. While I am puzzled

\(^{61}\)Ibid., p. 92.

\(^{62}\)Ibid., p. 93.

\(^{63}\)Ibid.
about the details of this conceptualization of Nietzsche's method
and while I sometimes find this particular aspect of Kaufmann's
interpretation platitudinous, nevertheless for those sympathetic
to Nietzsche, this sense of "existential" captures a significant
feature of what Nietzsche was doing. That there is more to be
said and that it could be said more clearly is certainly the case.
But there is a core of insight in what Kaufmann has said about
Nietzsche's existential method which one ought not overlook.

Not all of Kaufmann's commentary on Nietzsche's method is
flattering or apologetic. Kaufmann does at least suggest a
direction of criticism of Nietzsche's method in his observations
that Nietzsche failed to be cognizant of the basic need for some
systematic effort to substantiate the hypotheses that he formulated.

...while offering many fruitful hypotheses,
Nietzsche failed to see that only a systematic
tempt to substantiate them could establish
an impressive probability in their favor. Hence
his experiments are often needlessly inconclusive.
Though a system may be false in spite of its in-
ternal coherence, an unsystematic collection of
sundry observations can hardly lay any greater
claim to truth. 64

Nietzsche did not accomplish what could have been accomplished
through his experimental method. His philosophy remained unfor-
tunately incomplete, so Kaufmann believed, perhaps because Nietzsche
was the beginning, not the end of a whole era in human experience.

\[64\text{Ibid., p. 94.}\]
3. **Kaufmann explicitly relies exclusively upon interpretations which are assertional but appeals implicitly to other speech acts**

While I have been critical of Kaufmann's discussion of Nietzsche's method my more immediate interest is in the adequacy of his attempt to answer the charge that Nietzsche contradicts himself throughout his works. In what Kaufmann explicitly states about Nietzsche's method he seems always to construe Nietzsche's language as though the character of all his sentences was assertional, i.e., the sentences are all either true or false. Where Kaufmann discovers what appear to be contradictions in Nietzsche's writings he attempts to resolve them by seeking the more complex form of the assertions or he considers them to be the rare mistakes that actual contradictions represent (a statement both asserted and denied). Some of what Kaufmann says suggests that Nietzsche employs other methods, other modes of language, but Kaufmann does not explicitly take this position. That he responds as he does to the worry over contradictions indicates that he assumes that assertional mode is the exclusive mode of language employed by Nietzsche — at least with regard to the most important aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy. 65

While it seems quite clear that Kaufmann relies explicitly upon a construal of Nietzsche's language on the model of asser-

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65 An interview with Kaufmann in late 1971 did not give any evidence of an inclination to interpret Nietzsche's mode of language in a way other than as assertions. See notes from this interview in Appendix A.
tion there are occasional comments about what Nietzsche is doing that indicate that Kaufmann noticed non-assertional utterances though he ignored them in his stated theory of Nietzsche's method. In one chapter in Kaufmann's commentary, Kaufmann refers to certain utterances as "insults" and "invectives". While in some other sense of a sentence which was uttered as an insult it may be true or false, as an insult it does not seem to have a truth value. The sentence "You certainly have an enormous nose" as a description, as a proposition about your nose may be true or false. But regarding that same sentence, for example, as a response to your remark upon my beady eyes, that is, as an insult, the question of truth is not primary. A sentence's being uttered as an insult is not a matter of its truth or falsity. Similarly, though the case seems even clearer, invectives do not find their proper evaluation or description in terms of truth. To counter "That's not true!" to an invective hurled as only Nietzsche can hurl them is really rather foolish. Chaucer's characters, as another example, are quite skilled at such verbal pursuits -- one does not even repeat Chaucerian invectives in polite company they are so effective at stunning the recipient. The reasonable response is return in kind or even a punch in the

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66 Other considerations like plausibility may be involved in insults -- if your nose were exceedingly small, my remark would not be plausible and therefore might fail to be insulting. The remark might be plausible if your nose were of average size but oddly colored and hence it would be insulting. The point is that there are more important dimensions to insults than truth if truth be a dimension at all, ever.
nose. The response "That's not true!" misses the target completely. Now Kaufmann says that Nietzsche's sentences are sometimes insults and invectives but he does not pursue those observations far enough.

Kaufmann also writes that Nietzsche can be found at times "scorning" and at times "celebrating". These linguistic acts do not seem to be most suitably analyzed on the model of assertions. The intent, the effect, even the form of scorning or celebrating utterances do not correspond to the intent, the effect or the form of assertions. "Oh welcome, joyous springtime morn!" certainly seems to be a celebrating utterance, not an asserting utterance. This is not to say, however, that there are not implied propositions which could or ought to be asserted by one making that celebrating utterance. All that is insisted here is that Kaufmann does, in the way he discusses what Nietzsche does linguistically, employ terms for utterances which are not assertional, i.e., either true or false and uttered as being true. And again it is clear that Kaufmann did not make a point of these variants in linguistic behavior. Certainly he did not argue that the central considerations in Nietzsche's philosophy could only be understood by straying from the form of assertion.

When Kaufmann is not in the middle of discussing Nietzsche's method or his style but when he grapples with the comprehension of several core doctrines in Nietzsche's philosophy, he occasionally relies on a broader variety of linguistic modes to explain what Nietzsche is doing. In the chapter "God and the Revaluation," Kaufmann speaks of Nietzsche making diagnosis of his contemporaries, "--that is an attempt at a diagnosis of contemporary civiliza-
tion, not a metaphysical speculation about ultimate reality." There may be differences of opinion about whether "making a diagnosis" isn't exactly a case of an assertional utterance. It seems to me that they are different. The difference can be discovered by looking at what we say about someone who attempts to do each of them well. "No matter how hard Charley tries his diagnoses always are incorrect. He'll treat you for appendicitus and it'll turn out that you ate too many green apples." Granted there may be propositions which should be asserted by the person who is criticizing a diagnosis or making one. But the focus of interest in diagnosis is treatment and prognosis. Implicitly, it may be based on a string of causal propositions but that is not its primary function. Even if the diagnostic utterance has all the grammatical earmarks of a simple assertion, "He's suffering from gout," the relation between what is observed and what is uttered is more like that of "Now, we tracked the electron" than like "The cat is on the mat." One could admire a diagnosis as one might admire a theory and only in the distance care a whit about truth, if at all.

The other perhaps clearer instance of a non-assertional utterance being appealed to is in the chapter "Overman and Recurrence" where Kaufmann accounts for the extent of Nietzsche's commitment to the doctrine of eternal recurrence in this way:

Why did he value this most dubious doctrine, which was to have no influence to speak of, so extrava-
gantly? For it is plain that none of his other ideas meant so much to him. The answer must be sought in the fact that the eternal recurrence was to Nietzsche less an idea than an experience -- the supreme experience of a life unusually rich in suffering, pain, and agony. He made much of the moment when he first had this experience... because to him it was the moment which redeemed his life. 68

Though Kaufmann considers Nietzsche's interest in this doctrine as an interest in its consequences not its truth, he, nevertheless, returns to the position that Nietzsche offered eternal recurrence as a truth. 69

There are not many examples of Kaufmann's reliance upon a broader understanding of Nietzsche's linguistic behavior. One cannot help but be puzzled by the fact that an individual like Kaufmann who translates Nietzsche's works with an amazing sensitivity for poetry, the elegance of the turn of phrase, the humor, the finest of points in linguistic gestures, despite this obvious feeling for Nietzsche's language, never brings to the level of philosophical interpretation the centrality of this richness of language to Nietzsche's philosophy. Instead Kaufmann almost without exception, at least without important exceptions, reads Nietzsche as though he wrote in a discursive style, or as though the style was something to be seen through to the substance of the philosophy which lay behind or underneath the words and phrases. Kaufmann even comes to say:

68 Ibid., p. 323.

69 Ibid., pp. 332-333.
One must therefore ask in all seriousness whether Nietzsche was possibly led astray by language and deceived by his own metaphorical expression.\textsuperscript{70}

and

"Self-overcoming" is only a metaphor and involves two forces -- and one may wonder whether Nietzsche was deceived by the word or whether his earlier dualism was still in the back of his mind.\textsuperscript{71}

Kaufmann's view of Nietzsche's language, then, not only leads him to ignore the suggestions of his own observations but even brings him to reject the metaphorical expression itself.

\textsuperscript{70}Ibid., p. 215.

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., p. 229.
Danto does not have a chapter devoted to a discussion of Nietzsche's method per se and except for some quite scant remarks in the preface to his work Nietzsche as Philosopher does not treat method as a separate issue. These remarks do provide, however, the overall perspective with which Danto operates. Fundamental to Danto's understanding of Nietzsche is the view that Nietzsche experimented with ideas and concepts. This experimentation consisted essentially of using a word (concept) in a wider than normal context (in a number of settings in which the word was not customarily used). The effects of this experimentation could either be that it would "crack the habitual grip on thought in which language holds us" or it "sometimes exploded into absurdity or silliness".¹ Danto describes the experimentation as follows:

He would take a word, which had a restricted usage, and begin to give it a far wider application, using it now to describe things that had never been seen as falling within the meaning of that term before. Then, having immensely widened the scope of the word, he would force it back into the context from which it was originally taken. The context is then charged with an overload of conceptual energy it was not made to withstand.\(^2\)

The point of Nietzsche's experimentation to engage in a radical tormenting of words (concepts, ideas) directed toward demonstrating the "conventional nature of language"\(^3\) and eventually, producing "total conceptual permissiveness"; it would force us to fashion some new words and hence new thoughts. All of Nietzsche's writings can be seen from Danto's point of view as being established upon two principles:

1. language is conventional but also limiting on human thought, and 2. by producing conceptual anarchy one can prompt the formation of new conventions which means new ways of thinking as well.

Danto does not explicitly state these as two principles which determine Nietzsche's writings, yet as stated they do seem to capture what Danto is trying to say although he uses some rather odd terminology. Holding these two principles Nietzsche attempts to produce in his readers a freedom from their aging conceptual frameworks. By what must have seemed to contemporary analytic philosophers to be wildly unorthodox means, Nietzsche, by Danto's account, proceeded

\(^2\)Ibid.

\(^3\)Ibid.
to act on a principle which they, the contemporary philosophers, actually assent to and argue for. That is to say, that first principle is shared by Nietzsche and contemporary analytic philosophers; the second principle, however, is a further move which Nietzsche makes -- both conceptually and in terms of what he actually tried to bring about.

So by transplanting a word from "narrow" to "wider" contexts and back again Nietzsche produced "overloads of conceptual energy" which resulted (fortunately) in "cracking linguistic habits" or (unfortunately) in "exploding into absurdity". In other words, to Danto's mind some experiments succeed while others do not. It is in part because Danto is most interested in this conceptual experimentation that, by his report, roughly one third of his citations are to the Nachlass, the unpublished notes, since they presumably offer a glimpse of Nietzsche in his "laboratory".

In view of this understanding of what Nietzsche was doing, Danto would seem to be sympathetic to the language which Nietzsche uses. The style can be brilliant, he says, and it seems to be exactly what is necessary to achieve the desired ends. At least Danto believes that the style, the use of language which is found in Nietzsche's works is a means to the desired ends. He says:

The violent chemistry of subtle linguistic incongruities yielded a prose that was sparkling and explosive at its best, and a means to the liberation of the human mind. Men had to be made to understand

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4Ibid., p. 15.
Nietzsche experimented with concepts to the degree of "total conceptual permissiveness" and he selected those concepts which were the underpinnings of "the entire ramified network of human ideas". The general direction of Danto's analysis of Nietzsche's works, therefore, splits into two directions. Danto tries to establish that Nietzsche is seriously misunderstood because the degree to which he anticipated contemporary analytic philosophy is almost always overlooked. On the other hand, Danto has unresolved doubts about the clarity of Nietzsche's thinking, whether he espoused analytic philosophy or demonstrated it and finally whether he held an inconsistent philosophical doctrine.

Considerable light is shed on Danto's prefatory remarks on Nietzsche's method throughout the remainder of his book. This tendency to consider methods of interpretation seems more than appropriate and indeed reflects Danto's philosophical sensibilities. One case in particular illustrates Danto's interpretation of Nietzsche's language. In the chapter, "Art and Irrationality," Danto examines Nietzsche's use of the word 'art'. It is a case of the kind of

\[^{5}\text{Ibid.}, p. 12.\]
transplantation of a term which Danto had earlier claimed results in an "overload of conceptual energy." Nietzsche's earliest writings involved an aesthetic view which revealed the degree to which he would experiment with a concept. Danto mentions the fact that aestheticians have argued over whether or not art provides any cognitive content, i.e. whether art can be thought of as a form of knowledge, a means of access to truth. It is on this very issue that Nietzsche's willingness to extend concepts can be seen.

Danto says:

The radical character of Nietzsche's thought, even in its first significant expression, may be seen in the fact that he is indeed prepared to allow that art has no less claim than sense or science to objective truth. But this is because neither sense nor science can make any stronger claim to truth than art. Neither art nor the avenues ordinarily credited with conducting us to truth regarding the objective world lead us, in fact, to the truths they promise...Language...describes — insofar as, in Nietzsche's view, we may think of language as descriptive at all — the illusions we take for reality.

This view of Nietzsche's that art, sense, and science are only distinguishable in terms of their age, each being an illusion, touches a topic which Danto takes to be a central focus if not the one question which "occupied him [Nietzsche] throughout his entire philosophical career, and the answer that he gave it here...was one that he never saw fit to modify in any essential respect." The question:

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6 Another example not as thoroughly treated is "religion" in the chapter "Religious Psychology".


8 Ibid., p. 38.
"What is truth?". The answer, as Danto cites it from a little noticed early work called "Concerning Truth and Falsehood in an Extramoral Sense":

...A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, a sum, in short, of human relationships which, rhetorically and poetically intensified, ornamented, and transformed, come to be thought of, after long usage by a people, as fixed, binding, and canonical. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions, worn out metaphors now impotent to stir the senses, coins which have lost their faces and are considered now as metal rather than currency.\(^9\)

The implications of this view of truth as illusion are far reaching and Danto occupies himself for a large part with the intelligibility of this Nietzschean doctrine.

The connections between art, metaphor and truth are the skeletal structure of Nietzsche's metaphysics and epistemology. Danto's interest in these notions is not a side-issue but it is the very attempt to see through to the core of Nietzsche's philosophical doctrine. It is, furthermore, since Danto has already sketched Nietzsche's own language as intentionally deviant from ordinary use, an examination of the intelligibility of Nietzsche's own utterances. Since Danto has claimed that Nietzsche wished to alter all our basic concepts discussion of art-metaphor-truth is discussion of the feasibility of Nietzsche's philosophical task.

Danto expresses his understanding of the connections between art, metaphor and truth, as far as Nietzsche is concerned, in the following extended passage:

An acknowledged true idea is but one which is enshrined in the conceptual columbarium that is the "cemetery of metaphors." A false idea is an unenshrined or "live" metaphor, a deviant image. We cannot, therefore contrast metaphors with other utterances in the ordinary way, the difference between metaphors and non-metaphoric utterance being only a matter of relative location within a system of concepts -- not a difference between fact and fancy. But then (on this analysis) neither can we contrast poet with scientist nor either with the plain man. The statements of the one are quite as inadequate to the way things are as those of the other, today's common sense and scientific orthodoxy being yesterday's metaphor, cooled, so to speak, and hardened into fact. Notice, however, that metaphors here are spoken of as linguistic expressions for experiences, not for things, so there are routine and deviant experiences. The linguistic utterance or expression of a deviant experience must, in the nature of the case, be either metaphorical or unintelligible relative to a linguistic scheme worked out to accommodate routine experience. This almost guarantees that expressions of deviant experiences will border on unintelligibility. 10

What we acknowledge as truth is dead metaphor, concepts that fit into a scheme which accommodates itself to common experiences. What we call false is live metaphor, concepts that are deviant from the common and expressive of unusual experiences.

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B. Nietzsche's purely metaphorical language is impossible:
definitions of metaphor; the paradox; the language
is unteachable and unintelligible; Theories of truth

Danto tries three different definitions of metaphorical utter-
ance and on each of these the claim "all utterances are metaphorical"
is purportedly shown to be unintelligible. If this series of argu-
ments is valid then Danto will have demonstrated the impossibility
of Nietzsche's achieving conceptual anarchy. Were this to have
been Nietzsche's philosophical program -- to alter all our basic
concepts -- the program could not be accomplished. Since this is
the ambitious burden of arguments against "all sentences are
metaphorical" it is important to examine the arguments in some detail.
What definitions does Danto consider as Nietzsche's for metaphorical
sentences: 1.) sentences which are "deviant under a given scheme"
2.) sentences which are not "declarative utterances" ("by plain seman-
tic criteria and grammatical rule"), and 3.) sentences which are
never literally true. It is important to emphasize that these
are definitions of metaphorical sentences or, if the two terms are
equivalent, utterances.

By the first definition then, a metaphorical sentence, a sen-
tence which was "deviant under a given scheme," would have to be a
non-standard sentence. Danto's criticism of the "all utterances
are metaphorical" is that there cannot be all non-standard sentences
since there must be a standard for some to be non-standard. So "non-

\[11\] Ibid., p. 43.
standard sentence" is logically dependent upon "standard sentence" and "all utterances are metaphorical" if it makes sense must be false.

Danto's second definition of metaphorical sentence as the opposite of simple declarative utterance, as determined by semantic criteria and grammatical rule, produces the criticism of Nietzsche's view that it is just false that there are no simple declarative utterances; indeed again for the phrase "metaphorical sentence" to make sense there would have to be some declarative utterances and hence "all utterances are metaphorical" is false.

The third definition of "metaphorical sentence" seems to finally get to the concern with which he was most concerned. A metaphorical sentence is a sentence which is not literally true. Here Danto begins to sound hesitant in his criticism of Nietzsche. He says "One might slyly suggest that Nietzsche's general position has semi-paradoxical consequences." The criticism does not turn out to be slyly suggestive nor just semi-paradoxical. The criticism is

To say that all sentences are metaphorical entails that the thesis itself is metaphorical, hence not literally true, hence literally false. So, if he is right, he is wrong.

Nietzsche's claim, that all utterances are metaphorical poses the paradox for Nietzsche that even his own claim would have to be metaphorical. If "all utterances are metaphorical," that utterance is

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12 Ibid., p. 44.

13 Ibid.
as well. Given that "metaphorical utterance" is taken to mean not literally true, the claim that all utterances are metaphorical is not literally true and therefore it is literally false. That is to say, Danto suggests that Nietzsche is troubled by the old "This sentence is false" paradox.

One might think that this would spell disaster for Nietzsche but Danto observes that this is not an annoyance to Nietzsche. Nietzsche does tease his readers with remarks regarding the will to truth such as: "Why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance?" indicating that he is not cut to the quick by the possibility that his utterances are not true, or are false.

Danto also has in mind what he takes to be an analogous paradox. Not only is it a paradoxical consequence of "All utterances are metaphorical" that "All sentences are false" but there is the further consequence that what we ordinarily call "art" turns out only to be one form of art. If all human activities are creative (artistic, metaphorical) then making art, in the ordinary sense, is

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14 Ibid.

15 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 9.

16 Danto's seeming belief that these are two forms of the same paradox rests on something like the belief that certain terms derive their meanings in opposition to other terms, e.g. true-false, non-art-art, literal-metaphorical. In each of the examples the first of the pair may be taken to be the paradigm in opposition to which its mate derives its meaning. Hence any statement of the form "Everything is such and so" where such and so is either the paradigm or its opposite would have to be paradoxical. The analogy may be a loose one. Danto appears to construe it as an analogy. I will not argue this point.
but one instance of art in its more extended sense. Nietzsche has thereby radically altered the use of "art" and in doing so is speaking metaphorically. His utterances are instances of that to which they refer. Danto contends that the extended (metaphorical) use of the word "art" is logically dependent upon the narrower (standard) use of the word. It is only because we know the meaning of "art" in its narrower sense that its metaphorical use is possible. In fact the narrow sense serves as the paradigm which supports the metaphorical uses. It seems that we are to conclude that art must exist in its narrower forms so that we are able to understand what the extended use means.

Danto brings forward a different kind of argument against "All utterances are metaphorical." Even if such a language were possible, it could not be understood. This argument is that one must master a straightforward use of a word before one can use it in an imaginative or metaphorical way. Contained in the argument is the further point that it is impossible to see how one could be taught just an imaginative use of words. Children are, Danto suggests, taught the ordinary uses of words by ostension. "This is a cup," "This is a book," "This is a painting," "This is art"; as the child acquires these concepts he employs "is" in a non-imaginative way. However when asked to select something which "is" art when no paintings, sculpture, music, etc., are present, the same child could take up the cup and say "This is art." In so doing he would be using "is"

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17 Danto, op.cit., p. 45.
imaginatively and "art" metaphorically. Danto thinks the learning of imaginative uses of "is" is nearly mysterious.

However, we do come to be able to use "is" imaginatively; it is clear that we can so use it and that we can distinguish imaginative uses from "mistaken" uses. Nietzsche, by claiming that all utterances are metaphorical or that all human experience is art, does not allow, according to Danto, for the distinction between metaphor and error, between art and blunder.

A chief difficulty,...and one which seems to me seriously to affect Nietzsche's entire account, is that there is a plain sense in which the imaginative use of is logically presupposes mastery of the straightforward use. A child who calls his stick "horse" but who holds it to his shoulder and cries "Bang!" has not an overactive fantasy but an underdeveloped knowledge of horses. We may say the child imagines a horse is a gun. But this is only a way of saying he is mistaken, not that he is imaginative; for a genuine exercise of imagination is not regarded as a way of being mistaken.18

Danto insists that imaginative uses of words depend upon straightforward uses in that we cannot use words imaginatively until we can use them straightforwardly. Should we not be in mastery of the standard use of a word, our uses of it will more likely than not be mistaken not metaphorical. This results in Danto's claim that standard uses are logically prior and hence temporarily prior to imaginative uses of words.

18 Ibid., p. 46.
Imaginative usage, in presupposing ordinary use, seems almost to entail the sociological thesis that there could be artists in a society only after there were sober productive citizens. If, sociologically, a society consisting solely of poets is impossible, so would be a language which was only poetic. Perhaps, then, we do not have quite the liberty with the concepts of art and imagination which Nietzsche assumed in moving to his wider conception of art and artistic activity.19

This argument establishes, if it is correct, that "the first sentence ever uttered simply could not have been metaphors."20 Metaphors, for part of this argument, are taken to be non-standard word uses and since the first use of a word could not be deviant from a standard use, it could not be a metaphor. Danto notices that the first use of a word also could not be a standard use. The first use of a word could subsequently turn out to be in accordance with the standard but in that sense it could as easily turn out to be deviant from the standard so in the sense in which a first use of a word could be standard it could be metaphorical. This means that temporally prior to the agreement upon the standard there can be neither metaphor nor standard uses of a word.

Danto not only has argued that it is necessarily false that "all utterances are metaphorical." He has also argued that a totally metaphorical language could not be taught to a child. This latter

19 Ibid., pp. 46-47.

20 Ibid., p. 47. The tendency to equate the use of metaphors with metaphorical utterances seems to be responsible for the awkwardness of this particular statement.
argument assumes that ostension is required for the learning of a language. That assumption is shared with still another argument of Danto's, namely that a conceptually anarchic language could not be translated into our language and hence could never be made intelligible to us. The point of the present arguments goes further, however, to establish a principle that intelligibility depends upon the possibility of translating from a familiar language into a "new" language or vice versa. Translatability and learning a language being dependent on ostension, doctrines and philosophies can be intelligible if and only if their terms can be defined by ostension. Danto argues thusly:

The incapacity of ordinary language to express his own visions, without at the same time and through the very expression of them distorting his thoughts and locating them in a system of implications which it was (partly) the purpose of his thinking to destroy, explains, perhaps, why he thought his philosophy was hard to understand. Strictly, it should almost have been impossible to understand. How are we to understand a theory when the structure of our understanding is itself called into question by the theory we are asked to understand? Would it now follow from the fact that we had understood it at all that we had misunderstood it? Because the concepts by means of which we had achieved understanding were just the wrong ones? If we are asked to understand in a new way, how are we to understand this new request? There could be no lexical bridge between our language and any that Nietzsche might frame. For then ours would be a translation of his, having the same meanings, preserving the same truths. That language would have to be learned anew, just as we have learned ours. But how it would be learned is hard to say. The act of ostension -- pointing to what a word stands for -- would be ruled out if
there were no separable things at which to point. At best, or, if you wish, at worst, Nietzsche's view of the world verges on a mystical, ineffable vision of a primal, undifferentiated Ur-Ein, a Dionysiac depth.²¹

It is Danto's eventual thesis that the doctrine of the will-to-power,²² though expressed late in Nietzsche's career and therefore not completely developed, is central to the whole philosophical system. Danto does not attempt to show that this doctrine is unintelligible but in discussing it he refers again to the difficulty of teaching a totally new language.

It must be a difficult doctrine to render wholly intelligible -- and here we are back to a familiar point -- because the terms of intelligibility for us are precisely those which the theory cannot fit. To explain the doctrine in our language is to tolerate a fiction which one wishes to overthrow. So one needs a radical new language. Then the question remains. How is this to be learned, and how might one learn to cope with the world by means of it? I do not think this is Nietzsche's problem just here, however.²³

Even if we should find convincing Danto's arguments against Nietzsche's supposed thesis that all utterances are metaphorical, Danto's major line of interpretation of Nietzsche would be in grave difficulty. Danto attempts to show that Nietzsche was the intellectual forebearer of twentieth century analytic philosophy. But

²¹Danto, op. cit., p. 97.

²²The attempt to reduce all distinctions and categories down to one ultimate kind of thing is dubbed "methodological monism" by Danto in ascribing it to Nietzsche, Ibid., p. 216.

²³Danto, op. cit., p. 219.
among the very approaches which are represented in this philosophy are nominalists or conventionalists such as Goodman, Quine and Wittgenstein. Though their theories are best not oversimplified into the slogan "all utterances are metaphorical," that slogan embodies a principle which is characteristic of much in these contemporary philosophies. Even if Nietzsche had a doctrine such as this, a charitable reading of Nietzsche is twentieth century nominalism and Danto does not refute twentieth century nominalism. Therefore he could not have shown that Nietzsche's task was impossible.

Danto's argument however may be more subtle than what I have previously suggested. He might rather be arguing that Nietzsche's own philosophical doctrine is inconsistent with a totally metaphorical language. A more precise reading of these passages on intelligibility and translatability shows that Danto's argument has these premises:

1.) In order for a philosophy to be intelligible the language which expresses it must be translatable into our familiar or common language,

2.) In order for a new language to be translatable its terms must be capable of being attached to things by ostension, those things to which our familiar terms apply. These two premises alone would lead one to conclude the unintelligibility of a philosophical doctrine only on the basis of its terms not being able to be attached by ostension to "things".

Danto's argument against Nietzsche in regard to this issue, it turns out, is that given the metaphysical doctrine which Nietzsche holds (asserts) that there are no facts, no things as such, just a
"primal undifferentiated Ur-Ein, a Dionysiac depth," Nietzsche cannot attach terms to the elements of his philosophy of ostension. If there are no things to which the terms of a new language can apply, then the new language cannot be translated for us and hence the philosophy itself must be unintelligible.

To put the point in a different manner, in order for Nietzsche to accomplish his primary philosophical task -- that of establishing conceptual anarchy -- he cannot also espouse philosophical doctrines which are inconsistent with a wholly new language. Nietzsche's philosophical tasks require that his new language can be learned and this requires that ostension be used. For us to learn by ostension, we must assume differentia, "things," and that is precisely what Nietzsche denies. So Nietzsche cannot establish an intelligible conceptual anarchy if he holds the metaphysical view he seems to.

There is a further argument which Danto brings to bear against the possibility of Nietzsche achieving his philosophical task of conceptual anarchy. It seems to Danto that that philosophical task is in basic conflict with Nietzsche's theory of truth. Danto makes the critical point in the two passages quoted above which is that Nietzsche holds that the language of everyman is embued with the wisdom for survival. The trouble is that Nietzsche seems to advocate tinkering or wholesale revision of language on the grounds that new thoughts might be more life affirming. For this criticism to seem viable, Danto must argue that Nietzsche's theory of truth is in conflict with rejection of our basic concepts.
Particularly in his chapters "Philosophical Nihilism" and "Perspectivism," Danto considers Nietzsche's theory of truth. The central question is whether Nietzsche held the view that is currently called the "correspondence" theory or that called the "pragmatic" theory of truth. The third standard alternative, "coherence" theory, is not discussed per se but some views on it will emerge in connection with Danto's discussion of Nietzsche's errant Idealism and his philosophical system.24

So far as I can determine, Danto offers but one rather sketchy argument to the effect that Nietzsche rejects the correspondence theory of truth. That argument is as follows:

There is neither order nor purpose, things nor facts, nothing there whatever to which our beliefs correspond. So that all our beliefs are false. This (we must later determine what reasons he has for this spectacular claim) he regards as "the extremist form of nihilism -- the insight that every belief, every taking-for-true (Fur-wahr-halten), is necessarily false: because there is no true world at all." [Nietzsche, unpublished notes, p. 677, Schlechta edition]. In the end, we shall see that this is a highly dramatized rejection of the correspondence theory of truth.25

The argument is slightly more fully developed in some later passages where Danto indicates that it is the conditions which are necessary

24 Danto faults Kaufmann for holding that Nietzsche's major philosophical task was the seeking of truth without distinguishing the various theories of truth and without taking seriously Nietzsche's belief that everything is false.

25 Danto, op.cit., p. 33.
for there to be truths on the correspondence theory that Nietzsche rejects. Specifically, since Nietzsche believed that there are no facts, he hardly could have thought that there were true claims, where "true claim" means statement which corresponds to fact.

The conception of an independent and objective world structure, and the conception of truth which states that truth consists in the satisfaction of a relationship between a sentence and a fact, are views which Nietzsche rejects. Although Danto states here that Nietzsche rejects both conditions for truth on the correspondence model and "that truth consists... of a relationship between a sentence and a fact" his immediately preceeding quotations from Nietzsche show only the former and not the latter. Nietzsche could not be said to have rejected the correspondence theory. Danto really wants to say, and shortly thereafter does say, that Nietzsche uses "true" in two senses -- first in the sense of correspondence from which it follows that all claims are false, and second in a pragmatic sense where the truth of a claim is in its satisfying conditions for existence. Nietzsche's real interest, the criterion for his science, is in what enhances or develops life. This "pragmatic" test of value is often overlaid onto his penchant for using "true" in its more conventional, i.e., correspondence, sense. Nietzsche's shifting back and forth between these two senses, Danto observes, can only confuse the reader and result in apparent inconsistencies.

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26 Ibid., p. 72.
Although he had developed a pragmatic theory of truth, he often spoke in an idiom more congenial to the correspondence theory of truth which he was trying, not always and perhaps not ever in the awareness that he was doing so, to overcome. The inconsistency is not in his thought so much as in his language.27

The main question faced by Nietzsche's philosophy was, according to Danto, whether we could continue to inquire, create and live in the full knowledge that all perspectives are false,28 i.e., whence no claim corresponds to fact, all claims are false, all utterances are metaphorical. It is no wonder that Danto troubles throughout his book over the apparent paradox involved in these claims. Nietzsche's view, if it is asserted, would have to be false on the correspondence criterion. Danto finally resolves the paradox, albeit with a certain amount of grumbling, in his closing chapter, "Nachwort".

In these last pages I wish only to raise once again the obvious question regarding the status of Nietzsche's philosophy in terms of its own conception of philosophical activity. Was his philosophy, too, a matter of mere convention, fiction, and will-to-power? To put it in sophomorically but no less vexingly, was it his intention, in saying that nothing is true, to say something true? If he succeeded, then of course he failed, for if it is true that nothing is true, something is true after all. If it is false, then something again is true. If, again, what he says is as arbitrary as he has said, critically, that all of philosophy is, why should we accept him if we

27 Ibid., p. 80.

28 Ibid., p. 230.
are to reject the others? And if not arbitrary, how can it be right? How can what he says be true if he has said what the truth is? Nietzsche was alive to these difficulties, I believe. As he wrote in *Beyond Good and Evil*: "Supposing that this, too, is only an interpretation -- and one will be eager enough to raise this objection. Well -- so much the better"...

I suppose he would say that we are to judge him by the criterion we have in fact always employed, our philosophical idealogics notwithstanding: by whether his philosophy works in life. 29

Hence Danto suggests that this annoying paradox can be resolved by employing not a correspondence but a pragmatic theory of truth, as Nietzsche would have urged us to do. Even if we can establish that Nietzsche held a pragmatic theory of truth it would remain for us to decide if we found it acceptable as well in examining his writings. Danto's suggestion that we follow Nietzsche's lead in this regard seems full of the wisdom that otherwise we should catch ourselves up in tiny logical puzzles that miss the object of Nietzsche's works.

Our closing concern with Danto's commentary, except for his discussions of eternal recurrence and Übermensch which will appear in later chapters, is in regard to the lack of explicit mention of the coherence theory of truth. It is indeed possible that Danto does not take this to be either a substantial alternative theory or one which would be particularly productive in the examination of Nietzsche's theory (*Nietzsche is noteworthy for his predilection for apparent inconsistencies*).

If one construed the matter of coherence as a test not a theory of truth except in the context of a certain world view, Nietzsche’s critical remarks on the law of non-contradiction especially in The Will to Power should set that alternative quickly to rest. Danto does observe that Nietzsche strays from strict Idealism (that metaphysical view which I take it would make coherence a theory of truth not just a test of it) on the grounds that Nietzsche does say something about the truncated universe. As an Idealist proper, Nietzsche would presumably have to remain silent, i.e., would not have asserted anything, about the world beyond ideas (and perhaps minds).

Nevertheless, Nietzsche could not quite bring himself to the point of becoming an idealist, for whom there is no world outside the articulation of the mind... Because he wanted to say that all our beliefs are false, he was constrained to introduce a world for them to be false about; and this had to be a world without distinctions, a blind, empty, structureless thereeness. In fact he never surrendered this residual belief, and he came, in time, to speculate whether something after all might not be said about the real world.30

That Danto concerned himself repeatedly with this particular paradoxical element of Nietzsche’s writings is not the expression of a fetish. Rather, the claim that everything is false, that all utterances are metaphorical, is the center of Nietzsche’s philosophical system as Danto understands it. This centerpoint is reflected

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30 Ibid., p. 96. a) This looks as though Nietzsche assumed, rather than rejected, the correspondence theory of truth. b) What Nietzsche eventually wanted to say about the world is that it is Will-to-Power.
upon repeatedly especially as seen through the first four chapters; their titles express it: "Philosophical Nihilism," "Art and Irrationality," "Perspectivism," and "Philosophical Psychology." The nihilism or skepticism implicit in many of these views leads Danto to consider how Nietzsche can be both a philosophical nihilist and a systematic philosopher. Remember that Danto wants to make Nietzsche understandable to, no, acceptable to, contemporary analytic philosophers. In what way is Nietzsche systematic?

C. Nietzsche as systematic

Danto's whole commentary is an expressive effort to show the Nietzschean system. It culminates in attempts to integrate eternal recurrence, Übermensch and the will to power, offering the will to power as Nietzsche's metaphysical cornerstone, the one category in his "methodological monism." However Danto does remark upon system in Nietzsche's work very early in his commentary as well. It is plainly obvious that no system presents itself in any immediate way. Nietzsche did not possess an "architectonic talent."

Furthermore, one doubts that Nietzsche was ever conscious of a fully elaborated system that he should call his own. Danto says...

...it is not unreasonable to suppose that the system itself was never fully explicit even in his own awareness; or, if it was so, this would have been toward the end of his productive period when he was engaged in other projects, not knowing

31 Danto, op.cit., p. 22.
that he would not have the time and clarity to write it down.\textsuperscript{32}

Without countenancing the view that Nietzsche had a fully worked out system in his unconscious which was indirectly manifesting itself through his pen, Danto does argue that a system is present to be discovered in Nietzsche's work. This is accounted for by two "facts."

The first fact is that philosophy itself is systematic and insofar as a given individual undertakes the solution of a philosophical problem he implicitly commits himself to solutions to all of the others. Danto puts it this way.

The problems of philosophy are so interconnected that the philosopher cannot solve, or start to solve, one of them without implicitly committing himself to solutions for all the rest. In a genuine sense, every philosophical problem must be solved at once. He may work piecemeal at isolated problems only insofar as he accepts, if only tacitly, a system within which to conduct his inquiries.\textsuperscript{33}

The second fact is that we read into early works by an author positions which we know to be his in his mature works. Danto politely calls this unity which sounds for all the world like fudging, the "unifying force of historical intelligence." Coherence appears then in Nietzsche's works by way of these two facts.

\textsuperscript{32}Ibid., p. 23. It is not clear what "other projects" Danto had in mind. Nietzsche was so tormented by ill health, migraines and bad eyesight, it is hard to think he would postpone the writing of his completed system on the assumption he had time to do so even given that he might not anticipate that his illness would be mental in its final form.

\textsuperscript{33}Danto, op.cit., p. 24.
So the unifying forces of historical intelligence work together with the systematizing dynamism of philosophical thought to produce a coherent structure in a writer's works (his literary style and methods of composition notwithstanding), quite independently of whether he ever was able to express it as such, for himself or anyone else.34

Danto's view of the presence of a systematic nature in Nietzsche's work is certainly not a strong sense of system.35 For that sense Danto would presumably look for an "architectonic." It clearly is not a sense of system which would support a claim that Nietzsche espoused nor that he ought to be judged by a coherence criterion of truth. Danto recognizes his own commentary as a "reconstruction" of Nietzsche's philosophy and though it does not follow through on its own tempting leads it does provide an articulation of a system which could have been Nietzsche's. It could, that is, if Nietzsche was constructing a philosophical system.

2. Critical response to Danto

A. Lack of textual evidence for the view purported to be Nietzsche's

It must be granted at the outset of a critical analysis of Danto's interpretation of Nietzsche that there is an attractive

34 Ibid., p. 25.

35 Danto says that one can pick up Nietzsche's works and read anywhere at will; a remark which would set Kaufmann's teeth on edge as certainly as chalk screeching across a slateboard. He also says each aphorism, in a sense, contains the entire philosophy within it; a remark which would please Kaufmann for all its similarity to his notion of Nietzsche's method as monadological.
freshness about it. One is led to believe that an analytically-oriented philosopher, Danto, has some genuine appreciation of what Nietzsche was doing. My criticisms of Danto's arguments are not intended to show that Danto's initial insights about Nietzsche are incorrect -- that Nietzsche wanted to produce conceptual anarchy (or that it was or was not possible), and that Nietzsche can be seen as anticipating contemporary analytic philosophy. What I do want to establish is the inadequacy of Danto's arguments for demonstrating these insights. Other arguments may serve as such demonstrations but I do not believe that I need supply them in this chapter, if at all. What needs to be argued is not that Danto is completely wrong-headed about Nietzsche, and not that Nietzsche is without fault, but that 1) Danto's major critical arguments are not as conclusive as they may seem, that 2) there is not a strong case for Nietzsche anticipating contemporary analytic philosophy, in doctrine, as presented by Danto and that 3) Danto appears to be caught between two lines of interpretation which, while not logically inconsistent, result in Danto's accepting and rejecting the importance of Nietzsche's actual utterances. Danto's arguments are the following:

A. 1. Nietzsche both held and tried to behave in accordance with the principle: "All utterances are metaphorical."

2. The claim that "All utterances are metaphorical" must be false on a variety of grounds (reasons having to do with the nature of language).

3. The principle "All utterances are metaphorical" is logically false and paradoxical.
4. Nietzsche's philosophical undertaking, as a statement and expression of that principle, must be impossible.

Danto does not lay out his critical analysis of Nietzsche in quite these terms but it is an accurate portrayal of what he argues and the implications to be drawn from it.

Another somewhat altered version of argument A is what actually worries Danto about the underpinnings of Nietzsche's philosophy. Danto draws inferences from A to get this second argument, B, as its equivalent:

B. 1. Nietzsche both held and tried to behave in accordance with the principle: "All statements are false."

2. That principle is self-reflexive; hence it too must be false.

3. The principle "All statements are false" is logically false and paradoxical.

4. Nietzsche's philosophical undertaking, as a statement and expression of that principle, must be impossible.

Conclusions A-4 and B-4 need some comment before considering Danto's argument at some length. It seems that more background is needed to know what it means. Danto understood Nietzsche as attempting to carry out a philosophical program, the production of conceptual anarchy, which required that he, Nietzsche, believe that "All utterances are metaphorical", that he assert "All utterances are metaphorical" and that all his utterances be metaphorical. When I say that Danto implied that Nietzsche's philosophical undertaking must be impossible, I mean that Danto thought Nietzsche could not succeed in his undertaking. Danto did not hold that Nietzsche
couldn't actually write what he did write. What he maintained is that Nietzsche's philosophical writings could not be successful if predicated upon such a mistaken principle. What is not clear is whether Danto thought this philosophical success was doomed in terms of its failure to produce the effects Danto initially claimed Nietzsche was after or in terms of being an espousal of an inconsistent philosophical doctrine. The ambiguity between these two ways of conceiving of Nietzsche's success, or rather his failure, is an analogue to the ambivalence Danto seems to have between his two lines of interpretation.

The most immediate distress that one feels with Danto's arguments as I have claimed he pursued them is that there are only infrequent attempts to establish by clear textual evidence that Nietzsche ever wrote such a sentence as "All utterances are metaphorical."36

One might attempt to supply direct textual support of the claim that Nietzsche held this principle. Nietzsche appears to argue in many places that there is nothing but interpretation and thus in effect that expressions are metaphorical (live or dead). For example, these several paragraphs can be found in The Will to Power.

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36 Danto, in fact, begins with the expression "every sentence is metaphorical" (Danto, op.cit., p. 43) which I restate as "All sentences are metaphorical." There appears to be no change in meaning but I prefer the latter since the commitments of the claim seem to me to be more evident. Eventually Danto phrases the proposition using "all" instead of "every".
The very same milieus can be interpreted and exploited in opposite ways: there are no facts— . . .

I maintain the phenomenality of the inner world, too: everything of which we become conscious is arranged, simplified, schematized, interpreted through and through— . . . The "apparent inner world" is governed by just the same forms and procedures as the "outer world". We never encounter 'facts': pleasure and displeasure are subsequent and derivative intellectual phenomena— . . .

Against positivism, which halts at phenomena— "There are only facts"— I would say: No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations.

But this would be odd support indeed. What it demonstrates is that there is no description, literal or metaphorical. Hence it would not show that Nietzsche held the view that "All utterances are metaphorical."

It may very well be the case that Danto does not need direct textual evidence that Nietzsche stated "All utterances are metaphorical" but that he has attempted to capture an implicit and fundamental principle of Nietzsche's. Let us see if that case can be made.

Danto sets up his critical analysis of Nietzsche's basic concern with the nature of truth by way of the following reasoning.

Nietzsche holds, according to Danto, that "art has no less a claim than sense or science to objective truth." As a result Nietzsche

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38 Ibid., p. 263.
39 Ibid., p. 267.
40 Danto, op. cit., p. 37.
treats art as a form of cognition, each consisting of illusion.

So, Danto argues, Nietzsche has a related view of language:

Language rather describes -- insofar as, in Nietzsche's view, we may think of language as descriptive at all -- the illusions we take for reality.41

If Nietzsche makes any distinctions between art and attempts to describe reality, Danto believes them to be distinctions only in terms of age or degree of common acceptance. Hence Danto thinks "truths" are for Nietzsche dead metaphors. The text cited by Danto for this is from an early and little known work by Nietzsche (Concerning Truth and Falsehood in an Extramoral Sense, cited earlier in this chapter). The essence of the text is: "What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors..... Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions, worn-out metaphors now impotent to stir the senses....." We are, however, a long way from the assertion that "All utterances are metaphorical." At least no closer than we are to having established that "All utterances are true."

For what Danto has shown is that inasmuch as there are experiences, each of which may be highly individual, what is, according to Nietzsche, not simply an individual experience, whatever is agreed to as a common experience, is what we call "truth".

Danto suggests that Nietzsche shares some epistemological points in this connection with Kant. Particularly the suspicion that human knowledge never encompasses the thing-in-itself. It is

41 Ibid., p. 38.
in this way that attempts at description of Reality are destined to always be illusory, Danto outlines the Nietzsche-Kant differences as well: 1) that Nietzsche does not maintain one invariant set of concepts for humans and 2) that Nietzsche holds that some of our experiences might not fit the scheme with which we work. Here again Nietzsche's interest, if Danto is correct, is in the relation between the individual experience and common experiences. Danto identifies, for both Kant and Nietzsche, the language we use with our conceptual frameworks (the categories).

There are paragraphs that intervene between these discussions but they are of little significance in establishing that Nietzsche held that "All utterances are metaphorical." What they do show is that Nietzsche was interested in the possibility of deviance from a group and whether such deviant experience could be expressed in language.

Danto concludes from that discussion that Nietzsche's philosophical cornerstone can be expressed in the principle "All utterances are metaphorical." Danto begins his critical discussion of the epistemological issues just outlined with the following:

It is not difficult to be critical of this account. For one thing it might be readily objected that the claim that every sentence is metaphorical verges on meaninglessness.

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42 Ibid., p. 40.
43 Ibid., p. 43.
That introduction indicates that Danto has construed Nietzsche's two contentions (if that isn't the wrong term for his views): 1) all uses of language are descriptions of illusions and 2) the deviant experience may not be easily expressed in a shared language as being equivalent to the claim "All utterances are metaphorical."

But what Danto argued does not at all establish that Nietzsche did say that, or that he is committed to it. Quite the contrary. What Nietzsche was quoted as saying about "metaphor" in this regard suggests that he does distinguish metaphoric utterances from scientific claims or sense descriptions. His grounds for the distinction are not standard but he is not without making those distinctions.

Furthermore, the sense in which Danto portrays Nietzsche as understanding metaphor is a sense in which the serious worry for Nietzsche is whether or not there could be any metaphoric utterances, not, the sense in he would assert "All utterances are metaphorical." The slogan which Danto criticizes does not seem to be one which he has shown Nietzsche to hold. If Danto has not established that it is correct to ascribe to Nietzsche the principle that "All utterances are metaphorical" as it seems he has not, then premise A-1 and its errant translation into B-1 do not hold hence the conclusions to both arguments A and B are not shown. If as I have just argued, Danto had in fact shown that Nietzsche would have held such a principle to be false then it is even more clearly evident that the conclusions to arguments A and B have not been
shown to be true. 144

B. Danto's unsatisfactory attempts  
at definition of "metaphor"

Even if we were to assume the truth of A-1 and B-1 the arguments  
still seem to be problematic. There is a decidedly Nietzschean  
sound about the principle "All utterances are metaphorical."  
Nietzsche might have believed it. The interpretation of the prin­  
ciple would be crucial in that case. A large measure of confusion  
in Danto's consideration of Nietzsche flows from an indecisiveness  
on Danto's part about which definition of metaphor he will employ.  
There are two aspects to this difficulty: 1) Danto mentions but  
seems to ignore one definition of "metaphor" which he cites from  
Nietzsche, and 2) Danto attempts three definitions of metaphor the  
results of which are that if any one is an adequate characterization  
of Nietzsche's definition that would result in Nietzsche's holding  
either an extremely odd or vague view of metaphor, in fact a view  
which would by Danto's arguments be untenable.

Danto does mention a definition of "metaphor" which he attributes  
to Nietzsche. It does not appear that Danto is seriously interested  
in this definition, for he quickly returns to the interpretation  
of metaphorical utterances as not literally true (his own preferred

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144 I am allowing for the time being that the arguments are  
valid, that B is a correctly inferred argument from A and hence  
showing a premise not to be evidently true shows only that the  
conclusion has not been demonstrated. Eventually I will argue  
that B is not a correctly inferred argument from A.
sense of the word). Danto refers to a definition of "metaphor" not "metaphorical utterance" or "metaphorical sentence." Nietzsche's definition, then, as cited by Danto is "that a metaphor is but a concrete image used in place of a concept." 45 and then proceeds, apparently in his (Danto's) own view, with "metaphorical thinking is nonconceptual thinking". 46 Not much is made of this by Danto and it is mentioned here only to indicate what should have been Danto's understanding of Nietzsche's own construal of "metaphor." In contrast to what Danto cites as Nietzsche's definition of metaphor are the three definitions of metaphorical utterances which I mentioned that Danto considers: 1) "some sentences, deviant under a given scheme, are metaphorical relative to sentences which are standard under that very scheme.", 2) "if we do not have some sentences to be counted as straight declarative utterances with which to contrast others (by plain semantic criteria and grammatical rule) as metaphorical, it is difficult to see what we any longer can mean by metaphor at all.", and 3) "Metaphors are sentences which, at the very least, are never literally true." 47

No one of these definitions is Nietzsche's own definition of metaphor. Danto does not argue for the equivalence of any one or the whole set to Nietzsche's definition. Furthermore, if these were

45 Danto, op.cit., p. 44. Nietzsche quotation from The Birth of Tragedy.

46 Danto, op.cit., p. 44.

47 Ibid., p. 43.
Nietzsche's definitions and he had the principle "All utterances are metaphorical" it seems his philosophy would have been destined for rocky shores, or at least muddy waters. Finally, Danto ought to have hesitated given the sheer implausibility of at least the first two definitions.

A metaphorical utterance is "deviant under a given scheme." The consequence of this definition and the principle in question is that "if every sentence is metaphorical, each sentence is deviant, which is absurd."^[48]

The criticism seems tidy but a serious confusion attends it. What is a standard sentence? Two alternatives present themselves, neither of which is satisfactory. First, Danto could have taken deviance or standardness to be a matter of syntax or grammatical form. Sentences, then, of a certain grammatical form would be standards; other sentences, would not have that grammatical form and hence would be metaphorical sentences. This alternative is simply implausible since it makes 'metaphorical sentence' a grammatical classification, presumably one on par with question, statement, exclamation and so on. The second alternative is to construe metaphorical utterance not as a classification of sentences per se but of sentences uttered in given contexts. A metaphorical utterance would be one such that it is clear that under the prevailing circumstances it is customary to say such and so. For example it

^[48] Ibid.
might be quite standard to say of a given individual "She won't take shit from anyone" but the frequency with which this is said of someone does not in and of itself make the expression non-metaphorical. The conditions which are the context for a standard may be extremely hard to establish. Assuming that the notion did make sense one might well wonder whether there are such things as purely standard sentences at all. Degrees of standardness and non-standardness might make sense. That idea however would not differ from the implications of Nietzsche's own comments on truth and art. Degrees of standardness do not require the existence of instances of standard sentences in a pure form. Hence Danto would not have shown on this definition that "All utterances are metaphorical" is false. That is, he would not have shown that there had to be sentences which were purely "standard".

A metaphorical utterances is one which is non-declarative as determined by "plain semantic criteria and grammatical rule" and regarding this definition, Danto's argument is that we must have some declarative utterances which are straightforwardly so or "it is difficult to see what we any longer can mean by metaphor at all." Here again one must object that metaphors are not grammatical classifications. Furthermore, it is not clear that "plain semantic criteria and grammatical rule" could be determined such that we could

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49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.
establish that there are simple declarative utterances. Establishing that there had to be simple declarative utterances is a still different endeavor. Perhaps Danto has in mind that since "metaphorical sentence" is being defined as the opposite of simple declarative utterance, the term would not mean anything if we didn't know what "simple declarative utterance" meant. That we must know what "simple declarative utterance" means does not establish that they must exist. All that is necessary for "metaphorical utterance" to make sense is for us to know what "simple declarative utterance" means. Whether there must be such entities is not shown by the interdependency of their definitions. That we know what "simple declarative utterance" means does not, therefore, demonstrate that "all utterances are metaphorical" must be or is false. Danto makes precisely the same kind of inference in a later argument when he rejects the idea (again a purported Nietzschean doctrine) that "Everything is art." Danto restricts this principle in the same way. "To speak of everyone as an artist, and everything made by me as an artwork, is to stretch this concept to the point of ultimate debasement."5

Danto further says, of Nietzsche's use of "art" and "metaphor":

The purpose of this flagrant usage (which is metaphorical) is to demolish barriers, to emphasize similarities that had been overlooked, and, more important, to draw attention to the real nature of the activity or thing which was typically contrasted with the activity or thing it is now said to be.

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5 Ibid., p. [41]
Meanwhile it presupposes the precise concept which is under attack.\textsuperscript{52}

So Danto is arguing not a special case for linguistic entities, but it seems that for him for a much wider class of entities, knowing what they mean is knowing that the thing to which they refer exists.

Much more could be said of this particular argument against "All utterances are metaphorical." One last suggestion will close the issue, however. The premise that knowing what words mean is knowing that the entity to which they refer exists drags in a complete theory of language which is antithetical to the one which Danto appeared to be arguing that Nietzsche was committed to. If that is the case then Nietzsche is being shown to be mistaken, self-contradictory and wrong only under the assumption of a different philosophical machinery from the one which he presumably accepts. To argue against Nietzsche in that way is tantamount to arguing that with one hand tied behind my back I may assert a Platonic theory of meaning and thus refute Wittgenstein!

"Metaphors are sentences which, at the very least, are never literally true..."\textsuperscript{53} From this definition it follows that: "To say that all sentences are metaphorical entails that the thesis itself is metaphorical, hence not literally true, hence literally false. So, if he is right, he is wrong."\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{52}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 45.

\textsuperscript{53}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 43.

\textsuperscript{54}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 44.
My answers to this line of argument are first with regard to the literal falsity of metaphors and second with regard to Nietzsche's theory of truth in general. The most immediately troublesome point in Danto's argument here is the inference from not literally true to literally false. The inference is legitimate for that class of sentences which are assertional and not for those which are not. To put it another way, metaphorical utterances, as opposed to declarative utterances, do not support the inference from not literally true to literally false. In some linguistic activities the matter of truth simply does not arise or, if it does, it does so unhelpfully.

Secondly, it seems that a resolution to this supposed paradox is implicit in what Nietzsche's theory of truth is, according to Danto. It must be said that Danto sees Nietzsche as holding that the significant measure of the adequacy of a language is "only whether our language allows us to get on in life, and if it does this, little more can be demanded of it. The demand that in addition it be literally true is a philosophical not a realistic or practical demand." According to Danto, Nietzsche would quite comfortably accept the consequence that his own utterances, even the claim that all utterances are metaphorical, are literally false. Nietzsche's awareness was alert to the limitations which the language he used placed upon him and that literal truth, because of these limitations, was unattainable. His utterances no more than anyone else's would

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55 Ibid., p. 43.
be blessed with literal truth. The decisive factor could only be to what extent the language and its metaphorical utterances could assist in living. "Using deviant expressions and deviant ideas, he wrote, to some degree, as an artist; his work, at its best, was an instance as well as a discussion of artistic activity." 56 Danto understands Nietzsche to be employing deviant uses of language which are metaphorical and hence which are artistic uses of language.

If Danto is correct in his contention that Nietzsche rejects the correspondence theory of truth 57 and that the major interest for Nietzsche is whether a given use of language is helpful, or life-supporting, 58 of the normal sense of "true" Nietzsche could only be indifferent to truth on a coherence model. That is to say, if Nietzsche does reject correspondence theory, and shows some affinity for pragmatic theory, he could only shrug off lack of coherence -- that view of falsity that does make sense but doesn't matter. Falsity in the sense of lack of coherence is not an meaningless accu-

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56 Ibid., p. 44.

57 Ibid., pp. 32-33. Danto's argument does not seem to show that Nietzsche rejects the correspondence theory but that if he accepts it, no claims are true.

58 The so-called pragmatic theory of truth has never been clear to me, but when it has been clearest it has seemed incorrectly classified, i.e., not a theory of truth but an index of value.
sation but one that does not wound. Suffice it to say that, rudely put, if truth is construed on the correspondence theory and for Nietzsche there are no facts, there are no true claims, all utterances are false including his own that "all utterances are metaphorical."

On the coherence theory, there may be sentences which are uttered which do not fit with, are not compatible with other sentences, and that these sentences by virtue of not belonging to a system may be said to be false. In this sense "all utterances are metaphorical" may not fit a system of other sentences which cohere and therefore that claim may be false. There may be no Nietzschean system hence none to cohere with, hence no claim could be literally (coheringly) true, hence all claims could be false. Or given that each individual conceptual structure might be said to constitute a system, a given claim could be false relative to any one or number of them, but true, i.e., fitting, for at least one system. However, given the coherence interpretation of truth, the falsity of any one claim or all claims including "all utterances are metaphorical," could not touch Nietzsche. It would be a matter of relative indifference.

59 There are many things which Nietzsche says about the principle of non-contradiction and this issue with regard to the coherence theory as well as the development of philosophical system are of major significance; the matter was discussed in earlier sections on "truth" and "system."
Finally, on the pragmatic theory where falsity is in effect being counterproductive, Nietzsche might well be roused if his claim "all utterances are metaphorical" turned out to be false. One would first have to ask for whom was the utterance unhelpful. Nietzsche's primary if not exclusive responsibility in this regard is to himself, or the so-called philosopher of the future: "My judgment is my judgment; no one else is easily entitled to it."\(^{60}\)

Danto says of Nietzsche in Danto's discussion of truth "He then could ask only that men try his way, and see whether it did not enable them to get on in the world by means of it."\(^{61}\) If metaphorical utterances are utterances which are not truth-functional, except in the pragmatic sense, then the claim "all utterances are metaphorical" is itself metaphorical. And on this understanding of truth it appears that Danto can see what Nietzsche might mean. It is a claim which need not be false (unhelpful) but depending upon the reader it could be.

So if we construe, as Danto seems wont to do, "All utterances are metaphorical" as a denial of the ability of ordinary (non-metaphorical) language to serve in the survival of the individual, then for Nietzsche, if he believes that the unusual experience can be captured even by an extreme treatment of ordinary language, the principle would not be false in the pragmatic sense. That is, if

\(^{60}\)Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 53.

\(^{61}\)Danto, op.cit., p. 44.
Danto believes Nietzsche's fundamental notion of truth is pragmatic, then the truth or falsity of "All utterances are metaphorical (false): is in part shown by the success or failure of attempts for unusual experiences to be communicated. But that it must be false is not demonstrated. Hence premises A-3 and B-3 are not shown to be true and the conclusion of those two arguments, that "Nietzsche's philosophical undertaking, as a statement and expression of that principle must be impossible" is not demonstrated.

C. Assumptions of Danto's "unteachable" and "unintelligible" arguments rejected

Danto turns to two other arguments both of which are intended to establish the impossibility of Nietzsche's philosophical undertaking. Both of these arguments rest upon the idea that Nietzsche believed in and attempted to produce conceptual anarchy, a language which was completely metaphorical. These arguments appear in detail in earlier sections of this chapter, but they can be summarized as follows:

C. 1. We learn language, as children, by ostension. That is how we learn, in a straightforward sense what a "block," "tree," or "teddy bear" is.

2. If we are to learn imaginative (metaphorical) uses of words we must learn their straightforward uses first.

3. No language, if it is to be learned, could be completely metaphorical.

4. If Nietzsche wished to establish a new language which was completely metaphorical he could not teach it.
D. 1. Any new philosophical doctrine is *intelligible* if it can be described in familiar terms.

2. Nietzsche's philosophical theory required a new language.

3. If Nietzsche's philosophical theory is to be intelligible it must be described in familiar terms.

4. In order to translate a new theory into familiar terms the concepts must be defined by ostension.

5. Nietzsche's metaphysics disallows ostension.

6. Nietzsche's philosophical theory must be unintelligible.

Danto extends argument C to the claim that from it we may infer that the first use of language could not have been metaphorical.

This conclusion is strange given that Danto recognizes that the first use of language could hardly be said to be "standard" either.

If the point of calling a language use metaphorical is to contrast it with standard uses, from the perspective of the first language users, there is no reason to claim their language was either metaphorical or standard. If one thinks of Wittgenstein's "slab-block" language game one can equally well see that the use of language from its inception need not be declarative nor literally true -- the other two contrasts Danto gives to metaphorical.

It is because Danto assumes that the normal use of language is declarative and literally descriptive that he assumes that we can only learn language by ostension. If the only meaning a word can have is its referent then the only way to learn a language is by ostension. The reference theory of meaning is one which is
opposed by the more recent developments in language analysis in its very assumptions. Danto, having argued that Nietzsche anticipates the contemporary developments in linguistic analysis, criticizes some aspects of Nietzsche's view by assuming the necessity of ostension for learning language. That assumption is one which does not fit the view which Danto imputes to Nietzsche. So Danto's two arguments C and D require assumptions about language which are denied by the theory Danto argues that Nietzsche is in sympathy with. No matter who is right in the major dispute about the referential or non-referential theory of meaning, clearly Danto is operating at cross purposes in Nietzsche interpretation in this regard.

The reliance on the requirement of ostension is a key premise in argument D. Here again it is not convincing to argue that a new language is not possible on the basis of the necessity of ostension for definition of terms and translation rules. Since it is not at all obvious that the language which we ordinarily speak is learned by way of ostension, at least it is not exclusively learned by way of ostension, it does not seem necessary that translation rules be based exclusively on ostension. Furthermore, it is not shown that we cannot, without ostension for the translation of each term, comprehend a new term. Our familiar language and a new language need not be isomorphic for us to learn the new language. Danto's own insistence that Übermensch cannot be comfortably translated serves as an example of a situation where we are called upon to learn a
new term, though not by ostension. This, of course, does not establish that a whole new language could be learned without some reliance upon ostension but it does appear to show that a significant number of new concepts could be introduced without the need for ostension. Danto did not demonstrate that Nietzsche had to introduce a complete new language. He suggests that Nietzsche must do this but does not provide a proof for the point. What Danto says on the subject is in the vein of the following:

Man has not the language with which to express his uniqueness nor the individuality of his thought. Literally, he cannot, if he is in the least degree out of the ordinary, say what he thinks or feels. Nietzsche must then himself have felt constrained, through the logic of his position, to develop new terms to give odd and special twists of meaning to old terms, to warp common speech or to hammer out a whole new tongue. Any attempt to translate it all back into the mother idiom, into the language of the ordinary person, would be to cheapen and make banal his eccentric ideas.52

The case which Danto made was even stronger than the one just quoted. It is not just that Nietzsche would degrade his thoughts by expressing them. Furthermore it is not just that one could not learn what Nietzsche was saying (if the reference theory of meaning is correct and ostension is necessary). Argument D maintains that Nietzsche, if he believed in or attempted to originate a wholly new and metaphorical language could only believe that to be possible by ignoring his own metaphysical doctrine that there are no things,

52Ibid., p. 123. This section seems to be a loose description of the positing of technical terminology not an esoteric program for a new impossible language.
no facts, just a "primal undifferentiated Ur-Ein, a Dionysiac depth." Danto's argument must simply stated, then, is that Nietzsche could not consistently believe both that "All utterances are metaphorical" and that there are no facts. He could not consistently believe those two things either if it is true that ostension is required for learning language or if he believed ostension is required for learning language. Danto is arguing that the doctrine "All utterances are metaphorical" is not logically consistent with the doctrine that there are no facts.

If we understand Danto to be saying that what Nietzsche does with language is inconsistent with the metaphysics he asserts, we may notice that there is no reason to assume that the apparent assertion "There are no facts" is any more of a literal metaphysical proposition than is any other Nietzschean utterance. Indeed, if Nietzsche's utterances are not literal assertions, or not primarily literal assertions, it cannot be assumed that "There are no facts" is a literal assertion.

Furthermore, a point should be mentioned which is so tied to such a variety of other aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy and Danto's interpretation of it that it can only be made as a promising suggestion. Untangling the interconnections might well require another chapter or so on Danto alone and that is not the major interest of this dissertation. When Danto requires ostension for

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63Danto, op.cit., p. 97.
the learning of language are we to take this to mean pointing at physical objects, physical properties, situations, facts, characteristics of situations or facts? What must one be able to point to for the theory to be satisfied? Now, thinking of these considerations, in what sense does Nietzsche deny (if he does deny) the existence of facts, of things, of impersonal reality? Are there not even drives or needs or thoughts or experiences for Nietzsche? Danto seemed to suggest there were those kinds of things for Nietzsche in his interpretation of Nietzsche as an errant Idealist. If there are some "things" in Nietzsche's metaphysics, perhaps a loose sense of "things", are they "things" to which we could not point? Could one individual not point to the entity to be named by a new word, or an old word being given new meaning, in this process? Here we arrive at a point where the possibility of naming private experiences becomes crucial. Though Danto argues that Nietzsche anticipates the private language argument, it is not clear that he does. At this point the issue becomes even more complex, to interpret Wittgenstein's private language argument would require not just another chapter but more. And that is not my task either. Suffice it to say that Danto does not seem to convict Nietzsche of inconsistency in this matter. At least a lot of questions remain to be answered first.
D. The two senses in which Danto suggests Nietzsche anticipated contemporary analytic philosophy: What is shown; What is asserted as doctrine

What continues to emerge throughout these criticisms is that Danto only appears to be treating Nietzsche's philosophy in terms of contemporary analytic concerns -- at least those contemporary analytic positions associated with the views of Austin, Wittgenstein and Strawson, the names that he invokes in this connection. What needs to be done to examine the shimmer of contemporary analytic philosophy which Danto attempts to impart to these discussions is to separate it into two perspectives: 1) the way in which what Nietzsche does with his language anticipates what contemporary views argue needs to be done, and 2) the way in which Nietzsche's doctrines are like those of Russell, Austin, Wittgenstein and Strawson.

First we can see what Nietzsche shows of contemporary analytic philosophy by his utterances. Danto does imply that Nietzsche's use of language is a means of our freedom from our conceptual frameworks. Despite this apparent appreciation for the very style or method Nietzsche employs, Danto nevertheless also seems to refuse to accept its legitimacy. Danto argues that conceptual permissiveness is the key to bringing about the result Nietzsche intends but he rejects the method in its application. Some standard other than the accomplishment of a presumably worthy goal must be waiting in the wings. One finds Danto writing:
...although he likely was not always aware that he was doing so [dilating then circumscribing the meaning of a word], and was at times as misled by what he wrote as his puzzled readers must have been.\textsuperscript{64}

His language would have been less colorful had he known what he was trying to say, but then he would not have been the original thinker he was, working through a set of problems which had hardly ever been charted before. Small wonder his maps are illustrated, so to speak, with all sorts of monsters and fearful indications and boastful cartographic embellishments!\textsuperscript{65}

What is confusing about these comments is that Danto seemed to be holding that the very style of Nietzsche's work was somehow essentially related to his philosophical task, \textit{i.e.}, the freeing up of conceptual structures for new thoughts. These comments on language, however, suggest that the language Nietzsche used was rather in conflict with his philosophical task. At the close of the long paragraph describing conceptual permissiveness, distortions, violent chemistry of linguistic incongruities, etc., Danto said "It is for this that he is entitled to be called a philosopher."\textsuperscript{67}

And yet he opens the next paragraph with:

\textsuperscript{64}Ibid., p. 12.

\textsuperscript{65}Ibid., pp. 13-14.

\textsuperscript{66}I am not for the time being distinguishing between style, mode, method or use of language. They are not intended to refer to simply superficial characteristics.

\textsuperscript{67}Danto, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 12.
Nietzsche was more than a critic of concepts and a word tormenting anarchist. He tried to construct a philosophy consistent with the extraordinary openness he felt was available to man, or at least a philosophy that would entail this openness as one of its consequences.

Danto shifts in these few passages to the real interest of his analysis of Nietzsche's work. Beneath the confusion and distractions of what Nietzsche actually wrote lies a systematic, analytic philosophy which Danto plans to uncover. Unlike those who have interpreted Nietzsche's work exclusively in the light of biographical events, Danto treats Nietzsche in a way that will reveal implicit arguments which will be acceptable to contemporary analytic philosophers. He says:

For this reason I have written a book which treats of Nietzsche merely as a philosopher, whose thought merits examination on its own, independent of the strange personality and the special cultural circumstances of its author...

Nietzsche has seldom been treated as a philosopher at all, and never, I think, from the perspective, which he shared to some degree, of contemporary analytical philosophy...However, because we know a good deal more philosophy today, I believe it is exceedingly useful to see his analyses in terms of logical features which he was unable to make explicit, but toward which he was unmistakably groping.

I do not wish to disparage Danto's undertaking. There are in Nietzsche's writings philosophically sophisticated claims and

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69 Ibid., p. 13.
arguments which appear only implicitly. Furthermore it seems quite reasonable to show what is shared between these claims and arguments and those of contemporary analytic philosophers who so often even refuse to read Nietzsche's works or dismiss them with "I can't make any sense out of them whatsoever." However, there is a fine line between analysis/interpretation on the one hand and apologetics on the other. The suggestions in Danto's view that Nietzsche intended to affect a change in his readers, i.e., that he could best be understood as doing something, were most promising. Those suggestions were replaced too quickly by the more traditional question "What did he state?" It is more refined to seek what Nietzsche stated implicitly than explicitly, but I will contend it is still more correct to seek what Nietzsche did.

The overall thrust of Danto's analysis is in the attempt to explicate the philosophical arguments and claims which seem to him to be buried beneath the surface, i.e., embedded in and veiled by what Nietzsche actually wrote. Danto argues that Nietzsche's philosophical views are within the mainstream of a tradition that goes back to Socrates and continues through to anticipations of Russell, Wittgenstein, Austin and Strawson. Danto says

Language aside, then, Nietzsche hardly deviated from the tradition which goes back at least to Socrates... He might have said what he meant more plainly and with less conflagrating language. He was too self-indulgent and too self-dramatizing in...
representing to himself the difficulty of his thought. 70

Danto suggests that Nietzsche precedes Russell in the idea that there is little difference between claims of sense, claims of science and works of art. No one of the three has a stronger claim, to truth presumably in Nietzsche's view, than does another. All of these modes of apprehension and interpretation are illusions. Danto likens Nietzsche's position to that of Russell as follows:

Nietzsche's reasons for these highly skeptical conclusions consist in certain epistemological analyses, rather like those often urged later by Bertrand Russell, according to which our perceptions are said to resemble their causes, so that the language we employ, learned in connection with the having of perceptions does not describe the world as it really is. 71

One might argue that this position while it could correctly be ascribed to Nietzsche and to Russell is so generally put as to not adequately distinguish them from most other philosophies.

In connection with Nietzsche's "philosophical psychology," Danto observes that Nietzsche analyzes the mental concept of "will" with a thoroughness and precision which mental concepts do not again receive until Wittgenstein. Danto says:

There is, I think fair to say, little in the preceeding literature of philosophical psychology to match it, either in penetration or in refinement, and it is only since the

70 Ibid., pp. 149-150.

71 Ibid., p. 38.
epochal work of Wittgenstein that philosophers
have come at all near to analyzing mental con­
cepts with a comparable finesse.\footnote{Ibid., p. 114.}

Danto obviously has in mind the sort of discussion of "understanding,"
for example, which Wittgenstein conducts in the Philosophical Invest­
igations. The brilliance and revolutionary attempts of each are in­
deed strikingly similar. But this is just to say that as major philo­
sophers, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein can be compared. Again one would
have to show how other major philosophers were not also to be in­
cluded. Hume's analysis of our concept of "cause" seems in the same
league. Does Danto want to say that Hume therefore must be seen as
a predecessor of contemporary analytic philosophy? There is an un­
interesting sense in which all past philosophy anticipates contem­
porary philosophy. Danto would need to show more of the relation
as regards Nietzsche for this kind of observation to be more than
loosely suggestive.

Finally, in this regard, Danto alludes over three pages to the
similarities between Nietzsche on thought and language as to their
private and public nature and the arguments of Austin, Wittgenstein,
and Strawson on the same subject. As to Austin, Danto compares
Nietzsche to him by way of two quotations; first Austin then
Nietzsche.

Our common stock of words embodies all the dis­
tinctions man have found worth drawing, and the
connections they have found worth making, in
the lifetimes of many generations. 73

My motion is that consciousness does not belong
to the individual existence of men, but to what
is the community - and herd - nature...and con­
sequently that each of us, with the best will in
the world of understanding himself as individually
as possible, of "knowing himself," will always bring
into consciousness the nonindividual and the average...
Our thought is always translated back into the
perspective of the herd. 74

In addition to the important fact that this particular quotation
from Nietzsche does not say anything at all about language, there
is as well the significant divergence between the two philosophers
on the value of the ordinary (herd) language. One emphasizes that
it is the given of philosophical analysis, 75 the other, by Danto's
own admission, resists and violates that which is ordinary. Danto
makes this point eventually 76 so it is hard to see wherein lies
the Austin-Nietzsche similarity as Danto conceives it.

73 Ibid., p. 121. Danto quoting J. L. Austin's "A Plea for
Excuses."

74 Danto, op.cit., p. 121. Danto quoting Nietzsche's Joyful
Wisdom.

75 This is a simplification of Austin's as well as Wittgenstein's
and other ordinary language philosophers' methodology and assump­
tions. When one sees the method in progress it becomes clear that
what the ordinary man-in-the-street "would say" pales dramatically
in relation to what the precise, articulate philosopher "would say."
Austin says it is a place to begin much as Moore puts forth the
touchstone of common sense beliefs. This comment is not to cast
aspersions on the view, simply to note it isn't what it may be
thought to be because of its name.

76 Danto, op.cit., p. 123.
This particular position -- that our language and hence our thought is public -- is extended by Danto to liken Nietzsche's views to Wittgenstein's famous (though difficult) "private language argument." Danto says:

Nietzsche's point is that unless I am understood, I could not survive, and if I survive, I do so on the same terms as others, for my words will have had to be understood by them. This is logically little different from the account given of the possibility of private language languages in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, which has been the basis for so much contemporary discussion.77

Danto's only justification for this apparently strained analogy is that he thinks it is "logically little different" from the so-called private language argument. There is nothing further said to substantiate it. But the private language argument does not appeal to the survival of the individual. One could say that it is addressed to the "survival" of a word but that would be stretching a point.

77 Ibid., pp. 121-122. George A. Morgan in his What Nietzsche Means (New York: Harper & Row, 1941, 1965), p. 15, cites and translates a passage from Nietzsche which would appear to directly oppose the private language argument:

One finds out at last that people mean, feel, scent, wish different things in the same words...

This is said in order to explain why it is difficult to understand such writings as mine: with me inner experiences, valuations and needs are otherwise. For years I have had intercourse with men and pressed self-denial and courtesy so far as never to speak of things close to my heart. Indeed, I have lived almost only so with men. [Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Werke, XIV, 1882-1888, Gross-oktav Ausgabe, p. 411ff]
In any event the similarity is not at all evidenced in Danto's discussion.

The quotation above continues, without intervening comments with the following point intended to establish that Strawson is as well foreshadowed by Nietzsche:

It strikingly resembles the conclusions reached by P. F. Strawson. So much so that I must cite the following passage from Strawson's book on descriptive metaphysics:

There would be no question of ascribing one's own states of consciousness, or experiences, to anything unless one also ascribed, or were ready and able to ascribe, states of consciousness, or experiences, to others of the same logical type as that thing to which one ascribes one's own states of consciousness. The condition of reckoning oneself as a subject of such predicates is that one should also reckon others as subjects of such predicates...If only mine, then not mine at all.78

It is not at all apparent in what way this passage from Strawson relates to Nietzsche's views. There may be crucial and startling similarities but whatever they are Danto does not bring them out. He offers only this before going on to Nietzsche's resistance to ordinary language:

It is as Nietzsche put it, "our relationship with the outer world which has developed our consciousness." It is philosophically disingenuous to raise doubts about the external world on the basis of consciousness and our purported intimate relationship with, and yet epistemologically superior access to, our own states of mind.79

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78 Danto, op.cit., p. 122. Strawson as quoted by Danto.

79 Danto, op.cit., p. 122.
That is all one can find openly presented to establish Nietzsche's anticipation of contemporary analytic philosophy. Two lines of argument: Nietzsche attempts to alter our thinking while demonstrating the conventionality of language and Nietzsche entertains doctrines eventually held by contemporary analytic philosophers. These two lines have given Nietzsche an air of respectability but it does not seem that the arguments stand up well under close scrutiny.

E. Conflict between Danto's two lines of interpretation

The critical posture which Danto assumes relative to Nietzsche's language is in fundamental conflict with his apparent grasp of the variety of tasks which Nietzsche seemed to have undertaken and the appropriateness of non-declarative modes to those tasks.

He perhaps would have justified his language by saying that the ancients did not have the puritans to attack...Nietzsche was interested in breaking through to a new metaphysics and a new morality, and he believed that this could be effected only through modifications in our emotional life and release within us of the "life-conditioning affects."\(^80\)

If Nietzsche's intent was to produce the needed "modifications in our emotional life" it is odd that Danto would recognize that significance of the language then immediately criticize the language as being conflagrated, indulgent and dramatizing. This ambivalence about Nietzsche's language appears in other sections as well.

\(^80\) Ibid., p. 149.
In the chapter on "Perspectivism," Danto notes in connection with a discussion of Nietzsche's notion of eternal recurrence that the chief problem in philosophy, as he saw it, was not to try to provide solutions to the questions that have divided philosophers down the ages (for which the main positions are known) but rather to show how these quarrels might have arisen. Once this is clear, it no longer seems interesting or important to try to solve the problem on its own terms. To Nietzsche a philosophical problem is a question not to be answered but to be overcome; it is through science, especially the science he believed himself to have developed, that this is to be done.

This antimetaphysical, protoscientific, therapeutic view of philosophy has a decidedly contemporary ring to it (i.e., the contemporary philosophy of but a few years ago), however little Nietzsche himself may have contributed to these recent attitudes.

The adequacy of this science is in terms of how it "overcomes" the usual battery of philosophical questions, not how it answers them. Oddly enough Kaufmann makes use of the same idea, that of "overcoming" philosophical problems, in describing Nietzsche's method but neither Kaufmann nor Danto accepts the consequence that such philosophical activity may not be assertional at base.

Danto continues his consideration of this special sense of science by pointing out that it is not to be judged by standard scientific criteria nor by aesthetic criteria of success.

The criterion was always and only whether any of the structures which science exemplified enhanced and facilitated life. More than this, he [Nietzsche] felt, one could not claim, and more than this one should not need. To demand that science be true is

81 Ibid., p. 70.
to expose oneself to question whether "truth" means anything more than the facilitation of life...
It is always healthy, he thought, to remind ourselves that our ideas are arbitrary structurings of chaos, and the question is not whether they are true but whether we should believe them and why...82

So Danto describes Nietzsche's writings as instances of this special sense of science in cognizance of the fact that for this special sense of science, the rules for evaluation are not, as far as Nietzsche was concerned, a matter of truth or falsity.

Other types of linguistic activity which Danto attributes to Nietzsche's writings include cracking linguistic habits, doubting knowledge, divesting us of our fear of passions, diagnosing, coming to combat, insulting, offering a new faith, illustrating, and issuing a call to creativity.83 A substantial portion of these linguistic activities do not clearly stand as assertional themselves nor analyze down to a dependence upon claims, though there may very well be conditions under which they are appropriate, well-advised, felicitous, or "life-enhancing."

While it is clear that Danto understands Nietzsche to be undertaking certain philosophical tasks which in the context of contemporary analytic philosophy can be appreciated as legitimate therapeutic tasks and while Danto explicitly states that these therapeutic tasks may indeed require certain uses of language which are

82 Ibid., p. 72.

83 Extended footnote on following page.
A) cracking linguistic habits:
Nietzsche never sought for a new language although I believe sometimes that his frenzied employment of poetic diction, his intentionally paradoxical utterances, and his deliberately perverted use of terms might be taken in the spirit of the Zen koan, calculated to crack the shell which linguistic habit has erected between ourselves and reality and to expose us to open seas. (Ibid., p. 97)

b) doubting knowledge:
Thus his task was to doubt knowledge, to put our perspective in perspective, to ask whether there were not better possibilities open to us. But then this exposes us precisely to the chaos which our conceptual scheme has shielded us against; ... (Ibid., p. 124)

c) divesting us of our fear of passions:
Nietzsche saw it as his specific task "to divest the passions of their fearful reputation and (at the same time) to prevent them from becoming dominating torrents, to convert passions (Leidenschaften) into joys" (Freudenschaften).
(Nietzsche: The Wanderer and His Shadow, section 37, as quoted by Danto, op. cit., p. 148)

d) diagnosing, coming to combat and insultin:
This invective appears more frequently in the later writings... It is almost as though the work of diagnosis were over, the time having now come for combat...He who has followed this volume though will easily enough detect the thoughts behind the screen of insult... (Danto, op. cit., p. 182)

e) offering a new faith:
These may be seen merely as the words of incipient madness or as blows struck in the name of humanity. Or as both. The matter is sane if the style is beyond the permissible limits of manic utterance. He was, however, speaking as a prophet, and, as he tells us at the end of one discussion in the Genealogy, the raising of an altar demands the breaking of an altar. He was offering what he regarded as a new and liberating faith in place of an old and truncating one. (Ibid., p. 183)

f) illustrating:
Yet it is almost as if certain words release in him a spring of covert hostility, and when this happens, we get an illustration which blackly accompanies his text, almost as a verbal equivalent of a German woodcut, giving a particularity to his thought it neither demands nor requires. (Ibid., p. 184)

g) issuing a call to creativity:
This cannot be read as an appeal to return to the instinctual swamplands of the primitive psyche. It is a call to creativity, to new structures and to fresh ideals, in the light of which we might make ourselves over in an image of our own. God being dead, there is no reason to cringe in the corner of an unreal guilt. And let not something else take the place of this god, to make us feel humble and insignificant. The guilt is unreal, but so is everything. Let us will our way. (Ibid., p. 194)
outside the scope of typical philosophical discourse, he nevertheless repeatedly insists upon 1.) arguing against the truth of certain utterances despite having identified them (in effect) as non-truth-functional (in a correspondence sense), 2.) arguing that the task must be impossible because of the limits of our language and 3.) divorcing discussions of the "philosophy" from the language. The first and second of these indiscretions seems to have been rather thoroughly illustrated. The third will draw our immediate attention.

As a result of Danto's worry that Nietzsche's new language is not feasible and despite his frequent observation of the appropriateness of certain linguistic modes for Nietzsche's philosophical tasks, Danto attempts to divorce the consideration of Nietzsche's language from his philosophy. In his chapter on "moralties," to consider just one, Danto evidenced a distinctly unsympathetic response to Nietzsche's language:

"...we must say a few words regarding what were his beliefs in contrast with what I shall call the rhetoric he lapsed into when expressing them. His rhetoric must be conceded as inflammatory; So must his beliefs. But there was a considerable difference between them."

He is, as usual, employing language whose power is so in excess of the point he wishes to make that it drives him past his message into bordering conceptual territory. Yet he seems to have felt that unless he used excessive language, he could not reach his point at all.
Language aside, then, Nietzsche hardly deviated from the tradition which goes back at least to Socrates.\(^\text{86}\)

It is not difficult to see how readers who feel themselves to be superior persons should have found Nietzsche to be their philosopher, especially if they also felt that their superiority was unrecognized or without appreciation. Finally, this was Nietzsche's own situation, accounting perhaps as much as anything else for the ascending violence of his prose, for the increasing nastiness of his imagery and illustrations. He could have retained the same analysis with a far less Guignolesque rhetoric (after all, we find it already in his early books) and with a far wider and more humane application, for, as I have suggested and hope to show, it belongs to a broad and general theory indeed. But his isolation and vanity conspired, I believe, to confirm him in a style of writing and a pitch of shrill invective which seems, often, to be a despairing threat. In a way he declared war on society, as though he were misled by his own imagery into believing that only in time of war is the superior person whom in violation of his own theory he narrowly identified as the soldier -- honored and recognized as such. But this is a digression.\(^\text{87}\)

From the preface to the final chapters of his analysis of Nietzsche's writing, Danto has assumed that Nietzsche's language disguised his philosophical system. From beginning to end, Danto has argued that the language which Nietzsche needed was impossible. At its very core, Danto's analysis rests on the conviction that the use of language in philosophical enterprise if it is to be meaningful must be truth-functional. And if the language of a philosopher

\(^{86}\text{Ibid., p. 149.}\)

\(^{87}\text{Ibid., pp. 154-155.}\)
for whom one has respect seems not to be truth-functional that language must be ignored so that the philosophical system, which one believes to be buried among the invectives, illustrations and poetry, can be carved out.

What strikes one as unfortunate about this conflict is that Danto is often at odds with himself as to whether to attempt to analyze the linguistic activity of a given Nietzschean passage or to assess its implicit or explicit doctrines. Danto does succeed in bringing Nietzsche into the arena of contemporary discourse. He does to a certain extent focus our attention on the right concerns and the right questions. One could, of course, consider this line of interpretation to be just window-dressing for Danto's more sincere intent, the refutation of Nietzsche's philosophy. But there are many sections in Danto's commentary where he seems attuned to the fundamental methodological worries about interpreting Nietzsche.

Even the three definitions of metaphorical utterances which Danto employed all seem in one way or another to suggest a rich and enlightened reading of Nietzsche given that Danto admits that Nietzsche's own utterances are metaphorical. Not only is it the consequence of the claim that "all utterances are metaphorical" that Nietzsche's utterances are as well. It just seems to Danto to be a correct characterization of Nietzsche's writing. At least sometimes he speaks this way and here Danto is at his best. Following his own interpretations of "metaphorical utterances" we can say of Nietzsche's writings that it was, when it was most
brilliant, non-standard, deviant, non-declarative and not literally true. Danto understands that Nietzsche's language was directed to its effects not its correlation to facts. The insight is an extraordinary one, but Danto does not, as we have seen, take himself at his own word.
Jaspers' Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity first appeared in German in 1935 but its English translation by Walraff and Schmitz was not available until 1965. Since Jaspers was a proponent of a philosophical perspective known as Existenzphilosophie his commentary must be read in the light of the fact that he does have a doctrine of his own which may work on Nietzsche's writings. This chapter will not attempt to explicate Jaspers' own philosophy since that in itself would be another major task beyond the one immediately at hand. With this caveat in mind, readers may wish to further explore Jaspers' philosophy to determine what of the commentary reflects Nietzsche and what is Jaspers' dream for Nietzsche. To an extent, Jaspers does not believe that an impersonal presentation of Nietzsche is to be strained after. Jaspers suggests this in several places in his introductory remarks on interpretation.

No one will envisage the quiteessential in Nietzsche unless he achieves it himself.¹

...the true interpretation is a means to the possibility of self-involvement.²

Instead of merely dealing with the philosophical, literary, and biographical material produced by Nietzsche, instead of knowing him as just another person, we would enter into the movement of the authentic Nietzsche.³

2. The distinction held by Jaspers and Nietzsche between philosophical truth and scientific knowledge

A. The relation between truth, language and communicability

The basis for an understanding of Nietzsche, according to Jaspers, is in a distinction between philosophical truth and scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge is acquaintance with truth which allows of sharing. What is scientifically true can be grasped by each and his neighbor. In the sense of scientific truth, truth is public and indifferent to the individuality of those who seek it. In contrast, philosophical truth is a form of "self-realization," "an awakening takes place, and I discover myself as a result of the very way in which I discover being."⁴

In a section of the "Introduction," called "The Dependence of Understanding on the Nature of the Interpreter," Jaspers admits that interpretation is not an objective, impersonal activity. He says:

²Ibid., p. 6.
³Ibid., p. 8.
⁴Ibid., p. 18.
It accords with Nietzsche's intentions and concept of truth that the way in which an individual understands reveals what kind of person he is.

...in the process of understanding philosophical truth (and in all science insofar as it is philosophically inspired), self-realization becomes possible.\(^5\)

This view of philosophical truth raises some issues for Jaspers and for Nietzsche as well. Given that philosophical truth is self-realization it will be relative to the individual who comprehends that truth.

If truth, however, is not all on one level and is not the same for everyone, if access to it depends upon a condition existing in the truth-seeker, and if laying hold upon truth is self-realization, then we cannot escape the age-old question of what this entails in connection with the communication of truth, a question that jeopardizes the very possibility of any unequivocal communication and, in the end, truth itself.\(^6\)

Jaspers' observation that truth itself might end if its communication were jeopardized deserves some exploration. He is, in this paragraph, maintaining that philosophical truth as opposed to scientific truth is self-realization. As such it appears to be personal and hence not open to communications. The assumption here is that language is public and cannot, as a consequence, capture anything

\(^5\) Ibid.

\(^6\) Ibid.
individual. This assumption even if it appears without some argument on its behalf, argument which it needs, must be made explicit. It may very well be that this particular assumption is the reason for Jaspers' rather odd conclusion here that if philosophical truth is self-realization then the communication and the truth itself may be jeopardized. Is there something about truth which requires that it be capable of communication? Jaspers' belief that there is a form of truth which is not sharable so that it is not capable of being communicated should not lead him to think that the truth itself is jeopardized. Is it rather that truth, at least philosophical truth, is partially or wholly linguistic? If truth is a relation between a linguistic entity and something else -- another linguistic entity, a fact, or a useful outcome, then it could loosely be said to be partially linguistic. However philosophical truth is, for Jaspers, self-realization and that does not seem to have to be embodied in any linguistic form. Jaspers does not argue that it does and in fact seems to think it couldn't be necessarily linguistically manifested. Hence it is indefinite as to the grounds for the supposed necessity

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7This is a major assumption about language and one which cannot be examined, let alone settled, in this paper. The assumption is crucial to what Jaspers goes on to say about truth and his distinction between the rational and the historical.
of the relation between truth, communicability and language. 8

What Jaspers seems to be worried about is not the possibility of philosophical truth so much as the confusion over what an individual truth is:

For since truth exists only in communication and is unavoidably as public as the language by which alone it is conveyed, it is inevitable that the clash of irreconcilable presuppositions will, at the very least, produce a state of affairs in which truth becomes misunderstood, perverted, abused, and even open to question. 9

One must conclude from a confusion over relativistic and ineffable truths that there were no such truths, no philosophical truths. The problem which philosophical truth faces may be the skeptical responses of those to whom the truths cannot be communicated. 10

B. The ambiguity of truth vs. stages of truth

Whatever one's position is about the ability of language to capture the individual and the personal, it is fairly clear that

8Jaspers eventually argues that in Nietzsche's terms since language is the reflection of means of survival and truths too are wisdom for survival, failure in communication would show that one had not obtained truth. He says: "Truth is that which our conventional social code accepts as effective in promoting the purposes of the group." This is, as well, the ground for the preference for rationality since it is most readily communicated in a group (Jaspers, op.cit., p. 18).

9Jaspers, op.cit., p. 18.

10The reader should keep in mind that one is only so plagued if self-realization is not capable of communication. At least the worry seems to be that self-realization consists of a nature unlike other facts or situations which presumably can be unequivocally communicated. That 'the cat is on the mat' is less complicated than 'my self confidence is waning'!
from Jaspers' point of view philosophical truth presents special difficulties. He argues that in recognition of these difficulties one faces two alternatives:

...first, the doctrine of stages of truth corresponding to stages of human Existenz (the Pythagorean typology); and second, the doctrine of the in-escapable ambiguity of truth and the consequences thereof (which Nietzsche pushed to its limits). Nietzsche does not, according to Jaspers, accept the various principles of the view of stages of truth. As a result, Nietzsche is engaged in a method that is bound to be ambiguous in its form of expression. The responsibility for clarification and meaningfulness rests upon the very "being" of the reader. Therefore an inability to comprehend Nietzsche's writings will demonstrate a lack of character in the reader, not an inadequacy in the construction of the arguments or in the manner in which ideas are presented.

Nietzsche only addresses those who are his equal, those who will not inevitably misunderstand. "It follows from this that one

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11 Jaspers, op. cit., p. 18.

12 1) intentional concealment, 2) revelation directed toward the education of the reader, 3) protection of the reader from truths that he might not be prepared for, 4) an elite of enlightened who know the stages and how to conduct the education, 5) a selection procedure of worthy novitiates.

13 The term "being" is a technical term for Jaspers but one with which I am not at ease. I will use "character" in its place at times but that may not be an adequate substitute. At least it seems clearer and less mystical to me.
has the right to Nietzsche's thoughts only insofar as he is of the same rank." The necessity of an equal rank makes the comprehension of Nietzsche's philosophical truths a function of the "being" of the reader. Jaspers says:

But if truth is intrinsically comprehensible only to persons of corresponding rank, then every single individual must ask: Who am I? Can I understand? Do I have the right to participate? There are no answers to these questions. And there is only one way: through association with Nietzsche to attain a kind of elevation of soul that cannot be planned, foreseen, or put in concrete terms, even though, when realized, it will show me for the first time what being is and what I am.

This passage, as well as others, indicates that Jaspers believes that philosophical truth as expressed by Nietzsche is uniquely related to the nature of the reader. It appears that there is a truth or many of them to be communicated and what is being emphasized is that these truths are such that only individuals of certain types of character will be able to understand them. Philosophical truth is not distinctive in its relation between statement and object (reality, whatever) but it is distinctive in the potentiality that readers have for grasping that certain statements are true. It could very well be that philosophical truth and scientific truth are not different kinds of truth except in the conditions under which they are understood.

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14 Jaspers, op.cit., p. 20.

15 Ibid.
This hypothesis about the ground of Jaspers' distinction between philosophical and scientific truth, in addition to being a strange way to distinguish among kinds of truth, does not appear to be compatible with remarks which he made about stages of truth in connection with philosophical truth. Let us suppose that both scientific and philosophical truth required some effort for their communication, only select readers can appreciate each of them. One must ask before opening a specialized physics text "Who am I? Can I understand? Do I have the right to participate?" One needs to ask the same questions before beginning to read The Antichrist or Ecce Homo. In each case a certain higher level of rank is needed or misunderstanding will result. The difference lies, it seems, not in the fact that a higher rank is required but that with regard to that rank needed for philosophical truth the "elevation of soul... cannot be planned, foreseen, or put in concrete terms." Scientific truth does not require an unplanned, unforeseen elevation of the soul, though a high degree of specialized training may be essential. In other words, one may become prepared for a comprehension of Nietzsche but one is prepared to understand science. Jaspers may be grounding the distinction on the difference between growth and training. While this hypothesis seems to have some merit to it, it is not compatible with the claim about the "stages of truth" doctrine of philosophical truth. Jaspers speaks in that connection of programs of education

\[16\text{Ibid.}\]
much as one would in describing education for advanced scientific works. Hence one must suppose that the distinction between philosophical and scientific truth does not rest on the differences in the preparation of the readers.

Yet there still may be a ground for the distinction between philosophical and scientific truths in terms of preparation for comprehension. Jaspers might well be depending here upon the intelligibility of a distinction between the "soul" and the "intellect." Preparation of the former is necessary for the understanding of philosophical truth while preparation of the latter is required for comprehension of scientific truth. Classification of kinds of truth would then reflect faculties or modes of apprehension. This approach would not be unfamiliar and with some scrutinizing one might become satisfied that this distinction was legitimate. It does not, however, seem to be a distinction which Nietzsche would warmly embrace if we can take his remarks about the operations of the intellect as manifestation of one's personality to be resistant to a sharp distinction between soul and intellect. It may nevertheless be a distinction Jaspers wants to use and it would be at this point that he and Nietzsche would part ways on "truth."

Finally with regard to the distinction under consideration it should be noted that there are some passages in Jaspers which make it seem that these kinds of truth are not distinguished on the basis of their relation to language, form, mode of preparation for understanding, or faculty called into play, but on a fundamental differ-
ence in content. Jaspers repeatedly speaks of the content of philosophical truth as knowledge of being, for example:

...I discover myself as a result of the very way in which I discover being.\textsuperscript{17}

...it will show me for the first time what being is and what I am.\textsuperscript{18}

Though the meaning of "being" will become clearer in the course of discussion of Jaspers' view of the nature of Nietzsche's thought, at this stage it seems important to interpret it as an equivalent to "essence" and as the antonym of "becoming." So the content of philosophical truth is the essential foundation of all existence, the peculiarities of which are on the level of mere appearances, are transitory and simply becoming. Philosophical truth confronts the reader with a consideration of being in a way such that he can discover himself. This is not merely a distinction between kinds of truth on the basis of content though. The thoughtful consideration of being demands an inward examination of oneself. There is something about the way Nietzsche considers being, Jaspers suggests, that will require a recognition of oneself. Here, in this view of Nietzsche's philosophical truths, we find the most promising of hints for interpretation. How Jaspers follows through their course constitutes the bulk of the remainder of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., p. 18.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 20.
C. That Nietzsche’s works are ambiguous, the danger of truth, masks

Jaspers has contended that two alternatives lay open for those engaged in philosophical truth, one, the stages of truth, a guarded, step by step revelation of the truth and, two, ambiguity of truth, an unrestrained public declaration of the truth. The second was Nietzsche’s choice. What does it mean? It appears from Jaspers’ description of the process that Nietzsche relentlessly pursued "the truth." His expression of that truth became ambiguous in its communication not because Nietzsche intentionally concealed the truth but because of the variation in rank of those who read his works. There is a danger inherent in this ambiguity. Jaspers quotes Nietzsche on the subject.

"There are books which have opposite effects upon a person’s soul and general well-being, depending upon the rank of the soul that makes use of them: in the case of a base soul they are dangerous, devastating, corrupting; to the lofty soul they are the heraldic challenge which arouses the bravest to courageous deeds." 19

Nietzsche was obviously aware of the risk involved in the public access to his thoughts. It is most reasonable to assume that this is what is behind what seems to be Nietzsche’s intentional ambiguity. The whole predilection for "masks" in Nietzsche’s writing is an effort to remain hidden. Jaspers quotes Nietzsche in this connection:

19Ibid.
"our noblest insights must -- and should! -- sound like follies, and under certain circumstances even like crimes, when they surreptitiously reach the ears of those who are neither suited nor predestined for them." 20

Despite Nietzsche's recognition of the danger in the truth he is presenting, Jaspers insists that Nietzsche does not choose to conceal that truth. His philosophy is courageous. Jaspers says:

This danger is necessary and no one should be deprived of it, since it is impossible to tell in advance on whom it will act creatively and who will find it devastating. What is called for is not concealment of the truth but rather something far more difficult: the courage to acknowledge, to think through, and to say openly what we really know. 21

If there is sense to be made out of the way in which Nietzsche uses masks to conceal what he is saying it will not come from Jaspers' position on the point. Jaspers just maintains that ambiguity of truth is a function of variation in the rank of being in the readers.

The ambiguity of truth has nothing to do with the kind of dishonesty that practices concealment or deliberately preserves recognized ambiguities. It is an unintentional ambiguity that inheres in the communication of the truth just because the recipients are essentially so different. Courageous truthfulness means risking ambiguity rather than willing it. 22

20 Ibid. One could cite many other passages from Nietzsche's work which would demonstrate the pervasiveness of this aspect of the language. I quote only that which Jaspers does since I want to show here that Jaspers is cognizant of his tendency.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., pp. 20-
D. The "truth" or the value of Nietzsche's works?

Throughout this discussion Jaspers has spoken of Nietzsche's attempt to find and express "the truth." He has employed this phrase in place of such terms as "his truth" or "truths" or "supposed truths" or "beliefs." It is the revelation of "the truth" which is dangerous. It is "the truth" that is pursued. It is "the truth" which Nietzsche attempts to communicate. The phrase is important because it indicates that Jaspers believes that some principle, proposition, state of affairs is grasped by Nietzsche and that that "truth" is singular and absolute. Its diversity and ambiguity appear in its communication. Truth itself is not diverse or ambiguous.

The real interest of the expression of "the truth," as far as Jaspers seems to be concerned, is not that it, in its singularity, is comprehended by the reader but that some personal response takes place in him. The value of the utterances then is not clarity in communicating "the truth" but in the stimulation of some change in the reader. Jaspers sees this fact as central to Nietzsche's rejection of readers who take on his views as doctrine. Jaspers says:

...Since Nietzsche's thoughts are to be considered as neither vindicated by authority nor as absolutely valid truths, it would be wrong to become his "disciple." It is inherent in the very nature of this kind of truth that it is communicated only insofar as it awakens an appropriate personal response. Hence, from beginning to end, Nietzsche is the "prophet" who, unlike all prophets, refers everyone to himself...23

23Ibid., p. 21.
As a result of this emphasis, on the productive effect for the individual, Jaspers conceives the task of the reader rather than dwelling on Nietzsche's philosophical task. Of course the two are not unrelated. Again the individuality, the non-objectivity, of what previously was called "interpretation" can be seen. 

Our task is to become ourselves by appropriating Nietzsche. Instead of yielding to the temptation to take the apparent univocality of doctrines and laws as proof of their validity, each of us should respond to his challenge by attaining individually the highest rank of which his nature is capable. We should not subordinate ourselves to oversimplified principles and imperatives but, rather, through him find the way to the genuine simplicity of truth.24

It needs to be observed that Jaspers appears to be close to a radically different way of interpreting Nietzsche's works. He wants to insist that Nietzsche's works are a pinnacle in the history of philosophy. No one is to be mistaken about their value. At the same time the value that the works have is not in the propounding of a doctrine. However, Jaspers, slightly preceding the rush of analysis of language into its non-assertional forms, is saddled with describing the value of Nietzsche's philosophy in terms of truth. It is as though Jaspers would have more clearly analyzed the value of Nietzsche's philosophy if he had set aside the question of "truths" and spoken primarily about the effects for the individual reader as he looks as though he wanted to.25 Instead Jaspers' view

24 Ibid., p. 23.

25 I do not want to establish an artificial phototomy here. There are surely effects of assertions, both true and false assertions. However there are utterances better understood than in terms of truth and these I am marking off by the notion of "having effects."
abruptly starts and stops, moving from one direction in his analysis of Nietzsche to another; first discussion of effects then evaluation of terms of truth. What he needed to accept is that other functions of language besides the assertions of truth have value. 26

3. **Methods of Interpreting Nietzsche according to Jaspers**

**A. Types and criticisms of other's methods**

Jaspers was decidedly aware of the issue of principles of interpretation. In fact, he offered a classification of kinds of interpretation of Nietzsche's works which help to clarify what he himself pursues. According to Jaspers, there are four typical methods of interpreting Nietzsche: 1) a fixation on specific doctrines, 2) a view of Nietzsche's personality in grand historical terms, 3) an emphasis on mythical symbols and 4) an analysis of Nietzsche's thoughts in terms of his psychological dispositions. 27 Jaspers describes these methods in more detail, however it is detail which is not crucial to his own conclusion. Not at all surprisingly Jaspers sees each method as displaying only one aspect of Nietzsche's works. It is Jaspers' belief that no one of these approaches will be adequate to comprehension. However, though each is singly one-sided, collectively they may all contribute to an understanding of

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26 What will remain to be argued is whether non-truth-functional language is philosophical. If I succeed in showing Nietzsche's language to be non-assertional will that be tantamount to showing he was not a philosopher?

Nietzsche (or rather as Jaspers likes to conceive of it, the "appropriation" of Nietzsche). What Jaspers forges for himself is a method of interpretation which will employ all four approaches as means directed toward the goal of "entering into the movement of the authentic Nietzsche."^{28}

B. How to proceed: Jaspers' integration of various types of method and his principles of interpretation: on contradiction, availability of all writings, the "real dialectic," recognition of an "existential whole"

Several of his own principles of interpretation are outlined by Jaspers which are intended to accomplish the appropriation of Nietzsche. The principles are preceded by some rather general remarks about how to actually begin to read Nietzsche. Jaspers suggests quite strongly that we collect all of what Nietzsche says on any given topic.^{29} This process entails not just a good job of indexing by specific terms but "it can be accomplished conclusively through impartial interrelating, aided by a good memory for what is read."^{30} Among these instructions is one that is certainly sig-

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^{28} Ibid., p. 8.

^{29} Anyone who studies Nietzsche will be aware of how impossible this instruction seems. Though given passages seem to be on a particular topic, like ripples in a pond, the implications are far reaching. This is the element which Kaufmann recognizes in his concept of "monadological" and Danto alludes to in saying we can pick up Nietzsche's works and read anywhere at will.

^{30} Jaspers, op.cit., p. 10.
significant to one's success but looks devilishly hard to follow:

What leads to a true understanding of Nietzsche is precisely the opposite of that which the seductive allurements of his writings appear to promise: not the acceptance of definitive pronouncements, taken to convey the final and indefeasible truth, but rather the sustained effort in which we continue to question, listen to other contentions, and maintain the tension of possibilities. What Nietzsche means can never be assimilated by a will to possess the truth in fixed and final form which rises from the depths and strives toward the depths, which is prepared to encounter all that is questionable, is not closed to anything, and is able to wait.33

In stipulating "principles of interpretation" the matter does not get much simpler. Foremost among these principles, and indeed the most controversial is Jaspers' view on contradictions in Nietzsche's work. Jaspers takes the position that rather than being incidental or inadvertent, contradictions are essential, at the heart of Nietzsche's philosophical task. First, their number is not small:

All statements seem to be annulled by other statements. Self-contradiction is a fundamental ingredient in Nietzsche's thought. For nearly every single one of Nietzsche's judgments, one can also find an opposite. He gives the impression of having two opinions about everything...Consequently many have concluded that Nietzsche is full of confusion, is never in earnest, abandons himself to his own whims, and that it does not pay to take his inconsequential chatter seriously.32

31 Ibid., p. 9.
32 Ibid., p. 10.
Furthermore, the incidence of contradiction reflects the fact that what otherwise seems an unfortunate event is essential to Nietzsche:

But it could also be that we have here to do with contradictions that are necessary and inescapable. Perhaps the contradictories, presented as alternatives and appearing reasonable and familiar to the reader when considered singly, actually are misleading simplifications of being. If the understanding (Verstand) per se is condemned, as it were to remain on the surface of being, then being may have to become manifest through self-contradiction. This would certainly seem to be true for those who search passionately for the final truth but think only with the understanding and are limited to what is accessible to it. A contradiction arising in this way would be necessitated by the subject-matter; it would be a sign of truthfulness rather than of incompetent thinking.33

Here Jaspers fairly explicitly commits Nietzsche to a metaphysics and epistemology quite like that espoused by the late 19th century British Idealists. Each individual judgment, each act of the finite understanding can only grasp appearances as contrasted with reality. Inasmuch as each judgment is only partial, it is partially false. Its contradictory will be possible and hence could also seem to be the case. Because each judgment also represents an appearance it is familiar and hence it is partially true. Understanding is riddled with contradictions. So, any given judgment, to the degree that it represents appearances, is true and, to the degree that it is not of the totality of reality, is false. Speaking in contradictories is then a presentation of the inadequacy of our understanding.

33Ibid.
Notice how similar the above account, basically in Idealist terminology, is to that given by Jaspers of Nietzsche's penchant for contradictions. It becomes especially clear if one substitutes "reality" for "being," "appearance" for "surface of being" and "reason" for "understanding," that the passage cited from Jaspers is a close portrayal of Nietzsche in the Idealist frame.

Jaspers makes a quite subtle point in this passage which is in the pattern of that major element in his analysis which is most insightful. As has been discussed before Jaspers leans in two directions at once, towards assertion-truth on the one hand and towards non-truth considerations on the other. In the passage under consideration here, he says the following:

Perhaps the contradictories, presented as alternatives and appearing reasonable and familiar to the reader...34

The contradictories are, he says, "presented as alternatives." This is not the same thing as "Self-contradiction is a fundamental ingredient in Nietzsche's thought."35 In this latter expression, Nietzsche is construed as actually asserting P and ~P, i.e., asserting a contradiction. In the former expression though, Jaspers sees the use of the language to be presentational. Much as I could, in a context which could be stipulated, present two alternative blueprints for a proposed building, which could not both be built on the

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.
same piece of land, without being said to be contradicting myself, Nietzsche can be understood as presenting alternatives which if both were asserted would be contradictories but if "presented as alternatives" are not. Again Jaspers comes so close to a breakthrough in Nietzsche's interpretation. Alas, he persists in the terminology which carries with it the assumption that the utterances are statements and that they are asserted and that they are contradictions.

Jaspers turns his view on Nietzsche’s contradictoriness into a principle of interpretation which sounds like heresay to Nietzsche’s growing number of more analytically oriented fans:

In any case, it is the task of the interpreter to be forever dissatisfied until he has also found the contradiction, to search out contradictions in all their forms, and then, if possible, to gain direct experience of their necessity. Instead of being occasionally provoked by contradiction, one should pursue contradictoriness to its source.  

Though he does not say so following this directive, Jaspers believes that the source of that contradictoriness is in the limitedness of the understanding, i.e., the single judgments of the surface of being.

The second major "principle of interpretation" is, unless something has been overlooked, of no great important. It simply indicates that all of Nietzsche's writings must be published and that even though this will result in considerable repetitiousness there can at times be just one passage that will make sense out of the repeated passages on the same topic. Jaspers sees the repetitions.

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36 ibid.
as somehow setting off or singling out the important passage:

"Only explicit knowledge of the repetitions enables us to notice such single statements."\(^{37}\)

More pursuant to the first principle is the third. In it Jaspers maintains that it is because we chafe against Nietzsche's contradictoriness that we enter into "the real dialectic through which alone his intention becomes clear."\(^{38}\) This "real dialectic" consists in discovering which passages "belong together." Engaged in the "real dialectic" we follow Nietzsche through possible routes through thought and being. According to Jaspers, the reader who insists upon exercising exclusively logical powers will be unable to grasp Nietzsche's works. So the reader is to be diligent, persistent and indefatigable, but he must not restrict his comprehension to that which is accessible to reason alone. This is not to deny the relevance of logical examination but it is to insist that other modes of comprehension must also be brought to bear.

The sense of "dialectic" which Jaspers has in mind becomes more evident in his fourth and final principle of interpretation. The procedure for interpretation so far is: 1) discover contradictions, 2) notice repetitions of themes, 3) enter into a real dialectic, i.e., employ capacities including but more than logical ones. The result

\(^{37}\)Ibid., p. 11.

\(^{38}\)Ibid. Kaufmann also applied the term "dialectical" to Nietzsche. There are several possible significances to this ascription which were reviewed in connection with Kaufmann's commentary. The difficulties which attached to Kaufmann's use of the term do not seem to be associated with Jaspers' use of it.
of this process shifts to an apparently passive recognition of an existential whole. The culmination of these layers of interpretative activities is the "emergence" of a whole. Nietzsche is appropriated. Jaspers puts it this way:

A whole emerges, not only already attained but one that impels us to persevere by raising the increasingly incisive question concerning the central axis of Nietzsche's entire thinking in all its phases. The whole is not a concept, a world-view, or a system; it is the passion of the quest for being, together with its constant overcoming through relentless criticism, as it rises to the level of genuine truth.39

What is acquired is not the rational comprehension of a doctrine or a system, it is the quest for being and its attendant critical overcoming of accepted truths about being. What is acquired through appropriation of Nietzsche is a movement not a stopping place. Jaspers cautions:

...we must keep in mind the essential difference between the systematic wholeness of mere doctrines, which are themselves only functions of an encompassing whole, and the existential encompassing itself which is a basic incentive, but not a basic doctrine.40

The emphasis which Jaspers clearly brings out is that a sensitive comprehension of Nietzsche's works does not cease with the rational grasp of a specific philosophical doctrine or system. Contradictory statements insistently prod the reader to a personal resolution of understandings of being but more than that produce in him the con-

39 Jaspers, op.cit., p. 11.
40 Ibid.
tinuing tendency to move. One learns, in the appropriation of
Nietzsche, the habit of movement — contradiction, resolution,
criticism, contradiction, resolution... — not a doctrine. As
Jaspers put it earlier: "No one will envisage the quintessential
in Nietzsche unless he achieves it himself." And as he puts it
somewhat later:

The effort to comprehend him is bound to miscarry
so long as one attempts to hold him, in toto, to
a fixed position. Because Nietzsche indirectly
reveals himself only through movement, access to
him is achieved, not through perusal of something
formal and systematic, but through a movement on
one's own part. It is not possible to learn what he
really is by merely assimilating thoughts and facts;
on the contrary, one can bring forth, through Nietzsche,
the meaning that Nietzsche is to have for him only
through his own exertions and critical questions.

Although Jaspers' emphasis is on the reader's acquisition of
the movement of the authentic Nietzsche and although this develop­
ment, in part because it is personal, does not permit itself to be
systematically described. Jaspers suggests some orderlines in
the study of Nietzsche's works. Jaspers is correct in his view that

\[ ^{41} \text{Ibid., p. 4.} \]

\[ ^{42} \text{Ibid., p. 14.} \]

\[ ^{43} \text{Jaspers says: However, the system that derives from Nietzsche -- unlike the great systems of philosophy -- appears only as a phase or function within an encompassing whole that can no longer be presented in a systematic fashion.} \]

\[ \text{and: ...Nietzsche's thinking will always elude all attempts at a well-ordered presentation. (Jaspers, op.cit., p. 13)} \]
the mere fact that Nietzsche is not engaged in a great architectonic construction does not prevent the orderly presentation of his philosophical activity. Jaspers is correct, that is, if we ignore some of what he says on the subject and instead observe how he proceeds.

C. Jaspers' search for "characteristic aspects" by means of negation, the historical reality is not accessible to rational comprehension

It is often noted about Nietzsche's writings that he seemed to have something to say about virtually everything. Jaspers too sees this in Nietzsche and expresses the intention to get at those features of that wealth which could be called "characteristic aspects" and those thoughts or issues of central concern to him. According to Jaspers the "characteristic aspects" can be gotten at in two ways: "by following his limitless negations and by laying hold upon what is positive." 44 What is positive in Nietzsche's thought is indirectly present in his negations. One imagines that Jaspers means by this that implicit in any critique is a principle of value so that even should I utter only critical remarks one could infer what I held to have positive value. 45 Jaspers continues to say:

On the other hand, the direct communication of the truth always contains implicitly the contra-

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44 Jaspers, op. cit., p. 120.

45 "This consommé is spoiled by the addition of parsley flakes" suggests the positive view that "Consommé is left well enough alone," or even "I like consommé in its pure state," or further still "Foods are best at their simplest."
diction that again integrates the positions that seem most absolute into the all-encompassing movement -- except when Nietzsche, contrary to his nature, becomes momentarily snared within a dogmatic fixation...46

In addition to negations (critical statements) implying positive valuations they also, presumably like all statements whatsoever which are true of the surface of being, imply their own denial. Jaspers does not say "statements which are true of the surface of being;" he says "the truth" but I can only suppose that this is not what was intended. Again the notion of movement becomes even more clarified. The posture of criticism and, as is the case with any assertion of truth, implicitly brings forth its negation.47 Jaspers points up this process:

To the very end, Nietzsche's problem as he sees it is to proceed from the negative to the positive. It is not to be supposed that after a merely critical period he suddenly comes into possession of a new faith. Always the hazard of not-being and the awareness of being are simultaneously present to him. Even at the very last he counts himself, with Burckhardt and Taine, among the radical nihilists, "although I myself have never despaired of finding the way out --

46 Jaspers, op.cit., p. 120.

47 "This consommé is spoiled by the addition of parsley flakes" suggests both "Foods are best at their simplest" (by the first form of movement) and "Foods are best when tinkered with" (by the second form of movement). No wonder contradictions are seen by Jaspers to be the natural state of affairs for philosophers in search of truth.
the hole through which one arrives at the 'something'" (to Rohde, May 23, '87).

Not only does the essential contribution of contradiction to the development of Nietzsche's thoughts become evident but a distinction between modes of awareness appears again (it was discussed earlier in connection with the distinction between philosophical and scientific truth). Unaided rationality cannot tolerate this abundance of contradictions. The predominance of contradictions is tolerable only within the context of both rationality (the understanding) and "historical reality." The distinction is expressed this way by Jaspers:

The rationally conceived universal as such is critical and negative, that is to say, the understanding (Verstand) by itself is dissecive. Only the historical reality (Geschichtlichkeit) of the irreplaceable being that is not universal, that stands on its own and is one with its source, is positive. Such a being, however, remains not merely concealed, but even insubstantial until it gains illumination through the mediation of the understanding... Denial, as the mode of appearance of rational comprehension, is itself affirmation in the service of historical reality.

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48 Jaspers, op.cit., p. 120. The terminology anticipates much of that of contemporary existentialists. If Danto is right, Nietzsche anticipates contemporary analytic philosophy. If Jaspers is right, Nietzsche anticipates contemporary existential philosophy. Kaufmann says Nietzsche signals a whole new era in human experience. Could Nietzsche become the father of contemporary philosophy as Descartes has been said to have fathered modern philosophy?

49 Jaspers, op.cit., p. 121.
The claim is that while the rational and the historical realities are distinct, as universal and particular are, there is an interdependence between the two such that the particular only becomes anything at all in its expression through universals. Since expression through universals (rational expression) is always negative -- it is defined through limits, boundaries, what it is not -- the particular can never be discovered directly by way of the rational. Jaspers goes on to say:

This latter historical reality, again, in expressing itself, enters the sphere of the rational and disintegrates when the movement is expressed in words. The rational always exists only as conditioned by something else, and its validity depends upon relations; the historical is a self-sufficient reality that fuses with the communications of self-becoming.50

Only through the attempts at truth on the part of the understanding can the individual know himself, although strictly speaking, according to Jaspers such knowledge really is not possible. There continues in Jaspers' view the suspicion that language cannot express the historical reality, the individual. So, Jaspers' own view of language is such that insofar as Nietzsche reaches for a comprehension of his own individuality he surpasses rationality and enters the realm of the mystical and the ineffable.

D. The case of Nietzsche's presentation of "truth" according to Jaspers, an illustration of his method of interpretation

This second part of Jaspers' analysis of Nietzsche will become

50 Ibid.
more intelligible if we look at a particular basic concept.

Jaspers has said that the second part of his "presentation" of Nietzsche is addressed to basic concepts which are treated by Nietzsche and through that the revelation of characteristic aspects of his thinking. The movement which is characteristic, the opposition between scientific and historical realities and the centrality of contradictions will become more evident in the consideration of one example.

In Book II of Jaspers' presentation a wealth of basic concepts are treated. What man is in the world, reflexive behavior, drives and their transformations, the attack on morality, the individual and the universal, the superman, the methodical attitude, the limits of science, truth and Existenz, the dissolution of reason, the incommunicability of truth, truth and death, historical eras, genuine historicity, God is dead, politics, the lawgivers, education and breeding, the manifestation of exegesis, the world interpreted as the appearance of the will to power, the world as pure immanence, the source of awareness of being, the affirmation of the concept of being and the mythical elements in Nietzsche's nature. There are many, many other concepts which are dealt with throughout the six chapters of Book II but this sampling should illustrate the range and the magnitude of those that are examined. Two larger sections are of particular relevance to this thesis 1) discussions
of truth and 2) explication of the doctrine of eternal recurrence.\textsuperscript{51} Jaspers' understanding of eternal recurrence will be left for later chapters in this thesis while the discussion of truth provides the case to be elaborated on here to demonstrate what Jaspers takes to be the function of the utterances on the subject by Nietzsche.

The passages of interest appear in Chapter Two of Book II in Jaspers' presentation.

Nietzsche's comprehension of truth (one is reluctant here to refer to it as a "theory of truth") is presented in what can perhaps be best understood as five stages. These consist of two views of truth which might be characterized as definitions, the attitude toward truth which Nietzsche had, the consequences of the definitions and the attitude and finally the overcoming of the consequences or "transcendence" to the true meaning and ramifications of "truth." Each subsequent stage depends upon those that precede it and this is one sense in which rationality is thought by Jaspers not to be rejected but transcended.

First, the "definitions" of truth. Jaspers contends that Nietzsche had a deep appreciation for science. At times Nietzsche

\textsuperscript{51}Jaspers provides an eloquent and helpful view of Nietzsche's understanding of "Man," his possibilities, his freedom and his creation of his own life in Chapter One of Book II which is crucial to a good portrayal of conditions which determine the nature of Nietzsche's utterances and therefore which will be appealed to eventually for those arguments. That chapter also presents another example of a complex case of the real dialectic conducted through contradictions.
thought of studying science more intensively. Yet his fondness for science was similar to his affinity for religion. Each discipline is just that -- instructions on how to revere. In the case of science, we are instructed that its essence is in its methodology, what Jaspers calls a "methodical attitude." What science teaches us about truth is an approach to it, mainly one of care and exactitude. The methodical attitude of science brings with it a satisfaction of our deep longing for certainty. While we can by way of science obtain true knowledge of particulars, we must give up the desire for absolute knowledge to get it. The trade-off may not seem necessary yet Jaspers says (citing some texts from Nietzsche):

The methodical attitude destroys every kind of absolute knowledge in order to replace it by the unchallenged possession of a determinate knowledge of particulars with which it can accomplish something in the world: "Knowledge is valuable in that it ....... impugns so-called absolute knowledge"; "the belief in final and ultimate truths' begins to wane."52

One could construct reasons why science, or rather methodical attitude, would result in non-absolute knowledge and the impossibility of absolute knowledge though those reasons are not evident in either the Jaspers or the Nietzsche texts. It does seem in the spirit of Nietzsche's writings that an element in him admired the exacting requirements of scientific method though he easily turned to calling it a form of asceticism and from that to calling it a form of stupidity and even nay-saying (cf. the chapter "We Scholars" in Nietzsche's

52Jaspers, op. cit., p. 172.
Beyond Good and Evil, in particular). It should be said that whatever else is said about science it can and does provide knowledge about some things no matter how discrete and trivial they may be. The knowledge is certain, so the methodical attitude gives us some truth.

The second definition offered as Nietzsche's by Jaspers identifies "truth" with "conception of the world as we would like to have it be." The methodical attitude does not rest upon subject matter and conduct itself independent of the needs and motives of human beings. It is directed by this second form of truth -- the drive which we have to see things in a certain way. The methodical attitude settles upon specific isolated issues because of the interestedness of the scientist. This interestedness stems from psychological needs and hence objectivity is actually irrelevant. As Jaspers expresses it:

There is no such thing as a disinterested process through which truths may automatically be discovered. By representing the origin and development of scientific methods psychologically, Nietzsche shows that they constantly receive their animation from a substratum that in itself is foreign or even hostile to the truth.\(^5\)

Since the application of the scientific method expresses the drives of the individual, what is dubbed "objectivity" amounts to a resolution of the conflicts of individual needs. Each individual treats his own perspective as the complete truth.\(^5\) At its base, the search

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for objective truth is a war among individual truths. Jaspers views the process as a somewhat more conciliatory one:

So struggle is always the source of insight:
The objectivity of methodical investigation is the result of forces struggling to impose limitations upon each other; it is rooted in life itself and is real only insofar as it is part of life.55

For a variety of reasons the scientific method does not answer all important questions.56 The limitations of science make it an unsuitable replacement for the object of faith, a position formerly held by religious belief. The value of science, as the value of religion, remains. Both serve as instruments to the real source of knowledge, philosophizing.57 Although Jaspers describes Nietzsche's view in terms of the truth which can be discovered by the methodical attitude and the truth which is found through philosophizing, again it seems clear that what he is more concerned with is the value of these activities for human life. It is also the case, as we have seen before, that the content of science and philosophy can be distinguished in terms of philosophy dealing with "being in its entirety" and science uncovering certainty about "particulars."58

The similarities between all sciences and all doctrinal philosophies eventually impress upon Nietzsche the belief that what we con-

55 Jaspers, op.cit., p. 176.
56 Ibid., pp. 176-177.
57 Ibid., p. 180.
58 Ibid., p. 182.
sider to be knowledge is ultimately interpretation, specifically, in Jaspers' terms it is "interpretation of being." Such interpretation is a natural function of living human beings. It is finally the expression of evaluations though not merely moral ones. This is of interest rather than that, this is the way to see it rather than that because of the drives and transformations of the drives, the needs and conditions of the one who seeks knowledge. Nietzsche's thinking developed in Jaspers' account as follows:

In the course of his searching skepticism he developed the following theory of truth: All knowledge is an interpretation of being provided by a living and cognizing subject; there is no truth that is not entertained in thought and believed, that is, that is not found within that encompassing being that we are (das Umgreifende des Seins wir sind) and that is possibly all the being there is. Thus conceived, truth is not something independent, unconditional, and absolutely universal. Rather it is inextricably involved with the being of a living subject and the world that he has constructed. But this world as it appears to us is, like ourselves, in a constant process of temporal change.\(^59\)

As Jaspers understands Nietzsche's philosophical activity, the direction of such philosophizing is toward the source of all living Existenz. Nietzsche's philosophical activity will through denying, rejecting, destroying all absolutistic theories proceed to the

\(^{59}\)Ibid., pp. 184-185. The asterisk refers to a translators' note: The author is accustomed to distinguish between what might be called the subjective and the objective poles of being: the being that we are, and the being that surrounds us. The former includes existence (Dasein), consciousness in general (Bewusstsein überhaupt), spirit (Geist), and Existenz; the latter, the world and transcendence.
"authentic truth" which is the same as being, the ground of all Existenz. What has so far been described does not yet show how being itself is reached by way of Nietzsche's philosophizing.

The sense of truth which is the perspective of the living individual Nietzsche also calls "error" or "untruth." Truth as it is conceived by individuals and even agreed upon collectively by groups calling it "objective truth" is a way of living but from some other vantage point it is untruth. Jaspers quotes Nietzsche on this point:

"We do not regard the falsity of a judgment as an objection to it", for repudiating false judgments would amount to repudiating life itself. One must "allow untruth as a condition of life." The error that is a promoter of life is, as such, "truth."60

It is in this sense that truth is a necessary illusion. Jaspers argues that Nietzsche's truth-as-illusion doctrine entails a paradox.61 The paradox is that the theory or doctrine of truth as illusion is itself a proposition which could not be thought to be less illusory, more likely to be true than any other proposition, including those which state the nature of truth. Jaspers says:

The thoughts about the illusoriness of truth just sketched acquire a twofold meaning when they

60 Jaspers, op.cit., p. 186.

61 This paradox was that dealt with at great length in connection with discussions of Danto's objections to "all utterances are metaphorical." Jaspers draws different conclusions from the paradox.
are explicated. First of all, they constitute a theory that can be applied in the socio-psychological clarification of the circumstances under which things are taken to be true. This is to forget what it means for the theory itself to be true and to be concerned, instead, merely with the empirical truth involved in specific relations between human behavior-patterns.\textsuperscript{62}

However, he continues with this new observation:

But in the second place, the theory itself is a means of expressing a philosophical awareness of a limit and therewith an existential claim and a principle feature of the consciousness of being as such.\textsuperscript{63}

The real thrust of Nietzsche's theory of truth, the \textit{presentation} of his theory of truth, is that it can promote a change in those who genuinely consider it. Here Jaspers is seeing Nietzsche's philosophical activity in a most insightful way. He says in this regard:

While such presentations as those sketched above may seem to be mere applications of a theory, their real crux is in appeal: whether we entertain them reluctantly or find them illuminating, we consider them with a view to altering something in ourselves.\textsuperscript{64}

The circle that Jaspers says Nietzsche presents regarding truth is the inability to say anything in life about the non-absoluteness of truths in life without that utterance turning

\textsuperscript{62}\textit{Jaspers, op.cit.}, p. 187.

\textsuperscript{63}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{64}The presentations were of Jaspers' view that truths had to be communicable since they were to reflect usefulness to a group and that usefulness would require that they could be made to be understood.

\textsuperscript{65}\textit{Jaspers, op.cit.}, p. 188.
back upon itself. This circle, or paradox as one may prefer to understand it, is characteristic, according to Jaspers, of all thinking that takes place on the "boundary." In this particular circle, Jaspers provides an example of what he means by thinking that takes place on the boundary.

When knowledge undertakes to know knowledge, or the truth about truth is sought, thought proceeds in a circle. When this is the simple self-assertion of self-illumining truth, there is no difficulty. But when the circle consists in the overcoming of truth by itself, then either the self-overcoming is final and the truth founders, or a new mediated self-assertion arises insofar as a new source of truth appears within the circle.

There are only a limited number of resolutions to this circularity. Jaspers believes that Nietzsche accepts a position regarding truth which rejects the very assumptions which are necessary for its formulation and hence engages in "incessant contradictions." So the circularity does not disappear, it gives birth to innumerable contradictions.

Essential to Nietzsche's view, as we shall eventually see, is the affirmation of life. And on the subject of truth, Nietzsche takes the view that the will to truth is one piece of life despite the absence of any absolute truth which is sought. As a result,

66 Ibid., p. 189.

67 If this is another way of saying, as Danto did, that if his position is correct then it must be false, there is nothing new about Jaspers' view. There does seem to be something new, for Jaspers does not take the presence of contradictions as evidence of Nietzsche's position being wrong.
the posture in recognition of this is continual movement, the resistance to any enduring acceptance of a truth. The test of the legitimacy of this view is in whether or not it can promote life. Yet, as Jaspers indicates, the view itself is espoused and comprehended may not promote life for most people. It is clear from that Nietzsche addresses himself to others of his own rank, those for whom the thought that "there is no absolute truth," in all its paradoxes and contradictions, can be the stimulus to creative self-overcoming. The movement for those who can comprehend Nietzsche is suggested in one of Jaspers' summarizing paragraphs.

The life-process within which truth has its being in constantly changing illusion does indeed seem to Nietzsche to be an endless movement that always accepts a fixed and final truth only to bring about its dissolution. But essentially its philosophic significance is determined by what man becomes as a result of it. If all truths are undergoing alteration, then truth is never an independent reality with which we can rest content. On the contrary: "To be true means to be capable of exalting the human race."

In the context of the discussion of "truth" which has already been presented it is becoming quite clear what kind of interpretation Jaspers had in mind when he said that philosophical questions would not be answered per se but that the effect of Nietzsche's philosophical activity would be confrontation with the nature of being and through that a response to the question "Who am I?". It is in the very contradictoriness of Nietzsche's position on truth that the movement finds its origin.

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Jaspers, op. cit., p. 192
Jaspers insists that the process of Nietzsche's thought leads in the direction of transcendence into an awareness of being itself. However he also indicates that Nietzsche urges us not to reject what is in our present experience for the other-worldly. It is correct that Nietzsche resists all forms of the relinquishing of the immediacy of one's own experience for some promisory note of time in heaven or mystical bliss. It is this life which has value. This this-worldliness of Nietzsche in connection with the effects of his views on truth that Jaspers recognizes in comments such as:

Insight into the vital necessity of error, the illusoriness of truth, and the bottomless depths to be traversed in the unending search for truth is the reason for Nietzsche's demand that we consciously and deliberately lay hold upon the truth in the limited form that it always assumes within actual life; we are always within and still always beyond; we have nothing but the illusory, but when we experience it as illusory, it constitutes for us a cipher of being.\(^{69}\) If being is simply the illusory, still the fact that, at the boundary, its illusoriness is apparent transforms my entire consciousness of being. Consequently philosophizing of this kind forces us to approach true being within the bounds of existence and thus "remain loyal to the earth."\(^{70}\)

He also acknowledges that Nietzsche's philosophy entails that:

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\(^{69}\)This is another technical term for Jaspers. A "cipher of being" is a manifestation of being which provides us with a glimpse of its nature though not a picture or a characterization since those are not possible.

\(^{70}\)Jaspers, *op. cit.*, p. 199.
Truth resides in that which can be embodied in the here-and-now. Nothing in the beyond is to be allowed to cheat us of the contemporaneous.  

So although the term "transcendence" appears to lead us to the other-worldly, if Jaspers employs it in describing Nietzsche's account of truth in a manner harmonious with that account, it is rather an effort not to flee this world but to become even more vitally and fully aware of it. Specifically in this case, awareness of being, in those of higher rank will lead to their affirmation of their own lives and even those of the pitiable. The relation between this concept and the willing of eternal recurrence begins to emerge. Truth-as-illusion promotes the sense that all conceptualizations are possible. If all conceptualizations are possible all evaluations are. And if all evaluations are possible man has just begun to explore what he is. These remarks are intended to show what is at issue in Jaspers' insights but a few more positions on his interpretation of Nietzsche's view of truth remain to be considered before the central Nietzschean view of eternal recurrence can be examined thoroughly.

Jaspers maintains that the contradictoriness of Nietzsche's basic concept of truth is not directed simply to the propagation of doubt about absolute truths. Indeed, he says, Nietzsche directed his efforts at the very dissolution of reason itself. Jaspers has,

\(^{71}\) Ibid.  

\(^{72}\) All that Jaspers has in mind when he speaks of transcendence is not clear to me so I am not sure if this is a place where Jaspers' own philosophy covers over Nietzsche's.
it seems, put his point too dramatically. What he wants to argue is that we become, if we follow Nietzsche's dialectic or enter into a real dialectic with him, skeptical about the potency of reason in our acquisition of awareness of being. Surely Nietzsche's insistence on the value of science as an instrument is not the "dissolution of reason." Nor are the relentless psychological exposés of philosophical theories a "dissolution of reason." What is correct in this regard is that Nietzsche does not acquiesce to the standard assumption that rationality is the exclusive means to knowledge of the truth especially when truth is (as Jaspers claims) being. As Jaspers states it: "The question of truth is the question of all questions; its meaning is identical with the question of being for us." 73

Though it may be an overstatement for Jaspers to say that Nietzsche dissolved or tried to dissolve reason, he is right to observe an apparent indifference on Nietzsche's part to the structures of rationality. Jaspers, in these discussions of the dissolution of reason, refers to Nietzsche's utterances as "statements." A rather extended quotation from these discussions will seem to establish the orientation which Jaspers has towards Nietzsche's task and the means which Nietzsche employs to achieve it:

The contradictoriness of Nietzsche's positive and negative formulations gives his dissolution of reason the appearance of an ambiguity involving mutually exclusive meanings:

73 Jaspers, op.cit., p. 219.
His negative pronouncements, taken alone, tend to promote an indifference to reason. It may well appear that, whenever Nietzsche himself becomes indifferent to reason, his logical demands are accordingly vitiated. Hence contradictions in his statements are apt to stand mutely side by side as though, for an instant, he did not experience the sting of their opposition. The contradictions then become undialectical and cannot, as they stand, be brought into fruitful movement. Further, the fact that Nietzsche says now one thing and now another may seem to the reader to signify an indecisiveness equally receptive to all possibilities. Finally, in this connection, it must be noted that his penchant for true systematization and organization appears capable of being replaced by a desire for mere intellectual orderliness. \(^4\)

Yet Jaspers is not satisfied with the appearance that Nietzsche is indifferent to reason, that the contradictions are infrequent errors. \(^5\) He insists that the contradictions, the illogicality, and the speech out of all sides of the mouth are finally to show the inevitability of skepticism about being. At least Jaspers will not allow that consciousness of being will be described in any manner that will be intelligible. Jaspers says: "What constitutes the incommunicability of authentic truth is the fact that it ceases to be such whenever its existence assumes any sort of determinate form." \(^6\)

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 216.

\(^5\) This is a point of deep dispute between Kaufmann and Jaspers. Kaufmann wishes to sweep Nietzsche's contradictions under the rug while Jaspers exalts them to the essence of methodology.

\(^6\) Jaspers, op. cit., p. 220. The dialogue between Pyrrho, the skeptic, and an old man, referred to by Nietzsche and cited by Jaspers in this passage is worth reading.
Our conclusion for the time being in this matter must be that both initial "definitions" of truth are set aside, the first two stages in the process of real dialectic cannot be accepted as complete. Though we have not spent much time on it, the third stage of the formation of attitude is, according to Jaspers, the passionate quest for truth as well as the skepticism about the possibility of any absolute truth. Among the consequences, in the fourth stage is the growth of the individual in the creation of his own life. Finally, the fifth stage produces such insights as the limit of rationality, hence the incommunicability of truth (being). Included in the meaning of truth in its transcendent form for Nietzsche, according to Jaspers, is the identification of truth with death.  

But most important, the overcoming of the question "Of what does truth consist?" is the recognition that Nietzsche's position on truth releases individuals to the full and complete realization of their concrete individualities.

E. Effects of Nietzsche's dialectical movement

In connection with the phrase which has since assumed the status of a slogan: "Nothing is true, everything is permitted" Jaspers describes the effects of this principle on those who have genuinely appropriated Nietzsche:

...to Nietzsche it represents the emancipation of the deepest and therefore truest of human motives, unimpeded by any of those forms of so-called truth which, being fixed and final, are actually untrue. The passion for truth, in the guise of radical and

incessant doubt, causes all determinate and indeterminate truth itself -- cannot lie, yet every specific truth within the world can. Only the concrete historicity of Existenz, indubitably present though uncognizable, is then true.

... Only this attitude of unlimited openness to the possible under the strict leadership of something unknown, Existenz itself, can truly say: "Nothing is true." 76

Even that summarizing proposition cannot stand as the truth. It is Jaspers' opinion that the eventual effect of the dialectical movement as progressed through with Nietzsche is that "we are forced back to find fulfillment in our own historically present Existenz." 79

When we proceed to Jaspers' further general remarks about the third part of his presentation of Nietzsche we can see how it is a natural outgrowth of the assumptions just outlined. Here Jaspers conceptualizes the "historical reality" opposed to "rationality" as having the significance in Nietzsche's case of placing him as an historical event. Nietzsche becomes, for Jaspers, the expression of a movement in the development of world-historical changes.

Jaspers says:

Nietzsche is not merely the source of new reflections and the creator of a new language, but, in view of the whole course of his life and his thought, an event.

76 Jaspers, op. cit., p. 227.
79 Ibid., p. 228.
80 Ibid., p. 380.
His *Existenz* seems to present a challenge rather than offer a solution. A point, about which Jaspers feels most strongly, is expressed in this section:

...the fact of his existence signifies a historical ground that has become to us, as his heirs, an inescapable claim upon our integrity as well as a condition of our actuality, and, consequently, of our genuine participation in his philosophizing. What applies to everything great that enters existence by a leap, so to speak, applies here: Nietzsche's source is unprecedented and in-calculable.81

What Jaspers will continue to insist is that Nietzsche's most significant activity as a philosophy is something of which the serious reader will become more aware but which cannot be put into language. Nietzsche stands as an historical event; he is not merely the preacher of just another philosophical system. What is appropriated is not a rational grasp of a doctrine, it is rather "genuine participation in his philosophizing."

While there are suggestions in Jaspers' view with which I am sympathetic (he seems to be struggling towards a fundamentally new and, I think, correct approach to Nietzsche) Jaspers keeps denying the adequacy of language to describe what Nietzsche is doing. Furthermore he denies the adequacy of Nietzsche's language for what it is that Nietzsche is doing. Jaspers is cynical where it seems that Nietzsche's writings should have overcome his cynicism. Jaspers' own efforts to describe Nietzsche's philosophical activity are en-
lightening and, despite their burden of a peculiar terminology, they succeed in many places to provide essential insights into a most fruitful approach to Nietzsche. Why he insists upon refusing the adequacy of language to his task and Nietzsche's remains a puzzle.

4. The Kaufmann-Jaspers debate

A. Kaufmann's critique of Jaspers

One could hardly leave the presentations of the three major commentators, Kaufmann, Danto and Jaspers, without mentioning the critical exchange between two of them, Kaufmann and Jaspers, which appears in the main in the Schilpp volume, The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers.\(^{82}\) Kaufmann responded to Jaspers' response in Kaufmann's book The Owl and the Nightengale: From Shakespeare to Existentialism.\(^{83}\)

The debate is a methodological one somewhat in the sense we have been considering it so far. Briefly put, the disagreement amounts to the following. Kaufmann maintains that Jaspers engaged in an "untenable" methodology particularly in his (Jaspers') failure to seek Nietzsche's positive philosophy. As a result, or perhaps as the cause, Jaspers portrays Nietzsche as a member of the school of Existenzphilosophie, i.e., without positive philosophical doctrine. Jaspers' reply to this basic accusation is that Kaufmann has gotten

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caught in the standard approach of looking for a single doctrine in Nietzsche and hence, he (Kaufmann) has quashed the real vitality of Nietzsche's writings, a vitality that resides in Nietzsche's continual movement from one doctrine to another, a movement which both Jaspers and Kaufmann call the "whirl."

As the responses and replies to responses become more and more heated, the conflict just stated becomes characterized in terms of whether Kaufmann or Jaspers has forced Nietzsche into a "scholastic" or a "romantic" mold. These two terms appear to represent to them a dichotomy between a willingness to find philosophical conclusions (scholasticism) on the one hand and a resistance to such conclusions the maintenance of a contentless whirl (romanticism) on the other. Kaufmann, of course, does not want his Nietzsche interpretation to be names "scholasticism" and Jaspers, of course, does not want his Nietzsche interpretation to be named "romanticism." If agreement between the two is reached, one imagines them backing away from their own dichotomies and meeting by accident, almost without recognizing each other. They do agree that Nietzsche is neither a scholastic nor a romantic and neither wishes either label applied to his own interpretation.

Kaufmann's initial essay addresses itself to five primary critical points. The five points of criticism which seem to be the main contentions of Kaufmann's essay are not the same as the five points
he mentions under the heading "Summary of Criticisms" towards the close of the essay. For the time being, I will ignore Kaufmann's summary and consider his major arguments against Jaspers' Nietzsche from the text as a whole. They are: 1) Jaspers considered Kant a greater philosopher than Nietzsche and tried to make Nietzsche into a stage for the Kantian "rope-trick" to attainment of knowledge of the transcendent; 2) Jaspers did not acknowledge his own indebtedness to Nietzsche to an adequate degree; 3) Jaspers was under the influence of the George-circle and consequently failed to perceive a positive philosophy in Nietzsche's writings; rather Jaspers represented Nietzsche as holding no positions in order to set the

The reader can refer back to the section "Summary of Criticism" (Ibid., pp. 431-433) to make the comparison or rely upon the following brief outline of Kaufmann's points from that section:
1. Jaspers rejects or discounts Nietzsche's philosophy in favor of Nietzsche's philosophizing. Hence he "refuses to take seriously..." various Nietzschean doctrines.
2. Jaspers fails to accomplish even an introduction to Nietzsche's philosophizing since his method is "untenable." The reasons Kaufmann gives for this claim are a) Jaspers does not distinguish between finished works and mere jottings by Nietzsche, b) he ignores the chronology of views and hence Nietzsche's development, and c) Jaspers introduces the reader to Jaspers, not Nietzsche, by a means, a search for contradictions, that would serve as well with any other philosopher (e.g. Kant) as its object.
3. Jaspers uses the concept "ambiguity" in three senses. (Kaufmann does not argue this here but refers the reader to the distinctions in his own Nietzsche Philosopher Psychologist Antichrist (2nd edition) p. 54. When I consulted this reference it turned out to be a discussion of Nietzsche's biography not Jaspers' three senses of "ambiguity". Further searching established that one can locate this discussion in footnote 2 of the chapter "Nietzsche's Method", p. 373, the Meridian edition (2nd edition, eleventh printing, 1966).
4. The tragedy for Germany was that Jaspers did not read out Nietzsche's positive, anti-facistic philosophy.
5. Jaspers dissolves Nietzsche's work on particular philosophical problems.
reader "whirling" (the notion of "ambiguity" plays a part in this
criticism); 4) Jaspers reads his own philosophy into Nietzsche; this
is a consequence of the preceding faults; and 5) Jaspers, while his
work on Nietzsche was courageous, failed to make Nietzsche into the
counter-force to Nazism that he might have been had Jaspers sought
Nietzsche's positive philosophical doctrine rather than silencing him
by way of the concepts of the "whirl" and "ambiguity".

Jaspers' purported enamorment of Kant, his following of the
George-circle, his equivocation on the notion of ambiguity are all
merely details of Kaufmann's central disapproval of Jaspers' inter-
pretation of Nietzsche: Jaspers employed an untenable method and
consequently failed to discover Nietzsche's philosophical doctrine.
Kaufmann is doubly annoyed by Jaspers' "failures" since Kaufmann
sees Jaspers as having been able to use Nietzsche's philosophy to
speak out against German militarism and nationalism rather than
allowing Nietzsche's name and philosophy to become so long and so
deeply entangled with those very aspects of the German character
which Kaufmann is certain Nietzsche opposed. It is as if Kaufmann
views Jaspers as able to have given an honest reading of Nietzsche
but by some failure of nerve he (Jaspers) interpreted Nietzsche in
a manner that did not overcome the disaster in German history. 85

Kaufmann's feelings on this point are quite strong. For
example, he dedicated The Owl and the Nightengale, published in
1959 as follows:

To the Millions
in the name of false beliefs
by men who proscribed critical reason
this book is dedicated.
What is untenable about Jaspers' method as Kaufmann understands it? Jaspers recommends that we seek contradictions in Nietzsche, that we have not grasped Nietzsche or appropriated his movement (the "whirl") until we learn to never settle on any one position. In Nietzsche's works, according to Jaspers' and to Nietzsche's credit, one will find contradiction after contradiction, if one looks, since Nietzsche exhibits in his writings the very qualities of being itself. Those qualities are that no position, no single act of reason will encompass being itself. The presence of contradiction is Nietzsche's essential "ambiguity". Kaufmann says that for Jaspers this ambiguity is:

the irreducibility of existence to any single system, and Nietzsche's alleged ambiguity is thus the very virtue which Jaspers projects into Nietzsche by means of the illicit method... described. To cite Jaspers' Nietzsche (p. 407): "education by Nietzsche is like a first training in ambiguity."\(^{86}\)

The reasons which Kaufmann appears to rely upon in his insistence that Jaspers' method is "untenable" or "illicit" are that Jaspers: 1) does not distinguish finished from unfinished works, books from fragments, etc., and 2) ignores the dates of Nietzsche's statements and hence does not see Nietzsche's development.\(^{87}\) These two methodological "errors" by Jaspers allow him to find contradictions everywhere in Nietzsche's writings. The "discovery" of

\(^{86}\) Kaufmann, "Jaspers' Relation to Nietzsche," p. 432.

\(^{87}\) Ibid., p. 431.
contradictions in Nietzsche permits Jaspers to maintain that
Nietzsche presents the ambiguity of being itself, i.e., Nietzsche
presents Existenzphilosophie, i.e., Nietzsche is Jaspers in dis-
guise. Kaufmann says that all of his criticisms really condense
into this sentence from Jaspers' "Uber meine Philosophie":

Through my Nietzsche I wanted to introduce
the reader into that loosening up of thought,88
out of which, Existenzphilosophie must grow.

So in Jaspers' reading of Nietzsche, the seeming contradoriness
is precisely what makes Nietzsche's work the presentation of philo-
sophical truth, a comprehension of the ambiguity of being. Hence,
Kaufmann quotes Jaspers on interpreting any texts: "The procedure
in understanding texts is a simile for all comprehension of being."89
The point of contention between Jaspers and Kaufmann ultimately is
whether contradictions are essential or inadvertant in Nietzsche's
works.

B. Jaspers' reply to Kaufmann

Jaspers' reply to Kaufmann's essay also illustrates that Jaspers
sees the issue as a methodological one which centers on the manner
in which we treat Nietzsche's apparent contradictions. Jaspers
denies Kaufmann's argument that Jaspers' interpretation of Nietzsche
could as well be directed to any other philosopher besides Nietzsche.

88 Jaspers, "Uber meine Philosophie" as cited by Kaufmann,

89 Jaspers, Einfuhrung in Die Philosophie, as cited by
Instead he argues that unlike other philosophers, Nietzsche can be shown to be self-contradictory by "one thought-operation as a movement with a steady demonstration by quotations." Such a procedure results in the ordered whirl of which Jaspers says:

If one undertakes this effort, -- which can succeed only through the realization of one's own total essence, assisted by intellectual operations -- then this practice procures a freedom of thinking, which, without getting stuck in the false alternatives in the foreground implies not helplessness, not arbitrariness, but the systematically conscious domination of one's own thinking.

This central interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophical activity is something Jaspers maintains Kaufmann completely missed. In fact, Jaspers accuses Kaufmann of concealing quotations from Nietzsche which oppose the positive doctrines of superman, eternal return and so on.

Jaspers also denies the two supporting reasons which Kaufmann gave for his claim that Jaspers' method was untenable or illicit. First, Jaspers rejects the importance of the distinction between unpublished and published works. The unpublished notes even in not being like the published works demonstrate, to Jaspers' mind, the very point about the movement of Nietzsche's thought which he (Jaspers) wishes to make. Second, Jaspers claims that the chronology of Nietzsche's views is irrelevant in Nietzsche interpretation. In defense of this Jaspers says: "...I have expressly pointed this

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90 Jaspers, "Reply to My Critics," p. 858.

91 Ibid.
out and justified the sense in which the totality of that development is a unity, both in Nietzsche's own sense as well as for the interpreter."\(^{92}\) Though it is not at all clear to me how this second reply does respond to Kaufmann's worry, the first point does have some plausibility -- I am concerned how, or if, Jaspers would restrict the equation of published and unpublished works to Nietzsche's case alone.\(^ {93}\)

The perception which Jaspers has of Kaufmann's interpretation of Nietzsche is not that it is wrong but by being one of many possible readings of Nietzsche it cannot exclude interpretations such as his own. One's impression from this is that Jaspers sees his own interpretation as more complete by its encompassing of single-track interpretations like Kaufmann's. Single-track interpretations "minimize" Nietzsche into one trend among many. Therefore, Jaspers says of Kaufmann:

Kaufmann's tendency, therefore, as far as its form is concerned, is one that has been current for a long time; he simply realizes it with a new content in his Nietzsche book. Over and again one has been wanting to get positions from Nietzsche, either in order to make them one's own or else in order to fight them. In each instance this was possi-

\(^{92}\)Ibid., p. 859.

\(^{93}\)Authors might purchase shredders if they felt strongly about this distinction or take some of the measures Wittgenstein took -- as for example, burning his notebooks on occasion. The existence of Wittgenstein's 1913-1916 Notebooks testifies to the near impossibility of enforcing the author's wishes in this regard.
ble only by leaving many, very essential aspects unnoticed. In this process the immense spiritual energy of Nietzsche's thinking had to disappear from sight in favor of such positions. From that point of view my method of Nietzsche-interpretation, by which all positions without exception are denuded of their absoluteness, will have to be rejected as a procedure which -- as a critic says and Kaufmann thinks -- silences Nietzsche...I must deny...that I am making a flighty romantic out of him. My entire book shows Nietzsche as an event manifesting modernity by his own sacrifice, an event the magnificence of which is lost by singling out any isolated positions. 94

C. Kaufmann's response to Jaspers' reply

Kaufmann's response to Jaspers' reply can only be described as indignant if not outraged. Kaufmann was firmly critical of Jaspers in his essay in the Schilpp volume. When Kaufmann replies in The Owl and the Nightengale, he has gone beyond being firmly critical of Jaspers. Kaufmann believes himself (as surely Jaspers did as well) to have been misunderstood and misrepresented. Jaspers, Kaufmann nips, alters claims just enough to produce a new meaning, one other than that which was intended. What Kaufmann has in mind here is whether he said everyone is entitled to his own Nietzsche, or whether he thought anything in Jaspers' book was worthwhile or whether Jaspers and Bertram were closely similar, or whether Kaufmann did notice Nietzsche's "whirl" or finally whether Kaufmann can appreciate Jaspers' form of thinking. In many important details, Kaufmann urges, Jaspers misunderstood Kaufmann's essay. Kaufmann is so indignant that he goes so far as to say:

While "communication" is one of Jaspers' key concepts, his incapacity for understanding other points of view has become almost legendary.... It is as if he copied single sentences on file cards and then composed his books and essays around these excerpts. A former student, still full of admiration, confirms that this is precisely what he does. In the process, the structure and meaning of the views he discusses occasionally escape him altogether.95

There is something quite discouraging about a debate between Kaufmann and Jaspers on Nietzsche degenerating into what is tantamount to name-calling yet Kaufmann's concluding remarks in that section of The Owl and the Nightengale restore one's optimism about scholarship. In the closing two paragraphs of that chapter, Kaufmann seems to be reaching for the element on Jaspers' view of Nietzsche that I have been seeking throughout this dissertation -- what is the place of Nietzsche's writings in their interactions with readers? To argue that Nietzsche is attempting more than the assertion of philosophical doctrines is to do something akin to what Kaufmann struggles to express in these two paragraphs -- what both he and Jaspers, I would add Danto, Morgan, and Vaihinger, saw in Nietzsche. Kaufmann's expression of the point is vague, but his tone with Jaspers is conciliatory. At least one senses that Kaufmann, here, in the upshot of the debate, leans in the right direction:

95Kaufmann, The Owl and the Nightengale, pp. 288-289.
What I find admirable in Nietzsche is precisely that he transcended the spurious alternative of scholasticism and romanticism. There is life and passion and development in his work, and his thought cannot be reduced, any more than Plato's to a few doctrines that can be memorized; but for all that his concepts are not hollow symbols that do not matter, as if the "whirl" were everything.

This point transcends the interpretation of Nietzsche. We need not choose between the dogmatism of those who believe that only definitive doctrine can spell our salvation and the suspense of those who scorn all conclusions. Beyond the "shell," that Jaspers spurns and the "whirl" he seeks lies what makes life worthwhile.96

96 Ibid., p. 290.
CHAPTER V: MORGAN'S COMMENTARY: NIETZSCHE AS THE MASKED FISHERMAN

1. Introduction

George A. Morgan published his commentary on Nietzsche in 1941. Although his *What Nietzsche Means* does not appear to have been a major influence on more recent and widely known works such as Kaufmann's *Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist and Antichrist*, published in 1950, nor Danto's *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, published in 1965, indeed there are few citations to Morgan's work by either Kaufmann or Danto, there does seem to be a clearly imaginative view which was suggested by Morgan and is present in Kaufmann and Danto. In turn, Morgan disagrees in some points with Jaspers, thus indicating that he was familiar with Jaspers' interpretation and thus that the development in interpretation which has interested me in all these commentaries may find its earlier beginnings in Jaspers.1

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1 Jaspers does not discuss Hans Vaihinger's *The Philosophy of 'As if'* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1924, 1966), though it antedates Jaspers' own work on Nietzsche by more than a decade and would certainly have been available to him. Morgan and Kaufmann mention Vaihinger in passing and Danto mentions Morgan and Kaufmann in passing. The lineage of the thought I am most inclined toward about Nietzsche may lead back to Vaihinger, although I can not document that at this time.
What I wish to do in a fairly brief manner is to establish:

1) that there are unmistakeable lines of interpretation offered by Morgan which point in the direction of the non-assertional or non-doctrinal interpretation of Nietzsche's language and 2) that Morgan did not develop this aspect of his insight into Nietzsche but merely suggested it in pauses between analyses of Nietzschean doctrine. I suppose my discussion of Morgan could have slipped into this thesis as a footnote alone, as he seems to have done before in other commentaries. His interpretation deserves more recognition than that.

2. Morgan's notion of Nietzsche as the masked fisherman, intentional concealment, the "proper" reading and interpretation of Nietzsche, sensitivity to the form of Nietzsche's expression, the truth of doctrines is irrelevant

First, let the inspired suggestions Morgan makes be known. There is something compelling about reading Nietzsche as far as Morgan is concerned. Something more than our sheer intellect is engaged by Nietzsche. Morgan uses the metaphor of "The masked fisherman" as a catchall for the combination of modes of interaction between Nietzsche and his readers. Nietzsche writes about masks, the necessity of masks, the inevitability of masks and the removal of masks. What Morgan makes of this tendency in Nietzsche is that Nietzsche viewed his own philosophical development as deserving revelation to the most subtle minds. He cites Nietzsche as saying:
Thus I learned betimes to be silent, as well as that one must learn to talk in order to keep silence properly: that a man with backgrounds needs foregrounds, be it for others, be it for himself: for foregrounds are necessary in order that we may get a rest from ourselves and in order to make it possible for others to live with us.²

One is mistaken, Morgan warns, to think there is a single reality behind a multiplicity of masks. There is not one single Nietzsche to be eventually unmasked. The point is true of personalities in general and, as Morgan states, it is a point about personalities which Nietzsche himself made. Morgan says:

Nor is it a matter of one mask before one reality. Nietzsche speaks of a whole series or labyrinth of masks behind masks, in which one can never be sure of having reached bottom....³

and continues in a footnote to remark:

Perhaps Nietzsche's ultimate reason for the inevitability of "masks" is his denial of the absolute unity of personality, which implies that nobody is ultimately any one thing.⁴

Consistent with the understanding that Nietzsche is extraordinarily complex and not to be comprehended as a singular doctrine, Morgan begins his book with the view that "there are a hundred valid

²Nietzsche as quoted by George A. Morgan, What Nietzsche Means, (New York: Harper and Row, 1941), p. 14. Morgan's citations are to the twenty-volume revised standard Gross-öktav Ausgabe. Especially where these references are to the Nachgelassene Werke volumes, I can not readily locate the text in a more accessible manner.


⁴Ibid., p. 15.
and valuable ways of studying Nietzsche, and neither one nor all are ever likely to capture the whole of his elusive essence."\(^5\)

Morgan believes that Nietzsche's insistence upon masks as well as the complexity of that which lies beneath the masks is sufficient "to laugh out of court all unimaginatively literal-minded interpretations of Nietzsche."\(^6\) However, I must remark that one could say of any philosopher worth his salt that a merely first or second reading will never do justice to the work. One could say of many such philosophers that a sheerly literal-minded interpretation in that sense ought to be "laughed out of court."

But it is evident that Morgan means more by this than that we ought to take care in reading philosophy. What more is initially seen in Morgan's suggestion in the preface that Nietzsche is "existential":

Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche is an "existential" thinker; his philosophy is indeed lived, not merely celebrated.\(^7\)

Further, Morgan indicates that it is not simply that Nietzsche's life and his philosophy were inextricably bound. It appears that that may have been the sense in which he employed the term "existential" in that quotation. It is not simply Nietzsche's life and philosophy that are interwoven but for the patient reader, the

\(^5\) Ibid., p. v.

\(^6\) Ibid., p. 15.

\(^7\) Ibid., p. vii.
deliberate reader, the passionate reader, the reader comes also to live a different life. Morgan puts it this way:

We shall not compass Nietzsche with a dictionary. Only the most sensitive awareness of his idiom, coupled with a congenial gift for echoing novel life in our souls, will bring us near to him.\(^8\)

The philosophy becomes in this manner a form of relationship between Nietzsche and the reader. It is a vehicle of development in both, in one as expression and in the other as inspiration.\(^9\)

If Nietzsche's philosophy is a relationship between himself and the reader, the role of masks should become intelligible. Nietzsche employs masks so that only an individual, an unusual human, will live the philosophy. Morgan thinks that Nietzsche deliberately, by way of masks, eluded his readers. To this point Morgan says:

...Nietzsche could not bear to have his deepest concerns caricatured by the shallow.... Accordingly he wrote in a manner deliberately intended to make fools of unworthy readers....\(^{10}\)

This position places Morgan in direct opposition to commentators (Jaspers in particular) who deny that Nietzsche engaged in intentional concealment. In fact, Morgan's view of Nietzsche is that the educative program Nietzsche undertook required, even in Nietzsche's own mind, that intentional concealment be involved and

\(^8\)Ibid., p. 18.

\(^9\)These latter remarks are my elaborations and extensions upon what I have already said were "suggestions" in Morgan's discussion.

\(^{10}\)Morgan, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 16.
that the philosophy be revealed only by stages. Morgan cites two quotations in support of this view:

For the elect, Nietzsche intended his use of "masks" to have a progressively educative effect:

Suppose one conceives a philosopher as a great educator, mighty enough from his lonely height to draw long chains of generations up to himself: then one must also grant him the unearthly prerogatives of the great educator. An educator never says what he himself thinks, but only what he thinks of a subject in relation to the profit of him whom he is educating.\(^1\)

The second is from a letter of late 1886 to Nietzsche's friend, Franz Overbeck, where Nietzsche says:

I must first supply a multitude of educative premises until I have finally trained my own readers, I mean readers who may be allowed to see my problems without breaking on them.\(^2\)

So, Morgan interpreted Nietzsche's philosophical task to be one of educating readers who could gradually be exposed to the problems which Nietzsche knew to be significant in a way that the reader would respond by creating his own novel solutions and hence unique life. This task required masks and it required that

\(^{1}\) Nietzsche as quoted by Morgan, op. cit., p. 19.

\(^{2}\) Ibid. Morgan's citations to numerous letters are to, as he says on p. 379, Friedrich Nietzsche's Gesammelte Briefe (Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1907 ff), Friedrich Nietzsche's Briefwechsel mit Franz Overbeck (Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1916), and E. Förster- Nietzsche, Wagner und Nietzsche zur Zeit ihrer Freundschaft (München: Muller, 1915). I should add that recent volumes in English draw on some of those collections, making them more available to one not so comfortable with German: Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, translated and edited by Christopher Middleton, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969) and Nietzsche; A Self-Portrait from His Letters, translated and edited by Peter Fuss and Henry Shapiro (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) for example.
Nietzsche attract only those whom he wanted to catch. Nietzsche was, as Morgan describes him, "The Masked Fisherman."

He did not write for the sake of mystification, but rather to attract kindred minds with whom he might work in the intimacy of direct conversation. He was "fishing for men", as he called it, and often referred to his books as "fish hooks" or "landing nets." Morgan overlooks the Christian imagery of fishers for men, as I shall also do, and instead emphasizes that the fishing which Nietzsche conducted was for responsive readers, those who could be educated. The way in which masks functioned to select the "correct" readers is not made clear by Morgan. Perhaps it cannot be made clear.

Proper reading of Nietzsche, according to Morgan, is essential. He says that Nietzsche claimed philologists were trained to read in the proper way. However, that restriction is narrower than the intent. The good reader is sensitive to every word, every subtle suggestion and allusion. Morgan states that the aphorism itself stylistically enforces a limitation to the kind of reader participation Nietzsche sought. To Morgan, as presumably to Nietzsche:

An aphorism is a link in a chain of thought: the reader must learn to reconstruct the chain from the links. Although this passage leaves open the interpretation of the aphorism as a logical link between thoughts, there is no reason to think that Morgan had that in mind. Rather, the "links" would seem to be the

13 Morgan, op. cit., p. 17.

14 Ibid., p. 18.
movement of thought from one image, subject, issue, to another without the suprastructure of an argument.

Morgan further claims that Nietzsche's writing was constructed with a care and requiring a degree of interpretation that Nietzsche even (one thinks not so seriously) suggested that one day there would be chairs of philosophy to interpret Zarathustra. Whether serious or not on Nietzsche's part, Morgan concludes about Nietzsche's masked style in general:

This implies that he wrote with sufficient care to repay exact interpretation, and the influence is justified: niceties of mood or syntax often make a great difference.15

What Morgan goes on to say here is that Nietzsche will, for important reasons, shift from one mood of a verb to another. Such shifts, such "niceties of mood or syntax," are of considerable significance in the undertaking of interpretation. On this point I could not more definitely agree with Morgan. Indeed it seems that if the reader pays exacting attention to such stylistic shapes and signals he would not so readily rush to rephrase Nietzsche's writings into assertions of doctrines.

In Morgan's later discussions of eternal recurrence he also evidences a tendency to interpret Nietzsche's writings in terms of philosophical tasks rather than assertions of philosophical doctrine.16

15 Ibid.

16 I will return to Morgan's discussions of eternal recurrence in a later chapter. It does seem appropriate to complete to a degree the picture of his drift in the direction of non-assertional interpretation here.
According to Morgan, Nietzsche was familiar with the idea of eternal recurrence as a classics scholar. But in the summer of 1881 something different overcame Nietzsche about the significance of the doctrine. The effect of that experience is dominant in the work *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. Eventually, again in a letter to Franz Overbeck, Nietzsche revealed what significance he attached to the doctrine. As Morgan quotes the letter:

... it is possible that there has come to me for the first time the idea which will cleave the history of mankind into two halves.... If it is true, or rather: if it is believed true -- then everything changes and revolves and all previous values are devalued. 17

Nietzsche's attachment to the doctrine is clearly shown in this quotation. The centrality of the doctrine to his philosophical undertaking is equally obvious here. And a third observation, one which Morgan makes, is that the truth of the doctrine is suggested not to be what Nietzsche was interested in, he was interested in its effects if believed to be true. Morgan says in this regard:

This gives the clue, abundantly verified elsewhere: eternal recurrence appealed to Nietzsche not primarily as a cosmological theory, but as a way to transform humanity and escape nihilism: here Morgan refers one to his own later remarks on this subject in short, it came as a new religion, and certainly no one had made it the basis of a religion before. 18

In another place with reference to Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence, Morgan asks: "What is the human significance

of this theory?" To which Morgan answers "In his mind, it is first of all a means to extremes." To which Morgan answers: "If one attained an unreserved love of this world as it is, its everlasting return would raise affirmation to ecstasy." To which Morgan answers, regarding Nietzsche's attempt at a revaluation of all values, "His weapon for this purpose is the idea of 'eternal recurrence'." In essence Morgan refers to Nietzsche's use of the doctrine of eternal recurrence. This doctrine, of believed, is a means, an act of affirmation raised to ecstasy, a weapon in a crisis of historic proposition. All of this demonstrates, beyond a doubt, that Morgan perceived good questions to ask, he drew out of his own interpretations some excellent answers. In other words, there are evident strains of interpretation which by-pass the tendency to dwell on Nietzsche's language only in terms of its propositional value. Hence my first major contention should be established.

Oddly enough and about the same subjects, Morgan seeks the more standard and unsuited approaches to Nietzsche. As rich as Morgan's suggestions are, his overall view of Nietzsche weighs

19 Ibid., p. 303.
20 Ibid., p. 304.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 356.
equally heavily in the direction of treating Nietzsche's language as propositional. Let me state here that I have already acknowledged that the fact that an utterance has effects is not equivalent to a demonstration that its linguistic function is other than assertional. Assertions have effects, too. So it would not be inconsistent to hold both that utterances had effects, that the effects were of distinct importance and that those utterances were assertional. It is not inconsistent. What should be observed to be odd is that Morgan (as well as other commentators I have considered) argue that Nietzsche's language (style, method, whatever) is as it is because of his philosophical tasks, then argue what the effects of this language are and the centrality of them to the understanding of Nietzsche's philosophical tasks, then continue to predominantly conceptualize his utterances in terms of assertions. What I am insisting is odd is that the rich suggestiveness of Morgan's interpretation as it has already been surveyed shares its bed with the view that linguistic acts are all assertional. Furthermore, the rich suggestiveness is not followed into sufficient detail to become a convincing case for a given interpretation of Nietzsche's writings. Only the sympathetic reader extends the suggestions into more specific interpretations.

\[23\] In fairness to Morgan it should be said that more recent developments could not have informed him of refinements in linguistic act distinctions. I can only guess what he might have done if writing his commentary on Nietzsche within the last ten years or so.
3. **Morgan, however, relies on the "assertional" interpretation of Nietzsche's language**

Does Morgan rely upon the assertional interpretation of Nietzsche's linguistic acts? My second contention is that he does.

Morgan considers the subject of the apparent contradictoriness in Nietzsche's writings. In this connection he says:

> In my own judgment there is a surprising amount of coherence in Nietzsche, but I will not labor the point: since consistency is finally a matter of nice interpretation, unsympathetic minds will always be able to see him as a mass of contradictions. It does not matter.24

Morgan's good sense about Nietzsche leads him to say "It does not matter." The logical architecture is not the important concern with Nietzsche, no more so than it is with Plato, Augustine and Pascal.25 But Morgan did not say, as he might have, that the utterances in question are often not assertions and hence could not be contradictions. Nor did he say that even implicit contradictions in Nietzsche, Plato, Augustine and Pascal are irrelevant since the issue is not even one of implicit assertions.

Nietzsche's writings present what Morgan terms "a gradual revelation of his ulterior meaning and purposes."26 Somehow as Nietzsche developed he became disinclined to mask his own ideas. The transition he was going through when incapacitated by his final

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24Morgan, op.cit., p. xii.

25Ibid., p. xiii.

26Ibid., p. 20.
illness was from "the masked fisherman" to the "lawgiver of the future." Morgan says:

Just before the catastrophe, therefore, Nietzsche was beginning a new phase in his career, [Morgan cites letters to Carl Fuchs, 14/12/87, and Peter Gast, 16/12/88 wherein he planned to come out as openly for his ideas as was possible in public.] But this was cut short: what he left is a series of masks.27

This seems another way of saying that the earlier linguistic forms were diversions through which Nietzsche developed his own view and that Nietzsche would have stated his philosophy publically had he not gone mad when he did.

Morgan considers whether or not Nietzsche has a system. His position on this is surprisingly like Kaufmann's. Morgan rejects Jaspers' notion that Nietzsche is essentially inconsistent28 and argues instead that there is an implicit wholeness despite Nietzsche's shifting masks and which is discernible through them. While Morgan understands Nietzsche not to be systematic in a scientific sense, he says:

On the other hand, Nietzsche does admire some kinds of unity: organic growth, though not finality; coherence without rigidity. He likens the proper development of a philosophy to that of a tree:

We have no right to be fragmentary in any respect: we may neither err piecemeal, nor piecemeal strike the yea's and nay's and if's and whether's grow out of us with the inevitability with which a tree bears its fruit -- all together

27 Ibid.

28 Morgan, op.cit., p. 21, n. 47.
related and corresponding with one another and evidences of one will, one health, one soil, one sun.29

Whatever system Nietzsche's work possesses it is "organic" in its unity, it is held together by an "organic coherence."30 Morgan notes that Nietzsche envisioned his works as connected by a unity of thought at least as Nietzsche saw it retrospectively31 but that:

Nietzsche of course does not claim an absolute identity in all his writings; rather, his ideal of philosophy as a fruit of life implies change, including the discard of things outgrown.32 This view rests upon the idea that there is a philosophical doctrine and though its development may take some odd turns its fruits nevertheless are philosophical points which were taken -- or perhaps it suits this metaphor of the tree's fruit to say the philosophical fruits ripen and are given.

Nietzsche also seems not to be systematic in a standard sense because he is involved in a "dialectical pattern with cumulative effect."33 Nietzsche, according to Morgan, engaged in dialectical movement by intentionally postulating positions in opposition to

29 Nietzsche as quoted by Morgan, op. cit., p. 22.

30 A characterization of Nietzsche used by Kaufmann.


32 Ibid., p. 25. A characterization of Nietzsche used by Kaufmann. Kaufmann refers this notion to Carl Jung.

33 Morgan, op. cit., p. 26. Another characterization of Nietzsche used by Kaufmann.
those which he tentatively held. Morgan says:

Accordingly he speaks of having several philosophies, and recommends that one live through a series of viewpoints, finally uniting all in one comprehensive vision. 34

As has been mentioned, Nietzsche would have declared his own philosophy if not stopped short by illness, according to Morgan, presumably that comprehensive vision which resulted from his own process of development. In other words, Nietzsche's direction was, in Morgan's understanding of him, towards the development of a philosophical doctrine.

A view which has some similarities to the so-called "dialectical" method was described earlier by Morgan. In that discussion he leaned more heavily in the direction of the interest in the effects of Nietzsche's language on his readers:

Nietzsche not only considers many aspects of the world; he approaches them from many points of view. His thought on any topic is not a simple-minded opinion but a significant strife of ideas through which he works toward some complex synthesis. 35

This is not much different from the previous reading but Morgan continues:

Whether successful or not, that effort electrifies the mind to wrestle in turn with issues of ineluctable importance. To this is due in no small measure the vitality, the fertility,


35 Ibid., p. 5.
Notice however that Nietzsche only "almost" compels originality. Unfortunately the circumstances under which Nietzsche is said to "almost compel originality" seem to me to be ones that are barely distinguishable from those of an ambiguous stimulus. Nietzsche could then be all things to all men. Perhaps I do not see what Morgan is after here since my complaint against him would place him in fundamental conflict to what seems to be the spirit of his commentary.

Beyond the concerns about systems and contradictions there are other points where Morgan seems to reveal the more standard approach to Nietzsche. For example, Morgan says in connection with Nietzsche's seeming to be "radical":

That he is radical means simply that he digs remorselessly for the roots of things, and does not hesitate to draw the conclusions implied by his premises.37

When discussing Nietzsche's argument for eternal recurrence Morgan describes the argument first as necessary for the doctrine to be persuasive, then as what Nietzsche takes to be "the most scientific of all possible hypotheses, then as proved but not beyond a shadow of doubt then Morgan seems to maintain that Nietzsche believed the doctrine.

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
But Nietzsche does sincerely believes in it; he stakes his life on it and keeps alive for it, though he is able to question it, and has black moods when all seems lost. [Morgan cites letters to Franz Overbeck, 11/2/83; summer/83, c 8/12/83, 1/4/87, 3/2/88; and Peter Gast, 15/1/88.] He is confident that it will be substantiated in the end.38

It appears that Morgan is construing Nietzsche not only as asserting the doctrine of eternal recurrence in order to educate his readers but also believing himself that it is true. Morgan cites a quotation from Nietzsche at this point apparently to establish this contention but it decidedly does not achieve that purpose.

An inevitable hypothesis, which humanity must hit upon again and again, is more powerful in the long run than the best believed belief in something untrue (like the Christian faith).39

That Nietzsche says that eternal recurrence is "more powerful" than belief in a "best believed belief in something untrue" does not in and of itself show that Nietzsche believed that the doctrine was true. Morgan continues to support the contention by laying out the "argument" Nietzsche gives for eternal recurrence. But that Nietzsche "gave an argument" for eternal recurrence does not demonstrate that Nietzsche believed the doctrine was true.

Finally, also in discussing eternal recurrence and not withstanding the suggestiveness of Morgan's other remarks in this regard, Morgan seems to simply say that eternal recurrence is Nietzsche's "description" of reality. Morgan says:

38 Ibid., p. 286.

39 Nietzsche as quoted by Morgan, op.cit., p. 286.
Nietzsche's problem is how to say Yes to reality; and his description of reality has culminated in the idea of eternal recurrence.\textsuperscript{40}

Although I believe this passage is, to a certain extent, ambiguous as to whether Nietzsche is being said to have described reality as eternal recurrence, another statement by Morgan is not:

The end came before Nietzsche had completed his statement of his cosmology, and he did not fully clarify the relation of eternal recurrence to the rest of his theories.\textsuperscript{41}

So Morgan sees Nietzsche as stating a cosmology, an element in which is the theory of eternal recurrence.

My second contention, to repeat, is that Morgan, despite the suggestions he makes to the contrary, relies most often upon the view that Nietzsche's language is, either explicitly or implicitly, the attempt to assert a philosophical doctrine. Closer inspection of the text, a worthy endeavor on other grounds, would have to be made, and formulation about how often "most often" is would need to be agreed upon, before I could conclude that Morgan most often relies on assertional interpretations. I think it is clear that the second contention has been sufficiently supported so that we would not have expected it to be true of the commentator who made the enlightening suggestions discussed earlier. It can be agreed with Morgan that:

\textsuperscript{40}Morgan, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 303.

\textsuperscript{41}\textit{Tbid.}, p. 289,
Whether or not Nietzsche "has a system," we may conclude, depends upon the point of view, but there can be no doubt that he deserves to be read seriously as a philosopher. It is hoped that the ensuing chapters will explode the myth of his capricious inconsistency, but there is no need to claim him faultless in this respect -- what thinker has been? Insight is more important than logic and sometimes comes separately.

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\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 29.}\]
CHAPTER VI: VAIHINGER'S COMMENTARY: THE PHILOSOPHY OF AS-IF AND ITS MANIFESTATIONS IN THE WORKS OF NIETZSCHE

1. Introduction

Vaihinger introduces his philosophy of as-if in a combination of autobiography and argument. That is to say, the "origin" of the philosophy of as if is traced both in the psychological development of Vaihinger himself and in clear and condensed argument for the philosophy itself. Matters of why Vaihinger did not serve in the military, choose the university he did and so on, while of some interest to a devotee can be ignored for the purposes at hand. Vaihinger presents the conclusions which he draws in the philosophy of as if and that summary provides the argument for the view as well:

1. There seem to be two worlds offered by rationality -- the philosophical-psychological that ends in sensations, feelings, etc., and the one of science which portrays reality as particles in motion. Though we experience one world, reason cannot synthesize the two worlds.

2. Everything which lives, wills and acts.

3. Thought is a biological function which serves the will to live and to dominate.
4. The Law of the Preponderance of the Means over the End is the truth that means, such as thought, develop beyond what is necessary to achieve the end.

5. Thought, in accordance with the Law of the Preponderance of the Means excedes its practical purpose and now is "practised for its own sake as theoretical thought."

6. Theoretical thought poses problems which are not soluble.

7. Insoluble problems can be seen to develop through the backward look for the psychological causes.

8. The philosophy of as if rejects the belief that abstract or theoretical thought is an inherent human quality and hence is a form of anti-rationalism.

9. Thought-processes are biological phenomena not "rational" ones.

10. In this light many thought-processes and thought-constructs appear to be consciously false assumptions, which either contradict reality or are even contradictory in themselves, but which are intentionally thus formed in order to overcome difficulties of thought by roundabout ways and by-paths. These artificial thought-constructs are called Scientific Fictions, and distinguished as conscious creations by their As-if character.¹

11. The world of the as if is to be distinguished from the real world and is the sphere of ethics, aesthetics and religion. It is the realm of values and must be distinguished from the world of becoming.

12. "Reality" consists of sense contents.
13. Sense-contents possess regularities which are expressed in science.
14. The world of sense is not easily altered.
15. "It is senseless to question the meaning of the universe..."\(^2\)

The philosophy of as if, a seemingly close relative of pragmatism, is not the same. What Vaihinger calls "Fictionalism", another term for the philosophy of as if, has as its outcome the principle that:

"An idea whose theoretical untruth or incorrectness, and therewith its falsity, is admitted, is not for that reason practically valueless and useless; for such an idea, in spite of its theoretical nullity may have great practical importance."\(^3\)

It is obvious how Fictionalism is hence seen by Vaihinger as "diametrically opposed in principle" to Pragmatism. The basic principle of Pragmatism is, according to Vaihinger, that:

"An idea which is found to be useful in practice proves thereby that it is also true in theory, and the fruitful is thus always true."\(^4\)

What Vaihinger argues in the last chapter of The Philosophy of 'As if' is that Nietzsche espoused the view called Fictionalism and that he espoused that view throughout his whole career. Furthermore, Vaihinger maintains that Nietzsche was strongly influenced by

\(^2\)Ibid., p. xlvii.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. viii.

\(^4\)Ibid.
the views of F. A. Lange, who was in turn strongly influenced by Kant through Forberg, Schleiermacher and de Wette. In essence, Fictionalism as a form of Neo-Kantianism is the meeting ground, the commonality between Kant and Nietzsche. Vaihinger supports this view of Nietzsche by numerous quotations from major works but also by a heavy reliance on what are referred to as the "posthumus works". Vaihinger's position on Nietzsche, then, is that Nietzsche proposed, as doctrine, the philosophy of as if.

2. The philosophy of as if

A. Thought as an organic function

Vaihinger maintains the view that our thought processes are organic functions. This entails at least three considerations. First, roughly in accordance with Kant's philosophy, the "psyche" is said to be "an organic formative force" which shapes as it appropriates. This formative force is described in the following manner:

...consciousness is not to be compared to a mere passive mirror, which reflects rays according to purely physical laws, but "consciousness receives no external stimulus without moulding it according to its own nature."5

5 Ibid., p. 2. After his discussion of the "organic function of the logical movements involved in knowing," Vaihinger says that "Steinhal is due the merit of having established and worked out this view..." I suspect, therefore, that it is Steinhal who is quoted in the passage above, however, Vaihinger is less than careful about citations. I cannot find a complete reference to any work by Steinhal in Vaihinger's book. In connection with other quotations it is impossible to tell from the text who is being quoted or from what work the quotation is taken.
It has already been stated that the "psyche" was not to be understood as a substance but rather as "the organic whole of all so-called "mental" actions and reactions; these never come under external observation, but have to be partly inferred from physical signs, partly observed by the so-called inner sense." Such actions and reactions are held to be completely necessary and subject to causal laws.

Aspects of the "organic formative force" of the psyche are its creative and adaptive functions. A description of these aspects provides a fuller account of what is meant by the abilities of the psyche:

The mind is not merely appropriative, it is also assimilative and constructive. In the course of its growth, it creates its organs of its own accord in virtue of its adaptable constitution, but only when stimulated from without, and adapts them to external circumstances. Such organs, created by the psyche for itself in response to external stimuli, are, for example, forms of perception and thought, and certain concepts and other logical constructs. Logical thought, with which we are especially concerned here, is an active appropriation of the outer world, a useful organic elaboration of the material of sensation. Logical thought is therefore an organic function of the psyche.7

Given that the appropriative "organic formative function" of the psyche is understood, we turn to the second consideration of thought as an organic function. The logical operations of

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6 Vaihinger, _op.cit._ , p. 1.

7 Ibid., p. 2.
the psyche can only be correctly interpreted teleologically.

Thought-functions are according to Vaihinger (before him, Sigwart and Lotze) purposive activity. The purpose of the organic function of thought is:

...to change and elaborate the perceptual material into those ideas, associations of ideas, and conceptual constructs which, while consistent and coherent among themselves are, as the phrase goes and as we can also say provisionally, "clothed in objectivity." 8

Vaihinger does not believe that knowledge of objective reality is possible, therefore he explicates the purpose of the logical functions as the accommodation of the organism to practical existence which ultimately means that logical functions permit us to "...calculate events that occur without our intervention..." 9

The third point in the analysis, then, is to characterize the logical functions as the connective between the sense-content that is appropriated and that which is calculated or predicted.

As Vaihinger puts it:

If sensations are the starting-point of all logical activity and at the same time the terminus to which they must run, if only to render control possible... then the purpose of thought may be defined as the elaboration and adjustment of the material of sensation for the attainment of a richer and fuller sensational life of experience. 10

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8 Ibid., p. 3.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., p. 6.
But what is most significant about these functions is that they go on unconsciously for the most part. The operations of the psyche are largely unknown to the light of consciousness and proceed according to instinct.  

B. Fictions and their survival value

That thought-functions are organic and formative, that they are directed toward purposes and that they proceed primarily unconsciously does not yet establish that they are productive of fiction. Vaihinger distinguishes between rules of thought and artifices or fictions. He describes the development of a thought-fuction after it has become conscious as first technological and then "through practice, development and hereditary transmission" it becomes an art. The products of thought-functions which have been developed to the level of art are fictions. Fictions, or thought-constructs, may diverge from reality or even be self-contradictory. What is crucial about these constructs is that the psyche provides itself with them in order to continue to pursue its purpose. The process of the psyche as it seeks to achieve its purpose is rather dramatically described by Vaihinger:

By fictive activity in logical thought, is to be understood the production and use of logical methods, which, with the help of accessory concepts -- where the improbability of any corresponding objective is fairly obvious -- seek to attain the objects of thought. Instead of remaining content with the material given, the logical function introduces these hybrid and ambiguous thought-structures,
in order with their help to attain its purpose indirectly, if the material which it encounters resists a direct procedure. With an instinctive, almost cunning ingenuity, the logical function succeeds in overcoming these difficulties with the aid of its accessory structures. The special methods, the by-paths, of which thought makes use when it can no longer advance directly along the main road, are of many different kinds, and their explanation is our problem. They often lead through thorny undergrowth, but logical thought is not deterred thereby, even though it may lose something of its clearness and purity. It is relevant also to remark here that the logical function, in its pu.poseful instinctive ingenuity, can carry this fictive activity from the most innocent and unpretentious beginnings on through ever finer and subtler developments right up to the most difficult and complicated methods.12

The varieties of fictions are surveyed by Vaihinger. They appear in philosophy -- Kant's *Ding an sich* is a notable example. Fictions abound in the sciences in the form of artificial classifications, abstractions, concepts and models. Examples provided include the botanical system of Linnaeus, the assumption in Adam Smith's political economy of egoism as the sole cause of human behavior, the treatment of actual masses as points of zero extension by Bacon and in psychology, the hypothesis of a world containing a single individual. Vaihinger treats, at least briefly, artificial classifications, abstractive fictions, schematic, paradigmatic, utopian and type fictions, symbolic or analogical fictions, juristic fictions, personificatory fictions, summational fictions, heuristic fictions, practical or ethical fiction, the fundamental fictional concepts of mathematics, the method of abstract generali-
zation, the method of unjustified transference, the concept of infinity, matter and the sensory world of ideas, the atom as a fiction, fictions in mechanics and mathematical physics, things-in-themselves and the absolute.

The term "fiction" has long been used in a sense of mythology, poetry and art. Vaihinger classifies that use as aesthetic fictions and suggests that they might well be called by another name, specifically "figments" in order to distinguish them from the other major kind of fiction, scientific fictions. He does not insist on this terminological distinction since it appears that mythological fictions were the mothers of them all and since there seems to be a continuum from poetic to scientific fictions.

Fiction is distinguished from hypothesis on the ground that the hypothesis aims at eventual verification in reality. In this connection, Vaihinger says:

That is why in the case of a number of hypotheses, all equally possible, the most probable one is always selected. On the other hand, in the case of a number of equally possible fictions, the most expedient is chosen. The difference between the two constructs is here clearly shown.

Since the warrant for the continued use of a fiction is expediency, our concern will be with its justification in terms of its usefulness, not its verification in experience.

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13 Ibid., p. 81n.

14 Ibid., p. 85n.
Given, these general outlines and rudely stated distinctions we are assisted in our identification of fictions. Valhinger claims that there is a grammatical indicator of the use of a fiction. That grammatical indicator is "as if" (German: als ob or wie wenn). The grammatical indicator is not an idle clue but it represents the underlying structure of fictions. He says:

Our assertion that in the last analysis all fictions derive from comparative apperception, is supported by their linguistic form. For what is implied by the combination of particles, as if, als ob, wie wenn, etc.? First clearly a comparison... It is, of course, not a simple comparison, not a mere trope, and yet it is not a real analogy. The comparison lies midway between trope and a real analogy; in other words, between a rhetorical comparison and actual equivalent.\(^1\)

The further and equally important feature of fictions which is presented by the typical linguistic indicator (as if) is that part of the constructed comparison is recognized as being untrue or impossible. So a fiction is a recognized error, which, however, is a "more conscious, more practical and more fruitful error."\(^2\) As a consequence, the fictive judgment can be specified:

In a fictive judgment, as we might call this composite judgment, the possibility or necessity of a comparison or judgment, is stated, together with the assertion that this judgment has only subjective validity and not objective significance. It is easy to see that in the above verbal formulations there is actually expressed: first the denial of objective validity, i.e., the insistence upon the

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 91-92.
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 94.
lack of reality or the impossibility of what is stated in the conditional clause; secondly, the subjective validity, the assertion that this judgment, although subjective, is permissible or even necessary, for the human observer.\textsuperscript{17}

Before turning to Nietzsche's philosophy of as if, as presented by Vaihinger, it is important to be familiar with one further observation regarding fictions. Though Vaihinger inflates this observation to a "law", the observation uninflated is interesting and potentially enlightening.\textsuperscript{18} Simply put "The Law of Ideational Shifts" is the claim that the very same idea may shift from being understood as a fiction to being an hypothesis to being dogma. The process can go in reverse order. Although ideas usually shift from one stage to the psychologically next most adjacent stage, it can happen that an idea leaps directly from fiction to dogma or the reverse. Generally speaking scientific concepts move from fiction to hypothesis to dogma, while, for example religious concepts shift from dogma to hypothesis to fiction. It could happen, of course, that the construct would be dropped if it were the subject of a disconfirmed hypothesis and found not to be useful. This latter point emphasizes again that fictions stand in need of justification.

3. Nietzsche's philosophy of as if

A. Influences of Kant and Lange on Nietzsche

Vaihinger spends several chapters in an effort to establish that Kant held a philosophy of as if. Specifically, Vaihinger in-

\textsuperscript{17}Ib id., p. 95.

\textsuperscript{18}Vaihinger seems to have had a tendency to cast his ideas in bronze by referring to them as "laws." At the outset the reader was introduced to the "Law of the Preponderance of the Means over the End", while law presented here is the "Law of Ideational Shifts."
interprets Kant's philosophy of religion as a position that belief in God is a fictive judgment. Most interpreters of Kant, he maintains, fail to appreciate the degree to which Kant's philosophy was infused with the philosophy of as if. Scholars of other persuasions had their way with Kant's philosophy for several decades and it was not until Forberg published an essay in the Philosophische Journal in 1798 that the religion of as if was even adequately expounded. The journal which published Forberg's article, "The Development of the Concept of Religion," was edited by Fichte and Niethammer. Fichte introduced Forberg's article with his own, "On the Ground of our Belief in a Divine Government of the World." As a result the atheism-controversy which was stimulated by these essays came to be associated with Fichte, not Forberg. In attempting to right the oversight of Forberg's contribution, Vaihinger quotes several lengthy passages from the essay of 1798. One such quotation should suffice to acknowledge Forberg's achievement.

"...Believe that virtue in the end will triumph!
... Believe that no good action done or even merely designed by you no matter how small and obscure and humble it be, will be lost in the haphazard course of things! Believe that somewhere in this course

Vaihinger says that the as-if side of Kant's philosophy was only "slightly touched upon" by other philosophers until Forberg's article. Among those Vaihinger mentions are Volkelt, Rée and Görland. Nietzsche's association with Paul Rée may well be one of the links in the development of this view but again Vaihinger is lax in his citation so it is not clear that the Rée is the same as the one who was a friend of Nietzsche's. The probable dates can only be guessed at in this case. Chances are it is not Paul Rée.
of things there is a plan, imperceptible to you, it is true, but calculated on the ultimate triumph of the Good! Believe that the kingdom of God, the kingdom of truth and of justice, will come on earth; and do you but work for its coming! ... It is true that in all this you cannot scientifically demonstrate that it must be so. Enough that you heart bids you act as if it were so, and merely by so acting you will prove that you have religion!" 20

Duty for those who recognize the improbability of God's existence was formulated by Forberg as action as if there were a God and a world order. Forberg did not believe that there was reason to believe in either, yet his religion of as if required that one act as a practical theist though one might well be a theoretical atheist. Vaihinger notes that though Fichte's name is more often associated with the view, his comprehension of it left much about which to be dissatisfied.

The religion of as if did not re-emerge again until Lange's History of Materialism (Die Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart) in 1873-75. 21 Lange's philosophy lifted religion as if into the philosophical posture of the "standpoint of the ideal." In doing so Lange assumed much of Kant's metaphysics and epistemology. Specifically, according to Vaihinger, Lange held that: "The senses provide the material, but

20 Forberg as quoted by Vaihinger, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

21 Both Schleiermacher and deWette are credited by Vaihinger as holding some version of the religion of as if. Both theologians however did not maintain a pure Kantian religion of as if. Schleiermacher because he was influenced more by Fichte than Forberg and deWette because he insisted upon the necessity of a language which would provide a symbolic expression of the religious conviction.
it is our synthetic faculty which constructs from this a "causally" arranged world of "things." "22 Lange was suspicious, erroneously so from Vaihinger's point of view, of Kant's things-in-themselves, believing that Kant did not recognize that they were not real entities but fictions as much as were the morally ordered world and God. Oddly enough Lange accepted as his own intellectual forefather not Kant, but Schiller and from Schiller Lange developed the standpoint of the ideal.23 Schiller's "Take courage then in erring and in dreaming" can stand as a slogan for the standpoint of the ideal. A section of Lange's History of Materialism is entitled "The standpoint of the ideal" and is described by Vaihinger, sometimes quoting Lange, as follows:

Lange, in this section, is carrying on a battle on two fronts. On the one hand he attacks dogmatism and orthodoxy: "so long as this tendency reigns, the standpoint of the ideal in religion will never be able to assert itself clearly...

The other tendency against which Lange fights is materialism, not as a scientific method -- for in this form he accepts the materialistic mechanistic explanation of existence and events -- but in so far as materialism rejects wholesale, as it is bound in consistency to do, the religious world of ideas not only as a system of dogmatic doctrinal teachings but also as useful and tenable symbols, i.e. the materialism which casts religious ideas in general on to the scrap-heap.24


23Tbid., p. 334n. Vaihinger notes that Lange overlooks the fact that both Kant and Forberg used the expression "standpoint of the ideal."

Lange's standpoint of the ideal was not restricted to the domain of religious concepts. He argued that certain scientific and metaphysical concepts were equally well fictions. As Vaihinger puts it:

F. A. Lange, then, had already recognized that in science and life, imagination plays a part, that erroneous concepts, as measured by empirical reality, must be employed and this with full consciousness of their falsity: he recognized therefore, as we already saw at the beginning of this work that the thought and life fictions are indispensable.25

The philosophy of as if, the fictionalism now traced from Kant to Forberg to Lange was, by the time it reached Nietzsche, fairly well-developed into the view outlined at the beginning of this chapter. What remains to be seen is the contribution which Nietzsche made to this philosophical doctrine.

B. Nietzsche's early period: Interest in art

There is good reason to believe that Nietzsche was not only acquainted with Lange's History of Materialism but also that he found it quite to his liking. Vaihinger refers to Nietzsche commenting favorably to his friend Gersdorff in letters in 1866 and again in 1868. In the letter of August, 1866, to Gersdorff, Nietzsche wrote:

Finally, Schopenhauer must be mentioned, for whom I have every sympathy. What we possess in him was recently made quite clear to me by another work, which is excellent of its kind and very instructive: F. A. Lange's History of Materialism and Critique of Its Meaning in the Present (1855).

Here we have an extremely enlightened Kantian and natural scientist. His conclusions are summed up in the following three propositions.

1. The world of the senses is the product of our organization.
2. Our visible (physical) organs are, like other parts of the phenomenal world, only images of an unknown object.
3. Our real organization is therefore as much unknown to us as real external things are. We continually have before us nothing but the product of both.

Thus the true essence of things -- the thing-in-itself -- is not only unknown to us; the concept of it is neither more nor less than the final product of an antithesis which is determined by our organization, an antithesis of which we do not know whether it has any meaning outside our experience or not. Consequently, Lange thinks, one should give the philosophers a free hand as long as they edify us in this sense. Art is free, also in the domain of concepts. Who would refute in a phrase by Beethoven, and who would find error in Raphael's Madonna?* * *

Though Vaihinger does not discuss it, Nietzsche was also obviously familiar with Kant's work which, given the correctness of Vaihinger's interpretation, is also a full blown philosophy of as if. The key to Nietzsche's fictionalism is Lange's work according to Vaihinger, however.26 Intellectual history aside, the pertinent consideration is whether and to what extent Nietzsche should be read as a member of this school.


27 I remarked earlier on the possible intellectual crossbreeding in this view between Nietzsche and Paul Réé. Vaihinger insists that "... in regard to Illusion Nietzsche must definitely be set down as a disciple and successor of Lange." (Vaihinger, op.cit., p. 341)
Vaihinger believed that Nietzsche can be demonstrated to have maintained various elements of the philosophy of as if from the very beginning of his career. Nietzsche in his earliest published work, The Birth of Tragedy, opposes being and becoming and offers the view that myths stand stable against the shifting, evanescent becoming. Furthermore, the world of being is a necessary invention. Hence, truth and falsity are relative not absolute concepts. Vaihinger also refers to Nietzsche's "Truth and Falsehood in the Extra-moral Sense" (an unpublished essay "Über Wahrheit und Lüge im ausser-moralischen Sinne"). There Nietzsche introduced the notion of lying which is not to be judged morally, "the conscious deviation from reality to be found in myth, art, metaphor, etc." Art, drama, and so on are the conscious developments of illusion and as such are the expression of a fundamental, even a primitive, need. Nietzsche regarded the creation of illusions as provisions of the instinct.

In these his earliest writings Nietzsche included religious, metaphysical ethical views as inventions or illusions. Vaihinger cites several passages from this period in which Nietzsche employs the locution "as if". So of the elements of the philosophy of as if, Vaihinger has argued that Nietzsche, from the start maintained 1) that some of our concepts or ideas are illusions, 2) that these illusions are necessary and 3) that the illusions originate in the intellect from instinct.

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28 Vaihinger, op.cit., p. 342.
C. Nietzsche's transitional period:
The necessity of untruths

There is legitimate dispute about the "periods" into which Nietzsche's works ought to be divided. Vaihinger included in the middle period the works Human-All-Too-Human, Dawn and Gay Science as well as unpublished notes in Volumes XI and XII of the collected works. This middle period is characterized by Vaihinger as that time in Nietzsche's career when he struggled with the difficulty of accepting the value of untruths. It was at this time, however, according to Vaihinger that Nietzsche came to accept the necessity of illusions. As Vaihinger describes Nietzsche's thought:

In the advanced mind there develops more and more "the consciousness of illusion..." indeed a cult of illusion, "if nothing any longer proves to be divine unless it be error, blindness and lies," since on these "life has been arranged... This "impenetrable net of errors" is necessary for life..."

And again from the unpublished notes, Vaihinger draws the following:

"in order that there might be some degree of Consciousness in the world, an unreal world of error had to arise: beings with a belief in permanency, in individuals, etc. Not until an imaginary world, in contradiction to the absolute flux, had arisen, was it possible to erect on this foundation a structure of knowledge; and now finally we can see the fundamental error the belief in permanence upon which everything else rests...but this error can only be destroyed with life itself...our organs are adjusted to error. Thus there arises in the wise man the contradiction of life and of its ultimate determinations: man's instinct for knowledge presupposes belief..."
in error and life...to err is the condition of living...the fact that we know that we err does not do away with error. And that is not a bitter thought! We must love and cultivate error: it is the mother of knowledge."30

The scope of fictionalism for Nietzsche seems to be as broad as that which Vaihinger proposes. It includes not just religious and ethical concepts but the notions of laws of nature, mathematical concepts, identity, permanence, freedom and responsibility. Nietzsche even considers the distinction between appearance and reality (things-in-themselves) to be an imagined one.

D. Nietzsche's third period: Perspectivism

Although the works from this period include those which might generally be agreed to be Nietzsche's major mature works, Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, Genealogy of Morals, Twilight of the Idols, and The Antichrist, Vaihinger states that the support for Nietzsche's philosophy of as if comes in this period from the posthumous writings, specifically Volumes XII (235ff), XIII, XIV and XV. Nothing distinctive is added in this period beyond the introduction of "perspective" and "perspectivism." Vaihinger quotes Nietzsche in the use of these terms:

"it is nothing but a moral prejudice that regards truth as of more value than illusion...there would be no life at all were it not on the basis of perspective valuations and semblances" ... "the perspective is the basic condition of all life."31

30 Nietzsche as quoted by Vaihinger, op.cit., pp. 346-347.

31 Nietzsche as quoted by Vaihinger, op.cit., p. 352.
Vaihinger observes that in these works and notes, Nietzsche tends to use the term "hypothesis" especially in regard to scientific fictions, just as Lange did. A distinction was discussed earlier which Vaihinger maintains between hypothesis and fiction. Nietzsche uses the fuller term "regulative hypothesis" to indicate that the idea is employed even though it is recognized as a fiction. In a footnote, Vaihinger quotes Nietzsche on this point then claims the relatedness of Nietzsche's philosophy to Kant's:

...of particular significance is the passage in Vol. XIII, 139: "the mind has heretofore been too weak and too uncertain of itself to grasp an hypothesis as an hypothesis and, at the same time, to take it as a guide -- it required faith." To judge from the context this refers to morality. Thus, the "strong" mind ought to be conscious of its fictive nature and yet "take it as directive." He need not "believe" it, but he should act on it -- quite a Kantian dictum!...32

Vaihinger does not discuss this point at much length yet it seems important to notice that Nietzsche considers as a distinctive characteristic the ability to know that one is choosing one out of many possible "regulative hypotheses" and yet to regard it as a principle to be followed. That is, our values, though we know them to represent only our perspectives, are regarded as if they had absolute truth or non-subjective import. Nietzsche hence is providing an important criterion for identifying a "strong mind." Furthermore he speaks as though the strength of mind is the result of an evolutionary process -- previous generations of humans were

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32 Vaihinger, op.cit., p. 354.
not capable of consciously following a regulative principle.

This period in Nietzsche's work also was an occasion governed by a fear of the danger of regulative hypotheses which were mistaken as absolute truth. His fear was particularly intense and thoroughly explored in the case of Christianity. In fact the major works of this period are most expressive of this particular anxiety which Nietzsche had on behalf of his fellow human beings. His use of masks and his apparent ambivalence if not contradictoriness may well be rooted in the two convictions -- that fictions when they regulate lives have survival value and that if they are not recognized as fictions can result in a contrary effect. The dilemma Nietzsche faced was then the preservation of the fictions with their survival value as recognized fictions. The puzzle that pursued him was whether his fellow creatures could manage to do that. Recognition of a fiction could easily precipitate its rejection.

Vaihinger believed that Nietzsche began to probe what might be called a "Metaphysic of As-if":

with the question, what part illusion plays in the totality of cosmic happenings and how these cosmic happenings, from which illusion is necessarily developed, are to be regarded and evaluated...33

E. Nietzsche's fourth period:
Religious fictions as useful

It is probably the sense of all who read Nietzsche seriously that it was a tragedy that his prolific writing was ended in 1888.

33Ibid., p. 359.
This is no less the case with Valhinger. Each interpreter wonders about the projection of Nietzsche's development into the future that was abruptly blotted out. For Valhinger at least one projection seems reasonably clear: Nietzsche would eventually have come to accept the survival value of religious fictions. Though Nietzsche seemed insistent about the ravages brought by religious beliefs, Valhinger found several passages which suggest that Nietzsche may have accommodated himself to the acceptance of religious fictions. In the chapter "On the Religious" in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche seems to praise religions for teaching the ability to revere. Valhinger quotes only briefly from that chapter, even from the major works of this period, but there is a strong secondary theme under the virulent criticisms of religions. That second theme, however, appears to me to be a respect for individuals who possessed great souls despite the fact that those individuals at times were religious figures.

Valhinger says of the passages that speak favorably of religious fictions:

These utterances are the harbingers of a wider and final period of Nietzsche's development which was cut short by his illness. Nietzsche would inevitably have gained the road taken by the Kant he so completely misunderstood and also followed by F. A. Lange, the Lange by whom he had been so much influenced in his youth. He would not have revoked his Antichrist, whose incisive truths had,
once and for all, to be spoken, but he would have presented the "opposite of evil things" with the same relentless frankness: he would have justified the utility and the necessity of religious fictions.\textsuperscript{34}

4. The assertion of the philosophy of as if is not the same as the use of that view

The interpretation which Valhinger gives of Nietzsche's philosophy, that it is an instance of philosophy of as if, possesses some tempting insights. Valhinger surely presented many quotations from Nietzsche's works and notes which seem to authenticate this interpretation. One might argue that Nietzsche was more influenced by Schopenhauer and Wagner whom he mentions repeatedly in his correspondence than by Lange whom he mentions twice in the late 1860's. Or one might take issue with the claim that Nietzsche completely misunderstood Kant, while following Lange's Neo-Kantianism, since in the earlier letter which refers to Lange Nietzsche notes that Lange was an "extremely enlightened Kantian." If Lange was right about Kant and Nietzsche bought Lange's philosophy it should follow that Nietzsche could not have "completely misunderstood" Kant.

There is, however, a more important issue about Valhinger's discussion of Nietzsche. Valhinger expresses dismay that Nietzsche did not allow for the value of religious fictions and argues (briefly) that Nietzsche would have come to accept religious fictions had he not gone mad when he did. First of all there seems to be adequate

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., p. 362.
textual evidence to claim that Nietzsche did allow for the value of religious fictions. Not only the chapter on "What is Religions" testifies to that but also a number of other incidents in Zarathustra suggest that conclusion. At the very beginning of Zarathustra, Zarathustra does not tell an old religious ascetic what he has to say because of the fear that he would take from the man much more than he could give.

Furthermore, what is intriguing about Nietzsche's brand of fictionalism is that he stated it as doctrine and that he employed it in the promotion of new myths. Nietzsche even grants his critical reader that, yes, even his own philosophy is his perspective, and no one else is easily entitled to them. What persistently concerns Nietzsche is the necessity for the fictions or myths not to be mass myths. If the predominant emotional tone is to be joy, then the new myths cannot require suppression, sickness, naysaying. So Vaihinger's complaint with Nietzsche at the close of his career ought not to be that Nietzsche didn't accept the value of religious fictions. That is too trivial a concern. I suggested earlier that Nietzsche did not seem to have resolved how fictions can be recognized as such and still have force as regulative hypotheses. Is human psychology such that it can see its fictions as fictions and survive?

If we assume that most individuals cannot survive in the full recognition of fictionalism, then it is necessary that that philosophy not simply be stated baldly and without the presentation of
new myths for those who have understood the philosophy. Curiously enough, Vaihinger mentions in a footnote that eternal recurrence and the superman might be future myths.

Nietzsche has so little against such myths that he makes a demand for a "myth of the future" XII, 400. As a test of such a future-myth we can interpret the idea of the "Eternal recurrence". True enough, Nietzsche meant this at first as hypothetical, then as dogmatic, but, in the end, he himself appears to have interpreted it merely as a useful fiction. In this sense he says of this idea ... "Perhaps it is not true". And it is thus possible that G. Ewald (Nietzsches Lehre in ihren Grundbegriffen) was right in interpreting this thought as a pedagogical regulative idea, as G. Simmel also does. The idea of the "superman", too, is a heuristic-pedagogical-Utopian fiction of this sort.35

What I think should have crossed Vaihinger's mind is that Nietzsche did not just propose the philosophy of as if. Just as the linguistic form of the as if was a clue to its function, the linguistic form of Nietzsche's utterances should have been a clue to their function. Vaihinger virtually ignores Zarathustra and all of the mature works. Why, it must be asked, did Nietzsche rely on modes of expression which were literary, ambiguous and apparently contradictory as his own views developed? We must conclude that in large measure Vaihinger's exposition of the philosophy of as if and Nietzsche's form of it, though generally illuminating stops short of the more difficult problems which Nietzsche grappled with as a consequence.

CHAPTER VII: ETERNAL RECURRENCE

1. Nietzsche's task: The provision of metaphysical comfort

A. The three periods in Nietzsche's works; the importance of Zarathustra

Nietzsche's writings seem to strongly resist classification and interpretation. Nevertheless, I believe it is appropriate to identify a group of books as his "mature works" and to focus on them in order to bring out their central themes. In order to come to a general understanding of the totality of Nietzsche's works an understanding the significance of those central themes must be established. What follows is evidence that Nietzsche's works centered around Zarathustra and Zarathustra around the theme of eternal recurrence.

The five works written in 1888 might be disputed as the ravings of a madman since Nietzsche was clearly broken by 1889. Those five works: The Wagner Case, Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, Ecce Homo and Nietzsche contra Wagner, however, differ in scope and ought not be dismissed as a group simply because they were written in Nietzsche's final lucid year. The Wagner Case and Nietzsche contra Wagner while not exclusively concerned with Wagner, do have a much narrower focus than most of Nietzsche's works. They
seem to represent Nietzsche's reconsideration of his earlier worship of Wagner and perhaps therefore his setting to rest of his own previous naivete. The Antichrist is similar to the two Wagner pieces in that it presents Nietzsche's attempt to throw off the lingering influences of Christianity. Characteristically in these late works he still examines Great Men -- exerting much effort to show the distinctions between the Great Men of bad influence (Plato, Paul, Kant, Wagner, etc.) and those of good influence (Socrates, Heraclitus, Napoleon, Christ, Goethe, etc.). In a similar way, Nietzsche reviews his own previous conclusions in Twilight of the Idols by discussing Great Men. Hence the works of 1888 seem to share both a narrower scope and the illustration and illumination of his convictions by means of the stories of Great Men. No less is this the case with Nietzsche's Ecce Homo. In this work he examines a Great Man at close range by way of a most unusual autobiography. So, while the five works of 1888 are not without merit, not garbled, nor incoherent, of them Ecce Homo is most crucial to an understanding of Nietzsche.

Ecce Homo provides a potent set of clues to Nietzsche's own sense of the development of his thinking. Of Dawn Nietzsche says:

"There are so many dawns that have not yet glowed" -- this Indian inscription marks the opening of this book. Where does its author seek that new morning, that as yet undiscovered tender red that marks the beginning of another day -- ah, a whole series, a whole world of new days? In a revaluation of all values, in a liberation from all moral values, in saying Yes to having confidence in all that
has hitherto been forbidden, despised, and
dammed. This Yes-saying book pours out its
light, its love, its tenderness upon ever
so many wicked things; it gives back to them
their "soul", a good conscience, the lofty
right and privilege of existence. Morality
is not attacked, it is merely no longer in
the picture.¹

In Dawn Nietzsche begins his revaluation of all values, not
by a critique of morality but by the omission of morality. This
revaluation consists in saying Yes to that which was "forbidden,
despised, and damned." It is in The Gay Science that Nietzsche
sees the first exploration of what Yes-saying requires. It is in
The Gay Science that Nietzsche reveals Zarathustra and eternal
recurrence. Nietzsche describes the Gaya Scienza:

The Dawn is a Yes-saying book, deep but bright
and gracious. The same is true also and in the
highest degree of the Gaya Scienza: in almost
every sentence profundity and high spirits go
tenderly hand in hand. Some verses that express
my gratitude for the most wonderful month of
January I ever experienced -- this whole book was
its present -- reveals sufficiently from what
depths this "science" emerged to gaiety:

With a flaming spear you parted
All its ice until my soul
Hurries roaring toward the ocean
Of its highest hope and goal:
Ever healthier and brighter,
In most loving constraint, free --
Thus it praises your great wonders,
Fairest month of January!

¹Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New
What is here called "highest hope" -- who could have any doubt about that when he sees the diamond beauty of the first words of Zarathustra flashing at the end of the fourth book? --

It was in January of 1882 that Nietzsche wrote Book Four of Gay Science, the book which he subtitled in exaltation of that fairest January, Sanctus Januarius. Book Four begins with a paragraph which identifies amor fati with yes-saying. The next to the last paragraph introduces eternal recurrence while the last paragraph is identical with the opening of Zarathustra. So Nietzsche means, quite literally, that "the diamond beauty of the first words of Zarathustra" flash at the end of the fourth book of The Gay Science.

Nietzsche followed the fourth book of The Gay Science with the writing of Zarathustra, then Beyond Good and Evil, but did not write the fifth book of The Gay Science until 1886. Even though a complete copy of The Gay Science may suggest otherwise, the fourth book of it heralds the coming of Zarathustra.

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For the New Year - I still live, I still think; I must still live, for I must still think. Sum, ergo cogito: cogito, ergo sum. Today everyone takes the liberty of expressing his wish and his favourite thought: well, I also mean to tell what I have wished for myself today, and what thought first crossed my mind this year, -- a thought which ought to be the basis, the pledge and the sweetening of all my future life! I want more and more to perceive the necessary characters in things as the beautiful: -- I shall thus be one of those who beautify things. Amor fati: let that henceforth be my love! I do not want to accuse, I do not want even to accuse the accusers. Looking inside, let that be my sole negation! And all in all, to sum up: I wish to be at any time hereafter only a yeasayer! (Friedrich Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom trans. Thomas Common, New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing, 1964) p. 213 Die fröhliche Wissenschaft is translated by some as Joyful Wisdom and by others as The Gay Science.
The Heaviest Burden - What if a demon crept after thee into thy loneliest loneliness some day or night, and said to thee: "This life, as thou livest it at present, and hast lived it, thou must live it once more, and also innumerable times; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and every sigh, and all the unspeakably small and great in thy life must come to thee again, and all in the same series and sequence -- and similarly this spider and this moonlight among the trees, and similarly this moment, and I myself. The eternal sandglass of existence will ever be burned once more, and thou with it, thou speck of dust!" Wouldst thou not throw thyself down and gnash thy teeth, and curse the demon that so spake? Or hast thou once experienced a tremendous moment in which thou wouldst answer him: "Thou art a God, and never did I hear anything so divine!" If that thought acquired power over thee as thou art, it would transform thee, and perhaps crush thee; the question with regard to all and everything: "Dost thou want this once more, and also for innumerable times?" Would lie as the heaviest burden upon thy activity? Or, how wouldst thou have to become favorably inclined to thyself and to life, so as to long for nothing more ardently than for this last eternal sanctioning and sealing? --
(Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom, pp. 270-271)

Incipit Tragedia - When Zarathustra was thirty years old, he left his home and the Lake of Urm, and went into the mountains. There he enjoyed his spirit and his solitude, and for ten years did not weary of it. But at last his heart changed, and rising one morning with the rosy dawn, he went before the sun and spake thus to it: "Thou great star! What would be the happiness if thou hadst not those for whom thou shinest! For ten years hast thou climbed hither unto my cave: thou wouldst have wearied of thy light and of the journey, had it not been for me, mine eagle, and my serpent. But we awaited thee every morning, took from thine overflow, and blessed thee for it. Lo! I am weary of my wisdom, like the bee that hath gathered too much honey; I need hands outstretched to take it. I would fain bestow and distribute, until the wise have once more become joyous in their folly, and the poor happy in their riches. Therefore must I descend into the deep, as thou dost in the evening, when thou goest behind the sea and givest light also to the netherworld, thou most rich star! Like thee must I go down, as men say, to whom I shall descend. Bless me then, thou tranquil eye, that canst behold even the greatest happiness without envy! Bless the cup that is about to overflow, that the water may flow golden out of it, and carry everywhere the reflection of thy bliss! Lo! This cup is going to empty itself, and Zarathustra is again going to be a man." Thus began Zarathustra's downgoing.
(Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom, pp. 271-272)
In discussing Zarathustra in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche indicates that the central conception of the book is the idea of eternal recurrence. He even dates the origin of the idea in his experience and suggests that Zarathustra resulted from a "pregnancy" that began in 1881, with a fundamental change in taste, and ended in 1883 at the time of Wagner's death. The Gay Science constituted part of the pregnancy. As Nietzsche put it:

"My Gaya Scienza belongs in the interval and contains a hundred signs of the proximity of something incomparable; in the end it even offers the beginning of Zarathustra, and in the penultimate section of the fourth book the basic idea of Zarathustra."

That eternal recurrence is the central conception of Zarathustra is also explicitly stated at the outset of the chapter in Ecce Homo on Zarathustra.

Now I shall relate the history of Zarathustra. The fundamental conception of this work, the idea of the eternal recurrence, this highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable, belongs in August 1881: it was penned on a sheet with the notation underneath, "6000 feet beyond man and time." That day I was walking through the woods along the lake of Silvaplana; at a powerful pyramidal rock not far from Surlei I stopped. It was then that this idea came to me.

In the chapter on Zarathustra, Nietzsche not only says that eternal recurrence is the central conception of Zarathustra, that amor fati is the highest expression of saying Yes, he also identifies Zarathustra's task as his own. The period of Zarathustra

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6 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 296.

7 Ibid., p. 295.
was a change in Nietzsche, wherein Zarathustra as a type "overtook" Nietzsche. The physiological presupposition of that type is what Nietzsche calls "great health."

To understand this type, one must first become clear about his physiological presupposition: this is what I call the great health. I don't know how I could explain this concept better, more personally, than I have done it in one of the last sections of the fifth book of my Gaya Scienza. Nietzsche then quotes section 382 of The Gay Science. The rationale for the fifth book of The Gay Science is now evident. It was Nietzsche's return to complete the preparation for Zarathustra by unveiling the notion of Great Health. (Cf. Table 3 for a chronology of Nietzsche's works.)

Zarathustra and the related conception of eternal recurrence dominated what I consider Nietzsche's middle period. In the table of the chronology of Nietzsche's works I indicate that the middle works include The Dawn (1881), The Gay Science (1882), Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-85), Beyond Good and Evil (1886), and On the Genealogy of Morals (1887). The late works turn on two issues, as I have argued, the purging of old ties, blind faith, on the one hand, and the enthusiastic portrayal of Great Men, on the other. The early works represent Nietzsche's development of his own views, first the romance with the Greeks, then Strauss, then Schopenhauer,
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then Wagner. *Human, All-Too-Human* is a pivotal piece in the sense that it could well belong to the middle period. I am not concerned to develop an uncontestable classification system but I do think it is important to understand which thoughts invaded Nietzsche and centered his works.

B. Correspondence supports the importance

I wish to return to the middle period and the importance of *Zarathustra*. The evidence from *Ecce Homo* points to *Dawn* and *Gay Science* as preparations for *Zarathustra*. In a letter to Franz Overbeck in April of 1884, Nietzsche wrote:

> On reading *Morgenröte* and *Fröhliche Wissenschaft*, I happened to find that hardly a line there does not serve as introduction, preparation, and commentary to the aforesaid *Zarathustra*. It is a fact that I did the commentary *before* writing the text. 10

Nietzsche's correspondence from the middle 1880's also reflects the personal significance *Zarathustra* had for him. For example, again to Franz Overbeck in May of 1884, he wrote:

> My dear friend Overbeck, it's really wonderful that we've not become estranged these last years, Not even, it seems, because of *Zarathustra* 

> ............................................................... ............................................................... ............................................................... 

> With respect to the practical side of life I beg of you, my tried and true friend, to go on helping me maintain just one thing: the greatest possible independence and freedom from personal concerns. I think you know what *Zarathustra*’s urging "Become hard!" means for me in particular. My tendency to do justice to everyone, and to treat with the greatest gentleness precisely what is most hostile to me, is developed to excess. This invites

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10 Nietzsche, *Selected Letters to Friedrich Nietzsche*, p. 223.
one danger after another, not only for me but for
my task. Here indeed I need hardening and, for
disciplinary reasons, an occasional bit of cruelty. 11

Clearly Zarathustra's messages are crucial for Nietzsche. Zarathustra
speaks to Nietzsche's needs.

Another letter of 1884, this one to Malwilda von Meysenbug,
shows both how personally and how indirectly Zarathustra speaks:

...It has now become extremely difficult to give
me help; more and more, I consider it unlikely that
I'll meet anyone who can. Almost every time I've
entertained such hopes, it's turned out that I
was the one who had to pitch in. But I have no time
for that now. My task is enormous, my determination
no less so. What I want, my son Zarathustra won't
tell you. But he'll challenge you to figure it
out, and perhaps you can. This much is certain:
I wish to force mankind to decisions which will
determine its entire future -- and it may yet
happen that one day whole millennia will make their
most solemn vows in my name... 12

To Peter Gast, still in 1884, Nietzsche wrote:

I've managed to get the major task I set myself
this summer more or less done. The next six years
will go toward filling in an outline I've made of my
"philosophy." It looks promising. At the moment,
Zarathustra's value is entirely personal. For me, it
is "devotional literature." For everyone else, it is
obscure, mysterious, and ridiculous.

Heinrich von Stein (a splendid specimen of a man,
whose company has given me real pleasure) told me
candidly that of said Zarathustra he understood
"twelve sentences and no more." I found that very
comforting.... 13

11 Nietzsche, A Self-Portrait from His Letters, pp. 80-81.
12 Ibid., p. 81.
13 Ibid., pp. 81-82.
Nietzsche even refers to 1881 as "this Zarathustra year" (letter to Heinrich von Stein). But the year of 1883 did not find Nietzsche disinterested in Zarathustra. He wrote in June, 1883, to Carl von Gersdorff:

...The time for silence is past: my Zarathustra [parts I and II] may show you how high my will has flown....Do not be deceived by this little book's having a legendary air: behind all the plain and strange words stand my deepest seriousness and my whole philosophy. It is the beginning of my disclosure of myself -- not more! I know quite well that there is nobody alive who would do anything the way this Zarathustra is --

In the letters of 1883, Nietzsche also uses the metaphor of giving birth to Zarathustra, his son, and the protracted pregnancy resulting in Zarathustra. To Peter Gast in February of 1883, Nietzsche wrote:

...The incredible burden of the weather (even old Etna is beginning to belch) transformed itself into thoughts and feelings of frightful intensity. And out of my sudden release from this burden, in the wake of ten absolutely bright and bracing January days, Zarathustra was born, the most emancipated of my offspring.

Nietzsche's enthusiasm for Zarathustra and his continued insistence that it presented his philosophy, that it presented him, was expressed in most of his correspondence. To Peter Gast in August, 1883, he wrote "It is incredibly full of detail which because it is drawn from what I've seen and suffered, only

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14 Nietzsche, Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 231.

15 Ibid., p. 213.

16 Nietzsche, A Self-Portrait from His Letters, p. 71.
I can understand. Some pages seem to be almost bleeding...

Early in 1881, Nietzsche wrote to Erwin Rohde that "It is a kind of abyss of the future -- horrible, above all in its rapture. Everything in it is me alone, without prototype, parallel, or precedent; anyone whoever lived in it would come back to the world a different man."18

It seems to me that more than the notebooks, Nietzsche's correspondence can lead us in a fruitful direction in interpreting his works. What these quoted remarks indicate is that Nietzsche saw Zarathustra as monumental.19 For Nietzsche, personally, Zarathustra presented commands to "Be hard!" He said it was "devotional literature" for him. The work revealed both Nietzsche and his "philosophy" (he would consider that an artificial distinction, at best). But Nietzsche thought Zarathustra was monumental not only in regard to his own life. It brings us to the "abyss of the future," no one who ever "lived in it would come back to the world" as the same man. The extent of Nietzsche's

17 Ibid., p. 76.
18 Ibid., p. 77.
19 He expressed uncertainty in but one letter, to Franz Overbeck in March of 1883:

That reminds me again of my latest folly, I mean Zarathustra... I'm curious to know whether it has any merit whatsoever. I myself am incapable of judgment this winter and could be grotesquely mistaken about such things. Besides, I've heard and seen nothing of the book..." (Nietzsche, A Self-Portrait from His Letters, p. 73)
will was complete in Zarathustra for with it, he said "I wish to force all mankind to decisions which will determine its entire future..." With what intent: "...and it may yet happen that one day whole millennia will make their most solemn vows in my name..."

One does not know whether the name is "Zarathustra" or "Nietzsche" but it may not matter.

Nietzsche also showed in the correspondence that while his philosophy was behind Zarathustra, that work was not the statement of the philosophy. In one letter he wrote "What I want, my son Zarathustra won't tell you. But he'll challenge you to figure it out and perhaps you can." Nietzsche even remarked that he found "comforting" the fact that a friend said he found twelve sentences and no more of Zarathustra understandable. This suggests that Nietzsche did not want to be easily understood -- if he were stating a philosophy he wanted it to be obscure. His concern seemed to have been with the reader who "lived" Zarathustra and returned a different person.

The two concepts, eternal recurrence and the overman, are the primary interest in Zarathustra. Part iii of Zarathustra thrashes out eternal recurrence, especially in the sense of portraying the psychological impact of the thought of eternal recurrence. Zarathustra, if not an instance of the overman,

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20 I am somewhat embarrassed at simplifying Nietzsche's Zarathustra in this manner. That embarrassment is allayed by the fact that these comments are a sequel to the reading of Nietzsche's works and the preliminaries to re-reading them. Hence, in no way are these limited comments a substitute for the works themselves.
is a signal of what such an individual would be like. Episodes, reflections and comments sketch out what must be attempted in becoming an overman. Far from a manual on how to become an overman, the legend can inspire the reader into such paths of attempting.

C. Metaphysical comfort

Before considering the two concepts of eternal recurrence and the overman as they emerged in Zarathustra, I wish to go back to Nietzsche's first work, The Birth of Tragedy, to construct an element necessary for the claim that more than Dawn and Gay Science prepared the way for Zarathustra. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche considers "metaphysical comfort," specifically how it was provided by Greek tragedy.

What on its surface appears as an aesthetic theory with the Greek leanings to be expected from a philologist is with some scraping discovered to be a complex position paper on human needs. Though details of Nietzsche's views may have to be inferred from an understanding of his later works it is possible nevertheless to find in The Birth of Tragedy the rudiments of his epistemology and metaphysics as well as and more importantly the task which he set for his whole philosophy. It is likely that his epistemology and metaphysics altered and changed but his fundamental concern remained the same; that concern is that man find for himself a means by which he can live with his knowledge of his mortality, a means which is also not restrictive, limiting nor productive of mediocrity. The fascination of the Greek
tragedy for Nietzsche rested with the two forces -- the Apollinian and the Dionysian -- which constitute the tragedy -- and the "metaphysical comfort" provided by it. "Metaphysical comfort" seems to be the satisfaction which we experience in the illusion of immortality. In other words, *The Birth of Tragedy* offers a considerably broader look into Nietzsche's philosophy than the aesthetic theory that it may seem to be.

In order to make good on these general claims it will be necessary for me to present an explication of the Apollinian, the Dionysian, their relation in tragedy and an exploration of Nietzsche's view of the death of tragedy at the hand of Socrates. Further details as to the nature of the "metaphysical comfort" to be derived from tragedy and its difference from catharsis will eventually appear.

The primary psychological state of the Apollinian force is the dream, the impression of potential perfection which is not unfeeling but an illusion capable of being identified as illusion. The essence of the Apollinian force is the principle of individuation embodied in the Olympian gods who were the extremes of all aspects of life. They stood interposed between the Greek man and the horror of existence, so that he could endure existence. With this succor the Greek not only was able to endure life but so well accommodated himself to it that he developed a strong will to live.
In contrast to the dream state of the Apollinian is the intoxication of the Dionysian. Here the passions overcome the measure of the Apollinian and there is a loss of awareness of the individual in the frenzy of festival. In opposition to balance is excess. This state of intoxication is an identification with the primordial unity of all will. The personal subjectivity of "I" becomes mere appearance. Just as sculpture is the artistic expression of the Apollinian dream image, the Dionysian force is expressed or even recreated in music but the peculiar dithyrambic music, the folk music, which can transform the individual by removing his distinction from all other living things. (To the degree that Schopenhauer's metaphysics was of influence, in the Dionysian state the individual becomes at one not just with all other living things but thereby returns to the very womb of existence itself).

Greek tragedy with its healing grace appears then as a festival of transfiguration and redemption over the principle of individuation. It began with the chorus establishing in the audience a Dionysian passionate transelike state by way of dithyrambic chanting. In its sway the audience could accept the presentation of the Apollinian images of gods -- beings that were essentially larger than life. In his simplest statement of this complex relation, Nietzsche's says "...we must understand Greek tragedy as the Dionysian chorus which ever anew discharges itself..."
in an Apollinian world of images." This fundamental opposition of forces is repeatedly and in various degrees of completeness described throughout The Birth of Tragedy:

...I shall keep my eyes fixed on the two artistic dieties of the Greeks, Apollo and Dionysus, and recognize in them the living and conspicuous representatives of two worlds of art differing in their intrinsic essence and in their higher aims. I see Apollo as the transfiguring genius of the principium individuationis through which alone the redemption in illusion is truly to be obtained; while by the mystical triumphant cry of Dionysus the spell of individuation is broken and the way lies open to the Mothers of Being, to the innermost heart of things.22

The tragic myth is to be understood only as a symbolization of Dionysian wisdom through Apollinian artifices.23

If it does not seem awkward for Nietzsche to have done so, in defining tragic myth he employed the notion of "intuition" in a manner showing a lingering impression of Kant:

Dionysian art therefore is wont to exercise two kinds of influence on the Apollinian art faculty: music incites to the symbolic intuition of Dionysian universality, and music allows the symbolic image to emerge in its highest significance.24


22 Ibid., pp. 99-100.

23 Ibid., p. 131.

24 Ibid., p. 103.
Music therefore gives birth to myth, particularly to tragic myth.

The supposed tension and interdependence between the Apollinian and Dionysian tendencies is also shown in the attitude of the Apollinian:

Thus the Apollinian tears us out of Dionysian universality and lets us find delight in individuals; it attaches our pity to them and by means of them it satisfies our sense of beauty which longs for great and sublime forms; it presents images of life to us, and incites us to comprehend in thought the core of life they contain. With the immense impact of the image, the concept, the ethical teaching and the sympathetic motion, the Apollinian tears man from his orgiastic self-annihilation and blinds him to the universality of the Dionysian process, deluding him into the belief that he is seeing a single image of the world (Tristan and Isolde, for instance), and that, through music, he is merely supposed to see it still better and more profoundly. What can the healing magic of Apollo not accomplish when it can even create the illusion that the Dionysian is really in the service of the Apollinian and capable of enhancing its effects -- as if music were essentially the art of presenting an Apollinian content?25

The healing power of tragedy, our need for myth, echoes throughout Nietzsche's philosophy. It seems to be identical with his task of healing the "wound of existence." At this early point in his development, the temporary cure envisioned is the metaphysical comfort offered by the Greek tragedy. Notice that there is a distinctive joy in the witnessing of or the feeling with the destruction of the hero of the tragedy as well as the unique exhilaration through his individuation in a piece of sculpture.

25Ibid., p. 128.
The metaphysical joy in the tragic is a translation of the instinctive unconscious Dionysian wisdom into the language of images: the hero, the highest manifestation of the will, is negated for our pleasure, because he is only phenomenon, and because the eternal life of the will is not affected by his annihilation. "We believe in eternal life," exclaims tragedy; while music is the immediate idea of this life. Plastic art has an altogether different aim: here Apollo overcomes the suffering of the individual by the radiant glorification of the eternity of the phenomenon.... In Dionysian art and its tragic symbolism the same nature cries to us with its true undissembled voice: "Be as I am! Amid the ceaseless flux of phenomena I am the eternally creative primordial mother, eternally impelling to existence, eternally finding satisfaction in this change of phenomena!"

So metaphysical comfort is our joy in existence obtained by participating in the destruction of the individuated phenomena and in the mergence with the eternal primal unity of undifferentiated will. What joy is that? The refreshment of eternity. By taking part emotionally in the tragedy we grasp for our immortality. In the Apollinian exaltation of phenomena to their perfection as forms we correspondingly achieve the eternity of phenomena -- the essences, the types, the ideals are timeless. Our symbolic intuition of Apollinian images confers on us the immortality of contemplation. Inasmuch as the tragic myth is simultaneously the Apollinian and Dionysian mode of apprehension, the experience of the tragic myth can only be the most powerful technique for healing the wound of existence, removing our dread and rejuvenating a joy in life.

26 Ibid., p. 104.
According to Nietzsche, the destruction of tragedy occurs with the Socratic rationalistic outlook and its naturalism. Tragedy could not persist once the Dionysian force was banished from drama. Correspondingly the Apollinian aspect of tragedy since it arises from the Dionysian disappears with it. The metaphysical comfort of classic tragedy unhappily is replaced by the "happy ending" of the new drama and the shallowness of the new music.

The need continues for the tragic myth even though it has fled to the hills upon the entrance of Socrates. Our saving grace is of course the power of German spirituality. Dionysian music can resound again by way of Wagner — or when he at last was no longer enamoured of Wagner, Nietzsche himself through the mouth of Zarathustra can offer again the tragic myth.

A psychologist might still add that what I heard as a young man listening to Wagnerian music really had nothing to do with Wagner; that when I described Dionysian music I described what I had heard — that instinctively I had to transpose and transfigure everything into the new spirit that I carried in me. The proof of that, as strong as any proof can be, is my essay on Wagner in Bayreuth: in all psychologically decisive places I alone am discussed and one need not hesitate to put down my name or the word "Zarathustra" where the text has the word "Wagner".27

For Nietzsche to consider himself a Dionysian philosopher is for us to have a puzzle. To the extent that the Dionysian experience is redemption from individuation how does it come to pass that Nietzsche is the greatest celebrant of individuality

27 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 274.
one can discover? How can the festivals of primal unity of will be accommodated with the distinctness and power of the individual will as Nietzsche considers it the sole value to be retained in the midst of his iconoclasm?

What attracted Nietzsche to the tragic myth is that it seemed to offer both the acceptance of the phenomenal world of becoming and the eternity of the world of being. Even if rationality had not destroyed the ability of the tragic myth to offer metaphysical comfort, Nietzsche's own probings would have led him to a dissatisfaction with such a resolution. The individual will is lost in both the Apollinian and the Dionysian effects. The individual lets go. The individual is lost in the frenetic chanting of the purified ideal. Nietzsche's metaphysical comfort can only be derived with a new myth and one which preserves, even sanctifies, the individual will. If Nietzsche was overcome by the thought of eternal recurrence, was it not because that thought finally cured his "metaphysical" illness?

As Nietzsche came to conceive of the problem, it formulated itself in terms of the death of God. A most moving parable portrays the anguish of one who has given up faith in ideals:

The madman. — Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly: "I seek God! I seek God!" — As many of those who did not believe in God were standing around just then, he provoked much laughter. Has he got lost? asked one. Did he lose his way like a child? asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? emigrated? — Thus they yelled and laughed.
The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. "Whither is God?" he cried; "I will tell you. We have killed him -- you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light lanterns in the morning? Do we hear nothing as yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as yet of the divine decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.

"How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed; and whoever is born after us -- for the sake of this deed he will belong to a higher history than all history hitherto."

Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they, too, were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, and it broke into pieces and went out. "I have come too early," he said then; "my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder require time; the light of the stars requires time; deeds, though done, still require time to be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars -- and yet they have done it themselves."
It has been related further than on the same day the madman forced his way into several churches and there struck up his requiem aeternam deo. Led out and called to account, he is said always to have replied nothing but: "What after all are these churches now if they are not the tombs and sepulchers of God?" 28

This parable witnesses the metaphysical illness, being without ideals, which Nietzsche sensed as part of the loss in the demise of the Greek tragedy. By this time, Nietzsche no longer saw solace in the Dionysian (Schopenhauerian) suppression of the individual will. The individual remains as a series of events in the phenomenal world; his will is a feature of everything that lives. The question then changes to one of how one can live with only a belief in the phenomenal world. Can humans live without faith in eternal truths? With this question one teeters on the edge of nihilism. How can one live with only a belief in the phenomenal world and resist nihilism? In Book Five of Gay Science, Nietzsche wrote:

Our question mark. -- But you do not understand this? Indeed, people will have trouble understanding us. We are looking for words; perhaps we are also looking for ears. Who are we anyway? If we simply called ourselves, using an old expression, godless, or unbelievers, or perhaps immoralists, we do not believe that this would even come close to designating us: We are all three in such an advanced stage that one -- that you, my curious friends -- could never comprehend how we feel at this point. Ours is no longer the bitterness and passion of the person who has torn himself away and still feels compelled to turn his unbelief into a new belief, a purpose a martyrdom. We have become cold, hard, and tough

28 Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom, pp. 181-182.
in the realization that the way of this world is anything but divine; even by human standards it is not rational, merciful or just. We know it well, the world in which we live is ungodly, immoral, "inhuman"; we have interpreted it far too long in a false and mendacious way, in accordance with the wishes of our reverence, which is to say, according to our needs. For man is a reverent animal. But he is also mistrustful; and that the world is not worth what we thought it was, that is about as certain as anything of which our mistrust has finally got hold. The more mistrust, the more philosophy.

We are far from claiming that the world is worth less; indeed it would seem laughable to us today if man were to insist on inventing values that were supposed to excel the value of the actual world. This is precisely what we have turned our backs on as an extravagant aberration of human vanity and unreason that for a long time was not recognized as such. It found its final expression in modern pessimism.... and a more ancient and stronger expression in the teaching of Buddha; but it is part of Christianity also, if more doubtfully and ambiguously so but not for that reason any less seductive.

The whole pose of "man against the world," of man as a "world-negating" principle, of man as the measure of the value of things, as judge of the world who in the end places existence itself upon his scales and finds it wanting -- the monstrous insipidity of this pose has finally come home to us and we are sick of it. We laugh as soon as we encourager the juxtaposition of "man and world," separated by the sublime presumption of the Little word "and." But look, when we laugh like that, have we not simply carried the contempt for man one step further? And thus also pessimism, the contempt for that existence which is knowable by us? Have we not exposed ourselves to the suspicion of an opposition -- an opposition between the world in which we were at home up to now with our reverences that perhaps made it possible for us to endure life, and another world that consists of us -- an inexorable, fundamental, and deepest suspicion about ourselves that is more and more gaining worse and worse control of us Europeans and that could easily confront coming generations with the terrifying Either/Or: "Either
abolish your reverences or -- yourselves!" The latter would be nihilism; but would not the former also be -- nihilism?... -- This is our question mark.29

The intersection of eternal recurrence and the overman are presented toward the end of Gay Science when Nietzsche describes "great health."30

The great health. -- Being new, nameless, hard to understand, we premature births of an as yet unproven future need for a new goal also a new means -- namely, a new health, stronger, more seasoned, tougher, more audacious, and gayer than any previous health. Whoever has a soul that craves to have experienced the whole range of values and desiderata to date, and to have sailed around the coasts of this ideal "mediterranean"; whoever wants to know from the adventures of his own most authentic experience how a discoverer and conqueror of the ideal feels, and also an artist, a saint, a legislator, a sage, a scholar, a pious man, a soothsayer,... and one who stands divinely apart in the old style -- needs one thing above everything else: the great health -- that one does not merely have but also acquires continually, and must acquire because one gives it up again and again, and must give it up.

And now, after we have long been on our way in this manner, we argonauts of the ideal, with more daring perhaps than is prudent, and have suffered shipwreck and damage often enough, but are, to repeat it, healthier than one likes to permit us, dangerously healthy, ever again healthy -- it will seem to us as if, as a reward, we now confronted an as yet undiscovered country whose boundaries nobody has surveyed yet, something beyond all the lands and nooks of the ideal so far, a world so overrich in what is beautiful, strange

29Ibid., pp. 285-287.

30Recall that Book Five of Gay Science was written following Zarathustra and Beyond Good and Evil, but that those two books followed the writing of the first four books of Gay Science.
questionable, terrible, and divine that our curiosity as well as our craving to possess it has got beside itself -- alas, now nothing will sate us any more!

After such vistas and with such a burning hunger in our conscience and science....how could we still be satisfied with present-day men? It may be too bad but it is inevitable that we find it difficult to remain serious when we look at his worthiest goals and hopes, and perhaps we do not even bother to look any more.

Another ideal runs ahead of us, a strange, tempting, dangerous ideal to which we should not wish to persuade anybody because we do not readily concede the right to it to anyone: the ideal of a spirit who plays naively -- that is, not deliberately but from overflowing power and abundance -- with all that was hitherto called holy, good, untouchable, divine; for whom those supreme things that the people naturally accept as their value standards, signify danger, decay, debasement, or at least recreation, blindness, and temporary self-oblivion; the ideal of a human, superhuman well-being and benevolence...that will often appear inhuman -- for example, when it confronts all earthly seriousness so far, as if it were their most incarnate and involuntary parody -- and in spite of all of this, it is perhaps only with him that great seriousness really begins, that the real question mark is posed for the first time, that the destiny of the soul changes, the hands moves forward, the tragedy begins...

The discussions in this chapter to this point are intended to establish that Nietzsche considered a fundamentally personal yet generally significant problem -- how is one to live with impermanence? The problem is not one which Nietzsche expected many to recognize. The treatment which he offered is even narrower in its application. As Nietzsche put it "These are my truths and you are not easily entitled to them." What I maintain is that Nietzsche discovered the metaphysical illness of the anxiety which is created

31 Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom, pp. 346-347.
by knowledge of Heraclitus' truth: All is impermanence, 2) He resisted denials of that impermanence which were embodied in traditional ideals (metaphysical, ethical, religious, scientific), 3) He believed the alternative to belief in those ideals was nihilism which was equally unacceptable to him, 4) He valued the individual, 5) He valued diversity and complexity. Therefore, Nietzsche tried to discover an ideal which could be recognized as a fiction, which would not deny impermanence, which would not require sameness of all persons, and which would stave off the threatening nihilism. In brief, Nietzsche's problem was to produce joy not resignation in the face of impermanence. An individual who recognizes impermanence yet exalts his own values is roughly what is meant by the overman.

It is probably simplest to sketch Nietzsche's concept of an overman by considering the remarks on nobility in Beyond Good and Evil. Let me begin by stating a rather sweeping generalization which I hold with growing conviction. The lives of many concepts in the areas of morality, aesthetics, law and probably more, are to a large extent governed by area-specifying concepts such as, in these cases, human life, art and society. What I mean by this is, for example, most moral concepts are dependent on or derivative from the area-specifying concept of human life. Criteria which are exhibited in answers to questions like "What does it mean to be a human being?" or "Is X a human being?" surely also have significant
roles in how one answers questions such as "What does it mean to be good, or moral, or just?" as well as "Is action X a good, or moral, or just act?" I am also convinced that the criteria which function for the area-specifying concept, not only guide and limit what one says about a specific concept or how one uses that specific concept, but they also are most frequently the most difficult to uncover. Perhaps I am under the sway of a prejudice but I think that this dependency relation is found as well between the concepts of nobility and human life as Nietzsche uses them. It is time to "look and see."

Nietzsche presents many pictures of "life"; these are predominantly pictures of jungle growths, free-flying birds, and so on. He also makes great use of types of society to illustrate what has been the case with human life. The two societies are the barbaric tribes "men of prey who were still in possession of unbroken strength of will and lust for power"32 in contrast with more civilized societies which are rather utilitarian on the whole and do not differentiate between men. Repeated reference is made to the antithesis between differentiation and levelling. Differentiation between men is held in high regard since it would seem that Nietzsche is viewing man not as an actuality, not even as a sum total of barbarian and civilized, but as a potentiality, a promise of future possibilities.

In the concept "human life", the "human" part lays emphasis on spirituality, not in a religious sense, but more as an analogue to "spirited", and the "life" part is the struggle for power which necessitates sacrifice of weaker organisms. Nietzsche speaks of a will to power but that it is a will to spiritual power in the individual man, is evinced by his equation of the greatest events with the greatest thoughts, and his redirection of our attention progressively from act to intention to being. So, reading "life" as competition to grow and "men" as unique in spirituality and awareness of self, then "human life" is ideally seen as growth toward realizing the varieties of potentialities within the self, "...the craving for ever new widening of distances within the soul itself, the development of ever higher, rarer, more remote, further stretching, more comprehensive states..."

Though this is a coldly brief portrayal of Nietzsche's concept of human life, it should be enough to establish that the character of the concept is strongly flavored with the hope for things yet to come. It is with this ideal set before him that Nietzsche attempts to wean us from all our attachments to limitations, rules, systems, patterns, every instance of getting stuck to something which closes out variety and possibility. In succession, he attacks

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\[33\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 227.\]

\[34\text{Ibid.}, \ pp. \ 43-44.\]

\[35\text{Ibid.}, \ pp. \ 201-202.\]
philosophies, religions, moralities, scholarship and its supposed
objectivity, patriotism until he reaches the final subject "what
is noble". Never mind that he is brutal, unfair and cruel in the
process; his intention, it seems to me, is honorable enough, urgent
enough, given that he is consciously attempting to persuade the
reader that "true" nobility is in the self-overcoming of self,
directed toward the enhancement of the type man. The dependency
between Nietzsche's concept of human life, as an ideal not yet
realized, and nobility, as a state of realizing potentialities, should
be clear by now.

Many other moral terms are re-valued in relation to the area-
specifying concept of human life. Just a few examples should suffice
to illustrate this. Pity is not viewed as a laudable sympathy for
the weak and suffering. If there is any acceptable pity, it is for
the type man, but even this is not pity in the old sense; it is
rather a kind of nausea or even a sense of a great task. Since
suffering is a pre-requisite to nobility, pity is an inappropriate
affect, as is the unmanly desire to abolish all suffering. Ob-
viously, then, love cannot be formed out of pity, in fact, re-valued
love becomes love as passion between equals. But it, too, is cau-
tiously surveyed for any limitations it might place on the individual
in his higher task. Three of the "Epigrams and Interludes" convey
the tone and tempo of this: "Love of one is a barbarism; for it is

\[36\text{Ibid., pp. 117-118.}\]

\[37\text{Ibid., pp. 149-150.}\]
exercised at the expense of all others. The love of God, too."

"From the love of man, one occasionally embraces someone at random (because one cannot embrace all) but one must not tell him this"; "In the end one loves one's desire and not what is desired." 38

It seems that the structure of the re-valued values revolves in toto around the idealized concept of human life. Since it entails variety and possibility, any derivitive moral concept is required to have the addendum of "do this unless it interferes with growth" and in this sense is not unlike Hart's defeasible legal concepts. A specific case of this shows itself most clearly in a passage on honesty. The section begins with "Honesty, supposing that this is our virtue from which we cannot get away, we free spirits --" but eventually ends "let us see to it that it does not become our vanity, our finery and pomp, our limit, our stupidity. Every virtue inclines toward stupidity; every stupidity toward virtue." 39 There seems good reason here as elsewhere to suppose that Nietzsche even shies away from a value becoming thought of as a virtue since in doing so the temptation to stop there and parade in virtue would be unavoidable. It is interesting to note in connection with this point that even the title "Beyond good and evil" as well as references to the free spirit as "extra-moralists" or "immoralists" convey the pervasiveness of the central concept

38Ibid., pp. 79, 92, 93.

39Ibid., pp. 155-156.
of man as possibility, therefore constantly in flux and therefore stuck to no single set of virtues at all. This is a most astonishing result, is it not? If this analysis is anywhere close to being correct, then my original hypothesis was much too tame. Now it would appear to be more accurate to say -- not that criteria for the area-specifying concept can and do determine criteria for subsidiary concepts -- but that a re-examination of a standard area-specifying concept (human life) can result in a rejection of all subsidiary concepts (moral virtues). And it is not simply a case of rejecting extant subsidiary concepts but a claim that holding to any subsidiary concept would be an out and out denial of a necessary feature of the area-specifying concept itself. What this means is that by taking the position on the area-specifying concept, human life, that Nietzsche did, the area, morality, itself dissolved.

Rather undefined convictions I have had about certain themes in the book are made somewhat more reasonable now, if the above interpretation is viable. For one thing, Nietzsche makes much of the fact that "Every profound spirit needs a mask..."; "Our highest insights must -- and should -- sound like follies and sometimes like crimes..."40 The employment of masks in Nietzsche's writing makes it doubly difficult to sort out which is the mask and which is truly being said. It did, however, seem to me that Nietzsche was not proposing either master or slave morality, i.e., both seemed to be

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40 Ibid., p. 42.
masks. It now becomes a possibility that this was a reflection of
unwillingness to accept any morality at all in so far as morality
represents fixity and attachment to one system of values and their
solidification into virtues.

But perhaps I am led into a more important issue by this pre-
sent consideration. The concept of nobility, in the context of the
unusual character of the concept of human life as idealized by
Nietzsche, provides an interesting outcome with regard to the kinds
of criteria which may be used for the correct application of the
term "nobility". It seems that the standard distinction between
necessary and sufficient conditions, symptoms, reasons, etc.
are not to the point in this matter; however, the distinction
between kinds of criteria, specifically between descriptive and
non-descriptive criteria, may clarify Nietzsche's concept of
nobility.

Let me begin by indicating that Nietzsche's view of human life
is what might best be termed a naturalistic idealism, i.e., the
nature of man, including his instinct, is anticipatory of an ideal.
So we might say the Nietzsche's view of human nature is that it is
man's essence to strive to overcome, to strive to become the overman.
(In other places I will argue that the overman should not be construed
politically.) Three aspects of becoming an overman render that achieve-
ment, if it should be called an end, unnamable to any description.
Nobility is without any descriptive criteria. These three aspects
are: 1) futurity, in some sense or other the overman is a future
being -- he must be an unknown to Nietzsche; 2) internality, the object to be overcome is oneself and the result of such an enterprise is a newly created self; 3) fluidity, the overman must not allow any value to harden into virtue, any detail into a dominant feature of himself. If the true nobility is yet to be accomplished then we cannot, with certainty, give a description of it. If the true nobility is internally directed -- a matter of the self's ordering its own chaos -- then it need not manifest itself in any behavioral change. If the true nobility is being a continuing creation, then no static description will be possible. So there can be no certain behavioral criteria for the state of being noble for it is uncertain, non-behavioral and not a state. All of this can be summarized by saying there are no definitive criteria for Nietzschean nobility. Because of the nature of the ideal which Nietzsche offers as a goal it is not only impossible presently to forward descriptive criteria, it is antithetical to the role of the concept to do so.

The following groundwork must be laid before the process criterion is fully understandable. As I mentioned before, our accustomed attachments are repeatedly attacked. Philosophy as supposed knowledge of truth is questioned on the basis of the possibility that "truth", whatever it may be, does not necessarily have to be unitary, or systematic, or simple or objective in the sense of being without subjective perspective. The preface to Beyond Good and Evil
opens with the charming hypothesis: "Suppose truth is a woman -- 
what then?" Cutting remarks are made of those who would suppose
themselves to be "protectors of truth upon earth -- as though 'the 
truth' were such an innocuous and incompetent creature as to require 
protectors!" or that truth is worth more than appearance, or that
there is "an essential opposition of 'true' and 'false'" or 
that truth will make people happy or virtuous. So it seems that 
the philosophical search for truth is a very strange indeavor indeed,
once one begins to question the most basic assumptions. Not being 
one to seek after friendly allegiances with colleagues, Nietzsche 
goes as far as making this most endearing comment: "Gradually it 
has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: 
namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of in-
voluntary and unconscious memoir..." His contest with this state 
of affairs is not that the philosopher should do other than create 
his own truths, his own values, but that after doing so he pretends 
that they aren't his and tries to universalize his dogma. There is, 
of course, the dangerous possibility that the philosopher will come 
to consider his work as an external entity and fail to allow him-
self other perspectives. Again, fixity is the enemy.

\[41^{Ibid.}, p. 2.\]
\[42^{Ibid.}, pp. 35-36.\]
\[43^{Ibid.}, pp. 45-47.\]
\[44^{Ibid.}, pp. 49-50.\]
\[45^{Ibid.}, pp. 13-14.\]
As for religion, it has its role to play but, by and large, the efforts of religious men have been directed toward stupifying men so that they could endure life. This is done through the sugary promises of life after death, the reward which is reserved for those who do not explore and live out their lives as common herd animals. The contribution which religion can make is in educating men in self-discipline and reverence. Its mistake was to take itself not as a means but a sovereign end in itself.

The free spirit is the questioner of all unquestioned assumptions. His role is as the bad conscience of his time. Needless to say, Nietzsche considered himself a free spirit but did not think that he was a "true philosopher", these wondrous creatures were, so Nietzsche hoped, yet to come.

A non-descriptive process criterion, then, for a given state or property or laudatory term, is merely the requirement of a movement through a process which is thought or known to be a prerequisite for that state, property or praise.

Now what is this necessary process criterion of nobility which I alluded to earlier? It is the necessity of self-confrontation, self-reverance and self-affirmation. Self-confrontation is the stripping away of all externally imposed elements in one's own being. It is being honest with oneself without catching oneself at the task. Self-reverance is the acceptance of and faith in what one finds in self-confrontation. These two stages are followed by self-affirmation, when the individual creates valid for himself with the recognition that his truth is his own, his duties are his
own, and that he cannot get caught on any details in himself. The stages of religious man, moral philosopher, skeptic, lover of truth, objective instrument, philosophical laborer, free spirit and many more are the overt manifestations of the internal stages of self-confrontation, self-reverance and self-affirmation. These preconditions provide the ability "to see with many different eyes and consciences, from a height and into every distance, from the depths into every height, from a nook into every expanse." 46

I claim that this is only a necessary process criterion. Nietzsche sees as most tragic those men who in going through the process have lost their way. They are not noble; they represent the greatest of tragedies. So while the process criterion is necessary, it is not sufficient owing to the overwhelming likelihood that one will not remain noble once he has been so. "One must invoke tremendous counter-forces in order to cross this natural, all too natural progressus in simile, the continual development of man toward the similar, ordinary, average, herdlike -- common!" 47

Perhaps the case does not need to be argued that there are no descriptive criteria for nobility. I could just point out that if the noble man and the true philosopher are the same and if the nobility rests on being in a state of enhancing the type man, exploring unnumbered possibilities, then one cannot in any way describe this

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46 Ibid., pp. 135-136.

final state. Any statement like "the noble man must be honest" or "the noble man must be loving" and so on will only serve to limit the very state which is supposed to be limitless.

D. Eternal recurrence as the new myth

If the overman is a creature striving to not become static, with what means does he deal with the fact of impermanence. The thought which invades the overman is that of eternal recurrence. Part iii of Zarathustra is dedicated to the presentation of a noble man and his struggle with this thought. This part begins with Zarathustra as a wanderer and a mountain climber. Zarathustra says to himself such hints as "in the end, one experiences only oneself....What returns, what finally comes home to me, is my own self...." and "Only now are you going your way to greatness! Peak and abyss -- they are now joined together."48 Those remarks are but the prologue to the section called "On the Vision and the Riddle" in which Zarathustra first says to a dwarf "Courage, however, is the best slayer -- courage which attacks: which slays even death itself, for it says, 'Was that life? Well then! Once more!'"49 The conversation then introduces for the first time explicitly, with the exception of comments on amor fati, the doctrine of eternal recurrence:


\[49\] Ibid., p. 269.
"Stop, dwarf!" I said. "It is I or you! But I am the stronger of us two: you do not know my abysmal thought. That you could not bear!"

Then something happened that made me lighter, for the dwarf jumped from my shoulder, being curious; and he crouched on a stone before me. But there was a gateway just where we had stopped.

"Behold this gateway, dwarf!" I continued. "It has two faces. Two paths meet here; no one has yet followed either to its end. This long lane stretches back for an eternity. And the long lane out there, that is another eternity. They contradict each other, these paths; they offend each other face to face; and it is here at this gateway that they come together. The name of the gateway is inscribed above: 'Moment.' But whoever would follow one of them, on and on, farther and farther -- do you believe, dwarf, that these paths contradict each other eternally?"

"All that is straight lies," the dwarf murmured contemptuously. "All truth is crooked; time itself is a circle."

"You spirit of gravity," I said angrily, "do not make things too easy for yourself! Or I shall let you crouch where you are crouching, lamefoot; and it was I that carried you to this height.

"Behold," I continued, "this moment! From this gateway, Moment, a long, eternal lane leads backward: behind us lies an eternity. Must not whatever can walk have walked on this lane before? Must not whatever can happen have happened, have been done, have passed by before? And if everything has been there before -- what do you think, dwarf, of this moment? Must not this gateway too have been there before? And are not all things knotted together so firmly that this moment draws after it all that is to come? Therefore -- itself too? For whatever can walk -- in this long lane out there too, it must walk once more.

"And this slow spider, which crawls in the moonlight, and this moonlight itself, and I and you in the gateway, whispering together, whispering of eternal things -- must not all of
us have been there before? And return and
walk in that other lane, out there, before us,
in this long dreadful lane -- must we not
eternally return?"50

Zarathustra contemplates the thought, hears a dog howl, thinks
back on his childhood. He wonders where the dwarf has gone, where
the gateway has gone, the spider, the whispering. It is difficult
to distinguish dreaming from waking. Then the story which introduces

**nausea:**

Among wild cliffs I stood suddenly alone, bleak,
in the bleakest moonlight. But there lay a man.
And there -- the dog jumping, bristling, whin­
ing -- now he saw me coming; then he howled
again, he cried. Had I ever heard a dog cry
like this for help? And verily, what I saw --
I had never seen the like. A young shepherd
I saw, writhing, gagging, in spasms, his face
distorted, and a heavy black snake hung out
of his mouth. Had I ever seen so much nausea
and pale dread on one face? He seemed to have
been asleep when the snake crawled into his
throat, and there bit itself fast. My hand
tore at the snake and tore in vain; it did
not tear the snake out of his throat. Then
it cried out of me: "Bite! Bite its head
off! Bite!" Thus it cried out of me -- my
dread, my hatred, my nausea, my pity, all that
is good and wicked in me cried out of me
with a single cry.

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The shepherd, however, bit as my cry counseled
him; he bit with a good bite. Far away he
spewed the head of the snake -- and he jumped
up. No longer shepherd, no longer human -- one
changed, radiant, laughing! Never yet on earth
has a human being laughed as he laughed! O
my brothers, I heard a laughter that was no
human laughter; and now a thirst gnaws at me,

50 Ibid., pp. 269-270.
a longing that never grows still. My longing for this laughter gnaws at me; oh, how do I bear to go on living! And how could I bear to die now!\footnote{151}

Zarathustra breaks all the tablets of good and curses the good ones whom he sees as the beginning of the end. He says "... the good are unable to create; they are always the beginning of the end: they crucify him who writes new values on new tablets; they sacrifice the future to themselves -- they crucify all man's future."\footnote{152} The only new tablet offered is "become hard!"\footnote{153}

The initial thought of eternal recurrence does not bring metaphysical comfort to Zarathustra. That thought and nausea alternate in dominating his consciousness and his entrails. In the parable "The Convalescent" Zarathustra arises one morning shouting:

Up, abysmal thought, out of my depth! I am your cock and dawn, sleepy worm. Up! Up! My voice shall yet crow you awake! Unfasten the fetters of your ears: listen! For I want to hear you. Up! Up! Here is thunder enough to make even tombs learn to listen. And wipe sleep and all that is purblind and blind out of your eyes! Listen to me even with your eyes: my voice cures even those born blind And once you are awake, you shall remain awake eternally. It is not my way to awaken great-grandmothers from their sleep to bid them sleep on!

You are stirring, stretching, wheezing? Up! Up! You shall not wheeze but speak to me. Zarathustra, the godless, summons you! I,
Zarathustra, the advocate of life, the advocate of suffering, the advocate of the circle; I summon you, my most abysmal thought!

Hail to me! You are coming, I hear you. My abyss speaks, I have turned my ultimate depth inside out into the light. Hail to me! Come here! Give me your hand! Huh! let go! Huhhuh! Nausea, nausea, nausea -- woe unto me!  

After which he fell down into a deep translike state, guarded by his companions, the eagle and the serpent, his animals. Zarathustra awakened after seven days. Though the animals had worried over Zarathustra's condition they eventually said to him:

"0 Zarathustra," the animals said, "to those who think as we do, all things themselves are dancing: they come and offer their hands and laugh and flee -- and come back. Everything dies, everything blossoms again; eternally runs the year of being. Everything breaks, everything is joined anew; eternally the same house is being built. Everything parts, everything greets every other thing again; eternally the ring of being remains faithful to itself. In every Now, being begins; round every Here rolls the sphere There. The center is everywhere. Bent is the path of eternity."

It then becomes clear that Zarathustra was the shepherd who was choking on the snake. With the thought of eternal recurrence comes the thought of the recurrence of the smallest man:

"My torture was not the knowledge that man is evil -- but I cried as no one has yet cried: 'Alas, that his greatest evil is so very small! Alas, that his best is so very small!'"

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54 Ibid., pp. 327-328.

55 Ibid., pp. 329-330.
"The great disgust with man -- this choked me and had crawled into my throat; and what the soothsayer said: 'All is the same, nothing is worth while, knowledge chokes.' A long twilight limped before me, a sadness, weary to death, drunken with death, speaking with a yawning mouth. 'Eternally recurs the man of whom you are weary, the small man!' -- thus yawned my sadness and dragged its feet and could not go to sleep. Man's earth turned into a cave for me, its chest sunken; all that is living became human mold and bones and musty past to me. My sighing sat on all human tombs and could no longer get up; my sighing and questioning croaked and gagged and gnawed and wailed by day and night: 'Alas, man recurs eternally! The small man recurs eternally!' "Naked I had once seen both, the greatest man and the smallest man: all-too-similar to each other, even the greatest all-too-human. All-too-small, the greatest! -- That was my disgust with man. And the eternal recurrence even of the smallest -- that was my disgust with all existence. Alas! Nausea! Nausea! Nausea!56

But the animals persist. Zarathustra teaches eternal recurrence. He is the first teacher of eternal recurrence.

"Behold, we know what you teach: that all things recur eternally, and we ourselves too; and that we have already existed an eternal number of times, and all things with us. You teach that there is a great year of becoming, a monster of a great year, which must, like an hourglass, turn over again and again so that it may run down and run out again; and all these years are alike in what is greatest as in what is smallest; and we ourselves are alike in every great year, in what is greatest as in what is smallest.

"And if you wanted to die now, O Zarathustra, behold, we also know how you would then speak to yourself. But your animals beg you not to die yet. You would speak, without trembling

56Ibid., p. 331.
but breathing deeply with happiness, for a
great weight and sultriness would be taken
from you who are most patient.
"Now I die and vanish," you would say,
and all at once I am nothing. The soul
is as mortal as the body. But the knot of
causes in which I am entangled recurs and
will create me again. I myself belong to
the causes of the eternal recurrence. I
come again, with this sun, with this earth,
with this eagle, with this serpent -- not
to a new life or a better life or a similar
life: I come back eternally to this same,
selfsame life, in what is greatest as in what is
smallest, to teach again the eternal recurrence
of all things, to speak again the word of the
great noon of earth and man, to proclaim the
overman again to men. I spoke my word, I
break of my word: thus my eternal lot wants
it; as a proclaimer I perish. The hour has
now come when he who goes under should bless
himself. Thus ends Zarathustra's going under."57

This part of Zarathustra closes with a poem or chant, which
is followed by "The Seven Seals (Or: The Yes and Amen Song)."
The chant concludes "But all joy wants eternity --", "Wants
deep, wants deep eternity."58 The seven seals declare Zarathustra's
willing of eternal recurrence. Each of the seven verses ends with
"For I love you, O eternity!"59

Finally in the fourth part of Zarathustra in conversations
titled "The Drunken Song" Zarathustra tries to be understood by
the "higher men." Out of their number, spoke the ugliest man,
and perhaps a sliver of the lesson had been learned.

57 Ibid., pp. 332-333.
...the ugliest man began once more and for the last time to gurgle and snort, and when he found words, behold a question jumped out of his mouth, round and clean, a good, deep, clear question, which moved the hearts of all who were listening to him.

"My friends, all of you," said the ugliest man, "what do you think? For the sake of this day, I am for the first time satisfied that I have lived my whole life. And that I attest so much is still not enough for me. Living on earth is worth while: one day, one festival with Zarathustra, taught me to love the earth.

"'Was that life?' I want to say to death. 'Well then! Once more!"

"My friends, what do you think? Do you not want to say to death as I do: 'Was that life?' For Zarathustra's sake! Well then! Once more!"

What was not grasped was that one wants life but not "For Zarathustra's sake!" Not long after realizing that even the "higher men" do not understand his teachings, Zarathustra leaves them with his "final sin," pity for the "higher men." Before departing he repeats what he has come to call his "Once More" Song. The verses are different this time. The whole text of the song is as follows:

O man, take care!
What does the deep midnight declare?
"I was asleep --
From a deep dream I woke and swear:
The world is deep,
Deeper than day had been aware.
Deep is its woe;
Joy -- deeper yet than agony:
Woe implores: Go!
But all joy wants eternity --
Wants deep, wants deep eternity."

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60 Ibid., pp. 429-430.

61 Ibid., p. 436.
The willing of eternal recurrence when it is accomplished is not for the sake of another, nor is it just the wish that all pleasant moments recur. To love life, to love the earth is to will all recur. When the eternal recurrence of everything can be willed then nausea is overcome. As Zarathustra says to the "higher men":

All joy wants the eternity of all things, wants honey, wants lees, wants drunken midnight, wants tombs, wants tomb-tears' comfort, wants gilded evening glow.

What does joy not want? It is thirstier, more cordial, hungrier, more terrible, more secret than all woe; it wants itself, it bites into itself, the ring's will strives in it; it wants love, it wants hatred, it is overrich, gives, throws away, begs that one might take it, thanks the taker, it would like to be hated; so rich is joy that it thirsts for woe, for hell, for hatred, for disgrace, for the cripple, for world -- this world, oh, you know it!

You higher men, for you it longs, joy, the intractable blessed one -- for your woe, your failures. All eternal joy longs for failures. For all joy wants itself, hence it also wants agony. O happiness, O pain! Oh, break, heart!

You higher men, do learn this, joy wants eternity. Joy wants the eternity of all things, wants deep, wants deep eternity.

2. Eternal recurrence and other aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy

Let us assume that we have understood the task which Nietzsche took as his own -- the provision of metaphysical comfort without nihilism -- and that the relationship between the overman and the thought of eternal recurrence is one solution to that problem.

\[62\text{Ibid., pp. 435-436.}\]
These two conceptions have been held to be doctrines and the doctrines, it has been argued, are contradictory. If that were true it seems Nietzsche's philosophy would be a disaster. The propositions which summarize the doctrines are thought to be:

1) A new man can be created; that new man is the overman.
2) Nothing genuinely new can ever come into being for all events recur eternally.

There are three ways of considering eternal recurrence. First, there is the question of whether as a doctrine it was in contradiction to other of Nietzsche's doctrines, specifically that of the overman. Second, the issue arises as to whether Nietzsche believed the doctrine of eternal recurrence, even if it was unsubstantiated or false. Finally, one must ask what psychological effects might be expected from the thought of eternal recurrence whether it was true or not, or believed or not.

A. Eternal recurrence as a doctrine

To take Nietzsche seriously, that is, to try to think his works through to one's own satisfaction it is necessary to come to terms with the nature of Nietzsche's obvious fascination with eternal recurrence. To do that requires that if the utterances about eternal recurrence are treated as the explication of a doctrine -- a set of assertions -- they must be considered in relation to other identified or identifiable doctrines. Eternal recurrence is so troublesome in this regard that superficial commentators would rather pretend that eternal recurrence was a brief but intense aberration not worthy of much attention. The more inter-
esting commentators do worry over the subject. Only a sample of commentators will be considered here. It is obviously my conviction that the subject is worth thinking about.

In an essay called "The Importance of Nietzsche," Erich Heller argues both that Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence conflicts with other aspects of his philosophy and that there is nevertheless merit in the view in its effects. He wrote:

Nietzsche had to fail, and fail tragically, in his determination to create a new man from the clay of negation. Almost with the same breath with which he gave the life of his imagination to the Superman he blew the flame out again. For Zarathustra who preaches the Superman also teaches the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence of All Things; and according to this doctrine nothing can ever come into being that had not existed at some time before -- and, Zarathustra says, "never yet has there been a Superman." ...Thus the expectation of the Superman, this majestic new departure of life, indeed the possibility of any novel development seems frustrated from the outset, and the world, caught forever in a cycle of gloomily repeated constellations of energy, stands condemned to a most dismal eternity.

Yet the metaphysical nonsense of these contradictory doctrines is not entirely lacking in poetic and didactic method...63

Heller does not deny that eternal recurrence is asserted by Zarathustra and, hence, by Nietzsche as well. He goes on to argue that despite the metaphysical nonsense that is generated by the assertion of these contradictory doctrines, Nietzsche's works may have poetic value.

In the chapter on Morgan's commentary, it became apparent that Morgan had a promising idea in the notion of Nietzsche casting out lines with hooks, in "fishing" for men. That goal can be accomplished by making assertions, proposing doctrines. Morgan considers at greater length, the psychological effects of eternal recurrence, but he also refers to it as an element in Nietzsche's cosmology:

The end came before Nietzsche had completed his statement of his cosmology, and he did not fully clarify the relation of eternal recurrence to the rest of his theories. But on several points he is explicit. The recurrence is a strictly universal and eternal law, thus an exception to the previous denial of eternal regularities in nature; the total aggregate of energy is likewise eternal, therefore both are exceptions to the universality of change -- as was the will to power itself. 

So eternal recurrence contradicts the principle that everything is changing since it supposes a constancy in energy and the constancy (eternal truth) of eternal recurrence. Morgan maintained that the will to power also contradicted Heraclitus' dictum.

Danto refers to eternal recurrence as a doctrine but one which is stated as an imperative: "Stated as an imperative: So act (or so be) that you would be willing to act exactly the same way (or be exactly the same thing) an infinite number of times over." As a theory, Danto says the implications must have been

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64 Morgan, What Nietzsche Means, p. 289.

65 Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 212.
horrifying: "There is no possibility for any ultimate novelty in the universe." If there is no ultimate novelty there can, of course, be no true creation. The monotony of eternal recurrence as a psychological effect may well be important. The impossibility of true creation, however, conflicts with the characteristics of the overman.

The chapter on Jaspers indicated the significance which he found in Nietzsche's contradictoriness. Jaspers is, as much if not more than the other commentators, interested in the effects of belief in eternal recurrence. He does, nevertheless, refer to eternal recurrence as a doctrine and one which is in conflict with the doctrine of freedom to create. Jaspers wrote:

Eternal Recurrence. Nietzsche's idea of eternal recurrence is philosophically as essential as it is questionable: to him it was most overpowering, while probably no one since then has taken it seriously. Although it is the decisive point in his philosophizing, attempts to assimilate Nietzsche have usually sought to avoid it. Stated simply, the doctrine is to the effect that being is not an endless becoming of novelties, for everything recurs in extraordinarily great periods of time (the "great year of becoming").

Eternal recurrence is, in the first place, a physico-cosmological hypothesis.

Jaspers discusses how the willing of eternal recurrence allows the will to have control over the past. Not even the "it was"

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67 Jaspers, Nietzsche, p. 352.
68 Ibid., p. 363.
can limit the will. He observes then:

But, without Nietzsche's being aware of it, an antinomy arises — as always happens in the course of any thinking that transcends. It takes the form of asserting both that the will expresses the freedom to bring forth what is yet to come, and that the will itself is after all the cycle that simply repeats what has been. The result is that, if this type of philosophizing is genuine, the statements cannot but nullify each other: Assertions to the effect that when the total situation returns the particulars are non-identical, are opposed by claims "that we are identical with ourselves in every great year, in every respect, in the greatest as well as in the smallest." 69

The formulation of the "contradiction" as an "antinomy" is meant to produce in the reader the transcendence over the elements that result in the antinomy.

As I mentioned in the chapter on Vaihinger, he suggests, but only in a footnote, that both eternal recurrence and the overman may be pedagogical-regulative hypotheses. Vaihinger's interest in Nietzsche's writings was in their exposition of the philosophy of as if, not as instances of fictions.

Finally, in this regard, Kaufmann rejects the idea that there is anything more than the superficial appearance of contradiction in Nietzsche's conceptions of eternal recurrence and the overman. Kaufmann does not even give credence to the suggestion that eternal recurrence functions like Plato's noble lie. Eternal recurrence is a doctrine, or at least an hypothesis, according to Kaufmann.

69 Ibid., p. 362.
One may yet wonder why Nietzsche, having conceived of the will to power and the overman, able to look back upon many a keen psychological insight as well as a comprehensive philosophy, should have preferred to think of himself as the teacher of the eternal recurrence. Why did he value this most dubious doctrine, which was to have no influence to speak of, so extravagantly? For it is plain that none of his other ideas meant so much to him. The answer must be sought in the fact that the eternal recurrence was to Nietzsche less an idea than an experience -- the supreme experience -- the supreme experience of a life unusually rich in suffering, pain, and agony. He made much of the moment when he first had this experience (EH-Z) [Chapter on Zarathustra in Ecce Homo] because to him it was the moment which redeemed his life.70

...Nietzsche thought that his doctrine might be a decisive factor in "breeding"...One would go wrong, however, if one assumed that Nietzsche had specifically devised his doctrine as a factor in a "breeding" scheme. The eternal recurrence was not meant to be a "noble lie," and it has been seen that Nietzsche had the greatest scorn for such unholy means. On the contrary, Nietzsche thought that his doctrine of eternal recurrence was "the most scientific of all hypotheses." (WM 55) [Paragraph 55 of Will to Power]71

So Kaufmann interprets Nietzsche's attachment to eternal recurrence as a reflection of its personal meaningfulness but not as its being part of Nietzsche's philosophical system. If Nietzsche considered it important to his philosophy, Kaufmann would seem to disagree. Kaufmann would also seem to disagree with the idea that Nietzsche might propose a thought (which was personally meaningful) to be personally meaningful for others. That would have Nietzsche engaging in noble lies. According to Kaufmann,

70 Kaufmann, Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, p. 323.

71 Ibid., p. 325.
Nietzsche considered eternal recurrence as a scientific hypothesis.
The idea was not offered to be believed as dogma but to be tested
as hypothesis. Kaufmann says:

Perhaps one can grasp Nietzsche's conception of
"Dionysian" joy while feeling that the more explicit
"doctrine" transforms a fruitful notion into a
rigid crudity. One should remember, however, that
the doctrine of the eternal recurrence -- as dis­
tinguished from the profound experience of joy
which comes to the overman -- was presented by
Nietzsche not as a dogma but as a hypothesis,
true to his method. 72

What Kaufmann distinguishes is the content of the doctrine and
its psychological effects and given this distinction Kaufmann
seems to hold that the content of the doctrine is not part of the
content of Nietzsche's philosophy although he may have entertained
the notion as a personally significant hypothesis.

B. Belief in the doctrine

Given the possibility that Nietzsche offered eternal recurrence
as a doctrine, was it a doctrine which he himself believed? Even if
Nietzsche did not propose the doctrine is it one to which he is
committed, which he believed? One point, I take it, of Kaufmann's
claim that the idea was an hypothesis was that it was not necessarily
believed. There are several opinions as to whether Nietzsche believed
eternal recurrence, most noteworthy among them are those expressed
by Morgan, Danto, Mencken, Jaspers, Heller and Sartre. The issue

72 Ibid., p. 332. Cf. chapter II of this dissertation for a dis­
cussion of Kaufmann's understanding of Nietzsche's "method." "Hy­pothe­sis" is one of the characteristics of Nietzsche's method as outlined
by Kaufmann.
of belief is one of whether Nietzsche included eternal recurrence as part of his philosophical system. To pose the issue in this manner is to sidestep the distinction between explicit statement and implicit conviction.

Both Morgan and Danto claim that Nietzsche believed the doctrine of eternal recurrence. Morgan simply says: "But Nietzsche does sincerely believe in it; he stakes his life on it and keeps alive for it, though he is able to question it, and has black moods when all seems lost...." Danto notices the unusual language Nietzsche used to relate eternal recurrence but, relying on Nietzsche's Nachgelassene Werke, he claims that Nietzsche not only believed the doctrine but undertook proofs of it.

The doctrine is by and large presented in fanciful terms in Nietzsche's published writings, or hinted at, or stated obliquely with no particular effort at argument or proof. And perhaps Nietzsche came in time to believe he had proved it: it often happens that a certain theory is presented by a philosopher in a programmatic manner, and afterward is simply presupposed in his writings without his even having worked it out in detail. But Nietzsche did leave behind some purported arguments, presumable elaborated around 1881, the time at which he was composing Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft.  

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73 Morgan, op. cit., p. 286.

74 Arthur Danto, The Eternal Recurrence," In: Nietzsche; A Collection of Critical Essays edit. R. Solomon (Garden City: Anchor/Doubleday, 1973), p. 317. I am not at ease with the status of either the Nachgelassene Werke, or the notes that have come to be considered as The Will to Power. Therefore, claims based on textual evidence from those sources are not as convincing as ones based on evidence from the published works and the correspondence.
Danto’s position seems to be that Nietzsche believed eternal recurrence and that he attempted a proof of two of the doctrines to justify the belief.

In contrast to the view of Morgan and Danto, Mencken argued that Nietzsche believed eternal recurrence at first then failing to satisfy himself with an adequate proof he came to treat the concept as a philosophical speculation. Mencken wrote of eternal recurrence:

This notion, it must be admitted, was not original with Nietzsche and it would have been better for his philosophy and for his repute as an intelligent thinker had he never sought to elucidate it.... The idea seemed to fascinate Nietzsche, in whom, despite his worship of the actual, there was an ever-evident strain of mysticism, and he referred to it often in his later books. The pure horror of it -- of the notion that all the world’s suffering would have to be repeated again and again, that men would have to die over and over again for all infinity, that there was no stopping place or final goal -- the horror of all this appealed powerfully to his imagination. Frau Andreas-Salome tells us that he "spoke of it only in a low voice and with every sign of the profoundest emotion" and there is reason to believe that, at one time, he thought there might be some confirmation of it in atomic theory, and that his desire to go to Vienna to study the natural sciences was prompted by a wish to investigate this notion. Finally he became convinced that there was no ground for such a belief in any of the known facts of science, and after that, we are told, his shuddering horror left him.75

Mencken thought that Nietzsche then implanted the thought of eternal recurrence in his tragic hero, Zarathustra, and that the thought nearly drove Zarathustra mad. That observation about Zarathustra

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75 H. L. Mencken, Nietzsche the Man, (Boston: Luce, 1913) p. 118.
does not seem quite correct nor does it serve as direct evidence for or against Nietzsche's belief in eternal recurrence.

Heller suggests that the issue for Nietzsche may not have been belief in a doctrine as much as it was a matter of a test of fitness for survival:

Did Nietzsche himself believe in the truth of his doctrines of the Superman and the Eternal Recurrence? In one of his posthumously published notes he says of Eternal Recurrence: "We have produced the hardest possible thought -- the Eternal Recurrence of All Things -- now let us create the creature who will accept it light-heartedly and joyfully!" ... [Nietzsche, Gesammelte Werke, Musarian-Ausgabe, Munich, 1926-1929, XIV, p. 179] Clearly, there must have been times when he thought of the Eternal Recurrence not as a "Truth" but as a kind of spiritual Darwinian test to select for survival the spiritually fittest. There is a note of his which suggests precisely this...

...while Zarathustra preached the Eternal Recurrence, his author confided to his diary: "I do not wish to live again. How have I borne life? By creating. What has made me endure? The vision of the Superman who affirms life. I have tried to affirm life myself but ah!" [Nietzsche, Werke, XIV, p. 121]?

Not only does it seem that Nietzsche did not believe in eternal recurrence, he did not believe that he could meet the test for survival which it represented.77

In a long work on Genet, Sartre spends a few pages on Nietzsche and specifically on Nietzsche's belief in eternal recurrence.


77 Morgan sounds in some places like Heller but Morgan held that Nietzsche did actually believe eternal recurrence.
His interest in the matter is to explicate what he calls "Genet's adventure," the adventure, "the mad undertaking" of becoming what he already is. Belief in eternal recurrence seems to Sartre to result in the treatment of the real as the merely possible thereby making it as a phantom. Furthermore it would require the "displacement" of the will. Thirdly, there is no evidence nor proof of the truth of the doctrine. But did Nietzsche believe it? Sartre says that: "The myth of Eternal Recurrence is not in the least bit evident, and Nietzsche never bothered to furnish proof of it."  

The quirk in eternal recurrence, if I understand Sartre, is that if Nietzsche believed it then he would have had to have done so. That seems to be an odd sense of belief, especially that belief which is to show the scope of the will. Sartre says:

At the moment when the will seems sovereign, it is again derealized because it becomes gratuitous, one must again clench one's fists, beat the walls, scowl and cry out: "I believe it. I want to believe it." In short, one must dance the ballet of faith. Nietzsche plays at astonishment, exaltation, joy, anguish, he writes to his friends to inform them of his vision, he will celebrate its birthday, according to his custom, in order to integrate it into his sacred time. All in vain: behind the dance is only an absence of the soul. He does not believe; he wants to believe that he believes. The entire system founders in the imaginary....

78 J. P. Sartre, Saint Genet (New York: Braziller, 1963), p. 348. Sartre says there are some scratchings that make as if to be proofs but "these puerile and abstract arguments do not convince anyone, above all not Nietzsche. They belong to what I shall call 'the ballet of argumentation.'"

79 Sartre, op. cit., p. 349.
So Nietzsche could not believe though he wants to believe that he believed.

Vaihinger's discussions of the intentional belief in fiction provide another way of putting Sartre's view. The difficulty of intentionally believing in a fiction, in the full awareness of its being a fiction, was known to Vaihinger and, he thought, to Nietzsche. Perhaps it is the futurity in such an effort which is what Sartre means by "playing at" belief.

The range of answers to the question "Did Nietzsche believe eternal recurrence?" encompasses those of 1) yes, to his detriment, 2) yes, then no, 3) he not only did not believe but thought he failed the test that such belief would represent, and finally 4) that he did not believe but tried to make as if he did. In one sense the question of whether Nietzsche believed eternal recurrence seems to be an irrelevant consideration, an inquiry into Nietzsche's psychology rather than his philosophy. In another sense the matter may be just another way of framing the concern with the commitments of Nietzsche's philosophy, the assumptions of his philosophy. These two aspects are difficult to distinguish in the course of the discussions of Nietzsche's belief. Discussions of intended psychological effects more directly bear on this interpretation of Nietzsche's works.

C. The psychological effects of the "doctrine"

If we assume that Nietzsche did not assert eternal recurrence as a doctrine and that he did not necessarily believe the "doctrine,"
we must turn to enquire into the psychological effects that Nietzsche might have been attempting to produce both in himself and his readers by entertaining the thought of eternal recurrence. Some suggestions have already appeared. Perhaps he was providing a test for the overman -- could an individual live with the thought of eternal recurrence, was that person strong and independent? Vaihinger indirectly suggests that eternal recurrence is a practical fiction although he is sadly deficient in specifying the goal towards which that fiction leads. I have suggested that the thought may provide metaphysical comfort. Before turning to a detailed discussion of the way in which an analysis of psychological effects may more correctly interpret Nietzsche's views, several other views on the subject deserve mentioning.

According to Morgan "Nietzsche's problem is how to say Yes to reality..." Part of the description of reality is the idea of eternal recurrence. So we must ask of it "What is the human significance of this theory?" Of the several answers Morgan gives, the following are the most striking:

The moral import of eternal recurrence, therefore, places an infinite weight on every moment of life, forcing us toward one extreme or the other: either the weight will crush us or we shall overcome "the spirit of heaviness."

Nietzsche offers the eternal recurrence as a view which solves the dilemma, and without the fanaticism of the older religions -- its sole punishment for unbelief will be the consciousness that one's life is utterly transient...
Nietzsche deliberately devises the theory as the extremest form of fatalism, in order to generate the greatest possible degree of energy... as indeed fatalistic beliefs have sometimes done. 80

But affirmation, not negation, is the last word. For things are so connected that to negate anything unconditionally is to negate all -- including that negation -- and to say Yes to one instant is to say Yes to eternal recurrence.... To him who has married "the ring of rings," all moments of time are bound together in a mystic unity of shared value. Nothing is merely for the sake of something to come.... 81

In effect, Morgan seems to see eternal recurrence as a decision procedure to determine if one can say Yes to life. The thought of eternal recurrence to one who finds no joy in life is a nightmare, to one who finds at least one moment to which he would say "Stay!" the thought is one of Dionysian rapture.

Danto believed that eternal recurrence would produce a sense of monotony. He must have assumed that there could be recollection across the span of the great years. Nevertheless he believed there were positive psychological effects as well. First and foremost of these is that all teleological theories must be struck down. There is no other state or goal for which to strive. And, on the contrary there can be no lower state which could be an end-result either. Thinking of eternal recurrence we discover that "What counts is what we eternally do, the joy in overcoming, whatever our task may be, and the meaning we give to

80 Morgan, op.cit., pp. 304-305.
81 Ibid., p. 314.
our lives...What we do either has intrinsic meaning or it has none.\textsuperscript{82} Eternal recurrence can be formulated as an imperative to live in a manner so that you would be willing to repeat that life eternally. "Heeding this, men might stop feeling resentment. In existentialist terms, it is a plea for authenticity."\textsuperscript{83} In denying the possibility of some other different life, it rules out heaven and hell both. Danto quotes Nietzsche's cryptic but powerful "This life is your eternal life...." [\textit{Werke}, XII, p. 126]\textsuperscript{84}

Though some of Jaspers' own terminology intrudes upon his explication of the psychological effects of eternal recurrence, one can follow at least some of his conclusions. According to Jaspers, eternal recurrence "finalizes the 'death of God'" while simultaneously overcoming nothingness.\textsuperscript{85} In accomplishing these two conditions the present world regains its value. To this extent eternal recurrence is the "religion of religions."\textsuperscript{86}

Jaspers observes that a simply rational grasp of eternal recurrence will omit the substance of what Nietzsche achieved

\textsuperscript{82}Danto, \textit{Nietzsche as Philosopher}, p. 212.

\textsuperscript{83}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{84}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 213.

\textsuperscript{85}Cf. discussion of Nietzsche's task in Part I, section C of this chapter.

in his development with it. Jaspers described the development as follows:

Eternal recurrence is first of all a way of expressing basic existential experiences: It should induce me to exert myself to the utmost in my life's activities so that I may attain to the highest that is possible for me. What once comes into existence is eternal; what I do now is my eternal being; what I am eternally is decided in time.

Furthermore, recurrence expresses absorption (Aufgehobensein) of all things within being itself: nowhere is there a beginning, and end -- the world is always perfect, always complete, always beginning, middle, and end. Everything is redeemed. Time and annihilation of time become one and the same. Eternity is in every moment when love seizes all beings and elevates them to the perfection of imperishability.

The highest intensification of activity and the deepest devotion to being thus appear to meet in this thought. In it Nietzsche experiences both a freedom of Existenz that presses onward and upward and a loving unification of being. In this primal affirmation he sees the source and goal of any theodicy revealed and confirmed, realized and justified. Here Nietzsche touches the boundaries of existence in a manner so genuinely original for him that it is bound to appeal to us as well, if only for this reason. 87

In a recent article, "Reflections on Recurrence," Ivan Soll interprets eternal recurrence as a thought proposed not for its truth but its effects on Nietzsche's readers. 88 His position

87 Ibid., p. 365.

88 I began thinking about contractions in Nietzsche's works and particularly the apparent one between eternal recurrence and the overman when Soll put a question to me in 1970. I have not forgotten the occasion or the question. Aspects of Soll's solution are similar to Jaspers' position on eternal recurrence, Cf, especially Jaspers; Nietzsche, pp. 363-364.
merges two levels of interpretation of Nietzsche's works. Soll finds that Nietzsche's apparently obvious contradictions involving eternal recurrence are resolved when one sees that Nietzsche was interested in its psychological effects. However, Soll then finds the assumptions of those effects to be in contradiction with other Nietzschean doctrines. Soll argues, partially on the basis of the form of Nietzsche's expression, that Nietzsche was interested in what the thought of eternal recurrence would do to people's lives. Given that Soll does not believe that eternal recurrence is asserted as a doctrine, he does not worry about its purported contradictoriness with the overman. However, Soll does criticize Nietzsche on the apparent incompatibility of freedom of choice and eternal recurrence. He wrote:

The classical problem, that the acceptance of determinism apparently undermines the meaningfulness or applicability of such concepts as free will, choice and action, is particularly acute for a proponent of Nietzsche's theory of eternal recurrence. First, in addition to the usual determination of choice by its precedents within the cycle, there is the added determination of choice by its correlates in all previous cycles. Second, the undermining of the significance of the concepts of choice and action is particularly problematic for a theory one of whose purposes is to increase our sense of the significance of the choices we make.

Soll holds that Nietzsche's determinism and the intended effects of eternal recurrence produce a dilemma. Nietzsche cannot hold both:

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These consequences of the deterministic aspect of Nietzsche's theory point up a basic dilemma confronting the theory: determinism excludes the insignificance our actions would acquire if all logically possible combinations recurred eternally only to raise the specter of the same insignificance by apparently undermining the meaningfulness and applicability of the very concept of action.

Finally and most interesting to me is Soll's argument that eternal recurrence could only produce the intended effects for the individual if there were a continuing ego which Nietzsche denies. Soll's reasoning is as follows: If I were told that all events recur eternally and I was not a continuant through the great years then I could not remember what "I" had done in my previous occurrence. If I could not remember then I should not become bored. Since, according to Nietzsche's metaphysics, there are no continuants, nor, therefore, egos, I could not remember so the thought of eternal recurrence would have no significance for me. Furthermore if I could remember past occurrences of my previous life then this moment would be different from a corresponding moment in that previous life in that it had all the same characteristics plus one, namely the memory of the previous life's moment. Hence either I cannot remember (because I am not a continuant) or I cannot remember (because correlative moments would not be identical). And if I cannot remember then eternal recurrence fails to achieve its intended
psychological effect. Tidy though this argument may seem, I would contend that there is no more reason to believe that Nietzsche's views on the ego are asserted as doctrine than that eternal recurrence is asserted as doctrine. Hence I am to imagine that I could remember from my life in one great year to the next.

Soll suggests that Nietzsche might have held eternal recurrence and not contradicted his own presuppositions if he interpreted it in a supra-historical sense:

Since eternal recurrence is a supra-historical phenomenon, it is consistent with the idea of any historical pattern. Without contradicting his theory of eternal recurrence, Nietzsche could have held, though in fact he did not, that throughout the entire course of history there is general and inevitable progress; that throughout each entire cycle of recurrence there is improvement of all species through the process of evolution; and that within the span of known history the overman will gradually evolve and eventually appear en masse....

3. Nietzsche's utterances on eternal recurrence and their interpretation

It seems obvious to me, if not the reader, that the natural direction in interpreting Nietzsche's utterances on eternal recurrence, the overman, the ego, freedom of the will, and so on, is away from assertions. This does not mean that no utterances

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91 If Soll is correct about the consequences of Nietzsche's denial of a continuing ego, i.e., that one could not remember from one life to another, a more serious result would also follow, namely, that one could not remember within one life.

92 Soll, op. cit., pp. 336-337. Soll takes this approach under the influence of Kaufmann.
can be reasonably interpreted as assertions of doctrines. All that is being argued is that at least some utterances which have been treated as assertions by other commentators can be more suitably understood as therapeutic linguistic acts. Furthermore if the utterances, for example, regarding eternal recurrence, were to be construed in a way that an implicit doctrine could be asserted, the import of these utterances would not turn on the truth or falsehood of the implicit assertion, nor its purported contradiction with some other explicit or implicit doctrine. The intent of this thesis has been to bring evidence and argument on behalf of this position.

First the linguistic form is predominantly non-indicative. I would venture that on a statistical measure of indicative/non-indicative utterances, Nietzsche's works would be weighted toward non-indicative utterances, in excess of the .001 level of significance.

Second, it seems that when commentators try to get to the bottom of the meaning of Nietzsche's doctrines, they find themselves moving toward the discussion of the psychological effects not the conventional meanings of the supposed assertions of those doctrines. However, there do not seem to be rules or conventions which have been identified for the linguistic act of inspiring, healing, encouraging one's fellow human beings toward metaphysical comfort. There do not seem to be rules or conventions for the use of a thought as a test for whether
one is an overman or not, whether one has forged one's own values or not, whether one has questioned all unquestioned assumptions or not.

While I do not believe that there is any definitive set of criteria for signalling a reader that a non-assertional linguistic act is going on, the problem faced in interpreting Nietzsche in this regard is no more insurmountable than it is with any other utterance. Austin brought the case for "I promise." not being an assertion. Searle offered "This is a good apple." as another example of a linguistic act of a different kind. The richness of contemporary ordinary language philosophy leads the way to these identifications. I simply maintain that such distinctions need to be brought to Nietzsche interpretation.

When Austin and Searle limited their theories to the "literal" or "serious" uses of language they refused to consider the conditions for utterances of the non-literal type. Only Grice's recent "Logic and Conversation" begins to offer some of the philosophical tools to initiate the analysis. What I want to consider briefly, in conclusion, then, are three alternative directions for an analysis of Nietzsche's utterances, specifically with regard to eternal recurrence. They are: 1) Nietzsche's language employs intentionally ambiguous terms, open concepts, hence a given utterance may have several meanings, 2) Nietzsche's language is literary in intent, hence the utterances being fictional are neither true nor false, and 3) Nietzsche's language is
metaphorical -- with the attempted application of Grice's conversational implicature. The effect of any of these three alternatives is that Nietzsche's work would not be subject to the criticism of contradictoriness, at least not on the explicit level.

I have argued earlier in this chapter that there are no descriptive criteria for being an overman. When "nobility", a presumed characteristic of the overman is examined, Nietzsche appears to have avoided stipulating what that characteristic would be like. What he does offer are a series of psychological stages, a process, which can but need not lead to becoming noble, becoming an overman. When an important concept is not defined it leaves its meaning open to interpretation. Since Nietzsche seemed to desire to preserve the individual it is appropriate that certain central concepts serve much as ambiguous stimuli. The individual character of the reader can be seen as what becomes of value. The effect here is the recognition and valuation of the reader's own characteristics rather than the attempt to shape oneself to Nietzsche's requirements. "My truths," Nietzsche says. We are to find our own. Apparent contradictions, as ambiguous stimuli, may be the most effective means of producing that result.

The suggestions that Vaihinger gave that Nietzsche believed and espoused the philosophy of as if led to the possible interpretation of Nietzsche's "doctrines" as new fictions or myths. If Nietzsche's writings are fictional then the accusation of contradictoriness seems to miss the target. Critical concern with
fiction should be with sincerity, authenticity, and verisimilitude.

But even those considerations are minimal in literary criticism.

Furthermore, Nietzsche's fictions are not fiction for its own sake. The fictions must be helpful in attaining a goal. The thought of eternal recurrence seems to be helpful in attaining the goal of metaphysical comfort.

Grice's outline of conversational implicature provides an analysis of metaphor which might illuminate Nietzsche's eternal recurrence. According to Grice, one constructs a metaphor by flouting or exploiting one of the maxims that fall under the Cooperative Principle. The analysis results, however, in the identification of a "proposition" which was implicated though not stated. The proposition in the case of metaphor is the result of the categorical falsity of the utterance. Perhaps we could construe categorical falsity in a larger scope of contradictory doctrines which were asserted but there is uncertain ground underneath foot at this point. Furthermore, what is identified in the analysis of a metaphorical utterance is a proposition. Again, what, if anything, is behind Nietzsche's utterances seems to me to be an intended psychological effect, i.e., an event in the reader, not a proposition.

I am not prepared to revise Grice's model so that it can handle linguistic situations which produce events which are not the utterances of other intended propositions. It does seem, however, that those suggestions point the way to a light at the
end of the tunnel. In its general outline, the applicability of Grice's most recent work would be something like the following. Assume that Nietzsche's utterances are therapeutic in intent, not instances of information exchange. The point of the talk-exchanges would be, not the Cooperative Principle which Grice employed, but a revised principle something like: The purpose of therapeutic talk-exchanges is the assistance for the hearer in the development of the ability to tolerate and live fruitfully given the negative features of his circumstances and characteristics. And, again following Grice, certain submaxims might be associated with the principle. An example of such a submaxim might well be: Never tell the hearer in an unveiled way what can be felt when suggested indirectly. Or, as another example: Allow the hearer to distort ambiguous utterances so that the hearer can make self-discoveries.

That Grice's model can be extended to the therapeutic conversation and that these observations are significant to Nietzsche interpretation ought not stand or fall on the adequacy of the examples just given. The examination of therapeutic conversation requires an independent study on a scale comparable to moral conversation. What I, at least, am persuaded of is that the study is worth doing.
APPENDIX A: Interview with Kaufmann

The following pages are notes from a two hour interview which I had with Walter Kaufmann at Princeton University in December, 1971. The opportunity was made possible by Professor Kaufmann’s generosity with his time, some encouragement of him by Professor Robert Turnbull, Ohio State University and a small grant from the Ford Foundation Grant in the Humanities, administered by Kenyon College.

The 14 questions I wished to ask appear on the first two pages then the text of the interview follows. I transcribed Kaufmann’s responses from extensive notes within hours of the interview but they cannot be considered as direct quotations.
1. Where is your most complete bibliography; are you planning to translate HATH, Dawn, Gay Science?


3. Why does Nietzsche write the way he does? E.g. Why, Zarathustra in the midst of Genealogy of Morals, Birth of Tragedy, Beyond Good and Evil, etc?

4. If Nietzsche is offering a moral theory, what other moral theories is it an alternative to? Does he ever do positive philosophy?

5. What if anything would you say was an error committed by Nietzsche? You describe him as not being self-critical.

6. You describe Nietzsche's two types of morality (slave and master). You say there are many misconceptions about this typology -- what kind of misconceptions do you think there are?

7. What is Nietzsche's place in the history of philosophy?

8. Do you take Nietzsche to make a distinction between value and virtue?

9. What connections do you mean to make by using "monadologic".
   1. multiple reference, 2. self-sufficient, 3. multiplicity in #, 4. relativity, i.e., How much Leibniz is to be drawn in.

10. In what ways is Nietzsche's philosophy not a "system" [system-questioned axioms and deductions from them]. Is his (Nietzsche's) objection to systems that the axioms are unquestioned?
11. What sort of problem situation do you think Nietzsche is concerned with when you speak of him as a problem-thinker?

12. How do experiments stand as checks on each other if the interest is not in a solution. What are examples of Nietzsche's experiments conflicting with each other? If problems are outgrown how could they come into conflict with each other?

13. Do you consider the uncovering of presuppositions to be different from the building of systems? Logically different, i.e. employing different logical rules.

14. Do you mean more "dialectical" than 1) the critical examination of all opinions, none remaining as presuppositions and 2) the uncovering of presuppositions of any particular opinion -- or formulation of a problem? If so what?
Interview with Walter Kaufmann, December 16, 1971

Numbers refers to question numbers on previous pages.

1. Bibliography appears in 3rd edition of *Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist and Antichrist* (NPPA). Does not intend to translate anymore -- all the later works from *Zarathustra* on are complete.

2. Nietzsche's method. Apparent contradictions -- how do you treat them -- *Answer:* 1. There is a difference between published works and notes -- what is in note form does not problematically contradict what was presented in its complete form in a published work; so these do not represent troublesome contradictions. 2. In some cases, early work and late work conflict (no e.g.'s that I recall). This is not troublesome either since Nietzsche changed his mind as do most philosophers. I.e. not so much a contradiction as a change of mind. 3. Some cases are only apparently contradictory since a fuller explanation shows only their complete forms to conflict. (E.g. 'systems' in K's NPPA) 4. There are also problems at times with the legibility of Nietzsche's notes; this can present some difficulties.

*Question:* What about the not so innocent kind of basic contradiction -- say between the presupposition of commands (that you aren't now doing but are capable of doing what is commanded) and the content of the command. E.g. Become what you are.
Answer: But that's only another case like (3) above where the fuller explication of what is meant does not contradict itself. E.g. "Become what you are potentially." Nietzsche took great pleasure in formulating things in ways which were misleading but the effect was to jar the reader into reconsidering the issue at hand. Nietzsche loved to pull one up short.

11. What kinds of problems do you think Nietzsche was concerned with when you spoke of him as a "problem-thinker"?
Answer: In Birth of Tragedy (B of T) something like the origin, death and rebirth of tragedy; in Zarathustra (Z) partially how that style can present Nietzsche's philosophy, but also each chapter in Z presents a new problem; in Genealogy what is guilt, what relation between good-bad, good-evil, the bad conscience, asceticism, where do we go for meaning if God is dead.

12. Question: How do these experiments stand as checks on each other?
Answer: Problem situations and experiments are not the same thing although they are related. Once a problem is addressed rather than being solved what occurs is that one or several thought experiments are conducted. We can see several alternatives and in that perhaps gain insight into the problem. Question: Can problems which are outgrown conflict with each other?
Answer: That is Jung's concept and what is basically meant
is that what at one time seemed to be an important problem
at another time no longer seems significant. So rather
than being solved the problem is outgrown.

(What I was interested in -- namely
how problems, problem situations
could even seem to contradict each
other -- I never seemed to convey
in a way such that I got a direct
answer.)

(Somewhere in here the question of what is dialectical came up -- it
could have been in connection with (2) above but I also formulated
it as follows and K recapitulated.)

14. Do you mean more by "dialectical" than 1) the critical examin-
ation of all opinions, none remaining as unexamined presuppo-
sitions and 2) the uncovering of presuppositions of any
particular opinion -- or formulation of a problem? You
say, e.g., that Hegel's triad is not meant.

Answer: Perhaps Hegel ought not be understood even as using
a strict thesis, antithesis, syntheses formula. What is further
meant by dialectical, however, is 3) holding up two or more
views, experimentally, to insist upon their consideration,
4) deriving insights from this -- the courage for an attack
on one's convictions, 5) the raising of the level of one's
consciousness (notice that this was not common lingo when
Kaufmann first used the notion in 1955) and 6) attention to
how "bad" is related to "good", i.e. the refusal to do
"black and white" thinking only, i.e. going out of one's way
not to think in black and white terms.

In general what is going on is the exploration of the consequences
of beliefs and their origins.
9. What connections do you mean to make with Leibniz' monads with "monadologic"?

Answer: Obviously the allusion is to Leibniz but without going into a discussion of Leibniz, I mean that an aphorism which on its surface may seem to be about aesthetics will also illuminate issues in what we would typically call ethics, metaphysics, epistemology and so on. Each one reflects the rest of Nietzsche's view of the universe.

Question: Which of these do you mean to include among the senses or significances of "monadologic" -- 1. That they refer to many different subjects simultaneously, 2. that they are self-sufficient, 3. that they are multiple in number, 4. that each shows the universe from its point of view, i.e. relativistically.

Answer: All of these aspects are intended.

Question: You would recommend against taking an aphorism out of context, wouldn't you, even though it is "self-sufficient".

Answer: Yes, of course; but after studying much Nietzsche one aphorism can come to embody all of Nietzsche's work -- when we understand him one aphorism could be allowed to stand on its own for it would represent the whole of Nietzsche's philosophy.

10. In what ways is Nietzsche's philosophy not a "system"? (Assuming that "system" is a set of unquestioned assumptions and the deductive inferences from them.)
Answer: In that sense of system the issue isn't very interesting. What is intended is that we notice that Nietzsche is basically "unsystematic", his tendency is to disgress repeatedly. Nietzsche's thinking is not linear, i.e. it does not seek the shortest distance between two points (beliefs? statements?)

Question: Does Nietzsche's being unsystematic imply anything about how one goes about interpreting him, need we be unsystematic?

Answer: It will obviously be more difficult to understand and portray his philosophy. One can be somewhat systematic in treating his work -- e.g. show how notions like overman and recurrence are related or how power and pleasure are. However, standard classifications (chapter headings) like "Nietzsche's epistemology", "Nietzsche's metaphysics", etc. will only be misleading. There isn't any grid which can be neatly fitted onto his philosophy which will exhibit a set of axioms from which other statements follow deductively.

Question: Are there any axioms for Nietzsche?

Answer: What would you have in mind?

Question: Is there an unexamined belief in Nietzsche's work that any moral imperatives follow from psychological observations about human nature -- that there is a legitimate inference from one to the other?

Answer: It's not as simple as that. Nietzsche will take a psychological observation and show what the consequences are
of it, for example the consequences of ressentiment. He also will show what sort of conditions it originated in -- ressentiment originates in weakness. The sickness which ressentiment is is by that process shown not to be desirable and hence we ought to seek to rid ourselves of it.

Question: Couldn't we ask why value health over sickness just as Nietzsche urges us to consider what value is truth (or what value are values)?

Answer: Don't forget that Nietzsche says that asceticism which is our way of dealing with ressentiment is a sickness much as pregnancy is, i.e. creation will come out of it.

(I am not sure at this point if I have forgotten part of the conversation or whether the initial concern got lost in the issues which were the examples under consideration.)

13. Do you consider the uncovering of presuppositions to be different from building systems? Is it logically different, are different logical rules governing the process?

Answer: The same logical rules are operative but the processes are vastly different from each other. The method which Nietzsche employs is to always question always inquire into the matters of existential importance not merely to assume certain beliefs and go on from there.

8. Do you take Nietzsche to make a distinction between value and virtue?

Answer: Of course he does. Someone may value something without it having any moral overtones or suggestions that any one
else has to or even should also value it. E.g. I (value) like
to ski or I like rare roast beef -- there is no implication
that any one else should.

**Question:** Do you think Nietzsche rejects virtues? Passage
in *Beyond Good and Evil (BGE)* on Free Spirit says roughly --
Honesty let it not become our virtue, every virtue inclines
toward stupidity...

**Answer:** But Nietzsche does speak in other places of our
virtues -- e.g. sections in *Genealogy*. Usually there are
four -- reverence, honesty, etc. So it is not evident that
he rejects virtues altogether.

4. If Nietzsche offers a moral theory what other moral theories
is it an alternative to? I.e. does he do positive philosophy?

**Answer:** By "moral theory" do you mean metaethical or ethical?

**Question:** I was intentionally ambiguous to allow for either.

**Answer:** Nietzsche does do both metaethics and ethics. On the
metaethical level an alternative would be utilitarianism or
Kant's view (Cf. chpt. Power and Pleasure in Kaufmann's NPPA).
On the ethical level he offers commitment, e.g. to honesty as
an alternative to neighborly love.

5. What if anything do you take to be an error in Nietzsche's
work -- you speak of him as not being self-critical enough?

**Answer:** He will use one term in two different contexts and
shift the meaning without seeming to notice, for example "noble"
in the chpt. What is Noble in *BGE* is a set of qualities while
"noble" in *Genealogy* refers to a class of people.
3. Why Zarathustra in the midst of works like BofT, BGE, Genealogy, etc.?

Answer: Nietzsche was seized by inspiration but it was an experiment as well, to see if that mode of writing was useful in presenting his philosophy.

Further notes: (these comments are going to be out of context since I do not remember at which points they occurred, however they are worth making) Nietzsche sometimes will offer an insight -- it will not follow deductively from other ideas but rather it will represent a "leap". In a similar fashion Wittgenstein's writing, aphoristic in character as well, will take leaps. These leaps are occasioned by a radical shift in perspective on something as the philosopher turns a subject round in his mind.

(I am interested in whether or not it is possible for Nietzsche to describe the overman or whether he can only describe the necessary process for arriving there. Connected with this is the issue of whether he can urge us to seek to become overmen when they shall be the natural consequences of forces already at work -- Some of this prompted the following.)

Nietzsche does not speak of the overman in very many places -- mostly in the Prologue to Zarathustra. It seems to be Nietzsche's substitution for the concept of God; it can serve as an ideal or goal to seek.
Discipline is important in the development of man. It played a major role in Nietzsche's own background and in Zarathustra -- as the camel -- it is a stage to the self-overcoming. This idea appears again in Genealogy where asceticism is seen as having the function of teaching discipline.
APPENDIX B: References to Eternal Recurrence

References made to "eternal recurrence" according to the Index of the Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, XVIII, edited by Oscar Levy, (MacMillan: New York, 1924) (Page numbers refer to the Levy edition). The German texts for most of these passages appear in Appendix C.
1. the effects of new influences on the masks of many thousands of years, HATH, part 1, p. 62.

2. the doctrine of, JW, p. 270.

3. the burden of the thought, JW, p. 271.

4. ultimate ardent longing for, JW, p. 271.

5. Zarathustra's enunciation of the eternal recurrence of all things to the dwarf, which was the spirit of gravity, at the gateway where two roads came together, Z, p. 190.

6. The Convalescent, Zarathustra's exclamation to his most abysmal thought, Z, p. 263.

7. his dialogue with his animals on man and, Z, p. 265.

8. his animals relate to him how he would speak were he about to die -- now do I die...I come again eternally, Z, p. 270.

9. The Seven Seals, or the yea and amen lay, Z, p. 280.

10. O how could I not be ardent for eternity and for the marriage ring of rings -- the ring of the return, Z, p. 280.

11. as the desire of the most world-approving, exuberant, and vivacious man -- the opposite ideal to pessimism, BGE, p. 74.

12. and Nihilism, WP, part 1, pp. 47-54.

13. the doctrine of, to replace metaphysics and religion, WP, part 1, p. 381.

14. alluded to, WP, part 1, p. 334.


17. necessary as opposed to Theism, A, p. 244.
18. the opposite hypothesis, A, pp. 244-246.
19. without a goal, A, p. 247.
20. the circular process, not the outcome of evolution, A, p. 248.
22. the eternally true assumes the eternal change of matter, A, p. 249.
23. mankind's hour of noon, A, p. 250.
24. the effects of the doctrine among mankind, A, pp. 250-256.
25. the best ballast, A, p. 252.
27. leading tendencies, A, p. 254.
28. the doctrine as religion, A, p. 255.
29. milleniums may be necessary for its belief, A, p. 256.
30. the turning point in history, A, p. 267.
31. the creation of the thought, A, p. 274.
32. the teaching of, A, p. 275.
33. might have been taught before, EH, p. 73.
34. the highest formula of "yea" saying, first conceived in 1881, thus noted -- six thousand feet beyond men and time, EH, p. 96.
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