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ALEXANDER I AND THE NEAR EAST: THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1801-1807

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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* * * * *

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CHAPTER I

RUSSIA AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The eighteenth century was a period of dynamic expansion for the Russian Empire. During this century Russia's rulers attempted to stabilize the empire's frontiers in order to assure the country's military and economic security. In the South, Russian foreign policy goals were to obtain more defensible borders, to eliminate the threat of raids by the Crimean Tartars and to acquire a commercial outlet on the Black Sea.\(^1\) In order to attain these objectives Russia had to overcome the strong and persistent opposition of the Ottoman Empire. Obviously it is impossible in one brief chapter to present a detailed account of the complex history of Russian-Ottoman relations in the course of the eighteenth century. However, a few indications of the general trends of Russian foreign policy toward the Ottoman Empire are

necessary in order to understand Russia's later policies and
to show the changing power relationship between the two em-
pires.

The period between the accession of Peter I and the
death of Paul I marked an important transitional period in
Russian-Ottoman relations. At the time Peter assumed sole
control of the Russian throne, Europe acknowledged the Otto-
man Empire as a great power. Although in retrospect histo-
rians have shown that the causes for the decline of the
Turkish empire were present before the beginning of the
eighteenth century, these problems were not necessarily
recognized by contemporary European statesmen. To many it
appeared that while Ottoman expansion into Europe had been
checked, there was no assurance that this was a permanent
setback for the Turks. The European powers saw little to
indicate any substantial decline in Ottoman power. Even the
wars of Peter I against the Ottoman Empire seemed to sub-
stantiate the fact that the Turks were still a strong power.
Despite impressive gains made in the South during Peter's
first Turkish war, his second war with the Ottoman Empire
led to a complete Russian defeat and to the surrender of
most of the previous gains.

Peter's policy toward the Ottoman Empire exhibited the
opportunism and improvisation that characterized much of his
activity. It is difficult to discern clear and consistent
objectives in Peter's Ottoman policy. Many of his plans
were hastily formulated in response to particular situations. Peter's principal objective in his first Turkish war apparently was to obtain a more secure frontier in the South. This was in keeping with previous Russian policy aimed at eliminating the threat of raids by the Crimean Tartars. The war opened in 1695 with an attempt by the Russians to secure the city of Azov. The first attempt failed but the following year a second attack and siege, made more effective by the use of a fleet, led to the capture of Azov. Peter proceeded to expand his fleet and build a naval station at Taganrog on the Sea of Azov. He intended eventually to break out of the Sea of Azov and obtain a foothold on the Black Sea. Peter believed that the alliance he had concluded with Austria against the Ottoman Empire would result in a resounding victory. However, the Austrians, faced by approaching danger in the West, abandoned Peter and signed an advantageous peace treaty with the Turks at Karlowitz. Russia secured only a two year truce. Peter was bitterly disappointed but continued to negotiate with the Turks. Peter finally concluded peace with the signing of the Treaty of Constantinople in July 1700. The Russians had made high demands in the course of the negotiations. Their terms

included the demand for access to the Black Sea as well as
guarantees of religious freedom and freedom from excessive
taxation for the Balkan Christians. Although Peter was un-
able to obtain these demands, he did make significant ter-
ritorial gains. Russia obtained Ottoman recognition of the
conquest of Azov and Taganrog and also secured the right to
send a permanent diplomatic representative to Constanti-
nople.3

Russia had concluded peace with the Turks in 1700
partly because of the tsar's necessity to free himself for
action in the North against Sweden. Following the defeat of
Charles XII at Poltava, the Swedish monarch fled to the
Ottoman Empire. Late in 1710, with French support, Charles
successfully incited the Turks to war against Russia. Peter
reluctantly embarked on this new war. Peter's second Turk-
ish war is noteworthy for the new policies which the tsar
adopted. In terms of long range significance one of the
most important policies was Peter's call to the Balkan
Christians to rise up against their Moslem overlords. Peter
had considered such a call in 1700 but he concluded peace
before he had taken any positive steps. The response from
these people was relatively small and ineffective. For the
most part it was confined to an uprising among the

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3B. H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire
Montenegrins and some Serbs. The revolt did not succeed in diverting any significant number of Ottoman forces away from the main theater of operations. The Russian government had hastily drawn up the call to the Balkan Christians. The appeal represented a strategy on the part of Peter rather than a real commitment to these peoples. The Russians issued the call primarily on the basis of a common faith rather than on an appeal to common Slav brotherhood. The decisive field of battle proved to be in the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. Peter had attempted to secure the support of the two governors or hospodars of these Ottoman provinces. The hospodar of Moldavia had responded favorably and agreed to join Peter. However, his aid was not sufficient to prevent a decisive defeat of the Russian forces at the Pruth in 1711. As a result of this defeat Russia had to relinquish all the gains made in 1700. Peter even lost the right to have an ambassador in permanent residence at Constantinople. In 1720 the Turks again agreed to allow Russia to be represented at the Porte and indeed this proved to be the most important advantage gained during Peter's reign.

^Ibid., pp. 26-33. See also B. H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia (New York, 1962), pp. 71-73.

The Turks sought to restrict the activities of the Russian ambassadors. Nonetheless, the Russian representatives used their post to establish direct contacts with the Balkan Christians rather than deal through Greek ecclesiastics as had previously been the policy of Russian rulers.\(^6\)

By the end of his reign Peter had little to show in the way of concrete gains for his two costly campaigns against the Ottoman Empire. Peter's importance in this area was more in demonstrating that Russia could fight the Ottoman Empire as an equal. The establishment of an ambassador at the Porte, the weakening of the Crimean Tartars and the refusal to continue paying tribute to the Crimean khan were his only positive accomplishments. However, Peter did initiate new directions and new goals in Russian foreign policy. These included his attempts to secure access to the Black Sea, the establishment of regular relations with the Balkan Christians and a strong Russian interest in the Principalities. Peter's failures in the South were largely due to Russia's inability to support a sustained effort on both the northern and southern fronts. Peter had concentrated his efforts in the North and had achieved success. It was to be Peter's successors who would achieve many of his objectives but their success was due partly to Peter's accomplishments

\(^6\)Sumner, *Peter and Ottoman Empire*, pp. 59-73.
in strengthening and modernizing the Russian state. While Russia was progressing, modernizing and expanding, the Ottoman Empire was beginning its slow deterioration, stagnation and recession.  

Descriptions of Ottoman internal weakness by Russia's ambassador at the Porte were a factor in the first attempt by a successor of Peter to overturn the results of the Pruth defeat. The stated reasons for Empress Anne's decision to wage war against the Ottoman Empire in 1735 revolved around questions of frontiers. The real motive lay in the fact that Anne's advisers believed that the Ottoman state was now extremely weak and that Russia with its Austrian ally could easily defeat the Turks. Some suggested that by acting now Russia could chase the Turks from Europe. The Russians were victims of their overconfidence. Despite optimistic expectations of success predicated upon the reports of Ottoman weakness, on the anticipation of a rising of the Balkan Christians and on expected Austrian aid, the war proved extremely difficult for Russia. Turkish forces suffered heavy losses but were able to prevent large Russian advances. The expected rising of the Balkan Christians failed to materialize and the Austrians entered the war belatedly and then rather reluctantly. Austrian assistance was of little use and after suffering some military reversals the Austrians

\[\text{\textsuperscript{7}}\text{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 75-80.}\]
sought to withdraw from the conflict. By mid-1738 Russia was ready to end the costly war. However, the Turks proved unwilling to negotiate. In July 1739, in order to force an end to the war, a large Russian army invaded Moldavia and by September Russian forces had entered Jassy, the capital of Moldavia. Local nobles offered Anne the crown of Moldavia but by now the Russians only wanted peace. The war was proving extremely costly in both men and equipment and further advances would have required even greater losses. The basic indecisiveness of the war was reflected in the peace settlements agreed to at Belgrade in September 1739 under French mediation. Russia failed to achieve any significant gains. There was an attempt to define the frontiers between the two empires and Russia gained some commercial rights. However, the Black Sea remained closed to Russian shipping. Although Russia had recaptured Azov and Taganrog, the treaty stipulated that these areas were to be left unoccupied and unfortified. In view of the heavy cost of the war it is difficult to classify such negligible results as a victory. Indeed, the conflict of 1735-1739 seems to justify the description of one historian who refers to it as "Empress

A detailed account of the war and diplomacy of the Russo-Turkish conflict of 1735-1739 can be found in L. Cassels, The Struggle For the Ottoman Empire, 1717-1740 (London, 1966). The peace treaty is in Hurewitz, Diplomacy, No. 18, pp. 47-51.
The wars of Peter and Anne represented only the first stage in Russia's relations with the Ottoman Empire. The Russians had shown that they could fight the Turks as equals but they were still unable to achieve decisive results.

Many of Peter the Great's objectives in regard to the Ottoman Empire were brought to fruition by Catherine the Great. Catherine displayed an early interest in southern expansion and soon after consolidating her power she began preparing diplomatically and militarily for the possibility of a war with the Ottoman Empire. However, the outbreak of the war in 1768 caught the Russians still unprepared. The Porte initiated the war because of Russian activities in Poland and because of violations of Ottoman territory by Russian irregular forces. Although they had begun the hostilities, the Turks were even less prepared for war than the Russians. By the second half of the eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire had undergone significant intellectual, economic and military decline. In military terms the decline in the power and authority of the Ottoman central government meant that instead of strong regular armed forces the sultan had to rely primarily on the forces provided by provincial rulers or on untrained volunteers. The once powerful Ottoman navy was in even worse shape than the Turkish land

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*Klyuevsky, Peter the Great, p. 69.*
forces. In their weakened situation the Turks were no match for the Russians. The war lasted from 1768 to 1774 and was noteworthy for a number of reasons. Primarily the war demonstrated quite clearly the military superiority of the Russian Empire over the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning of the war, Catherine's advisers had drawn up a plan which, if it had been successfully implemented, could very well have destroyed the Ottoman Empire in Europe. The plan involved strategy that would be similar to that followed in subsequent wars against the Turks. In addition to land attacks into the Crimea and the Danubian Principalities, Russian strategists planned to send a fleet from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. The fleet was intended not only to act against the Turkish fleet and possessions but also to provide aid to a revolt by the Balkan Christians. Russian agents had been at work for some time trying to incite such a revolt. The Russian fleet was to provide weapons and military support for the uprising.

From the outset of the war the Russian military forces achieved remarkable success. In 1769 Russian troops easily defeated a Turkish army and soon occupied both of the Principalities. The Russian fleet en route from the Baltic to the Mediterranean received the aid and support of the

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English who provided repair facilities and recruits. At the battle of Chesme in June 1770 the Russians annihilated the Turkish fleet sent to engage them. The Russians could have attacked the undefended Straits but the fleet lacked sufficient land forces. Despite the overwhelming initial successes of Russia, the Ottoman Empire did not collapse and the war settled down to a virtual stalemate. The call for a revolt of the Porte's Christian subjects met with some response particularly among the Greeks. However, their efforts were unsuccessful partly because of insufficient Russian assistance. Turkish troops crushed the revolt with the enthusiastic support of local pashas who saw the revolt as a threat to their own interests.

The victories by Catherine's land and naval forces ultimately worked against Russia. The Russian naval victory at Chesme dramatically demonstrated to Europe that Russian military power was no longer limited to its land forces, the traditional source of Russian strength. Nothing since Poltava had so dramatically raised the awareness of Europe to the potential of Russian might. For the first time the


European powers gave serious consideration to the problem of further Russian expansion, especially if it were to be achieved at the cost of the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. The obvious imbalance that would be created in the European power structure if the Russians replaced the Turks at the Straits led to opposition to Russian objectives. From the beginning of the war the French had been opposed to Russia's activities against the Turks but they had not moved directly for fear of England. Austria was suspicious of Russian expansion into the Balkans and began to arm and draw closer to Turkey. Prussia, which was allied to Russia, wanted an end to a war from which it had nothing to gain in order to terminate the subsidies that the Russo-Prussian alliance of 1764 required. The Prussians were already formulating a plan which would deprive Poland of part of its territory in a general settlement that would include a Russo-Turkish peace. Initially, Catherine resisted the pressure to end the war. However, Austria, Prussia and Russia finally agreed to an arrangement in which the three would partition part of Poland. As part of the arrangement Russia agreed to settle its war with the Turks without insisting on retaining the Danubian Principalities. Negotiations to end the Turkish war began in 1772 but the negotiators failed to conclude a peace treaty. Catherine decided that further victories were necessary in order to secure the peace terms she desired. After a new campaign in 1773 the Turks proved
more willing to accept peace and by 1774 Catherine had moderated her terms in order to free more forces to combat the Pugachev uprising.¹³

The Russians and Turks finally agreed to peace terms at the village of Kuchuk-Kainardzhi in July 1774. Russia consented to withdraw from the islands of the Greek Archipelago and to return the Danubian Principalities. The Russians withdrew their demand that their warships be allowed to use the Straits. Although Catherine and her advisers had failed to achieve their more ambitious objectives, the treaty nonetheless gave Russia considerable gains. Russia acquired territories which gave it an outlet to the Black Sea and Russia could now fortify Azov and Taganrog. The Black Sea ceased to be an Ottoman lake. Russia obtained the right for its commercial vessels to sail in the Black Sea and through the Straits. The Crimea was to be independent. At least of equal importance for subsequent developments were the promises which the Porte made to protect the Christian religion and Christian churches within the Ottoman Empire. The treaty also contained vague references to Russia's right to make representations on behalf of the Porte's Christian subjects and to build and protect an Orthodox Church in Constantinople. The treaty was a significant setback for the Ottoman Empire and a tremendous blow to Ottoman prestige.

The Porte had not only surrendered its exclusive rights to the Black Sea and the Straits and given up important territories but also by recognizing the independence of the Crimea had opened the way for Russian annexation of a Moslem state. The Porte at first hesitated but finally accepted the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi treaty. The Ottoman Empire lacked the strength to renew fighting and France was the only power to show sympathy for the Ottoman cause. The serious state of decay of the Ottoman Empire was clearly in evidence to all Europe. Many statesmen began to believe that the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire was now in question and that another serious defeat might destroy the Turkish empire.\(^{14}\)

The conclusion of the war with Turkey did not signify an end to Catherine's ambitions regarding the Ottoman Empire. Within a few years after the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Catherine, encouraged by her close adviser and former lover, Gregory Potemkin, had devised what came to be known as the "Greek Project." The plan was based on some vague proposals made earlier by Gregory Orlov. It called for the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of a restored Byzantine Empire with its capital to be located at Constantinople. Catherine's second grandson, Constantine, who was

born in 1779, was to rule this Byzantine Empire. Moldavia, Wallachia and Bessarabia would form the "Kingdom of Dacia" with Potemkin as its probable ruler. Russia would extend its frontier to the Dniester and would obtain an island in the Aegean Sea as a naval base. Russia would also increase its Black Sea territory and acquire the Crimea. The other great powers with interests in the Middle East, France, England and Austria, were all to receive part of the spoils. The Turks would be left with a small state on the Anatolian peninsula. Catherine realized that in order to carry out her "Greek Project" she would need Austrian support. Catherine improved her relations with the Austrian emperor, Joseph II, and in 1781-1782 the two worked out the arrangements for expelling the Turks from Europe along the lines of the "Greek Project." Austria's reward was to be in the western Balkans with gains which were to include most of Serbia, the western part of Wallachia, Istria and Dalmatia. Since the last two belonged to Venice, the Venetians were to be compensated with other Ottoman territory. Russia promised that the crowns of the newly created Kingdom of Dacia and the new Byzantine Empire would never be joined to the

Catherine, although enthusiastic for her plan, wanted to proceed slowly and cautiously with the preparations. As an intermediate step the Russians decided to annex the Crimea where Russian intrigue and influence had been at work for some time. In April 1783 Catherine issued a manifesto which proclaimed the annexation of the Crimea along with the Kuban region and the Taman peninsula. The Porte deeply represented the annexation. It represented a serious blow to the sultan's prestige and undermined the sultan's claim to the title of caliph, or spiritual ruler of all Moslems, since he was allowing Moslems to pass under the control of a Christian state. The European powers generally seem to have expected Russia's action. None of them would join France's call for a joint protest. The Austrians informed the Turks that they supported Russia and finally even France advised the Ottoman Empire to yield to the Russian fait accompli. The Porte realized that it could do nothing without European support and in January 1784 the Ottoman Empire recognized Russia's annexations.  

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Catherine had won a relatively easy victory in acquiring the Crimea. She proceeded to strengthen Russia's hold on the area by building new fortresses, expanding the Russian fleet and promoting colonization. These activities only further alienated the Porte which continued to harbor resentment over the loss of the Crimea. In Constantinople the ambassadors of France, Prussia and England urged the Porte to take measures against the Russians. The Turks needed little encouragement. The plans of Catherine and Joseph II of Austria were widely rumored. In early 1787 the two rulers made a tour of Russia's new southern possessions and many believed that plans for further expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire were now reaching a decisive stage. The Porte did not hesitate any longer and in August 1787 the Turks declared war on Russia. The Porte's stated reasons for declaring war included Russia's annexation of the Crimea, Russian encroachments in the Caucasus, the subversive activities of the Russian consuls and vice consuls in the Principalities and in the Greek islands and Russian interference in the administration of the Principalities. Although Catherine would have preferred to choose her own time to begin hostilities, she and her advisers soon set Russia's goals. Ideally Russia hoped to be able to implement the "Greek Project." As a minimum program Russia sought to acquire the important fortresses of Ochakov and Akkermann and to create an independent state which would...
include Moldavia, Wallachia and Bessarabia. Austria, in accordance with its alliance with Russia, declared war on Turkey early in 1788.¹⁸

Russian and Austrian armies were soon achieving success and the Russian government drew up plans to send Russia's Baltic fleet to attack the Turks in the Mediterranean. Russia's newly expanded Black Sea fleet was to carry out attacks from the Bosporus side. Once again the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire appeared to be in doubt. However, Catherine's second Turkish war was significant for the fact that the international situation had changed drastically. The British government, which had aided Russia in the previous war, was now openly hostile. This hostility was largely due to Russia's activities in regard to the Armed Neutrality of 1780 and Russia's recently concluded commercial treaty with France. However, at least a few British leaders were beginning to believe that further expansion of Russian power at the expense of the Ottoman Empire could prove harmful to British interests in the Near East. Prussia was hostile to Russia because the Prussians resented Catherine's ties with Austria. Sweden's declaration of war on Russia in July 1788 served to further weaken the Russian position. Sweden revived its alliance of 1739

with the Ottoman Empire and also signed a subsidies treaty with the Porte. The Swedish declaration of war was due in part to Prussian and English encouragement. The Swedish threat proved to be of short duration. In August 1790 Russia and Sweden concluded a peace treaty which made no mention of the Ottoman Empire. The Swedish war and British hostility did prevent Russia from sending its Baltic fleet into the Mediterranean. Catherine's plans received a further setback when Emperor Joseph of Austria died. Leopold, Joseph's brother, succeeded to the Austrian throne. Fearing an attack by Prussia, Leopold agreed to end hostilities with the Porte. Austria and the Ottoman Empire signed a peace treaty in August 1791. The treaty stipulated a return to the status quo ante but a separate convention gave Austria some small territorial acquisitions.\(^\text{19}\) Russia now faced the Turks alone and in the face of Prussian and English hostility. British opposition came to center on Russia's retention of the Ottoman fortress of Ochakov which Russia had captured in 1788. This fortress and the area surrounding it were strategically and commercially important because this area controlled the estuaries of the Dniester and the Bug rivers. William Pitt, the British Prime Minister, decided

\(^{19}\)Gabriel Noradounghian (ed.), Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottomane, Vol. II: 1789-1856 (Paris, 1900), Nos. 3 and 4, pp. 6-16.
that Russia must not gain from its war with the Porte.

Pitt, with Prussian support, attempted unsuccessfully to get the other European powers to agree to a common ultimatum to be sent to Russia demanding that Catherine settle with the Porte. Since none of the others would join, Pitt issued an ultimatum on behalf of England and Prussia in March 1791. Russia was to agree to settle with the Porte or face England and Prussia. The Russian government was to respond to this demand within ten days of receiving it. Catherine was determined to resist this pressure even at the cost of war but this proved unnecessary. Very few members of Parliament supported Pitt's policy and the British public opposed going to war over such an obscure issue. Even Pitt's cabinet was decidedly unenthusiastic and British merchants were more concerned with the possible loss of Russian trade than with losses suffered by the Ottoman Empire. Pitt had to back down and withdraw his ultimatum. He was still in advance of the time when England would regard the preservation of the Ottoman Empire as vital to British interests.20

Catherine finally decided that peace was necessary because of the troubled international situation, particularly

the French Revolution. Furthermore, Russian victories had not been as decisive or as extensive as the empress would have liked. Peace negotiations led to the conclusion of the Treaty of Jassy signed December 29, 1791/January 9, 1792. The treaty contained rather meager results in comparison with the grandiose schemes envisaged by the "Greek Project." The terms of the agreement reaffirmed the previous treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardzhi and also acknowledged Russia's annexation of the Crimea. Russia received the fortress of Ochakov and the surrounding area between the Bug and the Dniester. Thus Russia's frontier extended to the Dniester and Russia obtained the area where the important city of Odessa would be built. The Russian negotiators also demanded and received concessions for the inhabitants of the Principalities.\(^\text{21}\) The Russian empress had not eliminated the Turks from Europe but she did not abandon the project. At the time of her death in 1796 Catherine was making plans for a new Turkish war that would lead to the execution of her "Greek Project."\(^\text{22}\)

In terms of its long range significance the reign of Catherine the Great represented an important stage in


Russian-Ottoman relations. Not only did Russia emerge as the clearly superior power but for the first time this decisive superiority became evident to Europe and even to the Turks. The European powers began to weigh the possible disadvantages of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the corresponding increase in Russian power that would result. European statesmen believed that a decisive Russian victory would threaten the European balance of power and risk the danger of trade losses in the Near East. Thus by the end of her reign Catherine had demonstrated that Russia, if freed from European interference, might succeed in chasing the Turks from Europe. Paradoxically, the very fact that Russia possessed this power made it unlikely that the other European states would quietly acquiesce to any extensive Russian gains at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.

The final stage in Russia's eighteenth century Ottoman policy evolved under Paul I. Upon his accession to the throne, Paul felt that the country needed respite from the wars, the lavish spending and the domestic turmoil that had characterized Catherine's reign. Paul planned to devote his efforts to internal reform and reorganization and to accomplish this he wanted to reduce Russia's role in foreign affairs. Paul especially wished to avoid commitments to the major powers and hoped to form alliances on his northern and southern borders in order to obtain security for Russia while he concentrated on domestic affairs. In the beginning
of his reign Paul showed none of Catherine's interest in projects of aggrandizement in the South. Paul ended Catherine's preferential treatment and generous subsidies for Russia's new southern acquisitions. In regard to the Ottoman Empire Paul embarked on a decidedly new course for Russia. Rather than follow the policy of expansion and aggression that had characterized Russia's relations for more than a century, Paul decided on a policy of friendship with the Porte. In part this course of action was a reflection of Paul's desire to support legitimate governments. In addition, Paul believed that the fall of the Ottoman Empire might lead to a situation that would be far more disadvantageous for Russia. Basically Paul's early policy was predicated on the belief that it was in Russia's interest to support the Ottoman Empire as a weak but friendly neighbor. Paul even offered to send Russian troops to aid the sultan in crushing a rebellion by one of the sultan's pashas. The offer was declined by the Porte which, quite naturally, was somewhat suspicious of Russian motives. 23

Paul was unable to carry out his intention of following a pacific foreign policy in order to concentrate on domestic

23 Norman E. Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807 (Chicago, 1970), pp. 25-32. Saul's book covers all aspects of Russia's Mediterranean policy including Malta, Italy, the Ionian Islands and the Ottoman Empire. Approximately two-thirds of the book is devoted to the period prior to the accession of Alexander I.
problems. Among Paul's principal foreign policy experts and diplomats there was no agreement concerning which course of action Russia should follow. Some believed Russia should enter into a close union with England against revolutionary France. Others argued that Russia should not become involved in continental problems while there was so much to be done at home. Originally the latter party succeeded in winning over Paul. However, events related to the Near East soon came to favor the war party. In June and July 1797 French troops had occupied the Ionian Islands. These islands were strategically located along the western flank of the Ottoman Empire. The young French general, Napoleon Bonaparte, considered the islands extremely important. The islands had belonged to the Venetian Republic which Bonaparte had overrun. The chain of islands consisted of seven large and a number of small islands. A power possessing them could use them to control the Adriatic and to serve as a base of operations for further activities in the eastern Mediterranean. Bonaparte believed that the islands were valuable either to support the Ottoman Empire or to assure

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France a share of the spoils if the collapse of the Turkish empire proved inevitable. Bonaparte also used the islands to initiate contacts with the Greeks and with various pashas of the western Balkans. The Treaty of Campoformio, signed by Austria and France in October 1797, formalized the French acquisition of the Ionian Islands. France also acquired the formerly Venetian enclaves of Prevesa, Parga, Vonizza and Buthrinto which were located on the mainland.

France's acquisition of the Ionian Islands caused great consternation in both St. Petersburg and Constantinople. Paul had neglected many of Russia's ties in the Balkans but he considered the French presence on the Ottoman frontier as a definite threat to Russia's interest. Paul and his advisers realized that Bonaparte's new position gave him a number of options. He could use his new acquisitions to establish contacts with either the rebellious and semi-independent pashas of the Ottoman Empire or he could foment revolt among the Porte's subject nationalities. The French could also intimidate the Ottoman Empire from their new possessions and possibly succeed in pressuring the Porte into

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26 Ibid., No. 2303, October 17, 1797, pp. 379-384.
joining France in an alliance directed against Russia. All of these possibilities worried the tsar and he responded by protesting to France and by placing the Russian Black Sea fleet on alert. The Ottoman Empire was equally apprehensive about the presence of a strong power on its western frontier. The Turks tried to get France to cede the islands to them in exchange for commercial privileges for French shipping in the Levant and in the Black Sea. However, neither Russian protests nor Ottoman offers succeeded in dissuading the French. France not only retained the Ionian Islands but also incorporated them as departments of the French Republic.

French activities in and around the Ottoman Empire continued to arouse Russian suspicion. In St. Petersburg the Russian government paid close attention to every rumor of French designs on the Ottoman Empire or on Russia. The news of Bonaparte's expedition to the eastern Mediterranean seemed to confirm many of Russia's fears. A large French force had left Toulon in May 1798 and, after stopping briefly to seize Malta, had arrived in Egypt in July. The details of Bonaparte's expedition were slow in reaching Russia. Paul believed that the French intended either to destroy the Ottoman Empire or to attack Russia. In response to the threat Paul ordered a Russian army to proceed to the Dniester and be prepared either to aid the Turks or, if the Turks joined the French, to defend against them. The Russians tentatively explored the idea of Russian-Ottoman
cooperation against any French aggression in the Ottoman Empire but the novelty of the idea and mutual suspicion delayed any concrete agreements. Paul decided to act even before he had learned the precise destination of the French expeditionary force. In August 1798 Paul ordered the commander of his Black Sea fleet, Admiral Fedor Ushakov, to sail to the Straits and offer Russian aid to the Turks through Russia's ambassador at the Porte, Vasili Tomara.

The French expedition to Egypt had not led the Ottoman Empire to an immediate declaration of war. France even attempted to justify its action to the Porte and cited advantages that the Turks would receive by the destruction of the Egyptian Mamluks. The Porte finally declared war against the French in September but only after receiving word of Admiral Nelson's destruction of the French fleet and the arrival of a Russian fleet to aid the Turks. The Russian fleet under Admiral Ushakov arrived near the Bosporus in early September and the Porte informed the Russian ambassador, Tomara, of its willingness to conclude an alliance with

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Tomara had entered Russian service during the reign of Catherine II. He was a rich Greek merchant who had participated as a Russian agent in Catherine's second Turkish war. "He claimed to know the Turks well and made up for a lack of diplomatic skill with a liberal distribution of bribes, for which he was generally despised by the rest of the diplomatic colony in Constantinople." See Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, p. 66.
Russia. The Porte agreed to allow the Russians to use the Straits for their warships and transports for the duration of the military alliance. Following this agreement, Russian, Turkish and British representatives met in Constantinople to decide on the strategy that they would employ against the French. The British representatives insisted that all efforts should be directed against the French in Egypt. However, the Turks and Russians were concerned by reports of increased French activity in the Ionian Islands. Both Russia and the Ottoman Empire believed that the French might be planning an invasion of the Balkans, possibly with the assistance of Ali Pasha of Janina. They therefore decided to send the largest part of a combined Russian-Ottoman fleet under Ushakov's command to dislodge the French from the Ionians and thereby eliminate the French threat.

The Russian-Ottoman fleet soon set sail for the Ionian Islands leaving the diplomats in Constantinople to formalize the arrangements in a military alliance. After much discussion and debate Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed a defensive alliance on December 23, 1798/January 3, 1799. The

\[28\] Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, p. 65.

\[29\] Bonaparte had attempted to contact Ali and had sent a friendly letter to the pasha calling for closer ties between them. The French emissary failed to contact Ali who was then fighting another pasha on behalf of the sultan. See Auguste Boppe, L' Albanie et Napoléon (1797-1814) (Paris, 1914), pp. 13-16.
alliance renewed previous treaties and the two countries mutually guaranteed each other's territories as they had existed prior to the French invasion of Egypt. The treaty emphasized the fact that neither party sought aggrandizement but rather sought to maintain the integrity of their states. The agreement was to last for eight years and at the conclusion of this period the two states would negotiate any necessary changes. England and the Ottoman Empire agreed to a similar defensive alliance a few days later. The more important treaty was the Russian-Ottoman alliance. The two countries were to set aside more than a century of traditional hostility and unite in a close alliance. Russia was to have free use of the Straits for its warships and transports for at least the duration of the war or, according to the Russian interpretation, for the duration of the alliance.

Ushakov's fleet arrived at the Ionian Islands in October and began to expel the French. Ali Pasha of Janina, who had thought of establishing ties with Bonaparte, decided

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instead to fight against the French and attacked the French forces stationed in the formerly Venetian cities located on the mainland. The forces under Ushakov systematically drove the French from the islands. Corfu, the most important of the Ionian Islands, finally surrendered in March 1799 after a prolonged siege.  

The conquest of the Ionian Islands left Russia in an extremely strong position in the eastern Mediterranean. The Russians had free use of the Straits, an alliance with the Porte and an excellent military outpost in the Ionian Islands. From the time of their conquest, the Russians treated the Ionians as a virtual protectorate. Tomara, the Russian ambassador at Constantinople, adopted a particularly dictatorial attitude toward the islands and interfered in numerous aspects of their affairs. On March 21/2 April, 1800 Russia and the Ottoman Empire agreed to a formal convention concerning the future status of the islands. According to this arrangement the Ionian Islands were to be a united republic governed by the principal men and notables of the islands. This new "Republic of the Seven United Islands" was to recognize the Ottoman sultan as its suzerain. Russia was to guarantee the integrity, the constitution and the privileges of the republic. The convention stipulated that

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33 Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, pp. 84-91. Rodocanachi, pp. 116-173.
the Ionian Republic was to pay a set tribute to the Porte every three years. However, the islands were exempt from any other taxes or tribute paid in the Ottoman states. The agreement permitted Russia and the Ottoman Empire to maintain troops in the islands but at the end of the war both empires were to withdraw their forces. The accord permitted the Ottoman Empire to annex the mainland territories of Prevesa, Parga, Vonitza and Buthrinto. However, the convention required that the Porte respect the religious rights of the Christian inhabitants of these cities and make no changes in the other privileges enjoyed by these people. The inhabitants of these towns were to enjoy the same privileges in religion and in judicial procedure that the inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia enjoyed. The convention thus gave Russia the right to intervene in the affairs of the Ionian Islands and the mainland cities and this would later be a source of friction between the two allies.

In addition to the other Russian activities in the Near East, Paul reestablished ties with the Balkan Slavs. The Vladika or Prince-bishop of Montenegro, Peter I Negosh, had always regarded the Turks as Montenegro's most dangerous enemy. However, the extension of French power to the Adriatic had led him to fear that the French, perhaps allied to

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34 Noradounghian, Recueil, Vol. II, No. 11, pp. 36-41.
Ali Pasha, would seek to conquer his tiny country. Negosh succeeded in gaining Paul's attention and won a grant of an annual subsidy from the Russian government. Russian ships also delivered some cannon to the Montenegrins.\(^{35}\)

Late in 1799 it appeared that Paul was preparing to abandon all the gains that Russia had won in the Near East. Paul ordered Ushakov to return to the Black Sea with all his ships and forces. Most studies attribute Paul's action to his anger with Austria and his desire to withdraw from the coalition against France. However, a recent study points out that the Russian fleet in the Adriatic was barely seaworthy and badly in need of repairs. The necessary repair facilities were available only in the Russian Black Sea ports. Since some of the ships recalled to the Black Sea were from the Baltic fleet and since the Russian government had begun an intensified ship building program in the Black Sea, the author argues that Paul intended to return to the Adriatic.\(^{36}\) In any case Paul's orders for a complete evacuation of the Ionians proved impossible to carry out. The Russian fleet needed numerous temporary repairs and good weather before Ushakov could risk setting sail with the


\(^{36}\)Ibid., pp. 129-132.
majority of his fleet. Ushakov finally sailed for the Black Sea in July 1800 but he had to leave behind some of the most badly damaged ships. In September 1800, part of a Russian squadron arrived in the Ionians and these forces remained there and continued to maintain order in the islands. 37

A number of reasons, some of which were related to the Near East, led to a split between Russia and England in 1800. Many in Britain were becoming increasingly concerned with Russia's growing power in the Near East and, indeed, many believed that Russian "protection" of the Ottoman Empire might ultimately be fatal to the Turkish empire. On the Russian side, Paul's policy of friendship toward the Ottoman Empire was not approved by all his foreign policy advisers or by many in Russia's diplomatic corps. Fedor V. Rostopchin became Paul's chancellor in August 1799. At the tsar's request, Rostopchin composed a plan late in 1800 to guide Russian foreign relations for the future. Rostopchin's proposals included a plan to partition the Ottoman Empire in accord with France and Austria. He was especially critical of England's policies and attitudes and felt it was in Russia's best interests to reach an agreement with Bonaparte.

According to Rostopchin's scheme, Russia, France and Austria would share in the spoils of the proposed partition, Prussia would receive compensation in northern Germany but England would receive nothing. At about this same time Bonaparte had concluded that enticements in the Near East might serve to win Russia to his side and he was prepared to use the lure of Ottoman territories to gain Paul's support. At the time of Paul's death in March 1801, Russia had broken with England and drawn closer to France. However, Paul had not yet abandoned his alliance with the Porte and any plans for Russian moves against the Ottoman Empire ended with the tsar's death.

At least three stages had marked Russian-Ottoman relations in the eighteenth century. Each of these stages represented a step by which Russian strength increased and Ottoman power declined. The wars of Peter and Anne against the Ottoman Empire represented the first stage in this changing power relationship. These wars had proven that Russia could fight the Turks as equals but neither Peter nor Anne

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was able to achieve significant gains. Peter, however, established many of the goals and strategies for future Russian rulers. The wars and diplomacy of Catherine II demonstrated Russia's clear military superiority over the Turks. At the same time, Catherine's victories did much to attract the attention of the other European powers. After 1774 European statesmen increasingly came to regard the fate of the Ottoman Empire as a European problem. From this time all subsequent Russian moves against the Turks had to take into account the probable reaction of the other European powers. The final stage in the eighteenth century relations of Russia and the Ottoman Empire developed under Paul I. For most of his reign Paul had attempted to reverse Russia's traditional policy toward the Ottoman Empire. Rather than follow a policy of war and expansion, Paul had sought friendship and cooperation with the Turks. However, at the time of Paul's death, the idea of a close alliance with the Porte was by no means universally supported by influential Russians. The basic problem of Russian-Ottoman relations remained unresolved: should Russia seek to destroy and partition the Ottoman Empire or should it attempt to maintain the Ottoman Empire as a weak state allied to Russia and dependent on Russia for support? The choice was not an easy one. Proponents of partition pointed to the political and economic advantages that Russia would acquire by further expansion against the Ottoman Empire and particularly by the
acquisition of Constantinople and the Straits. Those opposing this view argued that previous Russian gains at the expense of the Ottoman Empire had been rather costly and any further acquisitions would require a favorable international situation. The alternative solution of maintaining Turkey as a weak state allied to Russia also presented problems. Many Russians believed that the very weakness of the Ottoman Empire might serve as an attraction to France or some other European power. The Russian government regarded the presence of a strong power on its southern frontier or even the strong diplomatic influence of another power in Constantinople as a threat to Russia's security. By the end of the eighteenth century there was no clear consensus among Russian statesmen and diplomats concerning which policy Russia should adopt in regard to the Ottoman Empire. Thus Paul's son and successor, Alexander I, inherited a rather ambiguous legacy in this regard and the new tsar would have to decide for himself whether to follow a friendly or an aggressive policy toward the Ottoman Empire.
CHAPTER II

THE FORMATION OF ALEXANDER'S
NEAR EASTERN POLICY

The murder of Paul I brought to the Russian throne Paul's twenty-three year old son, Alexander. The new Russian ruler was a source of controversy among his contemporaries and historians have generally found him to be a difficult subject to study. Alexander was born in December 1777 and while he was still very young his grandmother, Catherine II, took him from his parents in order to raise him and to provide for his education. Alexander's principal tutor was the Swiss radical César La Harpe, who introduced his young pupil to the literature and ideas of the Enlightenment. Alexander's young mind never fully grasped the content of La Harpe's teaching. When his schooling ended at the age of seventeen, Alexander had acquired only a superficial insight into Enlightenment thought. Although Alexander retained the language of liberalism throughout much of his life, his actions often belied his words. La Harpe's teachings were not the only important influence on Alexander. While visiting his parents at Gatchina the young grand duke
also acquired some of the conservative and military outlook that prevailed at his parents' estate. Alexander always tried to please both his grandmother and his parents. The fact that he had to speak and act differently at St. Petersburg and Gatchina may help to explain his tendency to say whatever would please his listener.¹ Historians often cite Alexander's childhood to explain many of the tsar's inconsistent policies and his characteristic indecisiveness. They also have accused Alexander of abandoning Russia's true national interests in order to pursue whichever ideological view dominated his thought at the time.² An overall view of the reign of Alexander I demonstrates the validity of these accusations in many instances. During the early years of Alexander's reign the tsar was often more concerned with

¹For a detailed account of Alexander's life prior to his accession to the throne see the first volume of Nikolai K. Shilder, Imperator Aleksandr Pervyi: Ego zhizn i tsarstvovanie (Emperor Alexander the First: His Life and Reign) (2d ed., 4 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1904-1905).

²The view that Alexander followed a foreign policy that was contrary to Russia's national interests is forcefully presented by Kazimierz Waliszewski, La Russie il y a cent ans: le règne d' Alexandre I er, Vol. I: La Bastille russe et la révolution en marche (1801-1812) (Paris, 1923), p. 108. Waliszewski states that Alexander's detachment from Russian national interests was "absolute."
vague notions of international peace and justice than he was with pursuing his country's traditional interests. However, one traditional area of Russian interest, the Ottoman Empire, frequently attracted Alexander's attention. In the beginning of the nineteenth century Alexander responded in various and seemingly contradictory ways to the real or imagined threats to the Ottoman Empire. What appeared to be frequent shifts in Russia's Near Eastern policy caused confusion and suspicion among the European powers. The question has remained as to whether or not Alexander actually had a Near Eastern policy and whether his actions in regard to the Ottoman Empire were in Russia's best interests.\(^3\)

Throughout the early years of Alexander's reign, Russian diplomacy constantly turned to problems relating to the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning of the nineteenth century many European statesmen believed that the disintegration of the Turkish state was rapidly approaching. The inability of the Turks to act against the relatively small force that had invaded Egypt was cited as evidence to support this theory. The independence of the various pashas and the corruption

\(^3\)One author has no doubts on this subject. Boris Mouravieff, L' alliance russo-turque au milieu des guerres napoléoniennes (Neuchâtel, 1954). Mouravieff's book is largely a condemnation of Alexander's Near Eastern policy. This highly biased work should be used with caution since it contains numerous factual errors as well as some rather dubious interpretations and conclusions.
and inefficiency of the government in Constantinople provided additional proof. All of the European powers, with the possible exception of Prussia, felt that they had a direct interest in the fate of the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, each was suspicious of the activities and plans of the others whether they were allies or enemies. The principal fears were that one power might act first and thereby obtain the largest share or that two or more powers might combine to seize territory and exclude the others. The recent partitions of Poland appeared to be a precedent for similar actions against the Turkish empire. One very important unknown factor in regard to the Near East was the policy that Bonaparte would pursue. The activities of Bonaparte in regard to the Ottoman Empire were confusing to European statesmen and have remained a controversial aspect of his foreign policy. The French historian, Albert Vandal, believed that the French invasion of Egypt was an attempt by Bonaparte to carve an eastern empire for France. However, Vandal argues that Bonaparte's subsequent Near Eastern adventures were intended principally as diversions and as a means of dividing France's enemies.  

Emile Bourgeois regards the Near East as the most important point in Napoleon's

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foreign policy and Edouard Driault maintains that Napoleon's ultimate aim was to reestablish the Roman Empire as it had existed before its division into eastern and western empires. In order to accomplish this Bonaparte needed both Rome and Constantinople. Driault argues that even when Napoleon had gained supremacy in the West, he had only partially fulfilled his ultimate objective. To complete his work he had to conquer the Ottoman Empire and win Constantinople. Other French historians minimize the importance of the Ottoman Empire for Napoleon. In view of the lack of agreement among historians who have studied the available documents, it is easy to understand why contemporary statesmen and especially Russian diplomats were uncertain and alarmed by Bonaparte's Near Eastern moves.

At the beginning of his reign the situation regarding the Ottoman Empire was only one aspect of an extremely complex international situation facing Alexander. Paul had broken relations with his former allies, England and Austria, and had drawn closer to France although a formal peace was still not established. Thus, on ascending the throne

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6 The viewpoints of various Napoleonic scholars are summarized by Pieter Geyl, Napoleon For and Against (New Haven, Conn., 1949).
Alexander found Russia technically still at war with France but without any allies. In addition, a British fleet was in the Baltic apparently intending to attack Russia. Alexander had proclaimed his intention of following a pacific foreign policy. To accomplish this the young tsar had to move first to settle his problems with England. He then had to conclude the peace negotiations which Paul had begun in Paris. Alexander hoped eventually to bring about a general European peace so that he could concentrate on domestic affairs. The tsar wanted internal reforms to be the principal accomplishment of his reign. Alexander succeeded in obtaining a negotiated settlement with the British and ordered the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with both Great Britain and Austria. The most serious diplomatic problem from the beginning of his reign centered on Russia's relations with France.

Bonaparte had been bitterly disappointed when he learned of Paul's death but the first consul decided to try to win the friendship of the new Russian ruler. In April 1801 Bonaparte ordered his aide-de-camp, General Geraud-Christophe Duroc, to personally deliver a letter to Alexander. In the letter Bonaparte assured the tsar of his intention to do everything that was agreeable to Alexander. The first consul called for the conclusion of a definitive peace between Russia and France and the establishment of regular diplomatic relations. Duroc's private instructions show that the
French ruler hoped to use the Ottoman Empire as a lure to entrap Alexander or at the very least to discover what policy the new Russian ruler would follow in regard to Turkey. Bonaparte instructed Duroc to speak of Catherine II as one who had foreseen the fall of the Ottoman Empire and who realized the importance of southern acquisitions for Russia's commercial prosperity. If Bonaparte believed that Alexander would follow Catherine's policy of aggression at the Ottoman Empire's expense rather than Paul's early policy of friendship, he was soon disappointed. At the same time that Bonaparte was dictating Duroc's instructions, Alexander was dispatching directions to guide the Russian peace negotiator in Paris. The tsar asserted his desire to conclude peace with France and he expressed his concern and interest in the settlements in Germany and Italy. However, Alexander stressed that a subject of no less importance and one in which he had "an even more direct interest" was the situation regarding France and the Ottoman Empire. Alexander stated that he was concerned by the French presence in Egypt and felt that the Ottoman Empire would only be disturbed by having France as a neighbor. The imperial rescript added that Alexander considered himself obligated to fulfill Russia's engagements in regard to the recently concluded

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Russian-Ottoman alliance. The Russian peace negotiator therefore was to work for a quick evacuation of Egypt by the French forces. At about the same time a high-ranking member of the Russian College of Foreign Affairs was writing that the maintenance of the Porte's friendship was to be a primary goal of Alexander's foreign policy. Thus in the beginning of his reign Alexander planned to continue the policy of friendship and alliance with the Ottoman Empire. The Russian government was suspicious of French designs on the Ottoman Empire. Nikita Petrovich Panin, the first man to serve as Alexander's foreign minister, was especially wary of Bonaparte's eastern ambitions. Panin instructed

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8Aleksandr S. Trachevskii (ed.), Diplomaticheskie snosheniia Rossi s Frantsiei v epokhu Napoleona I (Diplomatic Relations of Russia with France in the Epoch of Napoleon I) (4 vols. Published in Vols. LXX, LXXVII, LXXXII and LXXXVIII of Sbornik imperatorskago russkago istoricheskago obshchestva, St. Petersburg, 1890-1893), Vol. LXX, No. 62, Rescript to Kolychev, April 16/28, 1801, pp. 125-137. Future references to this work will be cited as Sbornik along with the appropriate volume number.

9Peter Bartenev (ed.), Arkhiv kniaziia Vorontsova (Archives of Prince Vorontsov) (40 vols.; Moscow, 1870-1895), Vol. XVIII, Tatistchev to A. R. Vorontsov, April 14/26, 1801, pp. 353-354. Future references to this work will be cited as Arkhiv Vorontsova along with the appropriate volume number.

10By rank the leading man in the College of Foreign Affairs was Count Peter A. Pahlen. However, Alexander had requested Panin to assume actual control of Russian foreign policy. See Patricia K. Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I: Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1801-1825 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969), pp. 69-70.
the Russian peace negotiator in Paris, Stepan Kolychev, to continue to try to learn what he could of the first consul's secret designs on the Ottoman Empire and communicate his information to the Russian court. Kolychev reported that it was certain that the French government was formulating secret plans against the Porte and promised to try and discover their exact nature. 11

Despite the suspicion regarding Bonaparte's plans, Alexander continued to hope that a peace settlement with France would solve all of the problems in Russian-French relations. Bonaparte's special emissary to the tsar, General Duroc, received a very cordial reception. Alexander assured Duroc that Russia desired peace. The tsar told the French representative that he was sending Count Arkady Morkov to replace Kolychev in the Paris negotiations. Duroc reported that the tsar had instructed the Russian ambassador in Constantinople to calm the Turks' fears regarding Egypt. According to Duroc the tsar even intimated that Russia might agree to a French presence in Egypt. Alexander also spoke of his desire to see Russia and France united. Duroc was certain of the tsar's sincerity and he reported to Bonaparte that Russia was not interested in territorial aggrandize-

11 Sbornik, Vol. LXX, No. 65, Secret Dispatch of Panin to Kolychev, April 17/29, 1801, p. 140; No. 74, Kolychev to Panin, May 12/24, 1801, p. 152.
Alexander's instructions to Morkov set forth the principles that the tsar planned to follow in his foreign relations. The tsar told Morkov that he wanted peace with France in order to allow him time to reestablish order within Russia. Hopefully a Russo-French peace would be a step toward the reestablishment of a general European peace. The tsar said that he realized that Bonaparte might be seeking to negotiate peace as a means of gaining time. However, Russia would do everything possible to avoid friction. Alexander stated that he had rejected a British proposal for a joint Russian-British guarantee of the Ottoman Empire's possessions. Bonaparte might regard such a move as directed against him and consider it as the initial step in the formation of a new anti-French coalition. Morkov was to reassure the first consul that Alexander's rapprochement with England and Austria was not a threat to France. In regard to the Ottoman Empire, Alexander stated that the Porte had lived up to its engagements with Russia. Although the tsar acknowledged that once the French had left Egypt the Turks might again be hostile to Russia, nonetheless, the mere possibility of this would not deter him from adopting a friendly

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12 For Duroc's reports to Bonaparte see Sbornik, Vol. LXX, No. 75, May 14/26, 1801, pp. 155-159; No. 85, May 24/June 5, 1801, pp. 176-182; No. 91, June 20/July 2, 1801, pp. 192-193.
attitude toward the Porte. Alexander asserted that he would do everything possible to prevent any misunderstandings with his Turkish ally. He declared that it was against his principles and natural inclination to seek territorial aggrandizement and, in any case, Russia was already large enough. Rather than attempt to conquer more Turkish territory, Alexander believed that it was in Russia's interest to employ all its resources to preserve the Ottoman Empire. The tsar felt that the very weakness and bad administration of the Turkish state were "a precious pledge of security" for Russia.13

The fact that Alexander from the beginning of his reign showed a real commitment to the idea of preserving the territorial integrity and the friendship of the Porte does not mean that the tsar always followed a clear and consistent plan in regard to the Ottoman Empire. Many of the phases of Alexander's Near Eastern policy were not the result of any well-planned course of action but instead evolved in response to particular situations. Alexander, of course, did not formulate his Turkish policy or any other foreign policy decisions without the advice of his ministers and diplomats. However, the tsar made all the important decisions and the frequent change of foreign ministers meant that the tsar represented the force most capable of giving continuity to

13Ibid., No. 93, Instructions to Morkov, June 27/July 9, 1801, pp. 201-222.
Russia's Ottoman policy. The fact that continuity was often lacking is thus attributable directly to Alexander. During the first months of his reign Alexander had relied on older experienced diplomats to direct Russia's foreign affairs. However, the tsar had never considered either Pahlen or Panin as friends and, for the most part, their accessibility and influence on the tsar were very limited. Furthermore, both men had been involved in the murder of Paul, a fact which apparently bothered Alexander's conscience. The dismissal of Pahlen as titular head of the College of Foreign Affairs came in June 1801 but this did not lead to an increase in Panin's influence. Panin was a proponent of a strong foreign policy for Russia and was also a strong supporter of close ties with England. Shortly after assuming the direction of Russia's foreign affairs, Panin had written a memorandum stating his views on Russian foreign policy. Many of his ideas seemed to coincide with Alexander's positions. Panin wrote that Russia should seek to maintain peace and should not seek additional conquests. In regard to Turkey, Panin advocated maintaining the Ottoman Empire as a weak state as a means of assuring the security of Russia's southern borders. However, Panin believed that if another power attempted to gain a predominant influence

\[14\] For a discussion of Alexander's role in formulating foreign policy see Grimsted, Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, pp. 32-65.
in Constantinople, this would represent a threat to the Russian Empire. If negotiations failed to rectify the situation, Panin advocated the use of force to maintain Russia's position at the Porte. Panin argued that Great Britain was also a supporter of the Ottoman Empire and it was therefore in Russia's interest to ally with the English. Despite the similarity of some of these ideas with those expressed by Alexander, Panin increasingly found himself excluded from important decisions. Alexander assumed a more dominant role in the conduct of foreign policy and Panin's disagreement with the tsar's plans for internal reform and his opposition to a rapprochement with France led to his resignation in October 1801.

The man who replaced Panin was Victor Pavlovich

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15 A. L. Narochnitskii et al. (eds.), Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka: dokumenty rossiiskago ministerstva inostrannykh del (Foreign Policy of Russia of the 19th and Beginning of the 20th Century: Documents of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Series I, 8 vols.; Moscow, 1960-1972), Vol. I, No. 16, "Note of N. P. Panin Concerning the Political System of the Russian Empire," Precise date of the note is unknown but it was written not earlier than the second half of March 1801 and not later than July 16/28, 1801, pp. 62-68. Future references to this work will be cited as Vneshniaia politika Rossii along with the appropriate volume number.

16 Technically Panin was granted a three year leave of absence. However, he never resumed office. According to Grimsted, Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, p. 71, Panin favored a more aggressive Russian foreign policy in regard to the Ottoman Empire and this was another source of conflict between him and the tsar.
Kochubei. The new foreign minister's most important asset was his close friendship with Alexander. Moreover, Kochubei shared most of the tsar's current ideas on foreign policy. Throughout his reign Alexander would appoint foreign ministers who reflected his own thoughts on foreign policy and frequently a change in ministers would foreshadow a change in policy. His new appointee, Kochubei, had had some experience in foreign affairs. He had travelled extensively in western Europe and served in diplomatic positions during the reigns of Catherine II and Paul I. Kochubei was well informed on Turkish affairs and had served as Russia's ambassador to the Porte from 1794 to 1797. In this position Kochubei had advocated and followed a policy of friendship toward the Ottoman Empire. His work had been instrumental in preparing the groundwork which led to the signing of the Russo-Turkish alliance. Alexander had begun consulting with Kochubei on matters of foreign and domestic policy during the summer of 1801. The tsar convinced the reluctant Kochubei to accept the position of foreign minister in the fall of 1801.17

Beginning in the summer of 1801 Alexander had begun holding meetings of a "secret" or "unofficial" committee.

This group consisted of Alexander's close friends, Adam Czartoryski, Nicholas Novosiltsev, Paul Stroganov and Kochubei. Although Alexander had assembled this group of "young friends" primarily to discuss internal reform, the tsar frequently consulted the committee on matters of foreign policy. It was in committee meetings that Kochubei expressed his ideas on Russian foreign policy. In a session held during the summer of 1801, the committee members had agreed that Russia required a "system" for its foreign policy. Novosiltsev felt that it was necessary to establish definite guidelines to steer future foreign relations. This system would take into account Russia's true interests and the plan would remain constant despite changes in ministers. Alexander approved of this idea and he directed the committee, particularly Kochubei, to draw up such a plan. The committee discussed Kochubei's system that summer and the tsar received a formal memorandum on the subject early in 1802. Kochubei's system coincided with Alexander's current ideas on foreign policy. In essence the plan called for a passive policy in foreign affairs. Russia should avoid all foreign commitments. While it might be necessary to oppose France in the future, Kochubei felt that for the present Russia should do nothing to antagonize the French.

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Kochubei's Turkish policy was to maintain the Ottoman Empire in its present state of weakness. However, if in the future either France or Austria decided to seek aggrandizement at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, then Russia should become involved and share in the spoils. Such a partition was clearly not a desirable objective. The emphasis of the memorandum was isolation for Russia in foreign affairs and an important aspect of this was to be the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire as a weak and friendly neighbor.  

As the preliminary step to a general European pacification, Alexander wished to conclude a formal peace with France. The tsar had authorized Paul's representative in Paris, Kolychev, to continue his negotiations with the French foreign minister, Charles-Maurice Talleyrand. Negotiations progressed fairly well in regard to the public treaty but some difficulties arose over the secret articles. However, by the time Kolychev's replacement, Morkov, arrived in Paris the negotiations had progressed to the point where agreement was near. Morkov signed a peace treaty on September 28/October 10, 1801 and two days later

19 Ibid., No. 116, Session of August 13/25, 1801, pp. 48-52; No. 132, Session of January 22/February 3, 1802.

signed a secret convention with France. The public treaty reestablished peace and friendship between the two contracting parties and provided for the restoration of diplomatic and commercial relations. In the secret convention the French government agreed to open negotiations with the Porte for the reestablishment of peace between France and the Ottoman Empire. Russia would act as mediator in these negotiations. Both Russia and France recognized and guaranteed the constitution of the Republic of the Seven United Islands (the Ionian Islands) and agreed that foreign troops would no longer be allowed in these islands. Both parties agreed to act in concert "in all measures of conciliation or of force" to which they would agree "for the good of humanity, the general repose and the independence of governments." The peace treaty also provided for settlements or further negotiations in Germany and Italy.\(^{21}\)

The inclusion of the clause regarding the independence of the Ionian Islands and their evacuation by all foreign troops did not end the important role of these islands in international diplomacy. From the signing of the peace

treaty of 1801 until the Tilsit agreements of 1807 the Ionian Islands played an important part in the relations of Russia, France and the Ottoman Empire. Bonaparte continued to show interest in Ionian affairs and regarded France, by virtue of the secret convention of 1801, as a co-protector of the islands. Following the ratification of the Paris agreements, Bonaparte sent Colonel Armand Caulaincourt on a special mission to St. Petersburg to convey the first consul's pleasure at the conclusion of peace with Russia. In a letter to the tsar, Bonaparte pointed out that the Ionian Republic was in a state of anarchy. The first consul suggested that Alexander, by virtue of his religion, should interest himself in concerting with France on the best means of helping these people enjoy the constitution which they had been granted.  

22 Alexander received Caulaincourt very cordially and assured him of his desire to see close relations with France. The tsar expressed his deep personal attachment for the first consul.  

23 In his reply to Bonaparte, Alexander informed the French ruler that he was awaiting more precise information regarding events in the Ionian Islands before taking any action. He assured the first consul

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that he would inform him of any measures which he might take. The tsar largely ignored this promise to consult with France and the issue soon became a source of friction between Russia and France.24

Another problem that arose from the Russian-French peace treaty was the subject of Russian mediation to formally end the war between France and the Ottoman Empire. The Russian government took this task rather seriously since it wished to regard itself as a virtual protector of the Porte. France and the Ottoman Empire concluded a preliminary peace in October 1801 without the use of Russian mediation. The pact reestablished peace between the two states and provided for French evacuation of Egypt and its restoration to the Porte. France also recognized and guaranteed the constitution of the Ionian Republic. The Porte recognized this French guarantee as well as the guarantee of Russia. The agreement renewed all previous treaties between France and the Ottoman Empire and reaffirmed French commercial privileges in Turkey.25 Bonaparte sent a special emissary,

24 Sbornik, Vol. LXX, No. 122, Alexander to Bonaparte, December 3/15, 1801, pp. 298-300. Privately the tsar had expressed his satisfaction with the peace treaty with France. However, Kochubei believed that Alexander was not as favorably inclined to France as most people thought. See Arkhiv Vorontsova, Vol. XIII, Kochubei to A. R. Vorontsov, October 22, 1801, p. 161.

Colonel Horace Sébastiani, to deliver a friendly letter to the Turkish ruler, Sultan Selim III. Bonaparte told the sultan that he wished to see the traditional friendship re-established between France and the Porte. The first consul still asserted that France had not invaded Egypt because of hostility toward the Ottoman Empire. However, Bonaparte conceded that the resulting war had shown that it was in the interest of both France and the Porte to maintain close and friendly relations. The question of a definitive peace between France and the Ottoman Empire became a subject of conflict not only between these two principals but also between Russia and England. The British had concluded a preliminary peace with France and had been instrumental in obtaining the agreement between France and the Porte. However, when news of the preliminary peace reached Constantinople, the Russian ambassador, Tomara, had insisted that the treaty was invalid since the two parties had not concluded it through Russian mediation. Tomara had been working in Constantinople for the conclusion of a peace treaty through his mediation and therefore worked to get the sultan to reject the treaty. This and other actions of Tomara caused a great

deal of concern to the British although the Russian ambassador to London, Simon R. Vorontsov virtually disavowed Tomara's actions. The sultan found himself in the middle of this dispute. He hoped to play off the powers against each other in order to secure a greater degree of independence for his empire. However, the weakness of the Ottoman Empire made this difficult. In March 1802 England and France concluded the Treaty of Amiens without the participation of an Ottoman representative. The Amiens treaty, in addition to settling the various Anglo-French disputes, recognized the integrity of the territories, possessions and rights of the Porte as they had existed prior to the war. The parties to the treaty recognized the independence of the Republic of the Seven United Islands and invited the Porte to accede to the treaty. In May Sultan Selim ratified those provisions of the treaty which related to the Ottoman Empire. The sultan acknowledged the reestablishment of

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peace and friendship between his empire and France. Selim was angered that France and Great Britain had concluded the Amiens treaty without Ottoman representation. Russia had also concluded a separate peace with France. The sultan therefore decided that he would conclude peace with France without the mediation of either Britain or Russia. In Paris Morkov continued to insist on Russian mediation. Alexander, however, did not wish to overly offend the British. The Russian government assured the British ambassador, Lord St. Helens, that Alexander was willing to make sacrifices to prove his friendship for Britain since he realized that the British government shared his interest in preserving the Ottoman Empire.

The question of Russia mediating a peace between France and the Porte continued to play an important role in Russian diplomacy. Many of Alexander's advisers remained suspicious of French motives in regard to the Ottoman Empire and they warned the tsar of the danger involved in becoming tied to France in any way. For his part Alexander appeared to favor

\[\text{Source: Vneshnìä politika Rossii, Vol. I, No. 72, "Memo-}
\text{randum of the College of Foreign Affairs to the English Am}
\text{bassador in St. Petersburg, St. Helens," April 25/May 7,}
\text{1802, pp. 197-198.}\]
France and told the Secret Committee that France could do
Russia a great deal of harm by arousing the Porte to hostil­
ities against Russia. The committee, which generally ex­
pressed pro-British and anti-French sentiments, discounted
the threat of Turkish aggression and felt that the Turks
were far too weak to undertake hostilities against anyone.
The members of the committee urged Alexander to take a
firmer stand against France and its first consul.\textsuperscript{31} Russia's
ambassador in Paris, Count Morkov, was also suspicious of
France. Morkov feared that Bonaparte continued to harbor
ambitious projects for the Near East. He reported that the
French government was having revolutionary books, including
Rousseau's \textit{Social Contract}, translated into Greek. Accord­
ing to Morkov, French agents would distribute these books in
the Morea and in the Greek Archipelago. Morkov was also
suspicious of Bonaparte's continued interest in the Ionian
Republic and he believed that the first consul hoped to re­
acquire the islands in some manner that would not alienate
the Porte.\textsuperscript{32}

Morkov's instructions directed him to do everything

\textsuperscript{31}Mikhailovich, \textit{Stroganov}, Vol. II, No. 124, Session
of December 2/14, 1801, p. 79.

\textsuperscript{32}Sbornik, Vol. LXX, No. 155, Morkov to Kochubei, March
20/April 1, 1802, pp. 386-388; No. 182, Morkov to the Court,
June 22/July 4, 1802, p. 462.
possible to speed the conclusion of a definitive peace between France and the Porte. The Russian ambassador was even to support the French demand that the peace treaty give French commercial vessels the right to sail in the Black Sea. Although Morkov followed his instructions, both Talleyrand and the Ottoman representative, Mehmed Said Galib Efendi, did their best to avoid Russian mediation. In June 1802 Talleyrand and the Ottoman plenipotentiary signed a formal peace treaty. In addition to reestablishing peace, the treaty granted France the right to send commercial vessels into the Black Sea and reinstated the previous treaties and capitulations. Article V of the treaty stipulated the mutual guarantee of the territories of the two contracting parties. However, an "additional and secret" article modified this potentially dangerous clause. The secret article stated that the mutual guarantee of territories would not bind the Porte to become involved in wars which France might have to wage against other powers.

Alexander's Near Eastern policy continued to be in

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33Ibid., No. 158, Morkov to the Court, April 18/30, 1802, pp. 395-397.

agreement with Kochubei's system. In reviewing the foreign policy commitments of Russia for his ambassadors, Alexander stressed that one of the bases of his political system remained constant: Russia would maintain the Ottoman Empire using all available means because the weakness of the Porte was a guarantee of the security of Russia's southern borders. Although this aspect of Kochubei's system continued in force, Alexander was increasingly abandoning a passive policy in regard to other European affairs. By the spring of 1802 Kochubei's influence was diminishing and Alexander was beginning to act as his own foreign minister.

Kochubei had not wanted the post and as he saw Alexander consult him less frequently, he asked permission to resign. In September 1802 a reorganization of the Russian government abolished the system of colleges and replaced it with a ministerial system. In the reorganization Kochubei received the post of minister of the interior. Alexander appointed Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov as his foreign minister. As

35 See for example Vneshnia politika Rossii, Vol. I, No. 12, Alexander to the Ambassador in Berlin, A. I. Krudener, July 5/17, 1801, p. 48; No. 18, Alexander to the Ambassador in Vienna, A. K. Razumovski, September 10/22, 1801, pp. 84-85. Razumovski was specifically instructed to inform the Austrians that not only was the tsar opposed to any partition of the Ottoman Empire but also that Russia would not remain indifferent "to anything which could compromise the independence or the integrity of this empire."

36 The increased concern in continental affairs was probably tied to the failure to achieve any significant domestic
was often the case, the change represented the transformation that was taking place in Alexander's foreign policy. Vorontsov's simultaneous appointment as Chancellor of the Empire represented the increased significance that the tsar attached to foreign affairs. Vorontsov was a transitional figure between the passive foreign policy of Kochubei and the active policy that Czartoryski would follow. Vorontsov generally favored Kochubei's passive system so long as there were no threats to Russian national interests or to the honor and dignity of the Russian Empire. Normally Vorontsov favored settling any such problems through diplomacy and it was only gradually that he came to believe that Russia must go to war against France.37

There was no dramatic shift in Russia's foreign policy immediately following the change in foreign ministers. Alexander cooperated with France in settling German affairs and in establishing commercial relations between Russia and France in the Black Sea. The French ambassador, Gabriel Hédouville, also reported that Vorontsov seemed well-disposed toward France and that the Russian government appeared reform. See Grimsted, Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, pp. 87-90.

37 Ibid., pp. 91-94.
satisfied by the terms of France's treaty with the Porte. However, a number of sources of friction began to emerge in Russian-French relations. Russian concern over Bonaparte's ambitious designs against the Ottoman Empire was one important reason for this growing split. One area which Alexander watched closely was the Ionian Republic. The tsar and his advisers realized that these islands could be a starting point for French aggression against the Ottoman Empire. Alexander decided that Russia would have to reestablish order in the Ionians. This would be necessary to prevent France or any other power from using the anarchy that existed in the islands as an excuse to seize them. Alexander appointed George Mocenigo, a native of one of the islands who had entered Russian service, as his special representative in Corfu. The tsar directed Mocenigo to restore order and issue a new constitution for the islands. Russian troops that had been in Naples would aid him. Talleyrand had assured Morkov that France would welcome this move and that the French representative would cooperate. Alexander hoped that the stationing of Russian troops in the islands would only be a temporary arrangement. He intended to evacuate all Russian forces from the islands as soon as possible. Initially Alexander spoke of cooperation with France in matters

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relating to the Ionian Islands. Bonaparte personally as-
sured the tsar that his representative in the islands would
work with Mocenigo. In Constantinople, Tomara told the
Porte that Russia still supported the agreement of 1800
which placed the islands under Turkish suzerainty. The
spirit of cooperation did not last long. Problems arose be-
tween Russia and France in a number of areas but the Near
East was one of the most serious causes for concern.
Trouble began over French insistence that Mocenigo issue all
his proclamations in the name of France and Russia. The
French ambassador in St. Petersburg protested to Vorontsov
that Mocenigo was acting independently and was not consult-
ing the French consul-general in Corfu, Romieu. Vorontsov
replied that Alexander didn't protest Bonaparte's proclama-
tions in Switzerland and that he believed Russia must act
alone to establish a suitable government in the islands.

to Mocenigo, February 28/March 12, 1802, pp. 179-182; No.
83, Morkov to Mocenigo, June 16/28, 1802, pp. 231-232; No.
94, Kochubei to Mocenigo, July 20/August 1, 1802, pp. 249-
250; No. 123, Tomara to the Turkish government, October
VII, No. 6094, To Alexander, May 23, 1802, pp. 473-474;
No. 6120, To Talleyrand, June 26, 1802, pp. 695-696. For
a detailed account of Ionian affairs see Saul, Russia and
the Mediterraneaian, pp. 165-172.

40 Sbornik, Vol. LXX, No. 223, Hédouville to Talleyrand,
November 16/28, 1802, pp. 570-571.
It was clear that the Russian government was suspicious of French intentions in the islands and in the nearby provinces of the Ottoman Empire. As this suspicion increased, the tsar and his foreign minister took a firmer stand. The Ionian Islands began to assume the role of the Ottoman Empire's first line of defense. Russian interest began to go beyond the original goal of restoring order and stability in the islands. In late 1802 the Russian government limited its activity to some precautionary measures. Vorontsov assured Mocenigo that the tsar approved his actions. The chancellor instructed Mocenigo to continue his policy of keeping the French representative ignorant of his actions. Both Mocenigo and the Porte's representative were suspicious of French intentions. Vorontsov ordered Mocenigo to watch the activities of French agents in the islands and in the nearby Ottoman provinces. Furthermore, Vorontsov told Mocenigo not to continue reassuring the Porte's representative regarding French ambitions. The chancellor felt that there was no use keeping the Porte's eyes closed to the potential danger from France. Vorontsov also wrote to Morkov instructing him to inform Talleyrand that Russia did not have to consult France regarding Russian actions in the

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Ionian Islands. If there were to be consultation, it would be with the Porte. The Russian foreign minister added that the French consul was hindering Mocenigo in his work and not carrying out the orders that the French government claimed he had received.42

While Alexander and his advisers were taking increased interest in the affairs of the Ionian Republic and the French threat to Turkey, Anglo-French relations were continuing to deteriorate. Many expected war to recommence at any moment. Both British and Russian diplomats feared that Bonaparte would use the renewal of hostilities to attack the Ottoman Empire. The British hoped to use the Russian fear of French aggression in the Near East to win Russian support for the creation of a new anti-French coalition. Indeed, from the signing of the Amiens peace, British diplomacy had aimed at the re-creation of a coalition which would include Russia, Austria and Great Britain. The Russian government had politely rejected the initial British offers. However, the appointment of Vorontsov as foreign minister gave new hope to the British government which consequently renewed its efforts. The British foreign secretary, Lord Hawkesbury, determined that the best way to convince the Russians was to

appeal to their fears concerning the Near East. The British overtures to Russia came at an opportune time. Morkov had begun reporting that Bonaparte frequently alluded to the subject of the approaching dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Bonaparte had even made veiled references to Russia's historic claim to the Straits and Constantinople and had casually asked if there weren't in Russia some presumptive heir to the throne of Constantinople. Morkov interpreted these statements as either an attempt to arouse the Porte's suspicion of Russia or as a means of preparing Russia for a sudden French invasion of the Ottoman Empire. The strongly worded dispatches which Morkov's warnings elicited are indicative of Russian fears for the Ottoman Empire. Early in 1803 Vorontsov wrote to Morkov regarding French activities in the Ionian Islands and the possibility of French aggression against the Porte. The Russian chancellor agreed with Morkov that Bonaparte was seeking either to compromise Russia with the Porte or to prepare Russia for an approaching French invasion of Turkey. Perhaps, Vorontsov added, Bonaparte hoped to accomplish both these aims. Vorontsov instructed Morkov to pay close attention to this affair and to try to discover Bonaparte's actual plans regarding the Ottoman Empire. Vorontsov emphasized that Alexander was not at all interested in any hostile action against Turkey and that, on the contrary, Alexander was determined to maintain his ties of friendship with the Porte. Vorontsov had also
warned the Russian ambassador in Constantinople and Mocenigo to beware of French intrigues. Reports from the Ionian Islands indicated that France's agent, Romieu, was extending his interests to the mainland possessions of the Porte. Russia was interested in knowing exactly what France's relations were with Ali Pasha of Janina and whether the French favored Ali Pasha establishing his independence in Albania. Vorontsov directed Morkov to confer with the English ambassador in order to learn what the British knew regarding French designs on the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, Morkov was to try to discover exactly what Austria's position was in regard to a partition of the Ottoman Empire and whether France had already made some overtures to the Austrians. Although the foreign minister stressed the great concern which the tsar and he felt regarding the Ottoman Empire, Vorontsov specifically cautioned Morkov to avoid arousing French fear of an Anglo-Russian plot against France. For the present, Morkov should limit himself to learning what he could of England's intentions. If the need arose for closer cooperation with the English ambassador, Vorontsov promised he would send further instructions. Both Alexander and his foreign minister feared that France was intending to make some move against the Porte. The indications appeared too numerous to ignore. There were the statements of Bonaparte, the suspicious actions of the French agent in Corfu and the British warnings. Other signs of possible renewed French
interest in the Near East included the sending of a French ambassador to Constantinople and the French demand that its warships be allowed to enter the Black Sea to protect French commerce from pirates. In regard to this last demand Vorontsov categorically stated that Russia could not allow armed French vessels to enter the Black Sea. The Russian chancellor declared on behalf of the tsar that the Black Sea was a closed lake which belonged to the powers controlling its shores. He added that there were no pirates in the Black Sea and that in presenting this demand the first consul obviously had some other intention in mind.43

By the end of 1802 Russia's suspicions regarding French designs on the Ottoman Empire were thoroughly aroused. This was certainly not Bonaparte's intention and, perhaps hoping to calm Russian fears, Talleyrand gave assurances that France would not oppose Russia sending a large force to the Ionian Islands to maintain order there.44 Russia remained


44 Sbornik, Vol. LXX, No. 239, Talleyrand to Hédouville, December 17/29, 1802, p. 603; No. 241, Morkov to A. Vorontsov, December 22, 1802/January 3, 1803, pp. 606-607. Morkov continued to interpret French actions as attempts to promote mistrust between the Porte and Russia.
skeptical but at the beginning of 1803 neither the tsar nor his foreign minister contemplated taking military measures against France. The most that Russia was prepared to do was to relent in its demand that the British evacuate Malta. The Russian government apparently felt that the British presence in Malta would prevent any French naval expedition to the Near East. Vorontsov reasserted that Alexander remained committed to a pacific foreign policy. However, while assuring Morkov that the tsar had no desire for war, Vorontsov stated that Russia's position was strong and it had no reason to fear war. He added that there were a number of reasons that could lead Alexander to reconsider his intention of remaining at peace. One possible reason for the tsar to alter his policy was a threat to the honor or the security of the Russian Empire. Vorontsov also cited Alexander's more idealistic motives of supporting justice, the maintenance of order and the general welfare of nations. One specific instance that could lead Alexander to resort to active measures was an overt threat by one of the powers to seek the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. "His majesty could doubtlessly then only intervene actively, to assist his neighbor and to take the determinations that he believed necessary to the interests of Russia." Vorontsov added

\[\text{Ibid., Vol. LXXVII, No. 10, A. Vorontsov to Morkov, January 20/February 1, 1803, pp. 20-25.}\]
that although Alexander was sure that France had no hostile intentions regarding the Turks, he felt nonetheless that the first consul's statements necessitated a precise explanation of the tsar's views regarding the Ottoman Empire. The chancellor directed Mörkov to explain to Talleyrand that the tsar was completely satisfied with the present boundaries of his empire. Alexander had no desire to enlarge his territories at the expense of the Ottoman Empire or any other neighbor. The tsar believed that Turkey was the best neighbor that he could have and therefore he could not remain indifferent to any country seeking to acquire any part of the Turkish state. Vorontsov told Mörkov that Alexander was of the opinion that a primary reason for England's refusal to disarm was its fear of possible French aggression against the Porte. Consequently, the Russian ruler hoped that Bonaparte would calm England's fears by making a statement disavowing any desire for Turkish territory. This would reassure England and hopefully result in a stable European peace.46

Before Alexander received the assurances he sought from Bonaparte, more evidence of French designs on the Ottoman Empire appeared. In September 1802 Bonaparte had sent Colonel Horace Sébastiani on a mission to the Near East. Sébastiani's mission had commercial, political and military

46Ibid.
objectives. Bonaparte directed him to establish good relations with the various pashas that he encountered in the Levant. Sébastiani was also to gather military intelligence on the status of English and Turkish forces in Egypt. On his return to France early in 1803, Bonaparte had Sébastiani's report published in the Moniteur. The report stated that France could reconquer Egypt with as few as six thousand French troops. Sébastiani added that he had stopped in the Ionian Islands and had received a tremendous reception. He stated that the inhabitants of these islands were entirely pro-French and would openly declare themselves French at the first appropriate opportunity. Bonaparte's motives in publishing this report are unclear. Possibly he hoped to frighten the English. In any event the publication of the report greatly aroused not only the English but also the Russians and the Turks. Morkov promptly sent a copy of the report to St. Petersburg and again condemned Bonaparte's unreliability. The British government, having obtained what it considered secret Russian encouragement for its retention of Malta, became even less willing to compromise.47

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February Lord Hawkesbury sent a new proposal for a Russian alliance to the British ambassador in St. Petersburg. If the ambassador found that the Russians were still unwilling to conclude an alliance, then he should attempt to get Russia to agree to either a public or a secret treaty which would guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Alexander continued to reject any alliance or other written commitment. However, Vorontsov did promise that Russia would act in concert with Britain if the French threatened the Porte. Alexander remained committed to a foreign policy that would not involve further obligations. He rejected Austrian overtures for an alliance made at about this same time. 48

In addition to the other Russo-French problems regarding the Ottoman Empire, disputes between these two powers soon emerged over Russia's position in Constantinople. Alexander's policy of supporting the Ottoman Empire was predicated on the assumption that it would be a weak and friendly state. The Russian government carried out its policy by assuring that the Russian ambassador would be the most

Vorontsov, January 23/February 4, 1803, pp. 29-32.

influential foreign representative at the Porte. The Russo-Turkish alliance was certainly not an alliance of equals. The Russian government insisted on Turkey's strict fulfillment of the onerous commitments required by past treaties. Russia continued to take a special interest in the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. These two Ottoman provinces had suffered heavily in the various Russo-Turkish wars and from the invasions of the semi-independent local pashas. In addition, there were serious problems caused by the frequent change in the ruling princes or hospodars of the Principalities. Previous agreements had stipulated that these hospodars were to be removed only in the event that they had committed a serious crime. However, a newly-appointed hospodar was virtually required to distribute generous gifts on the occasion of his appointment and this became a lucrative source of income for Ottoman officials. The Greeks appointed to these posts would then recoup their losses by taxing the inhabitants of the Principalities. As a result of the frequent changes in rulers and the consequent taxes, the Principalities were becoming depopulated. The nobles and clergy sought the intercession of the Russian government. Alexander took an active interest in the plight of these people and instructed Tomara to intercede on their behalf. In Constantinople, Tomara had received a petition from the Principalities and had protested to the Turkish government about the conditions there. Tomara warned the
Porte that this situation could cause serious problems in Russo-Turkish relations. In order to remedy the situation the Russian government requested that the Porte fix the terms of the two hospodars at seven years. The Russians proposed that the hospodars be removed from office only in case of a serious offense and then only after Russia had concurred. Alexander also wished to see Wallachia granted a period in which the Porte would collect no taxes in order to allow the inhabitants time to recover. Tomara insisted on a prompt written response to the tsar's proposals. Because of Russia's insistence, the Porte yielded. In September 1802 the sultan issued a hatti sharif which granted virtually all of the Russian demands. The Porte recognized Russia's right to intervene on behalf of the two Principalities. The hospodars were henceforth to serve for a period of seven full years and could not be deposed unless found guilty of a proven offense. If the sultan suspected the hospodar of a crime, he would inform the Russian ambassador. The sultan could not remove the hospodar until both sides agreed that he was guilty. The sultan's decree also abolished all taxes imposed since 1783 and granted Wallachia a

For the notes of the Russian ambassador to the Turkish government see Vneshnåã politika Rossii, Vol. I, No. 88, June 24/July 6, 1802, pp. 238-239; No. 90, July 4/16, 1802, pp. 241-242; Nos. 95 and 96, July 21/August 2, 1802, pp. 250-252. For an indication of Alexander's concern for the Principalities see ibid., No. 14, Alexander to Tomara, July 9/21, 1801, pp. 58-59.
one year exemption from all taxes. The sultan stipulated that natives of the provinces were to be appointed to local administrative posts whenever possible.\(^{50}\)

By obtaining the decree in favor of the Principalities the Russians had won an important diplomatic victory and demonstrated how extensive their influence was in Constantinople. Despite Bonaparte's wish to cooperate with Alexander, the first consul had no intention of yielding to the Russian claim to a virtual protectorate over the Ottoman Empire. In order to extend French influence at the Porte, Bonaparte decided to appoint an ambassador to fill the vacant post in Constantinople. He selected General Guillaume Brune as his ambassador and instructed him to regain France's diplomatic supremacy at the Porte. Brune was to do everything possible to win the Porte's friendship, protect French commerce and reassert French protection of Catholics in the Ottoman Empire. He was to assure the sultan that France was opposed to a partition of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time Bonaparte directed Brune to secure intelligence on the various pashaliks of Turkey and establish contacts with the Greek rulers of the Principalities. Brune arrived in Constantinople in early January 1803.\(^{51}\) A new Russian ambassador, 


\(^{51}\)Napoléon, *Correspondance*, Vol. VIII, No. 6378,
Andrei Iakovlevich Italinsky, had arrived a short time before Brune. Although Bonaparte had instructed Brune to show regard for the Russian ambassador, the Russian and French representatives soon found themselves in disagreement. At first the sources of friction were trivial and centered on questions of diplomatic protocol and the reception ceremonies which Brune demanded of the Porte. The fact that the Porte yielded to Brune's demand was a diplomatic victory for the French ambassador. Italinsky generally avoided contact with Brune and maintained a correct but not particularly

"Special Instructions for the Ambassador to Constantinople (General Brune)," October 18, 1802, pp. 69-71. Paul Coquelle, "L'ambassade du maréchal Brune à Constantinople (1803-1805)," Revue d'histoire diplomatique, Vol. XVIII (1904), pp. 53-57.

AndreI I. Italinsky (1743-1827) had studied medicine in St. Peterburg, Edinburgh and London. He received his medical degree in London in 1774 and continued his medical studies in Paris. In 1781 he met the Tsarevich Paul who was travelling in western Europe. Through Paul, Italinsky obtained a diplomatic post in Naples in 1781 and later became Russian ambassador to Naples. In his memoirs Czartoryski is critical of Italinsky whom he had met in Italy. Czartoryski charged that Italinsky had acted effectively in ordinary affairs but lacked an aptitude for important matters. Czartoryski also criticized Italinsky's intellectual pretensions. However, the minutes of the Secret Committee indicate that it was Czartoryski who suggested that Italinsky be appointed to the post in Constantinople. See Russkii biograficheskii slovar', Vol. VIII, pp. 151-152. Charles de Mazade (ed.), Mémoires du prince Adam Czartoryski et sa correspondance avec l'empereur Alexandre I er (2 vols.; Paris, 1887), Vol. I, pp. 212-213. Mikhailovich, Strogonov, Vol. II, No. 140, Session of March 31, 1802, pp. 123-124.
friendly attitude toward the French representative. Brune reported that Italinsky was decidedly pro-British.\(^3\)

Reports of Brune's activities in Constantinople were a further indication of Bonaparte's continued interest in the Near East. In the beginning of 1803 Mocenigo reported that France was demanding a protectorate over the Roman Catholics in the Ionian Republic. Mocenigo said that the inhabitants of the islands feared that France would soon try to interfere in their government. Reports also reached St. Petersburg that French agents were active in stirring up trouble in the area of the Principalities. The Russian consul general in Jassy reported rumors of French agents encouraging the local pashas to rebel and promising to aid them against Russia and the Porte. Alexander began to pay increasing attention to these various reports. Both the tsar and his foreign minister still supported a peaceful foreign policy. However, Alexander repeatedly made it known that he strongly opposed any French projects against the Ottoman Empire and Russia continued to protest against the French activities in the Ionian Islands.\(^4\)

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The primary issue in European diplomacy in the early months of 1803 was Britain's refusal to evacuate Malta. This violation of the Treaty of Amiens was related to Near Eastern concerns. England, France, Russia and the Porte had at one time or another each expressed the opinion that control of Malta would be necessary for any new French eastern expedition. The British feared that once they had evacuated the island the way would be open for a new French attempt against Egypt. The British alarm caused by the publication of the Sébastiani report was reinforced when Bonaparte told the British ambassador to Paris that France would some day acquire Egypt. The first consul referred to the recent trip of Sébastiani as a military mission. While Bonaparte appeared to be trying to frighten the British into evacuating Malta, he apparently still hoped for a policy of cooperation with Alexander. Talleyrand informed Morkov that Bonaparte would give the tsar the reassurances which Alexander had requested. Bonaparte had inserted in his message to the Corps Legislative a statement to reassure the Porte regarding the rumors of French designs against Ottoman territory. Talleyrand stated that this was another attempt by the first consul to act in accord with Alexander on matters concerning

European affairs. The French foreign minister also directed Hédouville to bring to the attention of the Russian government the first consul's reassuring statements regarding the Ottoman Empire. Bonaparte declared to Morkov that he had no interest in Egypt. Morkov reported this to St. Petersburg but also noted in his dispatch that this statement contradicted what Bonaparte had told the British ambassador.\(^{56}\)

In attempting to ascertain Bonaparte's true motives and ambitions in regard to the Ottoman Empire, Alexander and his advisers had to rely heavily on the reports of Morkov. Throughout 1803 most of Morkov's dispatches on this matter gave ominous warnings. He reported in March that according to one source Bonaparte was planning to expand into southern Italy in order to be in a position to seize the Morea. The Russian ambassador seemed to lend special credence to information he received from Britain's ambassador, Charles Whitworth. The latter, not surprisingly, emphasized the French threat to the Near East and asserted that England held Malta in order to be able to frustrate Bonaparte's Near Eastern ambitions. In his reports to St. Petersburg, Morkov dismissed French reassurances to Russia and insisted that the French threat to the Ottoman Empire appeared to be very

\(^{56}\)Sbornik, Vol. LXXVII, No. 19, Talleyrand to Morkov, February 9/21, 1803, p. 42; No. 22, Morkov to A. Vorontsov, February 16/28, 1803, pp. 46-47; No. 23, A. Vorontsov to Morkov, February 21/March 5, 1803, p. 50; No. 26, Talleyrand to Hédouville, February 28/March 12, 1803,
real. The Austrian ambassador told Morkov that the French government had frequently told him that Austria would be able to recoup its recent territorial losses at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. The French officials had stated that the destruction of the Ottoman Empire was approaching. Morkov believed that if war broke out between England and France the danger to the Porte would greatly increase. Since France could not strike England directly, it might decide to attack indirectly by invading the Ottoman Empire. In support of this theory, Morkov cited the activities of the French in the Ionian Islands and in the nearby Ottoman provinces. Morkov believed that the French claim to protect the Roman Catholic church in the Ionian Republic was an attempt to establish French influence in the islands. Morkov advised that Mocenigo reject any such pretension and categorically state that France had no right to intervene in matters relating to the internal administration of the islands.57

The reports from Morkov in Paris, Italinsky in Constantinople and Mocenigo in Corfu began to have an effect

pp. 56-58; No. 28, Morkov to the Court, March 4/16, 1803, pp. 61-63.

57 Ibid., No. 29, Morkov to the Court, March 4/16, 1803, pp. 66-67; Nos. 30 and 31, Morkov to A. Vorontsov, March 5/17, 1803, pp. 68-71 and p. 73; No. 37, Morkov to A. Vorontsov, March 28/April 8, 1803, p. 86.
on Russian diplomacy. The English continued to use Russia's fears for the Ottoman Empire in an attempt to win a Russian alliance. The Sébastiani report was an especially effective weapon for the British who cited it as concrete proof of French designs on Egypt. Even more importantly from the Russian point of view, the report seemed to indicate France's interest in reacquiring the Ionian Islands. Although the British did not get an alliance with Russia, signs began to appear by early 1803 that Alexander was becoming more involved in matters of foreign policy. The tsar was still very far from wanting to go to war but he did begin to actively support measures that would prevent hostilities or at least keep them away from Russia. Guarantees for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire became a principal object for Russian diplomacy. In a letter to the Russian ambassador to London, Simon Vorontsov, Alexander affirmed that he remained committed to peace. However, the tsar stated that he could not remain indifferent in the event of a French invasion of the Ottoman Empire, a project which Bonaparte apparently was contemplating. Russia began to pay more attention to the English claim that they were holding Malta because they feared Bonaparte's Near Eastern ambitions. The Russian government agreed with Morkov that the renewal of hostilities between England and France would increase the danger to the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, the tsar offered to mediate the Anglo-French dispute. As Alexander saw
the problem, the first step in assuring peace would be to get England, France and the other principal European powers to guarantee the existence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. If Morkov in Paris and Vorontsov in London could obtain such an agreement, then England should be satisfied and yield Malta. Despite the appearance of acting impartially, the Russian government was clearly more suspicious of Bonaparte.58

Alexander's offer to mediate the dispute did not prevent the outbreak of war. However, the tsar did not abandon his hopes of restoring peace through Russian mediation. The Russian government remained outwardly friendly to France and, despite Alexander's reluctance to become too embroiled in the matter, he agreed to send a Russian garrison to Malta as part of a settlement. Bonaparte continued to hope for Alexander's support and believed that he could win the tsar to his side in spite of Alexander's pro-British advisers. The French made conciliatory offers which for a brief time even impressed Morkov by their fairness. However, the very generosity of Bonaparte's suggestions soon aroused the suspicions of the Russian ambassador. Chancellor Vorontsov was also suspicious of France and his dispatches displayed an

58Ibid., No. 39, Hédouville to Talleyrand, March 31/April 12, 1803, pp. 88-89; No. 44, Alexander to Bonaparte, April 10/22, 1803, pp. 100-103; No. 45, Rescript to Morkov, April 10/22, 1803, pp. 103-108; No. 46, A. Vorontsov to Morkov, April 10/22, 1803, pp. 108-111. Arkhiv Vorontsova,
increasingly anti-French attitude. Vorontsov's pronouncements began to sound more bellicose. He wrote that Russia could not remain indifferent to renewed hostilities and new upheavals on the continent. The tsar continued his mediation attempt but Bonaparte detected an increasingly pro-British position in Alexander's proposals. For their part the British disliked the tsar's ideas and sought to avoid committing themselves. The preliminary articles which Alexander suggested as a basis for peace clearly demonstrate the importance that Alexander attached to the need to provide security for the Ottoman Empire. In addition to a Russian garrison on Malta, Alexander suggested that England receive the island of Lampedusa as a Mediterranean base for its fleet. The French and the British would reaffirm their recognition of the independence of the Ionian Republic and both parties would guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. By the time Morkov could officially transmit these proposals to Talleyrand, Russian-French relations had deteriorated to the point where mediation was impossible. 

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59 Sbornik, Vol. LXXVII, No. 59, Hédouville to Talleyrand, May 15/27, 1803, pp. 148-149; No. 64, Rescript to Morkov, May 24/June 5, 1803, pp. 159-164; No. 78, Morkov to S. Vorontsov, June 1/13, 1803, pp. 203-205; No. 80, Markov to the Court, June 2/14, 1803, p. 212; No. 81, Morkov to A.
In the summer of 1803 the Russian government watched the activities of France with growing apprehension. The movement of French armies down the Italian peninsula appeared to be more of a threat to the Ottoman Empire than it was to Great Britain. Bonaparte was becoming less willing to conciliate Alexander. In July 1803 the first consul requested Morkov's recall. Talleyrand wrote to Hédouville that Alexander's mediation proposals were too partial to England. The growing coolness between Russia and France was accompanied by intensified rivalry between these two powers in Near Eastern affairs. The areas of conflict in the Near East remained the same but the measures taken by each side began to go beyond polite exchanges of notes. Both sides escalated their activities. The actions of France's representative to the Ionian Republic continued to raise strong Russian objections. Vorontsov asserted Alexander's continued interest in this small republic and stated


Ibid., No. 109, Talleyrand to Hédouville, July 6/18, 1803, pp. 270-271; No. 123, Bonaparte to Alexander, July 17/29, 1803, pp. 299-300; No. 135, Talleyrand to Hédouville, August 17/29, 1803, pp. 322-323.
that the tsar would not abandon his efforts on its behalf. The Russian chancellor continued to cite Alexander's humanitarian motives but also declared that the tsar didn't wish to destroy Russia's prestige among the Greeks since this would lead to French gains among these people. Russia also began asserting an even stronger influence in the Ionian Republic and even authorized its consuls to act on behalf of the Ionian Republic. France attempted to counter this Russian move by naming its own candidate as commercial agent for the Ionian Republic in France. This action elicited a strong protest from Morkov in Paris and a complaint by Vorontsov to Hédouville.61

French military advances in Italy and French intrigue in the Ionian Islands represented a potential threat to Russian interests and Russia responded accordingly. However, an even greater danger to Russia soon emerged when confirmed reports began reaching St. Petersburg concerning the activities of French agents in and around the Ottoman Empire. Dispatches from Vienna provided evidence that French agents were establishing contacts in Montenegro, a country where

Russian influence had been strong for almost a century. There were other indications of various Turkish provinces planning to revolt, possibly with French aid. The Russian government responded quickly. Alexander strongly approved of Mocenigo's actions of watching and reporting these French moves. The tsar decided that since Mocenigo was closest to the situation he should concern himself with obtaining precise intelligence on the activities of the French agents in the Ottoman Empire. The Russian government regarded the situation as increasingly serious. Writing on behalf of the tsar, Vorontsov clarified Russia's position in regard to the provinces and peoples of European Turkey. The chancellor divided the Porte's European subjects into Greeks and Slavs. Both of these peoples, he said, were attached to Russia on the basis of their common religion. Furthermore, the Slavs shared a common origin and similar language. "...These considerations render Russian influence unquestionable anytime Russia wished to acquire such influence." Vorontsov said that normally Russia's friendly relations with the Porte would seem to prevent Russia from making use of these ties and even lead Russia to discontinue those relations which had previously existed. However, in view of the current circumstances, this would not be any help to the Porte. On the contrary, Vorontsov believed that it would leave no opposition to the French and allow them to gain an ascendancy, particularly in Greece. This would only accelerate the
destruction of the Ottoman Empire. The Porte was incapable through its own resources of preventing the loss of these peoples. Vorontsov reasoned that only Russian influence was strong enough to oppose French encroachments and thereby keep the Porte from losing these provinces. Vorontsov added:

The emperor is certainly very far from wishing to abuse his influence in order to induce these peoples to deliver themselves from Turkish domination and to accelerate in this manner the ruin of an empire which already is only too shaky and in which for the moment Russia has a neighbor who cannot give it anything to complain about.

Russia remained committed to the policy which Alexander had followed since his accession. He would seek to preserve the Ottoman Empire as a friendly neighbor. Vorontsov added, however, that should the Ottoman Empire ever change its attitude toward Russia, then Russia would use its influence among the Slavs and Greeks to its greatest advantage. Alexander would never do anything to provoke such a change in Ottoman policy but he would do everything necessary to prevent the people of European Turkey from securing their independence in a manner contrary to Russian interests. Vorontsov maintained that Russia would be acting in the interest of the Slavs and the Greeks. Recent history demonstrated that liberty received from the French was only an illusion since the French would actually dominate these peoples. On behalf of the tsar, Vorontsov gave Mocenigo general
directions to carry out his mission of watching the activities of the French. He allowed Mocenigo a great deal of discretion in the specific measures he might wish to take but cautioned him to conduct his surveillance of European Turkey in a manner which would not compromise Russia with the Porte. The foreign minister said, however, that the Ottoman Empire could not object to Russian contacts with those people over whom it had only nominal sovereignty. Mocenigo should use caution in his contacts with these people but not as much as was necessary in his relations with those people whom the Porte governed directly. Vorontsov acknowledged that one reason for the increase in French influence in these regions was that Russia had neglected its old ties with the Slavs and the Greeks. Mocenigo would have to reestablish these ties and learn what he could of these countries. Mocenigo was to counteract the French influence, establish a network of reliable agents and render whatever assistance he deemed necessary to the various Balkan peoples. The Russian government was considering the reestablishment of a consulate on the Dalmatian coast as another means of contact with the people of European Turkey and Montenegro. Vorontsov recommended that Mocenigo attempt to learn what he could about Montenegro since the metropolitan of this country seemed devoted to the French. Throughout the instructions Vorontsov advised Mocenigo to act cautiously in all his activities so he would not alarm the Porte.
However, time was also essential and the chancellor urged him to conceive a plan of action quickly in order to calm Russian anxiety on the "harmful" and "tireless" activity of the French.  

The orders to Mocenigo represented Alexander's initial step in counteracting what he considered a direct threat to the Ottoman Empire and therefore an indirect danger to Russia. At the same time Vorontsov moved to reassure Austria that Russia had no intention of departing from its policy of preserving the Ottoman Empire regardless of what France might offer Russia. Russia approved of Austria's decision to keep its forces in readiness but remain neutral in the Anglo-French war. The Russian chancellor noted France's bad faith and its ambitious projects and said that eventually the European powers would have to impose a barrier to French ambition. Vorontsov complimented the Russian chargé in Vienna for keeping St. Petersburg informed of French armaments in the Mediterranean. These armaments, he said, were indicative of French ambitions in the Near East. The chancellor informed the chargé that the Russian government had "some rather certain data" regarding Bonaparte's designs on some of the Porte's possessions. Vorontsov believed that

the French entry into the territory of Naples was possibly tied to future French aggression against the Ottoman Empire. The Russian government sought Austrian cooperation in adopting a common policy at Constantinople since both empires had the same interests there.63

In an attempt to keep the Anglo-French war away from the Near East, the Russian government repeated earlier warnings that the Black Sea was a closed lake belonging to Russia and the Ottoman Empire. In a note to Morkov in Paris, Vorontsov stated that the Russian government had requested the Ottoman Empire to open this sea to the commercial vessels of other nations. This privilege did not extend to any warships or privateers. Neither the Russians nor the Turks were involved in the present war. Consequently, armed ships in the Black Sea belonging to any nation other than Russia or the Ottoman Empire would be regarded as pirates and treated accordingly. Vorontsov repeated this warning to Hédouville and issued a similar admonition to Great Britain.64 In Constantinople, Italinsky kept a close watch on

63 Ibid., No. 216, A. Vorontsov to Anstett, August 28/September 9, 1803, pp. 510-511; No. 223, A. Vorontsov to Anstett, October 6/18, 1803, pp. 528-529.

all the activities of the Ottoman government and particularly on the Porte's relations with France. The Russian ambassador continued to exercise a strong influence on important decisions made by the Porte. Italinsky's supremacy at the Porte was facilitated by the actions of Bonaparte. The Sébastiani report had enraged the Turks and Brune had lost whatever initial advantages he had enjoyed. Rumors spread in Constantinople that the French were planning an expedition to the Morea. Brune constantly had to deny these allegations. By the summer of 1803 Brune had won back some influence at the Porte and at his insistence the sultan agreed to send an ambassador to Paris. The sultan temporarily abandoned this concession when the Porte learned that a French ship had landed arms and munitions in the Morea. Bonaparte claimed that the English, disguised as French, were responsible for sending the arms to the Greeks. The first consul asserted that the whole incident was a British attempt to set the Porte against France. The Turks paid little heed to Bonaparte's charge and they continued to rely on the Russian ambassador for advice. The sultan finally agreed to send an ambassador to Paris but he instructed his representative to consult with Morkov and rely on the Russian ambassador for advice. Vorontsov notified the Russian embassy in Paris that the Porte was sending an ambassador and advised the Russian chargé, Pierre Oubril, to try to gain his confidence. Vorontsov warned Oubril that France might try
to take advantage of the inexperience of the new ambassador and attempt to use him to alter the Porte's policy toward Russia. Vorontsov cautioned Oubril to watch closely the relations between the Ottoman ambassador and France and to keep the Russian government informed on any significant developments. The chancellor added that it should be easy to win the confidence of this ambassador since the Turks realized that Russia's relations with the Porte were based on a desire to preserve the Ottoman Empire.65

By the autumn of 1803 Russian-French relations had greatly deteriorated. Alexander's fears for the Ottoman Empire and his suspicions regarding Bonaparte's plans in the Near East had played an important role in this growing hostility. Bonaparte complained that Russia spoke of preserving the Ottoman Empire's integrity but at the same time violated it by its dominant position in the Ionian Republic and in Wallachia. The first consul believed that Alexander's advisers in St. Petersburg and his ambassadors in Paris and London had misled the tsar. Chancellor Vorontsov, however, assured Morkov that Alexander completely approved of his conduct. Following an incident in which Bonaparte publicly

subjected Morkov to verbal abuse, the tsar recalled his ambassador. Alexander left Russian diplomatic affairs in Paris in the hands of the Russian chargé, Oubril. Soon after this the tsar informed France that he no longer considered himself bound to the terms he had proposed in his mediation effort. In an ominous gesture, the tsar authorized a levy of recruits to augment the Russian army. In a conversation with Hédouville, Vorontsov told the French ambassador that Russia was alarmed by the activities of the French army in Italy. The chancellor said that there were persistent rumors that these French forces in Italy were to be used to invade Egypt and the Morea. Hédouville denied these allegations and attributed the rumors to British intrigue. The French ambassador cited Bonaparte's repeated assurances that he had no designs on Ottoman territory as proof that the rumors were false. In view of the numerous reports of French activity in the Ottoman Empire, Alexander remained skeptical of Bonaparte's denials. In fact, the tsar's growing concerns for the Near East were to play an essential role in Russia's preliminary overtures for an alliance with England.66

October 16/28, 1803, pp. 379-381; No. 162, Hédouville to Talleyrand, October 27/November 8, 1803, p. 399; No. 163, Vorontsov to Hédouville, October 29/November 10, 1803, pp. 400-402; No. 164, Hédouville to Talleyrand, November 1/13, 1803, p. 407.
CHAPTER III

RUSSIA, THE NEAR EAST AND THE THIRD COALITION

By the end of 1803 Alexander was gradually abandoning his passive foreign policy in favor of a more active one. The French threat to the Near East and the increasing influence of Adam Czartoryski contributed to this reversal of Russian policy. Czartoryski had for some time been Alexander's close friend and confidant. The tsar frequently consulted him in foreign policy decisions and, until the defeat at Austerlitz, gave a great deal of weight to his advice. Czartoryski had had only limited experience in foreign affairs but his intellect, his capacity for hard work and his friendship with the tsar made him extremely influential. In September 1802 Alexander appointed Czartoryski as the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs. As an assistant to the aged and ill Vorontsov, Czartoryski had extensive authority in directing Russia's foreign affairs. The chancellor's frequent illnesses caused him to rely heavily on Czartoryski. As early as January 1803 the British ambassador in St. Petersburg observed that Czartoryski was second in rank in the foreign ministry but possibly first
in influence.¹ Many of Vorontsov's diplomatic dispatches of 1803 bear striking resemblance in language and content to Czartoryski's ideas. It appears that many of these were actually drawn up by Czartoryski and signed by Vorontsov.

Czartoryski played a particularly important role in leading Alexander to take a more active interest in Near Eastern affairs. In fact, many of Czartoryski's Near Eastern policies continued to influence Alexander even after Czartoryski had left office. Like Kochubei, Czartoryski believed that Russia needed a "system" to provide continuity and purpose to its foreign policy. He rejected Kochubei's passive system. In early 1803 Czartoryski drew up a memorandum "Sur le système politique que devrait suivre la Russie." Czartoryski read and presented the memorandum to Alexander and the tsar subsequently adopted a number of his recommendations. The memorandum contained a combination of idealistic goals and practical suggestions on various aspects of Russian foreign policy. Czartoryski believed that as a great power Russia could not follow a passive foreign policy. He did not advocate Russian territorial expansion. However, he strongly argued against those who maintained that Russia should not act until its territory or prosperity

were directly threatened. He asserted that a state had to anticipate such threats and seek to prevent them. In order to be able to do this, Russia needed a clearly defined statement of its true national interests. Czartoryski reviewed Russia's relations with the various European powers. He noted that England was the only country that Russia had to treat considerately because of England's navy and the importance of English commerce. Czartoryski believed that Russia should rely less on England as a trading partner. He strongly recommended that Russia promote its Black Sea commerce as one means of accomplishing this. In matters of Continental policy Czartoryski advocated the establishment of close ties with England since both countries favored a system of equilibrium on the continent. Czartoryski stated that it would be in the interest of both Russia and France to maintain peaceful relations. However, he believed that the "outrageous and insatiable ambition" of Bonaparte would not permit any real ties between France and Russia. Czartoryski pointed out that France could not attack Russia without the aid of Austria, Prussia or the Ottoman Empire. He felt it was unlikely any of these would join France because of their lack of confidence in its government. If the Turks, despite their fear of a Greek revolt, joined France against Russia, the French could only assist them by sea. Britain could play the deciding role in preventing this. Czartoryski recommended that Russia oppose French ambitions
through diplomacy. By taking a firm stand Russia might be able to avoid hostilities at a later date. Czartoryski believed that the French might yield to Russian diplomatic pressure because they realized that Alexander could always form a coalition against them.²

Czartoryski's views and recommendations regarding the Ottoman Empire were not in accord with Alexander's current Turkish policies. Czartoryski admitted that it was advantageous for Russia to have a weak neighbor such as Turkey. However, he believed that the Ottoman Empire was too weak to sustain itself much longer. Czartoryski felt that any external stimulus could bring about Turkey's fall. Austria was seeking aggrandizement and the logical place for this was Turkey. Even England in anticipation of gains might accept the expulsion of the Turks from Europe so long as France did not profit. In view of these facts, Czartoryski suggested that Russia examine its views on the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire so that it would be prepared if this situation arose. Czartoryski did not anticipate Russia acquiring any extensive amount of European Turkey. He believed that a new state would emerge in Europe. Czartoryski

asserted that a dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire would not harm Russia. He didn't favor taking any action to accelerate this process but only because of the unsettled conditions in Europe. As a short term measure Russia might seek to preserve the Porte's integrity because any change might be for the worse. Czartoryski recommended a few general principles to guide Russian policy in the event of the dismemberment of European Turkey. In order to protect Russia's Black Sea trade both sides of the Dardanelles should not be the property of one state. Furthermore, the other European powers for the most part should not gain territories in European Turkey. Most importantly, France should not acquire Turkey. Nor should the French gain influence over the sultan's European subjects by appearing to be their liberators. This was the role that Russia should play. Czartoryski believed that the Greeks could form a state out of European Turkey. He felt that such a state would be strong enough to maintain its independence. He recommended that Russia assure its influence over the Greeks by promising them liberty and a good government. Czartoryski admitted that he knew little about the Slavs of the Ottoman Empire. He declared that it was absolutely essential for Russia to acquire precise information on the various peoples and provinces of European Turkey. According to some reports the provinces of European Turkey were overrun by French agents and the people were ready to rise up and join any
foreign force that would promise them freedom. Czartoryski asserted that Russia had to determine the accuracy of these reports. If they were true, Russia had to devise a means to destroy French influence and replace it with Russian influence. Czartoryski noted that:

Russia by its ancient ties that it has had with the Greek nation, by the powerful link of religion, and by that of a similar language and origin with all the Slav peoples possesses the greatest facilities to assure itself a preponderant influence on all European Turkey . . . .

Czartoryski suggested that for the present Russia needed extensive data on European Turkey before it could adopt a more complete system.  

In summing up his memorandum, Czartoryski repeated that Russia needed to establish an active system to check Bonaparte's ambitious projects. Czartoryski felt that all the nations of Europe must return to their natural equilibrium. As for the Turks, he believed that they could be expelled from Europe since "humanity demands it . . . , the cause of civilization demands it, and they themselves are not in a state of preventing it." Following the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, only Austria should receive any territorial aggrandizement. Even these gains would be in return for Austrian concessions elsewhere. Czartoryski was not totally oblivious to Russia's own interests in the Ottoman

\[3\text{Ibid., pp. 67-69.}\]
Empire. While he indicated that assuring the general good would be sufficient advantage for Russia, nonetheless, he acknowledged that Russia might wish to "secure and round out" its frontiers. Russia might wish to form a union of the Slavic peoples of European Turkey with Russia as the center or perhaps even incorporate some of these areas into the Russian Empire. Czartoryski recommended sending representatives into Turkey and other parts of Europe in order to learn the sentiments of the people. Czartoryski also advised sending a mission to England to sound out the British ministry and to assure British cooperation.

Alexander did not immediately endorse Czartoryski's recommendations regarding the Ottoman Empire or his proposals for adopting a more active foreign policy. However, Bonaparte's continued threats to the Near East finally led Alexander to take some steps to protect Russian interests. The first step was to ascertain England's position particularly in regard to the Near East. In November 1803 the tsar approved the first Russian overtures to England. In a dispatch to the Russian ambassador in London, Chancellor Vorontsov wrote that Russia had learned that Bonaparte definitely

intended to land troops in Albania and the Morea. He noted that this invasion would harm not only the Porte but also all the European powers that wished to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Vorontsov warned that the French would seek to win over the Greeks and the Albanians. Once they were securely established in Greece, the French would then invade Egypt. Vorontsov asserted that Russia was informing Britain of this in hopes of maintaining tranquility in this part of Europe and preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Russia would employ all available means to oppose any French attempt to land troops in Albania. Alexander regarded the Ionian Islands as the most suitable position to defend Ottoman territory. In communicating his views on these matters the tsar hoped England would respond with equal frankness. The Russian government suggested that the British ministry authorize Admiral Horatio Nelson to detach some ships from his fleet to cruise in the vicinity of the Ionian Islands. Nelson might also concert with Count Mocenigo and conclude a secret agreement for common defensive measures for the protection of Greece. Vorontsov urged the British to respond promptly to the Russian dispatch. In addition to these overtures for a

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5 The letter can be found in John Holland Rose, Napoleonic Studies (London, 1904), Appendix IV, Letter of the Chancellor of the Empire to Count Vorontsov, November 20/December 2, 1803, pp. 365-367. For a discussion of Russia's
limited Anglo-Russian agreement to protect European Turkey, Alexander also approved the sending of more Russian troops to the Ionian Republic. These troops began leaving Sevastopol early in 1804. The reinforcements were not intended to police the Ionians but rather were to protect the islands and the nearby Ottoman possessions from a French invasion. In less than a year the Russian force totaled 11,000 Russian troops and a small naval force.  

The note to England and the sending of reinforcements to Corfu did not mean that Alexander had decided to establish or join a new anti-French coalition. The numerous reports of French activity in the Near East concerned the tsar but he was still not convinced that war was necessary. Alexander hesitated to take any strong measures and limited his actions to preliminary and cautious steps. Following Morkov's recall Russian diplomatic affairs in Paris were left in the hands of the Russian charge, Pierre Oubril. Vorontsov instructed Oubril to concern himself especially

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relations with England in the period of the formation of the Third Coalition see Avgusta M. Stanislavskiaia, Russko-angliiiskie otnosheniia i problemy sredizemnomor'ia, 1798-1807 (Russo-English Relations and the Problems of the Mediterranean, 1798-1807) (Moscow, 1962), Chap. VII.

with seeking to discover any French projects to seize Ottoman territory. The chancellor advised Oubril to observe closely the relations between the Turkish ambassador and the French government. Vorontsov assured the Russian chargé that the Porte's representative had received orders from his government to cooperate with him. Alexander's cautious measures did not prevent further strains in Russo-French relations. Oubril reported rumors of new French intrigue in the Morea. He also stated that the Ottoman ambassador evaded giving him any details of the conferences he had had with Talleyrand.  

Russia continued to prepare diplomatically and militarily for a possible French attack against either the Ionian Islands or the nearby provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Vorontsov advised Mocenigo to utilize whatever defenses were available on the islands. The chancellor warned that the extensive French armaments in Naples made all these precautions necessary. The Russian government continued to assert publicly that the new troops were being sent to complete the forces needed to police the islands. Privately the Russians assured the Ionian government that Russia would pay for the upkeep of the new troops. Vorontsov repeated his previous

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instructions to Mocenigo that he should establish good relations with the inhabitants of the nearby provinces of the Ottoman Empire and gain their confidence. Vorontsov told Mocenigo that if necessary he could assure these people that Alexander would never abandon them. Furthermore, the tsar would intercede on their behalf at the Porte on the first appropriate occasion. Mocenigo could promise that Alexander would seek to improve their civil and political existence and hopefully bring it closer in line to the situation enjoyed by the Danubian Principalities. Mocenigo would have to convince these people that this was a surer way to lead to their independence than anything the French could offer. Vorontsov advised Mocenigo to direct his efforts toward convincing these people to fight the French if they attempted an invasion. Vorontsov warned Mocenigo to beware of Ali Pasha of Janina who might be working with the French. Ali Pasha had captured the former Venetian coastal towns and Mocenigo should consider retaking these ports. This would cut off Ali from the sea and prevent him from aiding a French landing. Vorontsov again emphasized that the various measures that Mocenigo would undertake were in no way directed against the Porte. Under no circumstances was he to compromise Russia with the Turkish government. Above all, Mocenigo was to actively pursue Russia's principal aim which was the destruction of French intrigue and the preparation of defenses so that if the French landed they could be
effectively resisted from the Ionian Islands and the mainland. If the French attempted to land simultaneously at various points, Mocenigo would have to request the assistance of the British fleet. If the French actually landed in Greece, Vorontsov assured Mocenigo that Russia would send considerable reinforcements. In addition to these defensive preparations in the Adriatic, Russia also made overtures aimed at securing Austrian cooperation in defending the Ottoman Empire. The Austrians doubted that Bonaparte planned to invade the Ottoman provinces. Nonetheless, Vorontsov pressed the Austrians to declare what they would do in the event such an invasion occurred.®

By the beginning of 1804 Vorontsov's health had grown worse and Alexander finally granted him a leave of absence. Vorontsov left St. Petersburg in February 1804. Although Vorontsov retained the title of foreign minister until his death in late 1805, the actual control of the foreign ministry was in the hands of Prince Adam Czartoryski. The new acting foreign minister enjoyed the friendship and confidence of Alexander. However, despite the tsar's stated endorsement of many of his ideas, Czartoryski often found Alexander was too indecisive to implement the recommended

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policies. This problem was especially evident in the ques-
tion of the role of the Ottoman Empire in Russia's foreign
policy. Czartoryski's sympathy for the Greeks and Slavs of
the Ottoman Empire and his desire to see the Turks chased
from Europe directly conflicted with Alexander's policy of
preserving the integrity of Turkey. Despite the intellec-
tual and moral trappings that he gave to his Near Eastern
ideas, Czartoryski was much more a spokesman for traditional
Russian policies than the tsar himself was. Not only did
Czartoryski support the liberation of the Greeks and Slavs
but he also devoted far more attention to the importance of
Russia's Black Sea commerce than Alexander did. 9

Shortly after assuming control of Russia's foreign re-
lations, Czartoryski submitted an extensive report to Alex-
ander. This memorandum dealt with the recent overtures to
England and especially with the need for Russia to establish
a firm policy in regard to the Ottoman Empire. Czartoryski's
report is important for understanding Russia's Ottoman policy
in the years 1804-1806. Basically the report was a middle
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9Czartoryski did not receive the title of foreign min-
ister even after the death of Vorontsov. Many Russians re-
sented having a Pole who was also a Roman Catholic direct-
ing Russian foreign policy. Czartoryski noted that many
Russians were enthusiastic about his Greek and Slav projects.
However, he had to be careful in his support for the Poles.
For biographical information on Czartoryski see Kukiel,
Czartoryski and European Unity. Grimsted, Foreign Ministers
of Alexander I, Chap. IV. See also Czartoryski, Mémoires,
position between Czartoryski's earlier proposals to chase the Turks from Europe and Alexander's insistence on preserving the Ottoman Empire. In his report Czartoryski noted that the British government had responded to Russia's overtures with the greatest confidence and was willing to reach an agreement with Russia. Britain too was disturbed by the French threats to the Porte's European possessions. The British government believed that the various internal and external problems facing the Porte made the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire more probable and perhaps very near. The British ambassador, Sir J. B. Warren, had told Czartoryski that his government wished to prevent the Ottoman Empire from becoming a victim of French aggression. The ambassador had added that if Turkey couldn't be saved then "England desired at least to be assured that it was its friends and not its enemies who profited from its fall." Czartoryski believed that in view of the frank British response Russia should determine precisely what its own Ottoman policy was to be.¹⁰

Czartoryski presented his own ideas and observations to Alexander. He emphasized that the fate of the Ottoman Empire involved Russia's most essential interests. For the

present Czartoryski believed that Russia's only possible course of action was to preserve the Ottoman Empire in its current state and prevent any foreign encroachments. He noted that Russia now had a weak and friendly neighbor and had acquired important commercial advantages in the Black Sea. Czartoryski regarded these commercial advantages as "an object of the first importance" but he pointed out that they were the result of the Porte's weakness. If the Porte regained its former strength, or yielded to French threats or promises or if some European power gained control of Constantinople and the Straits then Russia could lose a great deal. Czartoryski believed that Russia's security would be compromised in any of these cases. He stated that even if the Porte remained faithful to its alliance with Russia there would still be a number of difficulties. Russia's historic ties with the Greeks and the Slavs of the Ottoman Empire were already an embarrassment in view of Russia's avowed policy of friendship with the Porte. Czartoryski noted that Alexander had recently reestablished a system of surveillance in the provinces of European Turkey. The tsar had also authorized limited actions to prevent complete French ascendancy in these areas. In addition to these steps, Czartoryski believed that Russia's honor and its national interest required it to maintain its relations with the Greeks and other Orthodox subjects of the Porte. These people were devoted to the Russian Empire which had
been their protector since the time of Peter the Great. Czartoryski stated that the greatest disadvantages would result if Russia allowed another power to replace its influence among the Greeks. He expressed the hope that despite the Porte's traditional mistrust it would understand that Russia's activities among the sultan's Christian subjects were necessary and could benefit Turkey. Czartoryski declared that if France invaded European Turkey and the Porte resisted, Russia would have to aid the Turks. The foreign minister rejected the argument that by joining the Porte against the French Russia would have to abandon the Greeks. Czartoryski asserted that Russia would have to keep all its options open. He pointed out that Turkey was traditionally hostile to Russia and might revert to an unfriendly attitude in the future. Conversely, the Porte's Christian subjects had been devoted to Russia for more than a century. If Russia deserted these people now, it would lose their confidence forever. They would then detest the Russian Empire as much as they had previously been attached to it. Furthermore, these Balkan peoples would join any invader who promised them independence. Czartoryski suggested a compromise solution which he hoped would satisfy the Balkan Christians and not alienate the Porte. He proposed that Russia promise to ameliorate the condition of the Christians of European Turkey. Russia would require the Porte to make such a promise in return for Russian aid against a French invasion.
Czartoryski admitted that there were risks involved in this attempt to satisfy such conflicting interests. He acknowledged that his proposal might eventually lead to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and its retreat into Asia. However, he believed that his suggested compromise was the only possible solution in these circumstances.\textsuperscript{11}

Czartoryski advised Alexander to seek an agreement with the British government for a guarantee of the Ottoman Empire against a French invasion. The tsar could assure the British government of his sincere desire to preserve the Ottoman Empire in its present state as long as possible. Alexander should point out, however, that to do this Russia would have to increase its influence among the Greeks and Slavs of the Ottoman Empire. He should also inform the British of Russia's defensive preparations in the Ionian Islands. Alexander should make it clear that Russia did not wish to provoke France but if France invaded the Porte's European possessions, Russia would act. Czartoryski suggested that the Russian forces in Corfu could be sent to the mainland to oppose any French invasion. He also advised Alexander to send an army to the borders of Wallachia. If the French invaded the Ottoman Empire, this army would cross the border and advance as far as circumstances demanded. Russia could

\textsuperscript{11} Sbornik, Vol. LXXVII, No. 200, pp. 489-492.
invite Britain to keep an army corps on Malta for possible use against the French in Greece. Alexander should also attempt to obtain British support for a demand that the Turks significantly improve the conditions under which the Greeks lived. Finally, Czartoryski recommended that if the fall of the Ottoman Empire became inevitable despite these efforts, Russia must secure for itself those points upon which the outlet of Russia's commerce depended.  

Alexander approved of most of Czartoryski's suggestions. In dispatches sent to ambassador Vorontsov in London, Czartoryski outlined proposals which were similar to the ones he had presented to the tsar. Czartoryski explained that Alexander intended to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. He added that the tsar was reviving Russia's ancient ties with the Porte's Orthodox subjects only as a means of combatting French intrigue. Czartoryski informed Vorontsov that Russia's ambassador at the Porte was pleading the cause of the Greeks and intervening on their behalf in cases where Russia had treaty rights. Russia hoped to convince the Porte of the necessity of winning the loyalty of its Christian subjects. Vorontsov was to inform the British government that if the French attacked the Ottoman Empire Russia would send troops to expel the invaders. Britain was invited to assist by sending Nelson's fleet and a British land

\[12\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 493-498.}\]
force from Malta. Czartoryski noted that in the event of a French invasion of European Turkey, Russia believed it would be necessary to aid the Porte immediately without awaiting a request for help. He suggested that the British and Russian ambassadors jointly explain such a move to the Turks and convince the Porte to defend itself. Czartoryski told Vorontsov of some Russian misgivings regarding England's conduct toward the Porte. The Russian government hoped that Britain would do nothing to alarm the Turks. Russia didn't want the Porte to deviate from its neutrality. Czartoryski said that Alexander believed that "the most essential interests of his empire" required him to preserve the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the tsar would limit his actions on behalf of the Porte's Greek and Slavic subjects to promises to seek some improvement in their situation. If the tsar did any less, he would lose the confidence of these people and they would join the French. Czartoryski asserted that Alexander's Ottoman policy could be reduced to two principles: first, the tsar wished to preserve the Ottoman Empire in its present state; second, he would defend it if it were attacked. Alexander remained committed to peace but he was prepared to fight if necessary. The tsar hoped that England would adopt his moderate views in regard to the Porte and not insist on the Turks giving England preferential treatment. This could lead the French to declare war on the Porte. Czartoryski's dispatches to Vorontsov did not
mention the possibility of the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Alexander's commitment to preserving the Porte led him to reject at this time any concrete proposals regarding its collapse.\(^{13}\)

Alexander continued to entrust Count Mocenigo with the responsibility for gathering information on the nearby Ottoman provinces and for secretly establishing contacts there. Mocenigo's role became crucial in view of Alexander's compromise position in regard to the Porte and the Balkan Christians. Mocenigo had to employ absolute secrecy in aiding those subjects of the Porte who were being oppressed by Ali Pasha of Janina. This was a potential source of friction between Russia and the Porte since Ali had used bribes to win friends in the Ottoman government. Ali's actions against the Orthodox Christians and his military moves against the former Venetian enclaves of Prevesa, Parga, Vonitza and Buthrinto caused concern in St. Petersburg. Alexander approved of Mocenigo secretly aiding the Orthodox Christians oppressed by Ali. The tsar also instructed Italinsky to intercede on their behalf. The Russian government presented strong objections to any attempts to change or modify the privileges accorded to the former Venetian towns especially

since Russia was a guarantor of these privileges. Czartoryski authorized Mocenigo to assure the people of these towns of Russia's support. The Russian foreign minister felt this was necessary to maintain Russian influence among the Christians of Albania and Greece. However, Czartoryski cautioned Mocenigo that Russia's desire to influence these people was not an attempt to undermine Turkish authority. On the contrary, Russia wished to guarantee Ottoman possession of these provinces while at the same time preserving the inhabitants from "the calamities to which they would be exposed, if the pernicious principles of the French took root among them." To assist Mocenigo Alexander approved the establishment of several consulates in the western provinces of the Ottoman Empire. These consuls would be under the formal authority of Italinsky but Mocenigo would actually direct and supervise their activities. Czartoryski emphasized that these consuls must act with extreme care so that they would not compromise Russia with the Porte. Czartoryski disagreed with Mocenigo's opinion that Russia's desire to maintain good relations with the Porte was diametrically opposed to Greek aspirations. Czartoryski argued that Russia was the only real hope for the Greeks. Mocenigo would have to convince the Greeks of this and promise them that Alexander would obtain assurances from the sultan that he would improve their conditions. Russia would hold the Turks to these promises. Czartoryski entrusted Mocenigo with
extensive discretion in carrying out his mission. He also
allowed Mocenigo a great deal of latitude in spending secret
funds that he was being sent.\footnote{Ibid., No. 237, Mocenigo to A. Vorontsov, December
1/13, 1803, pp. 566-567; No. 240, A. Vorontsov to Mocenigo,
December 5/17, 1803, pp. 572-575; No. 248, Mocenigo to A.
Vorontsov, January 16/28, 1804, pp. 605-607; No. 252,
Czartoryski to Mocenigo, February 10/22, 1804, pp. 613-614;
No. 257, Alexander to Mocenigo, February 18/March 1, 1804,
pp. 627-628; No. 258, Czartoryski to Mocenigo, February 20/
March 3, 1804, pp. 628-629; No. 265, Czartoryski to Mocenigo,
March 8/20, 1804, pp. 648-651. See also Stanislavskaia,
Russko-angliiskie otnosheniia, pp. 283-296. Piers Mackesy,
The War in the Mediterranean, 1803-1813 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1957), pp. 36-47.}

The importance of the Ionian Islands as a point of con­
tact with the Balkan Christians and as a defensive position
to prevent a French invasion of the Ottoman Empire led Rus­
sia to tighten its control over the republic. Czartoryski
suggested that the new Ionian constitution should mention
Russian suzerainty over the islands. The foreign minister
confidentially told Mocenigo that Russia should prepare for
the possibility of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.
If this occurred then Alexander, despite his sincere desire
to remain at peace, would have to act to prevent any other
country from gaining a foothold in European Turkey. Czár­
toryski emphasized that the tsar wished neither to hasten
nor to cause the dissolution of Turkey. Czartoryski in­
formed Mocenigo that the British government had ordered

\footnote{Ibid., No. 237, Mocenigo to A. Vorontsov, December
1/13, 1803, pp. 566-567; No. 240, A. Vorontsov to Mocenigo,
December 5/17, 1803, pp. 572-575; No. 248, Mocenigo to A.
Vorontsov, January 16/28, 1804, pp. 605-607; No. 252,
Czartoryski to Mocenigo, February 10/22, 1804, pp. 613-614;
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pp. 627-628; No. 258, Czartoryski to Mocenigo, February 20/
March 3, 1804, pp. 628-629; No. 265, Czartoryski to Mocenigo,
March 8/20, 1804, pp. 648-651. See also Stanislavskaia,
Russko-angliiskie otnosheniia, pp. 283-296. Piers Mackesy,
The War in the Mediterranean, 1803-1813 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1957), pp. 36-47.}
Admiral Nelson and the local British consuls to coordinate their actions with him. The foreign minister cautioned Mocenigo to be circumspect in his relations with the British. Russia would not support any excessive demands by the British. Mocenigo was to acquire intelligence on possible French landing sites in European Turkey and advise St. Petersburg on whether more troops would be needed. Czartoryski warned Mocenigo to act cautiously since Russia wanted to avoid a rupture with France as long as possible. For the present, Russia would resort to hostilities only if France attempted to land in Greece or Albania. If this occurred Mocenigo was immediately to send Russian troops to the continent in coordination with the British land and naval forces.¹⁵

Throughout 1804 the Ottoman Empire remained loyal to Russia. The French ambassador to Constantinople, General Brune, attempted to combat Russian and British influence but he achieved only limited success. Sultan Selim hoped to avoid a commitment to either side. However, both France and Russia soon began a struggle to win the support of the Ottoman Empire. In March 1804 Bonaparte sent a special envoy to

¹⁵Vneshnaiâ politika Rossii, Vol. I, Nos. 266 and 267, Czartoryski to Mocenigo, March 8/20, 1804, pp. 653-660; No. 268, Czartoryski to Italinsky, March 16/28, 1804, pp. 663-666. Many British leaders were suspicious of Russian intentions in the Near East. Admiral Nelson believed that the Russians were planning to conquer the Ottoman Empire or partition it with France. See Mackesy, War in the Mediterranean, p. 46. Anderson, The Eastern Question, p. 35.
Constantinople with a letter for the sultan. In his letter Bonaparte assured Selim that he wished to sustain the Ottoman Empire and he hoped that the Porte would regain its former strength and vigor. In his reply Selim expressed his high regard for Bonaparte and for France. The sultan assured the first consul that he did not believe the rumors of French plans to invade the Morea and Egypt. The sultan's friendly reply was part of a continuing Turkish effort to maintain a delicate balance in its relations with the European powers. However, the growing Russo-French hostility soon forced the Turks to choose sides.  

France's violation of the territory of a relative of the tsar and the execution of the Duke d'Enghien put Alexander more firmly in the camp of those favoring a break with France. In St. Petersburg a council was held in April 1804 to discuss the response Russia should make to the French action. The tsar believed that Russia should break relations with France. Czartoryski agreed with the tsar. In reviewing Russia's position in Europe the foreign minister remarked that the Porte appeared to have full confidence in Russia and was convinced that it should fear France. Czartoryski pointed out that although Bonaparte could not attack

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Russia directly, he could move against Russia's forces in the Ionian Islands. The reinforcements which Alexander was sending to Corfu would not arrive for several months. However, Czartoryski believed that once these reinforcements arrived Russia could defend the islands and protect Greece. The majority of the council agreed with the tsar and Czartoryski. The French ambassador immediately noted a change in St. Petersburg following the arrival of news of d'Enghien's execution. Hédouville reported to Talleyrand that there were rumors that Russia intended to break relations with France. The Russian court went into a period of official mourning. Alexander directed Czartoryski to notify France and the other European powers of Russia's objections to France's actions. One of the principal areas of Russian concern was the Ottoman Empire. Czartoryski instructed Italinsky to inform the Ottoman ministry of Russia's actions regarding the execution of the duke. He instructed the Russian ambassador to warn the Porte of possible new dangers from France. Czartoryski added that Russia was sure that the Porte would be eager to maintain and even renew its alliance with Russia. The Porte wouldn't be obligated to declare war on France in the present circumstances but should continue to maintain a strong defensive posture in those provinces threatened by a French attack. Czartoryski stated that Alexander was certain the sultan would wish to see the Russian troops remain in Corfu and that the Porte would not
object to the additional Russian troops and ships being sent to the Ionian Islands. Czartoryski directed Italinsky to obtain satisfactory written reassurances on all these points. 17

Despite Alexander's concern over the affair of d'Enghien, the tsar still asserted that he did not wish to provoke war with France. At the same time he continued to press Austria for a military alliance. The tsar promised to field an army of 100,000 men in the event of hostilities. Alexander noted that he already had 10,000 men in position in the Ionian Islands. These troops could protect Greece or act as a diversionary force in southern Italy. The need for an alliance with Austria and with other European states became more imperative as Russia's relations with France deteriorated. Bonaparte ordered Hédouville to leave St. Petersburg but the French government did not formally break diplomatic relations with Russia. Relations between Russia and France grew steadily worse during the summer of 1804. Russia presented France with sharply worded protests and demands that France fulfill its treaty commitments. Czartoryski ordered the Russian chargé in Paris, Oubril, to

leave the country if the French government failed to give a satisfactory response to Russia's demands. When a satisfactory reply was not received, Oubril requested his passports and received them in late August. Talleyrand notified the Russian chargé that he was to leave Paris immediately but could not leave France until the French chargé had left Russia. Czartoryski had already requested France's chargé to leave Russia. Official diplomatic relations between France and Russia ceased. War did not result immediately but Russia moved to secure alliances and assure the loyalty of other powers.¹⁸

The split between Russia and France had important repercussions in Constantinople. Beginning in the summer of

1804 the Russian government carefully scrutinized all the actions of the Porte to see that the Turks did not yield to French pressure. An important test of Turkey's loyalty emerged over the question of recognizing the imperial title which Napoleon assumed in May 1804. Alexander believed that by refusing to recognize Napoleon as emperor, Russia and the other powers might be able to force the French ruler to make some concessions. Neither the French government nor the Turks had originally anticipated any difficulties over the question of Ottoman recognition. However, the Russian ambassador, Italinsky, objected to Napoleon being recognized as "emperor and padishah." He claimed that these titles belonged exclusively to Alexander. The Turks attempted to compromise but Napoleon refused to accept anything less than Alexander's titles. Napoleon began an intensified diplomatic effort to win Ottoman support and destroy Russian influence in Constantinople. He attempted to convince the sultan that the Russian reinforcements being sent to Corfu were to be used against the Ottoman Empire. The French emperor instructed Brune to point out to the Turks that the relatively small number of Russian troops in the Ionian Islands would be useless against France. The Russian forces were evidently intended to be used in a Russian invasion of the Morea and ultimately for the conquest of Constantinople. In demonstrating this to the Porte, Brune was to warn the Turks of the obvious danger involved in continuing to allow
Russian troops to pass through the Straits. Although he publicly downgraded the significance of the Russian forces on Corfu, Napoleon began seeking accurate figures on the number of troops passing through the Straits. The emperor also directed Brune to report on the general situation of the Ottoman Empire and the Porte's disposition toward France.

Throughout the summer French warnings about Russian designs on the Ottoman Empire intensified. Napoleon personally advised the Turkish ambassador in Paris that Russia might attack the Ottoman Empire. All the French arguments, warnings and threats were unsuccessful. The Turkish government would do nothing to antagonize either Russia or Great Britain. Furthermore, the Porte was still somewhat suspicious of Napoleon's own plans. Despite Brune's persistent efforts, Italinsky remained the most influential ambassador in Constantinople. The Porte refused to recognize Napoleon as emperor and, despite French protests, continued to allow Russian warships and transports to pass through the Straits.19

Despite Italinsky's strong position at the Porte there were still a number of potential sources of friction in Russo-Turkish relations. One possible problem was Russia's ambiguous policy toward the Porte's Christian subjects. Alexander and Czartoryski planned to maintain friendly relations with both the sultan and his Orthodox subjects. As a result of this policy, Italinsky was constantly interceding on behalf of the Slavs and Greeks of the Ottoman Empire. In accordance with Czartoryski's instructions, Italinsky repeatedly urged the Porte to win the loyalty of the Balkan Christians. Frequently the Porte agreed with Italinsky's representations and ordered its pashas to treat the Christians considerately. However, in many of the Ottoman provinces imperial decrees were meaningless and complaints continued to reach Italinsky and Mocenigo. A serious test of Czartoryski's policy emerged as a result of the Serbian revolt which broke out in 1804. The Serbs had contacted Italinsky who attempted to get the Ottoman government to employ justice and moderation in dealing with the rebels. In the early stages of the revolt the Porte did not take offense at Italinsky's pleas on behalf of the insurgents. Initially the Serbs were rebelling against local officials and not against the Porte. However, as the revolt became increasingly directed against the Ottoman Empire, Russian intercession became more dangerous. A similar situation was developing in regard to Mocenigo's contacts with the
Christians of Albania and Greece. However, Czartoryski continued to urge both Italinsky and Mocenigo to follow a cautious and moderate policy in their dealings with the sultan's Christian subjects. Czartoryski's policy was temporarily successful and the French failed in their attempts to use Russia's relations with the Serbs and the Greeks to arouse Turkish suspicions.20

As friction between Russia and France increased in matters related to the Ottoman Empire and other European problems, the Russian government began to intensify its search for allies. By late summer 1804 Alexander had agreed with Czartoryski that a new coalition should be formed. Both men agreed that the new coalition would have to have more idealistic objectives than the previous coalitions had had. However, traditional areas of Russian interest were not entirely neglected. Alexander and Czartoryski believed that one of the important problems to be settled in negotiations

for a new coalition was the role of the Ottoman Empire. In August 1804 Czartoryski wrote to Simon Vorontsov in London to inform him that in a recent dispatch to the Porte he had alluded to the renewal of Russia's alliance with Turkey. He had not intended this as an overture for renewal but merely wished to reassure the Porte on Russia's future intentions. The Turkish government had immediately accepted the proposal and requested that Italinsky receive plenary powers to negotiate a renewal of the alliance. Czartoryski believed that this treaty, the renewal of which "the Porte so ardently desires," gave Turkey all the advantages but was of little use to Russia. Therefore it would be difficult for Russia to renew the treaty under its present terms. In view of Turkey's weakness and instability Russia would have to consider whether it wished to add to its own extensive problems by attempting to maintain the Porte. If it were to assume this additional burden, then Russia should consider some means of facilitating this task. Czartoryski believed that Russia and Great Britain should act in concert and evaluate the situation before renewing their engagements with the Porte. Both Russia and Britain should consider their own interests, Turkey's present condition and recent changes in the European balance. If they agreed to renew the treaty, then it would be necessary to decide the nature of the alliance and what new stipulations they should add. They would also have to decide whether they wanted the Turks to join them against
France in the event of hostilities. Although the Porte wouldn't be much help militarily, the Turks could close their ports to French commerce. Czartoryski noted that the British government had previously indicated that either Russia or Britain might have to occupy some parts of the Ottoman Empire to protect it from France. In addition to the need to protect Turkey, Czartoryski observed that the Porte's loyalty was always suspect. Traditionally the Turks had always preferred France. In view of these circumstances, Alexander had given serious thought to the British suggestion. Russia proposed expanding the scope and purpose of the British proposal. Czartoryski believed that Russia and Britain might have to occupy some parts of the Ottoman Empire in order to force France to accept equitable peace terms. Czartoryski argued that once the Porte had openly declared itself against France it would have to consent to this occupation for its own protection. Both powers would promise to evacuate the provinces of the Porte and restore them to the Turks in a more submissive condition than they had received them. However, they would return them only after France had evacuated Italy, Switzerland, Holland and other areas. The proposed occupation would be implemented only in an extremity but it was an important option to hold in reserve in the event that the powers could agree to form a coalition.  

21 Vneshniaia politika Rossii, Vol. II, No. 43,
Czartoryski did not neglect the Porte's Christian subjects. The foreign minister told Vorontsov that Alexander wished to see an amelioration of the conditions of the Greeks and Slavs of the Ottoman Empire. Czartoryski observed that the only way that Russia and Britain could effectively guarantee the future existence of the Ottoman Empire would be to eliminate the causes of its weakness. By improving the conditions of the Greeks and Slavs, Russia and Britain would be assuring their loyalty to the Ottoman government. Czartoryski directed Vorontsov to consult with the British ministry on the advisability of insisting on an article in favor of the Christians as a condition for the renewal of the treaty. The Porte wanted only a defensive alliance and didn't want to become embroiled with France. However, the Ottoman Empire was conscious of its weakness and its reliance on Russian and British support and might be willing to accept any terms. Czartoryski added that Alexander wanted any alliance with the Porte concluded jointly with England. The Russian government believed that only by acting together could these two countries save the Turkish empire. If this proved impossible, the two could act in

Czartoryski to Italinsky, August 13/25, 1804, pp. 115-116; No. 45, Czartoryski to S. Vorontsov, August 18/30, 1804, pp. 119-121.
common to prevent France from gaining from Turkey's dissolution. Czartoryski emphasized that none of the opinions in his dispatch represented a policy upon which the Russian government had definitely decided. Russia wished only a thorough discussion on these matters so that the two countries could decide on the most appropriate policy. Italinsky had received orders to delay negotiations until Russia had consulted with Britain.22

Alexander decided to send Nicholas Novosiltsev as a special emissary to London. Novosiltsev was to arrange an alliance with England. The tsar considered his regular ambassador, Simon Vorontsov, too much of an Anglophile. Furthermore, neither the tsar nor his foreign minister felt Vorontsov was suited to present their idealistic plans for the reorganization of Europe. Alexander informed Vorontsov that he was sending Novosiltsev to determine the British government's views regarding Russian-British cooperation against France. The tsar stated that he had already decided to prevent any French aggression against European Turkey. Alexander said that he based this decision on concern for Russia's security but he noted that it would also benefit all Europe. Alexander stated that past coalitions had failed because the participants had not established their objectives in advance. The tsar believed that any new coalition should

22Ibid., No. 45, pp. 121-122.
seek to return France to more restricted limits, strengthen France's neighbors and establish a union of Europe's states to prevent future upheavals.\textsuperscript{23}

Alexander's letter to Vorontsov contained only a brief outline of the detailed instructions which Novosiltsev received. Czartoryski drew up these instructions in consultation with the tsar. The objectives which Russia sought included idealistic goals such as the creation of a league of European states, the establishment of a new code of the law of nations and proposals to safeguard weaker states.\textsuperscript{24} However, the instructions did not neglect Russia's national interests. In regard to the Ottoman Empire, Novosiltsev's directions emphasized that its fate was important to the rest of Europe. The weakness of the Ottoman Empire, the anarchy of its administration and the unrest of its Christian subjects threatened to undermine the tranquility of Europe even after a coalition had dealt with France. Therefore it was

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., No. 49, Alexander to S. Vorontsov, September 10/22, 1804, pp. 131-135.

desirable for Russia and Britain to agree on an arrangement in regard to the Porte which would conform to "the good of humanity and to the precepts of a sound policy." This would be difficult in the present circumstances. However, if Turkey joined France and as a result its continued existence in Europe became impossible, Russia and England should agree on the method of disposing of the various parts of European Turkey. The instructions recommended that the two countries continue to maintain the Porte's confidence so long as the Ottoman Empire in Europe could be preserved. Russia still believed it would be necessary to demand an improvement in the conditions of the Porte's Christian subjects before agreeing to renew the alliance with Turkey. The instructions directed Novosiltsev to continue the discussions on this matter which Vorontsov had already begun. Any agreement on this subject should be a part of the final arrangements. The instructions indicated that Russia and England should obtain some compensation if they defeated France. These gains would demonstrate to their respective subjects the advantages of the struggle. Compensation would be especially necessary if other states benefited. In his "Additional Notes" to Novosiltsev's instructions, Czartoryski stated that no specific acquisitions had been designated because the conduct of Russia's neighbors would determine these. Czartoryski noted that the tsar was prepared to commit 110,000 men to the struggle against France. The
remainder of Russia's army would be kept on the frontier in case Russia needed it against Turkey or Prussia. Czartoryski gave Novosiltsev two different draft treaties of alliance with the Porte. The first draft called for Turkey to join the coalition. The Porte would have to allow England to occupy a number of Turkey's ports in the Adriatic region. The Turks would also have to allow a Russian army of not more than 20,000 men take up positions on the Danube. These concessions would be necessary in order to allow Russia and England to provide rapid assistance to the Porte if France invaded the western Balkans. Czartoryski suggested that before evacuating these positions Russia and Britain could establish one or two Greek and Slavic republics. Novosiltsev would have to ascertain the views of the British ministry in regard to the Ottoman Empire. If the British were unresponsive Novosiltsev might have to forget the more extensive proposals. The British prime minister, William Pitt, had always opposed schemes against Turkey. If the British were unwilling to accept the first proposal, then Czartoryski included another draft treaty. The second draft was more limited and wouldn't alienate the Porte or alarm the other European powers. Czartoryski felt that agreeing to this latter draft might be the more prudent course. It would allow Russia to direct all its efforts toward forcing Prussia to make a decision. The weakness of the Ottoman Empire was Russia's best assurance that it could deal with the Porte whenever
it was convenient. 25

Czartoryski's concern over British reaction to his Turkish proposals was well founded. Even before Novosiltsev arrived in London the British foreign secretary, Lord Harrowby, had written to St. Petersburg to express Britain's concern over future Russian policy in the Near East. Harrowby sought clarification on a number of points in Czartoryski's proposals. He wished to know precisely what Czartoryski meant by his proposal to improve the situation of the Greeks. The British were concerned that Russia was attempting to reduce the Porte's control over the Greeks. In general, Harrowby interpreted Czartoryski's proposals as an indication of Russia's interest in partitioning Turkey. The foreign secretary doubted the wisdom of such a move. He declared that "... no doubt can be entertained that Great Britain cannot give its sanction to a proceeding incompatible with the relations of friendship and alliance which, at the present moment, connect it with Turkey." Harrowby added that the British government had proposed the occupation of a few posts in Albania, the Morea and perhaps Alexandria as

a means of helping the Turks resist France. He emphasized that Britain had never intended anything but a temporary occupation. In regard to the renewal of the Turkish alliance, Harrowby wished to know exactly what equivalents the Russians expected from the Porte as a price for this renewal. 26

The actual agreements which established the Third Coalition did not include provisions for the protection of the Balkan Christians or for the occupation of parts of the Ottoman Empire. One reason for this exclusion was English and Austrian suspicion of Russia's intentions toward the Porte. However, an equally important reason was that Alexander himself never fully embraced Czartoryski's extensive and ambitious plans for the Ottoman Empire. By late 1804 even Czartoryski conceded that the formation of a coalition was the more immediate goal. In November 1804 Czartoryski stated that Russia would continue to support the Ottoman Empire. However, he still believed that the Porte's internal weakness and disorder might eventually lead to its disintegration. If this occurred, Russia would not allow a partition to take place which was contrary to Russian interests. 27 The numerous authors who maintain that in 1804


27Arkhiv Vorontsova, Vol. XV, Czartoryski to S.
Czartoryski had a detailed plan for the division of European Turkey are mistaken. They contend that in 1804 Czartoryski proposed the creation of several Slavic states which would join in a Slavic federation. The tsar would exert predominant influence on this federation by assuming the title of Emperor or Protector of the Slavs. In addition, Russia would acquire extensive territories including Constantinople and the Straits. The basis of this error is a misdated memorandum in Czartoryski's memoirs. The memorandum was actually written in late 1806 after Czartoryski had left office and not in 1804. In 1804 Czartoryski's knowledge 

Vorontsov, November 6/18, 1804, p. 278.

See the article by I. V. Evstigneev, "K voprosy o tselakh vneshnei politiki Rossii v 1804-1805 godakh" ("Toward the Question Concerning the Aims of the Foreign Policy of Russia in the Years 1804-1805"), Voprosy istorii, 1962 No. 5, pp. 203-210. The inaccurate dating of this memorandum is also noted by Kukiel, Czartoryski and European Unity, p. 55. The memorandum is in Czartoryski, Memoires, Vol. II, pp. 62-66. Among the many works that accept the dating of this note as 1804 is George Vernadsky, "Alexandre Ier et le problème slave pendant la première moitié de son règne," Revue des études slaves, Vol. VII (1927), pp. 94-111. Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, p. 186 is also apparently referring to this document when he speaks of Czartoryski's partition plans in 1804 as is Waliszewski, La Russie il y a cent ans, Vol. I, p. 144. Another author misled by the incorrect date is Henryk Batowski, "Un précurseur polonais de l'union balkanique, le prince Adam Czartoryski," Revue internationale des études balkaniques, Vol. II (1936), pp. 149-156.
of Turkey's European provinces was somewhat limited. He learned a great deal, however, from various correspondents and from Serbian delegations. Czartoryski took an increasingly stronger tone in urging the Porte to adopt a conciliatory policy toward the Serbs and he persuaded Alexander to grant some monetary aid to the Serbs. The tsar, while approving of limited measures on behalf of the Serbs, was unwilling to adopt any policies which would antagonize the Porte.\textsuperscript{29}

The first hesitant step in creating a coalition was the conclusion of a Russian-Austrian defensive alliance in November 1804. Among its other provisions, the treaty acknowledged that the tsar shared Austria's desire to maintain the Ottoman Empire. Both states agreed that an attack by another power on European Turkey would be a threat to the security of their respective empires. If the actions of

\textsuperscript{29}Yakschitch, L' Europe et la resurrection de la Serbie, pp. 60-63. For Czartoryski's role in regard to early pan-Slav movements see Frank Fadner, Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism in Russia, Karazin to Danilevskii, 1800-1870 (Washington, 1962), pp. 80-93 and p. 104. Fadner concludes that in this period "In general, Russia's official attitude toward the Slavs depended upon political circumstance; specifically Russia's relations to France and Turkey." Czartoryski was encouraged by many to adopt a more favorable attitude toward the Serbs and the other Slavs of the Ottoman Empire. See for example Vasiliy N. Karazin, Sochineneniia, pis' ma i bumagi (Writings, Letters and Papers), ed. D. I. Bagelei (Kharkov, 1910), Karazin to Czartoryski, November 21, 1804 and Supplement, November 27, 1804, pp. 35-51.
either party in support of Turkey led to war with France then the other party would aid its ally and work for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. This alliance with Austria did not give Alexander the strong coalition he wanted. The Russians suggested that Austria reassure France regarding Russia's troops in the Ionian Islands. This would be necessary to prevent the outbreak of hostilities until Russia and Austria had completed the essential diplomatic and military preparations. The Austrians needed no encouragement to follow a cautious policy. They wanted both Britain and Prussia included in any coalition against France. Furthermore, the bond between the allies was far from secure and did not eliminate their mutual suspicion regarding the Near East. The Austrians were particularly concerned by the activities of the new Russian consuls in the western Balkans. The Russian agents openly interfered in the internal affairs of Montenegro. The Austrians protested that Montenegro was a dependency of the Porte but Czartoryski denied this. He declared that Russia had had a special relationship with Montenegro for more than a century and that the country was voluntarily under Russia's protection. Despite Austrian objections the Russians continued to exert a strong influence on Montenegro. 30

30Martens, Sobranie, Vol. II, No. 54, "Declaration of Close Alliance Between Russia and Austria Against France,"
Although Alexander was unwilling to adopt Czartoryski's more extensive measures concerning Turkey, the tsar continued to support a policy of Russian diplomatic predominance in Constantinople. Alexander insisted on the strict fulfillment of all his treaty rights and directed Italinsky to continue to seek an improvement in the conditions of the sultan's Christian subjects. Alexander believed that even a partial improvement would help to strengthen and consolidate the Ottoman Empire. In Constantinople the continued refusal of the Porte to recognize Napoleon's imperial title was the clearest indication of Russia's dominant influence. Brune devoted most of his efforts to obtaining Ottoman recognition. However, Italinsky, supported by the British representative, effectively countered each move by the French ambassador. The Porte informed Brune that it could not recognize Napoleon's title without the approval of its Russian ally. Brune argued that the treaty of 1802 between France and Turkey abrogated the Russian-Ottoman alliance. The French ambassador threatened to leave Constantinople

unless recognition was granted. When the Turks continued to
equivocate, Brune left the capital. He stopped in a city
not far from Constantinople hoping that his departure would
intimidate the Porte. Initially it appeared that his strat­
egy had worked. The Turkish government sent Brune an urgent
message requesting that he return and promising that he
would receive a satisfactory response. Brune refused to re­
turn until formal recognition was accorded. Italinsky
learned of the Porte's promise to Brune and immediately
wrote a strongly worded note to the Ottoman government. The
Russian ambassador demanded that the Porte refuse Brune's
request. He warned that the slightest change in the conduct
of the Ottoman Empire toward Russia would be an affront to
the tsar. Alexander would then devote as much energy in
avenging such an injury to his dignity as he had placed and
still wished to place in supporting the interests and the
integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Italinsky advised the
Porte to consider the probable effects of Alexander's pro­
found resentment and weigh these against the French threats.
Italinsky's inflexible stand succeeded. Brune left the
Ottoman Empire and turned over the conduct of French affairs
to the chargé. The Russian government fully approved of
Italinsky's actions. Czartoryski warned the ambassador to
continue to watch closely the relations of the Ottoman gov­
ernment with France. He cautioned that French partisans in
the Turkish government would continue to employ all their
efforts to get the sultan to recognize Napoleon as emperor. If the Turks yielded on this issue the French would then demand other concessions. Napoleon would seek to pressure the Porte to forbid the passage of Russian warships and transports through the Straits and would insist on Russian withdrawal from the Ionian Islands. Czartoryski declared that Alexander would never consent to such demands while French troops remained in Italy and while France refused to settle its disputes with Russia. The foreign minister authorized Italinsky to begin negotiations for the renewal of the Russo-Turkish alliance. However, he advised the ambassador to prevent the Porte from taking any action which might lead to premature hostilities with France. Czartoryski stated that above all the goal of Russia was "always to conserve our ascendancy in Constantinople." The Russian foreign minister did not have to be concerned with Russia's position at the Porte. Both Selim and Napoleon realized that for the present Turkey had more to fear from Russia and England than it did from France. In January 1805 Napoleon wrote an acrimonious letter to the sultan. The French emperor asked caustically if the sultan had ceased to reign. Napoleon charged that half of Selim's officials were traitors who were in the pay of Russia. He declared that he had wanted to be Selim's friend. However, if the sultan continued to remain servile toward France's enemies, he would become the enemy of the Ottoman Empire. Napoleon added that the
Russians were Selim's real enemies. The Russians wanted Constantinople and would join with the sultan's Orthodox subjects to destroy the Ottoman Empire.  

Napoleon's threats were useless. The Russian and British representatives in Constantinople worked together successfully to prevent the Porte from recognizing Napoleon as emperor. Despite this cooperation, the Russians and British were still suspicious of each other's Near Eastern ambitions. This mutual suspicion appeared frequently in the negotiations for the formation of the Third Coalition. Novosiltsev arrived in London in November 1804. He immediately perceived that the Pitt ministry considered the recent dispatches from the Russian government regarding the Ottoman Empire as proof that Russia intended to acquire Turkish territory. Novosiltsev tried to reassure Pitt and his foreign minister, Lord Harrowby, that Alexander wished nothing more than to preserve the Ottoman Empire. He added, however, that the tsar could never permit another power to seize territory in European Turkey. Such an action would force Alexander to reconsider his policy. Novosiltsev mistakenly believed that

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he had eliminated the doubts of the British ministry. Actually, the fact that the British retained their suspicions was due in part to Novosiltsev's conversations with Pitt. The two men concurred on the general objectives of a new coalition. This agreement led Novosiltsev to discuss other issues that had occasioned mistrust between the two courts. Novosiltsev noted Britain's suspicions on the question of Russia's plans for Turkey which Pitt admitted had caused some alarm. Novosiltsev denied that Alexander had any intention of seizing Turkish territory. He again asserted that the tsar would only occupy Constantinople when he had exhausted all other means of preserving this part of the Ottoman Empire. If Novosiltsev had ended the matter there, his assurances might have been sufficient to calm Pitt's anxieties. However, Novosiltsev seriously undermined his reassurances when he presented a significant hypothesis regarding Turkey. He stated that although Russia did not intend to take aggressive action against the Porte, if it had intended to do so why should Russia's best friend be alarmed. He questioned what England could possibly lose in such an event. Novosiltsev observed that, if anything, England's commerce would be even safer. According to Novosiltsev, Pitt agreed that Britain would lose nothing. However, Pitt pointed out that such a move would be ill-advised and very harmful to the general cause. Novosiltsev accepted this response. The two men agreed on the need to obtain more
satisfactory terms in the new alliance with the Ottoman Empire. However, Pitt indicated that some of the articles which Russia proposed would present difficulties. Although the British did not completely reject Russia's proposals, they obviously wanted to avoid any extensive commitments to Russia in regard to the Ottoman Empire. Pitt wanted to secure Russia's participation in the coalition but not at the cost of endangering Turkey. On other matters the two men succeeded in drawing up a draft treaty which was sent to Russia for final approval.  

By autumn 1804 it had appeared that Alexander was fully committed to the formation of a coalition and a war against Napoleonic France. However, as it began to appear that the formation of a coalition was near, the tsar began to waver. Alexander refused to concede that war with France was inevitable. Although Britain's ambassador in St. Petersburg reported that Russia was fully committed to hostilities

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against France, Czartoryski saw that Alexander was still hoping to avoid a war. Czartoryski wrote to inform Novosiltsev of the tsar's indecision. He also sent Novosiltsev a copy of a draft treaty of alliance with the Porte. The foreign minister expressed the hope that the treaty would meet the British objections and that Britain would therefore instruct its new ambassador to Constantinople, Charles Arbuthnot, to support Italinsky. Many of the proposed articles of this alliance hardly seemed appropriate to achieve Russia's avowed aim of reassuring England. The public articles called for the renewal of the alliance and mutual assistance in the event of a French attack on Russia or the Ottoman Empire. The secret articles went much further. By the terms of the secret articles Turkey was to render all possible assistance to the anticipated coalition of European states. The Ottoman Empire was to agree to the unrestricted passage of Russian warships and transports through the Straits during the war with France. If the European states were unable to form a coalition and French forces continued to threaten Turkey from Italy, England and Russia pledged to actively defend the Ottoman possessions. The two most controversial clauses concerned the occupation by Russia and England of parts of Turkey and the improvement of the conditions of the Balkan Christians. The draft treaty noted that Russia's forces were too far from the region most exposed to a French attack. Therefore, in order to render
effective and timely help, the draft provided for the sending of a Russian corps of ten to fifteen thousand men from Russia into Moldavia and Wallachia. These troops would not interfere in the internal affairs of the Principalities. The Porte was also to entrust the defense of Parga to a Russian garrison of two thousand troops. In an attempt to allay British suspicions, Czartoryski included a provision that English forces would occupy Alexandria to insure the defense of Egypt. The Turks would also entrust England with a port in the Morea. Czartoryski privately conceded that the Porte would never agree to England's occupation of Alexandria. However, he believed that the inclusion of this clause in the draft would placate the British and would give Russia something to yield in the negotiations. Another secret clause of the draft treaty required the sultan to mitigate the conditions of the Christians of European Turkey. The sultan was to pledge not only religious freedom to the Christians but also the complete equality of his Christian subjects with his Moslem subjects. These secret provisions went far beyond what the Porte was prepared to yield. The proposed treaty was sent to Constantinople for negotiation. However, for the moment the more important object in Russian diplomacy was the formation of a European coalition and particularly the conclusion of a definitive alliance with
England. 33

The Near East and particularly the fate of the Ottoman Empire had played a significant role in leading Alexander to adopt more active measures against France. However, because of the mutual suspicion of the partners in the alliance, the agreements creating the Third Coalition made little direct mention of the Ottoman Empire. In April 1805 the Russian and British negotiators agreed on the terms of a treaty of alliance. The agreement settled most of the outstanding issues and included idealistic objectives that appealed to the tsar. The treaty also referred to territorial compensation for members of the coalition in the event of victory. The treaty mentioned no specific territories but it did stipulate that any territorial increases were to be in keeping with the European equilibrium. The most important source of disagreement was on the question of Malta. The British negotiator, Gower, refused to include a clause guaranteeing that Britain would eventually evacuate the island. Alexander declared that he had signed the treaty and agreed to

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fight France "for the cause of justice and for the prosperity of all Europe." The tsar threatened to refuse to ratify the agreement unless Britain was willing to compromise on Malta. Concerning the Ottoman Empire, Alexander still believed that the Porte was in danger of being attacked by France. If necessary Russia would defend Turkey alone. However, the tsar believed that Austria's interests would force the Austrians to aid Russia in this defense. The tsar expected the British government to add its influence in Constantinople in an effort to get the Turks to join against France. If other means of persuasion failed to move the Turks, Alexander suggested that Russian and British threats would succeed. The Russians continued to urge the British to cooperate more fully with Russian objectives in the Near East but these Russian requests had little effect in the first half of 1805.  

Negotiations for the establishment of a European coalition proved extremely difficult. The British government refused to yield Malta even if it meant the loss of the Russian alliance. The British argued that their retention of 

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the island was essential for the defense of the Ottoman Empire. Russia also found Austria to be a reluctant ally. The Austrians feared France and hesitated to go beyond the limited defensive agreement which they had signed with Russia. Furthermore, the poor state of Austria's finances led the Austrians to insist on larger subsidies than the British were willing to grant. The Prussians hoped to maintain their neutrality and resisted all efforts to get them to declare themselves against France. The Ottoman Empire likewise proved unwilling to join a coalition and rejected the extensive concessions which Russia demanded. The Porte consistently refused to accept Russian proposals regarding its Christian subjects and strongly rejected the idea of allowing Russian troops to enter the Principalities. The large increase in the number of Russian troops and ships in the Ionian Islands was beginning to concern the Porte. The Turks also disapproved of the activities of Russian agents who were recruiting Ottoman subjects in the western Balkans to serve in Russia's army. Czartoryski cautioned Italinsky to be moderate in his dealings with the Turks and to assure them that Alexander's only aim was to contribute to the safety and tranquility of the sultan's possessions. However, Italinsky generally took a very firm stand in his negotiations and was more likely to employ threats than moderation. The absence of a French ambassador in Constantinople throughout 1805 did not end French intrigue at the Porte. The
French embassy continued to protest the use of the Straits by Russian military vessels. Napoleon sent another special emissary to Constantinople in the spring of 1805. However, in the face of Italinsky's threats, the sultan continued to refuse recognition of Napoleon's title or to prohibit Russian passage through the Straits.  

Alexander authorized a final effort to prevent or at least postpone a European war. In June 1805 the tsar decided to send Novosiltsev on another special mission. This time Novosiltsev was to go to Paris with a proposal for a peaceful settlement of all the outstanding conflicts. However, the terms which the Russians proposed were hardly likely to induce the French to settle their disputes with Russia and England. Before Novosiltsev arrived in Paris, the Russian government learned of France's intention to annex Genoa. In view of this further expansion of French power, Alexander recalled Novosiltsev. In late July 1805 the tsar finally ratified the treaty of alliance with Great Britain.

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Britain and the Austrians acceded to this alliance. The principal participants in the Third Coalition were thus finally united. For the Russians the initial attempts at organizing a coalition had been largely motivated by fears of French designs on the Ottoman Empire. The final agreements forming the alliance, however, had little to do with Turkey. The mutual suspicion of the allies and the tsar's continued dedication to preserving the Porte prevented any agreement on Near Eastern affairs. The Russians did not even succeed in getting the Turks to participate in the war against France. The Ottoman Empire, hoping to await the results of the expected war, cautiously delayed the negotiations for the renewal of its alliance with Russia.

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CHAPTER IV

THE DECLINE OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE
IN CONSTANTINOPLE

The Russian government had not anticipated the serious problems involved in obtaining a renewal of its alliance with the Ottoman Empire. Czartoryski had confidently expected that because of their fear of a French invasion, the Turks would agree to any terms. The Russian foreign minister had miscalculated the Turkish situation. Sultan Selim III was actually less disposed than ever to yield to foreign pressure. The sultan wanted to preserve the remaining vestiges of Ottoman independence. Rather than submit to new Russian demands Selim would have liked to do away with some concessions previously granted. While the French military preparations in Italy may have originally troubled the Porte, the Turks realized that the formation of a new European coalition was certain to distract Napoleon from any plans he might harbor against the Ottoman Empire. The safest and most beneficial policy for the Turks was to remain uncommitted to either side and hope that neither France nor the coalition won a decisive victory. This would give Sultan
Selim the necessary time to carry out several reforms which he had begun. The reluctance of the Porte to bind itself to further commitments was especially evident in its firm opposition to allowing any foreign forces to occupy Ottoman territory. The Porte was also adamant in its refusal to grant any special concessions to its Christian subjects. Italinsky had received his instructions to renew the alliance with Turkey in January 1805. However, the Russian ambassador was unable to make any substantial progress in his negotiations for several months. In June 1805 the new British ambassador, Charles Arbuthnot, arrived in Constantinople. Arbuthnot had received instructions from his government to support Italinsky in his negotiations. The arrival of the British ambassador and his strong support for the Russian cause helped to decide the issue of renewal. Napoleon continued to urge the French representative in Constantinople, the chargé Pierre Ruffin, to exert every effort to prevent the renewal of the treaty. The absence of an ambassador hindered the French effort somewhat but Ruffin's threats and warnings to the Porte did slow the progress of the negotiations.\(^1\)

\(^1\)Czartoryski's original instructions to Italinsky were dated December 13/25, 1804. They can be found in Sergei M. Goriainov, "Dogovor 11 (23) sentiabrià 1805 goda mezhdú Rossieiù i Turtšieii," ("The Treaty of 11 (23) September 1805 Between Russia and Turkey"), Izvestiia Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, Book V (1912), pp. 235-243. Bertrand, Lettres, No. XCIV, August 26, 1805, p. 133.
The persistence of Italinsky along with the energetic support of Arbuthnot finally brought partial success to the allies. In September 1805 Russia and the Ottoman Empire renewed their treaty of defensive alliance. However, the Porte's stubbornness had won considerable advantages for the Turks. Alexander and Czartoryski had decided that in view of the probability of a European war Russia needed the Turkish alliance to protect its southern border and assure the use of the Straits. Czartoryski had therefore given Italinsky more latitude in conducting his negotiations. The treaty that resulted was far less than Czartoryski had expected. The public articles of the treaty called for strengthening of the ties of friendship between the two empires and provided for mutual assistance in the event that one of the contracting parties was attacked. The treaty renewed all the previous agreements between the two empires and mutually guaranteed the integrity of all territories which they currently possessed. The alliance was to remain in force for nine years and negotiations for its renewal would begin prior to its expiration. In the secret clauses the Porte agreed to cooperate with Russia in the anticipated war against France. Turkey's participation would consist of the military assistance specified in the public treaty and, in addition, for the duration of the war the Porte would facilitate the passage of Russian warships and transports through the Straits. Despite Italinsky's efforts he was unable to
obtain a clause guaranteeing an improvement in the conditions of the sultan's Christian subjects. However, Italinsky did secure Turkish recognition of Russia's right to intercede on behalf of the Christians of the formerly Venetian enclaves in Albania. The alliance also confirmed the agreement of March 1800 covering these areas. The treaty permitted Russian troops to remain in the Ionian Islands until Russia secured a more suitable arrangement for Italy. One of the secret clauses declared that the Black Sea was closed to all but Russian and Ottoman warships and any attempt by armed vessels to enter this sea would be resisted by the naval forces of Russia and Turkey. By a separate document

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2 The tsarist government and later the Soviet government contended that this treaty gave Russia a permanent right to the unrestricted use of the Straits by Russian warships. They based this claim on the interpretation contained in the work by Sergei M. Gorfainov, *Bosfor i Dardanelly: izsliedovanie voprosa o prolivakh po diplomaticheskoj perepiski, khranianashchiesia v gosudarstvennom i S. - Peterburgskom glavnom arkhivakh* (The Bosporus and the Dardanelles: An Investigation of the Question Concerning the Straits According to the Diplomatic Correspondence Kept in the State and St. Petersburg Central Archives) (St. Petersburg, 1907), pp. 3-5. Gorfainov cites what he alleges to be archival material in arguing that the treaty gave Russia free use of the Straits in all cases and made Russia and the Ottoman Empire jointly responsible for their defense. Jacob C. Hurewitz, *loc. cit.*, pp. 605-632 has proven that Gorfainov deliberately falsified the evidence, probably in an attempt to bolster the tsarist government's case for Russia's use of the Straits. Western scholars long accepted the Gorfainov interpretation. Actually, an accurate version of the treaty including the secret clauses was available in Noradounghian, *Recueil*, Vol. II, Nos. 21 and 22, pp. 70-77. This work contains a French translation of the original Turkish version of the treaty. Gorfainov later published an accurate
the Turkish Grand Vizier confirmed all previous privileges which the Porte had accorded to the Danubian Principalities by virtue of various treaties and imperial decrees.  

Sultan Selim was concerned that the tsar might refuse to ratify the treaty because it did not conform to the original Russian proposals. In a letter to Alexander the sultan explained that the introduction of Russian troops into Ottoman territory prior to hostilities could be misunderstood by his subjects and by the other powers. In regard to the Christians of the Ottoman Empire, the sultan stated that the religious and political laws of the Ottoman Empire demanded that they be protected. Selim claimed that the Porte had always observed these laws. However, Ottoman law forbade any attempt to grant the Christians the same privileges and rights that Moslems enjoyed. For these reasons, the sultan explained, he could not approve the two articles in question. In his reply Alexander assured Selim that he had only proposed the two controversial articles in an effort to aid and strengthen the Ottoman Empire. The tsar said that he still

\[\text{version of the treaty in an obscure journal. See Goriainov, loc. cit., pp. 244-249. Apparently most scholars were unaware of this later version. The Soviet government published the accurate version in Vneshniaia politika Rossii, Vol. II, No. 184, pp. 582-589.}\]

believed that some concessions to the Christians would have assured the tranquility of the Ottoman Empire. As for the introduction of Russian troops into the Ottoman Empire, Alexander asserted that this would have been the best means of defending Turkey. He added that these troops could have contributed to the restoration of order in several of the sultan's provinces. Alexander assured Selim that the offer of Russian troops was the same one that both Austria and Prussia had already accepted. However, the tsar declared that he did not want to displease "his loyal ally the sultan" and therefore he would ratify the treaty without insisting on the two articles. In return for this, Alexander requested Selim to show a reciprocal act of friendship by taking some effective measures to establish order in Moldavia and Wallachia. The tsar pointedly remarked that he could not remain indifferent to the troubled conditions of these two neighboring provinces whose well-being and peaceful existence he had guaranteed in treaties with the Porte. 

Russia recognized that the renewal of the treaty with the Porte was not a firm assurance of Turkey's loyalty.

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Both sides realized that the outcome of the war against France would determine the Porte's future actions. When the news of the French victory at Ulm reached Constantinople, there was great consternation. However, Italinsky reported that the Turks believed that the coalition would ultimately prevail. The Russian ambassador cautioned Czartoryski that in spite of their alliance with Russia, the Turks secretly hoped that the war would weaken all the participants. If this occurred, the Turks believed they would be left in peace. Italinsky warned that regardless of the outcome of the war the Russian government would have to watch the Turks carefully or they would evade their treaty obligations.\(^5\)

The decisive battles of the Third Coalition were over in a relatively short time and without Ottoman participation.\(^6\) Alexander had been confident that the forces of the


\(^6\) At least some thought was given to having the Turks join the war against France. Admiral Paul Chichagov had proposed to Alexander that the Porte provide a fleet and an army of 15,000 men for use in a campaign in the Mediterranean. It is extremely doubtful that the Turks would have committed themselves to the war unless they were virtually certain of the outcome. In any event, the war was over before any request was made. See Sbornik, Vol. LXXXII, No. 53, Pisani to Czartoryski, October 18/30, 1805, pp. 180-181.
coalition could defeat the French. This confidence greatly increased with the conclusion of the Russo-Prussian Treaty of Potsdam. By the terms of this treaty, Prussia agreed to mediate between the allies and France. If France refused the terms of this mediation, Prussia promised to join the coalition. Among the terms on which Prussia was to insist was a formal guarantee that France would not take any hostile actions against the Ottoman Empire. In a secret article Alexander agreed that he would evacuate the Ionian Islands if the French made this a sine qua non condition for agreeing to the other demands of the allies. However, Alexander expressed the hope that Russia would be able to keep a small garrison in the islands to help maintain order. The agreement with Prussia proved to be of little value. Like the Turks, the Prussians wanted to follow a cautious policy. The important battles were soon fought and resulted in a complete French victory. In October 1805 Napoleon routed a large Austrian army at Ulm and by the middle of November the French had occupied Vienna. At this juncture Talleyrand attempted to convince Napoleon to grant Austria a favorable peace in order to win Austria's friendship. Talleyrand proposed an elaborate scheme whereby Austria would receive the Principalities, Bessarabia and part of...
northern Bulgaria. He argued that this would block Russia's road to Constantinople. Talleyrand believed that a strong Austrian Empire was necessary to protect Europe from Russia and to guard the remainder of Turkey's European possessions. According to Talleyrand's plan, France would intercede at the Porte to get the Turks to yield the provinces peacefully. Austria would guarantee the remaining European possessions of Turkey. Talleyrand believed that his plan would halt Russian expansion into Europe. The Russians would have to turn their attention to Asia where they would inevitably clash with England. Napoleon rejected Talleyrand's plan.  

If France was to have an ally, the French emperor preferred an alliance with Russia. Prior to the battle of Austerlitz, Napoleon made friendly overtures to the tsar. He asked why the tsar waged war against France. Napoleon suggested that if Alexander was concerned with his country's interests he had only to expand Russia's frontiers in the South against the Turks. Alexander rejected Napoleon's overtures and the battle of Austerlitz soon followed.  

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9Tatistcheff, Alexandre Ier et Napoléon, pp. 92-95.
At Austerlitz the French routed an Austro-Russian army of 90,000 men. Following the battle, the Russians withdrew from Austrian territory and left Austria to make the best terms it could with Napoleon. On December 26, 1805 France and Austria signed the Treaty of Pressburg. Although Alexander was not a party to this treaty, its terms had important repercussions for Russia. The treaty greatly weakened Austria's position in Germany. In addition, the Austrians recognized Napoleon as King of Italy. From the Russian point of view the most important concessions which the Austrians made were on the Adriatic coast. Austria ceded to Napoleon as King of Italy the provinces of Venetia, Istria, Dalmatia and the Venetian islands of the Adriatic. As a result of these acquisitions, Napoleon became Turkey's neighbor. The Third Coalition, originally conceived as a means of protecting the Ottoman Empire from French aggression, ended with France in an even stronger position in relation to Turkey.

Alexander's initial reaction to the defeat at Austerlitz had been one of shock. He had immediately ordered the Russian troops in the Mediterranean to withdraw to the Black Sea and to leave only a force sufficiently large to garrison Corfu. The tsar wanted to return to a passive and defensive foreign policy. Czartoryski, however, insisted that Russia

could not remain in a situation of neither war nor peace. In January 1806 Alexander called a meeting of a Council of State in order to obtain some opinions on possible Russian reaction to the new European situation and particularly to France's new acquisitions. Many of the participants in the council believed that France by its acquisition of Dalmatia would now be able to carry out its hostile intentions against the Porte. The French might also use their new position to force the Porte to abandon its Russian alliance. Several members of the council recommended that Russia remain united to England and attempt to keep the Porte's confidence. At the same time they favored opening lines of communication with the Slavic and Greek peoples of the Ottoman Empire. A number of the participants suggested that Russia keep its military forces prepared to invade Moldavia and Wallachia if Austria attempted to occupy the Principalities or if France attacked the Ottoman Empire. Others recommended that Russia seek peace. Despite the detailed proposals he received, Alexander did nothing. The tsar summarized his policy in a rescript to the Russian ambassador in Vienna, Razumovski:

My system will now consist principally in defending my states and those of powers who will require my assistance or whose existence would be indispensable to my safety.

However, some of Alexander's advisers privately expressed doubt that the tsar would even take measures to defend
In the early months of 1806 Czartoryski devoted particular attention to Turkish affairs. He presented a series of notes and memoranda to the tsar. These dealt with the possible ramifications of the Ottoman Empire having France as a neighbor. Although Czartoryski's influence with Alexander had declined after Austerlitz, the tsar apparently still listened to at least some of his advice on Turkish affairs. Czartoryski sought to convince the tsar that the new French position in Dalmatia represented a direct danger to the Ottoman Empire and therefore an indirect threat to Russia's southern provinces. In view of this serious threat, Czartoryski believed that it was necessary to formulate a fixed Russian policy that would take into account the various possibilities. The foreign minister observed that if left to its own resources the Porte would offer only weak and useless resistance to the French or would submit unreservedly to their demands. However, Czartoryski believed that if the Porte showed itself willing to resist the French, then Russia and Great Britain should give the Turks all possible assistance. The foreign minister suggested that Alexander rescind his orders to General Lacy and leave the

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Russian forces in the Ionian Islands. These forces could halt any French invasion of the Ottoman Empire. Alexander should also secure the support of the Porte's Christian subjects who could aid Russia in defending Turkey. Czartoryski asserted that Russia and Britain should neglect nothing to assure the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Most of the measures which Czartoryski recommended were elaborations of previous suggestions. However, Czartoryski felt that additional steps were needed. Alexander should immediately assemble an army of at least 100,000 men on the frontier of Moldavia. The primary mission of this army would be to render immediate assistance to the Turks in the event of a French invasion. This force would fulfill the function of the army that Russia had recently sought unsuccessfully to have stationed on Ottoman territory. In view of the greater danger now facing the Turks, Czartoryski believed that a far larger army was needed than he had proposed earlier. In addition to defending the Ottoman Empire, this army would also be an effective means of holding the Porte to its Russian alliance. If Russia and Great Britain determined that the Porte planned to join France, the allies should resort to hostilities against Turkey. In the event

of Turkey's defection, Czartoryski recommended that Russia's land and sea forces in Corfu, along with the army on the Dniester and the Black Sea fleet, should join with British forces to attack the Ottoman Empire. The Russian army of the Dniester would occupy Moldavia and Wallachia and the British forces would seize Egypt. Czartoryski considered these military steps as a last resort. They would be carried out only if the Russian and British ambassadors in Constantinople had exhausted all other means of keeping the Porte faithful to its alliances. Czartoryski believed that Austria was probably too exhausted to cooperate actively in the Russian and British efforts to preserve the Ottoman Empire. However, Austria might support their actions indirectly through diplomacy. Czartoryski asserted that Prussia should share Russia's interest in wishing to prevent French encroachments on the Ottoman Empire. Russian diplomacy would have to work to get Prussia to declare publicly that it opposed any such French aggression. Thus Czartoryski hoped that by the use of diplomacy combined with the threat of force, Russia and Britain could prevent the Porte from yielding to French influence.\textsuperscript{12}

In a second memorandum Czartoryski examined the question of what Russia's policy should be in the event of the

collapse of the Ottoman Empire. He prefaced his remarks by saying that had it not been for Russia's efforts the Ottoman Empire probably would have already collapsed from internal weakness and decay. Czartoryski still insisted that Turkey was a perfect neighbor and it was in Russia's interest to continue to follow a policy aimed at preserving the Porte. However, the Treaty of Pressburg made this policy difficult. Czartoryski stated that, whatever actions the French took against the Porte, any new problems would almost certainly lead to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in spite of Russia's efforts to sustain it. The foreign minister pointed to the weakness of the Ottoman central government and the numerous insurrections in the provinces of the empire. Czartoryski believed that Russia should decide what advantages it should acquire if Turkey collapsed due to internal or external causes. He emphasized that Russia would not benefit from the fall of Turkey unless it gained more influence in this region than it presently had. Under no condition should Russia agree to a partition of European Turkey, especially one in which France received part of the spoils. On the other hand, Czartoryski acknowledged that there would be innumerable problems if Russia sought to acquire these lands for itself. Czartoryski therefore suggested an intermediate solution:

It seems now that the only suitable plan for Russia to follow on a future change
in the Ottoman Empire, would be to establish there separate states, enjoying some forms of independence as to their internal organization, but under the suzerainty of Russia and under the shield of its protection. One would except from the number of these states the countries that the imperial court would believe suitable to appropriate entirely, such as Moldavia, Wallachia and Bessarabia.

Czartoryski asserted that the acquisition of these last provinces would not only enrich Russia by their resources but also would give Russia a much more defensible frontier. 13

In his proposal Czartoryski envisaged a rather extensive form of Russian suzerainty for much of European Turkey. He believed that Russia would enjoy a preponderant influence in the new states since Russia shared a common religion with the inhabitants of these regions and shared a common race with many of them. However, this would not be sufficient. Czartoryski recommended that Russia would have to obtain formal assurances of its rights of suzerainty. To guarantee these rights, Russian troops would occupy various outposts in the new states. These troops would assure the tranquility of these areas and would prevent any intrigues or enterprises undertaken by other states which might resent such a considerable augmentation in Russia's power. 14


14 Ibid., pp. 255-256.
Czartoryski continued to insist on the need for Alexander to establish a fixed plan for Russia to follow in the event of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The first principle of Russia's Near Eastern policy should continue to be the preservation of Turkey. Russia's ambassador in Constantinople should make every effort to persuade the Porte to remain faithful to its alliances with Russia and England. However, Czartoryski doubted the reliability of the Turks. Italinsky would have to determine the true sentiments of the Porte and carefully examine all the representations made by the Porte. Russia would have to prepare for the possibility of Turkey showing some dangerous compliance toward France or even the possibility of the Turks joining France. Czartoryski pointed out that despite the renewal of their alliance with Russia, the Turks traditionally favored France and secretly hated Russia. The foreign minister observed that by virtue of Napoleon's new acquisitions in Dalmatia, France could either conquer parts of Turkey or establish French diplomatic supremacy in Constantinople. Czartoryski considered either of these alternatives equally disadvantageous for Russia. Russia must not only preserve the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire but it must also assure Russian diplomatic predominance at the Porte. Czartoryski indicated that there would be great problems involved in attempting to sustain the Ottoman Empire. He warned that Russia could suffer disastrous consequences by attempting to
do so. In order to be prepared for any eventuality, Czartoryski outlined a policy for possible hostile action against Turkey. He repeated his call for the establishment of an army of 100,000 men to be stationed on the Dniester. The commander of this army should receive instructions to act immediately in certain specified instances. These instances would include the entry of French troops into Ottoman territory, any Austrian move which indicated that Austria planned to seize some Turkish provinces or any attempt by Turkey to reinforce its garrisons on Russia's border. Czartoryski also recommended that the army should act without further orders if the Russian ambassador in Constantinople presented convincing evidence that the Porte had come to favor France. Sufficient proof of Turkey's defection would be a demand that Russia evacuate Corfu or Turkish insistence on an end to Russia's use of the Straits. In any of these instances the Russian army of the Dniester would immediately proceed to occupy Moldavia, Wallachia and Bessarabia. A combined Russian-English fleet, supported by troops from Corfu, would attack the Dardanelles. The Black Sea fleet would carry out a simultaneous attack from the side of the Bosporus. Although he emphasized the importance of attaching the Balkan Christians to Russia, Czartoryski also suggested that Russia should secretly contact the various rebellious pashas of the Ottoman Empire and attempt to win them to Russia's side. In concluding his memorandum
Czartoryski stressed the need for vigilance and energy at this critical time. He warned that unless Alexander acted on his suggestions, Russia's southern provinces could be exposed to imminent danger from either France or Turkey and possibly from both of these states.\(^{15}\)

In addition to his extensive proposals dealing with possible military action either to defend or to conquer the Ottoman Empire, Czartoryski also presented alternative plans. One of his proposals called for the creation of buffer states to separate the French possessions from Turkey. Czartoryski cited Russia's historic ties with the Montenegrins and other Slavs of the Adriatic region. Recently the Montenegrins had taken an oath of fidelity to the tsar and had requested that Alexander grant them a new political organization under Russian protection. Czartoryski advised the tsar that for the present Russia should limit its actions to assurances of support. Russia could encourage these people to resist the French and could provide them with arms and munitions. Later the Russian government could decide if it wanted the Montenegrins and other Slavs of the Adriatic region to take the offensive against France. In order to protect the Ottoman Empire, Russia should begin diplomatic preparations for the creation of a single inde-

pendent state consisting of Herzegovina, Montenegro, Dalmatia and the province of Cattaro. The new state would receive a constitutional structure similar to that of the Ionian Republic. This arrangement would establish a strong protective land barrier against a French invasion of the Ottoman Empire. In order to protect the Porte from a French naval attack, Czartoryski recommended that the Ionian Republic be strengthened by the addition of some territory on the mainland. The foreign minister recognized that although Russia was suggesting the creation of these states for the welfare of the Porte, the Turks would undoubtedly be opposed. Nonetheless, Czartoryski believed that Russia should pursue these measures in order to preserve the Ottoman Empire and protect Russia's interests. In summarizing the advantages of creating the two intermediary states, Czartoryski noted that Russia would have a preponderant influence on these states. At the same time Russia might make a lasting peace more possible since the new states would prevent French aggression against the Ottoman Empire.¹⁶

In Czartoryski's opinion, Russia should devote all its

attention to Turkish affairs because this was where Russia faced imminent danger. He reasoned that neither Austria nor Prussia presented any immediate threat to Russia. Prussia would do nothing to provoke a war with Russia and Austria was too weak to do so. Czartoryski believed that Bonaparte would rest for a short time and then turn all his attention to England and the Ottoman Empire. The foreign minister recommended that Russia maintain England's confidence but he also believed that it was advisable to end the war with France. He pointed out that for the present Russia could do nothing to force France to give up its control of large parts of Europe. Therefore Russia should seek to negotiate. Napoleon might be willing to grant Russia some advantages which would balance those that France had won. In order to avoid injuring Russia's dignity and to prevent the suspicions of the other courts, Czartoryski suggested sending someone to look after the Russian prisoners in France. This agent could get some idea of the French government's peace proposals and convey them to St. Petersburg. Czartoryski emphasized that while these contacts were taking place Russia would have to continue to prepare for all eventualities in regard to the Ottoman Empire. Basically, Czartoryski proposed a policy of extensive military preparations in the South combined with preliminary moves for peace with France. Czartoryski also hoped to get an agreement with Prussia that
would include a guarantee of the Ottoman Empire. 17

In a dispatch to Italinsky, Czartoryski warned that it would be necessary for him to watch the actions of the Porte very carefully. The Russian foreign minister advised Italinsky to warn the Porte that Austria's weakness would endanger Turkey since it would remove a barrier to French aggression. Czartoryski noted that French agents had already contacted the sultan's rebellious pashas. France would now be able to establish direct relations with some of these pashas. Czartoryski recommended that the sultan seek to gain the affection of his subjects. The Turks should also prepare their fortifications for a possible French attack. It would be particularly important for Italinsky to convince the Porte that it could resist Napoleon. The foreign minister noted that Russia was not concerned by any threat from Prussia or Austria and was therefore free to turn all its attention to the defense of the Ottoman Empire. 18

While Czartoryski was urging that the Porte strengthen

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its ties of friendship and cooperation with Russia, events in Constantinople were taking the opposite course. The French chargé, Pierre Ruffin, took advantage of the news of Napoleon's victories to warn the Porte of the possible consequences of its friendship with France's enemies. In January 1806 the French government sent another special emissary to Constantinople. He urged the Porte to return to its traditionally friendly policy toward France. The Turks did not need much encouragement. Despite the objections of the Russian and British ambassadors the sultan formally recognized Napoleon as emperor and padishah. Italinsky sent a sharp protest to the Porte. He rejected the Porte's arguments that it had to yield because of the danger of a French invasion and the distance of Russian aid. Italinsky declared that by yielding so quickly to French demands, the Porte was encouraging France to insist on even greater concessions. Italinsky said that while Russia did not want to see the Porte endangered by France it also did not wish to see it submit to French pressure. The ambassador warned that although the Porte claimed that it had recognized Napoleon because of France's proximity, it should not forget that Russia was also Turkey's neighbor. He noted that Russia was more powerful than France in the Near East. Italinsky cited the tsar's past opinion regarding the recognition of Bonaparte's titles and he stated that by acting contrary to the tsar's wishes the Porte might actually be increasing
In spite of Czartoryski's recommendations on the need to take strong and immediate measures to defend the Porte or at least prepare to profit from its fall, Alexander hesitated to take any decisive action. The tsar agreed to the proposal for establishing a large Russian army on the Dniester. He also ordered the commander of the Russian forces in the Mediterranean, General B. P. Lacy to remain in the Ionian Islands "in order to prevent as much as possible the execution of the designs of Bonaparte on the Ottoman Empire." However, whether by accident or design, the tsar ignored Czartoryski's suggestion that a duplicate set of these instructions be sent to Constantinople in case Lacy was already returning. Consequently, the orders arrived in Corfu too late. Lacy, along with a large contingent of Russia's forces, had already returned to the Black Sea. Czartoryski's ideas regarding the need for Russia to take offensive action against the French in the Adriatic also met with difficulties. The tsar was concerned that he would endanger Austria by resisting France's occupation of Dalmatia or by sending Russian troops into Ottoman territory. Furthermore, Napoleon had recently sought and finally obtained a Prussian

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guarantee of the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Alexander decided not to risk the hostility of Austria and Prussia and refused to adopt Czartoryski's proposals. The tsar resolved that for the moment he would not take the offensive in the Near East unless the French provoked such an action by violating Ottoman territory or by making extensive preparations clearly intended for an invasion of Turkey. Russia also watched Prussia's actions closely in view of Prussia's recent agreements with France. The Russian government was concerned that France might insist that Russia's use of the Straits and occupation of the Ionian Islands was a violation of Turkish independence and demand that Prussia join France against Russia.

Alexander's desire to follow a largely passive and defensive policy in the Near East was evident in the instructions sent to the Russian ambassador in Constantinople.


20 Vneshnia politika Rossii, Vol. III, No. 15, Alexander to General B. P. Lacy, February 3/15, 1806, pp. 50-51; No. 16, Czartoryski to S. Vorontsov, February 6/18, 1806, pp. 52-53; No. 18, "Report of the Conversations of Czartoryski and N. N. Novosiltsev with the Duke of Brunswick and the Prussian Ambassador, Goltz," February 14/26, 1806, pp. 58-59; No. 22, Czartoryski to Razumovski, February 20/March 4, 1806, p. 73; Footnote No. 38, p. 659. The Treaty of Vienna of December 15, 1805 between France and Prussia disturbed the Russians. In Article I of this offensive and defensive alliance, both parties guaranteed the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. This treaty was not ratified by the Prussian government but a similar
Czartoryski instructed Italinsky to employ reason and persuasion when dealing with the Porte. The ambassador was to emphasize Russia's recent friendly relations with the Porte and compare it with Napoleon's well-established designs on Ottoman territory. Czartoryski directed Italinsky not to make an issue of Ottoman recognition of Napoleon's titles. The tsar believed that this matter was not worth the danger of risking a French invasion of Turkey. However, the instructions on the question of recognition of the titles arrived too late to influence Italinsky's actions. The Russian government remained adamant on the questions of the use of the Straits and the continued military occupation of the Ionian Islands. These rights, Czartoryski declared, had been guaranteed by the recently concluded Russo-Turkish alliance. Italinsky was to refuse to agree to any attempt to alter these provisions. Czartoryski insisted that Russia could never evacuate the Ionian Islands while France retained its current position in the Adriatic. The foreign minister emphasized that the islands were essential for Russia's defense of the Ottoman Empire. Russia needed unhindered use of the Straits in order to supply its troops stationed in the islands. Czartoryski repeated previous assurances that the Ottoman Empire had nothing to fear from

 guarantee of the Ottoman Empire was included in the Franco-
Russia or Austria. The Turks should therefore direct all their attention to their defenses against a French attack from Dalmatia. Italinsky had thus inadvertently exceeded his authority. He had employed threats and warnings on the question of Napoleon's titles while the tsar was prepared to acquiesce to Ottoman recognition. The evidence indicates that Italinsky was acting in conformity to the tenor of his previous instructions. He was not yet aware of the changes that had occurred in St. Petersburg as a result of Austerlitz.21

In the early months of 1806, Russia followed a confused and often contradictory policy in the Near East. In fact, it would be more accurate to say that Russia had no policy for the Near East during this period. Alexander rejected the advice of Czartoryski and the "young friends" who had made up the Secret Committee. They advocated active measures in cooperation with England to prevent the French from winning over the Ottoman Empire. Initially, the tsar also rejected any negotiations with France. Unable to decide which policy to adopt, Alexander did nothing. Czartoryski, Stroganov, Novosiltsev and Kochubei all tried to convince

21Czartoryski's instructions regarding the question of Ottoman recognition of Napoleon's titles were dated February 18/March 2, 1806. Italinsky did not receive them until March 15/27, 1806. See Vneshniaia politika Rossii, Vol. III, No. 14, Czartoryski to Italinsky, February 3/15, 1806, pp. 49-50; Nos. 19 and 20, Czartoryski to Italinsky, February 18/March 2, 1806, pp. 65-68.
the tsar of the danger of remaining passive. However, the defeat of the Third Coalition and court intrigues directed against the "young friends" seriously undermined their influence. Czartoryski instructed Stroganov who was in London to approach the British government on his proposals for the creation of a Slavic and a Greek state to serve as barriers to protect the Ottoman Empire from a French attack. Despite this attempt to ascertain the British government's opinion on this matter, Czartoryski readily admitted that the tsar remained committed to inaction and would probably do nothing unless forced to act by the French. The tsar did, however, wish to know the views of the British ministry on the possibility of negotiating for a general European peace. Increasingly, it began to look as though this was the course that Alexander would favor.22

In March 1806 Russia learned of the Porte's recognition of Napoleon's titles. Although Alexander had decided not to oppose this action, other rumors and reports that began to reach St. Petersburg warned of a total reversal in Turkey's foreign policy. Based on these reports Czartoryski wanted to act immediately. The foreign minister reported to

Alexander that he had received information that the Turks were assembling troops and making other military preparations on Russia's borders. There were also indications that the Porte would depose the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia. Czartoryski declared that "everything indicates a change of system by which it appeared certain that the Porte wishes to annul its alliance with the imperial court, in uniting itself with France." He acknowledged that Italinsky had only confirmed the report on the recognition of Napoleon's titles. However, Czartoryski believed that the substance of the other reports was probably true. Russia should therefore begin making the necessary preparations. Czartoryski urged the tsar to take prompt and energetic measures to counter the Turkish moves. He argued that the Porte's actions indicated that the French had won over the Turks. Czartoryski warned that Russia's frontiers were in immediate danger of being attacked. Unless the tsar acted immediately to block the French intrigues in Constantinople, Russia would have a hostile neighbor on its southern borders. Furthermore, if Russia continued to delay, it would certainly lose the support of the Christians of European Turkey. Czartoryski proposed a number of measures that Alexander should adopt if the reports regarding Turkey were confirmed.

Kochubei to Stroganov, February 1/13, 1806, p. 118; No. 278, Stroganov to his wife, February 6/18, 1806, pp. 127-128.
The foreign minister asserted that the Turks would only yield out of fear. Therefore, the commander of the Army of the Dniester, General Ivan I. Michelson, should be ordered to prepare to occupy the Principalities. He would commence this action as soon as he had verified that the Turks were making military preparations against Russia. Czartoryski noted that the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia would deprive Constantinople of an important source of supplies and would force the Turks to return to a policy of cooperation with Russia. By seizing these provinces, Russia would also obtain a more defensible position on the Danube and would be able to aid the Christians of European Turkey. According to Czartoryski's proposal, the Russian army on entering the Principalities would issue an announcement of its purpose. This proclamation would state that Russia's invasion was not meant as a hostile act but as a means of maintaining the Porte's independence. The announcement would also declare that the Russian troops were in the Principalities to defend the Ottoman Empire from a French attack and that Russia wished to maintain its alliance with the Porte. Czartoryski advised the tsar that at the time of the invasion he should inform the other powers of his reasons for entering the Principalities. Russia would need to obtain the cooperation of Britain and the neutrality of Austria and Prussia. Czartoryski also suggested that the tsar send an emissary to Paris. This representative would inform Napoleon that
Russia would recommence hostilities rather than permit French encroachments on Turkey or even a predominant French influence in Constantinople. In return for France's renunciation of its designs on the Porte, Russia should be prepared to tolerate French influence in Italy. Czartoryski believed that the occupation of the Principalities would convince France that Russia considered its position in the Ottoman Empire as essential to its security. He warned that both France and Turkey were counting on Russian inactivity. Any hesitation would only augment Russia's difficulties and in the end Russia would still have to resort to war.23

Czartoryski's memorandum contained several references to the need for prompt and energetic action. In some additional remarks which he prepared for the tsar, Czartoryski presented some slight variations to his plan. Apparently anticipating the tsar's objections, Czartoryski suggested that even if Alexander believed that more facts were needed, it would still be necessary to act immediately. Rather than invade the Principalities, the Russian army could conduct a military demonstration. The army would actually invade the Principalities only if General Michelson learned that the Turks definitely were assembling large numbers of troops in Moldavia and Wallachia. Czartoryski sent Alexander proposed

rescripts that the tsar could send to General Michelson and to Italinsky. In these drafts Czartoryski embodied the principal suggestions of his memoranda. In the rescript to Italinsky, Alexander should inform the ambassador that Russia was prepared to invade the Principalities unless the Porte limited its actions on behalf of France to the recognition of Napoleon's titles. The Turks would also have to recall the troops they had sent toward Russia's borders. The invasion of Ottoman territory would also take place if the Porte attempted to make any changes in the Principalities without consulting with Russia or if the Porte violated any other agreements it had signed with Russia.24

Rather than adopt the stern warnings and aggressive measures that Czartoryski proposed, Alexander adopted a moderate and conciliatory approach. The tsar blamed Italinsky's strong protests and warnings regarding Turkey's recognition

24 Ibid., No. 86, "Appendix to the Remarks Concerning Turkey," February 24/March 8, 1806, pp. 322-324; No. 87, Rescript to Italinsky, February 24/March 8, 1806, pp. 325-328; No. 88, Rescript to Michelson, February 24/March 8, 1806, p. 329. Most works accept the fact that these last two rescripts (Nos. 87 and 88) were actually sent to Italinsky. Alexander is thus pictured as having decided to invade the Principalities in the event of an unsuccessful diplomatic effort at the Porte. However, the evidence indicates that Alexander had not decided on any such action at this time and instead greatly modified and weakened Czartoryski's proposals. The "rescripts" apparently were only drafts suggested by Czartoryski. Cf. Shupp, Near Eastern Question, pp. 19-20. Shupp maintains that "By the beginning of March it was evident that the Russian government had definitely decided to occupy Turkish territory if circumstances made
of Napoleon's titles for the deterioration in Russo-Turkish relations. The tsar also attributed Turkey's military preparations to the Porte's fears occasioned by Italinsky's threats. Alexander instructed Italinsky to assure the sultan that the tsar only wished to see the Porte observe its treaties with Russia. Czartoryski's note to Italinsky did not mention any of the aggressive measures which the foreign minister had suggested to the tsar. Czartoryski instructed Italinsky to convince the Porte to rescind the orders sending troops toward the Russian border and withdraw those forces already encamped near the frontier. The Turks should also end the extraordinary repairs being made on their fortresses on the Dniester and on the Danube and should cease their other military preparations in the Principalities. As a guide for Italinsky's future actions, Czartoryski summarized Alexander's current Ottoman policy. The tsar wished to devote every effort to keeping the Porte loyal to its Russian alliance and to preventing the Porte from committing itself to France. Alexander wanted the Turks to direct their entire defensive effort toward the new French possessions in Dalmatia. Before the Turks would do this, Italinsky would have to convince them that Russia had no ambitious designs on the Ottoman Empire. The strongest measure which it seem necessary." Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, p. 76 likewise believes that these rescripts were sent and that they therefore represented official Russian policy.
Czartoryski authorized Italinsky to employ in dealing with the Porte was a veiled warning that the Ottoman Empire would expose itself to grave danger if it changed from its policy of friendship with Russia. If this occurred, Alexander would have to take appropriate actions to safeguard the security of the Russian Empire. 25

The obvious discrepancy between Czartoryski's recommendations for forceful action against Turkey and the cautious warnings which Alexander authorized indicated the decline in Czartoryski's influence. Czartoryski tried repeatedly to get the tsar to adopt a more active foreign policy particularly in regard to the Ottoman Empire. The foreign minister believed that the Turks were planning to join France against Russia. He warned that by continuing to follow a moderate policy toward the Porte, the tsar was only hastening an alliance between the Ottoman Empire and France. The Turks would mistake Russia's moderation for weakness. Czartoryski pointed out that France's position in Italy and Dalmatia endangered the Ionian Islands. If Russia lost these islands, it would lose its contacts with the Greeks and the Slavs and lead these people to favor the French. Czartoryski argued that Turkey secretly hated Russia and was following a policy

of "arrogant and active hostile preparation" directed against Russia. The foreign minister charged that Russia had not even forcefully protested this Turkish activity. Czartoryski warned the tsar that Napoleon would soon demand the evacuation of the Ionian Islands and the closing of the Straits to Russian warships. If the Turks complied with these demands, it would be Russia's own fault for failing to take energetic steps. Czartoryski asked if Russia was going to sacrifice its national interests and remain idle while its enemies made hostile preparations. He repeated his earlier advice that the loss of Russian influence in Constantinople would lead to serious consequences. The southern commerce of Russia would be destroyed and Russia would face a war on its own frontiers. Czartoryski insisted that Russia could prevent these problems by occupying the Principalities. This occupation would give Russia "an extremely strong line of defense, all the resources of the two Principalities, a facility to give help to the Greeks and the Slavs, [the means for] marching on Constantinople and [would] establish as a consequence a direct communication between the Black Sea, the Bosporus and the Mediterranean." Czartoryski again urged Alexander to abandon his passive policy and to make some decisions regarding the problems in the Near East.26

26Czartoryski, Memoires, Vol. II, "Report on the
In view of the tsar's refusal to accept his suggestions, Czartoryski began requesting that Alexander permit him to resign. Czartoryski stated that since Austerlitz the tsar had paid little attention to his proposals. The foreign minister pointed out that Alexander believed the source of his recent problems was the fact that he had heeded the advice of Czartoryski and others. Czartoryski declared that actually the problem was that the tsar had ignored the proposals of his advisers. Czartoryski noted that for the past two years he had been recommending various ideas that would be advantageous for Russia. These ideas had included the acquisition of Moldavia and Wallachia and the creation of Slavic and Greek states. Although these steps would aid Russian commerce, Alexander had rejected them. Czartoryski accused the tsar of being too indecisive and criticized him for neglecting Turkish affairs. For the moment, Alexander refused to accept Czartoryski's resignation but he also refused to adopt his policies.27

Despite Alexander's reluctance to commit himself to a firm policy in regard to the Near East, events in Constantinople and in the Adriatic soon forced the tsar to make some

Current Situation of Russia," Czartoryski to Alexander, March 1806, pp. 86-94.

27Ibid., Czartoryski to Alexander, March 22, 1806, pp. 98-102; Memorandum of Czartoryski to Alexander, April 1806, pp. 105-106; Report to Alexander, April 5, 1806, p. 142.
decisions. Italinsky reported increased French influence in Constantinople and the ambassador noted Turkey's growing distrust of Russia's intentions. The Turks were particularly suspicious of Russia's motives in forming an army on the frontier of Moldavia. Italinsky confirmed the reports that the Turks were raising large armies. The ambassador reported that according to rumors these troops would be used against Russia. Although Italinsky discounted these rumors, his dispatches contained several references to actions taken by the Porte which were contrary to Russia's wishes. Russia was concerned at the Porte's reluctance to renew its alliance with Great Britain. The Russian government believed that this was another indication of the Porte's submission to French influence. In response to Italinsky's complaints regarding the Porte's behavior, the Turkish government continued to assure the ambassador that it intended to maintain its alliance with Russia. The Turks explained that they were raising and organizing new armies in order to quell the Serbian revolt. Italinsky, however, advised the Porte to pardon the Serbs and employ the Turkish armies to guard against a French invasion from Dalmatia. The Russian ambassador also objected when the sultan decided to send an ambassador to Paris. Italinsky warned the Porte that despite

its efforts to appease the French, Napoleon would never abandon his plans to destroy the Ottoman Empire. Italinsky continued to employ threats in dealing with the Porte. He warned that the least unfavorable change in the Porte's policy toward Russia would lead the tsar to alter his friendly attitude toward Turkey. Any Turkish disloyalty might lead Alexander, in the interest of Russia's security, either to employ his formidable military forces or to listen to the partition proposals made by other powers in regard to the Ottoman Empire.28

Alexander's concern over the Porte's loyalty and future policy represented one possible reason for the tsar to decide whether to continue the war or to seek peace. However, affairs in Constantinople represented only a potential danger. Events were taking place in the Adriatic which threatened to lead to a complete renewal of hostilities. The French threat to the Ionian Islands and the western Balkans had played a major role in Russia's decision to fight France. Russia had sent considerable forces to the Ionian Islands in 1804 and 1805 but their participation in the war had been minimal. Following the defeat at Austerlitz, Alexander had

28Vneshniaia politika Rossii, Vol. III, No. 21, Italinsky to Czartoryski, February 18/March 2, 1806, pp. 69-71; No. 26, Italinsky to Czartoryski, March 2/14, 1806, pp. 82-83; No. 32, Italinsky to the Turkish Government, March 19/31, 1806, pp. 95-99; Footnote No. 70, p. 666. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim III, pp. 334-336. Yakschitch,
recalled most of these forces. Although the orders rescinding the recall had arrived too late, a large number of Russian troops and ships had remained in the islands. In late January 1806 a fleet of reinforcements had arrived in Corfu from the Baltic Sea. The commander of this force, Vice Admiral Dmitrii N. Seniavin, had persuaded General Lacy to leave many of his troops. The Russian government had sent Seniavin to the Adriatic prior to the outbreak of hostilities. His mission had been to protect the Ionian Republic and to guard against a French invasion of the Ottoman Empire. However, the defeat at Austerlitz and the Treaty of Pressburg severely complicated Seniavin's mission. Upon learning of the terms of the Pressburg treaty, Seniavin had independently decided on a number of important measures. To facilitate carrying out his instructions to defend the Ottoman Empire, Seniavin decided to occupy Cattaro and establish contacts with the Montenegrins and other Slavs of the Adriatic region. In March 1806 a Russian force demanded that the

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29 For biographical accounts of Seniavin and his activities in the Mediterranean see Aleksandr L. Shapiro, Admiral D. N. Seniavin (Moscow, 1958) and Evgenii V. Tarle, Ekspeditsiia admirala D. N. Seniavina v sredizemnomoe more, 1805-1807 (The Expedition of Admiral D. N. Seniavin in the Mediterranean Sea, 1805-1807) (Moscow, 1954). See also Russkii biograficheskii slovar', Vol. XVIII, pp. 330-333.
Austrians surrender Cattaro. The Austrian commander complied and Russian and Montenegrin troops occupied Cattaro and the surrounding territory. Seniavin had no specific authorization to take this action. However, he defended his activities by citing the importance of Cattaro both as a port and as a base to defend or to pressure the Ottoman Empire. Seniavin also noted the need to establish direct contacts with the neighboring Slavs and he reported that the inhabitants of Cattaro wished to become Russian subjects.30

The seizure of Cattaro and Seniavin's aggressive measures against the French in the Adriatic region presented a difficult dilemma in international relations. Napoleon attached a great deal of importance to the acquisition of Dalmatia, Istria and Cattaro. He could use these provinces either to attack the Ottoman Empire or to pressure the Porte into abandoning its alliance with Russia. Napoleon had assumed that the Russian commanders in the Adriatic would not attack his new possessions until they had received orders from St. Petersburg. French troops would therefore be in control of the provinces before the Russians would have time to react. The French ruler personally directed the measures

being prepared for the occupation of Dalmatia. He insisted that Austria allow him to send troops across its territory in order to reinforce the garrisons in his new possessions. The Russian occupation of Cattaro was a matter of great concern to Napoleon and, upon learning of it, he ordered his troops to cease their evacuation of Austrian territory. The French believed that Austria was secretly collaborating with Russia and they threatened reprisals against the Austrians. In order to obtain French evacuation of Austria and prevent the threatened reprisals, the Austrian government insisted that Russia withdraw from Cattaro.\(^{31}\)

The question of what to do about Cattaro became the subject of extensive debate in St. Petersburg. Even before its capture by Seniavin, Czartoryski had indicated the advantages of possessing Cattaro. However, offsetting these advantages was the embarrassment caused to Austria. The refusal of Napoleon to evacuate Austrian territory until he received Cattaro meant that Austria could not begin to reorganize and to recuperate from its recent losses. The tsar believed that the recovery of Austria was more important than

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\(^{31}\)Napoléon, Correspondance, Vol. XII, No. 9864, To Prince Eugène, February 21, 1806, p. 83; No. 9953, To Prince Eugène, March 9, 1806, p. 173; No. 9966, To Prince Eugène, March 13, 1806, p. 183; No. 9968, To Talleyrand, March 14, 1806, p. 186; No. 9972, To Berthier, March 14, 1806, p. 189; No. 9988, To Talleyrand, March 18, 1806, pp. 199-200; No. 10003, To Prince Eugène, March 21, 1806, pp. 208-209; No. 10015, To Prince Eugène, March 24, 1806, pp. 215-216; No.
retaining Cattaro. Furthermore, Alexander's desire to end all Russian involvement in the war led him to consider not only yielding Cattaro but also withdrawing all Russian forces from the Adriatic. Czartoryski argued vehemently against surrendering Cattaro. Rather than withdraw from the Adriatic, Czartoryski proposed sending large numbers of reinforcements to aid Seniavin. Czartoryski continued to insist that Alexander's passive policy in the Near East could have serious consequences. He claimed that if Russia withdrew from the Adriatic it would leave France free to subjugate all of Italy and the Ionian Republic. From these positions the French could carry out their plans against the Ottoman Empire and within three months they could be in Constantinople. Russia would have lost the support of the Greeks and the Slavs and would be in imminent danger of invasion. To prevent these consequences Czartoryski wanted to send between 15,000 and 20,000 troops through the Straits to the Adriatic. The sending of these forces would also test the Porte's sincerity by showing whether the Turks planned to remain faithful to their alliance with Russia. If the Turks imposed any obstacles to the passage of these troops, they would be violating their recent alliance with Russia.

The Russian government would then know with certainty that the Porte had been won over by France. Russia could then respond by sending an army through the Principalities and Serbia to aid the Russian forces in the Adriatic. Czartoryski believed that if Alexander planned to take no active measures in spite of the hostile preparations of the Turks and the possibility of new trouble over Cattaro, then the only other reasonable course of action was to negotiate with France. If this were done, Russia could make Cattaro an object of negotiation and thus turn Napoleon's anger away from Austria. Czartoryski claimed that Austria was in no immediate danger. He argued that Russia's retention of Cattaro was actually in Austria's interest. The foreign minister asked Alexander to postpone ordering the evacuation of Cattaro and to await further developments before making any final decision. Czartoryski's reports and memoranda apparently had some influence on Alexander. The tsar still refused to undertake any of the energetic measures which Czartoryski proposed. However, Alexander did decide that for the present Russia would delay evacuating Cattaro. More

importantly, Alexander finally agreed that he would have to abandon his policy of neither war nor peace. The tsar had decided that in order to protect Russia's interests, including those in the Near East, he would authorize negotiations with France.
CHAPTER V

THE FAILURE OF ALEXANDER'S NEAR EASTERN POLICY

A number of factors were responsible for Alexander's decision to negotiate with France. Beginning in January 1806, Czartoryski's numerous reports had demonstrated that a passive policy could not benefit Russia in any way. If the tsar was unwilling to undertake active measures to obtain his goals, then Russia might be able to acquire some gains through diplomacy. The possible reopening of hostilities because of the French threat in the Near East and Seniavin's seizure of Cattaro hastened the necessity for a decision. The pretext for undertaking negotiations was already present. A new ministry in Britain had already begun preliminary discussions with France. Czartoryski proposed that Russia join these negotiations. The initial contacts with the French were made through the French commercial agent in St. Petersburg, Jean Lesseps. The ostensible reason for these contacts was Russia's assertion that, despite its war with France, the Russo-French commercial treaty of 1786 was still in effect. Russia complained that France
was violating this agreement. Napoleon agreed to Russia's claims and instructed Talleyrand to communicate his approval to Lesseps. In transmitting the French government's reply, Lesseps told Czartoryski that part of the response demonstrated Napoleon's desire for a rapprochement with Russia. Czartoryski was skeptical that the French government actually intended the response as a peace overture. However, he believed that Russia could use Lesseps' statements as an excuse to begin negotiations with France. Czartoryski suggested that the tsar adopt his previous proposal of sending a representative to France whose stated mission would be to aid the Russian prisoners. This agent could begin discussions on all the issues and learn the terms that France might propose. In the event of negotiations, Czartoryski believed that Russia would have to insist on "the maintenance of a Russian garrison at Corfu; retreat of French troops from Dalmatia; the recognition of the engagements contracted by the Porte in favor of Russia; the establishment of an independent state between the Porte and Italy." In return for these concessions, Russia would agree to peace with France and would recognize Napoleon as emperor. Russia would have to obtain additional benefits before recognizing any of the other changes which Napoleon had made in Europe. Czartoryski suggested that if Napoleon wouldn't accept Russia's terms, then the two sides could agree to a long truce.
which would last from eight to twelve years.\(^1\)

In conversations with Lesseps, Czartoryski emphasized that any stable peace would have to include a settlement of affairs in the Near East. The Russian foreign minister indicated that no peace in Europe could be assured if France continued as the Porte's neighbor. The Russians would always have to fear that France would gain ascendancy in Constantinople and incite the Turks against Russia. Czartoryski continued to urge the tsar to hold Cattaro. He pointed out that by retaining this province Russia could separate France from the Ottoman Empire. The foreign minister recommended that at the very least Cattaro could serve as an object of negotiation with France. By April 1806 Alexander had decided to send a representative to Paris. Czartoryski proposed that this agent settle the matter of Cattaro and alleviate French pressure on Austria. Czartoryski suggested that if the Russian ambassador in Vienna, Razumovski, determined that Austria was in immediate danger, he could order the evacuation of Cattaro. Hopefully, this could be done in a way that its recapture would be possible once the

French had occupied the province. In all his arguments Czartoryski returned to the problem of assuring the security of the Ottoman Empire. He asserted that there could never be peace between Russia and France while Napoleon sought to gain a predominant diplomatic position in Constantinople. Czartoryski presumed that Britain would support Russia on this issue and he insisted on the need for Russia to negotiate jointly with England.\(^2\)

Alexander's decision to negotiate with France did not indicate that he was willing to abandon his strictly defensive foreign policy. Czartoryski had to continue to argue for the necessity of leaving Russian forces in the Adriatic and for retaining Cattaro until the issue was settled by peace negotiations. Both Czartoryski and the British government wanted the number of Russian troops in the Adriatic increased. However, the tsar refused to take any aggressive measures. Alexander selected the former Russian charge in Paris, Pierre Oubril, to negotiate with France. Although formally designated as the "agent for the Russian prisoners," Oubril was authorized to enter into the negotiations already begun in Paris between England and France. Oubril could

sign _sub spe rati_ any agreement that conformed to the honor and interests of Russia. Czartoryski prepared Oubril's written instructions. The role of the Near East formed a crucial part of these instructions. Czartoryski insisted that France would have to evacuate Dalmatia. Czartoryski directed Oubril not to sign any act if it did not include a means of preventing France from attacking the Ottoman Empire. He was also not to agree to any stipulation providing for Russia's evacuation of Corfu or to any clause which gave France the right to invalidate the Porte's treaty obligations toward Russia. Czartoryski instructed Oubril not to agree to recognize Napoleon's imperial title unless Russia secured some important benefits. One such benefit to seek was "the evacuation in whole or in part of Dalmatia by the French and the establishment of one or several independent states between the Ottoman Empire and Italy." In addition to Czartoryski's written directions, Oubril met privately with the tsar and received Alexander's ideas on the necessity of signing a peace treaty with France. Alexander had a far more pacific attitude than his foreign minister. The tsar believed that sending Oubril to Paris was the best means of assuring that Russia could remain passive. 3

3Vneshnjaja politika Rossii, Vol. III, No. 43, "Report of Czartoryski's Conversation with the English Ambassador, Gower," April 24/May 6, 1806, p. 131; No. 45, Czartoryski to Oubril, April 30/May 12, 1806, pp. 135-136; No. 51, "Verbal Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Gower,"
Oubril first went to Vienna where he consulted with Razumovsky on the question of Cattaro. Razumovsky found that both the Austrians and the French refused to negotiate the return of Cattaro. The French held Austria responsible for yielding Cattaro to the Russians. The Austrians feared French reprisals and continued to demand that Russia return Cattaro. The Russian government was thus presented with a rather complex problem. The complexity of the situation was increased by the opposing views of the tsar and his foreign minister. In May 1806 Alexander had finally decided to accept Czartoryski's resignation. However, Czartoryski continued to act as foreign minister until the end of June. The split between the tsar and his foreign minister gave Russian diplomacy a dual aspect. One point on which both men agreed was the need for peace. They differed on what would constitute acceptable terms. Czartoryski firmly believed that in the interest of national security Russia would have to obtain a peace that would protect the Porte. The alternative was for Russia to invade the Ottoman Empire.

The invasion would not aim at conquering Turkey but would serve as a means of approaching the parts of Turkey which were threatened by France. Czartoryski recognized that the current situation on the continent was not very suitable for aggressive measures. Peace would at least give Russia and its continental allies time to recover. Czartoryski's desire for a peaceful solution that would protect the Near East led him to suggest that the allies abandon their demand that Naples be restored to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In return for this concession, Czartoryski believed that Russia might obtain either an area on the continent to enlarge the Ionian Republic or, preferably, the creation of a separate Greek state in the Morea. If the latter solution was accepted, the new state would be a vassal of the Porte. Czartoryski insisted that Russia could never accept France's continued possession of Dalmatia. He proposed some alternative solutions which were intended to protect the Porte. One way to safeguard Turkey would be for Russia to retain Cattaro. If this was unacceptable, Czartoryski favored returning Dalmatia and Cattaro to Austria. A third possible solution would be to form an intermediate state between Turkey and Italy. Czartoryski insisted that one of these options would have to be a *sine qua non* of any agreement with France. Another essential article would be one which guaranteed the Porte's territorial integrity and the strict fulfillment by
Turkey of its treaties with Russia. 4

In Vienna, Razumovsky attempted to negotiate the issue of Cattaro with the French ambassador but was unsuccessful. Razumovsky sent instructions to the Russian commanders in Cattaro ordering them to evacuate the province. However, he secretly instructed them to move slowly and await the outcome of negotiations. The Oubril mission to Paris was delayed while the Russian emissary awaited permission to enter France. The French government hoped to divide Britain and Russia by negotiating separately. Talleyrand had already begun discussions with the British representative, Lord Yarmouth. In his negotiations with Talleyrand, Yarmouth attempted to convince France to give up Dalmatia and Istria. Yarmouth told Talleyrand that Britain was concerned that France would launch an invasion of Turkey from these

Adriatic provinces. Talleyrand denied that France contemplated any hostilities against the Porte and he offered to include a French guarantee of the Ottoman Empire in the proposed peace treaty. However, negotiations between France and Britain soon encountered serious difficulties on the Near East and several other issues.  

When no progress was achieved in the discussions with Yarmouth, the French decided to permit Oubril to come to Paris. He arrived on July 6, 1806 at a time when the Anglo-French negotiations were virtually deadlocked. From the time of his arrival, Oubril was more accommodating to French offers than Yarmouth had been. Oubril favored an unofficial proposal which Talleyrand suggested. According to this plan, the ruler of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies would receive Dalmatia, Albania and Ragusa in return for his entire kingdom.  

Oubril believed that this new state would provide the

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6There were obvious problems in this proposal since much of Albania was part of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, the Republic of Ragusa was nominally a vassal of the Porte. On Napoleon's orders, the French had occupied Ragusa in May 1806. A combined force of Russians and Montenegrins had inflicted heavy casualties on the French and forced them to retreat into the city of Ragusa. See Napoléon, Correspondance, Vol. XII, No. 10197, To Prince Eugène, May 6, 1806, p. 351. Émile Haumant, "Les Français à Raguse," La revue
means for protecting the Porte and would destroy French influence in Constantinople. Oubril wrote to Stroganov in London requesting him to obtain British approval of the plan. While he was awaiting a response, the French government continually pressured Oubril to sign a definitive agreement immediately. At first Oubril insisted that no peace was possible while France remained a neighbor of the Ottoman Empire. Talleyrand then attempted to get Oubril to sign an immediate armistice in order to end the Russo-French hostilities in the Adriatic. Oubril refused to sign the armistice unless it would lead immediately to a common negotiation of Russia, Britain and France. However, Talleyrand rejected this. The French government steadily increased the pressure on Oubril. General Henri J. G. Clarke replaced Talleyrand in the negotiations and the French terms became progressively less favorable to Russia. Clarke stated categorically that France would not yield Dalmatia under any conditions. According to Oubril, the French began to demand that Russia annul all its treaties with the Porte and renounce all the privileges that Russia had acquired in the Ottoman Empire. Russia would also have to evacuate the Ionian Islands and permit French warships to enter the Black Sea. The French also threatened

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to destroy the Austrian Empire and to send an army into Turkey to crush the Serbian revolt. Oubril finally capitulated and decided to sign a peace treaty. In justifying his action to Stroganov, Oubril argued that Russia wasn't losing anything by separating its interests from England. Oubril pointed out that the tsar had decided not to follow an active foreign policy. He defended the treaty he had signed and claimed that it would protect the Ottoman Empire. Oubril argued that Russia lacked sufficient forces in the Adriatic to halt a French advance into Turkey. He also noted that "the Emperor had never wished to send reinforcements [to the Adriatic], despite all the requests of [Czartoryski]." Oubril believed that the treaty he had signed was not dishonorable and he felt that by signing it he had saved Austria.7

Oubril's treaty did not conform to the written instructions he had received. The agreement recognized Napoleon as Emperor of the French and King of Italy and established peace between Russia and France. It provided for the evacuation of all Russian troops from Cattaro, Ragusa, Montenegro

and Dalmatia. Both parties recognized the independence of the Ionian Republic and Russia agreed to withdraw most of its troops from the islands. Russia and France guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In return for its concessions, Russia obtained only a French promise to evacuate Austria and Ragusa. Basically, Oubril's treaty merely recognized the terms of the Pressburg agreement. Despite strong French protests, Oubril insisted on signing the treaty sub spe rati thereby making it subject to the tsar's approval. Oubril did agree to notify Admiral Seniavin that peace had been concluded between Russia and France. He instructed Seniavin to carry out those portions of the treaty which pertained to Russia's forces in the Adriatic. Nothing in the treaty provided any effective guarantee against France replacing Russia as the most influential power in Constantinople. On the contrary, France was soon to interpret the clause which guaranteed the "independence and integrity" of the Ottoman Empire in a way that was directly contrary to Russia's interests.  

While the English and Russian representatives were negotiating in Paris, Napoleon was taking steps to improve

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France's diplomatic position at the Porte. As early as May 1806, Napoleon had decided to send General Horace Sébastiani as his ambassador to Constantinople. He also appointed consuls to serve as his political and economic agents in other areas of the Ottoman Empire. As Czartoryski had predicted, Napoleon's interest in Ottoman affairs showed a marked increase following his acquisition of Dalmatia. The French emperor directed Talleyrand to keep him informed at all times on Turkish affairs. Napoleon declared that he needed "...to maintain frequent correspondence with Constantinople, because if the Turks come to allow themselves to be involved in new wrongs toward me, that would be a bad result for my affairs of Dalmatia." Napoleon personally assured the new Ottoman ambassador to Paris that Selim had nothing to fear from France. In his instructions to Sébastiani, Napoleon outlined the policy he planned to follow in regard to the Ottoman Empire. The basic objective of Napoleon's policy was to challenge Russia's position in Constantinople. Sébastiani would have to win the confidence and trust of the Ottoman government. Napoleon hoped that Turkey and Persia would join France in a triple alliance directed against Russia. Sébastiani would have to demonstrate to the Turks that the Russians were seeking the destruction of the Ottoman Empire through their support of the sultan's rebellious subjects. Napoleon instructed Sébastiani to persuade the Turks to close the Straits to Russian ships. He also wanted the
Turks to prepare their fortifications against Russia and to regain absolute control over Moldavia and Wallachia. Napoleon claimed that he did not want to see the Ottoman Empire partitioned. He declared that he wanted to see Turkey strengthened so that it would be an effective opponent to Russia. Napoleon wrote to Selim to urge the sultan to subdue the Serbian rebels whom he claimed were being encouraged by the Russians. The French emperor accused the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia of being agents of the Russian government and he personally encouraged Selim to close the Straits to Russian ships.

Napoleon's attempts to win over the Porte met with increasing success. Since the battle of Austerlitz, the Turks had become more friendly toward France. Napoleon's acquisition on the Adriatic placed the Ottoman Empire in a potentially dangerous position. Selim decided that it would be necessary to make every effort to avoid offending France.

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At the same time, the sultan and his advisers regarded the new situation in Europe as an opportunity to regain some of Turkey's independence. Regardless of whether the Porte's actions were aimed at placating the French or reasserting Ottoman independence, it was Russia that stood to lose the most. Disputes between the Ottoman Empire and Russia soon developed. One problem involved the issuance of berats or orders of protection granted by foreign governments to Ottoman subjects. These berats removed the holder from the jurisdiction of Ottoman law. Selim ordered an end to the indiscriminate granting of these privileges. Only those Ottoman subjects actually employed by foreign embassies were to receive these berats. All others holding berats would have to surrender them. The order applied to all countries having the right to issue berats but was especially aimed at the Russian embassy which had greatly abused the privilege. Italinsky objected to this order and protested against its implementation. Before any settlement of this dispute was reached, an issue of far greater importance arose. In late April 1806, the Porte requested that Russia cease sending its armed vessels and troop transports through the Straits. The Turks claimed that the Russians had the right to use the Straits only in the event of a general and defensive war. They argued that Russia was compromising Turkey's neutrality by using the Straits for offensive purposes. Italinsky rejected this interpretation and for the moment the Turks
limited their actions to friendly requests. No attempt was made to prevent Russian ships from using the Straits. Italinsky noted a growing independence in the manner in which the Porte treated Russia. However, the actions of the Porte coincided with the period in which Alexander had decided to secure peace with France through the Oubril mission. Alexander's intention of following a pacific foreign policy also applied to the Near East. The tsar hoped to settle problems in Russian-Ottoman relations through diplomacy. In an effort to remove one possible source of friction, Alexander sought to obtain a peaceful settlement of the Serbian revolt through Austro-Russian mediation. However, the Porte politely declined any attempt at foreign mediation in its internal affairs.  

Italinsky interpreted the Porte's actions as an indication of Turkey's fear of France. He proposed that Russia and England make a suitable demonstration of their military strength in an effort to counteract the rise of French influence. Italinsky advocated the use of threats in dealing with the Porte. He advised Czartoryski that the Porte would

interpret Russia's moderation as weakness. Italinsky believed that if threats failed, Russia should use force against the Turks. Czartoryski basically agreed with Italinsky's arguments. He wanted the British government to send a large fleet to the eastern Mediterranean in an effort to intimidate the Porte. The British ambassador in Constantinople had already requested British warships but the commander of British naval forces in the Mediterranean, Vice Admiral Lord Collingwood, had refused because he lacked sufficient ships. Alexander refused to adopt Italinsky's proposals. In June 1806 Czartoryski informed Italinsky that the tsar realized the wisdom of his suggestions but felt that it was not the proper time to implement them. The tsar believed that delay was necessary because of the uncertainty of European affairs and the need to prepare Russia's land and sea forces so that they would be ready to support Italinsky. Czartoryski assured the ambassador that the tsar would issue the necessary orders to the appropriate military commanders. For the present, Italinsky was to avoid any unnecessary confrontations with the Porte and adopt a middle ground in his dealings with the Turks. It would be necessary to display neither too much weakness nor too much hostility toward the Turks. The Russian foreign minister

predicted that Napoleon would soon present the Porte with an ultimatum on the question of Russia's use of the Straits and other matters. If the Porte refused the French demands, Napoleon would declare war against the Ottoman Empire. The sultan would then have to request Russian and British assistance. If the Porte yielded to French threats, Russia would not be in immediate danger. Czartoryski pointed out that it would be difficult for France to provide sufficient aid to the Turks to allow them to wage war successfully against Russia. Czartoryski surmised that the Turks wanted to utilize the French to extricate themselves from their treaty obligations to Russia. However, before the tsar would undertake the aggressive measures which Italinsky proposed, he wanted to attempt diplomatic persuasion to prevent the Porte from yielding to France.  

The Russian government responded differently to each challenge to its privileges in the Ottoman Empire. When St. Petersburg learned that the Porte might depose the rulers of the Principalities, there was a swift reaction. Czartoryski referred to the Porte's hatti sharif of 1802 which provided

for a seven year term for the hospodars. He authorized Italinsky to warn the Porte against removing the hospodars prior to the expiration of this seven year period. Any attempt to remove them would force Alexander to take appropriate measures to defend the privileges of Moldavia and Wallachia. Czartoryski declared that the Turks misunderstood Alexander's moderation. In response to the Porte's request that Russian military vessels cease using the Straits, Czartoryski expressed surprise that the Porte should even make such a proposal. The foreign minister noted that in view of Turkey's other unfriendly actions, Russia would have to examine whether the Porte was planning to break with Russia and renew its old alliance with France. Czartoryski instructed Italinsky to explain that Russia used the Straits and its position in the Ionian Islands to protect the Ottoman Empire. The foreign minister stated that Alexander had consistently avoided any action which could cause the Porte embarrassment or lead to unnecessary problems for the sultan. However, Czartoryski affirmed that Alexander would continue to insist on the rights he had been guaranteed in treaties. If the tsar wished to send additional troops or ships through the Straits, he would do so. Czartoryski added that Alexander was certain that the Porte would not violate its treaty commitments since this would amount to a renunciation of the friendship existing between the two empires. Alexander was willing to compromise on the question
of the berats. Czartoryski informed Italinsky that the tsar had no desire to become embroiled with an ally over an issue as unimportant as the berats. Czartoryski acknowledged that the Turks were justified in many of their complaints regarding the berats and other abuses. He suggested that the Porte establish a commission which would include a representative named by Italinsky. This commission could settle the disputes regarding the berats and the right of ships to sail under the Russian flag. Thus, in the principal disputes with the Porte, Russia took a generally firm position but displayed some willingness to compromise. This moderate stand reflected Alexander's views much more than it represented those of Czartoryski. However, by the end of June 1806 Alexander had replaced Czartoryski and the most important problem that soon faced the Russian government was the question of whether to accept or reject Oubril's treaty.¹²

While Oubril was negotiating in Paris and Italinsky's influence in Constantinople was being challenged, a series of events was taking place which would have important repercussions for the Near East. In St. Petersburg, Baron Andrei Gotthard Budberg replaced Czartoryski as Minister of Foreign

¹²Vneshniaia politika Rossii, Vol. III, No. 67, Czartoryski to Italinsky, May 16/28, 1806, pp. 179-180; No. 72, Czartoryski to Italinsky, June 1/13, 1806, pp. 189-191; No. 80, Czartoryski to Italinsky, June 17/29, 1806, pp. 205-207.
Affairs. At the same time, Russia was drawing closer to Prussia and Napoleon was completing his plans for the reorganization of Germany. The replacement of Czartoryski by Budberg did not institute any extensive changes in Russia's Near Eastern policy. On the contrary, many of the policies which Budberg followed were identical to those which Czartoryski had been advocating for years. Budberg's Near Eastern policy was certainly not inclined to be pacific. Even before Oubril's return, Budberg had expressed skepticism regarding France's intention of concluding a lasting peace. Budberg believed that France was using the negotiations to hide continued French aggression in the Adriatic. Like Czartoryski, Budberg believed that it would be better for Russia to abandon Italy to Napoleon and seek to get him to yield Istria and Dalmatia. The new foreign minister declared that Russia's interests could never permit any arrangement which

13 Baron Andrei Gotthard (Iakovlevich) Budberg (1750-1812) had had only limited diplomatic experience. He had been a general in the Russian army and had served for a short time as ambassador to Sweden. Budberg had been one of Alexander's tutors but following Alexander's accession had held no important governmental positions. Budberg was a man of mediocre ability who recognized his own shortcomings. He had been extremely reluctant to accept the position of foreign minister. "There seems to be no better explanation for the appointment than the emperor's desire for a clean break with his former advisers of the Secret Committee, for a fresh start with a man unassociated with early domestic difficulties and recent foreign failures, who had no predetermined policies for Russia." See Grimsted, Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, pp. 151-154. Russkii biograficheskii slovar', Vol. III, pp. 431-435.
left France as a neighbor of the Ottoman Empire. Russia could never abandon its position in the Ionian Islands. Budberg believed that the recent actions of the Porte indicated that the French were winning the battle for diplomatic supremacy in Constantinople. He assumed that the Turks intended to eliminate all Russian influence as soon as they thought they could do so with French aid. Budberg advised the tsar to begin making military preparations so that Russia would be prepared to employ military measures to prevent the Turks from yielding completely to French demands.

Oubril returned to St. Petersburg immediately after signing the treaty with France. Russian diplomats both in Russia and abroad condemned his work. In Britain both Stroganov and Simon Vorontsov were shocked and dismayed by the terms of the treaty. Stroganov had been negotiating with the British on the possibility of abandoning Sicily in return for the creation of a buffer state to protect the Ottoman Empire. The British had not rejected this idea but were reluctant to abandon Sicily and wanted more details on the plan. Before Stroganov could obtain further clarification, Oubril had signed the treaty. Stroganov referred to

Oubril's action as "shameful" and a sacrifice of Russia's honor. He told the British that Oubril had acted contrary to his instructions and he assured the British government that Alexander would reject the treaty. Simon Vorontsov regarded Oubril's actions as treason. However, Vorontsov feared that Alexander's weakness might lead him to ratify the treaty. Oubril defended his treaty by citing the need to secure Austria's safety and obtain rest for Russia. He also believed his treaty would protect the Ottoman Empire from a French attack.¹⁵

On his arrival in St. Petersburg, Oubril had received a friendly reception from the tsar but most Russian statesmen were hostile to him. Alexander may have favored either accepting the treaty or at least using it as the basis for further negotiations. However, in view of the sharp reaction against the peace agreement, Alexander decided to submit the treaty to a Council of State.¹⁶ After considering

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¹⁶It is difficult to determine Oubril's motives for
Oubril's written instructions and comparing them with the peace he had signed, the council advised the tsar to reject the treaty. Budberg observed that the only advantage of Oubril's treaty was the provision for French evacuation of Germany. He noted that the treaty contained numerous disadvantages, particularly in regard to the Near East. He believed that by leaving France in control of Dalmatia and Cattaro, Russia would be abandoning the Ottoman Empire to France. Napoleon would be free to intimidate the Ottoman

signing the peace treaty. On his return to St. Petersburg, Oubril privately told friends that Alexander had given him secret oral instructions to obtain a peace at any cost. Many secondary works accept Oubril's version. However, Czartoryski remarked that Oubril's story did not correspond to what Oubril had told him prior to leaving for Paris. Furthermore, before returning to Russia, Oubril acknowledged to Stroganov and Razumovsky that he had exceeded his instructions and was returning to Russia to defend his actions. It appears that Oubril had accurately perceived Alexander's strong desire for peace. However, the tsar probably expected better terms than those that Oubril obtained. See Mikhailovich, Stroganov, Vol. II, No. 184, Czartoryski to Stroganov, August 9/21, 1806, p. 249. Sbornik, Vol. LXXXII, No. 152, Budberg to Oubril, September 26/October 8, 1806, pp. 466-467; No. 154, Oubril to Budberg, October 9/21, 1806, pp. 469-471. Wassilitchikow, Les Razoumowski, Vol. II, Part II, p. 377. Kukiel, Czartoryski and European Unity, p. 76. Mouravieff, L'alliance russo-turque, pp. 183-184. Waliszewski, La Russie il y a cent ans, p. 188. Constantin de Grunwald, Alexandre Ier, le tsar mystique (Paris, 1955), p. 155.
government and thereby gain a predominant influence in Turkey. Budberg declared that such a situation would be contrary to Russia's national interests. He believed that the Turks were awaiting the outcome of events in Europe before deciding whether they would support Russia or France. Furthermore, he noted that if Russia surrendered its positions on the Adriatic coast, it would be leaving the Montenegrins and the inhabitants of Cattaro to face Napoleon's wrath. Not only would Russia lose the support of these people forever, but also the Greeks and Slavs of European Turkey would note the consequences of supporting Russia. Rather than being able to count on the loyalty of the Christians of European Turkey as it now could, Russia would find that these people had become its enemies. Budberg concluded that the evacuation of Germany was inadequate compensation for Russia's numerous losses. On the advice of his council and his foreign minister, the tsar rejected the treaty and Oubril was banished to his estates. Budberg notified Talleyrand that Russia had rejected Oubril's treaty but was prepared to resume negotiations. Budberg stated that Alexander did not believe that any peace with France could be durable while France retained its position as a neighbor of the Ottoman Empire. Russia also refused to sign any peace which did not include England. In addition to rejecting the treaty, Alexander ordered Seniavin to disregard Oubril's instructions and to continue to hold his positions in the
Adriatic. Budberg notified Stroganov of Russia's rejection of the treaty and informed him that Russia was beginning a new levy of troops. The Russian government began a new effort to win Prussia to the side of the allies and Budberg instructed Stroganov to attempt to get Britain to settle its differences with Prussia.17

In the summer of 1806 French activities in Germany and in the Near East forced Alexander to adopt a more active foreign policy. In July 1806, as a result of negotiations that had been underway for some time, Russia and Prussia agreed to a reciprocal declaration in which Prussia stated that its alliance with France did not abrogate its alliance with Russia. Prussia declared that it would not attack Russia if the Russians became embroiled in a war with France over the Ottoman Empire. The agreement with Prussia allowed the Russian government to take a stronger stand in dealing with the Ottoman Empire. Russia decided it would be necessary to begin to counter the French moves in the Near East. When Napoleon appointed a special representative to reside in the Principalities, the tsar responded by appointing an

agent of equal rank. Budberg instructed Italinsky to ascer-
tain the true sentiments of the Porte. He noted that the
Ottoman government continued to take no action to oppose the
French moves in Dalmatia. On the contrary, the Porte was
obstructing Russia's efforts to defend the Ottoman Empire.
Budberg observed that normally the unfriendly actions of the
Turks might have led the tsar to abandon the Porte to its
fate. Budberg warned, however, that Alexander could not re-
main a passive spectator to the dissolution of the Ottoman
Empire because this would threaten his own empire and the
Ionian Republic. Budberg authorized Italinsky to present a
note to the Ottoman government carefully detailing all of
Russia's complaints. Italinsky was to assure the Turks that
Alexander would fulfill all his treaty commitments to the
Porte. In return the tsar asked only that the sultan ob-
serve Turkey's treaty obligations. Budberg instructed
Italinsky to avoid giving the Turks any just grounds for
complaint since the tsar still hoped for a peaceful resolu-
tion of his problems with the Porte. However, Budberg told
Italinsky to reject any attempt by Turkey to get Russia to
evacuate the Ionian Islands. The tsar would consider such
a request as an indication of the Porte's intention to break
with Russia. Budberg added that the tsar would also be ex-
tremely displeased if the Porte attempted to violate the
1802 agreement regarding the Principalities. Italinsky was
authorized to oppose firmly and energetically any attempt
to remove the hospodars. Budberg acknowledged that, as a result of the Porte's actions, a Russo-Turkish war might become inevitable. However, he cautioned Italinsky that Alexander did not want to provoke a conflict and did not want to appear to be the aggressor. Despite the tsar's desire to follow a policy of moderation, he had decided to reinforce the army stationed on the Dniester. This army would now total 120,000 men and, for the moment, was intended solely to defend the Porte. Budberg warned, however, that Alexander might be forced to employ these forces to compel the Ottoman government to fulfill its treaty obligations.\(^\text{18}\)

In Constantinople, the problems which Italinsky had been predicting soon developed. The Porte renewed its objections to Russia's military use of the Straits. Italinsky insisted that Russia exercised this right by virtue of its recent treaty of alliance with the Porte. The Turks continued to protest but they did not attempt to prevent the passage of the Russian ships. The Russian ambassador's demands on other matters no longer achieved the results he

once could have expected. When Italinsky complained that the actions of Ali Pasha violated the rights of the former Venetian towns in Albania, he received no real satisfaction. Both Italinsky and the British ambassador, Arbuthnot, believed that the Turks were preparing to abandon their ties with Russia. They surmised that the Turks hoped to end their onerous treaty obligations to Russia through friendship with France. However, the Sultan wanted to move slowly to be sure that Napoleon had abandoned his former designs on Turkish territory. Sébastiani's arrival in Constantinople in August 1806 added to Russia's problems. Sébastiani utilized the terms of the Oubril treaty to win favor with the Turks. He showed the Ottoman government the clause in the treaty which guaranteed Turkey's independence and territorial integrity. Italinsky learned that the Ottoman ministry believed that it could use this clause to free the Ottoman Empire from its obligations to Russia. Italinsky had thought that the Turks would wait to see if Alexander ratified the treaty before they took any rash action. However, he soon learned that the Ottoman government was planning to depose the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia. There were many reasons for Turkey's decision to replace the hospodars including the simple motive of greed since new appointees customarily distributed generous gifts to government officials. However, a far more serious reason was the sultan's desire to reassert Ottoman independence and at
the same time remove two men whom he suspected of having treasonous relations with the Serbs and possibly with the Russians. The Ottoman government wanted to depose the hospodars before Sébastiani could officially demand their removal. Italinsky had learned that the new hospodars would be men who favored France. In informing Budberg of these developments, Italinsky referred to his numerous warnings in the past. He noted that although he had favored strong action, he had only been authorized to protest or to reason with the Porte. Italinsky believed that the removal of the hospodars would only be the first step. He warned that the Turks would soon abolish all of Russia's treaty rights. Italinsky requested instructions on the manner in which he should respond to the removal of the hospodars. His own recommendation was that as soon as the Porte announced the deposition of the hospodars, Russian troops should occupy both Principalities. Italinsky's suggestion was too late. In a postscript, the ambassador notified Budberg that the sultan had just deposed the hospodar of Moldavia, Prince Alexander Morousi. The hospodar of Wallachia, Prince Konstantin Ypsilanti, was to be removed from office the next day.  

One serious difficulty in Russian-Ottoman relations was the time involved in the transmission of dispatches between St. Petersburg and Constantinople. Normally, a dispatch would take from three to four weeks to go from one capital to the other. Thus, if Italinsky requested instructions, it would usually take between six and eight weeks to receive them. In the early years of Alexander's reign this delay had usually not been too serious since few problems needing immediate attention had arisen. Tomara and Italinsky had acted relatively independently following the general guidelines they received from St. Petersburg. However, following the reprimand which Italinsky had received for his strong protest of Turkey's recognition of Napoleon's titles, the Russian ambassador acted with greater caution. Italinsky's initial reaction to the deposition of the hospodars was fairly mild. A few days after their removal he had received Budberg's note which authorized him to protest the recent unfriendly actions of the Porte. Italinsky followed Budberg's instructions and presented the Porte with a detailed description of the various Russian grievances against the Ottoman Empire. The Russian ambassador specifically noted Turkish violations of Russia's commercial rights, the conduct of Ali Pasha, the various disputes relating to the Principalities, the question of Russia's use of the Straits and the Porte's failure to renew its alliance with England. Italinsky told the Turks that their actions disturbed the
tsar and made him suspicious of Turkey's true sentiments. He warned the Porte that Alexander regarded any Turkish violation of existing treaties between Russia and the Ottoman Empire "as a manifest intention of breaking with him."

Italinsky added that the tsar hoped that the Porte would reverse its policy and return to an attitude of friendship with Russia. He informed the Turks that in order to be prepared to assist the Porte against any aggression, Russia was augmenting its forces stationed on the Dniester. Italinsky stated that the sole reason for these troops was to aid the Turks and Alexander would regret being forced to employ them against the Ottoman Empire. Italinsky informed the Porte that the tsar expected a prompt written response to the various points mentioned in the note. Italinsky observed that the tsar had not anticipated the removal of the hospodars in violation of Turkey's agreements with Russia. He warned the Turks that he had notified the tsar who would take appropriate measures. While Italinsky was awaiting instructions, he called on the Ottoman government to delay sending the new hospodars to the Principalities. 20

Italinsky and Arbuthnot agreed that only the use of threats supported by force would cause the Turks to return

to a policy favorable to Russia. Both ambassadors believed that the Turks would support the side that represented the greatest danger to the Ottoman Empire. They observed that since Austerlitz the Ottoman government had concluded that France was the country most capable of harming Turkey. The ambassadors urged their governments to act vigorously to prevent further French gains at the Porte. Italinsky warned Budberg that the issue of the hospodars was linked directly to the tsar's dignity. He expressed the opinion that the restoration of the hospodars would have to be a sine qua non condition in negotiating with the Turks. Italinsky advised the Russian government to adopt strong measures to counter the growing influence of Sébastiani. 21

Even before news of the deposition of the hospodars reached St. Petersburg, Alexander had decided to pursue a more active policy in the Near East. In addition to increasing the number of troops stationed on Turkey's borders, Alexander finally agreed to send reinforcements to aid Seniavin in the Adriatic. When news of the removal of the hospodars reached the tsar, he acknowledged that force might be necessary. The tsar ordered General Michelson to be prepared to enter the Principalities. Budberg informed

Italinsky that the tsar's patience had reached its limits. The foreign minister added that regardless of what motives the Turkish government alleged for its actions, it was clear that the Porte had misunderstood Alexander's moderation. Budberg instructed Italinsky to make one final offer of conciliation. The ambassador was to present the Porte with a note detailing all the Russian grievances against the Turks. Budberg mentioned particularly the Porte's manifest intention of evading "the only interesting point" of Russia's alliance with the Porte, the use of the Straits by Russian warships and troop transports. Italinsky was also to emphasize Alexander's extreme displeasure at the removal of the hospodars. The tsar demanded that the sultan reinstate both hospodars immediately and allow them to serve the remainder of their terms of office. Budberg declared that Alexander would accept no delay and no evasion on the question of restoring the hospodars. If the Porte agreed to reinstate them, Italinsky was then to work for the complete restoration of all of Russia's rights. If the Porte refused or was evasive, Italinsky was to request passports for himself and the entire Russian mission with the exception of the Russian Counselor of State, Joseph Ponton. Italinsky was to leave Ponton as chargé d' affaires. Budberg informed Italinsky that the Russian government didn't have much hope that his representations would succeed. The foreign minister believed that the Turks would either refuse to comply or would
delay and thereby force Italinsky to leave Constantinople. Budberg stated that Italinsky's departure did not necessarily mean that war between Russia and Turkey would inevitably follow. However, he advised the ambassador to make preparations to transport the embassy's archives and his own effects to a Black Sea port. 22

In Constantinople the influence of Sébastiani continued to increase. After according the French ambassador a magnificent reception, the Turks continued to show him extraordinary marks of friendship and courtesy. Sébastiani proposed an offensive and defensive alliance of France, the Ottoman Empire and Persia but Selim was reluctant to commit himself to such an agreement. The Turks delayed giving Italinsky the written response he had requested. However, the news of Russia's rejection of the Oubril treaty was a matter of some concern to the Turks. Sébastiani declared that the tsar had not ratified the treaty because it included a guarantee of the independence of the Ionian Islands. The French ambassador charged that Russia intended to use the islands as a base from which to attack the Ottoman Empire. He also claimed that the Russians wanted to maintain their positions in the Adriatic as a means of contact with

22 Vneshniaia politika Rossii, Vol. III, Nos. 117 and 118, Budberg to Italinsky, August 26/September 7, 1806, pp. 300-304; Footnote No. 175, p. 701.
the Montenegrins and the Serbs. According to Sébastiani, the primary reason for Russia's rejection of the peace treaty was the inclusion of a guarantee of Turkey's independence and territorial integrity. Now that it was clear that Russia and France were still enemies, Sébastiani warned the Turks that Napoleon expected more than friendly gestures from the Porte. At the very least, the French emperor demanded the Porte's strict neutrality. Sébastiani charged that by allowing the Russians to use the Straits for military purposes, the Ottoman Empire was violating its neutrality and committing an act of hostility against France. If the Porte continued to permit this, it would have to grant France a reciprocal right by allowing French troops to cross the Ottoman Empire to attack the Russians on the Dniester. Furthermore, Sébastiani warned that if the Porte renewed its alliance with England or continued its alliance with Russia, it would also be violating its neutrality. Napoleon would then have to consider the Porte as a participant in the war against him. The French ambassador declared that Napoleon had formed the French army in Dalmatia to protect the Porte. However, this army could also be used to attack Turkey. Sébastiani demanded a prompt and precise response from the Porte on the various matters he had raised. The Porte thus faced almost identical threats from the French and the Russians. Placed in this difficult position, the Turks attempted to follow their usual policy of tergiversation.
The Ottoman government privately assured both sides of its friendship. However, this policy was little more than an expedient since both Italinsky and Sébastiani expected a written response to their demands.°

When Italinsky did not receive a response from the Ottoman ministry, he wrote directly to the sultan. The Russian ambassador stated that since he had not received an answer to his previous complaints, he would have to assume that the Porte had yielded completely to the French demands. Italinsky pointed out that the French army in Dalmatia could not exceed 20,000 men. Russia, however, had an army of 120,000 men stationed on the Dniester and could count on the support of the British naval forces in the Mediterranean. Italinsky declared that Russia and Britain would consider any further condescension to France or any attempt to violate existing treaties as a breach of their alliance with Turkey. He warned that Alexander would respond by sending his army across the Ottoman Empire to attack the French in Dalmatia. Italinsky advised the sultan that his response to the Russian demands would determine "the destiny of the Ottoman Empire." If no answer was immediately forthcoming, 

Italinsky said that he would inform his court and the tsar would take the necessary actions. Italinsky's stern warnings were vigorously supported by Arbuthnot. Nonetheless, the Ottoman government still refused to reinstate the deposed hospodars. At the end of September, Italinsky notified the Porte that unless Turkey yielded to Russia's demands, he would leave Constantinople. He stated that he had precise orders that would not permit any further discussion. The Porte would have to reinstate the hospodars immediately. Arbuthnot warned the Porte that if war broke out between Russia and Turkey, Britain would almost certainly support Russia. Although the British ambassador tried to mediate Russian-Ottoman differences, Italinsky rejected any compromise on the subject of restoring the hospodars. Italinsky began preparing to leave Constantinople but he agreed to remain for a short time while Arbuthnot tried to persuade the Turks to yield. Arbuthnot threatened to summon the British fleet to support Russia. He informed the Porte that a new coalition was being formed in Europe and Napoleon would be unable to help Turkey. Faced by the prospect of a Russian invasion and British naval attacks, the Turks capitulated. On October 16, 1806, the sultan reinstated Ypsilanti as hospodar of Wallachia and on the following day he restored Morousi as hospodar of Moldavia. It appeared that Russia had won an important diplomatic victory in its efforts to
prevent the Porte from defecting to the French.  

Events in Europe and in the Near East were forcing Alexander to reconsider and gradually abandon his strictly defensive foreign policy. The tsar began to believe that the recent actions of Turkey were proving that the advice of Czartoryski, Budberg and Italinsky had been sound. They had all advocated a display of force to convince the Porte that Russia was prepared to fight to maintain its treaty rights. The tsar now saw the possibility of Russia's southern borders being menaced at the same time that the hostilities between France and Prussia were likely to involve his armies in Europe. The Russian government probably had little expectation that the Turks would yield to Russia's demands. However, Alexander postponed ordering Michelson to enter the Principalities. When no response had been received from Constantinople within what was judged to be a reasonable period, the tsar ordered Michelson to begin the occupation of the Principalities. The Russians maintained that their

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25 Budberg later claimed that the Russian government had calculated that a response to its ultimatum should reach St. Petersburg by October 1/13, 1806. However, Italinsky did not receive the authorization to issue the ultimatum until
objectives in crossing into Turkish territory were to reestablish their former rights in the Ottoman Empire, to combat the predominant French influence at the Porte and to prevent a French army from crossing Turkey to attack Russia. Eight days after Alexander had ordered Michelson to invade the Principalities, a dispatch arrived from Italinsky informing the tsar that the hospodars had been reinstated. Nonetheless, Alexander had decided on his course of action and would not revoke the orders to General Michelson. According to Budberg, Italinsky's dispatches describing the recent events in Constantinople demonstrated that merely reinstating the hospodars would not suffice. Budberg rebuked Italinsky for limiting himself to the matter of the hospodars. Although the tsar had insisted on an immediate settlement of this issue, Budberg noted that Alexander was concerned primarily

September 17/29, 1806. Even if the Porte had complied immediately, the Russian government could not have received an answer by October 1/13. The orders to invade the Principalities were dated October 16/28. If the Turks had given an immediate response as the Russians demanded, the Russian government would have received word of this well before the orders were sent to Michelson. It would appear, however, that Alexander had already decided to invade the Principalities. The Russians wanted to move quickly so that the Turks would not have time to prepare effective resistance. In any case, the tsar and his foreign minister probably realized that they would not receive a completely satisfactory response. However, they wanted to make it appear that they had exhausted every effort to achieve a peaceful settlement of their dispute with the Porte.
with obtaining satisfactory assurances regarding the Porte's attitude toward Russia. The fact that the Turks had yielded so reluctantly and in only one instance was not an adequate guarantee for Russia. Budberg added that the Principalities were beset by new disorders. Since the Porte lacked the means and the will to restore order in Moldavia and Wallachia, Russia's troops would reestablish tranquillity in these provinces. Budberg declared that Alexander could not be sure of the Porte's friendship until the Turks had satisfied all of Russia's grievances. The foreign minister observed that the Porte's recent objections to Russia's use of the Straits for its military vessels was a matter of particular concern to the tsar. Alexander regarded these objections as clear evidence that the Porte had submitted to French influence. In order to be certain that the Ottoman government would no longer object to Russia's use of the Straits, the tsar would require a solemn declaration by the Porte that it would never violate this right under any pretext. Alexander also demanded that the Porte renew its alliance with England. Until these demands were met, the Russian army would continue to occupy the Principalities. Budberg still claimed that Russia had no hostile motive in occupying Ottoman territory. He argued that the Russian presence in the Principalities could even benefit the Porte since Russia would now be in a better position to aid the sultan against a French invasion. Budberg admitted to Italinsky
that Russia held out little hope for a change in the attitude of the Ottoman government. The foreign minister cited Italinsky's own dispatches which had been insisting that only force would succeed in reestablishing Russia's influence in Constantinople. Budberg noted that the current European situation required most of Alexander's attention and he did not want to have to worry about the Turks. The tsar could never be certain of the Ottoman Empire so long as the French exercised a dominant influence in Constantinople. Budberg added that the Russian army could not risk an attack on its rear or its flank while it was fighting Napoleon in the West. In any case, Russia could no longer tolerate the existing state of uncertainty which required the maintenance of a large Russian army on Turkey's borders.  

The Russian occupation of the Principalities caused serious international repercussions. The Russian government defended its action in a circular note to the diplomatic corps in St. Petersburg. In this note Budberg listed the numerous Russian grievances against the Ottoman Empire. He stated that the Russian occupation was justified by Alexander's need to protect his frontiers. Budberg also noted

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that the tsar wished to restore order in the Principalities and to frustrate the hostile plans of France. The note claimed that the invasion was not intended to destroy the Ottoman Empire but rather to force the Turks to return to their alliance with Russia. Despite Budberg's reassurances, the invasion of the Principalities was a matter of great concern to Russia's allies. Napoleon's rapid advances against the Prussians led both Prussia and England to warn Russia of the danger of involving itself in a war on two fronts. The Prussians particularly wanted Russia to commit all its forces against Napoleon. In October 1806 the armies of Napoleon had rapidly defeated Prussia's armies and had occupied Berlin before Russia could aid its Prussian ally. Despite Prussia's dire situation, Alexander refused to withdraw his forces from the Principalities. The British also would have preferred to see Russia concentrate its efforts against Napoleon. Furthermore, the British government did

27 N. K. Shilder (ed.), Posol'stvo grafa P. A. Tolstago v Parizhie v 1807 i 1808 gg.: Ot Til'zita do Erfurta (The Embassy of Count P. A. Tolstoi in Paris in 1807 and 1808: From Tilsit to Erfurt) (Published in Vol. LXXXIX of Sbornik imperatorskago russkago istoricheskago obshchestva, St. Petersburg, 1893), Part IV, No. VIII, "Circular Note Communicated to the Diplomatic Corps at the Court of St. Petersburg On the Occasion of the Entry of Russian Troops into Moldavia and Wallachia," October 23/November 4, 1806, pp. 127-131. Future references to this work will be cited as Sbornik, Vol. LXXXIX.
not want to see Turkey weakened any further. The British decided, however, that their alliance with Russia was the most important consideration. Britain worked to prevent a formal declaration of war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The British foreign minister, Lord Howick, decided to send a British naval force to the Dardanelles to force the Porte to yield to Russia's demands. Howick instructed Arbuthnot to support the Russian cause and to demand the expulsion of Sébastiani. While England and Prussia had an indirect interest in wanting an end to the occupation of the Principalities, the country most concerned by Russia's action was Austria. The Austrians were becoming increasingly suspicious of Russia's activities in the Near East. Austria's relations with Russia had not been especially friendly since the seizure of Cattaro. Russian forces still occupied this province despite numerous promises by the Russian government to return it. Austria was apprehensive about Russia's ties with the Serbian rebels. The Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg reported rumors that Russia was promoting an insurrection of all the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. The ambassador noted that this could endanger Austria which also had Orthodox subjects. The Austrian government suspected that Russia might be planning to partition the Ottoman Empire. In its weakened condition, Austria would be unable to benefit from such a partition and consequently supported the territorial integrity of the Ottoman
Empire. The Austrians protested strongly against Russia's occupation of the Principalities. Although they refused French offers for an Austro-French alliance against Russia, the Austrians did sign a convention with France promising to employ an Austrian army to help recapture Cattaro. Actually, the Austrians limited their actions to negotiating with Seniavin. The Austrians rejected Russia's attempts to get Austria to join the new coalition against Napoleon.28

Following the Russian invasion of the Principalities, the situation in Constantinople was rather confused. Italinsky had thought that the restoration of the hospodars would end the plans to invade Moldavia and Wallachia. He had not received any explanation from St. Petersburg as to why General Michelson had proceeded with the invasion. Italinsky had to work with Arbuthnot to prevent the Porte from immediately declaring war on Russia. The Turks postponed a decision on a formal declaration of war largely

Because they feared Arbuthnot's threat to summon the British fleet to attack Constantinople. The Turks also waited to see whether the Russian government would cease its occupation of the Principalities. The effect of Russia's actions and Britain's threats was soon offset by news of Napoleon's brilliant success against the Prussians. In notifying the sultan of his victories, Napoleon promised to continue fighting until Russia restored the Principalities to the Porte. Napoleon urged the sultan to declare war against Russia and to win back the provinces that the Ottoman Empire had lost to Russia in previous wars. The French victories greatly impressed the Turks. Selim notified Napoleon that he was sending a special ambassador to negotiate an alliance with France. The sultan declared that he was assembling all his forces and making all the necessary preparations to oppose the Russians. By the middle of December, despite some divisions within the Ottoman government, the Turks had finally decided on war with Russia. After some further vacillation, the Ottoman government ordered Italinsky and his staff to leave Constantinople. On December 27, 1806 the Ottoman Empire issued a formal declaration of war against Russia. The Turks began preparations to drive the Russians from Ottoman territory. However, Sébastiani advised his government not to rely on the Turkish army. The French ambassador doubted that the Turks would achieve much success against the Russians. Sébastiani believed that at best the
Turkish armies might be a useful diversion for Napoleon since the Turks would tie down a large Russian army.\textsuperscript{29}

The Russian armies had begun their occupation of Ottoman territory in November and had met little resistance. By the end of 1806, the Russians controlled most of Moldavia, Wallachia and Bessarabia. General Michelson issued a proclamation declaring that Russia was occupying the Principalities to protect the Ottoman Empire from France. At the same time, the Russian government began aiding the Serbian rebels with money and military advisers. However, assisting the Serbs was only a secondary objective of the invasion. Alexander had become convinced that force was necessary to prevent the French from gaining absolute ascendancy in Constantinople. Furthermore, the threat of an attack against Russia's southern provinces by French and Turkish armies was a matter of great concern to the tsar. Returning to a theme

that Czartoryski had often stressed, Alexander insisted that the Dniester was a poor line of defense. The tsar rejected all suggestions that he cease his operations against the Turks and concentrate his forces against Napoleon. Alexander noted that in view of the Porte's obvious subservience to France and its long-standing hatred of Russia, he would still have to leave a large army on the Dniester if he withdrew from the Principalities. Budberg strongly encouraged the tsar's resolute policy toward the Turks. He insisted that the mere restoration of the hospodars was not a sufficient reason to halt the occupation of the Principalities. Budberg, like his predecessors in the foreign ministry, believed that the Ottoman Empire was gradually disintegrating and could collapse at any time. He argued that because of Turkey's extreme weakness it had to submit to the exclusive influence of the country that represented the greatest danger to it. Until the Treaty of Pressburg, that country had been Russia. However, once France became a neighbor of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks had counted on Russian moderation and inactivity and had yielded to French influence. Budberg asserted that Russia's security required it to maintain an exclusive and preponderant influence in Constantinople. He recommended that the tsar accept nothing less than the complete return of the Porte to a system of close alliance with Russia. Until Russia could be certain of the Porte's loyalty, the Russian armies should continue to occupy the
Principalities. Budberg argued that by remaining in the Principalities Russia could regain its exclusive influence at the Porte, keep hostilities away from Russia's own frontiers and have the means of cultivating the friendship of the Serbs and the other Christians of European Turkey. Budberg's arguments echoed the logic that Czartoryski had often employed in trying to persuade Alexander to adopt an active policy in the Near East. The views of Budberg adequately reflected the ideas that the tsar had gradually come to accept. Alexander had followed a policy based on friendship and alliance with the Ottoman Empire. Even the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war did not mean that Alexander had completely reversed his Near Eastern policy. Once the tsar had become convinced that the French diplomatic triumphs at the Porte represented a potential threat to Russia, he had decided to act. Alexander was determined to reestablish Russia's paramount position in Constantinople since he regarded this as the surest way to protect the southern provinces of the Russian Empire.

CHAPTER VI

TILSIT AND THE NEAR EAST

Alexander had authorized the invasion of Moldavia and Wallachia as a defensive measure. The tsar insisted that Russia could not tolerate French diplomatic supremacy in Constantinople. If the Turks would renounce their French ties and restore Russia's treaty rights, the tsar would evacuate the Principalities. The actions which Russia undertook against the Porte in the first half of 1807 were aimed primarily at defending Russia's southern provinces and at forcing the Porte to return to its exclusive reliance on Russia.

In terms of overall military strategy, Alexander's policies always emphasized Russia's European theater of war. The Russian army that invaded the Principalities consisted of only 30,000 troops. The great majority of Russia's forces were committed against Napoleon. Budberg suggested a plan for Russia's war against the Ottoman Empire.¹ His

plan emphasized a holding action by Russia's forces in the Principalities using the defensive positions afforded by the Danube. Budberg's proposed strategy relied on economy of forces and full utilization of available resources without weakening the main effort against Napoleon. The foreign minister advised the tsar to seek the assistance of the Slavs of the Ottoman Empire in an effort to encircle the Turks. According to this ambitious strategy, Michelson's forces would link up with the Serbs. Through the Serbs Russia would be placed in contact with the Herzegovinians and Montenegrins and thus with Russia's forces in the Adriatic. Budberg also recommended that Russia should attempt to win the support of the influential pashas of the Danube. To further distract the Turks, Budberg favored encouraging dissent within the sultan's Asiatic provinces. It is important to note, however, that Budberg only wanted to weaken the Ottoman forces facing Russia on the Danube so that Russia could keep a minimal force stationed there. Budberg also advised the tsar to employ Russia's naval forces in an attack on both sides of the Straits. Russia's acting naval

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a war actually existed. It is interesting to note that Budberg devoted a large part of his report to defending Russia's actions in entering the Principalities. He argued that Russia's position on the Danube would provide a better defensive position and require fewer troops. Budberg's lengthy justification of the invasion seems to indicate that Alexander was having some second thoughts about the necessity of having taken the move.
minister, Paul Chichagov, also favored an ambitious plan whereby Russian fleets would conduct a coordinated attack against the Straits. However, Chichagov's plan hinted that Russia should seek to obtain some Turkish territories. Budberg opposed this aspect of Chichagov's proposal.²

The tsar was generally favorable to Budberg's suggestions. Alexander had become convinced that firmness was necessary in dealing with the Turks. The tsar authorized Michelson to effect a juncture with the Serbs. He also ordered Admiral Seniavin to leave a small force in the Adriatic and to take the remainder of his fleet to attack the Dardanelles. In spite of increasing pressure from Austria, the tsar refused to return Cattaro. Budberg informed the Austrians that the tsar believed that Cattaro was too important in view of Russia's war with Turkey and that Alexander would not yield to Austrian threats. Austro-Russian relations were further strained by the infringement of Austrian rights in the Principalities by Russian officials. Budberg promised to rectify the situation. However, he rejected Austria's suggestions that Russia withdraw from

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Moldavia and Wallachia. Budberg repeated that Russia would not leave the Principalities until it had obtained a just redress of all its grievances against the Turks. The Austrians were becoming convinced that Russia intended to use the Porte's recent actions as an excuse to acquire Turkish territory. Both France and the allies attempted to convince Austria to sign an alliance. Napoleon tried to use the Russian occupation of the Principalities as a means of arousing Austrian suspicion. The Russians countered with assurances that they did not intend to retain these Turkish provinces. Despite pressure from both sides, the Austrian government refused to abandon its neutrality and instead worked for the conclusion of a general peace.3

From the beginning of the Russo-Turkish war, the Russian government devoted greater efforts to securing an end to hostilities than it did to pursuing military activities. The Russians believed that they could successfully end the war through diplomacy supported by further military pressure. However, a lack of sufficient military forces and the difficulty of communicating with Russian forces in the Principalities, the Black Sea and the Adriatic severely handicapped

Russia's efforts against the Turks. A coordinated military operation against the Ottoman Empire by Russian land and sea forces proved impossible to carry out. The Russians requested and expected the British to aid them in their attempts to force the Turks to return to their alliance with Russia and Britain. In response to Russian requests, the British sent a fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Sir J. T. Duckworth to the eastern Mediterranean. Duckworth's orders were to support Arbuthnot, the British ambassador, in his efforts to obtain the restoration of the hospodars and to regain Russia's right to use the Straits for its military vessels. Duckworth was to force the Straits and anchor before Constantinople. If the Turks refused to yield to the British demands or if they employed delaying tactics, Duckworth was to attack Constantinople and destroy the Turkish fleet. The British expected Seniavin to cooperate in their expedition.4

In February 1807 the fleet under the command of Duckworth arrived in the vicinity of the Dardanelles where it


joined a smaller British squadron already stationed there. Duckworth found that Arbuthnot was already on board one of the British warships. The ambassador had left Constantinople after the failure of his efforts to frighten the Turks into expelling Sébastiani and renewing their commitments to Russia and England. The arrival of the British fleet was a matter of great concern to the Turks. The defenses of the Dardanelles were in a poor state of repair and Duckworth's fleet was able to enter the Straits virtually unmolested. Contrary to instructions, Arbuthnot and Duckworth conducted lengthy negotiations with the Turks. While the Turks were deliberately temporizing, Sébastiani directed the repair of the defenses of Constantinople and the Straits. French artillerymen arrived from Dalmatia and they helped to repair the defenses of the city. Once the fortifications were completed, the Turks broke off negotiations. Duckworth realized that his position was becoming increasingly dangerous and decided to withdraw. The British succeeded in getting out of the Dardanelles but suffered some losses. More importantly, the British naval demonstration failed to achieve the objectives that both the British and the Russian governments had sought. Sébastiani's influence was further increased and the chances for a rapid conclusion of the Russo-Turkish war by the use of a threat of force were virtually ended. The British action only served to drive the Turks
closer to France.  

The Russian fleet under the command of Admiral Seniavin did not arrive at the Dardanelles until after the British had withdrawn. Before sailing for the Straits, Seniavin had managed to win some support among the Greeks of the Archipelago. Upon his arrival at the Straits, Seniavin proposed that the Russian and British fleets attempt a new attack on Constantinople. Seniavin pointed out that the addition of his ships along with the Russian landing troops he had brought with him would make it possible to force the Straits. Duckworth objected that the Russians lacked a sufficient number of troops and he therefore refused to participate in any renewed attack. The British sailed off to seize Alexandria and Seniavin decided that he could not force the Straits without British aid. The Russians seized the island of Tenedos, captured the city of Salonika and established a blockade of the Dardanelles. Seniavin believed that the

blockade would lead to famine in Constantinople and thus force the Turks to yield. In the spring of 1807, Seniavin's forces achieved some success against the Ottoman fleet. However, the important events relating to Russia's Near Eastern policy took place in Europe and not in the Mediterranean. The failure of Duckworth's expedition made the Russian strategy of forcing the Turks to abandon French influence much more difficult to achieve. However, the tsar had still not abandoned all hope of obtaining his demands through a combination of force and diplomacy.\(^6\)

The Near East became an important center of activity for French diplomacy in the first half of 1807. Napoleon urged the Turks to assume the offensive against the Russians. The French wanted the Turks not only to expel the Russians from the Principalities but also to invade the Crimea and Georgia. In this way the forces facing Napoleon would be weaker. In order to aid the Turks, Napoleon offered to send the sultan whatever assistance he required in the form of arms, munitions or advisers. The French emperor even offered to send an army of 25,000 men to fight the Russians on the Danube. Napoleon proclaimed that France was

fighting for the independence of the Ottoman Empire and Persia. He declared that no European peace would be secure without a guarantee of the independence of these two empires. The French envisioned a concerted effort directed against Russia by France, Turkey and Persia. In order to formalize the ties of these three countries, both the Persians and the Turks sent special representatives to negotiate an alliance with France. Throughout the early months of 1807, Napoleon showed a great deal of interest in Near Eastern affairs. He was particularly pleased by the failure of Duckworth. However, as the French emperor received reports of the poor conditions of the Persian and Turkish armies, his enthusiasm for binding alliances with these countries greatly diminished. Napoleon was further discouraged to learn that the sultan was reluctant to allow any large French army to cross the Ottoman Empire and attack the Russians in the Principalities. As the prospect of making any substantial gains against the Russians or the English through an alliance with Persia or Turkey decreased, Napoleon began giving more thought to concluding an alliance with either Austria or Russia.  

De Testa, Recueil, Vol. II, No. LXXV, Napoleon to Selim III, January 1, 1807, pp. 289-290; No. LXXVI, Napoleon to Selim III, January 20, 1807, p. 290; No. LXXVII, Talleyrand to Sébastiani, January 20, 1807, pp. 290-291; No. LXXVIII, Berthier to Marmont, January 29, 1807, pp. 291-293; No. LXXIX, Napoleon to Talleyrand, p. 293; No. LXXXII,
For Alexander the war against the Ottoman Empire was an annoyance that could become a serious problem if the French joined the Turks on the Danube. The tsar also believed that the war with Turkey was a major reason for Austria's reluctance to join a coalition against France. Attempts to end the hostilities with Turkey on Russia's terms began almost as soon as St. Petersburg learned that the Porte had declared war. In February 1807 the tsar decided to send Colonel K. O. Pozzo di Borgo to negotiate with the Turks. At the time Pozzo was in Vienna where he had been attempting unsuccessfully to convince the Austrians to join the struggle against France. He attributed his lack of success in part to Austria's suspicions and resentment over Russia's invasion of the Principalities. The tsar hoped that Pozzo's new mission to seek peace with Turkey would reassure the Austrians regarding Russia's motives in invading Turkey. Pozzo was to carry a letter from Budberg to the Turkish grand vizier. In this letter Budberg declared that the tsar had invaded the Principalities to protect his frontiers and to force the Turks to fulfill their treaty commitments.

Sébastiani to Talleyrand, February 9, 1807, pp. 296-297; No. LXXXIII, Napoleon to the Senate, February 17, 1807, pp. 297-298; No. LXXXV, Napoleon to Talleyrand, March 3, 1807, p. 298; No. LXXXVII, Napoleon to Talleyrand, March 11, 1807, p. 300. Bertrand, Lettres, No. CCXXV, February 8, 1807, p. 296; No. CCXXXVIII, February 28, 1807, pp. 313-315; No. CCXLIV, March 5, 1807, pp. 325-327; No. CCXLVI, March 8, 1807, pp. 332-335.
Budberg argued that France could never be Turkey's friend. He insisted, however, that Russia was directly interested in the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Budberg asserted that the tsar wanted to reestablish the former ties of friendship and alliance between Russia and Turkey. He noted that Russia's peace terms remained essentially the same. The tsar asked only that the Porte observe its treaties with Russia. Although Alexander was willing to compromise on matters of lesser importance, he insisted on the right of passage through the Straits and on the maintenance of the privileges of the Principalities. In addition, Russia would require adequate assurances that the Turks would continue to respect Russia's treaty rights. Budberg warned the grand vizier that if this effort of conciliation did not succeed, Alexander would have to employ force to obtain satisfaction for his grievances and in this he would be supported by his British ally.®

The departure of Arbuthnot from Constantinople meant

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that Pozzo di Borgo would have to be the principal agent of Russia's efforts to achieve peace through diplomacy. At the same time, Russia continued to prepare for the possibility of using its armed forces to pressure the Turks into accepting peace on Russia's terms. The original proposal to send Pozzo to negotiate was part of a plan worked out by Czartoryski and Chichagov. Czartoryski believed that an Anglo-Russian armed demonstration at Constantinople combined with an intensification of Russia's military activity in the Principalities would force the Turks to negotiate. In March 1807 Czartoryski drew up a draft treaty to conclude with the Porte. According to this draft, the Turks would have to confirm all their previous agreements with Russia including Russia's right to use the Straits. They would also have to renew their alliance with England. In addition, Turkey would join Russia in expelling the French from Dalmatia. This province would then be returned to Austria. The sultan would have to agree to grant Serbia an autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire and to grant the Serbs a government similar to the Principalities. If the Turks agreed to these preliminary terms, both sides would then send plenipotentiaries to Jassy in order to conclude a definitive peace. Once both sides had ratified the definitive peace, Russia would withdraw from the Principalities. Although he was no longer foreign minister, Czartoryski still exerted some influence. His advice was accepted and the instructions
which Budberg sent to Pozzo were a modified version of Czar­
toryski's proposals. Budberg's instructions to Pozzo also
called for the Turks to join the Russians in expelling the
French from Dalmatia. However, rather than return this prov­
ince to Austria, the tsar and the sultan would decide on its
future status. If the Turks would not agree to participate
actively against the French, they would still have to allow
Russian troops to cross Ottoman territory to fight the
French in Dalmatia. In this case, the tsar alone would de­
cide the future status of Dalmatia. Pozzo was to secure an
adequate guarantee of the Porte's loyalty. One acceptable
guarantee would be to allow Russia to retain some fortresses
on Turkish territory until the conclusion of Russia's war
with France. If this proposal was totally unacceptable,
Pozzo could settle for the expulsion of Sébastiani. In ad­
dition, Russia wanted the Porte to allow the Principalities
to maintain a small armed force. Pozzo did not have to in­
sist on strict autonomy for Serbia but he should secure some
benefits for the Serbs. Likewise, Pozzo should try to ob­
tain a renewal of the Anglo-Turkish alliance but he did not
have to insist on this.9

347, pp. 738-739. Sirotkin, Loc. Cit., pp. 188-190. Shupp,
Near Eastern Question, pp. 443-444. Goriainov, Bosfor i
Dardanelly, pp. 9-10.
Budberg drew up his instructions to Pozzo after St. Petersburg had learned of Arbuthnot's departure from Constantinople but before news was received of Duckworth's failure. Consequently, the tsar and his foreign minister believed that an attack against the defenses of the Bosporus by Russia's Black Sea fleet combined with a joint Anglo-Russian naval demonstration before Constantinople would force the Turks to accept peace on Russia's terms. When Pozzo learned that Duckworth had been forced to retreat from Constantinople, he requested additional instructions. Initially, Pozzo suggested that, since the British had gone to war against the Turks in defense of Russia's rights, Russia should cooperate fully with Britain. Pozzo attributed the Porte's bellicose actions to the influence of Sébastiani and he advised Budberg that Russia should demand the expulsion of the French ambassador from Turkey. Pozzo informed Budberg that he had told the Austrian government of his mission to Turkey. He had assured the Austrians that his instructions were based on the principle of the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The Russian envoy observed that the Austrians wanted peace between Russia and Turkey but they didn't want a peace that would be particularly advantageous for Russia.¹⁰

A few weeks after learning of Duckworth's failure, Pozzo received the disturbing news that the British had gone to capture Alexandria. Pozzo believed that the important objectives of Russia and Britain were to achieve an honorable end to the Russo-Turkish war and to eliminate all French influence at the Porte. In this way Russia could employ all its forces against Napoleon and regain the right to use the Straits. Pozzo charged that Britain's expedition to Egypt had destroyed this reasonable plan. He declared that the occupation of Alexandria only complicated the situation and made peace more difficult to achieve. He could no longer negotiate in common with Arbuthnot since the British ambassador had gone to Malta. Furthermore, since the British fleet had separated from Seniavin, Pozzo felt that he no longer had sufficient means to pressure the Porte into accepting Russia's terms. Pozzo stated that Britain's actions were particularly inexplicable because the British knew that a prompt conclusion of the Russo-Turkish war was essential in order to allay Austria's fears. He charged that the British had once again abandoned the general interests in favor of their own particular objectives. Pozzo was continuing on his peace mission but he recommended that Russia's army in Wallachia assume the offensive. He believed that if Michelson's forces joined with the Serbs, this combined force might provide sufficient pressure to force the Porte to
accept Russia's terms. 11

Pozzo's criticisms of England and Austria were shared by others in the Russian government. Russia believed that Britain was not doing enough to aid against France. In the beginning of 1807, Russia had sent M. M. Alopeus as its new ambassador to Great Britain. In his instructions to Alopeus, Budberg had stressed the need for Britain to assume a more active role in the war on the continent. Budberg warned that if Britain did not participate more actively, Russia could always settle with France and look after its own interests. The news that Britain was sending a fleet to help the Russians coerce the Porte had temporarily allayed Russia's objections to Britain's inactivity. However, the British seizure of Alexandria was regarded in St. Petersburg as a purely selfish venture. The British campaign in Egypt seemed particularly hypocritical since Britain's ambassador had been requesting that the tsar again assure Austria that Russia sought no territorial gains from its war with Turkey. In fact, Alexander still supported the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In April 1807 Russia and Prussia concluded the Convention of Bartenstein. Although concerned primarily with general European affairs, the Bartenstein agreement included a guarantee of the independence and the

11 Ibid., No. 227, Pozzo di Borgo to Budberg, April 9/21, 1807, pp. 550-552.
territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. It appeared to Alexander that Britain might not share his commitment to preserving the Ottoman Empire. The tsar's resentment of Britain's occupation of Alexandria was evident in the new instructions sent to Pozzo di Borgo. The Russian peace envoy was to continue to seek to negotiate with the Porte. If it were possible, Pozzo was to try to conclude an agreement jointly with England. However, if the British persisted in following their own independent objectives which, according to Budberg, did not agree with the tsar's moderate intentions, Pozzo was authorized to conclude a separate agreement. 12

Throughout the first half of 1807, Austria attempted to bring about a general European peace. Napoleon did not reject the Austrian proposals but he was more interested in securing an alliance with either Austria or Russia. The French emperor was concerned by Austrian military preparations and therefore appeared to accept the idea of a peace congress. However, questions relating to the Ottoman Empire were a serious obstacle to an Austrian-mediated peace. The Russians accepted Austrian mediation in their war with

France but asserted that the Russo-Turkish war was an entirely different situation. The Russian government maintained that the war between Russia and Turkey was a dispute that involved only the participants and was not related to the European war. Budberg stated that Russia was willing to return the Principalities and seek nothing from the Turks but the tsar's former treaty rights. However, these conditions were unacceptable to the French. Talleyrand told the Austrian mediator, General Karl Vincent, that Napoleon insisted on the complete independence of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, Napoleon demanded that the Ottoman Empire be included in any peace congress. Russia, however, refused to participate in a peace congress if the Turks were represented. The negotiations continued but without any positive results. Both France and the allies wanted Austria to join them in a military alliance and therefore neither side wished to offend the Austrians.13

The land war between Russia and Turkey saw very little military activity once Michelson's forces had completed the

occupation of the Principalities. For the Russians, the war against Turkey remained a secondary theater of action. Michelson's army was too small to undertake any extensive operations and for the most part limited its activities to consolidating its position. Although Alexander's policy toward the Porte was still aimed primarily at obtaining a negotiated settlement of the war, other contingencies were explored. From the Ionian Islands, Mocenigo tried to secure the friendship of the pashas of the western Balkans. In approving Mocenigo's activities, Budberg noted that Russia would benefit even if Mocenigo could obtain nothing more than the neutrality of these pashas. Russia also began to give greater attention to its contacts with the Slavs of the Ottoman Empire. Budberg believed that the Slavs could be very useful to Russia if diplomacy failed to end the war with Turkey. The Russian government realized that the friendship and loyalty of the Balkan Christians would be especially important if France sent an army to aid the Turks. Alexander approved the sending of Colonel F. O. Paulucci on a secret mission to the Balkans. Paulucci was to determine whether the French were planning to attack the Russian forces in the Principalities. He was also to contact the Serbian leaders and assure them of Russian support. Budberg authorized Paulucci to promise continued aid to the Serbs in money and in arms and munitions. Paulucci was also to work out the details of a junction of the Russian forces
in the Principalities and the Serbian insurgents.¹⁴

Russia was able to retain its control of the Principalities with a small army largely because of the internal disorganization of the Ottoman Empire. Sultan Selim assured Sébastiani that the Turkish forces would act vigorously to expel the Russians from Ottoman territories. The sultan attempted to negotiate an end to the Serbian insurgency so that he could employ all his troops in a large spring offensive to recapture the Principalities. However, Napoleon's plan to send a French army to aid the Turks against the Russians was vetoed by the pashas of European Turkey. Many of these pashas as well as many Ottoman officials feared that France might be planning to use the passage of its troops to conquer European Turkey. The absence of French troops and the failure to secure an acceptable agreement with the Serbs seriously weakened the plans for the Turkish spring offensive. However, Selim did raise a large Ottoman army consisting of the janissaries who were the traditional Turkish troops as well as Selim's new army, the Nizam-i-Jedid. The Turkish army with the cooperation of the pashas

of the Danubian region began to win some victories against the Russians in the spring of 1807. The Turks prevented the Russian and Serbian forces from joining and as a result of an Ottoman offensive General Michelson planned to evacuate Bucharest. Before the Turks could follow up on their initial successes, they received word that a revolt in Constantinople had deposed Sultan Selim. The news of the revolt led to anarchy among the Turkish forces. Fighting broke out between the janissaries and the Nizam-i-Jedid, many of the pashas returned home and the entire Ottoman army soon ceased to be an effective fighting force. The disorder and confusion among the Turkish forces prevented any further Ottoman advances. By the end of June the Russians were able to undertake an offensive and link up with the Serbian forces. At the same time, Pozzo di Borgo tried unsuccessfully to open peace negotiations with the new Turkish sultan, Mustafa IV.15

Even before Napoleon received word of the revolution in Constantinople, he had begun to doubt the chances of obtain-

ing any advantages from an Ottoman alliance. Napoleon was more interested in obtaining an alliance with Austria. He tried unsuccessfully to win over the Austrians by arousing their suspicions regarding Russian designs on the Ottoman Empire. As for the Porte, Napoleon realized that the Russo-Turkish war and the Turkish actions against Duckworth's fleet made the sultan a de facto ally without binding France to any formal commitments. Franco-Turkish negotiations for an alliance were conducted in the spring of 1807. However, the Turks wanted only a defensive agreement directed solely against Russia and limited to a three year period. The Turks also wanted France to guarantee that they would regain the Crimea and other lands bordering the Black Sea that had been lost to Russia. The French rejected these stipulations. They wanted an offensive treaty of indefinite duration directed against Russia and England. The French also expected the Turks to grant them commercial advantages. Gradually the French terms became even more demanding. As a result, Napoleon never did sign an alliance with Turkey. The French found that it was easier to negotiate with the Persians. In May 1807 Napoleon concluded the Treaty of Finkenstein which was directed against both Russia and England. However, Napoleon's plan for a triple alliance of France, Persia and the Ottoman Empire never did materialize.16

16 Hurewitz, Diplomacy, Vol. I, No. 30, "Treaty of
In the European fighting the Russians fared badly against the French. However, both sides suffered heavy casualties, especially at the Battle of Eylau which both sides claimed as a victory. As early as March 1807, Napoleon had expressed a wish for an alliance with Russia. Such a Russian-French rapprochement did not take place immediately. However, on June 14, 1807 the French army inflicted a serious defeat on the Russians at Friedland. The commander of the Russian troops, General Leon Bennigsen, notified the tsar of the heavy losses and urged Alexander to begin negotiations with the French at least to gain time to recover. The tsar's brother, Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovich, also advised Alexander to seek peace or face an invasion of Russia. Alexander's reasons for concluding peace with France were complex. The Near East was certainly not the most important consideration leading to the Tilsit negotiations. However, Austrian and British suspicion and mistrust of Russia's Near Eastern policy annoyed the tsar and contributed to his decision to abandon his allies. Alexander particularly resented Britain's failure to render effective aid against the Porte. Russia charged that by sending its troops to

capture Alexandria rather than aid in a renewed attack on the Straits, Britain had prevented a quick settlement of the war with Turkey. Consequently, the tsar had had to divide his forces and this had contributed to Russia's defeat. In addition to Near Eastern considerations, the poor state of Russia's army after Friedland, Britain's apparent unwillingness to execute a diversionary attack on the continent and Austria's refusal to join the coalition against France all made peace appear to be the best solution. Alexander originally authorized Bennigsen to conclude an armistice in his own name. However, the tsar finally decided to send Prince Dmitrii Lobanov-Rostovski to negotiate an armistice as a preliminary step to a definitive peace. Napoleon gave a very cordial reception to the Russian negotiator. The French emperor spoke of his high regard for Alexander and of the need for an alliance between Russia and France. The negotiators signed an armistice and made plans for the conclusion of a definitive peace treaty.  

Alexander had to decide what terms Russia could accept in a peace treaty with France. This was a rather difficult task since the tsar was still uncertain of how generous Napoleon might be. With Prussia almost entirely overrun and the Russian army defeated, the French clearly held a very strong position. In the Russian discussions concerning possible peace terms, the Near East played an important role. The Prussian foreign minister, Prince Karl Hardenberg, presented one suggestion which he hoped would save Prussia by sacrificing the Ottoman Empire. Hardenberg's elaborate plan provided for a partition of European Turkey. Russia would receive the eastern half of European Turkey including Constantinople and the Straits and France would acquire Greece and the adjacent Greek islands. Austria would regain Dalmatia and would also obtain Bosnia and Serbia. According to Hardenberg's proposal, Prussia would receive no Turkish territory. Instead, the powers that had partitioned Poland would give up part or all of their Polish territories. A new Polish kingdom would be created and given to the king of Saxony and Prussia would then obtain Saxony. Hardenberg presented his plan to Bubberg who favored the proposal. Both the tsar and the Prussian ruler, Frederick William III, also expressed interest in the plan. However, Alexander was aware of the allies' rather weak bargaining position and he regarded the proposal largely as a means of distract-
The Hardenberg plan proved to be a rather unsuitable basis on which to negotiate with France. From the beginning of the peace talks, it was the tsar and Napoleon who made the important proposals and not the Prussian leaders. The Near East played an important part in Alexander's decisions prior to and during his negotiations with Napoleon. Draft copies of instructions drawn up for the Russian negotiators, Prince Lobanov-Rostovski and Prince Alexander Kurakin, demonstrate that the Russian government was prepared to make extensive concessions in the Near East. Aside from the recognition of the changes Napoleon had made in Europe and the abandonment of Russia's alliances with England and Austria, the Near East was the only area where Russia could make concessions. The first principle of Alexander's negotiating position was that Russia would not sacrifice any

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19 Butterfield perhaps best characterizes the audacity of the Hardenberg plan when he calls it "a monstrous piece of pretentiousness on the part of a power which had done so little to justify its existence as Prussia in this last year. And, addressed to Napoleon when he was almost at the farthest edge of the Prussian dominions, with Europe prostrate behind him and a Czar suing for peace, it was a sublime exhibition of impudence." See Peace Tactics of Napoleon, pp. 220-221.
part of its own territory. The tsar recognized that Russia would have to yield Cattaro and evacuate the Principalities. Alexander was also prepared to withdraw his forces from the Ionian Islands. However, the tsar hoped to obtain a guarantee of the independence of these islands under the terms of the Russo-Turkish convention of 1800. Alexander recognized that he would have to accept French mediation in the Russo-Turkish war if Napoleon insisted on this. However, Russia hoped to obtain a peace that would secure many of the treaty rights that it had previously enjoyed at the Porte. Russia was willing to make some sacrifices by offering to abandon or compromise on some of its treaty rights including the passage of warships through the Straits and the right to issue berats. On the question of an alliance with France, the instructions recommended a postponement of any such union. However, it was suggested that if France brought up the question of alliance, the Russian negotiators could use the occasion to ascertain Napoleon's future plans, particularly those regarding Turkey. In return for Russia's concessions in the Near East, Alexander hoped to obtain a restoration of Prussia, restitution of Mecklenburg and a reasonable peace settlement between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.20

20Sbornik, Vol. LXXXIX, No. 46, "Some Ideas Which May Find a Place in the Instructions of the Russian Negotiator,"
A later draft version of the instructions prepared for the Russian negotiators gave greater attention to questions concerning the Near East. This draft was drawn up after the initial meetings between Alexander and Napoleon. The draft indicates that the Russian position on questions regarding the Near East had not changed substantially as a result of these first meetings. The instructions are written in the first person as though from Alexander but are unsigned and do not carry the tsar's official mark of approval. The contents of the draft indicate that either the tsar or someone in close contact with him dictated the instructions since references are made to conversations that took place in private meetings between Alexander and Napoleon. The draft instructions continued to express the hope that Russia could achieve a peace settlement with the Porte without French mediation. Furthermore, in return for recognizing Napoleon's predominant position in southern and western Europe, it was felt that France should be willing to accept Russia's predominant influence at the Porte. If necessary, Alexander would agree to Napoleon's mediation in the Russo-Turkish war and would withdraw Russian troops from the Principalities as soon as the Porte consented to this mediation. The instructions acknowledged that Russia would probably have to

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evacuate the Ionian Islands but the negotiators were to continue to try to secure the independence of these islands. Russia was still prepared to surrender Cattaro but the Russian negotiators were to present this as a great concession by Russia.  

A supplement to the instructions prepared for the negotiators noted that, in the conversations of Alexander and Napoleon, the French ruler had frequently alluded to the possibility of an alliance between Russia and France. The supplement recommended a postponement of such an alliance especially if it were to be directed against England or the Ottoman Empire. In regard to the latter, the instructions noted that Alexander and Napoleon had agreed to postpone any final determinations on questions regarding the Near East. However, the Russian plenipotentiaries were to ascertain precisely what Napoleon's intentions were in regard to the Ottoman Empire. In so far as it was possible, Kurakin and Lobanov-Rostovski were to find out whether the French wanted a total partition of the European possessions of the Ottoman Empire or whether they favored a partial partition. According to the draft of the supplementary instructions, the basic principle of Alexander's Turkish policy was that the

tsar did not want to see the Turks expelled from Europe. The weak and disorganized Ottoman Empire was the best neighbor that Russia could have; therefore, the destruction of European Turkey would be disadvantageous for Russia. Furthermore, the instructions noted that any attempt to divide the spoils of the Ottoman Empire would only lead to quarrels among the partitioning powers. Even if all other parts of European Turkey could be satisfactorily divided, it would be virtually impossible to agree on who was to possess Constantinople. This was especially important to Russia which would suffer serious losses if anyone but Russia or Turkey possessed Constantinople. The final Russian objection to a complete partition of European Turkey was that Austria would have to participate. However, any expansion of Austrian power would not be in the interest of either Russia or France. For all these reasons, Alexander opposed a total partition of European Turkey. The tsar would agree to a reorganization of some of the provinces of European Turkey. According to this proposal, Russia would replace Turkey as the suzerain of the Principalities and Serbia. The Principalities could retain their current form of government and Serbia could adopt a similar system. France would become suzerain of all of Albania and would thus control the entire Adriatic seacoast.\footnote{Ibid., "Draft of a Supplement to the Instructions,"}
Following the famous meeting on the raft in the middle of the Nieman River, Alexander and Napoleon conducted long discussions on future arrangements for Europe. The secrecy of the private conversations makes it impossible to determine precisely what took place in the meetings. From the fragments of secondary reports and from later statements made by Alexander, it is clear that the two emperors held extensive discussions regarding the future of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. However, the fate of Prussia, Russia's future relations with England and questions relating to Poland were of equal or greater significance in the negotiations. Although Napoleon had assured the Turks that he would look after their interests, it appears that at Tilsit the French emperor tried to capture Alexander's imagination by holding out the prospect of extensive Russian territorial gains in Turkey. Napoleon often referred to the approaching dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and to the need for Russia and France to adopt a common policy in regard to this anticipated event. On one occasion the two emperors were reviewing a parade when Napoleon received a dispatch supposedly

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pp. 757-759. Both the draft of the instructions and the draft of the supplement were discovered among the papers of Budberg. However, they are not in his handwriting. Although both documents are undated and unsigned and do not carry the tsar's official seal of approval, they are consistent with other documents. Furthermore, many of the proposals in these two drafts were incorporated into the Tilsit agreements or were later raised as points of discussion between Alexander and Napoleon.
announcing the news of the overthrow of Selim. Napoleon
proclaimed that the news was "a decree of Providence which
tells me that the Turkish Empire can no longer exist."
While this may have been a more complete report of the
events that had occurred in Constantinople, it was certainly
not the first report Napoleon received concerning the revo­
lution. Napoleon had learned of the revolt from a dispatch
from Talleyrand which he had received prior to his first
meeting with the tsar.  

Historians have debated the question of whether it was
Alexander or Napoleon who was duped at Tilsit. The question
probably can never be determined satisfactorily. However,
where written evidence does exist and in the light of sub­
sequent events, it would be difficult to accept the inter­
pretation that Alexander was completely won over by Napoleon.
The needs of Russia's national security determined the
tsar's actions at Tilsit. Alexander was aware of Napoleon's
great vanity and used this to convince the French ruler of
his friendship and to secure a more favorable peace treaty.

23Napoléon, Correspondance, Vol. XV, No. 12813, To
Talleyrand, June 24, 1807, pp. 366-367; No. 12819, To Gen­
eral Lemarois, June 24, 1807, p. 369. Bertrand, Lettres,
No. CCCXXII, June 22, 1807, pp. 371-372. Martens, Sobranie,
Vol. XIII, pp. 304-305. Butterfield, Peace Tactics of Na­
poleon, pp. 256-258. Vandal, Napoléon et Alexandre Ier, pp.
73-75. Driault, La politique orientale de Napoléon, pp.
205-207. Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, pp. 185-
191.
Although some have criticized Alexander for his surrender of territory in the Near East, the tsar believed that these territories were a small sacrifice to make in order to gain peace and prevent an invasion of Russia. A restored Prussia would be a far more effective barrier between Russia and France than the few thousand Russian troops in the Adriatic. Alexander tried to secure self-government for the Ionian Islands and the retention of Russian forces at Corfu. However, Napoleon argued that the location of the islands made them a natural possession of France which could more easily defend them. The French emperor observed that the islands could have been useful to Russia in its designs against the Ottoman Empire. He noted that since Russia and France had agreed not to undertake anything against the Porte except in concert, the tsar would no longer have to station troops there. Alexander finally agreed to yield the islands but in return he requested more favorable treatment for Prussia.

Mouravieff calls the Tilsit agreement "a treason made in favor of the king of Prussia" because of the sacrifices that Alexander made in the Near East in order to secure better terms for Prussia. He cites the fact that Czartoryski and others had always stressed the importance of the Ionian Islands and Cattaro in their reports to the tsar. However, Mouravieff overlooks the fact that Czartoryski had recommended that Alexander be prepared to yield the Principalities, Cattaro and, if necessary, the Ionian Islands in order to secure peace. Czartoryski's proposal had even been made prior to the costly battles of Eylau and Friedland. See Mouravieff, L'alliance russo-turque, p. 267. Czartoryski, Memoires, Vol. II, "Memorandum on the Necessity of Opening Peace Negotiations with Napoleon," December 21, 1806/January 2, 1807, pp. 167-174.
In regard to the Ottoman Empire, the two emperors agreed to postpone any final decisions regarding partition until a future meeting.25

Although the agreements signed at Tilsit were concerned primarily with the affairs of western and central Europe, they contained some important provisions regarding the Near East. In the peace treaty between Russia and France, the tsar agreed to end hostilities with the Porte and to withdraw from Moldavia and Wallachia. The Turks were not to re-enter the Principalities until Russia and the Ottoman Empire had concluded a definitive treaty of peace. Alexander accepted Napoleon's mediation in the negotiations with the Porte. In the "separate and secret articles" of the peace treaty, the tsar agreed to hand over Cattaro and the Ionian Islands to Napoleon. The abandonment of Russia's positions in the Adriatic meant that Alexander was deserting his Montenegrin allies. The only consideration the Montenegrins were given in the Tilsit treaty was a promise that Napoleon would not take reprisals against them if they remained at peace. In addition to restoring peace and friendship between the two countries, Russia and France concluded an

offensive and defensive alliance. The treaty of alliance included the stipulation that if the Porte did not accept France's mediation or if it accepted the mediation but had not concluded an agreement within three months of the start of negotiations, France would join Russia against the Ottoman Empire. The two allies would then reach an agreement to remove "from the yoke and vexations of the Turks" all of European Turkey except for Constantinople and the province of Rumelia.  

Immediately following the signing of the Tilsit agreements, it appeared that Alexander was fully intent on carrying out the obligations imposed on him by the treaties. The tsar ordered General Michelson to propose a truce to the Turks. If the Porte accepted and agreed to negotiate under French mediation, hostilities were to cease. Alexander also instructed the commanders of the Russian forces in Cattaro and the Ionian Islands to hand over these territories to the French. The Russian fleet under the command of Admiral Seniavin was to cease hostilities. If the Porte accepted the armistice, Sébastiani was to try to obtain permission

for the Russian vessels belonging to the Black Sea fleet to return home through the Straits. 27

Upon his return to St. Petersburg, Alexander found that Russian society was almost unanimous in its opposition to the new ties with France. It appeared to most Russians that the Tilsit agreements offered all the advantages to France and gave nothing to Russia. However, it soon became obvious that Alexander did not intend to fulfill all the provisions of the treaties he had agreed to at Tilsit. Alexander refused to ratify the Russo-Turkish armistice concluded at Slobodzeia in August 1807. Citing technicalities and objections to certain provisions of the armistice, the tsar kept his troops in the Principalities and in Bessarabia. Actually, in view of the strong opposition to the French alliance, Alexander believed that he would have to show the Russian people some concrete benefit to be derived from the new system. That benefit was to be Russia's temporary or permanent retention of Moldavia, Wallachia and Bessarabia. If the Porte would accept the tsar's peace terms and return to its former system of dependence on Russia, Alexander

would agree to surrender these provinces. If the Turks refused the tsar's terms, then, by permanently retaining these provinces, the tsar could satisfy those who said Russia had gained nothing. Russia's southern provinces would have a more defensible frontier on the Danube and Russia would be in a better position to act if the fall of the Ottoman Empire took place.28

At Tilsit, Alexander had shown himself willing to yield on a number of issues relating to the Near East. However, subsequent events proved that Alexander had not suddenly abandoned his past policies for the Near East. Alexander's terms for peace with Turkey had always included a promise to return the Principalities. In return, the tsar had always demanded that Russia regain its position of dominance in Constantinople. The Tilsit agreements did not lead to a return to Russia's former position at the Porte but they did cause a decline of French influence there. From the time word of the Tilsit agreements reached Constantinople, Sébastiani's influence decreased. As for the surrender of

 Александра Поливтофф (ред.), La mission du général Savary à Saint-Pétersbourg: Sa correspondance avec l'empereur Napoléon et les ministres des relations extérieures, 1807 (Published in Vol. LXXXIII of Sbornik imperatorskago russkago istoricheskago obschestva, St. Petersburg, 1892), No. 33; Savary to Napoleon, September 11/23, 1807, pp. 84-85; Annex II, "Convention of the Armistice of Slobodzeia," August 23/September 4, 1807, pp. 93-97. Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, pp. 210-214 and pp. 219-222. There is evidence to indicate that at Tilsit
Russia's outposts in the Adriatic, Alexander had always regarded these positions as an overextension of Russia's power and had offered to give them up. Finally, although discussions regarding a partition of the Ottoman Empire took place both during and after Tilsit, neither Alexander nor Napoleon was anxious to precipitate such an upheaval. Alexander's concern and interest in a possible partition can be explained by the tsar's fear that Napoleon secretly intended either to seize Ottoman territory or to destroy Turkey. If Napoleon intended to act against the Ottoman Empire, Alexander wished to know as soon as possible so that Russia would be prepared either to occupy those areas of European Turkey which were vital to its national interests or perhaps be prepared to oppose or delay a partition.

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Napoleon had privately assured Alexander that Russia would not have to withdraw from the Principalities. See V. A. Zorin et al., Istoriia diplomatii (History of Diplomacy) (2d ed., 3 vols.; Moscow, 1959), p. 473.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of his reign, Alexander had hoped to follow a largely passive foreign policy in order to concentrate on internal reform. However, foreign relations were not ignored and it soon became evident that the Ottoman Empire would play an important part in Alexander's diplomacy. Alexander established the preservation of the Ottoman Empire as a basic principle of his foreign policy. The tsar believed that Russia was already large enough and had no need to acquire additional territories. Furthermore, Alexander believed that the weakness of the Ottoman Empire effectively guaranteed the security of Russia's southern provinces. The European possessions of Turkey were also a convenient barrier between Russia and the expanding French empire.

Although Alexander and his advisers hoped to follow a policy of friendship and alliance with the Porte, they regarded the Ottoman Empire as a virtual Russian protectorate. The tsar insisted that Russia had to maintain its position as the most influential power represented in Constantinople. The Russian government assumed a domineering attitude in
its relations with the Porte. The Russian ambassador in Constantinople frequently interfered in Turkish foreign policy decisions and even in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Alexander was especially suspicious of French activities in the Near East. Even in those periods of relatively friendly relations between Russia and France, there was a great deal of mutual distrust regarding the Near East.

Alexander realized that although the weakness and instability of the Ottoman Empire made it a convenient neighbor, these same factors could cause France or some other power to take advantage of Turkey. Fear for the safety of the Ottoman Empire and the Ionian Islands was an important motive for Alexander's growing involvement in the formation of the Third Coalition. The tsar's concern with the Ionian Islands had originally been based on his wish to establish a stable government there. Alexander had sent troops to the islands to restore order but he intended to withdraw these forces as soon as possible. However, as the tsar received increasing reports of French activities in the Near East, he began to utilize the Ionian Islands as a defensive position from which he could protect European Turkey. Alexander made it clear that he would regard an attack on the Ottoman Empire as a threat to Russian security. He hoped to preserve the Ottoman Empire through diplomacy but he eventually accepted the need to use force to halt French
The men who acted as Alexander's foreign ministers often had more ambitious designs for the Near East than Alexander did. In the early years of his reign, Alexander's most influential adviser on Near Eastern policies was Prince Adam Czartoryski. However, there were important differences in the Near Eastern policies of these two men. Alexander thought of the Ottoman Empire primarily in terms of its strategic value as a weak neighbor. Czartoryski recognized Turkey's strategic importance but also emphasized other considerations. Czartoryski believed that Russia's Near Eastern policies should take into consideration the importance of Russian trade. However, economic considerations played virtually no part in Alexander's activities in the Near East. Czartoryski also displayed a far greater interest in the fate of the Greeks and Slavs of European Turkey than Alexander did. Alexander's relations with the Balkan Christians were based largely on expediency. The tsar generally thought in terms of the benefits Russia could acquire by gaining the friendship of these people. Although Alexander interceded on behalf of the Greeks and Slavs of the Ottoman Empire out of a sincere desire to see reforms instituted, he was ready to abandon these people when Russia's interests demanded it.

In the discussions for the formation of the Third Coalition as well as in the negotiations for the renewal
of the Russo-Turkish alliance, the Russian government showed that while it wished to preserve the Ottoman Empire, it intended to do so strictly on its own terms. The agreements establishing the coalition did not include Russia's proposals for changes in the Near East. This was due partially to British and Austrian suspicion of Russia's motives. However, it can also be explained in part by the fact that Alexander was not fully committed to any significant changes in the Near East. These same factors also explain Russia's failure to secure the terms it had originally proposed for the renewal of the Russo-Turkish alliance. Furthermore, in the negotiations for the renewal of the alliance with Turkey, neither Alexander nor his advisers had an accurate understanding of Turkey's internal situation. The Russian government overestimated the Porte's weakness and believed that it was Russia alone that prevented the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

The defeat of the Third Coalition greatly increased the danger of French encroachments in the Near East. The Treaty of Pressburg made Napoleon a neighbor of Turkey and led to even greater Russian concern over its position in Constantinople. Throughout 1806 the Russian government carefully observed the actions of the Turks. Czartoryski, Italinsky and Budberg all urged Alexander to adopt a strong stand in dealing with the Porte. Despite this advice, the tsar refused to take decisive measures to counter the growth of French
influence in the Near East. Alexander invariably modified and weakened Czartoryski's plans for an extensive reorganization of European Turkey. The tsar generally opposed any proposals that could lead to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. He felt that such plans would only lead to greater instability in Europe. The only proposals that Alexander favored were those which were tied to suggestions for the creation of states over which Russia could exercise some control and supervision. If such schemes were unattainable, Alexander preferred to see the areas of European Turkey kept under the control of the sultan. Alexander did attempt to get the sultan to ameliorate the conditions of his Christian subjects and to restore order in his provinces. The tsar believed that such measures would benefit the Ottoman Empire and prevent any further reduction in Turkey's strength.

It was only after much hesitation and vacillation that Alexander reluctantly accepted the necessity of taking stronger measures to oppose the growing French influence in Constantinople. Alexander sincerely wished to avoid a conflict with Turkey. However, he feared that the Porte would join France in a war against Russia. In order to pressure Turkey into returning to its system of alliance with Russia and to secure a more defensible position in case of a Turkish attack, Alexander ordered his troops to occupy the Principalities and Bessarabia. The tsar did not intend the occupation to be permanent but he refused to evacuate
the Ottoman territory until he could be absolutely certain of Turkey's loyalty. The war with Turkey remained a secondary theater for Alexander. The tsar was far more interested in securing peace with Turkey than he was in continuing the war. However, Alexander continued to insist on peace terms that would assure Russia a dominant position in Constantinople.

Near Eastern problems contributed only indirectly to Alexander's decision to seek peace with Napoleon. At Tilsit, Alexander showed that he was willing to make sacrifices in the Near East in order to secure more favorable terms in matters relating to Europe. This was consistent with his previous Near Eastern policies. Alexander had frequently expressed a willingness to abandon both the Ionian Islands and Cattaro as part of a peace settlement. Furthermore, although he agreed to evacuate the Principalities, Alexander did not fulfill this part of the Tilsit treaty. When the Porte refused to accept Russia's peace terms, Alexander kept his forces in the Principalities. At the Erfurt conference of 1808, Napoleon agreed to Russia's retention of the Principalities. In 1812 when Alexander needed all his forces to fight Napoleon, he readily agreed to return Moldavia and Wallachia to the sultan. The Treaty of Bucharest of 1812 ended the Russo-Turkish war. Russia insisted on retaining Bessarabia because the tsar felt that the Russian people expected some gains from the long war
with Turkey.

The real importance of the Tilsit meetings in so far as they involved the Near East was that Alexander and Napoleon mutually agreed not to undertake any action against the Ottoman Empire except in concert. Thus Alexander was given some assurance that his alliance with France would not only give Russia the peace it needed but also would keep Russia informed of Napoleon's Near Eastern projects. In the months after Tilsit, Russia and France discussed grandiose plans for partitioning the Ottoman Empire but nothing ever came of these. The Tilsit meetings did not represent a complete reversal of Alexander's Near Eastern policies. On the contrary, Tilsit gave Alexander greater means of assuring that Napoleon would not embark on an aggressive Near Eastern policy.
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