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THE RELATIONSHIP OF EXPERIENCE AND BEHAVIOR:
TOWARD A THEORY OF THE PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL EDUCATION

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
James Lee Wilder, B.S.Ed., M.A.

The Ohio State University
1974

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INTRODUCTION

A discussion of the psychophysiological foundations of social education offers, at the extremes, two methods of approach. The most prevalent method at this moment of history is to adopt the methods and procedures of natural science. One can then proceed to an investigation of the nature of perception, cognition, emotion, and perhaps even revelation; and by a comparison with the empirical data relating to the functions of the autonomic nervous system, the central nervous system, the digestive, eliminator, circulatory, neuromuscular systems, and so on, one can hope to provide a "value-free" rendering of psychophysiological reality. All of this seems to be well and good to the degree that we do not confuse lines on a paper and statistics for flesh and blood. The great difficulty with value-free social and natural science is that logically it is not value free, i.e., value free is nonetheless a value. Sociologically, this situation contains several paradoxes of enormous consequences. For example, the organization of society on the predicates of natural science removes, as it were, a positive system of moral and ethical belief. Psychologically, the individual is then forced to find value in being valueless. In short, science provides a formal value, i.e., value freeness that is substantially void; it supplies a formal positive orientation whose content is negative. Thus, there is room for confusion. In short, there is no place for belief or conviction in science. Yet, scientific method itself is such a conviction, and its
pretense of being value free does not negate the fact that it has values nonetheless. This makes it all the more difficult and necessary to examine the consequences of such a posture.

The other method, in the extreme, is to completely disregard the methods of science and the language of abstraction and to embrace a different set of symbols. Indeed, this is the dilemma we find at the very beginning of Western philosophical discourse and dialogue. In the initial pages of Plato's *Republic* we find that the poets cannot articulate in discursive terms the why's and wherefore's of what they say in another set of symbols. In large measure the evolution of consciousness in the West has been measured against the degree to which it has succeeded in liberating abstract discourse from the symbols of poets, mystics, and prophets. However, it seems to me a tragic mistake to eschew either method in favor of the other. The poets may not know why they speak, but they speak nonetheless; and science to the degree that it ignores such expression and logic excludes the study and experience from which such articulations are made. Thus, in the following pages, an attempt is made to synthesize the best of both approaches.

It is important to note that this is not merely an academic dilemma. The death of Christian culture and the simultaneous birth and growth of science and technology have made the seeming conflict of these two approaches a historical and concrete reality of momentous consequence. The critical question is whether or not the complete subsumption of either approach by the other is desirable or possible. In Chapter I the position is taken that such subsumption is not. Secondly, it is argued that to believe that such subsumption is possible and desirable is destructive of the evolutionary potential of the species. Essentially,
the position is taken that the symbols of science and the symbols of poetry and religion imply each other, and that one cannot possibly choose either to the exclusion of the other without paying a horrendous and largely unconscious price.

This is not to say that neither Christian culture or a culture predicated upon the symbols of science does not provide a means of orienting oneself in the world. However, an exclusive reliance upon either is insufficient and harmful to both. Chapters II through V attempt to document the psychophysiological foundations of such insufficiency, and Chapter VI attempts to provide a schemata that can provide not only the framework for understanding the genesis and development of such insufficiencies, but a framework that at the same time holds the promise that we may be able to do something about them.

Such an effort is justified on the grounds that understanding the source of our dilemmas is of little value unless we can understand them in such a way as to maintain a sense of our own potency.

Moreover, inasmuch as there is a concern not only with how we tick, but how we can tick better, this effort is moral and visionary as well as scientific. Indeed, the moral and visionary dimension of this endeavor has lead the author not to the journals of academic psychologists and physiologists, but rather to the literature of the healers and practicing clinicians. In short, the data and inspiration for the present discussion is drawn largely from the highly intuitive works of clinicians, poets, and philosophers, rather than the more rigorous efforts of their scientific and academic counterparts. Such a choice is moral inasmuch as the justification for making it is predicated upon the explicit judgment that at this point in history it is more important to discuss and ponder how
we might live and function better rather than an illusory value-free
discussion of how we live and function per se. In more blunt language,
the implicitly and explicitly one-sided, idealized emphasis upon science
and technology represents a collective and personal disaster equaled only
by the equally idealized, one-sidedness of Christianity. Thus, it is
only reasonable to turn to the literature of psychotherapy rather than
the literature of experimental psychology.

In this regard, the importance of psychotherapy seems to reside
with the fact that it is the one disciplined enterprise created by modern
men that attempts to deal with the consequences of the collapse of
Christian culture and the rise of science. The importance of psychother-
apy, in short, does not reside in the claim that it attempts to deal with
the inner world, but in the recognition that it does so when the tradi-
tional means of dealing with the inner world have fallen into disuse and
disfavor. What the church once supplied within the framework of the
symbols and sacrements of Christianity has now been taken up largely by
the psychotherapist. As such, the lessons of therapy offers us the oppor-
tunity to begin to piece together the consequences and significance of
the collapse of Christian culture. In short, the neurotic, the criminal,
the madman, as well as the well-functioning "normal" citizen have some-
thing to teach us. Indeed, the neurotic offers us, as often as not, a
mish-mash of contradictions, motives, and fears, of which his more well-
adjusted brethren are less free of than simply unaware.

Lastly, we might reflect that the science of the turn of the century
certainly appeared to many of the hopeful and well-intentioned as the new
savior. However, the history of the last seventy years should give us
pause. Yet, to question the premises of science is to cast the dark eye of doubt upon previously acknowledged accomplishments. The dilemma is that if spirituality without science is inadequate, and if science without spirituality is adequate, what are we left with? Psychotherapy seems to be one ground from which a tentative answer may perhaps be articulated. The present effort is toward that end.
The purpose of the present chapter will be to establish the phenomenological relationship of three concomitant processes. The three processes are (1) the collapse of the symbols of Christianity as the predicates of Western culture, (2) the emergence of the symbols of science as the subsequent predicates of Western culture, and (3) the coming into being of the theory and practice of psychotherapy. It should be noted, however, that many of the symbols of Christianity (e.g., the cross of wood, the eucharist, baptism, rebirth, resurrection, and redemption, etc.) predate Christ and are not confined to Western culture. Similarly, it should be noted that the symbols of science do not suddenly come into being with the efforts of Copernicus. In regard to psychotherapy it has been long acknowledged that the roots of the profession extend back to the activities of the shaman. In short, the relatedness of such processes is not a uniquely twentieth century phenomenon. It has been explicitly or implicitly present from the moment men were capable of making history.

Despite the timelessness of these processes discussion will focus upon some of the ways the relationship between them has been perceived and developed by nineteenth and twentieth century clinicians, social scientists, and artists. There are several factors which necessitate such a limitation of scope. First of all, it is simply not feasible to
trace the historical development and interrelationship of these three processes. Such an endeavor would occupy a host of scholars for many lifetimes, assuming the debate concerning methods of investigation and interpretation could be settled. Secondly, the coming into being of the Industrial Revolution marks a change in the form of these processes that seems unprecedented in human history. Thirdly, the collapse of Western cultural traditions bequeaths to mankind the urgent task of remaking civilization. This task engenders a fourth factor—to codify our knowledge of these processes and formulate a vision, or a constitution, that harmonizes and stabilizes the relationship of these processes in such a fashion that it would properly be called a culture. Fifthly, and perhaps most importantly, is that unless the fourth is carried through modern men may fall ever more precipitously into a spiritual abyss. This creates unnecessary suffering, destroys any sense of community and human interaction, and in short, robs the species of any hope of meaning that transcends the boundaries of alienated self-interest. Taken together these five factors imply that scholars can ill afford the luxury of remaining relatively oblivious to the meaning their efforts have with regard to the current cultural and moral transition. Fortunately or unfortunately, this burden and responsibility seems to fall most heavily into the hands of educators.

The current moral and cultural transition is of immense importance to the conduct of education. Previously, when the task was to simply prepare the citizenry for the transition from an agrarian and Christian culture to an industrialized and scientific one, the path was clear enough. Industrialization called for skills the farmer did not possess,
and the world-conquering successes of science and technology were enough to sway all but the most perspicacious. Those who did not swallow enthusiastically the successes of the newly rising culture were left to shift for themselves and to pay the consequences. Within this perspective American education is a fabulous success: it has produced the workers, the management, and the consumers to sustain the greatest flowering of technology and science the world has ever known. As long as this flowering has gone unquestioned (or the evidence of its disasters obscured by the brilliance of its successes) educators have been able to proceed on the faith that they have been participating in the emancipation of man from the arders of grueling labor--liberating him to enjoy the pleasures and opportunities of freedom.

However, from the moment men begin to perceive evidence to the contrary, things do not proceed as smoothly. If the culture of science is flawed, we cannot for long continue to accept the flaws of science as preferable to the flaws of Christianity, particularly when the flaws of science threaten the survival of the planet and the species. In short, as long as there is a shared belief in the means and ends of a culture the educator's task is one mainly of initiation and transmission. Moreover once these ends and means are questioned and evidence is available to lend credence to the validity and urgency of the question, the educational task becomes problematic. It is no longer a matter of initiation into unquestioned rites and the transmission of acquired knowledge and skills, but a question of discerning more viable rites and transmission of skills and knowledge appropriate to them. This task is further complicated by the fact that the modern educator has accepted the notion
that "education" is a profession and not a presence and process that is diffuse throughout the culture. Thus, he often finds himself in a little corner from which he views the dissolution of his most noble purpose. The only other alternative is to begin to extricate himself. The present chapter is a part of that effort.

There seems to be little disagreement that we live in an age of transition. There also seems to be little disagreement as to what it is we are in transit from. "Literature and sociology have long supplied eloquent and knowledgeable mourners at the wake of Christian culture."\(^1\) To literature and sociology can be added the disciplines of physics, psychology, economics, biology, anthropology, and philosophy without great fear of over-statement. However, while there is no doubt about the transition, there is great doubt and apprehension concerning our individual and collective destination.

Christian culture supplied a "unitary system of common beliefs" that was internalized.\(^2\) Like Plato's young guardians Christians were reared in a climate that provided not only a sufficient guide to action and conduct, but in one which was more or less accepted by everybody. With the death of Christian culture and the concomitant conversion to a culture predicated upon the symbols of science the metaphysical glue which had held Western culture together for almost two millenniums dissolved. Rather than the internalized acceptance of the moral and ethical dimensions of Christianity as a guide to action and conduct, action and


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 2.
conduct are now predicated upon external contingencies. This shift of attention from internalized to externalized limitations upon action and conduct has enormous consequences for the evolution of culture.

Phillip Rieff has written that a culture "must communicate ideals, setting as internalities those distinctions between right actions and wrong that unite men and allow them the fundamental pleasures of agreement. Culture is another name for a design of motives directing the self outward, toward those communal purposes in which alone the self can be realized and fulfilled." The critical question is what does this shift from internal limitations to external limitations mean and do.

First of all it places upon the secular realm the task of setting such limitations. In the United States, for example, the sacred realm is allowed an existence through the First Amendment of the Constitution. However, it is placed outside and is thus irrelevant to communal purposes. Thus, religion is a matter of individual conscience and disposition. Conversely the secular is made the realm of collective endeavor and the source from which the relatively universal standards of action and conduct are to be articulated.

This dialectical interplay of individual and collective, sacred-secular, etc., is surely not new. Indeed, the history of the species could be viewed as movements between a complete subsumption of the secular by the sacred, the individual by the collective, and, at the opposite extreme, a tendency for the secular and individual to subsume the sacred and collective. Medicine men, functioning unknowingly as kings or presidents, are balanced by the possibility of kings and presidents function-

\[3\text{Ibid., p. 4.}\]
ing unknowingly as medicine men. From this perspective Christianity is a historical moment of intense separation. "Render unto Caesar what is Caesar's, and unto God what is God's."

"My kingdom is not of this world."

Also, from this perspective, the First Amendment to the Constitution reflects a historical moment in which the separation of realms is less intense. There are still two realms and two kingdoms. However, the focus is not fundamentally sacred. The framers and signers of the Constitution and the First Amendment were not consciously aware of themselves as prophets. Whereas Christ had a tradition and culture of prophets and prophecies to support him, the framers of the Constitution and the early Christians broke radically with their respective traditions.

For the Christians the Letter of the Law was to be fulfilled and "destroyed" by the Spirit of the Law: the Old Covenant was to be fulfilled by and in the New. The Declaration of Independence reflects the same sort of intent. However, the break seems to be in a different direction. That is to say, the forms of the "breaking away" may be quite analogous, but the content and direction of the movement are quite different. The Christian movement is towards the individual experience of God. It is this experience, or the firm faith in it, that provides the collective metaphysical glue that supplied "a unitary experience of common belief."

The movement is dialectical in the sense that one moves from a submersion in the Letter of the Law to a submersion in the Spirit of the Law, and it is this latter submersion that fulfills and completes the former. One is

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4Mark 12:17.

5John 18:36.
back where one began only fulfilled rather than unfulfilled.

In contrast the secular movement of the "founder fathers" seems to be a movement not from letter to spirit but from spirit to letter. The question is not fulfillment of the letter by the spirit, but the fulfillment of the spirit by the letter. In Christian terms the "spirit" of the founding fathers is really closer to Caesar than to God. It is a turning to the external world in hopes of fulfillment, and a turning away from the fulfillment promised by the internal. What is more, this turning is not really characterized by any sense of fulfillment. The recognition that "all men are created equal" is not a sacredly important recognition but a secularly important recognition. Men are equal before the Letter of Law and not the Spirit of the Law.

It is not unreasonable to expect the culture fostered under such tendencies to focus its energies upon external contingencies and behavior rather than internal processes and experience. Equality and community then become matters of secular rather than sacred concern. The communication of ideals and the "setting as internalities, those distinctions between right action and wrong which allow men the fundamental pleasure of agreement," is now predicated upon the assumption that such distinctions can be set with increasingly less reference to the sacred realms of experience and the Spirit of the Law. The Spirit of Law, experience, and the sacred realm are not considered as factors to be integrated into "secular" collective functions and purpose, but to be protected by the collective and given over to the individual.

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6Rieff, op. cit., p. 4.
Since there seemed to be little possibility of agreement among the founding fathers upon such distinctions derived from the traditions of Christianity, agreement was established through the technique of allowing disagreement upon religious matters and obtaining agreement upon the means by which disagreements could be ameliorated. It is not through a sense of spiritual awareness and recognition that social cohesion is to be achieved; rather, such cohesion as exists is predicated upon an agreement upon the means of establishing agreement when agreement in the sacredly, collective sense is not possible.

Politically this solution is manifest in the Constitution. However, insofar as the Constitution served as a vehicle for making agreements and settling disagreements the sacred realm was left to its own lesser devices. Moreover, insofar as this trend is directed primarily to the world of behavior and actions, the question is raised as to how agreement can be reached concerning the "external world." That is to say, not only is there the tendency to turn to secular institutions rather than to religious institutions for guies to action, there is the tendency to turn to the symbols and methods of science as a means of providing agreement and knowledge.

As long as men were preoccupied with the problems of the sacred, energies were consumed in the ardors of faith and worship or in the labors of survival. The turning away from the sacred frees those energies to work upon the secular. Moreover, to whatever degree Christian culture used the preoccupation with the sacred to exploit the labor and energies of the faithful, the system of communal purpose and belief was damaged. The Reformation and the subsequent fragmentation of Protestant
theology are surely testimony to this: the fabric of Christian culture
was beginning to crumble; the more it crumbled, the more it could be
viewed as an oppressive mistake; and the more it was viewed as an oppres-
sive mistake, the more the symbols of science could be viewed as the new
abstract savior. The rigors of science not only provided a method of
establishing agreement about something, when theology could not, but it
also promised the means whereby the labors of survival could be greatly
relieved.

Without denigrating the achievements or desirability of science,
there does seem to be some question as to the consequences of the whole-
sale subsumption of the sacred, internal, experiential, and Spirit of the
Law, by the secular, external, behavioral, and the Letter of the Law.
Indeed, there seems to be some question if such subsumption is possible.
Such reflections find their basis in the recognition that internal im-
plies external, sacred implies secular, the spirit implies the letter,
and experience implies behavior.

From such dialectical insights it becomes possible, if not necessary,
to view the "subsumption" of one set of terms by another as fundamentally
illusory. The seeming antagonism is balanced by a necessary compliment-
tarity. One cannot choose one set without choosing the other. Indeed,
there is no choice at all. In other words, from the moment of our con-
ceptions, a non-dialectical reality is a logical, psychological, and
biological impossibility. Thus, there is really no question of the sub-
sumption of internal by external, or vice versa, but only the question
of how it could seem as though there were.

Another way of saying this is that a person is the sum total of his
experiences and behaviors. If there is a gross predisposition to favor the external as opposed to the internal or vice versa, we may conclude that the organism is relatively out of balance. However, these imbalances may be natural and developmental as well as the products of trauma and miseducation. The infant cannot be expected to respond as would an adolescent or a mature adult. However, the judgment of imbalance is also dependent upon experiences of the person.

What is a person? Ronald Laing defines a person in a twofold way: "In terms of experience, as a center of orientation of the objective universe; and in terms of behavior, as the origin of actions." From this it follows that if a person consciously or unconsciously considers himself as primarily an originator of actions as opposed to a "center of the objective universe," he has seen only half of himself. Furthermore, since man is a two-dimensional being, at the very least, the implicit or explicit view that man is not is not really half a picture, but no picture at all. To see half a man is not to see man at all, but rather the Procrustean reflection of what one is able to see. To be half a person is not to be a person at all. The cruel paradox is that to see and be an originator of actions presupposes the ability to be and see oneself as the center of the objective universe, as the receiver, as well as the transformer of experience. The paradox becomes cruel when behavior is uninformed by experience and experience is not transformed by behavior.

Now Christian culture supplied a model of both experience and behavior. Every Christian by virtue of his participation in the sacraments,

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partook of the flesh and blood, the experience and behavior of Christ.

The body and soul of the believer became one with the body and soul of the Savior, and the bodies and souls of the believers were united in the larger corporate and Mystical Body. Viewed in this context Christian culture can be viewed much as we view the religious of our more primitive ancestors.

According to Joseph Campbell, man tended to identify with that which is most immediate and dangerous.

For the primitive hunting peoples of those remotest human millenniums when the sabertooth tiger, the mammoth, and the lesser presences of the animal kingdom were the primary manifestations of what was alien—the source at once of danger, need of sustenance—the great human problem was to become linked psychologically to the task of sharing the wilderness with these beings. An unconscious identification took place, and this was finally rendered conscious in the half-human, half-animal, figures of the mythological totem-ancestors. The animals became the tutors of humanity. Through acts of literal imitation—such as today appear only on the children's playground (or in the madhouse)—an effective annihilation of the human ego was accomplished and society achieved a cohesive organization. Similarly, the tribes supporting themselves on plant-food became catechized to the plant; the life-rituals of planting and reaping were identified with those of human procreation, birth, and progress to maturity. Both the plant and the animal worlds, however, were in the end brought under social control. Whereupon the great field of instructive wonder shifted—to the skies—and mankind enacted the great pantomime of the sacred moon-king, the sacred sun-king, the hieratic, planetary state, and the symbolic festivals of the world-regulating spheres.

Today all of these mysteries have lost their force; their symbols no longer interest our psyche. The notion of a cosmic law, which all existence serves and to which man himself must bend, has long since passed through the preliminary mystical stages represented in the old astrology, and is now simply accepted in mechanical terms as a matter of course. The descent of the Occidental sciences from the heavens to the earth (from seventeenth-century astronomy to nineteenth-century biology), and their concentration today, at last, on man himself (in twentieth-century anthropology and psychology), mark the path of a prodigious transfer of the focal point of human wonder. Not the animal world, not the plant
world, not the miracle of the spheres, but man himself is now the crucial mystery. Man is that alien presence with whom the forces of egoism must come to terms, through whom the ego is to be crucified and resurrected, and in whose image society is to be reformed. Man, understood however not as "I" but as "Thou": for the ideals and temporal institutions of no tribe, race, continent, social class, or century, can be the measure of the inexhaustible and multifariously wonderful divine existence that is the life in all of us.

The modern hero, the modern individual who dares to heed the call and seek the mansion of that presence with whom it is our sole destiny to be atoned, cannot, indeed must not, wait for his community to cast off its slough of pride, fear, rationalized avarice, and sanctified misunderstanding. "Live," Nietzsche says, "as though the day were here." It is not society that is to guide and save the creative hero, but precisely the reverse. And so every one of us shares the supreme ordeal—carries the cross of the redeemer—not in the bright moments of his tribe's great victories, but in the silences of his personal despair.8

The only difference between the primitives as precursors of Christianity seems to be that Christianity shifted the "field of instructive wonder" to man himself. No longer was man to be afforded the luxury of finding God everywhere but himself. Christianity is the attempt of mankind to unconsciously identify with mankind rather than animals, plants, the landscape, or the heavens. Man had become the source of danger and mystery. He had to be a God. The collapse of Christian culture is therefore the collapse of the idea that man and mankind is godly. Moreover, since man is now eliminating himself, as well as everything else, as "the field of instructive wonder" there are those who conclude that "a field of instructive wonder" does not exist. Such a conclusion is warranted if we can agree that our knowledge of ourselves is final and complete. The author believes most strongly that this is not the case.

Man is still the "field of instructive wonder." Moreover, if man is both an experiencer and a behaver, we shall learn nothing of man as long as we are ignorant of the relationship of experience to behavior. Ironically, this is precisely the relationship natural science ignores.

Natural science knows nothing of the relation between behavior and experience. The nature of this relation is mysterious--in Marcel's sense. That is to say, it is not an objective problem. There is no traditional logic to express it. There is no developed method of understanding its nature. But this relation is the copula of our science--if science means a form of knowledge adequate to its subject. The relation between experience and behavior is the stone that the builders will reject at their peril. Without it the whole structure of our theory and practice must collapse.9

Insofar as any unconscious identification with natural objects is precluded, and insofar as the Christian identifications are untenable, modern man has seemingly returned to the quest of trying to find God in things. However, there are not natural things but processed things, the products of his own labors. Secondly, there is no odor of God in them. As such there is little hope for the annihilation of the ego and the social cohesion it provided; and thus there is little likelihood of understanding Man not as an "I," but as a "Thou." Consequently, the sense of oneness and collective solidarity known to our primitive and Christian ancestors seems quite unlikely for us. However, ironically enough, if we are to recover our lost capacity to experience, it would seem that each of us indeed shares the "supreme ordeal;" each of us "carries the cross of the redeemer." And what is more we do it whether we know it or not.

Another way to view this might be to say that Christian culture is in transition. If Christ was the manifestation of Man's attempt to find the "great field of instructive wonder" in himself, the death of Christian culture might be viewed as the collapse of Christian man's attempt to find "the great field of instructive wonder" that is himself. The crumbling of Christian culture seems to presage this view. The turning toward the external and secular as the locus of collective concern as found in the American Constitution, is also a tacit admission that the collective cohesive power of Christianity is no longer serviceable in the collective arena. Each individual is thus turned loose to decide for himself. Each of us is a "Thou," at least theoretically, before the bar of secular justice and an "I" before the bar of judgment. Within the realm where Man traditionally annihilated his ego, modern man now finds his. Conversely, in that realm where he traditionally established his uniqueness is now where he finds his sameness.

Now, the sameness that is found in the secular is vastly different from the sameness found in the sacred. The sameness found in the secular is behavioral and external in orientation. The "fundamental pleasures of agreement" are not experiential in nature. For example, the Letter of the Law says we should not kill each other. It does consider that death is far more complex than the final incapacity to utilize the voluntary and involuntary muscles. It does not tell us how to stop killing each other. It does not inform us why or why not we should want to kill one another. It does not recognize that there are subtle forms of killing. The feeling and depth of emotion that could lead one to murder, or the lack of it, is not experientially dealt with. What is important is that we should not literally do it; not that we should psychologically
want or not want to. The Letter of the Law does not deny feeling and experience. It only places them in a foreign realm. Before the bar of "equal justice under Law" and "due process" it is behavior that is important and not experience and feeling. This is not to say that experience and feeling are not important. It is surely from such experience that the injunction to not kill originated. And it is surely from the same source from which comes the impulse to kill. However, both are beyond the Letter of the Law. Thus, the sameness one experiences is a sameness devoid of experiential confirmation or invalidation.

This is surely not a new problem. However, to the extent that the divorce of letter and spirit is ignored it becomes destructive. To quote R. D. Laing,

As adults, we have forgotten most of our childhood, not only its contents but its flavor; as men of the world, we hardly know of the existence of the inner world; we barely remember our dreams, and make little sense of them when we do; as for our bodies, we retain just sufficient proprioceptive sensations to coordinate our movements and to ensure the minimal requirements for biosocial survival--to register fatigue, signals for food, sex, defecation, sleep; beyond that, little or nothing. Our capacity to think, except in the service of what we are dangerously deluded in supposing is our self-interest and in conformity with common sense, is pitifully limited; our capacity even to see, hear, touch, taste, and smell is so shrouded in veils of mystification that an intensive discipline of unlearning is necessary for anyone before one can begin to experience the world afresh, with innocence, truth and love.10

The lack of the capacity to experience the world afresh is intimately bound to the degree of untruth, decadence, and apathy we find all about us. Culture as it has developed under the aegis of secular science has focused on behavior and not on experience. As such it is really an

10Ibid., p. 20.
anti-culture. Not only has it renounced any inward setting of internal-
ities, any deep communion and agreement among men about the distinctions
between rights, actions, and wrong, but it has abdicated one of the func-
tions without which a culture cannot be a culture. According to Reiff:

To speak of a moral culture would be redundant. Every
culture has two main functions: (1) to organize the moral
demands men make upon themselves into a system of symbols
that make men intelligible and trustworthy to each other,
thus rendering also the world intelligible and trustworthy;
(2) to organize the expressive remissions by which men release
themselves, in some degree, from the strain of conforming to
the controlling symbolic, internalized variant renderings of
culture that constitute individual character. The process by
which a culture changes at its profoundest level may be
traced in the shifting balance of controls and remissions
which constitute a system of moral demands.11

Modern culture has surely organized itself in reference to the
first function of culture. The moral demands have been organized under
the rubric of the secular law. To know the law and the rules of the
game is to render the players trustworthy. It makes activity possible.
However, to the degree that laws proliferate is the degree not to which
men can trust each other, or the degree to which the world is made intel-
ligible, but the degree to which it would be unintelligible and untrust-
worthy without the proliferation of secular law. A handshake is not
legally binding. A word given is not a signed contract. In short, as
the Spirit of the Law declines it is compensated by an increase in the
Letter of the Law. Activity is made possible not through the fundamental
pleasures of agreement, but through the stipulated and agreed upon con-
ditions that would mediate disagreement.

Thus, it is not fundamentally the pleasures of agreement that make

activity possible, but the contemplated prospect of the consequences of disagreement. Activity then is not pleasure oriented, but necessity oriented. Not cheating one's customers is more important than serving them well. However, to serve well would eventually entail an examination of the relationship of experience to behavior. And it is precisely this relationship that the natural sciences and the secular ignores. Moreover, as a result of that ignorance our capacities to re-examine the relationship of experience and behavior have been impaired. So much so that anyone, says Laing, must go through an intensive discipline of unlearning before he can even begin to know what he is about. Furthermore, we have no developed method for understanding this relationship, and "no traditional logic to express it." Yet, this relationship is the very "copula of our science," if science means a form of knowledge adequate to its subject.\textsuperscript{12} Under such conditions it is not surprising that the second function of culture has been consciously neglected by secular culture.

Christian culture organized its controls on the basis of the identification of the congregation with the passions of Christ and the prophets. Such identification was a release from the ego, from the constriction of "I" consciousness. One loved or feared Christ and God, and the "I" turned over and revealed the "Thou." Such identification not only provided the Christian with the temporary annihilation of his ego, and release from the strain of an arduous existence, but provided an experience that was positive in its own right. It is not that identification

\textsuperscript{12}Laing, op. cit., p. 20.
with Christ and the prophets does not accomplish an annihilation of the ego, but it does so by being an experience that is not the experience of an "ego" or an "I." The Christians obtained a glimpse of a transcendent interpersonal or transpersonal existence rather than just an absence of personal burdens. He moved into the ground of god-figures, of demons, principalities and powers. Thus what was remissive was also controlling at the same time.

This is also present in the form of the confessional. It provided a place to say and think the unsayable and unthinkable. The demonic or the daimonic was thus acknowledged on two levels, and the organization of the church was designed, consciously or unconsciously, to mediate the tension and conflict entailed by the setting of a system of moral demands. If one began to doubt, there was a place to share one's doubts. One did not suffer unacknowledged. And, even the ignorant and shallow were as bound to the church as were their more profound and aesthetic brethren. Thus, remission was organized so as to fortify the control. In short, the experience of identification and separation were utilized to fortify the cultural superstructure.

Modern culture reflects the same formal dialectic but on the level of behavior. Whereas Christianity was turned inward to the world of experience, secular culture turned outward to the world of behavior. The turn inward could be maintained as long as experiential states of separation and identification retained their emotional power. The turn outward can be maintained, perhaps, as long as behavioral activity can remain unaware that it is intimately related to an experiential realm.

Christian theology most literally identified itself with experience.
This is perhaps most manifest in the astronomical doctrine that the earth was the center of the solar system. When this was challenged by the Copernicans an obvious imbalance was corrected. However, the exclusivity of experience was also challenged. In modern man the problem is the opposite. It is the exclusivity of the behavioral and secular that begs for remission. However, to the degree that we remain estranged from our experience is the degree to which the remission is both unconscious and unorganized; or, perhaps more appropriately, unconsciously organized.

The cultural problem of modern man is not that there are not remissions, but that there are not remissions from an internalized moral demand system. The demand system is external rather than internal. It is not experiential but behavioral. Thus, it is not a moral demand system at all insofar as it is disassociated from the realm of internalized acceptance and experience. As Christian culture collapses modern man inherits more and more demands that are amoral rather than moral in nature. The Letter of the Law is divorced from the Spirit of the Law, and the Letter grows cancerously in order to cover more and more situations which would need not be covered if the internalized experience of "Thou" were a concrete reality. Thus, what modern man seeks remission from is not a system of moral demands, but from a system of amoral demands, or perhaps, if we begin to understand the relationship of experience and behavior, a system of immoral demands. Indeed, they are immoral to whatever degree they are issued from a stance that is ignorant of the relation of experience and behavior.

This means that experience as opposed to behavior is the co-equal source of morality and thus culture. Insofar as behavior is mediated by
the moral demand system, one is one's own judge and accuser. With the
shift to the behavioral orientation, one is no longer one's judge or
accuser. One is free with other men to make moral distinctions. How-
ever, the distinctions, insofar as they are divorced from experience
tend to become morally shallow. The more shallow they become the more
easily they can be abandoned, and the more easily they can be abandoned
the more shallow becomes the system of moral demands. Furthermore, it is
important to recognize that they are abandoned because they are inade-
quate. The shallowness is adequate. However, modern man, cut off as he
is from the sources of experience, seeks to find a new adequacy in extend-
ing the range of his behavior, and not by recovering his capacities for
experience. Indeed, such behavior is the manifestation and evidence of
the devastation of experience. Modern man thinks experience is behavior
and vice versa. In short, to lose the capacity for experience is to lose
the capacity for feeling distinctions, and to lose the capacity for feel-
ing is to lose the capacity for telling one feeling or experience from
another. Thus, what is called abstract is really concrete and what is
called concrete is really abstract. The "means" are the "ends" and the
"ends" the "means," the medium is the message and the message is the
medium.

In reality, none of this is truth. The reality is that the dis-
tinction can be made if we recover our capacity to experience. Moreover,
if we do not recover our capacity to experience, and the capacity to
feel and internalize distinctions, it is because we have mistaken our
current devastated capacity to feel and experience for normality.

Thus, if we wish to correct this imbalance we shall have to recover
our capacity to experience. However, experience has many modalities.

And immediate experience of, in contrast to belief or faith in, a spiritual realm of demons, spirits, Powers, Dominions, Principalities, Seraphim and Cherubim, the Light, is even more alien to us, we need greater and greater open-mindedness even to conceive of their existence.

Many of us do not know, or even believe, that every night we enter zones of reality in which we forget our waking life as regularly as we forget our dreams when we awake. Not all psychologists know of fantasy as a modality of experience, and the, as it were, contrapuntal interweaving of different experiential modes. Many who are aware of fantasy believe that fantasy is the farthest that experience goes under "normal" circumstances. Beyond that are simply "pathological" zones of hallucinations, phantasmagoric mirages, delusions.

This state of affairs represents an almost unbelievable devastation of our experience. Then there is empty chatter about maturity, love, joy, peace.13

What we must begin to realize is the "maturity, joy, love, peace," are experiential conditions and not cleverly constructed masquerades that fool the players as well as the audience. "Maturity, joy, love, peace," come into being within and throughout human beings. Such states are felt. One can argue, for example, what love is unto eternity. If one never feels, the reality of love is diminished, if not destroyed. Moreover, to experience "love" is not to experience all of love. According to Rollo May, there are at least four distinguishable "forms" of love: libido, or just plain lust; "erōs," the drive to love and procreate; "philía," brotherly love; and "agape" or "caritas," the love which is devoted to the welfare of others, the prototype of which is the love of God for man.14 To know love is not to know just one of these

13Ibid., pp. 26-27.

types but to know all of them. Otherwise, one is restricted in one's development. If love is all lust, or procreation, or friendship, or caring, one operates under conditions that are as often as not inappropriate to the circumstances. If, for example, brotherly love is inhibited, one might expect the repressed potential of such love to intrude upon another domain and vice versa. "Every experience of authentic love," says May, "is a blending, in varying proportions, of these four (types)." \(^{15}\)

Now this blending is experiential and behavioral. However, with the devastation of experience behavior tends to become experience. We rely upon abstract data rather than concrete perceptions and feeling to make judgments and evaluations. The irony of this is that such a renunciation of feeling and experience can be rationalized and justified to the degree that experience has been devastated. Insofar as the evaluations and feelings of the experientially devastated are increasingly inaccurate and destructive, we have ample reason to appeal to reason.

However, the subsequent reliance upon "reason" and statistical information further atrophies the experiential incapacities. Thus, if one wishes to recover the capacity to experience, one can expect difficulty to the degree that the capacity to experience has been devastated. If the exclusive orientation to the secular and external manifests a distorted view of reality one can expect the first remissions from that distortion to be colored and influenced by the degree of distortion.

Psychotherapists are specialists in human relations. But the Dreadful has already happened. It has happened to us all. The therapists, too, are in a world in which the inner is already split from the outer. The inner does

\(^{15}\)Ibid., p. 38.
not become outer, and the outer become inner, just by
the rediscovery of the "inner" world. That is only the
beginning. As a whole, we are a generation of men so
estranged from the inner world that many are arguing that
it does not exist; and that even if it does exist, it
does not matter. Even if it has some significance, it is
not the hard stuff of science, and if it is not, then
let's make it hard. Let it be measured and counted.
Quantify the heart's agony and ecstasy in a world in
which, when the inner world is first discovered, we are
liable to find ourselves bereft and derelict. For with­
out the inner the outer loses its meaning and without the
outer the inner loses its substance.

When our personal worlds are rediscovered and allowed
to reconstitute themselves we first discover a shambles.
Bodies half-dead; genitals dissociated from heart; heart
severed from head; head dissociated from genitals. With­
out inner unity, with just enough sense of continuity to
clutch at identity--the current idolatry. Torn-body,
mind and spirit--by inner contradictions, pulled in dif­
f erent directions. Man cut off from his own mind, cut
off equally from his own body--a half-crazed creature in
a mad world.16

If we follow Laing's line of thought there is no real question of
suppression. Outer and Inner worlds must be brought into balance. How­
ever, outer and inner are, under the aegis of the symbols of science and
the secular, currently out of balance. The outer world has lost its
meaning for modern man for the simple reason that meaning is impossible
without experience. Meaning is not just what we can say it is, but what
we are in sum whether we are ignorant of it or not.

Thus, if one cannot experience oneself and others, if one is dis­
connected head from heart, heart from genitals, and so on, without feel­
ing or experiencing that lack of connection, then there seems little
doubt that one's capacity to discover and articulate meaning is sorely
limited. Conversely, Christianity suffered from the opposite problem--

16Laing, op. cit., pp. 54-55.
"without the outer world the inner loses its substance." If we accept Laing's definition of a person as a transformer of personal experience onto a "given field of intention and action," then experience is insubstantial if it cannot be transformed into action, and action is meaningless unless it has personal experience to transform.

From this perspective the separation of internal-external, secular-sacred, experience-behavior is surely not a curse but the wellspring of all blessings. However, our "derelict and bereft" condition upon first rediscovering our inner worlds is really the evidential measure of the degree to which blessedness is absent. This means that the initial rediscovery is "just the beginning." After the initial rediscovery comes the realization that the realm of experience is as vast and varied as the realm of behavior. The task then becomes both to experience and to conceive the concrete, that is to say, "reality in its fullness and wholeness." Yet Laing is well aware that this task is "quite impossible immediately." "Experientially and conceptually we have only fragments." Furthermore, we have no developed method" and "no traditional logic" by which to understand and express the relationship between the fragments. Still further, those who lead us in this task, i.e., the psychotherapists, are surely not the products of virgin birth. They have been reared in the same culture as the "patient," and are indeed "patients" themselves. Consequently, the task of experiencing and conceptualizing reality in its wholeness is undertaken without an adequate guide to show us the way. Such a situation represents the dissolution of culture.

17Ibid., p. 55.
18Ibid., p. 22.
19Ibid., p. 22.
Those who transmit the moral demand system are a cultural elite, exemplifying those demands in the character and behavior. But an elite cannot merely teach or write of the moral demand system without acting out some part of it. However, the labor of exemplary enactment is divided, no culture survives long without its elite, those cadres which demonstrate the particular balance of control and remission in the culture itself.  

Further,

No culture of which we are aware has yet escaped the tension between the modalities of control and release by which every culture constitutes itself. Cultures achieve their measure of duration in the degree that they build releasing devices into the major controls. These are the devices that modern psychotherapy seeks to develop; it is this development which gives to psychotherapy its present importance in the history of culture.

With the death of Christian culture and the concomitant "conversion" to the symbols of science and to a system of demands that are amoral rather than moral, the cultural elite tends to resemble Spengler's Faustian soul who is better equipped to withstand the damnation of having no moral demand system than to creating or recreating one.

The point is that without a moral demand system one gets the parody of culture without a culture. "The best lack all conviction, and worst all full passionate intensity," said Yeats. And neither is an elite. Indeed, there cannot be an elite without a moral demand system. Thus, Max Weber, responding to the same dilemma, could foresee only "special-

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20 Rieff, op. cit., p. 233.

21 Ibid., p. 233.


ists without a heart;" and Nietzsche saw only the "last man."

Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer give birth to a star. Alas, the time of the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to despise himself. Behold, I show you the last man.

"What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?" thus asks the last man, and he blinks.

The earth has become small, and on it hops the last man, who makes everything small. His race is as ineradicable as the flea-beetle; the last man lives longest.

"We have invented happiness," say the last men, and they blink. They have left the regions where it was hard to live, for one needs warmth. One still loves one's neighbor and rubs against him, for one needs warmth.

Becoming sick and harboring suspicion are sinful to them: one proceeds carefully. A fool, whoever still stumbles over stones or human beings! A little poison now and then: that makes for agreeable dreams. And much poison in the end, for an agreeable death.

One still works, for work is a form of entertainment. But one is careful lest the entertainment be too harrowing. One no longer becomes poor or rich: both require too much exertion. Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both require too much exertion.

No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same, everybody is the same: whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse.

"Formerly, all the world was mad," say the most refined, and they blink.

One is clever and knows everything that has ever happened: so there is no end of derision. One still quarrels, but one is soon reconciled--else it might spoil the digestion.

One has one's little pleasure for the day and one's little pleasure for the night; but one has a regard for health.

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24 Max Weber quoted by Phillip Rieff, op. cit., p. ix.
"We have invented happiness," say the last men, and they blink.25

The devastating divorce of experience and behavior, sacred and secular, is, of course, the divorce of Western culture from its religions, traditions, and foundations. This has staggering consequences if and when we begin to realize there can be no revolution or reformation without a church.26 Indeed, the divorce from tradition guarantees a reactionary and monstrously conservative response. Not only is there no traditional moral demand system to be transformed or recreated, but the abolition of such a demand system under the guidance of the symbols of science creates the impression that such abolition is desirable. Thus, to move against the predominating conversion to the symbols of science, is to move against the fundamentally anti-cultural tide. To move with the tide of science is to move away from culture in the traditional sense. It was such speculation that prompted Weber to bemoan the prospect of "mechanized petrification" and the "convulsive sense of self-importance,"27 associated with the advocates of positivist science. Weber could only hope for "wholly new prophets or a powerful renaissance of old thoughts and ideals" to counter-balance the turning away from the world of "judgments, of value, and faith."28 However, the prospects for


28Ibid., p. ix.
such a renaissance are not auspicious. As Rieff notes:

In our own immediate period the incoherence of the revolutionary imagination...is a consequence of the decline of the necessary and permitting conviction out of which revolutionary imaginations can develop the vitality of tradition. The continuity between tradition and revolution having been shattered, the revolutionary imagination has become distorted. Because we really have no churches, we can have no re formations.29

From this perspective the appearance of psychotherapy, particularly psychoanalysis, on the stage of history could be viewed as an effort to ameliorate the discovery of the disaster of the divorce of experience and behavior. However, psychotherapy seems to occupy a rather devious position in this effort. On the one hand it has helped preside at the wake of Christian culture. There seems to be little remorse for the demise of Victorian morality. Yet to dispense with Victoria is one thing and to dispense with morality is quite another. In the first flush of release provided by the spectacular successes of science and the breaking of our ascetic and anti-sexual fetters, it may well have seemed appropriate to proclaim with Dostoyevsky that since God was dead anything and everything was possible. Yet it did take long for Nietzsche to turn the whole thing upside down--If God is dead, nothing is possible. Likewise, D. H. Lawrence:

Men are not free when they are doing just what they like. The moment you can do just what you like, there is nothing you care about doing. Men are only free when they are doing what the deepest self likes.30


To put it another way, the "outer world" loses its meaning if and when the "inner world" loses its substance and vice versa. In the former instance there is no moral reason or impulse to do or not to do anything. In the latter case there is an impulse and reason to not do something, and less and less reason and impulse to do anything more than you are not doing. In both cases purposeful and passionate behavior and experience are diminished, and in one mode or another, banished from the public realm.

Now, surely psychoanalysis and psychotherapy have played their role in the modern dilemma of deciding what has been done or not been done to our capacity for experiencing. Secondly, psychoanalysis has surely been instrumental in liberating sex from the too spiritual and ascetic bonds of Christian morality. Yet "voluptuaries without a heart" does not seem an improvement over ascetics without genitals. "Love" is not such a simple one-dimensional reality as many modern proponents would lead us to believe. However, psychoanalysis at least recognized libido and lust and gave them their due. However, the other types of love, particularly agape and philia, are regarded by psychoanalysis and psychotherapy as more or less sublimated and disturbed manifestations of the repressed libido and eros.

The position of psychoanalysis seems to be between libido and eros on the one side and agape and philia on the other. Freud's myth of the Primal Father and the brotherhood of the sons does not speak well for the prospects of brotherly love. The brothers not only kill the Father, they find that their killing is of no avail inasmuch as the brotherhood dissolves in the struggle for succession. Nothing really happens except
a useless killing, an abortive revolution, and the descent of a collective cloak of guilt and repressed remorse. Such a myth does not speak will for prospects of democracy either. However, one wonders if Freud's myth of the Primal Father is not more a projection of our future rather than a description of our past. The guilt as Nietzsche saw it comes not with the death of God, but with the realization that it is we who have killed Him.31

As for agape or caritas Freud made his views known in The Future of an Illusion. Religion is viewed as an anarchonic and no longer viable product of sublimation. The love one did not receive as a child was supplied in the love of Christ for man. The security and promise of an after-life supply the poltice for the "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune" which according to orthodox psychoanalysis, cannot really be ended, but only be ameliorated and born with greater wisdom and dignity.

This lack of an eschatological promise has lead many critics to suggest that psychoanalysis begin to psychoanalyze itself. Norman O. Brown has noted that psychoanalysis stands midway between science and the mystic tradition.32 From such a position one might expect psychoanalysis to at least investigate more thoroughly the reality of religious experience. However, this is an investigation that both Freud and his orthodox followers refused to undertake. The supremely analytical attitude of Freud advocated nothing. Analysis, of course, is most decidedly on the side of reason and to Freud a rationalist religion was a contradiction in terms. It is for this reason that D. H. Lawrence

31Nietzsche, op. cit., p. 124.

accused Freud of not being able or willing to "get down to the rock on which he must build his church."

Indeed, the contrast of Lawrence and Freud is a historical example of a rather archetypal struggle. According to Rieff: Freud possessed a coherent and conservative imagination--he was the one conservative genius of modern culture, defending only what can possibly be defended. Whereas, D. H. Lawrence "possessed an incoherent and revolutionary imagination--incoherent because revolutionary." While we surely can appreciate the sobriety and caution that Freud exemplified, we must also acknowledge that sobriety and caution may be carried too far. Lawrence was not unaware of Freud's contribution to the liberation of sexuality: "In one direction," he wrote, "all life works up to the one supreme moment of coition. Let us all admit it, sincerely."

Yet for Lawrence there is another direction, another impulse: "It is the pure disinterested craving of the human male (let us admit the narrowness of Lawrence's conception of masculinity without denying it) to make something wonderful out of his own head and his own self, and his own soul,'s faith and delight, which starts everything going. This is the prime motivity. And the motivity of sex is subsidiary to this: often directly antagonistic." For Lawrence the religious and creative

33 Phillip Rieff quoting D. H. Lawrence, op. cit., p. ix.
34 Ibid., p. xxii.
36 Lawrence, Fantasia, op. cit., p. 60.
37 Ibid., p. xxii.
motive was primal. Thus, in Lawrence's view, to the degree that Freud advocates nothing he ignores the most fundamental attribute of the species. Thus, psychoanalysis liberates a portion of our being from both the burdens of repressive morality and positivist science but leaves the primal and spiritual portions still buried. We have a greater freedom but not the informed experience to use it creatively.

From this perspective psychoanalysis becomes a sort of intellectual bunker where modern man hesitates before the prospects of the possible while holding out against the complete devastation of his soul. Viewed in such light psychoanalysis is both a manifestation and rationalization of ambivalence. There is no salvation, or if there is, the dangers of seeking it obfuscate our ability to conceptualize the possible experience and reward of finding it. Psychoanalysis, eventually reveals its devious foundations insofar as it raises the prospect of experiencing reality in its wholeness and concreteness, but stops us short with only a portion revealed and experienced. Indeed, one might view psychoanalysis as the process by which we can recover enough of ourselves to make bearable the loss of meaning and substance. Therapy can be seen to arise as both a cause and an effect of the death of Christian culture. On the one hand it is a mediator of that disaster, but insofar as it refused to acknowledge its religious implications it may be the author of a disaster on the other hand.

Lest we think the struggle between coherence and incoherence is unique to our time, the Chinese I Ching or Book of Changes states that there are "two prerequisites for a satisfactory political or social organization of mankind." According to this ancient text: "We must go
down to the very foundations of life. For any merely superifical order-
ing that leaves its deepest needs unsatisfied is as ineffectual as if no
attempt at order had ever been made. Carelessness--by which the jug is
broken--is also disastrous. If for instance the military defense of a
state is carried to such excess that it provokes wars by which the power
of the state is annihilated, this is a breaking of the jug."

Moreover, this also applies to the individual.

However man may differ in disposition and in educa-
tion, the foundations of human nature are the same in
everyone. And every human being can draw in the course of
his education from the inexhaustible wellspring of the
divine in man's nature. But here likewise two dangers
threaten: a man may fall in his education to penetrate
to the real roots of humanity and remain fixed in con-
vention--a partial education of this kind is as bad as
none--or he may suddenly collapse and neglect his self-
development. 39

This sort of situation is surely manifested in the postures of Freud
and Lawrence. Freud does not penetrate to the foundations of life and
Lawrence knows it. The failure of Freudian psychoanalysis to penetrate
to the roots gives just enough knowledge and feeling to relieve the burdens
and tensions of our personal and collective histories, but not enough to
transform them into a "given field of intention and action." Thus, modern
man is quite impotent. He can neither move forward or backward. This is
both carelessness and a lack of penetration to wellsprings of the divine
in man's nature. Thus, to the degree that men suffer under the weight of
their own impotence is the degree to which they risk both the sudden col-
lapse of self-development and remaining fixed in convention. And in


practical terms both of these alternatives amount to the same thing. It was such recognition that lead Lawrence to eulogize the "scream of violence" that exemplifies the most immediate expression of an intimate self caught in the "tyrannous permissiveness and publicity of modern life." However, as Rieff suggests, Lawrence would have been a "far less happy auditor of the 'scream of violence' had he heard the 'noises of Nuremberg,' or screams in Freud's Vienna neighborhood."41

If this analysis is relatively correct modern man cannot choose either of the alternatives represented by Freud or Lawrence. However, insofar as he does not choose he neglects his self-development and remains fixed in convention. Thus, in not choosing either, he chooses both. That is to say, by not choosing, he chooses to accept recurring screams of violence and the concomitant impotence to do anything about them except to perhaps kill the screamer, or tranquilize the scream out of existence. Such recognitions lead one to speculate that Christian culture is suffering the fate of its founder, and that the crucifixion of Christ is the crucifixion that all of us bear but cannot suffer. In any event, and ironically enough, the way out is to consciously rather than unconsciously choose both at the same time. This is dialectical choice, not an either/or choice. One must exercise carefulness while one is "going down to the very foundations of humanity." The dangers are real enough as Hitler and the World Wars demonstrate. However, the dangers of not going down are equally dangerous as ghettos and suburbia

40 Phillip Rieff in the Introduction to D. H. Lawrence, op. cit., p. xiii.

41 Ibid., p. xiii.
demonstrate. Ultimately, moreover, the states are life and death. The established order may or may not be morally and spiritually inadequate. We may be inadequate to the task of integrating our more profound levels of experience into consciousness, or perhaps, if we do we may find it was not worth it or a complete sham. Yet, it seems we have little real choice.

The greatest psychopathologist has been Freud. Freud was a hero. He descended to the 'Underworld' and met there stark terrors. He carried with him his theory as a Medusa's head which turned these terrors to stone. We who follow Freud have the benefit of the knowledge he brought back with him and conveyed to us. He survived. We must see if we now can survive without using a theory that is in some measure an instrument of defense.42

Freud let us realize that our civilization represses the "instincts."

However, we must move beyond Freudian theory to further realize that our civilization, and also psychoanalysis to the degree that it remains tied exclusively to sexuality and a narrow conception of libido, represses any form of transcendence.43 Psychoanalysis is a revolutionary doctrine inasmuch as it frees men to seek transcendence and the annihilation of the ego in the sexual act. However, it is a reactionary doctrine to the degree that it allows the transcendence to be corrupted into a behavioral rather than experiential transcendence. To break the codes and behavioral restrictions of a stodgy morality is one thing, to have sexual intercourse with the blending of the different forms and contents of Love is quite another.

Psychoanalysis is also reactionary on the score that sexual inter-

43Ibid., p. 11.
course is the only form of egoic transcendence that it recognizes. The result is that the "unconscious identifications" of our primitive ancestors have been superseded by the wisdom of analysis, and Christianity has become an embarrassment rather than a redemptive reality in the halls of technological academia. The somber wisdom of Freud does not lead us into fields where we may eat our fill and feel of the "divine." Psychoanalysis gives us the crucifixion without the resurrection and dialectical redemption. Through the process of psychoanalytic treatment one may re-experience many of the inhibitions and restraints placed upon one's development, but the experience of that which is developing is often ignored. For example, analysis in general manifests an almost unbelievable and devastating capacity to ignore the concrete experiences of the body. Psychoanalysis reintroduced pain, rage, sorrow, and guilt, and even a little laughter into the quest of knowing who we are. However, rage, guilt, pain, sorrow, etc., have their opposites. These, psychoanalysis tends to ignore. In contrast Lawrence defines his purpose in the Fantasia of the Unconscious as an attempt to "trace the creative and religious motive to its source in the human being." Thus, Lawrence's adventure in the Fantasia leads not to abstract renderings of the "mechanisms of the soul" but to an attempt, paraphrasing Laing, to "distinguish the pattern from that which is patterning."

It is to Lawrence's credit that he had courage enough to formulate a schemata that would account for both the sources of experience and behavior by locating their sources in the human body. Indeed, the body is

44Lawrence, op. cit., p. 60.

that which makes experience and behavior impossible. In the Fantasia Lawrence begins at birth and at birth existence is essence, experience is behavior, sacred is secular, consciousness is unconsciousness: only in the process of development do the juxtapositions become differentiated. The means whereby and the conditions under which this differentiation occurs determines the "setting of internalities" which Rieff tells us is so crucial to culture and the formation of the individual character structure. Thus, precisely because the infant is incapable of such differentiations "his body is for himself."

46 However, precisely because he is so dependent his body soon becomes a "body for the inspection of others." 47 That is to say, he comes into a world where alienation awaits him in a relatively unalienated state. 48 There seems to be little doubt then that a going "down to the foundations of life" entails a going back and down to the needs and experience of our infancy.

It was this that Lawrence attempted in the Fantasia of the Unconscious. His attempt is not abstract description. It is one thing to say, as did Freud, that the infant body is "polymorphously perverse." It is quite another to identify the qualities and attributes of that body, and still yet another to descend from the dominant heights of cerebral abstraction and feel the way the infant feels. Freud stopped at the anal, oral, and genital areas. Lawrence takes us inside, into the solar plexus, into the cardiac plexus, into the cervical lumbar ganglion; in


47 Ibid., p. 11.

short, into the autonomic nervous system.

All of this may sound nonsensical to the man of science. Yet, if science is a form of knowledge adequate to its subject, (and man is surely the subject of science even if he stoutly maintains that he is the object) it must reckon with the relationship of experience and behavior. Experience is surely not confined to the ping-pong of the cerebral cortex. Man is capable not only of feeling but of differentiated feeling, as May's typology of Love demonstrates. In short, man is not just a cerebral cortex even if he does possess the ability to act as if he were.

As Lawrence well knew there are other modes of experience and consciousness than that of the abstract and mental. In the personal and collective development of man there are indeed levels of nervous functioning temporally and spatially antecedent to the cerebral cortex. The "foundations of humanity" seem to lie in this direction. Moreover, the disciplined process of unlearning which Laing says we all need in order to experience the world afresh is to relearn the experience of being little children. This is not to be a little child, but to be an adult who can think and feel and sense and intuit as does a child. It is not a raw innocence and naivete we are after, but a means to redeem that which is redeemable in our lives.

Whereas Freud was concerned only with defending that which was defendable, Lawrence was concerned with redeeming that which was redeemable. However, redemption implies some sort of transcendence, and the forms of transcendence psychoanalysis recognizes are quite limited. In the modern world the annihilation of the ego which our ancestors knew is withdrawn
from the public realm and placed in the bedroom. This is surely better than having none at all. However, it still falls short of a communal transcendence and purpose which allows the individual to feel part of something greater than his inflated self. War seems to be for modern man the only other device he still has that promises such release. However, that too is inadequate as Vietnam demonstrated. As Rieff tells us: "It is time again for both the thoughtful and the passionate of [the] culture to realize that genuine revolutions are basically religious in character."49 If such is the case, it is not "reason" that leads to revolution a la Marcuse, but experience that once articulated expresses and embodies the deepest needs of the species, and which, moreover, is demonstrated and exemplified in the lives of those who articulate it.

From such considerations both culture and psychotherapy must assist us in three ways: (1) to actualize one's individuality; (2) to relinquish one's individuality and share in the common nature of us all; and (3) the ability to move fluently between the experience and behavior appropriate to (1) and (2). Indeed, the viability of the first need is dependent on the second. Individuality can be exercised and developed most propitiously in an environment that provides respite and succor. The community supports the individual, and the individual supports the community. All this, of course, presupposes a fluidity and continuity of an experiential movement that is unknown to most of us. The very fact that it is substantiates the thesis that there are so few "individuals" and so little communal feeling.

As unique specimens we are remarkably alike, and as members of the same species we seem almost alien to one another. In such a situation the hero task as Campbell says is for the individual to save and guide society, rather than the other way around. As a community and culture we have no redemptive goals or eschatology. We do not seek transcendence so much as the release from experiencing that it is perhaps possible. Therefore, the individual is left to discover the universal and communal in himself, and seek to understand it and express it in such fashion as to be of benefit to his fellows. However, this is certainly not an exclusively altruistic task. The hero suffers from a lack of community as much as any one else. His individuality lies precisely in the fact that he becomes aware of the suffering. The aware and experiential suffering is the redemption and release from the unaware and unredeemed suffering. This process constitutes the attainment of individuality, and the attainment of individuality gives rebirth to the possibility of community. That is to say, "the therapeutic process," or the passion, if you prefer, ironically culminates with the realization that either/or choices are absurd. Individuality is impossible without the ground from which it springs. And the ground from which it springs is the body and the body politic.

In short, man creates and is creating himself. Non-being flips into being, the impersonal power of daimonic returns, and man must transform his experience or be overwhelmed by it. If he chooses not to transform his experience by denying it in some form, he is overwhelmed by the inevitable consequences inhering in the fact that experience cannot really be denied. Experience is a given process and the consequences of its
suppression become manifest to those who begin to recover their devas-
tated capacity to experience. However, this takes us deeper into the
world of symbolism, body, type, dialectics, and the "foundation" of
humanity. It is to this world that we now turn.
CHAPTER II

THE COMMON GROUND OF THERAPY AND CULTURE

In the last chapter it was argued that a culture must communicate a system of internalized ideals and beliefs which provide individually accepted controls upon behavior while at the same time organizing a system of remissions which simultaneously fortify the controls while providing respite and relief from the burdens inherent in accepting them. The value of psychotherapy to culture consists in its recognition that such internalizations are not confined to the school or the therapeutic sessions. Indeed, if there is any validity at all to the efforts spawned by Freud, such internalizations are the products of the experiences of our infancy and earliest childhood. Consequently, the collapse of Christian culture has enormous consequences inasmuch as internalizations still occur, but do so outside of a "unitary system of common belief."

The result, as Rieff so aptly notes, is that there are several systems of belief now competing for the task of reorganizing the personality of the West. Thus, psychotherapy comes to the foreground of our interest inasmuch as it is the one enterprise which attempts to deal with controls and remissions unconsciously sought and accepted outside a "unitary system of common belief."

Aside from these connections there is also the question of the gene-
sis and consequences of such internalizations. The purpose of the present chapter is to conceptualize how and why such internalizations take place. The "common ground of therapy and culture" consists in fact that both deal with the processes of internalization. Our task is to conceptualize how the process comes into being. From such a conceptual understanding, it may be possible to view our current dilemmas with a little more wisdom and humility. In any case it seems necessary to investigate the genesis of a condition before we can do a great deal about it.

Bluntly put, the ground of the therapy is also the ground of culture. The *sine quo non* of each is a split or separation in experience and consciousness. According to Geza Roheim:

> We are born with a conflict between our older and more recent heritage, and something in us rather vaguely defined in psychoanalysis as ego is the organic defense against this inherent conflict. The struggle is eternal, the result is never stable.¹

This conflict arises out of the fact that the infant is psychophysically incapable of immediate adjustment and learning in his "more recent heritage." He comes into the world a highly differentiated organism. However, the infant, relatively speaking, has the prospect of his functional differentiation ahead of him. Birth marks the end of one phase of development and the beginning of another, and the human organism is far less immediately capable of accepting and integrating this change of phase than any other organism.

It was such insight that lead Freud to conclude that separation

¹Geza Roheim quoted by Norman O. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 72.
anxiety was the paradigm of all anxiety. That is to say, it was the core of every neurosis and every particular character type. In short, the "ego," the "I," is the result of the conflict between an "older and more recent heritage." Another way of saying this is that the ego, the person, is a what he is as the result of a hiatus of experience that inevitably follows from the conditions of human birth and development. In the language of psychoanalysis the conflict is between culture and nature, consciousness and unconsciousness, super-ego and id, and the ego, i.e., the person, is the result of that conflict. If we seek to understand the ground of therapy and culture we will do well to heed Roheim's insight, or similarly Jung's.

We shall probably get nearest to the truth if we think of the conscious and personal psyche as resting upon the broad basis of an inherited and universal psychic disposition which is as such unconscious, and that our personal psyche bears the same relation to the collective psyche as does the individual to society.

But equally, just as the individual is not merely a unique and separate being, but is also a social being, so the human psyche is a self-contained and wholly individual phenomenon, but also a collective one. And just as certain social functions and instincts are opposed to the interests of single individuals, so the human psyche exhibits certain functions and tendencies which, on account of their collective nature, are opposed to individual needs. The reason for this is that every man is born with a highly differentiated brain and is thus assured of a wide range of mental functioning which is neither developed ontogenetically or acquired. But to the degree that human brains are uniformly differentiated, the mental functioning thereby made possible is also collective and universal.²

Such insight gives us reason to pause on a number of accounts. First of all culture is the attempt to uniformly differentiate brains.

This supplies a kind of compromise and stability that mediates the influence of instinctual processes and one's particular family. Thus, the moral demand system is surely encountered first in the family, however, beyond the family is the tribe or the race or the nation which attempts a more or less uniform differentiation among families. Culture is thus the product of consciousness inasmuch as infants do not articulate outlines of political and social organization. Yet, the articulators of such outlines have been themselves infants. From this perspective culture could also be viewed as the product of the differentiation of consciousness out of unconsciousness. Culture, as it were, is an attempt to provide a uniform state of functioning appropriate to developing and unique organisms. However, insofar as the individual cannot discriminate his uniqueness out of the collective cultural differentiation on one side, and the collective aspects of the unconscious on the other, his individuality, his ego, his "I," is overwhelmed and/or annexed by attributes of the other two dimensions. Indeed, the distinction between what is culturally collective and what is instinctively collective becomes increasingly difficult to make as the individual is overwhelmed by either. What this means is that while culture represents on the one hand the most profound creation of the species, it at the same time threatens to swallow the individual and the species just as totally as do the powerful emanations of the collective unconscious. To put it another way the moral demand system we internalize most immediately through the family and less immediately through our particular culture allows and provides a stability and orientation that permits the child to develop into adulthood more or less harmoniously. In a sense culture can be thought of as
the collective consciousness; as such, it is the measure of the degree to which the collective unconsciousness has been differentiated. However, culture retains the attributes of collectiveness which makes it strikingly similar to that which is collectively unconscious. To the degree that the individual cannot discriminate himself out from both is the degree to which the collective consciousness functions as an obstacle to the further development of consciousness just as does the collective unconsciousness. Indeed, functionally and structurally they become allies, inasmuch as both manifest dangers from inside and outside, that threaten the evolution of consciousness.

According to those of Jungian persuasion the development of consciousness is the "decisive phenomena of human history." However, consciousness is developed most immediately and initially by individuals and not "societies of cultures." We do not collectively articulate a new idea or have the same experience at the same time. Culture is then surely the product of individual imaginations. The individuals, the heroes of the species, experience and articulate a vision of experience that refines and further differentiates the development of consciousness out of unconsciousness. It is a Moses, as somebody has noted, that stops all the fun and imposes the Law. Further developments in consciousness not only entail a struggle with the collective consciousness, i.e., the cultural and moral or amoral demand system, but also a struggle with the collective unconscious. Indeed, it is the acceptance of this struggle and the attaining of new levels of consciousness that makes the individ-

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ual an individual. A given culture seems to supply a developed figure
of consciousness out of the ground of the collective unconscious. How­
ever, to the degree that that figure overwhelms the individual in his
search for individuality and self-actualization it becomes a ground as
well from which the figure of the individual and the configuration of
new moral demand system must be elaborated if consciousness is to evolve.

From this perspective the evolution of consciousness seems to have
"responsibility" and "purpose" built into the conflict of our more recent
and past histories. As such the struggle cannot really be avoided. The
person stands in the gap of his experience. To the degree that he becomes
the obedient sheep of his culture both the personal and collective
aspects of his existence are crowded out of consciousness. However, this
does not abrogate the fact that he does have a uniquely personal "I,"
nor does it abolish the fact that the "I" "rests upon the broad basis of
an inherited and universal psychic disposition which is as such uncon­
scious."

Just because the individual is unconscious of his personal and col­
lective disposition and experience, does not mean that he does not have
them, or that they do not affect his behavior or experience. It just
means that insofar as he is unaware of himself as a personal unique self,
he is unconscious of the effects of cultural and instinctive "disposi­
tions." He is unconscious of his particular character structure. Thus,
in not knowing himself he knows not his position vis-a-vis his culture
and his biology. Consequently, men have two choices. Either they can
avoid any such awareness, or they can begin to accept it and hope that
stability can be maintained in the process. They can either attempt to
reduce themselves to automatons or try to become human. And in the last analysis there is little difference between the men of *Brave New World* and our primitive ancestors except that our primitive brethren still had the potential for development that Huxley's machines seemingly do not.

Whether or not a culture consciously acknowledges the personal uniqueness of the individual, or the ground out of which that individual developed, that uniqueness must be accounted for in some fashion as it is constantly, if unconsciously, always striving to manifest itself.\(^4\)

Any culture, whether "it" knows what "it" is doing or not, must provide releases from the controls it imposes. However, release or discharge, is a vastly different project than the integration and differentiation of the unconscious. Discharge serves to reinforce the dominant controls. Culture organizes the controls so that tension builds, then a culture organizes the releases from the tension, much like permitting a teapot to whistle and boil for a while and then turning down the fire. The great Dionysian festivals, the "catharsis" of Attica tragedy, the identification with Christ of the Apostles, etc., all provided vehicles of release. However, they also acknowledged that there was another realm to be released to. Modern man on the other hand has his remissions. He has sporting events, tranquilizers, television, and endless array of objects and the affluence to purchase them. He has alcohol, psychedelic chemicals, tobacco, the sexual revolution, and an increased literal mobility to provide a means of release from the burdens he carries. Moreover, his access to these releases are built into the controls. It takes money to purchase any of them. However, rather than the internalized

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 90.
moral demands of Christian culture the organization of both the controls and releases is externally and amorally organized. Rather than the Ten Commandments, or principalities and powers, for example, there are the laws of supply and demand, diminishing returns, thermodynamics, stimulus and response. One indeed obtains releases and remissions but one does so without any sense of the meaning or potentiality inhereing in the fact that one must seek them.

In the modern Western version of culture the unassimilated contents and forms of the personal and collective unconscious allow the tension to accumulate; the remissions relieve the accumulated tensions temporarily, but do so on the basis of not admitting there is a personal and collective realm of experience to be discriminated out of such consumptively oriented behavior, which, once assimilated, and refined, would constitute that process by which consciousness evolves and by which individuals and culture are born. Furthermore, there is built into this process of control and remission the ground for further evolution. To the degree that individuals must partake of these controls and remissions, is the degree to which the prospect for articulating visions of experience relating both to individual experience and collective experience is increased; and to that degree the impulse for ever widening and deepening consciousness becomes mandatory. Thus, by whatever particular configuration of controls and releases by which a culture is structurally and functionally organized these very controls and releases necessarily posit the inevitability of further evolution of the dominant controls and releases. To whatever degree then a culture is consciously engaged in organizing its controls and releases from the experience and articulation of the
"foundations of humanity" is the degree to which that culture increases its chances for both stability and change. The ultimate task of such a culture is thus to develop a conception and vision that will encompass and encourage individual and cultural development with minimum discontinuity and maximum stability. To the degree that a culture is unconsciously engaged in organizing its releases and controls in ignorance of the foundations of humanity is the degree to which it is devoted to the production of novel activities and objects which provide the "experiences" by which the burden of unassimilated personal and collective forms and contents may be relieved for a bit. And to that degree productive capacities must be able to supply the demand. Yet, if Marxian analysis is of any value at all, it is the alienating character of the means by which production is carried out that creates the demand for more novel and/or effective "experiences." Thus, economic and productive controls must not become so unstable as to become incapable of meeting the demands for release that they create. Yet, at the same time, the demands they create insure a certain instability. And this threat of instability insures the call for increased control, and the call for increased control demands new releases, which increases the prospects of instability still further.

In short, the impulse to individuality always returns in one form or another. However, according to the Freudians it returns in more and more distorted form. That is to say, the more one severs oneself from any conscious experiences and awareness of one's personal and collective histories the more one is incapable of perceiving its contents and forms. However, those contents and forms do exist and they make their appearance in disguise. The mutual destruction of races and nations can be viewed
as the manifestation of our refusal to integrate and transform the contradictions and conflicts inherent in our cultural, personal, and collectively unconscious lives. Rather than us, it is always them. As such, our behavior becomes symbolic. It is not the Black or the Jew or the woman that we cannot abide, but the Black, the Woman, and the Jew in us. Furthermore, as the definition of psychosis is to be lost in symbols, the primitive have the advantage over modern secular man in that their psychosis is still infused with the divine. They are mad, but as Brown says, it is a "holy madness."5

Modern man, on the other hand, is lost in symbols so distorted that he recognizes neither the symbol, the distortion, nor the holiness. Thus, the cultural differentiation and development of "brains" carried out by the conversion to the "symbols of science" is surely just as distorted and superstitious in its own fashion as were the symbols and identifications of primitive man. It would seem then that if man is to rediscover his humanity he must begin to discriminate and crystalize himself out of the collective consciousness and the collective unconscious. This is to say that consciousness arises out of such a concrecent crystallization on the part of individuals. Furthermore, it is these articulate crystallizations which internalized and institutionalized constitute a given culture. This conceptualization of the relation of the individual to culture may be of great significance. Its significance becomes obvious when we recognize that to the degree the individual refuses the ardors of establishing his individuality, or is condi-

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tioned into a false version of himself, phylogenetic history and our cultural history merge. Thus, modern man is strikingly similar to his primitive brothers inasmuch as both are subject to external forces. In strictly formal terms it makes little difference if the world is totally controlled by outside "spirits" or "natural laws." In terms of content, however, the difference is between holy and unholy madness.

To the degree that this is not perceived is the degree to which the arduous elaboration of consciousness and culture returns to the influence of the collectively unconscious processes. Consequently, if we are to have any conception and experience of the "foundations of humanity" we shall have to crystallize out of our experience that which is uniquely ours. Inasmuch as this enterprise has been abdicated by modern culture these components are fused; thus, our task is to experience and conceptualize their unfusing. Seemingly, it is only with the reseparation into fragments of fused fragments that the relationship of experience and behavior can be elaborated. However, rather than focusing a discussion upon the contributions of modern culture to this entanglement, attention will be turned to the attributes, qualities, and physiological foundations of consciousness and the formation of individual character structure out of it. Moreover, it should be noted that this discussion is not an attempt to recount or criticize anyone's particular view of consciousness or unconsciousness. Rather, discussion will proceed on the assumption that all theories which emphasize a separation of conscious and unconscious contain more than an element of truth. However, in an age of cultural and moral transition the important task is more to infuse the separation with meaning and direction rather than stale defini-
tions. Such an effort, admittedly, is a hazardous one—more often met with justified incredulity than informed interest. However, it seems apparent to this writer that human activity is far more fulfilling if it is infused with a meaning and purpose. Such meaning and purpose can, of course, be expressed consciously or unconsciously. And that is precisely the rub. If it is unconsciously expressed the hope of any sort of moral demand system decreases proportionately. And, if it is expressed consciously, one steps into the realm of Prometheus. In the age of science we do not take to expressions and acts that provoke our moral discomfort. Yet without them there is no real possibility of a culture.

Rollo May has written: "The moral problem is the relentless endeavor to find one's own conviction and at the same time to admit that there will always be in them an element of self-aggrandizement and distortion." Thus, the best method to eliminate and check such aggrandizement and distortion is to offer one's own convictions for the scrutiny of others. Otherwise, one is constantly one's own opponent, and is thus deprived of the pleasures of agreement and disagreement with others. Lastly, there is no concern with establishing conclusively the existence of a "collective unconscious." Instead, interest resides in the possible meaning it could have assuming that is indeed a concrete reality. Thus, the "collective unconscious" is a conception which once integrated and developed allows us to view ourselves perhaps more realistically. On the assumption that this is a worthy goal let us proceed to an examination of

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6May, op. cit., p. 158.
Jung's definition of the collective unconscious.

The collective unconscious is a part of the psyche which can be negatively distinguished from a personal conscious by the fact that it dies not, like the latter, owe its existence to personal experience and consequently is not a personal acquisition. While the personal unconscious is made up essentially of contents which have at one time been conscious but which have disappeared from consciousness through having been forgotten or repressed, the contents of the collective unconscious have never been in consciousness, and therefore have never been individually acquired, but owe their existence exclusively to heredity. Whereas the personal unconscious consists for the most part of complexes, the content of the collective unconscious is made up essentially of archetypes.

The concept of the archetype, which is an indispensable correlate of the idea of the collective unconscious, indicates the existence of definite forms in the psyche which seem to be present always and everywhere. Mythological research calls them "motifs"; in the psychology of primitives they correspond to Levy-Bruhl's concept of "representations collectives," and in the field of comparative religion they have been defined by Hubert and Mauss as "categories of the imagination." Adolf Bastian long ago called them "elementary" or "primordial thoughts." From these references it should be clear enough that my idea of the archetype—literally a pre-existent form—does not stand alone but is something that is recognized and named in other fields of knowledge.

My thesis, then, is as follows: In addition to our immediate consciousness, which is of a thoroughly personal nature and which we believe to be the only empirical psyche (even if we tack on the personal unconscious as an appendix), there exists a second psychic system of a collective, universal, and impersonal nature which is identified in all individuals. This collective unconscious does not develop individually but is inherited. It consists of preexistent forms, the archetypes, which can only become conscious secondarily and which give definite form to certain psychic contents.7

What this gives us is a three-layered concept of the person. At the most primordial levels there is the "collective unconscious, next there is the personal unconsciousness consisting of "forgotten or repres-
sed materials," and lastly there is the level of immediate consciousness which could consist of those contents which the person can recall upon demand. This is essentially very Freudian in character. There is superego, ego, and id in descending order with the ego being neither fully conscious or fully unconscious. This is also strikingly similar to the theological trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. There are further trinitarian analogies that may or may not be of importance or relevance: nonetheless, it is interesting and perhaps worthwhile to mention them.

Physiologists, for example, seem agreed that there is a hierarchy of nervous functioning; in descending order there is "conscious activity," "reflex and automatic activity," and "vegetative activity." Moreover, these activities correspond roughly and respectively to the "cerebral cortex and its auxiliary structures": the cerebellum bulb, spinal cord, and all that remains of the central nervous system if the cortex and its appendages are removed," (this would include the thalamus, hypothalamus, and limbic system); and finally the "autonomic or vegetative nervous system."9

It was from such observation that John Huglings Jackson "suggested the idea of successive integrations of the nervous system, and pointed out that in the erect posture in man, the successively higher structures are actually placed one above the other."10

Similarly Kurt Goldstein elaborated his model of consciousness-unconscious dichotomy pretty much along the same line. In Goldstein's


9Ibid., p. 17.

10Ibid., p. 17.
very empirical model there are performances which "correspond to voluntary, consciously experienced activities": "attitudes" corresponding to "the texture of affectivity to the feelings, attitudes, moods, settings, etc., experienced as inner states of ourselves": and "processes" or "somatic events" which corresponds concretely to the bodily processes or events experienceable only indirectly."\(^{11}\) In any event, Goldstein saw the connection between his own rather abstract expression and the more conventional expression as "mind, soul, and body." It was from such observation that Goldstein was lead to speculate that there were three prototypes of men: "the thinker, the poet, and the man of action."\(^{12}\) Moreover, he hastened to inform his readers that

...these items do not describe, but that they are mere abstractions, each of which represents an artificially isolated aspect of the total behavior of an organism. They may sometimes appear as separate entities, because the one or the other aspect of the total behavior, is at any given time, in the foreground as figure, while the others form the background. Which aspect of the unitary behavior shall become the figure, depends upon the situation and the kind of adjustment demanded from the organism as a whole.\(^{13}\)

In terms of the analogy we have been developing, there seems to be a correspondence, in ascending order, along the following lines:

1. The Collective Unconscious = id = Holy Ghost = vegetative activities = body = the autonomic nervous system = the man of action = somatic events = non-individuality;

2. The personal unconscious = ego = Son = reflex and automatic activities = soul = the old brain = the poet = attitudes = individuality;

\(^{12}\)Ibid., p. 490.  
\(^{13}\)Ibid., p. 313.
3. Consciousness = super-ego = Father = conscious activities = mind = the cerebral cortex and its auxiliary structures = the thinker = performance = society.

The important point to be grasped is that at the time of birth all these possible conceptualizations, types, activities, and parts are quite undifferentiated. For example, we know that the infant is relatively impervious to external stimuli for the first three weeks of life.\textsuperscript{14} We know that he is under the domination for the first fortnight or so of the inter-ceptive nerve endings and organs of the viscera.\textsuperscript{15} We know, furthermore, that these nerve endings and the viscera are closely associated with the phenomena of pain and influence attitude.\textsuperscript{16} We know, also, the myelin, that marvelous substance which provides for the unique conductive capacities of the central nervous system do not even begin to grow for some weeks.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, the myelinization of the neocortical tissue of the frontal lobe is not complete until the age of five or six and that this process is critical to the child's capacity for abstraction and generalization.\textsuperscript{18}

In the language of psychoanalysis the infant is completely controlled by the ID. That is to say, the "ego" and the "super-ego" are non-existent initially and it is only with the development and contact with the outside world that they crystallize out of the ID. In theologi-

\textsuperscript{14} Feldenkrais, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 57.
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 57.
\textsuperscript{17} Arthur Janov, \textit{The Anatomy of Mental Illness} (New York: Putnam, 1971), p. 44.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 45.
cal language it is the Holy Ghost which shines forth and not the Father or the Son. In the language of physiology the infant is completely under the influence of his autonomic nervous system. Consciousness and a sense of "I" and "Thou" or IT, arise only with the ability of the infant to orient himself in space and this, in turn, is dependent upon his ability to orient himself to the vertical. Thus, during the initial three weeks or so in which he is relatively impervious to outside stimulation it would seem that consciousness in any microcosmically relevant degree is not possible. Moreover, since the "muscular apparatus" of the infant is not yet functionally differentiated enough to allow him to express his needs adequately or to fulfill them on his own, the parasympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system, which mediates the function of the secretion of acetylcholine at the nerve endings of skeletal and voluntary muscles, which in turn allows for a differentiation and selectivity of movement and function, is not brought into play. Consequently, it must be the sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system that holds the dominant functioning position during the initial hours and days of life. Several other factors also seem to point to this conclusion.

First of all, the sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system is oriented primarily to the mediation of function of the smooth

19Feldenkrais, op. cit., p. 81.


21Feldenkrais, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

or involuntary muscles and organs of the viscera.\textsuperscript{23} It is not immediately and primarily focused upon the co-ordination of the voluntary musculature, and selectivity and differentiation of movement. Secondly, innervation of any part of the sympathetic system tends to spread to the rest of the system and still further to the body as a whole.\textsuperscript{24} Thirdly, the sympathetic system secretes hormones of the noradrenaline variety which tend to be the opposite or complimentary effect of acetylcholine.\textsuperscript{25} Moreover, the secretion of the noradrenalines by the adrena medulla goes directly into the blood stream and thus is spread equally to the tissues of the whole body, whereas, as far as we know, the parasympathetic secretion of acetylcholine remains selective and differentiated rather than diffuse.\textsuperscript{26} Fourthly, inasmuch as the infant cannot know consciousness of the mental variety, and inasmuch as he is unable to selectively co-ordinate his movements, it would appear that his functioning is regulated by the great nerve center of the solar plexus, or abdominal brain, which is located in the lower abdomen and which is the most primal component of the sympathetic division. Another way of saying this is that primal consciousness is the consciousness of the solar plexus and the belly. It is, in a word, undifferentiated and quite literally centered. However, this holds true only when the infant is not under intense internal stimulation. Under intense stimulation the centeredness of infantile bliss disappears and the most intense "vasomotor reactions" i.e., crying, vom-

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{23}Feldenkrais, op. cit., pp. 21, 27.
\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., pp. 84-85.
\textsuperscript{25}Seyle, op. cit., pp. 91-93.
\textsuperscript{26}Feldenkrais, op. cit., p. 92.
\end{flushright}
iting, spitting and uncoordinated movements of hand and feet "make their appearance."\textsuperscript{27} Another way of saying this is that when the infantile body responds with such vasomotor reactions, it does so under the influence of the secretion of the noradrenalines which serve as vasocontractors. His crying and vomiting bring his mother or whomever to his aid and the contractions disappear and recede, and the infant returns to his center. In short, the parents act as a kind of auxiliary parasympathetic system until the infant can assume these responsibilities himself. Yet, we must note that the cryings and vomitings are just as much a part of development as the fulfilling of needs. Indeed, such vasomotor reactions are themselves both responses to needs and the fulfilling of needful actions without which development could not take place.

What these facts point to is that both therapy and culture owe their being to the evolution of consciousness. Inasmuch as such evolution presupposes the simultaneous evolution of a hierarchy of nervous functioning and structure appropriate to it, both therapy and culture are concerned in the most concrete sense with the organization of control and remissions within and by bodies and bodies-politic. In short, the common ground of therapy and culture is the evolution and development of the species and the individual organism in all its potential aspects and capacities. Needless to say, the organism suffers to the extent that culture is declining and to the extent that no new "competing system of belief" is capable of expressing and organizing man's deepest hopes and desires.

\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., pp. 89-90.
As interesting as these facts may be in themselves they are as yet without any meaning. However, inasmuch as meaning presupposes consciousness, consciousness of the meaning of infantile autonomic nervous functioning requires not only a reopening to the possibilities of that experience but some reseparating and reconnecting of fragments as well. Without this process we are committed to finding the "soul in the mechanisms of the soul." Returning to Jungian language, if the archetypes are the patterns of instinctual behavior, what is the nature of this instinctual behavior? What are its contents and meanings? Of what use is it to know how the organism ticks and nothing else? It is not again to mistake a pattern for that which is patterning? The pattern of functioning and behavior by itself is of no meaning at all, and no meaning at all means no meaning-at-all, or meaninglessness. Furthermore, if consciousness is crystallized out of the collective unconscious and the collective consciousness how is this done? How do we account for the formation of character types? Of what relevance is sympathetic or parasympathetic function to those types? In short, what does it mean to be a human being, who is born, has a childhood, goes through puberty, middle-age and old age and dies?

As presumptuous as it is to attempt to speak on such questions it also is disastrous not to speak of them. Surely, the consciousness of the species cannot grow and develop if it has no conception and experience of development and growth. And it can have no real conception of growth and development unless it has some experiential knowledge of that which is growing and developing: namely, itself. Without such conceptu-

28Sandor Ferenczi, quoted by N.O. Brown, op. cit., p. 316.
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difficulty seems to reside in the fact that the proofs of science are no substitute for a more or less common vision and unitary system of belief. Indeed, the experience of Hitlerian eugenics or Stalinist agronomy are examples that exemplify the inability of science to either supply a common vision or system of belief, or to check the compound lunacies of men who need one desperately. It was such insight that lead Ferenczi to write: "If science is really to remain objective, it must work alternatively as pure psychology and pure natural science, and must verify both our inner and outer experiences by analogies taken from both points of view...I call this the 'utraquism of all truly scientific work." With this as a guiding methodological principle let us undertake the examination of the ground from which such a vision of common belief might be articulated and experienced. Such an examination, if it is to begin at all, must take the risk that an elaboration of detail is perhaps more harmful than helpful. This is not to say that the viability of such a vision will not be contradicted. It is to say that if one searches thoroughly for any possible contradiction before the preliminary vision or paradigm is articulated one takes the risk of never articulating anything at all. Thus, let us stick to the primary sense of concepts and not their endless elaboration. In short, let us stick to that which is patterning rather than the patterns it makes.

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31 Ferenczi quoted by N.O. Brown, op. cit., p. 315.
CHAPTER III

EXTROVERSION, INTROVERSION, AND ANXIETY

In the preceding chapter the common ground of therapy and culture was traced to the development of consciousness and the individual out of the conflict of the collective consciousness on the one hand and the collective unconscious on the other. Such reasoning falls flat insofar as it presupposes the existence of culture--itself a product of consciousness. Consequently, the logical validity of this discussion hinges on the possibility of accounting for the development of consciousness, culture, and individuality in terms of the capacities inherent in the psychophysiological structure of the organism. However, even this enterprise is circumscribed by the fact that no conclusive accounting can be made--there is simply no way of retreating into the dimmest recesses of human evolution and rendering a descriptive account of how we humans became human.

This is not to say that we cannot be informed by the insightful writings of ethnologists, anthropologists, biologists, and antiquarians. However, we should not rely solely upon such renderings when another method of investigation is open to us. This method, of course, is to focus our attention and powers of observation upon the development of the infant. Such a method provides us not only with a concrete and living reality, but with the nearest approximation we can find to the
consciousness of our primitive ancestors.

The present chapter will be devoted to establishing the concrete foundations upon which the conflict between "our more recent and past histories" is based. Inasmuch as the ego is supposedly the never stable result of that conflict we should expect our conscious recognition of the conflict to be accompanied by some designation concerning the particular history, i.e., recent or past, toward which the never stable ego is tending. Jung's concepts of introversion and extroversion reflect such a recognition. However, a thorough investigation of these tendencies is not undertaken. To do so would be to admit the possibility that such tendencies are genetically influenced. Such a discussion is both beyond the competence of the author and the scope of this endeavor. Consequently, the discussion of introversion and extroversion will be confined to those experiences of childhood and infancy which clinical practice and empirical research have demonstrated affect such tendencies.

Joseph Campbell provides us with an elementary sense of these concepts:

Jung terms Extroversion as the trend of the libido recognized by Freud, which is characterized by an openness—one might even say a vulnerability—of subject to the object: thinking, feeling, and acting in relation, willy-nilly, to the claims or appeal of the object. Introversion, on the other hand, is the trend recognized by Adler, which is characterized by a concentration of interest in the subject: thinking, feeling, and acting in relation primarily to the interests—concerns, aims, feelings, and thought processes—of oneself.1

There is surely little doubt that the concepts of introversion and extroversion have historical precedent. One need only recall Heavenly

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1Joseph Campbell, Introduction to the _Portable Jung_, op. cit., p. vii.
and Earthly cities, Ceasar and Christ, God and Satan. Blake's "pro-
ific and devouring" men, inner direction and outer direction, to
attest to the durability of such concepts. Furthermore, there is an
analogy to be taken from physics that helps elucidate this distinction.
Introversion is strikingly similar to the first Law of motion which
states that bodies at rest tend to remain at rest unless acted upon by
an outside force. Extroversion corresponds to the Second Law of motion
which states that bodies tend to remain in motion once set in motion
unless acted upon by an outside force. In the case of inorganic bodies,
the necessary outside force is the product of the "body's" own materi-
ality and the universal field of gravity. Movement in this field
requires an initial expenditure of energy far in excess of the energy
required to keep an object moving once moving. Extroverts are organic
bodies whose energy is consumed in their active relationships to
"objects." Whereas introverts are organic bodies whose energy seems to
be tied up in themselves, extroverts are organic bodies that when in
motion tend to remain in motion unless acted upon by the laws of
friction. Introverts are organic bodies who tend to remain at rest un-
less acted upon by outside energy forces. In both cases, both types of
bodies exhibit a peculiar characteristic of modern man, i.e., his body
is not for himself, but for the inspection of others, i.e., outside
factors. Each needs an outside force to slow down and to get going.
Insofar as this holds true modern man can be treated like an inorganic
body. Indeed, insofar as outside forces are required to excite or in-
hbit movement he becomes an inorganic body. That is to say, he dies.

Yet there is a difference in organic and inorganic bodies. It is
perhaps only a difference of degree, but a difference nonetheless. Organic bodies, for example, have been characterized as "energy systems" in continual self-destruction and creation. This also is true of inorganic bodies as the nuclear physics has demonstrated. However, there seems to be little doubt that organic bodies are capable of development in a direction that the inorganic are not. One may object here that inorganic bodies do grow by virtue of condensation and the like and this may well be true. However, over a period of centuries, the oak that developed from the acorn has evidenced a growth far more discernible and concrete than the rock that lay beside it at the time of its germination. This is not to say that both the rock and the oak will not disintegrate in time and rejoin the undifferentiated embrace of mother earth. Moreover, it is not to say that rocks or trees do not have a kind of consciousness. However, it dies seem to be the case that in organic bodies, and most particularly the organic body of man, that the "outside force" is often "inside," or vice versa.

According to Moshe Feldenkrais:

...only one of the instincts inhibits motion, namely fear or escape. An animal when frightened, either freezes or runs away. In either case, the first response to the frightening stimulus is a violent contraction of all the flexor muscles, especially of the abdominal region, a halt in breathing, soon followed by a whole series of vasomotor disturbances such as accelerated pulse, sweating, up to micturition and defecation.3

We should note that a contraction of the flexor muscles inhibits

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2Brown, op. cit., p. 155.

3Feldenkrais, op. cit., p. 83.
the extensors or antigravity muscles. As Feldenkrais noted, this would seem to be a contradiction insofar as the extensor inhibition would prevent the animal from taking flight. However, the initial degree of contraction of the flexors simultaneously calls forth a proportionate stimulation of the stretch reflex of the extensors. It is as if the body reacts to fear like a shock absorber that has had a sudden weight thrust upon it. There is the initial contraction and then the expansion following upon it. In the language of physics for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. However, in organic bodies the shock absorbers, i.e., the flexors, and the shock releasers, i.e., the extensors, may be prematurely damaged if the weight is too constant or too heavy. One gets a shock-absorber of a shock releaser that is incapable of responding. The anti-gravity mechanisms may become damaged. There is thus a chance that a human animal caught in such circumstances will, like all other animals if the fear reaction is too great, feign deadness. Moreover, if the feigning deadness will not do, and if escape is cut off, all animals are faced with a passive acceptance of death, or the utilizing of such restrained extensor ability as they have in the effort to defend themselves, or the anquish of a fearful impotence.

The critical fact in regard to this phenomenon is to note that the "only instinct which inhibits motion" is also the only instinct that the newborn infant is capable of knowing.

A new-born infant is practically insensitive to external stimuli. At birth he hardly reacts to light effects, to noise, smell and even moderate pinching. He reacts violently to immersion in very cold or hot water. Also, if suddenly

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lowered, or if support is sharply withdrawn, a violent contraction of all flexors with a halt in breathing is observed, followed by crying and general vasomotor disturbance.

The similarity of reaction of a new born infant to withdrawal of support, and that of fright or fear in the adult is remarkable. This reaction to falling is present at birth, i.e., inborn and independent of individual experience. It is therefore right to speak of the instinctive reaction to falling.6

It would seem that the instinctive fear of falling is surely part of our collective histories; as such, it is a universal experience of every member of the phylum. Now, inasmuch as this experience and reaction is initially under the influence of the sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system, the outwardly observed reactions of the infant must be paralleled by the "inward" stimulation of the sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system.7 The fact that the spreading of radiation over the whole nervous system is much greater in infants than in adults is surely accountable by virtue of the fact of sympathetic functioning. However, if the reaction of adult and infant to fear of falling is physiologically the same, imagine how much more intense the experience of fear must be for the infant.

The halt of the breath is sudden disturbance of the cardiac region. It is this disturbance in the diaphragmatic and cardiac regions that is sensed as anxiety. Some people describe it as a sensation of the heart falling out, or as emptiness or cold in the region of the sternum.8

It is little wonder that the breath is halted. Much like walking

6Ibid., p. 84.
7Ibid., p. 84.
8Ibid., p. 84, 85.
into sub-zero temperatures, or greeting any new intense stimulus that rapidly alters one's orientation (physiological or otherwise) to the world, both adult and infant respond in a manner fitting to insure their survival. The charge of adrenalin not only infuses the tissues of the body with a powerful flexor stimulator, but the flexor stimulation prepares for the way for an equally powerful extensor reaction. Moreover:

...the sensation of fear and anxiety due to the disturbance of the diaphragmatic and cardiac regions are actually abated by maintained general flexor contraction, and in particular that of the abdominal region.\(^9\)

In the adult, the loss of orientation is not only literal. The man or woman who finds their husband or wife in bed with another woman or man, the shock at the death of a loved one, the birth of a child, an animal running beneath the wheels of a car, all elicit similar reactions. However, the adult is capable of a differentiation of response which the infant is not. The adult can retreat with a word or a phrase; he can stand his ground and defend himself. He can turn the wheel and in a second or two it is all over one way or the other. The infant does not have such capacities. He has very little means of discharging the extensor reflex in a controlled and effective fashion—thus, the vaso-motor disturbances, the crying, the vomiting, spitting, and uncoordinated movements of hands and feet.\(^10\) In addition, inasmuch as his experience is surely more intense than that of the adult due to spread of nervous innervation and his inability to discharge that innervation in an effec-

\(^9\)Ibid., p. 85.

\(^10\)Ibid., p. 92.
tive differentiated fashion, the infant tends to respond totally and instinctively.

The falling body contracts its flexors to preserve the head from hitting the ground and to strengthen the spine by arching it. In the adult, the same response lowers his head, makes him crouch, bends his knees and halts his breath. His limbs are thus drawn nearer to the body in front of the soft, unprotected parts—the testicles, the throat and the viscera. This attitude gives the best protection possible and instils a sense of safety. The flexor contractions, when maintained, are instrumental in restoring the normal, undisturbed state.

The incitations arriving at the central nervous system from the viscera and muscles in this crouched attitude are synonymous with safety, quietening of the pulse and restoration of normal breathing. All the large articulations being flexed, the resistance to the circulation is largely increased and the pulse slowed down. The cardiac muscle must, however, be capable of the extra effort necessary to contract the heart against the suddenly increased resistance and the higher pressure in it. This was, in fact, assured by the additional adrenalin content in the blood resulting from the initial stimulus.

This pattern of flexor contraction is reinstated every time the individual reverts to passive protection of himself when lacking the means, or doubting his power, of active resistance. The extensors or antigravity muscles are perforce partially inhibited. According to my own observation, all individuals classified as introvert have some habitual extensor rigidity. Either the head or the hip joints are therefore leaning abnormally forward; turning the body is achieved by detour or roundabout means and not in the simplest direct way. Extroverts on the other hand have a more erect standing posture and gait.

In general, every pattern of impulses reaching the central nervous system from the viscera, muscles and soma in general is associated with an emotional state. The muscular contraction being voluntarily controllable, creates a feeling of power and of control over sensations and emotions. This is in fact so. To every emotional state corresponds a personal conditioned pattern of muscular contraction without which it has no existence.

Many people know that they can control in themselves physiological processes, such as preventing a headache from taking hold of them, and many other similar sensations, but dare not say so for fear of being thought ridiculous. Others, on
those muscles of the diaphragmatic and cardiac regions which calms the
sensation of anxiety and fear. This contraction also protects the
vital and relatively unprotected and vulnerable portions of the body and
also elicits the extensor reflex which prepares the way for action,
i.e., flight, fight or standing one's ground in a more differentiated
manner. However, we can also recognize that any configuration of cir-
cumstances that culminates in the "withdrawal of support" in a figura-
tive or metaphorical sense elicits a similar response. To the degree
that the infant is dependent upon "significant others" to effect his
survival is the degree to which "support" is far more metaphorical than
science would define. To the degree that these others supply the vol-
untary musculature that the infant is far from developing--not to mention
the cultural knowledge to use it effectively--is the degree to which
"support" can be understood in the figurative sense. For example, an
infant who suffers an unabated hunger, or whatever interoceptive inner-
vation, of his initial hours and days, is essentially in the same situa-
tion as an infant who is tossed into the air. The support he needs to
survive has been withdrawn. He is then thrown into a situation of dis-
orientation in which he reacts much the same as if he were dropped
repeatedly in his crib. A repetition of such literal or figurative
circumstances conditions the organism to an introverted orientation to
reality. The infant is powerless. He cannot deal with the reality of
his current condition. He thus conditions himself to survive by adopt-
ing the particular set of muscular contractions that correspond to an
introverted form of protection and prevention.

Furthermore, insofar as the infant is presented with similar situa-
tions in which his figurative orientation to reality is challenged in later years he may respond in essentially the same way. As physiologists and psychoanalysts well know the patterns set in our earliest hours and days are most resistant to change. If an individual was, as an infant, deprived of support in the literal and figurative sense, he is more than likely in his later years to meet any prospect of a change of orientation by a similarly survival-oriented mode of behavior. One moreover, adopted automatically and unconsciously in infancy. The difficulty with this is that change does come upon all of us with the passing of the years, and the responses of infancy are not appropriate to the years of middle age or old age.

In short, the muscular contractions which result from the experience and condition of human birth form the physiological and biological basis from which the structure and meaning of one's world and self is elaborated. Of course, this foundation also includes the experience of the womb and the character and quality of the "phfft," to use Norman Mailer's term, that conceived us.

All of this recalls the shock absorber metaphor previously utilized. Indeed, the "basic" biologic law, as Goldstein calls it, works on the same principle:

There is a continuous alternation as to which "part" of the organism stands in the foreground--and which in the background. The foreground is determined by the task which the organism has to fulfill at any given moment, i.e., by the situation in which the organism happens to find itself, and by the demands with which it has to cope.

The tasks are determined by the "nature" of the organism, its "essence," which is brought into actualization through the environmental changes that act upon it. The expression of this actualization are the performances of the organism. Through them the organism can deal with the respective environmental demands and actualize itself. The
possibility of asserting itself in the world, while preserving its character, hinges upon a specific kind of "coming to terms" of the organism with the environment. This has to take place in such a fashion that each change of the organism, caused by environmental stimuli, is equalized after a definite time, so that the organism regains that "average" state which corresponds to its nature, which is "adequate" to it. Only when this is the case is it possible that the same environmental events can produce the same changes, can lead to the same effects and to the same experiences. Only under this condition can the organism maintain its constancy and identity. If this equalization towards the average or adequate state did not occur, then the same environmental events would produce diverse changes in the organism. Thereby, the environment would lose its constancy for the organism, and would alter continually. An ordered course of performances would be impossible. The organism would be in a continual state of disquiet, would be endangered in its existence, and actually would be continuously "another" organism. This, however, is actually not the case. On the contrary we can observe that the performance of the organism shows a relatively great constancy, with fluctuations around a constant mean. If this relative constancy did not exist it would not even be possible to recognize an organism as such; we could not even talk of a specific organism.

This kind of coming to terms of the organism with the environment we call the basic biologic law.12

For the infant the "part" which is "foreground" and the "part" which is "background" are related to a lack of orientation and to the support which attempts to mediate the inevitable anxiety and fear that he must experience on his journey to maturity. If the lack of orientation and the corresponding anxiety reaction are in the foreground one might expect a form of introversion. If the provision of support provides the foreground and the lack of orientation the background one would expect a form of extroversion. In either case, the basic biologic law functions to insure the survival of the human organism. The law "sets" the foundations for its continued integrity as an organism.

12Feldenkrais, op. cit., pp. 92-93.
However, the integrity of the organism may be an alienated or lop-sided one. Later in life, to maintain his integrity as an organism, a person may continue to renounce those capacities and abilities which he automatically sacrificed as an infant and child. According to Jung, however, "The aim of one's life, psychologically speaking, should be not to suppress or repress, but to come to know one's other side, and so both to enjoy and to control the whole range of one's capacities; i.e., in the full sense to know oneself."13

This is a physiological quest as well. The muscular contractions that form the foundation for initial responses to the world are essentially identifiable with what others have called character structure. The individual, the ego, the "I," is who and what it is by virtue of them. Quite literally these particular muscular contractions are the physical referrent of the abstract "ego." Moreover, these contractions are not only of the skeletal or voluntary muscles, but are of the smooth, involuntary muscles as well. Furthermore, inasmuch as the organism is a totality these particular contractions of the voluntary and involuntary musculature affect all activities of the individual.

The structure of the nervous system is such that it is hard to imagine purely sensory, or motor, or vegetative impulses. The most abstract thought has emotional-vegetative and sensory-motor components. Abstract thinking is possible only in conjunction with a special configuration or pattern, or state of the body. The whole nervous system, therefore, participates in every act; whether it is easily observable or not is only a matter of knowing what and how to observe.14

13Jung, op. cit., p. xxvii.

In short, ideas can cause a change of orientation as well. They can challenge the efficacy of behavior and experience manifested in a particular character structure. For example, to the degree that those classified psychologically and physiologically as introverted must eschew the extroverted openness and vulnerability to the object is the degree to which they cannot give of themselves or issue forth generously and productively into the world. Cultural activity presents a danger and threat to their particular character structure. As such, introverts are examples of those members of the cultural elite who write and teach, but do not exemplify the balance of remissions and controls in their lives. From this view, the musculature configuration of each of us is the "setting of internalities": it is the basis for the distinction between "right and wrong." It is that which makes controls and remissions possible and necessary.

Conversely, the extrovert is captured by the world of objects. The self he does not know is the self that has experienced anxiety. Furthermore, his preoccupation with objects is at the same time a defense against the anxiety and the lack of orientation, and a measure of the support he received as an infant that allowed him to overcome it. In simplistic terms the introvert rejects the world and suffers for it; the extrovert rejects himself and suffers for it. However, we have not as yet really dealt with the genesis of extroversion. Introversion can be traced rather quickly to the repeated anxiety of a lack of support. What then is extroversion traced to? A study of the distinction between fear and anxiety will help.

Goldstein defines anxiety as the "experience of danger, of peril
for one’s self. However, anxiety is a unique peril. It differs from fear in the respect that fear is tied to "fear of something, while anxiety attacks from the "rear." Goldstein accepts the distinction between fear and anxiety found in Kierkegard and Heidegger. Fear is "fear of something," an object, an event, it can be faced and overcome. Whereas anxiety is a fear of "nothingness," it lacks an object." Anxiety is, as it were, "a breaking down or dissolution of the world," a complete loss of orientation, a complete loss of consciousness or unconsciousness as the case may be. According to Goldstein, "anxiety appears when it has become impossible for an organism to cope in any way with the tasks which are commensurate to its real nature. This is the endangering situation."15

Now, the real nature of the infant is not only that he is a human being, but that he is an infant human being. He has the needs of all of us. However, he has them in the form of an infant. The satisfaction of his needs and the tasks with which he can cope successfully are circumscribed by his stage of development. Consequently, to expect him to perform a task for which he is not yet capable is to endanger him and encourage the onset of anxiety. Such endangering at the earliest levels of infancy will surely dispose the infant toward an introverted posture and character. In extreme cases of deprivation the body literally seems to have a point of shut down. The infant seemingly deadens himself. As a result, his development is retarded, he becomes an autistic youngster. In the most severe cases the infant, of course, may die. However, for those infants whose need for support is adequately met, the repeated shocks and onsets of anxiety are absorbed by the organism and the advent

of a dominating introversion is avoided. Consequently, an opposite and
more healthy tendency begins to manifest itself.

The child behaves, in some respects, similar to the
brain-injured patient. It is very frequently confronted
with tasks with which it cannot cope, and which menace its
existence. Thus, anxiety certainly plays a great role in
the life of the child. However, it is diminished through
safeguards which the adult arranges and which save the
child from shocks that otherwise would be too extreme.
Furthermore, the anxiety in children is reduced through
a peculiarity which we must consider more carefully, as
it also plays a certain part in the adult's overcoming
of anxiety. This peculiarity is the extraordinarily strong
and general tendency to action, and the urge to solve given
tasks, which belongs to the nature and essence of the child.
Thus, the pleasurable surprise when the conquest of a piece
of the world has succeeded, replaces the experience of
shock. This drive is so strong that the child not only
fails to draw back from the impending anxiety situation, but
possibly goes not of his way to seek them: "Little John
went out to learn the creeps." Not to be afraid of dangers
which could lead to anxiety--this represents in itself a
successful way of coping with anxiety, and with that, repre-
sents the essential difference between a normal child and a
brain-injured adult, in contrast to the patient.\(^{16}\)

Yet there seem to be limitations with this tendency as well. The
limitations seem to reside in the fact that all anxiety has as its
paradigm the experience of birth and the withdrawal of support. The
child or the adult who goes out of his way to seek an "impending anxiety
situation," and overcomes it, is providing reassurance and evidence that
he is adequate to the task of orienting himself in the world. In the
process of development there are, of course, many opportunities "to
learn the creeps"; there are many "challenges" to use the current term.
However, one of the "creeps" of the man of action to learn is the
"creeps" of inaction. Indeed, the strategy of conquest as a means of

\(^{16}\text{Ibid.}, p. 303-304.\)
overcoming anxiety by successfully meeting the "creeps" of the outer world, is circumscribed and sustained by the "creeps" of the inner world. As long as the "creeps" are confined to the outside world, the more the "creeps" of the inner world are constantly projected into the outer world, identified, and given form. One's fear is then in front of one, not to the rear. In short, as long as the "objectless" anxiety of the inner world is not dealt with directly, it must be made manifest in the outer world and/or vice versa. This creates the prospect of continual disturbance outside in the attempt to deal with disturbance inside and/or vice versa.

Essentially the strategy of conquest is limited by the fact that it does recognize the source of the "impending anxiety." Insofar as we accept Goldstein's notion that fear is "nothing but the experience of the possibility of the onset of anxiety," the strategy of the conquest requires that the anxiety be converted into fear.\textsuperscript{17} That is to say, one must identify an object whose conquest will allay one's anxiety and perpetuate one's orientation to the world.

One can, of course, argue incessantly that this process ia a bad thing. The position is being taken, however, that such a phenomenon is inevitable. The process of converting anxiety to fear becomes evil or neurotic only to the degree that the identification of the object is made without reference to the inner world. If the conquest of anxiety through the strategy of identification of a fearful outside "object" is made without reference to the identifier's own repressed anxiety, the identi-

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid, p. 296.
cation of the outside object is made with less and less discrimination. This means that the challenge and enemy outside is a desperate need, rather than an objective struggle of honorable men to give the world normative meaning and form. If recourse to the realm of experience is rejected or ignored, the conquest of the "creeps" outside is a substitute acting out of the anxiety inside. If the inner world is continually rejected, we are faced with a repetition of pseudo-conquests and the continued dwindling of any normative sensibility.

With the dwindling of normative sensibility the strategy of conquest becomes a conquest for conquest's sake. Activity and behavior becomes more and more estranged from experience. Behavior becomes experience, the collective consciousness, i.e., culture tends to function as did the collective unconscious--there is a compulsive need for discharge. Now, however, the adult has the means to discharge the anxiety of his infancy that as an infant he did not. He tends to become a vastly intelligent child. He has means and no ends. He has everything but himself. He becomes lost in objects and projects without vision or heart. Other subjects, i.e., persons, become objects, and the extrovert is only interested in his experience of them as objects and not in their experience of him as subject. Being not interested in their experience of him as subject, he becomes an object in the eyes of others. He loses the capacity to be seen as subject. Thus, the empirical reality is that we are becoming more objects for each other than subject. Our bodies, from sole to cowlick, are not for ourselves, but for the inspection of others. With the loss of the subject, i.e., the individual, the collective consciousness, i.e., culture, functions as does the collective unconscious. Discriminations are thus less and less possible. The labor of the
development of consciousness in a culture or individual so afflicted sinks back into the unconsciousness functioning from which it grew. And with the loss of the 'subject' the possibility of a premature return to such one dimensional differentiation increases.

The individual then stands between the collective consciousness and the collective unconsciousness. He is that which makes possible the discrimination. To make any discriminations in one dimension only is functionally a return to an undifferentiated state while one exists structurally in a multidimensional reality. In short, there is nothing with which to contrast the dimension of one dimensional and strictly outer worldly differentiation. There is behavior, directed to avoiding experience, rather than to assimilating it.

Therapy is the process by which modern man has evolved which is most consciously committed to the process of discriminating the individual out of the collective similarities that impinge upon him. It is a process of crystallization, or the "rising to more personal and interpersonal levels of integration." Cultures, on the other hand, represent the watermark of man's ability to bestow to his progeny the fruits of the labors of the development of consciousness. Education and culture are fundamental attempts to transmit the inherited vision of experience of both our most immediate and most remote ancestors. This history is surely the history of consciousness; and inasmuch as consciousness grows from unconsciousness, it is also the history of the unconscious. Moreover, this history is surely the history of the experience of bodies as

18May, op. cit., p. 164.
well as the behavior of bodies. And, to the degree that a culture is
unaware of this process is the degree it finds its death prematurely.
That is to say, it dies unfulfilled. It does not generate enough
individuals to allow for its continued evolution. Its fulfillment con-
sists now in a barrier, a wilderness in the terrain that must be tra-
versed if consciousness and integration are to continue development.
Transitional periods these. Moreover, inasmuch as all genuine revolu-
tions are religious in character, generated from within rather than
without, as are all successful "evolutions" in the last analysis, this
evolution entails a turn inward, and a subsequent return outward.

Thus, the foundation of introversion would seem to lie in a succes-
sion of reactions to the withdrawal of support. Physiologically, this
finds its strength and definition in the contraction of the flexors
which protect the vital and vulnerable organs of the viscera. However,
in order for this particular pattern to be established there must have
been an inordinate series of such reactions going back most probably to
the time of early infancy. As such introversion reflects a style and
orientation most intimately connected with a predominance of sympathetic
nervous functioning. Physiologically, the body is contracted by the need
to protect itself, and this need manifests itself psychologically in sub-
ject centeredness. One walks through the world with hips and head thrust
forward, the shoulders hunched and rounded. The introvert is "fixated"
at a level at which the need for protection has to be chronically main-
tained. His ability to utilize his voluntary musculature productively
then hinges upon his ability to overcome his fear and anxiety. Whether
he undertakes this task in therapy, yoga, the university, etc., the
initial anxiety must be re-experienced and articulated if exemplary activity is to occur.

The extrovert represents a more or less successful coping with the reactions that lead to introversion. Rather than a predominance of sympathetic function there is a predominance of parasympathetic function insofar as voluntary muscular activity is mediated by the parasympathetic division. Whereas the introvert is leaning forward from the hips and head, the extrovert manifests the opposite tendency. Whereas the introvert cannot let go of the conflict and experience that keeps his head and hips too far forward, the extreme extrovert tends to have the same difficulties in the opposite respect. This difficulty is perhaps most manifest in sexual activity.

If our physiology is accurate, parasympathetic stimulation is necessary for erection in the male. However, sympathetic stimulation is necessary for orgasm. In our straight-back-stomach-in-chest-out-culture, parasympathetic stimulation is most prized. However, the quality of the orgasm and thus the act is more or less dependent upon the degree to which parasympathetic functioning can eventuate in a satisfactory and passionately wholesome release. If sympathetic stimulation predominates the adequacy of the erection will be unsatisfactorily circumscribed. By the same token if parasympathetic functioning predominates to the degree that it cannot be relinquished the orgasm itself tends to be less than it could be. In short, passionate and meaningful sexual experience involves the capacity to experience a contained and powerful release of energy from back to front, from voluntary to involuntary. In any event, there seems little doubt that introversion and extroversion are physiologically and psychologically manifest for those with eyes to
see. (And, even politically, there is the left and the right, liberal and conservative, conservative liberals, reactionaries and radicals. And, of course, at the extremes the similarity of rigidity and intensity often obscures the quite real differences.)

Therapy seeks, to use Jung's terms, to deflate and discriminate the inflations that occur to either side. According to Jung these inflations are the result of incursions of both the collective consciousness into the individual and personal sphere. That is to say, the inflations stand as impurities to be crystallized out of and differentiated from what is uniquely oneself. Cultures, to the degree that they seek to maintain boundaries, rather than expanding them or moving fluently across them, seek to keep inflations intact insofar as their organization of remissions is adequate to the continued stability of controls. Growth is more or less a temporal matter. That is to say, a culture operates by providing remissions and controls appropriate to different stages of development. Life itself is a therapeutic process insofar as these controls and remissions are adequate to its various stages of development, and insofar as they are woven into coherent and flexible whole. With the collapse of the fabric of Christian culture this sort of cultural configuration is no longer possible. Psychotherapy, at its best, is the real counter-culture. Moreover, it is not confined to the professional sphere. It occurs at all levels in varying degrees of effectiveness all of the time. It is, in the last analysis, no better or worse than a particular therapist. Therapy, like culture or teaching, is thus a moral endeavor.

The preceding provides a more refined conception of the ground of therapy and culture, however, it generates no positive meaning other
than an obligation to further investigate the development and misde-
velopment of the human organism. The ground of therapy and culture
may indeed be seen as a split or hiatus in consciousness, however,
consciousness is an attribute of human beings. Consequently, the most
urgent question is, "what is a human being and what capacities does he
have?"

The classifications of introversion and extroversion reveal some of
the patterns and directions of that which is patterning; however, such
examination is not enough. A classification in terms of introversion
and extroversion is a rather simple differentiation. Moreover, the
differentiation expressed in trinitarian relationships may also be in-
adequate. Evidence for this can be seen in the historical presence of
schemata that attempt to explain development and consciousness in a four-
fold way. One need only recall Plato's four stages of cognition:19 the
hermetic classification of the elements, i.e., "earth, air, fire, water;"
Hegel's scheme of normative development, i.e., instinctual immediacy,
right, morality, and ethics;20 the typology of men in the Bhagavad
Gita--"the man of devotion, the seeker of hidden treasure, the man of
knowledge, and the man of vision";21 Jung's stages of development, i.e.,
"infancy and childhood, adolescence, middle-age, and old age";22 the
current vogue of Carlos Castanada's account of the four enemies of men


20George Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. by T. M. Knox


22Jung, op. cit., pp. 8-22.
as expressed by the Uaqui sorcerer Don Juan, i.e., "fear, clarity, power, and old age"; or the title of Rollo May's last two books, i.e., Love and Will and Power and Innocence, to begin to suspect that there may be other factors to think about.

Now I a fourfold vision see,  
And a fourfold vision is given to me;  
'Tis fourfold in my supreme delight  
And threefold in soft Beulah's night  
And twofold always. May God us keep  
From Single Vision and Newton's sleep. 24

Without undertaking a lengthy examination of the relationships of such numerical schemata, it seems to me that the relationship is essentially as follows: single vision is being caught on one side of the split; the twofold vision is seeing the other side; the threefold vision is acknowledging the split that both connects and separates. And the fourfold vision is the revelation of the standing in the split and being the threefold vision happening. In Jung's language, all the inflations have been cleared away, one sees, hears, understands, and delights. The figure of the individual has been achieved, however, the condition for such achievement is to re-enter the world of the collective, for it is only by virtue of re-entry that the individual can be crystallized out of undifferentiation. Moreover, one possesses the ability to move fluently between the various visions as the circumstances require. However, as interesting as such speculations are, it seems that the investigation of relationships among four objects or categories requires more than a flight of intuition. Yet, it may be that intuition is the crucial ingredient for such "seeing." According to Jung and the

other cited sources it may well be. In any case, let us affirm the
return to that which is patterning. It would seem that such a return
is the only methodological principle upon which normative inquiry can
be based.
CHAPTER IV

JUNG'S CONCEPTION OF THE FOUR
FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The present chapter will be devoted to establishing the connections between Jung's conception of the four functions of consciousness and psychophysiological processes and systems. Such an effort reflects the author's faith in the hypothesis that abstract, conceptual, articulations often reflect concrete and largely unconscious contents and forms. Consequently, the content of the present chapter is, frankly, speculative. However, a certain care has been taken to frame these speculations within an empirical framework that lends them scientific support. Lastly, it is perhaps worthwhile to note that Jung considered himself a scientist even though he would hardly qualify for that distinction in the positivist sense of the term. The main difference seems to lie in the fact that science in the positivist sense relies upon carefully controlled experimentation while science in the sense of psychotherapeutics is more concerned with discovering the "variables," and allowing the patient to discover them himself, than with controlling them. Inasmuch as the technique of psychotherapy is a more directly interpersonal endeavor the conceptual categories developed by astute practitioners such as Jung are in and of themselves "variables" not readily accessible to the conceptual endeavors of academically oriented psychol-
ogists. Consequently, to the degree that we are concerned with learning in the interpersonal situation, is the degree to which the conceptual and theoretical categories of practicing psychotherapists and teachers becomes an almost mandatory subject of study. The present chapter is an example of one such attempt. Let us begin by quoting one of Joseph Campbell's succinct summations.

Jung assigns the leading part in the differentiation of types to what he terms the "Four Functions of Consciousness"; noticing that whereas one person may favor thought as a guide to judgment, another will follow feelings: and whereas one will tend to experience both the world and his friends through impressions made directly on his senses, another will be given, rather, to intuiting potentialities, hidden relationships, intentions, and possible sources. Sensation and Intuition are the two functions, according to this view, by which "facts" and the "fact world" are apprehended; Feeling and Thinking, those of judging and evaluating. But as Jung observes and shows--and here is the crux of his argument--only one of these four functions takes the lead in the governance of a person's life, and it is seconded, normally, by only one (not both) from the other duad: as, for example, Thinking supported by Sensation, or Sensation supported by Thinking: both of which combinations (characteristic of modern Western man) leave Feeling and Intuition disregarded, undeveloped, or even repressed and, consequently, in the unconscious, susceptible to activation and outburst as autonomous complexes, either in the way of demoniacal seizures, or, more mildly, uncontrollable moods.¹

If we recall that the individual is differentiated out of the unconscious, then we must assume that for the infant all of these functions are initially the same Function. If we recall further than the infant is relatively insensitive to all external stimuli except that of withdrawal of support (which has figurative as well as literal dimensions) then his first apprehensions of the world are actually apprehensions of himself in the world. In short, he becomes aware of "facts"

¹Joseph Campbell, Introduction to The Portable Jung, op. cit., p. xxvi.
and the "fact world" by gradually becoming aware of himself as a separate fact in the world. However, initially the infant is unaware of this. Thus, the world is himself and he becomes aware of himself as a separate fact of the world by being the experience of that-which-is-unaware-of-a-separation-becoming-aware-of-a-separation. In other words, the "safeguards" manifest in the activities of parents and others which prevent the shock of birth and childhood from becoming too extreme supply the particular stimulus-response which characterizes and somatically defines the infant's initial apprehension of the world, i.e., himself.

Furthermore, if we recall that nervous functioning is hierarchically organized, we must assume that apprehension of the "fact world" precedes any conscious evaluation of it. Consequently, we can assume that "sensation" and "intuition" are the functions most operative in earliest infancy. Moreover, since response to external stimuli is relatively absent, and since voluntary and consciously differentiated movement is confined to "vasomotor reactions" we can assume that "feeling and intuition" are most closely associated with the sympathetic nervous functioning. Eo ipso, "thinking and sensation" are most closely associated with parasympathetic functioning. To put it another way, "feeling and intuition" are more closely associated with the functioning of the smooth involuntary muscles and organs of the viscera and front of the body, while "sensation and thinking" are more closely associated with the functioning of the striated, voluntary muscles located primarily in the back.

We might also note that insofar as consciousness is defined in
terms of the capacities for abstraction, and insofar as science is concerned with the "fact world," there is a correspondence between modern culture and an overemphasis upon parasympathetic functioning. Moreover, since the Jungians have demonstrated that "consciousness," irrespective of culture or sex, is always expressed in dreams and fantasies as masculine in gender, then there is also a correspondence between masculinity, thinking and sensation, and parasympathetic functioning. Conversely, there is the identification of the feminine with the unconscious processes irrespective of culture and sex which leads to the assumption of association between femininity, feeling and intuition, and sympathetic functioning. What all of this may or may not mean, if anything at all, will be examined to some extent in the following pages. The excursion into such associations is justified on the ground that the "copula of our science is the relationship of experience and behavior." Insofar as there is correspondence between feeling, intuition, and experience and sensation, thinking and behavior, such free association is warranted. Moreover, inasmuch as that which is patterning is a highly complex organism, the foundations of experience and behavior must lie in the properties of the organism. Furthermore, insofar as that organism is a body, a totality, the abstract properties or attributes we identify must in some way be connected with the three dimensional body that is the developing human being. Otherwise our most laborious and impassioned efforts to understand ourselves are merely "one's man opinion." Consequently, these tentative efforts at

metapsychophysiology are the necessary ground from which more traditional hypotheses can be generated.

In addition, such speculation is the product of energy. If indeed such speculations are the *sine quo non* for the generation of hypotheses, the energy and experience which articulates them also supplies the requisite "conviction" or faith that will allow investigators to bear with the inevitable cul-de-sacs of scientific investigation.

Furthermore, if we are in the midst of a cultural and moral transition with several systems of belief competing for the "task of reorganizing personality in the West," and if scientific method is the attempt to "democratize knowledge," i.e., make knowledge "something any fool can see," then it is mandatory that such speculations be grounded by reference to physical and bodily reality. As Brown notes: "Knowledge is carnal knowledge. A subterranean passage between mind and body underlies all analogy; no word is metaphysical with its first being physical." There is little doubt that modern science and culture is hostile to such expression. However, if there is anything at all to the efforts spawned by Freud it would seem that a return to the experience from which such expression is generated is mandatory if science is to undertake the examination of its own premisses. Indeed, if therapy is grounded upon any valid assumptions at all, we would expect the emergence of such expression as the "patient" or "initiate" begins to

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3 Rieff, *op. cit.*, p. 4.


differentiate his uniqueness from the collective consciousness on one
side and the collective consciousness on the other.

The patient's conscious knowledge of the Bible was
at a lamentable minimum. Probably he had once heard of
the serpent biting the heel and then quickly forgotten
it. But something deep in his unconscious heard it and
did not forget; it remembered this story at a suitable
opportunity. This part of the unconscious evidently
likes to express itself mythologically, because this
way of expression is in keeping with its nature.

But to what kind of mentality does the symbolical
or metaphorical way of expression correspond? It
corresponds to the mentality of the primitive, whose
language possesses no abstractions but only natural and
"unnatural" analogies.6

Jung is perhaps the leading contemporary explorer into the terrain
of metaphorical expression. However, it would seem to be a colossal
blunder to assume that this means of expression is antithetical to
science.

The collective unconscious contains the whole
spiritual heritage of mankind's evolution, born anew in
the brain structure of every individual. His conscious
mind is an ephemeral phenomenon that accomplishes all
provisional adaptations and orientations, for which
reason one can best compare its function to orienta-
tion in space. The unconscious, on the other hand, is
the source of the instinctual forces of the psyche and
of the forms or categories that regulate them, namely
the archetypes. All the most powerful ideas in history
go back to archetypes. This is particularly true of
religious ideas, but the central concepts of science,
philosophy, and ethics are no exceptions to this rule.
In their present form they are variants of archetypal
ideas, created by consciously applying and adapting
these ideas to reality. For it is the function of con-
sciousness not only to recognize and assimilate the
external world through the gateway of the senses, but to
translate into visible reality the world within us.7

6Jung, op. cit., p. 33.
7Ibid., pp. 45-46.
From our discussion thus far it would seem that consciousness in the mode of thinking and sensation, behavior, parasympathetic functioning, and modern science has neglected the translation "into visible reality of the world within us." Seemingly, a part of this reality has been translated and a part has not. The part that has not justifies the attempt to formulate and articulate it. However, the dominant myth, i.e., science, requires that the formulation be cast into a form that science can begin to verify or invalidate within its own context. That is to say, the most significant subject matter of science really lies outside its context. The context of science is more the method by which such material is democratized. The fact that this material is moral and experiential in nature does not denigrate science, but rather informs it with the creative meaning and substance without which it becomes sterile and destructive. With these considerations briefly noted, let us renew our considerations of the functions of consciousness. According to Jung:

Consciousness seems to stream into us from outside in the form of sense-perceptions. We see, hear, taste, and smell the world, and so are conscious of the world. Sense perceptions tell us that something is. But they do not tell us what it is. This is told us not by the process of perception, but by the process of apprehension and this has a highly complex structure.8

What Jung says is, of course, true enough. However, it seems a level removed from infancy. The "something" that the infant knows is first himself. He does not "know" it in the conventional sense, he is it. The initial consciousness, i.e., unconsciousness, must be an immer-

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8Ibid., p. 25.
sion in "somatic events." Thus the initial sense-perceptions of the infant are the normal experiences of organisms which respond spontaneously and instinctively. The initial streamings are probably related more to the surge of adrenalin into the blood stream, the workings on the tongue at the nipple, the milk gliding down the throat and into the stomach, the initial passages of urine and feces, etc., than to any external stimulation. In short, the initial experience must be confined to the experience of the infant's initial somatic differentiations. He rises and falls like the tide--a living ocean. Moreover, vasomotor reactions are somatic events as are the satisfaction of needs. As primitive as is the expression of infant needs and displeasure, so the satisfaction of his needs and the depth of his pleasure must be equally primitive. In other words, the primal consciousness does not stream from outside but is the inside-streaming. Moreover, apperception, according to Webster's, is defined as (1) "introspective self-consciousness," and (2) "the process of understanding something in terms of previous experience." It would seem then that these primal inside streamings are the ground out of which consciousness grows. That is to say, these earliest personal experiences provide a basis that exercises a selective function upon all subsequent activity. In short, the infant must become sufficiently differentiated functionally himself in order to exercise his differentiating sensory capabilities. Moreover, while sense-perceptions do indeed tell us that something is, they do not tell us what it is. Thus, Jung's schemata, identification, i.e., what some-

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thing is, is a product of the processes of apperception. Thinking then is intimately connected with sensation.

The process of recognition can be conceived in essence as comparison and differentiation with the help of memory. When I see a fire, for instance, the light-stimulus conveys to me the idea "fire." As there are countless memory-images of fire lying ready in my memory, these images enter into combination with the fire-image I have just received, and the process of comparing it with and differentiating it from these memory-images produces the recognition; that is to say, I finally establish in my mind the peculiarity of this particular image. In ordinary speech this process is called **thinking**.

The process of evaluation is different. The fire I see arouses emotional reactions of a pleasant or unpleasant nature, and the memory-images thus stimulated bring with them concomitant emotional phenomena which are known as **feeling-tones**. In this way an object appears to us as pleasant, desirable, and beautiful, or as unpleasant, disgusting, ugly, and so on. In ordinary speech this process is called **feeling**.10

If thinking and feeling are the two functions by which we judge or evaluate the world it is obvious that these are both apperceptive processes. It should be equally obvious that the two processes are interdependent. For example, the six-month old child surely recognizes his mother as she approaches his crib. He remembers, he differentiates, he knows his mother from his father. However, there are surely feeling-tones operative as well. Memory and differentiation are thus surely concrete and experiential as well as abstract and behavioral.

Furthermore, during our childhood and infancy there would seem to be little doubt that feeling-tone evaluation is more pronounced. Janov, for example, notes that it is not until the myelination of the neocortical tissue of the frontal lobe of the brain is completed, at about

the age of five or six, that the child can be hurt conceptually by meanings. Inasmuch as this part of the brain is concerned with cortical abstraction and generalization it seems safe to conclude that "feelings tend to outweigh thinking" as the function of evaluating and judging the world in early childhood.

As with children so with our primitive ancestors. The logic and expression of feeling, of mythology and analogy, tends to be most forceful in the earlier stages of phylogenetic and ontogenetic development. However, inasmuch as thinking and recognition can be divorced from the function of feeling and evaluation the powers of abstraction can be developed more rapidly. Indeed, feeling must be repressed or forgotten to a certain degree if these capacities are to be developed. Thus, the infant, who is too much "feeling," is gradually and firmly disciplined into the development of his abstractive capacities. However, if this discipline, no matter how well intended, is begun before the appropriate age, the child will suffer. Furthermore, to the degree that the abstractive capacities and functions cannot be relinquished, the child's maturing processes of recognition are not informed by his maturing evaluating and feeling processes. And to that degree he becomes relatively more estranged from himself.

Such a possibility would rarely occur in a culture which provided a meaningful and foundational metaphysical glue. If a culture were to be truly predicated upon the deepest and most profound vision it was concerned with articulating and practicing, the abstractive capacities could develop with relatively less difficulty as could all the others.

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11Janov, op. cit., p. 45.
Thus, it would be wise for those who must to the call of science to realize that the fertile ground of science is really the fertile ground of culture and religion. Moreover, to the degree that the "conversions to the symbols of science" was parallel to the deconversion of the symbols of Christianity, science had better reckon with the dialectical reality that if one side dies so will the other; and a new side, a synthesis, can hardly be conceived by a copulation of corpses. The conscious cultural estrangement of sensation and thinking from feeling and intuition quite literally results in Weber's "specialists without spirit and vision" and "voluptuaries without a heart." In other words, feeling-tones and intuition are not utilized in either the apprehension of the evaluation of our activities and the world. It is the budget which must be balanced and not the organism. In physiological terms there is a great dominance of the voluntary musculature over the involuntary in our culture. If archetypes are the images of instinctual patterns one might surmise that the letting go of the involuntary system of controls and contractions plunges us in a world of involuntary remissions. As images these are the dreams and visions of old and young men. And, of course, in modern terms, these images represent a plunge into madness. However, this designation is surely as false as the equation of the middle class with sanity. Indeed, if Jung is correct, the symbols of science are really a brilliant rationalization and justification for the pattern of extroverted functioning. However, insofar as the organism is a totality, and insofar as introverted and sympathetic functioning has an explicit temporal priority over the extroverted and parasympathetic, the elaboration of scientific methods is just another
case of the Emperor's New Clothes.

To sense the above may be the single vision of Newton. To think it may be the twofold vision. To feel it perhaps makes the vision threefold. But to intuit it may be that fourfold vision which allows us to tell the Emperor the truth, he is stark naked, and the masquerade is over. What then is intuition?

The intuitive process is neither one of sense-perception, nor of thinking, nor yet of feeling, although language shows a regrettable lack of discrimination in this respect. One person will exclaim: "I can see the whole house burning down already!" Another will say: "It is as certain as two and two make four that there will be a disaster if a fire breaks out here." A third will say: "I have the feeling that this fire will lead to catastrophe." According to their respective temperaments, the one speaks of his intuition as a distinct seeing, that is, he makes a sense-perception of it. The other designates it as thinking: "One has only to reflect, and then it is quite clear what the consequences will be." The third, under the stress of emotion, calls his intuition a process of feeling. But intuition, as I conceive it, is one of the basic functions of the psyche, namely, perception of the possibilities inherent in a situation.12

We might ask if this is a lack of discrimination in language. If our previous discussion is of any merit the lack of discrimination can only be the result of a lack of consciousness. That is to say, the lack of discrimination in language is predicated upon a lack of the discrimination of the individual out of the twin presences of the collective consciousness and the collective unconsciousness. As such, this indicates a challenge in the evolution of the species. In other words, the lack of discrimination in language corresponds to a lack of discrimination in experience and articulation. This is not to say that such indiscrimination abounds at all of the levels of expression. The discrimation

ination may be present in the mythological or metaphorical means of expression. However, insofar, as this mode of expression and experience remains foreign to us it continues to exert its influence unconsciously, as it were, and thus it is not sufficiently re-experienced to allow an abstract or poetic expression to reach the collectively conscious light of day.

Moreover, if the authority of philosophy and science rests upon its "claim to be able to describe the non-concrete 'universals' or stable forms that underpin the mutable world," such indiscrimination reveals that there is indeed no such thing as a "non-concrete universal." There may indeed be "universals" but they are most assuredly concrete. Consequently, the task of philosophy and science is to accept the fact that a temporal, abstract discourse is the product of the crystallization of consciousness out of unconsciousness. To the degree that this crystallization is muddled and lacks discrimination is the measure of the degree to which that previous crystallizations have failed to discriminate sufficiently between the forms and contents of the collective consciousness and the collective unconscious. Thus, the task is to re-enter the realm of concrete experience. Otherwise, the task of philosophy and science is abandoned and with it the possibilities for the evolution of consciousness. The question is then what is the source of this lack of discrimination?

The source, it would seem, lies in the earliest experiences of infancy. Jung's definition of intuition as the "perception of the

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possibilities inherent in a situation" seems to be a conscious and formulated expression of what the infant is. The infant is a situation in a situation. To the degree that he is undifferentiated he embodies all the possibilities inhering in the species. "Each child is a new being, a potential prophet, a new spiritual prince, a new spark of light precipitated into the outer darkness." Now the perception of possibilities is surely the act of that which can perceive them. Perception in this sense is vision. Vision, however, not in the sense of mere identification, i.e., sleep, but vision in the sense of perceiving the possibilities of different elements in new combinations and movement.

The infant embodies all the possibilities for the further refinement and development of consciousness. In the earliest days and hours his functioning is the manifestation of God knows what. If life came into being in the sea, the infant is surely the crowning pinnacle of that journey. If life evolved from a single cell the possibilities inherent in situation are great indeed. Most immediately, one of the possibilities inhering in this situation is to discover the source for the lack of discrimination between feeling, sensing, thinking, and intuition. Goldstein gives us a clue.

This tendency towards actualization is primal, but it can effect itself only in conflicting with, and in struggling against, the opposing forces of the environment. This never happens without shock and anxiety. Thus we are probably not overstanding the facts if we maintain that these shocks are essential to human nature, even to all organic life, and if we believe that life by necessity must take its course via uncertainty and shock. Even though the tendency to reduce uncertainty, to standardize the environment, may have a correspondence in certain formal peculiarities in science, art, and religion, one cannot emphasize too often

14Laing, Politics of Experience, p. 30.
that it is impossible to regard the contents of cultural products as the expression of uncertainty and anxiety.

Where anxiety, as the mainspring for the activity of an organism, comes into the foreground, we always find that something is upset in the nature of that organism. Or, in other words: an organism is normal and healthy, in which the tendency towards self-actualization is a fact, and whether it is at all, we leave open to question. In any event, even life in its most perfect manifestation must pass through the disturbances which emerge from the adjustment to the environment. The creative person who ventures into many situations which expose him to shocks will find himself even more often in anxiety situations than the average person. Individuals differ as to how much anxiety they can bear. For a patient with brain injury, the amount is very low, for a child it is greater, and for the creative individual it is greatest.

The capacity of bearing anxiety is the manifestation of genuine courage, where ultimately one is not concerned with the things in the world but with the threatening of existence. Courage, in its final analysis, is nothing but an affirmative answer to the shocks of existence, which must be borne for the actualization of one's own nature. This form of overcoming anxiety requires the ability to view a single experience within a larger context, that is, to assume the "attitude towards the possible," to have freedom of decision regarding different alternatives. Thus, it is a characteristic peculiarity of man. Therefore brain-injured persons, whose change we characterized as a loss of the attitude toward the possible, as an impairment of freedom, are completely helpless when facing an anxiety situation. They are entirely surrendered to the anxiety situation, as long as they are not safeguarded against it through an enormous limitation of their world which reduces their human existence to the most simple forms.15

Thus, there would seem to be an intimate relationship between intuition, self-actualization, the joys of conquest, health, and anxiety. The relationship seems to be that the degree of intuition, self-actualization, joy of conquest, and health, is circumscribed by the degree of anxiety. Moreover, as anxiety is as primal as the drive of self-actualization, the source of anxiety is embedded in the objectless

15 Goldstein, op. cit., p. 304, 305.
experience of the loss of an orientation.

As the infant begins to gradually differentiate that something is going on, instead of just being the something that is going on, he gains the possibility for orienting himself. The rudiments of consciousness have emerged. What is more they have emerged as the inevitable result of the shocks the infant has experienced. The shocks must be for consciousness to be, thus there is no question of rearing children without shock. It is a question of balance. The infant does indeed need to kick and scream or perhaps experience a full scale depression. Without these experiences the voluntary musculature does not get the opportunity to begin its initial workings. The vasomotor reactions of the infant are the first exercises of the voluntary musculature, the first primitive stretchings and arching that may lead to dancing. They need to happen. By the same token the infant needs for these reactions to his most intimate needs to be ameliorated. As the abdominal brain, i.e., the solar plexus, seems to be the dominant nerve center during the first hours and days of the infant, the satisfaction of his needs for touch, affection, warmth, security, hunger, etc., return the infant into the collective unconsciousness. However, he returns after a series of vasomotor reactions and satisfactions, thus the quality of each return to the bliss of the satisfied solar plexus is affected by the intervening processes.

If we follow Hughling's observations that the nervous system is organized hierarchically with nervous structures stacked successively one upon the other; and if the solar plexus represents the lowest structure of the sympathetic system we should expect the corresponding
parasympathetic or voluntary center to correspond to the sacral and lumbar plexes of the parasympathetic system. Another way of saying this is to say that the solar plexus represents the center of the initial unconsciousness out of which consciousness is crystallized.

As such, this "pristine consciousness" as Lawrence called it, is the inherent source and center of all possibilities. However, these possibilities are in an undifferentiated form; hence, they cannot be perceived by the infant. When he begins to exercise his voluntary musculature he begins the process by which the possibilities can be perceived. Thus, it would seem logical to assume that the functioning of the lower parasympathetic centers are related to what Jung calls "sensation," insofar as the evolution of consciousness is predicated upon realizing that "something" is, before one learns to recognize what it is.

Again, following the hierarchical principle of successive levels of nervous functioning, "feeling and thinking" would seem to be correspondent to the cardiac plexus in the chest, i.e., sympathetic, and the cranial plexus in the upper back. As Jung stipulated "feeling and thinking" are the functions by which we judge and evaluate the world. Thus, they presume a separation from the world. As the mother stimulates the exteroceptive sense organs (which can only be stimulated by contact) the infant becomes aware that something is. With his orientation in space he becomes aware that this something, i.e., his mother, answers his needs. Thus, in time the image of mother becomes recognizable. However, these apperceived images are strongly colored by feeling-tones. The mother is the satisfier of the infant's needs. She is the source of
stimulation, a source of food, a source of touch and affection, security, etc. Yet, if the infant is to conquer his anxiety, if he is to self-actualize, one of the tasks that faces him is to learn to bear the loss of his mother. The culture, i.e., the collective consciousness, represents the measure of the degree that preceding generations have accomplished this feat. Thus, culture is in many ways set over against feeling. To the degree that abstractive capacities have developed is the measure of the degree to which the apron strings have been cut. However, to the degree that there is still lack of abstractive discrimination is the measure of the degree that they have not. Thus, if self-actualization is to proceed and consciousness evolve, they remain to be examined. Moreover, self-actualization is achieved not by cutting, but by bringing the repressed feelings, etc., into consciousness. Thus, the evolution of culture is tied to feeling. Cultures can then be the offspring of the cutting of the apron strings in their initial stages and victim of being unable to sever the remaining ones. It is these remaining stages which serve as the obstacles of succeeding generations.

From such a perspective intuition would appear to be a return to the consciousness of the solar plexus after the differentiations have taken place. What this means is that the undifferentiated possibilities inherent in infancy become differentiated in adulthood. Now, if the solar plexus is the seat of the primal consciousness it is also the center from which differentiation begins. Thus, to sort out the lack of differentiation entails a perspective or a state of consciousness from which one can "see" and experience one's particular character. In short, the initial function is undifferentiated intuition. Sensation
provides the first intimations of differentiation. Feeling and thinking further extend these possibilities. However, to perceive and synthesize these possibilities and functions requires a perspective where they can be visualized, i.e., perceived, in a differentiated and dialectically transformed way.

Our inability to achieve this perspective, or to embody it in our cultural institutions, accounts for the fact that Goldstein's typology consists of three types while Jung's consists of four. Goldstein:

Depending on the various patterns of centering, we can distinguish between three principle forms of human behavior, which we recognize in the prototypes: the thinker, the poet, and the man of action. In the thinker, the conscious objectifying behavior is particularly in the foreground. But it becomes dangerous if he neglects the "non-conscious," the "experienced mode of living activity, because then his work becomes excessive indulgence in thinking, suspended in vacuo. In the poet, the "non-conscious" attitudes, feelings, moods, etc., prevail. For him it is disastrous if he does not pay tribute to "objective" reality and to verification in action. Then his work becomes exuberance and redundancy of sentiments estranged from reality. The man of action, finally is in danger of losing himself in the milieu situation unless he comprehends, at the same time, the world in its objective aspects and does not lose sight of its entirety, which likewise has to be experienced and "lived through." Otherwise he becomes a destructive machine. If one or the other aspect usurps the foreground in a way detrimental to the total individual, then we have to deal with a deficiency as a result of the defective centering of the adequate configuration.

Jung differentiates this into four types. Similar to Goldstein's concept of centering, Jung finds that only one of the functions tends to dominate and occupy the foreground. Moreover, in Jung's typology the dominant function is seconded by one of the functions from the other duad. Inasmuch as the duads are divided in terms of comprehension of

16Goldstein, op. cit., pp. 490-491.
fact and the fact world, i.e., sensation and intuition, and the evaluation and judgment of that world, i.e., thinking and feeling, there would seem to be a function of exclusivity. That is to say, sensation is never in the foreground supported by intuition or vice versa. Thus, the dominant pairing is usually sensation supported by thinking or vice versa or feeling supported by intuition or vice versa. Furthermore, in Western culture it is the thinking and sensation that seems to predominate while feeling and intuition are left out. What this gives us is a schemata based upon the dominant functioning of parasympathetic or sympathetic systems with the "center" of gravity being primarily in the lower or higher nervous center and secondarily, most often, in the remaining plexuses of the same system. Thus, centering configuration, i.e., character and character type would seem to have a physiological correlation to the degree that the individual tends to operate from one of these centers. The man of action is dominated primarily by the sensation function first activated in the lumbar and sacral plexuses of the parasympathetic system. The thinker is functioning primarily through the activation of the cranial plexus of the upper back; the poet from the cardiac plexus of the heart. The reason that Goldstein does not mention a man of intuition or vision (you may recall he leaves the question open as to whether or not a self-actualizing individual exists—a man capable of perceiving the possibilities inherent in a situation) is that such a man would represent the actualization of the possibility of self-actualization. He would have managed to traverse the three prototypes Goldstein mentions and to have returned to his original center after being moved fluently or unfluently through the other
centers. All the dangers that Goldstein mentions that beset the three prototypes, i.e., the thinker, the poet, the man of action, can only be offset by communication and contact with the "experiences of the other centers." To the degree that this contact and communication is achieved is the measure of the integration and centering of the solar plexus. This must be true insofar as the primal anxiety and primal center of self-actualization is the olar plexus. Indeed, as the center of the most primary anxiety it forms the background of every form of anxiety. Thus, to the degree that movement from any one mode of centering or character threatens a disorientation, this threat reverberates down to the prototypal experience of loss of orientation. Thus, to the degree that anxiety cannot be experienced is the degree to which each form of centering tends to become rigid physiologically and psychologically. Centering then serves as protection from loss of orientation rather than the embarkation center for the continued joys of conquest and self-actualization. Consequently, if movement and self-actualization is to blossom the primal anxiety must be encountered. In short, one must allow oneself to go mad. Under proper guidance this is therapy--loss of orientation and the re-establishment of orientation in an honest rather than a vicious circle.

We should also note that the solar plexus is the location of the literal center of gravity of the body. Centering in one of the other centers tends to make us a little out of balance physiologically and psychologically. Thus, the attainment of harmony and a self-actualizing capacity requires a capacity to move down into the most primal center. However, the return is a return after or process of differentiation.
Thus, the experience of a loss of orientation which we know as infants will not recur: we are no longer infants. It is from such a perspective that the individual may look back upon his existence and see the possibilities and impossibilities inherent in it. He is not limited to one particular posture or mode of relating to the world. Jung calls this process Individuation.

Individuation is Jung's term for the process of achieving command of all four functions that, even while bound to the cross of this limiting earth (Saint Paul's "body of this death"), one might open one's eyes at the center, to see, to think, feel and intuit transcendence, and to act out of such knowledge. This, I would say, is the final good, the Summum Bonum of all his thoughts and work.17

To summarize, let us note that Jung's conception of character type is determined in a twofold way. First of all, there is determination by attitude, i.e., introversion and extroversion. Secondly, there is determination by function. This yields a typology of eight basic types, with the fully individuating person being a ninth. However, typologies are seldom simple. The actual reality is far more complex. For example, if we recall that any particular function is supported by either one of two functions the typology of eight becomes a typology of sixteen. Moreover, if we accept Jung's notion of the compensatory nature of the unconscious we may conclude that the sixteen possible combinations of conscious typology are matched by a reversal in the unconscious. Thus, our typology of sixteen becomes a typology of thirty-two. Thus, individuation within this schemata becomes quite complex.

Secondly, such a schemata would seem to answer a need that grows more urgent by the day. "Theoretically we need," according to Laing,

17Campbell, op. cit., p. 18.
"a spiral of expanding and contracting schemata that enable us to move freely and without discontinuity from varying degrees of abstractness to greater or lesser degrees of concreteness.‖ To the degree that we acknowledge fear and anxiety as evidence of discontinuity, the Jungian schemata gives us some possibility of distinguishing particular orientations and the psychophysiological dynamics that would be involved in movement "without discontinuity." Moreover, if we combine the insights of Jung with those of astute physiologists we get some measure and sense of the concepts of abstractness and concreteness. For example, we cannot possibly call concrete a mature adult who remains fixated at the primordial level of nervous and psychic functioning. Concreteness, in short, does not exclude the possibility of orienting oneself to the realities of one's particular culture. Such a man's so-called "concreteness" is illusory. Conversely, we can hardly label as concrete those behaviors and articulations which ignore the more primordial levels of nervous functioning. In short, to the degree that psychophysiological centering is rigidly maintained in whatever particular mode of attitude and functioning is the measure of the degree of abstractness-concreteness.

As for the expansion and contraction we have evidence of this in the secondary function and in the compensatory and dialectically reversed function and structure of unconscious processes. Physiologically, this is intertwined with expansion and contraction of voluntary and involuntary muscles. Psychologically, there is expansion and contraction in the sense that we come full circle. That is to say, in the process of

18 Laing, Politics of Experience, op. cit., p. 23.
individuation we return once again to our true center we have all four functions operative. Moreover, the two attitudes can be utilized without rigid adherence to any particular one. However, to the degree that this is possible we have a spiral and not a circle. Something alive is growing in a circular fashion. In one dimension this is just a circle, in two dimensions it is a spiral, and in three dimensions the spiral becomes a living reality.

There is a need, however, to connect this schemata to the body inasmuch as a three dimensional existence seems to be the rule from which there is no exception if we are to speak of human existence at all. The specific nature of these connections, of course, remains to be elucidated and verified. The present chapter is only an example of an attempt to generate hypotheses which may be verifiable by experimental techniques. However, it does make use of concepts and intuitions which have born fruit in clinical practice as well as data gathered from more rigorously controlled sources. The final justification for such an attempt is that the "four functions of consciousness," are concepts articulated by human beings and human beings comprise a multi-dimensional reality, and to that extent there must be connections and relationships between the most abstract concept and the primordial functioning of the most isolated cell. In short, our elucidation of concepts and functions must in some fashion correspond to the degree to which individual consciousness has succeeded in freeing itself from the incursions of both the collective consciousness and the collective unconscious.

Without an attempt at such discrimination and truly critical objectivity our most prized and seemingly irrefutable conclusions may conceal motives
and values that render our so-called "objective" knowledge far more "subjective" than we might realize. From this perspective efforts at metapsychophysiology should be greeted as heralds of a more precise and objective science rather than an enemy to be condemned.

Such attempts are, of course, rare and often short-lived in the twentieth century. Frued began such efforts with the concept of oral, anal, and genital character types and corresponding stages of development. Karl Abraham carried forth this work but dies before he could develop any of his preliminary insights. The more enduring efforts along this line have been carried out by those psychotherapists and artists who broke most emphatically with the Freudian School. For example, Wilhelm Reich and Paul Schiller developed cogent and insightful schemata attempting to relate psyche and soma.

Following another line of thought but in the same vein, Jung and his students, have constructed highly complex diagrams that attempt to relate mythological expression to bodily phenomena, processes, and parts. Among the artists, perhaps the most notable are Rilke and D. H. Lawrence. It was Rilke who focused attention upon the "unlived lines of the body" and who refused to continue his analysis with Jung when he learned its purposes: "If my devils are to leave me, I am

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21 Neumann, op. cit.

22 R. M. Rilke, quoted by N. O. Brown, Life Against Death, op. cit., p. 66.
afraid my angels will take flight as well." And, it was Lawrence, perhaps more than any other contemporary artist who intuited the limitations of Freudian thought, and set about to make the connections between psyche and soma as emphatically as he could.

If our discussion thus far is of any merit, Lawrence's intuitions contain much that is of interest to more scholarly and systematically oriented investigators. Consequently, it seems worthwhile to take a short look at what he has to say.

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In this chapter we shall sample some rather lengthy quotations from D. H. Lawrence's *Fantasia of the Unconscious*. As has been alluded to previously, Lawrence's avowed intention in the *Fantasia* is to "trace the religious and creative motive to its source in the human being."\(^1\) Whether or not we agree with the particular conclusions of Lawrence does not detract from the fact that he has given us ample food for thought; nor does it detract from the assumption that "the creative and religious motive" must be grounded in bodily realities and processes. Secondly, we shall attempt to elucidate some rudimentary connections between Jung's conception of the four functions of consciousness, Lawrence's conception of the four great nerve plexuses of the autonomic nervous system, and the more empirical data and conclusions gathered and articulated by Feldenkrais and Goldstein. However, a detailed discussion of such connections and relationships is limited by both the scope of the present effort and the availability of relevant data. Consequently, the present chapter is more concerned with giving Lawrence's views a respectful airing rather than a critical examination or an uncritical panegyric.

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Such an airing will have served its purpose if it provides an example of the maxim that poets and artists are the first to uncover the visions and concealed theorems that in the hands of scientists become paradigms and methods.

Lastly, the reader should be informed that the Fantasia was subjected to the harshest abuse by Lawrence's critics and was politely ignored by his most staunch supporters. Even such a formidable scholar as Phillip Rieff sees Lawrence's doctrinal works as mainly "divided between analyses of over-rationalizing our lives and advocacy of a religious mood, which is specifically irrational and erotic." However, as the following chapter will demonstrate, there is more to Lawrence than criticism for empty advocacy. For example, when Lawrence attempts to connect such concepts as will, love, power, and innocence to physiological processes in the infant, he is attempting to lay a foundation from which to begin to apprehend the phenomenology of alienation in its most concrete manifestations. In an age of science such speculations and convictions seem to be a true resurgence of the irrational and the superstitious. However, a touch of humility and open mindedness is not uncalled for in an age which needs all the friends it can find.

Lastly, the attempt to construct character typologies and related systems on the basis of four categories or attributes is not new. If one is of a Jungian or similar persuasion one might account for such recurrent efforts in terms of the presence of archetypes, or "immutable forms," or "innate ideas," or "categories of the imagination." Whether

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or not any of these particular accounting is final is not really the question inasmuch as such recurrent efforts beg for an accounting of some sort. Similarly, we might note that like attempts have been made in diverse cultures. The Hindu concept of the Chakras, the Sufi ascription of certain attributes to different parts of the body, the ancient Chinese theory of the twelve vital organs, and the association of particular bodily organs and parts found in astrological texts, all bear testimony to the fact that men have traditionally attempted to formulate some system of body symbolism. From whence this need arises and what it portends is certainly open to question. However, there seems little doubt that men have bodies and that their articulations and behaviors must in some fashion be related to the total experience of the three-dimensional organism. With these qualifications and facts briefly noted let us proceed to an examination of Lawrence's conceptualizations.

It may help to note that Lawrence considers the great nerve plexuses of the body as complimentary and polar. For example, the nerve centers on the lowest plane of nervous functioning, i.e., the solar and

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6I know of no authoritative texts on this subject. However, reference to almost any book on the subject will contain associations between various "signs" and the organs and/or limbs corresponding to them.

7Norman O. Brown discusses the need for some sort of body symbolism in the final chapter of his *Life Against Death* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1959).
sacral-lumbar plexuses exercise opposite but complimentary functions at
the primordial level. Similarly, the voluntary and involuntary plexuses
of the chest and back operate on the same principle. This view is
strikingly similar to Jung's conception of the pairing of functions.
However, there is also a polar and complimentary relationship between
"planes." If we recall Jackson's observation that the hierarchy of
central nervous organization is literally stacked one level upon the other we
would expect the lowest level to manifest those tendencies which we
might characterize as the more primitive. Thus, Lawrence characterizes
the level of the solar and lumbar plexus as "sensual" and the upper
planes of the cardiac, cranial plexuses and thoracic "region" as
"spiritual." Consequently, there is not only an opportunity for con-
lict between sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous functioning, or
introverted and extroverted functioning, but an opportunity for con-
lict between sympathetic-parasympathetic functioning at the "spiritual"
level and similar functioning at the most primitive level. However,
for Lawrence, the direction to investigate first is down.

The promised land, if it be anywhere, lies away beneath
our feet. No more prancing upwards. No more uplift. No
more little Excelsiors crying world-brotherhood and interna-
tional love and Leagues of Nations. Idealism and materialism
amount to the same thing on top of Pisgah, and the space is
very crowded. We're all cornered on our mountain top, clim-
ing up one another and standing on one another's faces in our
scream of Excelsior.

To your tents, 0 Israel! Brethren, let us go down. We
will descend. The way to our precious Canaan lies obviously
downhill. An end of uplift. Downhill to the land of milk
and honey. The blood will soon by flowing faster than either,
but we can't help that. We can't help it if Canaan has blood
in its veins, instead of pure milk and honey.8

8Lawrence, op. cit., p. 61.
Such a view broadens our field of vision somewhat. Both the death of Christian culture and the triumph of modern science leave us on top of Pisgah. The lower "sensual" plane is placed in a secondary condition in either case. When Lawrence calls for an end to "uplift" he is literally calling for an end to a top-heavy, pseudo-spiritualized, over-nationalized centering. Such centering is really off-center to the degree that the sensual level is renounced and thereby made inaccessible to experience. There is no fluent movement between attributes and capabilities. We are frozen in a fixed position--a character type, a centering type--which as Freud knew is just another name for hysteria, which is just another name for a secret psychosis, which is another name for the inability to bear a change of orientation, which, of course, leads us back to the anxiety and the primal condition of our infancy.

What does Lawrence have to say about it?

The first seat of our primal consciousness is the solar plexus, the great nerve-centre situated behind the stomach. From this centre we are first dynamically conscious. For the primal consciousness is always dynamic, and never, like mental consciousness, static. Thought, let us say what we will about its magic powers, is instrumental only, the soul's finest instrument for the business of living. Thought is just a means to action and living. But life and action take rise actually at the great centres of dynamic consciousness.

The solar plexus, the greatest and most important centre of our dynamic consciousness, is a sympathetic centre. At this main centre of your first-mind we know as we can never mentally know. Primarily we know, each man, each living creature knows, profoundly and satisfactorily and without question, that I am I. This root of all knowledge and being is established in the solar plexus; it is dynamic, pre-mental knowledge, such as cannot be transferred into thought. Do not ask me to transfer the premental dynamic knowledge into thought. It cannot be done. The knowledge that I am I can never be thought: only known.

At the solar plexus, the dynamic knowledge is this, that I am I. The solar plexus is the centre of all the sympathetic
system. The great prime knowledge is sympathetic in nature. I am I, in vital centrality. I am I, the vital centre of all things. I am I, the clue to the whole. All is one with me. It is the one identity.9

We might recall from our discussion of the primal anxiety reaction that it is the tightening of the abdominal muscles, etc., which is instrumental in relieving the "sensation" of anxiety, i.e., "the heart falling out, feelings of coldness and emptiness." To the degree that this primal fear is unconsciously manifest in the culture as well as in the immediate experience of the infant is the degree to which we lose the capacity to bring consciousness to the clue that the center of the organism is the vital center of all things. Thus, we must find our center elsewhere. Following the insight that we become aware that something is before we become aware of what it is, we would expect the next function to be called into play would be that of sensation or separateness. Indeed, the vaso-motor reactions consequent to the inevitable infantile loss of awareness or orientation is a precondition for this. Moreover, following Jung's schemata we would expect this to occur at the "sensual" level. Lawrence:

But at the lumbar ganglion, which is the center of separate identity, the knowledge is of a different mode, though the term is the same. At the lumbar ganglion I know that I am I, in distinction from a whole universe, which is not as I am. This is the first tremendous flash of knowledge of singleness and separate identity. I am I, not because I am at one with all the universe, but because I am other than all the universe. It is my distinction from all the rest of things which makes me myself. Because I am set utterly apart and distinguished from all that is the rest of the universe, therefore I am I. And this root of our knowledge in separateness lies rooted all the time in the lumbar ganglion. It is the second term of our dynamic psychic existence.

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9Ibid., pp. 74-75.
It is from the great sympathetic center of the solar plexus that the child rejoices in the mother and in its own blissful centrality, its unison with the as yet unknown universe. Look at the pictures of Madonna and Child, and you will even see it. It is from this centre that it draws all things unto itself, winningly, drawing love for the soul, and actively drawing in milk. The same centre controls the great intake of love and of milk, of psychic and of physical nourishment.

And it is from the great voluntary centre of the lumbar ganglion that the child asserts its distinction from the mother, the single identity of its own existence, and its power over its surroundings. From this centre issues the violent little pride and lustiness which kicks with glee, or crows with tiny exultance in its own being, or which claws the breast with a savage little rapacity, and an incipient masterfulness of which every young thing in its own single existence, the marvellous play-love, as well as the bursts of temper and rage, all belong to infancy. And all this flashes spontaneously, must flash spontaneously from the first great centre of independence, the powerful lumbar ganglion, great dynamic centre of all the voluntary system, of all the spirit of pride and joy in independent existence. And it is from this centre too that the milk is urged away down the infant bowels, urged away towards excretion. The motion is the same, but here it applies to the material, not to the vital relation. It is from the lumbar ganglion that the dynamic vibrations are emitted which thrill from the stomach and bowels, and promote the excremental function of digestion. It is the solar plexus which controls the assimilatory function in digestion.¹⁰

It is these two centers which constitute that which Lawrence calls sensual plane. They correspond, it seems to me, quite remarkably with Jung's functions of "intuition" and "sensation." Surely, if "consciousness seems to stream into us from outside, "there must be a clear discrimination between inside and outside for such consciousness to seem to stream. To the degree that this is not possible we could assume a need for the person to maintain a degree of non-separateness. That is to say, the person may, for many reasons, be unable to acknowledge his

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 75-76.
separateness. By the same token we may note the reverse. Indeed, the strategy of overcoming anxiety by attaching or cathecting to objects certainly mediates against the "objectless" fear which must be the fundamental characteristic of infantile anxiety. However, on the other side of the anxiety is the knowledge of centrality. Furthermore there are other "functions" and other plexuses and another plane to be developed.

A the cardiac plexus, there in the centre of the breast, we have now a new great sun of knowledge and being. Here there is no more of self. Here there is no longer the dark, exultant knowledge that I am I. A change has come. Here I know no more of myself. Here I am not. Here I only know the delightful revelation that you are you. The wonder is no longer within me, my own dark, centrifugal, exultant self. The wonder is without me. The wonder is outside me. And I can no longer exult and know myself the dark, central sum of the universe. Now I look with wonder, with tenderness, with joyful yearning towards that which is outside me, beyond me, not me. Behold, that which was once negative has now become the only positive. The other being is now the great positive reality, I myself am as nothing. Positivity has changed places.

If we want to see the portrayed look, then we must turn to the North, to the fair, wondering, blue-eyed infants of the Northern masters. They seem so frail, so innocent and wondering, touching outwards to the mystery. They are not the same as the Southern child, nor the opposite. Their whole life mystery is different. Instead of consummating all things within themselves, as the dark little Southern infants do, the Northern Jesus-children reach out delicate little hands of wondering innocence towards delicate, flower-reverential mothers. Compare a Botticelli Madonna, with all her wounded and abnegating sensuality, with a Hans Memling Madonna, whose soul is pure and only reverential. Beyond me is the mystery and the glory, says the Northern mother: let me have no self, let me only seek that which is all-pure, all-wonderful. But the Southern mother says: This is mine, this is mine, this is my child, my wonder, my master, my lord, my scourage, my own.

From the cardiac plexus the child goes forth in bliss. It seeks the revelation of the unknown. It wonderingly seeks the mother. It opens its small hands and spreads its small fingers to touch her. And bliss, bliss, bliss, it meets the
wonder in mid-air and in mid-space it finds the loveliness of the mother's face. It opens and shuts its little fingers with bliss, it laughs the wonderful, selfless laugh of pure baby-bliss, in the first ecstasy of finding all its treasure, groping upon it and finding it in the dark. It opens wide, child-wide eyes to see, to see. But when the mother puts her face quite near, and laughs and coos, then the baby trembles with an exstasy of love. The glamour, the wonder, the treasure beyond. The great uplift of rapture. All this surges from that first centre of the breast, the sun of the breast, the cardiac plexus.

And from the same centre acts the great function of the heart and breath. Ah, the aspiration, the aspiration, like a hope, like a yearning constant and unfailing with which we take in breath. When we breathe, when we take in breath, it is not as when we take in food. When we breathe in we aspire, we yearn towards the heaven of air and light. And when the heart dilates to draw in the stream of dark blood, it opens its arms as to a beloved. It dilates with reverent joy, as a host opening his doors to an honored guest, whom he delights to serve: opening his doors to the wonder which comes to him from beyond, and without which he were nothing.

So it is that our heart dilates, our lungs expand. They are bidden by that great and mysterious impulse from the cardiac plexus, which bids them seek the mystery and the fulfillment of the beyond. They seek the beyond, the air of the sky, the hot blood from the dark underworld. And so we live.

And then, they relax, they contract. They are driven by the opposite motion from the powerful voluntary centre of the thoracic ganglion. That which was drawn in, was invited, is now relinquished, allowed to go forth, negatively. Not positively dismissed, ut relinquished.

There is a wonderful complementary duality between the voluntary and the sympathetic activity on the same plane. But between the two planes, upper and lower, there is a further dualism, still more startling, perhaps. Between the dark, glowing first term of knowledge at the solar plexus: I am I, all is one in me; and the first term of volitional knowledge: I am myself, and these others are not as I am--there is a world of difference. But when the world changes again, and on the upper plane we realize the wonder of other things, the difference is almost shattering. The thoracic ganglion is a ganglion of power. When the child in its delicate bliss seeks the mother and finds her and is added on to her, then it fulfills itself in the great upper sympathetic mode. But then it relinquishes her. It ceases to be aware of her. And if she tries to force its love to play upon her again, like light revealing her to herself, then the child turns away. Or it
will lie, and look at her with the strange, odd, curious look of knowledge, like a little imp who is spying her out. This is the curious look that many mothers cannot bear. Involuntarily it arouses a sort of hate in them—the look of scrutinizing curiosity, apart, and as it were studying, balancing them up. Yet it is a look which comes into every child's eyes. It is the reaction of the great voluntary plexus between the shoulders. The mother is suddenly set apart, as an object of curiosity, coldly, sometimes dreamily, sometimes puzzled, sometimes mockingly observed.

Again, if a mother neglects her child, it cries, it weeps for her love and attention. Its pitiful lament is one of the forms of compulsion from the upper centre. This insistence on pity, on love, is quite different from the rageous weeping, which is compulsion from the lower centre, below the diaphragm. Again, some children just drop everything they can lay hands on over the edge of their crib, or their table. They drop everything out of sight. And then they look up with a curious look of negative triumph. This is again a form of recoil from the upper centre, the obliteration of the thing which is outside. And here a child is acting quite differently from the child who joyously smashes. The desire to smash comes from the lower centre.

We can quite well recognize the will exerted from the lower centre. We call it headstrong temper and masterfulness. But the peculiar will of the upper centre—the sort of nervous, critical objectivity, the deliberate forcing of sympathy, the play upon pity and tenderness, the plaintive bullying of love, or the benevolent bullying of love—these we don't care to recognize. They are the extravagance of spiritual will. But in its true harmony the thoracic ganglion is a centre of happier activity: of real, eager curiosity, of the delightful desire to pick things to pieces, and the desire to put them together again, the desire to "find out," and the desire to invent: all this arises on the upper plane, at the volitional centre of the thoracic ganglion.

Throughout the remainder of the Fantasia one finds brilliant fragmental observations of what amounts to a theory of character formation. Although Lawrence does not develop these in any systematic fashion, it is important to note that many of these observations have been confirmed by those therapists who have had the courage and wisdom to begin to

\[\text{\textsuperscript{11}}\text{Ibid., pp. 77-80.}\]
relate "psychic" phenomena to "somatic" phenomena. Furthermore, to whatever degree there is a correspondence between Lawrence and Jung, modern empirical social science seems at least on the verge of supplying some verification.

Raymond Cattell, for example, has devised some highly innovative and objective psychological and physiological tests that confirm more than a few of the intuitive concepts of "astute clinicians." Cattell's work also breaks down into four factors as the "building blocks" of personality, and while we would expect certain divergences between a Jung or a Freud and an investigator that utilizes "factor analysis" the similarities remain all the more striking. However, the crucial importance of these efforts is not that they confirm or deny Jung or Lawrence or Freud, but that they do so from the standpoint of an empirical posture which is still devoid of the concrete experience that gives the concepts meaning and substance. Thus, Cattell sees no return to feeling of intuition, or the reverence which the Chinese tell us is the basis of all culture. Rather we get a "democratic basis for evaluating wants: technocratic machinery; hoards of specialists to administer the wants; "social science training and psychological selection of political leaders"; "acceptance of evolutionary, ethical values in place of dogmatic religious values in social legislation"; etc., all of which sounds reasonable enough but which lacks any concrete experience of just what the organism is and what its potential may be.

The difficulty of such approaches is that they throw the baby out

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13Ibid., p. 42.
with the bathwater. The "heart's agony" can be quantified quite probably. With enough data and the time and machinery to play with it, we can all be conditioned into a state of stable euphoria. Types can be adjusted to types, types to occupations, and all will go well. The only question is that one is dealing with "personalities or character types that are already the products of alienation, and there is a vast normative difference between adjusting aberrations and mutations of lives unfulfilled and investigating the promises of fulfillment.

Indeed, the latter would seem a prerequisite for the former. That this is ignored is evidenced in the following statement of Cattell:
"There's plenty that goes on to disgust any thinking man these days. But I am confident that the basic thrust is toward a higher intelligence, and a greater sanity."¹⁴

If our theoretical speculations have any value at all there is reason to suspect such language. The "thinking man" is not the only man. "Disgust" has its sources outside of the realm of thinking. Evidently what is going on that is disgusting to the thinking man resides in character motivations and dispositions that are to be ameliorated by technocratic schemes rather than any concrete perception and understanding of the sources of such behavior or the thinking man's own disgust. Furthermore, such terms as "basic thrust" reveal a disposition that seems to be related to the idea of "higher intelligence and greater sanity." If our theoretical speculations are of value it would seem that greater intelligence is predicated upon greater feeling, intuition,

¹⁴Ibid., p. 43.
sensation, and vice versa. Moreover, sanity like morality is a matter of adjustment within the organism, of an integration function. What Cattell and Skinner and those of the behaviorist persuasion seem intent upon is to substitute a show of adjustment on the outside while leaving the inside in disarray. The key to this endeavor is, of course, to focus one's attention and desire upon the outside and to do so in such a way that the "attitude towards the possible" is more or less immediately gratifiable through the planned availability of projects and conquests that suit a particular type and supply just enough meaning to keep him occupied and inwardly unaware. It is quite a chess game really. The only other game available is finding a source of values based upon an inside adjustment which is explicitly prior to the external adjustment. That is to say, to reverse the flow, not to have social and political bodies geared to the adjustment of individual mal-adjustments, but rather to have social and political bodies reflect the adjusting potential of the organism. However, this calls for a conception not only of the organism but its development. It also calls for some sort of theory which makes this inside adjustment a concrete possibility rather than an idealistic dream more harmful than helpful.

Inasmuch as we have developed a conception of the organism which is fundamentally open-ended, it remains to trace its development. Moreover, we have offered no theory that allows for the possibility of any sort of adjustment in a concrete sense. However, the definition of function and the localization of function within the body give us the ground from which such figures can be elaborated. Moreover, by providing a ground of therapy and culture we have also supplied a framework which promises
to account for the deviation of adjustment. It remains to be seen whether or not such readjustment is possible. The next chapter will entertain such considerations.
CHAPTER VI

STAGES IN LIFE AND THERAPY

The present chapter will be devoted to a comparison of Jung's conception of the stages of life and the stages of therapy. Such an effort presupposes certain similarities otherwise it would not be undertaken. Briefly stated, the stages of therapy seem to be a microcosmic and highly intense version of the same psychophysiological processes that emerge more slowly during the process of maturation. Indeed, we would expect such similarities in a discipline whose theoretical premises are grounded primarily upon disturbances and retardations of growth. However, the prime reason for undertaking such an endeavor is the attempt to discover a concept of growth, and thus of education, that is adequate to fulfillment of all persons be they infants or octogenarians. Such a conceptualization is of immense importance to the development of culture inasmuch as a culture is retarded in its development to the degree that it does not embody an conceptualization of the total development of the person. The present chapter is an attempt to discover the foundations from which such conceptualizations might be generated.

PART I: A MODEL

In Plato's Republic we are told that models and graphs often point the way but are themselves not the way.1 With this in mind, Jung's

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1Plato, op. cit., p. 223.
conception of the stages of life seems an instructive guide.

The one hundred and eighty degrees of the arc of life are divisible into four parts. The first quarter, lying to the east, is childhood, that state in which we are a problem for others but are not yet conscious of any problems of our own. Conscious problems fill out the second and third quarters; while in the last, in extreme old age, we descend again into that condition where, regardless of our state of consciousness, we once more become something of a problem for others. Childhood and extreme old age are, of course, utterly different, and yet they have one thing in common: submersion in unconscious psychic happenings. Since the mind of a child grows out of the unconscious its psychic processes, though not easily accessible, are not as difficult to discern as those of a very old person who is sinking again into the unconscious, and who progressively vanishes within it. Childhood and old age are the stages of life without any conscious problems.2

David Cooper has elaborated a model of therapy that is strikingly similar to Jung's conception of development.

\[ \text{Eknoia} \rightarrow \text{Paranoia} \rightarrow \text{Noia} \rightarrow \text{Antinoia} \]

The eknoid state at the left of the diagram is the normal state of the well-conditioned, endlessly obedient citizen. This is a state of being in which one is so estranged from every aspect of one's own experience, from every spontaneous impulse to action, from every bit of awareness of one's body for oneself (rather than one's body as an object for inspection by others in the world), from all the carefully refused possibilities of awakening change, that one might truly, and

2Jung, op. cit., p. 22.
without metaphorical sleight of hand, regard this normal person as being out of his mind. Most people in the first world submit to this chronic murder of their selves with only faintly murmured, fast forgotten dissent. The pay-off for losing one's mind in this sense if of course considerable: one may become affluent, comfortable at least, one may lead a great corporation or a great state, or one may even revel in the ecological devastation of major areas of the earth's surface in the interest of normal values. In fact, on reflection, there's nothing like as good as being out of one's mind. Nor anything like the loss entailed.

By serial metanoias, one may move out of the eknoioid position. Metanoia means change from the depths of one-self upward into the supercies of one's social appearance. It includes much of the Pauline sense of conversion and repentance, and, particularly at the second level of metanoia (\(N_2\)), generates the "signs" of depression and mourning. Through the first metanoia one enters a region of "paranoia," of being beside one's self. If eknoia means being out of one's mind, in paranoia one is at least next to one's mind. Paranoia is about a neighborliness of self that might become affectionate. If eknoia is a state of being, a conglomerate of essences that are finally the passive products of social conditioning initiated in the family, paranoia is the beginning of active existence with the possibility of life for new projects. There is certainly confusion between persecutory fantasies and persecutory realities. With the former, one projectively explores social reality through the unknowing, but later half-knowing, superimposition of past experiential structures on the present. If this exploration is radical enough in the context of one's most significant relationships, one begins to develop an objective sense of persecutory reality that is transpersonal and beyond our superimpositions, although indirectly it has been mediated to us by our primary family experience in the first year of life, which conditions the persecutory fantasies.

The second metanoia represents work on one's self in the sense of total work (subsuming the psychoanalytic notion of "working-through") that leads us into a self-consistency, being in our own minds separate as a person from any other person, in unlonely aloneness that is open to the world. Here one encourages one's self, puts a new heart into one's self by invention rather than by transplantation, and one makes a wager to deal with any new experience in the self-containment of one's self-relation, so that one is free to allow a generous issuing of one's self into the world.

At this point one is ready for the abandonment of the self sense, of the restriction to a finite ego. The final metanoia is the fluent movement between the actively auto-
nomous self and self (-and world-) transcendence (anoia)—moving through the canceling-out of self-preformation in a moment of anti-noia. There is then, finally, no longer any question of states of being, and the illusory security represented by such states.

There is, of course, much room for confusion of location between these stages, one of the most disastrous being the attempt to move from eknoia and paranoia to anoia without the requisite attainment of self-containing autonomy. The un-guided use of psychedelic drugs and abortive, panicky forms of what seem to be "psychotic breakdowns" are such attempts. When this happens, people are still very much in the net of the internal family (and often the external family too) and compulsively search for rather less restricting replica family systems.3

If Jung's and Cooper's models are combined, something resembling the following is obtained:

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3Cooper, op. cit., pp. 11-13.
It may be objected that there is little resemblance between Cooper's eknoid citizen and the child. However, this is not as conclusive as it might appear. According to Jung:

In the childish stage of consciousness there are as yet no problems: nothing depends upon the subject, for the child itself is wholly dependent on its parents. It is as though it were not yet completely born, but were still enclosed in the psychic atmosphere of its parents. Psychic birth, and with it the conscious differentiation from the parents, normally takes place only at puberty, with the eruption of sexuality. The physiological change is attended by a psychic revolution. For the various bodily manifestations give such an emphasis to the ego that it often asserts itself without stint or moderation. This is sometimes called "the unbearable age."

Until this period is reached the psychic life of the individual is governed largely by instinct, and few or no problems arise. Even when external limitations oppose his subjective impulses, these restraints do not put the individual at variance with himself. He submits to them or circumvents them, remaining quite at one with himself. He does not yet know the state of inner tension induced by a problem. This state only arises when what was external limitation becomes an inner one: when one impulse is opposed by another. In psychological language we would say: the problematical state, the inner division with oneself, arises when, side by side with the series of ego-contents, a second series of equal intensity comes into being. This second series, because of its energy value, has a functional significance equal to that of the ego complex; we might call it another, second ego which can on occasion even wrest leadership from the first. This produces the division within oneself, the state that betokens a problem.4

The similarity of the child and the eknoid citizen can be shown on two grounds. First of all, to the degree that the eknoid citizen is "out of his mind" he resembles the child who is also out of his mind. The difference is that the pre-adolescent has not had the opportunity to get into his mind while the eknoid has and has succeeded in getting out of it instead. The key to this puzzle seems to lie in the fact that

4Jung, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
the eknoid citizen has solved the problem of "two egos" and a divided self by swallowing and converting external limitations into internal ones. That is to say, the external restrictions upon his impulses are internalized as the inside. The eknoid citizen substitutes the restrictions on his instinct for his instinct. There is no difference. Such a citizen is either perfectly adjusted; a model for all of us to follow; of a mindless machine. The child, on the other hand, has yet to come to grips with the dilemmas the eknoid citizen solves so simply. That is to say, the child has yet to face the psychic and physiological revolution of puberty and consciousness. He is yet to have a conscious problem. It may well be that he will solve his conscious problems by making them unconscious as does the eknoid citizen; nonetheless, in terms of degrees of self-consciousness the child and the eknoid citizen are on a relatively even footing. Each faces the task of further differentiating and developing his individual uniqueness. The only difference is that the eknoid citizen has substituted the collectively articulated consciousness for the collectively unarticulated unconsciousness while the child has not as yet had that opportunity. In short, the eknoid citizen solves the problem of being conscious by adopting the strategy he used instinctively as a child. He submits or circumvents as the case may be, however, the impulse for action is more or less always outside his own subjective impulses. Unlike the child who will inquire into the most unlikely places, i.e., anus, toilet bowls, mud pies, treetops, etc., the eknoid citizen sojourns only in prescribed ways.

The eknoid strategy is thus often closely associated with the wisdom of the child. However, it is a strategy appropriate to childhood
and not perhaps to the evolution of culture. Life holds other modes of activity. Eknoria is an example of nature holding the foreground rather than culture.

A second objection might be that the child certainly has his body for himself rather than for the inspection of others. This is also the second ground upon which the similarity of the eknoid citizen and the child can be demonstrated. According to Cooper:

The family is not only an abstraction, that is, a false existence, an essence, but also exists as a challenge to "go beyond" all the conditioning one has undergone in it. The way one effects this going-beyond seems always to be blocked, however. There are numerous taboos in the family system that reach much further than the incest taboo and taboos against greed and messiness. One of these taboos is the implicit prohibition against experiencing one's aloneness in the world. There seem to be very few mothers indeed who can keep their hands off their child long enough to allow the capacity to be alone to develop. There is always a need to try to arrest the wailing desperation of the other--for one's own sake, not for theirs. This leads to a violation of the temporalization, that is to say the personal time-making as distinct from time-keeping, of the other, so that the mother's need-time system (more or less passively mediating the need-time system of the wider society) gets imposed on the infant's. The infant may need, in her or his time, to experience frustration, desperation and finally a full-scale experience of depression...

...What one has to do in it is to discover a fluent dialectic that moves all the time on the shifting antithesis between being-alone and being-with-the-other.5

Compare Laing:

In order to rationalize our industrial-military complex, we have to destroy our capacity to see clearly any more what is in front of, and to imagine what is beyond, our noses. Long before a thermonuclear war can come about, we have had to lay waste our own sanity. We begin with the children. It is imperative to catch them in time. Without the most thorough and rapid brainwashing their dirty minds would see through our dirty

tricks. Children are not yet fools, but we shall turn them into imbeciles like ourselves, with high I.Q.'s if possible.

From the moment of birth, when the Stone Age baby confronts the twentieth-century mother, the baby is subjected to these forces of violence, called love, as its mother and father, and their parents and their parents before them, have been. These forces are mainly concerned with destroying most of its potentialities, and on the whole this enterprise is successful. By the time the new human being is fifteen or so, we are left with a being like ourselves, a half-crazed creature more or less adjusted to a mad world. This is normality in our present age.

We act on our experience at the behest of the others, just as we learn how to behave in complicity with them. We are taught what to experience and what not to experience, as we are taught what movements to make and what sounds to emit. A child of two is already a moral mover and moral talker and moral experiencer. He already moves the "right" way, makes the "right" noises, and knows what he should feel and what he should not feel. His movements have become stereometric types, enabling the specialist anthropologist to identify, through his rhythm and style, his national, even his regional, characteristics. As he is taught to move in specific ways out of the whole range of possible movements, so he is taught to experience out of the whole range of possible experience.6

Or Edmund Bergler:

Drives, Freud has taught us, are like rivers, more interested in discharge than in the direction of discharge. Imagine that a river flowing between high banks is dammed up by workmen in all directions; the result will be that the river eventually reverses its course. This is exactly what happens with undischarged aggression; it turns against its originator. Sceptics who doubt this statement are invited to observe their own children. If a small child of one or one and a half is prevented from hitting a parent or nurse he will, in desperation, try to bang his head against the wall. Is the child, as so many parents assume, "crazy"? By no means. Parents are just witnessing the basis for the scientific statement that "a drive is more interested in its discharge than in the direction of discharge." The show must go on.

Now being the object of "self-aggression" is painful and humiliating, to say the least. Every human being lives on the basis of the "pleasure principle." What pleasure, if any, can

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6Laing, op. cit., pp. 57-58.
derived from hitting oneself? Obviously none, unless one makes a pleasure out of displeasure. That is exactly what the future "psychic masochist" does. The only pleasure one can derive from displeasure is to make pleasure out of displeasure ("psychic masochism").

The psychic masochist is a genius: he solved an unsolvable problem, and at the age of four to eighteen months. No wonder every parent believes (if he is not ashamed to admit it) that his child is a prodigy. Parents don't even know how right they are; though they give the wrong reasons for their conviction, they are justified.7

The critical similarity between the child and the eknoid citizen is that neither have their bodies for themselves. As such, both are highly influenced by the particular organization of their immediate circumstances. Each is still wholly dependent and fundamentally unconscious. Moreover, since the direction of discharge presumes some sort of evaluating capacity, to the degree that these directions are determined by experience within the collective consciousness the external world is looked to as the source of values and discharging apparatus. Whereas one's parents supplied the avenues of discharge when one was a child, so now does the society once the first glimmerings of independence have been compromised by the substitute strategy employed by the eknoid citizen. Moreover, society must continue to supply them lest the strategy of the eknoid citizen be compromised in the revelation that he must rely upon himself. Conversely, the critical difference is that though neither have their bodies for themselves the child does not yet know it, while the eknoid citizen, by virtue of his experience of puberty unconsciously does. Thus, the behavior of the eknoid citizen is surely not as smooth as the child's. Puberty brings with it a necessary development of consciousness, and it does not vanish so easily.

7Bergler, op. cit., p. 31.
PART II: ADOLESCENCE AND THE FIRST STAGE OF THERAPY

As interesting as such comparisons and contrasts are they still leave us without a conception of adolescence and the mechanisms by which the child becomes Cooper's eknoid citizen. Recalling Jung's description of the onset of adolescence, the crucial issue is the conscious recognition that we have become problems to ourselves: another ego is born, as it were, and we are not equipped to deal with it.

What would happen to him [i.e., the adolescent] if he simply changed himself into that foreign-seeming "also-I" and allowed the earlier ego to vanish into the past? We might suppose this to be a quite practical course. The very aim of religious education, from the exhortation to put off the old Adam right back to the rebirth rituals of primitive races, is to transform the human being into the new, future man, and to allow the old to die away...

This outcome would be ideal if it could be brought about in the second stage of life—but there's the rub. For one thing, nature cares nothing whatsoever about a higher level of consciousness; quite the contrary. And then society does not value these feats of the psyche very highly; its prizes are always given for achievement and not for personality, the latter being rewarded for the most part posthumously. These facts compel us towards a particular solution: we are forced to limit ourselves to the attainable, and to differentiate particular aptitudes in which the socially effective individual discovers his true self.

Achievement, usefulness and so forth are the ideals that seem to point the way out of the confusions of the problematical state. They are the lodestars that guide us in the adventure of broadening and consolidating our physical existence; they help us to strike our roots in the world, but they cannot guide us in the development of that wider consciousness to which we give the name of culture. In the period of youth, however, this course is the normal one and in all circumstances preferable to merely tossing about in a welter of problems...

...the solution of the problems of youth by restricting ourselves to the attainable is only temporarily valid and not lasting in a deeper sense. Of course, to win for oneself a place in society and to transform one's nature so that it is more or less fitted to this kind of existence is in all
cases a considerable achievement. It is a fight waged within oneself as well as outside, comparable to the struggle of the child for an ego. That struggle is for the most part unobserved because it happens in the dark: but when we see how stubbornly childish illusions and assumptions and egoistic habits are still clung to in later years we can gain some idea of the energies that were needed to form them. And so it is with the ideals, convictions, guiding ideas and attitudes which in the period of youth lead us out into life, for which we struggle, suffer, and win victories: they grow together with our own being, we apparently change into them, we seek to perpetuate them indefinitely and as a matter of course, just as the young person asserts his ego in spite of the world and often in spite of himself.

The nearer we approach to the middle of life, and the better we have succeeded in entrenching ourselves in our personal attitudes and social positions, the more it appears as if we had discovered the right course and the right ideals and principles of behavior. For this reason we suppose them to be eternally valid, and make a virtue of unchangeably clinging to them. We overlook the essential fact that the social goals is attained only at the cost of a diminution of personality. Many—far too many—aspects of life which should also have been experienced lie in the lumber-room among dusty memories; but sometimes, too, they are glowing coals under grey ashes.®

The development of the eknoïd citizen seems then to involve the compromise of adolescence. At adolescence we adopt an attitude toward the attainable rather than the possible. The psychophysiological revolution of adolescence throws the instinctual and homeostatically adopted childhood ego into "a welter of problems." That is to say, the rather fluid submission of circumvention of external limitations adopted by the child is overturned in adolescence by the eruption of sexuality—an internal impulse that cannot really be successfully denied. However, if "drives are like rivers," and if the childhood ego is a psychophysiological response to limitations placed "upon the infantile instincts" the advent of adolescence reveals that there are dams, as it were, in the

®Jung, op. cit., pp. 10-12.
way of the discharge of this newest and most potent of "drives." Inasmuch as the discharge is more important than the direction of discharge the adolescent sinks his roots in the nearest available soil. The new drive swells the river, the river overflows or breaks the dam, and runs away as the terrain dictates. In this case the terrain is the culture at large and not just the parents.

Another way of saying this is that adolescence threatens a disorientation of the childhood ego. Much as the infant had to adjust to the outside world in order to survive, so does the adolescent. Furthermore, both do so on the basis of their particular "nature," or "essence." However, whereas the infant is relatively undifferentiated, the adolescent has had twelve or thirteen years of differentiation. Consequently, the adjustment of the adolescent will reflect the sum total of the particular "shocks" and "excitations" to which he has been exposed. In short, the adolescent responds as a particular, relatively more differentiated infant. Behind all of this, of course, is the presence of the prototypical anxiety as well as the drive to self-actualization. However, to the degree that the adolescent can withstand the anxiety, or is helped to withstand and transform it by others, this immediate and homeostatic response of the organism to anxiety and disorientation tends towards the possible and not merely the attainable; and to that degree the tendency to eknoia is mediated. If not, then eknoia.

Therapeutically, adolescence resembles the "paranoid" stage of therapy. Cooper characterizes this stage as a "neighborliness of self that might become affectionate." There is "the beginning of active existence with the possibility of life for new projects." Surely, this would apply to the emergence of sexuality and consciousness. Moreover,
this seems to be universal observation among psychotherapists. According to Campbell, for example, there is always the initial thrill of "getting under way."\(^9\) However, this thrill belies a changeover of leadership of the ego from conscious to unconscious factors. Jung terms this occasion enantiodromia, a term borrowed from Heraclitus which literally means "running the other way."\(^10\) According to Campbell, the idea is fundamental to Jung's psychology, and applies, furthermore, "to all pairs of opposites; interchanges not only of the four functions but also of those two contrary dispositions of psychic energy that Jung has termed extroversion and introversion."\(^11\) In short, what has been buried, or submitted to or circumvented makes its appearance. Malcolm Brown, who has been influenced by both Jung and Lawrence gives a graphic description of what such interchange entails.

The dissolving of the muscular and character armoring is determined not by the quantity of energy mobilization and expenditure produced by any single stress position or activity exercise but by the extent to which the individual's awareness becomes internally opened and instantaneously in touch with the various intuitive feeling centers below the neck which form the biological nucleus of an enduring core self. The opening of the patient's awareness to the intrinsic cognitive faculties mediated by the feeling centers within the torso is a three staged process at the very least. The first stage consists of the most primitive manifestations of an enhanced vegetative metabolism and accompanying heightened energy flow into those parts of the body which have hitherto been constricted and blocked. These primitive manifestations of an increased vegetative motility, or spontaneous movement of fluid energy flow from within, take a wide variety of forms and include such phenomena as (1) sensations of oppression and holding in the chest area, particularly near the heart, (2) sensations of

\(^9\)Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

\(^{10}\)Campbell, *Introduction to Carl Jung*, p. xxvi.

\(^{11}\)Ibid., p. xxvi.
straining, pulling and aching in any part of the neuromuscular-skeletal system which encompasses the body like a sheath, (3) sudden outbursts of quivering or acute pain in selected muscle complexes, involuntary jerks, tremorings or spasms of localized muscles, (4) mild, tentative tingling-like sensations, a shortness of breath, and dizziness in the head following a greater than average expenditure of physical energy, (5) an unexpected spurge of migraine-like headaches which come and go unpredictably or else linger menacingly at a low-grade level of intensity around the lower forehead and eyes, (6) sensations of excessive warmth suddenly changing to a shivering from cold sensations, gooseflesh, or itching in the pelvic-genital regions, (7) inexplicable appearances of skin rashes, boils, and other observable disturbances at the body's surface, (8) sensations of wanting to burst inside, choking, not being able to get enough breath, and sudden surging of heart palpitations, (9) sensations of nausea, vertigo and wanting to vomit the contents of the stomach from the belly region but being unable to actually do so, (10) roller coaster and elevator sensations in the pit of the stomach, (11) sensations of numbness and a sudden going to sleep of the limbs that did not exist hitherto.12

Several factors should be noted in reference to Brown's description. First of all, his style of therapy is far more bodily oriented than that of many other therapists. Indeed, he operates out of the assumption that the muscular and character armour are intimately related and that the therapeutic enterprise can be greatly facilitated by direct work on, by, and with bodies. For example, if one were to encounter an introverted patient, one would bring to that encounter the knowledge that introverted function is associated with flexor contraction and extensor rigidity. Consequently, one could then assign exercises expressly designed to alter this imbalance. Secondly, inasmuch as Brown operates somewhat out of a Jungian and Lavrentian orientation the juxtaposition and identification of function with the intuitive feeling centers below the neck comes into

12Malcolm Brown, "An Introduction to Direct-Body Contact Psychotherapy." Reprints Berkeley Institute for Direct Body Contact Psychotherapy, 3125 Claremont Avenue, Berkeley, California 94705.
play. Furthermore, with Brown's therapeutic procedures, these inter-
changes of function are precipitated not only by the attentive and accepting
climate of therapeutic session, and by the rather strenuous exercises
involved, but also by direct touch. That is to say, there seems to be an
ability of the body to respond to touch. For example, to touch a patient
on the chest and on the back seems to set up what Brown has called a
"polarized energy flow." By placing one's hands on the body the therapist
mobilizes internal energy currents in such fashion as to facilitate the
reconnection of previously estranged functions and regions. Thirdly, if
we recall the previously cited relationships between character type and
functional hysteria it is not surprising that the reaction to Brown's
therapy is what it is.

Indeed, the phenomena he lists are examples of "vasomotor reactions";
however, they occur in relatively differentiated organisms rather than in
undifferentiated ones. In short, the "enhanced vegetative metabolism and
accompanying heightened energy flow," are manifestations of the breaking
up of the dominating functional hysteria. Needless to say this descrip-
tion, although certainly more graphic, corresponds to what Cooper calls
paranoia, what Jung calls enantiodromia, and what May has called the re-
emergence of the repressed capacity to wish.13 However, the rediscovery
of the inner world is only the beginning.

According to Cooper the most immediate task is to mediate the con-
fusion that exists between "persecutory fantasies and persecutory reali-
ties."14 In Jungian language it is to begin to differentiate the indi-

13May, op. cit., pp. 262-266.
14Cooper, op. cit., p. 2.
vidual from the inflations he has accepted as his own due to the incursions of the collective consciousness, i.e., culture and society, on one side, and the collective unconscious on the other. In May's language it is to move from "wish to will." It is here, however, that we move beyond the parallel of adolescence and the first stage of therapy. As Cooper tells us: "There is, of course, much room for confusion of location between these stages, one of the most disastrous being the attempt to move from enoia and paranoia to anoia without the requisite attainment of self-containing autonomy." To the degree that the adolescent tends to carry over into middle age the particular compromise of his youth there is no "self-containing autonomy." The solutions of adolescence are only temporally valid. Similarly, the first intimation of "new projects" and a "new neighborliness of self" are but the initial beginnings. Without the "attaining of self-containing autonomy," i.e., individuality, the move from wish to will is characterized by a lack of differentiation and consciousness which essentially puts us back at the childhood and adolescent strategy of coping with reality.

PART III: MIDDLE AGE AND THE SECOND STAGE OF THERAPY

Middle age affords us the opportunity for a natural therapeutic period. The initial erupting of puberty has been dealt with one way or the other. The body is twenty-five to thirty years older. The endocrine and hormonal systems are not functioning with the exuberance that they

16May, op. cit., pp. 266-268.
once did. In short, another psychophysiological change is beginning to occur and it often finds us no better prepared to deal with it than we were at birth or puberty. As such it manifests similar characteristics. To the degree that we cannot bear the anxiety of a new orientation is the degree to which we shall clamp more firmly to the old. Needless to say, this creates new problems that are often exacerbated rather than met constructively. According to Jung:

The worst of it all is that intelligent and cultivated people live their lives without even knowing of the possibility of such transformations. Wholly unprepared, they embark upon the second half of life. Or are there perhaps colleges for forty-year-olds which prepare them for their coming life and its demands as the ordinary colleges introduce our young people to a knowledge of the world? No, thoroughly unprepared we take the step into the afternoon of life; worse still, we take this step with the false assumption that our truths and ideals will serve us as hitherto. But we cannot live the afternoon of life according to the programme of life's morning; for what was great in the morning will be little at evening, and what in the morning was true will at evening have become a lie. I have given psychological treatment to too many people of advancing years, and have looked too often into the secret chambers of their souls, not to be moved by this fundamental truth.

Aging people should know that their lives are not mounting and expanding, but that an inexorable inner process enforces the contraction of life. For a young person it is almost a sin, or at least a danger, to be too preoccupied with himself; but for the aging person it is a duty and a necessity to devote serious attention to himself. After having lavished its light upon the world, the sun withdraws its rays in order to illuminate itself. Instead of doing likewise, many old people prefer to by hypochondriacs, niggards, pedants, applauders of the past or else eternal adolescents—all lamentable substitutes for the illumination of the self, but inevitable consequences of the delusion that the second half of life must be governed by the principles of the first.18

The "illumination of self" and the devotion of "serious attention to himself" that Jung recommends for the middle aged is strikingly similar

18Jung, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
to Cooper's concept of "self-containing autonomy." However, this devotion of attention is often painful. To turn inward is to rediscover the inner world in shatters, and we do not entertain such prospects with eagerness. Yet there seems to be little doubt that it is necessary. The "Pauline sense of conversion" and the signs of "depression" and "mourning" are indications of the fact that the attainment of self-containing autonomy, of the discrimination and differentiation of a unique self out of the welter of societal and instinctive inflations, is not easy. Nevertheless, therapy if it is to be therapy rather than a masquerade that attempts to cover more than it reveals, must remain an "obstinate attempt of two people to recover the wholeness of being human through the relationship between them."19 This, of course, means an openness and vulnerability that does not shrink from depression or mourning or from painful self-examination. Much like middle age the second stage of therapy affords us the opportunity to "work through" our unresolved conflicts and pains, and there is really no therapy at all unless this is done. What seems to lie between us and a therapy or a culture that is effective is, moreover, our rather idealized picture of ourselves.

The crux of the curious difficulty lies in the fact that our conscious views of what life ought to be seldom correspond to what life really is. Generally we refuse to admit within ourselves, or within our friends the fullness of that pushing, self-protective, malodorous, carnivorous, lecherous fever which is the very nature of the organic cell. Rather, we tend to perfume, whitewash, and reinterpret: meanwhile imagining that all the flies in the ointment, all the hairs in the soup, are fruits of some unpleasant someone else.

But when it suddenly dawns on us, or is forced to our attention, that everything we think of is necessarily tainted with the odor of the flesh, then, not uncommonly, there is

19Laing, op. cit., p. 53.
experienced a moment of revulsion; life, and the acts of life, the organs of life, woman in particular as the great symbol of life, become intolerable to the pure, pure, soul.\textsuperscript{20}

In short, to make the distinction between persecutory fantasies and persecutory realities one has to drop down from the Pisgah of idealism and phony materialism and integrate what Lawrence called the sensual sphere. Rollo May is of the opinion that the body must be "accepted, aye exulted in, lusted in, loved, and respected," if therapy is to be effective.\textsuperscript{21} The only catch is that our bodies are not for ourselves which makes these requirements somewhat difficult to achieve. As long as we cling to the pure, pure, ideals--religious and/or scientific--of our youth, this betokens not only the dilemma of middle age, but the dilemma of the second stage of therapy as well. Again, let us turn to Brown for a graphic description.

The second stage of muscular-character armor dissolution consists of the incipient experiencing in awareness of hitherto repressed and indeterminate feelings and emotions. The gradual thawing out of the peripheral neuromuscular-skeletal hypertensions permits a greater and greater mobilization of protoplasmic vegetative currents from deep within the central regions of the body. It is this deeper metabolic loosening of the central regions which makes possible a resurrection of uncompleted emotional conflicts and unabreacked feelings and emotions from the distant past. Armoring is essentially a locking of natural animal impulses whose spontaneous emergence from within outwards is counteracted by a psychological defense against the impulse which operates from without inwards, so that there results a collision and compression of metabolic energy forces and a consequent binding and arrestment of flow in either direction. This stalemate, when loosened, will produce a breakthrough, at first with an uncontrollable immediacy of externalization and forcefulness, that can frighten the patient more than anyone else. After repeated breakthroughs of raw repressed feelings, all of which are usually negative, such as rage, fear, and hatred, the subject begins to identify the intrinsic texture of associated feelings underlying the overt breakthrough and the historical sequence of events which

\textsuperscript{20}Campbell, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 121-122.

\textsuperscript{21}May, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 266.
are directly connected with the newly liberated emotions. Both the raw breakthrough of repressed negative emotions and subsequent cognitive identification in rational awareness of the historical meaning of these emotions constitutes the second stage of armor dissolution.22

It is important to note these "breakthroughs" of raw feelings are to be connected to historical circumstances. That is to say, the repressed feelings are there because of repressed experiences. In the long run it does little good to have a discharge of raw emotion without connecting it rationally to one's history. Thus, many of the remissions of modern culture are quite ineffective, inasmuch as they are devoid of personal, interpersonal, or religious content. Of further importance is the fact that with these breakthroughs the body begins to return to itself. No longer are there pockets of energy and localization of function that warp not only the physique but the psyche; rather there is a communication among parts that promises integration and communion.

In short, the life that all of us forswear at adolescence, which is the more differentiated version of the "attitude towards the possible" which is forsworn in early childhood, begins to re-emerge with middle age. As such, we naturally begin to return, worse for the wear perhaps, back to ourselves. If we accept Jung's description of middle age then the similarity between the second stage of therapy (the middle stage, as it were) and middle age appears quite remarkable. From such a perspective, one is tempted to speculate that therapy is merely a microcosm of human development; the hologrammatic trip within the trip as it were. A consideration of final stage of therapy and old age should either support or deny this speculation.

22Brown, op. cit.
PART IV: OLD AGE AND THE FINAL STAGE OF THERAPY

According to Cooper the "attainment of self-containing autonomy" prepares one for "the abandonment of the self sense, of the restriction of the finite ego." Now if the ego is product of a conflict between our "older and more recent heritage," and if the ego is psychophysically manifest as character type, such an event assumes the release, or at least the seeing through of one's particular configuration of psychophysiological contractions and inhibitions. However, the ego seems to be structured from this conflict in a variety of ways. First of all, it mediates between the collective unconscious and the collective consciousness; it protects our vitals from the onslaught of society and at the same time inhibits the issuing forth of ourselves into society. In a quite literal sense the ego may be identified with the particular contraction of the neuromuscular skeletal sheath, part of which is in contact with our vital organs and part of which faces the outside world. Secondly, the ego can be viewed as a defensive posture which more or less limits the capacity for more differentiated function. Thirdly, the ego is structured to prevent movement and energy exchange from front to back; this corresponds to the concepts of introversion and extroversion. Moreover, any dissolution of the "ego" sense would require an abandonment, more or less permanently, of all these dimensions. Whether or not this is possible in a definitive fashion is open to question. However, there is little question that ego can be seen through.

The realization of the nonsubstantianity of the self is at the base of what is probably the most radical and transforming

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23Cooper, op. cit., p. 12.
experience in "therapy," the experience of the essential irony at the center of some of the most agonizing personal predicaments one may get into. The two levels that define this mode of irony are firstly the level of a full, suffering recognition of the "problem," secondly that what matters is only this recognition of the problematic, and not the immateriality, of the self that afflicts itself with the problem. The problem has to be seen, but inextricably wound up with the seeing of the problem is the seeing through of the self. And so one laughs and laughs with the other who sees through one's self and sees through one's seeing through of one's self. The pain remains totally real, but can now become the ball of a joyous ball game without loss of its value as pain. The joke that the ironic consciousness pushes through into a simultaneously explosive and implosive reality depends on the conjoint recognition of the absurdity of the notion of a self being afflicted by pain. Certainly one can be painfully affected by another person, but in a sense this is straightforward enough and in a sense it is no problem--at least one knows where one is. The problematic, more mystifying and difficult, that I am referring to here is dependent on the idea of one afflicting one's self with the problem. In terms of self-regard, we are relational beings. If relative beings are people who give priority to the others' regard of them over against priority to a false otherness in themselves over against the true self-sameness of their selves. We reflect on ourselves so that there is the reflecting self and the self the reflecting self, and reflectively decide to cancel it out and simultaneously decide to cancel out the decision as such. The final effect of this common enough gyration is to produce an illusory single self that is something like an object buffeted around the world in a football game that is totally passive and totally joyless. Through some ironic recognition, however, one can ask the question, "Who is the self afflicted by this problematic, and who is the self that afflicts itself in this manner?" And then one can ask a further question: "And what is the difference between these two selves anyhow?" If one asks this question in the only way it can be asked, that is, paradoxically and with fully self-loving and playful absurdity, one simultaneously annihilates it, and this is the ironic liberation into true self-unity.24

Cooper's conception of ironic consciousness takes us not only into the pain and the suffering but through it. In short, one must suffer one's problematic to see it and see through it. Most of us in this culture never get to the consciously suffering stage, much less seeing

24Tbid., pp. 88-89.
through it. Moreover, without such seeing through we remain stuck culturally and personally with the strategies of adolescence. Even if we accept the suffering, tragedy seems to be our lot rather than the ironic breakthrough into comedy and laughter. Campbell describes this condition quite succinctly:

Modern literature is devoted, in great measure to a courageous, open-eyed observation of the sickeningly broken figurations that abound before us, around us, and within. Where the natural impulse to complain against the holocaust has been suppressed—to cry out blame, or to announce panaceas—the magnitude of an art of tragedy more potent (for us) than the Greek finds realization: the realistic, intimate, and variously interesting tragedy of democracy, where the god is beheld crucified in the catastrophes not of the great houses only but of every common home, every scourged and lacerated face. And there is no make-believe about heaven, future bliss, and compensation, to alleviate the bitter majesty, but only utter darkness, the void of unfulfillment, to receive and eat back the lives that have been tossed forth from the womb only to fail.

In comparison with all this, our little stories of achievement seem pitiful. Too well we know what bitterness of failure, loss, disillusionment, and ironic unfulfillment galls the blood of even the envied of the world! Hence we are not disposed to assign to comedy the high rank of tragedy. Comedy as satire is acceptable, as fun it is a pleasant haven of escape, but the fairy tale of happiness ever after cannot be taken seriously; it belongs to the never-never land of childhood, which is protected from the realities that will become terribly known soon enough; just as the myth of heaven ever after is for the old, whose lives are behind them and whose hearts have to be readied for the last portal of the transit into night—which sober, modern Occidental judgment is founded on a total misunderstanding of the realities depicted in the fairy tale, the myth, and the divine comedies of redemption. These, in the ancient world, were regarded as of a higher rank than tragedy, of a deeper truth, of a more difficult realization, of a sounder structure, and of a revelation more complete.

The happy ending of the fairy tale, the myth, and the divine comedy of the soul, is to be read, not as a contradiction, but as a transcendence of the universal tragedy of man. The objective world remains what it was, but, because of a shift of emphasis within the subject, is beheld as though transformed. Where formerly life and death contended, now enduring being is made manifest—as indifferent to the accidents of time as water
boiling in a pot is to the destiny of a bubble, or as the cosmos to the appearance and disappearance of a galaxy of stars. Tragedy is the shattering of the forms and of our attachment to the forms; comedy, the wild and careless, inexhaustible joy of life invincible.25

For Cooper: in terms of the life of the person, irony is the most revolutionary sentiment of all.26 However, it is a vastly different irony from the "Ironic unfullfillment (that) galls the blood of even the most envied of the world," which Campbell describes. To suffer one's problematic consciously and to annihilate it by seeing that it stems from the fact that "relational beings give priority to a false otherness in themselves over against the true self-same-ness of their selves." This is quite distinct from suffering the problematic unconsciously, or announcing panaceas and compensations that purport to relieve the suffering and the "gall" in the blood without apprehending or suffering the source of one's difficulties.

The horrible truth is that we have given our bodies to others. The "shocks" and "anxiety" that each of us is heir to is embedded within us. The tragedy of man is that he is responsible for what he has become even through as a helpless infant he could do nothing about it. This is not to say that more enlightened and humane social organization will not alleviate many of the more brutal calamities; however, even the most enlightened and humane practices will not alter the conditions of human birth. Ultimately the individual is responsible for whatever has happened to him. It is the person who has felt the shock, known the anxiety, and adjusted accordingly. Nonetheless, he is not free from responsibility; rather, just the reverse inasmuch as the individual is both the experi-

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26Ibid., 89.
encer and the actor. The individual is the only one who has his unique personal history. He bears it in his blood and tissue. Who else can be made accountable in the last analysis? Ironic consciousness seems to acknowledge such responsibility. If, indeed, we have given ourselves to others it is only we who can retrieve ourselves from the false otherness we have posited in ourselves. The very fact that this recover has not been made accounts for the tragedy of democracy. The cultural irony is that when the "great houses" have been destroyed (be they historical or mythological or a combination of both) the drama of human development can no longer be located outside the person. There are no heroes with which to identify. Therefore, each individual becomes the unknowing hero, and the task of the hero is to know his heroism and perform the hero deed which is to take us beyond tragedy and into comedy. In short, the task is to see that the tragedy is ultimately self-inflicted, and that the self-infliction unapprehended and unsuffered results in more and more self-infliction. Thus, human development, because it cannot see its way through to the ironic liberation of comedy remains fixed in tragedy. However, there is more to it than that. Inasmuch as the tragedy cannot be appreciated or understood except from the viewpoint of comedy, the tragedy itself must be obscured. Thus, we sink back into farce which according to Marx is the "mode of consciousness in which a people take leave of their history."27 The result, of course, is complete estrangement from our personal and collective depths.

In terms of human development the last one hundred and eighty degrees of the circle seem to offer a natural and organic therapeutic

opportunity. Middle age seems to be the period most suitable to the initial recognition and sufferings of one's problematic. Old age seems most suitable to the period of our development when the problematic is overcome. It is as if the first one hundred and eighty degrees of the circle were devoted to the acquisition of the collective consciousness, while the last one hundred and eight degrees are devoted to the differentiation of oneself from it, and from the collective unconscious as well. If the old, as Jung says, sink back into unconscious processes, such a sinking is presupposed by the divesting of conscious processes. The critical factor is whether or not the divesting takes place with consciousness or without it. Without consciousness and apprehension we are like salmon who mindlessly swim from our personal genesis to the great sea and return again to the same spot to spawn and die without really having any idea of what we are about. With consciousness it is possible to imbue this process with meaning and beauty and greater life. However, this function is predicated upon a separation and crystallization of the individual out of the mindless subservience to the instincts on the one hand, and the collective consciousness on the other. It is consciousness of this sort that allows man the dual luxury of seeing himself as part of nature whose transit through life is akin to that of the flowers and the fishes, and at the same time the one species who can stand outside of this process while inside it.

The conversion to the symbols of science has effectively placed man outside of nature and removed the possibility for seeing himself as part of it. Thus, he has no real contact with his natural self and by virtue of this lack of contact no real possibility for experiencing himself as
he is, i.e., a creature inside the processes of nature who can simultaneously stand outside of those processes **without** severing his connection with them. Science lets us stand outside these processes but severs the connection, while traditional Christian culture lets us remain inside but did not provide the capacity for standing outside while inside. From this perspective both Christianity and science as the predicates of culture are inadequate and potentially destructive. Therapy seems to be a connecting link in conceptual terms. Insofar as science represents a devastation of our most profound experiences, therapy attempts to mediate that disaster. If Cooper and Campbell are correct, the mediation of that disaster points to a resurgence of aesthetic and religious experience and activity. Indeed, it is only with the annihilation of the false self that a valid and sustaining vision of growth and development can be articulated and actualized.

In primitive tribes we observe that the old people are almost always the guardians of the mysteries and the laws, and it is in these that the cultural heritage of the tribe is expressed. How does the matter stand with us? Where is the wisdom of our old people, where are there precious secrets and visions? 28

One can easily see that the precious secrets, visions, and wisdom of the old is forcefully limited by the inability of individuals to achieve and culturally embody the forms appropriate to the ironic mode of consciousness. There can be no tribe without elders of the tribe, and there is no fool like an old fool. Unfortunately, science rejects the notion of tribe altogether. And the tribal consciousness of the media people is the consciousness of the lost tribe. However, therapy,

insofar as the ironic mode of consciousness is attained, supplies the experience from which the laws and mysteries, the wisdom, secrets, and visions of the elders of the tribe may be articulated. Indeed, the laws and mysteries, etc., are the articulations of the labyrinthian experiential wanderings of the species. As such, they embody and objectify the deepest needs and desires of our history. However, unless the false self is discarded we cannot see them, and to that degree the possibility of any viable and developmental culture is eclipsed; and to that degree the wisdom of the old becomes more cynical than wise, more clouded than differentiated and clear. And to that degree the young must attempt to grow up long before their time. And to that degree even the functions of the first half of life are mediated by the inability of the elders to complete the circle. Thus life becomes more and more problematic and we are less able to see the problem.

To the psychotherapist an old man who cannot bid farewell to life appears as feeble and sickly as a young man who is unable to embrace it. And as a matter of fact, it is in many cases a question of the selfsame childish greediness, the same fear, the same defiance and wilfulness, in the one as in the other.29

The curious thing is that culturally there must be a relationship between the problems of the old and the young. To the degree that the aging cannot bid farewell is the degree to which the young cannot say hello. In other words the cultural body is like the individual body. It is a totality and an organismic unity. If there is rigidity at the top there will be compensation at the bottom; if there is willfulness outside there will be the opposite inside; if there is fear here there

29Ibid., p. 20.
will be courage there. However, the rules of scientific observation and method supply us with the procedures for seeing in one place and not seeing in another. Thus, modern man seems headed for the bottom unless he begins to retrieve what he so cocksurely has cast overboard.

...all great religions hold out the promise of a life beyond, of a supramundane goal which makes it possible for mortal man to live the second half of life with as much purpose and aim as the first. For the man of today the expansion of life and its culmination are plausible goals, but the idea of life after death seems to him questionable or beyond belief. Life's cessation, that is, death, can only be accepted as a reasonable goal either when existence is so wretched that we are only too glad for it to end, or when we are convinced that sun strives to its setting "to illuminate distant races" with the same logical consistency it showed in rising to the zenith. But to believe has become such a difficult art today that it is beyond the capacity of most people, particularly the educated part of humanity. They have become too accustomed to the thought that, with regard to immortality and such questions, there are innumerable contradictory opinions and no convincing proofs. And since "science" is the catchword that seems to carry the weight of absolute conviction in the contemporary world, we ask for "scientific" proofs. But educated people who can think know very well that proof of this kind is a philosophical impossibility. We simply cannot know anything whatever about such things.

Do we ever understand what we think? We only understand that kind of thinking which is a mere equation, from which nothing comes out but what we have put in. That is the working of the intellect. But besides that there is a thinking in primordial images, in symbols which are older than the historical man, which are inborn in him from earliest times, and, eternally living, outlasting all generations, still make up the groundwork of the human psyche. It is only possible to live the fullest life when we are in harmony with these symbols; wisdom is a return to them. It is a question neither of belief nor of knowledge, but of the agreement of our thinking with the primordial images of unconscious. They are the unthinkable matrices of all our thoughts, no matter what our conscious mind may cogitate. One of these primordial thoughts is the idea of life after death. Science and these primordial images are incommensurables. They are irrational data, a priori conditions of the imagination which are simply there, and whose purpose and justification science can only investigate a posteriori, much as it investigates a function like
that of the thyroid gland. Before the nineteenth century the thyroid was regarded as a meaningless organ merely because it was not understood...

It would be equally shortsighted of us today to call the primordial images senseless. For me these images are something like psychic organs, and I treat them with the very greatest respect. It sometimes happens that I must say to an older patient: "Your picture of God or your idea of immortality is atrophied, consequently your psychic metabolism is out of gear." The ancient *athanasias pharmakon*, the medicine of immortality, is more profound and meaningful than we supposed. 30

In addition to the primordial idea of life after death there is also the ancient appreciation of the ironic mode of consciousness. There is not only the mystery of death and the speculations one may make about this void in an attempt to come to grips with living, there is also the ancient idea of liberation here and now. These alternatives provide the means by which the limitations of science without religion and the limitations of religion without science may be adjusted and ameliorated. Moreover, the ironic mode of consciousness promises a personal liberation that goes beyond therapy and back into the community. It is from such an ironic consciousness that visions can be articulated and institutionalized that embody the laws of development that culminate in that mode of consciousness. Moreover, the value of religion can then be viewed not as an opiate or the sublimation of hysteria, but as one means for trying to assimilate that which is, in any final sense, unassimilable, but which nonetheless never vanishes and must be dealt with. And the way it is dealt with is to rise to new levels of personal and interpersonal integration by virtue of one's struggle with it.

Physiologically there is also a correspondence between old age and

the third stage of therapy. Let us quote Brown again.

The third stage consists of a wholesale shifting of the patient's center of gravity and self-identity downwards from the head region to the region of the belly. This shifting of the center of one's gravity and identity downwards to the belly will not happen if there is not a good deal of direct body-contact of those areas of the body which seem like little pockets of tension and hypersensitive tenderness.

The shift of the center of one's core being or true self downwards from the head into the deeper recesses of the belly is quite alien, then, to the whole Lowenian outlook and clinical technique. Not only is there a movement of the center of one's enduring being downwards with direct body-contact psychotherapy. There is the further movement inwards the more crystallized and further evolved becomes the patient's core self or being-for-himself. This can actually be perceived visually by the therapist the softer becomes the exterior tissue of the body to the touch and the deeper into the flesh he can place his hands with progressively lessening pressure from without. This movement inwards towards the core regions of dynamic feeling and the vital energy resources is observable from the manner in which the whole body responds with a quickened spreading of the excitation to embrace the totality when directly touched at any point. It is as if the energy sources and feeling centers at the innermost areas are instantaneously stimulated and permit a greater intensity and fullness of response than in armored and rigid persons. It is one of the blessed fruits of completely dissolving the chronic ego-defense system of the patient and opening the latter's awareness to his spontaneously self-regulatory vital intuitive feeling centers. The more integrated the person, the stronger becomes the internal channels of instantaneous interaction between the various feeling centers of intuition and the cerebral cortex and, by the same token, the more fluid and immediately responding becomes the person to the slightest stimulus. Anything so immediately stimulating as direct body-contact will rapidly generate a lot of vegetative current and fluid blood flow.

The infant is surely functionally dominated by the excitations emanating from his belly—from his solar plexus. Consciousness and growth seem to follow the psychoanalytic law of displacement upwards. However, to the degree that infancy and old age resemble one another

31Brown, op. cit.
there is a return in the opposite direction. One gets another look at
the terrain. However, the critical point is that this return may be un-
conscious or conscious. That is to say, one is either a salmon who
knows where he is going or a salmon who does not. Furthermore, such a
return to the belly presupposes dealing with the anxieties and shocks
of leaving it. That is to say, the pockets of energy collision and con-
fusion are sorted out and differentiated. The patient returns to his
source. The blows of life have been taken and one is now in a position
to learn and to teach in a fashion not known before. In short, redemp-
tion, resurrection, and vision. Wholeness. However, it is well to
remember that this is not a permanent, static, accomplishment. As
Don Juan, the Yaqui sorcerer, tells Carlos Castanada:

    The man will be, by then, at the end of his journey of
learning, and almost without warning he will come upon the
last of his enemies: Old age! This enemy is the cruelest
of all, the one he won't be able to defeat completely, but
only fight away.

    This is the time when a man has no more fears, no more
impatient clarity of mind—a time when all his power is
in check, but also the time when he has an unyielding
desire to rest. If he gives in totally to his desire to
lie down and forget, if he soothes himself in tiredness,
he will have lost his last round, and his enemy will cut
him down into a feeble old creature. His desire to re-
treat will overrule all his clarity, his power, and his
knowledge.

    But if the man sloughs off his tiredness, and lives his
fate through, he can then be called a man of knowledge, if
only for the brief moment of clarity, power, and knowledge
is enough.32

    It is from this perspective that therapy begins to yield the vision
that traditional culture and science both seem to lack. As Nietzsche

32Castanada, op. cit., p. 83.
once noted, philosophies are products of the stages of life from which they were articulated. Christ was a young man when he died. The separation of the earthly and heavenly were at the zenith, the emphasis was on experience rather than behavior. Thus, organized Christianity does not make the return home, it does account for the last one hundred and eighty degrees. If we may engage in a moment of speculation it would seem that the articulation of science is the extroverted antidote to the introverted emphasis of Christianity. However, both remain stuck at the boundary of middle age. With the advent of science and technocratic education the churches can no longer serve as "colleges for forty year olds" where people are prepared for "old age, eternity, and death."33

Nor is there any institutionalized and agreed upon possibility of sloughing off the final desire to rest and dying like a true mortal. In short, the evolution of Western culture seems for the most part an emphasis upon adolescent and childhood experience and behavior, with Christianity providing the experiential component and science the behavioral. Consequently, any worldly or otherworldly vision is bound to be subverted. The only alternative is to begin the task of articulating integrated visions and constructing the institutions appropriate to them.

America seems particularly important here. We are surely the nation most enamored of the miracles of techne. However, we are also the nation in the best position to perceive its limitations. If the tragedy of modern man is to be seen and seen through, it would most likely be seen through here. The Declaration of Independence is, after all, not the achievement of independence and individuality. The pursuit of life,

33Jung, op. cit., p. 17.
liberty and happiness is a grand enough ideal, but we seem to be in a position where our view of life is permeated with death, our liberty devoid of vision and heart, and our happiness more akin to the bliss of enforced ignorance. In short, to pursue is one thing; to gather and codify the fruits of the pursuit is quite another. Cultures, it would seem, must elaborate constitutional visions that say something about the possibilities of life, that provide maps of the inner experience of a people in their cultural particularity and in their universality. Without such visions we are shipwrecked. We do not know where we are going or what we are doing. In such circumstances even meaningless activity, even shallow meaning better than no meaning at all.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The purpose of the present chapter will be to draw a few tentative conclusions concerning previous chapters and to relate them specifically to social studies education. Such a purpose is, of course, bound to be incomplete and tentative, however, it seems beyond question that an examination of premises and foundations is a prerequisite if we are to have any hope of consciously evaluating and judging the fruits of our labors. In short, the present chapter will attempt to articulate the foundations from which the educational enterprise can be realistically initiated. The generalizations are warranted extrapolations of the philosophical-logical analysis and synthesis undertaken in this study:

1. Man is blessed and cursed by being caught in paradox. He has an inward and outward dimension. He is physical and spiritual, masculine and feminine, saint and sinner. He has a unique and particular consciousness and unconsciousness, and a collective cultural and psychobiological consciousness and unconsciousness.

2. Man's state is further complicated by the fact that man seems to possess differentiated functions and structures. Not only does he seem to fall within the bounds of introversion and extroversion, but he does so in a highly complex and differentiated fashion. For example, his extroversion may be most heavily influenced by what Jung called intuition,
seconded by thinking, with the situation completely reversed in the "unconscious." In any event, whether we use Jung's typology, or Goldstein's, or that of the ancient Greeks or Hindus, there seems to be an enduring sense of character type. Needless to say, the variations and complexities of such study may be infinite. However, the variety and complexity of human character does not prevent us from utilizing what we know. Furthermore, the eternal presence of what we do not know is at least a warning that we should proceed with compassion and humility.

3. Any practical use of the basic concepts of types is complicated by the fact that every human organism is subject to the laws of development. There is birth and childhood, adolescence, middle age and old age. These organic and natural revolutions subject the various types to different stresses and possibilities which will either be accommodated graciously or with difficulty. A recognition of these developmental levels is a significant aspect of any educational venture.

4. Psyche and soma are not independent variables. As goes the psyche, so is going the soma and vice versa. If our psyches are distorted, so are our somas. And, as we are, we see the world, and as we see the world, so we act. In Laing's words, "If our experience is destroyed, our behavior will be destructive."\(^1\)

5. The collapse and death of Christian culture and the conversion to a culture predicated upon the symbols of science represents a distortion and disaster neither more nor less overwhelming than the abuses of institutional and dogmatic Christianity. An awareness of this fact is basic to any conceptualization of cultural heritage in planning the

\(^1\)Laing, op. cit., p. 28.
content of educational experiences. To the degree that science neglects and punishes spiritual growth and development, and favors and rewards a more extroverted and object-oriented behavior is the degree to which the individual body and the collective body become distorted and unreal. Furthermore, to the degree that bodies politic become distorted is the degree to which the newborn imbibe and internalize distortions and unreality, and to that degree it becomes more difficult to become human and real, or to realize that one is not. Consequently, the educational enterprise, insofar as it serves the symbols of science exclusively, and insofar as the context of science is the de facto negation of spiritual dimension of human existence, attempts to create types of being appropriate to a distorted and unexamining being with little hope of self-actualization individually, and no culture worthy of the name to supply actualization collectively. In the last analysis moon shots are hardly adequate to fill the spiritual void. The same can be said of movies PG to X, drugs, affluence, the sexual revolution, the counter-culture, and most of all psychotherapy.

6. Psychotherapy should be conceived as a major resource in any reconceptualization of the foundations of education. However, therapy as conventionally viewed is not enough. Therapy, phenomenologically viewed, comes into being both as the sustainer and ameliorator of the collapse of Christian culture, and of the inadequacy of the emerging culture of science. Its collective value thus must lie in its ability to outline the premises and constitutional elements of the emerging culture. Without this effort the successes of psychotherapy are like so many bubbles in the breeze. Victims are produced faster than healers
or teachers. Thus, the psychotherapeutically reborn and the renewed re-enter a world which is more or less engaged in the systematic destruction of itself. Thus, if therapy has any value, that value will be manifest in the attempt to restructure society so as to reduce the quantity of victims.

To articulate in detail what such culture would look like is, of course, far beyond the scope of this effort. However, it seems almost obligatory that a few conclusions be drawn. Secondly, it is obligatory that some implications be drawn relative to the teaching of social studies. Inasmuch as social studies education does not exist in a vacuum, let us proceed to more general conclusions first. In other words, let us consider the whole and then the part.

**TOWARD A THERAPEUTIC CULTURE**

Perhaps the first consideration should be the recognition of the implications of organic development. If we accept the conclusion that the first half of life is directed outward, to study and to family and worldly activity, we must accept the notion that extroversion is appropriate to this half of life. Consequently, insofar as introversion and extroversion are environmentally influenced, every child should be given the opportunity to turn trustfully outward rather than react defensively and protectively. The means by which this could be accomplished are many. The following seem perhaps most important in the largest context of schooling-in-society.

1. Every child should be guaranteed an income from conception to maturity adequate to supply the basic needs. Not just subsistence, but security and comfort. This is a principle verified by countless encounter
groups. Formally, it is the principle of inclusion. No one is excluded, everyone belongs. One leaves the maternal and enters the cultural womb. Mothers and fathers no longer worry about money. Their primary responsibility is not so much fiscal, but moral. In short, such a measure could provide every parent with the responsibility of rearing his own children.

2. Every being capable of procreation should have the opportunity to learn what we have been able to gather concerning the development and misdevelopment of beings. This seems far more important than problems of democracy, writing, reading or arithmetic, or English I. Such a curriculum is the antithesis of the nuts and bolts, male and female socket theory of sex education. Such a curriculum would necessitate an appreciation of type, some realization of the particular anomies of one's own particular character configuration, as well as some conceptualization or esthetic sense of the path from conception to death.

3. The culture must foster the development of all its types. A therapeutic culture is not out to produce a Model T version of the human being. The man of devotion, the worker, the man of simple and enduring faith are as prized as the most assiduous scholar, warrior, or tycoon.

Not only does this conception have a certain equalitarian appeal, it also has an aristocratic one. In bodies and bodies politic there are specialized functions and arts. One cannot expect the fingers to accomplish the function of the kidneys, and while the heart may be more important than the foot, we are a whole; all parts are interdependent and

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interrelated. What this means is that if the foot suffers, the heart suffers also. In academic language, economically, politically, sociologically, and psychologically, if certain parts are neglected all parts will suffer. A one-sided emphasis on the intellectual and sensual functions, for example, may create wonders, but there is a point of diminishing returns. When such one-sidedness has succeeded in distorting the emotions and the instincts the total organism is in danger. Thus, the intellectual and sensual functions become destructive of the total organism of which there are only unsovereign parts. Consequently, allowance must be made for the existence and activity of different types.

4. If there is a place for free enterprise it would seem to lie in the ages of early adulthood. As Jung notes the first half of life is devoted to nature and the formation of individuality. The second half of life, however, is more healthily devoted to culture, to the relinquishment of partial individuality and to the facing of the prospect of death and eternity. Economic structure could reflect these stages. As the child is supported, so are the old; with the stages of adolescence and middle age comprising the rise of the fall of a partial individuality and a more exclusive concern with worldly labor and activity. In short, economics dovetails with the psychophysiological phenomenology of the spirit. Of course, all of this would be voluntary and subject to whatever forms particular character types might find most amenable.

5. It should be clear that such meagre insights are not utopian in the conventional sense. However, they are utopian in the sense that a utopia is realistic only when viewed within the context of the limitations of the species. We may in millions of years for example, evolve
into perfection, however, until such time let us recognize our imperfections, adjust ourselves to one another not only in our uniqueness, but in our sameness as well. The study of character is of immense importance to this endeavor. The difficulties we experience in making developmental and spiritual transitions must be better understood and allowances made for the limitations we perceive.

6. Education within the context of a therapeutic culture must be defined quite broadly indeed. It begins at conception and ceases at death. It is of crucial importance to note that the education of infants and children is largely unconscious if we are to believe the lessons of psychotherapy. There is no preventing this. We cannot really stop the infant from internalizing others as himself. All that we can do is attempt to make the quality of that internalization worthy, while allowing the infant the time and space to experience his own helplessness and forlornless. Seemingly it is only through such experience that one can separate oneself out from the hord of internalized others that unconsciously direct and control what we so uncritically assume to be the individual.

7. Inasmuch as childhood seems to be that period of development most grounded in unconscious processes, we might begin to utilize the products and artifacts of such processes. This would entail the inclusion of story-telling, theatre, dance, mime, music, mythology, fairy tales as a primary focus of the elementary curriculum. Such a proposal coupled with the economic support of all children, would effectively remove from the backs of children the burden of trying to cope with the abstractions and symbolizations of a more refined and abstract nature.
We may be able to teach three year olds to read, or to say five syllable words, or count to a million, however, these accomplishments are more for the delight of adults than the delight and instruction of children. In short, we could postpone the necessities and complexities of technical education until there are psychophysiological conditions that make such education more meaningful. What this means is that the primary focus is upon personified symbols and images in elementary years while the primary focus upon abstract symbols, i.e., numbers, letters, logic, etc., is reserved for the onset of puberty and young adulthood.

8. The education of adolescents would seem the most appropriate period for the emphasizing of technical aspects of education. Not only does the advent of puberty release new quantities and forms of energy, but the responses to this psychophysiological revolution are such that the adolescent turns to the outside world in the attempt to lay to rest his as yet unarticulated fears and ambitions. This would present a period in which this tendency could be utilized constructively or exploited unmercifully. The distinction between exploitation and constructive utilization would seem to hinge on the degree to which the adolescent can bear the anxiety the onset of puberty entails and the degree to which the particular forms of activity available to him are grounded in creative and fulfilling endeavors rather than in the demand for immediate discharge or increasing profits. Another way of saying this is that the education of adolescents should be geared to the amelioration of pubescent anxiety and provision of constructive activities and learnings suitable to the various types. Of course, if the adolescent is unable to make the discrimination it is up to the culture and the elders of the tribe to provide guidance.
What this means is that every adolescent should learn a trade or an art. Not everyone is suited to be a plumber or a computer programmer. However, the basic trade or art should be suited to a student's growing conception of himself. Moreover, economic provision should be made for those who are more suited to artistic than to explicitly technical endeavors.

Secondly, we might note that adolescence is an appropriate time to encourage both introspection and worldly activity. For those types who moon and despair such a situation is an opportunity for educational enrichment; for those whose muscles demand action and labor provision can also be taken. The fundamental criteria of education in this phase is not the production of a standardized model, but the nurturing of those differences of individual temperament and character that will allow the adolescent to maintain a sense of integrity, an appreciation for differences and the courage to encounter anxiety situations.

9. The psychophysiological realities of the latter half of life reflect the turn inward. That is to say the expansion and imperialism of childhood and puberty naturally begin their decline. In light of such occurrences several possibilities are suggested. For example, economically, it might be acceptable to relinquish all monies accumulated after a certain age. If we are indeed going to die with grace and dignity, we had better reckon with the wisdom that you cannot take it with you. Moreover, insofar as children are provided for at birth, and insofar as young adulthood seems the most appropriate period for capitalist enterprise, the personal wealth of individuals need not be accumulated beyond middle age. Educationally, this means that the middle age
should be given the opportunity to change professions or endeavors.
There should indeed be "colleges for forty year olds." The curriculum
of such institutions would be frankly therapeutic in nature. If adol-
escence is a compromise that renounces much, middle age is an opportunity
to get some of it back, and to accept graciously the loss of that which
is gone forever. This is, of course, a difficult undertaking and not
everyone, if hardly anyone, is suited to it, yet there remains much that
could be done to adjust and to make wholesome the inevitable transition
that middle age entails.

10. Lastly, the education of the old is fundamentally religious.
As was the custom in India, the first twenty years of life are devoted
to study, the second to family and worldly activity, the third twenty
to religious study, and the last twenty to religious actualization. The
old should then be supported as our children. They need not be cherished
as sages because most of them will not be. However, if we are to have
any view of the whole it would seem that those of elder stature would be
in the best position to supply it. Moreover, it is in the waning years
of life that the myths and tales which were so entertaining in childhood
begin to reveal their meanings. The stories of resurrection and redemp-
tion, rebirth and incarnation, of descents into darkness, of meetings
with demons and beneficial guides, have a spiritual and psychological
utility perhaps most appreciated by the youthful and the elderly. In
short, one comes full circle, or at least one has the opportunity to do
so. The owl of Minerva may indeed fly at dusk, as Hegel said, however,
the important point is that she flies.

Such remarks as the above are intended to give some sense of the
style and content that the consideration of psychophysiological reality
can generate. Nothing more is intended. To plan in detail how such a
culture would function, not to mention how one makes the transition from
an alienating culture to a culture more respectful of individual differ-
ences and similarities is not our task. However, this does not mean
that such a transition and such a culture are beyond our imaginations.
Indeed, these few paragraphs suggest such a possibility. Furthermore,
unless we are willing to foresake our evolutionary potential some such
structural reconstitution is in order.

SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATION

A more adequate foundation for social studies based on the research
undertaken in this study underscores two basic theses. First, is the
realization and utilization of symbolism as the critical factor of the
curriculum. Secondly, the method by which this critical factor can be
employed is what we might call social phenomenology. Let us examine
first the reality of symbolism and then proceed to a discussion of the
method of social phenomenology.

The central methodological principle of this effort has been that
there is "subterean passage between mind and body." Our lack of real-
izing the presence of this passage insures that we see the world in a
fashion identical to the way we are and do not see ourselves to be.
To the degree that the "mind" sets itself up as sovereign and dominant
and denies the mortality of the vessel which sustains and is the mind,
the "mind" is dissociated from concrete reality. Consequently, given
the reality that we have bodies, and given the reality that these bodies
function homeostatically, and given the fact that there is much we do

3Brown, op. cit., p. 249.
not remember and much in which we cannot share, and given the fact that we are dissociated from the fragility and temporality of this all too mortal flesh, it seems likely that this disassociation affects how we see the world and how we act. The rediscovery of this association reveals itself in symbolism. Symbolism tells us that the world outside is the same as the world inside. Not only is there a distinction between inside and outside to be rediscovered, it remains to be discovered that this distinction reveals inside and outside to be rediscovered, it remains to be discovered that this distinction reveals inside and outside as mirror images of each other. This can be illustrated by means of an example.

A unit in American History might be approached along the following lines. The Declaration of Independence tell us that we are entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. However, a Declaration of Independence from whom? England? What is England? England is the mother country and the father land. The Declaration of Independence is a cutting of the umbilical cord. However, what is involved in such a cutting?

This question can be approached psychohistorically from both the personal and collective points of view. For example, we might ask students, "If you were to sever yourselves from your parents, how would you go about surviving? A mere Declaration of Independence does not make you independent. It is more a declaration of intent rather than an actuality. Mother and father are still much stronger than you are. Moreover, a Declaration of Independence is just a noble sentiment, it is not a law or a concrete guide. You are a young country, barely a few seconds
old on July 4th, 1776. How do you survive and grow?" Such questioning offers the opportunity to examine and compare the growth of cultures and individuals.

All such questioning, of course, is based on the symbolic identity of the development of cultures and the development of the individual. If we wish to develop such an analogy further, we might investigate the laws of homeostatic functioning. We might ask students to let themselves collapse in the arms of their fellow students. "Can you trust them to hold together with you? What does it feel like not to trust, not to be responded to when you are falling? What does it feel like to be helped? How do you ask for help and support? Who do you ask, and what do they want in return? How does this affect you? Who did the United States ask? How did Franklin get by in France? Is there a parallel between the Articles of Confederation and biological functioning? Is there not a need and drive for integration and differentiation? Could the thirteen original colonies trust one another enough not to need a constitution? If not, why not? What does the constitution reflect? Is it not a defense against the abuse and injustices brought to light during the period from 1776 to 1789? What were these difficulties? What are the difficulties of the infants of children in adjusting to the world? What do you remember? Be an infant. Tell me what it feels like not to be able to get out of your high chair without eating your cereal. What must it have been like to pay tolls to move to Virginia to Maryland? What is it like to have the knowledge that some outside force may enter your milieu at any moment? What is it like to have coped with mother and father, and then find baby or older brother and sister barging into your world?"
All of this is reflected beautifully, if unknowingly, in the American Constitution. There is no more talk of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. The Constitution seems to reflect admirably the need for a character and body armor. There is to be an executive, legislative, and judicial branch. The underlying assumption is that these branches will fight for dominance, and the constitutional problem is to provide the checks and balances that will avoid not so much the conflict per se but the abuses of the conflict. This seems to be a recognition of function. There is the popular sentiment represented in the legislative with its two branches. There is action and movement as represented in the executive, and there is the law, the articulation of what is permitted and that which is not. Is the Constitution then not really a psychophysiological structure constructed to meet the demands and reflect the realities of an emerging culture and body politic? It might be appropriate at this point to ask the students to identify that portion of the body they identify with the popular sentiment, with the people, with the law, with action, with emotion, etc. One might begin to ask what happens when sentiment cannot be expressed, or when it has nothing to express. What happens when the executive is impotent? What happens when the law neglects the other parts, etc.?

Each of these questions is both academic and experiential. Symbolism is the reconnecting. Each question is amenable not only to scholarly pursuit, but to personal experience, group experience and interaction. Moreover, such an approach promises a relief from the rigidly compartmentalized approach to social education. Indeed, such compartmentalization is itself evidence of our dissassociation from concrete reality.
We might begin to realize that there is a sociology, a politics, an economics, a history of the body that is the product of the intercourse of our biological and cultural heritage. If we are to see the connections we must see the symbolic connections. Sociology is concerned with the studies of identifiable groups and their relation to the whole. Politics is concerned with dominance and power, economics largely with how energy and material are utilized, transformed and exchanged. Clearly all these are related. In bodies and bodies politic there are oppressed and repressed functions and capacities, psychophysiological character structure guarantees the localization and entrapment of energy. Politics could then be viewed as the result of the tension and disease thus generated, and history as the articulated perception of all this. What this boils down to is that the republic was constituted as were the bodies of the founding fathers. Their genius was that they were either honest or unconscious enough to allow their reality to be articulated and structured.

However, two hundred years have passed since the Declaration of Independence and what have we learned about life, liberty and pursuit of happiness? This experience is part of our history. Thus, it is also, the author believes, capable of being constitutionalized and articulated once we begin to realize the symbolic nature of reality.

The list of problems and areas of study amenable to symbolic analysis and experience is endless. To the degree that the "subterranean passage between mind and body" pertains, all "social" problems and areas are symbolic problems and areas. For example, more than one writer has suggested that the city is the attempt and symbol of man's attempt to
become God.  

What does it mean, then, that our cities are dying? Who populates these cities? How successful is the attempt? What of Cain and Abel? Another example badly in need of such treatment is the trauma of slavery. Politically, sociologically, economically, psychophysically, what is the meaning and consequence of the subjugation of entire people by another people? What is the symbolic meaning of black and white? In psychophysiological terms what does the ruthless and forced control of one function over another do to us? What are the consequences of such control personally and collectively?

We might begin to explore such questions by relating them to the body. A familiar example is the effect and consequences of premature toilet training. What does it do to us to force other muscles to perform functions that the sphincters should perform and cannot? And what does this have to do with anality and money? And what does anality have to do with the Protestant theology and the work ethic? Or what of the energy crisis? If our study of psychophysiological history reveals the entrapment and compulsive expenditure of energy, i.e., power in biological and religious terms, how does this relate to the current "energy crisis? Where is the ultimate source of the crisis? What can we do about it? Or, if we turn to ecological considerations, what does the pollution of earth, air, and water mean when we recall that in hermetic philosophy the earth was symbolic of our physicality, water was symbolic or our emotions, air symbolic of our intellectual capacities, and fire

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of our spirituality? Where then is the pollution and how does it come into being?

This last question raises the prospect of discussions on appropriate methodology. I have suggested that the methodology could be called social phenomenology. According to Laing:

Social phenomenology is the science of my own and others experience. It is concerned with the relation of my experience of you and your experience of me. That is with inter-experience. It is concerned with your behavior and my behavior as I experience it, and your behavior and my behavior as you experience it.

Since your and their experience is as invisible to me as mine is to you and them, I seek to make evident to others, through their experience of my behavior, what I infer of your experience through my experience of your behavior.

This is the crux of social phenomenology.5

From such a brief and succinct definition it is obvious that social phenomenology is concerned with relationship of experience and behavior. However, it is not a science that can be conducted by an isolated observer. It calls for the scientist to participate in the experiment. Moreover, the object of the experiment is called upon to infer the experience of the experimenter. Thus, both are scientists, both are subject and object, and the name of the game is to clarify oneself in relation to another. Thus, such a methodology not only overcomes the absurdities of insisting upon a value free social science, but accepts the notion that value is inherent in the nature of science. The science of social phenomenology is thus the kind of moral science of science—a meta-science, if you will.

A second recommendation for the science of social phenomenology is

5Laing, op. cit., p. 19.
that it needs no special equipment, no special setting to be begun. It begins quite simply: "Here is how I experience you. How do you experience me?" Of course, you may hear something you do not want to hear, or you may say something that will astound you. All of which is ample evidence to the fact that any sort of human honesty and intimacy has become strangely foreign to most of us. This is not to say that the science of social phenomenology cannot be augmented by scholarly pursuit, particularly, by the study of character type and the therapeutic process relative to each type. However, the crux of the science is the living of it in relation to others. Social science, as it now stands, is an instrument of intervention, which retreats to the drawing board and the grants of foundations the moment the "intervention" begins to reveal its inadequacies. Social phenomenology, in contrast, is not interventionist. It has as its goal the clarification of character rather than the implicit or explicit formation of specific types as results. It follows a very simple axiom—-if you do not know what is going on, ask somebody. Of course, not everyone can engage in this sort of dialogue, or even be present while others are engaged in it. Many are alienated by it. All one can do in this situation is to proceed with kindness and in the knowledge that not everyone wants to know how others are experiencing them.

A third recommendation for social phenomenology is that the more frank and open question of "How do you experience me," or a statement of "This is how I experience you," is rare enough to provoke a shift of orientation within the participants. This is not something that happens every day. Furthermore, we need have no fear of this becoming prosaic if we are willing to dig a little deeper. Such a shift of orientation will, of course, provoke a certain amount of anxiety. However, the
provocation of anxiety is the *sine qua non* of learning an appreciation for, and the possibilities of, a change of orientation. Indeed, the provocation of anxiety reveals that there is indeed something invisible that we have been calling experience, and that its resurrection is also the resurrection of the possibility of continued evolution and growth. Moreover, such experiences allow the symbolism to be recognized. If, for example, a heated dialogue between a student and teacher eventuates in a student remembering his difficulties with his parents an opportunity has arisen that may allow the student or the teacher to begin to unravel his responses to authority, to criticism, to intimacy, to honesty, to language, to his mate, etc.

The terrible truth is that most parents and children, and most students and teachers never see or hear one another. The student or teacher who walks into class and immediately begins a harangue is carrying around excess baggage. Social phenomenology is concerned with identifying whose baggage it is. Furthermore, it is concerned with giving the person the opportunity to lay such baggage down if he chooses.

A fourth recommendation is the hypothesis that laws of interaction and interexperience in the classroom are microcosmic examples of what is occurring throughout the culture and the world. If, indeed, cultures show the same patterns of growth and development as do individuals, the science of social phenomenology expands into a comparative discipline—a metaphor that is more than "just" a metaphor. Moreover, if we accept the hypothesis that we act in terms of the way we experience the world, and if we wish to change our behavior, we shall have to explore, refine, and support different modalities of experience. In short, social
phenomenology excludes nothing as irrelevant. Moreover, and most importantly, it has as its one aim the spiritual unification of the species. What could be a more worthy goal for social education?

However, there is an ingredient we have not mentioned which is indispensible, which is indeed both ends and the means, form and content, of the educational enterprise. For want of a no better word let us call it Love, or perhaps just plain goodness would be better. If the theses of science are not concerned with it, and cannot generate it, and if science is molding our psychophysiologies, and it is goodness we are in need of, science does not seem to be the answer. Moreover, the problem, says Laing, is that the spiritual force of science is so strong that most of us must go through an intense discipline of unlearning before we can even begin to experience the world afresh, with "innocence, truth, and love.

This gives rise to a cruel paradox. We must get that which we do not have, and we must have some to know some when we find it. What it boils down to is that we do have some. Each of us as children, somewhere along the line, knew a moment of exquisite bliss and love. Satisfied and radiant we looked upon the delightful subjects that pleased us and said, "You are everything, I affirm you totally. You are the universe." Such affirmation, even if made by a relatively 'unconscious' child, is an example of karma, a promise to be fulfilled. Such total affirmation is the equivalent of the forgiveness of sins. The total individual is accepted and affirmed. God sees all, and does not care. He will not break off his relationship with us. Such affirmation is also the complete affirmation of individuality. Moreover, as the Christian Passion
demonstrates, such goodness is the only redemption for the sins, or karma, or the hubris, of attempting to live without such a relationship, of denigrating and punishing it, of dancing around the golden calf of science, and of committing the idolatry of believing in only what you can see and conceptualize, and of knowing only what you read off paper.

The difficulty with love is that it must be given, it cannot be made, or taken. As such it defies all technical and military efforts to obtain it. Consequently, the method of obtaining it is the anti-method of destroying method; of using the instrument of the intellect to annihilate its own instrumentality. The result of such annihilations will lead in time to the Eternal Tao that cannot be named, the name of God that cannot be spoken. All that we can do in the meantime is to recognize in our deepest being that most of us are quite literally uptight. To break through the tightness is to let in a little more softness, a little more caring, and a little more humility. This does not preclude firmness or even anger. However, it does insure us that our firmness and boldness are tempered and spiritually potent. Without this there is nothing really worth talking about.
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