INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or “target” for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is “Missing Page(s)”. If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in “sectioning” the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from “photographs” if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of “photographs” may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeib Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
OKABE, Roichi, 1941-
THE RHETORIC OF DISTANCE REDUCTION IN INTERNATIONAL
AND INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION: A METHODOLOGY
FOR ANALYSIS AND ITS APPLICATION.
The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1974
Speech

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

© Copyright by
Roichi Okabe
1974

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.
THE RHETORIC OF DISTANCE REDUCTION IN INTERNATIONAL AND INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION: A METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYSIS AND ITS APPLICATION

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By
Roichi Okabe, M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1974

Reading Committee:
Dr. James L. Golden
Dr. Keith Brooks
Dr. William R. Brown

Approved By
James L. Golden
Adviser
Department of Communication
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my deep appreciation to Professor James L. Golden for his advice and assistance in the preparation of this dissertation. Without his encouragement and understanding, little would have been accomplished.

My sincere thanks also go to Professors Keith Brooks and William R. Brown for taking time out to read the entire manuscript and to recommend improvements.

My graduate studies in the United States would not have been a reality without the financial assistance so readily given by the Department of Communication at The Ohio State University and by Nanzan University in Nagoya, Japan. For their help I am deeply grateful.

My last words of appreciation and gratitude belong to my wife, Chizuko, who encouraged me in my direst moments and who patiently typed all the pages of this dissertation.
VITA

July 10, 1941. . . . Born—Okazaki, Aichi, Japan

1961-1964. . . . Undergraduate Work, Faculty of Foreign Languages, Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan

1963 (Summer). . . Summer Session, The University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah (Nagoya Broadcasting Network Scholarship)

1964-1965. . . . Undergraduate Work, Department of Speech and Theatre, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana (Sankei Scholarship)

1965-1967. . . . Graduate Work, Department of Speech and Theatre, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana (Nanzan University Scholarship)

1967 . . . . . . . M.A., Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana

1967-1969. . . . Assistant, Faculty of Foreign Languages, Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan

1969-1972. . . . Instructor, Faculty of Foreign Languages, Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan

1972-1974. . . . Teaching Associate, Department of Communication, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

PUBLICATIONS


iii

"Jiji Eigo to shite no Supichi to Sono Hihyo" (Speech Criticism as a Study Field of Current English). Jiji Eigogagu Kenkyu (Current English Studies), pp. 69-80, September 1972.


FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Rhetoric and Public Address

Studies in Rhetorical Theory. Professor James L. Golden.


Studies in Rhetorical Practice. Professor Goodwin F. Berquist.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</th>
<th>ii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter

### I. INTRODUCTION

- Purpose of the Study
- Definition of the Key Terms
- Method of the Study
- Significance of the Study
- Dissertation Progression

### II. A METHODOLOGICAL REVIEW OF STUDIES ON CRITICISM OF INTERNATIONAL AND INTER-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION

- Case Studies: Research Topic
- Case Studies: Methodological Perspective/Approach
- Methodological Studies
- Summary and Suggestion

### III. A HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF TWO RHETORICAL SITUATIONS

- Historical Context of Richard Nixon's Trip to China
- Historical Context of Kakuei Tanaka's Trip to China

### IV. THE CONCEPT OF DISTANCE AS A KEY DIMENSION IN INTERNATIONAL AND INTER-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION

- 133
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Nature of Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kinds of Distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategies for Reducing Distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Toward a Rhetoric of Distance Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>FORMULATION OF A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR ANALYSIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nature and Function of Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concept of Expectation in Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model of the Distance-Centered Rhetoric (or Interaction Model)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diagrammatical Model for Analysis of International and Intercultural Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>APPLICATION OF AN ANALYTICAL MODEL TO PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S RHETORICAL DISCOURSES IN CHINA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nixon's Distance Perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nixon's Rhetorical Strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outcome and Implications of Nixon's Rhetoric of Distance Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>APPLICATION OF AN ANALYTICAL MODEL TO PREMIER KAKUEI TANAKA'S RHETORICAL DISCOURSES IN CHINA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanaka's Distance Perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanaka's Rhetorical Strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outcome and Implications of Tanaka's Rhetoric of Distance Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII.</td>
<td>SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Future Directions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Case Studies on Rhetorical Criticism of International and Intercultural Communication (Chronological Arrangement)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure | Description | Page
--- | --- | ---
1. | Prototype of International and Intercultural Communication | 23
2. | International Communication | 24
3. | Intercultural Communication | 25
4. | Diagram of the Sino-American Relations | 106
5. | Diagram of the Sino-Japanese Relations | 127
6. | Classification of the Dimension of Distance | 145
7. | Grid of the Sixteen Possible Combinations of Variables | 199
8. | Diagrammatical Model of International and Intercultural Communication | 210
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since its beginning in Greece rhetoric has been concerned, primarily within one nation or culture, with influencing human behavior through a variety of symbolic modes. It has traditionally been founded upon the allied disciplines of logic, ethics, politics, and aesthetics. The twentieth century has witnessed new contributions of social and behavioral sciences such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, and political science to the development of rhetorical theory, but rhetoric is still viewed as operating largely within the boundaries of one nation or culture.

The practice of rhetorical criticism, too, has chiefly concerned itself with analysis and evaluation of intranational or intracultural communication. Abraham Lincoln addressing his fellow countrymen, Edmund Burke persuading the members of the House of Commons, and Adolf Hitler exhorting his followers in Germany—these have been the typical focal points from which rhetorical critics have viewed rhetorical transactions.
This emphasis on criticism of intranational and intracultural communication has been found predominant in the scholarship of criticism of rhetoric by Charles J. Stewart, who surveyed the state of rhetorical criticism in twentieth century America. He discovered, among other things, that more than eighty per cent of all the critical studies, published or otherwise, during the period between 1915 and 1970 focused their inquiry on some aspects of rhetorical activity practiced by American rhetors within their own national or cultural boundaries.¹

The rapid expansion of modern transportation and electronic communication, however, has helped to break down national and cultural boundaries especially since the end of World War II. Contact has greatly increased among nations of different cultures and racial backgrounds through diplomacy, business, education, and even casual travel. Diplomats representing the interests of their own countries at the United Nations or international negotiations gather together to discuss international problems of their common interest

and concern. Businessmen go beyond their own national boundaries to do business with those of foreign countries. Educators exchange their ideas with scholars of different countries for the purpose of promoting scholarship. People from one country or culture communicate their needs and aspirations to those of another culture and nationality. No longer do we live in an isolated world separated by the walls of national borders and cultural differences. Instead we live in a shrunken world that has become a community, or, in one of the McLuhanesque expressions, in a "global village." No longer are we permitted to direct our attention solely to developments within our own boundaries. In few areas are attention and understanding more needed, then, than in the realm of international and intercultural rhetoric and communication.

A call for the study of international and intercultural communication came, at first, not from speech communication scholars but from those in other disciplines. As early as 1948 anthropologist Margaret Mead proposed a study of "cross-national" communication --a study of "relationships . . . between the peoples of different nations, whose effective communication is compromised both by differences in culture and the circumstance of different nationality which gives a
special competitive coloring and significance to those differences." What Mead proposed, echoed Otto Klineberg, "represented an important area for further investigation. Some form of cross-national communication plays a part in every diplomatic exchange, every international conference, every attempt to bring people of different national origins together in the hope of solving a common problem." Ever since that time many studies have been conducted in the field of international and intercultural communication from the perspectives of anthropology, sociology, linguistics, psychology, political science, history, speech communication, and other varied disciplines.

Intercommunication among nations and cultures has recently attracted the attention and interest of students of speech communication. The 1970 convention of the Speech Communication Association was centered around the main theme of international and intercultural communication. Since its establishment in Janu-


ary, 1971, the Commission for International and Inter-
cultural Speech Communication in the SCA has actively
sponsored research seminars, conferences, and colloquia
in order to encourage interested students "to formulate
a consciousness about the critical role which interna-
tional and intercultural communication assumes, both at
the theoretical and at the practical levels." The
fact that this area of study is commanding considerable
attention from scholars of rhetoric is well manifested
in the recommendations adopted by the National Confer-
ence on Rhetoric concerning rhetoric's scope and place
in education and rhetorical criticism. The Conference
specifically urged, among other things, that speech
communication departments make "curricular investiga-
tions of cross-cultural, inter-cultural, and intra-
cultural communication," and that rhetorical criticism
focus its attention on the various kinds of rhetorical
transactions, including "cross cultural transactions."

4Michael H. Prosser, "Invitation to Consider
Long Range SCA Goals and Priorities," April 20, 1972,
p. 1. (Mimeographed.)

5Lloyd F. Bitzer and Edwin Black, eds., The
Prospect of Rhetoric: Report of the National Develop-
mental Project (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,

6Bitzer and Black, Prospect of Rhetoric, p. 225.
Several important books have so far been written or edited in the field of international and intercultural communication, mostly in the 1970s by such speech communication scholars as Oliver, Samovar and Porter, Prosser, and Harms. Furthermore, interracial communication has been the primary concern of two other writers. As the academic interest in international and intercultural communication is growing, still more works are in progress or in early stages of their preparation.

Despite this growing interest, the analysis and

---


criticism of international and intercultural rhetorical transactions are notable for the absence of their own established and standard methodology of research. Consequently, as the next chapter of this study will show, many critics have employed a neo-Aristotelian approach based on traditional rhetorical canons. It is assumed that since the international and intercultural communication situation is usually characterized by added and unique factors such as multiplicity of audiences, their expectations, channels, purposes, and languages, neo-Aristotelianism may be proved inadequate or unsatisfactory for describing, analyzing, and evaluating rhetorical transactions across national and cultural boundaries. It must be pointed out at the same time, however, that some insightful critics, though only a few in number, have formulated their own methods and perspectives of diversity and applied them to crosscultural communication to evaluate its merit. The lively concern and the conscious groping of scholars in this field for a proper method or approach are clearly reflected in two collections of articles recently published, the one by Prosser and the other by Samovar and Porter.

At this stage a couple of questions come to my mind. First, would it not seem appropriate to begin by
reviewing the previous literature methodologically in order to ascertain where we have been, where we are, and where we ought to be going in rhetorical criticism of international and intercultural transactions? My methodological inquiry into the past studies will hopefully shed much needed light on the state of criticism of intercommunication and on the possible direction this field might take so far as its methodology is concerned.

Second, if the critical approach is found to be predominantly neo-Aristotelian, as I assume it will be, I must ask the following question: does a neo-Aristotelian approach yield satisfactory results as a method for analyzing international and intercultural communicative transactions? As a matter of fact, many of those who employed neo-Aristotelianism in the 1950s and the early 1960s in their analysis of international and intercultural communication did so for the reason that this traditional approach had been most dominantly utilized by rhetorical critics in their evaluation of primarily intranational and intracultural communication.

Third, what alternative methods, approaches, or frames of reference, then, are available to a critic of international and intercultural communication is a logical question I will pose next. This study will
propose one alternative frame of reference from which a critic may view international and intercultural rhetorical transactions. Wayne Brockriede described the basic dimensions of a rhetorical framework that he felt could be applied to analyze any rhetorical transaction regardless of its cultural, national, or philosophical context.\textsuperscript{10} Elaborating further on this dimensional concept of rhetoric, Brockriede and Robert L. Scott offered the following advice to a critic: "The concept of dimensions offers guidelines. Each critic may choose those that seem most useful for viewing a particular rhetorical transaction."\textsuperscript{11} Following this advice, I will choose among "interpersonal dimensions" that of "distance" as a focal point in my critical act. When distance exists in a rhetorical situation, the primary function of discourse, according to Brockriede, will be "the establishment of an appropriate distance (whether decreasing, maintaining, or increasing it)."\textsuperscript{12}

It will be proposed in this study that, focus-

\begin{itemize}
  \item Brockriede, "Dimensions," p. 3.
\end{itemize}
ing on the dimension of distance, a critic view interna-
tional and intercultural communication not as a one-
shot effort but as a series of efforts, that is, a
campaign, in which by applying all the available rhe-
torical strategies the rhetor endeavors to fulfill the
varied expectations that both international and na-
tional audiences hold concerning his rhetorical mission
for the primary purpose of removing, or at least reduc-
ing, the interpersonal distance between himself and his
auditors and the international distance between his
country or culture and another country or culture. I
will urge a critic, in other words, to view an interna-
tional and intercultural communication transaction as a
rhetorical endeavor of distance reduction.

Fourth, what are the nature and characteristics
of the dimension of distance as a focal point in the
rhetoric of distance reduction? What rhetorical strat-
egies are available to the rhetor who tries to remove,
or at least reduce, the interpersonal and international
distance between himself and his audience? This study
will explore these questions from the perspectives of
anthropology, psychology, sociology, international re-
lations, and speech communication.

Fifth, can an analytical model be constructed
that may be applied to the assessment and criticism of
international and intercultural communication? I have two kinds of models in mind in this respect. One of them is diagrammatical in nature. It should show interrelatedness of the key components of international and intercultural communication at a glance with the dimension of distance playing a central role. This model should, of necessity, be eclectic, pluralistic, and interdisciplinary in nature in that it must be constructed upon pertinent components drawn from various fields of study.

The other is what I call a model of distance-centered rhetoric or an interaction model that may generate several hypotheses concerning how the independent variables such as the national and international audience expectation level and the speaker's rhetorical sophistication level relate to the dependent variable of distance establishment. This model will hopefully predict the possible outcomes in terms of distance reduction out of a dozen or so interaction types in intercommunication among nations and peoples. This model should, above all things, have a heuristic value, that is, it should provide a rhetorical critic with new ways to conceive of hypothetical ideas and relationships.

Sixth, does the proposed model based on the
dimension of distance satisfactorily account for rhetorical transactions that go beyond national and cultural boundaries? To demonstrate the applicability of my diagrammatical model and to examine some of the hypotheses that my interaction model will generate concerning the relationships among the varied expectations of the audiences, the speaker's rhetorical sophistication, and the extent of distance reduction, I will select as my sample specimens rhetorical discourses produced by President Richard M. Nixon and by Premier Kakuei Tanaka of Japan respectively during their visits to the People's Republic of China in 1972.

The rationale for selecting these rhetorical discourses as representative samples for my analysis should be mentioned here. It should first be pointed out that in international politics summit diplomacy has long been, and will remain, the dominant form of dealing with international problems of grave significance. Kazushige Hirasawa, a renowned political commentator, made this point: "In this age of air travel, diplomacy has taken the form of direct talks between top leaders, such as presidents or prime ministers, instead of ambassadors or foreign ministers." 13

Khrushchev and Brezhnev speaking to the American leaders and nation, Churchill addressing the United States Congress, Gandhi persuading the British Premier and members of the Parliament—these are the typical examples of international communication. Rhetorical discourses produced by Nixon and Tanaka which were directed to the Chinese officials and nation, therefore, fit in well with the category of international rhetorical transactions.

It will further be assumed that because of the national, cultural, linguistic, racial, and ideological differences lying between the two rhetors and their audiences, the existence of unmistakable distance, both interpersonal and international, characterized the rhetorical situations that Nixon and Tanaka had encountered respectively when they set out to wage their rhetorical campaigns in China.

In addition, since the two world leaders' trips to China were considered to be dramatic events from the diplomatic standpoint, the rhetorical situations were rife with varied expectations entertained by the audiences, both national and international, concerning the rhetors' missions. The analysis of these rhetorical situations will shed some light on how Nixon and Tanaka rhetorically endeavored to respond to the audience ex-
pectations for the purpose of reducing distance.

Finally, what implications does this study carry for future research in this field? This question will be considered based on the findings of my two case studies.

Before proceeding to the next section of this chapter, I must point out here that these foregoing seven questions, although separately posed, will naturally constitute a series of closely related problem areas which I hope to explore in this study.

**Purposes of the Study**

Formally stated, the purposes of this study include:

1. To review critically published articles, unpublished theses and dissertations primarily in the field of speech communication from the methodological point of view in order to ascertain the state of rhetorical criticism of international and intercultural communication.

2. To propose a theoretical basis for analysis as an alternative approach or frame of reference with the dimension of distance playing a key role. This includes the following three sub-purposes: (a) to examine the concept of distance from the perspectives of such social and behavioral sciences as anthropology,
psychology, sociology, political science, and speech communication; (b) to explore what formal strategies may be available to the rhetor when faced with a rhetorical situation that demands removal, or at least, reduction of distance; and (c) to propose analytical models that may be applied to international and intercultural rhetorical transactions.

(3) To apply the proposed analytical models to rhetorical discourses produced by Richard Nixon and Kakuei Tanaka respectively during their trips to the People's Republic of China in order to ascertain their applicability to criticism of intercommunication among nations and cultures.

What I intend to accomplish in this study, in sum, is to provide a theoretical exploration in and an applied criticism of international and intercultural communication. By focusing on the theoretical and applicative aspects of rhetorical criticism at the same time, this study hopes to answer the charge leveled against some rhetorical theorists by one critic who stated: "... theorists must develop the new emphases or approaches into usable methods and must illustrate them for potential critics. Too few critical theorists are practitioners of the art."\(^{14}\)

Before concluding this section of the first chapter, I should add one final word about the limited scope of this dissertation. This study should be considered to be of heuristic nature in that it will generate and formulate some dozen hypotheses concerning the relationships between the expectation fulfillment and the degree of distance reduction in international and intercultural communication. This study, however, does not claim to demonstrate the validity of all the hypotheses to be formulated here. My model, in fact, will generate more hypotheses than I can possibly examine here. It is hoped that future researchers will scrutinize some other hypotheses that will remain unexplored in this study.

**Definition of the Key Terms**

An attempt to define the terms *intercultural* and *international* communication inevitably raises the question as to just what is meant by *culture* and *communication*. It is not my purpose here to go into the deeper philosophy of the meaning of all-inclusive terms like culture or communication.

The term *culture* has long been the object of definition and redefinition by anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists. K. S. Sitaram wrote:
There have been about a thousand definitions of the term culture. Scholars have tried to define this term from the Vedic days about 1500 B.C., up to this day. These definitions have been descriptive, philosophical, historical, psychological, and normative. But sufficient for the purpose of this discussion is the general and rather simplified anthropological sense that culture, in the words of Edward T. Hall, is "the way of life of a people, ... the sum of their learned behavior patterns, attitudes, and material things." This definition includes not only the material features of the human environment, but also its conceptual features—the beliefs, science, myths, religion, value systems, and so on held by a group of people. Whatever man does in dealing with nature and with fellows, he does according to patterns of action and thought that are learned from other men. Such behavior is called cultural in distinction from narrowly physiological activities, such as breathing, that are not learned.


The term communication, too, has long been the object of definition and delineation by scholars in diverse fields of study. Philosophers, psycholinguists, sociologists, engineers, mathematicians, rhetoricians, and communicologists have attempted to clarify what communication is all about. Yet, the simplest and most useful definition for my discussion was offered by Gerald R. Miller, who stated: "In the main, communication has as its central interest those behavioral situations in which a source transmits a message to a receiver(s) with conscious intent to affect the latter's behavior." This view of communication as purposeful or goal-oriented was fully shared by James C. McCroskey, when he described goal orientation as one major characteristic of "rhetorical" communication.18 This definition emphasizes the role of the sender in a communication transaction. The criterion of conscious intent makes this a source-oriented definition.

It must be recognized at the same time, however, that to visualize communication as attempted,


purposeful, or rhetorical persuasion on the part of a source is sometimes too limiting as a definition of communication. As is implied in Edward T. Hall's *The Silent Language*, culture communicates both at the conscious and unconscious levels. It often happens that even if the sender of messages does not have conscious intent, the receiver perceives a whole communicative event entirely differently and attaches a significantly different meaning to it because of the difference in their cultural experiences. S. S. Stevens, for example, provided a useful definition of communication, which may be labeled as receiver-oriented. Stevens stated that communication is the discriminatory response of an organism to a stimulus.\(^{19}\) This definition is more inclusive than a source-oriented definition. It seems more sensible, therefore, to take into consideration at the same time both a conscious or overt intent and an unconscious or covert intent on the part of both the source and the receiver of messages when we view communication in international and intercultural settings.

I now come to the core of this section on def-

inition: that of the terms international and intercultural communication. The problem about these two popular terms, according to Sitaram, is that "... there is a great deal of confusion" between them. The same kind of comment was echoed by Gerhard Maletzke, a German scholar, who complained: "Very often, in the American literature in particular, the phrase international communication is frequently used, and one can never be sure whether the authors intend to differentiate as between international and intercultural." 

The phrase international communication means several things to different disciplines. To the field of journalism, international communication tends to be equated with foreign press, as Schramm wrote in his chapter to an introductory book on research in journalism that international communication is concerned with "the press of different foreign countries and ... the function and organization of the wire services." The equation of international communication with foreign

---


press is thus apparent in Schramm's definition. To public opinion specialists, international communication seems to carry the implication of something political in an international setting. This is implied by the fact that the spring, 1956 issue of the Public Opinion Quarterly devoted its entire space to studies on the combined topic of international and political communication. Some students of speech communication tend to equate international communication with diplomatic speaking, as Gerstman defined it as "speeches directed to multinational audiences" and used these two phrases interchangeably in her study.

I will view international communication as that which takes place on the levels of governments, nations, or countries, which is to say, across na-

---


23 Public Opinion Quarterly, XX (Spring, 1956).

tional boundaries, and as being political, diplomatic, and governmental in nature. Since included in this definition are government-to-government communication, diplomatic speaking, and a national leader's speaking to his counterpart in another country, international communication may be characterized by formality, impersonality, and at times vagueness. I will see it a main purpose of international communication to affect the national policy and the political actions of another government, nation, or country. The phrase international communication will be used synonymously with crossnational or transnational communication.

Intercultural communication, on the other hand, may be described as a form of interaction that takes place when a source and a receiver of the message come from different cultures. Unlike international communication, which has political implications, intercultural communication occurs at sociological and anthropological levels and deals with personal relations and contacts across cultural boundaries. The purpose of intercultural communication, as I see it, is to create and to facilitate understanding between the participants in the communicative act across cultural boundaries rather than to change the attitudes and behaviors of the recipient of messages. Intercultural communica-
tion is usually characterized more by reciprocity, informality, and personality. Such prefixes as "cross-" and "trans-" are also used in this context.

To summarize, Maletzke succinctly defined intercultural and international communication in a comparative form: "Whereas intercultural communication is an exchange of meaning between cultures, international communication takes place on the level of countries or nations, which is to say, across frontiers." If the definitions offered by Maletzke are to be followed, it might be said that in many cases international and intercultural communication may be the same, as the following illustration shows:

![Diagram of International and Intercultural Communication]

Figure 1.—Prototype of International and Intercultural Communication

---

25 Maletzke, "Intercultural and International Communication," p. 478. [Emphasis in the original.]
Communication between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, for instance, fits well into this illustration, since these two countries and cultures are separate and different entities.

But this is not necessarily the case at all times. It must be remembered that there exists at times international communication between the peoples of the same dominant culture whose language is the same, but separated only by the national boundaries.

![Diagram of international communication between three countries sharing the same dominant culture, but separated by national boundaries.]

**Figure 2.—International Communication**

A typical example of the above illustration may be seen in communication between the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea), both of which share the same dominant culture, but are separated only by the national
It is also possible, on the other hand, to discover intercultural communication within one country or nation when people of different cultures (usually, sub-cultures), races, and ethnic origins communicate with each other. The following illustration depicts this special pattern of intercultural communication:

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 3.**—Intercultural Communication

A good example of this type of intercultural communication may be found in communication between White Americans and Black Americans reared in their own respective cultures. In order to differentiate this communication type from the one illustrated in Figure 1, some scholars have proposed terms such as transra-
cial, interethnic, and interracial communication. I will urge, however, that the phrase intercultural communication be used as a superordinate term to include all those phrases just mentioned above, because it embraces all of the communicative situations that arise when people of different cultures communicate with each other. This study, in other words, will look at intercultural communication as being characterized by cultural differences that transcend ethnic or racial differences.

In the discussion that follows this study will primarily deal with international and intercultural communication in the most familiar sense illustrated in Figure 1.

Method of the Study

The critical approach is the primary method to be employed throughout this study. By viewing the term "method" as the more general and the term "procedure" as the more specific and descriptive term, Elton Carter

and Iline Fife defined the critical method as a set of "procedures of evaluating phenomena of speech according to appropriate criteria or standards of judgment." They further elaborated on these procedures:

The following procedures make up the minimum requirements of the critical method: (1) select the phenomena of speech to be evaluated or criticized and state the research problem; (2) orient the problem and establish the need for the study; (3) design the research by adapting or creating appropriate criteria and by planning how to use them; (4) control the factors involved in assembling and studying the relevant data; (5) evaluate the phenomena by observing them in relation to the criteria; and (6) draw conclusions from the data as evaluated.

The procedures (1) and (2) dealing with formulating the research design comprise the preliminary stage of a critical act. The procedure (3) may be called the criteria-establishing stage. The final three procedures from (4) through (6) embrace the evaluative stage of criticism.

This study will largely cover these three stages of the critical method. It begins with the methodological inquiry into the published and unpublished criti-

---


cal studies on international and intercultural communication. Although Auer included "methodological studies" as one type of the descriptive method of research in speech and theatre, I believe they should be considered a requisite to the preliminary stage of the critical method. Methodological studies in general should aid a critic in ascertaining the dominant approach to criticism of works of art, in illuminating its strengths and weaknesses, and in suggesting a possible alternative frame of reference. The preliminary stage of criticism also establishes the rationale for studying certain kinds of rhetorical phenomena for analysis and criticism.

In the second stage of a critical act a critic should establish, in the words of Ernest G. Bormann, "a series of assumptions about the nature of drama, rhetoric, oral interpretation" which "constitute the critic's viewpoint." In the case of this study, the theoretical discussion on the concept of distance and on proposed models for analysis will be based on two


underlying major assumptions.

I will assume, first of all, that, focusing on the dimension of distance, a critic should visualize international and intercultural rhetorical transactions as a campaign in which a rhetor endeavors to fulfill the varied expectations held by his audiences through his rhetorical sophistication for the purpose of reducing the interpersonal and international distance lying between himself and the receivers of his messages, both national and international. Intercommunication among nations and cultures, in other words, is assumed to be an interaction among such independent variables as the speaker's rhetorical sophistication and his audience's varied levels of expectations and the dependent variable of distance establishment (in the form of reduction, expansion, or retention).

It will further be assumed that the crucial question which concerns a critic in the final analysis should be: how successfully did the rhetor fulfill the varied expectations that the immediate and ultimate audiences had held concerning his rhetorical mission and consequently reduce the interpersonal and international distance without creating any undesirable side-effects? In this study the primary way international and intercultural communication will be judged, in
other words, is by evaluating its effect in terms of distance reduction. The ultimate questions that will be answered, therefore, are: "Were the speaker's rhetorical strategies effective? Did he accomplish distance reduction?"

On the basis of these two assumptions, I will delineate the dimension of distance from the perspectives of social and behavioral sciences and formulate two models for analysis to be applied to criticism of international and intercultural communication.

Based upon these two assumptions as the viewpoint, the evaluative stage of this critical study will include analysis, interpretation, and evaluation of the rhetorical discourses produced by President Richard M. Nixon and Premier Kakuei Tanaka during their trips to the People's Republic of China. More specifically, I will pose and answer the following questions:

1- What kinds of distance did the rhetor face and how did he perceive them?

2- What were the primary rhetorical strategies employed by the rhetor in order to reduce distance?

3- How effective was the speaker's rhetoric of distance reduction?

4- Why did the particular outcome turn out as it actually did?
Each of these questions will be answered and analyzed in Chapters Six and Seven in the hope of discovering characteristics and standards in international and intercultural communication. At the same time an attempt will be made to determine what elements contribute to the success or failure of the rhetoric of distance reduction from the perspectives of national and cultural idiosyncrasies of both the rhetor and his national and international audiences.

What I hope to accomplish through the use of the critical method, in sum, will be to establish an alternative frame of reference for analysis, to develop techniques of craftsmanship in rhetorical scholarship, and to facilitate understanding and appreciation of international and intercultural communication as a rhetorical endeavor to reduce distance. The employment of the critical method will, in the final analysis, enable me to "search for values and universals" in intercommunication among nations and cultures.

Significance of the Study

This study can make several unique contributions to the better understanding of international and

---

intercultural communication transactions. First, to my knowledge, no study has ever been conducted to examine methodological approaches to rhetorical criticism of intercommunication among nations and cultures. This is the main reason why one separate chapter will be reserved for this purpose.

Second, my proposed models based on the dimension of distance will hopefully shed much needed light on the complexity of unique and added dimensions in international and intercultural communicative settings. Particularly valuable to future critics will be a heuristic nature of these models for analysis, because they can generate yet unverified hypotheses concerning the complex relationships among the expectation fulfillment, the rhetorical sophistication, and the degree of distance reduction.

Finally, and most importantly, my bilingual background and rhetorical training qualify me for rhetorical criticism of bilingual rhetorical situations that the two rhetors under discussion encountered. The selection of rhetorical discourses produced in English and in Japanese as specimens for analysis, therefore, is a logical and natural choice to the one with this linguistic advantage. Charles J. Stewart pinpointed the real difficulty of the study of international and
intercultural communication, when he predicted: "Lack of competence in foreign languages will undoubtedly continue to place a great many fascinating topics beyond the reach of rhetorical critics." This prediction has much validity particularly with monolingual critics.

Dissertation Progression

The following organizational pattern reflects the study design formulated to make possible a preliminary inquiry, a theoretical exploration, and an actual application of rhetorical criticism in international and intercultural communication: (1) the nature and purpose of the study; (2) a methodological review of the literature on criticism of international and intercultural communication; (3) a historical narrative of President Richard M. Nixon's and Premier Kakuei Tanaka's trips to China; (4) the concept of distance as a key dimension in international and intercultural communication; (5) formulation of a theoretical model for analysis; (6) application of the analytical model to President Nixon's rhetorical discourses produced in China in February, 1972; (7) application of the analytical model

to Premier Tanaka's rhetorical discourses produced in China in September, 1972; and (8) general summary and conclusions of the study.

Chapter One has been designed to furnish the reader with insight into the nature and purpose of the dissertation. It has included the discussion of such matters as: (1) origin of the study; (2) purpose of the study; (3) definition of the key terms; (4) method of the study; (5) significance of the study; and (6) dissertation progression.

Chapter Two will critically review the previously published and unpublished studies on rhetorical criticism of international and intercultural communication and examine the methods or approaches used in these studies. This methodological inquiry will suggest possible alternative frames of reference in critical assessment of international and intercultural communication and also indicate possible research areas which students of intercommunication may pursue in the future.

In Chapter Three the rhetorical situations in which Nixon and Tanaka found themselves respectively and by which they were influenced will be surveyed and described. This chapter will assume the function of what classical rhetoricians called narratio, or the
statement of fact. This factual narrative of the trips to China made by Nixon and Tanaka will provide the reader a proper historical perspective. This chapter will demonstrate that a traditional, neo-Aristotelian approach will be found inadequate to cope with the unique and added dimensions of the rhetorical situations that Nixon and Tanaka encountered. The third chapter will be concluded by calling the attention of the reader to the dimension of distance in international and intercultural communication.

Chapter Four will single out and sharpen the dimension of distance as a key variable in international and intercultural communication. This examination will take its inspiration from many diverse sources of social and behavioral sciences such as anthropology, psychology, sociology, political science, and speech communication. This chapter will also explore what formal strategies for distance reduction may be available to the rhetor in international and intercultural communication situations.

Chapter Five is concerned with a theoretical formulation of models for analysis which I hope may be applied to rhetorical transactions across national and cultural boundaries. The proposed model of distance-centered rhetoric or the interaction model is designed
to serve a heuristic function in that it will generate several hypotheses concerning the relationships between the expectation fulfillment and the degree of distance reduction. This chapter, in addition, will delineate and define the major components that comprise the proposed diagrammatical model of international and intercultural communication.

The next two chapters will concern themselves with an application of the proposed models for analysis to two cases, that is, rhetorical discourses produced by Nixon and Tanaka during their trips to China in 1972. In Chapters Six and Seven the patterns for my analysis will be identical. Both chapters will attempt to answer the following crucial question: how did Nixon and Tanaka communicate and how successfully did they fulfill the varied expectations of the audiences and consequently reduce the interpersonal and international distance without creating ill effects? This will be accomplished by analyzing their rhetorical strategies and evaluating the nature of their rhetoric of distance reduction.

The final chapter will serve the standard function of summarizing and drawing general conclusions of the study.
CHAPTER II

A METHODOLOGICAL REVIEW OF STUDIES ON CRITICISM OF INTERNATIONAL AND INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION

This chapter critically reviews the previously published and unpublished studies on criticism of international and intercultural communication reported primarily in the field of speech communication and examines the methods, perspectives, or approaches used in these studies. As I have defined in Chapter I, international communication will be viewed in this study as that which takes place on the levels of governments, nations, or countries and which includes government-to-government communication, diplomatic speaking, and a national leader's speaking to his counterpart in another country. Whereas the source and the receiver of messages come from different countries or governments in international communication, intercultural communication is a form of interaction that takes place when the speaker and the audience come from different cultures. International and intercultural communication may be the same, as in the case of communication between the United States of America and the People's Republic of
China, since these two countries and cultures are separate and different entities.

Included in this review are those case studies which dealt with criticism of rhetorical transactions across national and cultural boundaries which I have defined in the preceding paragraph. The most common topics of these studies include foreign speakers (political, cultural, and literary figures) speaking to the American audience and international spokesmen addressing the United Nations. Also reviewed in this chapter are those theoretical studies which suggested methodologies, approaches, or perspectives to rhetorical criticism of international and intercultural communication.

I will exclude from this methodological inquiry, on the other hand, critical studies on the development of a national (or foreign) rhetorical theory and practice.¹

Also out of my consideration are case studies conducted by an empirical research method or theoretical studies which advocate empiricism in approach, since this review is primarily concerned with critical studies on international and intercultural transactions of rhetoric.  

What classification of methods of rhetorical criticism is to be used in this methodological inquiry? Fascinated by Thomas S. Kuhn's notion of "paradigm" as an imaginative picture of what reality is like, Robert L. Scott and Bernard L. Brock took a paradigmatic view in classifying methods of rhetorical criticism in the twentieth century. They contended that rhetorical criticism has been characterized by two general currents: "a traditional perspective and breaks from the tradition."  

Scott and Brock further divided these perspectives into approaches:

Within the traditional perspective we have identified two approaches: neo-Aristo-

---


telian and historical. The dominant tradition emphasizes that the speaker role determines the choices that make speeches. . . .

In the break from the traditional perspective, we have observed two general tendencies. First, the tendency to move the orientation of the criticism from the speaker to the critic. Second, the tendency to replace the Aristotelian rhetorical theory with some other theory as the starting point for criticism.

Criticism that has a critic's orientation we call the "experiential perspective." The critic's experience . . . is drawn on creatively as a starting point for his rhetorical criticism. . . . [Within this perspective] two approaches . . . are what we call the "eclectic" and the "sociocultural-psychological."

Criticism that attempts to replace Aristotelian theory will be referred to as the "perspective of the 'New Rhetorics.'" . . . We shall refer to two tendencies within this perspective: one that we shall call the "grammatical-semantical approach" and one that we shall call the "dramatistic approach."  

This paradigmatic scheme of classification will be employed as a guide when I set out to identify the kind of critical methodologies employed in the studies under review.

This chapter concerns itself with a methodological examination of some forty published and unpublished case studies and two theoretical studies on methodology conducted in the field of criticism of international and intercultural communication. This review will hopefully illuminate the present state of

---

^Scott and Brock, Methods, p. 15.
research in this area and suggest possible alternative frames of reference in critical assessment of intercommunication among nations and cultures.

Case Studies

I have compiled a chronological list of the case studies on criticism of intercultural and international communication transactions. This table will show at a glance who did what with what methodological approach with what major emphasis. It will also indicate whether a rhetorical critic consciously looked at his study from the perspective of intercultural and international communication.

The following is a detailed discussion of the present state of critical case studies on intercommunication among nations and peoples from the angles of the research topic, the research methodological perspective, the principal concern, and the presence or absence of consciousness of international and intercultural implications on the part of rhetorical critics.

Case Studies: Research Topic

About three fourths of the case studies reviewed dealt with rhetor-centered topics, the most typical of which was that of a foreign speaker of international reputation in the political, cultural, literary or edu-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Year)</th>
<th>Research Topic</th>
<th>Methodological Perspective/ Approach</th>
<th>Principal Concern</th>
<th>Consciousnessa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Behl (1948)</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
<td>Descriptive</td>
<td>Strengths &amp; weaknesses</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lomas (1949)</td>
<td>Japanese war propaganda</td>
<td>Traditional/ Neo-Aristotelian (Truncated)</td>
<td>&quot;Effect&quot; theory</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinocour (1953)</td>
<td>Oriental speaker in America</td>
<td>Traditional/ Neo-Aristotelian (Complete)</td>
<td>Rhetor-centered</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glenn (1954)</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
<td>Critical perspective of &quot;New Rhetorics&quot;/Semantical analysis</td>
<td>Semantical analysis</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooper (1956)</td>
<td>Propaganda broadcast</td>
<td>Traditional/ Neo-Aristotelian (Truncated)</td>
<td>Invention-centered</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Research Topic</td>
<td>Methodological Perspective/ Approach</td>
<td>Principal Concern</td>
<td>Consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLeod (1957)</td>
<td>British speakers in America</td>
<td>Traditional/ Neo-Aristotelian (Complete)</td>
<td>Rhetor-centered</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baisinger (1958)</td>
<td>British speakers in America</td>
<td>Traditional/ Historical</td>
<td>Idea-centered</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stitzel (1958)</td>
<td>American speakers abroad</td>
<td>Traditional/ Neo-Aristotelian (Complete)</td>
<td>Thematic analysis</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward (1960)</td>
<td>Oriental speaker in America</td>
<td>Traditional/ Neo-Aristotelian (Complete)</td>
<td>Rhetor-centered</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crocker (1961)</td>
<td>Oriental speaker in America</td>
<td>Traditional/ Neo-Aristotelian (Complete)</td>
<td>Rhetor-centered</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ewbank &amp; Baker (1961)</td>
<td>Russian speaker in America</td>
<td>Traditional/ Historical</td>
<td>Idea-centered</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Research Topic</td>
<td>Methodological Perspective/ Approach</td>
<td>Principal Concern</td>
<td>Consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post</td>
<td>British speaker in America</td>
<td>Traditional/ Neo-Aristotelian (Complete)</td>
<td>Rhetor-centered</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stump</td>
<td>Oriental speaker in America</td>
<td>Traditional/ Neo-Aristotelian (Complete)</td>
<td>Rhetor-centered</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliver</td>
<td>Oriental speaker in America</td>
<td>Traditional/ Neo-Aristotelian (Truncated)</td>
<td>Rhetor-centered</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rao</td>
<td>Oriental speaker in America</td>
<td>Traditional/ Neo-Aristotelian (Truncated)</td>
<td>Audience adaptation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharp</td>
<td>Russian speaker in America</td>
<td>Critical perspective of &quot;New Rhetorics&quot;/Semantical (Propaganda)</td>
<td>Propaganda techniques</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerstman</td>
<td>Speaker in UN</td>
<td>Traditional/ Neo-Aristotelian (Truncated)</td>
<td>Diplomatic speaking</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Research Topic</td>
<td>Methodological Perspective/ Approach</td>
<td>Principal Concern</td>
<td>Consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Prosser</td>
<td>UN communication problems</td>
<td>Descriptive</td>
<td>Diplomatic language</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1963)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Condon</td>
<td>American speaker abroad</td>
<td>Critical perspective of &quot;New Rhetorics&quot;/Value</td>
<td>Values of audience</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1964)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Prosser</td>
<td>Speaker in UN</td>
<td>Traditional/Neo-Aristotelian (Complete)</td>
<td>Varied audiences</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1964)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Prosser</td>
<td>UN audiences</td>
<td>Traditional/Neo-Aristotelian (Truncated)</td>
<td>Varied audiences</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1965)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Schwartz</td>
<td>Speechmaking in UN</td>
<td>Traditional/Neo-Aristotelian (Truncated)</td>
<td>Invention-centered</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1965)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Windt</td>
<td>Russian speaker in America</td>
<td>Traditional/Neo-Aristotelian (Complete)</td>
<td>Rhetor-centered</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1965)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Research Topic</td>
<td>Methodological Perspective/Approach</td>
<td>Principal Concern</td>
<td>Consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Zacharis</td>
<td>British speaker in America</td>
<td>Traditional/Neo-Aristotelian (Complete)</td>
<td>Rhetor-centered</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1966)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Carr</td>
<td>German speaker in America</td>
<td>Traditional/Neo-Aristotelian (Truncated)</td>
<td>Ethos</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1968)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Reeves</td>
<td>British speaker in America</td>
<td>Traditional/Neo-Aristotelian (Complete)</td>
<td>Rhetor-centered</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1968)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Alspaugh</td>
<td>American speaker abroad</td>
<td>Traditional/Neo-Aristotelian (Complete)</td>
<td>Rhetor-centered</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1969)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Biggs</td>
<td>Speaker in UN</td>
<td>Traditional/Historical</td>
<td>Idea-centered</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1969)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Carlson</td>
<td>Wildlife conservation campaign</td>
<td>Critical perspective of &quot;New Rhetorics&quot;/Value</td>
<td>Values of audience</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1969)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Research Topic</td>
<td>Methodological Perspective/Approach</td>
<td>Principal Concern</td>
<td>Consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Kaplan</td>
<td>Speaker in UN</td>
<td>Traditional/Neo-Aristotelian (Truncated)</td>
<td>Argument-centered</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1969)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Brockriede &amp; Scott (1970)</td>
<td>Russian speaker in America</td>
<td>Experiential/Eclectic</td>
<td>Distance reduction</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Heisey (1970)</td>
<td>Arab-Israeli conflict</td>
<td>Experiential/Eclectic</td>
<td>Dimensional analysis</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Kiernan (1971)</td>
<td>British speaker in America</td>
<td>Traditional/Neo-Aristotelian (Truncated)</td>
<td>Ethos</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Starosta (1971)</td>
<td>UN communication problem</td>
<td>Experiential/Eclectic</td>
<td>Diplomatic language</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Research Topic</td>
<td>Methodological Perspective/ Approach</td>
<td>Principal Concern</td>
<td>Consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. White</td>
<td>German speaker in America</td>
<td>Traditional/ Neo-Aristotelian (Truncated)</td>
<td>Thematic analysis</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1971)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Windt</td>
<td>Russian speaker in America</td>
<td>Traditional/ Neo-Aristotelian (Complete)</td>
<td>Rhetor-centered.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1971)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Prosser</td>
<td>UN as place of summitry</td>
<td>Descriptive</td>
<td>UN as agent of conflict resolution</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1973)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I have indicated by using 'Yes' or 'No' whether a rhetorical critic consciously looked at his study from the perspective of international and intercultural communication.
cational field who addressed the American audience. Because of the close ancestral heritage, the speech-making in America of such British Isles speakers as prime ministers, an Irish agitator, a social reformist, and a women suffragist was a recurrent topic which attracted rhetorical critics. Rhetors from the Oriental countries were also frequent topics in rhetorical criticism of international and intercultural communication. Spokesmen of international reputation from Korea, Persia, the Philippines, the Nationalist China, India, and Japan respectively were evaluated from the rhetorical perspective. It must also be pointed out that


6 Seymour Murray Vinocour, "Syngman Rhee, Spokesman for Korea (June 23, 1951--October 8, 1952): A Case Study in International Speaking" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1953); Allan
five studies were devoted to rhetorical criticism of
Nikita S. Khrushchev's speechmaking in America in 1959.7
German speakers in America, too, were the research

Lucius Ward, "An Historical Study of North American
Speaking Tour of 'Abudu'il-Baha and a Rhetorical Analysis
of His Addresses" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio
University, 1960); Lionel Crocker, "Carlos P. Romulo,
Orator: Part I," Today's Speech, IX (September, 1961),
1-3+30 and "Carlos P. Romulo, Orator: Part II," Today's Speech, IX (November, 1961), 14-16+26; Winifred
B. Stump, "A Critical Analysis of Selected Speeches from
Madame Chiang's 1943 American Tour" (unpublished M.A.
thesis, Ohio University, 1961); Robert T. Oliver,
"Syngman Rhee: A Case Study in Transnational Oratory,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVIII (April, 1962), 115-
27; Kolar Surya Narayana Rao, "Jawaharlal Nehru on
Kashmir: Nehru's International Audience Adaptation in
Selected Parliamentary Speeches" (unpublished M.A.
thesis, Pennsylvania State University, 1962); and Edward
Marcus Brown, "Dr. Inazo Nitobe in the United States,
1911-1912: A Rhetorical Criticism of a Japanese Pro-
fessor's Lectures" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni-
versity of Oklahoma, 1971).

7Henry L. Ewbank, Jr. and Eldon E. Baker,
"Khrushchev: Consistent or Contradictory?" Today's
Speech, IX (April, 1961), 1-4; Dawn Sharp, "A Study of
the Persuasive Techniques Employed in the Public Speak-
ing of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev during His Tour
of the United States" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Florida
State University, 1962); Theodore Otto Windt, "The
Rhetoric of Peaceful Coexistence: A Criticism of
Selected American Speeches by Nikita Khrushchev" (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University,
1965); Wayne Brockriede and Robert L. Scott, "Reducing
Rhetorical Distance: Khrushchev's 1959 American Tour,"
in Moments in the Rhetoric of the Cold War (New York:
Random House, 1970), pp. 44-78; and Theodore Otto Windt,
"The Rhetoric of Peaceful Coexistence: Khrushchev in
America, 1959," Quarterly Journal of Speech, LVII (Feb-
topics of two graduate theses. This discussion of the rhetor-centered research topic would not be complete without reference to governmental spokesmen in the United Nations. The speechmaking of Adlai Stevenson and of Abba Eban, for example, was the focal point in several case studies.

Not only foreign speakers addressing the American audience or the representatives in the United Nations, but American rhetors persuading foreign audience constituted another research area of rhetorical criticism in several case studies under review. Among them


were American delegates speaking at the Inter-American Conference, President Kennedy addressing the Mexican audience, and an American general persuading the audiences in London and in Rome respectively.¹⁰

Some scholars of speech communication tended to equate international communication with diplomatic speaking. This tendency was particularly evident in the studies of Robert T. Oliver.¹¹ Ever since its establishment the United Nations has been considered an indispensable forum for diplomatic speaking by students of communication. Viewing the United Nations from the organizational perspective, some studies re-


viewed here discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the Security Council as a forum of international debates and examined the potential of this world organization as the place of summitry in conflict resolution. Some other studies focused on the role and the inherent problems of communication in the United Nations rather than on its organizational aspects. Finally, since the United Nations includes over 130 sovereign states, public speaking in this organization is usually directed to the multinational audiences. This unique characteristic prompted one critic to identify the three kinds of audiences (primary, secondary, and secondary).


and spontaneous) that the UN speakers must take into account in their rhetorical endeavors.  

In addition to rhetor-centered and organization-centered research topics just discussed, the critical studies on international and intercultural communication under review selected rhetorical campaigns as their focal point. Two studies were concerned with war propaganda campaigns directed to the enemy camps beyond national and cultural boundaries. Two other unique areas of research fit well into the category of campaign-centered topics. One critic looked at the wildlife conservation efforts in Kenya as a rhetorical campaign, while another approached the Arab-Israeli conflict from the angle of a rhetorical campaign.


Case Studies: Methodological Perspective/Approach

Having thus identified the dominant research topics in critical studies on international and intercultural communication as rhetor-centered, organization (the United Nations)-centered, and campaign-centered, I now come to the core of this chapter, namely, a critical evaluation of methodological perspectives and approaches employed by the rhetorical critics under review. The paradigmatic scheme of classification proposed by Scott and Brock will be used as a guide in this methodological review.

Traditional Perspective/
Neo-Aristotelian Approach

As the preceding discussion of the research topics shows, most of the rhetorical critics reviewed here focused on the international speakers and spokesmen as the center of their interest. Scott and Brock referred to this perspective of a speaker orientation as the traditional perspective. The case studies based on this viewpoint assumed that the rhetorical context which a rhetor faces will pose unique problems for him, and that he will respond to this situation symbolically. This is a "great-orator-made-the-history" perspective.

The nomenclature common to this traditional perspective employed by the critics was primarily de-
rived from the sources of classical rhetoric and its modern offsprings. In his analysis of Commonwealth Prime Ministers' speeches, Alan L. McLeod, for instance, based his rhetorical assessment upon Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Cicero's *On Orators and Oratory*, Quintilian's *Institutes of Oratory*, and Thonssen and Baird's *Speech Criticism*.17 The pioneering book on the methodology of speech criticism by Thonssen and Baird, in particular, seemed to be most influential in case studies with rhetoric orientation.18 "The task of the propagandist," Lomas concluded in his study on the Japanese war propaganda, "is essentially that of Aristotle's Rhetoric, 'discovering in the particular case the available means of persuasion.'"19 Scott and Brock adopted Edwin Black's label "neo-Aristotelian" in order to designate one approach within the traditional perspective that was derived from the classical source.20


18 See, for example, Ward, "'Abudu'l-Baha," p. 34 and Stump, "Madame Chiang," p. 11.


A glance at TABLE 1 shows that by far the greatest number of the reviewed studies were based on the neo-Aristotelian approach. This approach tends to take Aristotle's principles and other classical canons of rhetoric as choices that a speaker should make in his rhetorical endeavors. I will look at the application of the neo-Aristotelian approach from the two different degrees of extensiveness: the complete and the truncated application. An application is complete when the traditional critics have employed all the available principles and canons of ancient rhetoric as standards of criticism. It is truncated when they have focused on several of the more dominant and useful principles and canons as critical points in their act of appraisal.

The standard analytical model was shared in common by all the case studies that employed the complete neo-Aristotelian approach. One typical example of this was furnished by John Zacharis, who evaluated the speaking tour in America of Emmeline Pankhurst, an English leading suffrage agitator. In the first chapter of his dissertation, Zacharis illuminated the biographical backgrounds of the orator from the viewpoints of her school training, personal beliefs and convictions, reading habits, and various activities as a suffragist. The writer concluded this chapter by summarizing that
her experience as a campaigner and reformer constituted an invaluable rhetorical apprenticeship for her later role as a speaker in the United States. The second chapter dealt in length with the social and political context in which Pankhurst found herself. The next chapter was intended to examine the nature of the American audience the English orator under discussion had faced during her speaking tour. Actually, however, what Zacharis did was to describe the American suffrage movement and to sketch its leaders biographically. Then came the description of Pankhurst's speaking tour in America: where she spoke, what topics she discussed, and how she was received by the immediate audience. The next two chapters furnished additional historical information on the orator's second and third American tours. The seventh and eighth chapters of Zacharis' dissertation concerned themselves with rhetorical assessment of Pankhurst's speaking from invention, organization, style, and delivery. The writer's summaries in these two chapters reflected the strong influence of neo-Aristotelianism in his approach to rhetorical transactions. Zacharis concluded that

employed ethos to win respect for herself, the W.S.P.U. [Women's Social and Political Union], and her ideas. Her reasoning, validated by traditional logic and factual examples, convinced audiences that militancy was justifiable in England. And her emotional appeals motivated her listeners to sympathize with W.S.P.U.  

Then he summarized the chapter on style and delivery in the following words:

"Though not embellished, Mrs. Pankhurst's delivery and style was [sic] effective. Her restrained and dignified delivery negated her image as an "Amazon." With techniques of emphasis, she convinced listeners of the seriousness of her cause."  

The final chapter of Zacharis' dissertation evaluated the influence Mrs. Pankhurst had exerted upon the American audience during her speaking tours in 1909, in 1911, and in 1913. The writer attempted to explain the persuasiveness of the British orator from the angles of (1) the coverage of the press, (2) her charismatic character, (3) her ability to adapt her speeches to varied audiences, and (4) her ability and asset as an orator. Zacharis concluded the dissertation by appraising that "Mrs. Pankhurst significantly influenced the American suffrage movement by convincing women that agitation was not only justi--

23 Ibid., p. 166.
fiable but politically expedient."²⁴

As the actual application discussed above indicates, neo-Aristotelianism in the traditional perspective tends to provide mechanical or artificial procedures for analysis. Douglas Ehninger aptly elaborated on the compartmentalized nature of classical rhetoric. Ehninger contended that the ancient rhetoricians and neo-Aristotelian critics

 divided the speech act into its functional parts of speaker, speech, and audience-occasion, and speculated upon the relative importance of each of these parts in determining the success of the whole. . . . They recognized the various arts or "offices" upon which oral communication depends— invention, disposition, style, memory, and delivery—and they assigned a specific function to each. As sub-classifications within the various officia, they devised vocabularies for discussing types of proofs, characters of style, and the parts of a speech.²⁵

Because of this compartmentalized nature of classical rhetoric, the neo-Aristotelian critics under review tended to ask and answer such technical questions as: what did a speaker actually say in his speeches? What did he mean by what he said? How did he explain his policies and ideas? What were his rhe-


torical methods? What were the effects of his speeches, both immediate and ultimate? How did he adjust his speeches to his specific audiences? In their eagerness to cover all these questions, these critics had a tendency to treat each category separately without giving due consideration to the interrelatedness of these parts as the unified whole.

Instead of covering all the aspects of neo-Aristotelianism, some critics truncated their critical act by singling out some dominant aspects of the neo-Aristotelian approach as their focal points. I will call this approach the truncated neo-Aristotelian method to criticism within the confines of the traditional perspective. Several studies focused on rhetor's audience adaptation as their critical point. Rao, for example, was deeply concerned with Nehru's adaptation to his American audience. He raised the following questions to be answered in his thesis: "What are the nature and methods of Nehru's adaptation of his speeches to the views of the United States Government?"; "To what extent did he adapt his speeches?"; and "How effective was this adaptation?"²⁶

Other critics looked at international and inter-

²⁶Rao, "Jawaharlal Nehru," p. 4.
cultural rhetorical practice from other focal points. Focusing on the concept of ethos as the most compelling dimension of rhetoric, Kiernan attempted "to examine the visit of Charles Dickens to America in 1842 as a rhetorical situation and in so doing demonstrate the mutability and complexity of ethos and its role as an emerging force in the communication process." With the major emphasis placed upon the rhetor himself, Oliver's article was primarily concerned with sketching Syngman Rhee's biographical backgrounds and discussing the varied rhetorical situations in which Rhee found himself. Oliver devoted more than half of the space to a biographical-historical description of this Korean leader whose speeches the author had ghostwritten while he served as Rhee's "personal ambassador in Washington." Because of this personal commitment to the rhetor under discussion, many of the critic's comments about the subject were inevitably highly laudable. Prosser, on the other hand, conducted an invention-oriented analysis of Adlai E. Stevenson's speeches delivered at the United Nations General Assembly. The critic's rhetorical assessment covered such factors as the speaker's

---

28 Oliver, "Syngman Rhee," p. 120.
basic premises, his development of these premises through arguments and evidence, his use of ethical and emotional support, his method of refutation, and, finally, his general effectiveness as a spokesman for the United States Government.\textsuperscript{29}

Here the question will be raised as to why so many critical studies (two thirds of all the case studies reviewed) utilized the neo-Aristotelian approach either in a complete or truncated form. This query will best be answered by taking into account the degree of consciousness of international and intercultural implications on the part of the neo-Aristotelian researchers. I included for this methodological review those critical case studies whose research topics happened to fall into the area of international and intercultural communication. The fact that many of neo-Aristotelian critics failed to consider consciously the implications of international and intercultural communication in their criticism leads me to conjecture that they must have selected their research topics such as international speakers and spokesmen indiscriminately and unconsciously just as they chose speakers from intranational and intracultural settings as their topics of criticism. Because

\textsuperscript{29}Prosser, "Adlai Stevenson."
they seemed to fail to make a clear distinction between topics in international (or intercultural) and intranational (or intracultural) communication, they tended to rely upon the most dominant approach to criticism of intranational and intracultural rhetorical practice. This happened to be the neo-Aristotelian approach.

Another reason for overdependence on the neo-Aristotelian approach on the part of the critics, especially those who were conscious that their research topics had international and intercultural implications, was the total absence of established methodology to criticism of international and intercultural communication. Edward Brown observed:

Perhaps because of little attention to the cross-cultural speaking event, no special methodology for a critical analysis has been devised. Whether a special methodology is required or not is a question yet to be answered, but currently no method specifically designed for criticism of cross-cultural public speaking exists.30

Because of this absence, even those few critics who consciously looked at their research topics from the angle of international and intercultural communication, therefore, were obliged to resort to neo-Aristotelianism in their critical act.

Traditional Perspective/
Historical Approach

Scott and Brock identified the second approach within the traditional perspective as the historical. This approach concentrates on the historical elements of the rhetor and the times in which he found himself. Assuming that a causal relation exists between historical events and speechmaking, the historical approach throws into relief the interrelationship of rhetoric and its time. The historical critic relates the rhetor to the ideas and themes of his public addresses which are assumed to be formative of historical events. 31

This idea-oriented, historical approach was evident in several studies dealing with international and intercultural communication topics. Acknowledging "a substantial debt" to Ernest J. Wrage who proposed that public address be approached as a study in the history of ideas, Baisinger, in examining the British speakers in America, adopted the following methodological procedures in his dissertation:

The first step was to classify them [the speeches] according to broad themes, such as international relations and peace, religion, education, spiritualism, literature, and others.
Speeches upon a common theme were then

31 Scott and Brock, Methods, p. 22.
examined for similarities and variations in point of view and interpretation, as well as for inconsistencies in a speaker's treatment of his theme. Speakers' ideas were interpreted with reference to the total setting in which they were advanced. The reason for doing this is patent. The meaning of any speech event must be drawn from the audience and occasion as well as from the words of the speaker.  

Baisinger proceeded to use this historical approach with the full conviction that "speeches—shaped as they are by time, place, and audience attitudes—yield insights into the political, social, and intellectual history of their time."  

Biggs, too, was interested in the ideas and themes of a rhetor (in this case, Adlai E. Stevenson) in order "to discover the advocacy . . . on the major issues" presented in his United Nations speeches. He hoped that this idea-centered, historical approach would give him some clues to better understanding of Stevenson's concepts of man and government. Ewbank and Baker attempted to identify the three major themes of Khrushchev's speeches and to relate them to the develop-

---


33 Baisinger, "British Speakers," p. 3.

opment of historical events in the mid-twentieth-century world.  

To summarize, the traditional perspective, whether the neo-Aristotelian (complete or truncated) or historical approach, had the speaker orientation as the central focus: what he said and how he said it with what effect. The tendency seemed to be strong, particularly with neo-Aristotelian critics, to fragment the rhetorical discourse and to investigate its constituents as independent variables. The interaction of such rhetorical components as speaker, speech, occasion, and audience tended to be viewed through the speaker's rather than the critic's perspective.

Many scholars pointed out the inherent inadequacy of neo-Aristotelianism. As early as 1957 Vinocour felt that an international spokesman addressing a multinational audience deals with unique problems and situations, and that traditional rhetorical canons may be inadequate or unsatisfactory for describing, analyzing, and evaluating the speeches of international and intercultural significance. Wayne Brockriede acknowledged

36 Seymour Vinocour, "Modern Diplomacy and Speech," _Western Speech_, XXI (Fall, 1957), 201-206.
that modern rhetoric occurs in a cultural context considerably different from that of Aristotle, and argued for a theory of rhetoric broad enough to take into account the multiplicity of cultures currently engaged in rhetoric.\(^\text{37}\) Edwin Black objected to the slavish devotion of contemporary rhetorical criticism to neo-Aristotelianism, because this preoccupation with the traditional perspective precluded some relevant judgments.\(^\text{38}\) These observations hold valid with the neo-Aristotelian critical studies on international and intercultural communication reviewed in this chapter.

Experiential Perspective/
Eclectic Approach

In the break from the traditional perspective, Scott and Brock observed the tendency to shift the orientation of criticism from the rhetor to the critic. They called this critic-centered orientation the experiential perspective in the sense that the varied experiences of the rhetorical critic are counted on as a starting point for his critical activity.

Brockriede emphasized the importance of a sys-


\(^{38}\)Black, *Rhetorical Criticism*, pp. 33-35.
tem view of rhetoric when he set out to discuss the dimensional aspects of the concept of rhetoric. He described the basic elements of a rhetorical framework that he felt could be applied to analyze any rhetorical tradition regardless of its cultural, national, or philosophical context. In the process of elaborating on the interpersonal, attitudinal, and situational dimensions of rhetoric, he recognized the importance of the eclectic critic's task in selecting a specific focal point.

As one application of Brockriede's dimensional model, Brockriede and Scott focused on Khrushchev's rhetorical endeavors in America to reduce the interpersonal distance. In addition to distance, the authors also analyzed such dimensions as image, power, rhetorical strategy, context, and channels as integral parts of the whole rhetorical transactions. Since their detailed, annotated record (such as text of speeches and communique) of Khrushchev's tour in America occupied more than half of the total space, not much room was


40 Brockriede and Scott, "Reducing Rhetorical Distance," pp. 49-50.
left for their critical interpretation of the function that these dimensions played. Admitting that this was a drawback of their study, Brockriede and Scott clearly demonstrated the eclectic nature of their critical approach within the experiential perspective of rhetorical criticism.

Another dimensional analysis using Brockriede's model was conducted by Heisey, who examined the Arab-Israeli conflict from the rhetorical point of view. He set forth the purpose of his study in the following words:

My intent has not been to apply Mr. Brockriede's comprehensive model; rather, it has been to select certain dimensions from his framework that seem to be particularly relevant to the Mideast rhetoric and explore their usefulness as a contemporary concept for a contemporary rhetorical situation. For the purpose of this essay, it was considered useful to sketch broad patterns in order to emphasize the dimensional and interrelated nature of the variables constituting the rhetoric of the Arab-Israeli conflict.41

He then set out to describe the nature of the rhetoric of the Arab-Israeli conflict from the relational, ideological, and situational dimensions.

William J. Starosta demonstrated still another application of eclecticism in his critical appraisal of

the United Nations communication. Drawing upon lines of analysis from Kenneth Burke, Chaim Perelman, Kenneth Boulding, and other theorists, Starosta applied them in the semantic examination of speechmaking in the United Nations.42

It should be pointed out that one thing shared in common by all these eclectic critics was the high degree of consciousness on their part that they were engaged in criticism of international and intercultural communication. Their orientation was toward international and intercultural rather than intranational and intracultural transactions of ideas. This high level of awareness was rarely evident among the traditional critics who were dealing with international and intercultural research topics.

Critical Perspective of "New Rhetorics"/Semantical Approach

In the breakdown of faith in the traditional perspective Scott and Brock observed the second tendency of a rhetorical critic to replace the neo-Aristotelian tradition with some other theory as his critical focus. The semantical approach assumes that the critic should take his analysis of the rhetor's use of language

as a focal point in order to establish generalized language patterns which will eventually facilitate better understanding of the rhetorical act.

Assuming that one of the problems of transmitting the ideas of one national or cultural group to members of another national or cultural group is primarily a problem of language, Glenn analyzed semantic difficulties faced by the members of the United Nations Security Council by using three basic groups of criteria: the patterns of reasoning; the verb "to be" and the verb "to do"; and the concepts of denotation and connotation.\(^3\) Another microscopic inquiry into the use of the speaker's language was conducted by Sharp, who delineated certain propaganda techniques employed by Khrushchev in his American-based public addresses. Using the propaganda cataloguing system developed by Frederic C. Bartlett, Sharp looked into Khrushchev's use of repetition, replacement of argument by dogmatic statements, catchwords, oversimplification, exaggeration, and deliberately misleading anecdotal material.\(^4\)

Methodologically speaking, both studies had one characteristic in common: their conclusions were based upon

\(^3\) Glenn, "Semantic Difficulties," esp. pp. 52-60.

a microscopic examination of the rhetor's language.

**Critical Perspective of "New Rhetorics"/Value Approach**

Although they were dealing with entirely different research topics respectively, Condon, Carlson, and Brown had two things shared in common. First, they selected as their main focus psychological constructs such as values, attitudes, and norms of the speaker and the audience. Second, they were fully aware that they were looking at rhetorical transactions from the perspective of international and intercultural communication.

Condon assumed that a lack of value-congruence between the rhetor and the receivers of his message might lead to misunderstanding, and that this problem would be aggravated as the speaker communicated across national and cultural boundaries. He developed and applied a methodology for determining values and for analyzing intercultural speaking in terms of these values to John Kennedy's speeches during his trip to Mexico in order to ascertain whether Kennedy successfully adjusted to the value system of the Mexican audiences.\(^{45}\)

Carlson attempted to analyze the American and

\(^{45}\)Condon, "Value Analysis."
European attempts to introduce wildlife conservation to the population of Kenya. "This dissertation," the writer stated, "has as its central concern the means by which the attempt is being made by one culture to change traditional attitudes of another culture."\footnote{Carlson, "Kenya Wildlife Conservation," p. viii.} After examining the values and attitudes of the Africans toward wildlife and those of the American and European persuaders as expressed in their conservation campaigns, Carlson concluded that the campaign resulted in little change in attitudes, because the rhetorical campaign was based on Western hypotheses and values about wildlife that were invalid in the Kenya culture. Her study demonstrated the importance of careful analysis of the interests and cultural values of the international and intercultural audiences.

Focusing on the speaker's rather than the audience's psychological constructs, Brown isolated the values and norms of the Japanese society in which Dr. Nitobe had been reared and predicted that the Japanese rhetor's speeches would contain evidence of the operation of those social norms on him. The critic then examined Nitobe's speeches made in English to look for the Japanese language traits that would preserve the...
social norms of the Japanese society. Brown found indications that Japanese social norms operated on the speaker when he delivered his lectures in English to the American audience. 47

It is interesting to note that in the total absence of any tested methodology for criticism of international and intercultural communication, Condon, Carlson, and Brown all followed the identical organizational pattern in their dissertations: first, to develop a critical methodology of analysis for such communication, and, second, to apply the proposed methodology to a significant event of intercommunication among nations and cultures. Instead of relying on the traditional perspective of rhetorical criticism, these critics at least succeeded in opening up new approaches to an analysis of communication across national and cultural boundaries.

Descriptive Approach

Three of the case studies reviewed here employed what I call the descriptive approach. Both Behl and Prosser viewed the United Nations as a forum of international communication and critically described the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the Security Coun-

cil, the rhetorical practices at the United Nations, and the special communication problems this international deliberative body had faced. The level of writing in these studies was mainly expository and explanatory rather than evaluative.

**Methodological Studies**

As I have stated above, three critics proposed and applied their own methodology based on the concept of values to actual international and intercultural communication events. Very few studies, however, primarily devoted themselves to the development of and elaboration on a special methodology for criticism of intercommunication among nations and cultures. As early as 1962 Oliver recognized the keen necessity of establishing a suitable methodology for analyzing international communication, when he stated: "There is a great need for us to learn to speak across national and cultural boundaries and to learn how to evaluate critically the transnational speaking of the major spokesmen of our time." As if to answer Oliver's call for a methodology for analysis, the following year

---

48 Behl, "Security Council" and Prosser, "Communication Problems" and "Role of Summitry."

Huber Ellingsworth proposed that rhetorical critics of crosscultural communication develop a "culture-related methodology for speech criticism" based on the anthropological method commonly called "the study of cultures at a distance." In order to understand better how a people communicates, rhetorical critics, urged Ellingsworth, should engage themselves in

formulation of working hypotheses about the culture, interviews and projective testing of informants no longer living in the area being studied, analysis of literature and art produced by the culture, and an end linkage in which certain concepts are collated with other elements in the same or different cultures.^

More recently the same author suggested another alternative which future critics might pursue: the development of what he called "national rhetorics." By pooling information and data about various national or cultural rhetorics, rhetorical critics, Ellingsworth hoped, would develop a standard methodology for criti-

---


cism of intercommunication among nations and cultures.

It is true that some writers called for the development of a specific methodology for analyzing instances of international and intercultural communication. It is also true at the same time that very few studies proposed a methodological model for analysis. The area of international and intercultural communication still remains largely undeveloped. When Bruce Smith reviewed the ten years of international communication research from 1945-1955, he concluded with lamentation that "with due deference to all these developments, it seems to the writer that no very adequate general theoretical model of the international communication process has yet developed." This assessment of Smith's still holds true even today, so far as the development of a suitable methodology for criticism of intercommunication is concerned.

Summary and Suggestion

A brief summary of this chapter will be offered below.

---

Research Topics

All of the rhetor-centered case studies except two dealt with foreign leaders and spokesmen addressing the American audiences as their main focus of criticism. The tendency of the American critic to select foreign speakers in America as his topic is understandable, when one takes into consideration the fact that these rhetors always spoke English as a means of communication. I must point out, however, that it is also important for rhetorical critics to pay more attention to those rhetorical situations in which the American rhetor faces the foreign audience. Stewart recommended one such topic possibility: "... we should look more to countries with no language barrier, Canada for instance, ..."54

The absence of common language, however, should not keep a critic from looking beyond national and linguistic boundaries for a possible research topic. An American President speaking to the foreign, say Chinese, audience, for instance, will afford a rhetorical critic

an excellent example of international and intercultural communication.

The variable always present in the reviewed research topics or proposed topic possibilities is the American playing the role of either the rhetor or the listener. It should be suggested in this context that rhetorical critics pay more attention to those situations in which a foreign rhetor sets out to persuade another nationally or culturally different group of people. The case in point may be a German leader addressing the British audience or a Japanese prime minister speaking to the Chinese audience. The inclusion of these topic possibilities will hopefully energize and vitalize rhetorical criticism of international and intercultural communication.

Methodological Perspectives/Approaches

A glance at the summary table of the case studies under review shows that many of the studies relied on the neo-Aristotelian approach within the framework of the traditional perspective. The uniformity in methodology, in other words, was characteristic of those published and unpublished studies I had examined in this chapter. I must mention, however, that some critics emphasized the importance of eclecticism in
approach in order to cope with the complexity of international and intercultural rhetorical transactions.

I fully agree with Scott and Brock when they characterized the nature of future rhetorical criticism as being pluralistic, tentative, and changing. Of these three characteristics, pluralism or eclecticism has long been recognized as most important. As early as 1956, Albert Croft demanded methodological pluralism: "There is no need for all research in rhetoric to follow a single pattern. Indeed, a pluralistic approach to research is the only intellectually defensive position." After surveying the literature in rhetorical criticism, Baskerville concluded in almost identical words in 1968: "... there is almost complete agreement that criticism need not follow a single pattern and that the pluralistic approach is the only defensible position." In the field of international and intercultural communication, pluralism was also advocated by

55 Scott and Brock, Methods, pp. 403-405.


Robert Oliver. He urged cultural pluralism when he recommended that we abandon a unitary or generic view of rhetoric and instead develop a series of divergent cultural rhetorics. After reviewing representative studies of face-to-face communication between members of different cultures, Ekroth recommended a pluralistic or eclectic approach to the study of intercultural communication, because he argued that it would involve many disciplines, and that no one discipline would have adequate theory and techniques to investigate the many questions as yet unanswered in this field.

It is assumed that international and intercultural communication is characterized by the multiplicity of and difference in audiences (immediate and "home" audiences, their values, attitudes, and norms), channels (translation, interpreters, and mass communication media), cultures (foreign and indigenous), and languages (foreign and native). The complexity of these interacting constituents will undoubtedly create

---


a unique rhetorical situation that demands use of a pluralistic approach on the part of a rhetorical critic. The next chapter will illustrate two such unique rhetorical situations that require a fresh critical perspective.
CHAPTER III

A HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF TWO RHETORICAL SITUATIONS

The historic trips to the People's Republic of China made by President Richard M. Nixon in February, 1972 and by Premier Kakuei Tanaka of Japan in September, 1972 will afford a rhetorical critic of intercultural communication an excellent opportunity of examining how the leaders of the world as rhetors endeavored to respond to the unique rhetorical situations across national and cultural boundaries. This chapter surveys and describes those unique contexts in which Nixon and Tanaka found themselves and by which they were influenced. In other words, it assumes the function of what classical rhetoricians called narratio. Edward P. J. Corbett defined this part of rhetorical disposition as "statement of facts or circumstances that need to be known about the subject of our discourse."¹ This fac-

tual narrative of the rhetorical situations is designed to put the China visits into historical perspective.

**Historical Context of Richard Nixon's Trip to China**

For the past two hundred years relations between the United States and China have been characterized by the alternation between periods of friendship and those of disenchantment or hostility. Although the Wanghia Treaty of 1844 initiated official diplomatic relations between the two countries, the beginning of the unofficial Sino-American relations dated back to 1784, when Major Samuel Shaw reached Canton on the *Empress of China* with a cargo of trading goods. Hoping to find in this Oriental market the means of economic independence from Great Britain, America from the outset attached great importance to the trade with China. The Manchu dynasty, however, did not want to see the tranquility of the empire disturbed by the Western traders whom the Chinese had viewed as "barbarians" and, therefore, confined incoming foreign merchants to a small area outside Canton. In these pretreaty sixty years from 1784 to 1844, the Sino-American trade had, of course, undergone several ups and downs. Despite the alternation of successes and setbacks, the American vision of China as an immense market remained unchanged.
in the rest of the eighteenth century and still dazzled nineteenth-century America.  

This vision was paralleled by the attraction of China as the greatest field for the spread of Christianity in the nineteenth century. Next to the traders and merchants, missionaries formed the second important American interest group in Chinese affairs. Preceded by the European missionaries, American Protestant counterparts began entering China in the 1830s. They were, however, welcomed no more warmly than the first American trading vessel in 1784. The American missionaries were regarded by the Chinese as subversive of some of China’s most cherished beliefs, for instance, the Chinese practice of filial piety. This negative

---


5 Tong, United States Diplomacy, pp. 78-79.
reaction of the Chinese, coupled with the language barrier, constituted serious obstacles to the American missionary work. Nevertheless, the missionaries started to found schools for disseminating Western, particularly American, concepts and ideas.

Not all Chinese were anti-missionary, however. The influence of the democratic ideas and practices disseminated by the missionaries was profound, as was manifested in the fact that many of the leaders of the successful nationalist revolution were "westernized" Christians who drew much of their inspiration and encouragement from the American sources. When the 1911 revolution toppled the Manchu Government, Congress and the American press hailed this take-over as destined to be the greatest event of the twentieth century.6

At this time the image of America in Chinese eyes gradually shifted from bad to good. It must also be pointed out here that not only commercially and religiously but also politically the United States started to become involved in Chinese affairs particularly at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Eight years after the 1911 revolution sharp

Chinese disappointment came with the Shantung controversy of 1919. Japan had seized German's holdings on the Shantung Peninsula and China's hopes of regaining Shantung at the Versailles Peace Conference rested on President Woodrow Wilson. Although he tried to espouse the Chinese cause, Wilson finally yielded to Japan's demands that she obtain her rights in Shantung. At this moment anti-Americanism more than offset the feeling of good will toward America.

The Shantung controversy of 1919, however, paled in comparison with the consternation and turmoil created on the American scene by the loss of China to the Communist regime thirty years later in 1949. Much had happened during these years. America soon realized that Japan's designs against Shantung were over the prong of a global threat to American security. America was deeply concerned when Japan embarked upon a policy of forcible expansion in 1931. This turned out to be the beginning of the rampage of Japanese militarists

---

over the Chinese mainland in the 1930s. Then started the Pacific War over the issue of economic sanctions against Japan. After Pearl Harbor there was the wartime glow of friendship on the part of the Americans for the brave Chinese ally. The expectation grew high that General Chiang Kai-shek's China would emerge from the war as a great friendly power helping to maintain stability in the Pacific. Then came the dramatic disclosure made by the Secretary of State Dean Acheson that Chiang Kai-shek's government was too corrupt to stand the attack from the Chinese Communists. Acheson concluded the white paper on China by stating flatly that "Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it." After the Japanese defeat, the civil war became more serious. America tried, in vain, to bring the two sides together in a coalition government. As predicted by Dean Acheson, the rapid Communists' advances finally forced the Nationalists to retreat to Taiwan in 1949.

---

The Chinese mainland, the beneficiary of American assistance, abruptly turned into a dangerous foe allied with international Communism in the new and perilous cold war. This was the beginning of the American foreign policy of containment against the People's Republic of China. Between Washington and Peking the strong mold was set for two decades of mutual misapprehension, mistrust, suspicion, hostility, hatred, and fear. For two decades China was virtually surrounded by American military bases stationed around its neighboring countries in Asia. For two decades the American people regarded the Chinese people as the foremost ideological foe of their political system. For two decades the Chinese were likewise whipped up by constant anti-American campaigns into a view of the Americans as the enemy of all mankind.

It is now clear that relations between America and China had been unilateral rather than bilateral with the former having a special, benevolent role to play in the struggle of the latter to find a rightful place in the world. The Americans had always taken an initiative, first, as traders, then, as missionaries, then, as diplomatic and political advisers, and, finally, as ideological foes. America, in a word, had been the actor, whereas China had remained the acted upon. Con-
sequently, there had never been a mutual exchange of culture, ideology, and people between these two countries.

In this historical context of hostility and isolation did President Richard Nixon, who had made his mark as a Communist-hunter in 1950s, start to move in the direction of breaking the icy relations between America and China. In 1967, as part of his drive to give himself a statesmanlike image for the 1968 Presidential campaign, he contributed an article to a prestigious quarterly on international politics. In it he postulated, though still vaguely, that "any American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China." Nixon further stated: "Taking this long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation."¹⁰ Nixon's interest in striking a new note in Sino-American relations intensified as the U.S. ping-pong team was invited to visit Peking in April,

1971. At the same time he expressed his hope at the meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors that he would be able to visit China some day.\textsuperscript{11} On July 15, 1971 Nixon startled the whole world by announcing in the three-minute statement that he had accepted an invitation to visit Peking and to embark on what he proudly called "a journey for peace—peace not just for our generation but for future generations on this earth we share together."\textsuperscript{12}

No geographer is needed to remind the reader that the United States of America and the People's Republic of China are separated by the physical or geographical distance of about 16,000 miles. What this geographic fact signifies in international relations is best explained by Norman Hill, when he asserted: "Nothing does more to shape a nation's interests and to determine its policies than geography." Hill further expanded:

\begin{quote}
The basic importance of the facts of geography often stands out strikingly in the behavior of nations. . . . The geographic
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{12}U.S., Department of State, "President Nixon Announces Acceptance of Invitation to Visit People's Republic of China," \textit{Department of State Bulletin}, August 2, 1971, 121.
location of the United States has been the principal basis for the policy of isolation which ... has been so frequently asserted.\textsuperscript{13}

As the history of the Sino-American relations clearly shows, China and America had never had mutual contact and exchange of culture, ideology, and people for the past two centuries. "The two nations," the New York Times editorialized on the day of Nixon's departure to China, "are too different in historic and cultural backgrounds, in ideology and world outlook, and even in patterns of daily life for full familiarity and mutual confidence to come easily or quickly."\textsuperscript{14}

The lack of contact and communication fostered by the geographic fact, the political reality, and the inevitable difference in culture, ideology, way of life, language, and so on were responsible for the creation of the feeling of psychological vacuum—ignorance, misunderstanding, enmity, suspicion, and hostility—in the minds of the Chinese and the Americans respectively. Although linked by two hundred years of history, America and China were deeply engulfed by the tremendous dis-


tance, whether it was geographical, political, ideological, or cultural. No Sinologist, therefore, was necessary to remind President Nixon that the U.S. and China were separated by an almost unbridgeable gulf of, in the words of Dean Acheson, "the distance and broad differences in background" lying between the two countries. 15

When President Nixon announced his intention to visit Peking in this context of the geographical distance, the political isolation, and the psychological vacuum, the Americans and the people of the world registered diverse reactions. One weekly magazine described the immediate impact of this announcement upon the American people in the following words: " . . . ironically, the man who originally built his political career on anti-Communist rhetoric chose to announce his historic overture to Communist China in a speech so devoid of emotion that, in its initial moments, millions of his countrymen failed to absorb the impact of what the President was saying." 16

The instant reaction was generally what Nixon

16 Newsweek, July 26, 1971, p. 16.
must have expected. On the whole, many Americans were pleased because the China policy of four successive Presidents had never seemed to promise anything more than a perpetually hostile stalemate. William Bundy wrote: "Mr. Nixon's trip to Peking clearly ranks as one of the great political turning points of twentieth-century history; it marks the dramatic ending of one era and will constitute a major element in the new power situation. . . . For all the pitfalls of summit diplomacy, this may have been the only way to break through the barriers to effective communication between China and the United States. Thus, the basic idea, as well as its execution, deserves fervent support."\(^{17}\)

Describing Nixon's announcement as "dramatic and spectacular," one Washington correspondent reported that "the very conception of the China visit seems the most large-minded act of the Nixon Administration."\(^{18}\) What this announcement signified, Newsweek declared, was that the United States of America and the People's Republic of China had finally "decided to recognize each other's presence" after two decades of "fighting each


other, castigating each other, fearing each other." The magazine described this announcement as "a great leap forward."¹⁹

Generally speaking, Congressional reactions were enthusiastic as well. Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield was described as being "flabbergasted, delighted and happy" and Republican counterpart, Robert P. Griffin, was quoted as calling Nixon's plan "a stunning and hopeful development."²⁰ Clearly, Nixon's traditional enemies such as Hubert Humphrey and George McGovern were overjoyed with his new line of foreign policy. One week after Nixon's announcement, Senators Mike Mansfield and Hugh Scott cosponsored the resolution that President Nixon "be and is hereby commended for his outstanding initiative in furtherance of . . . world peace by deciding to undertake 'a journey for peace' to the People's Republic of China [and] that the Congress offer and does hereby offer its full faith and support to the President in carrying out the purpose of his journey."²¹

¹⁹Newsweek, July 26, 1971, p. 21.
²⁰Time, July 26, 1971, p. 16.
The fact that the expectation was high with many Americans did not mean, however, that there was no opposition to Nixon's plan. His traditional friends, primarily consisting of right-wing conservatives, were not nearly so entranced. William Loeb, a long-time Nixon supporter and contributor and publisher of New Hampshire's influential Manchester Union Leader, called the President's decision "immoral, indecent, insane and fraught with danger" and stated with lamentation that Nixon had joined the "stinking hypocrite" Dwight Eisenhower, the "No. 1 liar in the U.S.A." John Kennedy, and the "skunk's skunk's skunk" Eugene McCarthy on Loeb's political enemy list.  

Conservative columnist William Buckley Jr. gibed at the liberal supporters of Nixon's proposed trip: "F.D.R. would have hesitated to go to Berlin to wine and dine with Adolf Hitler--but we are about to do that, and all the liberals who can't stand the Greek colonels are jumping for joy." At the time of the President's announcement the one unanswered question which worried these opponents was: what price was America being forced to pay, since the

---


23 Time, July 26, 1971, p. 16.
initiative had come from Nixon himself? Those conservatives, together with Taiwan lobbyists, feared that Formosa might be abandoned to Communist China in exchange for the establishment of normal relations between America and mainland China.

The initial over-reactions as exhibited in both high expectations and emotional disparagements gradually waned as time passed. There was a crucial seven-month lapse of time between Nixon's announcement in July, 1971 and his actual trip in February, 1972. This time lapse was primarily responsible for cooling down the emotional, instantaneous reactions of both pros and cons. What gradually emerged instead was reasoned observation and analysis of the merits and demerits of the proposed trip in terms of national interest. Newsweek, for instance, was quick to notice the sudden change in national mood:

The news from China had come from a whiff of incense, sending much of the nation on an Oriental high. And then . . . the euphoria began to evaporate, and suddenly it was time for a sober second thoughts about Richard Nixon's forthcoming meeting with Chou En-lai. Clearly, a generation of visceral hatred and fear would not be swept aside even by a Presidential mission halfway around the globe. And thoughtful Americans last week were giving consideration to the pitfalls into which Mr. Nixon might conceivably stumble.24

Among the "thoughtful Americans" who registered reasoned reservation included columnist Zbigniew Brzezinski, novelist-turned-to-China-authority Edgar Snow, and former Under Secretary of State George Ball. Brzezinski aptly observed: "President Nixon's plane fare to Peking is likely to be higher than currently advertised. This is so because the advantages and the disadvantages of his bold initiative are somewhat narrowly balanced. This is not to suggest that his initiative was undesirable; there is, however, a conflict between the substance and the style of that initiative."\(^{25}\) Warning against the over-expectation toward Nixon's trip on the part of the American people, Snow endeavored to remind them of the stern reality that China is firmly based on the hard-core ideology of Communism. He went on to caution: "... popular illusion that it will consist of a sweet mix of ideologies, or an end to China's faith in revolutionary means, could only serve to deepen the abyss again when disillusionment occurs." He concluded with a strong warning that over-expectation is "to court disenchant-

\(^{25}\)Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Substance and Style," Newsweek, August 9, 1971, p. 41.
To be sure, Nixon's mission was not without risks. One magazine called it "a high-risk journey." It is true that summitry offers the advantage of direct dialogue between often isolated leaders. But, if the past is any guide, the summit meeting often proves to be a slippery road to the danger of miscalculation. In this respect George Ball expressed his opinions of reservation just before Nixon left for China. Although he acknowledged the value of re-establishing communication with China, Ball still made the following contention which would also shed much light on the difficulty of intercultural and international communication: "Few myths have done more harm than the sentimental conceit that men of different countries can understand one another better through direct conversations than when their exchange of views and ideas is filtered through experts, sensitive to the nuances that derive from different cultures. Such a fanciful belief becomes particularly misleading when cultural differences reflect quite disparate habits of thought--as, for example,


between Americans and Orientals."²⁸ Being a career diplomat and strongly attached to the Department of State, Ball understandably suggested that this mission should have been carried out with less diplomatic fanfare by someone of the stature of Secretary of State William Rogers. What America needed most at this historic juncture, in sum, according to Edwin O. Reischauer, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, was the sense of moderation, which seemed incompatible with the American love of two-valued orientation. Reischauer aptly warned: "The American people must not expect too much too soon. We are still hung upon China--either we hate her or we love her; we respond either with hostility or excitement."²⁹

It is important to point out here that the Nixon Administration was also busy with preaching moderation primarily through the mouth of Henry Kissinger, thereby carefully damping the excessive expectations or subtly calming the unwarranted fears. Carefully cautioning that the road ahead to the Peking talk was strewn with obstacles, the Presidential adviser con-


²⁹Quoted in Time, July 26, 1971, p. 12.
sciously reminded the Americans that "we are not sentimental" about the Nixon trip. He went on to state: "One of the remarkable aspects of this opening toward China was the difficulty of establishing even rudimentary communication with a country from which one has been cut off for nearly 25 years . . . We recognize that the People's Republic is led by highly principled men whose principles are diametrically opposed to ours."30

This discussion of reactions to Nixon's announcement will not be complete without any reference to those displayed by the Chinese government and its people. It must be understood that one of the unique characteristics of rigidly totalitarian governments like that of China is their ability to turn enthusiasm on or off as they wish through their controlled media. Before Nixon arrived in Peking in February, 1972, the Chinese government seemed deliberately to have played down the impact of the President's proposed trip. The Reuter dispatch reported the calculatedly low-key announcement of Nixon's trip made simultaneously by Peking radio:

"Communist China's millions were being told quietly and with no fanfare . . . [that] the man they have heard denounced almost daily as a 'war-hawking god of plaque' soon would visit Peking. There was no letup in anti-American rhetoric and the government made no attempt to explain the sudden invitation."\(^31\) The Chinese leaders deliberately tried to leave the impression that it was Nixon, and not Mao Tse-tung or Chou En-lai, who initiated this historic move. In his interview with Chou, Neville Maxwell, correspondent for a London newspaper, asked him why he would have a talk with the American President. The Chinese Premier answered: "President Nixon himself knocked on the door, saying that he wished to come to Peking for talks. So, well and good, we invited him to come for talks."\(^32\)

The Chinese officials must have rigidly educated their people what to think about Nixon's visit. This passive, unexcited response of Chou was universally copied by ordinary Chinese when asked what they thought about the Nixon trip. A special correspondent for the Knight Newspapers reported the almost identical responses given by three Chinese of widely varying loca-


tion and rank, when he spoke with them on the first day of the Nixon visit. All said, in effect: Your president asked to come to our country; Chairman Mao said it was all right for him to come; so we welcome him.\textsuperscript{33}

Consequently, these seemingly indifferent, passive Chinese reactions were accurately mirrored by what Max Frankel of the \textit{New York Times} called "the correct but only modest welcome" Nixon received when he arrived in Peking.\textsuperscript{34} No cheering crowd at the airport, no smiling, flag-waving children lined the President's route into the city of Peking. It seemed almost as if the Chinese government had ordered its people to stay away in order to hint the low degree of their expectation to the visiting guest. A \textit{Newsweek} correspondent perceptively analyzed the Chinese intention of this passive response: "It had become abundantly clear that the reception laid on for him by the Chinese had been calculated, with exquisite care, to be correct but


decidedly cool. The Chinese, quite obviously, sought to capture the diplomatic and psychological initiative by putting Mr. Nixon on notice that it was up to him to break the ice."35

Against the background of national and international climates surrounding the Nixon trip to Peking, I must here throw into relief Nixon's main motives for seeking and accepting the invitation to visit China. The official announcement simply mentioned that the summit meeting was arranged "to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides."36

What "the normalization of relations" specifically meant in the Sino-American context will be made clearer if one recalls the special nature of the two-century relations. It must be remembered that China and America had never maintained bilateral relations for the past two hundred years. Their relations had always been unilateral in that America had been the actor and China the acted upon. The following diagram illustrates the one-sided nature of the Sino-American relations:


Nixon's special task was first and foremost to create newly the mutual communication channel between the two countries that would possibly form the basis for bilateral contact in the future. A Wall Street Journal correspondent reported from China that what the White House wanted most was "a communication link with Peking. . . . The purpose would be to exchange information so that needless misunderstanding wouldn't lead to hostilities."\(^{37}\) Another source specified that Nixon's trip to China would "set the stage for a . . . 'dialogue' between Peking and Washington."\(^{38}\) By first


establishing the mutual communication or dialogue channel, America naturally hoped to remove or reduce the psychological barrier of hostility and enmity on both parts to a better understanding of each other. "The minimum we expect to get out of this trip," Kissinger aptly remarked, "is a better understanding by both sides of each other's positions and a continuing means of remaining informed about these positions, so that one is not so dependent on these very dramatic setpiece encounters." Nixon's task, in other words, was to reduce the psychological distance by creating a better understanding of America on the part of the Chinese, influencing their perceptions and conceptions, and hopefully affecting their general attitudes toward America and the American people. It was, in the final analysis, to alter their psychological frame of reference for enhancing their understanding of similarities and differences that lay between the two countries.

Nixon's purpose obviously stopped far short of the formal diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China. Judging from the expectation level of the Americans toward the Nixon trip, it may be pre-

---

dicted that if America had gone that far, it would surely have created backlash from the Americans. In addition, this policy would have probably disarrayed in the Pacific the status quo of quasi or outright alliance with the United States of such East Asian countries as Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and so forth. This was the last thing Nixon could do under the national and international climates surrounding his trip in 1972.

Finally, in addition to aiming at accomplishing these specific purposes, Nixon had a personal motive behind his trip of making political use of this event in the upcoming Presidential election at home. He needed some headline-grabbing event to attract the attention of the American voters. His breakthrough with China in summity fulfilled this requirement. By creating a symbolic event like his visit to China, Nixon hoped to enhance his image as a fearless peacemaker and master of foreign policy in the minds of the American electorates. Describing Nixon's decision to unfreeze relations with Peking as "a political triumph," the New York Times commented on the image-evoking effect of this event: "No President ever looks better than when he is seen to be working for peace in a large,
statesmanlike way. . . “40 As a shrewd political strategist Nixon lost no chance to appeal directly from China to the American people via television in order to assure victory in the 1972 Presidential election.

With the complicated historical backgrounds behind him—the geographical and psychological distance, the differences in culture, ideology, and way of thinking, the varied expectation levels of both the Americans and the Chinese—President Richard Nixon arrived in Peking on February 21, 1972 to span the gulf left by twenty-two years of containment and hostility and to start a new relationship between the most powerful and the most populous nations.

Historical Context of Kakuei Tanaka's Trip to China

It is ironical that Japan, one of America's most faithful allies in Asia, suffered most severely from the Nixon announcement of accepting invitation to visit China. This so-called "Nixon Shock" of July, 1971 had an immeasurable impact upon the Japanese government, since it had loyally followed the American policy of containment against the People's Republic of China.

Despite the state of hostility that had existed since the Communist take-over in 1949, Japan and China had shared a long history of contact. Envoys and traders had gone back and forth between the two countries since at least the first century A.D. As a result of this contact, both countries had opened up the wide avenue to regular mutual exchange of culture and people. Knowledge of Chinese writing had become well established in Japan by the fifth century. In the sixth century Japan was exposed to the tremendous influence of Buddhism and Chinese Confucian political and ethical concepts. For the next several hundred years there were a steady contact of culture and people between the two countries and a constant exchange of ideas and practical arts of sericulture, weaving, metal casting, and brewing as well as the cultural arts of writing, literature, and painting. Between 630 and 837 A.D., twelve official missions to the Court of China were reported, each of them accompanied by large numbers of scholars, priests, and others. The tradi-

---


tion of these official cultural missions continued until the ninth century. But a steady flow of students, both lay and priestly, unofficially continued as well as other contacts between the two nations. In the thirteenth century, when there was a resurgence of interest in China, another tide of cultural influence was welcomed. The two countries soon became interested in not only cultural but commercial exchange and started a formal relation in the following century.

With the closing of the country in 1639, which lasted for more than two centuries, Japan naturally terminated all its contact with foreigners. But since the Chinese were exempt from this policy, Japan's cultural and commercial relations continued.

Japan and China had maintained the bilateral relationship in cultural, commercial, and political spheres until the mid-nineteenth century. After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan grew industrially strong as a result of rapid Westernization. One editorial writer pointed out the change in Japanese attitudes toward China that had been a product of this

---

Westernization

Since the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan has made an effort to penetrate and pursue Western culture to the extent that in Japan "modernization" has the same meaning as "Westernization." This "Westernization" has been modestly successful. But considering China from the standard of "Westernization," the respect paid to it as an advanced country prior to the Meiji period was then reversed, and China became despised as a backward and unenlightened country. 44

This reversal in attitudes created later antagonisms that were strongly colored with "feelings of ingratitude on the one and betrayal on the other." 45 Thus, from the late 1890s to the end of World War II the two countries were tightly locked in enmity and hostility.

The bilateral relationship was finally over with the Sino-Japanese war in 1894. This war itself bred animosities and hatreds in the minds of the Chinese people. The twentieth century witnessed a series of attacks and aggressions on China by the Japanese military regime. In 1915 Japan seized Germany's holdings on the Shantung Peninsula after joining the Allies in World War I. Indignation over the Japanese inter-


ference gave birth to intense anti-Japanese boycott that strongly impelled the nationalist drive to revive China. Then came the military control of Manchuria in 1932. Japan set up the state of Manchukuo in the northern part of China, thereby extending its influence over entire China. Japan's progressive development for these sixteen years ultimately filled the Chinese nationalists with enmity against Japan, a sentiment bolstered by fury against Japan's imperialism and betrayal of her fellow Asians. In 1937 the clash of interests developed into an armed conflict in the suburbs of Peking between these two neighboring countries. This year was the beginning of Japan's ultimate intervention in China that lasted until 1945 in order to suppress by force the Chinese anti-imperialist movement.  

When one looks back on the history of postwar Sino-Japanese relations, the passive, and sometimes antagonistic, nature of the diplomatic position consistently taken by the Japanese conservative govern-

---

ments stood out as a glaring fact. Japan's conservative leadership had constantly failed to see that the normalization of Tokyo-Peking relations should be inevitable for the dissolving of the Asian cold war. The governments, instead, had allowed themselves to be pushed around by the United States and to pursue faithfully the same course of containment that America had advocated. Although the movement to restore normal Japan-China diplomatic ties was promoted through the cumulative efforts of some liberal members of the ruling party and of the opposition parties, the conservative governments persisted in erecting obstacles. In the Shanghai Communique issued at the conclusion of the meeting between President Nixon and Premier Chou, China went so far as to denounce Japan as a new source of aggression and threat, stating that it "firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan."


\[48\] "Joint Communique," par. 8. See Appendix A.
The so-called "Nixon Shock" of July, 1971 inevitably forced the Japanese government to re-evaluate its foreign policy toward China. After Nixon's visit to China in February of the following year, a consensus seemed to be shaping up from conservatives to liberals that Japan confronted a major change in China policy. At the resignation of Eisaku Sato from the premiership the ruling Liberal Democratic party elected Kakuei Tanaka as Sato's successor at its national convention on July 5, 1972. Tanaka immediately made public his intention to start the normalization talks with China. Three weeks later Japanese League of Diet Members for the Restoration of Normal Diplomatic Relations with China submitted a resolution to the Lower House calling for early normalization of relations. A total of 328 Lower House members, including fifty-four members of the ruling Liberal Democratic party, put their signatures on this petition. In early August the Liberal Democratic party plenum unanimously passed a resolution approving Tanaka's plan to visit Peking. "The unanimity of the vote, in which pro-Taiwan Diet members took place," a correspondent of the Los Angeles Times

reported from Tokyo, "gave further impetus to the bandwagon that has been rolling toward Peking."\(^{50}\)

Fully aware that the bandwagon phenomenon was taking place in Japan, Premier Chou formally sent Premier Tanaka an official invitation to visit Peking, which the latter accepted on August 15, 1972. By mid-September a considerable amount of groundwork had already been laid out for the Premier's visit scheduled on September 25, 1972. Former Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka, who headed the mission to China for the arrangement of Tanaka's trip, announced on his return that "the minor questions of differences would be left to future settlement for the sake of the greater common interests."\(^{51}\) Kosaka's mission thus virtually removed all possible barriers to Tanaka's historic trip.

Geographically speaking, the distance between Japan and China is extremely small: some 500 miles of open sea stretch between the two countries. This geographical advantage, in turn, had made possible the reduction of the cultural distance, as was indicated in the frequent cultural exchanges between the two countries. Thus there was a special binding relationship

\(^{50}\) *Los Angeles Times*, August 10, 1972, p. 4.

between them. Japan's written language and much of its religious, artistic, and moral civilization derived from Chinese culture, while Japan was the primary influence both positively and negatively on whole generations of Chinese revolutionaries. Racially speaking, both the Chinese and the Japanese belong to the same stock of Mongoloid, thus sharing its common attributes.\textsuperscript{52} The apparent similarities in culture, race, language, and morality must have prompted \textit{The (London) Times} to remark: "They know each other's mind better than any others know either."\textsuperscript{53}

Despite this common heritage of civilization and mutual influence, there existed some important chasms on both sides of the China Sea. China has adopted a Communist ideology since its take-over in 1949, whereas Japan has accepted a democratic system of government. The ideological difference, therefore, was as great as it could be. "Whether the people of a Communist and a capitalist nation," one Japanese editorial writer stated, "can succeed in this national experiment of coexistence is . . . a question of im-

\textsuperscript{52} Reischauer, \textit{Japan}, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{The (London) Times}, September 25, 1972, p. 5.
mense historical interest." \(^{54}\)

But more significant than the difference in ideology or social system was the remoteness of the mental or psychological distance between China and Japan. The history of Japan-China relations in the twentieth century, when viewed through the eyes of the Chinese, added up to a series of internal interferences and armed aggressions on their country by the Japanese military regime. "The tragedy," according to Takeo Miki, Deputy Premier of Japan, "was created by Japan, the aggressor, and China was the victim." \(^{55}\) Even twenty-seven years after the Japanese surrendered, many Chinese must have clearly remembered the bitter personal memories of the Japanese occupation. Their memories must be particularly acute in Nanking, where the Japanese army engaged in an orgy of rape and murder and killed more than 12,000 non-combatant Chinese in two bloody days in 1937. \(^{56}\)

The atrocities of the Japanese military regime

---


planted in the Chinese the seeds of mistrust and hatred for Japan. And at the same time in the hearts of many Japanese remained the sense of guilt for causing enormous damages to the Chinese people through war. The scar inflicted by the war upon the minds of both peoples was so serious that, as one editorial writer put it, "this psychological damper will remain as a limiting factor in Sino-Japanese relations, probably until the present leaders are replaced entirely by the younger generation which has no war experience."\(^{57}\) Thus, the engulfing distance in ideology, social system, and psychology or mentality was the major obstacle lying between the two countries at the time of Tanaka's visit to Peking in September, 1972.

When Tokyo and Peking simultaneously announced that Tanaka would visit China to "establish good neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries" by "settling the questions of normalization of Japan-China relations,"\(^{58}\) the Japanese rejoiced at the news. The major newspapers were unanimous in their editorials in supporting this historic event. In addition, all

---


\(^{58}\) *Japan Times*, September 22, 1972, p. 1.
the opposition parties—the Japan Socialist party, Komeito, the Democratic Socialist party, and the Japan Communist party—joined the ruling Liberal Democratic party in welcoming this announcement of historic dimension. The Japan Socialist party, for instance, said in its statement that the party expected Tanaka's upcoming talks with Chinese leaders to terminate the "state of war" between Japan and China, leading to the establishment of permanent friendly ties between the two nations. Another manifestation of the high degree of expectation entertained by the opposition parties was that for the first time they all sent their leaders to the airport to see off a Premier going on a foreign tour. One newspaper observed: "This reflected how moves for normalization of relations with China have been made with the backing of the opposition." It would be an overstatement to assert, however, that no objection was voiced against the whole scheme of detente. When he announced his intention to visit Peking, Tanaka faced obstinate objections from some pro-Taiwan elements within his ruling Liberal Democratic

60 Japan Times, September 26, 1972, p. 1.
Leading pro-Taiwan Diet men and Taiwan lobbyists became increasingly restless as they fully understood that to establish diplomatic relations with Peking would automatically mean to sever long-standing relations with Taipei. Tanaka's proposed trip to the People's Republic of China also drew critical fire from some outstanding intellectuals. Mineo Nakashima, professor of international relations, expressed fears over Japan's conduct of diplomacy. He said in an interview: "To sum up, Japan's approach to China this time seemed to indicate its dangerous inclination toward 'super power diplomacy' . . . which is likely to ignore small countries." A famed columnist felt frightened at the speed with which the two countries came closer: " . . . the rapidity of the developments over the past two and a half months has left many people with a feeling of uneasy concern." The same columnist cautioned that "we must not be swept along by the easy-going 'mood' " generated by the Tanaka government.

---

61 *Asahi Evening News*, September 22, 1972, p. 3.
But the excitement, the hope, and the expectation were the consensus of the majority of the Japanese. Japan's sense of geographic proximity and historic kinship with China, coupled with her sense of guilt over Japanese treatment of China in the twentieth century, made the Japanese yearn for formal, diplomatic relations with mainland China for the promotion of common interests in the fields of politics, economy, and culture. In mid-1972 Sino-Japanese relations were the single most powerful issue that captured the attention of the Japanese people. Just before Tanaka's departure for Peking on September 25, 1972, the daily Asahi Shimbun published a poll showing that thirty-nine per cent of the Japanese population now rated China as Japan's top foreign policy priority while the United States, which had always led such polls before, dropped to second place with a twenty-eight per cent rating, and that as much as seventy per cent favored Tanaka's scheduled trip to China. 64 Most Japanese, therefore, expressed their wholehearted support for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and China after decades of unhappy relations between the two

64 Asahi Shimbun (morning ed.), September 18, 1972, pp. 1-2.
neighbors. They greeted Tanaka's announcement as an epoch-making event in 2,000 years of relations.

The Chinese leaders and people displayed equally favorable reactions toward Tanaka's announcement of the Peking trip. John Burns, a Canadian correspondent stationed in Peking, inferred from the Chinese press treatment of Tanaka's scheduled visit that the expectations of the Chinese toward the Tanaka mission were higher than those toward the Nixon trip. He filed the following report from China's capital:

When the date of President Richard Nixon's visit to China was announced, the People's Daily reserved space for the item at the top of its front page. But . . . when it announced that the visit of Japan's Premier Kakuei Tanaka would begin . . . , the paper threw its reserve and accorded the item pride of place at the top of the page. By giving bigger play to the Tanaka story, the editors of the Communist party journal were giving expression to a feeling that has been palpable whenever Chinese have gathered— that the prospect of rapprochement with Japan is even more exciting and dramatic than the pursuit of detente with the U.S. To the ordinary Chinese, the Nixon visit was a spectacular but remote event. . . . America and Americans have always been a distant and relatively unknown quality to him. The same cannot be said of Japan and the Japanese, whose encroachment on Chinese territory began toward the end of the last century and culminated in the brutal occupation of 1931-45, during which 10 million Chinese are said to have died.65

China's sheer speed in arranging the talk with Premier Tanaka was another indication that the former expected much to come out of this historic detente. The speedy approach of the Chinese toward the Japanese prompted one Japanese official to remark with surprise: "For years we unsuccessfully tried to improve relations with China. Now, we the wooer have become the wooed."66 Because of this over-willingness on the part of China, one American commentator went so far as to assert that "China needs Japan more than Japan needs China." He elaborated on this assertion from the political and economic perspectives:

In political terms, Tokyo wants little more than to create a harmonious atmosphere and lay the groundwork for the development of friendly, formal relations with Peking. In economic terms, . . . [as] a developing country, China needs capital goods and a wide range of sophisticated industrial products, for which Japan is the natural supplier.67

This observation serves to support my contention that China had a high degree of expectation toward the Tanaka visit.

Although it is always difficult to ascertain

66Quoted in U.S. News & World Report, October 2, 1972, p. 73.

what the ordinary Chinese think about a certain event in such a tightly controlled society as that of China, one Reuter correspondent reported from Peking just before the Tanaka visit that "the Chinese seem much more involved in the event than they were with U.S. President Richard Nixon's February visit." According to this report, the Chinese people had been studying the history of Sino-Japanese relations at study sessions in communes and urban street committees throughout the country. The same correspondent observed that while many Chinese had bitter memories of the Japanese atrocities, they were being told by the Chinese officials to make a clear distinction between the rulers and the people of Japan: Japanese militarists were to blame, and not the people.68 This willingness of China to negotiate with Japan was so noticeable that the New York Times editorialized just before the Tanaka visit that "the most impressive point revealed in the preparation for the visit is the unexpected mildness of the Chinese position on some of the knottiest problems of the Pacific community."69

68 Japan Times, September 24, 1972, p. 1. A similar report was also filed from Peking by one AP correspondent. See Asahi Evening News, September 25, 1972, p. 1.

69 New York Times, September 24, 1972, p. 34.
As a result of this high level of expectation on the part of China, not only the Japanese press but also the American correspondents in Peking were unanimous in observing that the Chinese officials extended a more cordial welcome to Premier Tanaka when he arrived in Peking than to President Nixon.70

When he left Japan for China on September 25, 1972, Premier Kakuei Tanaka had more difficult tasks to be achieved than President Richard Nixon. The main obstacle Tanaka had to face in accomplishing them lay in the feeling of the Chinese that they were the victims of the Japanese atrocities. This unique situation dictated, therefore, that his approach be characterized by the stance of compromise or apology. Tanaka, in other words, faced the difficulty of trying to shift national gears suddenly from confrontation to conciliation. The following diagram (Figure 5) illustrates the summary history of the Sino-Japanese relations. It should clarify the specific missions Premier Tanaka intended to accomplish during his trip to Peking.

Japan had enjoyed friendly bilateral contact up to 1894 and Tanaka's major goal of the trip was, unlike that of Nixon's, not only to reopen the communication channel, but to restore the mutual relation for the purpose of recognizing China as a sole and independent state. More specifically, the Japanese Premier was generally expected to fulfill two immediate tasks of extreme importance. First, Tanaka as head of
his government had to apologize to the Chinese for the Japanese war acts. A few days before his trip, the Premier, in an informal conference with members of the Cabinet Press Club, expressed his views on his forthcoming talks with the Chinese leaders. Among other things, he emphatically said that he would express his "apology" to the Chinese "as a gesture of friendship" for Japan's wartime activities on the Chinese mainland.\textsuperscript{71}

Second, Tanaka had to make a formal termination-of-war declaration, since China contended that the state of war and hostility still existed. The editorial of the \textit{Asahi Evening News} seemed to represent the position of most Japanese newspapers: "Inasmuch as true Japan-China friendship will be possible only if the Japanese first settle the wrongs they have committed against the Chinese through the past war of aggression, a declaration terminating the war will necessarily have to be the starting-point of new relations between the two countries."\textsuperscript{72} Only after successfully completing these


\textsuperscript{72}\textit{Asahi Evening News}, September 26, 1972, p. 4.
two immediate tasks, was Tanaka then in a position to proceed to carry out the major objective of his trip: to establish new diplomatic relations based on the formal recognition of China.

The similarity and the difference in mission between Nixon's and Tanaka's trips to China were succinctly summarized by Newsweek:

On the surface, Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's visit to Peking this week may look like a dubbed Oriental rerun of Richard Nixon's mission to China seven months ago. Tanaka will see the same sights, enjoy the same banquet fare and leaders. Indeed, Chinese officials even presented Japanese advance men with the same booklet--written in English--used to orchestrate everything from TV camera placement to reception protocol for the Nixon visit. Yet the Tanaka trip is hardly a simple replay. For when he touches down at Peking airport, he will close a bitter chapter in the 2,000-year-long Sino-Japanese relationship and before the week is out, Tanaka and his host, Premier Chou En-lai, are expected to announce steps toward re-establishing full-fledged diplomatic relations.

Finally, like President Nixon, Premier Tanaka had the strong motive behind his trip of making symbolic use of this historic event in the upcoming national election at home. Having fully realized the popular sentiment of the Japanese people toward his scheduled visit to China, Tanaka hoped to dissolve the

---

Newsweek, October 2, 1972, p. 37.
Lower House of the Diet after his trip and to add a public mandate to his cabinet and ruling Liberal Democratic party in the national election.

When Premier Kakuei Tanaka stepped out of his DC-8 airplane at Peking airport on September 25, 1972, it was a moving beginning to a historic meeting that would end a century of hostility and reopen a dialogue between Asia's two great powers.

To summarize, President Richard Nixon and Premier Kakuei Tanaka faced unusually complex situations in which they had to find themselves. Whatever they did and whatever they said during their trips were expected to meet the demand of these situations. From the rhetorical point of view, what they uttered should be construed as their symbolic responses to the rhetorically unique situations in which they were supposed to fulfill the varied expectations of their audiences, both immediate and ultimate, in order to remove the psychological barriers in interpersonal and international relations between themselves and their host country. The rhetorical situations which Nixon and Tanaka faced as rhetors, in sum, were characterized by such important factors as the historical facts of international and intercultural relations between a speaker-nation and an audience-nation, the various kinds of
distance that separated the rhetor and the receivers of his message, the varied levels of expectations the receivers held toward the rhetor's mission and the rhetor's overall purposes. These highly important variables, in turn, will, to a great extent, determine the kind of commitment or choice a rhetor will make in his rhetorical situation.

One final question needs to be asked of every critic who undertakes to evaluate these unusually complex rhetorical situations: Is the neo-Aristotelian or historical approach of the traditional perspective sufficient to cope with these situations in which international and intercultural communication often takes place? An analysis of Nixon's and Tanaka's rhetorical situations based on the classical perspective of criticism will yield very little critical result. The classification of these rhetorical discourses into forensic, deliberative, and epideictic; the classification of their proofs into ethical, logical, and pathetic; the assessment of these discourses in the categories of invention, disposition, style, and delivery; and the evaluation of these rhetorical discourses in terms of their effects on the immediate audience of the Chinese people--these critical acts will shed little light on the magnitude and dimension of the rhetorical
transactions in which Nixon and Tanaka as rhetors were supposed to fulfill the various kinds of expectations held by various kinds of audiences for the purpose of removing, or at least reducing, the interpersonal distance between themselves and their hosts and the international distance between China and America or Japan. In addition, the traditional perspective of criticism usually does not take into account such intercultural variables as the existence of linguistic plurality, the use of translation or interpreter as a medium of communication, and the varied audience attributes as influenced by the cultural differences.

What is needed in criticism of international and intercultural communication is a new methodological model for analysis that will encompass all the possible intercultural variables discussed in the preceding paragraph. Before I formulate an analytical model, I will delineate in Chapter Four the concept of distance as a central dimension in international and intercultural communication.
CHAPTER IV

THE CONCEPT OF DISTANCE AS A KEY DIMENSION IN INTERNATIONAL AND INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION

To fulfill the primary function of narratio, the preceding chapter has historically reconstructed the unique contexts in which President Richard Nixon and Premier Kakuei Tanaka had found themselves and the unusual rhetorical situations which they had encountered as practitioners of rhetoric during their respective trips to the People's Republic of China. What has emerged from the narrative description in Chapter Three is the complexity of international and intercultural communication situations characterized by the existence of various kinds of distance. This leads me to believe that a proper understanding on the part of a rhetorical critic of the dimension of distance that confronts and conditions the speaker is indispensable to his perceptive criticism of international and intercultural communication.

I propose, therefore, that, focusing on the dimension of distance, a critic view international and
intercultural transactions as a rhetorical campaign in which by employing all the available strategies the rhetor endeavors to respond to the unique situation that demands removal of distance lying between the rhetor himself and the receivers of his messages. Furthermore, I contend that a critic should specifically ascertain the nature of two major kinds of distance: the interpersonal distance between the rhetor and his listeners and the international and intercultural distance that separates the speaker's country or culture and the counterpart of his hosts. Finally, I propose that the crucial question which concerns a rhetorical critic equipped with a "distance" orientation or perspective should be: how successfully did the rhetor in an international and intercultural situation pursue his rhetorical goal of reducing these two kinds of distance without creating undesirable side-effects upon the receivers of his message, both international and national?

Based upon these propositions, I will first explore in this chapter the nature of distance that separates nations and peoples from one another and then examine the formal strategies of removing, or at least reducing, interpersonal and international dimensions of distance, drawing upon the perspectives of anthro-
polity, psychology, sociology, international relations, and speech communication. My final task in Chapter Four will be to postulate what I call a rhetoric of distance reduction by suggesting a few basic potential intrinsic and extrinsic strategies for the reduction of distance. This "rhetoric" is designed to suggest to an analyst of international and intercultural communication where he may look to discover what distance-reducing strategies are open to the rhetor of intercommunication among peoples and cultures.

Nature of Distance

We frequently say of A that he is "close" to B, but that C is "distant," but that D, on the other hand, is open-minded and, therefore, "easy to meet." We usually feel "closer" to those persons whom we know or like and "farther" from those whom we do not know or like. All these expressions describe distance. In all personal relations, sociologist Robert Park aptly observed, "we have a sense of distance toward individuals with whom we come into contact."¹

Man has long been consciously or unconsciously aware of the importance of space that forms distance in

his world. Edward Hall pointed out that "the history of man's past is largely an account of his effort to wrest space from others and to defend space from others . . . ."\(^2\) The significance of space as a dominant factor in human interaction was also recognized by Alfred Hallowell, when he stated:

> Without the capacity for space perception, spatial orientation and the manipulation of spatial concepts, the human being would be incapable of effective locomotion, to say nothing of being unable to coordinate other aspects of his behavior with that of his fellows in a common social life.\(^3\)

Despite the obvious importance of space and distance in the human world, no theoretical treatment of the distance concept had been made prior to the twentieth century.\(^4\) It was in 1906 that German social


\(^4\)This does not mean, however, that even a casual reference had not been made to the concept of distance before 1900. Emory S. Bogardus, for instance, believed that Chinese philosopher Mo Ti was the first to comment on the distance concept in the fifth B.C. and that B. C. Gabriel, a French magistrate and philosopher, was the pioneer in the Western world who referred to distance in 1890. Willard C. Poole, on the other hand, identified C. Tarde as the man who had made the first use of distance concept in his field of sociology. See Emory S. Bogardus, "Social Distance and Its Practical Implications," *Sociology and Social Research*, XXII (May, 1938), 463, and Willard C. Poole, Jr., "Distance in Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIII (July, 1927), 99.
philosopher Georg Simmel introduced the distance concept for the first time. Focusing primarily on what had later become known as social distance, Simmel postulated that around each person is gathered a sphere made up of his affairs. He continued:

... an ideal sphere surrounds every human being, different in various directions and toward different persons; a sphere varying in extent, into which one may not venture to penetrate without disturbing the personal value of the individual. Honor locates such an area. Language indicates very nicely an invasion of this sort by such phrases as "coming too near." The radius of that sphere, so to speak, marks the distance which a stranger may not cross without infringing upon another's honor.\(^5\)

Simmel, however, did not systematically arrange and define his use of the distance concept.\(^6\)

Ever since Robert Park and Ernest Burgess introduced the concept of distance into American socio-


\(^6\)Much later, Simmel made a few references to the concept of distance in his theory of sociology. Consult Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, trans. and ed. with an introduction by Kurt H. Wolff (New York: Free Press, 1950), pp. 7, 97, and 402. At one point, Simmel fully recognized the importance of the distance concept in man's interpersonal behavior, when he stated: "[The] dualism of nearness and distance is necessary for our behavior to be consistently correct. It inheres, so to speak, in the fundamental forms and problems of our life" (p. 97n).
logical thought from Georg Simmel's treatise on sociology, the concept has gained great interest among sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists. Sociologists and psychologists such as Emory Bogardus and Kurt Lewin, for instance, were interested in attempting to reduce to something like measurable terms the grades and degrees of understanding and intimacy which characterize personal and social relations generally. Bogardus eventually devised the social distance scale. The concept of distance has also been the focal point to some anthropologists, among whom Edward T. Hall cuts a prominent figure. Hall has extensively theorized the dimension of space and distance by proposing what he calls proxemics, that is, "the study of ways in which man gains knowledge of the content of other men's minds through judgments of behavior pat-
terns associated with varying degrees of proximity to them. Hall was quick to point out that "it has very little to do with the single-viewpoint linear perspective . . . " and observed that "how people are feeling toward each other . . . is a decisive factor" in the formation of distance.

How will such an important interpersonal factor as distance be related to communication in general? Hall perceptively remarked: "The flow and shift of distance between people as they interact with each other is part and parcel of the communication process." Cultural anthropologist George Foster elaborated on this "flow and shift of distance" in a communicative situation. He viewed as a speaker's major function the

---


9 Hall, Hidden Dimension, p. 108.

10 Hall, Silent Language, p. 160.
two-dimensional manipulation of the distance which is seen to prevail between himself and the receivers of his message. Foster expounded: "This manipulation is two directional: it may attempt to decrease the distance between speaker and addressee, or it may attempt to increase the distance." Wayne Brockriede went much further than Foster in adding the third direction which the speaker might take: maintenance of distance. When distance exists in a rhetorical situation, the primary function of discourse may be, in the words of Brockriede, "the establishment of an appropriate distance (whether decreasing, maintaining, or increasing it) . . . ." 

An examination of the two rhetorical situations in Chapter Three confirms the validity of Willard Poole's contention that "the essence of distance is conflict." If this assertion is correct, then, distance should be viewed as the barrier to free exchange.


13Poole, "Distance in Sociology," 102.
of ideas between individuals or nations. I propose, therefore, that the main function of communication, particularly in international and intercultural contexts, be neither to increase nor to maintain, but to decrease or reduce, the distance that lies between the communicator and the communicatee. This proposition is consonant with the view presented by Franklin Knower that "communication is almost always a process of bridging a . . . distance." 14

Assuming that the rhetor is expected to remove or reduce distance in international and intercultural settings, what kinds of distance he is expected to encounter and manipulate is the major topic of concern in the ensuing section of this chapter.

Kinds of Distance

It must be mentioned at the outset that scholars of varied disciplines make use of the term "distance" both literally and figuratively in diverse ways. Geographers and some scholars of international relations conceive of distance primarily as geographical in terms of miles and use it accordingly for mapping, for flight computation, for analyzing the impact of

geographical distance upon international relations, and for other related purposes. Economists use a more sophisticated concept of economic distance, which is measured in terms of "mileage along a specific transport route . . . , fuel . . . , and a number of intervening opportunities." The economic distance between two points is, in essence, the cost of transporting a commodity from one to the other. Sociologists starting with Georg Simmel talk about social distance or racial distance for the purpose of ascertaining a group's or race's conception of its relation to another group or race. Anthropologists likewise see cultural distance in terms of the relation of one culture to another. Assuming that the distances relevant for travel, for trade, for intermarriage, or for communication are all somehow related, some scholars even propose the concept of what they call effective distance based upon physi-

---


Psychologists, too, come into this scene. Some of them, represented primarily by Charles E. Osgood, are interested in disparities in meanings held for concepts evoked by verbal symbols and call them semantic distance. The term "distance," commonly prefaced by aesthetic or psychical, has also been in vogue with writers in oral interpretation. Relying heavily upon Edward Bullough's theory of psychical distance, students of oral interpretation, according to Beverly Whitaker, use the term in a variety of ways—to describe a quality in the literature readers should choose for oral interpretation, to define one of the standards of artistic performance, and to identify the relationships among the reader, the speaker in a text, and the listener.

---


As the distance observed in particular cases is a compound of different and perhaps conflicting components, it seems unprofitable to define it in inclusive terms. Each form of distance, instead, must be related to a larger scheme of classification of the distance concept and defined in its own terms in light of the context of international and intercultural communication. Figure 6 shows my classification of the concept of distance.

Wayne Brockriede identified two kinds of distance: "an interpersonal distance between each two participants in a rhetorical act" and "a social distance which exists within the structure of the group or groups within or related to the rhetorical act." For "social distance," however, I will propose to substitute "international or intercultural distance" that is assumed to exist between the communicator's country or culture and the communicatee's counterpart as the second major category of the distance concept. I will later classify social distance as one of several subcategories which fall within the dimension of psychological distance.

---

Figure 6.—Classification of the Dimension of Distance
Interpersonal Distance

Interpersonal distance exists between the speaker and the receivers of his message. Two kinds of distance make up the dimension of this interpersonal distance. One is personal distance. The term was originally used by Willard Poole in 1927 to designate "the relation between any two [individuals] . . . apart from their positions as members of various groups." The personal distance that separates rhetorical participants from each other will primarily be determined by what one party thinks the other to be. Of particular importance among several sources of personal distance is the intimacy level, which sociologist Robert Park observed in the following words: "The point is that we are clearly conscious, in all our personal relationships, of degree of intimacy, . . . [and that] the degree of this intimacy measures the influence which each has over the other."22

The other kind of the dimension of interpersonal distance is what I call an official distance that lies between the international communicator and the

---

21Poole, "Distance in Sociology," p. 150.
22Park, Race and Culture, p. 256. [Italics Park's.]
communicatee. This distance will be formulated by the official position of rhetorical participants and the power which comes from it. Power may here be defined as potential influence of some person over some others that may lead to possible change in thinking, attitudes, and beliefs. I am specifically thinking of power in terms of legitimate power which is derived from official status of those involved in a rhetorical act.

The consideration of official distance is important to a critic, because the prototype of international communication may be found in a situation where an internationally known leader or head of state addresses his counterpart and his people of a different country. Khrushchev and Brezhnev speaking to the American nation, Churchill addressing the United States Congress, Nixon persuading the Chinese leaders—these are the typical examples of international communication. It will be safely assumed, then, that official status and power structure under which participants are expected to interact will play a significant role in intercommunication among nations and cultures.

**International Distance**

International and intercultural communication, first of all, is characterized and conditioned by the
difference in and multiplicity of such factors as culture, custom, language, national character, social structure, geography, ideology, race, and psychological frame of reference. This difference and multiplicity in an international and intercultural context will inevitably create international distance lying between participating nations or cultures. The dimension of international distance is thus the result of an interplay of different and perhaps conflicting components.

I will here set out to analyze from the multiple perspectives of geography, sociology, psychology, and international relations the two general kinds of international distance: geographical distance and psychological distance, the latter being used as a generic or superordinate term to include such subordinate terms as cultural, social, racial, ideological, linguistic, and racial distance.

Every rhetor of international communication must be concerned with the geographical distance that separates his country and his host country. Traditional rhetorical transactions usually take place within the same region, district, or country, thus rarely creating as great geographical distance as do international communicative situations. In the case of President Nixon or Premier Tanaka addressing the
Chinese audiences, however, the geographical distance of 16,000 miles or 2,000 miles that separates the capital of the United States or of Japan from that of China is a stern fact they could not possibly neglect in their subsequent rhetorical campaigns during their respective visits to Peking.

Of all who have written extensively about the importance of geography in international relations, Harold Sprout, professor of geography and international relations at Princeton University, and his wife, Margaret, have contributed much toward clarifying concepts, developing hypotheses, and presenting framework for examining man-milieu relationships. The Sprouts contended that since each political community is set on a territory which is a unique combination of location, size, shape, distance, and national resources, most transactions among nations entail significant, even crucial, geographical conditions. They said:

In nearly all international transactions involving some element of opposition, resistance, struggle, or conflict, the factors of location, space, and distance between the interacting parties have been significant variables.\(^23\)

---

They further noted that international statecraft exhibits in all periods "more or less discernible patterns of coercion and submission, influence and deference; patterns reflected in political terms with strong geographic connotations." The most important premise with the Sprout theory was that geography affects all human phenomena, and that, above all, nothing does more to shape a nation's interests and to determine its policies than geography.

Needless to say, one of the factors that evoke feelings of nearness is physical propinquity. With geographical proximity is usually associated knowledge of where one is. "Unfamiliarity with locale," Harry Turney-High aptly remarked, "is the mother of insecurity." This view was shared by Edward Hall, who stated: "We visualize the relationship between places we know by personal experience. Places which we haven't been

---

24 Sprout and Sprout, Ecological Perspective, p. 15.


to and with which we are not personally identified tend to remain confused."27 Geographically speaking, distance and isolation denote separation in space. Rhetorically speaking, the essential characteristic of distance and isolation is usually found in exclusion from communication. Geographical distance is rhetorically significant so far as it prevents communication and contact. One scholar in international relations, for example, attributed the U.S. "containment" policy toward China to geographical distance and isolation.28

Why should the rhetor of international and intercultural communication concern himself with the geographical distance that is evidently unreduceable in a physical sense? Although it is physically impossible to remove or reduce the geographical distance that lies between the two participating groups or nations, the development of modern technology has virtually made it possible to shrink the world, thus removing or reducing the distance that used to be a geographical barrier to successful intercommunication among nations and cultures. The jet age has made it easier for the rhetor himself

27 Hall, Silent Language, p. 150.

to fly across national and geographical boundaries and to address a foreign audience in person. The advent of international television coverage also affords him an effective channel of reaching the receivers of his message, both international and national, directly and simultaneously.

Not only geographical distance but also some other kinds of distance created by differences in culture and society inevitably influence international and intercultural communication. Park and Burgess made this point: "The study of cultural differences between groups has revealed barriers quite as real and as effective as those of physical space and structure. Variations in language, folkways, mores, conventions, and ideas separate individuals and people from each other as widely as oceans and deserts." I will call the second kind of international distance "psychological distance," a phrase being used as a generic or superordinate term to include such subcategories as social, racial, linguistic, cultural, and ideological distance.

Psychological distance is primarily made up of what is commonly called social distance. Social psychologist Tamotsu Shibutani, for instance, equated so-

cial with psychological distance, when he discussed the difference between social and geographical distance:

"... social distance is not the same as geographical distance; linear space is not irrelevant, but it is not directly related to degree of psychological closeness."^30

Ever since Park introduced Georg Simmel's concept of social distance to the American sociological thought in the early part of the twentieth century, it has become a standard term in the field of sociology. As conceptualized by Park, the phrase was to be applied chiefly to the phenomenon of interracial and interethnic relations. Mozell Hill succinctly summarized the several assumptions underlying in Park's notion of social distance. They include:

1. that groups develop a sense of "distance" toward other groups with whom they come into contact;
2. that such terms as in-group, ethnocentrism, race consciousness, class consciousness, and the like suggest a state of mind within the group which determines the distance that separates it from other groups;
3. that this in-group feeling and/or state of mind interferes with, modifies, and qualifies the nature of intergroup relations.


Park was closely followed by one of his students, Emory Bogardus, who first applied the concept of social distance to a scale for measuring attitudes. He defined the social distance as "the degree of sympathetic understanding that operates between any two persons, between a person and each of the social groups of which he is a member, and between any two social groups." For Bogardus, sympathy refers to feeling reactions of a favorably responsive type, and understanding involves that knowledge of a person which also leads to favorably responsive behavior. One should here note that Bogardus' definition of social distance implies a psychological view of the factors regulating behavior. Bogardus then set out to identify four "primary sources" of social distance:

1. Differences in temperament and biological make-up.
2. Adverse sensory reactions having physiological origins.
3. Differences in culture patterns which prevent one person from understanding another.
4. Lack of acquaintance and knowledge.

Further writing on the subject of social distance tended to confirm Bogardus' view. Shibutani, for example, saw social distance lying along an axis between

---

32 Bogardus, "Distance and Implications," p. 462.
33 Bogardus, "Distance and Implications," p. 467.
"sentiments" and "conventional norms," a usage closely related to Bogardus' criterion of "the degree of sympathetic understanding" that obtains between persons or groups.34

What Park, Bogardus, and, in recent years, Shibutani shared in common was their contention that social distance is the product of difference in and multiplicity of race consciousness, social structure, human character and, in a larger sense, national character, sensory perception, and cultural pattern.

To a list of these sources of social distance were added some other determinants. Harry and Leigh Triandis conducted a review of the literature on social distance and suggested the three factors central to a proper understanding of the determinants of social distance. They included conflicting norms and values, sense of insecurity, and prejudice which exist between interacting groups.35 In addition to the lack of knowledge and acquaintance, sociologist Michael Banton added "a relative lack of common interests or experiences" and "a self-interest springing not from an individual's per-

34Shibutani, Society and Personality, p. 382.
sonality but forced upon him by his social position" to a list of possible sources responsible for creating social distance. It must thus be emphasized that race consciousness, social structure, human character, sensory perception, cultural pattern, norms and values, and such psychological frames of reference as prejudice, self-centeredness, and insecurity will all combine to produce social distance between groups or nations. Park found in social distance potential obstacles to communication: "The barriers to communication are not differences of language and of culture merely, but more particularly of self-consciousness, race consciousness, and consciousness of kind; not physical distances merely, but social distances." 

The preceding paragraph indicates the existence of several subcategories of distance closely related with social distance, such as racial distance, linguistic distance, cultural distance, and ideological dis-


tances that lie between the two cultural groups or na-
tions. As I have already stated, these subcategories
should be treated as subordinate under the superordi-
nate term of psychological distance. This superordi-
nate distance, in other words, represents all these
minor distances created by differences in language,
race, social structure, culture, and ideology. For
these factors are mainly responsible for forming par-
ticular psychological frames of reference of a group
or nation.

Psychological distance is here viewed as a
pervasive dimension in international and intercultural
communicative transactions. I have repeatedly stressed
that international and intercultural communication is
characterized and influenced by the multiplicity of
language, custom, value system, culture, ideology,
race, and, above all, psychological frames of refer-
ence. In other words, when he sets out to wage a rhe-
torical campaign, the rhetor is usually faced with the
immense task of removing, or at least reducing, the
psychological distance lying between his country or
culture and the counterpart of his hosts.

I have thus delineated the dimension of dis-
tance from the multiple perspectives of psychology,
sociology, geography, and international relations and
defined the function of the international and intercultural rhetor as reducing the various kinds of interpersonal and international distance.

**Strategies for Reducing Distance**

My attention will next be directed to the following question: what do theorists in the field of philosophy, sociology, psychology, and rhetoric say about formal strategies for removing, or at least reducing, the various kinds of the distance dimension, both interpersonal and international?

The reduction of distance on a personal level may be achieved through several rhetorical methods of enhancing ethos. Ethos enhancement in communication has interested rhetorical theorists since the days of Corax and Tisias. Ethos may be defined, according to James McCroskey, as "the attitude toward a source of communication held at a given time by a receiver." The importance of this definition lies in McCroskey's contention that ethos resides not so much in the communication source as in the mind of the receiver. Ethos is, in other words, the perception of the image of a speaker held by his audience.

---

Much has been written under various captions about the strategy of enhancing ethos. Theorists are generally in agreement in asserting that ethos enhancement is indeed instrumental in facilitating the acceptance of a speaker by his audience, that is, in bringing about mental union between the participants in a rhetorical act. For the purpose of this chapter, it would suffice to list several rhetorical methods of enhancing ethos open to the rhetor who is encountering personal distance. Karl Wallace, for instance, urged that the speaker convey what he called "four moralities" of communication:

1. Duty of search and inquiry
2. allegiance to accuracy and fairness
3. expression of individual motive
4. tolerance of dissent.

After having reviewed the divergent research findings on ethos, especially derived ethos, McCroskey offered the following succinct summary on rhetorical methods of enhancing ethos:


... the communicator who carefully selects the propositions he will support, so as to be certain that they are not highly discrepant with his audience's attitudes; who supports his arguments with evidence from well-qualified sources; who presents his message in a sincere manner, so as to make himself worthy of belief; who establishes common ground and good will with his audience; who makes himself appear to be open-minded; and who makes his audience aware of the favorable aspects of his background, experience, and affiliations—that communicator will be most likely to find his ethos increased.\footnote{McCroskey, \textit{Rhetorical Communication}, pp. 77-78.}

One will recall that official distance, the second subcategory of the dimension of interpersonal distance, is primarily the product of the disparity of power and status which exists between rhetorical participants. My concern, therefore, will be with rhetorical strategy of achieving power parity or equalization. When confronted with official distance, the rhetor will have a felt need to readjust power relationships and subsequent actions stemming from this need. He will see his rhetorical goal in the accomplishment of such readjustment of power discrepancy. As might be expected, the speaker's identification with someone equal in power or with someone significantly stronger will serve to adjust power disparity, thereby reducing the official distance caused by power discrepancy. I will call this
whole operation a strategy of creating power equilibrium.

To summarize, the reduction of interpersonal distance may be possible through the speaker's skillful use of strategies of enhancing ethos and creating power parity through identifying with objects in equal or superior status and power. These strategies are open to the rhetor of international and intercultural communication.

So far as the first kind of the dimension of international distance is concerned, the impossibility of the literal reduction of geographical distance does not mean that no distance-reducing method is available to the international communicator. Recently the variable of communication channel has been of growing importance in intercommunication. The mass media, namely satellite-borne television, is of particular significance to the speaker of international and intercultural communication. "The development of television since the 1950's," Heinz-Dietrich Fischer and John Merrill correctly observed, "revolutionized the cross-national relations and opened new and dramatic channels for global information. In close connection with television development is the use of communication satellites
The advent of the satellite television hookup is rhetorically significant in that television instantly connects multiple nations, thereby serving to reduce geographical distance figuratively.

The strategy of maximum dependence on television by the rhetor is basically different from other rhetorical strategies I have discussed above in that whereas the latter constitute intrinsic elements of persuasion, the former is an extrinsic means that lies outside the speech itself.

By far the closest attention should be directed to a discussion of rhetorical methods of reducing psychological distance, the second subcategory of international distance.

George Herbert Mead suggested one possible method of dissipating the distance, primarily social, that lies between the groups of people. He said:

> Anthropology and all the comparative social sciences have been making it easier and easier for us to put ourselves in the places of those who are far removed from us by social caste, economic status, race, and differences of culture and civilization. They bring us nearer the emotional attitude which

---

has been the inspiration of the universal
religions, that of regarding every man as
our neighbor.\footnote{George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the
Act, ed. by Charles W. Morris in collaboration with John
M. Brewster, Albert M. Dunham, and David L. Miller
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 510.}

The following key phrases need to be noted here. "Re-
garding every man as our neighbor" and "put[ting] our-
selves in the places of those . . . " will, in Mead's
mind, constitute a strategy for reducing social dis-
tance. Mead's view was supported by sociologists Kurt
and Gladys Lang, who observed in almost identical words:
"The social gulf separating two people can be bridged
only when they are able to 'meet' with a personal idea
of and a feeling toward one another, to sense how the
other feels toward oneself."\footnote{Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang, Politics
204-205.}

What Mead and the Langs emphasized was that one
should maximize the agreements and similarities shared
in common by human beings rather than lingering over
the disagreements and differences that separate him
from others. This emphasis on maximizing agreements
is commonly called the strategy of "common grounds" by
rhetorical critics. John Condon elaborated on this
method of reducing psychological distance: "It [the
strategy of emphasizing common grounds] expresses the similarity of values held by the speaker and his audience, or it expresses the common 'enemy' or 'dis-value' of the speaker and audiences." Having analyzed Premier Khrushchev's rhetorical campaign in America in 1959, Wayne Brockriede and Robert Scott discovered the Soviet leader's reliance upon this strategy. They observed: "Throughout the tour Khrushchev played down policy disputes that were impossible to settle in 1959 and emphasized the need to handle the resulting conflict so that nuclear war could not erupt." They continued:

Premier Khrushchev seems to have adopted the strategy of extending the operational agreement to the rhetorical level. The need to avoid nuclear war is implicit in every speech, . . . . The final declaration . . . in the joint communique . . . functions as a culmination of Khrushchev's strategy to maximize agreement.47

---

45 John Carl Condon, Jr., "Value Analysis of Cross Cultural Communication: A Methodology and Application for Selected United States-Mexican Communications, 1962-1963" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1964), p. 67. It is essential to note that Condon emphasized the importance of both common values and common "dis-values." The need for action in the common cause, both positive and negative, makes individuals in the previously conflicting groups important to one another.


47 Brockriede and Scott, Moments, pp. 71-72.
This stress on the common grounds for agreement, according to Mead and others, will in all probability open the psychologically shut door of other people’s minds, thus removing or reducing the distance lying between the two interacting groups.

When he reiterated the phrase "put ourselves in the places of those . . . ," Mead obviously had in mind his famous concepts of "significant symbol" and "universe of discourse." What Mead meant by the term "significant symbol" was the speaker's use of symbols for the purpose of creating a shared meaning between himself and his audience. He formally defined this key phrase as those verbal and non-verbal messages which have the capacity for "arousing in ourselves those responses which we call out in other persons, so that we are taking the attitudes of the other persons into our conduct."48 When communication fails to create universality of meaning among participants in a rhetorical act, it is far from being of significance, according to Mead. He stated at another place: "What is essential

---

to communication is that the symbol should arouse in one's self what it arouses in the other individual. It must have that sort of universality to any person in the situation.\textsuperscript{49}

It is important to observe here that the successful achievement of a significant symbol, according to Mead, will lead to the establishment of what he called a "universe of discourse" in a rhetorical transaction. He elaborated on the relationship between these two key concepts:

\ldots a universe of discourse is always implied as the context in terms of which, or as the field within which, significant gestures or symbols do in fact have significance. This universe of discourse is constituted by a group of individuals carrying on and participating in a common social process of experience and behavior, within which these gestures or symbols have the same or common meanings for all members of that group, whether they make them or address them to other individuals, or whether they overtly respond to them as made or addressed to them by other individuals. A universe of discourse is simply a system of common or social meanings.\textsuperscript{50}

The arousal of socially common meanings and the appeal


\textsuperscript{50}Mead, Mind, Self and Society, pp. 89-90.
to the universality of meanings through "putting one's self in the place of the other person's attitude," that is, communicating through significant symbols, Mead proposed, should be considered as "the formal ideal of communication."\(^{51}\) This strategy of attaining a universal discourse through the use of significant symbols may be taken as one way of reducing the psychological distance extending between the communicator and the communicatee.

Another strategy deserves to be discussed as an effective distance reducer. The concept of identification has been a frequent topic in sociology, psychology, and rhetoric. This concept, as Karl Wallace interpreted it, "describes both the effect of persuasion and the kinds of materials, methods, and techniques included in any process of communication aiming to influence belief and action."\(^{52}\) It is mostly with the latter area of inquiry that I am concerned here. My interest is in the concept of identification as a rhetorical method of reducing psychological distance between participating


parties in a rhetorical act.

"The tendency to identify one's self with other selves," Park and Burgess remarked, "is essentially a movement toward contact." Their theory, if translated into the terms of rhetoric, meant that the rhetor's "psychic union" with the receivers of his message is indispensable to removing the psychological distance lying between them. It is precisely through the strategy of identification as suggested by these sociologists that we will be able to bridge the psychological chasm stretching in our human relations.

This discussion on identification will not be complete without reference to Kenneth Burke. The philosophical basis for Burke's rhetoric postulated that men are fundamentally divided, that society is characterized by the condition of estrangement, and that the main function of rhetoric, therefore, is to remove, or at least to reduce, the interpersonal and social division and distance that exist among men in society. Burke commented on the seemingly paradoxical relation between identification and division:

Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there

would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity. If men were wholly and truly of one substance, absolute communication would be of man's very essence.  

Against this background should be understood Burke's key concepts of identification and consubstantiality. He viewed the strategy of identification as crucial for a man's effort to remove or reduce the inherent division in society. He saw identification as a process of overcoming the division of men by providing them with concepts, ideas, and attitudes that allow them to become substantially one with others. For a speaker to identify with his audience, in other words, means for him to become consubstantial with his audience. Thus his central concepts of identification and consubstantiality are indispensable to the rhetoric of distance reduction with which I am here concerned.

If we conceive of Burke's rhetoric as that of "peace and war," as did Daniel Fogarty, it may then be said that his rhetoric and his concept of identification in particular will take on added significance and meaning in the area of international communication.


whose main themes are usually peace and war. To reduce psychological distance, according to Burke, the rhetor must be able to identify the values, needs, and desires of his receivers so that he may achieve the understanding of them and eventually the establishment of peace as his highest aim.

A good example of critical pieces written from this perspective of identification was supplied by Marvin Bauer, who made a rhetorical analysis of Henry W. Grady's speech on the new South. The rhetorical critic concluded:

By identifying himself with a sentiment held dear by his audience [respect for Abraham Lincoln], he [Grady] had succeeded in breaking down psychological barriers and stirring his hearers so intensely that from then on they were favorably disposed toward him and his message.\(^{56}\)

I will finally turn to Chaim Perelman's notion of communion, which seems to have much to do with the concept of identification, as Hugh Duncan stated that "identification occurs in communication when speaker and hearer reach deep communion."\(^{57}\) The strategy of creating communion in a rhetorical transaction is also

---


\(^{57}\) Duncan, Communication, p. 170.
useful in bringing men together over chasm and distance. In order to establish communion with the audience, or to put it in another way, in order to reduce psychological distance, recommended the Belgian rhetorical theorist, the speaker, particularly in an epidictic situation, should "increase the intensity of adherence to values held in common by the audience and the speaker" for the purpose of achieving "the sharing of values . . . [as] an end."\textsuperscript{58}

The fact that intensified adherence to common values is characteristic of ceremonial forms of speech was well recognized by Wil Linkugel and his associates. In discussing the nature of ceremonial discourses or what they called "speeches that build social cohesion," they stated that the occasional speeches are . . . noncontroversial for a specific audience. They do not urge adoption of new values or rejection of old values. Rather, they seek to reinforce and revitalize the existing audience values. The speaker seeks unity of spirit or a re-energizing of effort or commitment; he tries to inspire, to kindle enthusiasm, or to deepen feelings of awe, respect, and devotion.\textsuperscript{59}


Perelman's emphasis on the strategy of establishing communion in epidictic forms of oratory will assume greater relevance in international communication whose dominant characteristic is usually ceremonial and occasional rather than argumentative and deliberative in nature. The case in point was President Nixon's trip to China which was rhetorically highlighted by four banquet speeches of primarily epidictic nature.

I have thus far identified several possible strategies a rhetor of international and intercultural communication could utilize for the purpose of reducing psychological distance, the second subcategory of international distance. Maximizing common grounds, establishing significant symbols, achieving identification, and creating communion— all these strategies are among the formal methods of reducing psychological distance expounded by philosophers, sociologists, and rhetorical theorists. These strategies are the ones which a speaker constructs and weaves into his speech. They are artistic, intrinsic methods as opposed to non-artistic, extrinsic methods such as using the channel of television as a means of reducing geographical distance.

One such non-artistic, extrinsic strategy may be included as a possible reducer of psychological dis-
that of relying maximally on translation (including interpreters). International and intercultural communication inevitably entails the problem of the multiplicity of languages. This means that the dimensions of translation and interpreters have taken on greater importance in an international and intercultural communication context. Even a slight mistake in translation would jeopardize the delicate rhetorical transaction. Consequently, interpreters have gradually come to play an important role as a distance reducer. How interpreters translate tends to be as significant as what speakers say in an intercommunication context. Richard Merritt pointed out the problem of translation in the following words:

Not the least important of these deal with the codes used by those doing the actual communicating; the need for translation compounds the normal semantic issues in verbal communication; simultaneous interpretation at international conferences assumes great importance; nonverbal communication runs the risk of misinterpretation. 60

It must again be stressed that channels such as translation and interpreters may constitute an effective reducer of linguistic and semantic distance, thus

greatly influencing the outcome of a rhetor's endeavor to communicate across national and cultural boundaries.

I should here add one word of caution before proceeding to the final section of this chapter. I have identified several intrinsic strategies as possible distance reducers in international and intercultural transactions of rhetoric. This does not mean, however, that I view them as exclusively relevant to the reduction of distance in international and intercultural communication alone. Needless to say, such strategies as enhancing ethos, establishing power parity, maximizing common grounds, establishing identification, creating communion, and achieving a universe of discourse through significant symbols can also constitute effective persuasive methods in intracommunication within one nation or culture. The point this chapter has endeavored to make is that these intrinsic strategies identified above tend to assume greater relevance and usefulness as rhetorical methods for distance reduction in the international and intercultural communication situation usually characterized by the existence of the more demanding distance factor.

Toward a Rhetoric of Distance Reduction

By way of summarizing what has been said above,
I will postulate what I call a rhetoric of distance reduction in international and intercultural communication by suggesting possible strategies open to the speaker of intercommunication among nations and cultures. The purpose for the formulation of this "rhetoric" is two-fold: first, to let the rhetor of international and intercultural communication know what strategies are open to him when he sets out to reduce various kinds of distance, and second, more importantly, to suggest to a rhetorical analyst where he may look to discover the rhetorical methods the speaker has used in his endeavor to reduce distance.

The eight strategies described below are derived not so much from an extensive analysis of international and intercultural discourses of rhetoric but from the assumption that there are a few potential strategies in the reduction of distance which can be extracted from the theories of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and rhetoric. Such a beginning welcomes modifications and additions on the basis of additional studies on criticism of international and intercultural transactions of rhetoric. It must be stressed that the following suggested strategies are not in any way mutually exclusive, nor are they assumed to be exhaustive. My intent is to suggest a tentative framework of dis-
tance-reducing rhetoric so that future critics might be able to refine and expand it.

Before summarizing strategies for the rhetoric of distance reduction, I should make the following general postulation: for the purpose of reducing distance, the rhetor of international and intercultural communication is in a unique position to employ both intrinsic and extrinsic strategies. Anthony Hillbruner made a clear distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic factors in rhetorical criticism:

The extrinsic factors are those exterior to the speech itself, although of salient significance to it. . . .
The intrinsic factors are those dealing more comprehensively with the speech itself. . . . Then, too, intrinsic factors are concerned with the more formal aspects of the speechmaking. . . .61

Using Hillbruner's differentiation, I define intrinsic strategies as those which the rhetor will consciously devise, construct, and weave into his speech in order to achieve his intended purpose. Extrinsic strategies, on the other hand, should be taken to mean those which are there for the rhetor to utilize rather than to construct them himself. Most of the strategies

described below are intrinsic in nature with the exception of two: use of satellite television and dependence on translation. The point to be made here is that because of the inherent nature of international and intercultural communication, not only intrinsic but extrinsic strategies are available to the speaker in an international and intercultural context.

The following are summary statements of the rhetoric of distance reduction:

1. The strategy of enhancing ethos is available for the reduction of personal distance under the category of interpersonal distance.

The importance of rapport building cannot be over-emphasized. This is particularly true in an international and intercultural communication situation where the speaker and his audience usually do not share a slightest degree of common bond such as the same nationality, language, or culture. The best way for the speaker to break down the initial barriers to fruitful interaction is to induce the audience to accept him as a man of worthiness and trustfulness. Rhetorical theorists of all ages have recognized the pervasive power of ethos in a rhetorical situation. Ethos enhancement on the part of the communicator, therefore, will take on added significance and meaning in an international
and intercultural communication situation where initial personal distance is thought to be greatest.

2. **The strategy of minimizing power discrepancy is available for the reduction of official distance under the category of interpersonal distance.**

It is often noted that the lack of power parity between the participants in a communication will create the sense of superiority on one party and that of inferiority and loss of face on the other. In international dealings where leaders of high rank, position, and power interact, even a slightest degree of power disparity will be detrimental to successful interaction. It is essential, therefore, for the international communicator to remove official distance by creating power equilibrium between himself and his audience.

3. **The strategy of depending maximally on the mass media, especially satellite-borne television, is available for the reduction of geographical distance under the category of international distance.**

This is an extrinsic strategy which is there for the speaker to utilize in order to supplement the full working of intrinsic strategies he has constructed in his speech. The instantaneous nature of satellite television coverage has served to shrink the geograph-
ical dimension of the world, thereby making it possible for the international and intercultural communicator to appeal to various kinds of audiences across national and cultural boundaries simultaneously. No rhetor will be fully successful in intercommunication without skillful deployment of the power of the mass media, namely television.

4. **The strategy of maximizing common grounds for agreement is available for the reduction of psychological distance under the category of international distance.**

This strategy expresses the similarities of values, beliefs, and attitudes held in common by the rhetorical participants, or it expresses the common dis-values shared by the speaker and the audience. It may be effective in opening up the psychologically closed minds of the receivers of messages.

5. **The strategy of establishing a universe of discourse through the use of significant symbols is available for the reduction of psychological distance under the category of international distance.**

It is generally believed that communication depends in part upon the meaning which the sender and the receiver hold in common for the symbols used. Although it seems probable that no sender and receiver
can ever hold exactly the same denotative and connotative meaning for any symbol, it is likely that unless the meaning held by the receiver has elements similar to those of the sender, the concept evoked will not be the one intended. This semantic distance can usually be kept at a minimum in an intranational and intracultural situation where the one and the same language is usually a medium of communication. It is, however, in the area of international and intercultural communication where the multiplicity of languages as a significant variable creates the greatest semantic distance that Mead's plea for the establishment of a universal discourse through appealing to the universality of meaning will take on added significance and relevance.

6. **The strategy of achieving identification is available for the reduction of psychological distance under the category of international distance.**

If we accept the Burkean concept of identification and his philosophical premises behind it, we are led to believe that the world is characterized by its divisiveness, and that leaders of the world as rhetors symbolically endeavor to reduce this inherent division which is the product of the multiplicity of culture, language, race, ideology, and social structure. The strategy of maximizing identification will afford the
rhetor solid bases for facilitating mutual understanding between the rhetorical participants and eventually removing or reducing the psychological barriers to communication.

7. The **strategy of creating communion** is available for the reduction of psychological distance under the category of international distance.

Intensified adherence to common values, in Perelman's theory of rhetoric, is the surest way to establishing communion with the audience particularly in an epidictic situation. The strategy of creating communion in ceremonial forms of oratory will assume greater relevance in international communication whose basic nature is occasional rather than argumentative.

8. Finally, the **strategy of relying maximally on the medium of translation (including interpreters)** is available for the reduction of psychological distance under the category of international distance.

This is another kind of extrinsic strategy of which the rhetor of international and intercultural communication is expected to make the best use. It is true that the use of translation and interpreter does not necessarily remove all the linguistic and semantic difficulties confronting the participants of different linguistic backgrounds. But channels such as these,
if skillfully employed, will constitute an effective reducer of the distance, both linguistic and semantic, thereby influencing the outcome of the rhetor's endeavor at intercommunication among nations and cultures.
CHAPTER V

FORMULATION OF A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR ANALYSIS

It will be recalled that Chapter Three has historically depicted the rhetorical situations in which President Richard Nixon and Premier Kakuei Tanaka as rhetors were supposed to fulfill the varied expectations of their audiences in order to remove the interpersonal and international distance lying between the rhetorical participants. The preceding chapter has examined the concept of distance as a dominant variable in international and intercultural communication and proposed the rudimentary framework of what I call a rhetoric of distance reduction in order to help a rhetorical critic of intercommunication to assess better the level of the speaker's rhetorical sophistication. I will here define the rhetorical sophistication of the international and intercultural speaker as the extent to which he is aware of and able to employ rhetorical strategies such as are postulated in the previous chapter. It is clear that the degree of distance reduction depends in a great measure upon the level of rhetorical
sophistication. To put it more succinctly, rhetorical sophistication operates as an independent variable, whereas the establishment of distance (whether expanding, retaining, or reducing it) is considered a dependent variable in an international and intercultural transaction of rhetoric.

What makes intercommunication among nations and cultures more complicated is the presence of the varied levels of expectations which the audiences, both international and national, hold toward the rhetor's mission and his overall purposes. It must be assumed that the establishment of distance is determined by the level of expectations held by the international and "home" audiences and by the extent of expectation fulfillment by the speaker through a certain level of his rhetorical sophistication. The level of expectation, in other words, will also constitute an independent variable.

This chapter is concerned with a theoretical formulation of models for analysis which I hope may be applied to criticism of rhetorical transactions across national and cultural boundaries. More specifically, I will first explore the nature and function of a model in general and a communication model in particular. Second, I will propose a model of the interaction be-
tween distance establishment as a dependent variable and expectation level and rhetorical sophistication as independent variables, a model that should generate prediction as to the possible outcome of the distance-centered rhetoric. Finally, I will construct a diagrammatical model of international and intercultural communication, the major components of which will then be defined and delineated.

Nature and Function of Model

Karl Deutsch broadly defined a model as "a structure of symbols and operating rules which is supposed to match a set of relevant points in an existing structure or process."¹ Irwin Bross echoed Deutsch's view, when he stated that a model represents a process of abstraction from the real world in which the major components are emphasized by eliminating unnecessary details.² Communicologist Mortensen shared the view of abstraction as an essential nature of a model, when he defined it as "a systematic representation of an


²Irwin D. J. Bross, Design for Decision (New York: Macmillan Company, 1953). Bross discussed in Chapter 10 the role played by models in scientific thinking.
object or event in idealized and abstract form. . . .
The act of abstraction eliminates certain details to
focus on essential features."

A structural and systematic abstraction of the
communication event, which is commonly referred to as
a communication model, should have several properties.
Franklin Knower contended that a good model of communi-
cation

first should be realistic. The model must
indicate all the generally important vari-
ables of the behavior for which it stands.
. . . Since a model should conform to the
skeleton of a reasonable theory of its ref-
erent, it should be systematic. It is well
to keep in mind that a model of this type
is open ended. As theory develops the
model should be revised to keep pace. It
should have practical significance in that
it should be applicable to various common
examples of its territory. It will be es-
pecially helpful if it can stimulate schol-
arship and research on its various charac-
teristics. And it should exemplify the
economy, and the dynamics characteristic
of the human behavior for which it stands.

What Knower postulated above indicates some of
the important functions a model is expected to assume.
The first is the systematizing, organizing function--

---

3C. David Mortensen, Communication: The Study
of Human Interaction (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Com-
pany, 1972), p. 29. [Italics in the original.]

4Franklin H. Knower, "A Model for a Communi-
the ability of a model to clarify by showing similarities and relationships between disjointed data how they fit into the general picture of the total spoken event. The second function is that of what Knower called stimulating scholarship and research in the field of communicology—the heuristic function of a model. As the common definition of the term "heuristic" indicates, a good model is expected to stimulate interest as a means of furthering investigation. It should provide a researcher with fresh, creative questions about and insights into communicative events. The more research ideas and original thoughts he can glean from a model, the better its heuristic value will be. Mortensen thought this heuristic value the most important of the functions of a model. Although Knower failed to mention this, one final function of a model should be added to those discussed above. A good model

---


7Mortensen, Communication, p. 31.
of communication should provide a researcher with clues that will help him to render precise prediction concerning behaviors of communication participants or possible outcomes of communicative events. To put it differently, it should perform the predictive function.

To summarize, a model in general or a communication model in particular should exercise several functions, among which are included the organizing, the heuristic, and the predictive. Whatever model I may formulate in this chapter is expected to fulfill some of the requirements discussed in the preceding paragraph.

**Concept of Expectation in Communication**

I will propose a model of the interaction among expectations of the audiences, both national and international, rhetorical sophistication of the international and intercultural communicator, and distance establishment. The foregoing chapter has discussed the nature of distance and rhetorical strategies of distance reduction open to the rhetor of intercommuni-

---

cation. The concept of expectation, however, still remains unexplored in this study. Before setting out to formulate a model of the interaction among these variables, therefore, I will first explore the concept of expectation as an important factor in communication.

Bruce Biddle defined expectation as "a cognition consisting of a belief (or subjective probability mapping) held by a person for an aspect of another."9 O. J. Harvey and William Clapp went much further, when they included the element of future orientation or future prediction in their definition of the term. Expectation, according to them, is "that which the organism has come to anticipate as the most probable occurrence from a class of possible events."10 Ralph Stogdill afforded a most perceptive insight into the nature of expectation. Describing expectation as a readiness for reinforcement, Stogdill regarded it as a

---


10 O. J. Harvey and William F. Clapp, "Hope, Expectancy, and Reactions to the Unexpected," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, II (July, 1965), 45. An almost identical definition was also proposed by M. Peter Scontrino, "The Effects of Fulfilling and Violating Group Members' Expectations about Leadership Style," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, VIII (August, 1972), 121.
function of (a) drive (or motivation and intention); (b) the estimated level of desirability of a possible outcome; and (c) the estimated probability of an outcome. The estimated desirability of an outcome, according to Stogdill, consists of a person's judgment related to the "satisfying of, need for, demand for, appropriateness of, or pleasantness or unpleasantness of, a possible outcome." He went on to state that the estimated probability of occurrence of an outcome consists of a person's "prediction, judgment, or guess relative to the likelihood that a given event will occur." Characterized by a future predictive orientation, the term "expectation," in sum, denotes one's belief about what will occur in the future.

Why should the concept of expectation be considered an important variable in human interaction and, above all, in human communication? The crux of the whole matter lies in the contention that, as Gordon Allport put it tersely, "What people expect determines their behavior." This view of expectation as a per-


The . . . important factor in influencing men's choice of action is the set of pictures they have in their minds about the probable shape of the future. The response a person gives to communications designed to bring about a particular line of behavior will depend very largely on his expectations regarding the trend of events. He may be unaware of the influence which these expectations have upon his present actions or attitudes, but they nevertheless play a leading role in shaping his decisions.\footnote{Frederick S. Dunn, War and the Kinds of Men (New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Brothers, 1950), pp. 42-43.}

Some scholars of speech communication recognize the importance of expectation in communication. On the basis of his conviction that "the concept of expectations is crucial to human communication," David Berlo offered an extended discussion of the structure of expectations held by both the source and the receiver toward each other. Berlo contended that communication behaviors are affected by the expectations which the participants in a communicative act hold toward each other. He went on to explain the expectation of the audience toward the speaker:

\ldots Receivers have expectations about sources. When we observe the President, we expect him to behave in certain ways and not in others--because he is the President. \ldots
Communication receivers select and attend to messages in part because of their images as to the kind of message these sources would produce.\textsuperscript{14}

It may be assumed that the confirmation or fulfillment of expectations is one of the central motivating forces in human behavior. The successful fulfillment of the audience's expectations on the part of the speaker through his use of various rhetorical strategies will eventually make the receivers more susceptible to the course of action or attitude recommended by the communicator. The confirmation of expectations is to be assumed to result in a state of pleasantness on the part of the receivers, which, in turn, facilitates their speedy acceptance of the speaker's message. The disconfirmation of expectations, on the other hand, probably results in a state of unpleasantness, which prompts them to reject the speaker's recommendation obstinately.

Since international and intercultural communication usually takes place in a dramatic context, as in the cases of Nixon's and Tanaka's visits to China, it is rife with various kinds and degrees of expectations.

held by the international and national audiences toward the speaker's mission. Thus, expectation fulfillment by the international rhetor through the high degree of his rhetorical sophistication assumes added importance and relevance in rhetorical transactions of intercommunication among nations and cultures.

**Model of Distance-Centered Rhetoric**

(or Interaction Model)

Having thus placed the concept of expectation in a communicative perspective, I will now proceed to formulate a model of the interaction among expectation, rhetorical sophistication, and distance establishment. This model should perform two of the three functions I have discussed above: the predictive and the heuristic functions. (1) It should enable a critic of international and intercultural communication to make approximate prediction as to the outcome of the distance-centered rhetoric (whether expanding distance, retaining it, or reducing it). (2) It should enable him to determine which instances of interaction should be selected

---

for further study in order to enrich and refine the rhetoric of distance reduction in particular.

In writing this section of the current chapter, I will follow the procedures outlined below. First, I will isolate and identify two factors as independent variables in the distance-centered rhetoric, namely, the level of the audience's expectation and the level of the speaker's rhetorical sophistication. I will further specify that because of the unique nature of international and intercultural communication, I have to take into account two aspects of the audience: the international audience which the international speaker directly faces and the national or "home" audience whose expectation is also assumed to condition the speaker's rhetorical choices.

Second, I will attempt to combine each of these variables with all the others to determine whether the variations in combination will produce different outcomes in terms of distance establishment in actual interactions between the expectation level and the rhetorical sophistication level. Since I view each variable as having two levels (high and low), I will work with four possible combinations for the interaction between expectation of the international audience and rhetorical sophistication of the speaker and another
four combinations for the interaction between expectation of the national audience and rhetorical sophistication of the speaker. I will, in other words, come up with a grid of sixteen possible combinations of variables. This grid will be presented later in tabular form.

Finally, given these sixteen possible combinations of interactions between the variables of expectation and of rhetorical sophistication, I will make some generalizations concerning the possible outcomes of the distance-centered rhetoric in international and intercultural communication.

The Independent Variables

1. Expectation level of the international audience. In international and intercultural communication the immediate audience is usually made up of the international or foreign audience the speaker directly faces. The Chinese audiences President Nixon and Premier Tanaka addressed respectively fall into this category. As Chapter Three has shown, the expectations of the Chinese leaders and people held toward the missions of these foreign guests were conditioned by the national and international climates, the historical backgrounds, the geographical, cultural, political, ideological, and psychological circumstances. I conceive of this vari-
able as having two levels: high level and low level of expectations held by the international audience toward the rhetor’s mission. The level of this variable will be determined by a critic of intercommunication by analyzing the historical context of a communicative event.

2. **Expectation level of the national (or "home") audience.** The rhetor of international and intercultural communication may sometimes find it necessary to pay more attention to the needs and expectations of his "home" audience than to those of his immediate, international audience. This is particularly true when he intends to make use of the intercommunication opportunity as a means of enhancing his own image in the minds of his own countrymen. The point to be made is that the existence of this variable will eventually condition the way the international and intercultural speaker makes rhetorical choices, when he faces his international audience. Again, I conceive of this variable as having two levels: high and low. The level of this expectation will also be ascertained by a critic of intercommunication.

3. **Rhetorical sophistication of the international and intercultural communicator.** By "rhetorical sophistication" is meant the extent to which the international and intercultural communicator is aware of and
able to employ such rhetorical strategies as are expounded in the previous chapter in order to fulfill the varied expectations of the audiences, both immediate and removed, and eventually to reduce the various kinds of distance lying between himself and the receivers of his message. This variable, too, I view as being two-dimensional: high level and low level of rhetorical sophistication exhibited by the international and intercultural communicator. A critic is expected to determine the level of the speaker's rhetorical sophistication by assessing his rhetorical strategies deployed to fulfill the expectations of both the international and the national audiences.

The Dependent Variable

As a result of manipulating the independent variables discussed above, the speaker will ultimately expand, retain, or else reduce the interpersonal and international distance lying between himself and his international audience. I have limited the scope of this study by focusing solely on the distance between the speaker and his international audience and by excluding from my consideration that lying between the rhetor and his national audience.

Although my main concern here is with the re-
duction of distance, the establishment of an appropriate distance in the form of expansion, retention, or reduction should be taken as the dependent variable in this model of interaction. So far as the variables of expansion and reduction are concerned, I conceive of them as two-dimensional: high level and low level of distance expansion and high level and low level of distance reduction. Distance retention, on the other hand, should be viewed as being one-dimensional. It does not make much difference whether one looks at it as being high or low.

Figure 7 presents the sixteen possible combinations of variables, theoretically representing all interactions among the independent variables. Each cell is numbered and the terms such as "expansion," "retention," and "reduction" in each cell refer to the probable and predicted outcomes of interactions of the distance-oriented rhetoric.

The Prediction of the Outcomes

**Type 1.** When the expectation levels of both the international and national audiences are high and when the speaker is responsive to these different kinds of expectations with the high level of rhetorical sophistication, he will be in the best position to reduce
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expectation Level of International Audience</th>
<th>Rhetorical Sophistication Level of Rhetor</th>
<th>HIGH</th>
<th>HIGH</th>
<th>LOW</th>
<th>LOW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7—Grid of the Sixteen Possible Combinations of Variables
maximally the distance lying between himself and the immediate audience. This should be considered the most ideal type of interaction in the rhetoric of distance reduction.

**Type 2.** The international communicator who rhetorically endeavors to fulfill the high expectation level of his home audience with total disregard to the comparable expectation level of his foreign audience is predicted to alienate the immediate receivers he is directly addressing, thereby most probably expanding the existing distance to a great degree instead of reducing it. In this type of interaction his whole rhetorical endeavor is doomed to failure primarily due to his miscalculation of how important it is to fulfill the expectations of the international audience in intercommunication among nations and cultures.

**Type 3.** When the international audience is low in expectation and the national audience is high in expectation, the rhetor who tries to be responsive to both expectation levels at the same time with the high level of rhetorical sophistication will find himself in a position to reduce, to some extent, the existing distance between himself and his foreign audience. The serious problem with this interaction, however, is that since the immediate audience, after all,
does not expect much from the speaker, the latter will neither be in a position to expect much in return in terms of distance reduction. The immediate listeners from the outset do not care whether the speaker is going to fulfill their expectations or his home audience's. This negative attitude on the part of the international audience may keep the speaker from achieving the high level of distance reduction.

**Type 4.** This type is irrelevant in the rhetoric of distance reduction. Although the pattern of interaction under discussion takes the form of international and intercultural communication, the virtual absence of meaningful interaction on the part of both the speaker and the international audience will make the whole transaction look like an intranational and intracultural interaction where the rhetor exhibits the high level of rhetorical sophistication for the purpose of satisfying his own national audience. The most that the speaker can do in this context will be to retain the existing distance between himself and his immediate, international audience.

**Type 5.** With the low rhetorical sophistication level, the speaker in this interaction might probably alienate his home audience whose expectation is high. However, since the immediate, international receivers
are fully aware that the speaker is rhetorically trying his best to satisfy them even at the expense of disregarding the interests and expectations of his own countrymen, this posture of the speaker will undoubtedly aid him in achieving the high level of distance reduction in his international and intercultural communication.

**Type 6.** This type is a good example of interaction that will result in the maximum degree of distance expansion. It should be judged as a failure from the perspective of the rhetoric of distance reduction. This failure is probably due to the speaker's inability to make an accurate analysis of the audiences, both international and national, or to his incompetence in achieving rhetorical sophistication sufficient enough to satisfy the high expectation level of both audiences.

**Type 7.** One noticeable characteristic of this type of interaction is incongruity on the part of the speaker in his rhetorical strategy: the low level of rhetorical sophistication in response to the high level of expectation of the home audience and the high level of rhetorical sophistication in response to the low level of expectation of the international audience. In addition to this inconsistency, the obvious lack of expectation held by the foreign audience toward the
speaker's mission will contribute to nothing but the maintenance of the status quo, that is, retention of the existing distance.

**Type 8.** In this type of interaction, the speaker fails to respond either to the demands and expectations of the international audience or to those of his home audience. This shows that he lacks in communicative ability to handle properly rhetorical situations in which he finds himself. The speaker's lack of rhetorical sophistication that would otherwise meet the unique demands of the varied audiences will inevitably result in retaining the existing distance between himself and the international audience.

**Type 9.** So far as the speaker is endeavoring to meet the high expectation level of the international audience with the high degree of rhetorical sophistication, he is predicted to stay on the right track in his efforts to reduce distance. The problem with this pattern of interaction, however, is that his unnecessary endeavor to satisfy the low expectation level of his home audience with the high degree of rhetorical sophistication might probably offset, to some extent, the favorable outcome he could otherwise obtain in terms of distance reduction. The end result of this rhetorical interaction, therefore, will be the mild degree of dis-
tance reduction.

**Type 10.** This is another example of rhetorical incongruity on the part of the speaker. Instead of trying to meet the needs and expectations of his international audience, he appeals to the low expectation of his countrymen with the unduly high level of rhetorical sophistication. The result of his rhetorical effort in international and intercultural communication will be the maximum expansion of the existing distance lying between himself and his immediate, foreign audience.

**Type 11.** The rhetor is capable of creating the high level of rhetorical sophistication, but the problem remains that neither the international nor national audience expects much from the speaker. By reacting positively to the basically low level of expectation of his international audience, the speaker could possibly accomplish distance reduction. The obvious lack, however, of the high expectation level particularly on the part of the international audience is predicted to weaken whatever favorable outcome he might otherwise obtain.

**Type 12.** In this type of interaction the speaker is basically capable of producing the high degree of rhetorical sophistication, since he exhibits the high degree of rhetorical sophistication in re-
response to the expectation of his home audience. However, the absence of meaningful interaction between the speaker and his international audience is expected to contribute little either to the reduction or to the expansion of distance. The probable outcome of this type of interaction will be the maintenance of the status quo: retention of the distance between the speaker and his immediate, international audience.

**Type 13.** This type is similar to **Type 12**, except that this time the meaningful interaction is missing between the speaker and his home audience. All that the speaker is expected to do in this type of interaction is to try his best to fulfill the high expectation level of his international audience with the high degree of rhetorical sophistication without worrying about the existence of his home audience. The probable outcome out of this rhetorical interaction is predicted to be the high degree of distance reduction.

**Type 14.** The speaker low in rhetorical sophistication in facing up with both international and national audiences will not be in a position to produce a drastic change in the outcome of the interaction. Although the immediate, international audience holds the high expectation level toward the speaker, the latter's inability to employ suitable rhetorical strate-
gies will be primarily responsible for retaining the existing distance between himself and his international audience.

**Type 15.** The low degree of distance reduction may be expected out of this type of interaction. The virtual absence of the necessity for the meaningful interaction between the speaker and his removed, home audience will permit the speaker to pay attention only to the needs and expectations of his international audience with the high level of rhetorical sophistication. The fact that the international audience is low in expectation is predicted to depreciate somewhat whatever favorable outcome he could possibly produce in this pattern of interaction.

**Type 16.** This is the most irrelevant type of interaction in international and intercultural communication. The lack of expectation on the part of the national and international audiences and the apparent absence of initiative on the part of the speaker to appeal rhetorically to the expectations, however low, of the receivers of his message—these two factors will be detrimental to the accomplishment of any fruitful outcome out of this type of interaction. Little change in the status quo, that is, retention of distance, will result from this type.
To summarize, if viewed from the perspective of the rhetoric of distance reduction, this model of interaction predicts that the interactions for cells 1, 3, 5, 9, 11, 13, and 15 will most likely accomplish rhetorical success, and that the interactions for cells 2, 6, and 10 will probably result in rhetorical failure. It also predicts that the interactions for cells 4, 7, 8, 12, 14, and 16 will presumably produce little change in the existing distance lying between the rhetor and his international audience, thereby being far short of accomplishing the rhetorical purpose of reducing distance.

Before concluding this section of the present chapter, I must add one final word. Needless to say, this model does not intend to be comprehensive nor inclusive. Nor does it profess to be based on a sufficient number of actual case studies. What I have endeavored to accomplish is to present a rudimentary model of interaction among several key variables so that a critic of international and intercultural communication may predict rather accurately the probable outcomes of a dozen or so rhetorical transactions. It is to be hoped that future critics of intercommunication will modify and revise this proposed model when they have conducted numerous case studies on criticism
of international and intercultural communication. My model should be taken as having achieved its purpose if it has adequately performed the heuristic and predictive functions, however naive they may be at this elementary stage of the formulation of a model.

Diagammaitical Model for Analysis of International and Intercultural Communication

My final task in this chapter will be to set out to construct another rudimentary model, this time diagrammatical in kind, that I hope will be applied to an analysis and criticism of international and intercultural rhetorical transactions. Being based on the theoretical discussions of the dimension of distance, of distance-reducing strategies, of the concept of expectation, and of the interaction of key variables as treated in the preceding and current chapters, this proposed model should, of necessity, be eclectic, pluralistic, and interdisciplinary in nature in that it must be constructed upon pertinent components drawn from various fields of study. This diagrammatical model should also show interrelatedness of the key components at a glance with the dimension of distance playing a central role. In other words, this model should perform the systematizing, organizing function I have mentioned at the outset of this chapter.
In addition to the organizing function, this diagrammatical model for analysis is expected to serve the heuristic function in that it should enable a critic of international and intercultural communication to decide which components are dominantly operating and worth focusing on in his critical act. It should provide him with a new and fresh perspective from which he might profitably look at intercommunication for analysis and assessment.

It has been the major contention of my study that the international and intercultural interaction and dynamics demand a primary focus on the concept of distance, both international and interpersonal. This model, therefore, should place the distance dimension as a central component. Around this key element will be clustered other important components under such subheadings as rhetorical participants, communication channels, rhetorical strategies, behavior output, and international and intercultural settings. Here are summary statements of important components in international and intercultural communication as are depicted in Figure 8.

**Distance**

This study has contended that the distance di-
RHETORICAL STRATEGIES
Enhancing Ethos
Minimizing Power Disparity
Maximizing Common Grounds
Establishing a Universe of Discourse through Significant Symbols
Creating Identification
Establishing Communion

Figure 8.—Diagrammatical Model of International and Intercultural Communication
mension is the single most important route to an understanding of international and intercultural communication. I have specified that the distance concept is divided into two major categories: the interpersonal and international distance. The interpersonal distance is further subdivided into the personal and the official distance. The international distance is classified into the geographical and the psychological distance, the latter being used as a superordinate phrase to include such subordinate terms as social, cultural, ideological, linguistic, or racial distance.

The task of a critic of international and intercultural communication, then, is to identify the kind and extent of the distance which the rhetor faced, when he set out to wage a rhetorical campaign. More specifically, he is advised to examine the level of personal intimacy and trust and the degree of similarity and difference in ideas, beliefs, and sentiments between the participants in a rhetorical act. He should be aware that one person's distance from the other is the extent to which the two fail to share a common life of attitudes, manners, and philosophy. It is also essential for a critic to look into the status and power disparity that may constitute important sources of the official distance between the communi-
Rhetorical Participants

A critic may profitably look at rhetorical
participants from the angles of the rhetor, the international audience, the national audience, and the interpreter.

1. **Rhetor.** The most important of all the rhetorical participants is the rhetor, the principal actor in a rhetorical act. A critic is advised to examine several crucial factors. He should, first of all, inquire into how the rhetor perceived the image of the international audience and that of himself as perceived by that audience. Second, he should determine the level of expectation held by the international audience toward the rhetor's mission. Third, he should analyze how the speaker perceived the dimension of distance separating himself from his international receivers of his message. Furthermore, a critic should ascertain how the rhetor's perception of these international and intercultural factors influenced the way he actually employed several available rhetorical strategies in order to fulfill his international audience's expectations and eventually to reduce various kinds of distance. In other words, he should determine the level of the speaker's rhetorical sophistication in response to the expectations of his international audience.

A critic's jobs do not end with all this. He is expected to go much further. This time he should
examine how the rhetor perceived the image and the expectations of the national audience and to what extent he endeavored to appeal rhetorically to these intranational and intracultural variables without creating any undesirable side-effects upon his immediate, international audience. In other words, a critic of intercommunication should also assess the level of the speaker's rhetorical sophistication in response to the expectations of his national audience.

2. International (Immediate) Audience. This is the immediate audience the rhetor directly addresses. Two important variables deserve to be scrutinized by a critic: how the international audience conceived of the speaker both in his individual capacity and in his official capacity as a representative of another nation or culture, and what level of expectations they held toward his mission. An examination of these variables is crucial in that they usually condition the way the rhetor makes his rhetorical choice.

3. National ("Home") Audience. Because of the special nature of international and intercultural communication, a critic should pay attention not only to the international (immediate) audience but also to the national (removed or "home") audience as an indispensable component. If a rhetor from Country (or Culture)
A is to address an international audience in Country (or Culture) B, the speaker's national audience back home may be hooked up by international television satellite. Due to this technological development, the speaker's task now is to satisfy rhetorically two kinds of the receivers at the same time without creating any undesirable side-effects on either of them. The advent of instantaneous communication system has thus expanded the function of the international and intercultural communicator.

Since the national receivers of messages, too, hold their own hopes and aspirations toward the rhetor, a critic is advised to look into the image of and the expectation toward the rhetor in order to ascertain the degree to which he was rhetorically responsive to these national attitudes of his countrymen.

4. Interpreter as a Rhetorical Participant. International and intercultural communication inevitably entails the problem of multiplicity of languages. Here arises the need of the rhetor to depend on an interpreter. Due to the complexity and sensitivity of international relations, a translator has assumed greater importance and sometimes plays as leading a role as the rhetor he is assigned to serve. It is appropriate, therefore, to deal with him as one of the
rhetorical participants under discussion.

It is apparently incorrect to say that two peoples who have no common language are absolutely unable to share their experiences or to communicate their ideas in any way. It is correct to say that such sharing or communication would, of necessity, be very limited and very imperfect. The use of an expert interpreter is expected to remove, or at least reduce, that limitation and imperfection. Naturally, the employment of a translator does not solve instantly all the problems of noncommunication and miscommunication arising from the language difference between participants of international and intercultural communication. Stanley Rundle aptly pointed out the personal, cultural or linguistic, and political aspects of the translation problem in the following words:

... in some cases it is likely that errors have been due to lack of knowledge or care on the part of the translator. Very often the truth is that an exact rendering is in any case impossible. More often than not, these difficulties and shortcomings have been deliberately made use of by certain people for the purpose of creating certain definite impressions [as in the case of political propaganda].

---

Since the duty of a translator as a rhetorical participant, first and foremost, is to render faithfully the meaning of the message entrusted to him by the rhetor, a critic of international and intercultural communication is well advised to ascertain whether he performed this primary duty. The critic should assess the linguistic competence level of the interpreter under discussion and carefully examine whether he might not have any hidden purpose other than that of rendering accurately the message of one language into another.

Particularly important to a critic at this juncture is the fact that an interpreter of international and intercultural communication is often entrusted with a task of enhancing the image or ethos of the rhetor he is assigned to assist. How did the translator endeavor to enhance the image of the principal actor during his activity of translation? How did he vary in the decisions he made while translating rhetorical discourses? These questions should interest a rhetorical critic when he engages in criticism of international and intercultural communication.

Communicative Channels

A critic of international and intercultural communication will profitably look at the strategy of
maximum use of television, particularly satellite television hookup, employed by the rhetor to transmit his message across national, cultural, and geographical boundaries to his intended audience, both immediate and removed. He might also be interested in asking the following questions: how did the use of the mass media, especially television, influence the image the rhetor tried to project and how did the image-enhancing strategy through television help the rhetor to achieve the distance-reducing function of his communication?

It would suffice to point out here that an interpreter has double functions to perform: that of serving as a rhetorical participant, which I have already discussed, and that of serving as a communication channel. The process of translation is a channel by which noncommunication or miscommunication can be minimized, if not totally removed.

Rhetorical Strategies

I have suggested possible formal strategies that are open to the rhetor engaged in fulfilling the audience expectations for the purpose of reducing several kinds of distance in an international and intercultural context. They include: enhancing ethos, minimizing power disparity, maximizing common grounds,
establishing a universe of discourse through the use of significant symbols, achieving identification, and creating communion. Using as a guideline the list of rhetorical strategies for distance reduction as suggested in Chapter Four, a critic of international and intercultural communication is advised to examine the rhetorical sophistication level of the speaker, that is, the extent to which he was cognizant of and able to employ these possible strategies for the purpose of reducing the distance lying between himself and the international receivers of his message.

**Behavior Output**

Communication is an on-going, dynamic, and not static, phenomenon. It is basically circular in nature with no clear-cut beginning or ending. The speaker's rhetorical endeavor usually elicits some kind of response, or what I call behavior output, of the receivers of his message, both national and international. This behavior output then serves as a modifier of the subsequent messages of the rhetor. Any kind of action produced by the audience as a result of the speaker's communication should be considered behavior output in this context. If Fotheringham's classification of action is to be used, "adoption," "continuance," "deter-
rence," and "discontinuance" of action on the part of the receivers will be among possible behavior outputs. 17 A critic is required to assess the audience's latitude of acceptance or rejection of the rhetor's communicative effort to reduce the existing distance. He might also profitably assess the similarities and differences in behavior output between the national and international audiences.

International and Intercultural Settings

One obvious, yet important, fact about the communication with which I have been concerned is that this communicative transaction takes place in unique international and intercultural settings. This means that the rhetor and his "home" audience are inevitably conditioned by their own cultural and national idiosyncrasies, and that the same is true of the international audience. If rhetoric is culture-bound, as Robert Oliver asserted, then, how the rhetor and his national audience conceive of rhetoric and communication might be entirely different from how the international audi-

ence conceives of them. This difference in perception concerning speech communication might eventually influence the kind of outcome the speaker of one culture or country will produce upon the audience of another culture or country.

The challenging questions to be raised by a critic of intercommunication, therefore, include: how did the cultural and national factors influence the way the rhetor actually selected certain kinds of rhetorical strategies for the purpose of reducing the existing distance and how did they affect the way the international audience actually accepted the rhetor of another culture or country and his rhetorical messages? A critic, in other words, should account for the outcome of the rhetoric of distance reduction from the angle of cultural idiosyncrasies of both the rhetor and his audiences.

This diagrammatical model for analysis of international and intercultural communication, although still rudimentary in scope, will hopefully serve to provide one methodological perspective from which an

---

obviously complicated international and intercultural rhetorical transaction may be viewed with some degree of clarity and insight.

Chapter Five has been primarily concerned with the formulation of a theoretical model for analysis and criticism of international and intercultural communication. This concludes my theoretical exploration of one possible alternative frame of reference to criticism of intercommunication—a modest methodological proposal of the rhetoric of distance reduction.

The next two chapters are designed to demonstrate the actual application of my proposed methodology to two unique rhetorical situations of international and intercultural dimension.
CHAPTER VI

APPLICATION OF AN ANALYTICAL MODEL TO PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S RHETORICAL DISCOURSES IN CHINA

This dissertation is divided largely into three major parts. The first two parts are primarily concerned with the preliminary and theoretical aspects of criticism of international and intercultural communication: a methodological examination of critical approaches to analysis of intercommunication and a theoretical formulation of analytical models as an alternative frame of reference. The last part, which comprises Chapters Six and Seven, deals with the applicative aspect: the proposed models for analysis will be applied to actual rhetorical discourses of international and intercultural dimension in order to assess their rhetorical merit in terms of distance reduction.

As I have already stated in Chapter Three, the historic trip made by President Richard Nixon in February, 1972 created a unique rhetorical situation in which Nixon as a rhetor was supposed to fulfill the
varied expectations of his audiences, both international and national, for the purpose of reducing the interpersonal and international distance lying between himself and the receivers of his message. Using the distance-centered perspective to international and intercultural communication as proposed in the theoretical part of this study, I will throw into relief in the current chapter the whole rhetorical transaction in which Nixon responded to the demands of the situation by producing several rhetorical discourses for the purpose of reducing distance.

It should be noted here that I have employed the term "discourse" in the preceding sentence instead of the more familiar word like "speech." Donald Bryant, for instance, regarded the characteristics of being both oral and written as inherent in "discourse," when he proposed in 1953 his now famous definition of rhetoric as "the rationale of informative and suasive discourse."1 Two decades later, while reaffirming the validity of this definition, Bryant paraphrased the

term "discourse" into "the web of words." Karl Wallace went much further, when he viewed discourse as "the unit of meaningful utterance." He went on to elaborate:

... a discourse is manifestly made up of units of meaning, variously and ambiguously referred to as sentences, clauses, statements, assertions, or predictions. Each unit carries its particular meaning and simultaneously reflects and influences the meaning of neighboring units.

The term "speech" carries a connotation of orality and constitutes one aspect of "meaningful utterance." It may, therefore, be classified as one kind of "discourse." After defining discourse as "the full text (when feasible) of an oral and written situation," James L. Kinneavy listed as possible other kinds of discourse "a poem, a conversation, a tragedy, a joke, a seminar discussion, a full-length history, a periodical article, an interview, a sermon, a TV ad."

It is precisely this broad meaning of the term

---

2Donald C. Bryant, Rhetorical Dimensions in Criticism (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), p. 15.


"discourse" that I had in mind when I set out to analyze Nixon's rhetorical products. Since I view Nixon's endeavors to reduce distance not as a one-shot effort but as a series of efforts, that is, a campaign, I will include in rhetorical discourses formal banquet speeches, statements, informal remarks and conversations with reporters, and written documents such as the joint communique.  

For the past two hundred years relations between China and America had been characterized by the alternation between periods of friendship and those of disenchantment or hostility. The last two decades had invariably witnessed hostility and isolation primarily due to the American foreign policy of "containment" against the People's Republic of China. Since there had been virtually no contact between Nixon and Chinese leaders both in private and official capacities, the interpersonal distance had been as great as it could possibly be. Furthermore, no geographer was needed to remind Nixon that China and the United States are separated by the physical or geographical distance. The two nations, in addition, are significantly differ-

---

5 The full texts of Richard Nixon's rhetorical discourses made during his trip to the People's Republic of China are reprinted in Appendix A.
ent in social system, ideology, world outlook, and culture. The lack of virtual contact and communication fostered by the geographical fact, the political reality, and the difference in culture, ideology, language, and way of thinking had been responsible for the creation of the feeling of psychological vacuum in the minds of both nations. International distance in the dimensions of geography and of psychology had thus been great between the two countries. With these complicated backgrounds behind him, President Richard Nixon arrived in Peking on February 21, 1972 to reduce the various kinds of distance created by two decades of containment and hostility and to start a new relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America.

The main purpose of this chapter will be to assess the rhetorical effect of President Nixon's campaign of reducing the existing distance lying between himself and the receivers of his message. More specifically, I will, first, inquire into Nixon's distance perception, or how Nixon as a rhetor perceived the distance, both interpersonal and international. I will then examine his rhetorical discourses from the perspective of distance-reducing strategies I have elaborated in Chapter Four for the purpose of ascertaining
his rhetorical sophistication level. My concern will be with how his distance perception influenced the way he actually made rhetorical choices of strategies. Next, once I have assessed his rhetorical sophistication level and the expectation level of both the international and national audiences, I will then be in a position to refer to the prediction grid as postulated in the preceding chapter for an approximate assessment of the possible outcome of Nixon's rhetorical efforts to reduce distance. Finally, I will conclude this chapter by discussing implications of this criticism from the standpoint of national and cultural idiosyncrasies of both the rhetor and the receivers of his message.

**Nixon's Distance Perception**

Here was the President flying half way around the world to sit down with the leaders who had been avowed enemies for a long time. Nixon was keenly aware of the geographical distance that divides the People's Republic of China and the United States of America. Just before he left Washington for Peking, Nixon acknowledged in his remarks at the White House departure ceremony that America and China are "separated by a
vast ocean. During his stay in China, Nixon consciously made several references to the actual geographical distance. At the informal press conference on the top of the Great Wall, the President remarked: "... we have come a long way to be here today, 16,000 miles. ... as I look at the Wall, it is worth coming 16,000 miles just to stand here and see the Wall" (Remarks at the Wall, par. 6). 7 When he visited the famous tombs of the Ming Emperors, Nixon again referred to this geographical fact: "As I said earlier, it is worth coming that far to see this, too" (Remarks at the Tombs, par. 3). On the eve of his departure for Washington, Nixon once again had this geographical reality in mind when he stated: "... what we have said in that communique is not nearly as important as what we will do in the years ahead to build a bridge

---

6 "Nixon's Remarks at White House Departure Ceremony, February 17, 1972," Department of State Bulletin, March 20, 1972, p. 419. This source will hereafter be cited as "Speech at Departure Ceremony" in the text of this chapter.

7 "Remarks at the Wall, par. 6" is an abbreviated form of citing a particular passage which appears in the sixth paragraph of Nixon's "Informal Remarks at the Great Wall." The full texts of his discourses made in China are reprinted in Appendix A. This form of citation will hereafter be used in the text of this chapter.
across 16,000 miles . . . [that has] divided us in the past" (Shanghai Banquet, par. 5). And on his return home Nixon twice reminded the American people of the geographical distance of, this time, "almost 12,000 miles."

It must be noted at the same time that Nixon was fully aware of the impossibility of reducing geographical distance literally or physically, as was implied by his assertion that "we cannot close the gulf between us" (First Banquet, par. 4). Why, then, did Nixon repeatedly cite the geographical distance which was obviously unreduceable in a physical sense? He seemed to have one clear purpose in mind. Throughout his entire trip the President wanted to remind his audiences, both international and national, of the stern reality that, just as the geographical distance sepa-
rated the People's Republic of China and the United States of America, many insurmountable differences lay between the two countries, thereby constituting main sources of international (primarily psychological) and interpersonal distance.

From the very beginning of his trip Nixon thoroughly recognized the existence of the interpersonal distance, both personal and official, lying between himself and the Chinese officials basically due to non-contact, non-communication, and consequently non-acquaintance. He stated at the departure ceremony that he was "under no illusion" that "20 years of hostility" between the two nations could immediately be removed by this visit alone (Speech at Departure Ceremony, p. 419). He echoed the same tone again and again. He reminded his audience of the significant facts that "communication has been cut for the last 20 years" (Remarks at the Tombs, par. 7), that China and America had "so many years without contact" (Communique, par. 5), and that a gulf of "22 years of hostility" (Shanghai Banquet, par. 5) and of "22 years of non-communication" (Speech at Arrival Ceremony, p. 434) separated the two countries. Nixon, therefore, candidly confessed to his ignorance of Asia in general and of China in particular: "... we have not known Asia well enough. And when you speak
of Asia, the great country of China is a country we have not known long enough" (Remarks at the Tombs, par. 7).

Not only the interpersonal distance and the geographical distance, but also the psychological aspect of international distance occupied the attention of President Nixon. He knew that many differences lay between the two nations. Before he left for China, he seemed restrained, as he cautioned against over-expectation toward his historic mission: "... we must recognize that the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States have had great differences. We will have differences in the future" (Speech at Departure Ceremony, p. 419).

At the formal banquet held in his honor on the day of his arrival in Peking, Nixon reiterated the same position in almost identical words: "In the spirit of frankness which I hope will characterize our talks this week, let us recognize at the outset these points: We have at times in the past been enemies. We have great differences today" (First Banquet, par. 4).

The same tone of reservation, which must have been prompted by Nixon's accurate perception of distance, was evident in his subsequent rhetorical discourses. At one occasion he used the word "wall" metaphorically to signify the differences:
The Great Wall is no longer a wall dividing China from the rest of the world, but it is a reminder of the fact that there are many walls still existing in the world which divide nations and peoples.

The Great Wall is also a reminder that for almost a generation there has been a wall between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America (Second Banquet, pars. 6-7).

Furthermore, the joint communique specifically pointed out the existence of essential differences lying between the two countries (Communique, par. 9). Nixon himself admitted: "This communique was unique in honestly setting forth differences rather than trying to cover them up with diplomatic doubletalk" (Speech at Arrival Ceremony, p. 435).

In what areas did Nixon find greatest differences between the two nations? He believed that they lay in the spheres of "social systems and foreign policies" (Communique, par. 9), "ideology or philosophy" (Remarks at the Wall, par. 5), and "system of government" (Speech at Arrival Ceremony, p. 435). Having in mind the ideological distance derived from the differences in "system of government," Nixon continued: "And one fact stands out, among many others, from my talks with the Chinese leaders. It is their total belief, their total dedication, to their system of government. That is their right, just as it is the right of any
country to choose the kind of government it wants" (Speech at Arrival Ceremony, p. 435). Nixon succinctly described this polarizing, unreconcilable difference in ideology in the following words: "You believe deeply in your system and we believe just as deeply in our system" (Second Banquet, par. 9).

What were Nixon's motives for arraying these apparently negative, and at times polarizing, statements which implied the existence of interpersonal and international distance? First, he clearly had in mind his national audience of the American people whom he wanted to warn against the over-expectation some of them held toward this historic mission. A series of the negative statements, in other words, was designed to make his home audience mentally prepared for possibly limited results, or in Nixon's own phrase, no "magic formula" (Speech at Arrival Ceremony, p. 434). Second, and this is more important, Nixon was eager to let his international audience of the Chinese officials know how accurately he perceived the insurmountable differences lying between the two countries. By so doing, he sought to enhance his credibility as a knowledgeable and realistic man. Finally, against the background of this reality of difference, Nixon was ready to commence his crucial task of reducing the interpersonal and interna-
tional distance by employing all the available rhetorical strategies open to him during his visit to the People's Republic of China. When he arrived in Peking on February 21, 1972, he immediately started "the long process of removing that wall" between the two nations (Second Banquet, par. 8).

To summarize, President Nixon was under no illusion that the road ahead would be an easy one. No Sinologist was necessary to remind him that China and America were separated by an almost unbridgeable gulf of geography, history, ideology, philosophy, and culture. He was fully aware that because of the immense magnitude of the existing interpersonal and international distance, his trip alone could not completely heal two decades of mutual enmity and suspicion. He was expected to respond rhetorically to this complicated situation characterized by the existence of various kinds of distance and of the divergent levels of expectations held by the international and national audiences toward his mission. The next section of this chapter will examine rhetorical strategies Nixon utilized in order to respond to the audience hopes and expectations for the ultimate purpose of reducing the existing distance. This examination will reveal the level of Nixon's over-all rhetorical sophistication in response to the
demanding situation in which he found himself.

**Nixon's Rhetorical Strategies**

In face of this difficult situation, Nixon as a rhetor utilized all the available rhetorical strategies open to him. First of all, against the background of the stern reality of difference, he was ready to commence his important task of reducing psychological distance by employing the rhetorical strategy of maximizing common grounds for agreement rather than merely magnifying difference.

Nixon's real motive for emphasizing in his discourses several instances of difference between the two nations lay in his calculated effort to use the common realization of this difference on the part of the two sides as the agreed-upon starting point for seeking to achieve broader agreement. Throughout the trip Nixon's major strategy, therefore, included playing down the obvious distance in geography, culture, social and political systems, ideology, and philosophy that was impossible to reduce, much less to remove, and, instead, emphasizing whatever common grounds both sides could accept as bases for broader agreement. Just before leaving Washington for Peking, Nixon reminded the American people of the major theme he intended to pursue
during his visit: "The fact that they [China and America] are separated by a vast ocean and great differences in philosophy should not prevent them from finding common ground." He went on to stress his major premise: "... what we must do is to find a way to see that we can have differences without being enemies in war" (Speech at Departure Ceremony, p. 419). In his first banquet speech which should be viewed as his keynote address, he again set forth the theme of his trip:

What brings us together is that we have common interests which transcend those differences. As we discuss our differences, neither of us will compromise our principles. But while we cannot close the gulf between us, we can try to bridge it so that we may be able to talk across it (First Banquet, par. 4).

What Nixon sought to underscore was the necessity on both sides of accepting the fundamental agreement to disagree as the first step toward better understanding of each other.

Nixon again reiterated this position at the second banquet: "It is not our common beliefs that have brought us together here, but our common interests and common hopes ... " (Second Banquet, par. 9). On the night before his departure from China, Nixon once again struck home the importance of sharing common grounds:
If we succeed in working together where we can find common ground, if we can find common ground on which we can both stand, where we can build the bridge between us and build a new world, generations in the years ahead will look back and thank us for this meeting that we have held in this past week (Shanghai Banquet, par. 11).

Nixon believed that both nations could find common grounds for broad agreement in several spheres. Even if China and the United States acknowledged the "difference in their social systems" (Communique, par. 9), he hoped that they could find agreement on the following four specific areas. First, they would "progress toward the normalization of relations." Second, they would try to rescue the world from "the danger of international military conflict." Third, neither would seek hegemony in Asia or permit any other country to try to extend its power in the area. Finally, they agreed not to "negotiate on behalf of any third party" or to assist each other in any operation directed against another nation (Communique, par. 10).

With these specific, agreed-upon principles of international relations in mind, Nixon set out to emphasize the importance of establishing mutual understanding as the first step toward better relations in the future. He said to the reporters at the Ming Tombs: "It is important as we think of ourselves as members of
the family of man, that we know them [the Chinese people] and know them better, . . . " (Remarks at the Tombs, par. 6). Once the basis for mutual understanding had been established, Nixon believed it easier to construct a new world together based on the common values and dis-values. In his search for common grounds, Nixon strongly urged the Chinese people to join him in building

a new world order in which nations and peoples with different systems and different values can live together in peace, respecting one another, while disagreeing with one another, letting history rather than the battlefield be the judge of their different ideas (Second Banquet, par. 9).

The awareness on the part of both nations of the importance of establishing a new world order as well as the fundamental agreement to honor the specific principles of international relations was taken by the American President as the prerequisite to his further search for common grounds of greater agreement. The common interest that united the two countries, Nixon contended, was the earnest desire for world peace. Thus he proposed this keynote in the following words:

So, let us, in these next 5 days, start a long march together, not in lockstep, but on different roads leading to the same goal, the goal of building a world structure of peace and justice in which all may stand together with equal dignity and in which each nation, large or small, has a right to
Nixon re-emphasized the same view in his second banquet speech by quoting from George Washington's Farewell Address the famous passage "Cultivate peace and harmony with all" and by offering a toast "to the hope of our children that peace and harmony can be the legacy of our generation to them" (Second Banquet, pars. 10-11). Furthermore, in order to stress the common interest which bound the two countries, the President consciously made frequent allusions to the generation of peace and repeated references to the future interaction of today's youth on both sides of the Pacific. Thus Nixon made explicit the common need to strive for peace and future orientation throughout his trip.

The final declaration of the common interest made by a jubilant Nixon at the farewell party in Shanghai amounted to a call for peace and functioned as a ground for broader agreement. He asked the Chinese people to join the American people in the quest for peace. He concluded:

Mr. Prime Minister, our two peoples tonight hold the future of the world in our hands. As we think of that future, we are dedicated to the principle that we can build a new world, a world of peace, a world of justice, a world of independence of all nations.
Let the Chinese people and the great American people be worthy of the hopes and ideas of the world, for peace and justice and progress for all (Shanghai Banquet, pars. 10-11).

Nixon's strategy of maximizing common grounds for agreement and emphasizing common interest shared by the two nations successfully provided Premier Chou En-lai and other immediate, international audience members with the fundamental bases for communication and dialogue. The Chinese leaders responded quite favorably to Nixon's plea for establishing common grounds for broader agreement. Nixon and Chou took part in over fifteen hours of formal talks and approximately the same amount of time was spent in face-to-face discussion between Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei. So, the Nixon trip finally reflected over thirty hours of formal discussions between the leaders of the two countries.\(^9\) The Chinese side responded to Nixon's trip not only with this substantive move but also with a highly symbolic gesture. Mao Tse-tung accorded him a one-hour audience on the first day of his visit. What struck

experienced foreign observers in Peking as extraordinary with this historic meeting was not the small amount of time for this encounter but with the promptness with which the Chinese officials arranged it. "Although the session appears to be largely symbolic," Joseph Kraft reported for The New Yorker, "it is the first time that the Chairman has received any foreign statesman on the first day of a visit." Mao broke his practice of seeing visiting dignitaries at the end rather than at the beginning of their trips to China. This unprecedented reception of Nixon on the part of Mao meant that the official Chinese stamp of approval was placed on what thereafter was to be talks on a state-to-state level. It also signified that Mao publicly approved a Chinese dialogue with the United States on the basis of several grounds for broader agreement shared in common by the two sides. These facts, together with the invitation for Nixon's visit itself, indicated that China, too, was as willing as the United States to establish, at least, the "talking" relations based on common values and dis-values.

Nixon's calculated strategy of maximizing com-

---

mon grounds for agreement successfully opened the cautious minds of the Chinese people and helped to bring them into the common arena for communication and dialogue which had been absent for a quarter century. This constituted an important part of Nixon's total rhetorical strategy to reduce primarily the psychological aspect of the international distance between Peking and Washington.

The strategy of emphasizing agreement also had a calculated effect upon the national audience in America that had been reached via the mass media, especially satellite-borne television. One may recall that as time passed after Nixon's dramatic announcement of his intention to visit China, America gradually regained a sense of restraint from the initial emotional reactions to this news. Although many Americans expected some good result out of this epoch-making trip, some others, including even governmental officials, came to register voices of reasoned reservations and warned against over-expectation held by some Americans toward Nixon's mission. The level of expectation among Americans, in other words, was not universally high. Against this background of the national mood, Nixon's appeal to generality in terms of common values and dis-values (such as supporting world peace and opposing ag-
gression) rather than to specific policies (such as those about Taiwan and Vietnam) was designed to give a sense of reassurance and satisfaction to the majority of Americans and a sense of relief, especially to those conservatives who were afraid that Nixon would conclude a "dangerous" deal and agreement with "Red" China. Nixon's strategy of maximizing common grounds for agreement, in other words, could satisfy all concerned --the international as well as national audiences. It could properly serve the purpose of reducing the psychological distance between the two nations without creating any undesirable side-effect on either of them.

The strategy of maximizing common grounds through emphasizing common values and dis-values was closely related with another strategy which deserves to be mentioned in connection with Nixon's total scheme for reducing the psychological aspect of international distance. It is significant to note that most of Nixon's rhetorical transactions during his visit to China took place in the rituals of the toast, that is, they were characterized by an epidictic form of oratory, and that Nixon set out to increase the intensity of adherence to certain common values and dis-values which both sides had already accepted. The reason for Nixon's repeated emphasis on such common values as
peace, justice, harmony, understanding, and peaceful coexistence, and on such common dis-values as aggression, interference, oppression, and hegemony lay in his conscious intent to employ next a strategy of establishing a sense of communion with the Chinese audience centered around these values and dis-values recognized by the international audience of the Chinese people. In a series of the rituals of the toast, Nixon sought to reinforce and revitalize the existing audience values and looked for unity of spirit in the sole hope of opening up the door of the cautious minds of the Chinese people. Because these values continued to be salient to the international as well as national audiences, Nixon, in a sense, spoke well to the universality of the Chinese people in order to establish communion with them.

If one accepts Hugh Duncan's assertion that identification takes place when the speaker and the auditors have established a sense of communion between them, Nixon's strategy of establishing communion should be taken as preliminary to another important strategy he employed for the purpose of reducing dis-

---

tance: that of creating maximum identification with his audience. Nixon endeavored to identify his theme and cause with those that were respected by the international audience of the Chinese people and the national audience of the American people.

Throughout the trip Nixon made frequent references to Chairman Mao. The most striking example of this was his quotation from Mao's poem at the first banquet. Nixon quoted Mao to strike home the urgency of the time to start the joint ventures for world peace: "So many deeds cry out to be done, and always urgently. The world rolls on. Time passes. Ten thousand years are too long. Seize the day, seize the hour" (First Banquet, par. 8). Immediately following this quotation, Nixon introduced his keynote theme:

12This poem is said to have been written in response to another poem by Kuo Ho-jo, historian and poet, which praised the Chinese people's unity and strict discipline. The part of the poem quoted by Nixon, according to Bon Shiraishi, means:

"Certain things have been hurriedly achieved to the present.
The world is in revolution and time is ever pressing.
To leave events to take their own course, awaiting solutions for ten thousand years, is to wait too long.
One must earnestly struggle for a day and half a day
To hasten independent conclusions."

"This is the hour. This is the day for our two peoples to rise to the heights of greatness which can build a new and a better world" (First Banquet, par. 9). He also used the phrase "a long march," a clear reminder of the Long March Chairman Mao and Premier Chou led to unify the country under the Communist doctrine. "So," Nixon urged the Chinese leaders, "let us, in these next 5 days, start a long march together" toward the common goal of building a world structure of peace (First Banquet, par. 5). The name of Mao was mentioned at least once in every major speech of Nixon's during his stay in China. Through his strategy of identification, Nixon thus skillfully expressed his eagerness to get something done in a hurry. This expression of eagerness on his part was consonant with the Chinese desire to establish, at least, the "talking" relations with the United States. This strategy of identification, in other words, was well calculated to fulfill the expectations, however guarded, of the Chinese people toward Nixon's mission.

Nixon's strategy of identifying his theme with the spirit and essence of Mao's thoughts seemed particularly effective in softening the disciplined and guarded minds of the Chinese people. Richard Dudman, correspondent for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, observed
that "there was a burst of applause" when the audience heard the American President's quotation from Mao and his "reference to the Chinese equivalent of Valley Forge, the Long March of 1936." Whatever the Chinese leaders may have thought of the [first banquet] speech," reported another correspondent from Peking, "it seemed to be a hit with ordinary Chinese, many of whom expressed pleasure at the President's quotation. . . ." The same reporter went on to quote one Chinese official as saying: "It's a good thing he [Nixon] should do that. The Chairman has written many great things, and everybody can learn from him." These testimonies were indicative of Nixon's success in breaking the ice from the very start of his visit by employing the strategy of identification under his total scheme for reducing the international distance lying between the two countries.

Nixon's strategy of identifying his theme and ideas with those of Mao served to reduce not only international distance but also interpersonal distance.

13 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 21, 1972, p. 1.

14 John Burns, who was a correspondent for a Toronto newspaper, contributed his article entitled "Peking Reporter's Notebook" to the Christian Science Monitor, February 28, 1972, p. 5.
It must be recalled that the Chinese officials had publicly called Nixon "an enemy of all mankind" right before his scheduled visit. By equating himself with Mao, the American President tried to enhance his ethos by projecting himself as an acceptable leader to the Chinese officials, thus reducing the personal distance between himself and his hosts. This strategy also helped to elevate himself to the comparable position as head of the state which Mao enjoyed and to adjust whatever power disparity between the two leaders there would otherwise have been in the minds of the Chinese people, thereby reducing the official aspect of interpersonal distance. Nixon's strategy of identification, in other words, also constituted the strategy of enhancing ethos or of achieving power parity in his total scheme of reducing the interpersonal distance between himself and his Chinese hosts.

Those places which the Chinese regarded with deference also functioned as effective rhetorical devices for identification in Nixon's endeavor to reduce distance. The Great Wall was often referred to as a symbol of the greatness of the Chinese people. Nixon said to the reporters:

I think that you would have to conclude that this is a great wall and it had to be built by a great people. . . . But under the cir-
cumstances, it is a certain symbol of what China in the past has been and of what China in the future can become. People who could build a wall like this certainly have a great past to be proud of and a people who have [sic] this kind of a past must also have a great future (Remarks at the Wall, par. 3).

Wherever he visited in China, Nixon tried to interweave the places into his speech to induce the international audience of the Chinese people to accept his theme and ideas. The Ming Tombs, for instance, reminded him that China "is a great and old civilization, these people who have given so much to the world in terms of culture and development in many ways" (Remarks at the Tombs, par. 5). Of Shanghai, which he visited a few days later, he said: "We have, today, seen the progress of modern times. We have seen the matchless wonders of ancient times. We have seen also the beauty of the countryside, the vibrancy of a great city, Shanghai" (Shanghai Banquet, par. 3). He further touched on the sad history of this coast city and declared that the American people would join the Chinese people in their dedication to the principles of non-aggression and non-intervention.

On another visit at Hangchow, a Chinese historic place, Nixon quoted the saying that "Heaven is above and beneath are Hangchow and Soochow" (Hangchow
Banquet, par. 2). This drew a heavy applause from the Chinese officials present at the reception. However, he was at times so eager to seek identification as to puzzle the immediate audience. The case in point was his observation that "the proud citizens of this province would say that Peking is the head of China, but Hangchow is the heart of China" (Hangchow Banquet, par. 2). One embarrassed Chinese official explained at a table of the American reporters that they would say Peking is the head and heart of China.15

Although he had a "slip of tongue" once in a while out of excessive eagerness, Nixon's strategy of identifying himself, his ideas, and his main theme with those that the international audience of the Chinese people respected undoubtedly succeeded in opening up the cautious and skeptical minds of the immediate audience and eventually in reducing the psychological aspect of the international distance between the rhetor and his listeners.

President Nixon also had in mind the national or "home" audience of the American people when he employed the strategy of identification. He relied

heavily upon the names of the Americans whom the na-
tional audience esteemed. Taking the occasion of
George Washington's birthday, he closed his toast at
the second banquet with the founding father's "Fare-
well Address";

Just this week, we have celebrated in America
the birth of George Washington, the Father of
our Country, who led America to independence
in our Revolution and served as our first
President. He bade farewell at the close of
his term with those words to his countrymen:
"Observe good faith and justice toward all
nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with
all" (Second Banquet, par. 10).

At this point the rhetor was not so much concerned with
the immediate effect upon the immediate, international
audience of the Chinese people as with the removed ef-
fect upon the removed, national audience of the Amer-
ican people who watched his deeds and words through
satellite-borne television. Nixon could impress his
potential voters at home, though tacitly and implicitly,
by identifying himself and his cause with the greatness
of George Washington and the relevance and universality
of his appeals.

In addition, one paragraph of his first banquet
speech must have reminded the American audience of
Abraham Lincoln, when Nixon pronounced: "Yet, what we
say here will not be long remembered. What we do here
can change the world" (First Banquet, par. 2). Since
the Chinese people unconditionally revered Mao as their leader and responded favorably to the spirit and essence of the Washington quotation or the Lincoln allusion, and since most Americans respected Washington and Lincoln as their national heroes and took as acceptable the spirit and essence of the Mao quotation, these big names functioned as a unifying force in the minds of the message receivers, both international and national, and consequently as an effective reducer of the psychological dimension of the international distance between the Chinese and American peoples.

President Nixon's trip to China created an unusually complex situation characterized by the existence of various kinds of distance and of the multiple levels of the international and national audience expectation. Under these difficult circumstances Nixon skillfully employed the rhetorical strategies of maximizing common grounds, of enhancing ethos, of creating power parity, of creating communion, and of establishing identification for the purpose of reducing interpersonal distance and primarily the psychological aspect of international distance.

Nixon's total scheme for distance reduction did not stop here, however. He had in mind a grand strategy of creating a universe of discourse through the use
of significant symbols. His scheme dictated that it should be based upon the previously mentioned strategies of maximizing common values, of creating communion, and of establishing identification. Nixon was fully aware that if he were to establish significant symbols, he should create a set of contexts for possible common grounds that would make communion and identification possible. As Chapter Three has indicated, Nixon took a series of initiatives for the purpose of establishing a universe of discourse through significant symbols. They included: (1) contribution of a journal article indicating his keen interest in China as early as 1967; (2) adoption of a policy of gradual troop withdrawal in Vietnam; (3) dispatch of Dr. Kissinger to Peking twice to arrange mutually agreed-upon guidelines and agenda for Nixon's trip; (4) tacit approval of visit of the American ping-pong team to Peking; (5) repeated public statements expressing his desire to visit China; (6) dramatic announcement of his acceptance of an invitation to visit China; and (7) the actual trip he made in February, 1972.

With this set of contexts behind him, Nixon was ready to launch his strategy of creating significant symbols by skillfully employing appraisive signs, or axiological language that emphasized common values
and dis-values shared by the Chinese and American people. Nixon's subsequent emphasis on such common values as world peace, justice, understanding, peaceful coexistence, and fundamental agreement to disagree, and on such dis-values as aggression and interference was consonant with China's Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. That the Chinese leaders were receptive to Nixon's appraisive, axiological approach was clearly reflected in Chou's first banquet speech. Quoting one passage from Nixon's departure ceremony speech ("what we must do is to find a way to see that we can have differences without being enemies in war"), Chou concluded his keynote speech on the day of the President's arrival in Peking with the following remarks: "We hope that, through a frank exchange of views between our two sides to gain a clear notion of our differences and make effort to find common ground, a new start can be made in the relations between our two countries."

Once he had received a tacit approval of his

axiological approach from the Chinese side, President Nixon began to seek to place himself in the perspective of his hosts as much as he could in order to create significant symbols. Nixon took a particular care in viewing the knottiest issue of Taiwan from the perspective of the Chinese hosts. The joint communique was specific in this respect:

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this purpose in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes (Communique, par. 13).

Once he had assumed this perspective, Nixon found it easier to place himself in the position of his immediate audience, wherever he went in China. He tried his best to assume the role of the Chinese people to understand who and what they were. Nixon remarked:

As I walked along the Wall, I thought of the sacrifices that went into building it; I thought of what it showed about the determination of the Chinese people to retain their independence throughout their long history; I thought about the fact that the Wall tells us that China has a great history and that the people who built this Wonder of the World also have a great future (Second Banquet, par. 5).
The President not only assumed the role of the Chinese audience but also encouraged them to assume his or American people's role so that they might understand how the common values would be applied to others as well as to themselves. The case in point was his speech at the Shanghai Banquet. By touching on the sad history of the city of Shanghai, Nixon emphasized the importance of the principle of non-aggression as a common value to be applied to both sides:

To mention only one that is particularly appropriate here in Shanghai, is the fact that this great city, over the past, has on many occasions been the victim of foreign aggression and foreign occupation. And we join the Chinese people, we the American people, in our dedication to this principle: That never again shall foreign domination, foreign occupation, be visited upon this city or any part of China or any independent country in this world (Shanghai Banquet, par. 9).

Nixon's use of appraisive signs for the purpose of arousing shared meaning in himself at the same time it occurs in the Chinese audience--this strategy of creating significant symbols was instrumental in bringing about a universe of discourse between the American President and the Chinese officials. By so doing, Nixon was in the best position to fulfill the expectation of his international audience and eventually to reduce the psychological aspect of the international
distance between the two countries.

All of the strategies I have identified as parts of Nixon's total design for distance reduction were artistic and intrinsic in that Nixon constructed and wove them into his rhetorical discourses. He was also aware that two non-artistic, extrinsic strategies were open to him when he set out to wage a rhetorical campaign of distance reduction: using television as a means of reducing the geographical aspect of international distance and relying on an interpreter as a possible reducer of the psychological aspect of international distance.

The President's trip to China showed that television coverage had opened up what was virtually a new field of action to men in power—it had, in Henry Kissinger's words, "personalize[d] foreign policy for a mass audience."^17 Nixon was thoroughly aware of the potentiality which television had in reaching the national audience of the American people and the world audience beyond the immediate audience of the Chinese people. He knew that the skillful use of satellite-

---

borne television would function as an effective reducer of the geographical dimension of the international distance between China and America.

His consciousness of the strength of this extrinsic strategy was clearly evident in his rhetorical discourses produced during his visit to China. Being aware of the world audience to be reached via television, Nixon stated: "At this very moment, through the wonder of telecommunications, more people are seeing and hearing what we say than on any other such occasion in the whole history of the world" (First Banquet, par. 2). He went on to stress the urgency of the hour by referring to the expectation of those world listeners beyond the immediate Chinese audience: "The world watches. The world listens. The world waits to see what we will do" (First Banquet, par. 5). Nixon's eagerness to maximize the effect of television led one correspondent to remark about the first banquet speech:

Throughout the visit, he has seemed very conscious of the television cameras, and the banquet speech seemed to have written as much for consumption by the television audience at home as it was for the Chinese leaders listening to him in the Great Hall of the People. Certainly its delivery was tailored for TV, with Mr. Nixon running straight through the speech in English first, rather than having
the Chinese interpreter translate it a para-

graph at a time.18

Thanking Chou for his invitation, Nixon again
said with the world-wide television audience in mind:
"You have made it possible for the story of this his-
toric visit to be read, seen, and heard by more people
all over the world than any previous occasion in his-
tory" (Second Banquet, par. 4). The next paragraph in
the same speech once again implied Nixon's awareness
of the potentiality of television: "Yesterday, along
with hundreds of millions of viewers on television, we
saw what is truly one of the wonders of the world, the
Great Wall" (Second Banquet, par. 5). Max Frankel,
correspondent for the New York Times, commented on
Nixon's appreciation of the potentiality of television
as exhibited in his second banquet: "In deference to
American custom--or the requirements of American tele-
vision--Mr. Nixon delayed the toasts from the first to
the last main course of the meal, which was cleared
precisely at 9 p.m."19 When he returned to Washington,
Nixon made another reference to the impact of televi-
sion: "Because of the superb efforts of the hard-

18 John Burns reported for the Christian Science
Monitor, February 28, 1972, p. 5.

working members of the press . . . millions of Americans in the past week have seen more of China than I did" (Speech at Arrival Ceremony, p. 434).

Nixon's strategy of maximizing the impact of television was manifest in the way how he allocated to various media the total number of eighty-seven seats out of some 2,000 applications. The three television networks were permitted to send twelve correspondents and twenty-five cameramen and producers (including three vice presidents), thus occupying more than forty per cent of the total allocation. In addition, Nixon took great care in tailoring his every appearance and every major event for television intended primarily for the American audience. His arrival at Peking Airport was rescheduled for delay so that it could be viewed in prime evening television time in the United States. His appearances at the banquets were carefully coordinated so that they might produce the greatest impact upon the greatest number of the American viewers. He also delayed his return to Washington for nine hours,

grounding his plane in Alaska, so that it could touch down at the Andrews Air Force Base in prime viewing time. 21

Not only the major events such as banquets and arrival and departure ceremonies but also the casual sightseeing tours were fully orchestrated for television, as John Chancellor, N.B.C. news anchorman, filed the following perceptive observation:

The first option was to schedule a lot of Presidential sightseeing early in the morning. From nine to twelve in the morning in Peking is prime evening television time in the United States, and I was not alone in my belief that we could be given a series of what the White House called "photo opportunities" before lunch everyday. The networks would have put it on, because they should have put it on; here was a President, indeed, President Richard M. Nixon, seeing the sights in the People's Republic. 22

Since the President was keenly interested in securing this massive television attention, his staff at the White House kept him posted on his television performances. Jack Anderson wrote:

Everyday President Nixon was in China, the White House kept him informed how the trip was going over at home. He received a daily


22 John Chancellor, "Who Produced the China Show?" Foreign Policy, No. 7 (Summer, 1972), 92.
digest on what the newspapers and the TV networks were saying about his adventure on the Chinese mainland. Most of the digests were devoted to his TV coverage, giving complete summaries of each network's reports from China. These confidential summaries informed the President which film shots showed him at his best and what the TV commentators had to say.23

Nixon's strategy of maximizing the use of television was expected to perform two functions. The first was to give maximum exposure of Nixon as candidate for re-election to the American voters via satellite-borne television. He had announced his candidacy for the second term just before his departure for the historic trip and intended to make the best use of this event politically. The second function, however, was more relevant to the rhetoric of distance reduction. The television with its instantaneous nature served as a channel by which the President could reduce particularly the geographical aspect of international distance. By giving the American people the image of a new China, which had been isolated by the geographical distance, Nixon hoped that his countrymen would have a better realization and understanding of this mysterious country in Asia. Nixon knew that this "Sinification of the American public" by television, as one editorial

23 Boston Globe, March 5, 1972, p. 38.
writer put it, would eventually contribute greatly to reducing the geographical and, possibly, psychological aspects of the international distance lying between China and America.

Surprisingly enough, the Chinese officials cooperated with this unprecedented publicity spectacle of Nixon's, essentially because they thought it would offer to promote their own interests. First, they wanted to give the American public the televised new image of a nation of genteel, hospitable, and hard-working people. Second, on the basis of the theory that the more Nixon's presence in China was publicized through television, the greater would be domestic American expectations for him to return home with some kind of concrete results, they sought to inflate his image deliberately so that, unless he was willing to leave Peking empty-handed, he would have to acquiesce to their demands. Whichever may be the truer motive for the Chinese cooperation, Nixon's strategy of maximizing the use of television fulfilled the expectation of the immediate, international audience of the Chinese people.

24 The New Yorker, March 25, 1972, p. 29.
25 Stanley Karnow, "Playing Second Fiddle to the Tube," Foreign Policy, No. 7 (Summer, 1972), pp. 100-102.
as well as those of the national audience of the American people.

Nixon's trip to China created a theatrical or dramatic effect through his skillful deployment of a modern magic in this electronic age called television. Newsweek commented: "Of one thing there was never any doubt. The trip had been a great theater, perhaps the first McLuhanesque summit in history, a showcase voyage where the medium was the diplomatic message." 26 William Millinship of The Observer in London was quoted as remarking that "the journey, via the media, is the message." 27 Richard Wilson echoed the same observation: "The visit itself was both the medium and the message." 28

With the awareness and realization on Nixon's part of the potentiality of television as an agent of creating dramatic impacts, his strategy of maximum dependence on this electronic medium not only satisfied the enormous curiosity of the American people about China but also fulfilled the expectation of the Chinese officials at the same time. It must thus be concluded that this strategy functioned as an effective reducer

---

26 Newsweek, March 13, 1972, p. 18.
27 Quoted in Nation, March 6, 1972, p. 291.
28 Wilson, President's Trip, p. 145.
of the international distance between the two countries.

The President was careful as well in the use of interpreters. In deference to Chinese sensitivity, Nixon relied entirely upon interpreters provided by the People's Republic of China, although he brought with him several experts in the Chinese language. The Brooklyn-born young woman named Tang Wen-sheng served in this capacity at most public and televised appearances. It must be mentioned that Nixon's decision to use a Chinese interpreter rather than an American counterpart had a non-verbal significance: the choice reflected his considerateness to the pride and dignity of his hosts. At one occasion Nixon took time out to thank his Chinese interpreter provided by the local committee for her expertise: "On this informal occasion, may I express my appreciation to my Chinese voice, to Mrs. Chang. I listened to her translation. She got every word right" (Hangchow Banquet, par. 6). Nixon's care in the choice of an interpreter and his subsequent tact must have given additional force in his total scheme of distance reduction he had waged during his visit to China.

President Nixon achieved the major goal of his trip to China: that of reducing hostility and opening up new communication channels for future exchange of
ideas and people. To achieve this goal, he, first and foremost, had to fulfill rhetorically the varied expectations of his audiences, both national and international, and eventually to reduce the interpersonal and international distance lying between rhetorical participants and between China and America. With this rhetorical purpose in mind, Nixon skillfully employed intricate strategies of maximizing common grounds for broader agreement, of enhancing ethos, of creating power parity, of establishing communion, of identifying his causes with those of his audiences, of creating a universe of discourse through significant symbols, and of maximizing the use of television and an interpreter. Although he faced an unusually complex rhetorical situation, he was fully cognizant of and able to employ all the available rhetorical strategies for the purpose of reducing distance. Nixon, in other words, responded to this unique situation with the high level of rhetorical sophistication.

Outcome and Implications of Nixon's Rhetoric of Distance Reduction

It may be recalled that Chapter Three has described the expectation level of Nixon's audiences, both international and national. I have indicated that the Chinese people overtly displayed rather low-key
expectations toward the Nixon trip before he arrived in Peking, especially because they thought twenty-two years of hostility were too grave and serious to be wiped away by this historic detente alone. All they could expect to achieve out of this meeting was to establish at least the "talking" relations with the country they had regarded as an enemy for a quarter century.

The American people likewise expressed wide varieties of reaction toward Nixon's proposed trip and were far from being unanimous in their expectations toward his mission. It should be recalled that as time went on after the announcement of his proposed trip, reasoned reservations gradually came to be expressed among the Americans as to the real worth of the trip. In these international and national climates all Nixon was expected to do was to establish the bilateral, dialogical relations between the two countries. This major objective obviously stopped far short of the formal diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China. Neither side, in fact, expected that much out of this historic encounter alone.

The preceding section of this chapter has shown that to the rather low level of expectations of both the international and national audiences, Nixon skillfully responded with the high level of rhetorical so-
phistication. Nixon's rhetorical transactions in China, in other words, were conditioned by such independent variables as the high level of rhetorical sophistication in response to the low expectation level of the international audience of the Chinese people and the high level of rhetorical sophistication in response to the low expectation level of the national audience of the American people. This combination of the variables is represented by Type 11 of the interaction model I have formulated in Chapter Five. The model has predicted a moderate degree of distance reduction out of this type of interaction. After citing the absence of high expectations as the major problem with this type, I have predicted that the speaker will be in a good position to achieve a certain degree of rhetorical success in terms of distance reduction by reacting positively to the basically low expectation level of the international audience.

My analysis of Nixon's rhetorical transactions has shown that he could achieve his major goal of establishing communication channels with China by accomplishing his rhetorical purpose of reducing the interpersonal and international distance between himself and his hosts and between the two countries. His rhetorical strategies did not produce any undesirable
side-effects on either of the international or national audience. They, in fact, functioned as effective reducers of various kinds of distance. This assessment of Nixon's rhetorical endeavors has tended to support the prediction that the interaction model has made concerning the possible outcome of Type 11 in international and intercultural communication.

Several factors may account for Nixon's success in his rhetoric of distance reduction. It is true that the expectation level of the audience may greatly influence the outcome of any communication interaction, but this happens to be one of those factors which the rhetor can least control. It is there in his rhetorical situation, and he has to accept it as it is. The level of rhetorical sophistication, on the other hand, resides in the rhetor himself and is easily controllable. What makes a difference in the level of rhetorical sophistication, in the final analysis, includes several culture-bound elements such as the rhetor's acquired skill in speaking and his perception of speech communication. In the case of Nixon, I will cite two cultural factors as chief determinants of his high rhetorical sophistication level, and, in a larger sense, of his success in the rhetoric of distance reduction. They were communication consciousness and mental pre-
paredness.

First, the nature of the rhetorical tradition in a country may influence the rhetorical sophistication level of the speaker. America has a long tradition of rhetorical theory and practice. Under the democratic system of government the leaders are expected to know how to appeal rhetorically to the minds and hearts of their people, the journalists are required to learn how to evaluate rhetorical transactions, and the general people are supposed to understand how to react to the words and deeds of their leaders. All the people, in other words, are expected to have some appreciation for and understanding of the power of persuasive communication. All are, in one word, communication-conscious. America is one of those communication-conscious societies which have been strongly influenced by a long tradition of Western rhetoric. This communication consciousness is well reflected by the fact that any introductory book on speech communication starts with a chapter on the rationale for and the function of communication in a democratic society. This high level of communication consciousness on the part of the American people has also promoted and at the same time has been further strengthened by the development of an academic discipline called speech com-
Throughout the trip Nixon was characteristically communication-conscious, partly because of the major goal he pursued of opening up communication channels with China, but mainly because of his cultural orientation toward communication. At one time he used the symbol of the Great Wall to suggest that the future for both countries would be bright if the walls of ideology and animosity would be pierced by communication (Remarks at the Wall, par. 5). In addition, he made four other references to the importance of communication in his discourses produced during his China tour.

Thus, the high degree of communication consciousness present in the American society may possibly account for the fact that Nixon could successfully employ, or his rhetorically conscious advisers got him to use, those effective strategies I have identified in the preceding part of this chapter. This may also explain the fact that most of the newspaper and television correspondents accompanying Nixon were well prepared to write or report rhetorical criticisms, however impressionistic and naive at times, and that their dispatched articles and reports were full of comments about Nixon's rhetorical transactions. It must be concluded from the above discussion, therefore,
that each culture has its own peculiar form of communicating ideas and aspirations, and that the difference in a person's or his culture's perception of speech communication and rhetoric will inevitably influence the level of his rhetorical sophistication that he may achieve in a given communicative situation.

The second explanation for Nixon's success in the rhetoric of distance reduction was that he approached his rhetorical transactions with thorough-going preparation. Closely related with the communication consciousness I have just discussed, the mental preparedness on his part was also a culture-bound factor in that it was facilitated by his realization of the American ignorance about China resulting from the lack of contact in culture and people for a quarter century. "For more than 20 years," observed one American correspondent, "most of us have cultivated a flourishing ignorance of China. . . . Few of us knew much to begin with, and what little we knew was probably nonsense culled from 'Terry and Pirates,' and the 'warcards' that came from with our bubble-gum."29 Max Frankel quoted Nixon as remarking humbly on his way to

29 Russell Baker, "China Isn't Easy to Recognize," reprinted in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 21, 1972, p. 2D.
Peking: "Because of a lack of communication, we are a mystery to them as they are a mystery to us." 30

This confession of ignorance and ensuing cautiousness must have prompted Nixon and his party to be well prepared for the trip. As early as September, 1971, one weekly magazine reported that "the White House is now engaged in intensive preparations for President Nixon's forthcoming trip to Peking." 31 This intensive preparation continued just before the Nixon party arrived at Peking Airport. The planes which took the American official party were in effect "airborne universities" where "from the President down, the passengers were engaged in a concentrated study session. . . ." 32 Nixon also spent much time preparing for the speeches, as "the [first] banquet speech," according to Ronald L. Ziegler, the President's press secretary, "was finalized only hours before it was delivered, with the President sitting down over the draft with Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, . . ." 33


31 Newsweek, September 27, 1971, p. 53.


In addition, Nixon and his American delegates must have made a careful analysis of the Chinese people as their immediate audience. After having two intensive sessions with the Chinese leaders, Kissinger, for instance, remarked with surprise that "the People's Republic is led by highly principled men," and that without the basic understanding and acceptance of their major principles on the American side, "even rudimentary communication" would be difficult to establish between the two countries. The American side fully realized at the same time that if Nixon could show his willingness to accept some of their major principles and successfully appeal to their universality, in all probability the international audience of the Chinese people would be induced to accept him and his cause. Nixon's success in employing various effective strategies, especially that of maximizing common grounds, therefore, resulted from his accurate perception of the immediate audience based on a careful audience analysis.

The above discussion suggests that some cultural idiosyncrasies of both the speaker and his inter-

---

national audience will eventually influence the speaker's rhetorical sophistication level, his way of choosing particular rhetorical strategies, the acceptance level of the speaker on the part of his international audience, and, most importantly, the outcome he can produce upon his auditors of another country or culture.

This chapter has attempted to make a rhetorical analysis of Richard Nixon's discourses made during his trip to China from the perspective of distance reduction. The purpose has been to demonstrate how my proposed models for analysis will be applied to rhetorical criticism of international and intercultural communication. The case with which this chapter has dealt has been that of rhetorical success in terms of distance reduction. The next chapter will treat another rhetorical situation whose case happens to be one of rhetorical failure in terms of distance reduction.
CHAPTER VII

APPLICATION OF AN ANALYTICAL MODEL TO PREMIER KAKUEI TANAKA'S RHETORICAL DISCOURSES IN CHINA

The previous chapter has demonstrated the applicability of my proposed models for analysis to criticism of one rhetorical campaign of international and intercultural dimension. It has dealt with one successful case of the rhetoric of distance reduction.

The historic trip to China made by Premier Kakuei Tanaka of Japan in September, 1972 will afford a rhetorical critic another opportunity of examining how the leader of the world as a rhetor endeavored to respond, though unsuccessfully, to the demands of a unique rhetorical situation by employing available rhetorical strategies for the purpose of reducing the interpersonal distance between himself and his hosts and the international distance between Japan and its host country, China. Using the same analytical models, this chapter will seek to throw into relief an unsuccessful case of the rhetoric of distance reduction in international and intercultural communication. It
will follow the same organizational pattern as in the previous chapter: the rhetor's distance perception, his rhetorical strategies, and the outcome and implications of his rhetoric of distance reduction.

It may be recalled from Chapter Three that Japan and China had shared a long history of contact since the first century A.D. Since then both countries had opened up the wide avenue to regular mutual exchanges of culture and people. This bilateral relationship was finally over with the Sino-Japanese war in 1894. The twentieth century witnessed a series of attacks and aggressions on China by the Japanese military regime. When one looks back on the history of postwar Sino-Japanese relations in particular, the passive, and sometimes antagonistic, nature of the diplomatic position consistently taken by the Japanese governments stood out as a striking fact. On succeeding Eisaku Sato as Premier, Kakuei Tanaka immediately made public his intention to start the normalization talks with the People's Republic of China.

Geographically speaking, the distance between China and Japan is extremely small. This geographical advantage, in turn, had made possible the reduction of the cultural aspect of international distance, as had been indicated in the frequent cultural exchanges be-
tween the two countries. Despite this common heritage, there existed some important chasms on the both sides of the China Sea. The most significant of them was the remoteness of the mental or psychological aspect of the international distance between the two countries. The atrocities of the Japanese military regime had planted in the Chinese the seeds of mistrust and hatred for Japan.

When Premier Kakuei Tanaka set out to wage a rhetorical campaign for reducing distance in the People's Republic of China in September, 1972, the main obstacle he had to face lay in the Chinese mentality and feeling that they were the victims of Japanese aggressions and atrocities. The rhetorical situation dictated, therefore, that his approach be characterized by the stance of compromise or apology. Tanaka thus faced the difficulty of trying to shift national gears suddenly from confrontation to conciliation.

It may also be recollected that since Japan had enjoyed friendly bilateral contact up to 1894, Tanaka's task, unlike Nixon's, was not only to reopen the communication channel that had existed prior to the Sino-Japanese war, but to restore and normalize the mutual relations for the diplomatic purpose of recognizing the People's Republic of China as a sole and
independent state. The Chinese side contended that Tanaka could properly perform this task only through, first, expressing a sincere apology to the Chinese for the Japanese war acts, and, second, making a formal declaration of the termination of war between the two countries.

While staying in China, Premier Tanaka publicly responded to the demands of the situation by three formal banquet speeches and the joint communique. These rhetorical discourses form the core of materials to be analyzed in this chapter.

Tanaka's Distance Perception

When he visited China, the Japanese Premier found that the direct flight from Tokyo to Peking required only a little over three hours, and that it testified to the close geographical proximity of the two countries. Tanaka was conscious of this geographical propinquity when he delivered his first banquet speech on the day of his arrival in Peking. He obviously had this geographical factor in mind when he began his speech: "I flew nonstop from Tokyo to Peking on this

---

\(^1\)The full texts of Kakuei Tanaka's rhetorical discourses made during his trip to the People's Republic of China are reprinted in Appendix B.
trip. It makes me once again deeply aware that Japan and China are close neighbors with only a strip of water in between" (First Banquet, par. 2). Furthermore, in his subsequent rhetorical discourses made during his stay in China he used such derivatives of the word "neighbor" as "neighboring," and "good-neighborly" as many as nine times in order to stress the geographical closeness between the two countries.

Thanking Premier Chou for his invitation, Tanaka continued: "I am very happy to be able this time to set foot on the soil of our neighbor China ... " (First Banquet, par. 1). The joint communique repeated the introductory part of Tanaka's first banquet speech in almost identical words: "China and Japan are neighboring countries separated only by a strip of water, ... " (Communique, par. 4). Although he did not refer to the actual geographical distance of about 2,000 miles that separates Peking and Tokyo, his repeated references to the geographical elements showed that he was aware of the geographical aspect of international distance.

In addition, Tanaka perceived the cultural distance between Japan and China as extremely close. Responding to Chou's remark that "Friendly contacts and cultural exchanges between our two countries have
a long history of two thousand years," Tanaka stressed the cultural grounds shared in common by Japan and China in the following words: "The two countries are not only so close to each other geographically, but have a history of 2,000 years of rich and varied ties" (First Banquet, par. 2). This was an established fact, as the joint communique reaffirmed: "... there was a long history of traditional friendship between them [China and Japan]" (Communique, par. 4).

By first establishing the common grounds, both geographical and cultural, Tanaka helped the international audience of the Chinese people to prepare to face the reality of difference that still separated the two nations. He took note of the fact that "the two sides have their own basic positions and peculiar conditions," and that "some minor differences exist between the positions and views of the two sides, ... " (First Banquet, par. 6). He again observed, though this time a little more realistically, that "there are ... many problems lying between Japan and China that need to be resolved in the future" (Second Banquet, par. 6). Because of these differences, reminisced the

---

2The English translation of Premier Chou's first banquet speech was reprinted in Asahi Evening News, September 27, 1972, p. 4.
Japanese Premier, "the leaders of both nations had to suffer a long period of waiting and tread a thorny road before they could sit down for knee-to-knee talks" (Second Banquet, par. 5).

In what areas did Tanaka find greatest differences between the two nations? Actually he was not so specific in this respect, except his general statement that "it goes without saying that Japan and China have different political convictions and social systems, . . . " (First Banquet, par. 5). The joint communique touched briefly on the social difference between the two countries (Communique, par. 6). He thus recognized, though vaguely, that the political and social aspects of international distance produced by the differences in ideology and social systems lay between the two countries. The Japanese Premier, however, failed to go much deeper and to refer to the greatest source of the psychological distance created by the atrocities of the Japanese military regime on the Chinese people. He seemed to have refused to be specific, except his deliberately vague references to the "abnormal and unnatural" relations and to "unfortunate experiences" (First Banquet, par. 3).

The main reason for Tanaka's failure or refusal to be specific in this respect lay in his shaky opti-
mism founded on the theory that the geographical and cultural bondage was strong enough to offset some of the differences between the two nations. His guarded references to the sources of the psychological vacuum between the Japanese and the Chinese might also be accounted for by his excessive consideration of the special interests of the small faction in his ruling party at home at the expense of alienating the international audience of the Chinese people and the more important and majority segments of the national audience of the Japanese people. These two reasons will be discussed fully later in this chapter. It would suffice to conclude here that Premier Kakuei Tanaka's level of distance perception as revealed in his rhetorical discourses was noticeably and at times deliberately low during his rhetorical campaign in China.

Tanaka's Rhetorical Strategies

We must be reminded again that for the Japanese Premier to make a formal apology and to declare the termination of the state of war were generally considered prerequisite for his goal of restoring full diplomatic relations. "Within hours of his arrival in Peking," Newsweek perceptively observed, "Tanaka set to work on one of the psychologically most important
purposes of the visit—formally apologizing to the Chinese people for the Japanese slaughter of some 25 million Chinese during the 1930s and '40s. The psychological aspect of international distance was the greatest obstacle Tanaka had either to remove or reduce before he could settle pending problems at the negotiating table in Peking.

Having emphasized the important similarities rather than the differences between the two nations, Premier Tanaka tried to make the Chinese people psychologically prepared to face, and, hopefully, to accept his inevitable remarks of apology for the Japanese brutalities. This was the part that the international audience of the Chinese officials was anxious to hear. The Japanese expectation toward his sincere expression of regret and repentance for past aggression against China was also reported to be extremely high. Speculations as to what stance Tanaka would take were rife among diplomats and journalists staying in Peking.

---

3 *Newsweek*, October 9, 1972, p. 45.


One Reuter correspondent filed the following report from China's capital: "Diplomats here expect that Mr. Tanaka will make a speech apologizing to the Chinese people for the hardships and brutalities inflicted on them during Japan's seizure of Manchuria during the nineteen-thirties and her expansion into other areas of China in a war that caused millions of Chinese deaths and devastated the country."  

It is important to trace chronologically how the Japanese Premier viewed this crucial problem of making a formal apology after he was elected Premier in July, 1972 and before he left Tokyo for Peking in September of the same year. At his first press conference as Premier of Japan, Tanaka said: "We have given troubles [meiwaku] to China one-sidedly. But now the time is ripe for starting normalization talks with China." When the opposition parties submitted a formal question concerning this problem of apology, the newly-formed Tanaka government issued a reply, which read in part: "Our country gave great troubles

---


7 Asahi Shimbun (Asahi Newspaper, morning ed.), July 7, 1972, p. 2. All the translations of quotations from the Japanese sources are mine unless otherwise noted.
[tadai no meiwaku] to the Chinese people at one period before and during the war. For this Japan will make humble self-examination.®

As the time for Tanaka's trip drew nearer, however, a subtle change in his attitude came to the fore. At the press conference just before his departure for China, he was again asked to comment on this problem. He replied rather guardedly: "Concerning the unfortunate problem of the war, I will frankly say to the Chinese side, 'We gave you great troubles [taihen na meiwaku]. We shall never give you any trouble [meiwaku] again.' But I will not single out this fact alone for emphasis. To do so would dampen the friendly mood that has recently been created between the two countries."® At one of the television interviews two days before his historic trip the Premier once again touched on the same topic:

There are a number of difficult problems still lying between Japan and China. One of them is the problem of making an apology for that abominable incident. But the Chinese side sees it more important to establish the normalization of relations than to linger over something past. Although I admit opin-

ions are divided on this issue, we must go beyond this in order to normalize relations between the two countries.\textsuperscript{10}

Was Tanaka accurate in his assessment that China was more interested in normalization of relations than in his apology? China's position had been that the making of a formal apology on the Japanese part was prerequisite for normalizing relations. Premier Chou, in fact, reminded the members of the Japanese advance party one week before Tanaka's visit that the Chinese people had suffered "disasters."\textsuperscript{11} The Chinese Premier again referred to this past fact in his toast at the first banquet in honor of the visiting Japanese Premier:

\begin{quote}
... in the half-century after 1894, owing to the Japanese militarists' aggression against China, the Chinese people were made to endure tremendous disasters... The past not forgotten is a guide for the future.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

If one recalls that the Chinese are a principled people, one must conclude that the Japanese Premier had

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{10}Asahi Shimbun (morning ed.), September 23, 1972, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{11}Asahi Shimbun (morning ed.), September 19, 1972, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{12}Asahi Evening News, September 27, 1972, p. 4.
\end{flushright}

[Italics mine.]
misconceived and miscalculated the Chinese intent and position up until his official visit to Peking.

With these national and international climates behind him, Kakuei Tanaka was about to wage a rhetorical campaign for distance reduction with his first banquet speech on the day of his arrival in Peking. The following was the sole paragraph which Tanaka uttered for the purpose of reducing the psychological aspect of the international distance between Japan and China:

However, it is regretful that for several decades in the past the relations between Japan and China had unfortunate experiences. During that time our country gave great troubles [tadai no meiwaku] to the Chinese people for which I once again make profound self-examination. After World War II the relations between Japan and China remained in an abnormal and unnatural state. We cannot but frankly admit this historical fact (First Banquet, par. 3). [Italics mine.]

Premier Kakuei Tanaka intended this paragraph as an expression of apology. These four sentences were intended as a bridge to connect the two countries over the deep psychological chasm. It is evident that his description of the bloodshed brought on by the Japanese invasion as "great troubles" contrasted strongly with Premier Chou's reference to "tremendous disasters."

The reaction of the international audience of the Chinese people was understandably cool. This para-
graph changed the friendly mood at the banquet to one of disapproval and dissatisfaction. A special correspondent for the *Asahi Shimbun*, an opinion leader of the Japanese press, observed this sudden change in atmosphere: "During Premier Tanaka's banquet speech, the Chinese audience applauded almost every time the speaker paused. However, at several instances the audience refrained from applauding, such as when he referred to 'great troubles' visited upon the Chinese people. Premier Chou used the word 'disasters' to express the same thing. The deliberate failure to applaud on the Chinese part could have been a strong indication of dissatisfaction with his casual expression of 'troubles.'"¹³ This overt negative reaction should lead one to judge that Tanaka scarcely succeeded in performing his specific task of his trip and, consequently, in removing, or at least reducing, the psychological and moral sources of hatred and animosity in the minds of the international audience of the Chinese people.

Tanaka's casual reference to "great troubles" prompted the Western observers in Peking to suggest

¹³*Asahi Shimbun* (morning ed.), September 26, 1972, p. 2.
that the Japanese Premier deliberately pitched the apology in a low key. John Burns, Peking correspondent for the *Toronto Globe and Mail*, observed, "Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka offered a guarded apology to the people of China last night for the suffering inflicted on them during the Japanese occupation. . . ." An American weekly magazine, too, described Tanaka's posture as "a bit guarded." The *Times of London* took note of the noticeable difference in language use between Tanaka and Chou when they referred to the same historical fact. The British newspaper remarked that the Japanese Premier's "language on this contrasted with that of Mr. Chou, who had spoken of the 'enormous disasters.'" John Roderick, AP correspondent, was most perceptive in reporting that "Mr. Tanaka, in his expression of regret for past Japanese misdeeds, stopped short of an outright apology."

The reactions of the national audience of the Japanese were more harsh and critical. The Tokyo news-

---

14 *Toronto Globe and Mail*, September 26, 1972, p. 3.

15 *Newsweek*, October 9, 1972, p. 45.

16 *The Times*, September 26, 1972, p. 6.

papers were unanimous in denouncing the ambiguous stand of the Premier took on this crucial issue of apology.\textsuperscript{18}

One characteristic reaction was registered in the popular column \textit{Tensei Jingo (Vox Populi, Vox Dei)} of the \textit{Asahi Shimbun}:

In connection with this [the issue of apology], there are voices saying, "We wanted him to apologize more frankly." There are other voices that technically "this was the limit" at a place of diplomatic negotiations between two countries. Opinions are divided on the evaluation of the way he apologized, but listening to the speech, doubts remained in our minds concerning the words, "great troubles."

He talked about "self-examination." Then, what did Japan do that was wrong? It was not just killing people on the battlefield. It was not restricted to the Sino-Japanese War. How "deeply" have we Japanese considered this question? In specific terms, how did the Government, scholars, teachers and parents carry out self-examination? As a result, how did Japan and the Japanese change psychologically and ideologically?\textsuperscript{19}

The reaction of the Japanese was instant. Three days after the speech, a forty-one-year-old elementary school teacher wrote to the editor of the \textit{Asahi Shimbun}:


\textsuperscript{19} The essay in \textit{Tensei Jingo} is daily translated into English for the \textit{Asahi Evening News}. See \textit{Asahi Evening News}, September 28, 1972, p. 4.
I am very much disappointed in the Premier when he simply said that he would "make self-examination." If he had looked back on the past history correctly, he would and should have uttered sincere words of apology to the Chinese people and of condolence to the war victims.

I am all for the normalization of relations based on the equal stands. But, it is one thing to normalize relations on an equal footing; it is quite another to apologize frankly for the past misdeeds. I wished Premier Tanaka would have first made a profound apology to the Chinese people on behalf of the Japanese people.20

One political commentator echoed the same feeling, when he wrote that Premier Tanaka should have uttered a succinct statement "I apologize" instead of using such a vague expression as "we gave you troubles" with an equally vague adjective "great" prefixed to the noun "troubles." The same critic continued: "The Japanese side may have made an apology at the closed-door negotiation table. I like to think it has. But my feeling is that the first banquet was an excellent public opportunity for the Premier to express a sincere feeling of apology to the Chinese audience."

It is interesting to note that if the contro-


versial phrase sounded carefully guarded, the joint communique signed four days later went much further. "The Japanese side," it stated, "is keenly aware of Japan's responsibility for causing enormous damages in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself" (Communique, par. 5). [Italics mine.] The statement continued: "The abnormal state of affairs which has hitherto existed between the People's Republic of China and Japan is declared terminated on the date of publication of this statement" (Communique, par. 7). During the four-day negotiations, the Japanese side must clearly have given in to the Chinese demands of apology and of declaring the state of war terminated. Tanaka must have been prepared to make this much concession at the negotiating table.

Then, it would have been of greater national interest to Japan if the Japanese Premier had politely and at the same time courageously made a clear-cut apology for the past atrocious deeds and declared the state of war terminated at the formal banquet before the immediate, international audience of the Chinese people and the national audience of the Japanese people to be reached via satellite-borne television. Such a direct approach on Tanaka's part would have been consonant with the high level of expectations held by
both the Chinese and the Japanese audiences toward his mission, thereby having immensely facilitated his rhetorical endeavors to reduce especially the psychological aspect of the international distance between Japan and China. This stance would have impressed the audiences, both national and international, for his straightforwardness and sincerity. This, in turn, could have enhanced his credibility, thus having successfully reduced whatever interpersonal distance there might have been between the guest and his hosts. Actually, however, the paragraph of the first banquet speech under discussion virtually alienated the rhetor from his varied audiences and therefore contributed greatly to his unsuccessful rhetoric of distance reduction.

The main reason for Premier Tanaka's guarded expression of apology to the Chinese was the necessity of his dealing with the right wing faction in his ruling Liberal Democratic party, which remained critical of his reconciliation with Peking and of the effect and impact this rapprochement would have on Japan's diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Some pro-Taiwan members of the party contended that the statement of a proper apology and the declaration of the termination of war had already been made at the time of the signing of a Peace Treaty between the governments of Japan and of Nation-
alist China in 1952. They knew that the normalization of relations with Peking would automatically mean the termination of formal diplomatic relations with Taipei.

Recognizing that the handling of the Taiwan issue might be problematic, Premier Tanaka and his advisers, according to one Japanese correspondent, frequently revised his speeches so that some parts might sound more appeasing to the small, but noisy group of pro-Taiwan members in his Liberal Democratic party. The same correspondent continued: "Because of these drastic revisions, the speeches sounded mild and at times very vague. The Premier's political judgment was that he should take care at least for the time being not to irritate some hawkish members of his ruling Liberal Democratic party." On the basis of this highly political assessment, Tanaka chose to appease this small faction of his party at the expense of alienating the more important and majority segments of the national audience of the Japanese people. Any sensible rhetor would easily have avoided this kind of risk in his rhetorical transactions. Tanaka's failure to reduce the psychological aspect of international

---

distance came from his concern with the domestic political consideration to the extent of totally disregarding the high expectation level of the immediate, international audience of the Chinese people and the equally high expectation level of most of the national audience of the Japanese people.

The above discussion of the issue of apology and how Premier Tanaka expressed it inevitably posed the problem of translation and a translator in international and intercultural communication. It has been contended in the theoretical part of this study that the rhetor's strategy of maximizing the use of an interpreter or of calculated dependence on the medium of translation, if skillfully and dexterously executed, will serve as an effective reducer of the psychological aspect of international distance produced by the multiplicity of languages involved. Unlike President Nixon, Premier Tanaka failed to take into account the real implications which the problem of translation would carry in his rhetorical transactions. His use of the medium of translation fell far short of achieving success in his rhetoric of distance reduction.

The linguistic and semantic problem with the controversial phrase "great troubles" was that the Japanese original for this phrase meiwaku [迷惑] was
officially translated by a Japanese translator into mafan [麻煩] in Chinese. A renowned Japanese scholar in the Chinese language flatly stated that meiwaku Tanaka used did not carry any implication of apology at all. Meiwaku is very vague in meaning, according to this scholar, and the modern Chinese does not have this phrase which is commonly used in Japanese. He stated that the translated term mafan bears a light meaning of "sorry for a mistake." In a letter to the editor of the Asahi Shimbun entitled "A Serious Mistranslation: On Purpose or Out of Ignorance?" the director of a Chinese language training school echoed the same view and questioned the accuracy of the translation of meiwaku in Japanese into mafan in Chinese. This reader went on to point out the serious problem of a translator:

Mafan is commonly used to mean "sorry for a trouble" or "excuse me." It does not bear a meaning of apology at all. The important thing about all this is that this translation was not simultaneously made while the speaker was delivering his speech but must have been prepared far in advance based on the draft of the speech by the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If this is the case, the official translator should be blamed.

Two factors may account for such a seri-

23 Professor Akiyasu Todo's comments were reported in Shukan Asahi (Asahi Weekly Magazine), October 13, 1972, p. 29.
ous mistranslation. One reason may be that the translator viewed the Japanese aggression on China as just a little trouble. The other explanation may be that his mistranslation stemmed from his sheer ignorance of the Chinese language and people.24

To these two possible explanations should be added another important factor to clarify the translation problem in international and intercultural communication. The true explanation for mistranslation may sometimes be found in the real intent of the rhetor himself rather than in his translator. The Japanese translator Tanaka had used must have been selected on the basis of his expertise in the Chinese language. It is highly inconceivable, therefore, that this official interpreter mistranslated the particular term under discussion out of sheer ignorance. In addition, when a translator assumes an official capacity as such, he is usually not in a position to express his own personal views and perceptions. It must be assumed, then, that when the official interpreter for the Japanese Premier translated meiwaku into mafan in Chinese, this was done with the full knowledge and approval of the rhetor he was supposed to serve. Mr. Tanaka, in other words, must have permitted his translator to render the

way he actually did for purely political reasons at home in Japan.

The ensuing Chou-Tanaka meetings after the first banquet were reported to have been filled with tense moments of arguments and counter-arguments over the crucial issue of apology, particularly over Tanaka's use of the word meiwaku. After his return from the trip Tanaka introduced the behind-the-scenes story of tense verbal exchanges over this matter to the plenary session of his ruling party. The Japanese Premier quoted Chou as arguing that "the term mafan is used in China when one has accidentally put a few drops of water over the skirt of a woman," while Tanaka defended his use of meiwaku, saying to the Chinese Premier that this was an accepted classical form of apology in the Japanese language. 25

In the case of the Tanaka trip, Chinese and Japanese were the two official languages. The fact that many correspondents from English-speaking countries covered this event, however, added to the complexity of the translation problem. The specific linguistic problem reportedly took place among corre-

25Asahi Shimbun (morning ed.), October 1, 1972, p. 3.
spondents covering the first banquet. They were not provided with an English language text of the Japanese Premier's keynote speech, causing confusion as to how exactly he had phrased his apology for the "great troubles." The case in point was Tanaka's phrase "profound self-examination" [fukai hansei]. A Chinese foreign ministry official, giving an unofficial translation, quoted Tanaka as having expressed "deep repentance" at the "great troubles" brought upon China by the Japanese invasion and aggression. Japanese officials suggested, however, that the word "repentance" was too strong and offered several other alternatives, each of them tending to weaken the nuance of apology. The Japanese side described Tanaka's phrase as a traditional form of apology, conveying deep feeling of reflection and self-examination. It must be pointed out in all fairness that what the Japanese officials were explaining was just a quibble over words rather than clarification.

What all this signified in Mr. Tanaka's rhetoric of distance reduction was that the controversial paragraph of his keynote address fell far short of ful-


filling the high expectation level of the Chinese audience and that of the majority of the Japanese audience and, consequently, of reducing the psychological aspect of the international distance lying between Japan and China.

What rhetorical strategies did Premier Tanaka consciously utilize for the purpose of reducing interpersonal and international distance? Throughout his rhetorical campaign one specific strategy came to the fore in his total scheme for distance reduction. Like Richard Nixon, Kakuei Tanaka relied heavily upon the strategy of maximizing common grounds for broad agreement instead of magnifying inevitable differences in ideology and social systems that were impossible to bridge over. Striking a different note right after the paragraph on apology, the Japanese Premier declared that the two countries "should not forever linger in the dim alley of the past," but should concentrate their energies on building a friendly relationship "in the interests of tomorrow" (First Banquet, par. 4). Premier Tanaka then set out to expound the keynote theme of his trip:

It goes without saying that Japan and China have different political convictions and social systems, yet, I think, in spite of all this, it is possible for Japan and China to establish good-neighborly and
friendly relations. . .

. . . of course, the two sides have their own basic positions and peculiar conditions. But despite the fact that some minor differences exist between the positions and views of the two sides, I believe it is possible for Japan and China to overcome their divergence of views and reach agreement in the spirit of seeking common ground on major questions and of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation (First Banquet, pars. 5-6).

This spirit of putting aside minor differences for the sake of the greater common interest was also evident in the joint communique (pars. 6 and 12) and in the second banquet speech in which Tanaka said in part: " . . . I believe that these problems [lying between Japan and China] can be overcome if both nations deal with them in a spirit of mutual concession and mutual trust" (Second Banquet, par. 6).

Tanaka believed that China and Japan could share common grounds in several areas. He said that the common interest was to be found in the earnest desire on both parts to normalize the relations hitherto unnatural and abnormal (Communique, par. 6 and Shanghai Banquet, par. 2). Tanaka was confident that the normalization of relations would inevitably lead to "the relaxation of tension in Asia" (Communique, par. 6), "peace in Asia and in the world" (Second Banquet, par. 7), and "prosperity in Asia and in the world at large"
(First Banquet, par. 4).

With this much, Premier Chou obviously agreed. He was all for shelving differences of the past for the sake of seeking common agreement for the future, as he spoke in his first banquet speech of "seeking common ground on major points while reserving differences on minor points." This did not follow, however, that the Chinese leader was willing to forget the past for the sake of the future. He firmly abided by their principle that the future should be based on the past. On the question of the termination of war, for instance, Premier Chou stressed that the Japanese invasion on China had caused great damages, and that the termination of the state of war was yet to be declared by the Japanese leader. He hinted that without the Japanese initiative to settle this question and other knotty issues there would be no progress in the normalization talks. This highly principled stance on Chou's part contrasted strongly with that of Tanaka, who seemed to imply, particularly in his strategy of maximizing common grounds, that it would be more important to look forward to the future than to look back on the past. His real motive for emphasizing the importance of max-

28 Asahi Evening News, September 27, 1972, p. 4.
imizing agreement rather than magnifying difference seemed to lie in his conscious effort to bypass, if possible, the stigma of referring to the abominable past. It must be concluded, therefore, that the tremendous negative impact created by the controversial paragraph and Tanaka's ambivalent stance on major issues as implied in his discourses tended to cancel whatever favorable effect this strategy of maximizing agreement could have otherwise produced for the purpose of reducing the psychological aspect of the international distance between Japan and China.

It has been the contention of the theoretical part of my study that the strategy of identifying the rhetor's theme and ideas with those his audiences adore will serve as another effective reducer of both interpersonal and international distance. One may recall that wherever he visited in China, President Richard Nixon consciously uttered rhetorically quotable remarks by identifying his major theme and ideas with those national figures and places of interest which the Chinese and American audiences revered respectively for the sole purpose of reducing distance, both interpersonal and international. The names and thoughts of Mao, Washington, and Lincoln, and his impressions of Peking, the Great Wall, the Ming Tombs, Hangchow, and Shanghai
were subtly woven into his speeches for achieving maximum identification with his audiences, thereby attempting to enhance his ethos in their minds for the rhetorical purpose of reducing distance.

Although Premier Tanaka followed the same tour route as Nixon, except that his itinerary excluded Hangchow, Premier Tanaka failed to use this strategy of identification with sufficient skill to have facilitated the fulfillment of his rhetorical purpose. Referring to the meeting with Chairman Mao, he simply mentioned that the conversation turned out to be "impressive" (Second Banquet, par. 3). This fell far short of establishing identification with his Chinese audience. Of Shanghai, he said: "Of all the big cities in China, Shanghai is closest to Japan. The Ballet Troupe of your city visited Japan a few months ago and impressed our people with its excellent performances" (Shanghai Banquet, par. 3). This was all the Japanese Premier could do in terms of the strategy of establishing identification with his audiences. It came short of producing rhetorical effects that could have contributed much to the reduction of the interpersonal distance between himself and his hosts and the international distance between Japan and China.

It has been contended in this study that the
mass media, especially satellite-borne television, has come to assume an important function as an effective reducer of mainly geographical distance in international and intercultural communication. The preceding chapter has characterized President Nixon as a master of using television channels, one who fully realized their effectiveness and capability in his rhetoric of distance reduction.

The scenes of Premier Tanaka's arrival in Peking and the banquets were likewise televised live in color through a communications satellite and a Japanese portable ground station. The exact number of the TV viewers' rate in Japan on this occasion was not known, but officials of Japan Broadcasting Corporation (N.H.K.) and private broadcasting companies estimated that seventy per cent of Japan's twenty-seven million TV sets were tuned in to this historic event.29

Without the rhetor's understanding of the magnitude and dimension of satellite-borne television as a carrier of messages across national and geographical boundaries, its potential effectiveness will be of no use. An examination of the Japanese Premier's rhetorical discourses revealed that there was no conscious

29Japan Times, September 26, 1972, p. 2.
effort on his part to maximize the use of this powerful channel to get his message over the geographical aspect of international distance. The presence of the conservative pro-Taiwan elements at home to be reached by television must have forced him to be all the more cautious, reserved, and at times evasive concerning the knotty issues of Taiwan, apology, and termination of war. Instead of using television constructively as one strategy for distance reduction, he was passively conditioned and influenced by the presence of international television, thus making himself a victim, rather than a master, of this modern electronic medium. A columnist for a Tokyo paper tersely observed the effect of satellite-borne television in the following words: "While watching the television relay, the more we thought that Peking was closer, the more strongly were we impressed on the other hand by the 'distance' between Japan and China." He was referring here to the psychological distance between the two nations that remained unchanged or became expanded in spite of Tanaka's trip. This ill effect created by television contrasted

---

30 This observation was made by a correspondent for a London newspaper. *The Times*, September 26, 1972, p. 6.

31 "Peking Is Closer" in the column *Vox Populi, Vox Dei*, *Asahi Evening News*, September 27, 1972, p. 4.
strongly with the favorable effect upon Nixon's rhetoric of distance reduction produced by his careful preparation for media utilization.

Diplomatically speaking, Kakuei Tanaka's trip was successful in that he could achieve his main goal of establishing the diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. It must be mentioned, however, that from the very beginning the summit was clearly destined to be a success in a diplomatic sense, since prior preparations and negotiations had been completed before the Premier arrived in Peking. It is for this reason that his mission should be evaluated from the rhetorical rather than the diplomatic point of view. How he rhetorically responded to the unique situation in which he found himself should be a focal point here.

Like Nixon, Tanaka, too, faced the problem of reducing the interpersonal distance between himself and Chinese leaders and the geographical and psychological aspects of the international distance between Japan and China. He publicly responded to this unique rhetorical situation with three formal banquet addresses and one official document. His rhetorical discourses, overall, lacked ingenious strategies and tended to be dull, except, perhaps, the first banquet speech widely considered his keynote address. On analyzing them, one may
easily find that his discourses were full of appeals usually directed to the general platitude rather than to the minds and hearts of his international and national audiences. He had no sense for the dynamism of the varied audiences in an international and intercultural context. Above all, he made a serious mistake in bringing in the characteristically ambiguous and at times illogical way of thinking and expression of the Japanese into the logically-oriented, highly principled frame of reference of the Chinese. In other words, he fatally misread the character of his international audience of the Chinese people in terms of their hopes and expectations toward his mission. Likewise, his misjudgment of his own home audience was betrayed in his conscious effort to appease the small segment of his ruling party at the expense of alienating the majority of his countrymen. Ironically enough, he ended up in satisfying neither the minority nor the majority of his national audience. Although he faced an unusually complex rhetorical situation, he was not cognizant of and consequently not able to employ fully available rhetorical strategies for the purpose of reducing distance. Premier Tanaka, in sum, responded to the demand of the situation with the low level of rhetorical sophistication. All these factors combined to function
negatively in his rhetoric of distance reduction.

**Outcome and Implications of Tanaka’s Rhetoric of Distance Reduction**

Chapter Three has made it clear that the majority of the Japanese welcomed Tanaka’s proposed détente with China with excitement, hope, and expectation perhaps partly because of their sense of geographical proximity and historical kinship with China and partly because of their sense of guilt over their treatment of China in the twentieth century. They extended their whole-hearted support to his mission for restoring diplomatic relations with Peking. They therefore sent off the Premier to China with the high level of expectation.

Equally as jubilant, though not outwardly, were the Chinese leaders who signaled hints of approval and support to Tanaka’s desire to normalize relations through their controlled media. China’s sheer speed with which her leaders arranged Tanaka’s visit was one good indication that the Chinese expected much to come out of this historic event. In addition, it should be judged from all indications, particularly from the Chinese press treatment of Tanaka’s scheduled visit, that the expectations of the Chinese toward the Tanaka mission were much higher than those toward the Nixon trip. To summarize, Tanaka’s international audience and the
majority of his national audience highly expected their leaders to establish full diplomatic relations, which they hoped would, in turn, contribute greatly to stability and peace in Asia.

The preceding section of this chapter has indicated that the Japanese Premier responded with the low level of rhetorical sophistication to this high expectation level of his international audience and of the majority of his national audience. Tanaka's rhetorical campaign in China, in other words, were characterized by such independent variables as the low level of his rhetorical sophistication in response to the exceptionally high expectation level of his international audience of the Chinese people and the low level of his rhetorical sophistication in response to the generally high expectation level of his national audience of the Japanese people. This combination of the independent variables is represented by Type 6 of the interaction model I have formulated in Chapter Five. The model has predicted a high degree of distance expansion as the probable outcome out of this type of interaction. This combination of the variables, in other words, should be judged as a failure from the standpoint of the rhetoric of distance reduction with which my study has been concerned. I have previously reasoned that this predicted
rhetorical failure will probably come from the rhetor's inability to make an accurate assessment of the expectations of his audiences, both international and national, or to his incompetence in achieving rhetorical sophistication sufficient enough to satisfy the high expectation level of both audiences.

My analysis of Premier Tanaka's rhetorical campaign in the preceding section of this chapter has indicated that he failed to achieve his rhetorical purpose of reducing interpersonal and international distance. His rhetorical campaign produced noticeably undesirable side-effects on his audiences, both international and national. This assessment of Tanaka's rhetorical endeavors has tended to confirm the validity of the prediction that the interaction model has made concerning the possible outcome of Type 6 in international and intercultural communication.

Several factors may account for Premier Tanaka's failure in his rhetoric of distance reduction. It is understandable that the high level of expectations held by the international and national audiences must have made his endeavors to fulfill them all the more difficult. In the case of Nixon, since both Chinese and American audiences did not expect anything fantastic to come out of his mission, the President must have
felt all the more relaxed at least psychologically. This psychological advantage, in turn, must have made his rhetorical campaign much easier to wage than it would have been otherwise. In the case of Tanaka, however, the fact that his international and national audiences held the exceptionally high level of expectations toward his mission must have placed him in a difficult position to fulfill them with the mediocre level of rhetorical sophistication. The situation demanded that he respond to it with the high level of rhetorical sophistication. This he failed to do.

This leads me to contend that what makes a difference in the outcome of the rhetoric of distance reduction is the speaker's level of rhetorical sophistication. I further maintain that what determines his rhetorical sophistication level includes such factors as his culture's perception of rhetoric and speech communication and some national characteristics that shape the nature of communication in his society.

The Japanese Premier's inability to achieve the high level of rhetorical sophistication may be accounted for by not so much his personal idiosyncrasies as cultural peculiarities of the society in which he has been reared. It would be certainly difficult for those who have been familiar with a long tradition of Western
rhetorical theory and practice to believe that little constructive attention has ever been paid to the importance of communication by the Japanese people. Japan has actually been barren of the tradition of rhetoric and communication. Cultural anthropologist Masao Kunihiro made this point:

In Japan, language, or communication through language, has not received the same emphasis as in the West. Rather than an expression of one's own will or thoughts, language has been a way of casually throwing the other guy a ball in order to get a reaction from him on which to base one's next action. It has been considered poor policy to use words as a tool to express one's views, to persuade the other fellow or to establish any depth of understanding. Language as an instrument of debate or argument is considered even more disagreeable and is accordingly avoided. Thus, in Japanese society, use of words becomes a sort of ritual, not often to be taken at face values.32

What are the reasons behind such distrust of communication in general or rhetorical communication in particular? Kunihiro and others attributed this tendency to Japan's long history of racial, ethnic, and linguistic homogeneity. In a highly homogeneous society like that of Japan, its members tend to share common attitudes, life-styles, and ways of thinking.

Because of the feeling of familiarity and cohesion among them, maximal understanding and consensus will be achieved with the minimal necessity for persuasion through rhetorical communication.\(^\text{33}\)

Another reason for the Japanese contempt for rhetorical communication may be traced to the hierarchical structure of the Japanese society. Despite the recent socio-economic changes, it is still highly structured vertically by age, sex, level of education, occupation, and other social factors. This type of society tends to have one-way communication where the will of those higher up the ladder is conveyed downward with no flow of communication going upward from the lower level of social structure. The vertical society usually creates a strong bond in human relations, thus exerting a high degree of compulsion on its individual member. Having examined the nature of interpersonal persuasion in the Japanese society, Kazuo Nishiyama concluded: "Under this system [of the vertically stratified Japanese society], a strong emphasis is placed on a persuader's interpersonal relationships

\(^{33}\)Kunihiro, "Indigenous Barriers," pp. 97-98. The same view was also expressed by Shigehiko Toyama, "Sutairu to Retorikku no Aida" (Between Style and Rhetoric), Bungaku (Literature), September, 1968, pp. 13-14.
rather than on his technical competence [for persuasion]."^34

As a result, under this closed communication system the people tend to think it sufficient and at times safer to pay more attention to manner rather than matter of communication, if they need to communicate at all. Formalism, in other words, is one characteristic of Japanese human interaction, as sociologist Hidetoshi Kato observed that the Japanese people "are more conscious about the form of communication than about the content."^35 Formalism in communication is closely related to the development and predominance of the poem as the main vehicle for the expression of ideas and feelings.

It is symbolic to note in this respect that on his arrival in Peking Premier Tanaka composed a poem in Chinese and expressed his feeling of expectation and hope to the effect that

---


Japan and China severed their relations many years ago. But now the time has come to resume these links. The people of China see me with warmth in their eyes. Peking weather now is very clear and the atmosphere of autumn most profound.

Kakuei Tanaka

It is symbolic, too, that when China learned Tanaka had composed a Chinese poem, Chairman Mao Tsetung, in accordance with Chinese etiquette, answered this gesture with the gift—the six annotated volumes of the works by the third century B.C. Chinese poet Chu Yuan. In addition, at the fourth meeting there reportedly was an exchange of Chinese sentences written in calligraphy between Premier Chou and Premier Tanaka. When the Chinese host presented Tanaka with a Chinese sentence ("What has been said should be trusted; what has been started should be completed"), the Japanese

---

36 This translation was supplied by Kyodo News Agency. Japan Times, September 27, 1972, p. 1.

A corollary to the Japanese preoccupation with formalism in communication might be called the aesthetics of ambiguity that springs from the sparing use of communication medium. In a highly homogeneous and hierarchically structured society its members would find it suitable and often safer to avoid being specific in expression and to leave the task of reading between the lines to the receivers of messages for the main purpose of maintaining harmonious and cordial interpersonal relationships. This characteristically Japanese way of expression must have influenced the Japanese Premier when he uttered such controversial and vague phrases as "great troubles," "self-examination," and "abnormal and unnatural state" in his discourses. He

---

should have recognized that his intracultural modes of thinking and expression do not always facilitate his rhetorical campaign in international and intercultural communication. They, in fact, served as barriers to the achievement of the high level of his rhetorical sophistication.

The implication of all this is that each culture has its own way of perceiving rhetoric and communication, and that this unique perception will, in turn, influence and condition the way a speaker sets out to wage a rhetorical campaign in an international and intercultural communication situation.

Another explanation for the Japanese Premier's failure in his rhetoric of distance reduction is that his rhetorical endeavor was founded on the shaky optimism and miscalculation based on the so-called dobun doshu setsu, or "same character (or script), same stock" theory. This phrase, in essence, means: Japan and China are neighboring countries and they have had mutual exchanges in culture and people for over two thousand years. The people of both countries are of the same yellow race and closely resemble each other in face and form. Japan has devised a means of writing which uses Chinese characters and has even invented a method of reading Chinese in a Japanese way. It is,
therefore, said that the Japanese and Chinese use the "same character" and are of the "same stock." This expression has been used to demonstrate good feelings between the two nations. Behind this phrase lies a general optimistic feeling of the Japanese that Asians are Asians, and that they can understand each other because they are Orientals.

Just before his trip to China Premier Tanaka expressed his hope to newsmen at the press conference to the effect that since we are Orientals, we will be able to arrive at a good conclusion if we talk in all sincerity. This optimism founded on the "same character, same stock" theory reflected the total lack of mental preparedness on the part of the Japanese Premier. A renowned scholar in the Chinese classics warned: "The Japanese should approach the Chinese as foreigners, just as the Chinese view the Japanese as foreigners."

Harvard Asia scholar Edwin Reischauer, a former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, remarked with caution that external similarities such as ethnic backgrounds and lin-


guistic and cultural ties can be misleading. He went on to observe tersely: "The two societies are radically different. I do not see them drawing close together merely on the basis of being Asian."\(^{41}\)

Reischauer's observation was shared by Donald Keene, an expert in Japanese literature and culture, who recently remarked: "... despite all the cultural influence received from China over the centuries, the Japanese and Chinese are basically quite different peoples."\(^{42}\) A clearer realization of this stern reality on the part of the Japanese Premier would have made him more mentally and at the same time rhetorically prepared for this historic mission of rapprochement.

The "same character, same stock" theory seems to reflect a characteristically Japanese frame of reference. Hidetoshi Nishimura, an Asahi Shimbun correspondent who accompanied Premier Tanaka to Peking, made the following significant observation: "The Chinese remind us the Japanese that we are foreigners to them. This remark has struck me most. The Japanese may have had an unconscious feeling of amae [dependency] that,  

\(^{41}\)Quoted in Time, October 9, 1972, p. 28.

sharing the 'same character, same stock' with the Chinese, the Japanese can naturally maintain friendly relations with them." Contending that the concept of amae is a key for understanding Japanese personality structure, L. Takeo Doi, a renowned psychiatrist, offered the following definition of the term amae:

"amaeru [the noun form of which is amae] can be translated as "to depend and presume upon another's love." This word has the same root as amai, an adjective which corresponds to "sweet." Thus amae can have a distinct feeling of sweetness, and is generally used to express a child's attitude toward an adult, especially his parents. I can think of no English word equivalent to amae except for "spoil," which, however, is a transitive verb and definitely has a bad connotation, whereas the Japanese amae does not necessarily have a bad connotation, although we say we should not let a youngster amae too much. I think most Japanese adults have a clear memory of the taste of sweet dependency as a child and, consciously or unconsciously, carry a lifelong nostalgia for it.

Premier Tanaka must have entertained a feeling of amae that whatever he might say and however he might say it in China would be understood and accepted by the Chinese people. He must have brought in this character..."

---

43 Hidetoshi Nishimura, "Chugoku Taishu no Nippon Imeji o Pekin no Machi ni Saguru" (Searching for the Chinese People's Image of Japan in the City of Peking), Shukan Asahi, October 13, 1972, p. 25.

teristically Japanese frame of mind into a foreign context of international and intercultural dimension. Whereas, as Professor Doi observed, "the gratification of amaeru stands as the norm in Japanese society, or perhaps it is better to say, as the principle of mutuality which alone guarantees a smooth transaction," in international and intercultural communication the Japanese psychology of amae will most probably bring in ambiguity and confusion to a rhetorical context, thereby hindering "a smooth transaction" between the rhetor and his international audience. Tanaka's conscious or unconscious feeling of amae may, therefore, be said to be partially responsible for his failure in the rhetoric of distance reduction.

Using my proposed models for analysis, this chapter has examined one case of rhetorical failure in terms of distance reduction in international and intercultural communication. I have identified several culture-bound factors that may explain why the Japanese Premier failed in his rhetoric of distance reduction. I have attempted to show that several cultural and national idiosyncrasies of the rhetor, in fact, influ-

enced his perception of distance, his way of choosing particular rhetorical strategies, his rhetorical sophistication level, and, above all, the kind of outcome he could produce out of his rhetorical campaign.
CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The final chapter serves the standard function of summarizing and drawing general conclusions of this study. More specifically, this chapter will include summary statements concerning the major findings of the study, its implications for rhetoric and criticism, and some possible directions the critical research in intercommunication might pursue in the future.

Findings

This dissertation has been divided largely into three parts: the preliminary inquiry, the theoretical formulation, and the actual application of rhetorical criticism of international and intercultural communication. This organizational division, at the same time, has reflected the three major purposes my study has sought to achieve: (1) to review the literature of critical studies on international and intercultural communication primarily from the methodological perspective; (2) to propose a theoretical
basis for analysis as an alternative frame of reference based on the dimension of distance; and (3) to apply the proposed approach to criticism of the actual rhetorical discourses produced by President Richard Nixon and Premier Kakuei Tanaka during their respective trips to the People's Republic of China.

Having reviewed some forty critical studies on international and intercultural communication, I have found that most of them tended to rely on the neo-Aristotelian approach to rhetorical criticism of intercommunication among nations and cultures. I have attributed this excessive preoccupation with neo-Aristotelianism to two factors. First, because of the lack of consciousness on the part of most neo-Aristotelian critics that they were dealing with international and intercultural communication as objects of criticism, they simply set out to analyze this unique type of communication indiscriminately just as they analyze intranational and intracultural communication by using the most dominant approach available. This happened to be the neo-Aristotelian approach. Coupled with this is the second reason that criticism of international and intercultural communication is conspicuous by the total absence of its standard methodology. I have reasoned that this absence must have led even those
critics who were conscious of dealing with communication of international and intercultural dimension to resort to neo-Aristotelianism.

The literature review has also made it clear that the topics of criticism in international and intercultural communication were invariably American-centered, that is, Americans playing the focal role either as the audience addressed by foreign speakers or the rhetors addressing foreign audiences.

I have found it an encouraging sign that several critics developed their own critical methodologies for analysis and applied them to significant events of intercommunication. Instead of relying on the traditional perspective available to them, they at least succeeded in opening up new approaches or viewpoints from which to look at communication across national and cultural boundaries.

I have raised one question concerning the desirability of the neo-Aristotelian approach to rhetorical criticism of international and intercultural communication. It has been assumed that intercommunication among nations and cultures is characterized by the multiplicity of and difference in audience (international and national, their expectations, values, attitudes, and norms), channels (translation, interpreters, and
mass communication media), cultures (foreign and indigenous), and languages (foreign and native). It has been further assumed that this complexity will create a unique rhetorical situation that demands a fresh approach or perspective other than the traditional neo-Aristotelian approach in order to cope with added dimensions of international and intercultural communication.

On the basis of these assumptions, I have historically illustrated two unique rhetorical situations in which President Richard Nixon and Premier Kakuei Tanaka found themselves respectively. I have found these situations representative in that the two leaders were supposed to fulfill simultaneously the varied expectation levels of their international audience of the Chinese people and their national audiences of the American or Japanese people across national and cultural boundaries for the major purpose of reducing the interpersonal distance between themselves and their Chinese hosts and the international distance between their countries and their host country, China. Neo-Aristotelianism has proved to be of little help to cope with the magnitude and dimension of the international and intercultural communication situations I have described. The first part--the preliminary inquiry--of
my study has been concluded with a call for a fresh approach to rhetorical criticism of intercommunication among nations and cultures.

The second part—the theoretical formulation—of my dissertation has started with two major propositions. I have proposed, first of all, that the critic view international and intercultural communication as a campaign in which by employing all the available strategies the rhetor endeavors to respond to the unique situation that demands reduction of the existing distance lying between himself and his audience. I have further postulated that the crucial question that concerns the rhetorical critic of intercommunication should be: how successfully did the rhetor pursue his rhetorical goal of reducing distance without creating any undesirable side-effects upon the varied receivers of his message?

The ensuing discussion of the nature and kinds of distance and the formulation of what I have called a rhetoric of distance reduction have taken their inspiration from the diverse fields of social and behavioral sciences such as anthropology, psychology, sociology, international relations, and speech communication. I have discovered from what the experts in these disciplines said about the nature of distance that the es-
sential function of communication is to establish an appropriate distance between the communicator and the communicatee, whether expanding, reducing, or retaining it. I have maintained that the most important goal the rhetor of intercommunication should achieve is to reduce the existing distance between himself and his audience. It has further been specified that the distance which the rhetor of international and intercultural communication is required to remove is of two kinds: the interpersonal distance between himself and his immediate auditors and the international distance between his country or culture and that of his immediate, international audience. The interpersonal distance has been identified as having two subcategories: the personal and the official. The international distance has also been found to have two subcategories: the geographical and the psychological, the latter being used as a superordinate term to include such subordinate terms as social, racial, cultural, linguistic, and ideological distance. The rhetor of international and intercultural communication, in sum, is supposed to reduce both interpersonal and international distance by employing all the available rhetorical strategies.

What formal strategies are open to the rhetor who endeavors to reduce distance is the next question.
I have posed and answered. I have identified eight formal strategies, both artistic or intrinsic and non-artistic or extrinsic, that might constitute what I have called a rhetoric of distance reduction. So far as the artistic strategies are concerned, I have found the strategies of enhancing ethos and of creating power parity extremely helpful for reducing interpersonal distance. The psychological aspect of international distance may best be reduced by the skillful deployment of the strategies of establishing identification, of maximizing common grounds, establishing a universe of discourse through significant symbols, and creating communion.

I have pointed out at the same time that these intrinsic strategies discussed above are not necessarily exclusive solely with international and intercultural communication. They may, in fact, turn out to be effective rhetorical methods in intranational and intracultural communication. The point I have endeavored to make in this study is that since intercommunication among nations and cultures is usually characterized more strongly by the existence of various kinds of distance between rhetorical participants than intracommunication within one nation or culture, these intrinsic strategies will assume added significance and
relevance as potential distance reducers in international and intercultural transactions of rhetoric.

The non-artistic strategies, on the other hand, are composed of two kinds: that of maximizing the use of the mass media, particularly satellite-borne television, and that of relying on interpreters and translation. I have especially stressed the potentiality of international television as an effective reducer of the geographical aspect of international distance. The interpreter also plays an important role as a rhetorical participant in international and intercultural communication whose expertise will help to reduce the distance created by the difference in languages used between the rhetor and his international audience.

This formulation of a rhetoric of distance reduction has been designed to accomplish two purposes: first, to let the rhetor of intercommunication know what strategies are open to him when he sets out to wage a rhetorical campaign for distance reduction, and, second, to suggest to the critic where he may look to discover what methods the rhetor has utilized in his endeavor to reduce distance.

An analysis of the two rhetorical situations has led me to believe that what makes intercommunication more complicated than intranational and intracul-
tural communication is the presence of the varied levels of expectation which the audiences, both international and national, hold toward the rhetor's mission. I have then postulated that what makes a difference in the rhetoric of distance reduction is how skillfully the rhetor has fulfilled the varied expectations of his audiences by employing all the available rhetorical strategies without creating any ill effects on either side of the listeners. To put it more succinctly, a success or failure in the rhetoric of distance reduction will be determined by the degree of expectation fulfillment on the part of the audiences produced by the international speaker's level of rhetorical sophistication.

Here several important variables have been found predominant in the rhetoric of distance reduction. I have identified as independent variables the expectation level of the international audience, that of the national audience, and the rhetorical sophistication level of the speaker in response to the expectation levels of the audiences. I have further viewed these three variables as having two levels of being "high" and "low." The establishment of an appropriate distance has been specified as the dependent variable.

Having come up with sixteen possible combina-
tions of these variables in international and intercul-
tural communication, I have then made generalizations
or hypotheses concerning the relationships between the
expectation fulfillment and the degree of distance re-
duction. This model of distance-centered rhetoric or
the interaction model has predicted the possible out-
come of each interaction type in terms of distance re-
duction. This interaction model has intended to help
a critic of intercommunication to make an approximate
prediction concerning the probable outcome of the par-
ticular interaction he is analyzing and to help him to
determine which instances of interaction should be se-
lected for further study in order to enrich and refine
the rhetoric of distance reduction in international
and intercultural communication. I have repeatedly
emphasized the importance and value of the heuristic
function this proposed model is capable of performing.

The second model for analysis which I have
formulated is diagrammatical in nature. This model has
been designed to show a critic the interrelatedness of
various components of intercommunication at a glance
with the dimension of distance playing a central role.
I have defined and delineated as major components the
rhetor, the international and national audiences, and
the interpreter under the category of rhetorical par-
participants, the mass media, especially television, and translation under the heading of communication channels, and other categories such as rhetorical strategies for distance reduction, behavior output of the audiences, and international and intercultural settings. Since this model has taken its inspiration from the diverse sources of disciplines, its eclectic, pluralistic, and interdisciplinary nature has been stressed. This model, too, has intended to serve the heuristic function in that it will enable a critic of international and intercultural communication to determine which components are dominantly operating and interacting with the central dimension of distance. The formulation and explanation of these two models for analysis has concluded the second part of my dissertation.

The last part of my study is applicative in nature in that the proposed models for analysis have been applied to two rhetorical situations in order to demonstrate their applicability.

The historic trips made by President Richard Nixon and Premier Kakuei Tanaka of Japan in 1972 respectively have afforded a rhetorical critic excellent opportunities of examining how the leaders of the world as rhetors endeavored to fulfill the varied expecta-
tions of both international and national audiences with their levels of rhetorical sophistication for the major purpose of reducing the existing interpersonal and international distance between themselves and their Chinese hosts. I have examined Nixon's and Tanaka's distance perceptions as revealed in their discourses, their rhetorical strategies for distance reduction in order to ascertain their rhetorical sophistication levels, and the outcomes and implications of their rhetoric of distance reduction.

President Nixon's case, as we have seen, proved to be successful in the rhetoric of distance reduction. His perception of distance apparently was accurate. He utilized numerous available strategies, both artistic and non-artistic, to fulfill the varied expectation levels of his international audience of the Chinese people and of his home audience of the American people for the rhetorical purpose of reducing the existing interpersonal and international distance between himself and his Chinese hosts and between America and China. Although the expectation levels of both audiences toward his mission were relatively low, Nixon responded to them with the high level of rhetorical sophistication. Nixon's rhetorical campaign, in other words, was characterized by the high rhetorical sophis-
tication level in response to the low expectation level of the international audience and the high rhetorical sophistication level in response to the low expectation level of the national audience. This combination of the variables is represented by Type 11 of the proposed interaction model. This type has predicted the reduction, though mild, of distance as the probable outcome. In other words, this pattern of interaction has predicted a success from the perspective of the rhetoric of distance reduction. My rhetorical analysis of Nixon's discourses has tended to support the validity of this prediction.

Several factors may have accounted for Nixon's success in his rhetoric of distance reduction. Having postulated that what makes a difference in the speaker's rhetorical sophistication and eventually in the outcome of his rhetoric of distance reduction is his national and cultural idiosyncrasies, I have discovered in the case of Nixon, among other things, that his national or cultural view of rhetoric and speech communication was primarily responsible for the kind of outcome that he achieved. More specifically, communication consciousness of the American culture apparently accounted for his success in the rhetoric of distance reduction. America has a long tradition of rhetorical theory and
practice. America is, in a word, an oral communication-conscious society. This fact explains why Nixon could successfully employ, or his rhetorically conscious advisers got him to use, those effective strategies I have identified in the applicative part of my study.

Premier Tanaka's case, on the other hand, was judged to be one of failure in the rhetoric of distance reduction. His perception of distance was vague, since it was based on miscalculation and blind optimism. In addition, although the expectation levels of both international audience and most of the national audience were exceptionally high toward his mission, Tanaka failed to respond to them with the high rhetorical sophistication level. He instead tried to appease the minority segment of the special interest group within his own party even at the expense of alienating the more important audience of the Chinese people and the majority of the Japanese people. He eventually ended up in satisfying neither the minority nor the majority of his national audience. His strategies for distance reduction were characterized by vagueness and indecision and influenced more by the domestic political rather than rhetorical considerations.

Tanaka's rhetorical situation was portrayed by
the low rhetorical sophistication level in response to the high expectation level of the international audience and the low rhetorical sophistication level in response to the high expectation level of the national audience. This combination of the variables is represented by Type 6 in my proposed interaction model. This interaction type has been predicted to result in maximum expansion of the existing distance between the speaker and his immediate, international audience, which should be interpreted as a failure from the perspective of the rhetoric of distance reduction. My rhetorical assessment of the Japanese Premier's discourses has tended to confirm the validity of this prediction.

One factor that may have explained Tanaka's failure in the rhetoric of distance reduction was that his audiences' expectations were too high for easy fulfillment. I have argued, however, that what makes a difference in the outcome of the rhetoric of distance reduction is the speaker's rhetorical sophistication, and that what influences his rhetorical sophistication is, again, his national and cultural idiosyncrasies such as his culture's unique conception of rhetoric and speech communication.

In the case of Tanaka, two cultural peculiari-
ties seem to have determined his low rhetorical sophistication level. First, Japan has long been barren of the sound development of rhetorical theory and practice. The Japanese have entertained the deep distrust for rhetorical communication, which may have been the result of the homogeneous and hierarchical nature of the Japanese society. This distrust for rhetorical communication has instead prompted the development of a more formalistic type of communication. It is symbolic to note in this respect that the Japanese Premier resorted to a poem to express his feeling of expectation and hope rather than to intricate strategies of orally-oriented rhetorical communication. This national and cultural peculiarity may have accounted for Tanaka's failure as an oral persuader in his rhetoric of distance reduction.

Another explanation for the Japanese Premier's failure in his rhetoric of distance reduction was that his rhetorical endeavor was clearly founded on the shaky optimism and miscalculation based on the so-called dobun doshu setsu, or the "same character, same stock" theory. He frequently declared that since the Japanese and the Chinese use the same characters and are of the same racial stock, they can understand each other. This posture of Tanaka's reflected the total
lack of mental and at the same time rhetorical preparedness for the China trip on the Japanese Premier's part. Implicit in this position was the characteristically Japanese feeling of *amae* [dependency], which must have eventually influenced Tanaka's psychological frame of mind and his mode of expressing themes and ideas in his discourses.

The final two chapters have thus examined a case of rhetorical success and one of rhetorical failure in terms of distance reduction. I have identified several culture-bound factors that may have explained why the outcomes turned out as they actually did. I have attempted to show that several cultural and national idiosyncrasies of the rhetor conditioned his perception of distance, his way of choosing particular rhetorical strategies, his rhetorical sophistication level, and, above all, the kind of outcome he could produce in his rhetoric of distance reduction. This discussion of unique cultural peculiarities has concluded the last part--the applicative aspect--of my study. Thus, the goals set for this dissertation have been achieved.

**Implications**

What implications this study will have for
rhetoric and criticism is the question I will pose and attempt to answer next.

First, I have frequently stressed that international and intercultural communication is characterized by the multiplicity of and difference in culture, language, and nationality. Premier Tanaka's use of the controversial word meiwaku [troubles] illustrates one significant problem of intercommunication, that is, the problem of language and meaning. The fact that the international audience of the Chinese attached an entirely different meaning to this word from the one the Japanese side intended to assign testifies that the meaning of a word resides not so much in the word itself as in those who speak and hear it, and that their respective perceptions of the meaning of the same word are highly conditioned by their national, cultural, and personal experiences and backgrounds. This inevitable difference in perception is a main source of misunderstanding and miscommunication. This disparity seems to be greatest in international and intercultural communication situations. What all this signifies is an urgent need for a microscopic inquiry into language and meaning in international and intercultural communication.

A corollary to the problem of meaning will be
that of translation, which has assumed added importance in intercommunication among nations and cultures. Mis-translation of both intentional and unintentional nature functions as a major source of communication breakdown. Unintentional mistranslation is easier to detect and to avoid, since it primarily results from the lack of knowledge and expertise on the part of the interpreter.

Intentional mistranslation, on the other hand, creates a knotty problem, since a critic should take into account not only the intention and expertise of the interpreter but also the true and often hidden intention of the rhetor whom he is assigned to serve. More often than not, the real source of intentional mistranslation may be found not so much in the translator as in the rhetor himself. International and intercultural communication is rife with mistranslations and misinterpretations intentionally brought about by the interpreter with the tacit approval and often positive encouragement of the rhetor. This means that the problem of translation in international and intercultural communication may no longer be solved at the level of language but should be approached from the perspective of the rhetor's psychological frame of reference such as his hidden motives and intentions. This
makes the job of a critic doubly difficult and at the same time all the more challenging in the realm of rhetorical criticism of intercommunication among nations and cultures.

Third, it may be recalled that what determined the rhetorical sophistication level of Nixon and Tanaka and eventually the outcome of their rhetoric of distance reduction was their respective national and cultural idiosyncrasies. Particularly important in this respect is my contention that their society's or culture's conception of rhetoric and speech communication functioned as a dominant determinant of a success or failure in their rhetoric of distance reduction.

What all this implies is that each major culture has, to some extent, its own way of knowing, viewing, and valuing things and its own mode of expression and communication. Cultures do impose their own modes and habits of thought, values, feeling, and expression upon their populations and if we want to understand intercommunication among nations and cultures, we must abandon a unitary view of rhetoric and instead develop a divergent view of rhetorical pluralism. The Japanese view of rhetorical communication as being undesirable and unnecessary, for example, is one way, though negative, of looking at the human phenomenon called commu-
nication, whereas the American conception of communication as an indispensable human activity is another mode of viewing rhetoric and speech communication. The idea of rhetorical pluralism, in other words, should be taken to mean that there are many approaches and viewpoints to rhetoric and speech communication in this world.

Ideally, a critic of intercommunication should be well versed in the diverse views of rhetoric and communication held by major cultures. This does not mean, of course, that he should be an expert in all phases of all cultures and nations to assess international and intercultural communication with accuracy and success. It means that he should at least realize the significance and implications of rhetorical pluralism and endeavor to understand the fundamental nature of the cultural and national rhetorics he is directly dealing with in his rhetorical act.

Finally, but most significantly, this study implies the importance and inevitability of the idea of methodological pluralism and eclecticism in rhetorical criticism of international and intercultural communication. Rhetorical criticism of intercommunication among nations and cultures seems broader in scope than that of intracommunication within one nation or cul-
ture, since the former embraces much more complicated interacting constituents than the latter tends to have. This will make the need for methodological pluralism all the more urgent. Divergent methods should develop from the variety of questions asked and the international and intercultural communicative processes that are probed. Furthermore, eclecticism is the only sensible frame of reference to the critical study of intercommunication, because it will involve many disciplines and no one discipline will have adequate theory and techniques to investigate the many questions as yet unanswered in this field.

Here lies the significance of my study. Having taken inspirations from the diverse sources of social and behavioral sciences, I have intended my proposed methodology based on the dimension of distance to be one alternative frame of reference to criticism of intercommunication among nations and cultures. Of course, it does not claim to account for all aspects of international and intercultural communication. But the fact that it has at least explained the two cases of international and intercultural transactions of rhetoric with some degree of clarity and insight will justify me in asserting that my proposed rhetoric of distance reduction should be accepted as one viable
approach to the critical study of international and intercultural communication.

To summarize, the semantic problem, translation complexity, rhetorical pluralism, and methodological eclecticism are the major implications that this dissertation appears to indicate.

**Future Directions**

This study will be concluded with a brief discussion of the directions which a critic of international and intercultural communication might profitably pursue in the future.

When I have formulated a rhetorical framework of distance reduction from the viewpoint of formal strategies, I have emphasized the tentative nature of the proposed rhetoric of distance reduction. It would be profitable for future critics, first of all, to revise and modify my proposed framework on the basis of the results of their additional critical studies on international and intercultural transactions of rhetoric.

Second, the model of distance-centered rhetoric or the interaction model I have formulated in Chapter Five has generated sixteen hypotheses concerning the possible relationships between such independent variables as the expectation level of both the international
and national audiences and the rhetorical sophistication level of the speaker and the dependent variable in the form of distance establishment (whether expansion, retention, or reduction). Since this study has examined only two types out of the possible sixteen combinations of variables in international and intercultural communication, it would be rewarding to see additional studies conducted to confirm, reject, or modify the hypotheses of the rest of the interaction types.

Third, as may be recollected, my proposed interaction model has specified that a critic should look at the independent variable of the audiences' expectations from one dimension: those toward the speaker's mission. It has also required that a critic ascertain the speaker's rhetorical sophistication level through his careful analysis of formal strategies which he has deployed. It seems increasingly clear, however, that another dimension of the "expectation" variable might also influence the outcome of the rhetoric of distance reduction in international and intercultural communication, that is, the audiences' expectations toward the speaker's rhetorical sophistication. How the international and national audiences have perceived the speaker's rhetorical competence before and after his mission seems to be
as important a variable as how the critic has assessed the speaker's rhetorical sophistication level. An inclusion of the audiences' perception of the speaker's rhetorical sophistication as another dimension of the "expectation" variable, in other words, might further refine and enrich the interaction model I have proposed in Chapter Five.

Fourth, one may recall that my review of the literature in Chapter Two has discovered the strong tendency on the part of the American critics to select foreign leaders or spokesmen addressing the American audience as their main focus of criticism. So far as research topics are concerned, two possible future directions might be pursued in order to energize and vitalize rhetorical criticism of intercommunication among nations and cultures. First, it is important and at the same time profitable for future critics to pay more attention to those rhetorical situations in which the American rhetors face the foreign audiences. The American president addressing the Canadian audience or an American ambassador persuading the people of a country to which he has been assigned will constitute new topic possibilities that future critics of intercommunication might explore. Second, I might suggest another topic possibility to remedy the excessive preoccupation with
the American-centeredness, that is, the focus on the Americans playing the role of either the rhetor or the listener. Rhetorical critics might, more rewardingly, look at those situations in which a foreign rhetor sets out to persuade another nationally or culturally different group of people. The case in point may be a German leader addressing the British Parliament. The consideration of these topic possibilities will hopefully provide new insight into the nature of international and intercultural communication.

Finally, future critics will remain interested in what the rhetor has said and how he has said it, but they might advantageously pay more attention as their main focus to those forces which seem to permeate rhetorical discourses and campaigns. There might be, in other words, a shift in focus on the part of future rhetorical critics from their preoccupation with a one-shot rhetorical product yielded by the rhetor to their increased attention to the intricate interactions that will make intercommunication a uniquely rhetorical process. This process view of communication will suggest that future critics' orientation be directed toward the operating forces and interacting dimensions of rhetoric rather than toward the rhetor as a persuading agent.

It is to be hoped that these suggested future
directions will vitalize and refine the critical theory and practice of the rhetoric of distance reduction in particular and of international and intercultural communication in general.
APPENDIX A

President Richard M. Nixon's Rhetorical Discourses during His Trip to the People's Republic of China, February 21-28, 1972
Mr. Prime Minister and all of your distinguished guests this evening! On behalf of all of your American guests, I wish to thank you for the incomparable hospitality for which the Chinese people are justly famous throughout the world. I particularly want to pay tribute, not only to those who prepared the magnificent dinner, but also to those who have provided the splendid music. Never have I heard American music played better in a foreign land.

Mr. Prime Minister, I wish to thank you for your very gracious and eloquent remarks. At this very moment, through the wonder of telecommunications, more people are seeing and hearing what we say than on any other such occasion in the whole history of the world. Yet, what we say here will not be long remembered. What we do here can change the world.

As you said in your toast, the Chinese people are a great people, the American people are a great people. If our two people are enemies the future of this world we share together is dark indeed. But if we can find common ground to work together, the chance for world peace is immeasurably increased.

In the spirit of frankness which I hope will characterize our talks this week, let us recognize at the outset these points: We have at times in the past been enemies. We have great differences today. What brings us together is that we have common interests which transcend those differences. As we discuss our

---

1To establish the authenticity of texts of this speech and of the subsequent speeches and remarks, I have examined the following three sources: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, the Department of State Bulletin, and the New York Times. I have found that the slight variations are found not in content or wording but in punctuation. The texts that follow are taken from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, February 28, 1972, pp. 464-82.

2The number in the brackets indicates the paragraph number of a rhetorical discourse.
differences, neither of us will compromise our principles. But while we cannot close the gulf between us, we can try to bridge it so that we may be able to talk across it.

[5] So, let us, in these next 5 days, start a long march together, not in lockstep, but on different roads leading to the same goal, the goal of building a world structure of peace and justice in which all may stand together with equal dignity and in which each nation, large or small, has a right to determine its own form of government, free of outside interference or domination. The world watches. The world listens. The world waits to see what we will do. What is the world? In a personal sense, I think of my eldest daughter whose birthday is today. As I think of her, I think of all the children in the world, in Asia, in Africa, in Europe, in the Americas, most of whom were born since the date of the foundation of the People's Republic of China.

[6] What legacy shall we leave our children? Are they destined to die for the hatreds which have plagued the old world, or are they destined to live because we had the vision to build a new world?

[7] There is no reason for us to be enemies. Neither of us seeks the territory of the other; neither of us seeks domination over the other; neither of us seeks to stretch out our hands and rule the world.

[8] Chairman Mao has written, "So many deeds cry out to be done, and always urgently. The world rolls on. Time passes. Ten thousand years are too long. Seize the day, seize the hour."

[9] This is the hour. This is the day for our two peoples to rise to the heights of greatness which can build a new and a better world.

[10] In that spirit, I ask all of you present to join me in raising your glasses to Chairman Mao, to Prime Minister Chou, and to the friendship of the Chinese and American people which can lead to friendship and peace for all people in the world.
Informal Remarks at the Great Wall
February 24, 1972

[1] Question. Mr. President, what did you think of the Wall?

[2] The President. The Great Wall stands there, the Wall going to the peak of the mountain. It runs hundreds of miles, as a matter of fact, thousands of miles over the mountains and through the valleys of this country. It was built over 2,000 years ago.

[3] I think that you would have to conclude that this is a great wall and it had to be built by a great people. Many lives, of course, were lost in building it. There was no machinery or equipment at the time. It had to all be done by hand. But under the circumstances, it is a certain symbol of what China in the past has been and of what China in the future can become. People who could build a wall like this certainly have a great past to be proud of and a people who have this kind of a past must also have a great future.

[4] My hope is that in the future, perhaps as a result of the beginning that we have made on this journey, that many, many Americans, particularly the young Americans who like to travel so much, will have an opportunity to come here as I have come here today with Mrs. Nixon and the others in our party, that they will be able to see this Wall, that they will think back as I think back to the history of these great people and that they will have an opportunity, as we have had an opportunity, to know the Chinese people, and know them better.

[5] What is most important is that we have an open world. As we look at this Wall, we do not want walls of any kind between peoples. I think one of the results of our trip, we hope, may be that the walls that are erected, whether they are physical walls like this or whether they are other walls, ideology or philosophy, will not divide peoples in the world; that peoples, regardless of their differences and backgrounds and their philosophies, will have an opportunity to communicate with each other, know each other, and to share with each other those particular endeavors that will mean peaceful progress in the years ahead.
So, all in all, I would say, finally, we have come a long way to be here today, 16,000 miles. Many things that have occurred on this trip have made me realize that it was worth coming, but I would say, as I look at the Wall, it is worth coming 16,000 miles just to stand here and see the Wall. We will not climb to the top today. We are already meeting at the summit in Peking.

Let me ask the members of the press, do you think it was worth coming?

Reporters. Yes, Mr. President.

The President. You know, you are lucky, and my wife is lucky, you get out to see the great points of interest. She gives me a report every night. Of course, I would not trade. My talks are very interesting, too.

Question. Mr. President, are you finding the afterhour events as entertaining as we are, such as the athletic events?

The President. Fantastic. I thought the ballet was great, Tom, and I also thought that the athletic event last night was just superb. As you know, I have a rather casual interest in athletics and it has been so reported. The gymnastic events--I have never seen a tumbler like the last one. I have never seen that move made by a tumbler before. I didn't think it was possible to make that move. Then the ping pong table, those little girls and teenaged boys! I used to play a little ping pong years ago--I thought I played it. Now I realize I was playing another game, except for the score.

Then too, the ballet was, of course, as we all know, it had its message and that was one of its purposes but also, while it was a powerful message and intended for that, it was also very dramatic--excellent theater and excellent dancing and music, and really superb acting. I was very impressed.

I have seen ballets all over the world, including the Soviet Union and the United States. This is certainly the equal of any ballet I have seen. I thought some of the production effects were very dramatic, too, like the scene where they showed the guer-
rilla forces going across the stage at the end at great speed in the dark. I can't describe it, but certainly people who had a chance to see it on television will remember it. I thought another thing was the vivid effect when they had the rifle fire, having the gun powder smoke float back into the audience so we could smell it. You had a feel of realism that was quite vivid.
Informal Remarks at the Ming Tombs
February 24, 1972

[1] The President. I have not had an opportunity, of course, to see this before. The only thing I think is comparable to it in the world is the Valley of Kings in Egypt. That is a very different time, of course, and a different country.

[2] But when one sees these tombs, while this does not go back very far in China's history--its history goes back thousands of years rather than hundreds--it is again, of course, a reminder that they are very proud in terms of cultural development and the rest, a rich history of the Chinese people.

[3] As I said earlier, it is worth coming 16,000 miles to see the Wall, and it is worth coming that far to see this, too.

[4] Question. Will you be recommending that Americans apply for visas to have an opportunity to be tourists in China?

[5] The President. I won't comment on that question at this point. When we complete our meetings, we will see what kind of recommendations will be made in that respect. Certainly speaking in a general sense, I think it would be very valuable and worthwhile for Americans and, for that matter, people in all countries, to be able to visit China. It is a great and old civilization, these people who have given so much to the world in terms of culture and development in many ways.

[6] It is important as we think of ourselves as members of the family of man, that we know them and know them better, and I would hope that in the future that my children, and their children as well, would have the opportunity to come here.

[7] I would put it this way: that when we think of the world, most of us think of our own countries, some even our own States, and some just our cities. We should think of the whole world, and we have not known Asia well enough. And when you speak of Asia, the great country of China is a country we have not known long enough. That communication has been cut for the last 20 years, and in the future I would hope one of the developments that would occur as
a result of our trip is that apart from the relations between governments, that people will be able to come here, and that, of course, Chinese people would be able to come to the United States.

[8] I don't mean to suggest that that exchange of people solves the problems of the world or problems between governments. But it so enriches the lives of people to know other civilizations and not to live simply on their own little island.

[9] That is why this experience, I am sure, is not only an interesting experience for us but for the members of the press. I think it reminds us that all of us must work for an open world where people of different cultures, different philosophies, and so forth, may at least have an opportunity to know each other.
Second Banquet Speech in Peking, February 25, 1972

[1] Mr. Prime Minister and our very distinguished guests from the People's Republic of China and the United States of America: It is a great privilege while we are guests in your country to be able to welcome you and the Chinese who are present here as our guests this evening.

[2] On behalf of Mrs. Nixon and all of the members of our official party, I want to express my deep appreciation for the boundless and gracious hospitality which you have extended to us.

[3] As you know, it is the custom in our country that the members of the press have the right to speak for themselves and that no one in government can speak for them. But I am sure that all those from the American press who are here tonight will grant me the rare privilege of speaking for the press in extending their appreciation to you and your Government for the many courtesies you have extended to them.

[4] You have made it possible for the story of this historic visit to be read, seen, and heard by more people all over the world than on any previous occasion in history.

[5] Yesterday, along with hundreds of millions of viewers on television, we saw what is truly one of the wonders of the world, the Great Wall. As I walked along the Wall, I thought of the sacrifices that went into building it; I thought of what it showed about the determination of the Chinese people to retain their independence throughout their long history; I thought about the fact that the Wall tells us that China has a great history and that the people who built this Wonder of the World also have a great future.

[6] The Great Wall is no longer a wall dividing China from the rest of the world, but it is a reminder of the fact that there are many walls still existing in the world which divide nations and peoples.

[7] The Great Wall is also a reminder that for almost a generation there has been a wall between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America.
[8] In these past 4 days we have begun the long process of removing that wall between us. We began our talks, recognizing that we have great differences but we are determined that those differences not prevent us from living together in peace.

[9] You believe deeply in your system and we believe just as deeply in our system. It is not our common beliefs that have brought us together here, but our common interests and our common hopes, the interests that each of us has to maintain our independence and the security of our peoples and the hope that each of us has to build a new world order in which nations and peoples with different systems and different values can live together in peace, respecting one another while disagreeing with one another, letting history rather than the battlefield be the judge of their different ideas.

[10] Mr. Prime Minister, you have noted that the plane which brought us here is named the Spirit of '76. Just this week, we have celebrated in America the birth of George Washington, the Father of our Country, who led America to independence in our Revolution and served as our first President. He bade farewell at the close of his term with these words to his countrymen: "Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all."

[11] It is in that spirit, the spirit of '76, that I ask you to rise and join me in a toast to Chairman Mao, to Premier Chou, to the people of our two countries, and to the hope of our children that peace and harmony can be the legacy of our generation to theirs.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Prime Minister, and all of our friends from China and the United States: When we were planning the schedule for our visit to the People's Republic of China, the Prime Minister determined what cities we would visit. Our time would only permit Peking, of course, and two other cities in this great country. The Prime Minister naturally said one city must be Shanghai, the biggest city in China. And then, out of all of the other great cities in China, he said the other city must be Hangchow.

Now that we have been here, now that we have seen the splendor of this city, we realize why it has been said that heaven is above and beneath are Hangchow and Soochow. I am sure that the proud citizens of this province would say that Peking is the head of China, but Hangchow is the heart of China.

Tonight I wish to express appreciation on behalf of all our party for this wonderful banquet and particularly for the beautiful decorations that we see here and on these tables which are a tribute to the great sense of beauty for which Hangchow is famous all over the world.

I think that since we have applauded the Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee and others, that all of us, too, would like to join in applause for those who prepared this wonderful banquet, who prepared these beautiful decorations, and who served us so beautifully tonight.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Prime Minister, I propose tonight a toast to the health of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, to the health of Premier Chou, to the friendship between the Chinese people and the American people, and to our children and their children. May their future be as bright as the beauty of Hangchow.

On this informal occasion, may I express my appreciation to my Chinese voice, to Mrs. Chang. I listened to her translation. She got every word right.
Joint Communique, February 27, 1972

[1] President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

[2] President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

[3] During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

[4] President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

[5] The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

[6] The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace; just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world,
free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

[7] The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution--this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and
nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.

[8] The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea." It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

[9] There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The
United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

[10] With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

--progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
--both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
--neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
--neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

[11] Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

[12] The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

[13] The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms
its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

[14] The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

[15] Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

[16] The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

[17] The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

[18] President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.
Banquet Speech in Shanghai, February 27, 1972

[1] Mr. Prime Minister, Chairman Chang, and our Chinese and American friends: This magnificent banquet marks the end of our stay in the People's Republic of China. We have been here a week. This was the week that changed the world.

[2] As we look back over this week, we think of the boundless hospitality that has been extended to all of us by our Chinese friends.

[3] We have, today, seen the progress of modern times. We have seen the matchless wonders of ancient times. We have seen also the beauty of the countryside, the vibrancy of a great city, Shanghai. All of this we have enjoyed enormously.

[4] What was most important was the fact that we had the opportunity to have talks with Chairman Mao, with Prime Minister Chou En-lai, with the Foreign Minister and other people in the government.

[5] The joint communique which we have issued today summarizes the results of our talks. That communique will make headlines around the world tomorrow. But what we have said in that communique is not nearly as important as what we will do in the years ahead to build a bridge across 16,000 miles and 22 years of hostility which have divided us in the past.

[6] What we have said today is that we shall build that bridge. And because the Chinese people and the American people, as the Prime Minister has said, are a great people, we can build that long bridge.

[7] To do so requires more than the letters, the words of the communique. The letters and the words are a beginning, but the actions that follow must be in the spirit that characterized our talks.

[8] With Chairman Mao, with the Prime Minister, and with others with whom we have met, our talks have been characterized by frankness, by honesty, by determination, and above all, by mutual respect.

[9] Our communique indicates, as it should, some areas of difference. It also indicates some areas of agreement. To mention only one that is particularly
appropriate here in Shanghai, is the fact that this great city, over the past, has on many occasions been the victim of foreign aggression and foreign occupation. And we join the Chinese people, we the American people, in our dedication to this principle: That never again shall foreign domination, foreign occupation, be visited upon this city or any part of China or any independent country in this world.

[10] Mr. Prime Minister, our two peoples tonight hold the future of the world in our hands. As we think of that future, we are dedicated to the principle that we can build a new world, a world of peace, a world of justice, a world of independence for all nations.

[11] If we succeed in working together where we can find common ground, if we can find common ground on which we can both stand, where we can build the bridge between us and build a new world, generations in the years ahead will look back and thank us for this meeting that we have held in this past week. Let the Chinese people and the great American people be worthy of the hopes and ideals of the world, for peace and justice and progress for all.

[12] In that spirit, I ask all of you to join in a toast to the health of Chairman Mao, of Prime Minister Chou En-lai, and to all of our Chinese friends here tonight, and our American friends, and to that friendship between our two people to which Chairman Chang has referred so eloquently.
APPENDIX B

Premier Kakuei Tanaka's Rhetorical Discourses during His Trip to the People's Republic of China, September 25-30, 1972
First Banquet Speech in Peking, September 25, 1972

[1] His Excellency Respected Premier Chou En-lai, gentleman: I am very happy to be able this time to set foot on the soil of our neighbor China in my capacity as Prime Minister of Japan, at the invitation of His Excellency Premier Chou En-lai. My heart is very much warmed by such a grand evening banquet held here today to welcome us. I hereby express my deep thanks to you gentlemen from various quarters concerned for your considerate attention.

[2] I flew nonstop from Tokyo to Peking on this trip. It makes me once again deeply aware that Japan and China are close neighbors with only a strip of water in between. The two countries are not only so close to each other geographically, but have a history of 2,000 years of rich and varied ties.

[3] However, it is regretful that for several decades in the past the relations between Japan and China had unfortunate experiences. During that time our country gave great troubles to the Chinese people for which I once again make profound self-examination. After World War II the relations between Japan and China remained in an abnormal and unnatural state. We cannot but frankly admit this historical fact.

[4] But we should not forever linger in the dim blind alley of the past. In my opinion, it is important now for the leaders of Japan and China to confer in the interest of tomorrow. That is to say, to conduct frank and sincere talks for the common goal of peace and prosperity in Asia and in the world as a whole. It is precisely for that goal that I have come

---

1 Premier Tanaka spoke in Japanese. I contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, Japan and the Embassy of Japan in Washington, D.C. to ask for English translations of the Premier's speeches. I found out, however, that no English translation is available. Letters to me from Bureau of Information and Culture, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 13, 1974 and from Information Section, Embassy of Japan, February 20, 1974. This Reuter translation of Tanaka's First Banquet Speech in Peking is taken from the Asahi Evening News, September 27, 1972, p. 4.
here. We hope that we can establish friendly and good-neighborly relations with great China and its people and that the two countries will on the one hand respect each other's relations with its friendly countries and on the other make contributions to peace and prosperity in Asia and in the world at large.

[5] It goes without saying that Japan and China have different political convictions and social systems, yet, I think, in spite of all this, it is possible for Japan and China to establish good-neighborly and friendly relations and, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, strengthen contacts, respect each other's stand and carry out cooperation.

[6] The normalization of relations is absolutely necessary to the establishment of good-neighborly and friendly relations between Japan and China on a solid basis. Of course, the two sides have their own basic positions and peculiar conditions. But despite the fact that some minor differences exist between the positions and views of the two sides, I believe it is possible for Japan and China to overcome their divergence of views and reach agreement in the spirit of seeking common ground on major questions and of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. I am willing to accomplish this important task and take a new step forward along the road of long-standing Japan-China friendship.

[7] Finally, I avail myself of my host's wine to propose that we raise our glasses with His Excellency Premier Chou En-lai and other gentlemen in a toast to the happiness and health of His Excellency Chairman Mao Tse-tung, to the health of His Excellency Premier Chou En-lai and the success of his work, and to the lasting friendship between the peoples of Japan and China and peace and prosperity in Asia.
Second Banquet Speech in Peking
September 28, 1972

[1] His Excellency Premier Chou En-lai and our very distinguished guests: It is a great privilege to be able to welcome you and the Chinese leaders as our guests at this banquet of appreciation tonight.

[2] On behalf of Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido, other members of our official party, and the members of the press, I would like to express my deep appreciation for the warm welcome and the gracious hospitality which you have extended to all of us.

[3] Yesterday, I had an opportunity to meet with His Excellency Chairman Mao Tse-tung and to discuss with him the future of the Japan-China relations and other various topics of international concern and interest. I found this meeting extremely impressive.

[4] I have visited the People's Republic of China with one solemn goal in mind: that of achieving the normalization of relations between the two countries. We have had very frank exchanges of views in a friendly atmosphere. As the result of these fruitful discussions, I am sure that our hope to normalize relations is now about to be achieved.

[5] The leaders of both nations had to suffer a long period of waiting and tread a thorny road before they could sit down for knee-to-knee talks. I want to take this opportunity of thanking those Chinese and Japanese people who have made great contributions to the opening of a dialogue between the two countries.

[6] The normalization of relations is a first step toward tomorrow and I would like to seek a new perspective in the major tide of history. There are, however, many problems lying between Japan and China that need to be resolved in the future. But I believe that these problems can be overcome if both nations deal with them in a spirit of mutual concession and mutual trust.

---

2 The translation is mine. The text of this speech in the original was supplied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, Japan.
[7] I am sure that the termination of the abnormal state between the two countries and the normalization of relations which both nations have long desired will not only open a new chapter in the history of the two countries but also contribute to peace in Asia and in the world.

[8] I hope that this visit of ours to your country will provide an impetus to future exchanges in various fields and promote friendship between Japan and China.

[9] It is in this spirit of friendship that I ask you to join me in raising your glasses to the health of China's great leaders, His Excellency Chairman Mao Tse-tung and His Excellency Premier Chou En-lai, to prosperity of the People's Republic of China, and to the lasting friendship between the two countries, and to peace in Asia and in the world.
Joint Communique in Peking, September 29, 1972

[1] At the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan visited the People's Republic of China from September 25 to 30, 1972. Accompanying Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka were Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido and other Government officials.

[2] Chairman Mao Tse-tung met Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on September 27. The two sides had an earnest and friendly conversation.

[3] Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei had an earnest and frank exchange of views with Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, all along in a friendly atmosphere, on various matters between the two countries and other matters of interest to both sides, with the normalization of relations between China and Japan as the focal point, and the two sides agreed to issue the following joint statement of the two Governments:

[4] China and Japan are neighboring countries separated only by a strip of water, and there was a long history of traditional friendship between them. The two peoples ardently wish to end the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between China and Japan -- the realization of such wishes of the two peoples will open a new page in the annals of relations between the two countries.

[5] The Japanese side is keenly aware of Japan's responsibility for causing enormous damages in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself. The Japanese side reaffirms its position that in seeking to realize the normalization of relations between Japan and China, it proceeds from the stand of fully understanding the three principles for the restoration of diplomatic relations put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

---

This English translation of the Joint Communique is taken from the Asahi Evening News, September 30, 1972, p. 4.
The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.

[6] Although the social systems of China and Japan are different, the two countries should and can establish peaceful and friendly relations. The normalization of relations and the development of good-neighbourly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the interests of the two peoples, and will also contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the safeguarding of world peace.

[7] (1) The abnormal state of affairs which has hitherto existed between the People's Republic of China and Japan is declared terminated on the date of publication of this statement.


[9] (3) The Government of the People's Republic of China reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of China and adheres to its stand of complying with Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.

[10] (4) The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan have decided upon the establishment of diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to adopt all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of functions of embassies in each other's capitals in accordance with international law and practice and exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.


[12] (6) The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan agree to establish durable relations of peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in
each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.

[13] In keeping with the foregoing principles and the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Governments of the two countries affirm that in their mutual relations, all disputes shall be settled by peaceful means without resorting to the use or threat of force.

[14] (7) The normalization of relations between China and Japan is not directed against third countries. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each country is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

[15] (8) To consolidate and develop the peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan agree to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship.

[16] (9) In order to further develop the relations between the two countries and broaden the exchange of visits, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan agree to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion of agreements on trade, navigation, aviation, fishery, etc., in accordance with the needs and taking into consideration the existing non-governmental agreements.
Banquet Speech in Shanghai, September 29, 1972

[1] His Excellency Premier Chou En-lai, Chairman Chang Chun-chiao of Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee, and distinguished guests: I would like to take this opportunity of expressing my sincere appreciation for the hearty hospitality extended to all of us by His Excellency Chairman Mao Tse-tung, His Excellency Premier Chou En-lai, the Chinese officials and people during our stay in your country.

[2] As the result of our visit and of fruitful meetings between the Japanese and Chinese leaders, the normalization of relations which both nations had long desired has finally been achieved. We are now about to open a new page in the history of the Japan-China relations. With this successful summitry as a basis for our solid future relations, we are resolved to establish everlasting peace and good-neighborly friendship between the two countries through our constant effort to solve one by one the various problems lying between Japan and China.

[3] The two countries, which had been both close to and at the same time far away from each other, have now literally become close neighbors. Of all the big cities in China, Shanghai is closest to Japan. The Ballet Troupe of your city visited Japan a few months ago and impressed our people with its excellent performances. I hope that this success will promote more exchanges in various fields in the future.

[4] In this spirit of hope, I ask all of you to join me in a toast to the health of His Excellency Chairman Mao Tse-tung, His Excellency Premier Chou En-lai, and His Excellency Chairman Chang Chun-chiao, to peace and prosperity of the Chinese people, and to the lasting friendship between our two peoples.

---

The translation is mine. The text of this speech in the original was supplied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, Japan.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rhetorical Discourses


Public Documents


Books


Scholarly Articles


Chancellor, John. "Who Produced the China Show?" Foreign Policy, No. 7 (Summer, 1972), 88-95.


Ewbank, Henry L., Jr., and Baker, Eldon E. "Khrushchev: Consistent or Contradictory?" Today's Speech, IX (April, 1961), 1-4.


Hall, Edward T. "The Language of Space." Landscape, X (Fall, 1960), 41-45.


Lewin, Kurt. "Some Social-Psychological Differences between the United States and Germany." Character and Personality, IV (June, 1936), 265-93.


Oliver, Robert T. "Speech in International Affairs." *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, XXXVIII (April, 1952), 171-76.


Oliver, Robert T. "The Varied Rhetorics of International Relations." *Western Speech*, XXV (Fall, 1961), 213-21.


Toyama, Shigehiko. "Sutairu to Retorikku no Aida" (Between Style and Rhetoric). Bungaku (Literature), XXXVI (September, 1968), 1012-22.


Vinocour, S. M. "Modern Diplomacy and Speech." Western Speech, XXI (Fall, 1957), 201-206.


Magazine Articles


_______. "Packing the Trunks for China." Newsweek, September 27, 1971, pp. 53-58.


_______.  "The President's Odyssey Day by Day."  Time, March 6, 1972, pp. 13-16.

Newspapers


Dissertations and Theses


Unpublished Miscellaneous Materials


