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INTRODUCTION

Leon Trotsky once remarked that Nicholas II, on the occasion of his coronation in 1894, inherited not only a vast empire, but a revolution. By 1917, after a quarter century of struggle, this revolution had gained ascendency in what had been the empire of the Romanovs. For Trotsky, the process was inexorable, epic, and consistent with the Marxist script of history. While many Western scholars would reject Trotsky's historical determinism, most have studied the meaning and/or logic of 1917 more in terms of the revolutionary movement than the autocracy. Less apparent in that crucial quarter century preceding 1917 was the advent of new political groupings and voices dedicated to the task of preserving the autocracy and Russia's historic institutions. These apologists, drawn frequently from outside official circles, sought to formulate a policy to effectively negate the threat of revolution. Often this quest led these self-appointed apologists far beyond the narrow sphere of official policy to unconventional, even radical, schemes for the reorganization of Russian national life. A Russian "Right"—incipient, aggressive, increasingly autonomous—had emerged during

the reign of Nicholas II to challenge revolution. Until recent times this phenomenon has remained an ignored chapter in modern Russian history.

Lev A. Tikhomirov (1852-1923) provides an interesting expression of this stillborn Russian right. A raznochintets and former member of the Narodnaia volia, Tikhomirov came to the defense of the autocracy by a curious route. After nearly two decades of revolutionary activity, four years of which were spent in prison and six years in exile, Tikhomirov renounced revolution in 1888. His motives were ideological and personal, devoid of any treachery. He was not an agent provocateur, a fact which tsarist authorities respected and Soviet scholars acknowledged. Propelled by an urgent desire to provide Russia an integrated, harmonious socio-political order, Tikhomirov turned to the autocracy. His "second career" as an apologist for the autocracy has passed for the most part unnoticed by students of Russian history, while a more systematic study has been pursued on his earlier revolutionary activity. Soviet scholars have edited and published his memoirs, but predictably in a fashion to accentuate Tikhomirov's relevance to the history of Russia's revolutionary movements. Certain Western scholars have found his transition from revolution to monarchism of compelling interest, but there has been a marked indifference toward Tikhomirov's post-1888 political thought. Once beyond the pale of the revolutionary tradition, Tikhomirov's thought has ceased to command
attention. As Robert F. Byrnes, the biographer of K. P. Pobedonostsev, has lamented, the history of Russian conservative thought has been sorely neglected. ²

Among apologists for the autocracy, Tikhomirov occupied perhaps a unique position by virtue of his approach. His intention was to provide the Russian monarchy and its kindred social and political institutions the same ideological underpinning which Marxism had given socialism. Such a grandiose task dominated Tikhomirov's consciousness at the turn of the century and reached its fruition with the publication of the four volume theoretical work, Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', in 1904. Combining history, social psychology, political science, and religious thought, this work sought to demonstrate the continued viability of the monarchical principle for modern times. As evidenced in this project, Tikhomirov understood that in the twentieth century political stability required a healthy political consciousness within the nation. Around this central work, Tikhomirov produced an impressive series of pamphlets and articles designed to evoke the necessary national awareness concerning the compatibility of the autocracy with Russia's historical, organic development. The autocracy, in his mind, could not survive merely by police measures, but only through the articulation of its essential character and the accompanying

willingness to adapt to the peculiar conditions of the twentieth century.

In addition to Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', most of the major items in Tikhomirov's post-1888 corpus of writing have been available for this study. His polemical tracts written in the immediate period after his return to Russia, his tracts on the workers question and the Duma, and his numerous articles on public affairs as editor of Moskovskie vedomosti (1909-1914) have been accessible. Unfortunately, Tikhomirov's final work, "The Basic Philosophic-Religious Ideas in History," written in the context of the 1917 revolutionary upheaval, was not available for research purposes. This work in manuscript form resides in the Central State Archive in Moscow. This circumstance and the fact that Tikhomirov's editorship of Moskovskie vedomosti ended just prior to the outbreak of war in 1914 has necessitated that this study focus, for the most part, on Tikhomirov's worldview as it crystallized before World War I. Certain fragmentary materials trace his post-1914 life to its tragic conclusion in 1923, but they are not substantial enough to enable the researcher to follow with any clarity the evolution of his ideological outlook and the shifts, if any, which may have occurred in the wake of Russia's epic revolution. The chapter divisions which follow constitute the major components of Tikhomirov's ideological posture as it evolved prior to 1914. A concluding chapter will attempt
to identify those themes which give unity to Tikhomirov's thought and place him within the pre-Revolutionary tradition of Russian intellectual history.
CHAPTER I

A REPENTANT REVOLUTIONARY, THE TRANSITION 
TO MONARCHISM IN 1888

The Fortress of Schlusselburg, captured by Peter the Great from the Swedes, is situated on an island forty miles east of St. Petersburg. No longer operative as a military bastion by the end of the nineteenth century, it had been converted into a prison for the use of the Imperial political police, to achieve even greater significance as a bulwark against domestic foes. By 1890, the grim Schlusselburg contained two important revolutionaries, Vera Figner and N. A. Morosov. Both had been active in the Executive Committee of the Narodnaia volia and their determined opposition to the autocracy had earned them, if not execution, a prolonged period of incarceration.¹ Cut off from the outside world and contact with the scattered remnants of their revolutionary movement, the two prisoners had to sustain their sense of purpose by means of their own

¹Vera Figner was arrested in February, 1883, tried and sentenced to death. This sentence was commuted to a twenty year prison term. She was freed in 1904. N. A. Morosov was arrested in 1881 and was committed to the Schlusselburg fortress from 1884 to 1905. See Lev Tikhomirov, Vospominaniia L'va Tikhomirova, ed. V. P. Alexeev (Moscow, 1927), p. 465.
resources. The harsh prison routine denied them access to certain forms of reading, even from Russian literature. The solitude was both physical and spiritual.

This isolation was broken, quite unexpectedly, by the prison authorities themselves who thrust before their prisoners a tract by an old comrade-in-arms, entitled *Pochemu Ja perestal byt' revoliutsionerom*. Out of malice, the authorities at Schlusselburg had revealed to their captive revolutionaries a cause célèbre which had captivated the attention of Russians at home and abroad months before—the defection of Lev Tikhomirov to the autocracy. Their knowledge of this episode was belated but the shock, the sense of outrage, the incredulity was typical of other revolutionaries who first read the tract in the Spring of 1888.

Trapped in the punitive isolation of the Schlusselburg, both prisoners found the news of Tikhomirov's "renegatstvo" demoralizing, but on reflection, not inexplicable. His tract, set against the background of their own personal knowledge of the author, was a fatuous document. To them, Tikhomirov's conclusion, announced in advance in the title, was more significant than his labored arguments or apparent sincerity. Ignoring any ideological rationale for such a dramatic turnabout, Figner argued that he was "sick psychologically." Sensing in Tikhomirov's life a more deep-seated predisposition for such behavior, Morosov concluded cryptically that
"this always could have been expected." Both remained committed to the idea of revolution and as a consequence of this continued fidelity to the cause long years in prison awaited them. By contrast, Tikhomirov's sense of purpose had led him down a new path, no less political, to a future career as a counter-revolutionary journalist and apologist for the Russian autocracy.

Lev Aleksandrovich Tikhomirov was born in 1852 and died in 1923. His life was exceptional in many ways, spanning two apparently contradictory careers. In separate roles as a revolutionary and a defender of the autocracy, Tikhomirov encountered many significant events and personalities. An associate of the terrorist Zheliabov who dined frequently with Pobedonostsev, a leading theoretician of the Narodnaia volia who later served with enthusiasm under Stolypin, a fugitive from justice for his complicity in regicide who received a golden snuff box from the last Romanov, Tikhomirov is not without enigma and contradiction. The irony of his career is illustrated in the fact that a quarter-century prior to this recognition by Nicholas II, Tikhomirov had penned the petition of Narodnaia volia to Alexander III following the


3See V. A. Maevskii, Revoliutsioner-Monarkhist, Pamiati L'va Tikhomirova (novyi Sad, 1934).
assassination of his father, Alexander II, in March, 1881.

His formal departure from the ranks of the revolutionaries in 1888, on the surface abrupt and dramatic, provided one pivot for this apparent duality.

In his private life Tikhomirov was secluded and self-protective. His memoirs are more a public document than a chronicle of his inner life. Always hidden are his deeper motives, particularly in relationship to his revolutionary youth, a subject which prompted deep remorse in his mature years when his memoirs were written. His diary, which has been carefully edited and published in fragments by Soviet scholars, conveys in its brevity sporadic moments of doubt and despair which punctuated his adult life. Of course, these candid and emotional statements were never intended for public scrutiny. They provided an occasional counterpoint in mood to the often strident character of his formal political posture. For the reader of Tikhomirov's memoirs, there is the inescapable conclusion that his personality, so carefully shielded in his own lifetime and preserved in such a fragmentary and contradictory form in existing documents, will remain elusive and enigmatic.

Tikhomirov's physical appearance, as revealed in a small photograph of him taken in his revolutionary days, conveys a boyish aspect. Small in stature, an unkempt

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4 All dates cited are according to the old style or Julian calendar used in Russia prior to 1918. In the nineteenth century the Julian calendar was twelve days behind the West, thirteen days in the twentieth century.
beard combined with prominent eyes, all enhanced by a bearing that is both disheveled and eccentric, the young Tikhomirov projects an intensity of character, not without a hint of what he once described as a "nervous condition." Contemporary accounts provide additional details. A. N. Bakh, a former revolutionary comrade who once stayed in Tikhomirov's apartment in Paris, described him as a thick set man with a broad ruddy face and "shifty eyes." Furthermore, Bakh added with a fastidiousness more typical of a Parisian bourgeois than a Russian revolutionary that Tikhomirov's clothes were covered with grease spots and traces of food and obviously had never been cleaned.

J. H. Rosny, a journalist who by chance interviewed Tikhomirov in exile for Harpers magazine, confirmed the poverty of those years. Rosny was also struck by Tikhomirov's prominent eyes which evoked in his mind a "restless" quality.

All that is known of Lev Tikhomirov's personality seems to justify the impression of N. A. Charushin, a young revolutionary who fell under his influence in the early 1870's. Charushin described him as "intelligent" and "capable." Noting also a certain sobermindedness,

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5 Tikhomirov, Vospominaniia, p. 200.


8 N. A. Charushin, Detstvo i v gimnazii, Kryzhok
Charushin detected a salient feature of Tikhomirov's personality which his biographer, V. A. Maevskii, would later describe as "professorial." Tikhomirov belonged to that class of revolutionaries who have been distinguished more as theoreticians than activists. Never a Bakunin or a Zheliabov, he displayed a disdain for terror, both as a tactical and moral consideration. Tikhomirov, by personal choice and party decision, was excluded from the elaborate machinations preceding the assassination of Alexander II in March, 1881. More appropriate to his character and talent, Tikhomirov was commissioned by the party to write various articles and to serve as editor of *Vestnik Narodnoi voli*.

As a revolutionary or as a "monarchical tribune," Tikhomirov always maintained an independent bearing. No stranger to discipline or sacrifice, he persistently displayed a capacity for independent action, even maverick behavior. He could accept the rigor of four incredibly difficult years in prison, assume a position of leadership

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on the Executive Committee of Narodnaia volia, defend the ideological posture of the party against the attacks of Plekhanov or later serve in the Ministry of Internal Affairs under Peter Stolypin, but throughout retain a meaningful sense of autonomy. Preserved in his large corpus of writing—memoirs, articles, tracts and books—is this characteristic trait of independence of thought.

As through a glass darkly Tikhomirov spoke of his family background and childhood in his memoirs. His mother, Khristina Nikolaevna Karataeva, was an emotional, deeply religious woman for whom Tikhomirov displayed a profound attachment. She had been reared in an orphanage and at an early age married an army officer who died of tuberculosis shortly after the marriage. Tikhomirov's father, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, was a doctor by profession and came from a family which, over the course of several generations, had supplied the Russian Orthodox Church with many priests. His son Lev was born in 1852 while he was stationed at the military fortress at Gelendzhik in the Caucasus. In his memoirs Tikhomirov said little about his childhood at this beleaguered military bastion on the periphery of the Russian Empire. He attended the gymnasium at Novorossiisk and recorded that at an early age he adopted radical views after reading Pisarev and other writers in Russkoe slovo. Subsequently, Tikhomirov enrolled at the University of Moscow in the medical faculty. Here his radicalism found
reinforcement when he joined a number of radical students who had established ties with the Chaikovskii circle in St. Petersburg. In time, Tikhomirov's studies gave way to active political work.\textsuperscript{12}

The pattern of Tikhomirov's revolutionary life was typical in many respects. After a period of agitation and propaganda work among the workers of Moscow and St. Petersburg, Tikhomirov was arrested in November, 1873.\textsuperscript{13} Held in pre-trial detention for four years, he was released in January, 1878, his four years of internment having satisfied the court. He recorded little during this time of imprisonment, the first year being spent in solitary confinement at the Peter and Paul Fortress and without contact with his family. Having survived this ordeal, Tikhomirov attempted to renew his university studies after his release in 1878, but was refused, perhaps as a consequence of his revolutionary activity. It was at this juncture of his life that another blow was struck. Earlier a love affair had developed between Tikhomirov and Sofia Perovskaia, the future regicide. After his release from prison they quarreled and broke off the relationship. These events had a profound effect on Tikhomirov emotionally. Not for a decade would his prospects for the future and his mood

\textsuperscript{12}Tikhomirov, \textit{Vospominaniiia}, p. 30, pp. 70-75.

\textsuperscript{13}During this period of propaganda work, Tikhomirov wrote \textit{Gde luches′e, Skazka o chetyrekh brat′iakh i ob ikh priklucheniiakh} (Geneva, 1873).
Upon his return to his parents in Novorossiisk in the fall, 1878, a series of events occurred which thrust Tikhomirov into the revolutionary movement once again. At this time he received word of the decision of Alexander II to condemn him to administrative exile in Siberia, a decision which reversed the earlier order of the court releasing him from prison and further disabilities. Rather than face this ordeal, Tikhomirov fled north, to St. Petersburg, to join the Narodnaia volia, which at that moment was entering its climatic and dramatic phase of revolutionary terror. In this context, Tikhomirov became a close associate of Alexander Mikhailov and other revolutionaries, wrote numerous articles for Zemlia i volia, and finally, became a member of the Executive Committee of Narodnaia volia. While not directly involved in the assassination of Alexander II, Tikhomirov was called upon to write the manifesto of the party which took the form of a petition to Alexander III, the successor to the slain Emperor. In the chaotic aftermath to the assassination, Tikhomirov with his wife, the former Ekaterina Dmitrievna Sergeeva, fled to Rostov-on-Don and, finally, abroad to escape the police repression, reaching Switzerland in the fall of 1882. Ekaterina Dmitrievna Sergeeva had been a revolutionary herself in St. Petersburg. Tikhomirov met and

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14 Tikhomirov, Vospominaniiia, pp. 96-112.
married her in 1879, shortly after his break with Sofia Perovskaia. Once abroad in revolutionary exile, Tikhomirov continued to pursue his journalistic career. Amid the difficulties and uncertainties of emigré life, Tikhomirov became an important spokesman for the Narodovol'tsy, defending its ideological orientation in the post-1881 years. With Lavrov, Tikhomirov edited Vestnik Narodnoi voli between 1883-1886.

This enduring interest in journalism suggests a mind more at home with ideas than action and reinforces Vera Figner's interpretation that he was temperamentally unsuited to be a revolutionary. His interests were devoted fully to the goal of integrating life, to tie one's commitments—moral, intellectual and political—to an integrated world view. At whatever ideological orientation he found himself, Tikhomirov sought complete identification. His profound difficulty as a revolutionary and his subsequent frustration as a monarchist was caused by the periodic disparity between his ideals and reality. At times this tension became acute. History, despite his perceptive analyses and systematic work, could follow peculiar paths quite at odds with his expectations. The 1905 Revolution, much like the unanticipated collapse of Narodnaia volia


after 1881, forced adaptation and revision in his ideological position. In his mature years, Tikhomirov's bellicose commitment to the monarchy and, finally, his religious faith sustained him even in the darkest hours.

"Revolutionary Russia as a serious, conscious force," Tikhomirov wrote in March, 1886, "does not exist. There are revolutionaries, they stir and will continue to stir, but this is not a storm, but a ripple on the surface of the sea." The observation is pivotal to his evolving worldview and his subsequent political loyalties. Exactly five years had passed since the assassination of Alexander II and two years would lapse before he would make his formal departure from the revolutionary camp with the publication of his tract, Pochemu Ia perestal byt' revoliutsionerom. The statement was recorded in the privacy of his diary and it conveyed his altered outlook with clarity. Doubts had preceded the remark, vacillation accompanied it, and months passed before Tikhomirov followed the logic of his conclusion and disassociated himself from the revolutionary movement.

Tikhomirov's metamorphosis was complex. He described it in terms of two parallel, but mutually interacting, processes. At first there was the "clear realization" that his old ideals and interests, even his life to date,

17 Tikhomirov, Vospominaniia, p. 189.

18 Lev Tikhomirov, Pochemu Ia perestal byt' revoliutsionerom (Moscow, 1895). This tract appeared first in May 1888 and underwent several reprints.
were "contrived and foolish." This internal process was conditioned and reinforced by the European milieu. His acquaintance with French politics, for example, only undermined his existing belief in republicanism and, by implication, the whole spectrum of radical politics from liberalism to socialism. Predictably, Tikhomirov articulated this disorientation in theoretical terms, in what he described as his understanding of "social phenomena." By contrast, the model of "French culture" attracted him and played a role in his emerging conservative cultural perspective.

Some confusion surrounds the manner and the time of Tikhomirov's rejection of revolution in general and terror in particular. His post-revolutionary writings, beginning with Pochemu la perestal byt' revoliutsionerom and ending with his memoirs, portrayed his disaffection as profound and evident as early as 1880. It was indeed true that he

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19 Tikhomirov, Vospominaniia, p. 282. 20 Ibid.

21 Tikhomirov, Pochemu la perestal byt' revoliutsionerom, p. 26; Vospominaniia, pp. 190, 261; and Abbott Cleason "The Emigration and Apostasy of Lev Tikhomirov," Slavic Review 26 (September 1967): 426. Cleason argues that Tikhomirov's association with Paul and Juliette Adam, particularly the latter, and Ol'ga Alekseevna Novikova brought him into a new circle dedicated to the idea of a Franco-Russian alliance and fed his "ambition to play a great role in Russian politics." The circle around Juliette Adam and La Nouvelle Revue hoped to use Tikhomirov for their own design to build a Franco-Russian alliance. For Tikhomirov's general impression of Europe see Vospominaniia, p. 149.

22 Tikhomirov, Vospominaniia, p. 140.
only participated in revolutionary affairs sporadically. Yet, this participation, when juxtaposed to the description he provided concerning the evolution of his political outlook, exposed a curious gap between his altered consciousness and his formal role in the party. Subsequently, he argued that he had abandoned party work after 1882 to write his memoirs. This interpretation, however, contradicted the fact that he had accepted numerous positions of leadership in the party during his period of exile in Western Europe. Coinciding with the diary entry mentioned above, he published La Russie, Politique et Sociale, a substantial work devoted to existing Russian social and political conditions and written largely from a populist perspective in 1886. As late as 1888, the year in which his famous tract was published, he wrote a popular account of revolutionary activity in the 1870's Conspirateurs et Policiers.

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23 Ibid.

24 Lev Tikhomirov, La Russie, Politique et Social (Paris, 1886). This work was published in English translation in 1888. The translator was the son-in-law of Karl Marx. See Russia, Political and Social, trans. Edward Aveling, 2 vols. (London, 1888). See also Tikhomirov, Vospominaniiia, pp. 91, 109, 194.


26 Lev Tikhomirov, Conspirateurs et Policiers,
Such incongruities masked the essential nature of Tikhomirov's transformation. The progression of ideological shifts under the panoply of his revolutionary world view initially implied the disavowal of terror and a redefinition of his outlook. He emerged from this context as something vaguely "progressive" or "liberal." This was apparent by 1886, and merely suggested that Tikhomirov had ceased to be a revolutionary. The critical leap of Tikhomirov to monarchism, admittedly latent or even logical within the confines of his intellectual development, cannot be understood apart from the personal crisis he endured during the winter, 1886-1887. With a dramatic suddenness, Tikhomirov's son, Alexander, was victimized by a severe attack of meningitis. Under pressure from the French police and in desperate poverty, Tikhomirov, his wife and sick child left Paris in July for the small town of Le Rainey, one hour by train from Paris. Here in isolation Tikhomirov faced the challenge of his son's near fatal illness. The ebb and flow of the disease, the constant care, the sleepless nights, the convulsions, the false signs of


recovery—all drained Tikhomirov emotionally. His wife, overwrought and intimidated by the severity of the illness, provided little solace. At the most agonizing moments she fled the sick room holding her ears and weeping hysterically, leaving Tikhomirov alone to care for the child.

The family crisis and the prolonged period of his son's recovery, spent in the isolation of Le Raincy, gave Tikhomirov compelling reasons to continue his pattern of reexamination, only now at an accelerated pace. Tikhomirov turned to God, first in desperation and then as a new focus for his shattered beliefs. As a child he had grown up in a spiritual atmosphere and now in crisis, as an adult, he sought to renew his faith. By his side throughout these desperate days was an icon of St. Mitrofan and a gospel, both gifts from his family. The crisis had destroyed his pride, and with humility, he prayed for the first time since his youth. "Turning to something in my soul, in my heart," he recalled that he prayed, "not knowing to whom." At one desperate moment, he prayed, "Lord, if you exist, help!" In a large room, austere and without furniture, on the ground floor of his rented house in Le Raincy, Tikhomirov found a place for solitude and meditation. Penitent and fatigued, he made the passage from materialism back to Christianity in this improvised cell. He experienced what he described as "mystical feelings," a new awareness of

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29 Ibid., pp. 287-88. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid.
the "invisible hand" of God guiding his life in the past and the present. The long hours of meditation were devoted to study as well as prayer. Turning to the Scriptures, he conducted what he described as "secret conversations" with God. Each passage conveyed with unique authority an answer to some doubt or perplexing question. These "conversations" had a profound effect upon Tikhomirov, comparable to a conversation with "some wise, experienced man."

One passage, Acts 7:10, dealing with Joseph in exile in Egypt, possessed unusual meaning for Tikhomirov. It reads: "And delivered him out of all of his affliction and gave him favor and wisdom in the sight of Pharoah King of Egypt . . . ." Deeply moved by the apparent hand of God in the reading of this random passage of Scripture, Tikhomirov drew explicit personal direction from the deliverance of Joseph. His personal exegesis drew additional parallels between the Pharoah and the Tsar.

Maevskii, Tikhomirov's biographer, used another Biblical analogy, Saul of Tarsus, to explain this spiritual transformation. For Maevskii, Tikhomirov's life, during and after Le Rainey, was one of penitence. Saul, the outcast and persecutor, became Paul the apostle of autocracy and the church. If Tikhomirov was a latter day Saul of Tarsus, then Le Rainey was his Damascus Road.

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Ibid., p. 290.
Tikhomirov was now thirty-five and the crucible of Le Raincy, by rekindling a long dormant spirituality, gave a new direction to his life. The transformation was pivotal, as intense as the crisis that nourished it. At mid-life, his youthful passions spent, his doubts translated into new values, Tikhomirov achieved a moral purpose which had been denied him during the difficult exile years. His "mystical" feelings, following a certain momentum of their own, altered his total perspective. His native land became a renewed object of intense affection. He recorded in his memoirs his renewed love for the steppe, the mountains, the bearded muzhik and other images of Russia.³³ This heightened nationalism was also accompanied by what he described as a new boldness toward "social questions."³⁴ His deep emotional experience had severed his ties with his revolutionary past. Now he sought to integrate life anew, to redefine his ideological orientation. The new focus for his social and political posture was the autocracy, considered now by Tikhomirov to be ordained by God and grounded in the historical evolution of the Russian people. His subsequent commitment to these values paralleled in intensity his earlier fidelity to revolution in the years prior to 1881.

Tikhomirov was quick to express his altered world view. A second edition of his La Russie, Politique et

³³⁴Ibid., p. 286. ³⁴Ibid., p. 292.
sociale was scheduled for print in 1887. At first he requested from his publishers permission to make substantial revisions of the original text. His proposal rejected, he decided in the fall of 1887 to write a new introduction for the second edition.³⁵ The introduction was designed to serve as a vehicle to articulate some of his fundamental criticisms of the revolutionary movement. It appeared in print in February, 1888. Viewing the impotence of the revolutionary movement, Tikhomirov suggested in this introduction that the radical intelligentsia, with their inordinate interest in theory, had reached their nadir. Separate from them was the Russian social reality, a phenomena they were powerless to understand through the prism of Europe. Their thought was derivative and deductive, overly abstract and devoid of nationalism. The reading of "international books" had directed the intelligentsia away from Russia and any perception of its important needs.³⁶ By contrast, Tikhomirov praised Count Kiselev, the Minister of State Domains under Nicholas I, whose work improved the lot of twenty million peasants. Kiselev's achievement was concrete and consistent with the Russian context.

³⁵Ibid., p. 219; Tikhomirov, Pochemu Ia perestal byt' revoliutsionerom, pp. 3-16.
³⁶Ibid., p. 10.
Likewise, the approach employed by the radical intelligentsia exposed a methodological error of grotesque proportions. Political extremism had led to the use of the tactic of terror. Apart from its moral implications, terror had been demonstrated as being patently absurd. According to Tikhomirov, "One of two things" confronted the revolutionary on this question:

Either you have the power to subvert a given regime or you do not. In the first case there is no necessity for political murder. In the second case it will avail nothing. . . . It is either unnecessary or impotent. Such is the dilemma of terrorism as a system of political struggle. 37

The circulation of copies of this introduction among the Russian emigres evoked numerous outcries of criticism, some of which found their way into print. 38 Tikhomirov's reservations about terrorism were well known, his strictures against the intelligentsia, while insulting, did not make him anathema, but his exaltation of the autocracy carried weighty implications. By praising Kiselev, Tikhomirov had implied that the revolutionary movement was alien, superfluous, even destructive. National redemption, according to Tikhomirov, was to be achieved by the autocracy. The situation was clear to his fellow emigres, Lev Tikhomirov had ceased to be a revolutionary.

The first step, it was certain, had been achieved—the introduction had established the broad outline of Tikhomirov's new direction. The intense controversy which followed the appearance of this document prompted Tikhomirov to make a more complete and definitive statement about his altered views. Having returned from Le Rainey to Paris, he devoted his full energies to this project. By May, 1888, the project was completed and appeared in the form of a brochure, Pochemu la perestal byt' revoliutsionerom. At this point, there was no doubt in the emigre Russian community of Tikhomirov's defection. For the author, the transition was from Saul to Paul; for those still loyal to the revolutionary cause, there was the apprehension that it was a transition of a revolutionary into another Degaev, a traitor and an agent of the police. Degaev, the notorious agent provocateur, had fled into obscurity, Tikhomirov, by contrast, took on a polemical posture and published his tract.

Pochemu la perestal byt' revoliutsionerom constituted Tikhomirov's ideological manifesto. Brash, intense, somewhat disorganized, it conveyed Tikhomirov's new sense of priorities. Its emphasis, as well as its strength as a

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39 Sergei Degaev (1857-1921) was a notorious and enigmatic double agent in the early 1880's. After his trial before a special tribunal of Narodnaia volia, which included Lev Tikhomirov, he was permitted to leave Europe. He fled to America where he became in later life a distinguished mathematician. For a detailed account of his life, see Von Hardesty and John D. Unruh, Jr., "The Enigma of Degaev-Pell" South Dakota History 3 (Winter 1972): 1-30.
polemical treatise, was its exposure of the past errors of the revolutionary movement. In dealing with the present and future, it was less explicit and persuasive. To a significant degree, it was a critique of the author's former world view. A basic premise was Tikhomirov's statement that in his mind "the revolution was buried." His error, as he saw it, was not renouncing revolution in 1886, at the time he first began to appreciate this reality. Throughout, he maintained a posture which could be described as "progressive." While denying revolution, he did not detach himself from the ideals of reform and social justice. He was careful to avoid the opprobrium of being a reactionary. His tone was didactic, particularly toward the young, to whom Tikhomirov presented himself as a model. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the tract projected a moral intensity. The immediacy to Le Raincy was apparent. Tikhomirov wrote with a crusading zeal, with the fresh and confident purpose of a recent convert.

40 Tikhomirov, Pochemu ia perestal byt' revoliutsionerom, p. 35. In discussing Tikhomirov's ideological shift in 1888, Abbott Cleason argued that the above tract conveyed "a feeling of weariness in the struggle, the desire for submission and peace." See Cleason, "The Emigration and Apostasy of Lev Tikhomirov," p. 427. This mood is discernible vis-a-vis the revolutionary movement, but to assume that Tikhomirov's "weariness in the struggle" defines the character of Pochemu ia perestal byt' revoliutsionerom is mistaken. Implicit in his rejection of revolution was the affirmation of the autocracy and the desire to serve Russia as expiation for his revolutionary past (See Vospominaniiia, p. 251). Tikhomirov's immediate renewal of political struggle after his return to Russia illustrates this fact.
Tikhomirov's initial question in the tract was "Why not remain silent?" His critics had raised this question and to answer it forthrightly would legitimatize his outspoken tract. His decision, he indicated, hinged on his own interpretation of the "moral rights and responsibilities of a man."\textsuperscript{41} The implied ethic of silence, anticipated by others for him, was acknowledged, but he went on to say that his own sense of responsibility dictated a different course. In this regard he mentioned the acquisition of experience, which he viewed as being inversely proportional to the retention of his former beliefs, and the loss of years to a false cause. He affirmed: "When I believed, 'yes,' I said 'yes'; when I thought 'no,' I also said 'no.'"\textsuperscript{42} Concerning his responsibility to the party, he argued that he had none. On both counts, the moral responsibility of doing what conscience dictates and the formal responsibility of doing that which one is obliged to accomplish, he asserted that his record was above criticism. To illustrate this contention he sketched a brief survey of his revolutionary years, high-lighting his larger purpose of serving Russia, his independence, and the inevitable process of his personal awakening.\textsuperscript{43} Being "constructive" in his approach, he argued that he tried to unify the party

\textsuperscript{41} Tikhomirov, Pochemu Ia perestal byt' revoliut-sionerom, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p. 19.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., pp. 21-25.
with the country, to negate terrorism, and to build a
"great national party." Now "the revolutionary period,"
Tikhomirov concluded, "is past" and it did not possess
the strength to move Russia from its "historical path."

The remainder of the tract was devoted to the three
questions: terrorism, student agitation, and state admin­
istration. The first topic, the tactic of terror, was a
question of profound significance for Tikhomirov. Maevskii,
argued that the assassination of Alexander II was a central
episode in his life. Prior to 1881, as a member of
Narodnaia volia, Tikhomirov had gone little beyond endor­
sing terror theoretically as a skirmish before a general
revolution. At one point, he explained it as a conse-
dence of the immorality of the old order. Despite
these hesitant theoretical musings, Tikhomirov was alien­
ated emotionally and morally from the practice of terror
and, once the party ceased to represent in his mind a

44 Ibid., p. 32.  45 Ibid., p. 36.  46 Ibid., p. 38.

47 Maevskii, Revoliutsioner-Monarkhist, p. 33. Vera
Figner indicated that Tikhomirov's immediate response to
the assassination perplexed his revolutionary comrades.
She recorded that he wore a black armband, attended church
and swore an oath of allegiance to the new emperor. Figner
"Po povodu zapisok L. Tikhomirova," p. xxii. Tikhomirov's
deep remorse over this event is apparent throughout his
writings. This is conveyed poignantly in his petition to

48 Duran, "Lev Tikhomirov and the End of the Age of

49 Ibid., p. 155.
"conscious political force," he opposed it openly. Within Pochemu Ia perestal byt' revoliutsionerom his attitude toward terror became strident and emotional, calling the practitioners of terror "street robbers." 50

In the introduction to the second edition of La Russie, Politique et Sociale, he had criticized terror from a practical standpoint, "it is either powerless or superfluous." To the old argument that it disorganized the government, Tikhomirov asserted that its actual role had been to disorganize the revolutionaries. 51 Now he attacked terror as being destructive from a moral and intellectual perspective. The arbitrary power of one man over the life of another was unconscionable. And why? Because the recognized and legal government refused to execute the "false demands of a handful of people." 52 To justify their political crimes, Tikhomirov continued, they talked about returning power to the people. In this he detected irony, adding that the people did not request terrorist activity. Such "moral representatives" of the people were in reality "apostates," whose arrogance concealed a subtle tyranny. 53 They were guilty of tyranny because, contrary to the party's name, it did not derive from the peoples'
will. In reality, it was "anarchistic," placing the all-powerful personality, "the attacking wolf," above society.\(^{54}\) Historically, the use of terror was "symptomatic of weakness," used in desperation when the revolutionary situation had disappeared.\(^{55}\) Only moral blindness and self-delusion sustained the practice of terror.

To Tikhomirov, terrorism, whatever its justification was a crime. A true reformer, he stated, must be intellectually and morally above his environment. This was the source of his "pride and might."\(^{56}\) Tikhomirov argued that the creative alternative to terrorism was "cultural work."\(^{57}\) This term appeared frequently in his writing, but was never defined with clarity. At the end of the tract he mentioned the need for education, the improvement of the forms and techniques of work and productivity—all within the perimeters of the existing order.\(^{58}\) These non-revolutionary objectives are consistent with his use of the phrase "cultural work" and reinforce his earlier assumption that terror, like revolution itself, was outside Russia's historical path of development.

The attraction of Russian youth for revolution disturbed Tikhomirov. His own life revealed to him the fatal temptations, the misapplied priorities, the destructive

\(^{54}\)Ibid., p. 44. \(^{55}\)Ibid., p. 35. \(^{56}\)Ibid., p. 45. \(^{57}\)Ibid. \(^{58}\)Ibid., pp. 79-80.
consequences of political involvement without education. Tikhomirov's imperative to share this personal experience had led to numerous conversations with Russian students. His admonitions and counsel had achieved some success in the past. Such activity alarmed many revolutionaries who were quick to accuse Tikhomirov of condemning the young to "moral death." The charge, much like the insistence that he remain silent, violated Tikhomirov's own sense of moral responsibility.\(^{59}\) For him, it was imperative to expose the subtle pressures on the young and to redirect their energies along constructive paths. To shatter the fatal link between the "apprentice young" and the revolutionary movement was now viewed as a prerequisite for Russia's future greatness.

As for the spectre of "moral death," Tikhomirov identified the traits of passive obedience and imitation as the more fundamental dangers. "Moral death," he argued, "came with the ossification of conscience which is living only when it acts, appraises, selects."\(^{60}\) In a "restless epoch," so "abased morally" and "with a paucity of intellectual work," Tikhomirov asserted that there was a need for a courageous quest for truth. If a party program required a "hypnotized mind," then the program was false. "My counsel

\(^{59}\)Ibid., p. 47. Rusanov also complained of Tikhomirov's "socratic method." See Rusanov, V Emigratsii, p. 160.

\(^{60}\)Ibid., 49.
to the young," Tikhomirov wrote, "is to think, observe, beware of words and huge phrases and do not permit yourself to be intimidated. ..." 61

Behind this critique of the students was Tikhomirov's hostility toward the Russian intelligentsia. Their lack of intellectual independence was reflected in the youth. The educated class was a crucial strata of society, the "brain of a country." 62 It was a melancholy fact that Russia, despite its past greatness, projected little strength in this area, a colossus with a defective brain. Two persistent traits precluded the proper utilization of this strata for the development of the country—the intelligentsia's unlimited faith in theory and their low esteem for facts. 63 Tikhomirov affirmed the creative role individuals could play in history, but warned of romanticism and "airy theories." He spoke of the "mutual interaction of generations" and the durability of social institutions. For example, the obshchina appeared to him to be beyond the ministrations of men who would either save it or destroy it in the short space of their lifetime. Tikhomirov felt men should know both the complexity of society and their own limitations. 64

61 Ibid. 62 Ibid., p. 52.
63 Tikhomirov, Pochemu Ia perestal byt' revoliut-sionerom, p. 53.
64 Ibid., p. 56.
Tikhomirov's specific advice for the young was to avoid politics. Any relationship to politics should be preceded by serious study, both of history and the present conditions. As to the complaints of students regarding university regulations, the source of considerable student agitation, Tikhomirov urged obedience. To achieve such "self-control," he stated that a new set of values must be internalized. Students must learn to defend "peaceful development" out of conviction, not out of cowardice. They must separate the notion of revolt from the concept of honor. In Tikhomirov's opinion, the scarcity of such people reflected the "ruling position of theory."

Tikhomirov's defense of the autocracy was a logical and necessary corollary to the above arguments. His initial point was a repudiation of the notion that cultural work was impossible in the existing political context. To Tikhomirov, this assumption was unhistorical and reflected the intelligentsia's incapacity to evaluate the worth of political forms. Public ideas developed, he argued, under Peter the Great, Catherine II and Nicholas I. Tikhomirov asked: "How many republics in the course of twenty-five years have been transformed as Russia was during the reign of Alexander II?" Moreover, cultural achievement had been compatible with the autocracy. He illustrated this point by referring to Pushkin, Gogol and Tolstoi. For Tikhomirov society was organic and complex; its progress was inexorable
and associated with a strong state. All these facts, according to Tikhomirov, revealed the legitimacy of the autocracy.

Tikhomirov's subsequent career was devoted to the elaboration of these basic ideas about the autocracy. Russia's historical institutions, particularly the monarchy and the church, were viable; they only lacked a sophisticated defense. At the end of his tract, Pochemu Ja perestal byt' revoliutsionerom, Tikhomirov stated that the revolutionary movement was not the evil which threatened Russia, it was merely a symptom of it. The fundamental evil was the superficiality of the educated class, the lack of any "serious work of the mind." The fate of Russia hinged on its ability to nourish mature minds, a task which in Tikhomirov's view should be given the highest priority. The publication of Tikhomirov's Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost' (1904), designed to be a theoretical underpinning for the autocracy, provided evidence for his own commitment to this priority.

Tikhomirov conceded that reforms (unspecified) were needed, but within the "existing legal path of political activity." The autocracy was the source of leadership for any required changes. He denied the compatibility of any parliamentary structure for Russia, but praised the parliamentary practice of loyal opposition, as embodied in

\[65^{\text{Ibid.}, \ pp. \ 58-66.} \quad 66^{\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 77.}\]
Gladstone, who remained ready to serve even with the loss of a parliamentary majority. Translated into the Russian context, Tikhomirov argued that all progressive elements should be ready to serve at the autocracy's request. The autocracy, not the educated class, had the prerogative to utilize advice or individuals as it deemed necessary. Only the autocracy possessed the initiative and responsibility to accomplish the great national tasks.67

The appearance of Pochemu la perestal byt' revoliutsionerom attracted considerable attention. Two important questions were debated: the reasons for Tikhomirov's turnabout and the complicity of Tikhomirov, if any, with the secret police as informer or double agent. Among the revolutionaries, Peter Lavrov was the first to respond in a polemical fashion. In his "Letter to Comrades in Russia Concerning the Brochure of Lev Tikhomirov," Lavrov declared that Tikhomirov was "henceforth alien."68 Lavrov's tone was hostile and his analysis unyielding in its opposition to Tikhomirov's ideas. All of Tikhomirov's fundamental arguments were rejected, including his major assumption that reform was possible under the autocracy.69 Lavrov reaffirmed the use of violence and the need for a socialist

67Ibid., pp. 83-86.
68Peter Lavrov, Pis'mo Tovarishcham v Rossii po povodu broshiuru L. A. Tikhomirova (Geneva, 1888), p. 4.
69Ibid., p. 25.
reconstruction of Russia. As to Tikhomirov's motives, Lavrov compared him to Degaev. Tikhomirov was declared anathema and "alien to every living thing in Russia."\(^{70}\)

Other revolutionaries reacted to Tikhomirov's recantation with varying degrees of hostility.\(^{71}\) N. S. Rusanov, a major contributor to this polemic, was more strident and abusive than Lavrov. Rusanov identified "egocentrism" as the motive power in Tikhomirov's life.\(^{72}\) According to Rusanov, Tikhomirov was essentially an actor, shrewd and without original ideas, a political chameleon, infinitely adaptative and self-serving. When stronger personality types were removed from the scene, Tikhomirov lost the arena for his skillful game and discovered that he was isolated. For Rusanov, his defection to the autocracy was consistent with his character. It did not represent the tragedy of a great mind, but the "everyday drama of a

\(^{70}\)Ibid., p. 31.

\(^{71}\)See G. V. Plekhanov, "Novyi zashchitnik samoderzhaviia, ili gore g. L. Tikhomirova (Otvet na broshiuru Pochemu Ia perestal byt' revoliutsionerom'), Sochineniia 3 (Moscow, 1923): 67; E. A. Serebriakov, Otkrytoe pis'mo L'vu Tikhomirovu (Avtora; 'Pochemu Ia perestal byt' revoliutsionerom'), (Geneva, 1888); Soiuz ili Bor'ba (L. Tikhomirov, "Pochemu Ia perestal byt' revoliutsionerom") (Geneva, 1889).

\(^{72}\)Rusanov, V Emigratsii, p. 177. Rusanov also indicated that he was the author of Evoliutsiia ili revoliutsiia, a polemical tract written in opposition to Tikhomirov's second introduction and attributed to Lavrov. See Ibid., p. 174.
secondary man."73

G. V. Plekhanov, an old polemical adversary of Tikhomirov, provided the Marxist critique.74 Plekhanov found the mechanism for change, not in Tikhomirov's character, but in his ideological development. Tikhomirov represented the essential weakness of populism, the idealization of a backward economic structure. As Plekhanov had affirmed earlier in his response to Tikhomirov's introduction to the second edition of *La Russie, Politique et Sociale*, reaction was implicit in populism. Once the faith in revolution was undermined, there was the fatal attraction for the autocracy as the means to achieve economic goals.75

V. I Nevskii, a Soviet scholar writing in the 1920's, echoed Plekhanov's analysis: the primary element in Tikhomirov's evolution was this natural shift to the right.76 For Nevskii, this rightward shift led to liberalism.

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74 See Samuel H. Baron, Plekhanov, the Father of Russian Marxism (Palo Alto, 1963), pp. 85-92. Tikhomirov was a major polemical foe of Plekhanov during the debate which preceded the publication of the latter's famous tract, "Nashi raznoglasia." Plekhanov's "Novyi zashchitnik smoderzhaviia, ili gore g. L. Tikhomirova," written on the occasion of Tikhomirov's defection, was the continuation of a long dispute. For Tikhomirov's reaction see his Vospominaniiia, pp. 238, 239, 254.


Tikhomirov, by embracing monarchism, had merely pursued the logic to the extreme. The difficulty of this interpretation was the failure to appreciate the radical nature of Tikhomirov's pre-1888 political posture. Tikhomirov, much like Plekhanov, had been disillusioned with populism in the 1880's. His ultimate ideological "shift," however, was not to liberalism, a political phenomenon he loathed, but to a peculiar form of right wing radicalism. As such, Tikhomirov anticipated certain themes embodied in twentieth century fascism. The evolution of Tikhomirov's thought, as will be illustrated below, cannot be explained within the confines of the Plekhanov-Nevskii categories, as some eccentric form of liberalism clothed in reactionary garb. Tikhomirov's view of the autocracy was dynamic, not static. Toward the question of social and political reform, occasioned by the rapid industrialization of Russia at the turn of the century, Tikhomirov urged upon the autocracy a systematic program of adaptation and modernization.

The sensation of Tikhomirov's repudiation of revolution and his open desire to return to Russia aroused fears among the revolutionaries that he planned to purchase his freedom at their expense. Tikhomirov's correspondence with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in particular with V. K. von Pleve, and his petition to the Emperor, Alexander III, revealed a man of scrupulous integrity. "I hope," he

77 Ibid. 78 Tikhomirov, Vospominaniia, p. 233.
wrote to von Pleve, "that you do not insult me by a proposal that I wish to purchase something from my government or give something to it." In regard to his future plans, he indicated that he wished to start a new life, but in this new life, "I am hoping, as in the old, to do nothing against honor and the responsibility of a decent man." He wished to serve Russia, but not at the expense of his former comrades. His insistence that he not be cross-examined about his revolutionary past was respected by the tsarist government.

Tikhomirov returned to Russia in January, 1889. His pardon stipulated that he was to remain under public surveillance for a period of five years. His wife was granted full restoration of civil rights. Tikhomirov was extended permission to publish, subject only to existing regulations. The steps taken by Tikhomirov preliminary to this pardon included a long petition to Alexander III, written in September, 1888. More a confession than an

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79 Ibid., p. 277. 80 Ibid., p. 233.
81 Only after N. Mikhailovskii's death in 1904 did Tikhomirov reveal his role in the preparation of the manifesto to Alexander III after the assassination of his father. Reference was made to Olga Liubatovich by both Rusanov and Maevskii (Rusanov, V Emigratsii, pp. 175-176; Maevskii, Revoliutsioner-Monarkhist, p. 33). Liubatovich argued that Tikhomirov was never a Degaev. See O. S. Liubatovich, "Dalekoe i nedavnee. Vospominaniia iz zhizni revoliutsionerov 1878-1881 gg.," Byloe, no. 5 (May 1906), pp. 208-245; no. 6 (June 1906), pp. 108-154.
82 Tikhomirov, Vospominaniia, p. 313.
83 Ibid., p. 264. 84 Ibid., p. 40.
ideological treatise, it provided a short, intimate biography of the repentant revolutionary. Tikhomirov labeled his previous life as criminal. In specific detail he described his past association with terrorist activity, always careful to demonstrate his moral opposition and his lack of personal involvement. Along with family notes and commentary on emigré life, Tikhomirov described his evolving world view and his conversion to monarchism. "Permit me," he concluded, "to return to a pure and legal life in order to become useful. To erase, if not from my heart, from recent memory this nightmare of my insane past."\(^5\)

When Vera Figner and N. A. Morosov received their copy of *Pochemu Ia perestal byt' revoliutsionerom* Tikhomirov had already returned to St. Petersburg and assumed his new life. Their belated conversation at the Schlusselburg fortress centered on the nature of his personality. For Figner, he was sick; to Morosov, his change of allegiance was not unexpected. Writing in the 1920's, Figner indicated that their isolated interpretations of Tikhomirov were both correct. Tikhomirov was without will or character. He had yielded to influences which lifted him to the heights or lowered him to the depths. His "psychosis" transformed him from "a revolutionary, a republican and an atheist into a renegade, a monarchist and a hypocrite."\(^6\)

\(^5\)Ibid., p. 251.

Vera Figner's harsh appraisal of Tikhomirov's personality rested, perhaps, on the inexplicable character of his actions. To embrace the autocracy constituted from her revolutionary perspective, a sort of madness. Tikhomirov's eccentricities, his fears, his doubts, his religious zeal and superstition were well known to Figner, either from personal experience or from reading his memoirs. All these facts reinforced her harsh conclusion.

The weakness of Figner's analysis, as with most estimations made of Tikhomirov by revolutionaries, was her indifference to his intellectual legacy. Tikhomirov's prolific corpus of writing, all devoted to the defense of autocracy, constituted a serious, and oft-times perceptive, intellectual endeavor. No exaggerated emphasis on aspects of his personality can diminish the historical significance of his work. 

CHAPTER II

THE "NEW CHILIASM," THE CRITIQUE OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY TRADITION

Lev Tikhomirov returned to Russia in January, 1889. Coincidental to his arrival in St. Petersburg was the celebration of Europe of the centennial year of the French Revolution. This memorable year was also the occasion for the birth of the Socialist Second International. As a repentent radical, Tikhomirov returned from exile with a profound conviction that "the false idea of revolution," as reflected in these events, ruled Europe. He shared the sentiments of Joseph de Maistre, the Savoyard conservative, who had argued that the Revolution constituted an "insurrection against God."¹ In Tikhomirov's words, the century of revolution represented a form of "religious apostasy" which challenged the divinely ordained structure of existing society. To confront this menace, he sought to engage in "serious intellectual work" in defense of the Russian autocracy. Without such efforts, the autocracy would have to rely solely upon police measures to resist a political movement which was as much idea as deed. Having once embraced radical thought himself, Tikhomirov appreciated the

¹Lev A. Tikhomirov, Bor'ba veka (Moscow, 1895),
power of its ideological pretensions. By contrast, the monarchical principle, even in the face of a mortal challenge, had failed to meet its enemies on ideological grounds. A major strength of radicalism had been the pivotal weakness of monarchism. For Tikhomirov, the void had to be filled and soon, if the Russian autocracy was to survive and escape the dire fate of Western Europe.

After his return to Russia, Tikhomirov resumed his former work as a journalist and a political activist. His imperative to defend the monarchy occupied a central position in his political outlook. Other motives were no doubt present—social acceptance for himself and his family, self-justification as a political ideologue, the desire to ingratiate himself with the tsarist government. Tikhomirov's diary provides little insight into this inner drama of motives and private aspirations. The decision to cast his lot with the autocracy had placed him largely outside the ideological pale of the intelligentsia and for the remainder of his life he was viewed with contempt as either a reactionary or an agent provocateur, or both. His fateful turnabout at Le Raincy had led to intellectual ostracism, even as it established limited acceptance and access to the

p. 100. Tikhomirov's opposition to revolution, like Joseph de Maistre's, was based to a profound degree on religious considerations. Tikhomirov's Orthodox faith, as well as the altered context for the elaboration of his social thought, however, dictated a different orientation from that of de Maistre, particularly in reference to the evolutionary nature of social change.
established regime. Such a context seemed to prompt in Tikhomirov an extraordinary intensity, political and religious, which propelled him to seek vindication. Tikhomirov retained the reflexes and the mood of a Russian intelligent; his political involvement was total and absolute, intolerant of conflicting viewpoints, always bellicose, and uncompromised by moderation or equivocation.

Tikhomirov's strident political style during the first half of the 1890's concealed from view a process of study and political maturation. Only toward the end of the decade did Tikhomirov publish his first theoretical work, *Edinolochnaia vlast' kak printsip gosudarstvennago stroeniia* (1897). This work and his subsequent four volume *Monarkhicheskaya gosudarstvennost* (1904) conveyed in positive terms Tikhomirov's understanding of the historical and theoretical content of the monarchical principle. In these early years after his return to Russia, as his theoretical views developed, Tikhomirov devoted his energies as a polemicist solely to a critique of the ubiquitous revolutionary ideas. For Tikhomirov, there were contradictions to expose, illusions to shatter, and evils to exorcise. These polemical activities articulated with clarity Tikhomirov's opposition to the revolutionary outlook, from classical liberalism to contemporary schools of socialism.

While these initial writings of Tikhomirov exposed certain weaknesses inherent in radical thought, they only hinted at the ideological posture Tikhomirov would assume
at the end of the decade. More implicitly than explicitly, they revealed Tikhomirov's opposition to philosophical materialism, to any extreme form of environmentalism in social thought, and to any political creed based on mass politics. His somber view of human nature prompted deep misgivings toward individualism and visions of social harmony. Always deferential to science, Tikhomirov nevertheless appealed to religious concepts as the ultimate standard with which to criticize revolution or substantiate the assertions he made in defense of existing institutions. Although religious ideas frequently were adapted to his writing belatedly and with little attention to systematic integration, they revealed his deep foreboding of secularism, which he viewed as the dominant mood of the century. Like his political posture, his religious outlook was extremely nationalistic and establishmentarian. Tikhomirov opposed political reform on the Western democratic model as fervently as he struggled against revolution. He did not, however, oppose change or seek to freeze Russia at one stage of its development. His ardent wish was for the autocracy to reassert its moral character and assume a strong, decisive leadership over the nation. He shunned the label "reactionary" and attacked any form of what he described as "congealed conservatism." Later, this belief in wholesome change and controlled adaptation in political life was elaborated within the framework of his own organic interpretation of the state.
Tikhomirov's initial contribution to anti-radical protest in Russia fell roughly between the death of Leontiev (1891) and the publication of Pobedonostsev's *Reflections of a Russian Statesman* (1896). This phase of his writing contained three major tracts: *Nachala i kontsy* (1890); *Bor'ba veka* (1895); and *Demokratiiia, liberal'naia i sotsial'naia* (1896). As a fledgling apologist for the autocracy, Tikhomirov devoted some attention to selected aspects of his revolutionary past, a theme which diminished in importance once his credibility was established. By virtue of their emphasis, these early writings constituted a separate, preliminary phase to Tikhomirov's goal of forging an apologia for the Russian autocracy. In many respects, these tracts with their open hostility to

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3See Lev A. Tikhomirov, *Konstitutsionalisty v epokhy 1881 goda* (Moscow, 1895). This work, devoted to certain aspects of the revolutionary movement leading up to 1881, represented his most thoroughgoing treatment of events related to his revolutionary years. In this work, Tikhomirov was particularly critical of Count Loris-Melikov for his constitutionalism. See also Lev A. Tikhomirov, *Nachala i kontsy* (Moscow, 1890), p. 59f.

4See Lev Tikhomirov, *Vospominiia*, pp. 343-438. This segment of his memoirs contains his diary for the years 1889-1895. The editor of Moskovskia Vedomosti sought his memoirs at the time of his return in 1889. His diary entries are punctuated with his publication plans and experiences. Frequently, his concerns are partly monetary since financial solvency remained a critical problem for him during this period of his life.
democracy and revolution anticipated in mood and content the critical commentary utilized by Pobedonostsev in his more famous Reflections. The possibility of ideological cross-fertilization is strong, for Tikhomirov and Pobedonostsev corresponded frequently and when Tikhomirov visited St. Petersburg, he was a frequent guest at the Pobedonostsev home.

In 1890, Tikhomirov published his first important post-revolutionary treatise, Nachala i kontsy. As the title suggested to his contemporaries, the work sought to demarcate the past and to convey the broad features of his altered world view. Compared to his Pochemu la perestal byt' revoliutsionnerom, it was more reflective in tone and coherent in organization. As a transitional polemic, it sought to bridge the twenty-year period of revolutionary activity, now abandoned, with his new life, now focused on the preservation of Russia's historic institutions. At the outset of Nachala i kontsy, Tikhomirov observed that the falsehood inherent in any world view can be subtle and

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5See Lev Tikhomirov, Bor'ba veka (Moscow, 1895); Nachala i kontsy (Moscow, 1890); Demokratiia, Liberal'naia i sotsial'naia (Moscow, 1896). The latter contained three articles which appeared in the original as follows: Lev A. Tikhomirov, "Sotsial'nye mirazhi," Russkoe obozrenie, no. 7 (1891); "Kommunizm i partikularizm," Russkoe obozrenie (July 1892); "Panama i parlamentarizm," Moskovskie Vedomosti, nos. 351, 354 (1892). Another tract, "Dykhovenstvo i obshchestvo v sovremennom religioznom dvizhenii," (Moscow, 1893), was unavailable for research.

6Tikhomirov, Vospominaniiia, p. 418.
frequently unperceived, even by the most astute minds. The distortion of reality and human values, the existence of certain innate contradictions, as well as traits of explicit evil, become manifest only when the world view has developed to its logical conclusion. Every generation, Tikhomirov remarked, possessed its Cassandras, those unique individuals gifted with the perception to see the consequences of a given world view. Their numbers, as well as their influence, remained minimal. In Tikhomirov's mind, to be a Cassandra, to perceive how ideas function apart from their pro forma content was a forlorn occupation. Few appreciated or understood such efforts. In part, this reaction was understandable, for, initially, an erroneous world view appeared inoffensive, even attractive. No one was frightened. Few saw the implicit danger, Tikhomirov concluded, and when the enormity of the evil became manifest the very existence of the nation was at stake.\footnote{Tikhomirov, Nachala i kontsy, p. 3-6.}

The "New Era," inaugurated in 1789, reflected this painful gap between human awareness and reality. For Tikhomirov, the "false idea of revolution" had overwhelmed Europe and now, as a rising tide, threatened the shoreline of Russia. Despite its failures, the "New Era" had achieved a frightening momentum and possessed few ideological detractors. In Bor'ba veka Tikhomirov argued that the task of combatting this danger was difficult because the
revolutionary idea possessed numerous, but unspecified "achievements." To oppose the revolutionary idea and the cluster of values related to it was to struggle, often alone, against intense resistance. Since the eighteenth century, the tendency to reject "historical society" had become habitual, almost a conditioned reflex in social thought. Once in the ascendency, these false ideas and assumptions acquired a validity and inevitability which precluded criticism. As a consequence, Tikhomirov argued, his own generation became alarmed only at the extremes of the revolutionary idea. Particularly within its educated class, Russia was threatened by this paralysis of consciousness as Europe had been in the earlier part of the century. By implication, Tikhomirov had assumed the role of a Russian Cassandra.

The "proud dreams" of the modern era suggested to Tikhomirov a phenomenon which he described as the "New Chiliasm." Despite its materialism and secularism, the past century had been unique in terms of its millenial thrust. From the eighteenth century to the present, the mood had been visionary and messianic. Rousseau and Condorcet, Tikhomirov observed, were archetypal. They and their heirs had viewed freedom, equality, and democracy as a "reflection of the objective law of social nature." Their

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8 Tikhomirov, Bor'ba veka, p. 53.
9 Ibid., p. 7. 10 Ibid., pp. 3-5. 11 Ibid., p. 7.
optimistic analyses of man and society had given momentum to a host of false ideas such as the "natural rights" of man and the theory of the "social contract." Having rejected both God and history, they proclaimed a "faith in humanity, in social forms and the future earthly paradise of materialism." ¹²

Faith in "progress," the expectation of a "future order," and the glorification of man as an autonomous being accompanied the fundamental rejection of existing society. ¹³ Tikhomirov found this to be a "strange condition of the mind," a curious expression of secular chiliasm. The rejection of the existing order had derived not from a cold, rational consideration of actual abuses, but from this chiliastic mood. Tikhomirov marvelled at the discrepancy between the real inadequacies of the existing order and the harsh severity of the sentence pronounced over it by these "dreamers of a future order." ¹⁴

A "social mirage" had been fixed on the European horizon since the eighteenth century, but, despite its error and unreality, the social impact had been tangible. For Tikhomirov, ideas—false or true—played a measurable role in the development of society and formed part of what he described as the "conscious activity of man." ¹⁵ Such

¹² Tikhomirov, Nachala i kontsy, p. 23.
¹³ Tikhomirov, Bor'ba veka, p. 8. ¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 8-9.
¹⁵ Ibid., p. 42; see also Tikhomirov, Demokratiiia, liberal'naia i sotsial'naia, pp. 6-10.
"conscious activity," he argued, had paralyzed the "organized social forces" by either promoting revolution or arresting the growth of society by prompting varieties of "congealed conservatism." 16

In political terms the impact was obvious to Tikhomirov. The political thrust of the century had been republicanism. This political panacea was pursued openly or through the construction of "constitutional monarchies." The effort to unify forms of sovereignty had been futile. 17 For Tikhomirov, no synthesis or integration of these two principles was conceivable. In the end, the monarchical principle was betrayed, despite the perpetuation of the outward panoply of monarchical forms and usages. At the base of republicanism was the notion of popular sovereignty, which remained unrealized and impractical after a century of intense effort and experimentation. In the name of this noble ideal stood the fraud of democracy with its disorder and corruption. 18

A fundamental characteristic of the "New Era" was the alienation of modern man from God. In the course of a

16 Tikhomirov, Bor'ba veka, p. 42.
17 Tikhomirov, Demokratiiia, liberal'naia i sotsial'naia, p. 5.
18 Ibid., pp. 103-154. This section contains Tikhomirov's article on the Panama scandal and the parliamentary system in France under the Third Republic. To Tikhomirov, this abuse of public office illustrated the inherent corruption of parliamentary government.
century, a bellicose materialism had separated the individual and society in Europe from their spiritual roots. For Tikhomirov, man's spiritual nature was innate to his character, a facet of human nature which had been atrophied by the superficiality and fantasy of the "New Era."

Tikhomirov endorsed warmly the conclusion of Ivan Aksakov that modern society was "Christian, but separated from Christ." In the context of the modern age, these "Christian souls" had been deprived of the necessary moral content for a meaningful existence. The moral content, required for the individual and society, was to be realized only within the discipline and authority derived from Christ. The existence of unfulfilled "moral strivings" had given way in a secular context to grandiose social dreams, the quest for freedom, and the ideal of human perfection. While stillborn, the "New Era" demonstrated in a most unusual fashion that the formal acceptance of materialism could be combined with a form of secular chiliasm. To Tikhomirov, this "psychological" phenomenon made his own era unique in character. At no point in these early works, however, does Tikhomirov attempt to provide an overarching framework—theological, historical or philosophical—to explain this peculiarity of modern times.

If the impact of this de-spiritualization of modern man had compromised European evolutionary development, it

19Ibid., p. 15. 20Ibid., pp. 15-20.
had not altered the nature of social phenomena. The appearance of disruptive ideas or "social mysticism" could create havoc and even interrupt social development, but these distortions, as Tikhomirov sought to explain, were external and ultimately subject to correction. Tikhomirov affirmed that there were "laws of nature" which were elemental, immutable, and beyond the "trifles and fantasies" of the contemporary era. The prophets of "social mysticism," operative within the sphere of the "conscious activity" of man, could destroy the structure of the old society, but were incapable of creating a new society. Their fantasies could evoke chaos, misdirect social energies, and even topple venerated regimes such as the Bourbon dynasty, but their handiwork was purely negative, without fruition. 21 "There is no disaster," Tikhomirov warned, "capable of inflicting so much harm as this revolutionary chiliasm of our epoch." 22

This social movement, once in motion, was subject to a peculiar evolution of its own. Born in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and christened in 1789, the "New Era" had experienced a sequence of stages. Each stage was first postulated in theoretical terms and then, after some agitation, was realized in part. At the threshold of triumph, its theoretical hegemony proved ephemeral, for at

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21 Ibid., p. 5; Tikhomirov, Bor'ba veka, p. 33.
22 Ibid., p. 36.
this juncture a new elaboration of the theoretical basis of the "New Era" occurred. The successive stage with equal optimism struggled to realize its dream, only to find itself challenged by a new theoretical formulation seeking to actualize itself. This quasi-dialectical progress, separated from the actual laws of social reality and apparently without a final synthesis, was evident in the century which had elapsed since 1789. "Liberal democracy" had been constructed on the ruins of the Old Regime, but no sooner had it gained the ascendancy than it discovered itself to be challenged by segments of its own constituency. Increasingly, "socialistic projects" were put forward to fully realize the ideals of freedom and equality. Socialism in various guises soon attained hegemony in progressive circles. Scarcely had this doctrine been articulated than there was a shift to anarchism. No variant of "social mysticism" was capable of establishing social consensus. Babeuf earlier had appeared to his generation as absurd and illogical, but decades later Karl Marx explained his eccentricities to his generation as the "economic law of nature." Karl Marx, in turn, found Michael Bakunin's ideas so absurd that he thought he was being used by the authorities as an agent provocateur to discredit socialism. Now with anarchism as the compelling force, challenging the dominant school of social democracy, what new novelty, 

23 Ibid., pp. 10-12.
Tikhomirov asked, awaits us in the future? 24

The motive power behind this sequence of ideological shifts was the chiliastic frame of mind. The process was subjective and artificial, separated fully from the concrete social reality which these "dreams" purported to reflect or embody. To Tikhomirov, these stages were illogical and destructive, but self-sustaining. The despiritualization of modern man provided the psychological context for the appearance of these irrational hopes. The frustration which naturally resulted with the failure of each stage to realize its vision provided inspiration and energy for its successive stage. Tikhomirov observed that Madame Roland, who had written in her memoirs about her childhood under the Old Regime, had described that life as almost idyllic. Yet, in prison awaiting execution by the forces of revolution, she adamantly maintained that the old order must be destroyed. For Tikhomirov, Roland and numerous others 25 had not condemned the old order for its actual inadequacies and injustices (there were many), but in the name of a dream about a future order. 26

24 Ibid., pp. 17-18. Tikhomirov referred to Karl Marx as "the most powerful revolutionary mind of the nineteenth century." His leap to revolution, according to Tikhomirov, reflected not the logic of his theory, but his own dreams about a future order. See Demokratia, liberal'naia i sosial'naia, pp. 63-64, for reference to Friedrich Engels.

25 Ibid., p. 12. Tikhomirov made reference also to men such as Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Cabet.

26 Ibid.; Tikhomirov merely acknowledged the existence of certain imperfections in traditional society without naming them or reflecting on their significance.
The seedbed for the historical elaboration of the "New Era" was liberal democracy. The liberal world view provided an ideological and institutional framework for the displaced old order. All subsequent expressions of this social movement, including anarchism and terror, were tied by logic and inspiration to the liberal political creed of the eighteenth century.²⁷ Placing emphasis on equality and individualism, the liberal world view had supplied the impetus toward the complete atomization of society. Social custom and traditional patterns of hierarchical organization were sacrificed to the ideal of egalitarianism.

The advent of democracy, Tikhomirov asserted, had resulted in inequality and stratification, despite its formal pretensions. In a subtle fashion intellectual life had been subordinated to the "mediocre," capitalism had been able to achieve economic supremacy over the proletariat, and finally, the political life of Europe had seen the emergence of a new elite. For Tikhomirov, the resulting stratification, although less obvious than in the past, was nevertheless real.²⁸ Unlike previous forms of stratification, it lacked a framework for the harmonious integration of society.

Among these areas of stratification, Tikhomirov devoted his full attention only to the political sphere.

²⁷Tikhomirov, Nachala i kontsy, pp. 109f.
²⁸Tikhomirov, Demokratiia, liberal'naia i sotsial'naia, p. 47.
Liberal democracy, the basis for the progressive movement in the nineteenth century, had been "poorly created" and was devoid of moral authority. Tikhomirov ignored the Marxist association of the bourgeoisie with liberal democracy by arguing that the structure lacked a true ruling estate. There emerged within the political context of liberal democracy a group of self-seeking intriguers. These politikany, or politicians, as a new elite, manipulated the political machinery of democracy. The politikany were ubiquitous and perverse. At least, he argued, the aristocracy was respected and feared, even when hated, but the politikany, reflecting a lower intellectual and moral level, were simply held in contempt. Character was destiny in such a political context, for these men were adroit careerists, practical and devoid of independence or scruples, intent on nothing less than power. As "banal democrats," they lacked moral authority and were as separated from the people as they were from their formal ideals.

Toward the public such a class of men displayed an artful capacity to deceive. The vehicle for their deception was the political party. Organized around certain vested interests, which Tikhomirov failed to identify, political parties agitated, intimidated, and bribed the electorate. In the course of their political maneuvers, they maintained

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29 Ibid., pp. 48-51. 30 Ibid., p. 27.
the fiction of the peoples' will and the whole gamut of
democratic virtues. Where, Tikhomirov asked, was the
spirit of the nation in the shifting ground of parlia-
mentary majorities with its deception and careerism?
Under political stress governments served their creators,
the political party, and not the nation.31

The political structure of liberal democracy was
maintained in large measure by the "fiction of the peoples' will." This conception, which only exposed the contra-
diction between democratic ideals and reality, found its
modern inspiration in Rousseau. In Tikhomirov's view, the
eighteenth century philosophes had clearly separated this
ideal from functioning representative democracy.32 The
explicit association of the theory of the peoples' will with
representative government came with the French Revolution.33
Now, after a century, Tikhomirov argued, the politikany and
democrats utilized the doctrine as a prop to maintain con-
trol. Their claim to represent the will of the nation, if
examined closely, was totally spurious. A consideration of
the mechanics of "representing" the people through parlia-
mentary means reinforced this conclusion. To consult the

31 Ibid., pp. 41-44.

32 Ibid., pp. 21-27. The distinction was made between Volonte de tous and Volonte generale. At no point did
Tikhomirov comment on the implicit totalitarianism of the
latter. The critical concern was Rousseau's separation of
Volonte generale from "deputies, electors and journalists."

33 Ibid., p. 25.
people on the affairs of the state was impossible. The vast number of people to be consulted and the gargantuan task of providing the machinery to consult them, the factor of time in dealing with crucial questions, and the impracticality of providing a plebiscitary base for decisions on petty questions made the quest an impossibility. If the task were not beyond human means, Tikhomirov concluded, the gauging of the will of the majority would reveal nothing. The gesture would be mechanical and futile. Can one compel people to vote? If they do vote, how can one be sure they are properly informed and will make an intelligent decision? The will of a nation cannot be expressed by such a vehicle as the plebiscite or, indirectly, through representatives. A "general spirit" within the nation existed, he argued, but representative democracy was not a reflection of it.  

"The frog," Tikhomirov wrote, "is markedly different from the tadpole."  

This allusion, drawn from a familiar biological phenomenon, referred directly to the organic relationship between social democracy and its progenitor, liberal democracy. They were "different phases of one and the same evolution."  

Despite their apparent differences and tension, they were bound together, sharing a common set of assumptions about man and society. This commonality of outlook was embodied in their shared optimism about the epoch of progress; their separate characteristics resulted

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from differing emphases. Socialism, once it achieved full
development with the teachings of Karl Marx, emphasized in
an exaggerated fashion the materialism implicit in liberal
democracy. According to the logic of its development,
socialism separated itself from liberal democracy because
it could accept man as "a mere object of material nature."
Coincidentally, anarchism deviated from social democracy
for essentially the same reason, the unwillingness to sub-
ordinate the individual, either in theory or practice, to
the elemental forces of nature. 37

According to Tikhomirov, the instinct of the anarchist
to reject social democracy as a threat to individual freedom
was well-founded, if based on false assumptions about the
nature of human freedom. In a most prophetic discourse on
communism in Demokratia, liberal'naia i sotsial'naia,
Tikhomirov projected the broad outlines of twentieth-
century totalitarianism, already implicit in communist
theory and practice. 38 Written nearly a generation before
the triumph of Bolshevism, his analysis of social democracy
strikes the modern reader as perceptive. Moreover, his
conclusions, in part intuitive, approximated what Nikolai
Berdiaev would later describe as the peculiarities of
Russian communism. 39

37 Ibid., p. 55f; Tikhomirov, Bor'ba veka, p. 20.
38 Tikhomirov, Demokratia, liberal'naia i sotsial'naia, pp. 55-66, 75-88.
39 See Nicolas Berdyaev, The Origin of Russian
Communism, Tikhomirov argued, sought to destroy freedom in the name of freedom. With its economic determinism, it placed the derivative social order above the individual, promising in the course of historical change the acquisition of certain external freedoms. Such external freedoms related to everchanging conditions surrounding the "means of production"; it did not derive from man's innate character or rights. The confident expectation of freedom, much like the ultimate destruction of the state, was a hollow doctrine. Communist organization and style, apart from their fraudulent doctrine, conspired to preclude any such earthly paradise. The projected communist "anthill" would place society above the individual and the process would destroy man's "internal freedom." All thought, politics, and legislation would be adapted to socio-economic priorities. Under such a system the individual was destined to be obliterated.\(^4^0\)

If social democracy contained the germ of what the twentieth century would know as totalitarianism, was it conceivable that such an order would be constructed? Tikhomirov's reply was in the affirmative. The communist program in practical terms was feasible. Contemporary industry was concentrated and it would be possible to

\(^4^0\) Tikhomirov, *Demokratiiia, liberal'naia i sotsial'naia*, p. 66.

*Communism* (Ann Arbor, 1964), particularly the last two chapters.
bring it under state control. Tikhomirov visualized a future communist state with a vast cadre controlling distribution through state-owned warehouses. The difference between governments organizing and equipping large armies and this sort of economic centralization was essentially a matter of degree. Social democracy was uniquely equipped to perform such a feat.41 "The anarchists," he argued, "could murder and threaten to revolt, but they, by principle, did not wish to organize." Their fundamental doctrine was their essential weakness and, as a consequence, they represented nothing more than a "chronic illness."42 By contrast, social democracy posed a real danger and, as the annual May Day demonstrations illustrated, the movement was strong and was difficult to destroy. Its goals were realizable, a fact that was reinforced by the social democratic emphasis on organization and discipline. Whatever visions of a future order accompanied this social movement they combined harmoniously with the notion of "scientific socialism." Such operative myths evoked dreams among the workers and appealed to their interests. Without such "innocent adornments," Tikhomirov observed, the dogma appeared excessively crude.43 Social democracy had successfully orchestrated the separate spheres of social myth and political expediency.

In regard to the future, Tikhomirov was both

41 Ibid., p. 79. 42 Ibid., p. 72. 43 Ibid., p. 77.
impressed and alarmed by the social democratic political organization. With a disciplined, authoritative organization, "the envy of any army," they prepared for the acquisition of power. Coldly practical, they would strike when their strength was superior, or, if conditions were propitious, they would assume power legally. Already they were prepared for the huge transformation of society—"directors, administrators, commissars," the communist cadre, only awaited the hour to assume their social tasks. "It [social democracy] has intelligent leaders and the docile masses. If fate has decreed such a social revolution—then this party will produce it."^4^4

The plight of the individual under social democracy, as Tikhomirov projected it, would be desperate. Authority over the individual, he argued, was destined to be immense. The individual would be powerless and without any means of escape. The family would provide no isolation. All life would be under supervision.

Will a classless society emerge during the dictatorship of the proletariat? Tikhomirov's conclusion anticipated Milovan Djilas' analysis of the communist system. Having affirmed that classes, performing "a unified social role," were a constant in all societies, Tikhomirov predicted that social democracy would give birth to a highly stratified society. In fact, he stated, social democracy

^4^4Ibid., p. 79.
already possessed a "shadow ruling class"—an ordered ruling class of politikany. Only in a socialist state would such an elite have an opportunity to fully develop.45

The very dynamic which created a social order, Tikhomirov argued, gave it form and character. Imbued with "despotism, discipline and centralization," social democracy would give birth to a ruling elite, more powerful and refined than the scorned politikany of liberal democracy. They would share the "socialist intelligentsia's" attitude that the masses must be educated and disciplined—all to be pursued with the specious claim that their leadership represented "society." They would formulate public opinion and arbitrate all affairs. In fact, Tikhomirov concluded, communism with its universal claims would seek to subdue the planet. In the pursuit of such a grandiose vision, they would suppress internal restlessness and provoke external war.46

At this juncture, Tikhomirov asserted that the rule of social democracy, while pervasive and total, would be short-lived. The powerful capacity to organize and discipline concealed a fundamental weakness, which, for Tikhomirov, precluded the perpetuation of such a system. The failure of social democracy to appreciate the need for individual development would prompt an "anarchistic revolt against communism."47 This revolt would be elemental and

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45Ibid., p. 84. 46Ibid., p. 85. 47Ibid., p. 89.
violent, reflecting the inevitable popular response to such a regime of de-humanization.

The outburst of anarchistic revolt would paralyze the highly organized system of control under social democracy at the very moment of its triumph. The subsequent fate of society, to follow Tikhomirov's prophesy, would be a Hobbesian state of nature. Humanity would lapse into a primitive state, without authority or social integration. Having escaped the "barracks" of communism, society would disintegrate, giving way to small groups, cohesive and belligerent, struggling to gain hegemony over society. At this remote point in the future, society would have come full circle, from civilization to primitivism. No inexorable law decreed such a fate; only man's potentiality for self-deception paved the way for collective ruin.\textsuperscript{48}

Tikhomirov's projected scenario of the development of social democracy, despite its brevity, conveyed in many respects an impressive presentiment of the twentieth century. Two assumptions undergirded his conclusion that social democracy, at the very pinnacle of its power, would disintegrate. First, Tikhomirov viewed social democracy as an expression of "social mysticism." Its political program at its core was false and disassociated from the more fundamental, organic social reality which conditioned, guided and set the perimeters of social development. Integral to

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., pp. 94-97.
this social reality, which Tikhomirov viewed as organic and immutable, was man's spiritual nature. Social democracy in the nineteenth century derived in part from the distortion of this spiritual nature. In a meaningful sense, social democracy, as with other expressions of "New Chiliasm," acquired its motive power from the orphaned moral striving that came with the alienation of man and society from God. Liberal democracy had failed, not because of the impracticality of its program, but because of the lack of moral authority. By erroneously placing moral authority in society and consequently crushing the individual, social democracy would suffer the same fate.

Tikhomirov's second assumption, that social democracy, through police measures or education, was incapable of controlling the desire on the part of human beings for individual expression, has been demonstrated to be overly optimistic. Tikhomirov, writing in the early 1890's, did not sense or even vaguely imagine the tools—psychological and technological—that the twentieth century would provide the practitioners of totalitarianism. Tikhomirov's polemic stands as an eloquent and perceptive protest against the totalitarianism implicit in communism. His analysis, however, did not confront the authoritarian abuses explicit in autocratic Russia. His objection was to the anticipated totality of communist control which distinguished it from existing authority. Whatever reservations he possessed at this juncture in his life concerning the authoritarianism
of the Russian Empire, he did not express them.

Social democracy and anarchism were latter-day expressions of the chiliastic vision evoked in the eighteenth century. As the children of one mother, liberal democracy, they shared many common traits, the most notable for Tikhomirov being the alienation from Christianity. The breach between these two schools of socialism was based on the differing historical roles assigned to the individual. Beyond these broad similarities and differences, there was the peculiarity of their genesis. The social democrats, Tikhomirov observed, were the "creation of Jewish-Protestant elements of contemporary culture" and their growth was most pronounced in Northern Europe. By contrast, anarchism represented a renegade manifestation of capitalism and Roman Catholicism. Tikhomirov's treatment of this subject is cryptic, prompting the reader to raise numerous queries about his precise meaning. By implication more than direct statement, Tikhomirov seemed to be arguing that Catholic and Orthodox countries, with their "higher cultivation" of spiritual values, possessed a predisposition for anarchism. According to Tikhomirov, this spiritual character in practical terms meant a greater appreciation for the human personality. Anarchism grew in these areas, not because of any authoritarian tradition as one might presume, but as a consequence of this spiritual life which constituted a

\[49\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 67-74.\]
contravailing force to the materialism implicit in "Jewish-Protestant" social democracy. In nineteenth-century Russia, the birth of nihilism in the 1860's, an expression of anarchism according to Tikhomirov, and the relative weakness of social democracy in the 1890's illustrated this relationship between religious heritage and political behavior.

Among the contemporary expressions of anarchism, Tikhomirov's deepest hostility was reserved for Tolstoi and his followers. The Tolstovshchina represented to Tikhomirov something more subtle and perverse than the common variety of anarchism. Conventional anarchism placed an exaggerated emphasis on the individual's supposed autonomy. Rejecting God and the existing social structure, they attempted to build a new order. Within this "pathological process" of revolt and extreme individualism, "Tolstoism" constituted, not a petty ramification of the doctrine, but a completely new channel for all currents of anarchism. 50 According to Tikhomirov, Tolstoi rejected society and, by necessity, the culture created by it, but he maintained his link with religion. As the "final logic of spiritual sickness," he was seeking to alter Christianity rather than renounce it. Tikhomirov concluded that the Tolstovshchina posed a unique threat to society with its destructive character. While Tikhomirov argued that

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50 Tikhomirov, Bor'Mba veka, p. 23.
anarchism was a "chronic illness," he apparently viewed Tolstoi's anarchism with special alarm because of its adaptation to Christianity. The fact that Tolstoi was both heterodox and Russian no doubt intensified his hostility. 51

A persistent feature of Tikhomirov's ideological posture after 1888 was his close affinity to the established church. Later, when Tolstoi was faced with excommunication, Tikhomirov endorsed enthusiastically the decision of the authorities to proclaim Tolstoi and his teachings anathema. Given the totality of Tikhomirov's polemic against Tolstoi, it is plausible that his fundamental opposition was directed at Tolstoi's religious views, not his anarchism. At this initial stage of his second career, however, Tikhomirov was anxious to place Tolstoi within the realm of the "New Chiliasm," a social phenomena which, in his opinion, was both false and alien to the Russian experience.

Tikhomirov's writing during these early years after his pardon and return to Russia conveys a certain apocalyptic tone. These were the "dog years" of civilization, he wrote at one point. The collapse of civilization, while not foreordained by any inevitable process of history, was nevertheless a possibility. Although alarmed over the fate of civilization, Tikhomirov remained a voluntarist. He believed that the range of choice for man on social and

political questions was vast, if not absolute. There were
certain eternal truths which were embodied in human nature
and the social reality. The "tragi-comedy" of the nine-
teenth century was its consistent rejection of historic
truth for fanciful dreams about a future order. The quest
for an earthly paradise had propelled many down a dangerous
path and in the process they had denied the most funda-
mental of truths, the existence of God. In his struggle
with these dangerous trends Tikhomirov exposed his revital-
ized theism. This salient feature gave form and meaning to
his evolving world view. In seeking to interpret the
course of human events since 1789, Tikhomirov, much like an
Old Testament prophet, was seeking to awaken his people to
the fundamental spiritual questions which faced them. 52

Russia faced in the nineteenth century, not a foreign
invasion or a natural calamity, but "spiritual decay." 53 To
illustrate this assertion, Tikhomirov devoted a large
portion of Nachala i kontsy to Russian conditions. This
theme was pursued by way of historical analysis of the
1870's. Partly a personal memoir and partly a critique of
the revolutionary ideology, Tikhomirov's Nachala i kontsy
focused on those factors which facilitated this spiritual
decay. Chief among these factors was the inadequate edu-
cation of Russian youth. The separation of the younger

52 Tikhomirov, Demokratiia, liberal'naia i sotsial'
naia, pp. 97-99.
53 Tikhomirov, Nachala i kontsy, pp. 8, 34.
generation from Russia's historical culture paved the way for the manifestation of self-will, revolution, and a "whole liberal culture" which was, by character, negative and anti-Russian.  

Faith in revolution and the "Russia of the future" had become the surrogate for the spiritual needs of this generation of the 1870's. In time, this led to a "stupefaction of conscience" and acts of inhumanity such as terror. Reluctant to understand their true nature or the impotence of their ideals, the revolutionaries stood in complete contradiction to reality. In Bor'ba veka and Demokratiea, liberal'naia i sotsial'naia Tikhomirov described the danger facing Russia in broader historical terms. Russia, situated on the periphery of Europe, was challenged by the epic forces unleashed by the French Revolution. With its historic institutions intact, Russia had the opportunity, if properly aroused, to escape the transformation which had altered Europe. Russia's peculiar weakness was its alienated educated class which had been the source of the abortive revolutionary movement during the reign of Alexander II. The task was to forestall this threatening crisis, as spiritual as it was political, by awakening all

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54 Ibid., p. 29-32. Tikhomirov found the "cosmopolitanism" of this world view to be anti-national, particularly toward the Great Russian majority. This theme assumed greater significance in subsequent writing, especially after the 1905 revolution. The Great Russians, in his view, possessed "great state instincts."

55 Ibid., pp. 30, 101. 56 Ibid., p. 91.
facets of Russian society to the great falsehoods of the contemporary era. The objective would be realized only at that moment when the conscious activity of society coincided harmoniously with the underlying social laws.

The concept of society which Tikhomirov sought to explain to his generation was derived from his interpretation of the nation. Within his larger theistic framework, Tikhomirov viewed the nation as a historic entity, a "socio-organic phenomenon," with more-or-less clearly elaborated laws of internal development. This organism, subject to growth, decay, and even death, was not a theoretical abstraction, but a "scientific fact." Tikhomirov identified certain fundamental elements contained in all societies such as the family, classes, property, individual rights and public authority. The existence within society of diverse interests was reflected in the class structure. The relationship between classes was one of eternal antagonism and reconciliation, all regulated by "the power of the whole." The exact mechanism for this regulation, as well as the precise role for the state as a component element, was not defined by Tikhomirov in these early polemical writings. The full elaboration of these relationships became an important feature of his subsequent theoretical works. The social cement, however, was

57 Tikhomirov, Demokratia, liberal'naia i sotsial'naia, p. 30.
58 Tikhomirov, Bor'ba veka, p. 31.
provided by custom, tradition and, most importantly, by religion.

The disorder of contemporary life was a result of the loss of unity between this consciousness and the organizational force of society. The freedom of man, according to Tikhomirov, was demonstrated by his potential to insert "purpose" into the social life of the nation. Always contained within the confines of social necessity, this human prerogative could elevate society or disrupt it, depending on the nature of the goals pursued. Here, Tikhomirov argued, the educational and spiritual character of the personality was critical. The "root of social wisdom" was the harmony between the purposeful conscious activity of men and the "irrevocable" laws of nature. The contemporary idea of "progress," being devoid of any spiritual content, prompted a disharmony between these two spheres and had ushered in the chaos of the past century.

For Tikhomirov, the development of a nation was evolutionary, not progressive. Echoing Danilevskii, he asserted that each nation represented a given "type." Whatever development or decay which occurred was within the perimeters of its character. This character defined its fundamental forces and, in turn, its potentiality. Nations were not preordained for some common destiny or, as the

59 Tikhomirov, Nachala i kontsy, p. 39.
60 Ibid., p. 41.
"vain dreamers" would assert, revolution. Such false notions, to the contrary, undermined the capacity for the social environment to achieve its potential. Likewise, conservatism, if conceived as pure reaction, produced the same effect. If actual life did not embody revolution as a creative principle, it similarly was incompatible with social inertia or retrograde motion. Any attempt to freeze life, Tikhomirov warned, was a form of self-destruction.

To counter the dominant chiliastic mood of this era, Tikhomirov offered, in the vaguest of language, his concept of zhiznedeiatel'nost'. This term, for which there is no precise English translation, embodied the notion of the social development of man and society in a context of security and realism. As such, zhiznedeiatel'nost' superseded the outmoded and inadequate concepts of "progress"

61 Ibid., pp. 47-48.

62 Ibid., p. 50. To illustrate this approach, Tikhomirov referred Leontiev. In Konstitutsionalisty v epokhy 1881 goda (p. 108) Tikhomirov praised Count D. A. Tolstoi as a positive influence. During and after the 1905 Revolution, Tikhomirov became more forthright in criticizing governmental actions. At this stage in his career, he was willing only to criticize an intellectual expression of reactionary conservatism.

63 Tikhomirov, Vospominaniia, p. 344. Tikhomirov records that he obtained the collected works of Ivan Aksakov (entry for March 22, 1889). He mentioned Aksakov and Katkov as creative members of the "conscious" part of society who sought to destroy social myths; see Nachala i kontsy, p. 118. In the same work (p. 24) he implied a familiarity with the work of Danilevskii which he praised as "Christian." In Demokratiiia, liberal'naia i sotsial'naia, (p. 2) Tikhomirov made reference to J. K. Bluntschli. The latter, along with the Russian political theorist, Boris Chicherin, received greater emphasis in his theoretical works beginning with
The evolution of society was constant, vital, and comprehensible. The task for his time, Tikhomirov asserted, was to study zhiznedeiztel'nost', to understand its laws both as scientific fact and political art.

Such as inquiry, however, could not exclude from consideration the social significance of religion. In his conclusion to Bor'ba veka, Tikhomirov maintained that religion was fundamental to society. Religion provided moral authority, social discipline, and an avenue to perceive truth. The futility and social chaos of the past century resulted from its deviation from this essential factor. By securing freedom and "wholesome obedience," religion was integral to the existence of zhiznedeiztel'nost'. After all, Tikhomirov remarked, man's goal on earth is not pleasure but personal development and understanding of life.

There were concrete remedies for the social malady which had victimized Europe since the eighteenth century. Moving from generalizations to political action, Tikhomirov urged the "suppression" of those who dreamed of a future order. Without suggesting specific measures, Tikhomirov argued that no society could permit open

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64 Tikhomirov, Bor'ba veka, pp. 53f.
65 Ibid., p. 62.
subversion or even disobedience to established laws.  

Careful to avoid the danger of "congealed conservatism," he added that suppression alone was inadequate as a corrective tool, particularly if it stymied growth and social consciousness. There was a need for "freedom with discipline," for "spiritual balance and self-possession."  

If the fall of civilization came, Tikhomirov remarked, it would not be accomplished by social democracy or anarchism, but by the continued waste of moral and material strength. The marks of decay were evident, not only with the continued presence of social illusions, but with the fact that the social foundations of modern civilization were being undermined. A moral vacuum existed with little apparent capacity on the part of humanity to reverse the condition. Yet, Tikhomirov argued there was time, particularly for Russia, and, if the correct path were selected, a "new spiritual equilibrium" could be achieved. These sentiments were expressed confidently in Demokratia, liberal'naia i sotsial'naia, which was published in the year of the coronation of Nicholas II as Emperor. 

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68 Tikhomirov, Demokratia, liberal'naia i sotsial'naia, p. 97.  
69 Ibid., p. 102.
CHAPTER III

THE MONARCHICAL PRINCIPLE, AN APOLOGIA

The critique of the revolutionary tradition had provided Tikhomirov in the immediate period after his return to Russia an appropriate métier for the renewal of political activity. As a repentant radical, Tikhomirov's polemical efforts represented both his mea culpa and his initial contribution to what he described as "serious intellectual work." Behind his energetic polemic was the realization that any systematic exposure of the inherent weaknesses of the "New Era," even in the most articulate form, constituted little more than an implied endorsement of the autocracy. Such polemical forays were, by nature, narrow in scope and negative in tone. They fell short of the more demanding imperative to provide an apologia for the monarchy. For Tikhomirov, the monarchical idea in Russia, apart from the outworn formulation of "autocracy, Orthodoxy and nationalism," was devoid of any positive, theoretical defense. To construct such a positive affirmation of the autocracy, Tikhomirov abandoned the narrow confines of criticism and exposé in the late 1890's to construct an exposition of those principles, theoretical and historical, which undergirded the monarchical idea.
Writing in 1911, Tikhomirov described this period leading up to 1905 as an effort to substantiate his conviction that the autocracy constituted a "higher political principle," capable in its proper expression to provide "order, prosperity, and freedom."¹

Beginning with Edinolichnaia vlast' kak printsip gosudarstvennago stroeniia (1897) and culminating with Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost' (1904), Tikhomirov forged his apologia, an effort which earned him the characterization by some contemporaries as the "Karl Marx of the right."² Such a comparison was not inappropriate, at least in reference to Tikhomirov's objective, for he sought nothing less than a definitive statement on the social dynamic at work in history. His confident expectation was that such an elaboration of the social reality would illustrate the viability of the monarchical idea. Tikhomirov combined in his work the skills of a sociologist, a political theorist, and a lay theologian. The motive power behind his theoretical work was the desire to resolve the apparent disharmony between human consciousness and the actual social dynamic at work in history. Social stability and, by implication, the ultimate survival of the autocracy, rested on these two spheres. Consciousness, or the

¹Lev Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii (Moscow, 1912), p. 4.

perception of the social reality, related to the crucial phenomenon of human will. When the collective will of society was guided by an awareness of those inexorable social laws which conditioned and limited human existence, social harmony was achieved. Knowing both the limitations and potential of social life guaranteed for organized society stability and development. A misapprehension of the social reality, i.e. the disharmony between consciousness and the social process, meant confusion, disorder and the ultimate disintegration of society.\(^3\)

Tikhomirov argued that the most apparent evidence of this disharmony between consciousness and the social reality in the Russian context was the intelligentsia. Tikhomirov's evolving ideological posture had placed him in open contradiction to the dominant outlook of the radical intelligentsia. His religious ideas, his organic view of society, and his overt sympathies for certain established institutions reinforced his ideological estrangement. On the other hand, Tikhomirov shared the essential mood and approach of a Russian intelligent with his absolutist outlook, his profound interest in social theory, and his intolerance of opposing viewpoints. Despite the prevailing materialism and secularism he detected in the educated classes, Tikhomirov argued confidently for a national intelligentsia.\(^4\)

\(^3\)Lev Tikhomirov, *Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost'*, 4 vols. (Moscow, 1904), 1: 79.

\(^4\)See Dimitry Pospielovsky, *Russian Police Trade*
Such a national intelligentsia would restore the necessary harmony between social consciousness and social reality. According to Tikhomirov, education was not theoretically incompatible with the monarchical principle. His work as a political theorist was designed to demonstrate this fact.

As a political theorist, Tikhomirov occupied no university chair or position of political importance from which to influence his contemporaries. His vocational choice remained journalism and his political priorities stemmed from a life of political activism. His stress, if not his pretensions, was more ideological than scholarly, more polemical than philosophical. His former life as a narodovolets cast a long shadow over his career and raised the question of his credibility. This factor, combined with his deep remorse over his revolutionary past, prompted an inhibition on his part to criticize publicly the regime. Ultimately, the burden of Tikhomirov's political posture with its exaltation of an ideal national monarchy came into conflict with the apparent shortcomings of the existing regime, particularly after 1905 with the adoption of constitutional forms. At this point, the reservations and despair, hitherto expressed in the privacy of his diary,

Unionism, Experiment or Provocation? (London, 1971), p. 82. Among the most talented workers, Tikhomirov wanted to form a "people's intelligentsia." Throughout his career Tikhomirov persisted in his belief that the alienated educated classes could be enlisted into the defense of Russia's historic institutions.
began to penetrate his public utterances. Yet, his political associations with such diverse figures as Pobedonostsev, V. A. Gringmut, Serge Zubatov and Peter Stolypin tied him in a forceful way to the regime. Tikhomirov's dilemma, the tension between the impulse to criticize and the compelling sense of loyalty to the autocracy, was never resolved. As with other members of the amorphous Russian right at the turn of the century, Tikhomirov sought in vain to establish an acceptable avenue to influence public affairs. As Hans Rogger has pointed out, the regime solicited no defenders in the public sphere. In fact, they displayed an acute apprehension of any self-proclaimed, autonomous defenders of the autocracy. Only within the confines of the printed word did Tikhomirov find a medium wherein he could articulate his concerns with any degree of clarity and urgency.

Once Tikhomirov began to forge his theoretical defense of the autocracy, to engage in the most crucial phase of his "serious intellectual work," he discovered that political science was a realm of "convention, chance, and contradiction." This "flower of science," as a discipline, had
not in Tikhomirov's opinion gone beyond the "empirical stage." As a crucial field of inquiry, political science had merely studied the social and political process, not the goals behind it. An interest in structure, institutions and juridical matters, for instance, were important, but they were inadequate alone to explain the meaning of political life. Tikhomirov sought to transcend this narrow range of subject matter of formal scholarship by giving attention to the non-rational, religious, and moral dimensions of political organization. By such an approach, Tikhomirov hoped to postulate an overarching meaning for the social order and the state. The anticipated result of his inquiry in conjunction with other kindred studies would be the alteration of the national consciousness toward the existing socio-political reality.

Tikhomirov's interpretation of this socio-political reality was not created sui generis, but resulted from his wide-ranging study of classical and contemporary thought. Considered in its totality, Tikhomirov's intellectual borrowings were selective and specific, all fashioned to illustrate his basic contention that the monarchical

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8 Ibid.
9 This fundamental theme in Tikhomirov's writing was expressed in numerous contexts. For example, his discussion of the "historical fate" of the nations; see, Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost' 4: 256-261.
principle was consistent with the on-going nature of society. At no point did Tikhomirov completely endorse one theory or theorist. His borrowings were often direct, providing both idea and language, but invariably he applied them to the Russian context in terms of his own priorities. Frequently, Tikhomirov utilized the ideas of certain men in a measured, critical fashion. If certain ideas were deemed particularly offensive or perverse, Tikhomirov supplied a complete refutation. Through praise, limited acceptance, or repudiation, Tikhomirov disclosed in his work an impressive familiarity with social thought, particularly in the contemporary period.

From this vantage point of his own era, Tikhomirov endorsed enthusiastically the assertion made by Herbert Spencer that "society is an organism." Organismic theories of society and the state had acquired a considerable following in the late nineteenth century and Tikhomirov represented in the Russian context one variant.¹⁰ Tikhomirov's biological interpretation of social phenomena, derivative in many respects, provided for him, as it did for others, a powerful means to refute the prevailing rationalistic and mechanistic social theories which lay behind democracy and now in various guises threatened Russia's traditional institutions. Tikhomirov's particular social theory, once it was fully articulated, could best be

described as a mixture of what P. Sorokin has described as the "bio-organismic" and "instinctivist" schools of social thought. He combined the biological model to explain the structure, the growth, and mutual dependence of the various components of society. He stressed psychological factors to interpret the peculiarities of national character and the accompanying predisposition for certain forms of political organization.

From references contained in Tikhomirov's two major theoretical works, Edinolichnaia vlast' kak printsip gosudarstvenago stroeniiia and Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost' the specific character of his adaptation of social and political thought is apparent. From Spencer and Danilevskii he adapted much of his organic theory, preferring the anti-democratic and national bias of the latter. From Alfred J. E. Fouillée, a contemporary social philosopher, it is conceivable that Tikhomirov derived much of his psycho-social theory, particularly Fouillée's theory of ideas as forces. From J. K. Bluntschli, the Swiss jurist and political theorist, Tikhomirov was exposed to the theory of the state as a moral juridical person, a viewpoint which reinforced Tikhomirov's evolving conception of the state as the bearer of a "moral ideal." From Gustav LeBon, another French social psychologist, Tikhomirov was exposed to a social theory stressing the romantic notions

Ibid., pp. 194-197.
of national character and racial soul, all cast within an elitist framework. Le Bon's aristocratic and anti-democratic posture, if not the specifics of his racist ideas, were congenial to Tikhomirov's instincts. Le Bon provided an important variation of certain themes pursued by Danilevskii, whom Tikhomirov had read earlier with high praise. Friedrich List influenced Tikhomirov in the area of political economy.¹²

Beyond Danilevskii, there were a number of Russian writers and scholars who made an impact of Tikhomirov's thought. Boris Chicherin, the renowned political theorist, prompted frequent reference along with the historian Serge Soloviev. Pobedonostsev exerted an important influence on Tikhomirov when the latter began to adapt his general ideas to the Russian milieu. Other Russians such as K. Leontiev, Ivan Aksakov, M. N. Katkov, A. S. Khomiakov and later, F. Dostoevskii were referred to by Tikhomirov in a favorable fashion. Others such as Vladimir Soloviev and Leo Tolstoi were subjected to occasional criticism and denunciation, particularly in reference to their religious ideas. When Tikhomirov denounced social democracy, he preferred to attack Karl Marx or Frederick Engels rather than his old polemical adversary George Plekhanov. Tikhomirov viewed Ivan IV, Nicholas I and Alexander III as

¹²Tikhomirov made reference to these men and others in his two major theoretical works. For a concise summary of the contemporary social theorists who influenced Tikhomirov, see F. W. Coker, Organismic Theories of the State (New York, 1967); Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories.
exemplary rulers, combining in their reigns the national spirit and decisive state policy. As to Russian statesmen, he preferred Kiselev to Speranskii and Stolypin to Witte. While all these four statesmen were associated with social and political change, Kiselev and Stolypin, in Tikhomirov's view, were less Western in their outlook and more committed to the preservation of the autocracy.\(^\text{13}\)

Tikhomirov's theoretical defense of the monarchical principle focused on several crucial considerations. He began with a discussion of power (vlast'\(^1\)) as the everpresent factor in human existence, defining and animating relations between individuals and groups. From this pivotal consideration he explored the nature of obshchestvennost' and gosudarsvennost', the former reflecting the human striving to create community, the latter the derivative need to forge a state as a means to regulate and integrate social life.\(^\text{14}\) Within these two broad areas of theoretical

\(^{13}\) Among the Russian writers Tikhomirov gave specific and detailed coverage were M. N. Katkov, I. S. Aksakov and K. N. Leontiev. See Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', 3: 127-147. Frequent reference was made to Boris Chicherin in the elaboration of Tikhomirov's political theory. For example, see Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', 1: 42, where Tikhomirov analyzed Chicherin's interpretation of limited monarchy. Inter­spersed throughout Tikhomirov's writing are brief references or quotations from Chicherin and other theorists. Tikhomirov frequently used such occasions to establish a "false" idea or a straw man which he subsequently criti­cized or rejected.

\(^{14}\) A concise statement on Tikhomirov's definition of the role of the state is found in Edinolichnaia vlast', pp. 11-16.
speculation, Tikhomirov dealt with four specific topics—the role of power in human affairs, the nature of the social order, the role of the state in relation to the social process, and, finally, the significance, theoretical and historical, of the monarchical principle. These four fundamental themes constituted the core of his political theory and the sequence of topics considered below. While Tikhomirov's analysis in Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost was cast for the most part in theoretical terms, his discussion throughout, first by implication and then later in more explicit form, was centered around the Russian autocracy. He had the Russian autocracy in mind when he idealized the monarchical state as an expression of verkhovnaia vlast or argued that the monarchical principle provided the most effective means of integrating social life in the industrial age. Despite all his efforts to interpret the monarchical idea as universal and applicable to all societies, Tikhomirov considered the Russian autocracy as a unique form of "genuine" monarchy. In the course of his work he exercised the dual role of theoretician and apologist. These roles did not overlap as much as they were combined in his thought. His theoretical conclusion that the monarchical idea was viable merged with his more fundamental drive to save the Russian autocracy, which he defined as

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15 Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', 1: 117. This section contains Tikhomirov's definition of "true" or "genuine" monarchy.
a unique historical expression of "true" monarchy. 16

Throughout history, Tikhomirov argued, social relations had been defined by the phenomenon of power (vlast'). To exert influence, to defend vested interests, or to control destructive impulses, men, as individuals and within the context of a group, utilized vlast'. This elemental factor animated the totality of human existence and its dynamic explained the course of social life. During the revolutionary epochs in America and Europe, Tikhomirov lamented, the phenomenon of vlast' had fallen into disrepute. 17 Although by nature neither good nor evil, vlast' had been associated with tyranny and oppression. This distrust of vlast' had given birth to the anarchistic idea, at the time of Tikhomirov's writing a powerful current in European political life. For Tikhomirov, this misapprehension of vlast' had been accompanied by a contempt for social hierarchy, organized religion, and public authority. These attitudes dominated public opinion and constituted in Tikhomirov's mind a form of political illness. 18 For Tikhomirov, vlast' derived from human nature and was a necessary condition for social organization. It was the

16 Tikhomirov became more explicit on this basic assumption in Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', 3: 201. This is implicit in much of his theoretical writing. See also Edinolichnaia vlast', p. 87.

17 Ibid., p. 5.

18 Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', 1: 72f.
"ruling force," creating public order and the context for the evolutionary growth of society.\textsuperscript{19} By defining the respective spheres of authority and subordination, \textit{vlast}' conditioned the complete range of human interaction, from the relationship of individuals to the clash of nations in the arena of international affairs.\textsuperscript{20}

The nation provided the crucible in which \textit{vlast}' became \textit{verkhovnaia vlast}' or supreme power.\textsuperscript{21} A protean concept, \textit{verkhovnaia vlast}' derived from the collective striving for order and functioned as a unifying principle.\textsuperscript{22} In political terms, \textit{verkhovnaia vlast}' was an indivisible and indestructible source of authority.\textsuperscript{23} Simple in form and juridically unrestricted, inviolable, all-powerful and without external restraint, \textit{verkhovnaia vlast}' was the creator of the state (\textit{gosudarstvo}).\textsuperscript{24} The state constituted the necessary and inevitable manifestation of \textit{verkhovnaia vlast}'.\textsuperscript{25} The state represented the instrumentality of \textit{verkhovnaia vlast}'. By asserting authority

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19}Ibid., p. 9; \textit{Edinolichnaia vlast'}, p. 18f.
\item \textsuperscript{20}Tikhomirov, \textit{Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost'}, 1: 16.
\item \textsuperscript{21}Tikhomirov, \textit{Edinolichnaia vlast'}, p. 43.
\item \textsuperscript{22}Ibid., p. 17; \textit{Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost'}, 1: pp. 3-4.
\item \textsuperscript{23}Tikhomirov, \textit{Edinolichnaia vlast'}, p. 19.
\item \textsuperscript{24}Ibid., p. 24; \textit{Monarkhicheskaia gosudarsvennost'}, 1: 44.
\item \textsuperscript{25}Ibid., p. 49.
\end{itemize}
and defining the rights and duties of man, the state embodied the ultimate will of the nation.\textsuperscript{26} State administration (pravitel'\'stvo) was distinguished by Tikhomirov from the state (gosudarstvo). State administration, as a mechanism or "transmissive" power,\textsuperscript{27} was not to be confused with verkhovnaia vlast' embodied in the state.\textsuperscript{28} The particular form of pravitel'\'stvo stemmed, not from the inner logic of verkhovnaia vlast', but from a multitude of historical circumstances.\textsuperscript{29} Unlike the state, created by one simple form of sovereignty, state administration was able in its specialized functions to incorporate contradictory ideas such as democracy and aristocracy.\textsuperscript{30} If transformed into a power-seeking bureaucracy, pravitel'\'stvo lost its creative function and threatened the state by separating it from the spirit of the nation.\textsuperscript{31} To explain the organization of society, Tikhomirov isolated four elements: the narod, the seed-bed of socio-political organization by virtue of its internal psychological character and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{26}Tikhomirov, \textit{Edinolichnaia vlast'}, p. 17.
  \item \textsuperscript{27}Tikhomirov, \textit{Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost'}, 1: 56-61. He indicated that there were two aspects of transmissive power—the serving (sluzhiloe) and the representative (predstavitel'noe). The latter he considered as a distortion found in democracies.
  \item \textsuperscript{28}Ibid., pp. 32-33.
  \item \textsuperscript{29}Tikhomirov, \textit{Edinolichnaia vlast'}, p. 17.
  \item \textsuperscript{30}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{31}See particularly \textit{Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost'}, 3: 156-197.
\end{itemize}
historical experience; the principle of verkhovnaia vlast' as the unifying principle; the gosudarstvo, as the concrete, organizing power created by verkhovnaia vlast'; and pravitel' stvo, as the organized system of administration. According to Tikhomirov, verkhovnaia vlast' existed in three basic forms—aristocracy, democracy, and monarchy. State organization invariably took shape under the aegis of these three principles of sovereignty. Being universal in character, these principles were capable of development in any society. A crucial feature of Tikhomirov's theory was the contention that they could not be combined, despite the theories, ancient and modern, which assumed that mixed forms were feasible and/or desirable. Tikhomirov conceded that combinations of aristocratic, democratic, and monarchical elements were only conceivable in the sphere of state administration. Verkhovnaia vlast' or sovereignty, by virtue of its unity and prerogative, precluded any mixed expression. In practical terms this conclusion by Tikhomirov mitigated against the idea of a constitutional monarchy.

The three forms of verkhovnaia vlast', Tikhomirov argued, were latent in all societies, but he did not explain with precision the peculiar historical circumstances which gave birth to one form, then another. Once verkhovnaia vlast' appeared, Tikhomirov stated only that it was

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32 Ibid., 1: 33; Edinolichnaia vlast', p. 62f.
33 Ibid., p. 32. 34 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
subject to an evolution of its own. This process was conditioned by two factors: the internal logic of development implicit in the particular form of sovereignty and environmental influences, national and international.\textsuperscript{35} A nation, having embraced one form of sovereignty, could shift to another. The crucial factor appeared to be national consciousness which was sustained or was debilitated by either the indifference or hostility of the nation to a given form of verkhovnaia vlast.\textsuperscript{1} National consciousness stemmed from a more basic reality, the psychological character of the nation, or what Tikhomirov called, "national psychology." Politics, Tikhomirov observed, was merged with "national psychology." As the ultimate expression of the authority of the nation, verkhovnaia vlast was predetermined and conditioned by this living repository of a peoples' traditions, customs, and historical experience. Aristocracy, democracy, and monarchy were tied inextricably to this "national psychology." By virtue of their relationship to the nation, they could achieve ideal form. Or, to the contrary, the three forms could be evolving into the distorted expressions of aristocracy, democracy and monarch—"oligarchy, mob-rule, and tyranny."\textsuperscript{36}

Tikhomirov maintained that aristocracy, democracy and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 32.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Tikhomirov, \textit{Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost'}, 1: 73-74.
\end{itemize}
monarchy were separate principles. They were not related to each other on some evolutionary progression with one form representing a final phase. They could rise or fall, achieve ideal form or evolve separately into some distorted representation, but they never reflected in their shifting fortunes some inexorable evolutionary or cyclical process. This theoretical point was congenial to Tikhomirov's larger purpose of illustrating that democracy in the contemporary period did not reflect a higher stage of political development. By maintaining the insularity and autonomy of each of these forms and by associating the various shifts in forms of verkhovnaia vlast' to the "moral-psychological" content of the nation, Tikhomirov, if proven correct, had overcome a fundamental premise of the "New Era." Democracy ceased to be inevitable and the way was cleared to consider monarchy as a viable form of state organization in the modern industrial age.

If the psychological factor explained the phenomenon of vlast' and influenced the development of verkhovnaia vlast', it provided as well the means to understand the social process. Echoing Fouilléé, Tikhomirov identified three psychological attributes which gave shape and motion to society—"sense (chust'), idea (prenstavlenii) and desire (zahlanii)." These human drives in their

37Ibid.
38Ibid., p. 6. Coker, Organismic Theories of the State, pp. 180-190.
interaction constituted society and what Tikhomirov called the "laws of cooperation." Without providing any explicit or detailed description as to how this triad of forces operated in society, Tikhomirov merely affirmed that they were constant and indestructible features of the social organism. Having identified them and associated them with the social process, Tikhomirov did not clarify their relationship to human nature or to the larger theistic framework of his outlook. He insisted that the existence of sense, idea and desire, as operative factors in social life, made social science possible. His treatment of this psychosocial phenomenon, however, was for the most part derivative, tautological, and undeveloped.

If the operation of these psychological elements remained elusive and inexact, the importance of them to Tikhomirov's theory was obvious. As with his interpretation of verkhovnaia vlast', where he attempted to establish that democracy was not a higher form of sovereignty, he now explained the taproots of the social process in a fashion that was congenial to the monarchical principle. Without negating the significance of environmental factors, Tikhomirov had postulated a theory of social behavior which stressed non-rational elements. Man ceased to be atomized or to be the plaything of materialistic forces and became an integral part of a complex, organic community, the nation.

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This self-conscious social entity possessed unity, purpose and spiritual character. Tikhomirov's organic view of society anticipated the existence of the state, not as a contradiction or necessary evil, but as an instrumentality of the national will.

Tikhomirov's study of gosudarstvennost revealed the state to be a manifestation of verkhovnaia vlast. Whether the state was organized by the democratic, the aristocratic, or the monarchical principle, it reflected the natural and legitimate striving of a society to establish public order. In terms of Tikhomirov's organic view of society, the state, viewed from the monarchical perspective, was not a political artifice for restricted administrative tasks or, as the Marxists claimed, a tool of the ruling class. The state as a "higher union" was the natural expression of verkhovnaia vlast. It achieved the perfection of society through the regulation and integration of the myriad interests and groupings found in society. The state was designed to harmonize the natural conflict found in society rather than to superimpose the hegemony of a ruler or a class. Moreover, the state was not explicable in juridical or constitutional terms alone. The state exerted its authority through institutional means. It created laws and provided for justice, but the

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40 For Tikhomirov's analysis of the state see Ibid., 1: 22-37; Edinolichnaia vlast', pp. 11-21.
41 Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', 1: 30.
state was not to be understood exclusively in terms of these functions. The state, as a special union, embodied the national will and character.\(^{42}\) It was tied inextricably to the nation, sharing by this organic relationship the national spirit. The state's power was supreme. As the instrumentality of national will, it compelled obedience and defined the respective spheres of rights and responsibilities. In performing these tasks, institutional and spiritual, the state provided for ordered freedom and security.\(^{43}\)

The state, as guardian, arbiter, and authority, created the context for "factual" freedom.\(^{44}\) Tikhomirov viewed freedom and authority as separate, but mutually dependent aspects of human existence. Freedom was defined in a context of social discipline by the state. Freedom was not absolute or anarchistic, but linked, by necessity, to civic duty. This reality was explicable if one examined the psychological basis of society. Civil freedom was meaningful only in terms of its underlying social purpose—the independence of the human personality. Society was a fabric, the interrelationship of family, community and classes, each separately exercising its own authority. The individual was accorded both privileges and responsibilities.

\(^{42}\) Tikhomirov, *Edinolichnaia vlast*, p. 17.

\(^{43}\) Tikhomirov, *Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost*, 1: 27.

\(^{44}\) Tikhomirov, *Edinolichnaia vlast*, p. 9.
within this pluralistic and overlapping social environment. His freedom derived not from a bill of rights, but from this integrated hierarchical social existence, the interacting spheres of rights and responsibilities. In addition, Tikhomirov separated the concept of human freedom from equality. The state, as the highest triumph of human freedom, sustained a social context of mutual responsibility. From the religious-moral point of view, Tikhomirov observed, men possessed only responsibilities. Whatever rights existed, they were corollaries of this more fundamental principle of duty. Tikhomirov contrasted the above idea of "rational" freedom, admittedly restricted and theoretically detached from the individual, with "alien" freedom. By the former he meant the idea of social freedom (svoboda obshchestvennaja); the latter signified the exaggerated individual freedoms which left social responsibility and civic duty undefined, presumably in democracy.

Tikhomirov felt that Christian teaching reinforced his conception of "social freedom." The Biblical maxim, spoken by Christ himself, "to render to Caesar, what is Caesar's" established forcefully in his mind the obligation of Christians to accept secular authority and, by implication, the existing social structure. Indirectly, such

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45 Ibid., p. 120; Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', 4: 24-48.
46 Ibid., 4: 25; Edinolichnaia vlast', p. 121.
47 Ibid., p. 52.
an act of obedience was to God, for all secular authority was ordained by God. By subordination to "truth," Tikhomirov argued, men were free; by virtue of this submission man became subordinate to his "higher self." In formulating this interpretation, Tikhomirov sought to separate freedom from the prevailing democratic notions which stressed individual rights at the expense of social duty. In monarchy, he felt, the security of freedom was guaranteed by the balancing of both of these imperatives which stemmed from the social reality.

From these basic assumptions about the relationship of the state to the social order, Tikhomirov formulated his interpretation of the monarchical principle. Among the three basic forms of sovereignty, monarchy represented a higher form of *verkhovnaia vlast*. Monarchy shared with democracy and aristocracy the broad objectives of state organization—to establish order and organize national life. But monarchy uniquely embodied the "supremacy of the moral ideal" and the rule of a "higher force." By associating the moral ideal with the nation and God, Tikhomirov placed democracy and aristocracy in autonomous, but inferior categories of state organization. Monarchy, unlike

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49 Ibid., 4: 249.
50 Tikhomirov, *Edinolichnaia vlast*, p. 46.
other forms, derived its ultimate authority from God rather than the people. Its mandate was sustained not merely by its innate talent or by its instinct for survival, as with Caesarism, but as a consequence of the "higher moral ideal" operative within its leadership. When speaking of this theoretical monarchy, grounded in the nation and serving the divine will, Tikhomirov was thinking of the potentiality of the Russian autocracy to achieve this ideal in modern times.

Tikhomirov placed the monarchical principle in and above the nation. Although his interpretation of the relationship of the monarchy to the nation and its "moral ideal" was expressed in vague, idealistic language, his thrust was clear. Tikhomirov sought to establish the necessary and direct linkage between the monarch and the nation while simultaneously denying the latter any exercise of sovereignty. The "national-moral type" gave birth to verkhovnaia vlast' in the form of monarchy, but the nation was denied any direct means of political control. The separation of the source of power and the exercise of power was not, as with Hobbes, the consequence of human frailty. Anticipating some of the fascist theories of the

52 Tikhomirov, Edinolichnaia vlast', pp. 81-82.

53 See Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaiia gosudarstvennost', 4: 314. Here Tikhomirov provided a summary of his entire work placing this basic concern in larger focus.

54 Ibid., 1: 113.
state, Tikhomirov maintained that while the link between sovereign and people was not defined or sustained by constitutional machinery, it was nevertheless direct, symbiotic, and spiritual. Unlike fascist dogma, however, Tikhomirov gave greater stress to God as the ultimate sanction for monarchical power. The religious aura Tikhomirov associated with the monarchical principle in some respects harkened back to the Byzantine model of the emperor possessing power by virtue of a divine mandate. For Tikhomirov, the monarch embodied the higher moral ideal, which was derived ultimately from God and resided in the nation. The monarchy, apart from God or the nation, became atrophied and, if not renewed, lost its claim to verkhovnaia vlast'. At no point did Tikhomirov clearly define the "higher moral ideal" or the circumstances in which the will of God was operable in the nation.

The monarch was a "servant of God" (Bozhii Sluga), ordained to execute his will and realize a higher moral existence for man. By virtue of this divine sanction, the monarchy, as an expression of individual vlast', became supreme. The monarch, unlike a dictator, did not serve the ephemeral priorities of political power or seek merely to preserve certain vested interests or privileges. As sovereign, he embodied and executed a higher duty, which

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55 Ibid., 1: 112.

56 Ibid., p. 101; Edinolichnaia vlast', p. 27.
was not defined or endorsed by plebiscites or the machinery or representative government. According to Tikhomirov's model, the monarch was divine in his calling, autonomous in his power, and restricted only by the content of the moral ideal embodied in him.57

The historical existence of monarchy, once conceived in its "true" form, was not guaranteed perpetuation by its intrinsic character, or by the divine mandate which exalted it above the other forms of state organization. Tikhomirov suggested that "true" monarchy, as defined above, could be transformed into two distorted variants: "despotic" or "absolutist" monarchies.58 Both were aberrations of the monarchical principle and reflected in their activity a lack of moral content. Their clear sense of duty and purpose had been obscured by their altered relationship to God and/or the nation. "Despotic" monarchy, while possessed of verkhovnaia vlast', was devoid of true consciousness concerning its mission and was not in full submission to God. By contrast, the absolutist monarchy, as a concept and a historical phenomenon, was devoid of verkhovnaia vlast' and survived in various guises purely on its own resources.59 Tikhomirov associated the latter with the monarchies of Western Europe. Lacking sovereignty, which

57 Ibid., pp. 46-48; 81-82. Tikhomirov provided in this section a brief definition of monarchy and its relationship to religion. See also, Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', 1: 79-106; 4: 31-62.

58 Ibid., 1: 93. 59 Ibid., 1: 117.
in actuality resided in the nation, the absolutist variant possessed at best higher administrative power.\textsuperscript{60} Detached from the national spirit and blessed with only a meagre sense of duty, it sought by its own logic to perfect the state machinery, giving rise to an inordinately powerful bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{61} For Tikhomirov, the latter was properly understood as absolutist, not monarchical. Bureaucracy constituted a serious threat to "true," or what Tikhomirov now labeled as "autocratic" monarchy by creating a bureaucratic wall between the sovereign and the nation. This partition meant obligatory norms, legalism, the stifling of creativity, and the loss of moral purpose.\textsuperscript{62} While affirming that the autocratic expression of monarchy was capable of existence in any society, even America, Tikhomirov hinted that true monarchy possessed its greatest potential for realization in modern times in Russia where the drift to absolutism had not reached fruition.

The eternal validity of the monarchical principle rested on two crucial relationships: the tie of the monarchy to religion, its ethical-religious content, and the organic link of the monarchy to the social order, the arena for its historical mission.\textsuperscript{63} According to Tikhomirov

\textsuperscript{60}Ibid., p. 117.
\textsuperscript{61}Tikhomirov, Edinolichnaya vlast', p. 92.
\textsuperscript{62}Ibid., pp. 92-95; Monarkhicheskaiia gosudarstvennost', 1: 65.
\textsuperscript{63}Ibid., pp. 87-100.
monarchy integrated the spheres of religion and sovereignty, state organization and society. Tied to the moral ideal and above class, monarchy possessed a unique capacity, particularly in modern times, to harmonize the diverse elements of society. Only by understanding these two relationships could the Russian nation appreciate the contemporary viability and latent strength of the autocracy.

The relationship of monarchy to religion was symbiotic and fateful for the nation. Supreme power or verkhovnaia vlast' was achieved through the vital presence of the moral ideal internalized in the religious consciousness of the nation. Religion gave meaning to human existence and an ethical dimension to political life. Religious consciousness, according to Tikhomirov, existed throughout history in varying degrees of perfection, from paganism to the highest form, Christianity. The advent of the latter provided the context for the rise of "true" monarchy wherein the moral bond between religion and politics achieved its ideal form. The loss of religious consciousness, by the nation or by the monarch, set into motion forces which distorted monarchy into despotism or absolutism or, if the shift in consciousness were decisive, into another form of state organization.

Two rules were operative in the posture of monarchy toward the crucial sphere of religious affairs. Initially,

64 Ibid., p. 65.  
65 Ibid., p. 66.
the monarchy required the foundation of a national religion, a religious profession which must be official and unequivocal. Secondly, monarchy must promote as its highest imperative what Tikhomirov called the "progressive evolution" of religious consciousness of the nation. The latter was given vital significance by Tikhomirov because it required the monarchy to go beyond the pro forma endorsement of religion to the cultivation of the religious life of the nation. By strengthening the religious consciousness of the nation, the relationship to God, as with ancient Israel, was maintained. Correspondingly, the security of the monarchical state was assured. Having utilized the analogue of Israel, Tikhomirov implied that religious consciousness involved as one of its traits obedience to God. Appealing to "Christian teaching of vlast'," Tikhomirov argued that obedience to God required obedience to temporal authority, particularly to the divinely sanctioned monarchical state. Always prone to emphasize civil responsibilities over civil rights, Tikhomirov believed that religious consciousness sustained the monarchy by encouraging solidarity in society and discipline in politics.

Inasmuch as the moral ideal found institutional expression in the monarchical state, the religious life of the nation, as willed by God, was embodied in the church.

66Ibid.
67Tikhomirov, Edinolichnaia vlast', pp. 52-54.
The church was defined by Tikhomirov as the "totality of people united by faith, the hierarchy, and the sacraments." The church, as with the state, was ordained by God with a separate, contiguous existence. It possessed its own sense of mission and conception of duty to God and man. For Tikhomirov, the relationship of the state to the church was the most important question faced by the nation. This relationship was one of cooperation, not competition. The church consecrated authority; the state provided for the free existence of the church. Together they reflected the will of God, the moral ideal of the nation, and the commitment to duty.

For the church to be true to itself and its divine mission, Tikhomirov argued, it must be free. His concern for the "freedom" of the church, a freedom he valued above the freedom of individual conscience, differed markedly from Cavour's dictum of a "free church and a free state." For Tikhomirov, freedom for the church meant spiritual freedom, not institutional independence. Tikhomirov argued that the church, to fulfill its ethical tasks, must be free spiritually, to be submissive only to Christ and its own mission. For this freedom the church abrogated temporal affairs to the state. To be useful to the nation,

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68 Ibid., p. 98.
69 Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaja gosudarstvennost', 4: 70.
70 Ibid., p. 78.
Tikhomirov observed, the church must be free from adminis-
trative control. Such a projected autonomy became an
important theme in Tikhomirov's writing after 1905, when
he argued that bureaucratic officials and non-Orthodox
elements in the Duma threatened with their regulations and
legislation the capacity of the Russian Orthodox Church to
fulfill its spiritual mission.

The relationship of the monarchical state to the
church was complex and delicate. Properly understood, the
relationship was to be a coordinate one, with separate,
mutually recognized spheres of activity. While separate in
function, both expressed the moral or ethical content of the
nation. Apart from its sacramental life, the church pro-
vided a valuable educational function for the nation. Tikho-
mirov perceived this educational function in terms of moral
education. By encountering the individual at crucial
moments in his life through the sacraments, the church stood
witness to a "higher moral world view." While this
function was crucial to the nation, it was not coercive.

71 Tikhomirov, Edinolichnaia vlast', p. 103.
72 See, for example, Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi
Rossii, pp. 42-44, 64-66, 72-81.
73 Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost',
4: 81.
74 Ibid.; Edinolichnaia vlast', p. 103.
75 Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost',
4: 81.
The church, as the union of society in its religious life, incorporated into its structure parallel elements of discipline and hierarchy.\textsuperscript{76} In more specific terms, the church taught obedience to the authority of the state.\textsuperscript{77} Political self-will, the antithesis of this Christian duty, was perceived as a mortal danger to the individual and society. To step outside the political quietism proscribed by Tikhomirov and question established authority or attempt to exert political influence, individually or in concert with others, violated social discipline, Christian teaching, and true freedom.\textsuperscript{78} Likewise, for the church to enter the political arena, a sphere separate from its spiritual life, was a violation of its mission.

For Tikhomirov, religious toleration was incompatible with the logic and spirit of this unified social order of state and church. The monarchical state could not be formally neutral in religious matters or in state policy affirm the equality of religious creeds.\textsuperscript{79} Being a "servant of God," the monarch was also the "son of the church" and, by necessity, supported the true faith.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{76}Tikhomirov, \textit{Edinolichnaia vlast'}, p. 99.
\textsuperscript{77}Ibid., p. 52. \textsuperscript{78}Ibid., p. 53.
\textsuperscript{79}Tikhomirov, \textit{Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost'}, 4: 90.
\textsuperscript{80}Ibid., p. 97. The sovereign was not the "lord" of the church, but the "son" of the church. This subtlety, for Tikhomirov, laid the basis for the spiritual autonomy of the church.
This imperative was consistent with his larger concept of duty. Although critical of extreme forms of religious persecution, Tikhomirov reserved for the monarch virtually unlimited powers of repression. The church, according to Tikhomirov, could not counsel the monarch to be equivocal or indifferent toward religious truth. In fact, the monarch must affirm truth as it is interpreted by the church. On the practical matter of conceding religious toleration in any form, Tikhomirov argued, he must seek the guidance of the church. Religious toleration could not be decided apart from the church, which in Tikhomirov's view represented the ultimate source of authority of this question.

Having affirmed the monarch's imperative to defend religious truth, Tikhomirov was not prepared to elaborate upon the practical implications of this monarchical prerogative. Apart from asserting that the question of religious toleration must be decided from the perspective of church teaching, Tikhomirov provided little detail or insight into the religious policy he would later advocate for the autocracy. A Great Russian nationalist and a devout believer in Orthodoxy, Tikhomirov possessed deep hostility toward the ethnic and religious minorities within the polyglot Russian Empire. His effort to define the perimeters of religious toleration was secondary to his...

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81 Ibid., pp. 93-94. 82 Ibid., p. 97.
more fundamental interest—the maintenance of the
hegemony of the Orthodox faith. His theoretical con-
cession to religious freedom was oblique, offered more
out of expediency than conviction, always mixed with his
bellicose nationalism, and qualified to the point that the
original principle of freedom ceased to have meaning. When
he spoke of "reconciliation," he invariably juxtaposed
"compulsion."\(^83\) Whatever rights were to be extended to
dissenters depended on what he cryptically referred to as
the "clarity" of religious ideas animating verkhovnaia
vlast\(^84\). In practical terms, this reservation meant that
religious toleration was conceivable only at that moment
when the true faith was viable and secure. By implication,
a weakening of religious consciousness or a sustained
threat to Orthodoxy by any form of heresy or alien religion
would prompt the monarch, as the "bearer of higher truth,"
to exercise his broad prerogative for repression. Tikhom-
mirov deliberately avoided any concession of inalienable
rights of free expression to religious groups outside the
established church. He scorned any "philosophical" debate
on this matter and opted instead to assert the prerogatives
of "truth" rather than justify its claims to hegemony.

As he vacillated in his commitment to compulsion or
reconciliation as state policy, Tikhomirov sought to ex-
plain the nature of religious persecution in the past. All
historic struggles centering on religious issued were part

\(^{83}\)Ibid., p. 99.  \(^{84}\)Ibid.
of a larger phenomenon which Tikhomirov labeled as the "struggle for opinion."\textsuperscript{85} In the modern age, he argued, society observed the same scenario with only the content and language altered. The contemporary period differed from early times only in the sense that the focal point for conflict was political rather than religious. The Parisian guillotine, the excesses of the Terror, and the bloodshed of the Paris Commune represented the familiar impulse to coerce people, only in a fashion more cruel than before, and for political purposes. The church, in the past, he observed, was not the source of persecution, no more than the church was responsible for the excesses of Nero or the slaughter of Christians in Japan. Religious persecution took place in a larger social context than the church and reflected the historic struggle of ideas.\textsuperscript{86}

Tikhomirov found the proposal of separating the state from religion, as a social remedy for persecution, to be a specious idea. The political fanaticism of the nineteenth century arose at a time when the church was being disengaged from politics. Such excesses for political conformity amounted to a modern indictment of this simplistic notion. The struggle for opinion operated apart from religion and interacted with permanent factors such as national, social and economic interests.\textsuperscript{87} In fact, he argued, religion in the past had prompted persecution only when it coincided

\textsuperscript{85}Ibid., pp. 97-98.  \textsuperscript{86}Ibid., p. 98.  \textsuperscript{87}Ibid., p. 99.
with these basic interests. Vested interests, not religion, were the motive elements in persecution. Viewing the complexity of this phenomenon, Tikhomirov did not advocate that the state should be removed from this struggle for opinion. The monarchical state, as an instrument of верховная власть could not be indifferent to the conflict of opinion. It must always provide for reconciliation and set the perimeters for debate, affirming at the same time the "higher truth" embodied in its activity.\textsuperscript{88}

The second crucial relationship for Tikhomirov was the bond between the monarchy and the social order. If the bond of monarchy with religion explained the moral dimension of state organization, the relationship to the social order demonstrated the capacity of monarchy to provide an institutional framework to accommodate and integrate the diverse, often conflicting, components of society. Tikhomirov did not view the monarchy in theory or practice as an institution separate and, in certain circumstances, hostile to the social order. The monarchical principle did not maintain its hegemony through arbitrary power or popular mandate. The monarch, the bearer of верховная власть and the higher moral ideal, stood above a pluralistic, hierarchical social order, differentiated into corporate groupings, yet sharing a common sense of nationhood. The monarch, as a social and political force, provided order, integration and the reconciliation of interests. His authority derived

\textsuperscript{88}Ibid.
ultimately from God, not the people, and was sustained in his exalted office by his subordination to God and his sensitivity to the national consciousness. The existence of this national spirit suggested a national will which Tikhomirov was quick to acknowledge and simultaneously separate from any theory or practice of democratic representation. For Tikhomirov, the monarchical order was the highest form of social organization, by virtue of the fact that it provided for the attainment of a higher moral existence. According to Tikhomirov, democracy and aristocracy, the two other forms of verkhovnaia vlast', could not make such a claim.

In the study of the social order, particularly under the monarchical principle, there had been an inordinate amount of emphasis placed on its juridical aspects. Political science, Tikhomirov argued, had failed to explain the organic nature of the social order which was antecedent to the legal relationships of society. Moreover, obshchestvennost' and gosudarstvennost' were not totally explicable in terms of economic materialism. Juridical relationships and economic motivations provided insights into the structure and dynamic of society, but, alone or even combined, they fell short of their pretensions. For Tikhomirov, the advent of society with its goals and diverse structure, was comprehensible only in terms of his naturalistic view of

89 Ibid., p. 11.
life, an outlook which allowed for social diversity and the will of God.

The structure and evolutionary nature of society explained the particular relevance of the monarchical principle to complex, mature societies. The development of the social order, according to Tikhomirov, fell into two historical stages: the "simple social order" and the "complex social order." The former represented homogeneous groups, the latter a diverse pattern of social organization. They were tied together in one process of evolution. The motive power propelling society from one state to the next was not ideas or class struggle, but the inevitable specialization which occurred to meet the material and spiritual needs of an ever enlarging and maturing social order.

The "simple social order" had two phases: the patriarchal and the tribal (rodovoi). The patriarchal phase consisted of small primitive groupings devoid of specialization. The tribal phase was characterized by the appearance of specialized functions and increased complexity. As the process of specialization continued, society moved into the "complex social order" which in turn possessed two phases. The first phase was the "simple class" structure, a social condition which differed from the tribal only by degree. The second phase was the

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90 Ibid., p. 121.
91 Ibid., pp. 121-122. Tikhomirov's theory of social
"free class" or corporate stage which constituted the mature formulation of the social order. Social hierarchy (soslovnost') according to Tikhomirov, represented society in its most complex and specialized form. Echoing Leontiev's idea of a complex social order, Tikhomirov asserted that complexity in social life was evidence of vitality, not chaos.

The panorama of social development from simple forms to complex forms, from primitive tribal groupings to a corporate existence with myriad classes, specialization, and interests necessitated social integration. For Tikhomirov, this social requirement gave birth to the state and, in particular, the monarchical state. Under the monarchical system, the evolving class structure found the means to preserve specialization without the perpetuation of class struggle. Once under the aegis of the monarchy, classes were given state recognition and legal organization; they became estates, bound together in the nation with specified rights and duties. The monarch, as sovereign and arbiter, stood above all estates. Under this integrated corporate system, society was preserved in its complex structure and specialization; political order was achieved with justice; and freedom, individual and corporate, was

 evolution was not "progressive." He maintained that the development of society could be retrograde. As with Leontiev, he linked the degree of existing complexity in the social order to its maturity.

92 Ibid., p. 124.
guaranteed.

The epoch of the French Revolution had signalled the decay of the old corporate society upon which European monarchies had rested their power. Why had hereditary estates decayed and the institution of monarchy found itself incapable of adaptation? For Tikhomirov, there were two distinct reasons. At first, there had been an intense development in the intellectual life of Europe, giving rise to a new class of people who earned their living through intellectual work. In time, according to Tikhomirov, professions had emerged to represent these new social elements. Secondly, there had been the extraordinary industrial development of Europe. The social impact had been profound and unavoidable. The need for free labor had shattered the rigid, highly defined class structure of the old society. Economic necessity required free labor and social mobility. Classes, as opposed to estates, emerged in the wake of this social change. In addition, there was a new demand to secure the rights of the individual, not as a member of an estate, but as a citizen. Increasingly, the demand arose for a state structure to reflect these new realities.

The existing monarchies, which for centuries had been tied to the corporate social order, now found themselves powerless. The new social forces unleashed in European

\[93\text{Ibid.} \quad 94\text{Ibid., p. 125.}\]
life increasingly severed the ties of monarchy to the social order, bringing atrophy to the monarchical state and giving rise to bureaucratism. At this juncture, the European monarchies felt the pressure for democratic reform. Ultimately, the drift to absolutism became inevitable. Having degenerated to this condition, European monarchies found it extremely difficult to resist the demands for a constitution or, in the case of France, a move to create a republic.

The problem for monarchy in modern times was to re-assert its traditional function as the integrating force for society in the face of altered economic and social conditions. The advent of the democratic social order represented in theory and practice a powerful threat to monarchy. The accompanying manifestation of bureaucracy and the politikany signalled a whole new orientation toward society and political life. Increasingly, substantial numbers of society, particularly within the ranks of the educated class, refused to accept the traditional social hierarchy and the viability or legitimacy of estates. For them, the existing political order was separated from the new social reality. A democratic political structure, defined by a constitution, but in reality ruled by the politikany, challenged the older corporate society. Although powerful enough to overthrow the old regime, the democratic order would ultimately demonstrate its own

95 Ibid., p. 126. 96 Ibid., p. 131. 97 Ibid., p. 127-28.
incapacity to reflect the living spirit of the nation.  

For Tikhomirov, the task of monarchy in the modern era was to bridge the gap between the state and the social order by deliberately seeking to identify and integrate new groups into the legal structure. Once these incipient proto-estates were incorporated into socio-political life, monarchy would find renewal and society would escape the ravages of class conflict. The monarchical principle, sensitive to social pluralism and hierarchy, was better equipped than other forms of verkhovnaia vlast' to accomplish the task of social stability. It alone could provide a unifying principle for social life without sacrificing one natural social group to another or compelling society to accept some uniform mode of existence. Most importantly, the monarchical principle, if properly adapted to contemporary circumstances, could avert revolution by performing a reconciling role in social life.

No group or proto-estate occupied the attention of Tikhomirov more than the industrial proletariat. Set in a larger context of class tension and outside the legal structure, the proletariat posed a serious dilemma for the autocracy. To ignore or repress the legitimate desire of workers to improve their economic condition was foolhardy in Tikhomirov's mind. Moreover, such repression violated a crucial feature of Tikhomirov's concept of the autocracy—

98 Ibid., pp. 128-130. 99 Ibid., pp. 140-141.
the monarchy, unlike democracy or aristocracy, was national in character and above classes. To avert continued class struggle and affirm the common interest shared by workers and capitalists, Tikhomirov participated at the turn of the century in the Zubatovshchina, the effort to establish trade unions under government supervision.\textsuperscript{100} As its "chief ideologue," Tikhomirov offered a labor program which called for the full integration of workers into the social structure, as a legal estate. His effort to create social solidarity by the formal definition of the rights and responsibilities of both capital and labor, under the reconciling leadership of the autocracy, constituted in practical terms Tikhomirov's program for institutional change in the face of altered social conditions.\textsuperscript{101}

The theoretical formulation of Tikhomirov's labor program was articulated in Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost' as a component part of his larger treatment of the relationship of the monarchy to the social order.\textsuperscript{102} Stratification, he observed, was a normal aspect of social development.\textsuperscript{103} Classes represented the natural stratification of a complex society. Such a phenomenon was both necessary and desirable.

\textsuperscript{100}See Dimitry Pospielovsky, Russian Police Trade Unionism, pp. 81-83, 105, 144, 150-51; "25 let nazad, iz dnevnikov L. Tikhomirova," Krasnyi arkhiv, 1: 38.

\textsuperscript{101}Pospielovsky, p. 83.

\textsuperscript{102}Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', 4: 109-149.

\textsuperscript{103}Ibid., p. 142.
Trade unions, for example, reflected certain legitimate and concrete interests which had arisen in the wake of industrialization. These interests, economic and social, rather than political, must be acknowledged in the context of affirming the larger community of interests between all classes.

The perversity of socialism was its tendency to exalt class struggle and affirm the economic interests of the proletariat above all other classes. This accentuation of class tension and class interests constituted what Tikhomirov called "worker's Judaism."\(^{104}\) Ignoring the national context of social life and real bonds between various classes sharing one heritage and language, the socialists had preached a form of class solidarity which called for the economic, social, and political dominance of one class. Such a program of compulsory social unity under the hegemony of one class projected for man a future of "socialistic slavery."\(^{105}\) As an alternative, Tikhomirov argued that society must seek "moral solidarity" under the organizing and reconciling force of the monarchical principle.

Apart from the theoretical considerations about such a "moral solidarity," transcending class stratification, Tikhomirov postulated his own practical program to achieve social stability. Various means, he argued, were available

\(^{104}\)Ibid., p. 143. \(^{105}\)Ibid.
within the existing society to provide for the amicable resolution of economic disputes between the owners of capital and labor. Through courts of arbitration and other formal structures, both groups, as separate estates, could achieve agreement.\(^\text{106}\) Both capital and labor constituted segments of the larger social fabric. According to Tikhomirov their organization within society should be formal and compulsory. Tikhomirov rejected any notion of free capital or free labor, seeking to fulfill its objectives without reference to the state or the rest of society. The compulsory organization of these two new classes into estates under legal sanction affirmed Tikhomirov's stress on mutual dependence of all estates under the autocracy. The corporate representation of owners, administrators, technicians, and workers and the recognition of a given industry as a separate community or commune represented in Tikhomirov's mind the equation for social stability. The monarchical principle alone could reestablish the living bond between the state and the social order.

The capacity of monarchy to forge such a bond and guarantee a stable social existence was related to its orientation to the social process. It must comprehend the organic nature of change within society and the corresponding requirements of state leadership. Part of the difficulty in the past had been the inability to realize the compatibility of "conservatism" and "progress."\(^\text{107}\)

\(^{106}\)Ibid., pp. 143-144.  \(^{107}\)Ibid., pp. 262-268.
A nation, Tikhomirov observed, lived successively from generation to generation, giving birth to tradition and historical consciousness. These elements provided for continuity. The idea of "conservatism" derived from this reality. If society was continuity, it was also change. Inevitably, Tikhomirov continued, society experienced shifting conditions in its life, prompting adaptation and/or the desire to improve life. The idea of "progress" stemmed from this aspect of social existence.

Both "conservatism" and "progress" were combined in Tikhomirov's concept of zhiznedeiatel'nost'. Calling for continuity and change in the social order, Tikhomirov turned to this concept of zhiznedeiatel'nost'. It represented a social phenomenon, not an ethical-religious principle, as reflected in his aforementioned discussion of a "higher moral principle," which animated national life. With little clarity or integration with his larger organic theory of the nation, Tikhomirov described zhiznedeiatel'nost' as a "process." In social life it was a living force, guiding an organic, evolving society and, simultaneously, providing a source of unity. In state policy, its free expression forged national goals. In the overarching historical perspective, it embodied the forces of the nation realizing their internal content.

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Zhiznedeiatel'nost' embodied Tikhomirov's theory of "organic laws," which defined and regulated the myriad social forces, and ultimately guaranteed social equilibrium. As a theory of the social dynamic, zhiznedeiatel'nost' represented in part Tikhomirov's desire to establish an alternative to economic materialism and revolution.

Tikhomirov supplemented his analysis of social conditions under a monarchical system by examining certain crucial aspects of state policy for Russia. As with his labor program, Tikhomirov combined nationalism with a deliberate effort to isolate areas for social and political adaptation. In economic policy, he argued for self-sufficiency, equitable land distribution, and the restriction of foreign capital investment. On the territorial question, Tikhomirov was a bellicose nationalist and offered little room for compromise. To achieve a "world role," Russia must secure its borders. Writing in Monarkhicheskaiagosudarstvennost' at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, Tikhomirov expressed his alarm at the impending loss of territory as a consequence of Russia's defeat. Dealing with the territorial question in theoretical terms, he argued that those nations playing a world role had the prerogative

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112 Ibid., pp. 262, 269. 113 Ibid., pp. 265-69; 270-72. 114 Ibid., pp. 269-274; 282-290. Tikhomirov listed his published works in this specific area: "Zemlia i fabrika," (Moscow, 1899); "Voprosy ekonomicheskoi politiki," (Moscow, 1900).
to secure the requisite territory for their mission, even at the expense of other nations. Echoing Danielevskii, Tikhomirov warned against any equivocation on this "major concern of the state." Russia, as a great state, must secure its territory and find the means to develop it. In the larger arena of international relations, Tikhomirov argued that the Russian Empire possessed the prerogative, consistent with its perception of national interest, to expand its territory. In theoretical terms, the Russian autocracy, as an expression of verkhovnaia vlast', was restricted only by the content of its own moral character. The failure to exercise its sovereign prerogatives amounted to a violation of its mission as a great state and paved the way for a national calamity.

A logical corollary of Tikhomirov's interpretation of Russian state policy was his Great Russian nationalism. The presence of ethnic and religious minorities within the Russian Empire challenged the capacity of the autocracy to create a sense of community outside the Russian nationality. Diversity, Tikhomirov observed, was helpful to a great state, but it required control. The hegemony of the Russian nationality, the builders of the state, must be formally acknowledged and diligently maintained. Political equality for nationalities violated Tikhomirov's

notion of hierarchy, social and national, and, if allowed to come to fruition would destroy the Russian Empire. In a fashion reminiscent of Metternich, Tikhomirov argued for cultural pluralism under the panoply of Russian political domination. This unity was to be achieved through deliberate state policy. For example, minority languages would be recognized and allowed to survive in the localities in which they existed, but simultaneously the state would take steps to establish Russian as the "common language" of the empire. Such a policy of "Russification," at least in Tikhomirov's theoretical formulation, would not be found incompatible with minority languages or seek to replace them. A community of language served useful ends in Tikhomirov's mind from the obvious application in commerce to the effective operation of the judicial system.

In addition, Tikhomirov argued that the state should promote the free development of science. Science was considered by Tikhomirov to be a part of the cultural life of the country and non-political in character. In his discussion of this aspect of state policy he did not express any fears that the free development of science would undermine traditional institutions or values. Tikhomirov's assumption on this question, as with his whole intellectual endeavor, was the compatibility of modern science and Russia's historical institutions. The encouragement of

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118 Ibid., p. 293.
science was viewed by Tikhomirov as a means to enhance cultural unity or the "general mind." Tikhomirov, however, juxtaposed this proposal with the statement that the state must openly affirm "truth." In his treatment of this function of the state in Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost, Tikhomirov conveyed in veiled language the strident Russian nationalism he espoused after the 1905 revolution. His theoretical consideration of community and particularism failed to express his latent chauvinism or the lengths to which he was willing to go to maintain the hegemony of the Russian Orthodox Church. Faced with the ethnic and religious pluralism of the empire, Tikhomirov wanted to counteract vigorously the centrifugal forces incipient in the political context at the turn of the century. Throughout his analysis of this problem, Tikhomirov displayed a greater concern for a reaffirmation, by state policy and action, of Russian national hegemony, than for the theoretical rights of minorities. In fact, Tikhomirov offered them economic and cultural survival in a restricted, state controlled environment with no effective avenues open for political expression. Their survival rested on the largess and benevolence of the state, not on constitutional and legal guarantees.

"The ruling principle of the future," Tikhomirov wrote at the conclusion of Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost. 

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119 Ibid., pp. 292-295. 120 Ibid., p. 295.
"is always the one which is most capable of realizing the development of the nation." As Tikhomirov viewed the social crisis of the nineteenth century, he felt the monarchical idea, particularly in the Russian context, possessed unique tools to achieve such development and social stability. Being all-national and above class, monarchy provided a concrete means to adapt a state system to the complex problems of a developing social order. Beyond the general propositions about the nature of society and the state, Tikhomirov had postulated with special emphasis a practical program for enlarging the existing corporate structure to include the urban proletariat. To legitimize this growing class as an estate was not only a creative response to social crisis, but a necessary adaptation to social change. To become the unifying principle, the autocracy, Tikhomirov had argued, must also reject absolutism as it energetically struggled against revolution. Only through a consciousness of its singular capacity to bear the "moral ideal" would pave the way for its rejuvenation and spare it the fate of European monarchies. The consequences were obvious to Tikhomirov—a stable, powerful state, an integrated social structure, an end to class enmity, and an era of true progress.

Tikhomirov's ambitious effort to provide an apologia for the autocracy was accompanied by unforeseen circumstances which abruptly and dramatically altered the course

121 Ibid., p. 315. 122 Ibid., p. 318.
of his political life. The publication of Monarkhicheskaja
gosudarstvennost' preceded by a few months the outbreak of
the 1905 revolution. The fruition of his "serious intel-
lectual work" coincided ironically with the advent of a
constitutional monarchy in Russia. His subsequent political
activity evidenced a return to his older polemical style as
he sought to stem the tide of constitutionalism and revol-
ution. The upheaval of 1905 now occupied a centrality in
his thought and activity, as journalist and erstwhile
government official. Only after 1917, at the moment the
autocracy and his own personal fortunes had reached their
nadir, did he return to theoretical speculation about the
nature of the historical process.\textsuperscript{123}

During the intervening period of 1905-1917, the last
days of the empire, Tikhomirov attempted to influence his
contemporaries to accept his practical program for the re-
newal of the Russian autocracy. With his theoretical work
as a basis, he now directed his polemical skills against
the constitutional reforms which had accompanied the
October Manifesto of 1905.

\textsuperscript{123}After the fall of the autocracy, Tikhomirov re-
turned to theoretical speculation and completed in manu-
script form a work entitled "The Basic Philosophic-Religious
Ideas in History." This manuscript is located in the
Central State Archive, Moscow.
CHAPTER IV

THE 1905 REVOLUTION AND THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

The appearance of Monarkhicheskaja gosudarstvennost' in 1905, set against a backdrop of military defeat, revolution, and constitutional reform, prompted a deep remorse in Tikhomirov. With cruel irony, Tikhomirov's theoretical defense of the autocracy, if long overdue, now seemed at best ill-timed, at worst ill-suited to the new political reality. The confident tone of Tikhomirov's public utterances during this period, as evidenced in this four volume apologia and his varied political activity, contrasted sharply with the heightened despair, even apocalyptic mood, of his diary.¹ The elemental, seemingly inexorable, forces at play in 1905 and their accompanying impact on Russian political institutions confirmed the latter mood even as they brought into question the theoretical assumptions of his political posture. Beginning with the October Manifesto of 1905 and culminating with the alteration of the Fundamental Laws in April, 1906, a constitutional order of sorts had been grafted on the existing autocratic structure. Despite its imperfections and its limited powers, the State

¹Tikhomirov, "25 let nazad, iz dnevnikov L. Tikho-
Duma had challenged an unspoken, but essential component of Tikhomirov's ideological formulation—the perpetuation of the autocracy unhampered by any formal concession to parliamentarism. The appearance of the Duma was synonymous in Tikhomirov's mind with the advent of the hated politikanuskil order. As a consequence, these fateful events of 1905-1906 inaugurated the final phase of Tikhomirov's public life—the polemical struggle to overturn Russia's new constitutional order.

Tikhomirov's response to the dramatic events of this period was at first visceral, then polemical. His private thoughts, his moods of anxiety, his sporadic fits of paralysis were carefully concealed in his diary. Always a private man, Tikhomirov recorded his sharpest complaints against the authorities in this personal document and occasionally in his correspondence. These documents reveal a different Tikhomirov than the one known to his contemporaries—a man of self-doubt, of pent-up antagonisms, and of a peculiar form of fatalism which was religious as much as it was political. In these unpublished thoughts, the Cassandra of the 1890's became Job. Lamentation followed lamentation, reaching in 1905 a crescendo of bitterness and despair. Speaking of this turbulent year, he wrote to A. S. Suvorin that the "sins of generations" mimrov," The introduction to his diary for 1904-1905 makes a strong point of this contrast.
had accumulated and had brought havoc to Russia. The
bureaucracy, for example, had acquired inordinate power
and now stood in the way of national renewal. Enemies of
Russia abounded, internal and external. Most reprehensible
to Tikhomirov was the type of internal subversion exem-
plified in the "vile plot" to blow up a bridge over the
Volga which was crucial for the logistical support of the
army in their struggle against the Japanese. And, of
course, there were the ubiquitous student radicals who, in
open defiance of the government, gave overt support to the
Japanese. Russia had been humiliated on the battlefield
by a shrewd enemy and at home by the perversity of a
Westernized intelligentsia, with its disruptive, unpatriotic
posture. "Poor Russia" had capitulated to the pressure of
what he described as a "cosmopolitan-Jewish-German" intelli-
gentsia. Responding to this ebb and flow of events, he
argued characteristically that St. Petersburg was devoid of
"honorable men," save one, the iron-fisted Governor-General,
D. F. Trepov; that Serge Witte was "two faced," serving

\[\text{N. A. Bukhbinder, "Iz zhizni L. Tikhomirova (po neiz-}
dannym materialam)," Katorga i ssylka, Istoriko-revolui-
sionnyi vestnik 49 (1928): 65. Diary entry for 21 February
1905.}\]

\[\text{Tikhomirov, "25 let nazad," p. 24. Diary entry for}
5 January, 1904.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., p. 38. Diary entry for 16 February, 1904.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., p. 65. Diary entry for 26 October, 1904.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., p. 54. Diary entry for 31 December, 1904;}
11 February, 1905; p. 67, 14 February, 1905; p. 55,}
5 January, 1905.\]
perversely both the autocracy and the radicals; and that
the Emperor in response to the crisis merely prayed. In
this context of "cowardice and concessions," a dishonorable
peace settlement and a series of constitutional reforms had
been forced upon the Russian nation. Such developments
suggested to Tikhomirov that perhaps Russia had been
"condemned by God."^ 

Tikhomirov's despair, voiced so poignantly in his
private papers, was occasional and no doubt a necessary
means of catharsis. His larger purpose, to defend the
autocracy, remained operative, despite these momentary
moods of paralysis. The unanticipated developments of
1905-1906 had created a political crisis for which Monark-
itcheskaia gosudarstvennost only supplied a partial
answer. The formal adoption of a quasi-constitutional
monarchy in 1906 posed the problem of reestablishing the
autocratic principle in a legal sense, not merely of sus-
taining it. Parliamentary democracy, criticized in the
abstract by Tikhomirov in the early 1890's, was now some-
thing more that a spectre, even if it was not yet a reality.
For Tikhomirov, as always, this struggle centered around
the question of national consciousness, an uneven struggle
where predictably the autocracy lacked an articulate
defense of its prerogatives.

^Ibid., p. 71. Diary entry for 7 August, 1905.
^Ibid., p. 73. Diary entry for 24 August, 1905.
To comprehend Tikhomirov's intellectual response to the political crisis of 1905, one must examine his historical frame of reference. Earlier, when Tikhomirov had attacked democracy or the revolutionary tradition or had expounded on the nature of verkhovnaia vlast', he was contending essentially with abstract ideas, to be understood as potentialities rather than realities. The upheaval of 1905, however, was concrete, epic, and by implication, either a rupture in the whole course of Russian history or an inevitable expression of its deeper meaning. Faced with these conflicting perspectives, Tikhomirov affirmed the former interpretation, arguing that the adoption of liberal reforms contradicted not only the evolutionary pattern of Russian development, but the very will of the Russian nation which, in his mind, remained loyal to the autocratic principle.9

Viewing the panorama of Russian history, Tikhomirov asserted that Russia represented a country with "special, favorable conditions" for the elaboration of the monarchical principle.10 Other forms of verkhovnaia vlast' such as the


10 Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', 3: 1.
democratic veche, had become manifest in an embryonic fashion in the course of Russian history, but they remained recessive elements in Russian life. The dominant idea animating Russian political life was the monarchical principle. Tikhomirov traced the growth of the tsarist idea of vlast', not to the Tartars, but to the Christian ideal of life and the Byzantine influence. From Riurik to modern times, he argued, there had been a clear evolution of verkhovnaia vlast'. The achievements had been obvious—the liberation from the Tartar yoke, the gathering of Rus', the expansion of territory and the securing of a world role for the Russian nation. These developments reflected in their purpose and content the psychological content of the Russian nation which had given birth to the autocracy and remained its chief support.

Even as the Russian nation displayed its genius in the creation of an ideal monarchy, it revealed certain weaknesses throughout its political history. "Russia," Tikhomirov lamented, "always was and remained weak in relationship to political consciousness." Russia's self-awareness, despite its manifold achievements, remained "vague, confused and divergent." Furthermore, Russian political development revealed considerable spontaneity in character. The "force of instinct," Tikhomirov argued, was

\[1^{11}\text{Ibid., pp. 13-15.} \quad 1^{12}\text{Ibid., p. 198.} \]
\[1^{13}\text{Ibid., p. 202.} \quad 1^{14}\text{Ibid., p. 52.} \]
a vital and enduring factor within the Russian nation, giving shape and direction to its course of political development. This "voice of internal sense," inarticulate for the most part, provided for durability and continuity. Moreover, it sustained the moral ideal which Tikhomirov associated with the historical existence of the Russian nation. The nation, "as a rock," stood for the autocracy, for without a Tsar, Tikhomirov stated, Russians could not imagine their existence as a country.

Such spontaneity in Russian history unaccompanied by a "powerful and firm" political idea had made Russia vulnerable to certain dangers, particularly in modern times, from the seventeenth to the twentieth century, when alien political philosophies challenged Russian institutions. Lacking self-understanding, Russia had never given evidence of a political philosophy or clear system of law. In the Muscovite period Russia had elaborated a general idea of an autocratic tsar, unrestricted in his power except by the content of his religious faith. Having given birth to this political tradition, as simplistic in form as it was absolute in its prerogatives, the Russian political development remained undefined in its consciousness. Questions as to the appropriate means to achieve its political objectives, the whole sphere of administrative institutions, and the relationship of subjects to verkhovnaia vlast' evolved apart

15 Ibid., p. 77. 16 Ibid., p. 78.
from precise definition, even as the tsarist idea of sovereignty remained dominant and unchanged vis-a-vis the nation. In such a political context, certain weaknesses became evident, as early as the Muscovite period. The administrative structure was characterized by great disorder. A similar pattern of chaos was also evident in the judicial sphere. The political structure, displaying only the rudiments of gosudarstvennost' during this period, was weak, a realm of chance and individual inspiration, rather than a system with clarity and order. In fact, Tikhomirov observed, the prikazy or ministries were best understood as persons, not categories of responsibility. These intermediate levels of administration, apart from verkhovnaia vlast', displayed in time a whole syndrome of abuses. Being unsystematic in organization and devoid of any guiding principle, they were ineffective, on occasion corrupt, and the seedbed of modern bureaucracy. The lack of clarity provided the context for internal struggle, particularly in the time of Ivan IV, between the shifting interests of tsar, boyar, and bureaucrat.

This "bankruptcy of national consciousness," according to Tikhomirov, had become manifest in the time of Peter the Great. At this juncture in history, Russia found itself vulnerable to a new danger, absolutism. The exposure to Western Europe had brought alien ideas, intellectual ferment, and criticism of Russia's indigenous institutions.

17Ibid., p. 80. 18Ibid., p. 82.
The penetration of European thought coincided with the incipient backwardness and lack of national consciousness. This crisis was heightened by the seventeenth-century church schism which, in Tikhomirov's mind, illustrated the religious backwardness of Russia. Faced with a dispute over church reforms, Russia discovered itself to be confused and uncertain even as to what it believed.\textsuperscript{19} In practical terms the Great Schism brought about the separation of the hierarchy from the nation and increased the power of the tsar over church affairs. Accordingly, the absence of consciousness in the dual spheres of political and religious life exposed Russia in the eighteenth century to the mortal danger of adapting its national life to European technology and culture without an organizing principle derived from indigenous sources in national life.\textsuperscript{20} The rupture in church life and accompanying loss of autonomy by the church accentuated this problem by paving the way for the evolution of absolutism in Russian political life.\textsuperscript{21} Russia possessed great goals at the end of the seventeenth century, Tikhomirov observed, but ironically it was incapable of defining them or articulating the nature of Orthodoxy even in the face of a supreme challenge.

Peter the Great, under whose aegis European enlightenment was transplanted to Russia, was viewed by Tikhomirov as

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., pp. 94-100. \textsuperscript{20}Ibid., p. 93. \textsuperscript{21}Ibid., p. 97.
necessary and correct in his essential decisions. Measured in his criticism and praise, Tikhomirov argued that the Petrine reforms saved Russia's future by compelling the nation to accept modernization. "A Great Russian man," Peter the Great had prevented Russian bondage to Western Europe. Ironically, the reforms of Peter had strengthened the autocracy and simultaneously set into motion the forces which in the course of time undermined it. The harsh measures to compel the Russian people to accept the reforms were expedient, a question of "to be or not to be," but when transformed into principle they ceased to be creative in character. Enslavement of the nation, once institutionalized by Peter, became a perverse element, distorting the monarchy and, after Peter's death, paving the way for foreigners to gain access to the throne. Likewise the relationship of Peter to the church illustrated this pattern of expediency transformed into principle. Tikhomirov argued that temporary measures had become permanent. The subjugation of the church and the failure to appoint a patriarch undermined the basis of autocratic power, i.e. its moral-religious character, while outwardly strengthening the power of autocracy. For Tikhomirov, Peter was a believer in God, but his religious outlook was more Protestant than Orthodox in character. Always an admirer of decisive rulers, Tikhomirov, throughout his writings,

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preferred Ivan IV who, in his opinion, embodied the true autocratic ideal.27

For the next two hundred years Russia reflected the impact of the Petrine reforms. Modernization provided Russia with the means for survival. Within this altered political structure, the spectre of absolutism continued to haunt Russia. The nation, for the most part unaffected by the reforms, displayed as before an insufficient consciousness of political principles animating its political evolution.28 Flashes of consciousness, according to Tikhomirov, were evident, but the pervasive European culture, especially among the intelligentsia, overshadowed these native, largely unarticulated religious and political values. Cosmopolitanism and the aping of European thought and life-style blurred Russian self awareness, which was now complicated by the acquisition of new territories with a diverse array of non-Russian nationality groups. The advent of cultural pluralism within the Empire only accentuated the complicated crisis of self-definition. National consciousness, while lacking the scope and intensity to combat effectively alien influences, nevertheless lived in individuals. Tikhomirov identified Philaret and A. S. Khomiakov as important contributors to Russian


28Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', 3: 104.
religious consciousness; publicists such as M. N. Katkov, Karamzin, I. S. Aksakov, and K. N. Leontiev were given special attention as bearers of Russian political principles; and Westerners such as Herzen, Granovskii, and Belinskii were attributed certain qualities of the "Russian spirit," despite their overt sympathies for European values. 29

Tikhomirov postulated the theory that the modern dividing line in Russian development was not the Petrine reforms, but 1861, the year in which serfdom was abolished in Russia. Whereas the Petrine period had exposed contradictions in national life, the reign of Alexander II represented in a historical sense the beginning of another "time of troubles." The revolutionary upheaval of 1905 merely reflected its critical stage. The Petrine period, despite its deficiencies and distortions, had not undermined the autocratic ideal; it had merely distorted the Russian state with its European forms and bureaucratism. The "new period," from 1861 to the crisis of 1905, brought restlessness and an organized effort to weaken the autocratic prerogative. 30 These efforts differed in qualitative terms from the earlier dangers identified by Tikhomirov. These dangers had been the subtle temptation of absolutism, the dead hand of bureaucratism, and the

29 Ibid., pp. 118, 127-154, 213. Tikhomirov devoted separate sections to Karamzin, Aksakov and Leontiev.

30 Ibid., pp. 197-206.
derivative nature of the Petrine reforms. Now Russia was faced with a "revolutionary spirit," intent in its various guises to alter autocratic institutions formally through constitutionalism or to bring about the actual destruction of autocracy through revolutionary socialism.31

The revolutionary spirit of the new epoch was not a superficial phenomenon, to be exorcized by vigilant internal security forces as in the case of the Decembrists. The liberation of the serfs in 1861, while necessary and theoretically consistent with the preservation of the autocracy, had set Russia afloat, "without a rudder."32 Unlike previous institutional changes, the abolition of serfdom had brought about a series of related institutional reforms which, in the mind of Tikhomirov, sacrificed the "absolute rule of truth."33 Always deficient in national consciousness, the Russian nation after 1861 faced an altered and confused institutional structure wherein powerful forces sought to compromise or overturn the autocratic state idea. In this context, the aristocracy, normally a buttress to the traditional order, had ceased to defend the autocracy. In addition, anti-Orthodox agitation expanded as Great Russian hegemony was challenged. In a parallel fashion a socialist movement gained strength among the educated classes and the proletariat. In sociological terms, Tikhomirov referred to this fluid, socio-political environment as one of

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31Ibid., p. 206. 32Ibid. 33Ibid., p. 205.
This condition, he argued, was exemplified by the aforementioned economic ruin of the dvor'anstvo. Their decline and corresponding loss of social and political leadership was accompanied by the growing significance of the raznochintsy. This middling social stratum, dominated by, but not synonymous with Jews and the liberal professions, provided the impetus behind the drive to alter Russian political institutions. The masses, Tikhomirov argued, were particularly vulnerable to their propaganda by virtue of the demoralization and erosion of corporate life which resulted from the 1861 reforms.

After four decades of political confusion, Tikhomirov could only point to the rudimentary existence of a national consciousness. A "national intelligentsia" had emerged, but with insufficient strength to dominate the Russian political scene. The events of 1905 reflected in a dramatic way this crucial deficiency—the absence of a powerful national consciousness, fully embodied in the outlook and values of the educated classes and in constant interaction with the national spirit residing in the Russian nation. The negative posture and cosmopolitanism of the existing educated classes stood across the path to national development. Such obstructionism or forthright opposition to Russia's "historical mission" became more

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critical after 1861, for the institutional instability now threatened to erode for the first time the fidelity of the masses to the "Russian principle." 36

In Tikhomirov's discussion of Russia's latter day "Time of Troubles," he frequently turned to the historical analogue of 1613, the year when the Romanov dynasty, as the bearer of verkhovnaia vlast', brought national redemption. The chaotic period which preceded this event was characterized by military defeat, internal upheaval, and the paralysis of the Russian state. The Russian Empire in 1905 faced a similar situation. For his own time, Tikhomirov rejected democratic reforms as a solution to Russia's crisis and argued for the full restoration of autocratic power. His repudiation of reform or revolution was grounded in his historical analysis of the Russian nation and its evolving political institutions. Reform represented compromise and the abandonment of Russia's historical mission; it merely heightened the political crisis by undermining any clear definition of the "state idea." The reaffirmation of the autocratic principle, given birth and sustained in its purpose by the Russian nation, meant national renewal and internal security. For Tikhomirov, such a conclusion was consistent with the Russian idea of gosudarstvennost'. Moreover, the monarchy provided a unifying principle to harmonize the vast, complex, pluralistic social forces

36 Ibid., p. 219-222.
which existed within the modern boundaries of the Russian Empire. 37

From Tikhomirov's perspective, the reaction of the autocracy to the crisis of 1905 constituted a direct contradiction of this idea of gosudarstvennost'. Initially, Nicholas II, out of motives of expediency, had promised in October, 1905, to grant civil liberties and to create a national assembly. In April, 1906, just four days before the convocation of the Duma, Nicholas II promulgated a revision of the Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire. 38 Rather than grant a constitution, Nicholas II used this instrumentality to affirm the principle that "the supreme autocratic power belonged to the emperor of all the Russias" and to restrict the Duma in its legislative authority. While failing to establish a constitutional, parliamentary regime, the ukaz of April, 1906 did sanction the co-existence of the bicameral Duma, restricted in function, but ambitious to extend its power, with the autocracy, equally determined to preserve its traditional prerogatives. The awkwardness, even contradictory nature, of this arrangement satisfied few on the left or the right. For Tikhomirov, a self-proclaimed theoretician of the autocracy, the political arrangement violated his conception

37 Ibid., pp. 224, 244.

38 Warren Walsh, "Political Parties in the Russian Dumas," Journal of Modern History 22 (June, 1950): 144. Walsh provides a concise description of these institutional changes.
of verkhovnaia vlast' and amounted to a revolutionary turnabout in Russia's development. His subsequent activity as a journalist and polemicist was devoted to the reversal of 1906, an effort which ceased only when the issue became eclipsed by the epic struggle of the Great War and the accompanying revolution in 1917. As an editor of Moskovskie vedomosti, Tikhomirov gave considerable attention to the "constitution" of 1906.39 In 1907, he published a tract on the subject, O nedostatkakh konstitutsii 1906 goda, which summarized remarks he had made before the "Monarchical Assembly" in Moscow in that year.40 The themes articulated in this political treatise established Tikhomirov's basic thesis that the Fundamental Law of 1906 represented a misunderstanding both of verkhovnaia vlast' and Russian political development. The "boundless caprice"41 of this "constitution" so alarmed Tikhomirov that he openly urged Peter Stolypin in 1911 to accept the "necessity" of a revision of the 1906 Fundamental Laws. This call for revision amounted to an appeal to abolish Russia's embryonic parliamentary system by arbitrary means, an approach which aroused considerable controversy.42

39 Tikhomirov served as editor from 1909-1914.

40 Lev Tikhomirov, O nedostatkakh konstitutsii 1906 goda (Moscow, 1907), p. 1. This speech was made in Petersburg on 7 June, 1907 and in Moscow on 15 July, 1907. See also Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii, p. 230.

41 Tikhomirov, O nedostatkakh konstitutsii 1906 goda, p. 2.

42 Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii, pp. 284-
The advent of the "politikanskii order" in 1906 prompted Tikhomirov to make numerous statements as to its character and meaning. The "reforms" were not a step toward national renewal or even pacification of Russia's agitated society. Born out of "fatigue" and revolutionary in terms of their impact on the autocratic prerogatives, the reforms had merely accentuated the anarchy of 1905 by institutionalizing political struggle in the State Duma where parties now maneuvered for position and plotted subversion. The "anti-Russian" character of these activities was revealed in the new freedom of action granted to "alien" elements who joined the autocracy's ideological enemies in a joint effort to dismantle the Empire's historical basis. Tikhomirov called these enemies of Russia "thievish elements," a modern-day incarnation of that same subversive spirit that surfaced in the early seventeenth century during the Time of Troubles. Tikhomirov never lost his sense of urgency on these matters. The crisis was as real in 1911 as it was in 1905. Always alarmed at any display

286, 293. A polemical exchange took place between Tikhomirov and Vestnik Evropы. At one point A. Stolypin stated publicly that his deceased brother, Peter Stolypin, had considered Tikhomirov's proposal too theoretical in its approach and so provocative in character it would spark a revolution. Tikhomirov throughout his public life retained deep respect for Peter Stolypin whom he considered to be a statesman who "profoundly understood gosudarstvennost'".

of anti-Orthodox agitation, particularly within the Duma, Tikhomirov had become convinced that the church was a special target for the enemies of Russia. For example, efforts to establish religious freedom for the Old Believers were interpreted by Tikhomirov as a deliberate effort to subvert the position of the Orthodox Church in the Empire. At one point he interpreted these manifestations of "hostility" to the Orthodox faith as a sign that the time of the anti-Christ was near.47

Certain specific consequences of the new order were evident to Tikhomirov. The October Manifesto represented the undermining of the autocracy. Ostensibly it was granted to guarantee internal peace. This objective, Tikhomirov argued, remained elusive after five years.48 The Manifesto had been enacted after the unrest in the capital had actually subsided. Moreover, it came at a time when Russian victory was near in the Far East. The result was a profound blow to state power at that very moment when the Japanese were near exhaustion. While these conclusions about the political and military context for the October Manifesto were startling and controversial, they were not central to Tikhomirov's argument. The October Manifesto represented the restriction of autocratic


power, despite protestations to the contrary by the authorities. Under the flag of national representation the power of the politikany was established, signalling a struggle between the principles of parliamentarism and monarchism. Russia's future, Tikhomirov warned, stood in the balance much as it had in the years before 1613.  

In a similar fashion, the promulgation of the Fundamental Laws in April, 1906 posed specific problems for the Russian state. Whereas the October Manifesto was a set of vague promises, the alteration of the Fundamental Laws in 1906 had bequeathed to Russia a quasi-constitutional order. Juxtaposed in Russian political life after 1906 were the contradictory aims of the Duma, seeking to become a parliament, and the autocracy, attempting to exercise its prerogative as verkhovnaia vlast'. Apart from the theoretical considerations, this situation became a practical impossibility for Tikhomirov. The new order embodied cowardice and expediency rather than some larger principle, or the will of the nation. Its origins stemmed from the arbitrary decision of the Imperial Chancellory, not from a zemskii sobor. It possessed little sanction, least of all from the revolutionaries, who through their violence prompted the political compromise. Few supported the "constitution" of 1906. Within the Duma itself,

49 Ibid., p. 104.

50 Tikhomirov, O nedostatkakh konstitutsii 1906 goda, p. 16.
Tikhomirov argued, there resided a pervasive desire to change it—"No one wanted it or wants it" as a political instrument. The Fundamental Law of 1906, Tikhomirov observed, compared unfavorably with the work of Michael Speransky in codification. As a legal instrument, it lacked harmony and arrangement of the various articles as well as clarity and precision of expression. It bore the marks of the atmosphere which produced it—a lack of coherence and attention to the long range implications of the content. Hence the ukaz of April, 1906 was "a capricious invention," which weakened autocratic power without providing a durable institutional structure to assert political authority.

Writing in 1909, Tikhomirov traced part of the problem to the confusion about the nature of a "constitution." He maintained that each state, by virtue of existence, possessed a "constitution," otherwise there would be anarchy. Even tyrannies such as the Committee of Public Safety had had constitutions. The existence of a state order was evidence of a "constitution," in the sense of defining the structure of the state. Tikhomirov observed that some political figures used the word in a narrow unscientific sense, as a means to restrict the monarchy. While acknowledging the historical reasons for this conception of a

51 Ibid., p. 22. 52 Ibid., p. 17. 53 Ibid., pp. 53, 20. 54 Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii, p. 239.
constitution, Tikhomirov rejected it as inappropriate for Russia. A constitution of this variety meant a compromise between a monarchy and a republic.\(^{55}\)

In a larger sense, the new state order introduced in 1906 contradicted Tikhomirov's conception of verkhovnaia vlast'. Sovereignty, Tikhomirov had argued consistently, was singular and indivisible. Among the three forms of supreme power, autocracy was the most exalted for it alone could truly embody the moral ideal. A corollary of this belief was Tikhomirov's assertion that the Russian people perceived politics in ethical terms and, by implication, possessed loyalty to one form of verkhovnaia vlast', the autocracy, which had been the singular expression of the Russian nation's political genius and evidence of their capacity, even their duty, to exercise the responsibilities of a great state. In _O nedostatkakh konstitutsii 1906 goda_, Tikhomirov reaffirmed his earlier argument that sovereignty and the state were indissoluble, the latter deriving from the former as a "juridical personification of the nation."\(^{56}\) All executive, legislative, and judicial power derived from the sovereign; all constituent powers were restricted; and, the sovereign, as the source of authority, remained unrestricted. Britain, Tikhomirov observed, differed from Russia by virtue of the fact that

\(^{55}\)Ibid., pp. 240-241, 262.

\(^{56}\)Ibid., p. 249; see also Tikhomirov, _O nedostatkakh konstitutsii 1906 goda_, p. 25.
sovereignty resided in parliament, not the monarch. Tikhomirov asked: "Where is verkhovnaia vlast' in the 'constitution' of 1906?" The Emperor, on the one hand, was granted the fulness of supreme power, to appoint ministers and to alter the laws; yet, on the other hand, he could not alter any law without the consent of the State Duma. Such confusion, Tikhomirov warned, threatened the existence of the Russian state, fomented an internal political struggle to decide where sovereignty should reside, and obliged the Russian nation to live in a condition of anarchy.

With these considerations in mind, Tikhomirov interpreted the constitution of 1906 as an effort to substitute one form of verkhovnaia vlast' for another. Going back to the zemskii sobor of 1613 and subsequent formulations of the Fundamental Law, the autocrat's prerogative had remained unrestricted both in the formal and real sense. In 1906, article seven of the new Fundamental Law established restrictions of the emperor's power of legislation. Having avoided the threat of revolution, Russia had fallen victim to a "governmental overturn" wherein the verkhovnaia vlast' became in theory confused, and in practice the

57 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 58 Ibid., p. 31.
59 Ibid., pp. 32-33; K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii, pp. 111-114.
60 Tikhomirov, O nedostatkakh konstitutsii 1906 goda, p. 5.
61 Ibid., pp. 6-8.
object of political struggle. This dangerous situation brought in the immediate stage a paralysis of state, a condition which, he argued, would worsen until the contradictory nature of the post-1906 Russian state was resolved. In this sense the question of verkhovnaia vlast' was not merely a theoretical problem, but the essential factor which conditioned the course of state affairs even in their most practical functions.  

The imperative to establish "a clear expression of verkhovnaia vlast'" dominated Tikhomirov's outlook as editor of Moskovskie vedomosti. In his effort to encourage Peter Stolypin to alter the Fundamental Law of 1906, Tikhomirov had expressed his sense of urgency over the matter of verkhovnaia vlast'. Five years of disorder, Tikhomirov stated, confirmed the validity of his original thesis articulated in O nedostatkakh konstitutsii 1906 goda, that the constitutional order had brought about the modification of verkhovnaia vlast' and forced Russia into a period of political anarchy. On these matters, he argued, Russia was not faced with a question of "theory," but of "facts." In his controversial letter to Stolypin, Tikhomirov had argued forcefully that verkhovnaia vlast', while compromised, continued to reside in the emperor. As a consequence, the autocracy had not lost its prerogative to

62 Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii, p. 112.
63 Ibid., p. 230. 64 Ibid., pp. 230-231.
act in the best interests of the country, to reaffirm 
verkhovnaia vlast', and end the state of anarchy. Tikho-
mirov lamented the fact that he was unable to convince 
Stolypin of the urgency of this matter, to comprehend his 
association of theoretical concerns with practical politics. 65

The State Duma, the arena for practical political 
affairs, embodied even in its truncated form all the evils 
of parliamentarism which Tikhomirov had cautioned against 
in the early 1890's. The Duma was an "infernal machine," 
incapable of reflecting national consciousness, and a bur-
densome brake in the quest for national renewal. 66 Moreover 
it became in time a "tool of revolutionary excitement" and 
a forum for revolutionary propaganda. The cumulative effect 
for Tikhomirov was to undermine authority and civic virtue. 67

The Duma was engaged in a systematic effort to assert the 
prerogative of verkhovnaia vlast' through the leverage of 
the budget, a portion of which it controlled. 68 Tikhomirov 
described these pretensions as an "embryo" of a parliament, 
seeking to deepen its roots in the Russian soil. 69 Such a 
"path of disaster" appeared imminent to Tikhomirov, pro-
jecting a future, among other things, of "pseudo-freedom, 
exploitation, and socialism." 70

65 Ibid., pp. 229-286. 66 Ibid., p. 130.
67 Tikhomirov, O nedostatkakh konstitutsii 1906 goda, 
pp. 43-44.
68 Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii, p. 108.
69 Ibid., p. 142. 70 Ibid., pp. 145-146.
Comparing the Duma to a chariot filled with enemies, Tikhomirov attacked the inauguration of party politics in Russian life. Various groups were described by Tikhomirov as being in constant motion, maneuvering for position and advantage, and disregarding general goals as an "irritating fly." If devoid of purpose, these individuals were also castigated by Tikhomirov as incompetent and unfit for legislative work. Their coordination with the intelligentsia raised the question of treason in Tikhomirov's mind. A test of their fidelity to the state was their response to questions of internal security. In the cases of assassination of security officials, Tikhomirov observed little solidarity on the part of the Duma with the government.

Among the various political parties and orientations which emerged in the Duma, Tikhomirov was especially critical of the Cadets and the Octobrists. Both espoused forms of compromise and reformism, which prompted a strong reaction from Tikhomirov. The Cadets, Tikhomirov observed, were incoherent and without any place to go. They lived only in opposition. For them to acquire power would mean the alteration of their principles. Political triumph, he argued, would destroy their party. Ironically, such a victory for the Cadets would amount to defeat. The

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71 Ibid., p. 132. 72 Ibid., p. 136. 73 Ibid., p. 106.
Octobrists, the Russian "center," were also devoid of any purpose--"Their raison d' être was to occupy the middle position between the extremes." Likewise, victory for the Octobrists would force them into a strange role, for which their political ideas offered little direction. The republicanism of the Cadets was energetically condemned by Tikhomirov, but his most strident opposition was directed at the Octobrists, albeit monarchists, whom Tikhomirov criticized as "opportunists." They (the Octobrists) sought not to give Russia an established political order, but a brief respite in a larger struggle to decide what political order would triumph in Russia. Their perversity stemmed from their interest in peaceful development at the very moment when urgent reforms were needed.

The existing political atmosphere had brought more extreme factions into the arena of Duma politics, on both the left and right. These groups, Tikhomirov observed, were less tolerant, seeking in various ways to eliminate their political foes. The diverse array of leftist groups within the Duma occasioned little comment from Tikhomirov. Perhaps, their affinity for revolution and socialism placed them beyond consideration as political forces compatible with existing institutions. Unlike the Cadets and the Octobrists, these groups had been given considerable attention by Tikhomirov in his earlier

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74 Ibid., p. 137. 75 Ibid., p. 288. 76 Ibid., p. 289.
writings. Moreover, those elements within the Duma which worked for the establishment of a genuine parliament alarmed Tikhomirov to a greater extent than the revolutionaries who decided to use the Duma for their own ends. This fear led Tikhomirov to label as leftist any move, even by the relatively moderate elements, to expand the legislative prerogatives of the Duma.77

The amorphous right within the spectrum of Duma politics shared in Tikhomirov's mind the same congenital weaknesses of the Cadets and the Octobrists. If faced with the unexpected responsibilities of political leadership they, too, would be devoid of creativity.78 Those who were "reactionaries" would simply reestablish the old order, only this time perhaps with greater discipline. Most of the political right, Tikhomirov argued, did not fully understand the issues at stake, particularly in reference to church affairs. If their opposition was dissolved, they would be devoid of purpose or directions. They shared the "absurdity" of Duma politics, seeking to fight for a cause, but ill-equipped in mood or content to exercise leadership if thrust into power.79

The participation of non-Russians in the Duma aroused violent feelings in Tikhomirov. The existence of such "alien" groups--Poles, Jews, and other ethnic minorities--suggested the end of Russian hegemony in political affairs.

77 Ibid., p. 131. 78 Ibid., p. 137. 79 Ibid., p. 138.
The fact that these groups, for example, would arbitrate the affairs of the Orthodox church prompted resentment in Tikhomirov. This extension of political rights to non-Russians found its legal expression in the Fundamental Laws of 1906 and indicated that ten centuries of Russian leadership had now been reversed. For Tikhomirov, it was not without its absurdities—"The Jew who was not given freedom of residence was granted political rights in the Duma." Moreover, these alien elements were hostile to Russia's historical foundations; they were incapable of sympathy for the "Russian psychology" and, in some instances, even despised Russians. Tikhomirov found it difficult to concede even their sincerity, let alone their ostensible compatibility with the interests of the Empire. "We do not permit," Tikhomirov wrote to his readers in Moskovskie vedomosti, "a jury to be composed of persons who have committed murder and robbery, but in relations to political representation we forget the logic of things." The fact that the Duma did not materialize as a body "Russian in spirit" only confirmed Tikhomirov's earlier critique of the Fundamental Laws of 1906. "The harmful, empty and insulting" sessions of the Duma revealed to Tikhomirov other defects. As with European parliaments, the Duma

80 Tikhomirov, O nedostatkakh konstitutsii 1906 goda, p. 59.
81 Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii, p. 131.
82 Ibid., p. 132.
displayed the predictable pattern of careerism, corruption, and political divisiveness. The problem, Tikhomirov stated, lay with the system, not the individuals in question. Only self-delusion concealed this fact from the deputies in the Duma. Associated also with the Duma was the tendency to advance the power of bureaucracy. In the midst of such corruption, Tikhomirov conceded only minimal productivity of the Duma. In the area of workers' legislation the Duma had passed, to its credit, bills related to workers' insurance. But here their work had been modest, having failed to perceive the need to provide a legal, corporate structure for the workers to represent their interests.

Russia faced in her prolonged and unresolved constitutional crisis an uncertain future. Her state institutions had been weakened even as they had been broadened, "alien" elements were poised to sacrifice the Empire to their narrow interests, and the forces of parliamentarism and revolution struggled to supplant a weakened autocracy. In such a time of upheaval, the analogue of 1612-13 suggested to Tikhomirov a sense of urgency and a renewed commitment to the autocracy. Faced with ubiquitous enemies and sporadic moods of despair, Tikhomirov resisted, publicly and privately, the temptation to support extra-legal means to crush the forces of reform and revolution. In a letter written to A. S. Suvorin in 1906, he rejected the notion of a "dictator,"

83 Ibid., 152. 84 Ibid., p. 323. 85 Ibid., p. 129-30.
arguing that no national renewal was conceivable without the Tsar. In that same letter he stated his preference for a zemskii sobor, to be Russian in character and summoned by the autocracy.\textsuperscript{86} Behind all the problems Russia faced, Tikhomirov stated, was again the question of verkhovnaia vlast'. Accordingly, a dictator would lack the mandate to resolve this issue. Only a zemskii sobor (to be understood as an assembly of the nation, not a parliament) could re-establish authority in the same fashion as the zemskii sobor of 1613 restored peace to Russia by placing Michael Romanov on the throne.\textsuperscript{87} Such a resolution of Russia's political crisis would not only be legal, but peaceful and enduring in character.

Throughout the political controversy which surrounded the events of 1905-1906 Tikhomirov maintained a political posture, at least in his own estimation, which stood outside and above "reaction." Writing in 1910, he condemned "reaction" as strongly as he anathematized revolution.\textsuperscript{89} Reaction, he observed, stemmed from the desire to thwart the destructive ends of revolution. Reaction, by seeking to merely restore the old order, became an ephemeral phenomenon between two revolutions. The effort to freeze

\textsuperscript{86}Bukhbinder, 67. In this same letter Tikhomirov lamented the fact that no one read his Monarkhiceskaia gosudarstvennost' in the wake of this political crisis.

\textsuperscript{87}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 67-68.

\textsuperscript{88}Tikhomirov, \textit{K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii}, pp. 35-38.
development or mechanically reconstruct a socio-political order without reference to needed change or long range purpose was destined to failure. Being powerless to create, a reactionary regime would ultimately force a more powerful revolutionary situation upon Russia. By contrast, Tikhomirov asserted, the Russian nation needed a rebirth of her national historical foundations. Both reactionaries and revolutionaries, he warned, were enemies of "the spiritual content of the Russian nation" and stood in the way of the development of this rebirth and what he described "as a brotherly social order."  

Having forthrightly defended the autocracy and the need for change in a legal framework, Tikhomirov proposed a specific course of political reform to achieve national renewal. To restore autocratic vlast', to preserve the union of state and church and to renew the bond between tsar and nation (the components of national renewal for Tikhomirov), the Fundamental Law of 1906 had to be revised. Tikhomirov sought to dismantle the prerogatives of the Duma insofar as they undermined the supreme power of the autocracy. The institutions created by the "constitution" of 1906 were to be preserved, but in altered form. The task was to be performed by the Emperor himself, who, in spite of the chaotic and confused political climate following

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89 Ibid., p. 37. 90 Ibid.  
91 Ibid., pp. 201-203, 247-248.
1905, still possessed verkhovnaia vlast' both in theory and in fact. His role would be strictly legal and consistent with his implied powers as sovereign. Such a revision should aim to restore clarity in regard to verkhovnaia vlast' and by doing so correct the chief defect of the Fundamental Laws of 1906. Tikhomirov viewed such a proposed action as merely the "clarification" of existing laws, not a coup de état or the creation of a new political structure.92

To appeal to the Emperor to unilaterally "clarify" the laws of 1906 was not merely a petition to the sovereign to exercise his inherent powers. Tikhomirov yearned for a general, "pole star" principle to be embodied in the autocracy. "We need the conviction," he stated, "that what we do today serves the work of tomorrow."93 Without such a leadership principle animating state affairs, Russia was relegated to the uncertainty and confusion of the post-1906 system of compromise which had created the Duma. Giving a single, leading idea to the nation was a means of eclipsing the political parties, "a collection of stuttering voices," with decisive autocratic leadership.94 The nation required "proper authority" which served national interests, not the goals of revolution. If the state was active and true to its responsibilities, then society would be calmed morally in a time of political crisis. The state in the face of revolution, Tikhomirov asserted, must not exhaust its

92Ibid., pp. 254-56. 93Ibid., p. 30. 94Ibid., p. 31.
energies with police measures outside such a guiding principle. The state was the center of society; without the state, the nation was not only without hands, but also without a head. \(^{95}\)

To achieve "clarification" of *verkhovnaia vlast*, Tikhomirov proposed several, selective revisions of the Fundamental Laws of 1906. \(^{96}\) Article seven had affirmed that the Emperor carried out legislative power in unity with the Duma. Tikhomirov sought to revise this article to read that "legislative power belonged in its fullness to the Emperor" who at his discretion could channel legislation through the customary path of a deliberative body or by extraordinary means, directly, by imperial edict. This latter form of legislation carried the weight of imperial authority and was the direct expression of *verkhovnaia vlast*. Article ten which dealt with administrative power, was also to be revised to establish the same principle; the Emperor's prerogative was to be full and unrestricted. In Article twenty-two, dealing with judicial authority, Tikhomirov sought to expand the discretionary power of the Emperor over the establishment of courts. Here Tikhomirov's revision only added to the vague language of the original article by inserting the undefined discretionary feature.

As to the question of how imperial edicts became law (Article twenty-four) Tikhomirov simplified the procedure...
by having it read that they took effect immediately. The original article stated that an edict from the Emperor became validated only after it was promulgated by the chairman of the Council of Ministers or the appropriate ministry and the State Council. Having revised the article to establish the immediate validity of an imperial ukaz, Tikhomirov altered the role of the State Council to that of a clerical function; it merely published the content of the edict for general information. Where article eight-four had affirmed that the Russian Empire was administered on the "firm basis of law," Tikhomirov added the phrase, "established by means of verkhovnaia vlast'." By virtue of this revision, verkhovnaia vlast' (the Emperor) was made anterior to all laws. Such clarity significantly undermined the principle of the rule of law. The procedures for enacting legislation (Articles eighty-six and eighty-seven) were given special attention by Tikhomirov. Where Article eighty-six had established the procedure for the approval of legislation by the State Council, the State Duma, and finally, the Emperor before it became law, Tikhomirov revised the Article to read simply that "no new law was to be enacted or altered other than by an imperial decree." As to extraordinary legislation(Article eighty-seven), Tikhomirov attempted to provide the legal formulation to establish the validity of such legislation outside the activity of the Duma.97

97 Ibid., pp. 259-262.
Considered in their totality, these revisions, according to Tikhomirov, would clearly define the source and character of verkhovnaia vlast*. For Tikhomirov such clarity would anticipate the full exercise of authority by the autocracy. Likewise, it would undercut the threat of parliamentary democracy which had established itself in the political crisis of 1905-1906.

Tikhomirov shared with Nicholas II the desire that the State Duma become "Russian in spirit." Tikhomirov, however, did not believe such a condition would be achieved through the manipulation of the electoral process, so as to guarantee a majority favorable to the autocracy. In fact, Tikhomirov loathed the very concept of majority rule. "National representation" had to be deprived of the pretense of being verkhovnaia vlast* or the bearer of the will of the nation. Instead, representation on a national level, for Tikhomirov, was to be an instrumentality to express the "opinions, interests and wishes of the nation before verkhovnaia vlast*." Tikhomirov urged that this model of a consultive, representative body be adopted into law. According to Tikhomirov, such a scheme would renew in a meaningful way the bond between Tsar and people.98 While Tikhomirov's plan harkened back to the zemskii sobor of the Muscovite period, there were significant differences. Tikhomirov urged the formation of new organized groups, to

98 Ibid., p. 266.
be fully represented, such as the industrial proletariat. This was consistent with Tikhomirov’s notion that social groups rather than individuals or organized political parties should be represented. Only by this method, Tikhomirov argued, would Russia truly achieve "national representation." If Tikhomirov’s scheme for a reconstituted zemskii sobor was adopted, he was confident that the autocracy could secure political order and provide a new basis for an integrated, harmonious national existence. By the logic of his argument the great work of 1612 could be duplicated in the Russia of the twentieth century.

If the evolution of the Russian state had been punctuated by crisis and recovery, the epoch of 1905 presented certain peculiarities and dangers. Tikhomirov viewed Russia entering "an epoch of international partition." The upheaval of 1905 and the accompanying weakness of the Russian state had international implications. If Russia could not regain its strength, it faced the dismal prospect of partition, the danger of war, and a future status as a "minor power." The nations singled out to exercise world power were Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan. He even hinted that a "slumbering China" could conceivably play a role in this future scenario of world partition. Tikhomirov’s xenophobia prompted him to remark that not since the time of Peter the Great had Russia needed a

"powerful and well organized state." 102 It was a time of decision, "to be or not to be," but Tikhomirov failed to develop adequately this interpretation or fit it into the larger framework of his religious outlook.

The immediate crisis of 1905-1906 had created a platform for revolution; at best it left Russia in a severely weakened position. Tikhomirov affirmed the possibility of recovery, but seemed somewhat hesitant to spell out the specifics of his program. Like most defenders of the autocracy, he had to find an acceptable avenue to urge a reluctant, suspicious autocracy to alter its path. Moreover, there was the reality of internal opposition to the sort of remedy Tikhomirov advocated for Russia’s ills. Tikhomirov favored the destruction of all "constitutional" elements, theoretical and institutional, in Russian political life, but he was forced to advocate a more cautious approach as revealed in his appeal to "clarify" the Fundamental Laws of 1906. Perhaps his true sentiments were expressed in O nedostatkakh konstitutsii 1906 goda when he stated that a zemskii sobor was necessary in order to require state institutions to become tools of that "great, wise, believing, historical Russia." 103

The response of Tikhomirov to the constitutional crisis of 1905-1906 revealed certain common themes. As a monarchist, he sought to preserve the autocracy in its

102 Ibid., p. 147.
103 Tikhomirov, O nedostatkakh konstitutsii 1906, p. x.
traditional form. His fidelity to the Orthodox faith reinforced this overarching imperative. His claim not to be "reactionary" was valid, if that category within the agitated Russian political climate meant simply a return to the old order. By contrast, Tikhomirov sought a new basis for Russian political life, but not along the path of parliamentary democracy. The study of Russian history suggested to him the use of traditional institutions for the revitalization of national life, namely the zemskii sobor. For this projected consultive assembly, as for the autocracy, Tikhomirov advocated a broader base of participation. Convinced that industrialization and modernization had created a new social environment, Tikhomirov urged the autocracy to provide a legal status for the industrial workers through a zemskii sobor and other means. Tikhomirov displayed throughout his writings little hostility toward industrialization, despite his traditionalism in politics and religion. Tikhomirov reserved his strongest criticism, as in the case of the Duma, toward those elements which obstructed the adaptation of the autocracy to new circumstances.

Behind Tikhomirov's reaction to the crisis of 1905 and his desperate effort to revise the Fundamental Laws of 1906 was the yearning for what he called a "definitive order" (okonchatel'nyi stroi). A strong autocracy,

104 Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossi, p. 238.
uncompromised by "constitutional" restraints, and in resonance with the nation provided the sole means to resolve Russia's internal chaos and external dangers.
CHAPTER V

THE AUTOCRACY AND THE WORKERS' QUESTION

The plight of the Russian industrial class as the turn of the twentieth century posed an ominous challenge for the autocracy. For nearly a decade after 1900, Lev Tikhomirov gave considerable attention to this problem both as a component of his larger theoretical study of the autocracy and as a subject for personal involvement. The industrial worker became for Tikhomirov the key to social harmony, the most immediate priority for adaptation by the autocracy. While still formally a member of Narodnaia volia, he had perceived of the autocracy, not as a bastion for the defense of vested interests, but as the protector of the downtrodden. Writing in 1886, he focused his attention on the peasantry, praising the reforms of Kiselev under Nicholas I as an exemplary form of state protection.¹ Nicholas I, a "most true, intelligent, and just master," had embodied in his rule what Tikhomirov called a "guiding idea."² Now in the context of the twentieth century, an era of industrialization and urbanization, Tikhomirov, as a


²Ibid., p. 267.
defender of the autocracy, broadened his notion of the downtrodden to include Russia's ever-expanding social stratum of industrial workers. Viewing the autocracy in organic rather than static terms, Tikhomirov urged an ambitious state program to integrate the working class into Russian society. For Tikhomirov, the task was crucial for the survival of Russia's existing political structure. Moreover, the effort, as outlined by Tikhomirov, was to be formal, national in scope, and attentive to the immediate economic needs of Russia's industrial class. Consistent with his definition of the autocracy as a vehicle for verkhovalia vlast' and the national will, Tikhomirov argued energetically for his program of systematic adaptation, not merely as a timely release of accumulated social pressures, but as a facet of a larger state policy for the renewal of Russian social and political life.  

At the turn of the century, as he prepared to write his major theoretical work, *Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost',* Tikhomirov was provided with an unexpected opportunity to test his ideas in the agitated arena of Russia's new industrial order. Beginning in 1898, Sergei Zubatov, head of the Moscow political police, initiated a program of police sponsored industrial trade unions,  

Tikhomirov, *Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost*, 4: 57-58. Tikhomirov had written a short story touching upon working class themes in his revolutionary youth, entitled *Gde luchshee? Skazka o chetyrekh brat'ıakh i ob ikh priklycheniakh.*
designed to operate outside the control of revolutionaries. An amalgam of genuine efforts at labor reform and police control, the Zubatovshchina would endure until 1903, when the authorities, more accustomed to less adroit methods of social control, decided to abandon Zubatov's innovative labor program. Always faced with the extreme hostility of the revolutionaries and rarely able to reassure a nervous, suspicious government, Zubatov was compelled to abandon his effort to separate the worker and his quest for economic security from the various revolutionary socialist groups. It was in the course of organizing his police sponsored trade unions that Zubatov sought out a number of lecturers and writers, drawn from the academic world and the ranks of ex-revolutionaries to popularize his own notion of "progressive socialism." Tikhomirov was invited to join Zubatov's "Lecture Bureau" in 1902 and in a short

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4Pospielovsky, Russian Police Trade Unionism; A. Morskoi, Zubatovshchina (Moscow, 1913). Pospielovsky provides an excellent bibliography of the Zubatovshchina, along with detailed coverage of Lev Tikhomirov's role in the Zubatov experiment (pp. 81-3, 105, 144, 150-51). Morskoi (Von Stein) deals with Tikhomirov's role in a more oblique fashion. For a Bolshevik account of the Zubatov movement in Moscow, the locale of Tikhomirov's participation, see S. Aynzaft, "Zubatovshchina v Moskve," Katorga i sylka 39 (1928). An overview of the Zubatovshchina by a Western scholar is provided by J. Walkin, "The Attitude of the Tsarist Government Toward the Labor Problem," The American Slavic and East European Review 13, no. 2 (April, 1954).

5Pospielovsky, Russian Police Trade Unionism, pp.81-3.

6Ibid., p. 77.
time became the "chief ideologue" of the Moscow organization. His active participation represented an extension of his long-standing theoretical interest in the relationship of the industrial worker to the autocracy. There is evidence that Tikhomirov may have exerted considerable influence on Zubatov as early as 1900. While it is difficult to assess with precision Tikhomirov's actual role in the labor program of the Zubatovshchina, it is apparent that both as a lecturer and ideologue, Tikhomirov was active and his contribution was substantial.

In 1902, the year he formally joined the Zubatov organization, Tikhomirov submitted to General Dmitrii Trepov (then Moscow Chief of Police and later Governor-General of St. Petersburg) an extensive memorandum on trade unionism. This memorandum, in three parts, dealt with the professional organization of workers under the aegis of the autocracy. Consistent with the innovative approach of Zubatov, Tikhomirov argued that the working class could be incorporated

7Ibid., p. 81.

8Ibid., p. 83. Tikhomirov wrote "Zemlia i fabrika," a brochure published in 1899, but unavailable for this study. The title of this tract would indicate that Tikhomirov's interest in the workers' question coincides roughly with the beginnings of the Zubatovshchina. See F. A. Brokgauz and I. A. Efron, Entsiklopedecheskii slovar 33 (St. Petersburg, 1901): 292-293.

9Pospielovsky, Russian Police Trade Unionism, pp. 79-83. The memorandum appears as an appendix to A. Morskoi, Zubatovshchina, pp. 181-213. It is entitled "Zapiska ob uchpezhdenii professional'nykh soiuzov."
into Russian national life under the panoply of the autocracy as a loyal segment of society. Since the autocracy was "classless," it was consistent with its own interests to provide for the economic improvement of the worker. Ultimately, Tikhomirov argued in the memorandum, the recognition of this nascent social class should extend to full legal status as a self-governing estate. Such a formal status would provide for the industrial worker both expanded rights and defined responsibilities toward the state. Implicit in such a scheme were the requisite elements for social equilibrium. Contrary to socialist propaganda, Tikhomirov argued confidently that the worker would become a buttress of the regime.\textsuperscript{10}

In this memorandum, Tikhomirov asserted that the workers would be ultimately organized into workers' communes, the initial trade union (under government protection and guidance) to serve as a transitional phase. To emphasize the evolutionary character of such trade unionism, Tikhomirov argued for a formative period of experimentation, to accumulate experience and to provide data for specific legislation. In anticipation of a future legal status, the

\textsuperscript{10}Pospielovsky, Russian Police Trade Unionism, p. 82. Tikhomirov gave emphasis to the church as a pervasive influence in maintaining social harmony. To achieve stability within the ranks of the industrial workers, he spoke of the most talented workers forming a "peoples' intelligentsia." Learning and nationalism were projected as vital components in the future of the industrial class.
workers were to foster mutual aid organizations, forge a trade union leadership committed to peaceful change, and seek to provide for self-improvement through education. In regard to the latter, schools were to be organized with the church playing a prominent role in the moral instruction of the workers. Moreover, Tikhomirov went as far as to suggest a program of profit sharing, a concept which was justified as a component within the larger framework of a legal estate where privileges were to be accompanied by certain defined responsibilities. In this case, profit sharing was not a concession extracted from industry by the exercise of labor power, but a logical consequence of a projected estate for the industrial worker, where the workers assumed the responsibility to abide by the defined rules and duties of their corporate group. Hence economic needs were to be realized peacefully, within the context of a pluralistic, cooperative society.

According to Dimitry Pospielovsky, Tikhomirov's labor program represented "a mixture of ideas on social solidarity, clericalism, and Slavophilism, with traces of what we would nowadays brand as fascism."\(^{11}\) Combining traditional forms with existing social forces which accompanied industrialization, Tikhomirov hoped to resolve a troublesome area of class conflict. The *Zubatovshchina* represented the necessary experimental and preliminary

\(^{11}\)Ibid., p. 81.
phase for Tikhomirov. The abrupt fall of Zubatov in August 1903 at the insistence of V. K. von Plehve, Minister of Internal Affairs, brought the experiment to an end. Certain vestiges of the Zubatov organization persisted, most notably the St. Petersburg group which evolved into the workers' organization led by Father Gapon in 1905. In Moscow, where Tikhomirov had played a prominent role, the organization gradually disintegrated after Zubatov's fall. As late as January, 1904, Tikhomirov made reference to the old organization which apparently survived despite the confusion over the official status of such trade union activity.

Tikhomirov's attitude toward the demise of the Zubatovshchina is not fully clear, although he displayed in his diary considerable disdain toward certain aspects of the program which persisted, as well as the policies of von Plehve.

The fact remained that the Zubatovshchina, as a viable government program had ended in 1903. Tikhomirov's interest in the labor question, however, persisted in the years which followed, the revolutionary upheaval of 1905 prompting a renewed sense of urgency. In the wake of this upheaval, Tikhomirov wrote five important tracts between

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12Ibid., pp. 144-5. 13Ibid., p. 150. 14Ibid., p. 110.

15"Iz dnevnikov L. Tikhomirova," p. 23. Excerpts from his diary for 1904 point to certain vestiges of the Moscow organization. Tikhomirov blamed von Plehve for Zubatov's fall and viewed him as a chief opponent of reform. See diary entry for 21 January, 1904.
the years 1907-1909 on the subject of labor reform. These tracts would be Tikhomirov's last sustained effort to provide a theoretical and practical state program toward the burgeoning Russian industrial class. In the immediate aftermath of the 1905 Revolution, Tikhomirov was deeply impressed with the fact that the revolutionary elements had penetrated with "great force" into the Russian labor movement.¹⁶ After writing several articles on social and economic questions related to the working class in Moskovskii golos and Kolokol, Tikhomirov published a series of brochures on the subject: Grazhdanin i proletarii (1907); Sotsialism v gosudarstvennom i obshchestvennom otnoshenii (1907); Zaslugi i oshibki sotsialisma (1907); Plody proletarskoi idei (1908); and Rabochii vopros (1909).¹⁷ Polemical in tone and designed for a popular audience, these separate brochures attempted to focus on the current threat of socialist political parties and articulated Tikhomirov's own solution to the labor crisis. Throughout the brochures, a sense of urgency blended with a smooth, straightforward

¹⁶Tikhomirov, Grazhdanin i proletarii (Moscow, 1907), p. 3.

¹⁷Tikhomirov's Grazhdanin i proletarii was an installment in a three part series. It was followed by Zaslugi i oshibki sotsialisma (Moscow, 1907) and Plody proletarskoi idei (Moscow, 1908). Sotsialism v gosudarstvennom i obshchestvennom otnoshenii (Moscow, 1907) was a separate publication and provides a good overview of the various elements of Tikhomirov's labor program. Rabochii vopros (Moscow, 1909) was Tikhomirov's final effort on the workers' question, but unfortunately was unavailable for this study.
style. Compared with some of his more scholastic efforts, these tracts appear simplistic. Being designed for a broader reading public, they possess a power which derives not from the weight of documentation, but from a sequence of compelling arguments derived from Tikhomirov's own experience in the Russian industrial order.

Tikhomirov's enduring opposition to socialism and his profound shock at the effectiveness of the "general strike" of 1905 provided the context, general and specific respectively, for this post-Zubatovshchina polemic on the workers' question. He sought to affirm that while the socialist movement pursued solidarity and cooperation and struggled against the exploitation of man, as Peter Lavrov defined it, it did not provide for human freedom;\(^\text{18}\) that socialism in its modern form defied the "natural laws" of obshchestvennost' in its approach to the industrial order; that socialism was to be understood as an extreme reaction to an earlier extreme, the bourgeois democratic order; and that socialism constituted a direct threat to the economic and corporate interests of the working class.\(^\text{19}\)

Having observed the political upheaval of 1905, Tikhomirov was most alarmed with the tactic of the "general strike." He associated this particular agitation with the "socialist intelligentsia" which, in his view, used the

\(^{18}\)Tikhomirov, Sotsialism v gosudarstvennom i obshchestvennom otnoshenii, p. 4.

\(^{19}\)Ibid., pp. 5-6.
workers and their legitimate grievances for their own ends. By seeking to identify the worker as a "proletarian," not as a citizen, they fostered class conflict and drove a wedge between the worker and his fellow countrymen. For Tikhomirov, the natural inclination of the industrial worker was to organize for purely economic reasons. At the very moment workers sought to form a trade union movement, the ubiquitous socialist intelligentsia, following the precepts of their ideology, endeavored to sidetrack the worker toward revolution. The general strike was one such device, used by the socialists to divert the working class from its true interests. To repudiate the general strike and illustrate the real interests of the worker, Tikhomirov felt compelled to take up the pen once more against the socialists, who now in the period after 1905 occupied a position of considerable strength in Russia's industrial centers.

In contrast to his polemical writings in the 1890's, Tikhomirov displayed a more balanced, measured posture toward the socialist movement. For example, he took care in his post-1905 tracts to acknowledge the apparent virtues of socialism even as he narrowed his attack upon the more serious defects of the socialist program vis-a-vis the worker.  

20 For example, see Tikhomirov, Plody proletarskoi idei, pp. 3-15. In this section, Tikhomirov focused on the general strike and its harmful consequences for the workers' cause.
for pragmatic reasons. Such statements spoke to the favorable predisposition of many Russian workers toward certain socialist values, even as they illustrated the fact that Tikhomirov was not a mere reactionary. Furthermore, in his analysis, Tikhomirov adopted the basic Marxist script of history, viewing the French Revolution as the advent of bourgeois democracy and affirming the notion that social democracy constituted the mature expression of socialism. 21 If Tikhomirov adopted Marxist terminology and periodization, he rejected the implicit historical determinism of Marxism. He maintained, even in the context of post-1905 Russia, that the options for future development were essentially open and that the autocracy, for its own sake as well as in the best interests of the worker, must provide leadership for the new industrial order. For Tikhomirov, socialism was neither inexplicable nor inevitable.

Tikhomirov turned to historical analysis, as he did in the 1890's, to illustrate his contention that socialism was incompatible with Russia's future development. His approach, however, differed from his earlier critique of socialism: the analysis evidenced less concern for socialism's "visionary" trappings then for what Tikhomirov considered to be its manifest failures. A healthy society,

21 Ibid., p. 34. Tikhomirov rejected the Marxist analysis of the development of capitalism, particularly the projection that capitalism would become concentrated in the hands of a few owners.
Tikhomirov observed, embodied a true balance of the principles of individualism and collectivism. An overemphasis of one over the other brought either chaos or regimentation. The bourgeois order had stressed individualism in an exaggerated fashion. In historical terms, socialism as a reaction to the bourgeoisie represented a one-sidedness toward the collective principle, which brought it inevitably into contradiction with the "actual laws of obshchestvennost". If distorted in emphasis, socialism was to be understood as a "natural outgrowth" of the one-sidedness of the French Revolution. By providing a "correction" to the extreme individualism embodied in the "erroneous state order" which emerged out of the French Revolution, socialism then amounted to a historical by-product of bourgeois democracy. Tikhomirov cast this century-long development in dialectical and class terms. Neither the bourgeois or socialist stages were viewed as permanent, for both represented an aberration of a healthy social and political order. By implication, Tikhomirov's idealized autocracy alone could provide a new social equilibrium for Russia.

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22 Tikhomirov, Zaslugi i obshibki sotsialisma, p. 5.

23 Tikhomirov, Sotsialism v gosudarstvennom i obshchestvennom otnoshenii, p. 24.

24 Ibid., p. 25. In his opening section to this work Tikhomirov summarized his theory of society. Echoing his earlier work in Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', he alluded to the "psychological element" in social life, making
After the middle ages, Tikhomirov stated, Europe had lost its claim to an integrated social and political life. By the time of the nineteenth century, the disorder occasioned by the French Revolution (itself a reaction to the excessive authoritarianism of the Old Regime) had become critical.²⁵ Real community had dissolved, a process of disintegration which had been accelerated by the advent of industrialization. The liberal bourgeois state, stressing the value of individualism, did not, by principle, regulate industrial relations. The direct ties between the state and the social order were deliberately severed. Once detached from society, the state served class interests. Abuses arose, wealth became concentrated in the hands of a few, and the principles of freedom and equality increasingly became a pious fiction.²⁶ Under the bourgeois state a stark economic reality emerged and contrasted sharply with the official democratic dogma of the social and political structure.²⁷

As the working class grew in numbers, Tikhomirov observed, it found itself without political rights and

specific references to Alfred Fouilléé and A. V. Espinas as authorities. Tikhomirov also emphasized the potential for "mutual activity" in society which he described in organic terms. See pp. 8-9.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 24-25; 44-45; Zaslugi i obshibki sotsialism, pp. 8-9.

²⁷Tikhomirov, Sotsialism v gosudarstvennom i obshchestvennom otnoshenii, pp. 25-26; 45-47.
without the legal means to alter its economic condition. Society under bourgeois leadership placed little emphasis on collective responsibility in economic life. The state remained non-interventionist. The rational task, according to Tikhomirov, was to recognize these distortions and reestablish society on the eternal laws of obshchestvennost', where individual and collective rights would be defined and maintained in balance. But neither science nor practical experience provided any clear path for social adjustment. Socialism emerged in this context as one answer to the problem of the worker and the broader concern for social stability. It was a "revolt against individualism," and, Tikhomirov confessed, it supplied "useful insights" as Europe sought to resolve its social crisis in the nineteenth century.  

Tikhomirov viewed the subsequent evolution of socialism in two phases, the utopian and the Marxist. The utopian phase stressed the importance of economic conditions and the responsibility of society to assist its members in seeking a better life. Through Owen, Fourier, Cabet and others, Tikhomirov acknowledged the considerable "moral influence" utopian socialism had exerted over its contemporaries. It aroused faith in a better future and represented an initial, albeit incomplete, striving to understand the true nature of obshchestvennost'. Despite its moral

\[28\text{Ibid., p. 26.} \quad 29\text{Ibid., p. 27.}\]
fervor and social vision, utopian socialism had failed. Owen, Tikhomirov stated, had applied humane methods to factory life, but the whole accompanying thrust toward communistic experimentation had proven unworkable. Only those communities established with a strong religious motive endured for any length of time; the remainder were dismal failures.\(^\text{30}\) Yet, the idea of cooperation persisted and represented a necessary antidote to bourgeois individualism. From this idea of cooperation, the impetus to establish mutual aid organizations and cooperatives among workers emerged in the course of the century. Their experiments, largely initiated and sustained by the workers themselves, stood in Tikhomirov's mind as a sharp contrast to the socialist leadership and their still-born schemes for communism.\(^\text{31}\)

For Tikhomirov, the mistakes and exaggerated hopes of utopian socialism had not been necessarily harmful to the interests of the worker. In fact, their moral protest had done much to evoke a needed consciousness of the problems related to industrialization. By contrast, the Marxist school, organized on a broadly European basis as "Social Democracy," played a more perverse role with its false goals and its policy of obstructionism to social reform. Here the socialist intelligentsia held a dominant position and

\(^{30}\)Ibid., pp. 48-50. The utopian experience was viewed by Tikhomirov as proof of the impracticality of communism.

\(^{31}\)Ibid., p. 29.
forcefully pushed the European worker toward revolution, not toward improved working conditions. Calling the social democrats "renegades," Tikhomirov argued that their claim to "scientific socialism" was spurious. Social democracy had become ironically an obstacle to progress with its forthright effort to destroy the existing social order. Instead of assisting the worker to obtain economic gains in an extended period of peaceful change, they consumed their energies in seeking violent revolution. While the worker desired private property and a greater share of the wealth, which had accumulated with the advent of capitalism, socialism sought the destruction of both. Where the worker struggled to create a free, representative trade union movement to defend his interests, social democracy endeavored to coerce the worker into the disciplined ranks of a political party, to stand belligerently in opposition to the nation. Social democracy defined itself as "scientific," a pretension which was as empty as its claim to represent the interests of the worker. Despite its false pretensions, Tikhomirov concluded, social democracy continued to exert a powerful party program.

Among the various representatives of socialism in the nineteenth century, Tikhomirov displayed considerable warmth toward Lassalle and Bernstein. Ferdinand Lassalle, a rival to Marx for leadership of the German workers' movement,

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32Ibid., p. 32. 33Ibid., p. 33. 34Tikhomirov, Zaslugi i obshibki sotsialisma, p. 9.
had in the course of his political career embraced the state as the institution through which the individual would achieve rational development. While Lassalle's statism was more Hegelian than religious, Tikhomirov found in him a constructive voice for social reform within the framework of nationalism. Tikhomirov expressed similar interest in Eduard Bernstein for essentially different reasons. Bernstein had rejected revolution and embraced a deliberate tactical program of reform. Tikhomirov found in Bernstein a kindred soul when the latter warned against the "dictatorship of orators." Bernstein had supported the economic organization of workers on a national basis and at the expense of the socialist intelligentsia, the very program which attracted Tikhomirov to the Zubatov trade union experiment. Tikhomirov's interest in both Lassalle and Berstein was grounded in the fact that they had rejected, openly or by implication, the revolutionary facets of the Marxist script of history. As Tikhomirov was quick to conclude, capitalism could be tamed within the national context under state initiative.

Tikhomirov conceded, however, that social democracy remained in its dominant formulation a hostile contradiction

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36 Tikhomirov, Grazhdanin i proletarii, p. 25.
37 Tikhomirov, Sotsializm v gosudarstvnom i obshchestvennom otoshenii, p. 23.
to the more pragmatic programs of Lassalle and Bernstein. Occasionally, as Tikhomirov was anxious to note, certain important figures such as Jean Jaures spoke out against the general strike, but the movement as a whole continued to endorse revolution.\(^{38}\) Throughout Tikhomirov's discussion of socialism (used interchangeably at points with social democracy), he focused his analysis on Western Europe. At no point did he refer to any prominent Russian socialist other than Peter Lavrov. Writing as late as 1907-1909, Tikhomirov expressed alarm at specific manifestations of socialist subversion in Russia, such as the general strike, but he made no direct reference to the leadership of Russian social democracy or to other Russian socialist groups. The occasion for Tikhomirov's writing, as well as his sense of urgency, derived from the indigenous Russian context, but his perception of socialism, both in terms of ideology and leadership, was focused on Europe. There is no direct or implied reference by Tikhomirov to suggest that socialism in Russia was insignificant; his conclusions were to the contrary. Tikhomirov's disregard (conscious or unconscious) of prominent Russian socialists reinforced his long-standing position that socialism was an alien, European phenomenon. By ignoring the Russian socialist leadership and their party organizations, Tikhomirov seemed to imply that their activities represented a mere extension of the larger European movement.

The more fully developed social democracy of Western Europe constituted, in functional terms, a reactionary force in Tikhomirov's mind. Focusing on Germany, which possessed the most powerful social democratic party, Tikhomirov sought to document his contention that the economic interests of the worker had been systematically undermined. Tikhomirov recorded in *Sotsialism v gosudarstvennom i obshchestvennom otnoshenii* (1907) the parliamentary obstructionism he observed in the social democratic party. Social democrats, he reminded his readers, had opposed a diverse array of progressive legislation: taxes on the bourgeoisie (1881 and other years); social insurance for workers (1883); accident insurance (1884); maintenance for invalid and aged workers (1885); and a job security law (1891). Tikhomirov's list included such particulars as taxes on automobiles and legislation against the abuses of pawnbrokers as examples of "progressive" legislation which social democrats had refused to support.³⁹ Tikhomirov's documentation summarized the specific voting record of the socialist deputies, but did not make reference to the circumstances surrounding their voting or the specific character of the rejected legislation. For Tikhomirov, this documentation provided ample evidence to prove his charge that socialism was an "anti-social idea."⁴⁰

³⁹ Tikhomirov, *Sotsialism v gosudarstvennom i obshchestvennom otnoshenii*, p. 36.

movement under such leaders as Karl Kautsky amounted to an "unheard-of reaction:" "It destroys," Tikhomirov stated, "the very capacity of people to live in society and to create society." By advocating the general strike, the movement not only threatened the well-being of the nation, but undermined worker (i.e. professional) ethics by ignoring the "moral responsibility" of the worker before all mankind. Socialism, Tikhomirov concluded, sensed its separation from society and in response sought to exert its power over society. Moreover, socialism with its thrust toward a central despotism, threatened the very basis for "human culture" and social duty.

The fundamental defects of socialism, however, were not to be found in its contradictory parliamentary record. At the very center of socialism was the principle of materialism which Tikhomirov called "a principle of death." Philosophical materialism translated into a political movement gravitated against the wholesome development of society by precluding the "higher striving" of the people. Tikhomirov associated "higher striving" with religion and religion in turn with the preservation of the individual and his rights. By making the working man a proletarian,

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41 Tikhomirov, Sotsialism v gosudarstvennom i obshchestvennom otnoshenii, p. 45.
42 Ibid., p. 47.
43 Ibid., p. 48; Zaslugi i obshibki sotsialisma, p. 3.
44 Ibid., p. 16.
45 Ibid.
socialism subordinated him to the party program and to a future dictatorship of the proletariat. Socialism's quest for collectivism deprived the individual worker of freedom, even as the bourgeoisie's effort to guarantee individual autonomy from the state had denied the worker economic security.

Tikhomirov identified three essential rights for the individual—freedom of thought, of activity, and of property. Correspondingly, society possessed the prerogatives of supreme power—the responsibility to maintain public order, and the obligation to establish laws as a means to establish security and justice for the nation. For the working class, as with all members of society, there were the mutual spheres of rights and social obligations. As defined by Tikhomirov, society was pluralistic and complex, and unified by the state, the "organized power of the whole over the parts (gosudarstvennost')." The state was the protector of the individual's rights, which Tikhomirov explained exclusively in non-political terms. The right to individual freedom appeared to be understood by Tikhomirov solely in the context of the individual's corporate group. For the worker, corporate participation in society meant legal recognition, the freedom to acquire property, and the opportunity to improve his economic condition. As an

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46 Tikhomirov, Sotsialism v gosudarstvennom i obshchestvennom otnoshenii, pp. 10-12.
47 Ibid., p. 12.
alternative to the implied discipline of socialism, Tikhomirov affirmed religion as the necessary, cohesive bond between the worker and the social structure. While socialism eroded freedom in the name of freedom, religion gave true independence to man and unity to society.

For Tikhomirov, socialism undermined all these foundations upon which the individual and society pursued a "higher existence." Toward the family, religion, and the fatherland, socialism was uncompromisingly hostile. Socialists told the worker to identify with the international proletariat and seek to overthrow existing society. As an extreme reaction to the distortions of the bourgeois epoch, socialism, as an organized movement, propelled society toward a "huge ant-hill." Instead of the single boss of the factory, socialism gave to society a "collective boss." To achieve its exaggerated collectivism, socialism compelled man to forget his "higher nature." It lowered the general morality of society by evoking class conflict. By placing the priority of party interests above all questions of human rights and national interest, it diverted society (and, by implication, the worker) from meaningful economic improvement.

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48 Ibid., p. 13. 49 Ibid., p. 14. 50 Ibid., p. 20. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid., pp. 50-51; Zaslugi i obshibki sotsialisma, p. 12.
The Russian worker, Tikhomirov argued, faced a momentous decision to embrace either citizenship (grazhdanstvo) or the proletarian cause (tovarishchestvo). In Grazhdanin i proletarii (1907), Tikhomirov indicated that these conceptions of worker loyalty were diametrically opposed and, as options for the future, represented a fatal choice for the industrial class. To reject the appeals of the socialist intelligentsia to follow the proletarian idea, meant that the Russian worker could pursue the quest for economic security in the broader context of national renewal. Tikhomirov endorsed the statement of Lassalle: "We are all workers, if we have the wish to be useful to society." By implication, the worker was to realize the amelioration of his economic condition inside civil society, as a participant, not as an outcast or a revolutionary. In dealing with the alienation of the worker, Tikhomirov asserted that the current epoch was not to be understood as revolutionary, but a time in which the family, the race, and the community were destined to play a greater role. He reminded the Russian worker that the theorists of socialism, from Saint-Simon to Marx, were not drawn from the laboring ranks; as outsiders they were proponents of social radicalism or revolution, not the economic interests of the working

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53 Tikhomirov, Grazhdanin i proletarii, p. 9.
54 Ibid., p. 8.
55 Tikhomirov, Zaslugi i obshibki sotsialisma, p. 13.
In *Plody proletarskoi idei*, to underscore their alien character, Tikhomirov indicated that some of the major figures in the socialist movement such as Marx were Jews. 56

As an alternative to the alienation which characterized the socialist intelligentsia, Tikhomirov argued for his own notion of citizenship, which by extension would incorporate the working class. A citizen was defined in relationship to society, not in reference to wealth or apparent class interests. Citizenship was not co-extensive with one class or a segment of society, but a "great and high idea" animating the lives of each conscious member of society. While members of society differed in terms of occupation, social function, and corporate identification, they were united in terms of *grazhdanstvo*. For Tikhomirov, this unity took on different expressions such as the idea of "general interest," defined as a feeling of brotherhood among the various professions and a rootedness in the "circle of human existence." In such a context, each class exercised both prerogatives and social obligations. 57

If the worker existed in a situation of economic hardship, a fact that Tikhomirov openly acknowledged, the worker must seek to improve his lot within the confines of this

56 Tikhomirov, *Plody proletarskoi idei*, p. 31. In this same tract, Tikhomirov praised Lassalle without reference to his Jewish background. Engels and Kautsky were listed with Marx as examples of Jewish-led agitation against the "national idea."

57 Tikhomirov, *Grazhdanin i proletarii*, pp. 9-11.
integrated community. By voluntaristic programs and state protection his condition would improve, but once the worker ignored the underlying solidarity among all classes his economic condition would worsen in direct proportion to his pursuit of self-interest as a class. Having acknowledged the desperate condition of the Russian worker, Tikhomirov asked: "Are they not responsible to the fatherland, to this society?" His answer was in the affirmative, a response Tikhomirov considered consistent with the national interest and the immediate and long-range interests of the industrial worker.

Tikhomirov turned to the English trade union movement to demonstrate the feasibility of his scheme for a patriotic industrial organization. While the English experience provided little support for Tikhomirov's corporatism, it did display the potential compatibility of the worker and his cause with nationalism. Tikhomirov admired the independence of the English worker, his affinity for practical trade unionism as opposed to revolutionary politics, and his apparent loyalty to the monarchy. Not only had the worker sought peaceful change, the English social structure had displayed considerable flexibility. The whole trade union movement and the reaction of the government had achieved in the course of the nineteenth century an

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60 Tikhomirov, Sotsialism v gosudarstvennom i obshchestvennom otnoshenii, p. 37.
impressive blend of modernity and traditionalism.

Being the first to industrialize, the English experienced the growth of revolutionary sentiment among the laboring classes in the 1820's and 1830's. There were strikes, a reaction to severe forms of economic exploitation, and the advent of socialism, an effort to provide a political program to assist the English worker. The English, Tikhomirov observed, had been quick to respond to the social problems which accompanied industrialization. By the 1840's, a new maturity was evidenced when the workers were given the right to organize. Other reforms followed as the workers organized and the other classes saw the need to effect necessary changes. The workers in their trade unions pursued strictly "professional" goals, rejecting at each step the blandishments of the socialist intelligentsia to follow the path of revolution. The "objective" improvement of working conditions was the result of this independent, pragmatic, professional labor movement. The eight-hour day, the development of cooperatives, increased wages, and the overall improvement of the social life of the industrial class provided ample evidence of the concrete achievements of English trade unionism. "Socialists," Tikhomirov stated, existed, but only as "individuals." 62

While Tikhomirov applauded the achievements of the English working class, particularly their independence and

61 Ibid., p. 39.  62 Ibid.
evolutionary approach to social change, he never made reference to the democratic context which conditioned the English experience. He noted that the English worker sought to be a citizen, not a proletarian, but he ignored the obvious political dimension of that attitude. He identified in the English workers' independence a greater degree of "creative force" than on the continent, but attributed this laudable facet of their character to their separation from the discipline of the socialist intelligentsia. Tikhomirov's interest in English trade unionism was grounded on his belief that the Russian worker could achieve the same economic improvement outside revolutionary politics. He ignored the democratic institutions within which the English trade unionism had taken form and developed. Crucial to Tikhomirov's optimism about the Russian worker was his aforementioned belief that political agitation was always secondary to economic grievances. Once the latter was resolved both in the immediate and legal sense, the worker would prefer corporate life and the economic security it offered to politics.

Tikhomirov based his hopes for duplicating the English model of trade unionism in Russia on grounds other than democracy. The attachment of the industrial class to society rested on its tangible economic position in national life. For Tikhomirov, the genius of the English system was

63 Tikhomirov, Grazhdanin i proletarii, p. 23.
its capacity to provide avenues for the worker to obtain property.\textsuperscript{64} The right to property, which the socialists denied the workers out of ideological priorities, was an essential factor in the modern social equation. Tikhomirov argued that property gave independence to the worker and encouraged closer ties with society. The existence of property precluded the slavish society envisaged by the socialist revolutionaries.\textsuperscript{65} Tikhomirov urged greater equity in the distribution of wealth, but did not argue for any systematic division of the land or property. He urged that greater economic freedom be extended to the working class with the opportunity for the members of this class to obtain private property. Likewise, labor should be free, according to Tikhomirov, to enable the industrial class to achieve "professional" status, a preliminary stage to full citizenship. Under the autocracy, the projected industrial estate would achieve economic viability, defined rights and duties, and participation in national life.\textsuperscript{66} The nation would be unified and revolution would become a memory.

At stake in the industrial crisis was the very survival of "historical society."\textsuperscript{67} For Tikhomirov, socialism in its effort to capture the loyalty of the

\begin{itemize}
\item Tikhomirov, \textit{Zaslugi i obshibki sotsialisma}, pp. 16-17.
\item Tikhomirov, \textit{Grazhdanin i proletarii}, p. 11.
\item Tikhomirov, \textit{Zaslugi i obshibki sotsialisma}, p. 23.
\item Tikhomirov, \textit{Sotsialism v gosudarstvennom i obshchestvennom otnoshenii}, p. 51.
\end{itemize}
working class, constituted a direct threat to his concepts of obshchestvennost' and gosudarstvennost', the principles which had created historical society. Despite the "falsehood" of socialism, Tikhomirov acknowledged its pervasive influence and its potential to disrupt Russian society.68

It was an either-or situation for Russia: either socialism was to be destroyed or Russia's historic institutions would disappear in a revolutionary cataclysm as socialists pursued their collectivist vision.69 The task was to provide a context for the laboring class to find a remedy for its economic grievances, a crucial, preliminary step to their unqualified affirmation of loyalty to society. This could be achieved, Tikhomirov stated, by pursuing correct goals and correct means.70 According to this national policy, the workers must be afforded the freedom to organize in a larger framework of coordinated national organizations under state supervision. Implied in this legal existence were the rights to property, the freedom of association and work, and the formal acceptance of the industrial worker as a vital, integral part of the Russian nation.71 Tikhomirov regarded this process as evolutionary and peaceful, but he warned

68 Tikhomirov, Zaslugi i obshibki sotsialisma, pp. 28-29.

69 Tikhomirov, Sotsialism v gosudarstvennom i obshchestvennom otnoshenii, p. 51.

70 Ibid., p. 52; Zaslugi i obshibki sotsialisma, p. 29.

71 Tikhomirov, Sotsialism v gosudarstvennom i obshchestvennom otnoshenii, p. 53.
that the program must go beyond theory to practice. To renew society by such adaptations would create a "new solidarity."\(^{72}\) This "new solidarity," grounded on laws of obshchestvennost', would replace the unbalanced bourgeois and socialist schemes for society.\(^{73}\)

Tikhomirov's solution to the "workers' question" contained many significant social reforms, some of which had been tested in the period before 1905 under the Zubatov police sponsored trade unions. The thrust of Tikhomirov's program transcended the narrow police priorities of maintaining domestic order. As indicated above, Tikhomirov dreamed of introducing into Russian national life the lost qualities of stability and balance. This design called for a deliberate effort to win over the industrial worker to the autocracy, an urgent task which began with the recognition of two realities: the working class, by virtue of its growth and size, constituted an important key to social harmony; the socialist agitation, as evidenced by the 1905 general strike, had become a formidable threat as the assumed spokesman for the working class. Tikhomirov projected a "corporate society," enlarged to accommodate the working class, as the ultimate resolution of Russia's profound and enduring social crisis. This option for the future was cast in idealistic terms and frequently was unsupported by concrete specifics, but it constituted an

\(^{72}\text{Ibid.}\) \(^{73}\text{Ibid., p. 54.}\)
alternative to both bourgeois democracy and socialism. Curiously, Tikhomirov had turned to English trade unionism to provide the concrete evidence that his scheme was feasible. Rather than build Russian trade unionism, as a prototype to an industrial estate, on English-style democracy, Tikhomirov turned to the paternalism and protection of the autocracy. For him, individual freedom, as well as corporate organization, as indicated earlier, was understood in economic, non-political terms. Being neither a democrat nor a revolutionary, Tikhomirov had to await the response of the autocracy to a program which he felt was essential to its survival. His plans were ignored by the autocracy and Tikhomirov, in his last years of active public life as editor of Moskovskie vedomosti (1909-1914), turned his attention to his new, all-consuming passion, the preservation of the Russian Orthodox Church.
CHAPTER VI

THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

Lev Tikhomirov accepted the position of editor of Moskovskie vedomosti in 1909. Two decades had passed since his return from revolutionary exile. The subsequent five-year tenure as editor of this rightwing periodical provided a unique forum for Tikhomirov to defend the autocracy in its eleventh hour. It was also an "Indian summer" for Tikhomirov in terms of his own career. The financial uncertainties which had characterized his life in the 1890's had given way temporarily to a context of relative prosperity. Where in the recent past his theoretical writings had passed almost unnoticed and his participation in the Zubatovshchina had been abortive and shortlived, he now discovered unexpected avenues to exert his influence, even beyond the readership of Moskovskie vedomosti. Coincidental to his editorship, Tikhomirov had been appointed by Nicholas II to the Council of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with the rank of state counsellor. In appreciation for his services to the state, the Emperor had given him a golden snuff box.¹ For Tikhomirov, a former member of the

¹Maevskii, Revoliutsioner Monarkhist, p. 7. His appointment to the Council of the Ministry of Internal Affairs occurred during the tenure of P. A. Stolypin, a
Executive Committee of Narodnaia volia, the transition from revolutionary activist to defender of the Fatherland now seemed complete.

Tikhomirov's editorship of Moskovskie vedomosti fell between Russia's two revolutions, a brief interlude from continued struggle, which would culminate with the collapse of the autocracy when war and revolution resumed. As time passed events proved to be more congenial to the ideological aspirations of Tikhomirov's youth, than to his post-1888 theories on society and politics. But at the moment of his debut as editor of Moskovskie vedomosti in 1909, the impending revolutionary cataclysm was merely an apprehension, not a reality. Tikhomirov's sense of urgency prompted him to use his editorial position to the fullest. His prolific writings for this period are contained in part in his aforementioned K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii (1912). This anthology of his editorials and articles for the years 1909-1912 touched upon a wide range of public issues, from Duma politics to aspects of ecclesiastical reform. Central to Tikhomirov's perspective on these diverse issues was the "constitutional" structure bequeathed by the revolution of 1905.² The endemic political restlessness and the atrophy

political figure who Tikhomirov warmly endorsed as a practical reformer and statesman. See Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii, pp. 204-205, 276-289. For some critical remarks by Tikhomirov on Stolypin's acquiescence toward some Duma legislation on church affairs see Ibid., pp. 190-191.

²Ibid., p. vii.
of autocratic power stemmed from this compromise between parliamentarism and monarchy. Hydra-headed and ambitious, the Duma threatened not merely Russian political institutions, but her religious life as well: it had become the vehicle for "anti-Orthodox strivings."^3

In the face of such developments, Tikhomirov turned his attention increasingly to Church affairs. This shift in emphasis is apparent in K reforme obnovlenii Rossi, where an inordinate amount of space was devoted to religious matters. Even in his discussion of political issues, such as Duma legislation, his concerns were frequently directed at those pieces of projected legislation which dealt with Orthodox Church affairs, religious minorities, and the question of religious toleration. Tikhomirov's bellicose defense of Orthodoxy, both as a faith and an institution, prompted some of his critics to charge him with clericalism.4 Tikhomirov denied that his posture had altered from that elaborated in Monarkhitcheskaia gosudarstvennost', where he had affirmed the autocracy as the sole bearer of supreme power, but the fact remained that he had emerged in the period after 1905 as an outspoken defender of the Russian

^3Ibid., p. 5. Tikhomirov gave considerable space to the political affairs of the Duma in this anthology. The Duma in its various legislative projects provided ample material to illustrate Tikhomirov's definition of the social and political crisis after 1905.

^4Ibid., p. 38.
Orthodox Church. He had published articles in Kolokol, the semi-official organ of the Holy Synod and other church periodicals. By the time he assumed the post of editor of Moskovskie vedomosti, Tikhomirov had evolved his own reform program for Orthodoxy, which included an energetic defense of its prerogatives as the established church coupled with certain institutional reforms. In the wake of the revolutionary upheaval of 1917, Tikhomirov would cling to his Orthodox faith for guidance and protection. His last work, "The Basic Philosophic-Religious Ideas in History," was written in manuscript form during Russia's epic revolution and civil war. This work conveyed in the language of its title Tikhomirov's apocalyptic frame of mind after 1905.

With the demise of the autocracy, Tikhomirov, desperate and without means for survival, sought shelter in his final days behind the walls of the Trinity-St. Sergius Monastery near Moscow. His death at this historic center of Russian

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5Ibid., pp. 12-14. This article was entitled "Tsar i narod" and reflected Tikhomirov's tendency to move from political concerns to religious conclusions. At the end of this article, he called for the convocation of a Church sobor.

6Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', 4: 71. He referred to an article he wrote in Bogoslovskii vestnik (1903), entitled "Lichnost', obshchestvo, i tserkov." For relevant sections of religion in Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', see 1: 79-118; 2: 30-39, 47-78, 126-131; 3: 5-19, 169-181; 4: 63-108.

7Maevskii, Revoliutsioner monarkhist, p. 8. Maevskii records that Tikhomirov's final days were spent with the writer V. V. Rozanov who also sought shelter at the monastery. Tikhomirov's son Alexander became a bishop in the Orthodox Church and was later executed by the Bolsheviks. In terms of Tikhomirov's religious outlook, Maevskii states
Orthodoxy in 1923 suggested in symbolic terms an end to an intellectual pilgrimage which had begun a half century earlier at the University of Moscow when Tikhomirov first became attracted to the radical Chaikovskii circle.

The extent of Tikhomirov's ideological emphasis on the Russian Orthodoxy after 1905 was apparent in his introductory essays for the collected articles which appeared in K reforme obnovlenii Rossii. Viewing the post-1905 crisis as a modern analogue to the "Time of Troubles" in the seventeenth century, Tikhomirov argued that a guiding idea was absent from Russian life. He described this "new order" as "anti-Russian" in character. Alien elements under various guises had been unleashed and with their freedom of action now threatened the historical basis of the Russian nation. Beyond their desire "to appropriate the state institutions and direct them," Tikhomirov saw these anti-Russian elements poised to strike a blow at the Orthodox Church. By implication, the very moral fiber of the nation was now subject to erosion and with its disintegration, the prospects for true national renewal would be lost. The national crisis of the seventeenth century provided not merely a precedent for Tikhomirov; it suggested a remedy—the convocation of a Zemskii sobor. Such a national sobor, that his revolutionary past haunted him throughout his second career in Russia, describing his posture as one of profound "penitence" for his past sins.

Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii, p. viii.
as in the past, would revitalize national life by making state institutions an instrumentality of that "great, wise, believing, historical Russia." 9

At the bottom of the current crisis was a deficient national consciousness, a defect which Tikhomirov identified with all nations beset by social disorder. 10 This same theme had been elaborated upon earlier in Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost'. 11 Russian development had been characterized by spontaneity and minimal national self-consciousness. The crisis of 1905 had exposed the dangers of this anemic national awareness. Now a segment of the educated classes, the radical intelligentsia, attempted to fill the void with alien ideas and visionary schemes for the transformation of Russia. 12 Tikhomirov warned that this moment of social crisis contained unique dangers. The task was to return to the "national idea" or, as Tikhomirov defined it, a revitalization of those historic institutions and values which expressed the inner character and will of the Russian people. 13

To articulate those ideas which reflected the "internal essence" of the Russian nation, constituted the immediate imperative for any decisive political leadership. 14

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9Ibid., p. x. 10Ibid. 
12Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossi, p. 2.
13Ibid., p. 1. 14Ibid., p. 3.
As editor of Moskovskie vedomosti, Tikhomirov turned increasingly to religion to explain this "internal essence" in order to articulate the necessary basis for the wholesome existence of society. Orthodoxy remained in his mind the real "animating" force in Russian national life. The preservation of the religious authority and institutional integrity of the Orthodox church was tied inextricably with the morality of the nation and the vitality of the autocracy.

To preserve the Orthodox Church and reassert its role of moral leadership in the nation, Tikhomirov endorsed the idea for convening a special church council or sobor to confront the question of ecclesiastical reform. The clamor for such a sobor was first evident during the reform era under Alexander II, but acquired serious attention only in the first decade of the twentieth century. Pobedonostsev, as Over Procurator of the Holy Synod, had opposed the original proposal and in the period after 1905 when the idea gained momentum the Holy Synod continued its opposition. Great hope was generated in the idea of a sobor when Nicholas II issued his ukaz of December, 1904 which promised a number of reforms, including religious toleration. For a brief period of time, Count Witte and the Council of

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15Ibid., p. 4. 16Ibid., p. 5. 17Ibid.

18John S. Curtiss, Church and State in Russia (New York, 1940), p. 211.
Ministers were given responsibility to formulate a program for ecclesiastical reform. The result was a proposal for extensive reform of the legal and institutional character of the Church.

Witte's memorandum to the Emperor outlined this program of reform which attracted the support of liberal Orthodox clergy and lay figures interested in either modernizing the church structure or expanding the rights of religious minorities. The memorandum itself endorsed the idea of convening a church sobor, to correct the Petrine distortions of church structure which had created in the course of two centuries a dry, highly formalistic and dispirited Church, devoid of vitality and popular appeal.\textsuperscript{19} Furthermore, the memorandum urged a revitalization of parish life by exempting the priesthood from police functions, particularly the requirement to violate the confessional. The priesthood, it was stated, had become a closed class, separated from the masses by the fact that, in the absence of fixed salaries, priests were forced to charge fees for their religious services. This practice had led to abuses and the alienation of the laity from the clergy. As a permanent solution to this problem, the memorandum called for the democratization of parish life. Parishes were to elect their own priests and exercise control over local church affairs. Such a reform was

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., p. 212.
considered necessary to counteract the excessive centralization which existed under the administration of the Holy Synod. Finally, to improve religious life of the church, it was suggested that religious education be thoroughly reorganized. Seminary life with its rigidity, abuses and endemic student unrest had become a scandal to the church. To effect the above changes the projected sobor was to include representatives of all segments of church life, clergy and laity.  

The program of reform outlined in the Witte memorandum appealed to progressive churchmen such as Metropolitan Antonii of St. Petersburg, but it evoked the relentless opposition of Pobedonostsev who resisted the idea of a church sobor. In the wake of his protest, the Emperor reassigned the matter of church reform to the Holy Synod. Despite Pobedonostsev's opposition, the Holy Synod made an appeal to the Emperor to call a church sobor and name a bishop to fill the vacant position of Patriarch. Endorsing most of Witte's proposals for reform, the Holy Synod

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21 Curtiss, *Church and State in Russia*, pp. 242, 369. Metropolitan Antonii was a prominent liberal churchman who opposed the reactionary Union of Russian People and later protested the influence of Rasputin over the Imperial family.
suggested that diocesan administration and diocesan courts be given greater autonomy, along with parishes at the local level.  

Certain events followed which gave hope to the reformers. On the question of a church sobor, Nicholas II was quick to respond. Urging caution, he made an oblique commitment to the idea. He noted that it was a "troubled time" and no project as significant as a church sobor should be pursued without careful consideration. The Emperor concluded: "I propose, when a favorable time shall come, to set this great work in motion, after the ancient example of Orthodox Emperors, and to call a sobor of the all-Russian Church for canonical consieration of subjects of faith and Church administration." Later, in January, 1906, Nicholas II appointed a pre-sobor Conference, composed of ten bishops and metropolitans and twenty-one professors, drawn from the religious academies and universities, to prepare an agenda for the projected sobor. The Emperor's promise and his pre-sobor Conference did not satisfy the liberal reformers who objected to the deferred status of the sobor and the fact that the committee which was given the responsibility to prepare the agenda did not

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22 Ibid., p. 214. Among church periodicals this proposal evoked an enthusiastic response. Moskovskie vedomosti, the newspaper which Tikhomirov later edited, took a cautious position, but not one of total opposition.

23 Ibid.
include either the lower clergy or representative laity. Others such as the reactionary Bishop Antonii of Volhynia condemned the whole projected reform. 24

Apart from the subject of a sobor, Nicholas II made other decisions which related to the religious life of the Empire. A constant source of agitation during this period was the plight of the religious minorities. To reduce the civil disabilities of religious minorities, Nicholas II issued an ukaz on 17 April, 1905, granting religious liberty. 25 While the edict was couched with qualifications and described as a "temporary" measure, it did extend to Russia's religious minorities some important concessions. For the first time, individuals could leave the Orthodox Church without loss of rights or penalties. The Old Believers, for example, acquired substantial benefits as a consequence of this ukaz: their congregations could purchase property for the first time; their clergy could now use ecclesiastical titles, claim exemption from military service, legitimatize marriages and births, keep records and organize programs of religious instruction; and their communities could now open new houses of prayer and their own cemeteries. 26 Other sectarian in subsequent


26 Ibid., p. 228-229. On October 17, 1906, Nicholas II issued a second ukaz permitting the organization of Old Believers and sectarians into congregations with self-government and the privilege of purchasing property.
years enjoyed similar freedoms and concessions from the state. Once established as a facet of state policy by the Emperor, religious toleration became an object of concern in the Duma in 1906. In the years following there were persistent efforts within the Duma to expand the Emperor's modest concessions to non-Orthodox religious communities.

The calling of a church sobor and the granting of religious toleration constituted the two major features of a projected ecclesiastical reform in the twentieth century. On the surface, they were separate religious questions: the agitation for a church sobor dealt with the urgent need to reform and modernize the established church; the cry for religious freedom reflected both secular and sectarian concern over Russia's numerous religious minorities which continued to exist in a confused context of relative freedom and repression. Yet, both priorities dealt ultimately with one, fundamental question—the hegemony of the Russian Orthodox Church. Tikhomirov sought change and adaptation in the Orthodox Church and state policy relating to religious minorities, but not in the spirit of the Witte Memorandum. Accordingly, Tikhomirov sought church reform, but not liberal church reform. His peculiar views of the autocracy and Orthodoxy and their mutual inter-relationship as institutions prompted him to support with considerable

27 Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii, p. 186. His article was titled "Rol' tserkovnoi vlasti v osvoboditel'nykh reformakh (1910)."
energy the calling of a church sobor in order to revitalize both institutions. Tikhomirov's fear and hostility toward non-Orthodox religious sects led to his complete rejection of religious toleration grounded on liberal principles.

The convocation of a sobor represented a step toward church renewal of singular importance to Tikhomirov. His belief that the period between 1905-1907 had witnessed a breakdown in the church-state union intensified his sense of urgency. The Orthodox Church was plagued with internal weaknesses and corruption, governmental interference, and a chorus of enemies outside its walls. Tikhomirov had grown impatient with the temporizing on the question of calling a sobor. The reasons for such an assembly were self-evident and pressing. Without a sobor, he argued, no correct moral and legal relationship between church and state was conceivable. Earlier, Tikhomirov had stated in Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost' that monarchical verkhovnaia vlast' must be supported by a national religion and it must in return support the religious consciousness of the nation. A sobor was viewed as a necessary measure to restore this relationship.

For Tikhomirov, a church sobor was necessary also to reform the internal life of the Orthodox Church. One of his

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28 Ibid., p. 185. 29 Ibid., p. 308.
30 Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', 4: 66.
earliest commentaries on the subject of church reform was included in his *Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost*.\(^{31}\) Bureaucracy, Tikhomirov lamented, had made vast inroads into church life, a phenomenon which he traced back to Peter the Great.\(^ {32}\) The passage of two centuries had effectively destroyed the former independence and authority of the church. The patriarchate had been left vacant and in its place a synodical church administration had been substituted. The Over-Procurator was appointed to head the Holy Synod much in the same fashion an official was appointed to head a secular ministry. The Holy Synod had become the approximation of a ministry of church affairs.\(^ {33}\) Bishops were forced into a subservient role and the believing masses were denied any meaningful role, even at the parish level.\(^ {34}\)

Such a centralization of power within the office of the Over-Procurator had effectively eroded the autonomy of the church, distorted its sense of mission, and separated it from the people. The power of the Over-Procurator had become state power; the Holy Synod had emerged as an agency which controlled the legislative, judicial and administrative life of the church. Despite its prerogatives, the synodical system had proven ineffectual and cumbersome.

\(^{31}\)Ibid., 3: 169-182.  \(^{32}\)Ibid., 3: 170.

\(^{33}\)Ibid., 3: 178.

\(^{34}\)Ibid., 3: 182; *K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii*, p. 313.
This was most explicit in the consistories which handled diocesan affairs. Here Tikhomirov noted the existence of a powerful and numerous stratum of chinovniki. His complaints approximated those of liberal reformers—the excessive bureaucratic red tape and the powerless position of the bishop. For Tikhomirov, this condition was in the "highest degree abnormal" and was accentuated by the fact that bishops were frequently transferred from diocese to diocese. Added to these defects in church administration was the atrophy of parish life. A bureaucratic church administration had destroyed the unity between priest and parish. The synodical system had become a "paper secretariat," without spirit or inspiration, and impervious to any "voice of conscience."

A sobor, Tikhomirov hoped, would give the Orthodox Church the requisite independence to perform its spiritual mission. By independence, Tikhomirov meant a measure of autonomy for the church, or more precisely, a position of equilibrium vis-a-vis the state. The Petrine system had proven to be secular in intent, overly bureaucratic, and disastrous for both the state and the church by preventing Orthodoxy from fulfilling its mission. Among many liberal reformers, Tikhomirov discerned another threat. These reformers, including Witte, called for the adoption of more

35Curtiss, Church and State in Russia, p. 56.
36Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', 3: 182.
democratic practices; some even urged the actual separation of church and state. Tikhomirov viewed these options for the future as an effort to effect the "protestantization" of the church. He rejected both synodical centralization and democratization in favor of his own notion of an Orthodox Church, subordinate to the autocracy in political matters, but spiritually autonomous. To regain its lost "moral authority," Tikhomirov urged again the calling of a church sobor, where the Petrine system of church administration would be overthrown. In Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', Tikhomirov stated that the church must possess that necessary freedom from the state in order to be subordinate to Christ. In serving Christ, Tikhomirov believed the church could remain in harmony with the state, providing that essential "moral worldview" for the nation.

If the Orthodox Church was to acquire institutional freedom, it was not to lose its hegemony in the religious life of the nation. Tikhomirov viewed the ukaz of April 17, 1905 as the first step toward the destruction of this hegemony. By affirming the principle of religious toleration this edict, despite its "temporary" character, had set into motion a concerted drive toward a state policy of neutrality in religious affairs. As a consequence the

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37 Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii, p. 342.
38 Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', 4: 78.
39 Ibid., 4: 78.
the whole pattern of church-state union was in jeopardy. The Duma provided the immediate vehicle for the destruction of the Orthodox Church's supremacy in national life. Without providing for the security and vitality of the Orthodox Church, the state had encouraged the extension of religious freedom to minorities, at the very moment a strengthened church-state union was needed for national survival.

By hegemony Tikhomirov meant the "ruling position" of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Empire. The state was to continue to recognize Orthodoxy as the official faith and provide for its institutional security. Such a recognition of Orthodoxy indicated that the state was not indifferent toward religious questions, but sought to embody in its activity the moral teachings of the church. God ruled both the church and the state and their relationship was one of mutual interaction within the nation. Hegemony of the Orthodox faith within a religiously pluralistic Empire did not mean the extinction of other religious groups. They would survive, but in a context where Orthodoxy's special relationship to the state was openly acknowledged and maintained. Orthodoxy, Tikhomirov argued, was to exercise moral influence over the state and its laws. Moreover, the Orthodox Church was to influence in a decisive fashion the legislation regulating non-Orthodox churches. This role,

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40 Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii, pp. 169-72.
41 Ibid., p. 182.
he observed, was not administrative, but consultive; the
state was to draw upon the teachings of the church. Tikho-
mirov condemned the Roman Catholic approach to temporal
power where the conception of hegemony was understood in
administrative as well as formal terms. Orthodoxy, by
contrast, remained subordinate to the state in the adminis-
trative and political spheres. Moreover, it did not seek
what Tikhomirov called "world power."42 As he established
in Monarkhicheskaiia gosudarstvennost', caesaropapism or its
opposite, papocaesarism, stood in contradiction to the co-
ordinate, harmonious relationship necessary between church
and state.43 The church and state represented on distinct
levels the organized nation. Each possessed a divine man
date and a corresponding sense of duty. Implicit in their
functions was joint participation in national life, not the
aggrandizement of power outside their defined sphere and at
the expense of the other.

In the period after 1905, Tikhomirov identified the
Duma as the most immediate threat to the hegemony of the
Russian Orthodox Church. The Duma had attempted in myriad
ways to expand upon the principle of religious liberty
established in the ukaz of April 17, 1905. These legis-
lat ive efforts were wide-ranging and designed to assert the

42 Ibid.
43 Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaiia gosudarstvennost',
4: 81.
power of the Duma over religious affairs. Within the Duma, Tikhomirov warned, Jews, atheists, Moslems and heretics had equal footing. The context was strictly political. No notion of natsional'nost' inspired or conditioned their legislative proceedings.\textsuperscript{44} Seeking to expand its parliamentary prerogatives, the Duma sought to subordinate the Holy Synod to its will, to control the church budget,\textsuperscript{45} and to expand the rights of dissenting churches at the expense of the national church. Nothing less than "moral death" awaited the Orthodox Church in the future if the Duma triumphed. This victory would amount to the hegemony of secular political parties over the religious life of the nation.\textsuperscript{46}

The Duma had entered into the arena of religious affairs in an aggressive fashion to dissolve the union of church and state. Tikhomirov accused the Octobrists as being the most visible proponents of religious liberty, which was a subterfuge to weaken the historical basis of Russian national existence.\textsuperscript{47} The Octobrists were joined by other groups who in many instances found the issue of religious toleration useful for the pursuit of other ends. Tikhomirov described a "dreadful spectacle" of Octobrists in league with Social Democrats, Cadets, Catholics, Protestants, Moslems and others in an effort to weaken the

\textsuperscript{44}Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii, p. 316.
\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 160. \textsuperscript{46}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 318. \textsuperscript{47}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 302.
position of Orthodoxy. This "dreadful spectacle" had become Russia's "second Mukden."\textsuperscript{48} The nature of the Duma agitation was conveyed poignantly in the fact that belief and unbelief were accorded equal respect; the "betrayers of the Church" were given equal homage with "people of conscience and duty."\textsuperscript{49} If the designs of the Duma were allowed to reach fruition, Tikhomirov warned, the "full overturn of Russian gosudarstvennost'" would be the dire consequence.\textsuperscript{50}

Tikhomirov's critique of Duma politics led in a natural fashion to a consideration of the various groups which profited by the post-1905 context of religious toleration. His analysis, animated by fear and hostility, focused largely on the consequences of religious liberty. The Old Believers, a large and growing segment of dissenters, drew Tikhomirov's attention. Earlier in Moskovskie vedomosti he had called upon the state to forge a rational policy toward this dissenting group within the Orthodox heritage.\textsuperscript{51} Voicing the same concern, he urged in 1910 that the state abandon its temporary laws and forthrightly confront the problem on a long term basis.\textsuperscript{52} For Tikhomirov, the Duma had demonstrated its incapacity to deal with the

\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., p. 305.  \textsuperscript{49}Ibid., p. 306.  \textsuperscript{50}Ibid., p. 302.
\textsuperscript{51}Tikhomirov, Monarkhitcheskaia gosudarstvennost', 4: 85.
\textsuperscript{52}Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii, p. 172.
question of religious toleration; it had viewed the problem in abstract terms, either freedom or slavery. Such "profound questions of national life" were crucial to the wholesome development of the nation and should not be left to the intelligentsia to decide. Tikhomirov urged that the Old Believers' freedom of conscience be preserved, but the threats posed to the ruling Orthodox Church by the sect be acknowledged and resisted. By implication, this peculiar approach would not be contradictory in Tikhomirov's mind. The Old Believers as well as other groups, were to exercise their religious freedom within limited perimeters. The Orthodox Church would not seek to eliminate the Old Believers as much as provide a necessary context for its own spiritual mission. Accordingly, the Orthodox Church would be identified with the state and accorded a special position of supremacy in national life. All other religious groups would presumably acknowledge this hegemony and conduct their religious affairs in a passive, discreet, non-aggressive fashion.

Toward other religious groups Tikhomirov was less conciliatory. The Baptists in particular alarmed him with their propaganda and aggressive proselytizing activities. The Baptists were described by Tikhomirov as the most evil of all the sects. Their efforts to tempt Russians away

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53 Ibid., p. 173. 54 Ibid., p. 175. 55 Ibid., pp. 166-167.
from Orthodoxy, the "spiritual sustenance" of the nation, amounted to an anti-social as well as an "anti-Christian" movement. Tikhomirov viewed Roman Catholicism with the same apprehension. Their propaganda had been equally aggressive, even within the confines of Moscow, he lamented. But the defections to Roman Catholicism from Orthodoxy, particularly in the western border regions of the Empire, had disturbed Tikhomirov deeply and reinforced his conviction that the Orthodox Church must be renewed and cease to be a department of government administration. To counteract both the aggressive inroads of the Baptists and Roman Catholics, the Orthodox Church would have to be revitalized from top to bottom, from its hierarchy to the parish level. For these reasons, a sobor became for Tikhomirov the necessary instrumentality to simultaneously restore the church to its former vitality and, by virtue of this fact, neutralize the enemies of Russia's national faith.

There were other, more subtle enemies of Russia who threatened her traditional religious and political institutions. Tikhomirov found in the Jews and the Masons a kindred, if not coordinated, effort to destroy both the church and the autocracy. The "Jewish Question" became a

\[56\text{Ibid., p. 76.}\]
\[57\text{Ibid., p. 78; Curtiss, Church and State in Russia, pp. 226, 323.}\]
significant issue for the nation because of the visible role played by Jews in the revolutionary movement, the press, and the Duma. Their acquisition of equal rights, Tikhomirov stated, would lead to their rule over Russia.\textsuperscript{58} Being quite xenophobic on this issue, Tikhomirov identified the Jews with the unspecified, "those who would subjugate us."\textsuperscript{59} To resolve the "Jewish Question," Tikhomirov argued that the "Russian Question" must be first answered, to wit, that Russia must become again a "moral and material force." In a veiled criticism of Nicholas II, Tikhomirov remarked that "we have fallen from the time of Alexander III, but we can rise from the ashes."\textsuperscript{60} Tikhomirov balanced the antidote of national renewal to the Jewish threat with a simple, specific expedient—the Jews should be denied any expansion of their rights within the Empire.\textsuperscript{61}

The association of Jews with the Masons occasioned some remarks on the part of Tikhomirov, since this link was considered by many on the Russian right to be real and ongoing. Some had charged that the Masons were in league with the "Elders of Zion"; others assumed that masonic leader-

\textsuperscript{58}Tikhomirov, \textit{K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii}, p. 65.
\textsuperscript{59}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{60}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{61}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 67. Tikhomirov did defend the right of Jewish converts to Christianity to be exempted from the restrictions placed on the Jewish community. He went as far as to defend their right to study for the priesthood.
ship was dominated by Jews. Tikhomirov dismissed the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" as spurious and denied any organic link between the two groups. But this polite bow to reason and historical authenticity did not prevent Tikhomirov from castigating the Masons for exploiting "all the weak sides of the nation and the state." For this, he remarked, one did not have to read the "Protocols." Masons weakened the moral fiber of the nation, and, as a secret society, along with other movements such as occultism and spiritism, must be uprooted. Masons and Jews shared in Tikhomirov's mind a similar objective— the subjugation of the world. They had not created the current social disorder, they merely exploited the circumstances for their own ends. They could be effectively neutralized, Tikhomirov asserted confidently, if church and state were strong.

Tikhomirov's apprehension over the status of the Orthodox Church in the Empire merged with his own Russian ethnocentrism. To assert the hegemony of the Orthodox Church was a crucial, even central feature, of his Russian nationalism. The "ruling position" of the Orthodox Church in religious affairs was to be matched by the hegemony of the Russian nationality in political affairs. Tikhomirov rejected any scheme for national self-determination in the pluralistic Russian Empire with the same degree of energy.

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62 Ibid., p. 55. 63 Ibid., p. 58. 64 Ibid., p. 61.
as he rejected the liberal idea of religious toleration. The justification for such a dual, coordinate form of religious-political hegemony was to be understood in terms of the "universal mission of the Russian nation." To perform this mission, Tikhomirov stated, the Russian nation must exert its leadership and establish the necessary conditions to achieve its purposes. As in politics, so in religion: Russia was the bearer of the Christian mission, the cause of God. How could Russia surrender its mandate, religious and political, to other nations? Tikhomirov cast his religious ethnocentrism in universal terms and rejected the notion that the defense of Orthodoxy and its prerogatives was an expression of a narrow concept of national self-interest. Curiously, he argued such a viewpoint was "Jewish," not Christian. Unlike the Jews, the Russians had not identified their faith exclusively with their race, considering themselves the elected. Russians did not "own" Christianity; they were the servants of the Christian faith. Hence their mission was a selfless endeavor, pursued for the sake of humanity. The Russians were historically the antithesis of the Jews.

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65 Ibid., pp. 79-82. 66 Ibid., p. 72.
67 Ibid., pp. 73, 162. Tikhomirov singled out for specific praise Kireevskii, the Aksakovs, Khomiakov, Katkov, Pushkin, Dostoevskii, Pobedonostsev, and others. Some of Tikhomirov's ideas on Christianity and Russia approximate those of Dostoevskii, who Tikhomirov referred to as a "national prophet." See Ibid., pp. 15-19.
In cultural terms, Tikhomirov associated the Russian nation with other Slavic peoples. Russia in the past had been protector and had participated in a joint life with other Slavic nations. In terms of the future and the fate of the autocracy and Orthodoxy, Tikhomirov gave scant attention to this relationship of the Russian Empire and the Slavic world. Beyond speaking in vague terms of a "Slavic cause" and the possibility of evolving an "original culture," he said very little. In religious terms, Tikhomirov did not speak to the division of Slavs between the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox communions. Likewise, he did not identify Orthodoxy with the Slavic peoples or their "cause." In reference to Slavic minorities within the Empire, Tikhomirov was decidedly candid and uncompromising. The Poles were to remain an essential, if not fully integrated, component of the Empire, a relationship which would necessitate the recognition of the ruling position of the Russian nation and the Orthodox Church within the state. Among the Great, Little and White Russians, Tikhomirov spoke of a vital unity: "We have lived and will live--one life, as one entity." There would be no separate Ukraine or Poland.

Tikhomirov, as editor of Moskovskie vedomosti, had remarked in this period that few in his time were interested in clarifying "the basis of our national state." Having

68Ibid., pp. 82-84. 69Ibid., pp. 66-86. 70Ibid.
realized that police repression was inadequate, Tikhomirov argued that national self-consciousness was antecedent to any renewed, viable Russia. The role of the Orthodox Church was not a peripheral one in his mind, but a central, animating force both in the life of the nation and the state. The relationship of the church to the state had been outlined by Tikhomirov in Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost'. To live in Christ and to be useful to the nation, the Orthodox Church must be free in spiritual matters. Once it was exempt from the slavish subordination to the state, a mere administrative appendage, it could educate the nation, provide a sense of morality, and teach the nation the mutual relationship between rights and responsibilities. The church's social utility stemmed from its spiritual autonomy from the state. At the basis of his larger notion of national renewal was Orthodoxy, "the very source of the morality of the people." In the final moments of his career, Tikhomirov came to realize that Orthodoxy was the alpha and the omega of the Russian nation.

71 Tikhomirov, Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost', 4: 77.
72 Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii, p. 24.
Lev Tikhomirov died at the Trinity-St. Sergius monastery in October, 1923. He had moved to this historic monastery near Moscow during the time of the 1917 Revolution. Here he lived in extreme poverty and solitude, almost as a hermit.\textsuperscript{1} These final years of Tikhomirov’s life are shrouded in mystery, but certain facts are known. About the time of his retreat to the monastery, Tikhomirov apparently renounced political affairs and took refuge in the religious life which had assumed increasing importance to him after 1905.\textsuperscript{2} It was during this chaotic and difficult time that Tikhomirov wrote his last work in manuscript form, "The Basic Religious-Philosophic Ideas in History." It is highly probable that this final theoretical statement by Tikhomirov conveyed his interpretation of the denouement of the Russian autocracy. In the period after the October Revolution the Bolsheviks banned Tikhomirov’s published works. These same authorities decided not to

\textsuperscript{1}Maevskii, Revoliutsioner monarkhist, p. 9.
molest Tikhomirov himself in his final years, a decision which may have been based on the fact that Tikhomirov's defection from the revolutionary ranks had not been accompanied by the betrayal of his former comrades. 3

Considered in its totality, Tikhomirov's career was remarkable in many respects. Few men could recount the varied experiences and personalities, on both sides of the barricades, which Tikhomirov encountered during his lifetime. Going back to the early 1870's, he had worked with revolutionaries such as Alexander Mihailov, Sofia Perovskaia, Peter Lavrov, and George Plekhanov, to name a few. More significantly, he had challenged their revolutionary outlook and, after a tortuous period of transition, embraced the monarchical principle. Having altered his formal ideological posture, Tikhomirov's career as a publicist and political theorist brought him into contact with important figures such as K. P. Pobedonostsev, Serge Zubatov, and Peter Stolypin. Perhaps Tikhomirov's most important position after 1888 was his editorship of Moskovskie vedomosti, the conservative newspaper which M. N. Katkov had edited earlier in the nineteenth century. Much like Katkov, Tikhomirov's career cut across official and unofficial life and suggested an approach that was both traditional and

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3 See Maevskii, Revoliutsioner monarkhist, p. 10. Maevskii stresses the fact that Tikhomirov had given long service to the "shattered state order" of Russia.
modern. While committed to the preservation of the autocracy, Tikhomirov retained his independent bearing and detachment from any specific political party or faction.

This autonomy in political matters was evident in 1909 when Tikhomirov assumed the position of editor of Moskovskie vedomosti. Viewing the orientation of the newspaper in reference to the contemporary political scene, Tikhomirov articulated in concise form his own political posture in the era between Russia's two revolutions. As a matter of personal faith and as a theoretical conviction, religion provided for Tikhomirov the desired foundation for the wholesome existence of the individual and society. For Russia, the Orthodox Church possessed the capacity to unite the nation in the sphere of its religious life. From this fundamental consideration, Tikhomirov argued that the autocracy, the historical, organic expression of the Russian nation, was the highest political principle, capable in its correct expression to provide "the greatest good, order, prosperity and freedom." Having identified the essential components of his own political orientation, Tikhomirov indicated that Moskovskie vedomosti, in the context of the post-1905 social and political crisis, would not permit itself to become an

4See Utechin, Russian Political Thought, pp. 91-94.
5Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovленной Rossii, pp. 4-9.
6Ibid., p. 4.
organ of any partisan cause. Rather it would serve as an organ of that historical "national direction" which flowed out from the spirit of the nation. Without defining the specifics of this direction beyond the implied endorsement of the aforementioned institutions of Orthodoxy and autocracy, Tikhomirov went on to declare that the press was obliged to participate in the realization of the will of the nation. In practical terms, this meant that Moskovskie vedomosti would aspire to become a vehicle of Russian national thought.

Always concerned with national consciousness, Tikhomirov summarized those components—religious, social and political—which he believed to be crucial for the survival of the Empire. He argued that Orthodoxy must be preserved in an institutional sense, but more significantly it must become the animating force in Russian national life. In the social life of the country, he maintained that science, education and culture must bear "Russian ideals" and the state must move to guarantee the economic security of all classes, particularly the workers and the peasants. On the latter point, Tikhomirov assumed that the current social unrest among workers and peasants was fundamentally an economic, not a political issue. In political affairs, Tikhomirov renewed his call for a strong state, uncompromised by democratic institutions or by concessions to

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7Ibid. 8Ibid., p. 5.
non-Russian nationalities within the Empire. These pro-
grammatic elements were set in Tikhomirov's larger framework
of an organic, corporate, religiously grounded society. In
their more detailed formulation they constituted the prac-
tical application of his theories elaborated in Monark-
hicheskaia gosudarstvennost'.

Toward the Russian right Tikhomirov took an explicit
position. In the post-1905 period, a time when the "fundamental basis" of the Empire had been shaken, the temptation
to organize political parties had become irresistible for
many. For Tikhomirov, party struggle, even in the defense
of the autocracy, undermined national order and demoralized
the nation. Moskovskie vedomosti stood apart from this
phenomenon with all its dangers and affirmed those principles
which transcended party programs, even those which espoused
monarchical, Russian, or Orthodox ideas. To serve the Church,
the Tsar, and the Fatherland, Tikhomirov, as an individual,
and Moskovskie vedomosti, as a newspaper, pursued an inde-
pendent course, one which allowed for the freedom to arti-
culate the national will and at the same time established
an avenue for political action which did not contradict the
traditional prerogatives of the autocracy in the sphere of
politics. Moreover, as Tikhomirov was quick to point out,
the various parties of the Russian right had a tendency to
be merely reactionary, to exist only in opposition to the

9Ibid., p. 8.
revolutionary parties. Once their opposition disappeared, he observed, they would find themselves without direction.\textsuperscript{10}

Tikhomirov's disdain for organized political groupings on the left or right, stemmed from his faith in the autocracy and its potential to reestablish a powerful, integrated socio-political order.\textsuperscript{11} His whole intellectual career after 1888 had been devoted to the sole objective of providing the essential ideological tools to accomplish this task in the modern context. He had provided a critique of the revolutionary tradition since 1789, an interpretation which had attempted to demonstrate that liberalism, socialism, and anarchism were part of one phenomenon, the "New Chiliaism." To illustrate the viability of the monarchical principle, he had written his major work, *Monarkhicheskaiia gosudarstvennost',* an exhaustive study of the theoretical and historical content of monarchism. Within the specific context of the Russian Empire at the turn of the twentieth century, he had explored the relationship of the autocracy and society to the working class, an interest which eventually paved the way for his participation in the Zubatov-shchina. In addition, Tikhomirov directed his attention to the quasi-constitutional order which emerged after 1905 and, finally to Orthodoxy itself, a question which possessed

\textsuperscript{10}Ibid., p. 138; See also Hans Rogger, "Was There a Russian Fascism?," *Journal of Modern History* 36 (1964): 398-415.

\textsuperscript{11}Tikhomirov, *K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii*, p. 146.
compelling interest for him as a matter of personal faith and state policy. Only at the very end, with the collapse of the autocracy, did Tikhomirov apparently abandon politics, to seek meaning in the narrower confines of the Church.

As a writer and political theorist, Tikhomirov displayed divergent talents and moods. His basic strength, as a revolutionary and a monarchist, was his facility as a writer, a talent which enabled him to formulate a sequence of coherent and persuasive works on a number of social and political themes. Always a formidable polemicist, Tikhomirov at times reached conclusions which simultaneously projected insight and naivety, as was illustrated in his analysis of social democracy. Frequently, his approach was scholastic and professorial. He could also reveal in his writings a darker side, his fears and negativism: he loathed democracy and socialism; he feared Jews, Masons, and other groups he considered alien; and, as his diary suggests, he reacted emotionally to bureaucrats, the Westernized intelligentsia, and, at times, the actions of the Emperor himself. Tikhomirov's approach to human nature was somber, but not devoid of optimism concerning human potential, particularly within the confines of the nation, which he considered to be an organism with a soul, a morality, and a consciousness of its own.

Tikhomirov's view of history was not deterministic. He acknowledged that no political order, even the most
exalted like the Russian autocracy, possessed by virtue of some historical law or divine mandate the right to perpetual existence. His organismic outlook toward nations suggested growth on an evolutionary pattern with the possibility for decay or renewal. To define the ultimate source and/or authority for this organic, evolutionary socio-political order, Tikhomirov turned to religion. In his effort to integrate his social theory with religion, Tikhomirov displayed minimal clarity and precision. Here more than anywhere else, his limitations as a theoretician and a system builder were evident. In dealing with such topics as sovereignty, the nation, and the autocratic principle, he failed at certain points to fully define his meaning. Despite these apparent weaknesses, Tikhomirov constructed for the autocracy a plausible theory of monarchy and a program for adaptation which took into account modern industrialization with its manifold social and political ramifications.

An important component of Tikhomirov's theoretical and polemical work had been his criticism of the dominant radical wing of the Russian intelligentsia. This critique anticipated in many respects the controversial Vekhi essays of 1909, which constituted an attack on the radical intelligentsia by a younger generation of writers. While these seven essays prompted no apparent response by Tikhomirov, they echoed in somewhat altered and detailed
form Tikhomirov's earlier stricutures against the radical intelligentsia. The alarm expressed by the Vekhi writers over the prevailing atheism and materialism of the radical intelligentsia and its disruptive role in Russian intellectual life affirmed many of Tikhomirov's concerns over national consciousness and the educated stratum of society. Moreover, Tikhomirov shared with Simeon Frank, Peter Struve, Serge Bulgakov, and Nicholas Berdiaev, four Vekhi contributors, an intellectual pilgrimage which began with political radicalism and ended with an affirmation of religion. From the vantage point of an earlier generation, Tikhomirov called for the reconciliation of the radical intelligentsia to Orthodoxy, an appeal which coincided with the Vekhi criticism of the Westernized intelligentsia for its lack of a religious foundation. If falsely led by its educated class, a nation, Tikhomirov warned, could cease to understand those guiding ideas which were derived from its historic life. Such a condition would be fatal, for at that point a nation's development would be compromised by disorder and confusion of purpose. To avoid such a calamity, Tikhomirov urged a national intelligentsia.

The position of Lev Tikhomirov in Russian intellectual history is difficult to define in terms of a tradition or school of thought. His personal and ideological ties to

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traditional Russian conservatism are obvious, particularly in reference to figures such as M. N. Katkov and K. P. Pobedonostsev. Yet, Tikhomirov's dynamic conception of the autocracy placed him largely outside of this tradition, perhaps in a peculiar radicalism of his own which employed traditional forms and language. The label "conservative" may be used for Tikhomirov, but in a meaning quite separate from the more static and/or reactionary outlook of Pobedonostsev. Tikhomirov's program to expand the legal estates to include the working class, as well as his notion of a complex corporate society in a modern context of industrialization, suggested a dynamic approach to Russia's social crisis. Such an approach was "conservative" in the sense that it was designed to bring about social pacification, but the role projected for the autocracy in this quest was dynamic, even radical, in character.\footnote{Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii, p. 2.}

S. V. Utechin has defined Tikhomirov's thought as a variant of "Westernist Conservatism" and has placed him along side M. N. Katkov and K. P. Pobedonostsev.\footnote{Utechin, Russian Political Thought, pp. 98-100.} According to Utechin, this political outlook had close ties to Official Nationality and shared many points with the Slavophiles, but was distinguished from both by the belief that "what they valued and advocated neither was nor should be specifically Russian, that they had common ground with
the conservatives of Western Europe."\textsuperscript{15} While this category of classification is logical for Katkov and Pobedonostsev, it is problematical for Tikhomirov. It is true, particularly in those theoretical portions of \textit{Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost'} and in polemical tracts such as \textit{Bor'ba veka}, that Tikhomirov's analysis of political science and his condemnation of the revolutionary tradition was cast in universal terms, seemingly applicable for all societies. Unlike Pobedonostsev, however, Tikhomirov spoke almost exclusively to the Russian context. His primary focus was placed on the autocracy, a Russian expression of the monarchical principle which he considered unique in many respects, particularly in its capacity to bear certain moral and ethical ideals. Tikhomirov remained a xenophobic Russian nationalist, a devout follower of Russian Orthodoxy, and a champion of the Empire in an era of war and "international partition."\textsuperscript{16} He did not recommend the autocratic principle for other nations. To the contrary, the thrust of his political thought was to affirm the autocracy as a unique creation of the Russian people. Juxtaposed in Tikhomirov's ideological posture are universalist and particularist elements. Utechin's characterization of his thought merely expresses one side of this duality, a dimension of his outlook which was recessive, not

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 91.

\textsuperscript{16}Tikhomirov, \textit{K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii}, p. 237.
dominant, and subordinate to his more fundamental objective of revitalizing the autocracy.

Tikhomirov's corporatism and his organismic view of the nation and the state has raised the question as to whether his theories represent a form of fascism. V. A. Maevskii, his biographer, has referred to him as a "Russian fascist." According to Maevskii, Tikhomirov's Monarkhicheskaia gosudarstvennost' provided the ideological content for an incipient fascist movement in Russia. While there are many elements within Tikhomirov's thought which appear "fascist" or in retrospect anticipated fascism, it would be difficult to maintain consistently that Tikhomirov's political outlook was fascist. The essential problem was Tikhomirov's energetic defense of the autocracy. According to Hans Rogger, the defense of the autocracy was the very element which disqualified most pre-1917 rightists from being fascists: "They could not become leaders or creators of a national revolution as long as the monarchy survived and as long as they proclaimed their loyalty to it and to its head." Being wed to the old regime and without the possibility of power, these rightists were deprived of the dynamism and activism which characterized post-war European fascism. As Rogger suggests, such a context with its built-in restraints effectively negated, as in the case of

17 Maevskii, Revoliutsioner monarkhist, p. 75.
18 Rogger, "Was there a Russian Fascism?," p. 415.
the leadership of the Union of Russian People, a political radicalism on the right which appeared in the last years of the autocracy. Tikhomirov worked under these same restraints, but it is important to note that he did not affirm the autocracy reluctantly or out of necessity, but out of conviction. He opposed violence and refused to formally endorse any extra-legal political activity, even if designed to save the autocracy. His defense of the Orthodox Church only reinforced his ties to the old regime. In approach, Tikhomirov's political dynamism was aimed at providing Russia with a definitive order through the instrumentality of the autocratic principle. As an alternative for Russia, it combined traditional political forms with the acceptance of modernization.

Both as a revolutionary and a monarchist, Tikhomirov had attempted to resolve Russia's social crisis by articulating an ideological formula which provided for firm political leadership in conformity with the apparent laws of social organization. Consistent with this theme, Tikhomirov had opposed the constitutional reforms of 1905-1906, not in response to their implied republicanism, but in reaction to their chaos, their artificiality, and what he called their lack of a "center of gravity." The quest for "firm foundations" (osnovy) had led Tikhomirov first to embrace revolution and then the autocracy and Orthodoxy

19 Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovленной Rossii, p. 232.
as the basis for the renewal and consolidation of Russian national life. The quest itself, apart from the ideological baggage, provided a thread of unity for the totality of Tikhomirov's political career.20

Tikhomirov lived to see the autocracy collapse under the pressures of external war and internal revolution. This fateful event abruptly destroyed Tikhomirov's political alternative for Russian development, but it did not necessarily make his theory of monarchy untenable. In terms of his theory, Tikhomirov had argued consistently that the viability of any monarchy, including the Russian autocracy, rested on its relationship to the nation. The monarchical principle, as a form of *verkhovnaia vlast', was subject to either evolution or decay as an expression of the spirit of a nation. If the link with the nation was severed, it could be replaced ultimately by another form of sovereignty. Having faced this eventuality in his own lifetime, Tikhomirov fell back solely upon his Orthodox faith to sustain his sense of purpose. If Tikhomirov is viewed as a Russian Cassandra, a role he assumed as early as the 1890's, his apprehensions over the fate of the autocracy appear vindicated by history—ironically and tragically, at the expense of his vision for Russia's future.

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