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IMPOSITIVE SPEECH ACTS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

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CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

1.1 A recent outgrowth of work by the philosophers J.L. Austin, H.P. Grice and John Searle has been developed into what may be viewed as two distinct theories of indirect speech acts. One theory extends the performative analysis, developed from Austin's lead by Ross and Sadock, while the other places more emphasis on the felicity conditions of illocutionary acts.¹ Both theories attempt to account for speech acts whose illocutionary force differs from that which their superficial form (or sentence type) indicates; for example, questions which serve as suggestions rather than requests for information, such as

1) How about taking in a movie?
2) Why not stay here for awhile?
3) Shouldn't you call your mother?

Before going into these two theories I would like to clarify the terminology I will be using. As is obvious from the examples above, the illocutionary force of an utterance does not directly correspond to the utterance's sentence type. By 'sentence type' I mean the class of utterances dis-
tinguished by certain superficial characteristics and generally classified as declarative, interrogative or imperative (I will ignore such structures as exclamations, interjections, etc., although some grammarians classify them together with either imperatives or interrogatives). I will use these three terms to refer only to surface or near surface structures that are distinguished in the traditional manner and not to refer to semantic or pragmatic notions of illocution or performance. The typical traditional distinction between these three types of sentence in English is roughly as follows: in declarative sentences the word order in generally subject-verb-object, a declarative sentence always begins with a noun or noun phrase (unless the sentence as a whole is modified) and is followed somewhere along the line by a verb; declarative sentences typically have a falling intonation. Interrogative sentences, or questions, have several different forms, i.e., WH-questions, yes-no questions and tag questions, and some of these forms have different intonational contours; however none of the differences in form or intonation necessarily corresponds to difference in types of illocutionary acts. The third sentence type, imperative, is typified by an initial non-finite verb and by the lack of an overt subject. Of the three sentence types this last one correlates most closely with certain kinds of illocutionary acts; however, even this correlation is not
exact, as we will see later on. There are cases where properties associated with different sentence types are combined, for instance a declarative or imperative word order with some sort of question intonation; there are also rhetorical questions, which function quite differently from what their form would indicate. How such kinds of sentences are related to types of illocutionary acts is a problem that any speech act theory must deal with.

It is easy to confuse sentence types with illocutionary act types. Indeed, it usually is the case that assertions, requests and orders, which are all illocutionary acts, are performed by using declaratives, interrogatives and imperatives, respectively. However, it will not do simply to equate illocutionary act types with sentence types, because there are obviously more illocutionary act types than just three, e.g. there are promises, offers, warning, suggestions and oaths. (Criteria for distinguishing types of illocutionary acts will be discussed in the next chapter.) Also, as was mentioned above, many illocutionary acts may be performed by several surface sentence types.

The notion of illocutionary act is basically semantic or pragmatic in nature and does not directly correspond to the superficial syntactic notion of sentence type. Each type of illocutionary act is associated with a particular illocutionary force which is
the communication (or attempted communication) by the speaker of his intention in performing the speech act. That is, the speaker intends the utterance to be taken by the hearer as an order, a promise, a request, a declaration, a suggestion, or whatever.

Performative analyses, as proposed by Ross (1970a, 1970b) and Robin Lakoff (1969), incorporate the notion of an abstract verb with the following properties; it is a linguistic verb of communication, it is always the highest verb of an utterance (i.e., it cannot be embedded), it may belong to any of several meaning classes (SAY or DECLARE for declaratives as opposed to IMPERE for suggestions and orders) and, of course, it is described as 'performative'. To say verb is performative means two quite distinct things depending upon whether the verb in question is an abstract verb or a real verb. If it is an abstract verb, then what is being said is that its existence in semantic structure is what determines the performance of a particular illocutionary act. If it is a real verb it is the actual utterance of that verb, unembedded, with a first person singular subject, in the present tense and with the appropriate felicity conditions holding, that performs the illocutionary act. I will refer to the former types of verbs as 'abstract performative verbs' and the latter as 'explicit performative verbs'; it should be borne in mind, however, that they are quite different creatures, even though
explicit performatives are always derived from abstract performatives.

These terms have not always been used in the way I am proposing to use them; much of what I will have to say in later chapters will go toward justifying this terminology since, in the present state of the study of illocutionary acts, as is often the case, the terminology is a reflection of theoretical biases, either implicit or explicit. In discussing Sadock's view below I will be using terms just as he does and therefore not according to what I have just outlined; in my opinion, this is one of the problems with Sadock's theory. That is, he has not consistently distinguished between superficial sentence types and illocutionary act types.

1.2 Returning to the two speech act theories, the first one we will look at is the extended performative analysis, which has been developed primarily by Jerry Sadock. He has taken the basic notion of a higher performative sentence (which he calls 'hypersentence') and extended it by proposing that such performative sentences may be conjoined and embedded. So that sentences such as:

4) Won't you give me a drink?
5) Do you have anything to drink?
6) How about a drink?

which Sadock calls 'whimperatives', derive from an under-
lying structure containing two conjoined hypersentences, an imperative and an interrogative. There are also speech acts which result from the conjunction of hypersentences of declaration (i.e. assertion) and interrogation. Such conjunctions Sadock dubs 'queclaratives':

7) Does anyone study Aristotle anymore?
   (which may have the effect of saying "No one studies Aristotle anymore.")

8) Haven't I been good to you?
   (which may have the effect of saying "I have been good to you.")

9) Who wants to be president?
   (which may have the effect of saying "No one wants to be president.")

Examples of sentences resulting from embedded performatives are:

10) I regret to inform you of your dismissal.

11) I am pleased that I can offer you a new position.

12) I would like to congratulate you.

13) May I point out that this sentence is quite grammatical.

(Sentences (4) - (13) are all Sadock's examples.)

The conjoined hypersentence analysis for whimperatives has since been rejected by Sadock, though he still holds that queclaratives derive from conjoined hypersentences and that sentences like (10) - (13) derive from embedded hypersentences. Sadock's modified analysis accounts
for some forms, but the interesting whimperative forms are now left unaccounted for.⁵

1.3 The other theory of indirect illocutionary acts, which, as was mentioned above, I will adopt here, was suggested by Gordon and Lakoff (1971) and modified and developed by Heringer (1972). Heringer's proposal is that those participant-based felicity conditions ('intrinsic' conditions) on the performance of a particular speech act may be either questioned or asserted in order to indirectly perform that speech act. At the deepest level of representation, Sadock's whimperatives, for example, are indirect requests based on a felicity condition of deference; the request is then mapped onto a question, after which the syntactic transformations apply. (Based on another condition, the same request may turn up in a similar manner as an assertion, such as I'd like a beer.) Since for commands, there is no deference condition (although the underlying structure for requests and commands is probably the same), commands cannot be made indirectly in a way analogous to whimperatives. There are other restrictions, which will be discussed as they arise in the analysis of indirect suggestions, requests, recommendations and commands.

1.4 Without going into detail, I will make some general statements about why I have not chosen to work within the
framework of an extended performative analysis. Speech acts, in order to be properly interpreted in terms of illocutionary force, have associated with them certain felicity conditions which must be fulfilled. These conditions are related to either the conversational participants (intrinsic conditions) or to the conversational setting (extrinsic conditions); examples of the former are the speaker's beliefs, intentions and desires. Extrinsic conditions pertain to such relations as the status of the participants and the social setting (e.g. classroom, court of law) of the conversation. If it is the case, as has been suggested by Heringer (1972), that such conditions can be used to produce the illocutionary force of the acts which they are conditions on, then there is no need to introduce that force via embedded or conjoined hypersentences. Sadock's whimperatives, for example, differ from ordinary commands in that the questions are primarily used when the speaker is being deferent to the hearer; this is a felicity condition based on the speaker's attitude and, it seems to me, the only difference between whimperatives and commands. That is, both speech acts are essentially the same illocutionarily, since the point or purpose of the illocution is to get the hearer to do something. Since the illocutionary force is basically the same for whimperatives and commands, I think the performative sentences dominating them ought to be the same.
The more general reason for rejecting Sadock's theory, however, is that felicity conditions are necessary for speech acts in any case; if they can be used to explain how indirect illocutionary acts are produced (and one of the main points of this thesis is to show that they can) then there is no reason to posit such complicated underlying performative sentences. A felicity condition account of indirect speech acts has the potential for being a simpler, more coherent theory than the extended performative analysis which not only has become rather complex, but also fails to treat the requesting sense of statements of desire as illocutionary. Certainly a sentence like

14) I'd like a beer.

counts as a request for something to drink as much as the whimperatives

15) Won't you get me a beer?
16) Could I have a beer?
17) Do you have any beer?
18) How about a beer?

and more so than

19) Give me a beer.

Yet according to the extended performative analysis the command (19) is more like the whimperatives (15) - (18) than the expression of desire (14) is.7

By choosing not to work within Sadock's framework, I am not implying that there is no place for such an anal-
ysis. The big advantage to the felicity condition approach is that it provides a principled way of determining how indirect illocutions are produced (i.e., what is the motivation for various forms and what motivations and forms are possible). After that has been determined, the utterances must be syntactically derived, possibly by way of hypersentences or similar structures.
2.1 My main concern in this thesis will be suggestions and related speech acts; in order to see where such speech acts fit into the larger realm of illocutionary acts in general I will examine some taxonomies of illocutionary acts. Much of what has been said about illocutionary acts and performative verbs stems from J.L. Austin's (1962) on the subject. It is therefore appropriate to begin with Austin's taxonomy of illocutionary acts. Although Austin was originally concerned with the performative/constative distinction he came to the realization that such a distinction was only secondary to the classification of illocutionary acts in general and his final taxonomy does not explicitly depend on that dichotomy.1 Austin's criteria for distinguishing illocutionary act types are vague, but since the taxonomy is a starting point (and one used by many subsequent investigators) I will present it here: Verdictives—utterances which give verdicts or findings; examples of verbs with this illocutionary force are:  
acquit, calculate, convict, describe, find, hold,
measure, rank, rate, understand.

Exercitives—utterances which are the exercise of powers, right, or influence; examples of verbs with this illocutionary force are: advise, appoint, command, demote, direct, excommunicate, nominate, order, plead, sentence, veto.

Commissives—utterances which in some way commit the speaker to doing something; examples of verbs with commissive force are: adopt, bet, consent, declare for, embrace, favor, intend, promise, vow.

Behabitives—utterances which involve attitudes and social behavior; examples of verbs exhibiting behabitive force are: apologize, blame, congratulate, dare, protest, thank, welcome.

Expositives—utterances which show how what is being said relates to the discourse of which it is a part. Austin makes a subcategorization of these verbs, but it is not clear what criteria he uses for it. Examples of verbs with expositive force are: 1. affirm, state, describe, identify. 2. remark, mention. 3. inform, tell, answer. 3a. ask. 4. testify, swear, doubt. 5. accept, withdraw, demur to, recognize. 5a. correct, revise. 6. postulate, argue, emphasize. 7. begin by, conclude by. 7a. interpret, analyze, define. 7b. illustrate, explain. 7c. mean, call, understand.
2.2 Vendler (1972) presents an Austinian taxonomy which distinguishes verbs of saying (illocutionary force verbs) from verbs of thinking (propositional attitude verbs). Many of the verbs which Austin includes in his classification describe mental states (e.g., doubt, expect, intend, understand) or mental acts (decide, identify, realize, recognize); these are the verbs Vendler calls verbs of thinking. Vendler suggests a larger category of 'container' verbs (i.e., verbs which take sentential nominalizations) which includes both verbs of saying and verbs of thinking.

Vendler redefines Austin's classes by making subclasses in some cases and attempting to find grammatical correlates to the classes. The result is seven illocutionary act types: all of Austin's plus a class of operatives (which had been included in Austin's exercitives) and interrogatives (which had been for Austin a type of expositive). Vendler's taxonomy with grammatical correlates and examples follows (the definitions for the classes are the same as Austin's unless some specification is mentioned):

Expositives are distinguished grammatically in that they take that-clauses and wh-forms in their complements; subclasses are:

Strong declaratives: state, declare, assert, affirm, claim, contend, maintain, insist.
Weaker declaratives: guess, submit, suggest.
Expositives that give reactions: agree, disagree, concede, deny.
Expositives that are temporally marked as to past or future: report, testify, admit, confess, predict.
Expositives that operative in logical contexts: postulate, argue, conclude.
Expositives that have an obligatory indirect object: tell, assure, inform, remind, warn.

Verdictives exhibit the grammatical correlate of having as an underlying embedded sentence one which has a copulative verb (be) which turns up as as in the surface structure. The subclasses are:
Verdictives that measure on a scale: rank, grade, place, appraise, rate.
Those with a broader perspective: call, describe, characterize, diagnose, classify, define, distinguish.
Those found in legal contexts: plead, rule, find.

Commissives require that the underlying subject of the commissive verb be the same as the subject of the proposition; also they take the modal will or shall.
Examples are: promise, undertake, swear, vow.
Exercitives exhibit the infinitive construction, the deleted auxiliary should, and have as an indirect object the same noun as is the subject of the embedded sentence.
Strong exercitives: order, command, demand, tell.
Less strong: request, ask, urge, counsel, advise.
Weaker: permit, allow.
Weakest: entreat, pray, beseech, beg.
Provokers: dare, challenge.
Negatives: forbid, prohibit, warn.

Operatives have in their underlying form the copula become, and their uncontracted form require a that-clause. In general operatives create new situations; the subclasses are:
Those that change the status of a person in a positive sense: recommend, nominate, appoint, name, elect, hire, admit, promote.
Those that change the status of a thing in a positive sense: propose, dedicate, proclaim, assign, consign, relegate.
Negative: degrade, demote, dismiss, fire, suspend.
Legal: arrest, sentence, condemn, fine, appeal.
Religious: baptize, confirm, ordain, absolve, excommunicate, canonize.
Miscellaneous: offer, give, grant, surrender, accept, refuse, reject, greet, salute, welcome.

Behabitives require that the object of the behabitive verb be the same as the subject of the embedded proposition; also behabitive utterances refer to events in the past and take various prepositions:
For, favorable: thank, command, praise.
For, unfavorable: apologize, censure, pardon.
Upon: congratulate, felicitate, compliment.
Against: protest.

Interrogatives are followed by indirect questions. There are no subgroups; examples are: ask, question, inquire.

Finally, Vendler treats the verb say as a general performative which can be used to describe most types of speech acts.

2.3 In a recent paper (1973), J. McCawley also refines and comments upon Austin's taxonomy. McCawley adopts Vendler's operative classification and adds to it two more distinctions among what Austin had called exercitives. One class is imperatives which includes admonish, beg, caution, command, demand, direct, entreat, forbid, implore, insist, order, plead, pray and supplicate. The other class is advisories: advise, advocate, counsel, propose, recommend, suggest, urge, and warn. This accounts for all Austin's original exercitives, so McCawley's taxonomy consists of the following seven classes: verdictives, operatives, imperatives, advisories, commissives, behabitives, expositives.

McCawley is more concerned in this paper with explicit performative verbs than illocutionary act types, but since much about illocutionary acts can be learned
from explicit performatives, his taxonomy is included in this discussion of illocutionary force and acts. An important distinction McCawley makes is between performative verbs which are causative in nature and those which are not. All the classes that McCawley uses, except expositives, are causative; that is, the verbs in these classes refer not only to a linguistic act, but also to consequences which come about as a part of that act. It is these two properties of causative performative verbs that make them performative. The non-causative performative verbs, expositives, are performative just by virtue of saying whatever they say.

2.4 In a slightly earlier paper (1972) Fraser deals with much the same topic, vernacular performative verbs (he excludes ceremonial or institutional performatives). Fraser's taxonomy is not as heavily dependent upon Austin's original classification as Vendler's and McCawley's are; rather, he proposes seven criteria for analyzing vernacular performatives and establishes his classes according to them. Many of these criteria are the same as John Searle has proposed and will be discussed thoroughly in the next section. Fraser's criteria are:

1) the purpose of the illocutionary act
2) the propositional content
3) the status of the speaker to the hearer
4) the commitment of the speaker
5) the attitude of the speaker and the hearer towards the proposition expressed
6) the relation of the utterance to the conversation
7) uptake

The only one of these criteria which is not discussed in Searle's paper is uptake; this has to do with verbs like bet which require that the hearer respond appropriately for the act of betting to take place.

Fraser divides performative verbs into two main types; those which describe the world and those which change the world. This distinction is essentially the same as McCawley's causative/non-causative distinction with the exception of one type of verb, that which Fraser calls verbs of stipulating. Most of the verbs in this class (which is a world-changing class for Fraser) fall into the expositive (non-causative) class for McCawley.

Fraser's verbs describing the world are of three main types:
Declaring: acknowledge, agree, assent, comment, confess, deny, grant, predict, refuse, report, say, verify.
Evaluating: analyze, characterize, date, estimate, find, identify, picture, read, speculate, value.
Reflecting speaker attitude: acclaim, apologize, compliment, curse, deplore, excuse, protest, recognize, thank.

The verbs changing the world are of five types:
Stipulating: abbreviate, characterize, declare, define, 
dub, nominate, rule, stipulate, term.
Requesting: appeal, beg, command, demand, enjoin, invite, 
plead, solicit.
Suggesting: admonish, advise, caution, exhort, propose, 
recommend, suggest, urge, warn.
Permitting: abolish, acquit, approve, close, countermand, 
decree, deny, fine, grant, permit, renounce, reject, 
revoke, tender, withdraw.
Committing: accept, award, commit, grant, obligate, pro­
mise, swear, vow.

In addition to offering this taxonomy, Fraser also 
examines the class of verbs of requesting to see if there 
is some regularity to their verbal complementation. The 
evidence he presents indicates there is no syntactic cor­
relation between verbs of requesting and the kinds of verbal 
complement they take. Although the evidence is not pre­

tered, Fraser claims that this is also true for the other 
classes of performative verbs. This finding is at direct 

odds with Vendler's claim that there is a syntactic correl­
ation to illocutionary types; this disagreement cannot be 
attributed to different taxonomies, because in many cases 
the classes the authors treat are essentially the same. 
Vendler, however, does not present evidence for his view 
and, although his correlations work for some of the more 
common verbs within the classes, there are many verbs for
which they do not work. In addition, Vendler's claims seem to be based on unsystematic observations with no account presented of the reasons for assuming that a particular semantic structure is associated with a particular surface structure. On the whole, Fraser's conclusion is more convincing.

2.5 Before going into Searle's criteria and his taxonomy, which I feel is the most complete and accurate, I would like to point out those aspects of the taxonomies I have just described which are not explicit in Searle's analysis and which I think are important. First, Vendler's distinction between verbs of saying and thinking; I think Austin's (and others') inclusion of verbs of thinking as illocutionary is unwarranted and very confusing. Verbs of thinking are not linguistic communication verbs, and they have a much wider range of occurrence than the more normal performative verbs. If verbs of thinking are considered to be performative verbs, the definition of performative verb must be made so general as to make the determination of whether a particular verbs is performative or not almost impossible. Second, McCawley's distinction between causative and non-causative performatives; although the basis of the distinction must be made clearer (to determine the status of Fraser's verbs of stipulating) it seems to be a sound distinction which should lead to a
better understanding of illocutionary force and acts, through the investigation of the sorts of consequences that are caused, and whether or not the consequences are necessary. Finally, Fraser's demonstration that there is no obvious correlation between the syntax and illocutionary force of performative verbs.

2.6 Recently, Searle (1973) proposed a classification of illocutionary act types based on various properties of illocutionary force. Searle's taxonomy of illocutionary acts does not rely on explicit performative verbs, as several of the ones already discussed do, and his proposed set of properties of illocutionary acts clearly distinguishes not only major illocutionary act types but also minor variations within these types.

2.6.1 Searle's first three (of twelve) properties divide illocutionary acts into five types; these properties are:

1) The point of the illocutionary act; this is understood as, for instance, the purpose, intention or aim of the act.

2) The direction of fit; this property differentiates between acts which are attempts to change the current state of affairs and those which simply describe or comment upon them. This property corresponds to McCawley's causative/non-causative distinction and Fraser's describing/changing
3) The expressed psychological state of the speaker; this property corresponds to what Austin calls sincerity conditions and refers to the psychological set of the speaker, such as beliefs, desires and intentions.

2.6.2 The five major illocutionary act types which are distinguished by their illocutionary points and further defined by the second and third properties are:

Representatives: acts whose purpose is to commit the speaker to the truth or falsity of a proposition; this type of act is not world-changing and requires that the speaker believe the proposition being stated. Some sample verbs which may be used to either perform or describe this kind of act are: affirm, state, describe, mention.

Directives: acts whose point is to get the hearer to do something; these acts are world-changing and the speaker must desire that the hearer do the specified action. Some verbs used in this kind of act are: ask, command, recommend, suggest, warn.

Commissives: the purpose of commissives is to commit the speaker to an action; the are world-changing and the speaker must intend to fulfill the commitment. Typical commissive verbs are: promise, intend, guarantee, vow.

Expressives: the illocutionary point of this act is to express the speaker's psychological state concerning the
content of the proposition; there is no direction of fit, and, presumably, the psychological state of the speaker is that which he proclaims it to be when performing this act. Verbs corresponding to expressive acts are: deplore, welcome, thank, congratulate.

Declarations: the purpose of this act is to make the propositional content of the act come to be the case; it is therefore necessary that the speaker be in some way empowered to make the declaration according to some extra-linguistic institution; the direction of fit is both ways, i.e., not only does the act comment upon the world, it also changes the world; there are no sincerity conditions. Some verbs which describe and perform this sort of illocutionary act are: christen, declare war, open (a meeting).

The type of speech act which includes suggestions and will be the major concern of this thesis is what Searle has labelled 'directive'. This type of speech act has been called 'impositive' by Georgia Green (1973); I shall adopt the latter term on the grounds that it is descriptive of more varieties of the act type than the former. A representative sample of verbs used to describe impositive acts is: admonish, advise, appeal, ask, beg, beseech, bid, caution, command, counsel, demand, direct, enjoin, exhort, forbid, implore, insist; instruct, interdict, move, nominate, order, petition, plead, pray, prescribe, proscribe, propose, recommend, request.
require, solicit, submit, suggest, urge, warn.

There is also the rather smaller class of verbs which seem to have some features in common with impositive verbs, but not all; these 'semi-impositive' verbs are: bet, challenge, dare, defy, invite, wager and threaten.

2.6.3 Searle's list of illocutionary properties includes many which can be considered minor in that they do not primarily distinguish between the five main categories of illocutionary acts, but rather between sub-types within those five categories. There are nine such properties, some of which are less relevant to impositive acts than others.

To continue the list of illocutionary properties:

4) The strength with which the illocutionary point is made may differ within an act type. Impositive verb pairs which reflect this difference are: admonish-exhort, recommend-urge, advise-exhort, suggest-insist, ask/request-appeal/beg/beseech/implore/plead.

5) There may be differences in status between the speaker and the hearer of the illocutionary act. This distinction is very important for impositive speech acts; it separates them into two classes according to whether or not the distinction applies equally or unequally. The first class, which I shall call unequal-status impositive acts, requires that there be a status difference between the speaker and hearer. This status relationship may be either of two
types: either the speaker has ascendency over the hearer (as in commands, demands and instructions, for example) or the hearer has ascendency over the speaker (as in requests, pleas, etc.) The impositive acts to which this property applies equally constitute another class; verbs associated with impositive acts for which the speaker and hearer have more or less equal status are: admonish, advise, caution, counsel, exhort, insist, move, nominate, propose, recommend, suggest, urge, warn.

6) An illocutionary act may or may not involve the interest of either the speaker or the hearer. In the case of impositive acts, warnings, advice and suggestions are among those which are in the interest of the hearer. Requests, pleas and other impositive acts in which the speaker is assuming an inferior position to the hearer are in the interest of the speaker. Although for request-type acts this property corresponds exactly to the status property, it does not for the others since suggestion, advice and warnings are neutral with respect to ascendancy but do express the hearer's best interest.

7) There may be differences in how a particular illocutionary force relates to the discourse in which it occurs. This is not a property of impositive acts; illocutionary acts which do depend to some extent on their immediate linguistic context are replies, deductions and agreement.

8) Some illocutionary forces require that their embedded
propositions exhibit certain properties; this is true of many impositive acts. Most such acts must have second person subjects; they also generally refer to some future action. Suggestions are the only impositive acts which do not appear to have this property; it may be, however, that this is just a superficial characteristic and that, semantically, suggestions behave just like other impositive acts. This problem will be dealt with in more detail later.

9) Another difference in illocutionary forces is whether or not the act is necessarily linguistic; most illocutionary acts are linguistic in nature, but Searle points out that the verb conclude can be used to describe an act which has illocutionary force but is not necessarily linguistic. Impositive verbs are, for the most part, necessarily linguistic, but there are some semi-impositive verbs, such as threaten, where the illocutionary force can be conveyed non-linguistically.

10) Some illocutionary forces require that there be some extra-linguistic institution providing the special authority necessary for the act. This is a property of a few impositive acts; for example, a command seems out of place unless there is some special hierarchical (such as military or parental) role involved. It is also the case that certain impositive verbs are rarely used at all in normal discourse and are reserved almost exclusively for legal matters; some of these verbs are enjoin, interdict, petition and
solicit.

11) The verb or verbs associated with a particular illocutionary act may or may not have a performative use; among impositive verbs, warn can be used performatively but the semi-impositive threaten cannot. It is much less clear whether or not other impositive verbs may be used as explicit performatives, and there seems to be a good deal of dialect variation. Most of the verbs referred to above as particularly legalistic are difficult for many people not in the legal profession to use performatively. Other verbs such as instruct, require, appeal and pray are not usually used performatively in ordinary language while caution, advise, insist, recommend, propose, suggest and request are quite common.

12) Searle's final property is the style with which the illocutionary act is performed; some examples of verbs which describe acts that differ in style of disclosure are announce and confide. This seems rather a general sort of property and perhaps even a catchall for those differences which are difficult to define and categorize. It is therefore no easy task to say which impositive verbs differ in style; the two verbs forbid and proscribe may be examples. Also, recommend and urge, while differing in strength, seem to differ in style as well, even though this difference in style may well be a consequence of the difference in strength. Other candidates for impositive verbs which
exhibit distinct styles of disclosure are propose and nominate (which again may be the result of some other property, such as extra-linguistic context) and ask and beg (which like recommend and urge may result from the difference in strength between them).

2.6.4 Although Searle's twelve properties seem to cover most of the differences that can exist between speech acts, the properties themselves seem to be widely varying in terms of application and importance. The first three properties are at least functionally different from the others in that they serve to distinguish the major types of illocutionary acts. Of the other nine properties most of them make important categorial distinctions within the five main types but the performative/non-performative property does not make such a distinction. Of course Searle has not relied heavily on this distinction, but it does seem that this dichotomy ought to be marked as a less important (or more accidental) one than the others.

Another problem with Searle's list of illocutionary force properties is that it contains a certain amount of ambiguous overlap (i.e., certain aspects of one property are indistinguishable from certain other aspects of another property). The property of the status of the speaker and hearer (property five) and the one concerning the speaker's position within an extra-linguistic institution (property
ten) seem really to be the same thing. The only difference lies in how the context is defined, i.e., whether or not the status between the conversational participants is institutionalized or not; precisely how the status between people is determined does not affect how the status relationship functions in illocutionary acts and should, therefore, not be part of the linguistic information about such acts.

There is one more criticism I would like to make of Searle's properties. The last property, the difference in style of illocutionary act does not seem to be an independent property, but rather it seems to derive from other properties; for example, the difference in style of disclosure between announce and confide could be a result of the difference in interest of the speaker or possibly the psychological state of the speaker (i.e. whether or not he or she was proud of the proposition being announced or confided). There is generally a difference in style of disclosure associated with a difference in strength (property four) which itself is related to expressed psychological state or interest. For example, urge and recommend seem to differ in the more basic property of psychological state, i.e., the desire that the speaker has is greater when urge is used than when recommend is used. This also seems to be the case for other impositive verbs mentioned earlier as differing in strength: admonish-exhort, advise-exhort, suggest-insist,
ask/request-appeal/beg/beseech/implore/plead. It is very difficult to tell which of these sets differ in style and which differ in strength, but in any case they all seem to differ in expressed psychological state as well. It may be that there are other reasons for a difference in style, but at least some of such differences are clearly derivable from other properties.

2.7 Many of Searle's properties of illocutionary force actually describe felicity conditions on illocutionary acts; others do not. By sorting out the felicity conditions and determining what different types of felicity conditions they are, some organization can be added to the list of properties. The term felicity condition is a very general one; a way of specifying it is to determining whether a condition applies to the conversation participants (an 'intrinsic' condition, to use Heringer's terminology) or to the situation or setting (Heringer's 'extrinsic' condition).

2.7.1 Before we look at Searle's properties in terms of these specified felicity conditions, a few words about these specifications are in order. A distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic seem right, but when examined closely the difference between the two becomes blurred. Are social conventions, recognized hierarchies, community laws, etc. intrinsic or extrinsic? They seem on the one
hand to be part of the setting, and consequently extrinsic. But, on the other hand, they consist primarily of beliefs of people who presumably participate in conversations, and so the conventions seem to be intrinsic.

The problem seems to derive from labelling every condition either intrinsic (and therefore not extrinsic) or extrinsic (and therefore not intrinsic). If these conditions are thought of as forming a continuum from intrinsic to extrinsic, with at least one and perhaps many intermediate stages, the relationship between individual beliefs and conventionalized beliefs can be more easily described. Conditions which are purely or absolutely intrinsic hold for speech acts which are bound only by rule of conversations; the condition, for example, on promises, that the speaker intend doing the promised thing, is such a condition. Other examples are that a speaker believe that an asserted proposition is true and that a speaker desire a request object or action.

Intermediate between intrinsic and extrinsic are those conditions involving the relative status of the speaker and the hearer; this sort of condition is intermediate because it depends on the speaker and hearer sharing the belief that a particular status relation obtains. If such agreement is not present the hearer can deny the speaker's ability to perform the act in question. For example, a speaker might order a hearer to do something
and the hearer might deny that the speaker has sufficient authority to make such an order. In this case the conversational participants, both of whom are necessary to the illocutionary act of ordering, will not agree upon whether or not the act of ordering has taken place. In the speaker's opinion, an order has been issued and not been obeyed; in the hearer's opinion, the necessary conditions were not met and there was only an attempt made at ordering, not an actual order.

An absolute extrinsic condition is one which is determined by the collective agreement of the community and exists outside the particular members. Consequently, if a conversational participant does not believe or agree with an extrinsic conditions, it makes no difference whatever to the performance of an act dependent on that condition. When a Catholic hears the Pope excommunicate someone, he cannot deny that act. He can claim that the person acting as Pope is not actually the Pope and upon proof of such a statement those papal acts committed by the non-Pope would be rendered null and void. This shows how the extrinsic end of the continuum is related to the intermediate stage and is yet quite different in terms of how the conversational participants may affect the outcome of the speech act.

Now that it is clear what is meant by the specifications intrinsic and extrinsic, let us look at Searle's
twelve properties with these felicity conditions in mind to see how the properties may be related through the conditions. The relationships are represented schematically in Table 1.

2.7.2 The first property, the point of the illocutionary act, is not only a felicity condition it is an essential one (i.e., one which must hold for the act to be validly performed). This condition is intrinsic for the first four types of speech acts and extrinsic for the fifth. The point of both representatives and commissives is to commit the speaker to something, the point of expressives is to express the speaker's psychological state and the point of directives is to cause the hearer to do something; in each of these cases either the speaker or the hearer is crucially involved in the illocutionary point. However, this is not true for declarations; in fact quite the opposite is true: by the utterance of such an act the world is made to conform to the proposition uttered. In this act the effect is on the world, or the setting, quite apart from any individual conversational participant; the illocutionary point of declarations is therefore extrinsic.

The third property, expressed psychological state, is also a felicity condition, and an intrinsic one, for all illocutionary acts with the exceptions of declarations. For representatives the speaker must believe the proposition,
### Felicity Conditions

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<td>Property 5: Relative status of conversational participants.</td>
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<td>Property 4: Strength,</td>
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### Not Felicity Conditions

- Property 2: World-changing or not.
- Property 8: Propositional content.
- Property 9: Necessarily linguistic versus not necessarily linguistic.
- Property 11: Performative versus non-performative.

Table 1
for directives he must desire the action, for commissives he must intend to do the action and for expressives he must be sincere with regard to whatever it is he is expressing. Declarations, according to Searle, have no sincerity conditions and they would therefore seem not to have an intrinsic condition of psychological state associated with them. This is definitely true if persons in authority can be forced under duress to perform declarations which are then valid, and this does seem to be the case.

As was mentioned earlier, there are two of Searle's properties which seem to derive from (or at least be related to) property three; they are properties four (the strength of force with which the illocutionary point is made) and twelve (the style of disclosure). Not surprisingly then, these properties are also intrinsic felicity conditions, dependent upon the speaker's psychological state. Another property that was also mentioned earlier as being related to the property of style is property six, whether the proposition is in the interest of the speaker or the hearer. This property is an intrinsic conditions on illocutionary acts too. Exactly how all these properties (three, four, six and twelve) are related will be discussed in detail in Chapter five.

Regardless of how interdependent these properties may turn out to be, Searle has done us a service by separating and clearly defining them as he has; otherwise their
interrelationships would be much more difficult to discern.

2.7.3 Of all the properties Searle enumerates there is only one which falls into a category intermediate between intrinsic and extrinsic; that property is five, the status relation between speaker and hearer. This condition was discussed when it was introduced as an intermediate condition; I will only point out here that this condition is an important one for impositive speech acts; more will be said about it in Chapter three.

2.7.4 Two of Searle's properties are extrinsic conditions: the relation a particular illocutionary force has to the rest of the discourse (property seven) and the position within the extra-linguistic institution that is required for the illocutionary force of certain verbs (property ten). Both of these depend upon context, not conversational participants, and neither of them is particularly relevant to impositive acts. The institutional condition is the endpoint of the continuum of which the status condition is a midpoint, and although many impositive acts have the status condition, only the act of enjoining can be considered to have a meaning restricted to institutional use (in this case, a legal use). Some impositive verbs are used formally (interdict, move, nominate, petition, proscribe) but this does not constitute a rigid enough requirement to be call institutional, although formality does
seem related to the institutional condition.

2.7.5 The rest of Searle's properties are not felicity conditions. The second property, the direction of fit, is similar to the semantic notion of causation. Impositive acts, for example, are world-changing and have as their consequences the perlocutionary effect of causing the hearer to do the indicated action. Another property which is not a felicity condition but is a part of semantic structure is property eight, how the propositional content is affected by the illocutionary force of the act. This property certainly applies to impositive acts; the fact that impositives are causative with a second person object implies that the propositional content of impositive acts will be affected by the nature of the illocutionary force. Impositive acts, like commissive acts, require that the proposition be in the future tense. These and other syntactic and semantic characteristics of impositive acts will be dealt with in detail in Chapter three.

Finally, Searle presents two properties which seem to be neither felicity conditions nor semantic elements. They are property nine, whether or not the verb describing an illocutionary act is necessarily linguistic, and property eleven, whether the verb associated with the illocutionary act has an explicit performative use or not. An example of a verb which is not linguistic is conclude;
probably the verbs *suppose*, *guess* and *intend* also fit this description. Although these verbs are superficially like verbs used to convey illocutionary acts, I agree with Vendler's analysis that these verbs do not have illocutionary force. Although they occur in the first person singular, non-progressive tense, that is a form in which descriptions of mental states, as well as habitual actions occur. The fact that *hereby* does not occur with the so-called performative use of *suppose* and *guess* indicates that these verbs are not actually usable as performatives and have no special illocutionary force of their own. Also, for *intend* and *conclude* as well as *suppose* and *guess* there are no special felicity conditions which distinguish their occurrence in performative-like sentences from performances of statements or declarations. In fact, the felicity conditions on the so-called performative use of these verbs are exactly those of a declarative sentence.

If these verbs do have illocutionary force, then we need a new definition of illocutionary force to cover acts which are not speech acts, and that seems a rather drastic step to take. It would be more reasonable to regard these verbs as Vendler does, i.e., as describing acts or states of mind, if it is necessary to account for their use as first person singular present tense verbs. The other property which does not fit into any justifiable classification is the explicit performatice/non-performative
distinction. Although making such a distinction has advanced the study of speech acts, its importance is all too often overestimated. Whether or not a particular verb which describes an illocutionary act can be used as an explicit performative seems to be purely accidental; as was mentioned earlier, impositive verbs vary widely in this regard and seem to depend a great deal on dialectal and idiolectal factors. This property is a much less significant one than the others Searle presents.

2.6 To put this discussion of taxonomies into perspective, and to summarize briefly, impositive speech acts have the following intrinsic conditions: the point of the illocutionary force is to get the hearer to do something (this is closely related to the perlocutionary force of impositive acts, and that relation will be dealt with in Chapter five); the expressed psychological state is that the speaker wants the hearer to do the action specified in the proposition; the related notions of strength and interest of speaker and hearer vary with the specific impositive act in question; and finally the difference in style also varies with the particular verb. The intermediate condition of status is crucial in distinguishing two types of impositive acts. The extrinsic condition of relation to the rest of the discourse is not relevant to impositives, and the other extrinsic condition, position within an
extra-linguistic institution is only marginally relevant (i.e., orders and commands have a special significance in the military as do the verbs enjoin, interdict, counsel, petition and solicit in law).

Of those properties which are not felicity conditions, the direction of fit, or causation for impositive acts, is an essential property for these acts. How the propositional content is affected by the illocutionary force of an impositive act is also important.

The details of all these claims about impositive speech acts are the substance of the following chapter.
CHAPTER III

IMPOSITIVE SPEECH ACTS

3.1 The speech acts which are impositive speech acts are those whose illocutionary point is to get someone to do something, or to impose the speaker's will upon the hearer. The list of verbs which describe such speech acts was given in Chapter two and is repeated here for convenience:

admonish, advise, appeal, ask, beg, beseech, bid, caution, command, counsel, demand, direct, enjoin, exhort, forbid, implore, insist, instruct, interdict, move, nominate, order, petition, plead, pray, prescribe, proscribe, propose, recommend, request, require, solicit, submit, suggest, urge, warn.

For Austin, impositive acts were a part of the rather diverse category he called exercitives. Vendler reduced Austin's category of exercitives, but it still contains two subcategories which do not fall into the impositive class. One is the type Vendler calls 'weaker exercitives', which includes the verbs permit and allow; although acts of permitting and allowing may make it poss-
ible for the hearer to do something, they are not attempts to get the hearer to do something.¹ The other type Vendler includes in his list of exercitives that are not impositive verbs are what he calls 'provokers'; examples of such verbs are dare and challenge. These verbs do seem to share the same illocutionary point as the impositive verbs mentioned above, but they also differ in many ways. For this reason I have labelled them 'semi-impositives' and will deal with them in more detail later, after the nature of the more straightforward impositive verbs has been examined.

The other taxonomies discussed in Chapter two use two categories for impositive verbs. McCawley divides them into imperatives and advisories, apparently using a criterion similar to the status condition, the imperatives being those verbs which may be used to describe an act in which there is unequal status and advisories being used when there is equal status between the speaker and hearer. Fraser's distinction is between verbs of requesting and verbs of suggesting; these two categories correspond, for the most part, to McCawley's imperatives and advisories, respectively. However there is a discrepancy: the verbs admonish and caution are for McCawley imperatives, while for Fraser they are verbs of suggesting. Since the precise criteria for categorizing verbs are not spelled out by either McCawley or Fraser, it is difficult to see why they differ with regard to these two verbs but agree on all other impositive
verbs.

3.2 In this chapter I will attempt to show that impositive speech acts are properly divided into two main types and three secondary types according to the condition on status. Also, it is my contention that there is a further semantic distinction which differentiates acts within one of the main status types. A summary of the proposed taxonomy of impositive speech acts follows.

The specific Status condition involved in impositive acts applies to distinguish the relative status of the conversational participants in 'orders' and 'requests' (hereafter grouped together as the 'unequal status impositives'). The condition applies to insure that the status of the conversational participants is the same in 'suggestions' (the equal status impositives'). Although the Status condition applies to impositive acts in three ways (distinguishing, in general, orders from suggestions from requests) the type of application is not always discrete; for instance, acts of advising require only slightly unequal status. There is no impositive act to which the distinction does not apply; all impositive acts exhibit some reference to status. The condition applies to orders by requiring that the speaker have (or be acting as if he had) superior status to the hearer or be in a position of authority (or acting so, at least). Verbs of ordering are: command, demand, direct,
enjoin, forbid, instruct, interdict, prescribe, proscribe and require. For requests the speaker is in an inferior position or has lower status than the hearer (or, is acting as if this were the case). Requests are performed and/or described by the following verbs: appeal, ask, beg, beseech, bid, implore, petition, plead, pray, request, solicit, supplicate. Recommendations and suggestions are distinguished by the fact that recommendations require that the speaker have just slightly higher status than the hearer, or at least that he definitely not have lower status than the hearer. For suggestions, the status need only be approximately equal, and the speaker can even have slightly lower status than the hearer. Verbs of recommending are: admonish, advise, caution, counsel, exhort, insist, recommend, urge and warn. Suggesting verbs are: move, nominate, propose, submit and, of course, suggest.

There is another property which distinguishes among equal status verbs. There are verbs of suggesting and recommending which reflect an attempt to cause the hearer to consider a proposition or action, and there are verbs of suggesting and recommending which reflect an attempt to get the hearer to do an action. The unequal status impositive acts are all attempts to get the hearer to do an action.

3.3 The first two properties used above for distinguish-
ing the various types of impositive acts are quite different in nature from the third, and they present different kinds of analytic problems. Felicity conditions such as the Status condition can be considered to be pragmatic, whereas the decomposition of verbs of recommending and suggesting into considering as opposed to doing is clearly semantic. The problem arises of how to determine what is pragmatic and what is semantic in illocutionary acts; and, although linguists have at least some idea of how syntax and semantics interact, it is unclear how pragmatics interacts with semantics. While a final solution to this major theoretical problem is beyond the scope of this study, some remarks on the matter are require.

The traditional philosophical distinction between semantics and pragmatics is that semantics concerns propositions as they occur in language while pragmatics concerns language users and contexts in which language is used. One problem is whether illocutionary force is semantic or pragmatic, since the function that illocutionary force performs is to link up the speaker (his intentions, desires, etc.) with the proposition of the speech act. Linguists have generally considered illocutionary force to semantic for several reasons. Ross (1970a) considers the possibility of illocutionary force being pragmatic rather than semantic (a 'pragmatic analysis' of speech acts as opposed to a 'performative analysis') and rejects it mainly on the grounds
that no pragmatic theory of language exists and therefore the pragmatic analysis does not exist. There is, however, a semantic theory into which a performative analysis fit. Moreover, there are syntactic facts supporting performative verbs in deep syntactic (i.e., semantic) structure. Ross does not rule out the development of a pragmatics, but since the time of his writing of this article no theory of language use has been propounded that would be capable of incorporating a pragmatic analysis of illocutionary force.² What has been proposed is that illocutionary acts, while not actually pragmatic in nature, are sensitive to pragmatics in specific ways. I will be adopting a performative analysis here, and taking the view that illocutionary force is semantic and is represented by abstract performative predicates, but that the illocutionary force can be indirect and that such indirection is the result of operations which may be performed on pragmatic felicity conditions.

It is easier to see that illocutionary force is semantic in nature if one considers speech acts other than impositive acts. As was noted earlier, the illocutionary point of impositive acts is to get someone to do something, and, although it was also noted that illocutionary points are in general felicity conditions, this is an oversimplification (which will be discussed further in the next section). At least a portion of what Searle labelled illocutionary point is semantic and part of the illocutionary
force. The difference between impositive acts and other speech acts is that the illocutionary force of impositive acts includes an intended perlocution, i.e., it is the speaker's intention to, in some way, affect the hearer's future actions (even if only mental actions). However, this does not warrant calling the illocutionary force of impositive acts pragmatic; the relationship between perlocution and illocution will be dealt with in detail in Chapter five.

Certain felicity conditions on illocutionary acts can only be said to be pragmatic; extrinsic conditions refer to the language user and the context, and they neither refer to propositions nor have any direct syntactic consequences. Viewing felicity conditions as semantic creates a problem in that their representation in semantic structure, as it is generally accepted, is difficult. Calling felicity conditions pragmatic simply relocates the problem of representation, one of the many problems yet to be solved in pragmatics.

One relationship between felicity conditions and presuppositions is that what is a felicity condition for the performance of a particular speech act is a presupposition in the reporting of that act. This would seem to imply that if any felicity conditions are pragmatic, so are presuppositions (or at least those presuppositions that correspond to felicity conditions). Recently it has been suggested
(Karttunen 1973, Stalnaker 1973, Thomason 1973) that at least some presuppositions are pragmatic rather than semantic. It is most likely that the type of presupposition that reflects felicity conditions is one of these pragmatic presuppositions.

3.4 Given the apparatus of generative grammar, the semantic structure of impositive speech acts can be any of several possibilities which interact in some way with various felicity conditions to produce commands, suggestions, recommendations, and requests. I now sketch these possibilities in order to show which is the best and why.

Although I will be concerned here solely with impositive acts, the analysis presented here is extendable to other sorts of speech acts. Based on the facts about both direct and indirect impositive acts, I will try to show which aspects of meaning and illocutionary force must be expressed as part of the semantic structure of the impositive utterance and which must be considered as pragmatic conditions on those utterances.

There are basically four possibilities for the semantic structure of impositive acts; beginning with the most extreme and most unlikely we have:

3.4.1 **No similarity in semantic structure**

This view is that there is no necessary underlying
similarity among impositive speech acts either in semantic primes or in the manner in which such primes relate to one another. The problem with this view is that there are certain similarities among the various types of impositive acts which must be accounted for in some way. First, there are the properties that derive from the illocutionary point. Since the illocutionary point of all impositive acts is to get the hearer to do something, the following properties are shared by all impositive acts:

a) they are intentional;

b) they involve causation;

c) they involve a change of state.

Next there are syntactic properties:

d) the subject of the proposition is in the second person when the act is explicitly performative;

3) the proposition of an explicitly performative impositive act is in the future tense.

There are exceptions to (d) and (e), significant exceptions, in fact; however they are limited to suggestions. (These exceptions will be dealt with in section 3.4.2.)

Finally there is a property whose importance is very difficult to determine:

f) impositive acts can, in general, be performed directly with an explicit performative verb.

Although there is no obvious significance to impositive acts having many explicit performative verbs, the fact that
they do contrasts sharply with the fact that Searle's representatives (e.g., *affirm*, *describe*, *mention*), for instance, have relatively few explicitly performative verbs. Since it is doubtful that property (f) has any real bearing on the nature of impositive acts (and if it does, it is a mystery how), this property will not be considered in trying to arrive at a probably semantic structure for impositive acts.

Properties (a) – (c) could be considered to be either pragmatic or semantic; of the three, property (a) is the one most likely to be pragmatic: intention certainly refers to the language user. There is, however, no real problem with considering (a) to be pragmatic, since it is a property common to all illocutionary acts having locutions (that is, all speech acts except exclamations involve the idea of intention even though what is intended differs for various kinds of acts). Intentionality is therefore not particularly useful in characterizing impositive acts. What is significant is that while (a) can be thought of as pragmatic, (b) and (c) cannot (as will be shown below). Consequently, the notion of illocutionary point, which includes (a), (b) and (c), is not as simple as it at first seemed.

In adopting a performative analysis, I have already excluded the possibility that all these features are pragmatic. However, it remains to be seen that properties (b) and (c) are not pragmatic (the syntactic properties (d)
and (e) are not serious candidates for pragmatic features). Causation and change of state ((b) and (c)) are, I believe, semantic; such semantic features have already been proposed and used in semantic structures throughout the literature (e.g., Dowty 1972, G. Lee 1971, J. McCawley 1968). In fact, the syntactic property (d) is a consequence of either (b) or (c), or both (b) and (c). (Since causation implies change of state it is perhaps unnecessary and redundant to refer to them as two separate features.) Change of state involves a time prior to the change \((t_1)\) and a time after the change \((t_2)\). When a speech act is performed it is performed in the present \((t_1)\); consequently any change which the act is intended to bring about must occur after \(t_1\), and any time after the present is the future. It is therefore a direct result of property (c) that the proposition of an impositive act is in the future tense (property d).

Since properties (b) and (c) are semantic and are common to all impositive acts, they must be represented as similarities in the semantic structure of impositive acts.

3.4.2 Total similarity in semantic structure

This view is that all impositive acts are semantically the same, i.e., they share a distinctive set of semantic primes and similar semantic structure and their only differences are those arising from different felicity conditions. This view is not as blatantly wrong as the
first one, but it does suffer serious drawbacks.

Before examining the problems with such an analysis, let us look at what sort of semantic primes are involved. An abstract performative verb, represented as IMPERE, has been posited in the underlying structure of both requests and commands by several linguists (among them R. Lakoff and Sadock); however, the nature of this performative predicate is not always agreed upon, and, in fact, is rarely even specified. I propose a related predicate IMP which has the advantage of not being any more closely associated with imperative sentence types or commands than with any other sentence type or impositive act type. The semantic prime IMP embodies that which is semantic and peculiar to impositive speech acts, i.e., the speaker's attempt to cause the hearer to perform an action. The predicate IMP has, of course, in addition, the properties that all abstract performative verbs have of being a linguistic verb of communication, being unembeddable and being able to be realized as an explicit performative (the last property is generally, but not universally, true of performative predicates).

Returning to the second alternative for the semantic representation of impositive acts, such a structure can now be represented as:
This proposal is that all impositive acts can be represented as (1) and that the only differences among them derive from non-semantic sources such as pragmatic felicity conditions.

If it were the case that there were no syntactic variations corresponding to impositive act types, this proposal would be a plausible one. There is some negative evidence for this proposal in Fraser's (1972) demonstration that there is no correspondence between types of impositive acts (or at least different impositive verbs) and types of complementizers that occur with those verbs. But there is also more direct evidence against this proposal.

It was mentioned above (in 3.4.1) that there are exceptions to the two syntactic properties (d) that the subject of the proposition be in the second person, and (e) that the verb of the proposition be in the future tense.
First, there are some exceptions to (d) which occur frequently but are easily accounted for.

This set of exceptions to (d) are exemplified in the performative utterances (2) and the reports of performative utterances (3):

2) a. I demand that he leave.
   b. I insist that he leave.
   c. I request that he leave.
   d. I order that he leave.
   e. I advise that he leave.
   f. I beg that he leave.

3) a. I demanded of Hilda that Norman leave.
   b. I insisted to Hilda that Norman leave.
   c. I requested of Hilda that Norman leave.
   d. I ordered (of) Hilda that Norman leave.
   e. I advised Hilda that Norman leave.
   f. I begged of Hilda that Norman leave.

(The dubious grammatical status of (3d) is idiosyncratic and not relevant to this point.) Although these all seem to be violations of the generalization that impositive acts require the subject of the proposition to be the hearer or second person, these sentences submit only to a rather special interpretation, namely, that, in the speaker's opinion, the hearer is in some way able to control or influence the behavior of the person referred to in the proposition. This is shown by the fact that (4) is a paraphrase of (2) and (5) or (3).

4) a. I demand that you \{let/have him leave.\} \{get him to leave.\}
   b. I insist that you \{let/have him leave.\} \{get him to leave.\}
   c. I request that you \{let/have him leave.\} \{get him to leave.\}
d. I order you to \{let/have him leave.\} \{get him to leave.\}
e. I advise you to \{let/have him leave.\} \{get him to leave.\}
f. I beg you to \{let/have him leave.\} \{get him to leave.\}

5) a. I demanded of Hilda that she let Norman leave.
b. I insisted to Hilda that she let Norman leave.
c. I requested that Hilda have Norman leave.
d. I ordered Hilda to have Norman leave.
e. I advised Hilda to get Norman to leave.
f. I begged Hilda to get Norman to leave.

Also, the (3) sentences can be conjoined with sentences explicating the manner in which the request, recommendation or order is carried out:

6) a. I demanded of Hilda that Norman leave and she obeyed by letting him go.
b. I insisted to Hilda that Norman leave and she obeyed (?) by letting him go.
c. I requested of Hilda that Norman leave and she complied by having him go.
d. I ordered Hilda that Norman leave and she obeyed by having him go.
e. I advised Hilda that Norman leave and she took my advise and got him to go.
f. I begged of Hilda that Norman leave and she complied by getting him to go.

Sentences (4) - (6) indicate that the semantic structure of (2), rather than being grossly different from (1), is simply an elaborated version of (1) where the structure under $S_2$ is causative, on the order of (7).
Although these orders, recommendations and requests cannot be said to be exceptions to (d), in any but a most superficial sense, that is not true of suggestions.

8) a. I propose that he leave.
   b. I suggest that he leave.

9) a. I proposed to Hilda that Norman leave.
   b. I suggested to Hilda that Norman leave.

The performative utterances (8) and the reports of them (9) do not necessarily imply that the hearer has, in the speaker's opinion, influence or control over the actions of the subject of the proposition; rather, they only imply that the speaker wants the hearer to think about the possibility or desirability of the proposition. This is shown by the fact that (10) and (11) are not paraphrases of (8) and (9)
(as (4) and (5) were of (2) and (3)).

10) a. I propose that you get him to leave.
   b. I suggest that you let him leave.

11) a. I proposed to Hilda that she get Norman to leave.
   b. I suggested to Hilda that she let Norman leave.

The point here is that the proposition of suggestions and some recommendations may have subjects in some person other than second with no special interpretation of hearer influence over the subject associated with them.5

The exceptions to syntactic generalization (e)—that the verb of the impositive act always be in the future tense—are the same type of impositive acts that are exceptions to (d), i.e., suggestions.

12) I {order} you to leave {immediately.}
    {advise}
    {insist}
    {request}
    {tomorrow.}
    {*yesterday.}
    {*last year.}

13) I {propose} that you left {yesterday.}
    {suggest}
    {last year.}

It might be argued here that these violations of the syntactic generalizations (d) and (e) stem from felicity conditions because the kind of impositive acts that violates them (i.e., suggestions) is the kind to which the Status condition applies equally. However, the Status condition applies relatively equally to recommendations too, but they do not tend to violate (d) and (e): Moreover, there is no way in general to link up felicity conditions conditions with syntactic facts and, in this particular case,
a connection between the Status condition and the second person pronoun or the future tense is extremely unlikely.

I think it is fair to conclude that there is some semantic difference among different types of impositive acts. The question now is: how should such differences be represented. The last two proposals for the semantic structure of impositive acts explore this question.

3.4.3 **Different abstract performative verbs, same embedded proposition**

This solution does not really come to grips with the problems mentioned in 3.4.2 above. It is inadequate in that it simply says that there are two IMPs with different syntactic restrictions; it offers no explanation as to why that might be so. Perhaps the lack of explanation offered by such a proposal results from our general lack of knowledge about the nature of abstract performative verbs. In any case, a solution along these lines does not provide much enlightenment.

It was stated earlier that ideally the abstract performative verb should embody the illocutionary force of the speech act; having two verbs of imposition would lead one to wonder whether the illocutionary force of suggesting is different from that of ordering, recommending and requesting. This is certainly not an entirely implausible idea, however, the problem remains that there is no way,
within the currently available framework, to explore this possibility. Consequently, the rejection of this view is based not on any real evidence against it, but on its lack of fertility. It may eventually turn out that this view is the right one, but for now we need a proposal which will shed more light on the similarities and differences among types of impositive acts.

3.4.4 **Same abstract performative verb, different embedded propositions**

This proposal says that the similarities among orders, recommendations, suggestions and requests are due to the same abstract performative verb and that the differences result from the structure beneath the performative predicate. For orders, recommendations, and requests, the structure proposed earlier as (1) is adequate.

1) $S_0$

   $V$  
   |   
   NP  
   |   
   IMP Sp H $S_1$
   |   
   $V$  
   |   
   NP DO H $S_2$

Suggestions, however, require some modification of the structure $S_1$. One possibility is to simply substitute a variable for $H$ in $S_1$, as is illustrated in (14):
This would solve the problem of the unrestricted subject of the embedded proposition of suggestions, but it does not deal with the fact that the verb of the embedded proposition is not necessarily in the future tense for suggestions. Also, this formulation of the semantic structure of suggestions leads to a rather peculiar result when the rule of Performative Deletion is applied to it. Since what Performative Deletion does is delete the performative sentence, $S_0$, when applied to a structure like (14) it would produce a sentence which is indistinguishable from a declarative-form assertion and not interpretable as a suggestion (e.g., the reduced form of (8a) would be He will leave).

The other solution, and the one advocated here, is a semantic structure on the order of (15) with an intermediate proposition whose predicate is CONSIDER, a representation of the properties common to the lexical items consider, think about, take into account, etc.
The hearer NP of $S_1$ is deleted under identity, and then Predicate Raising (McCawley 1968) applies, giving the structure illustrated in (16).

Finally, the surface verb suggest (or one of its synonyms) is inserted to produce the derived structure (17).

The semantic structure (15) explains why suggestions seem to violate the syntactic generalizations (d) and (e) which
hold for other impositive acts. The proposition which turns up in the surface structure was not originally embedded under IMP and is therefore not restricted as to person of subject and verb tense. The next chapter explores the restrictions the predicate CONSIDER places on its complement sentence and the general nature of CONSIDER.
4.1 Before going into the details of the predicate CONSIDER and the arguments for its existence in the semantic structure of suggestions, I would like to examine the verb suggest, or, more precisely, the various verbs suggest. The other impositive verbs of suggesting (propose, move, submit, etc.) are not ambiguous in the same way as suggest is, and, since they share the important semantic features of the impositive suggest, they will be assumed to derive from the same semantic structure as suggest.

In each of the categories of impositive verbs there are a few verbs which seem to typify the category by their neutrality and their freedom of occurrence. For suggestions these verbs are suggest and propose (as opposed to move and nominate, for example). For orders, the verbs order and command are typical; advise and recommend are typical to recommendations, as are ask and requests for requests. The other verbs in each of these categories are distinguished by such things as the context in which they may occur, the style or manner of speaking, and the strength of
the impositive act. Since it is my contention that each of the two types of impositive acts has a particular semantic structure, regardless of which verb appears in the surface structure, I will not be concerned with the individual vagaries of each verb.

4.1.1 One sort of ambiguity that suggest exhibits involves the agentive sense as opposed to the connection-of-ideas sense. This is an ambiguity that resides in many non-impositive verbs as well (mean, imply, indicate, prove, demonstrate, say and tell). The connection-of-ideas suggest (suggest₁) has the meaning 'to bring to mind through association' and is illustrated in the following sentences:

1) It suggested a fine Italian hand to me.
2) The fragrance suggested trade winds and palm trees.

Suggest₁ is, consequently, entirely distinct from the impositive suggest, since verbs which can be used as explicit performatives or which can be used to describe speech acts (as the impositive suggest can) must take agents as their subjects.

It has been argued by philosophers (e.g., Ware 1973) that a crucial difference between acts and actions is that acts must be performed by an agent. Linguistic evidence for such a view, however, is something of a problem to produce. Explicitly performative uses of verbs are highly restricted: they do not allow manner adverbs nor do they
occur embedded after persuade—so that such verbs cannot be shown to be pro-agentive when they are used as explicit performatives. They can be used in imperative-form sentences, e.g.,

5) Order her to stay.
6) Advise him to return.
7) Request them to come soon.

but all that shows is that they can take agents when occurring in that context; it says nothing about when they occur as explicit performatives. Similarly, it can be shown that in reports of impositive acts the verbs are agentive:

8) Miranda \{cleverly\} \{ordered\} \{advised\} \{stupidly\} \{requested\} us to leave.

9) Hilda persuaded Miranda to \{order\} \{advise\} \{request\} us to leave.

These facts make it seem likely that the subjects of explicit performative utterances at least can be agents, but what is really needed is evidence that the subject of such verbs cannot be non-agents. Such evidence is provided by the following anti-agentive context (proposed in G. Lee, 1971):

10) NP turns out to ______.

where turns out to is interpreted as proves to. In this frame only verbs which cannot have agent subjects may occur, as (11) - (14) illustrate:

11) *He turns out to assassinate the premier.
12) *He turns out to believe the story.
13) It turns out to glimmer.
14) It/he turns out to be tall.

Those impositive verbs which can be used as explicit per­
formatives and which do not have a non-agentive reading
(as suggest has) cannot occur in this environment.

15) *It/he turns out to \{ advise \} that we leave.
\{ order \}
\{ request \}

This indicates that these verbs can never take non-agents
as subjects and therefore must take agents as subjects.
Although because of its non-agentive reading, suggest does
not prove to be agentive according to this test, I will show
that there is an agentive suggest, which is similar enough
to the other impositive verbs to be supposed to be agentive
when used as an explicit performative.

4.1.2 Another property of explicitly performative verbs
is that they are verbs of linguistic communication. It is
in this way that the impositive suggest differs from yet
another suggest; this suggest, is agentive but not neces­
sarily a verb of saying and means 'to show indirectly or
imply':

16) Carl suggested he was guilty by refusing to
answer the question.

17) Without saying a word, Hermione managed to
suggest that we go to bed early.

18) Zachary cleverly suggested leaving by declining
another drink.
19) Silently, but unmistakably, Jane suggested that I had said enough.

There are speakers for whom (16) - (19) are marginally acceptable at best; this may be the result of a hierarchical relationship of the linguistic communication aspect of verbs, which will be examined below.

4.1.3 The third suggest, meaning 'to bring (a thought, problem, or desire) to mind for consideration,' is the one which occurs as an explicit performative, as in (20) - (22).

20) I (hereby) suggest that we try to help.
21) I suggest you eat less.
22) I suggest that Cora did it.

suggest3 is a more specific verb than suggest2 (having the added restriction of being a verb of linguistic communication) and, as was pointed out to me by Arnold Zwicky, can be contrasted with suggest2 in a sentence like (23),

23) She suggested2 that Harbird was guilty, without suggesting3 it.

A sentence such as (23) would be contradictory unless two distinct verbs were involved; the less specific one (suggest2) being asserted and the more specific one (suggest3) being denied. I personally do not find (23) to be contradictory and there are speakers who agree with that judgment; however, other speakers do consider (23) to be contradictory. This judgment is similar to the judgment of unacceptability of (16) - (19) in that it results from the same
This hierarchy consists of verbs of communication and is determined by the nature of the communication—whether or not it is linguistic and to what degree it is or is not. A rough idea of this hierarchy's categories and category members is given in (24).

24)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not necessarily linguistic</th>
<th>Necessarily linguistic</th>
<th>Really linguistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>persuade</td>
<td>imply</td>
<td>suggest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>suggest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>say</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>mutter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>say in a mutter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The verbs on the non-linguistic end of the continuum occur with the adverbial phrase without saying a word, while the really linguistic verbs do not. Conversely, the non-linguistic verbs do not occur with the adverb loudly, while the linguistic and really linguistic verbs do occur with it.

25) a. Without saying a word, Joshua persuaded Irving to give up.
   b. Without saying a word, Joshua implied/suggested that Irving should give up.
   c. Without saying a word, Joshua suggested that Irving should give up.
   d. Without saying a word, Joshua said that Irving should give up.
   e. Without saying a word, Joshua muttered that Irving should give up.
   f. Without saying a word, Joshua said in a mutter that Irving should give up.

26) a. Joshua loudly persuaded Irving to give up.
    b. Joshua loudly implied that Irving should give up.
    c. Joshua loudly suggested that Irving should give up.
    d. Joshua loudly said that Irving should give up.
    e. Joshua loudly muttered that Irving should give up.
There are many mysteries connected with this hierarchy; for instance, why are manner-of-speaking verbs like mutter or say in a mutter so much worse with the phrase without saying a word than say or suggest \(_3\)? By labelling the manner-of-speaking end of the hierarchy 'really linguistic' I have suggested that these sorts of verbs are somehow more linguistic than other necessarily linguistic verbs; I have no idea what it might mean for some necessarily linguistic verbs to be more linguistic than others. In any case, if it turns out that there actually is such a hierarchy, it may be that for some speakers the continuum is so tightly compressed in the middle that suggest\(_2\) and suggest\(_3\) are indistinguishable; for those speakers, sentences (16) - (19) are unacceptable and (23) is an internal contradiction. This is really just to say that, for those speakers, agentive suggest is neutral rather than ambiguous and that the neutrality involves the manner of communication.

4.1.4 Returning to the verbs suggest, we find that there is one more, suggest\(_4\), which means 'to propose someone or something as a possibility.' Suggest\(_4\) can also be used as an explicit performative, and, in fact, seems to differ from suggest\(_3\) only in the nature of its direct object, which must be concrete as opposed to the abstract object (e.g., thought, problem, etc.) that suggest\(_3\) takes. But
even that difference has a superficial appearance since, according to the definition of suggest, it is as a 'possibility' that the concrete is being viewed. The following sentences,

27) I suggest Cora. (may = 22)
28) I suggest mangoes.

can be reduced versions of the sentences

29) I suggest (that it is possible) that Cora did it.
30) I suggest (that it is possible) to have mangoes (that we have mangoes) for dessert.

The fact that the sentences in which suggest occur have non-elliptical counterparts which look very much like the sentences in which suggest occurs indicates that they are the same verbs, and that the difference resides in their complements sentences. This, then, is the impositive suggest whose semantic structure will now be examined.

4.2 It was proposed in Chapter three that the semantic structure of suggestions involves a predicate CONSIDER; such a predicate would encompass the meaning common to the following lexical items (and probably others as well):

31) consider, contemplate, deliberate on, mull over, muse, ponder, reflect on, take into account, think about.

The semantic commonality of these verbs is that they all
express intentional mental activity, directed toward a specific matter.

Syntactically, they are non-stative:

32) a. Morley was \{considering \{reflecting on \} \textit{going home.}\} (thinking about)

b. Morley slowly \{considered \{reflected on \} \textit{going home.}\} (thought about)

These verbs are also agentive:

33) a. \{Consider \{Reflect upon \} \textit{going to the party.}\} (Think about)

b. Milly \{carefully \{deliberately\} \} \{reflected on \} (thought about) \textit{going to the party.}\}

c. Lynn persuaded Mark to \{consider \{reflect upon \} \textit{going to the party.}\} (think about)

From these properties of the verbs in (31) it can be inferred that the semantic predicate CONSIDER is also non-stative and agentive; consequently, CONSIDER is decomposable into some structure involving DO. Although the details of such a structure are not clear, nor especially important here, it is interesting to note that the semantic structure of suggestions is not as radically different from that of other impositive acts as it may have appeared when CONSIDER was first introduced. That is, the predicate embedded immediately under IMP is DO for orders, recommen-
dations and requests; for suggestions it is also DO, but with the added specification of direct mental activity.

A more interesting property of the verbs in (31), and of the predicate CONSIDER, is that they take as complements sentences whose main verbs may be of any tense. If CONSIDER is a part of the semantic structure of suggestions, this property would account for the fact that the suggested propositions may be in the present or past tense, as well as the future tense. In other words, the proposed structure (repeated here as (34)),

\[
S_0 \\
V \quad NP \quad NP \quad NP \\
IMP \quad Sp \quad H \quad S_1 \\
V \quad NP \quad NP \\
CONSIDER \quad H \quad S_2
\]

would, by virtue of a syntactic property of CONSIDER, explain why suggestions like (35) are acceptable, while similar orders, recommendations and requests, as in (36), are not.

35) I \{suggest\} that you left \{yesterday.\}
There are two other properties of the verb consider that must be carefully excluded from the syntax of the predicate CONSIDER. The first one is only a property of consider when it is synonymous with the verbs assume and suppose; the property is that the complement sentence be suppositional in nature. The predicate CONSIDER does not take suppositional complements, so that (37), which looks like it could derive from a structure like (34) (by Equi-NP Deletion of the hearer NP of $S_1$ and Performative Deletion of $S_0$), is not a suggestion.

37) Consider that all triangles are red.

It is, rather, the equivalent of (38), which must have a suppositional reading.

38) \{Assume \{Suppose\} that all triangles are red.\}

In this imperative-form construction the preferred reading of consider is suppositional and therefore not equivalent to the suggestion:

39) I suggest that all triangles are red.

The other property of consider that is not a property of CONSIDER is that consider may take a factive complement but CONSIDER may not. This is related to the fact
about suppositional complements; what it means for a sentence to be suppositional is that the proposition being put forth is to be accepted as true or as a fact for the sake of an argument. It is, therefore, a factive. So it seems that the observation about the difference between consider and CONSIDER in regard to suppositional complements is just an instance of the more general difference between them involving factive complements. (40) - (42) show that consider (or one of its synonyms) may have complements which can only be interpreted factively; (43) - (45) show that suggest (or IMP CONSIDER) cannot:

40) a. Consider the fact that Martha ran for office. 
   b. Think about the fact that Sam skipped the country. 
   c. Take into account that the corporation donated a million dollars.

41) a. Consider his refusal to testify. 
   b. Think about Bland's gift to the committee. 
   c. Take into accoung Yvonne's perserverance.

42) a. Consider Martha's running for office. 
   b. Think about Sam's skipping the country. 
   c. Take into account the corporation's donating a million dollars.

43) a. *I suggest the fact that Martha ran for office. 
   b. *I suggest the fact that Sam skipped the country. 
   c. *I suggest the fact that the corporation donated a million dollars.

44) a. *I suggest his refusal to testify. 
   b. *I suggest Bland's gift to the committee. 
   c. *I suggest Yvonne's perserverance.
There is a construction very similar to the Poss-ing construction of (42) and (45) which is non-factive and therefore does occur with suggest. This non-factive construction differs from the factive one only in not having a possessive marker on the first noun of the proposition. Examples are:

46) \{Consider  \\
Think about\} Martha running for office.

47) I suggest Martha running for office.

4.3 It should perhaps be noted here that the imperative sentence form, which crops up so often in a discussion of impositive speech acts, is a direct result of an underlying structure which has as its abstract performative, IMP, since one of the properties of IMP is that the subject of its embedded sentence is coreferential with its indirect object (i.e., the hearer of the utterance). The result of this property of IMP (which is, incidentally, reflected in the statement of the illocutionary point of impositive speech acts) is that Equi-NP Deletion can apply to delete the hearer NP of \( S_1 \), after which Performative Deletion may apply to \( S_0 \), producing the typical subject-less imperative sentence form. With the exception of requests, whose deferential nature requires that the direct act be somehow modified (as with the addition of tags like please or will you), all imposi-
tive acts can undergo Equi-NP Deletion and Performative Deletion and turn up as imperative sentences. Therefore, if a structure like (34) does underlie suggestions, one would expect imperative-form sentence beginning with consider (at least in its non-factive sense) to be suggestion. Sentences like (46) do seem to be suggestions. 8 Not only are they paraphrases of sentences like (47), but they also do not allow tags that orders typically allow (such as expletives like dammit, or adverbs indicating urgency like now!, immediately!, and I don't mean next year!):

48) Consider Martha running for office, *dammit!
49) Think about doing it, {*immediately!
                        *and I don't mean next year!}

Consider imperatives like (46) cannot be requests because requests do not occur as unmodified imperatives. It is more difficult to distinguish imperative-form suggestions from imperative-form recommendations, but it does seem that a sentence like (50) is odd.

50) {Joe doing it.}
        {For your own good,}
        {For Thelma's sake,}
        {For my sake,}
        {Joe doing it.}
        {having your hair cut.}

Both the strangeness of (50) and the restrictions mentioned above on the kinds of tags that may occur with either orders or requests are results of felicity conditions on various types of impositive acts; these conditions will be examined
in detail in Chapter five.

4.4 There is another way that suggestions may be distinguished from other impositive acts which could also be taken as evidence for the existence of CONSIDER in the semantic structure of suggestions. It was demonstrated by Morgan (1973) that there is a syntactic relation between utterances and their responses. Suggestions can typically be responded to by sentences making reference either to the act of considering or the the sort of thing which can be considered (i.e., an idea, a proposition, etc.). So the suggestions in (51) below can be responded to by the sentences in (55), but the orders in (52) and the requests in (53) cannot. Just as the distinction between suggestions and recommendations was difficult to perceive above, so it is now, with some of the responses in (55) being appropriate to the recommendations in (54) and some not. However, the fact that the responses which are not appropriate to the recommendations are those with explicit reference to considering--(55d-f)--may indicate a real semantic difference between suggestions and recommendations. In any case, it is clear that suggestions and recommendations have more in common with each other than suggestions do with either orders or requests; this is a point that I will return to shortly.
51) Suggestions:
a. I suggest we all leave now.
b. I suggest Harry go first.

52) Orders:
a. I order you to clean the latrine.
b. Pick up your socks, dammit!

53) Requests:
a. Please give me a dime.
b. I humbly request that you stay.

54) Recommendations:
a. I recommend that we leave now.
b. I advise you to stay put.

55) Responses:
a. That's a good idea.
b. That's a terrible idea.
c. I'll keep that in mind.
d. That's worth thinking about.
e. That's worth considering.
f. I'll think about it.
g. I'll take that into consideration.

4.5 The problem of determining just what is a suggestion and what is a recommendation involves both semantics (if CONSIDER is actually a semantic predicate of the act of suggesting) and pragmatic felicity conditions. This section will be devoted to exploring both kinds of distinctions in an attempt to clarify the suggestion/recommendation problem. The reason that these two types of impositive acts are so much more confusing than orders and requests is that the latter two are easily distinguished from each other and from suggestions and recommendations by the felicity condition involving the relative status of the speaker and hearer. This Status condition applies in a very similar way to
suggestions and recommendations, so the difference between these two kinds of impositive acts must be sought elsewhere.

The simple proposal for distinguishing suggestions and recommendations is that: a) recommendations have in their semantic structure IMP DO, and a felicity condition that the speaker believe that the action being recommended is desirable or good for the hearer or some other concerned party, and that: b) suggestions are semantically IMP CONSIDER and do not have a 'Good For' condition. As might be expected, this simple proposal is too simple; the impositive verb suggest, for many speakers, implies a Good For condition identical to that of recommendations. In addition, there are occurrences of direct suggestions which do not seem to involve CONSIDER, but rather DO, e.g.,

56) I suggest you \{go jump in the lake.\} \{go soak you head.\} \{bug off.\}

It does seem that sarcastic suggestions like (56), which have a semantic DO, are never supposed to be good for the hearer, so suggestions and recommendations are still indistinguishable.

A less clear set of examples of suggestions which have DO rather than CONSIDER in their semantic structure are those indirect suggestions beginning with Let's as illustrated in (57)
57) a. Let's go swimming.  
b. Let's throw a party.  
c. Let's get to work.  
d. Let's clean the fish; we've got to do it sometime.  
e. It's now or never and we've got to get it over with, so let's do it.

There is a problem with Let's suggestions; they frequently seem to have a Good For condition (as in (57a) and (57b)), but sometimes it is unclear whether or not they have such a condition. (57c) is especially unclear, while (57d) and (57e), by their explanatory additions, indicate that the end result or the accomplishment of the action is a good or desirable thing. If Let's suggestions do have a Good For condition, then they are not really suggestions at all, but recommendations. Another possibility for these sentences is that they do not have exactly a Good For condition, but a more general condition that the proposed action is not bad for the hearer or hearers. That would account for the neutrality of (57c) in regard to desirability and the apparent need for justification in (57d-e). It would also explain why (56) is either rude or facetious, but not an ordinary suggestion. If this is the case, then there is still a pragmatic difference between suggestions and recommendations.

The final problem is that the verbs advise and recommend (though none of the other verbs of recommending) are sometimes used with the same freedom of complements as verbs of suggesting. That is, (58) and (59) are not unacceptable.
58) I recommend that Joan, Ella and Ann go.
59) I advise that he leave now.

If the semantic structure of recommendations is IMP DO, there is a problem in deriving these forms; if it is IMP CONSIDER there is no problem. Also, (60) and (61) are at least rough paraphrases of (58) and (59).

60) For you sake, consider that Joan, Ella and Ann go.
61) In your own best interest, I suggest that he leave now.

This indicates that, while these sorts of recommendations can have the Good For condition, they also have the semantic structure usually associated with suggestions.

The result of this attempt at disentanglement is four kinds of equal status impositive acts:

I. DO recommendations.
   Semantic structure: IMP DO
   Felicity condition: Action is good for hearer.
   Example: I recommend you leave now.

II. CONSIDER recommendations.
    Semantic structure: IMP CONSIDER
    Felicity condition: Action is good for hearer.
    Example: I recommend that Ann go.

III. CONSIDER suggestions.
      Semantic structure: IMP CONSIDER
      Felicity condition: Action is not bad for hearer.
      Example: I suggest that he did it.

IV. DO suggestions.
    Semantic structure: IMP DO
    Felicity condition: Action is not bad for hearer.
    Example: Let's get to work.
4.6 In concluding this chapter, I would like to point out that, although there are no strong arguments for the existence of CONSIDER in the semantic structure of CONSIDER suggestions or CONSIDER recommendations, such a predicate would account for the fact that these two kinds of imperative acts can be paraphrased by imperative-form sentences with consider and, more importantly, the fact that they can have complement sentences which are not constrained by IMP to have second person subjects and future tenses, as are other structures dominated by IMP. The second point is more important that the first because consider imperatives could just as easily be explained on the grounds that there is a felicit condition which says the hearer is to consider the proposition and this condition may be asserted to perform indirectly the act of which it is a condition.

There is, however, no other way to account for the second point.

On the other side of the issue are two arguments against decomposing suggest into IMP CONSIDER. One is that the scope of an adverb like again or almost can be either the whole structure or just the embedded verb; consequently sentences like (62) and (63), with the causative verb boil, are ambiguous:

62) John almost boiled the water.
63) John boiled the water again.
Sentence (62) can mean either

64) John almost caused the water to boil.

or

65) John caused the water to almost boil.

Likewise, (63) can mean either

66) John again caused the water to boil.

or

67) John caused the water to boil again.

If suggest decomposed into IMP CONSIDER one would expect (68) and (69) to be ambiguous in the same way as (62) and (63) are.

68) John almost suggested it.

69) John suggested it again.

These sentences are not ambiguous in the expected way, and so the IMP CONSIDER proposal is weakened.

To further weaken it is the fact that the embedded predicate of a decomposed verb can be referred to by a pronoun, as in (70).13

70) Julia thickened the sauce, but it took her three hours to bring it about.

where the second it refers not to what Julia did, but rather to what she caused to happen (i.e., that the sauce became thick). In a report of a suggestion, CONSIDER cannot be anaphorically referred to.

71) George suggested the theatre, but it took him three hours to do it.

(71) can only be interpreted to mean George has a terrible
stutter, aphasia, or is incredibly circumlocutory. It cannot mean that it was three hours before anyone considered the theatre.

Although these two arguments have only been made for causative decompositions, there is not obvious reason they should not hold for impositive decompositions as well, especially in view of the fact that, as was mentioned in Chapter two, there is a causal relation between the speaker and the hearer of an impositive act. These arguments are therefore good arguments against the IMP CONSIDER proposal. For this reason, I leave it as simply a proposal, or CONSIDER suggestion, saying only that it is possible, not necessarily desirable.
CHAPTER V

INDIRECT ILLOCUTION AND PERLOCUTION

5.1 According to a proposal made by Heringer (1972), speech acts may be performed indirectly by reference to certain participant-based felicity conditions on those speech acts. Heringer's proposal is that such intrinsic conditions can be either asserted or questioned to perform, indirectly, acts for which they are conditions. These intrinsic conditions are either essential, involving the speaker's knowledge, intentions and desires, or non-essential, involving the speaker's beliefs. The essential intrinsic conditions of intention is an important part of what Searle calls illocutionary point, in that the illocutionary point is the speaker's purpose or intention in performing the speech act. This condition and the essential conditions of speaker's knowledge and desire are not of primary importance to the performance of indirect impositive acts and therefore will not be discussed here. This chapter will be mainly concerned with those intrinsic conditions, which happen to be non-essential, that are peculiar to impositive speech acts and that are the basis for
the majority of indirect impositive acts.²

5.2 As was mentioned earlier, there is, for impositive acts, a condition of participant status which is neither purely intrinsic nor purely extrinsic. It cannot, therefore, be used as a basis for indirect impositive acts (i.e., either questioned or asserted to perform the act), but it does affect how various types of indirect impositive acts may be performed.

The Status condition for impositive acts can be thought of as applying in three distinct ways: for command the speaker must believe he has superior status to (or authority over) the hearer; for suggestions and recommendations, the speaker must believe that he and the hearer are of equal status; for requests, the speaker must believe, or be acting as if he believed, that he has status inferior to the hearer. This is a simplification, however; it takes slightly more status to advise than to suggest and even more to insist, urge or exhort. Similarly, it takes less status to propose or submit than to advise. Rather than viewing the Status condition as dividing impositive acts into a trichotomy, then, it will be considered to be one aspect of a 'squish',³ with orders and requests having special properties, not because they are qualitatively different from suggestions and recommendations, but rather because they form the endpoints or boundaries of the squish.
Regardless of the way in which the relation between the Status condition and suggesting is viewed, it still contrasts sharply with the relation between the Status condition and ordering on the one hand, and the Status condition and requesting on the other hand. Commands are only felicitous if the conversational participants believe that the speaker has the authority or sufficiently higher status in terms of the particular social setting relevant to the conversation. When a person without such status issues a command it is considered rude or impertinent and will, no doubt, be ignored. Requests, however, are used when the speaker wants to act as if he is inferior in status to the hearer(s). Such behavior is usually referred to as 'deference' and is crucially involved in certain conditions on illocutionary acts (e.g., Heringer's intrinsic conditions 3.21, 3.24 and 3.35). It should be noted that neither aspect of the Status condition is independent of the social setting; in fact, they are completely determined by such setting.

There is a certain asymmetry here due to the nature of authority; a person in an authoritative position may easily show deference if he like, but it is much more difficult (perhaps impossible) for a person not in authority to show authority. The linguistic consequence of this is that the violations on authority conditions for commanding are much easier to recognize than violations of deference condi-
tions on requesting. In fact it may never be the case that a speaker cannot show deference.

In both cases the speaker and hearer(s) have to agree upon their relative status. If they do not agree and the speaker makes a command, a hearer may respond with a denial or questioning of the speaker's authority, e.g.,

1) You can't tell me what to do.

2) Who do you think you are, trying to tell me what to do.

3) You've (got) no right to order me around.

A speaker with authority to command may, of course, choose to be deferent. However if his superior is recognized by the hearer(s) they may respond with a direct reference to the speaker's ability to command:

4) I won't do it unless you order me to.

5) I'm afraid you'll have to make that an order.

6) I'll do it if you command me to, but not if you just ask.

There is a way in which the Status condition, by applying to suggestions in such a neutral way, affects indirect suggestions. If one person wishes to order another to do something, he cannot possibly do it by asking a question; likewise, in making a request or plea a speaker cannot use an assertion without relinquishing his guise of deference or subservience. Since these restrictions do not hold for suggestions, both assertions and questions may be
used to perform the indirect illocutionary act of suggesting.

The squish representing the continuum of the Status condition also indicates the strength of the act, with the strongest acts being at the order end and the weakest at the request end. Strength itself is not a felicity condition but rather a result of a combination of conditions, one of which is Status. (The other condition involved will be discussed in section 5.5.)

Impositive verbs fit into the strength squish in approximately the following order (slashes indicate equivalence of strength):

7) command/order/enjoin/interdict - proscribe/
demand/forbid - direct/require - instruct -
exhort/urge/warn - insist/admonish - caution/
counsel/advise/recommend - suggest - submit/
propose/move/nominate - ask/request - petition/
bid - solicit/appeal - plead/beg/beseech/implore
- pray/supplieate.

This is not meant to be definitive by any means; there is always a problem with fixing the order of continua, especially when many of the items are synonymous or nearly so. It is presented here only to give a general idea of how a squish based on strength might look, and it does reflect the way in which these acts are talked about. For instance, a strong suggestion is actually a recommendation. Also, different impositive acts can be referred to in different
ways; e.g. and that's an order, versus it was just a suggestion and I was only asking.

5.3 There are three main intrinsic conditions upon which indirect impositive acts are based and one derivative condition. The first condition is one discussed by Heringer as condition 3.31: 'the performer of an illocutionary act K believes that no acts involved in the performance of K are already performed.' This formulation, however, needs certain modification; not only must the speaker believe the actions are not performed, he must also believe they are not, at the time of the speech act, being performed.

That this condition is actually a condition on impositive speech acts is illustrated by the fact that if it is denied at the same time that the act is uttered, an unacceptable sentence results:

8) *I don't care if you are doing the dishes, (I order you to) do the dishes.

9) *I suggest you have your wisdom teeth taken out even if you've already had them taken out.

10) *Lease set the clock if you've already done so.

That the proposed modification of Heringer's statement of the condition is necessary is shown by the fact that (11) - (13) are not unacceptable:
11) I don't care if you did do the dishes (once),
   (I order you to) do the dishes (again).

12) I suggest you look (some more/again), even if
   you've already looked.

13) I know you just did it, but please do it again
   for me.

This condition will be referred to as the Not Done condi-

5.4 The next intrinsic condition is restricted to recom-
   mendations and suggestions, and requires that the action
   involved be possible. It is rather difficult to tell where
   this Possibility condition stops being applicable on the
   impositive continuum, but it does seem that whereas one
   can order and request actions, he does not necessarily
   believe to be possible, he cannot suggest or recommend
   them:

   14) Whether it's possible or not, I order you to
       be there.

   15) Whether or not it's possible for you to come,
       I request you to (come).

   16) ??Whether or not it's possible for you to do
       so, I suggest you take Joanna
       with you.

   17) ??I advise you to get a good night's sleep,
       even though it's impossible.

5.5 The third condition has to do with whether or not
   the action, in the speaker's opinion, is desirable, or good
   for, either the hearer or some third party. This is a
belief condition and should be carefully distinguished from the intrinsic condition involving the speaker's desire. This latter condition is an essential one, and it requires that the speaker want the action to be done. The non-essential belief condition (which will be called the Good For condition) primarily concerns the nature of the act mentioned and usually some person other than the speaker. The two conditions are not unrelated; however, it can be the case that the reason the speaker wants the hearer to do the action is that the speaker believes the action will benefit the hearer or someone else whom the hearer has an interest in. Orders do not have this condition and requests ordinarily do not, although they may be modified to include it, as it:

18) a. For Charley's sake, I beg you to leave now.
   b. For your own good, please tell the truth.

It was assumed in Chapter four, for the sake of exposition, that there was a qualitative difference between suggestions and recommendations in terms of the Good For condition. Upon closer examination, however, it appears that this condition is really only quantitatively different for suggestions and recommendations. Consequently, there are no absolute differences between these two types of impositive acts. That there is no absolute difference is not surprising in view of the overlap in meaning of the verbs suggest, advise and recommend. These verbs are in the
middle of the strength squish mentioned above; they are the equal status verbs. This portion of the squish will be referred to simply as suggestions when there is no reason to specify whether the semantic structure contains DO or CONSIDER and no reason to specify the particular application of the Good For condition.


This strength squish corresponds not only to difference in status, but also in how good for the hearer (or whomever) the action is believed to be. Although the Good For condition cannot in itself definitively differentiate between various direct impositive acts, it does play an important role in differentiating indirect impositive acts, as will be seen in the next chapter. The Good For condition can be used to perform indirect impositive illocutions because it is an intrinsic condition; the Status condition is not purely intrinsic and therefore cannot be so used.

The Good For condition applies most strongly to the strong end of the sub-squish (19); those acts to which the Good For condition applies most strongly can be modified by the condition, but not by its denial as (20) and (21) show.
20) a. Since sunshine is healthful, I recommend that we all sunbathe two hours a day.

b.*Since sunshine is dangerous, I recommend that we all sunbathe two hours a day.

21) a. I warn you that if you don't get out of the way, you'll get hurt.

b.*I warn you that if you don't get out of the way, you won't get hurt.

(20) and (21) are, of course, not out-and-out unacceptable sentences; they can be used if the speaker is trying to be ironic or especially perverse (i.e., the speaker has, or is acting as if he had, the belief that being unhealthy or dead is good and that one should try to attain such a state). It should be noted that on the perverse reading of (20) and (21) the Good For condition is still not being violated or suspended; what is being violated is the ordinary way of interpreting the adjective dangerous and the verb hurt. Whereas in normal usage dangerous and hurt are both considered to be bad or undesirable, in the perverse usage they are being used by the speaker as good or desirable things. So that if dangerous or hurt are believed by the speaker to mean or imply something which is bad for the hearer, then the (b) sentences are unacceptable. I am not able to find an acceptable reading for:

22) *Since I believe sunshine is dangerous, and I believe danger is bad and to be avoided at all costs, I recommend that we all sunbathe two hours a day.

Before going into the last intrinsic condition
which may be used derivatively to perform indirect impositive acts, I would like to point out that there is at least one other feature of impositive acts that is derived from others. Because there are two conditions determining the strength squish, it is very difficult to be precise about which of several verbs, like urge, exhort and warn, is stronger—or even if strength is what differentiates them. There is, however, a derived property of strength, which Searle calls style of disclosure, that can be used to distinguish among impositive verbs. Style is said to be derivation of strength, because style tends to correspond very closely with strength, and it is only when two or more impositive verbs have identical strength that style distinguishes them. Such is the case with exhort, urge and warn; although warn has certain distinctive syntactic properties, semantically, it is indistinguishable from urge and exhort. All three of these verbs have the same amount of strength, but exhort emphasizes the contribution of the Status condition to strength, while urge stresses the Good For condition. Warn is more like urge in that it also stresses the Good For condition, but it tends to do it by giving the reason that a particular action is or is not good for the hearer.

Finally, indirect illocutions of impositive acts may be performed by asserting or questioning certain implications of the three intrinsic conditions just discussed.
The implications that may be so used are those which refer to any of the three conditions as a (or the) reason for the hearer to carry out the action specified in the proposition, or that give a reason for the speaker believing the particular intrinsic condition. This Reason condition is a derived condition because its existence is dependent upon the three basic conditions of Not Done, Possibility and Good For, which provide the reason for doing the proposed action. The Reason condition is, then, that the reason the speaker wants the hearer to do the action is any one of, or any combination of, the three primary intrinsic conditions. The implication of the Reason condition itself is that the speaker believes any one of, or any combination of the intrinsic conditions.

The Reason condition can be used to modify imperative acts by stating, either conditionally or not, that there is no reason not to do the action (as illustrated in (23)), or that there is a reason to do the action (as illustrated in (24) and (25)).

23) a. If/Since there's no reason not to learn French, I suggest you do (it).
   
   b.*If/since there is a reason not to learn French, I suggest you do (it).

24) a. If/since there's a good reason to go to New Zealand, I recommend that we go.
   
   b.*If/since there's no good reason to go to New Zealand, I recommend that we go.
25) a. If/since there's a good reason not to eat apples, I warn you not to.

b.*If/since there's no (good) reason not to eat apples, I warn you not to.

For sentences (23b) and (24b) there is the same sort of perverse reading as there was for (20b) and (21b). For the perverse reading of (23b) the speaker must believe that things should be done without reasons for doing them, which is a strange attitude. For the weird reading of (24b) the speaker must believe that the fact that there is no reason to do the action is itself a reason to do the action, which is conceivable if, for some reason, the speaker wants to do something irrational (or at least apparently irrational). Perhaps it is more likely that such a speaker would want to do something unpredictable, as when he does not want another person to be able to figure out what he will do next or where he will go next and therefore tries to do the thing or go to the place for which no reason, except for the very lack of reason, exists.

It seems that there ought to be a perverse reading for (25b) parallel to those of (23b) and (24b), however if there is one, I cannot discern it: (25b) seems simply to make no sense at all, perhaps because of the over-abundance of negatives.

It might be argued that the (a) versions of (23) - (25) are not ideal sentences either; and I would agree, however I believe that the reason they are not perfectly
common everyday sentences is that these conditions are so basic to the speech acts in question that it seems odd actually to assert them; they are generally assumed by all speakers of the language. Certainly in the case of the version of the (a) sentences with if, the oddity arises from the fact that the sentences are tautologies. In the cases of the (a) sentences with since, they seem strange because usually if a speaker believes that there is a reason to do something or not to do something, he will give the reason rather than just saying that there is one. This is borne out by the fact that (23a) with since is not as unusual a sentence as (24a) and (25a) with since, and in (23a) the condition being illustrated is the lack of a reason.

The Reason condition can also modify an impositive act by giving one of the three basic conditions as a reason, as is illustrated in (26) - (28):

26) a. If/Since you haven't done your homework yet, I suggest you do it.
   b.*If/Since you've already done your homework, I suggest you do it.

27) a. If/Since it's possible to finish today, I suggest we do so.
   b.*If/Since it's impossible to finish today, I suggest we do so.

28) a. If/Since it's good for you, I recommend you do it.
   b.*If/Since it's not good for you, I recommend you do it.
Before turning (in the next chapter) to the question of how these conditions are used in the performance of indirect impositive acts, I would like to discuss the distinction between perlocution and illocution.

5.7 When a command is given or a request made, the intended perlocutionary effect is that the hearer do the specific action commanded or requested. If that particular effect is not produced the command or request still stands as an illocutionary act of commanding or requesting. On the other hand, suggestions or recommendations to consider have only the intended perlocutionary effect of making the hearer consider the possibility or desirability of the specified action. This weaker sort of perlocutionary effect is necessary to the felicitous performance of such suggestions and recommendations (i.e., CONSIDER impositives). An illocutionary act is said to fail if a crucial felicity condition is not fulfilled; this differs from a successful act which is ignored or disregarded by the hearer. In the case of belief conditions, both the speaker and the hearer must hold the belief the act to succeed. The sentences below show the difference between disregarded impositive acts and failed impositive acts:

29) I ordered him to leave but he wouldn't.

30) I tried to order him to leave, but he refused to recognize my authority to do so.
31) I requested him to go, but he refused.
32) I tried to request him to do it, but he said I'd have to order him.
33) I suggested eating out, but they said no.
34) I tried to suggest eating out, but they wouldn't {hear of it.} {even consider it.}
35) I warned him of the tsunami.
36) I tried to warn him of the tsunami, but he thought {it was a Japanese lollipop.} {it was nothing to worry about.}
37) I advised him to go to court, but he decided not to.
38) I tried to advise him to go to court, but he (didn't seriously consider it because he) thought I was kidding.

The notable difference between the reports of commands and requests (29) - (32) and the reports of suggestions (33) - (38) is that the commands and requests can fail only if the relative status of speaker and hearer is not appropriate to the command or request. (I am only considering those conditions related to the participants' beliefs; it is also the case, of course, that an impositive, or any speech act for that matter, cannot succeed if, for example, the hearer(s) cannot hear or understand the speaker.) The suggestions, however, fail if the speaker does not succeed in making the hearer consider the proposition in question, no matter what the reason.

The importance of this is that it sheds some light on the problem of perlocutionary versus illocutionary sug-
gestions. Since the perlocutionary effect is crucial to the illocutionary force of CONSIDER suggestions, anything which produces that perlocutionary effect can be said to be a suggestion (in the common usage of the word); it need not be related to the semantics of suggestion; it need not even be linguistic in nature. Such suggestions are perlocutionary suggestions; they are not necessarily illocutionary suggestions\(^\text{13}\) although they certainly may be, since illocutionary suggestions must also produce the perlocutionary effect of making the hearer consider the proposition.

Since purely perlocutionary suggestions do not seem to be related in any obvious systematic way to the syntax and semantic of direct illocutionary suggestions, they should be distinguished from indirect illocutionary suggestions and excluded from the discussion of such acts. One way of differentiating between indirect illocutionary suggestions is by means of appropriate responses. Indirect suggestions can be properly responded to by any of several remarks which make reference to some aspect of the semantics of direct suggestions, such as:

39) That's a good idea.

40) That's a lousy idea.

41) That's a possibility.

42) That's worth thinking about.

43) I'll keep that in mind.
44) I'll think about it.
45) That's a fine suggestion you just made there.
46) You think that's possible, do you?

This test eliminates the following sorts of perlocutionary suggestions:

47) It's time to go.
48) Well, Josie, it's about that time.
49) You haven't eaten your spinach.
50) There's rice to be cooked yet.
51) Did you clean up your room?
52) I don't see why you don't drink milk.
53) Is it advisable to touch that?
54) Should you do that?

Although there may well be a chain of deductions which relate such perlocutions to the semantic structure of suggestions, that relation is far more complicated than what I propose to deal with here.

Even more distantly related are those non-linguistic perlocutions, discussed in Chapter four, which suggest, e.g.:

55) I suggested leaving to her by starting the car.
56) By yelling real loud I managed to suggest to him that he was hurting me.
57) Fido suggested going for a walk by scratching on the door.

Since these perlocutions cannot even be used illocutionarily there is no question of their being confused with indirect suggestions; they are mentioned here just by way
of rounding out the discussion of possible ways to suggest.

The responses (39) - (46) reflect the notion of considering and are responses to CONSIDER suggestions. DO suggestions, as well as requests, may be responded to by:

58) OK.
59) Sure.
60) All right.

which, with normal falling intonation, are not appropriate responses to either the perlocutionary suggestions (47) - (54) nor to the perlocutionary requests below:

61) It's cold in here.
62) The window's open.
63) Do you have the time?

It is important to notice that it is only the utterances OK, Sure and All right in isolation that distinguishes illocution from perlocution. Any of these expressions followed by a reference to the intended perlocutionary suggestion or request is an appropriate response to at least some of the perlocutions illustrated in (47) - (54) and (61) - (63), e.g.:

64) OK, we'll leave now.
65) Sure, I'll do it.
66) All right, I'll close the window.

The situation with negative responses is similar but not nearly as clear, since it is not obvious what the
negative counterparts to (58) - (60) are. The best candidate I am aware of is:

67) Sorry.

which is an appropriate response to indirect illocutionary requests, like

68) Could you close the window?
69) Can we leave now?

but is not appropriate to the perlocutionary requests (61) - (63). Sorry can, like OK, etc., be elaborated to become a legitimate response to perlocutionary requests, e.g.,

70) Sorry, we have to stay.
71) Sorry, the window has to stay open.
72) Sorry, my watch is broken.

Unfortunately, the Sorry response does not work for suggestions (for rather obvious semantic reasons). The drawn-out, equivocal Well... is a relatively negative response to indirect illocutionary suggestions, but I am not entirely sure that it cannot also be an appropriate response to purely perlocutionary suggestions.

In view of the fact that elliptical responses reflect the underlying structures of what they are responses to (Morgan 1973), it is not surprising that (58) - (60) are appropriate to indirect illocutions and not perlocutions since the former are derived from semantic suggestions and requests while the latter are not.

There has been no mention made so far of perlocu-
tionary or indirect illocutionary commands for the reason that, as far as I can see, they do not exist. In giving a command, the speaker has no reason to be polite, which is the motivation behind many indirect illocutionary acts; the person commanding does not want the hearer to be able to (politely) refuse to carry out the order and so does not leave him a way out by indirect illocution or perlocution. The responses appropriate to orders (e.g., Yes, sir!, Immediately!) can only be used in response to indirect impositive acts when the hearer (i.e., the speaker of the response) is trying to be facetious or sarcastic by acting as if he understood the act to be an order.

There are other ways to distinguish indirect illocution from perlocution. One way involves the kinds of sentences that can be said to be fair reports of indirect suggestion or requests. Both of the most commonly used verbs, suggest and ask, are ambiguous in ways which would make them usable for reports of perlocutionary, as well as indirect illocutionary, acts; suggest has a non-linguistic meaning corresponding to imply, as we have already seen, and ask can be used to report an interrogation regardless of whether or not it is impositive, direct, indirect or perlocutionary. There are, however, verbs referring to the carrying out of the action specified in the impositive act which can be used in conjunction with suggest and ask. These verbs are obey for orders, follow or take (with a
subsequent suggestion or advice) for suggestions and comply with for requests. Indirect illocutionary acts, such as,

73) You should see a doctor.

74) Could we eat now?

can fairly be reported either by using unambiguous verbs such as recommend and request, as in (75a) and (76a) or by using suggest and ask along with a reference to the actions performed in response to the impositive act, as in (75b) and (76b).

75) a. She recommended that I see a doctor.

b. She suggested that I see a doctor, and I took her advice by visiting Dr. Kim.

76) a. She requested that we eat.

b. She asked that we eat, so I complied by thawing dinner.

Notice that (75) and (76) are not fair reports of the perlocutionary suggestions and requests (77) and (78):

77) Should you see a doctor?

78) I'm hungry.

There are also syntactic tests for distinguishing illocution and perlocution. Sadock (1971b) has observed that please may occur before a perlocutionary request, as in (79), but not after one (e.g. (80)), while it may occur in either position with an illocutionary request, as (81) and (82) show.
79) Please, it's cold in here.
80) *It's cold in here, please.
81) Close the window, please.
82) Please, close the window.

The indirect illocutionary suggestions based on the Reason condition and having the form:

83) Why don't you run for office?

exhibit peculiarities that perlocutionary suggestions do not. It was observed by Gordon and Lakoff (1971) that the indirect illocutionary suggestion (83) could reduce to:

84) Why not run for office?

and that no other readings of (83) could so reduce.15

Also, Sadock (1971b) has pointed out that the why don't you portion of sentences like (83) may be moved to the end of the sentence on the indirect suggestion reading, e.g.,

85) Run for office, why don't you?

These two properties of why don't you suggestions distinguish them from both the literal reading of such utterances as requests for information and any perlocutionary effect of suggesting such a literal reading may have.

There is also a movement transformation which makes tags out of the modal plus second person sequence in indirect suggestions (Sadock, 1974, calls this process 'fracturing'). All but a few modals allow this movement to take place and those few that do not are not interpretable as indirect illocutionary suggestions according to the res-
ponse tests given above.

86) a. Can you get the paper?
    b. Get the paper, can you?

87) a. Can't you get the paper?
    b. Get the paper, can't you?

88) a. Could you get the paper?
    b. Get the paper, could you?

89) a. Couldn't you get the paper?
    b. Get the paper, couldn't you?

90) a. Will you get the paper?
    b. Get the paper, will you?

91) a. Won't you get the paper?
    b. Get the paper, won't you?

92) a. Would you get the paper?
    b. Get the paper, would you?

93) a. Wouldn't you get the paper?
    b. Get the paper, wouldn't you?

94) a. Should you get the paper?
    b. *Get the paper, should you?

95) a. Shouldn't you get the paper?
    b. ?Get the paper, shouldn't you?

96) a. Must you get the paper?
    b. ?Get the paper, must you?

97) a. Mustn't you get the paper?
    b. ?Get the paper, mustn't you?
There are two kinds of tags on suggestions which seem to result from a movement rule, but are not as widely accepted as those mentioned above. The source of the How about and Let's suggestions of (98) and (99) below will be examined in Chapter six; the point to be made here is that these indirect illocutionary suggestions can produce tagged sentences similar to the way in which why don't you and the sentences with modals can.

98) a. How about getting the paper.
   b. Get the paper, how about it.

99) a. What do you say we go into town?
   b. Whatcha/Whaddya say we go into town?
   c. Let's go into town, whatcha/whaddya say?

These tests will allow us to determine whether or not the indirect illocutionary acts derived from felicity conditions discussed in the next chapter are actually indirect illocutionary acts or only perlocutionary acts.
CHAPTER VI

INDIRECT IMPOSITIVE ACTS

6.1  Impositive acts may be performed directly in two ways: as an explicit performative sentence with an impositive verb, or as an imperative-form sentence. The first way has been exemplified repeatedly in the preceding chapters. The second way has been mentioned with regard to CONSIDER suggestions; it is the most normal for of impositive acts on the strong end of the impositive squish (i.e., orders). Imperative-form sentences may also be used to suggest, but not to request, since using a direct form is not a polite way to impose one's will upon another, and the Status conditions on requests is that the speaker act as an inferior to the hearer (and hence deferentially).

There are many more ways to perform impositive acts indirectly, but even these are limited by the Status condition. Orders, to be effective, must be direct; requests, to be polite, must be in the form of questions or otherwise modified (e.g., with the addition of please or tags). Suggestions, however, are not so constrained by the Status condition and therefore may be either assertions or questions.
The result is that there are many types of indirect suggestions, some types of indirect requests and no indirect orders.

6.2 Looking first at the Not Done condition, we find the following indirect suggestions based on it,

1) Have you thought about Jeremiah's doing it?
2) You haven't considered Jeremiah's doing it.
3) Have you read *Cat's Cradle*?
4) You haven't read *Cat's Cradle*.

Sentences (3) and (4) are less obviously suggestions than (1) and (2), but they do appear quite natural with the responses appropriate to CONSIDER suggestions. There seems to be no reason that (3) and (4) are not DO suggestions; also, one would expect (1) and (3) to be possible indirect requests which they are not. It would appear that the Not Done condition has a very narrow range of indirect acts that it can produce by being questioned or asserted; although it is a condition that applies very generally, it only produces CONSIDER suggestion indirectly. Why this should be so is not clear, but the Not Done condition is the only condition which applies equally to all impositive acts; the other conditions apply more strongly to some impositive acts than to others and can be used to perform indirectly those to which it applies most strongly. The Not Done condition follows this pattern for the performance of indirect acts, but it
does not apply any more strongly to one type of act than to another.

The Not Done condition also has implications which may also be used to perform indirect suggestions:

6) Are you aware that Jeremiah could do it?

7) You don't seem to be aware of the possibility of Jeremiah's doing it.

Sentences like (6) and (7) are possible indirect suggestions based on the Not Done condition because 'not being aware' is related to 'not doing' or 'not done' by the Reason condition; that is, a possible reason for not having done an action is not being aware of the possibility of doing it. The indirect suggestions (6) and (7) also involve the Possibility condition, illustrating that indirect illocutions may be far from simple results of asserting or questioning felicity conditions.

Notice that (8) is not really a suggestion—possibly not an acceptable sentence of any kind:

8) ?You aren't aware of the possibility of Jeremiah's doing it.

The oddity of (8) is a result of the fact that it is very difficult (if not impossible) to know, or even think with any confidence, what another person is aware of (in ordinary circumstances). It is not as difficult to have an opinion on whether or not another person has considered a matter since such consideration usually results in some sort of action (linguistic or otherwise), especially in a situ-
ation calling for suggestions upon or discussion of a matter.

6.3 The Possibility condition produces the following indirect suggestions, (9) - (11), and requests, 12) - (13),

9) You could eat liver.
10) It wouldn't kill you to wash your feet.
11) Maybe she could take you to school.
12) Could we move that thing?
13) Is it possible to turn the radio down?

No doubt, for some speakers, the more direct assertion, It's possible for you to eat liver, which (9) is a paraphrase of, is also acceptable; in my dialect there is something strange about stating such an obvious fact in such a direct manner. Sentence (10) is slightly more indirect than (9); but since it rests on the indisputable fact that, for most people, an action which requires relinquishing one's life is not a possible action, it is a reasonable indirect suggestion. (11) illustrates that the possibility can be asserted more than once, and that such a possibility may depend on someone's physical ability to do something. An even more exaggerated assertion would be Maybe it might just possibly be the case that she could possibly, if she were able, take you to school, which is still an indirect suggestion although it certainly gives the hearer cause to doubt that the speaker actually believes in the possibility of the
action. Sentences (12) and (13) are straightforward and need no further comment.

It should be noted at this point that since all the conditions being discussed here are conditions on the speaker's beliefs, the indirect suggestion performed by asserting those beliefs can be prefaced with I believe or I think, so that such versions of (2) and (9) - (13) are also suggestions:

14) I think you haven't considered Jeremiah's doing it.
15) I don't think you've thought about Jeremiah's doing it.
16) I believe you could eat liver.
17) I don't think it would kill you to wash your feet.
18) I believe maybe she could take you to school.

I have used as main examples, and will continue to do so, those sentences without the I believe or I think in them because it is always assumed that, if a speaker is being sincere, he believes what he asserts, and therefore the simple sentences are more common and more natural.

Although the Possibility condition applies to all impositive acts, it is stronger on the weak end of the continuum; that is, the Possibility conditions is more important for suggestions and requests. With the exception of orders, at the strong end of the squish, just the opposite is true for the Good For condition. It applies more strongly
to recommendations than to suggestions and more strongly to suggestions than to requests. The result of this, for indirect illocutions, is that the Possibility condition is used to perform indirect requests and suggestions, but not recommendations, and the Good For condition is used to perform recommendations (and sometimes suggestions), but not requests.

6.4 The Good For condition is that the speaker believes the action is desirable or good for the hearer, although it is not always as an individual that the hearer is being thought of, but rather as a member of a group. There may be cases where the best interest of a particular individual is, in the speaker's opinion, less important than the welfare of the group; in such cases a recommendation may still be made, even though the proposed action may not be desirable for a particular member of the group. (However, even in these cases, the speaker believes the hearer will, as a member of the group, benefit in the long run.)

Some indirect recommendations, then, are:

19) It would be nice if you visited your mother.

20) He ought to learn to drive.

21) You should read Tolkien.

22) Shouldn't you try sketching first?

23) It wouldn't hurt to straighten up your desk once in a while.
24) Wouldn't it be better to chew tobacco?

Sentences (19) - (22) are fairly straightforward; that which is 'nice' is good for someone, and, for (20) - (22), the only link needed is the generally accepted notion that people should do good or desirable things, or that desirable thing are things that people should do. Sentence (23) is more complicated, partly because it is a sarcastic recommendation, but also because of certain assumptions the speaker makes when he says (23). Since the speaker of this sarcastic recommendation believes that for the hearer to straighten up his desk once in a while is a desirable thing, and furthermore he believes (or at least is pretending to believe) that the hearer shares this belief, then there must be some reason that the hearer doesn't straighten up his desk; a candidate (deliberately unlikely, by the way, since otherwise the speaker would not be able to deny it so confidently) for such a reason is that the hearer fears he will do himself psychic or bodily harm by cleaning up his desk. The speaker doesn't think any harm will befall the hearer if he cleans up his desk and says so. The sarcasm comes from the assumption of some sort of harm as a consequence of desk-cleaning; the speaker doesn't really believe that that is the reason for hearer's slovenliness, he is just pretending to believe it in order to attribute a reason to the hearer which he (the speaker) can then dispute or deny. This complex example involves the Reason con-
dition as well as the Good For condition.

Sentence (24) is considerably less complicated; the speaker is questioning the condition with a negative auxiliary, which implies that he believes that to chew tobacco would be better; since the related question with a positive auxiliary lacks that implication, *Would it be better to chew tobacco?* does not count as a recommendation; this exemplifies the fact that the condition need not be stated, but only implied, to effect the recommendation; it is also true of (22) and other questions.

Indirect warnings are also produced by asserting the Good For condition; however, warnings are generally against particular actions, so they turn up in negative sentences more often than in positive one.

25) It's not a good idea to run on lava rock.
26) If I were you I wouldn't do that.
27) I don't think you should drink that cobra venom.
28) It's not safe to swim here.

Example (25) is an assertion of the condition by virtue of the fact that *a good idea* is a paraphrase (perhaps a loose paraphrase, but a paraphrase, nevertheless) of 'something that is good for someone.' In (26) there are certain assumptions made; if an action is undesirable, the speaker would not do it—so, instead of saying it is not desirable, he says he wouldn't do it, thus affirming the consequent. Furthermore, since the hearer is the one contemplating, or
about to do, the action, the speaker hypothetically puts himself in the hearer's position, thereby warning him indirectly.

The cobra venom sentence is more obvious; one should not do potentially harmful things. (28) is also straightforward—unsafe actions (in the belief of most people) are not good things to do.

This particular condition does not lend itself to questioning as a way to perform indirect warnings; the sorts of questions one would expect ot be indirect warnings are:

29) Is it wise to feed cockroaches?
30) Should you grow pot in your front yard?
31) Would it be healthful to eat granola?

These are obviously not warnings; they are not even suggestions; they may have the perlocutionary effect of warning, but not even that is obvious. There are two possible reasons for these questions not being indirect warnings. One has to do with the syntactic form of the question, which must be that the auxiliary is positive (since the action is a negative or undesirable one); it seems that although the negative auxiliary implies the desirability of the complement (as was noted above), the positive auxiliary does not quite imply the negative; it seems, rather, to be relatively neutral in this respect. Therefore the undesirability is not implied and the warning is not produced. The other possible reason that (29) - (31) are not indirect warnings
is that warnings are toward the strong end of the impositive squish. Consequently, unless a speaker is fairly secure in his belief that the action is undesirable he will not feel justified in making a warning; if the hearer is already involved in the action or obviously contemplating it, a speaker who is not secure in his belief of the undesirability of the action will become even more insecure, since the very fact that the hearer does not seem to consider it undesirable may influence his (i.e., the speaker's) views on the matter.

It is the combination of the Good For condition and the Reason condition that produces the most common form of warnings, the conditional sentence. In some cases the Good For condition is relatively explicit, e.g.:

32) Don't touch that, if you know what's good for you.

33) If you want to stay alive, tell us the secret formula.

In other cases, it is not quite so explicit, e.g.:

34) There's a good reason not to sell now.
35) You'll lose a bundle if you sell now.
36) If you as much as look cross-eyed, I'll punch you in the nose.
37) Don't move or I'll blast you.
38) Don't touch it or it'll sting you.

Sentence (34) is not the best warning a person could give, but that is due to the fact that if the speaker has a rea-
son, it is more normal for him to say what that reason is rather than to simply state that there is one. However, if the hearer has sufficient confidence in the speaker's knowledge of, for example the stockmarket in (34), then such an assertion will probably serve as a warning. (35) is actually the more normal form that one would expect an indirect warning to take, i.e., the asserting of the reason for not doing the action. (36) is one of the most common ways that warnings are made, giving the reason for not doing an action in terms of a hypothetical situation; it is, of course an exaggerated warning, but such an exaggeration simply adds force to the intended effect. The warning in (37) is also a common type and, like (36), gives the reason for the hearer's not doing the specified action. The last example is similar to the previous one and simply shows that warnings of this type do not have to be threats like (36) and (37).

As in the set of warnings derived from the Good For condition, there are no warnings based on the Reason condition in the form of a question. However, there are sentences like (39),

39) Why sell dope?

which are not quite strong enough to be warnings, but which admonish or discourage. This is to be expected since admonish is weaker on the impositive squish than warn, and, in general, questioning is the milder form of indirect illo-
cution and tends to be used for weaker sorts of imposi-
tive acts.

6.5 The Reason condition is asserted and questioned
to perform suggestions in the following sentences:

40) There's no reason not to have a party.

41) There's nothing preventing us from making
    stroganoff.

42) I see no reason not to drink wine.

43) Is there any reason not to invite Yuriko?

44) Does anyone have anything against rehearsing
    now?

The first two of these indirect suggestions are plain
enough. (42) uses only the additional assumption that a
reason has to be known to be a reason. The question (43)
is straightforward and (44) requires only that a possible
reason for not rehearsing now is understood to be that
someone may not want or be able to. There is a point that
becomes slightly more prominent here than in previous exam­
ples, and that is that all these sentences are ambiguous;
they all have literal interpretations where the speaker
intends only to state a fact or request information. In
cases such as (43) and (44) where the literal readings tend
to overshadow the indirect illocutionary readings, the
stress of the sentences plays an important part. To be a
suggestion, (43)' must be stressed normally, i.e., on Yuriko;
if the stress is on not, for instance, the suggestion read-
ing does not come through. Likewise, for (44); the stress must be on now, which is the essence of the suggestion; extra stress anywhere else obliterates the impositive reading.

Recommendations based on the Reason condition are:

45) There's at least one good reason to impeach the president.
46) We'll make a lot of money if we sell now.
47) You'll live longer if you practice yoga.
48) Why don't we go horseback riding?
49) Why not buy the Bishop Estate?

The only assumptions involved in these sentences is that at least one reason is a reason, sentence (45); making a lot of money is a good reason for doing something, (46); and living longer is a reason to do something, (47). Like the suggestions in (43) and (44), the stress in the indirect recommendations (48) and (49) affects the import of the recommendation. The normal stress of (48) is on horseback; however if it is shifted to don't the recommending force is lost and the only sense left is that of requesting information. The stress can be shifted to we and still maintain the impositive reading; the only difference is that the recommendation centers on us as opposed to some other person or people. When the stress is reduced on don't and we they can be deleted, and a sentence of the form illustrated by (49) results. (49) can have stress either on
buy or Bishop Estate and still be an indirect recommendation, but if there is extra stress on why or not it must be interpreted literally.

6.6 There are two rather common types of suggestions which seem to be indirect but are not derivable, in any straightforward way, from the intrinsic conditions on direct suggestions. The first of these is the Let's suggestions, such as,

50) Let's go to town.
51) Let's think about moving to California.
52) Let's have dinner.

Part of the problem with these suggestions is that they are, at least to some degree, idiomatic with very curious syntactic properties.²

None of the intrinsic conditions discussed above provide a basis for the Let's suggestions; however, there may be some basis for these suggestions in the intermediate (i.e., neither purely intrinsic nor purely extrinsic) Status condition. Since the form of Let's suggestions is idiomatic, it is very difficult to see what the exact relationship between them and the Status condition is. It does seem, however, that the speaker and hearer have equal status in Let's constructions, and if the Let's idiom originated from the permission granting let, and if the underlying subject of Let's is both I and you (as Costa
(1972) suggests), these facts would link up the equal status requirement and the Let's suggestions. This is all very tenuous, of course, but there is one other fact that may lend it support. Sentences like (53) and (54),

53) Let's go, Sheila.

54) Let's get crackin', Kay.

can, for some speakers, be interpreted as not including the speaker in the action. When this is the case, the force of such impositive is much stronger than just a suggestion. It is, in fact, very like an order, made less severe (or perhaps even indirect) by using the equal status Let's. 3

Another type of impositive act which does not fit neatly into the framework provided here are those beginning with How about and What about as in:

55) How about a drink?

56) How about coming home with me?

57) What about Arlene?

58) What about going home?

These too are idiomatic; there is no direct, literal reading of them. Because of this idiomacity I can only offer a suggestion as to how they might be related to the felicity conditions on impositive acts: that How about and What about forms originate from questions on the order of How do you feel about and What do you think about, whose most direct function is to elicit an opinion from the hearer. Speakers generally only elicit opinions from
people they consider their equals or superiors. According to the Status condition, these *How about* and *What about* sentences, if they are to be interpreted as impositive acts, must be either suggestions or requests. And so they are: (55) - (58) are all interpreted as suggestions by some speakers, while others take (55) and (56) to be suggestions and (57) and (58) to be requests.

55) a. How about a drink?
   b. That's a good idea.
   c. OK./*Sorry.

56) a. How about coming home with me.
   b. That's a lousy idea.
   c. OK./?Sorry.

57) a. What about Arlene?
   b. That's a possibility.
   c. OK./Sorry.

58) a. What about going home?
   b. I'll keep that in mind.
   c. OK./Sorry.

6.7 I conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of verbs which exhibit some properties of impositive verbs, but which differ from them in fundamental ways. The first of these 'semi-impositives' is the verb *invite*; invitations look very much like regular impositive acts. They can be direct:

59) a. I hereby invite you to my party.
   b. You are hereby invited to my party.

They can also have the same indirect forms that requests can have, e.g.,
60) Can you come to my party?
61) Will you come to my party?
62) I'd like you to come to my party.

or even some of the suggestion forms,

63) How about coming to my party?
64) Why don't you come to my party?
65) Why not come to my party?

The request-type invitations of (60) - (62) are more normal than the suggestion-types (63) - (65) and (63) is a better invitation than (64), which in turn is slightly better than (65). Why there should be a difference among the invitations (63) - (65) is not clear, but the difference between (60) - (62) and (63) - (65) is understandable. Requests are more polite than suggestions; invitations generally are polite and therefore the requesting forms are better invitations than the suggesting forms. There is a problem here however, being polite means assuming a position inferior to that of the hearer, but at the same time, a speaker must, in order to be able to issue an invitation, be in a position higher than that of the hearer. In this way invitations are different from impositives; although it may be the case for impositive acts that the speaker is only acting as an inferior, there are no impositive acts which require that the speaker have higher status and at the same time require the speaker to act as if he had lower status.

The other major difference between invitations and
impositive acts involves illocutionary point. The purpose or aim of invitations seems to be to get the hearer to do something, which is the same as the illocutionary point of impositives. There is, however, another way of looking at the purpose of invitations: what appears to be the illocutionary point is actually a purely perlocutionary effect, and the illocutionary point of invitations is actually just to give the hearer permission to do something or to make an action possible for the hearer. Whether getting someone to do something is illocutionary or purely perlocutionary is in principle easily determined. If invitations are impositive acts, it is safe to assume they are requests; it was proposed in Chapter five that the positive responses,

66) OK.
67) Sure.
68) All right.

and the negative response,

69) Sorry.

were appropriate to illocutionary requests but not to perlocutionary requests, for which they require elaborated responses. E.g.,

70) OK, I'll come.
71) Sure, I'd like to come.
72) All right, I'll be there.
73) Sorry, I can't make it.

The problem with invitations is that, at least in
my dialect, it is not obvious that the simple responses
(66) - (69) are completely inappropriate, although they do
seem considerably worse than the elaborated responses
(70) - (73):

74) A. i. Can you come to my party?
   ii. I'd like you to come to my party.

75) B. i. OK.
   ii. Sure.
   iii. All right.
   iv. Sorry.

76) B. i. OK, I'll come.
   ii. Sure, I'd like to come.
   iii. All right, I'll be there.
   iv. Sorry, I can't make it.

I have called invitations semi-impositives because
their status condition works differently than that of any
impositive act and their illocutionary point, though simi­
lar, is not indisputably the same as that of impositive acts. There are semi-impositive acts which appear to be
special types of invitations and differ from impositives in
even more interesting ways.

These acts I will refer to as challenges; they are
performed and/or described by the verbs dare, defy and
challenge and are exemplified in:

77) I dare you to cross that line.

78) I defy you to say that again.

79) I hereby challenge you to defend that claim.

    a duel at sunrise.

Challenges are invitations in that they invite (or make it
possible for) the hearer to do some action. However, chal­
Challenges differ from normal invitations in the application of felicity conditions. The status condition is the same as for invitations (that is, the speaker has higher status than the hearer) but one of the ultimate results the speaker of a challenge hopes to produce is to conclusively determine his superior status.

Another felicity condition that holds for imperatives does not hold for challenges, namely, the Good For condition. A speaker uttering a challenge does not believe that the hearer's taking up the challenge will benefit him (the hearer); in fact, he believes quite the opposite and is trying to get the hearer to engage in an activity that will be harmful to him.

The Possibility condition is an interesting one for challenges. It seems to hold for them as (80) shows:

80) If/Since you think you can climb that tree,
    I \{ dare, defy, challenge \} you to do it.

However, a common form of indirect challenges is based on the negation or denial of this condition, e.g.,

81) You can't climb that tree.
82) You can't catch me.

Notice that the hearer may respond to (81) or (82) with either of the following two remarks:

83) Is that a challenge?
84) That sounds like a dare to me.
This is the first instance we have seen of the denial of a felicity condition being used to perform an indirect illocutionary act. A closer look at negative illocutionary verbs is needed to see how general this phenomenon is.

The denial of the possibility condition as an indirect challenge is also exhibited in certain uses of the verbs bet and wager. When these verbs are used to express the speaker's belief that the hearer is incapable of performing a particular action, the resulting assertions are illocutionary challenges. E.g.,

85) I bet you can't catch me.
86) I wager you aren't able to do it.

This illustrates another new aspect of indirect illocutionary acts: the existence of specific verbs that can be used to perform only indirect illocations. Bet and wager do not count as challenges (although they are, of course, used as direct bets), as the unacceptability of (87) and (88) show,

87) *I bet you to clim that tree.
88) * I wager that you catch me.

(The asterisks here refer only to the challenge reading; with that-clauses both verbs are acceptable but must be interpreted as bets, in which case the speaker does believe the hearer can do the specified action.)

Negative bets without the modal of possibility can are ambiguous as between bets and challenges, though the literal (bet) reading is stronger.
89) I bet you don't climb that tree.
90) I wager that you don't catch me.

This discussion has only touched upon the possibilities involved in related illocutionary act types (impositives and invitations), denial of felicity conditions, and indirect illocutionary verbs. A more comprehensive analysis must await further investigation.

There is one last semi-impositive I would like to mention. The verb threaten describes both linguistic and non-linguistic acts; it is related to the impositive warn in that a threat can be a specific kind of warning—namely, one in which the speaker intends to produce the undesirable effect being warned against.

However, threats can be used to inform the hearer of the speaker's intention to harm him. Threats only seem impositive when the hearer is offered a choice: either do the specified action or suffer the consequences. The following threats do not have impositive force.

91) I'm going to take you teddy bear away.

92) No matter what you do, you can't stop me; I'm going to cut your hair.

Illocutionarily, threats are commissives; causing people to do things is a perlocutionary effect of threats which can be either intentional or unintentional. In this regard threats are very much like contingent promises which also have the perlocutionary effect of getting the
hearer to do something. Thus the difference between the two is neither illocutionary or perlocutionary. The sentences below are threats if the intention of the speaker is to do something which is not good for the hearer, and they are promises if it is something that is good for the hearer.

93) Cook dinner. and I'll help you with your project.

94) If you cook dinner, I'll help you with your project.

The two interpretations of (93) and (94) depend entirely on the Good For condition; the relationship between threats and promises is similar to many different types of impositive acts which have the same illocutionary point but different felicity conditions.

The discussion presented here of semi-impositives is meant only as an indication that there are related speech act types and that such relations can be described in terms of illocutionary point, perlocutionary effect, and felicity conditions. Further such analyses of other types of speech acts should provide us with much valuable information on the nature of illocutionary acts.
Chapter I

Felicity conditions are to be understood as the conditions which must hold for an illocutionary act to be successfully performed. Exactly how felicity conditions are to be represented in the semantic structure, if at all, is as yet an unresolved question.

There is some sort of correspondence, however, since (as was pointed out to me by Arnold Zwicky) different forms of declarative sentences (e.g., negative sentences, sentences to which transformations like Extrapolation has applied) or interrogative sentences (e.g., yes-no questions, WH-questions) are not considered separate sentence types.

Exactly what constitutes a meaning class has not always (or maybe even ever) been agreed upon, e.g., R. Lakoff (1968) requires that the members be identical and substitutable, hence, suggest and insist for her derive from structures with different abstract verbs, whereas Ross (1970a) (at least implicitly) would allow one abstract performative verb of saying for declarative sentences which would include many superficial verbs and would be a much broader sort of meaning class. As will become clear later, I favor a broader classification like Ross does, with differences accounted for by embeddings under the performative predicate and felicity conditions.

Notice that at least some felicity condition is crucial for the performance of an illocutionary act with an explicit performative verb since without such a condition an unembedded first person singular, present tense utterance could be a description or report of a habitual action.

Sadock (1974) briefly suggests that whimperatives be derived from an underlying I indirectly request of you...; no details of the proposal are given, so it is impossible to evaluate it.

Sadock (1974) points out that whimperatives like Will you shut up? are not polite, although they are somehow less direct than the corresponding command Shut up!. I believe that such whimperative forms, as well as those with please (e.g., Will you please shut up?) are basically polite forms which are being used sarcastically. I have not yet, how-
ever, explored this notion in detail.
7 Sadock doesn't deal explicitly with forms like I'd like a beer, and I see no way that they could be fit into his framework except as perlocutionary requests.

Chapter II
1 Since Austin's taxonomy is largely intuitive, it is difficult to tell how much it derives from the performative/constative dichotomy.
2 Expressive speech acts are particularly prone to having their sincerity conditions violated in polite society.

Chapter III
1 At least they are not direct attempts to get people to do things; they may function as indirect illocutionary impositive acts, but that is a different matter and will be dealt with in Chapter five.
2 R. Lakoff (1972) has suggested that a pragmatic analysis is possible and that certain pragmatic features have syntactic consequences. However, it is not clear that these features are purely pragmatic, i.e., are not semantic features with closely related pragmatic features.
3 The term 'semantic structure' is used throughout this thesis rather presumptuously; there are no doubt deeper semantic representations for the structures presented here.
4 R. Lakoff (1968) in discussing abstract performative verbs in Latin syntax uses IMPER for commands only and suggest that there are other such verbs for other types of impositive acts. Sadock (1971a) uses IMPERE in an underlying structure (p. 223), but gives no explanation of what he means by it.
5 The verbs suggest, recommend and advise are, for some speakers, ambiguous as between a suggestion and a recommendation; see section 4.5 for more on this.
6 This proposal, in general, is the same as R. Lakoff's (1968) who advocated several different abstract performative verbs, each representing only surface verbs which are synonymous. Each of her abstract performative structures are differentiated by undergoing only certain transformational rules.
7 Performative Deletion was proposed by Ross (1970a, 1970b) and, although there are some problems with its exact formulation and application (see Anderson (1971) and Fraser (1971) for criticism of the performative analysis), the general idea is sound. All types of impositive acts can be formed via this rule: it applies after Equi-NP Deletion
for orders (accounting for the imperative sentence type in Go home!) and before Subject-Verb Inversion for requests (Will you go home?).

Chapter IV

1 Several linguists have discussed this particular sort of ambiguity; G. Lee (1971) argues that the connection-of-ideas sense derives from a structure involving CAUSE (SEEM) whereas the agentive sense derives from an underlying agent. Ann and Arnold Zwicky (1973) suggest that the ambiguity stems from an underlying REASON which divides into CAUSE (for non-agentives) and PURPOSE (for agentives).

2 The term 'pro-agentive' was introduced by G. Lee (1971) and refers to contexts in which agents may occur; the opposite term 'anti-agentive' describes contexts in which agents may not occur. Lee distinguishes pro-agentive contexts from the broader class of non-stative verbs proposed by G. Lakoff (1966); the following are pro-agentive contexts: in imperative sentence form; with a manner adverb typically referring to human attributes (e.g. cleverly, stupidly, intentionally); and as complement of the verb persuade. In contrast, a test such as whether or not a verb can occur in the progressive says nothing about agentivity, but only whether that verb is stative or non-stative.

3 Notice that the relationship between the two verbs is such that suggest\textsuperscript{3} implies suggest\textsuperscript{2}, but not vice versa; a sentence such as (i) is contradictory for all speakers:

\begin{enumerate}
  \item She suggested\textsuperscript{3} that Harbird was guilty (by saying "I suggest Harbird did it.") without actually suggesting\textsuperscript{2} it.
\end{enumerate}

It is because suggest\textsuperscript{3} implies suggest\textsuperscript{2} that G. Lakoff's (1970) test for showing ambiguity does not work:

\begin{enumerate}
  \item She suggested that Harbird was guilty and so did he.
\end{enumerate}

This line of argument was originally presented in Zwicky and Sadock (1973).

4 It may also be that the same speaker would accept (16) - (19) but not (23) simply because of the phonological identity of the two suggests in (23).

5 See Morgan (1973) for an extremely interesting account of sentence fragments.

6 See G. Lee (1971) and Dowty (1972) for a discussion of the role DO plays in the semantic configurations of activities and agentive predicates.

7 There are speakers for whom (45) has a non-factive reading (in addition to the factive one); for those speakers sentence (45) is acceptable and means the same as (47).
It is possible that (46) is an indirect suggestion based on a felicity condition involving the notion of considering; this and other problems with the CONSIDER analysis will be discussed in section 4.6.

This was suggested or recommended to me by Gregory Lee.

Recommendations and suggestions are beginning to look very indiscrete, especially with respect to the Good For condition.

More will be said about this kind of indirect illocution in the next chapter.

The almost argument is attributed to Jerry Morgan by McCawley (1968); the again argument is simply a logical extension of the almost argument.

This argument is due to G. Lakoff (1970b).

Chapter V

An important non-essential condition of some impositive acts is that the speaker believe that the proposed action is one which is desirable to, or good for, the hearer or some concerned party. This is related to the essential condition of speaker desire in that it may provide a reason for the speaker's desiring to perform the act.

See Heringer (1972), Chapter three, for more general conditions on a wider variety of speech acts, which account for some indirect impositive acts such as, May I suggest you get ready and I would like to suggest that we leave now.

The term 'squish' is due to Ross (1972), who defines it as a quasi-continuum of linguistic elements. A later definition (Ross 1973) is: 'the matrix formed when two hierarchies interact to mutually define each other.' (p. 98)

These conditions of Heringer's are:

(3.21)'In settings where he is being deferential to the addressee, the performer of an illocutionary act K believes that he has permission of the addressee to perform the volitional acts involved in the carrying out of K, i.e., that the addressee will allow him to carry out these acts.'

(3.24)'The performer of an illocutionary act K believes (and, in fact, knows) that the addressee has his permission to perform the volitional acts involved in K, i.e., that he will allow the addressee to carry out those acts.'

(3.35)'In less formal settings where he is being deferential to the addressee, the performer of
K believes the addressee desires that all acts involved in the performance of K take place.

Note that whether the notion of considering is represented as a semantic CONSIDER or as a felicity condition, it still falls under the domain of this condition, since in either case it is an act involved in the performance of an impositive act.

It was pointed out to me by Richard Garner that this appears to violate the illocutionary point of impositive acts. However, that is only true if what the speaker is attempting to get the hearer to do is to complete the specified action. For these cases, it appears that the speaker is only trying to get the hearer to attempt to do the specified action. In this regard these acts are similar to the semi-impositive acts of challenging discussed in section 6.7.

A broader view of this condition is expressed in Searle's property six, which says that an act may differ in whether the proposition is in the interest of the speaker, hearer, both or neither. For impositive acts only the interest of the hearer is important.

Apparently, for some speakers there is an acceptable sarcastic reading of (22). It was suggested to me by Gregory Lee that such a reading is possible, especially if the adverb naturally is inserted before recommend.

The sort of perversion inherent in the acceptable readings of (20) and (21) is not only linguistic in nature; other sorts of general behavior exhibit the same properties. For example, masochists or cigarette smokers do not violate rational modes of behavior by engaging in activities they believe to be bad; rather they believe that there is a certain goodness derived from being beaten or smoking which outweighs whatever bad effects these activities may produce. Put another way, the beliefs of such people differ from normal people's beliefs--but, given these abnormal beliefs, the ensuing behavior is rational.

There is also the factor of the extra-linguistic environment in which the act is performed affecting style; nominations and motions are the formal equivalent of suggestions.

This aspect of warnings will be dealt with more fully in Chapter six.

There is a very limited range of situations in which sentence (32) can be used, since speakers can almost always choose to be deferent if they like. A possible situation for (32) might be if the speaker of the sentence were a sergeant in the army and the hearer a private, and, due to the atrocious nature of the request, the private would only
acknowledge it if it were made as a command within the military hierarchy.

13 Sadock (1974) refers to the perlocution of purely perlocutionary suggestions as 'force-perlocutions' and that of illocutionary suggestions as 'sense-perlocutions.'

14 It was pointed out to me by J.R. Ross that comply describes an act which is more clearly illocutionary when it is followed by some kind of NP. A sentence such as

i) She asked that I leave and I complied.

reports an act which is less clearly an illocutionary request than

ii) She asked that I leave and I complied by going.

which in turn reports an act less clearly illocutionary than

iii) She asked that I leave and I complied with her request by going.

15 It was called to my attention by D.L. Stampe that the why don't you part of the indirect illocutionary reading of (83) also undergoes stress reduction and various other rules of casual speech to be pronounced [wɔyə], while the literal reading may not be so reduced. This is only true for sloppy speakers.

16 The must sentences were brought to my attention by George Lakoff.

Chapter VI

1 One way of looking at this difference is that for the weaker impositives the speaker is relatively neutral toward the possibility of the action, but for orders the speaker believes strongly that the action is either possible or not (cf. note 6, chapter five).

2 Newmeyer (1971) points out that if Let's suggestions are assumed to have the underlying structure:[We let we[we eat]] certain tags are easily accounted for:

i) Let's eat, shall we?

ii) Let's eat, why don't we?

However, he notes, such an underlying structure would predict:

iii)*Let ourselves eat!

instead of:

iv) Let us eat!

Costa (1972) proposes that Let's suggestions are 'true imperatives' with an underlying structure like:
3 It was pointed out to me by Arnold Zwicky that some speakers have the compound suggestions:

\{ \text{How about} \}
\{ \text{Don't} \}
\{ \text{let's do that!} \}

4 This discussion of kinds of invitations owes much to suggestions from Gregory Lee.

5 This view is opposed to the one that Sadock (1974) takes; he claims that threats and warnings constitute a distinct illocutionary type.

6 R. Lakoff (1969) discusses a consequence of this difference in application of the Good For condition. Where contingent promises normally have some, threats have any, e.g.,

i) If you eat \{ \text{some} \} candy, I'll give you ten dollars.

ii) If you eat \{ \text{*any} \} candy, I'll whip you.
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