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The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1974
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THREAT, DECISION TIME, AND AWARENESS: THE
IMPACT OF SITUATIONAL VARIABLES ON
FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

by

Linda Parrish Brady, A.B., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University

1974

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Department of Political Science
For my first teacher, who encouraged
me to question, to create, and to hope.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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The assistance of so many colleagues does not, of course, remove my responsibility for any errors of omission or commission. For these, I bear full responsibility.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION .............................................. ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .......................................... iii
VITA .................................................... v
LIST OF TABLES .................................... viii
LIST OF FIGURES .................................... x
INTRODUCTION ............................................. 1

Chapter

I. THE SITUATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ............. 7
   Introduction
   Basic Definitions and Assumptions
   Alternative Models of Situational Influence
   Conclusion

II. DIMENSIONS OF THE SITUATION, BUREAUCRATIC PROCESS AND FOREIGN POLICY .......... 37
   Introduction
   Threat-Opportunity, Decision Time and Awareness: The Situational Cube
   The Bureaucratic Process
   The Event as Foreign Policy
   Dimensions of Foreign Policy Behavior
   Conclusion

III. THE IMPACT OF SITUATIONAL DIMENSIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR .......... 88
   Introduction
   Threat-Opportunity and Foreign Policy
   Decision Time and Foreign Policy
   Awareness and Foreign Policy
   Conclusion
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>DATA AND METHODS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Event Data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparative Research on the Events of Nations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operationalization of Concepts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reliability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Validity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data Analysis and Interpretation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>SITUATIONAL DIMENSIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY: SOME INITIAL RESULTS AND ADDED HYPOTHESES</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Threat-Opportunity and Foreign Policy Behavior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision Time and Foreign Policy Behavior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Awareness and Foreign Policy Behavior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Situational Type and Foreign Policy: Hypotheses and Illustrations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>THE SITUATION, BUREAUCRATIC PROCESS AND FOREIGN POLICY: TESTING TWO ALTERNATIVE MODELS</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Situational Type and Foreign Policy: Some Initial Conclusions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Situational Type and Foreign Policy: The Interaction Question</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Situational Type, the Bureaucratic Process, and Foreign Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct and Indirect Models of Situational Influence: An Evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Distribution of CREON Events by Country and Year</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Distribution of Events by Type and Year in CREON</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sample Events from the CREON Data Set</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Distribution of Events by Situational Dimension and Year</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Frequencies for Bureaucratic Process Variables</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Distribution of Events by WEIS Action Code and Year</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Factor Loadings for 30 WEIS Categories (Orthogonally Rotated Matrix)</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Factor Loadings for Specificity Variables (Orthogonally Rotated Matrix)</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Frequencies for Specificity Variables</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Concepts and Selected Indicators from the CREON Data Set</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Comparison of Reliability Estimates for Recoded Variables</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Percentage of Complete Situational Data for CREON Nations</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Cumulative Percentage of Complete Situational Data for CREON Nations</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Distribution of Events by Situational Type and Year</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Situational Type by Nation for 35 CREON Nations</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Examples of Event, Stimulus, and Situational Coding for the Eight Situational Types</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Summary of t-Tests for Threat-Opportunity</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Summary of t-Tests for Decision Time</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Summary of t-Tests for Awareness</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### LIST OF TABLES (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Situational Type and Foreign Policy Behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Comparison of Observed and Expected Situational Type Rankings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Three-way Analysis of Variance Results for Individual Behavior Dimensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Four-way Analysis of Variance Results for Individual Behavior Dimensions (Centralization of Authority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Four-way Analysis of Variance Results for Individual Behavior Dimensions (Bureaucratic Opposition)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A Direct Model of Situational Influence</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>An Indirect Model of Situational Influence</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Situational Cube</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Summary of Bivariate Hypotheses</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Direct and Indirect Models of Situational Influence</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Suggested Integration of Situational, Bureaucratic Politics, and Personal Characteristic Perspectives</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reality is not an exhibit for man’s inspection, labeled "Do not touch." There are no appearances to be photographed, no experiences to be copied, in which we do not take part. Science, like art, is not a copy of nature but a re-creation of her. We re-make nature by the act of discovery, in the poem or in the theorem. And the great poem and the deep theorem are new to every reader, and yet are his own experiences, because he himself re-creates them. They are the marks of unity in variety; and in the instant when the mind seizes this for itself, in art or in science, the heart misses a beat.

J. Bronowski
INTRODUCTION

Transitory qualities of the situation confronting decision-makers are often viewed as mediating influences on foreign policy behavior. Policy-makers may act in the context of a crisis, their behavior conditioned by the impact of the situation on their ability to cope with stress. Alternatively, bureaucratic participants in the foreign policy-making process may respond routinely to those situations in international affairs which occur periodically. At times, lack of structure in a situation (or, ambiguity) discourages response altogether, resulting in the absence of specific directed foreign policy behavior.

Generally, however, concern with the impact of situational factors on foreign policy behavior tends to be superficial. Nearly twenty years ago Richard Snyder (1955: 478) called for "greater emphasis on situational analysis as an integrating device" in the study of international politics. To date few foreign policy analysts have accepted his challenge; those who have merely pay lip service to the significance of the situation, avoiding explicit statements describing the nature and extent of that influence and the conditions under which situational factors will be influential. Although some attention is paid to particular types of situations such as crises, little attention is directed towards the wider range of possible situational types. Case studies of specific problems do, of course,
exist. However, these studies (with the possible exception of those concerning crises) are not situation-oriented. Normally they serve as laboratories for testing other alternative explanations of foreign policy, and rarely do they view the situation itself as the major explanatory variable.

This study investigates the impact of the situation confronting decision-makers on foreign policy behavior, and has four general purposes:

(1) to assess the impact of situational qualities on foreign policy behavior

(2) to test two alternative models of situational influence

(3) to determine the utility of a particular situational typology in explaining foreign policy behavior

(4) to evaluate the potential of event data (and, in particular, data collected by the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations [CREON] project) for the study of situational influences on foreign policy.

In achieving the first purpose we select three situational variables—threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness—and present and test a series of hypotheses relating these dimensions individually to three foreign policy behavior variables—hostility-cooperation, commitment, and specificity. The choice of these particular situational and behavioral dimensions is justified by their appearance in the international relations and foreign policy literature.

This survey of the literature in international relations and foreign policy also reveals several approaches to the study of situational influences on international behavior. Abstracting from this
literature we develop a series of definitions and assumptions which underly a general situational perspective. From these definitions and assumptions two models are derived which suggest alternative explanations of situational influence. The first model asserts a direct linkage between situational variables and foreign policy, while the second views bureaucratic process characteristics as intervening variables affecting the relationship between situation and foreign policy. Both models are subsequently tested for the three behavior dimensions.

Thirdly, we evaluate the utility of a specific situational typology in explaining these same behavior dimensions. Charles F. Hermann (1969a) presents an eight-fold typology by dichotomizing three dimensions of the situation confronting policy-makers—threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness. This typology may be pictured as a situational "cube," the eight corners of the cube representing ideal types of situations resulting in varying decision processes and foreign policy behavior. Based on our earlier assumptions, the results of psychological experiments, empirical research in international relations, and our findings from the initial bivariate analysis, we construct and test hypotheses linking the eight situational types to foreign policy behavior.

International events collected by the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations [CREON] project form the data base for this analysis. The data represent foreign policy actions initiated by thirty-five selected nations during a sample of thirty months drawn from the decade 1959 through 1968. Our final aim is to draw some
initial conclusions regarding the appropriateness of international event data for the study of situational influences on foreign policy. The recent growth of the international event data "movement" has led to application of event data to a wide variety of research questions. Given the nature of the questions addressed by a situational perspective, can such data profitably be used to study the impact of situation on behavior? More specifically, do the CREON data allow us to ask questions which might not be asked were other event data to form the basis for the analysis?

The format of the study is as follows: Chapter I presents an illustration of situational influences on foreign policy, argues the significance of a situational perspective, introduces the definitions and assumptions underlying situational analysis, and derives two models of situational influence. Chapter II discusses the situational "cube" and its composite dimensions, the foreign policy behavior dimensions, and bureaucratic process characteristics, and justifies their selection. Chapter III develops hypotheses relating the three situational dimensions to foreign policy behavior. Data collection techniques and methods of analysis are discussed in Chapter IV. In Chapter V we present the results of the bivariate analyses and on the basis of these results derive propositions relating the eight situational types to the three behavior dimensions. Three rankings of the eight types are then hypothesized, each suggesting relative levels of the behavior variable expected for the situational types. Chapter VI compares these expected rankings with those obtained from a three-way analysis of variance, discusses interaction effects among the situa-
tional variables, and then evaluates the direct and indirect models of situational influence using four-way analysis of variance techniques. In the concluding chapter we assess our results in terms of our initial aims and suggest avenues of future research.
NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1 Representative of more systematic discussions of situational variables by an economist and a political scientist, respectively, are Boulding (1962) and Jervis (1970). The empirical application of a situational model to Canadian foreign policy behavior may be found in Munton (1973). For the psychological approach to situational influences on international affairs see Pruitt (1965) and Kelman (1970).

2 For example, see Cohen (1957) on the Japanese peace settlement after World War II, Epstein (1964) on British foreign policy during the 1956 Suez crisis, and Thordarson (1972) on the Canadian decision to initiate a foreign policy review.
CHAPTER I

THE SITUATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base—by the presence of these large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction—constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all Americans....This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms build-up in Cuba would retain its original defensive character....

President John F. Kennedy
October 23, 1962
(Kennedy, 1969: 132)

A high-priority cable...arrived from Santo Domingo. The Ambassador reported that the situation was 'deteriorating rapidly.' He warned: 'American lives are in danger.' I told my advisors that I was not going to sit by and see American lives lost in this situation. If local authorities could not provide protection, we had no choice but to provide the necessary protection ourselves...My decision had been made: The Marines would protect Americans and move them safely out of the Dominican Republic.

President Lyndon B. Johnson
April 28, 1965
(Johnson, 1971: 194-195)

As has often been argued, particularly by participants in the decision-making process, foreign policy is not made, and therefore should not be interpreted, in a vacuum. Aspects of the context
within which decision-makers act affect both the policy-making process and the substantive policies which result. President Kennedy's decision to impose a naval blockade on Cuba in October, 1962, Israel's reaction to military attack by the Arab nations in October, 1973, President DeGaulle's 1959 announcement that France would cease participation in NATO military activities, and Prime Minister Trudeau's acceptance of Canadian appointment to the I.C.C.S. following the January, 1973 Vietnam ceasefire agreement were influenced by the context within which those policy choices were made. If Soviet missiles in Cuba had been far from operational, if the Arab nations had not been receiving military support from the Soviet Union, if the United States and other NATO countries had been willing to make certain concessions to DeGaulle regarding France's role in the alliance, and if Canada previously had not participated in numerous UN-sponsored peacekeeping activities, might not alternative decisions have been made?

The notion of context appears under various labels in foreign policy discussions. Harold and Margaret Sprout (1965) speak of the influence of the environment or "milieu" within which decisions are made. They further separate the environment into objective (operational) and subjective (psychological) components. In another discussion the Sprouts (1971: 11) document "the changing context of international politics," referring to "...the emerging dilemmas of dysfunctional power and grossly insufficient disposable resources, the spreading crisis of priorities, and the inescapable growth of interdependence that is transforming our world into a single
ecosystem." Numerous writers apply the more general rubrics of "external conditions" or "environmental factors" in their analyses of international politics (Deutsch, 1966; Rosenau, 1971; Rosecrance, 1963; Alger, 1966). In a slightly different vein, Stanley Hoffmann (1968) has attempted to describe the "setting" of American foreign policy.

Other researchers set forth a narrower conception of the context or environment. From Snyder's (1958: 17) perspective, nations are viewed as actors in a "situation." The situation presents policymakers with an occasion for decision; this occasion, when considered together with characteristics of the individual decision-maker and the organizational context, provides an explanation of foreign policy decisions (Snyder, et al., 1962). How might we more specifically define this occasion for decision? Robinson and Snyder (1965) suggest a relationship between the situation and policymakers' images. According to their formulation, the occasion for decision influences whose images "count" in the policy-making process as well as the substance of those images. Pruitt (1965) offers a similar perspective. Policymakers' definitions of the situation result from their images of other international actors. More specifically, definition of the situation includes images of other actors, perceptions of the relationships between those actors and one's goals, and notions of the appropriate behaviors to be directed at other actors.

Focus on the "situation" by no means suggests individual characteristics are unimportant. Field theoretical analyses argue against a focus on the individual or the situation, but instead
encourage simultaneous consideration of both influences. Kurt Lewin's work is particularly instructive. Lewin (1951: 240) defines a "field" as "the totality of coexisting facts which are conceived of as mutually interdependent." Included in a social field are both characteristics of the individual and dimensions of his environment; the field, in fact, describes the relationship of an individual to his environment. According to Lewin a field is psychological; its characteristics do not represent objective qualities but, rather, the interaction of the individual with a specific situation. Sells (1963) adopts a similar approach in his discussion of dimensions of stimulus situations; these dimensions arise from the interaction of the individual with his environment. Finally, Cattell (1963) defines the "environmental situation" in terms of its psychological meaning.

Is recognition of the interaction of individual with situation incompatible with a "definition of the situation" approach? To the contrary, Lewin's perspective and the Snyder approach seem complementary. At no point does Snyder suggest individual characteristics are irrelevant to policy-makers' definitions of the situation. In fact he argues, at least implicitly if not explicitly, that such characteristics shape the definition of the situation (Snyder, 1958: 33-35). Viewed from this perspective, definition of the situation might be equated with interaction of the individual with a specific situation. This perspective will be adopted in this study.

For the purpose of this study, we elect to focus on the situation confronting decision-makers as representative of a kind of contextual influence on foreign policy. As such, situations share
certain characteristics with "external conditions" and "settings." All three, for example, suggest the significance of decision-makers' relationships with other entities, be they decision-makers in other nations or non-human elements of the environment. On the other hand, by situation we mean something quite distinct from these kinds of contextual influences. In brief, situations describe elements of the context related to other nations' behavior, as perceived by decision-makers. These perceptions (or, their definitions of the situation) result from the interaction of individual characteristics and aspects of the context. We will elaborate this definition below.

The large-scale commitment of American forces in Vietnam during late 1964 and the first half of 1965 dramatically illustrates the impact of situational factors on foreign policy actions. On August 2, 1964 the destroyer USS Maddox was attacked by three North Vietnamese PT boats while on patrol 30 miles off the North Vietnamese coast in the Gulf of Tonkin. That same morning President Johnson called a meeting in the White House of his key advisors. Present at the meeting were Secretary of State Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance, General Wheeler representing the Joint Chiefs, and several technical intelligence experts. As a result of the meeting the decision was made to continue the Maddox patrol, with the addition of another destroyer and air support. Moreover, the President and his advisors drafted a diplomatic protest to Hanoi and, when direct communication proved impossible, had the note broadcast on the Voice of America and released to the world press.

A second attack directed at the Maddox and the USS C. Turner
Joy occurred on August 4. Labeling the situation a "crisis" in the Tonkin Gulf, President Johnson interrupted a National Security Council meeting on the Cyprus problem to discuss these events and possible American responses. From these deliberations emerged decisions to initiate retaliatory air strikes against the PT boats and an air strike against a selected North Vietnamese air depot. The President also attempted to gather more accurate information concerning the attacks; at one point, for example, he had received intelligence reports denying such attacks. Following the President's instructions, Secretary of Defense McNamara contacted Admiral Sharp, Commander in the Pacific, and pressed him for specific, detailed accounts of the two incidents. Finally, on the evening of August 4, President Johnson met with the Congressional leadership and sought their approval of a resolution empowering him to protect the lives of American citizens in the Gulf of Tonkin. Such a resolution was in fact approved by Congress, opening the way for further American commitments.

During February, 1965 a policy of gradual but consistent retaliation for North Vietnamese attacks in the South developed within the Johnson administration. According to the President's own interpretation, the report of his Assistant for National Security Affairs (McGeorge Bundy) based on first-hand observation of conditions in South Vietnam exerted a strong influence on the development of this policy. Upon returning from consultations in Saigon, Bundy issued a report which stated that "the situation in Vietnam is deteriorating, and without new U.S. action defeat appears inevitable—probably not in a matter of weeks or perhaps even months, but within the next year
or so. There is still time to turn around, but not much.² An immediate result of this report was the adoption of a retaliation policy. Commitment to the general policy was put to the test on February 6 when the North Vietnamese launched a major attack on the U.S. Army barracks at Pleiku and a nearby helicopter base. The United States responded with air strikes against the North and evacuation of all American dependents in South Vietnam. A February 10 North Vietnamese attack on army barracks in Qui Nhon was countered with additional air strikes and a decision to protest the action in the UN Security Council. From this point on, American commitment escalated rapidly.

Each of the momentous decisions so briefly described here illustrates the influence of situational factors on both the decision-making process and the substance of American foreign policy. The initial decisions taken in response to the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, for example, were made in the context of small, ad hoc or formal groups—either the National Security Council or a group of the President's "key" advisors. Furthermore, the nature of the situation (which the President himself identified as a crisis) prompted President Johnson to initiate an extensive search for information concerning the incidents. In early 1965 the deteriorating situation in Vietnam influenced development of a policy of retaliation by means of air strikes. American responses to this continuing crisis, then, involved large-scale commitments of resources and extremely hostile behavior.

From the preceding discussion it should be clear the nature of the situation confronting decision-makers can have an impact on
decision processes and foreign policy behavior. But the question remains, how significant are situational influences? Do they represent just one of a myriad of potential influences on foreign policy, or are their impacts such that they deserve intensive study? If they are in fact influential, how can we describe the process by which such influence is exerted? Does the situation directly affect the substance of policy, or is the impact indirect, through the bureaucratic process? In short, does a situational perspective provide a theoretically useful approach to the study of foreign policy? These questions form the core of this study.

Basic Definitions and Assumptions

A number of definitions and assumptions underly a situational perspective in the study of foreign policy. Although we will attempt to make many of these definitions and assumptions explicit, our goal is not to elaborate a complete set of definitions and assumptions that would demonstrate all the necessary conditions for an exhaustive situational perspective. Rather, the assumptions presented are considered the minimal assumptions necessary to derive certain propositions relating transitory qualities of the situation to foreign policy behavior. An ultimate goal (although one not attempted in this study) would be to set forth those assumptions which are both necessary and sufficient to define the situational perspective in theoretical terms.

Why is it necessary to set forth any definitions and assumptions? Could not the research be carried out without elaboration of the underlying assumptions? Although the answer to this latter
question is yes, several reasons can be given for making our definitions and assumptions explicit. First, the intellectual activity involved in the formal statement of definitions and assumptions aids in conceptual development. The definitions and assumptions set limits on the definition of situation, and result in a more rigorous conceptualization. Second, explicit assumptions are necessary for theory-building. As stated above, the specification of necessary and sufficient assumptions would provide a base from which a variety of propositions could be derived logically. Finally, explicit statement of assumptions will aid in the integration of the situational perspective and a number of other theoretical perspectives on the explanation of foreign policy behavior. Every theoretical perspective is grounded in a number of fundamental assumptions (either explicit or implicit) concerning the nature of the international system and the behavior to be explained. Integration of several perspectives requires compatible or, at the very least, not contradictory assumptions. And comparison of assumptions is a much easier task if those assumptions are explicitly stated. Thus the goal of integration provides an additional incentive to make our definitions and assumptions explicit.

Definition 1: Foreign policy can be defined as those behaviors by decision-makers intended to influence the present or future activities of international actors external to their nation.

Numerous approaches to the identification of foreign policy can be found in the literature. Richard Snyder (1958) focuses on the "decision" as his unit of analysis. Other writers alternatively speak of transactions (Brams, 1966) or interactions (McClelland,
1968). K. J. Holsti (1972: 154) emphasizes national goals, roles, orientations, and actions. "An act is basically a form of communication intended to change or sustain the behavior of those upon whom the acting nation is dependent for achieving its own goals" (K. J. Holsti, 1972: 154). We elect to define foreign policy in behavioral terms, thus focusing on the elements Holsti would label "acts." A major assumption underlying a behavioral conceptualization is that policy-makers' desires, goals, and orientations will be reflected in the behaviors which they pursue.

Moreover, these behaviors represent attempts to influence other international actors. The exercise of influence and a struggle for power motivate all nations' behavior in the international system, according to the realist interpretation of international politics (Morgenthau, 1967). Even non-realist scholars, such as Charles McClelland (1966), suggest influence is inherent in the international political process. By influence we mean the ability to persuade an international actor to do (or to cease doing) something it might not do (or cease doing) had the influence attempt not been initiated. The objects of influence attempts need not be national actors. International organizations or alliances, private, non-governmental groups, and mass publics may find themselves objects of influence attempts.

**Assumption 1:** Only authoritative decision-makers (e.g., governmental representatives) initiate foreign policy actions in the name of their nation, officially committing that nation's resources in the international arena.

By focusing on decision-makers we assert that their behavior must be understood in order to explain the decision and action
components of foreign policy. Put differently, although foreign policy activities may be described solely in terms of aggregate units of interaction it can best be explained from the perspective of the decision-maker. By authoritative actors we mean those public officials (whether elected or appointed) who have formal responsibility for decision-making and who actively participate in the decision-making process (Hermann, 1971). Although acknowledging non-governmental individuals and groups have a role to play in the day to day flow of people and non-human resources across national boundaries, we suggest only authoritative decision-makers have the power to officially commit their country's resources in the pursuit of national goals.

Assumption 2: The foreign policy behavior of nations can be described as discrete acts of individuals which are always taken in response to the perceived prior behavior of domestic elements or external actors. These acts may, in turn, provide the basis for future behavior by these individuals or other actors.

Assumption 2 underlies the development and recent growth of the international event data "movement." Conceptualizing foreign policy activity in terms of discrete, unaggregated events has several advantages. First, the foreign policy behavior of many nations can be compared and generalizations developed concerning the causes and consequences of that behavior (Hermann, 1971). Secondly, a single nation's behavior over time can be studied through the construction of sequences of behavior--linking that nation's prior action to its present behavior. Finally, foreign policy interactions can be analyzed by linking one nation's present behavior with another's past behavior. More broadly, this assumption asserts foreign policy
activities may be responses to either external or internal stimuli. Numerous studies suggest such a stimulus-response linkage (Fleiss, 1966; McClelland, 1968; Hoggard, 1970; Phillips and Crain, 1972; Wilkenfeld, 1968; Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen, 1972).

Assumption 3: The foreign policy behavior of nations can be described in multi-dimensional terms.7

Both theoretical studies and empirical analyses suggest the multi-dimensional nature of foreign policy behavior. On the theoretical side, Morgenthau (1967) differentiates status quo and imperialist policies, K. J. Holsti (1972) elaborates a series of national roles ranging from "bastion of the revolution" to "faithful ally," and Wilkinson (1969) describes behavior as extension or defense-oriented. Empirical analyses have produced a wide range of behavior dimensions. Munton (1973), Salmore and Munton (1973), and Kegley (1973) identify two behavior dimensions--affect and passivity (participation)--using factor analytic techniques. Rummel (1969) finds these and five additional dimensions--aid, ideology, popularity, South American, and migration. Six factors or dimensions emerge from McClelland and Hoggard's (1969) analysis, and Salmore, Hermann and Rosen (1973) identify four dimensions of foreign policy behavior. In short, our assumption of multi-dimensionality is well-grounded.

Definition 2: Situational variables are those dimensions of other nations' past or future behavior perceived by policy-makers, which have the capacity to vary over the short term, and represent the most temporally immediate external influences on foreign policy.8

Only those aspects of the external environment pertaining to other nations' past or future behavior and perceived by policy-makers
meet our criteria. Non-human, environmental influences, although obviously providing both opportunities for and limitations on the actions of policy-makers, are not considered situational variables. In addition, dimensions of other nations' behavior must be perceived by decision-makers before they can be called "situational." Viewed in terms of the Sprouts' (1965) distinction cited earlier, situational variables represent a subset of the policy-maker's psychological environment.

At this point it should be noted that we have been able only to approximate this aspect of Definition 2 in the analysis reported in subsequent chapters. Although we have not directly tapped policy-makers' perceptions of situational characteristics, we have constructed a series of coding rules which allow estimation of these perceptions. Thus our intention is to avoid defining situational variables in terms of "objective" characteristics of the situation. Rather, we attempt to estimate decision-makers' perceptions by constructing indicators of those perceptions. Needless to say, such a procedure increases the probability of error in characterizing a decision-maker's definition of the situation. As a first approximation, however, we believe this procedure is justified; it allows us to collect data on a large number and wide range of situations while investing a reasonable amount of research time. We shall return more specifically to this issue in Chapter IV.

A second attribute of situational qualities is their short-term nature. By short-term we mean having both the capacity and a high probability of varying from day to day. At one extreme,
makers' perceptions of the situation may change from event to event. On the other hand, these perceptions may remain stable for up to a month or longer. The central notions here, however, are capacity and probability. If a variable does not have the capacity to vary over the short-term, or if the probability of variation is slight, then that variable is not a situational quality. (The personality characteristics of political leaders, for example, could not be described as transitory qualities of the situation.) The absence of observed variation over a short time period does not necessarily indicate a particular variable is not situational. For example, the level of situational ambiguity may remain constant over a period of several weeks, yet because perceived ambiguity has both the capacity and a high probability of varying from event to event it represents a situational quality.

Finally, adopting Hermann's (1969a) approach we elect to focus on the most "immediate" external influences on foreign policy. By "immediate" we mean those external influences which are closest in time to the foreign policy behavior to be explained. In defining situational qualities as immediate we do not mean to imply that these qualities are a-historical in nature. Because situational qualities are defined from the perspective of the decision-maker, they reflect his nation's values, goals, past experiences, and general images regarding international affairs. Consequently, every situational quality has a history. The past actions of the present actor as well as the past actions of the nation to which the present actor is now responding all contribute to the development of the situation which
serves as the stimulus for foreign policy behavior. But the situational perspective as defined here does not subsume the study of how a particular situation comes about. Instead, the focus is on what results when the situation is defined as an "occasion for decision."

Assumption 4: Because situations are defined from the perspective of the decision-maker, they reflect the values, goals, past experiences, and general images regarding international affairs of the individual decision-maker, his organizational context, and his nation. Therefore, differences may emerge in the perception of the situation from one individual to another.

Decision-makers' perceptions in any specific situation are influenced by the individuals' images of international affairs (Boulding, 1969; Jervis, 1970), differences among organizational units (Allison, 1971), and the larger context within which the situation occurs (Kelman, 1955). When policy-makers "define" a situation they ascribe meaning to that stimulus on the basis of their personal images and experiences. Put differently, defining a situation results in a valuation by policy-makers (Snyder, 1958: 17). The decision-making process occurs within an organizational context, and the interaction of often competing national, organizational, and personal goals leads to variations in perceptions of the situation (Jervis, 1970; Allison, 1971). Furthermore, because each situation can be located in the larger context of ongoing relations between two nations, interpretation of that situation depends on the relationship between the situation and the general level of interaction (Kelman, 1955: 51). As a consequence of these varying influences on perceptions of the situation, the definition of any specific situation may differ from one decision-maker to another.
The relationship of a situation to its larger context poses numerous conceptual and operational problems. How can we distinguish a situation from the larger context in which it is embedded? Cattell (1963) differentiates focal and global situations, and argues the latter subsume the former. But he fails to provide explicit criteria for establishing boundaries between these situational levels. Similarly, Carr (1948) presents four concepts used in the analysis of situational structure: situation, situational focus, focal field, and situational field. Situations represent the most specific patterns of relationships among individuals, groups, and concepts, while situational fields provide the larger context of relationships within which situations occur (Carr, 1948: xiii). Here again, conceptual distinctions are made without the development of clear operational criteria.

Alternatively, situations may be viewed as "nesting" phenomena. Decision-makers are involved in many different kinds of situations simultaneously. Their immediate co-workers, the larger organization, the nation as a whole, and the external environment or context may represent distinct situations offering both opportunities for and limitations upon policy-makers' behavior. Variations in policy-makers' definitions of the situation may result at least partially from differences of focus or level of attention. Pike (1967: 81) argues the importance of defining focus with reference to participants in the situation. Although such definitions may vary from individual to individual, generalizations can be constructed regarding the focus or situational level adopted by a specific group (Pike, 1967: 81).

**Assumption 5:** The processes of making decisions and
engaging in foreign policy actions occur in the context of large-scale organizations.

Assumption 6: The participation of large-scale organizations in the foreign policy process is consistent across all types of nations.

Numerous scholars indicate the relevance of the organizational context in contemporary foreign policy decision-making. In the introduction to his description of American foreign policy-making, Sapin (1966: 3-4) states that "...the executive agencies involved in foreign policy are, from a sociological perspective, complex organizations or bureaucracies, and they have many of the characteristics associated with nongovernmental bureaucracies." Commenting on the growth in influence of bureaucracies, Rourke (1972: 8) says that "while the power of bureaucratic organizations over decisions in foreign affairs has sometimes been exaggerated for political reasons, it is clear that these organizations have come to play a tremendously important role in the foreign policy process since World War II." And suggesting a reason for their increased significance, Henry Kissinger (1969: 17) argues that the development of bureaucratic structures "... is an inevitable by-product of the risks of international affairs in the nuclear age."

Recognition of the importance of the organizational context of foreign policy decision-making is by no means limited to students of American foreign policy. Comparing open and closed political systems, Farrell (1966: 187) asserts: "The very bigness of governmental activity demands compartmentalization and specialization." Moreover, "there are problems of organization common to all foreign ministries,
regardless of whether their political systems are open or closed" (Farrell, 1966: 187). And Eayrs (1961) devotes a chapter in his analysis of Canadian foreign policy-making to the increasing influence of the bureaucracy. In short, foreign policy decision-makers, regardless of their specific national ties, generally act within the limits imposed by large-scale bureaucratic organizations.

**Assumption 7:** Decision-makers' definitions of the situation affect the structure and operation of the bureaucratic process.

The general rationale behind Assumption 7 may be stated simply. Bureaucracies are not self-contained units which remain closed to influences from the external environment. Following Blau (1955, 1956) and Thompson (1967), we adopt the propositions that bureaucracies receive inputs from their environment and that decision-makers within these bureaucracies adopt organizational structure and process to fluctuations in the environment. Thus the bureaucratic process changes because policy-makers perceive variations in the external environment relevant to the ability of their organization to survive and to function efficiently, and these policy-makers' perceptions (or, definitions of the situation) encourage adaptation of behavior within the organization to those variations.

In his development of a bureaucratic politics model of American foreign policy-making during the Cuban missile crisis, Graham Allison (1971: 180) argues that "in a nuclear crisis, the central decisions will be hammered out not in the formal forums, e.g., the National Security Council, but rather by an ad hoc group that includes the President, the heads of the major organizations involved, plus
individuals in whom the President has special confidence." In this instance, Allison relates the occurrence of a specific situation (crisis) to variations in the bureaucratic process (development of informal decisional groups). The decision-making approach to the study of foreign policy also lends support to Assumption 7. Snyder et. al. (1962) view the state as actor in a situation. Moreover, Snyder (1958: 24) contends that situation affects spheres of competence and information flow; these represent two of the three major classes of determinants of foreign policy, and the two classes describing dimensions of the bureaucratic process or organizational context of decisions.

In addition, studies in organizational theory suggest a relationship between situation and the bureaucratic process. March and Simon (1958: 123) argue in their discussion of the impact of conflict on the process of organizational decision-making that "the greater the munificence of the environment, the less the felt need for joint decision-making." From their analysis of differences in the powers of the clientele of two departments within a county agency, Blau and Scott (1962) conclude that power differences affect such things as the size of case loads and the method of work or case assignments. Thompson and McEwen (1958) suggest a variety of strategies employed by organizations in setting their goals, given the impact of an unstable environment. In his general discussion of bureaucracy, Anthony Downs (1966: 270) hypothesizes that "the total volume of messages in a bureau necessary per unit of output will be higher...the greater the time-pressure upon its decisionmaking." Thus both the formal
structure and informal processes which occur in bureaucratic organizations respond to variations in the situation confronting foreign policy decision-makers.

Assumption 8: Certain properties applicable to any situation, but having distinct values in different situations, may be perceived by virtually all decision-makers exposed to that situation.

Although situations are unique in the senses of occurring at a particular point in time and in being composed of a unique set of circumstances, general dimensions describing these situations can be identified. For example, policy-makers' perceptions of the relationship between the situation and their goals or objectives appear in many decision-making analyses of situational influences (Paige, 1968, 1972; Lentner, 1972; Schwartz, 1972; Hermann, 1972a). The presence or absence of time pressure on decision-makers also receives attention (O. Holsti, 1965, 1972; Hermann, 1972a; Paige, 1968). One of the significant consequences of being able to identify general properties of situations is that multi-dimensional typologies of situations can be constructed. Describing situations in multi-dimensional terms results in a more complete reflection of the situational context within which behavior occurs. Both theoretical and empirical studies indicate the utility of this approach (Sells, 1963; Frederiksen, 1972; Hermann, 1969a; Brewer, 1972; Brady, 1973).

Alternative Models of Situational Influence

Given these definitions and assumptions, how can we describe the situational perspective? Decision-makers' perceptions of another nation's behavior create a relationship between the two nations. It
is this relationship we choose to call a situation. Stated formally, a situation is the relationship created by the behavior of decision-makers representing one or more nations, and other decision-makers' perceptions of how that behavior affects their nation's goals and fits into their cognitive map of the international system. Situations act as stimuli, presenting policy-makers with occasions for decision. Policy-makers respond to these situations with specific foreign policy decisions and actions. Put simply, the situational perspective seeks to explain foreign policy in terms of the situations or stimuli which provide policy-makers with occasions for decision and action.

Such a description of the situational perspective is not sufficient. Simply asserting that situations influence the decision-making process and resulting foreign policy behavior ignores an important theoretical issue. Put simply, how can we describe the conditions, events, or processes which combine to link the situation and foreign policy behavior? In Singer's terms (1972: 19), what kinds of "scenarios" can we construct to explain the relationship between situation and policy? Two alternatives will be suggested here. Labeled the direct and indirect models of situational influence, the scenarios assert distinct relationships between situation and foreign policy. However, both models are grounded in the definitions and assumptions presented earlier. Each model can be expressed by a macro-hypothesis:

**Proposition 1:** The nature of the situation confronting decision-makers has a significant direct impact on the nation's foreign policy behavior.

**Proposition 2:** The nature of the situation
confronting decision-makers has a significant direct effect on the bureaucratic process and through this process an indirect impact on foreign policy behavior.

Proposition 1 hypothesizes a direct relationship between the situation and foreign policy behavior. The direct linkage of situation and foreign policy is not supported in the decision-making literature for obvious reasons. Decision-making analysts have placed their research bets on the significance of organizational, informational, and motivational factors in explaining foreign policy behavior (Snyder, et. al., 1962). Thus their analyses of situational influences tend to stop with consideration of the impact of the situation on the decision-making process. Often foreign policy outputs are not even discussed. And when such discussion does occur it tends to revolve around the process of making decisions or the choice of policy options rather than the nature of the behavior addressed to another nation or nations in the international system.

Foreign policy analysts adopting a systems perspective are more likely to assert a direct relationship between situation and foreign policy. Charles McClelland (1969), for example, finds the presence of crisis related to an increasing volume of behavior exchanged between participants combined with an increasing degree of hostility in their actions. Phillips and Hainline (1972) discover a number of types of crises, based on examination of the kinds of foreign policy behavior engaged in by participant nations. From his analysis of the "conflict-escalation situation" in the Middle East, Edward Azar (1972: 130) concludes that "when two parties (one of which is a differentiated ad
hoc alliance) are involved in a conflict-escalation situation, the behaviors of the individual members of the alliance toward their perceived enemy tend to be congruent." Moreover, he finds that "when two parties (one of which is a differentiated ad hoc alliance) are involved in a conflict-escalation situation, the behavior of the enemy towards each member of the alliance tends to be as violent as that member's behavior towards that enemy" (Azar, 1972: 130). The occurrence of specific types of situations can, then, be linked directly to variations in national foreign policy behavior.

Scholars suggesting the significance of personality characteristics of high-level decision-makers in explaining foreign policy behavior lend additional support to the direct linkage between situation and behavior. Their argument might go something like this: Situational variables are defined in terms of decision-makers' perceptions of other nations' past or future behavior. National foreign policy is made by those individual decision-makers. Therefore, explanation of foreign policy need not include organizational variables. Decision-makers react to dimensions of the prior situation, and these reactions directly determine their policy choices. Figure 1 illustrates the direct model of situational influence.

![Figure 1: A Direct Model of Situational Influence](image)

Proposition 2 suggests an indirect relationship between
situation and foreign policy behavior. Our second proposition posits a linkage between situation and the bureaucratic process, and is supported by much of the bureaucratic politics literature. This proposition differs from proposition 1 in suggesting the linkage between situation and foreign policy is mediated by characteristics of the bureaucratic process. The situation does not, then, have an independent, direct influence on foreign policy behavior. In operational terms, the relationship between situation and foreign policy "washes out" when characteristics of the bureaucratic process are controlled. Foreign policy behavior during a crisis, for example, would be a function of the centralized decision process which tends to occur under these conditions, rather than a function of the crisis situation per se. Moreover, foreign policy behavior resulting from a decentralized decision process, even though occurring in a crisis, would tend to resemble non-crisis rather than crisis behavior.

The indirect model is supported by most decision-making approaches to situational analysis. Graham Allison's discussion of American foreign policy during the Cuban missile crisis is a primary example. He asserts that the "probability of the U.S. government making a decision to use more military force (rather than less) in a crisis increases as the number of individuals who have an initial, general, personal preference for more forceful military action increases in the following positions: President, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Secretaries of Defense and State, Chairman of the JCS, and Director of the CIA" (Allison, 1971: 180). Use of military force in a crisis is attributed to the preferences
of individuals intimately involved in the decision-making process—those holding high-level bureaucratic positions. Morton Halperin (1972) attempts to develop a theory of American foreign policy based on bureaucratic participants' reactions to the impact of domestic and international situations on their immediate, personal interests. And Samuel Huntington's (1961) analysis of the politics of defense budgeting can be viewed as extensive bureaucratic interaction in response to a routine situation. All of these studies share the assumption that foreign policy decision-making takes place in the context of large-scale organizations. Foreign policy is made through bureaucratic interaction, and is influenced only indirectly by the nature of the situation confronting decision-makers. Figure 2 illustrates the indirect model.

![Figure 2: An Indirect Model of Situational Influence](image)

**Conclusion**

Why should we adopt a situational perspective in the study of foreign policy? What interesting and relevant questions about foreign policy behavior can a situational perspective address? More immediately, why should we engage in this study?

At the outset, we know that certain kinds of situations (such
as crises) have serious potential consequences for the future of the international system. In a century overshadowed by the possibility of nuclear war, the impact of crises on foreign policy behavior deserves considerable study. Crises are often accompanied by stress, which may hamper decision-makers' ability to cope with the situation. This condition can interfere with the usual decision processes and result in irrational foreign policy choices. Under extreme stress the decision process may collapse, preventing any form of response. Faced with less extreme conditions, decision-makers tend to overreact or underreact to the actions of other nations. Given the possibility that such reactions might result in a nuclear exchange, the behavior of decision-makers in crises should be studied with the aim of increasing their ability to adequately cope with stress.  

Other dysfunctional effects are associated with crises. Within the decision-making unit the number and quality of communications channels decreases, leading to information distortion and overload. In addition, policy-makers tend to exclude other issues from consideration. The increased demands for information and the formulation of alternative courses of action place greater pressure upon participants, driving them to physical exhaustion. Because less rational decisions tend to be made under such conditions, research should be undertaken to develop techniques for coping with the effects of crisis on the bureaucratic process.  

Still another reason for adopting a situational perspective in the study of foreign policy is that the situation has the potential of linking foreign policy and international politics approaches within
international relations. Situations serve as a link between actions, thus creating a linkage of interaction. If Nation A acts toward Nation B, that creates a situation for Nation B's decision-makers. When those decision-makers respond to that situation, their action creates a situation for Nation A. Nation A's decision-makers then respond to the situation created by Nation B's action, creating a situation for Nation B, and so on. Situations thus link the actions of nations and allow us to describe a series of interactions between those nations. What makes this linkage theoretically significant is the joining of action and interaction perspectives in the study of international relations. Behavior creates situation, and situation in turn leads to further behavior.

In summary, the theoretical potential of a situational perspective on foreign policy seems apparent. Underlying assumptions and definitions can be made explicit, macro-hypotheses relating situation to foreign policy behavior can be developed, and theoretically important and policy relevant questions can be asked. In the next chapter we present dimensions of the situation, bureaucratic process, and foreign policy behavior which will be used to test the direct and indirect models of situational influence.
NOTES

CHAPTER I

1 This description of the American commitment in Vietnam is taken from Johnson (1971), especially Chapter VI, and Simons (1971).

2 McGeorge Bundy and other advisors (including Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton) personally evaluated the situation in Vietnam in late January, 1965. This excerpt from their report is cited in Johnson (1971: 126).

3 Such an effort is being undertaken by participants in the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) project. Participants in the CREON project include: Charles F. Hermann, Maurice A. East, Stephen A. Salmore, Margaret G. Hermann, Barbara G. Salmore, and the author. The following theoretical perspectives are represented: bureaucratic politics, national attributes, properties of the international system, characteristics of political regimes, psychological characteristics of political leaders, and transitory qualities of the situation. For a summary of these perspectives, see East (1974, forthcoming).

4 This definition resembles those suggested by Hermann (1971) and Munton (1973).

5 The distinction between micro and macro levels of analysis has been made by Burgess and Lawton (1972). They argue that although description may be carried out at either level, explanation is logically feasible only at the micro level. Their argument is accepted here.

6 The history of the event data "movement" has been extensively documented and will not be discussed in detail here. For descriptions of the movement and its development see Azar (1970), Brady (1971), and Burgess and Lawton (1972).

7 Munton (1973) also assumes multi-dimensionality in his study of Canadian foreign policy behavior between 1957 and 1970.

8 In theory, situational factors need not be limited to external influences. Domestic events often create situations to which decision-makers respond, and their responses can be directed to external entities. Crises, for example, are not necessarily created by the actions
of other nations. Domestic economic and political crises often influence foreign policy behavior. (For discussions of these kinds of linkages see Rosenau, 1966, 1969; Wilkenfeld, 1968; Fleiss, 1966.) For the purpose of this study, given the limited nature of our data, we will focus solely on external situational influences. Needless to say, inclusion of internal situational influences would be desirable, and it is our intention to pursue the question of internal situational influences in future research. In particular, we plan to compare and contrast the influence of external and internal situations on foreign policy behavior, and to suggest relationships among internal and external situational developments. But these issues will not be addressed in this study.

9 In Lewin's (1951) terms, the stimulus situation is located in a "field." We are grateful to Warren Phillips for indicating similarities between Kurt Lewin's field theoretical work and the present formulation.

10 The notion of situation as an "occasion for decision" has been developed by Snyder (1958) and Hermann (1969a). In an earlier effort Hilgard and Marquis (1940: 73) defined a stimulus as "...the occasion for response."

11 Much research has been done by both psychologists and political scientists concerning the impact of individual and personality characteristics on foreign policy behavior. For representative studies see Rogow (1963), George and George (1964), O. Holsti (1969), Thordardson (1972), Barber (1972), and M. Hermann (1974b).

12 The direct and indirect models elaborated in this chapter by no means exhaust the larger class of situational explanations of foreign policy. Several alternative models might be briefly suggested.

First, the possibility of a feedback loop between characteristics of the bureaucratic process and the situation does not enter into either model. The addition of this component to either model would assert the bureaucratic process influences decision-makers' perceptions of the situation. If a small number of high-level officials form the decision-making group, then their interpretation of the situation might be very different from the interpretation of participants acting in the context of their bureaucratic roles.

Secondly, alternative intervening variables could be introduced into the indirect model of situational influence. For example, might not the personalities of political leaders or characteristics of the political system challenge the bureaucratic process as significant intervening variables?

We conclude that numerous situational models might be elaborated and tested. For the purpose of this study, however, our focus will remain with what we have labeled the direct and indirect models.
of situational influence. In Chapter VII we return to this issue and attempt some initial integration of situational (as defined here) and non-situational explanations of foreign policy.

13 Milburn (1972) addresses this problem, and in a creative essay develops a series of "decision rules" to aid policy-makers in making rational choices under stressful conditions.

14 Many of the essays in C. Hermann (1972b) examine the impact of crises on the bureaucratic process. Hermann and Brady (1972) summarize the relationships proposed in these essays and formulate an organizational process model of crisis behavior.
CHAPTER II

DIMENSIONS OF THE SITUATION, BUREAUCRATIC PROCESS, AND FOREIGN POLICY

Introduction

Both the direct and indirect models of situational influence depend upon identical concepts or variables: characteristics of the situation, bureaucratic process, and foreign policy behavior. Differences in the two models are a function of the hypothesized interrelationships among these concepts. As presented in Chapter I, in the direct model the situation confronting foreign policy decision-makers has an unmediated effect on national foreign policy behavior. The indirect model, on the other hand, asserts characteristics of the bureaucratic process intervene to affect the relationship between situation and foreign policy. In both models the component concepts remain the same—situation, bureaucratic process, and foreign policy.

Each of these concepts (or, more properly, variable clusters) may be defined in multi-dimensional terms. Situations are often ambiguous, can represent threats, provide opportunities, or promote trust among participants. They may place limits on the amount of decision time available to policy-makers or occur unexpectedly. Decision-makers operate in a bureaucratic context characterized by a centralized or diffused structure of authority. Discussions of policy
alternatives may generate widespread bureaucratic opposition or momentary consensus. And decisions may be made rapidly, or slowly, or perhaps not at all. Similarly, the results of the decision-making process are also multi-dimensional. Foreign policy actions involve economic transactions, use of military force, propaganda techniques, or diplomatic and protocol behavior. They range from highly cooperative to highly conflictful in nature, and may variously address one or a number of other nations. In short, all three classes of variables may be tapped through a variety of dimensions.

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce multi-dimensional conceptualizations of the situation, bureaucratic process, and foreign policy behavior and to present theoretical justifications for selection of the several dimensions for each cluster. A situation is described by the level of threat or opportunity confronting policy-makers, the amount of available decision time, and the extent of decision-makers' prior awareness of the situation. Degree of centralization of authority structure and the level of within-government opposition represent components of the bureaucratic process. Foreign policy behavior is defined in terms of events and characterized by the amount of hostility or cooperation expressed in the action, level of resource commitment, and degree of specificity. Following justification of individual dimensions, a three-dimensional situational typology is developed.

How does the content of this chapter fit into the overall goals of the study? First, the dimensions or variables introduced are necessary to test the direct and indirect models of situational influence. Second, the situational typology will be used in tests of
the direct and indirect models. Third, discussion of an "event" notion of foreign policy behavior lays the groundwork for later assessment of event data as a tool in the study of situational influences on foreign policy. We begin this chapter with a discussion of the three-dimensional situational typology. Next, bureaucratic influences on foreign policy behavior are described. Finally, we discuss the nature of foreign policy.

**Threat-Opportunity, Decision Time, and Awareness: The Situational Cube**

Charles Hermann (1969a) has suggested a situational typology composed of three dimensions—threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness. Hermann hypothesizes the existence of eight situational types derived from all possible combinations of high and low values on each of the dichotomized dimensions. The situations are labeled: crisis, innovative, inertia, circumstantial, reflexive, deliberative, routinized, and administrative. Figure 3 illustrates the situational "cube" by which this typology may be represented. Composed of three dimensions, the situational cube forms a closed space within which any foreign policy action conceivably can be located. In stimulus-response terminology, the location of a particular action in the cube indicates a prior stimulus to which foreign policy decision-makers are presently responding. The eight corners of the cube represent ideal types of situations, each with distinctive decision processes and each resulting in varying foreign policy behavior.

Why were these dimensions selected to form the situational typology? Situations can be described by an infinite number of
Figure 3: The Situational Cube

1 Crisis
2 Innovative
3 Inertia
4 Circumstantial
5 Reflexive
6 Deliberative
7 Routinized
8 Administrative

dimensions; thus some justification must be given for selection of these particular dimensions. This typology developed from an empirical investigation of crisis decision-making (Hermann, 1965). In that study, Charles Hermann defined crises as situations threatening goals, allowing minimal decision time, and occurring unexpectedly. Dichotomizing the crisis dimensions results logically in an eight-fold situational typology, of which crisis represents one ideal type. Fundamentally, then, selection of situational dimensions for the typology was predetermined by the prior analysis of crisis behavior. Nevertheless, separate and independent arguments may be made for inclusion of these three dimensions in a situational typology. Each dimension will be defined and its selection justified.

Concern for national goals underlies decision-makers' foreign policy activities. Foreign policy leads to preservation of territorial integrity, extension of economic or political influence, and protection of the domestic population. For example, nations engage in wars, establish and break diplomatic relations, sign trade agreements, and negotiate military force reductions in efforts to achieve their goals. Goals may be defined as preferred states of the international system expressed by foreign policy decision-makers. The threat-opportunity situational dimension describes the relationship between the acting nation and its goals, as affected by the prior behavior of another nation or domestic entity. Threat is defined as foreign policy decision-makers' perceptions of impending harm to desired values, goals, or conditions which are created by the statements and/or actions of another nation's decision-makers. On the other hand, an opportunity
exists when decision-makers view the situation as an occasion to make progress or move closer to the desired value, goal, or condition (Salmore and Brady, 1973).

These definitions include two fundamental components. First, a value, goal, or condition considered important to decision-makers must be recognized. The value may be descriptive of the status quo or it may refer to a state of affairs yet to be realized. The United States, as a status quo example, desires maintenance of a balance of troops between the East and West in Berlin; Canada, in comparison, values economic and political independence from the United States. But both nations' foreign policy activities are directed toward either preserving or achieving a particular position concerning their goals.

Secondly, the threat or opportunity must be anticipated as a future possibility. In the case of threat, the expected harm must not have already occurred. If the prior event consists of implementation of a previous threat, then threat does not exist in the present situation. Put differently, if harm has already occurred to the fullest extent possible, then threat does not define the situation. A similar argument applies to opportunity. An opportunity exists only if the actor can make progress toward a desired goal by his own actions in response to the situation. The prior situation must present a choice of behavior to the present actor. If the present actor believes his range of responsive behavior extremely limited, then opportunity does not exist. In effect, the actor must have the option of refusing to take advantage of the situation.

Thus both threat and opportunity are contingent upon an active
response by a nation's decision-makers. Generally expressed as contingent if-then statements, threats require either action or inaction in response to the threatening nation's demands. If the appropriate response is not forthcoming, then the threat is carried out. Likewise, opportunities depend upon active responses. Presented with an occasion to move toward a desired goal, foreign policy decision-makers must act to take advantage of the situation before it is transformed. Once transformation occurs, policy-makers may no longer be faced with an opportunity. In fact, the situation often may be transformed from an opportunity to a threat.

The relationship of threat-opportunity to action provides one justification for this dimension's selection. Because foreign policy behavior is conceptualized as discrete, unaggregated actions, situational dimensions encouraging active responses have greater utility than those promoting inaction. Decision-makers acting in response to a threat or opportunity generally note the prior situation which gave rise to their response. Thus the linkage between situation and foreign policy behavior is simplified.

Ease of linkage is by no means the only justification for selecting the threat-opportunity dimension. The concepts of threat and opportunity appear in a wide variety of discussions concerning foreign policy, ranging from traditional analyses to more systematic, scientific studies, and even journalistic accounts of foreign policy decision-making. In general, a focus on national goals suggests implicit if not explicit concern with the threat-opportunity dimension. Arnold Wolfers (1962) argues, for example, that foreign policy
decision-makers act to achieve one of three national goals: self-preservation, self-abnegation, or self-extension. Foreign policy behavior may then be interpreted in terms of situational influences on attainment of these goals—the presence of threats or opportunities. Moreover, threat and opportunity underly general questions of conflict and conflict resolution (Schelling, 1963; Boulding, 1962).

Finally, the threat-opportunity dimension has been incorporated in psychological studies, suggesting its wide applicability. (Most studies, however, focus on threat.) Reviewing the psychological literature relating threat to persuasion, Higbee (1969) finds a curvilinear relationship: middle levels of threat tend to be more effective persuaders than extremely low or high levels. On the basis of research using the prisoner's dilemma game, Lindskold et al. (1969) conclude the higher the personal cost of noncompliance to threats, the more likely compliance in a threatening situation. Bonoma et al. (1970: 111) support this finding: "holding source capability constant, the greater the punishment magnitude and thus the greater the message utility of threats, the more compliant will be the target." Effective use of this dimension as an explanatory variable in psychological research thus prompts us to include it in the situational typology.

The amount of available decision time also constrains policymakers' actions. In the absence of sufficient time for deliberation and choice, policy alternatives may be ignored. Moreover, the option finally selected may not represent the most effective path toward a desired goal. Large-scale bureaucratic participation is discouraged
under conditions of short decision time. Extended decision time, on the other hand, allows consideration of numerous policy alternatives, promotes more efficient policy selection, and stimulates bureaucratic participation. The decision time dimension describes the temporal relationship between the present actor and the situation created by the behavior of another nation or domestic entity. More specifically, decision time represents the amount of time participants in the foreign policy process feel they have in which to make a decision, before characteristics of the situation vary to the point at which the occasion for decision is transformed.

As Brewer (1973: 9) suggests, decision time is a function of clock time and the complexity of the task: "Clock time refers to the amount of time (in the conventional sense) that will elapse before the situation would significantly change so that any decision would have to be made in less advantageous circumstances. But the amount of effective decision time is also affected by the complexity of the problem (the number of participants, the number of subtasks to be performed)." "As the coordination problems and subtasks increase, more time is required to handle the situation" (Hermann, 1965: 30). However, the more complex the decision task, the more likely will decision time be perceived as short rather than extended. Thus the relationship between clock time and psychological time depends upon level of task complexity. Short clock time is generally accompanied by short psychological time. When confronted with a highly complex task, however, decision-makers will perceive shorter decision time
regardless of the available clock time (Robinson and Snyder, 1965: 441).

Justification of the decision time situational dimension borrows from psychological research. Experimental and social psychologists have contributed significant findings concerning the impact of time on human behavior. In one of the earliest systematic, theoretical discussions, Cartwright (1941a) argues that amount of decision time required for a particular task increases with increasing uncertainty in judgment situations. As the result of a related experiment he concludes that "...increases in the length of decision time are produced by a conflict between different responses and...such a conflict arises when a stimulus falls upon the border between two ranges of equivalent stimuli" (1941b: 174). More recently, Gescheider and Wright (1971) suggest that reaction time increases the closer on the sensory continuum an observation is to an individual's signal present-signal absent decision rule. And Remington (1971) finds the reaction time to a repeated signal is faster than the reaction time to a signal that has been altered. In short, perceptions of decision time are dependent upon several factors, including differentiation and repetition of the stimulus.

In addition, psychologists have investigated the estimation of time. Clausen's (1950: 761) research on schizophrenic patients suggests the estimation of a specified time interval and the reproduction of that interval stem from different underlying functions. He concludes that "...shorter intervals have a tendency to be overestimated and longer ones to be underestimated" (Clausen, 1950: 760). Stress
created by the expectation of physical shock in an experimental situ-

ation encourages the over-estimation of time intervals (Falk and
Bindra, 1954). The significance of time in psychological research,
then, prompts inclusion of a decision time dimension in the situational
typology.

By far the most important justification for the decision time
dimension derives from its linkage to the bureaucratic process. De-
cision time has been defined in relation to performance of a task (the
decision) within an organizational context. As such, decision time
both affects and is affected by characteristics of the organizational
context (of which the bureaucratic process is a part). Adopting a
similar perspective, Snyder (1958: 23-24) sets forth time as a
decision-making resource which tends to be limited by factors both
internal and external to the decisional system. Political scientists
and organizational theorists acknowledge the impact of decision time
on the bureaucratic process. Downs (1966: 182-184) links increasing
time pressure to inefficient search procedures in bureaus. In the
context of an organizational theory approach to decision-making, March
and Simon (1958: 154) argue that "in general, we would expect selec-
tive perception to be most acute where decision time is shortest."
Moreover, bureaucratic politics explanations of foreign policy depend
on decision time as an explanatory variable. Allison and Halperin
(1972: 53-54) hypothesize that the implementation of substantial
changes in foreign policy is at least partially dependent on the
presence of time pressures. In another context, Allison (1971: 168)
argues that deadlines within the decisional unit "...raise issues and
force busy players [participants in the decision-making process] to take stands," thus encouraging decisions. Since the situational--bureaucratic process relationship represents one of our research questions, inclusion of the decision time dimension seems especially justifiable.

Decision-makers' awareness or lack of awareness of prior stimulus events also affects the foreign policy process. The awareness dimension describes the relationship between the present actor and the prior behavior of another nation or domestic entity, in terms of whether or not the actor expected the prior behavior. Surprise is defined as the condition in which foreign policy decision-makers are confronted with an unexpected situation in either their domestic or international environments. The condition may be brought about by sudden change in the status of a specific problem or condition in the environment, such as the death of a national political leader or a military coup d'état. If decision-makers are warned of the event then surprise is not present; in this case, decision-makers are said to have anticipated the prior event. Anticipation results, for instance, whenever the present group of decision-makers participated in the prior event to which they are responding. If a nation votes on a resolution it has sponsored in the context of an international organization, then that resolution would be anticipated. Moreover, if the acting nation in the prior event states a position its decision-makers are known to have taken previously, the present group of decision-makers probably anticipated that statement.5

As with threat-opportunity and decision time, the concept of
awareness is defined from the perspective of the decision-maker. Thus surprise indicates that decision-makers, given the evidence available to them at the time, did not expect the prior event. Anticipation, then, suggests decision-makers were warned in some fashion that the prior event would occur. One can think of instances in which an event coming as a surprise to academic or journalistic observers or the mass public might very well have been anticipated by decision-makers. It has been suggested, for example, that the October, 1963 ouster of President Diem in South Vietnam, although coming as a surprise to most Americans, was anticipated if not explicitly planned by top-level American policy-makers. For the purpose of this research, then, the perceptual approach will be adopted.

Discussions of surprise abound in the strategic studies literature. Implicit in Holst's (1966: 33) narrative of the German attack on Norway in April, 1940 is the notion that miscalculation and misperception produce surprise. In his discussion of the outbreak of World War I, Russett (1962) denotes the "point of surprise" as the moment when those controlling the foreign policy of a state realize that something is going wrong and is likely to involve their state in war. Perhaps the best-known analysis of surprise in international relations is Roberta Wohlstetter's (1965) examination of the failure of American intelligence prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941. Wohlstetter (1965: 118) concludes that the presence of too many signals prevented perception of the relevant signals which would have served as a warning to American decision-makers.

In justifying selection of the awareness dimension, we turn
first to psychological research. Awareness has been found, empirically, to have a significant impact on human behavior, thus supporting its inclusion as a situational dimension. Deutschberger (1947) finds awareness (along with the existence of choice and accurate perceptions) positively related to the ability to create and enter into mutual social relationships. Arguing that change in a partner's strategy during a prisoner's dilemma game results in increased variation in behavior, Swingle and Coady (1967) conclude that the degree of cooperation does not, however, seem to be affected by change in strategy. Jessor and Readio (1957: 228) suggest, for example, that the value of an event or occurrence influences the expectancy of that event's occurrence. Desired events tend to be expected, and undesired events unexpected; thus decision-makers would more likely be surprised at the occurrence of an undesired event, while taking the occurrence of a desired event in stride.

Unlike decision time, awareness is only indirectly related to the decision-making process. Although awareness is not defined in terms of the bureaucratic process, its relevance to decision processes can be illustrated. Awareness characterizes the actor's relation to the prior event to which he is responding. If we accept a problem-solving conceptualization of the decision-making process, the centrality of awareness becomes apparent. Decision-makers must perceive problems before they can initiate responses to those problems. If events are anticipated, decision-makers are more likely to have contingency plans available for responses. Unanticipated events, on the other hand, force decision-makers to react to the specific situa-
tion, rather than allowing the use of contingency plans. The indirect relationship between awareness and the bureaucratic process contrasts with decision time: awareness is more past-oriented and decision time more future-oriented. As a consequence, both dimensions are included in the situational typology to allow comparison of their impacts on the bureaucratic process and foreign policy behavior.

Three situational dimensions have now been proposed: threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness. Each dimension comprises a separate component of the situation confronting foreign policy decision-makers. Do decision-makers view these dimensions individually, or do they define situations in multi-dimensional terms? Put differently, are multi-dimensional situational types perceived by policy-makers? For the purpose of this research we assume situational types are accurate reflections of decision-makers' perceptions. Charles Hermann (1969a) makes just such an assumption in his presentation of the situational cube.

The pros and cons of typologizing are widely discussed. McKinney (1966: 3) defines a constructed type as "...a purposive, planned selection, abstraction, combination, and (sometimes) accentuation of a set of criteria with empirical referents that serves as a basis for comparison of empirical cases." Defined in this manner, a typology does not provide a complete description of reality; information concerning particular instances or occurrences is sacrificed to the goal of generalization. Two purposes of classification have been identified—organizational and theory-building. The organizational approach uses the typology as a means of ordering reality, while a
theory-building approach adopts the typology as a set of hypotheses to be tested. That is, relationships among the dimensions of the typology are themselves set forth as propositions which are confirmed or disconfirmed in terms of the utility of the typology in describing and explaining behavior.

Whether constructed for organizational or theory-building purposes, a typology requires the fulfillment of several basic conditions. First, the individual categories must be comprehensive and mutually exclusive. Second, the various dimensions must be differentiated into types. And, third, each dimension must be significant for the proposed research (Tiryakian, 1968: 178). The three dimensional typology composed of threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness fulfills all three requirements. The eight situational types formed by dichotomizing these dimensions are comprehensive and mutually exclusive. Every stimulus situation may be classified as one and only one of the eight situational types. Each dimension is dichotomized, and thus differentiated into types. And, as we have shown, independent arguments can be made for the theoretical significance of each situational dimension.

If developed as a theory-building device, a typology requires fulfillment of two additional conditions--the identification of relationships and the establishment of measures (Hermann, 1972c). As described by Hermann (1972c: 64), "the categories in a classification system should relate to numerous other characteristics." Stated differently, the greater the explanatory potential of a classification system, the more useful that classification. A situational typology
which explains foreign aid behavior would, for example, be less theo-
retically useful than a typology which explains a wider class of
foreign policy actions. Moreover, "the treatment of classifications
as hypotheses that must be tested with empirical data leads to the
requirement that the categories be measurable" (Hermann, 1972c: 65).
In other words, the typology must be operational. The situational
cube fits these additional requirements. Offering explanations of a
wide range of foreign policy actions, the typology also is susceptible
to measurement using foreign policy event data—a point to which we
will return in Chapter IV.

To summarize, we have introduced a three-dimensional situational
typology and suggested theoretical justifications for including each
dimension. Questions regarding typology construction in general have
also been addressed. Bureaucratic process influences on foreign policy
behavior form a second class of variables in this analysis, and it is
to discussion of these influences that we now turn.

The Bureaucratic Process

In Chapter I we introduced the assumption that foreign policy
decisions and actions are made and implemented in the context of
large-scale organizations. Participation in large-scale organizations
provides opportunities and presents limitations to foreign policy
decision-makers. Abstracting from the literature concerning large-
scale organizations, three distinct approaches may be identified:
decision-making, organizational behavior, and bureaucratic politics.
When applied to the analysis of foreign policy decision-making, each
approach reveals a different interpretation of the bureaucratic process.

The appearance in 1954 of Richard C. Snyder's decision-making approach to the study of international politics marked the beginning of a transformation in foreign policy analysis. Building on the efforts of organizational theorists and students of public administration, Snyder developed a conceptual scheme specifically designed to explain the behavior of foreign policy decision-makers. Decisions, according to this perspective, represent the behavior to be explained. Chief among the determinants of decision-making behavior are three: spheres of competence (roles), communication and information, and motivation (Snyder, 1958: 24). Assuming that foreign policy decisions are made by authoritative decision-makers and that decision-makers are actors embedded in a situation, Snyder views the process of foreign policy-making as a sequence of activities occurring in an organizational context. "Decision-making results in the selection from a socially defined, limited number of problematical, alternative projects (i.e., courses of action) of one project to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision-makers" (Snyder, 1958: 19). Decisions are made, then, when policy-makers view the situation as an "occasion" to make progress toward a goal. The decision-making unit is by no means restricted to formal organizational lines. In fact, "...it is constituted by the observer [analyst] in terms of the decision-makers responsible for, and activities geared to, a particular policy, problem, or other specific assignment. With respect to any objective or mission, there is an organizational unit
so constituted as to be able to select a course of action for that objective" (Snyder, 1958: 20).

A related yet distinct approach to the bureaucratic process has its roots in organizational theory. While sharing Snyder's concern with the organizational context of decision-making, organizational theorists focus on organizational actions or outputs rather than decisions by governmental leaders (Allison, 1971: 67). Participants in the decision-making process tend to be occupants of formal organizational positions, attempting to satisfice (in Simon's terminology) rather than maximize their goals. When faced with a problem requiring solution, organizations follow established search procedures in uncovering alternatives. "Organizational search for alternative courses of action is problem-oriented: it focuses on the atypical discomfort that must be avoided" (Allison, 1971: 84). Moreover, because of the widespread use of organizational routines government action is incremental: "The best explanation of an organization's behavior at \( t \) is \( t-1 \); the best prediction of what will happen at \( t+1 \) is \( t \)" (Allison, 1971: 88). The organizational theorist's unit of analysis is the formal organization with its structure of roles, standard operating procedures, authority, and communications channels, rather than conscious goal-oriented decisions.

Although formal role structures and standard operating procedures are central to an organizational theory description of the bureaucratic process, these structures and procedures are not immune to variations in the organizational environment. Bureaucracies are not closed systems; they adapt to inputs from the external environment.
(Lawrence and Iversch, 1969). "System adaptability (e.g., organizational) is a function of ability to learn and to perform according to changing environmental contingencies" (Terreberry, 1967: 611-612). Thompson (1967) conceptualizes the organizational environment in terms of distinct "task environments" to which organizational structures and processes respond. Moreover, Cyert and March (1963: 100) argue that, especially in stress situations, organization members direct their attention to the short-run adaptation of their unit to the environment. Thus under certain conditions formal role structures and standard operating procedures may adapt to the external environment. In general, however, adaptation occurs within the context of formal roles and standard operating procedures.

Popularized by Graham Allison's analysis of American foreign policy during the Cuban missile crisis, the bureaucratic politics approach to foreign policy represents a third perspective on the decision-making process. Destler (1972: 52) defines bureaucratic politics as "...the process by which people inside government bargain with one another on complex public policy questions." Bargaining among individual "players" in a competitive "game" forms the basis of the bureaucratic politics model. Each player, although he may be drawn from a formal organizational unit, acts as an individual in attempting to achieve his personal goals and protect his interests. "Individuals become players in the national security policy game by occupying a position that is hooked on to the major channels for producing action on national security issues" (Allison, 1971: 164). Viewed from this perspective foreign policy decisions and actions are
political resultants—outcomes of a bargaining process characterized by conflict and consensus-building among individual political actors wielding varying amounts of influence.14

The decision-making, organizational behavior, and bureaucratic politics approaches differ in terms of: (1) participants, (2) results, and (3) causal factors. Based on the assumption that foreign policy equals the directions provided by government leaders, decision-making analysis focuses on those individuals concerned with a specific objective or goal. Decisions or choices with respect to these goals are the results to be explained. Causal factors range from aspects of the situation confronting policy-makers to spheres of competence, communication and information channels, and decision-makers' motivations. Organizational theory, in contrast, views formal organizations qua organizations as actors and organizational actions or outputs as results. Adopting an incremental approach to policy-making, the organizational theorist explains actions in terms of organizational routines and standard operating procedures. These routines and procedures do respond, however, to variations in the external environment which provides the context for organizational behavior.

Bureaucratic politics advocates take completely different stands on these issues. Individual "players" represent participants in a competitive bargaining "game." Policy results are political resultants, rather than decisions or organizational outputs, and causal factors are many and varied. Relative positions and influence among players, the existence and utilization of action channels, and the development of both formal and informal game "rules" interact to produce specific
policy resultants. Often policy resultants take the form of inaction or nondecision. In short, these three approaches—although sharing concern for the significance of the organizational context—bring distinct theoretical perspectives to the foreign policy-making process.

Our concern here, however, is not to specifically evaluate the relative explanatory potential of these approaches. Instead, we are more concerned with similarities rather than differences among the approaches. All seek to explain foreign policy in organizational or bureaucratic terms. The following general definition of the bureaucratic process may be applied to decision-making, organizational behavior, and bureaucratic politics perspectives: the bureaucratic process is represented by the interactions which take place among government decision-makers (acting either in their formal, organizational roles or as individual players in a competitive game) attempting to protect their personal, role, and national interests through the exercise of techniques of persuasion and influence. Assessment of the relationships between situational variables, the bureaucratic process, and foreign policy behavior requires selection of dimensions of the bureaucratic process. And selection of dimensions common to all three approaches assures a more accurate representation of the bureaucratic process. Such a procedure is followed here. Two dimensions have been selected and will be justified in terms of support drawn from the decision-making, organizational behavior, and bureaucratic politics perspectives.

The concept of authority appears in most discussions of the
organization of authority is defined as the degree to which participation in the decision-making process is limited to the head of state, ad hoc groups, or private individuals in whom the head of state has personal confidence. When participation extends to representatives of bureaucracies acting in their formal roles, authority is diffused rather than centralized.

Centralization of authority contributes significantly to the explanatory power of spheres of competence in the decision-making approach to bureaucratic politics. Snyder et al. (1962: 116) define authority as "...the ability to issue orders, instructions, and commands with the probability that they will be obeyed." The structure of authority falls within the spheres of competence set of causal factors in explaining foreign policy decisions. As such, it is part of the prescribed, conventional, and implicit rules which guide decision-makers' actions. Included are command-subordinate relationships and horizontal relationships with decision-makers on the same level (Snyder, 1958: 25). Taken together, these authority relationships help explain decision-makers' behavior in their spheres of competence, or roles. And competence, in turn, interacts with communication and information structures, decision-makers' motivations, and characteristics of the situation in explaining foreign policy decisions.

Similarly, the organizational behavior perspective on the bureaucratic process incorporates centralization of authority in descriptions of organizational structure. Two approaches to the
concept of authority can be identified in the literature: conventional and human relations (Peabody, 1964). As summarized by Peabody (1964), the conventional approach defines authority as a property possessed by decision-makers due to their formal role in the organization. Max Weber adopted such a definition of authority as "control from the top" in his influential studies of bureaucracy (Gerth and Mills, 1946). Popularized by Mary Parker Follett among others, the human relations approach views authority as a shared, cooperative activity (Peabody, 1964). The attitudes and behaviors of subordinates thus are instrumental in defining authority; the structure of authority represents the relationship between superior and subordinate, viewed from the perspectives of both parties. Whether defined in conventional or human relations terms, centralization of authority appears in most organizational theory discussions. On the empirical side, centralization of authority emerges as a distinct dimension in factor analyses of organizational behavior (Reimann, 1973; Mansfield, 1973).

The bureaucratic politics emphasis on individual players bargaining in a competitive game might at first suggest a minimal role for structure of authority. Although accepting the least structured conception of authority, bureaucratic politics advocates nonetheless include authority as an element in their analysis of foreign policy as a political resultant. Authority is defined in terms of players positions and their influence. Allison (1971: 164-165) for example, introduces four classes of players which he labels chiefs, staffers, Indians, and ad hoc groups. Underlying his discussion, if only implicitly, is the assumption that a structure of authority exists
among these classes of participants. In a more recent essay, Allison and Halperin (1972: 47) differentiate senior and junior players. Halperin and Kanter (1973: 7-8) extend the discussion even further and conclude that "...whether a particular participant is senior or junior is only imperfectly related to the formal hierarchy of organization. Thus President Nixon's advisor for national security affairs clearly is a very senior participant but holds an office whose position in the formal hierarchy is, at best, unclear." In short, players relationships to one another (whether in terms of formal or informal authority) are viewed as the major determinants of policy, the elements on which the nature of political resultants depend.

Degree of centralization of authority is by no means the only bureaucratic process dimension common to the decision-making, organizational behavior, and bureaucratic politics perspectives. The extent of within-government, bureaucratic opposition surfacing around an issue has an impact on policy results. Opposition is defined as the extent of disagreement within the government (judicial, legislative, or executive branches) concerning a recommended policy decision or action. Excluded is opposition on the part of domestic, nongovernmental groups or individuals. Opposition may, of course, be expressed in a variety of ways. Individual bureaucrats may leak stories of opposition to the press, publicly make statements criticizing the policy in question, or testify before formal governmental hearings. Individuals may refuse to obey directives from their superiors, block implementation of other policies desired by superiors, and, as a last resort, formally resign their positions. Entire departments or agencies express
opposition through similar channels. Opposition is viewed as ranging from low, in which case general agreement exists concerning a proposed policy, to high, in which case a number of individuals or bureaucratic units express discontent.

Although not explicitly introduced in Snyder's (1958) essay, the concept of within-government, bureaucratic opposition is not incompatible with his discussion of decision-making. In his words, "tension points and conflicts may be linked to different functional bases of competence (line vs. staff; areas vs. subject matter expert) and to different satisfactions with the legitimate order" (Snyder, 1958: 26). Conflict within the decision-making unit can thus be expected, and is due to a variety of factors. Overlapping formal roles may lead to conflict. Conflict may also result from different conceptions of the goals or objectives toward which specific foreign policy behavior is directed. Moreover, interaction among decision-makers exercising distinct spheres of competence influences choices among alternative courses of action. Opposition, then, exerts an indirect influence on foreign policy decisions.

Opposition emerges as a central concept in March and Simon's (1958) summary of research in organizational behavior. Focusing their study on conflict in organizations, March and Simon (1958: 112) make explicit the linkage between opposition and policy: conflict is defined as "...a breakdown in the standard mechanisms of decision-making so that an individual or group experiences difficulty in selecting an action alternative." Put simply, opposition fosters inaction. Conflict results when policy-makers must make a decision but are
confronted with differing goals and/or perceptions of reality, and neglect to share information among participants (March and Simon, 1958: 121 and 127). Within-government opposition, in short, interferes with the implementation of standard operating procedures and organizational routines, thus influencing the nature of organizational outputs or actions.

Contrary to the decision-making and organizational behavior approaches to the bureaucratic process, the bureaucratic politics perspective accepts within-government bureaucratic opposition as a normal component of the policy-making process. Allison (1971: 162) describes decisions as "...resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence...." Central to Halperin's (1970: 8) concept of the bureaucratic game is the idea of opposition: "The bureaucratic game concerns efforts to obtain and block decisions changing policies or directing an action or pattern of actions." Opposition among participants is natural, given their different positions, goals, interests, and levels of influence. Even strategic policy-making is not immune to opposition, as illustrated by Huntington's (1961: 146) discussion of horizontal bargaining within the executive branch: "Strategic programs, like other major policies, are not the product of expert planners, who rationally determine the actions necessary to achieve desired goals. They are the result of controversy, negotiation, and bargaining among officials and groups with different interests and perspectives." In sum, within-government opposition
significantly influences the outcomes of bureaucratic bargaining games.

We began this section by assuming that foreign policy decisions and actions occur in the context of large-scale organizations. Three approaches to the bureaucratic process were introduced: decision-making, organizational behavior, and bureaucratic politics. From these perspectives we abstracted two dimensions of the bureaucratic process—centralization of authority and bureaucratic opposition—and justified their selection in theoretical terms. Although these dimensions obviously do not include all dimensions relevant to describing the bureaucratic process, they appear representative of the kinds of dimensions necessary to tap the general class of bureaucratic process explanations of foreign policy. Future research efforts would differentiate these dimensions by approach, but this is not our purpose here. Examination of the relationships among situation, bureaucratic process, and foreign policy behavior requires next a discussion of the concept of foreign policy.

The Event as Foreign Policy

If it has had no other impact, recent foreign policy research has forced us to reconsider our time-worn definitions of foreign policy behavior. No longer can we remain content to assert explanations of foreign policy without explicitly defining the object of our explanatory efforts. This tendency toward specifying the dependent variables of our analysis has made us conscious of the fact that foreign policy means quite different things to analysts with varying research purposes. K. J. Holsti (1972: 101), for example,
characterizes foreign policy as actions or ideas directed toward the solution of problems in a country's external environment. Building on this definition, he suggests several components of policy: national orientations, roles, objectives, and actions (Holsti, 1972: 101). Foreign policy has variously been classified by geographical units or political entities, strategic or grand designs, skills and resources, action properties, relational attributes, basic values, national goals, communication characteristics, pattern variables, and issue areas (Hermann, 1972c).

Defining the unit of analysis in foreign policy research is a thorny problem to the solution of which the decision-making perspective has made a significant contribution. In an early study, Snyder et. al. (1962: 73) define foreign policy as the making and implementation of decisions—"the formulation and execution of policy." Brecher et. al. (1969), accepting this approach, use the concept of decision in their input-output framework for foreign policy analysis. Paige (1968) attempts to explain the Korean "decision" leading to American involvement in the Korean War. And Thordardson (1972) documents the 1968 Canadian decision to conduct a foreign policy review, traces the activities developing from this decision, and evaluates the impact of the review on Canadian foreign policy. Illustrative of a related decisional approach is Frankel's (1963: 1) general analysis of foreign policy decision-making, in which he defines policy as "...decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent relations between one state and others." "Decisions," in short, seem to be popular choices for the unit of analysis in foreign policy research.
Although representing an advance in the study of foreign policy, the decision-making approach soon revealed problems in attempts to apply the scheme to specific cases. It became clear that decisions could be broken down into a number of sub-decisions. Put differently, decisions were not unitary acts but represented a sequence of activities. Paige (1968: 278) describes the Korean decision at two levels: "Analytically the Korean decision may be viewed either as a single decision or a sequence of decisions. It might be regarded either as the American decision to resist armed aggression in Korea through military counteraction, or as a set of decisions taken by the United States Government during the period June 24-30, 1950." Likewise, American foreign policy during the Cuban missile crisis may be represented by the decision to impose a naval blockade of the island or by the many decisions and actions taken between October 16-28, 1962 (Kennedy, 1968; Abel, 1966). Desire on the part of foreign policy researchers for a discrete, empirically identifiable and comparable unit of analysis combined with quantitative developments in international relations research to encourage acceptance of the foreign policy event as a unit of analysis.

Projects using event data abound, some focusing on geographical areas such as the Middle East, others investigating an issue-area (e.g., the Cold War), and still others attempting to map interactions among the countries of the world. Scholars currently involved in the generation of event data share several research interests. Describing the behavior of nations (or, "who" did "what" to "whom" in event jargon) is a primary goal. Regardless of the theoretical
underpinnings of the particular event data project, each investigator strives to map the interactions which occur among nations, often classifying these interactions according to their conflictful or cooperative nature. The specific classificatory schemes may (and do) vary from project to project, but the attempt to classify in some manner forms a common theme. Moreover, scholars working with event data share the aim of predicting future nation-state behavior based on analysis of patterns of past behavior. Predictive interests range from anticipating the future behavior of specific nations, to developing hypotheses concerning the behavior of classes of nations, to describing scenarios of future international systems.  

Underlying most event data projects is a standard notion of foreign policy event: an event may be defined as an action by authoritative decision-makers directed toward elements of a nation's external or internal environment with the intention of influencing the behavior of another national entity (Hermann, 1971). Event-interactions are distinguished from transactions, the latter referring to exchanges between nations which occur so frequently that they become regularized and lose their "newsworthy" character (McClelland, 1969). Every event or event-interaction includes several components: actor, action, target and/or object, and date. Building on this core definition, an event may be described according to a variety of action properties. Events are verbal or physical, hostile or cooperative, involve diplomatic, military, or economic resources, and are engaged in unilaterally or bilaterally, to suggest just a few dimensions. Assumptions supporting the use of event data are numerous and are discussed elsewhere
Although much attention has been paid to the generation of event data sets, comparatively little attention is directed to examining the linkage between event and foreign policy. A recent survey of event data research argues that events serve merely as indicators of foreign policy behavior (Burgess and Lawton, 1973). Events and foreign policy are not equated by any event data project; nevertheless, the relationship between event and foreign policy is rarely made explicit.

Hermann (1973: 14) suggests that "policy can...be interpreted as the aggregation of these behaviors [events] according to some logic imposed on them by actors or observers." Elsewhere, foreign policy has been defined as "...those discrete official actions of the authoritative decision-makers of a nation's government, or their agents, which are intended by the decision-makers to influence the behavior of international actors external to their own polity" (Hermann, 1972c: 72). Foreign policy, then, consists of discrete actions or events viewed in the context of the problem, issue, or goals toward which they are directed. Extensive conceptual analysis remains to be done concerning this issue, but such a task will not be attempted in the present study.

**Dimensions of Foreign Policy Behavior**

To describe and explain the actions of nations more is required than simply a definition of foreign policy behavior. Rather than explaining foreign policy in general, scholars normally focus on aspects or dimensions of policy such as economic policy, conflict, and
alliance behavior. Traditional analyses of international politics illustrate the variety of dimensions. Morgenthau's (1967) classic "realist" approach to international relations introduces three foreign policy dimensions: status quo policies, imperialism, and prestige behavior. Status quo policies represent attempts to preserve the existing balance of power, while imperialist actions aim to change the status quo and redistribute power. Protocol actions and the use of military force reflect demonstration of power, or prestige behavior. Padelford and Lincoln (1967: 5) suggest a conflict-cooperation dimension: "At any one time relations among states extend along a front ranging from limited contacts because of lack of related interests or physical separation, through varying degrees of persuasion and accommodation, either to cooperation and alliance or to friction, conflict, and sometimes open violence." Supporting the existence of a conflict-cooperation dimension, Arnold Wolfers (1962: 26) comments: "Relations among states can vary in a wide spectrum of total enmity of two belligerents in a fight to the finish to the extreme of amity when two states let down their guards completely, as have the United States and Canada." Although we might argue with Wolfers' characterization of Canadian-American relations, his point is clear. Moreover, he suggests that some nations--such as Switzerland--engage in "minimal relations" by attempting to minimize their political contacts with other countries.

More recent discussions of foreign policy suggest complex dimensions. Frankel (1963: 206-209), for example, argues for the centrality of an intensity dimension of foreign policy behavior.
Although not explicitly defining his dimensions, Wilkinson (1969: xiv) suggests foreign policy may be described in terms of its "coherence, stability, efficiency, realism, farsightedness, and success."

Harold and Margaret Sprout (1971) present a detailed typology of techniques of statecraft. Their typology is based on a number of distinctions: direct-circuitous, verbal-nonverbal, nonviolent-violent, supplying-withholding, sustaining-coercing and/or destroying. To take just one distinction, "direct approaches are those in which one government deals directly with another; circuitous approaches, those in which some intermediary is involved" (Sprout and Sprout, 1971: 145). Other dimensions and typologies of foreign policy behavior could be presented; suffice it to say that both traditional and more recent conceptual discussions of foreign policy define behavior in multi-dimensional terms.

As suggested in Chapter I, multi-dimensional approaches are by no means limited to conceptual or theoretical analyses. Examination of recent empirical research reveals increasing concern with describing the component dimensions of foreign policy behavior. A great deal of attention has been directed toward scaling decision-makers' perceptions and national actions in terms of hostility and cooperation (Moses, et. al., 1967; O. Holsti et. al., 1968, 1969). In their analysis of international relations among European powers between 1870-1881, Rosecrance et. al. (1972) extract a conflict-cooperation dimension of dyadic behavior. A single scale representing conflict-cooperation is also derived by Azar (1972). Based on data for Middle East nations, COPDAB develops a thirteen-point violence dimension ranging from political integration at one extreme to general war at the other extreme (Sloan,

Initial studies and further analysis of data collected by the World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) Project under the direction of Charles McClelland suggest similar foreign policy behavior dimensions. McClelland and Hoggard (1969) classify actions into three basic groups: conflict, cooperation, and participation. Participation actions represent "overhead" activities necessary for the maintenance of the international system, such as comments and consultations. A factor analysis of the WEIS data by Salmore and Munton (1973) revealed two dimensions: conflict-cooperation and inverse commitment. After regrouping the WEIS action categories and performing another factor analysis, six event types emerged: military conflict action, non-military conflict action, verbal conflict, participation, diplomatic exchange, and support (Salmore and Munton, 1973). Phillips (1972)
has compared WEIS and DON patterns of conflict behavior using canonical analysis. His results yield two conflict behavior dimensions, the first representing diplomatic (nonviolent) conflict and the second representing violent conflict behavior (including threats and accusations). Given the desire for comparability across data sets, Phillips' findings are encouraging.

Several analysts have attempted to scale WEIS along evaluative and potency dimensions. Employing the semantic differential technique, nine constructs emerge accounting for 62% of the variance: evaluative, strength, definitiveness, stability, complexity, scope, flexibility, activity, and style (Calhoun, 1971). Moreover, Sigler (1971) finds the WEIS data scale along a combined evaluative-potency dimension. Finally, Corson (1970) constructs separate conflict and cooperation scales based on analysis of data describing interaction within and between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization nations. The empirical specification of foreign policy behavior dimensions has, in short, made rapid progress.

Three dimensions will be used in the present study to describe foreign policy behavior: hostility-cooperation, resource commitment, and specificity. Reasons for their selection vary from dimension to dimension. Often, the dimensions appear in traditional analyses of international relations. Two of the dimensions emerge in most empirical attempts to classify foreign policy behavior. Although the third dimension does not receive as much attention as the other two, an argument will be made for its inclusion based on its potential theoretical significance. Each of these dimensions will be presented
and justified in turn.

As we have seen, hostility and cooperation are concepts often used to describe foreign policy. Not only do they appear in most traditional analyses of international politics; recent empirical studies also reveal their centrality. In general, hostility and cooperation may be defined either from the perspective of the actor or from the perspective of the target nation. The former approach is adopted here. The actor perspective evaluates the degree of hostility or cooperation in an action in terms of the actor's intention. If the actor means the action to harm the target, then hostility is expressed. Correspondingly, if the actor desires to benefit the target in some way by the action, then cooperation is expressed. This approach seems reasonable given our conceptualization of situational variables. Because situational variables are defined from the perspective of the actor, the linkage between situation and behavior can best be described if behavior is also defined from the actor's perspective. Put differently, it seems more reasonable to link an actor's perception of the situation to his behavioral intention than to a target's perception of his intention. Moreover, the short-term nature of situational phenomena argues for an actor's perception approach. Boulding (1962: 153) adopts a similar perspective in his discussion of conflict within organizations. He concludes that "...hostility is related to the concept of the other in each organization, not to the self-images. Thus it is possible for A to like a certain move because A thinks that this injures B, whereas B might regard the move as beneficial to him. This would still indicate hostility."
Hostility is defined as the degree of negative affect expressed by one nation toward another nation which serves as either the target or object of behavior. Here we accept the dictionary definition of affect as "inward feeling or disposition." The greater the degree of negative affect, the higher the level of hostility; the less the degree of negative affect, the lower the level of hostility. Cooperation, on the other hand, is defined as the degree of positive affect expressed by a specific action.

Do hostility and cooperation represent a single dimension, or are they separate, independent dimensions of foreign policy behavior? This question has become a significant point of contention among students of foreign policy, and the issue is by no means settled. Corson (1972) asserts conflict and cooperation form separate scales, and proceeds with his analysis on the basis of this assertion. At no point in his study of NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization interaction, however, does he empirically substantiate this assertion. A factor analysis of WEIS data by McClelland and Hoggard (1969) reveals separate cooperation and conflict dimensions, but these results have been questioned by Brody (1972). Abstracting from Brody's discussion, two points seem relevant to the issue. First, analyses including event-interaction and transaction data (e.g., Rummel, 1967) are more likely to uncover a multi-dimensional affect component. In the second place, dyadic analyses are more likely to reveal a unidimensional affect component (Sigler, 1971; Kegley, 1973; Munton, 1973). As summarized by Munton (1973: 34), "...when only event data are being used and when dyads are the unit of analysis, then it appears that cooperative
and conflictful behavior are unidimensional." The dimensionality issue is, in sum, far from settled. Consequently, acceptance of a unidimensional approach—if supported by other studies—is justifiable.

Important distinctions should be drawn between hostility, threat, and stress—concepts which, although related to one another, have separate and distinct meanings. Hostility, as defined above, is the expression of negative affect or feeling by means of either verbal statements or physical deeds. Threat, on the other hand, requires in addition the capability to fully implement the verbal statements or physical deeds damaging to the other side, and usually represents a conditional statement. As Brody et. al. (1967) suggest, threat is a product of hostile intent plus capability. Stress, in contrast to hostility and threat, refers "...to a state of the organism, not to a class of conditions" (Vogel et. al., 1972: 290fn). Stressful conditions may be viewed as those "...which overtax the ordinary or normal devices" (Menninger, 1972: 178) of individuals, often resulting in an inability to cope. As defined by O. Holsti (1972: 11), "...stress is viewed as the result of a situation that threatens important goals or values" (italics removed). Thus it can be argued that hostile actions directed by nation A toward nation B may create a perception of threat among decision-makers in nation B, resulting in the development of stress within the decisional unit.

Empirical studies attempt to isolate the causes of hostile behavior. The Stanford Studies in Conflict and Integration contribute a number of generalizations. Constructing an index of injury prior to the outbreak of World War I, O. Holsti and North (1966) conclude
that the higher a nation's position on this index, the more likely will it engage in hostile behavior. Zinnes, et. al. (1972: 140) present a model which "...postulates (1) that changes in the intensity level of perceptions of hostility (P) depend on the immediately preceding perception and on the most recently received messages (R), and (2) that the expression of hostility (E) depends on the immediately preceding expression of hostility and on the current perception of hostility." To summarize, these studies generally relate an actor's hostile behavior to the expression of hostility by another nation and to the perception of that expression by the actor.

Hilton (1971: 262) repeats the Zinnes analysis for the expression of hostility, finding that "...the level of hostility expressed on any particular day is dependent upon the levels expressed on the previous days and on this only." Unlike the results of the Zinnes experiment, Hilton (1971: 262) concludes that "no evidence is found to suggest that there is a relationship between expressions of hostility and perceptions of hostility." Moreover, Sigler (1971) successfully maps U.S.--Soviet--Chinese relations between 1966 and 1971 solely in terms of changes in the expression of hostile actions. Brody, et. al. (1967) suggest, however, that both perceptions and expressions of hostility are relevant in explaining foreign policy. Similarly, Field (1972) finds in his analysis of the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict that above a certain threshold (the existence of open, armed hostilities) behavior tends to explain behavior. Below that threshold, however, perceptions are significant influences on behavior (Field, 1972: 34-35).
Non-perceptual explanations of hostility are also presented. Choucri and North (1969) argue that the outbreak of World War I may be explained in terms of a "pressure" theory of conflict or hostility. Increasing population growth without a corresponding increase in territory and other resources creates pressure for expansion, resulting in the outbreak of hostility. Haas (1968) adopts a similar perspective, relating hostility to increasing social stress and strain.

The significance of the hostility-cooperation dimension of foreign policy behavior should by now be apparent. Appearing in traditional discussions of international relations, the concepts at times represent the central organizing foci (Aron, 1966). Similarly, empirical investigations without exception reveal an affect dimension (or, dimensions). Psychologists have long directed their research efforts toward understanding hostility. Sociological analyses of small group behavior have also focused on expression of hostility and cooperation within and between groups. In short, hostility-cooperation is included in our description of foreign policy behavior because of its wide-ranging theoretical importance in the study of human behavior.

Level of commitment of resources is a second dimension of foreign policy behavior. Although equally significant, commitment tends to be less emphasized than hostility. Commitment is defined as the extent to which physical resources as opposed to verbal statements or diplomatic, protocol resources are pledged in any particular foreign policy action. Underlying this definition is the assumption that the use of physical resources involves more of a commitment than a verbal statement of evaluation or intent. For example, one nation's offer
to aid another if attacked by a third country involves less commitment than the actual dispatch of military forces to aid that second nation. Moreover, verbal statements differ in terms of their extent of commitment. If one nation responds to an accusation by another nation with a threat of diplomatic sanctions, then the impact of that response would probably be greater than simply a denial of the accusation.

Furthermore, the extent of commitment tends to vary with the amount of resources a nation has at its disposal. The more resources available to a nation, the greater must the commitment be to be regarded as significant. Token commitments of resources can be regarded as symbolic rather than significant deeds. Commitment requires the investment of time, planning, money, or other scarce resources, and may involve training of soldiers or technicians, the building of hospitals and schools in other nations, and so forth. The notion of commitment often implies the future loss of control over resources, either through verbal or physical actions. At the most extreme point, commitment is transformed from a conditional to an unconditional concept when the actual transfer of resources takes place. Approaching the concept of commitment in this way does not signify that verbal behavior is unimportant in comparison to physical behavior. What is implied is only that physical deeds tend to be more difficult to implement and require more time to change once a commitment has been made. In general, however, the closer a nation moves to engaging in physical behavior, the higher the level of commitment.

What conditions lead to the making of commitments in international relations? Often a commitment is made for ideological or
normative reasons. Foreign aid may be given in an effort to raise the standard of living in underdeveloped nations. Or, military resources are committed in "the defense of freedom" or to "liberate" oppressed peoples. More often, nations commit resources with an eye toward getting something of value in return. Thus nations involve themselves in military or defense alliances and establish export-import agreements to protect trade advantages. Finally, nations faced with a threat or actual military attack from another nation tend to respond vigorously with the use of military resources and, at times, a large-scale commitment of both machinery and manpower. In short, a variety of justifications are given for the commitment of resources under specific conditions.

Empirical research has contributed numerous generalizations concerning commitment. Franck and Weisband (1972: 118) focus on the use of verbal strategy in Soviet-American relations. They suggest that "verbal weapons are as 'real' in their strategic potential as missiles and submarines." Moreover, "any deployment of words by a state is likely to have some affect on (1) the international system in general and (2) the options available to the state in further specific confrontations with other states" (Franck and Weisband, 1972: 119, italics removed). Verbal statements act to create shared expectations among parties, and the use of a number of signals over time indicates the extent of commitment to a particular norm or norms of behavior (Franck and Weisband, 1972: 121). Phillips (1969) and McClelland and Hoggard (1969) conclude from factor analyses that verbal and physical dimensions of conflict behavior are distinct. Supporting
these results, Phillips and Hainline (1972: 10) find that "...several patterns of crisis experience are a mixture of words and deeds."

Finally, commitment emerges as one of two major dimensions of foreign policy behavior in factor analyses of WEIS and PEACE data.20

Research using CREON data suggests a number of explanations of verbal and physical behavior. In her analysis of the impact of decision-makers' personality characteristics on foreign policy behavior, Margaret Hermann (1972: 4) finds that "the more nationalistic the head of state is, the less external commitment of its resources his nation will make." Furthermore, "the more cognitively complex the head of state is, the more deeds as opposed to words his nation will engage in" (M. Hermann, 1972: 5). Analyzing the impact of regime structure on foreign policy behavior, Barbara and Stephen Salmore (1972: 13) conclude that "illegal regimes are more likely to have a higher percentage of words (low commitment acts) than deeds (high commitment acts) than legal regimes," where legality refers to the nature of genesis of that regime. Also, "illegal regimes will have a higher percentage of verbal conflict acts than legal regimes, but legal and illegal regimes will differ little in deed conflict" (B. Salmore and S. Salmore, 1972: 13).

Finally, Charles Hermann and Maurice East (1972) investigate the effect of nation genotype on foreign policy behavior. Three of their conclusions relate to commitment. First, "...governments of large nations engage in proportionately more verbal behavior than those of small countries" (Hermann and East, 1972: 20). Secondly, "... less developed nations engage in more verbal behavior" (Hermann and East, 1972: 20). Lastly, "... governments of closed nations engaged in relatively more verbal behavior (and relative [sic] fewer deeds) than
their counterparts in open systems" (Hermann and East, 1972: 20). As suggested by these studies, a number of antecedents of varying levels of resource commitment have been identified.

Similar to hostility-cooperation, the resource commitment dimension appears in most discussions of foreign policy behavior. Frameworks for classifying available tools and techniques of statecraft abound (Sprout and Sprout, 1972). Factor analyses of event data collections normally reveal a commitment dimension along with a hostility-cooperation dimension (Munton, 1973; Salmore and Munton, 1973; Kegley, 1973). When adopted as a descriptive dimension, resource commitment has been successfully explained by a variety of theoretical perspectives. For these reasons, resource commitment forms the second dimension of foreign policy behavior in this analysis.

The third and final dimension selected to describe foreign policy is degree of specificity. Specificity receives the least attention of the foreign policy dimensions in either theoretical or empirical discussions. For the purpose of this research, specificity is defined as the extent of differentiation of the problem or issue, target, and resources expressed in the foreign policy action. Specificity should be viewed as a dimension running from high specificity at one extreme to low specificity or, generality, at the other. As defined, specificity may refer to the problem, target, and resources, either singly, taken in pairs, or all three together. An action which is specific in terms of all three components would be generally more specific than action specific only in terms of the problem, for example. President Nixon signing an agreement with Prime Minister
Trudeau to loosen restrictions on Canadian power utilization built into the Columbia River basin treaty would be an example of the former. The latter case is illustrated in a statement by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers that the U.S. hopes the cease-fire agreement in Vietnam will be successful. In general, specific actions convey more information than general actions.

Why should a nation's decision-makers choose to engage in specific as opposed to general actions? First, engaging in actions which are specific regarding an issue or problem has advantages. Specificity of issue allows decision-makers to carry on relations with a nation in one particular area without necessarily affecting relations in other areas of mutual concern. The United States can, for example, establish certain guidelines with Cuba concerning airline hijackings without establishing formal diplomatic relations with the Castro regime. In another instance, the Canadian government severely criticizes American bombing of North Vietnam without effecting any drastic change in Canadian-American relations.

Addressing actions to specific targets decreases the chances of the target "not getting the message." Use of such devices as the "hot line" to establish direct communication between heads of state during an international crisis represents a critical use of target specificity. At times decision-makers attempt to influence groups or mass publics in other nations through a variety of means, some overt and some covert. By differentiating groups or mass publics from the target nation as a whole, the acting nation is engaging in specific rather than general behavior. Specificity also relates to the kind
and amount of resources involved in the action. If resources are committed on a conditional basis, statement of the conditions under which such transfers will occur increases understanding of the action for both the actor and the target. In sum, specificity aids in effective communication between nations.

Little research has been carried out regarding the specificity-generality dimension of foreign policy. McClelland and Hoggard (1969) discover that approximately one third of all actions initiated in the international system in 1966 represent participatory acts. As described earlier, they regard these acts "...tentatively as functioning as a kind of 'overhead' expenditure to help keep the system in motion" (McClelland and Hoggard, 1969: 715). Because many of these acts cluster at the less specific end of the specificity dimension, one might conclude that general activities form a significant base line upon which more specific actions can be built. In short, although less explicitly addressed than either of the first two dimensions, specificity-generality underlies many discussions of foreign policy. It resembles the "scope" dimension abstracted by Calhoun (1971) in his application of the semantic differential to the WEIS data. Additionally, specificity of target parallels the direct-indirect classification introduced by Harold and Margaret Sprout (1972). The implicit acceptance and lack of explicit development of this dimension in typologies of behavior provides one of the major reasons for selecting specificity-generality to describe foreign policy behavior.
Conclusion

We have now come full circle in our discussion of concepts necessary for a situational explanation of foreign policy. This chapter began with the introduction of a situational typology proposed by Charles Hermann. Composed of threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness, the typology allows a multi-dimensional approach to the nature of the situation confronting policy-makers. Each dimension is viewed from the perspective of the foreign policy decision-maker, and represents a characteristic of the situation to which he is responding. Because the typology is comprehensive, mutually exclusive, and measurable, theoretically significant statements can be constructed linking situational types to foreign policy behavior.

Next, we considered bureaucratic influences on foreign policy. Following a survey of decision-making, organizational behavior, and bureaucratic politics approaches to the bureaucratic process, we abstracted two common dimensions: degree of centralization of authority and bureaucratic opposition. The commonality of these dimensions to three bureaucratic process perspectives supports their selection. Because of this commonality we can be more certain the dimensions tap general underlying characteristics of the bureaucratic process considered significant in the explanation of foreign policy.

Finally, three dimensions of foreign policy behavior were introduced. Abstracting from the foreign policy literature, we selected three behavior dimensions: hostility-cooperation, resource commitment, and specificity. The first two dimensions appear in numerous factor analyses of a wide variety of event data collections. The specificity
dimension was chosen because of its hypothesized theoretical relevance.

Evaluations of the situational typology and direct and indirect models of situational influence require more than the elaboration of concepts. Relationships linking the situational typology and the behavioral dimensions remain to be explicitly stated and empirically tested. This statement begins in Chapter III.
NOTES

CHAPTER II

Defining foreign policy behavior as discrete, unaggregated events means we must be able to empirically locate these events in time. If the situational dimensions we select lead to inaction rather than action, then we will be unable to identify the results of their influence. Non-actions cannot be empirically observed.

The list of studies focusing on threat and/or opportunity is unending. Some of the most interesting and relevant discussions can be found in: Alcock (1970), Baldwin (1971), Brody et al. (1967), Choucri and North (1969), Druckman (1971), Field (1972), Gladstone (1955), Paul (1971), Price (1972), Zaninovich (1964), and Zinnès et al. (1961).

For illustrative studies, see Berlyne (1957), Dmitriev and Kochegina (1959), Eson and Kafka (1952), Falk and Bindra (1954), Gescheider and Wright (1971), Gilliland et al. (1946), Guilford (1928), Harton (1938), Langer et al. (1961), Meerloo (1948), Pruitt and Drews (1967), and Remington (1971).

See above, page 45.

These "clues" for identifying anticipated situations have been formalized. Salmore and Brady (1973) present a detailed discussion of these and other coding rules.

On political intelligence, see Knorr (1964).

Among significant psychological studies we would include Deutschberger (1947), Jerror and Readio (1957), Krieckhaus and Eriksen (1960), and Swingle and Coady (1967).

We are indebted to Charles Hermann for suggesting this point.

For good summaries of the most frequent arguments, see Hempel (1965), Lazarsfeld and Barton (1951), McKinney (1966), Swanson (1972), and Teryakian (1968).

Both Hermann (1971) and Frederiksen (1972) suggest these purposes.
Rosenau (1967) describes a very personal reaction to Snyder's early work, and suggests the decision-making approach did indeed signify a new direction in foreign policy research. For the original formulation, see Snyder et al. (1954).

Perhaps the most widely read studies by organizational theorists are Simon (1965), March and Simon (1958), Blau and Scott (1962), and March (1965).

Allison's (1971) work both follows in the tradition of and has prompted other studies. See, for example, Halperin (1972), Allison and Halperin (1972), Destler (1972), George (1972), Hilsman (1967), Huntington (1961), Halperin and Kanter (1973), and Neustadt (1960). For important critiques of the bureaucratic politics model, see Krasner (1972) and especially Art (1973).

Allison (1971) and Hilsman (1967) refer to political resultants and consensus-building, respectively.

Structure of authority is a significant element in each of the following studies: Simon (1965), Blau and Scott (1962), and Snyder (1958).

For discussions of the relevance of bureaucratic opposition in the decision-making process, see March and Simon (1958), Destler (1972), Lindblom (1965), Sorenson (1963), Hilsman (1967), and Huntington (1961).

Early attempts to develop a comparative study of foreign policy neglected explicit definition of the dependent variable. Rosenau's "pre-theory" reflects this problem. As argued by Hermann (1971), the event data movement provided analysts with a specific unit of analysis—the foreign policy event.

These three approaches are illustrated in Azar (1972), Corson (1969), and McClelland (1970).

Munton (1973), Hermann and East (1972), and McClelland (1968) represent these concerns.

For the WEIS analysis, see Salmore and Munton (1973). Munton's (1973) factor analysis of PEACE data produces a dimension which he labels "inverse commitment."
CHAPTER III

THE IMPACT OF SITUATIONAL DIMENSIONS
ON FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

Introduction

How do variations in characteristics of the situation confronting decision-makers affect foreign policy? Put differently, do the actions of foreign policy decision-makers reflect the situational constraints and opportunities under which those policy-makers operate? These questions provide the central focus of our analysis. Up to this point we have introduced a number of assumptions and definitions underlying situational explanations of foreign policy. Building on these assumptions and definitions, we suggested two models of situational influence. The direct model argues situational characteristics have a direct effect on foreign policy behavior. Alternatively, the indirect model hypothesizes an indirect linkage between situation and policy, mediated by characteristics of the bureaucratic process. In the preceding chapter we selected and outlined those concepts central to both models.

The purpose of this chapter is to present a series of propositions relating variations in situational characteristics to variations in dimensions of foreign policy behavior. The propositions are supported by the definitions and assumptions introduced in Chapter I and
by the concepts described in Chapter II. Statement of these propositions does not imply acceptance of either the direct or indirect models of situational influence. Rather, as will be seen, arguments supporting these propositions draw from both models. Our purpose here is not to evaluate the relative utility of the models--this will be done in later chapters. Instead, these propositions seek to establish a relationship between situation and foreign policy. Once the relationship has been determined, we can then proceed to evaluate the dynamics of that relationship through explicit consideration of the impact of bureaucratic process characteristics.

The following format will be adopted in this chapter. First, we discuss the general relationship of each situational dimension to foreign policy. Next, propositions will be developed which link variations in the situational dimensions to variations in the three foreign policy behavior dimensions. Recent American, Soviet, and Canadian foreign policy actions provide examples of these relationships.

**Threat-Opportunity and Foreign Policy**

Threat has been defined as foreign policy decision-makers' perceptions of impending harm to desired values, goals, or conditions which are created by the statements and/or actions of another nation's decision-makers. An opportunity exists when decision-makers view the situation as an occasion to make progress on or move closer to the desired value, goal, or condition. Thus the threat-opportunity dimension links other nations' behavior to the acting nation's goals by
describing the impact of that behavior on the status of those goals. If the impact of the action is negative, then decision-makers are confronted with a threatening situation. Positive impact, on the other hand, indicates the existence of an opportunity. Whether indicating threat or opportunity, the situational impact on goals affects subsequent foreign policy behavior.

The argument for the impact of threat-opportunity on foreign policy behavior in general can be made as follows: We assume foreign policy decision-makers act in the international arena on behalf of their nations to achieve either short or long-range goals. Furthermore, the actions of other nations may present threats to or provide opportunities for the achievement or maintenance of these goals. If national goals are endangered, then decision-makers will react to protect and defend those goals. If, on the other hand, the situation presents an opportunity to make progress toward these goals, then decision-makers may engage in foreign policy activities designed to take full advantage of the existing opportunity. In any event, the existence of either a threat or an opportunity prompts reaction by foreign policy decision-makers (from Assumption 2). The degree of threat or opportunity in a specific situation can be linked, therefore, to subsequent foreign policy behavior.

What specific effects does a threatening situation have on foreign policy behavior? As indicated above, decision-makers respond to impending harm with actions to prevent the threat from being carried out (Gladstone and Taylor, 1958). This response may take either of two forms. First, if the threat is so great as to endanger
a nation's existence goals, then that nation's decision-makers will capitulate (Lindskold, et. al., 1969). In less severe circumstances where the threat does not endanger existence goals, decision-makers will engage in hostile behavior (Hermann and Brady, 1972). In the latter case, decision-makers can react with hostility because the consequences of that behavior are less dire. Even if the behavior is not effective and the threat is carried out, the nation's existence has not been endangered. The developing multipolar international system and the general threat of nuclear destruction in the second half of the twentieth century decrease the probability that one nation will threaten the existence goals of another nation. The costs of failure to capitulate are too great, especially if the threat involves American and/or Soviet interests. Given these facts, most threats will be cast deliberately at a level designed not to force the target nation into a corner by endangering its existence. As a consequence, decision-makers are more likely to respond with hostility in an effort to prevent the threat from being carried out. This general relationship between threat and hostility is supported by Zinnes, et. al. (1961), Zaninovich (1964), Choucri and North (1969), and Alcock (1970).³

A threatening situation also affects the level of resources committed by a nation's decision-makers. Under conditions of threat, decision-makers react to protect and defend their goals. Resolve or intent to protect those goals must be clearly communicated in threatening situations. In the absence of such communication, the probability that the threat will be carried out increases. How might
decision-makers communicate their resolve? One method involves the commitment of resources. Actions that utilize scarce resources are more difficult to implement than most verbal statements of evaluation or desire. Once a commitment has been made, the implementation of decisions reversing that commitment becomes almost impossible. The decision to engage physical resources, then, indicates a high degree of resolve or commitment to that policy. Intent is therefore communicated through commitment. Consequently, decision-makers when threatened are likely to engage in actions requiring commitment or potential commitment of physical resources.

Finally, threat influences the degree of specificity attached to foreign policy actions. In responding to threatening situations decision-makers act to keep their options open. In the event that a particular response does not satisfy the threatener, decision-makers want to retain flexibility in their subsequent behavior. On the other hand, decision-makers also see utility in keeping the threatener's options open. By acting to increase the threatener's flexibility, decision-makers keep open the possibility the threat can be withdrawn, or at least scaled down. Flexibility, then, is valuable to both sides. Generality in foreign policy behavior increases options and flexibility for both the threatener and the threatened because it increases their ranges of perception for any particular action. A similar point is made by Jervis (1970: 123): "It is the noise and ambiguity in the signaling system that provide flexibility and protection by reducing the danger of damage to an actor's reputation when he undertakes probes and initiatives." General behavior aids
decision-makers in retaining flexibility. Thus under conditions of threat decision-makers are more likely to engage in general rather than specific behavior.

Developments in Laos during the early months of the Kennedy administration confronted American policy-makers with a threatening situation. From March through July, 1961 the future of Laos remained uncertain. Continuous fighting between neutralist-Pathet Lao forces and troops of the pro-American Laotian government divided the country. On March 9, 1961 neutralist-Pathet Lao forces mounted a major offensive and captured the road junction between Luang Prabang and Vientiane, thus threatening the two major cities. In addition to posing a threat to these cities and the Laotian government, the neutralist-Pathet Lao action threatened American interests in Southeast Asia. The military situation was viewed as a threat to SEATO's credibility. (If the United States did not stand by the Laotian government during this crisis, other SEATO allies might have asked, why should we expect the Americans to come to our assistance in time of need?) Moreover, the neutralist-Pathet Lao action posed a threat to the situation in South Vietnam. (If Laos was lost to the Communists, so the argument went, men and equipment could be transported through Laos to Vietcong operating in South Vietnam.) Viewed in a larger context, the situation presented a threat to the balance of power in Southeast Asia. In sum, a variety of American interests were threatened by the neutralist-Pathet Lao military offensive of March 9.

The American response to this situation lends support to our hypotheses relating threat to dimensions of foreign policy behavior.
Initially, the Kennedy strategy was to continue to seek negotiations leading toward the establishment of an independent and neutral government in Laos. At the same time the United States had to be fully determined to intervene in the fighting if such intervention became necessary. During a meeting with his advisors on March 9, President Kennedy set in motion preparation of a plan moving from military advisors to the all-out use of force. Strategies for supplying and training Laotian government forces were also discussed. On the diplomatic front Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson met with Soviet Premier Khrushchev to convey America's "utmost resolve" to prevent a Communist takeover in Laos; similar diplomatic messages were conveyed to the Peoples' Republic of China and North Vietnam.

When the Soviet Union failed to respond to American overtures, Secretary of State Rusk met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and suggested the situation represented a threat to Soviet-American relations generally. The National Security Council met on March 20-21 to determine means of increasing pressure on the Soviet Union to influence a cease-fire. As a result of this meeting, the American task force on Okinawa was alerted, the Seventh Fleet cruised to the Gulf of Siam, and supplies and equipment were transported to bases near the Laotian border. To further convey his determination, President Kennedy appeared on television on March 23 and stated that peace in Laos required cessation of the attacks by externally-supported Communist forces. In presenting a tacit ultimatum with no time limit specified, Kennedy attempted to convey a "quiet" warning to the Soviets. Kennedy refused to make public the nature of the Communist provocation.
which would force the United States to intervene, deliberately conveying an ambiguous message. Not long after (April 3) the Soviet Union agreed an end to the fighting in Laos was necessary before serious negotiations could begin.

The United States thus countered the neutralist-Pathet Lao military offensive with hostile behavior, a high level of resource commitment, and general rather than specific behavior. Alerting the American task force on Okinawa, relocating the Seventh Fleet, and transporting military supplies and equipment to bases near the Laotian border represented hostile actions and required a high level of resource commitment. At the same time, these and President Kennedy's other actions were general rather than specific in terms of their target and their intent. President Kennedy's issuance of a tacit rather than explicit ultimatum, and his use of the television media rather than direct diplomatic channels to communicate the American resolve were intended to maintain an ambiguous situation. Such ambiguity encouraged Soviet leaders to agree to an end to combat prior to the beginning of negotiations.

How do foreign policy decision-makers react when faced with an opportunity rather than a threatening situation? It will be recalled that an opportunity presents decision-makers with an occasion to make progress on their goals. This occasion results from actions of another nation or nations which have a positive impact on the present actor's goals. It seems reasonable to assume that these actions will be cooperative in nature. Given the cooperative atmosphere of the situation, decision-makers are more likely to make progress on their
goals if they in turn respond cooperatively. Cooperative responses tend to elicit subsequent cooperative behavior (Pruitt, 1969), thus moving the nation even closer to achievement of its goals. When confronted with an opportunity, then, decision-makers are likely to engage in highly cooperative foreign policy behavior.

The level of resource commitment engaged in by foreign policy decision-makers also depends upon the existence of an opportunity. Resources tend to be committed under dire circumstances when goals are endangered and the communication of intent or resolve to protect those goals becomes crucial. A missed opportunity normally does not have the immediate dire consequences of a missed or ignored threat. Although a missed opportunity brings decision-makers no closer to their goals, it generally fails to push them farther away from those goals. A missed or ignored threat may, in the extreme situation, result in national destruction. Even in the less extreme case, an ignored threat generally results in harm to the threatened nation's goals. Thus the communication of intent or resolve is less crucial under conditions of opportunity than under conditions of threat. Consequently, when faced with an opportunity foreign policy decision-makers are less likely to commit physical resources than when faced with a threatening situation.

In addition, situational opportunity affects the specificity dimension of foreign policy behavior. An argument similar to that regarding resource commitment can be made. When goals are endangered decision-makers tend to engage in general behavior to encourage flexibility both for their nation and the threatening nation. They are,
in one sense, merely attempting to avoid the situation. Their actions
tend to be defensive rather than offensive. Ambiguous communications
have utility under such conditions. The desire to keep options open
is not as great under conditions of opportunity. In fact, decision-
makers are more likely to engage in behavior that closes other options
as they take advantage of the occasion to make progress on their goals.
Opportunities may more often be structured as particular actions that
can be taken. Decision-makers respond specifically to the opportun­
ities presented by the actions of another nation because a general
response might not be interpreted by that nation as acceptance of the
available opportunities.

The United States' effort to formulate and sign a peace treaty
with Japan following World War II represented action in response to
an opportunity. Beginning with initial efforts made in 1947, the
settlement was formally ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1952, and came
into effect in 1953. The situation following World War II provided a
unique opportunity to American policy-makers. In the wake of the
war's destruction, the United States sought to build a lasting peace
through the establishment of a settlement with Japan which would also
extend to the Pacific area at large. The necessity of coming to an
agreement or understanding with Japan served as the impetus for
security and other agreements with a number of nations (Australia,
New Zealand, the Philippines, and Canada). In short, the situation
provided the United States with an opportunity to unite vulnerable
free world nations in the very early stages of the cold war.

The resulting treaty approved by the U.S. Senate reflects the
impact of situational opportunity on dimensions of foreign policy behavior. In the first place, the negative connotations of the settlement were deliberately played down in government circles. Secretary of State Dulles believed that "...the only sure way to secure the friendship of the Japanese people in the future was to return sovereignty to them in as simple and generous a document as possible" (Cohen, 1957: 12; italics added). Furthermore, the American formulation was presented to the United Nations General Assembly as "non-punitive" and "nonrestrictive." And although the settlement contained reparations provisions these were deemed quite "moderate." Thus the treaty essentially represented a cooperative overture toward Japan.

The Japanese peace settlement involved a low level of resource commitment by the United States. Although American military bases in Japan were turned over to the Japanese to protect both nations' security, provisions of the treaty required no new appropriations by the U.S. Congress. In effect, most of the treaty provisions requiring the transfer of American resources were merely symbolic. For example, although occupation forces were to be withdrawn from Japan not later than ninety days after ratification of the settlement, "...this provision did not apply, however, to the 'stationing or retention' of foreign troops in Japan in consequence of agreements negotiated with Japan for this purpose" (Cohen, 1957: 18). Moreover, the treaty provisions were highly specific. Provisions ranged from regulation of former Japanese territories to procedures for withdrawal of allied occupation forces and the admission of Japan to the United Nations. In sum, the peace treaty ratified by the United States serves as an
example of cooperative foreign policy activity characterized by a low level of resource commitment and high specificity.

Decision Time and Foreign Policy

Decision time has been defined as the amount of time participants in the foreign policy process feel they have in which to take action before characteristics of the situation vary to the point at which the occasion for decision is transformed. Ranging from short to extended, decision time links the situation to the organizational context within which foreign policy options are considered and choices made. We assumed in Chapter I that authoritative decision-makers act on behalf of national units and that they react or respond to situations created by events in the domestic or international environments. Given that situations are short-term phenomena, the nature of time available for decision-making becomes an important consideration. If characteristics of the situation vary rapidly, then decision-makers must operate within the context of short decision time. If, on the other hand, the situation remains stable, then decision-makers have a relatively extended period of time in which to consider options. Decision time thus structures the context within which foreign policy choices are made.

How does short decision time influence a nation's foreign policy? Constraining the amount of time available for deliberation of policy alternatives discourages consideration of a wide variety of alternatives (Downs, 1966; Hermann, 1969b). Moreover, those alternatives proposed are examined casually, their long-range implications
often left implicit. Under conditions of short time, decision-makers retain a narrow perspective on their nation's interests. Communication with allied nations decreases (Paige, 1968; O. Holsti, 1965), and policy-makers are less likely to consider the interests of other nations in making decisions. Such behavior might be described as less than "rational."^8 Faced with short time in which to evaluate the situation, decision-makers may inappropriately respond to the actions of another nation. They may react with a greater or lesser degree of hostility. But the interaction of national interest and inappropriate reaction orientations tends more often than not to result in hostile rather than cooperative behavior (O. Holsti, 1972; Pruitt and Drews, 1967).

Level of resource commitment is also affected by short decision time. In Chapter I we assumed the process of reaching decisions and engaging in foreign policy actions takes place in the context of large-scale organizations. Following from this, we can conclude that standard operating procedures and/or informal bureaucratic channels form the context within which decisions regarding resource commitment are made. Short decision time interferes with the normal operation of bureaucratic channels by discouraging communication across levels of authority. Short decision time thus means that issues will be considered at or close to the bureaucratic level where they are first perceived. Because the information-gathering capacities of large-scale organizations are decentralized, perceptions of the relationship between an organization and its environment occur initially at low bureaucratic levels.9 Thus under conditions of short time decisions
tend to be made at these lower levels. Commitments of money, personnel, or other resources generally require higher authority approval. Because short time elicits decisions at low authority levels, the likelihood of high levels of resource commitment decreases in these situations.

Short decision time influences the degree of specificity of foreign policy behavior. The development of general, wide-ranging policies applicable to a wide variety of situations requires participating decision-makers have a broad perspective both on national goals and the actions of other nations in the international system. Such a more generalized perspective is likely gained by decision-makers exercising high levels of authority. Low level bureaucratic participants tend to view situations in terms of organizational interests and in terms of the particular problem for which they are responsible, thus bringing a narrower perspective to the policy-making process. Short decision time leads to the consideration of issues at the bureaucratic level where they were initially perceived. Since the information-gathering processes in large-scale organizations are decentralized, initial consideration of issues occurs at low level bureaucratic positions. Under conditions of short time, then, when decisions are likely made at low bureaucratic levels, policy-makers tend to engage in highly specific reactions to the immediate situation.

In November, 1957 Tito's actions at a meeting of communist leaders in Moscow created a situation of short decision time for Soviet leaders. The Soviet Union organized a meeting in Moscow in November, 1957 attended by leaders of the international communist
movement. The purpose of this meeting was to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. To mark the occasion, participating leaders drafted and signed a "Declaration of Unity" which expressed the solidarity of all socialist countries and condemned revisionism and the development of national communism. Tito, representing Yugoslavia, refused to sign the declaration. Soviet leaders were embarrassed by this action, and felt pressured to respond immediately in an effort to restore some semblance of ideological order to the international communist movement.

From the close of this meeting through December, 1957 the Soviet press engaged in a series of hostile, verbal attacks against Tito and Yugoslavia's independent direction in both foreign and domestic affairs. This antirevisionist campaign continued through 1958. Thus although the Soviet press responded to Tito's assertion of independence with hostile behavior, that behavior remained on the verbal level and did not involve the commitment or potential commitment of physical resources. Moreover, these attacks were directed at Tito and Yugoslavia specifically, in an attempt to restore ideological conformity to the international communist movement.

Extended as compared with short decision time provides decision-makers with a long period of deliberation in the policy-making process. As a consequence of extended time decision-makers tend to consider a larger number of alternatives and wider range of policy options (Downs, 1966; Hermann, 1969b). At the same time, the implications of policy options are more likely to be explicitly addressed and developed. Extended decision time creates an atmosphere in which the interests
of other nations can be seriously taken into account. Because of this fact, a broader perspective is brought to the situation by decision-makers. In the process of considering allies' interests' policy-makers engage in more communication with other nations. Since decision-makers are under less pressure and stress in an extended time situation, their actions more accurately reflect rational judgments. Moreover, extended decision time discourages inappropriate reactions which tend to occur in stress situations. As a consequence of the broader decisional perspective adopted by policy-makers and the decreasing likelihood of inappropriate reactions under conditions of extended time, foreign policy behavior tends to be cooperative rather than hostile.

The level of resources committed by foreign policy decision-makers also depends upon the extent of available decision time. As stated earlier, standard operating procedures and informal bureaucratic channels form the context within which decisions are made. Extended decision time allows the normal operation of bureaucratic procedures, thus facilitating communication across authority lines. The circulation of issues both among policy-makers at one organizational level and between levels is more likely to take place under conditions of extended time. Large-scale resource commitments generally require the approval of higher authorities—low level bureaucrats rarely have the capacity to individually commit resources. Extended decision time facilitates the approval process by encouraging the normal operation of bureaucratic procedures and channels. Consequently, resources are more likely committed under conditions of extended decision time.
Three separate arguments can be made relating extended decision time to the degree of specificity of foreign policy behavior. In the first instance, the development of general, widely-applicable policies requires extended decision time. Policies made under time pressure tend to reflect the necessities of the immediate situation, and are therefore highly specific. A second argument is based on the extent of participation in the bureaucratic process. As time available for decision increases more participants are likely to become involved in the decision-making process. And the more participants involved in the formulation of policy, the more general must the resulting policy be in order to be accepted by those participants. Finally, decisions tend less to be made at low bureaucratic levels under conditions of extended as opposed to short decision time. Given the fact that higher level decision-makers view the immediate situation in terms of a broader perspective, foreign policy behavior will tend to be cast in the form of more general activities.

President Eisenhower's invitation to Soviet Premier Khrushchev to visit the United States during the latter half of 1959 presented the Soviet Union with an extended decision time situation. The invitation was extended by Eisenhower in the spirit of seeking a relaxation of international tensions, through development of a detente with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, for its part, viewed the situation as an opportunity to negotiate with the United States on the question of Berlin's status. Because the international situation was relatively stable, Eisenhower's invitation presented Soviet leaders with an extended period of time in which to plan their responses.
The major result of the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meetings, which began on September 15, 1959 and were carried on for two weeks, was expressed by both participants as the "Spirit of Camp David." Soviet behavior was highly cooperative, involved commitment, and was highly generalized. Both parties made a firm commitment to a decrease of East-West tensions, through more frequent consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The specific means by which a decrease in tension was to be effected, however, remained implicit. As a result of these discussions, the two leaders agreed on a summit meeting to be held in 1960. Furthermore, Premier Khrushchev invited President Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union later in 1960. Thus commitments were made, but the precise nature of those commitments was not developed. In short, the "Spirit of Camp David" could best be characterized as involving a commitment by both the United States and the Soviet Union to decrease international tensions.

Awareness and Foreign Policy

Awareness describes how the prior event which created the present situation fits into the cognitive map of foreign policy decision-makers. The awareness dimension allows us to address such questions as: What aspects of the environment do decision-makers recognize as relevant to the process of foreign policy formulation? How do policymakers order occurrences in the international system in relation to prior occurrences? Surprise has been defined as the condition in which foreign policy decision-makers are confronted with an unexpected situation in either their domestic or international environments.
Prior to the specific event triggering the reaction, this situation did not fit into the cognitive map of foreign policy decision-makers. Put differently, decision-makers' images of future behavior by other actors in the international system did not include the specific event in question. Anticipated situations, in contrast, were expected by policy-makers.

How can awareness be related generally to foreign policy? In Chapter I we assumed that authoritative decision-makers act on behalf of their nations, and that the situation confronting these decision-makers is defined from the perspective of their goals; values, and general images regarding international affairs. The awareness situational dimension asks: Given decision-makers' perceptions of "how things are" and the "rules of the game" in the international system, were they surprised or did they anticipate the prior event? If surprised, decision-makers probably had not formulated any contingency plan to be put into effect if the event occurred. Under these conditions policy is formulated on the spot to cope with the immediate situation. If, on the other hand, policy-makers anticipated the prior event, then an option may already have been selected as the appropriate response. At the very least, the issue would have been discussed by the participating decision-makers. In short, whether anticipated or not, the situation impacts on foreign policy behavior.

The level of hostility expressed through foreign policy actions depends upon the extent of awareness attributed to decision-makers. Surprise generally implies the absence of previously formulated plans for coping with the immediate situation. The absence of a planned
response may in some instances encourage inappropriate reactions. Moreover, decision-makers are likely to act so as to protect their nation's goals and interests, narrowly defined, in the absence of previously formulated responses. Given the absence of prior planning, a narrowly-defined national interest focus, and the possibility of inappropriate reaction, hostile behavior is more likely to result from an unexpected rather than an expected situation. Surprise more than anticipation, then, tends to elicit a hostile response.

Surprise also influences the level of resources committed by foreign policy decision-makers. Surprise indicates the absence of contingency plans for the immediate situation. The commitment of physical resources requires some degree of planning for implementation. Although the extent of this planning varies with the level of resources being committed, minimal plans for implementation are necessary in every instance involving resource commitment. Furthermore, many of the activities central to implementation depend upon the operation of elaborate bureaucratic procedures. Surprise situations may not present themselves in a form which allows their handling by means of these procedures. The establishment of new procedures or reinterpretation of the situation to fit existing procedures may have to take place. Both the absence of prior planning and ineffective or non-existent procedures for coping with surprising situations discourage the commitment of physical resources.

The degree of specificity expressed in foreign policy actions is affected by surprise. Decision-makers tend to focus on the immediate situation because of the absence of a planned, general response
to a certain class of situations. Characteristics of the situation at hand cannot be generalized to a larger class of situations, and thus foreign policy actions cannot be derived from a larger class of responses appropriate to the more general situation. Consequently, foreign policy behavior tends to include specific activities designed to address the immediate situation, rather than wide-ranging, generally applicable responses.

French President DeGaulle's visit to Canada in celebration of France's national day at EXPO 67 touched off a surprising situation for Canadian decision-makers. Prior contact had existed between France and the government of Quebec: Quebec opened a delegation in Paris in 1961, youth and teacher exchange programs were established in 1964, Quebec was delegated authority to negotiate her own cultural agreements with France in 1965, and in April, 1967 a Department of Intergovernmental Affairs was opened in Quebec. But DeGaulle's actions in Montreal were so out of line with prior Canadian expectations that they came as a surprise to Prime Minister Lester Pearson's government. Arriving at Quebec City on July 23, 1967, President DeGaulle drove to Montreal on July 24 and addressed a large gathering. At the close of his speech he shouted "Vive le Québec libre!"—the French-Canadian separatist slogan—to the receptive crowd.

Canadian reaction was swift. Prime Minister Pearson called a cabinet meeting the following day. The Prime Minister appeared on national television that night, and condemned statements which encourage minorities who are bent on destroying the Canadian nation. He declared DeGaulle's remarks totally unacceptable to the Canadian
government. President DeGaulle then cancelled his expected Ottawa visit and returned to France. Prime Minister Pearson issued a statement announcing the French President's departure, insisting the circumstances were not of Canada's making. Canada's reaction to DeGaulle's behavior was extremely hostile. In making his unexpected appeal to the French-Canadian separatist movement, DeGaulle encouraged the Canadian government to defend national unity. Actions taken by Canadian officials focused on verbal denunciation of DeGaulle's remarks, and those denunciations were addressed specifically to the French head of state. In short, Prime Minister Pearson responded with hostile behavior, involving a low level of resource commitment and a high degree of specificity.

If decision-makers were not surprised but rather anticipated the prior event, then this is reflected in their behavior. Previously formulated plans tend to exist for coping with anticipated situations. If anticipated, a situation has most likely received attention and study by decision-makers at a previous point in time. During these discussions policy-makers are likely to have considered alternative responses and their implications. Moreover, if decision-makers anticipated the prior situation in earlier discussions they probably also considered the impact of their responses on the interests of allies. In so doing, communication increased between the nation and its allies. Prior planning also tends to prevent overreaction to the situation. Previous attention to the issue often insures a reaction tailored to the stimulus, thus decreasing the likelihood that an inappropriate response will be made. In short, decision-makers tend to react
cooperatively when confronted with an anticipated situation.

The level of resources committed by decision-makers reacting to an anticipated situation tends to be far greater than commitment under conditions of surprise. Anticipated situations normally have generated contingency plans. The large-scale commitment of physical resources requires prior planning for implementation. In addition, activities involved in the process of implementation occur in the context of large-scale organizations, necessitating the use of standard operating procedures and requiring the efficient operation of bureaucratic channels. If the situation has been anticipated the procedures and channels probably have been established, thus simplifying the implementation process. Under these conditions, the tendency for resources to be committed increases. Thus a higher level of resources will be committed in those situations anticipated by decision-makers, rather than in situations which take policy-makers by surprise.

Anticipated situations also influence the level of specificity expressed in foreign policy actions. As suggested above, contingency plans normally exist for anticipated situations. Familiarity with a general class of situations allows decision-makers to react to a particular situation at a more general level. The existence of a planned, generalized response increases the likelihood that foreign policy behavior will be interpreted in terms of wide-ranging policy goals and objectives. Thus decision-makers tend to react with elaborate, general statements of policy when confronted with an anticipated situation.
Canadian decision-makers were confronted with an anticipated situation in October, 1971 when Soviet Premier Kosygin arrived in Canada for a nine-day state visit. This event was expected because of prior Canadian-Soviet exchanges. In May, 1971 Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau had visited the Soviet Union. As a result of his visit a number of agreements were signed, including a bilateral protocol calling for consultations between Canada and the Soviet Union regarding important international issues. Because of this prior commitment to increased communication between the two nations, Premier Kosygin's return visit to Canada was expected by Canadian policy-makers.

The substantive policy results of Premier Kosygin's visit illustrate the impact of anticipated situations on foreign policy behavior. In particular, Canada's behavior was highly cooperative, involved the commitment of resources, and was generalized rather than specific. Although a number of agreements were signed, perhaps the most important was the General Exchanges Agreement. The major objective of this agreement was to expand Canadian-Soviet exchanges in scientific, technical, educational, and cultural fields. The agreement included a provision for periodic general reviews of exchange programs between the two nations. Thus, although serious commitments were made, the specifics of these commitments were not made explicit. The precise nature of the exchanges and the structure of the general reviews were left for future negotiations.

Conclusion

Figure 4 summarizes the bivariate hypotheses introduced in this
chapter. Based on the definitions and assumptions of Chapter I, these propositions have been supported by empirical research where applicable and illustrative examples from recent American, Soviet, and Canadian foreign policy. In the following chapter we describe the data which will be used to test these propositions and, ultimately, allow us to evaluate the utility of the direct and indirect models of situational influence.
### Situational Dimensions

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Direct relationships are indicated by a plus sign.
Inverse relationships are indicated by a minus sign.

Figure 4: Summary of Bivariate Hypotheses
CHAPTER III

1 Most foreign policy discussions emphasize the importance of goals or objectives as the motivating forces behind national behavior. For example, see K. J. Holsti (1972), Morgenthau (1967), and Wolfers (1962).

2 Due to their nature, however, opportunities are more likely than threats to be missed or ignored. In general, threats tend to be more pointed, and because they endanger goals they are unlikely to be ignored. But we will argue that, in general, both threat and opportunity situations tend to encourage some form of response.

3 These studies merely illustrate the kinds of analyses relating threat and hostility. By no means do they exhaust the fund of studies concerning the impact of threat. Significant contributions by psychologists were cited in Chapter II.

4 This proposition receives a great deal of support from the bureaucratic politics literature. As summarized by Art (1973), once a commitment is made participants attempt to maintain their involvement. Participants soon develop a vested interest in increasing or, at the very least, maintaining their level of commitment. Thus reversing a commitment once one has been made becomes difficult. And the degree of difficulty increases with both the extent of commitment made originally and the length of time such a commitment has existed.

5 The following description draws from Hall's (1971) discussion of American involvement in Laos.

This and all following examples are meant only to suggest the plausibility of the general propositions. Counter examples do, of course, exist. But it is our belief (to be tested later) that most instances which might be cited would tend to be in the direction of the offered example.

6 This general notion is elaborated by Jervis (1970).

7 Cohen (1957) describes in detail the conditions leading up to the peace settlement. Our discussion is adopted from his analysis.

8 The problem of defining "rational" behavior is not new. For our purposes, we assume that in the best of all possible worlds.
decision-makers attempt to absorb as much information as possible regarding the impact of their behavior on other nations. Moreover, we also assume that decision-makers will consider the long-range consequences of their actions. These behaviors are considered "rational." For an extended discussion of rationality in decision-making, see Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963).


10. Allison (1971) and M. Hermann (1974b) describe this phenomenon.

11. Tito's actions and Soviet responses are documented in Rubinstein (1966: 287-288), from which this discussion is taken.

12. For a discussion of these reactions and means of coping with them, see Milburn (1972).

13. Again, this argument is supported by the bureaucratic politics literature. Given the fact that participants in the policy-making process have divergent interests, goals, and objectives, they are not likely to agree on specific policies. Such policies will undoubtedly further only a small portion of these interests. Adoption of a general policy, in comparison, allows each participant to read his own interests, goals, and objectives into the broad policy framework. The larger the number and the more varied the nature of participants, the more general the resulting policy.


15. This incident and the Canadian response are described in Dobell (1972: 46) and Thomson and Swanson (1971: 41).

16. Kosygin's visit and the antecedents to this situation are discussed in Dobell (1972: 29-31) and Stewart (1971: 119-121).
CHAPTER IV

DATA AND METHODS

Introduction

We introduced in Chapter I definitions, assumptions, and two macro propositions which form the basis of situational explanations of foreign policy behavior. To summarize: 1) Foreign policy may be described in terms of discrete events. These events can be linked, forming sequences and responses. 2) Authoritative decision-makers alone can act in the name of their nation and commit that nation's resources in the international arena. Decision-makers react or respond to situations created by events in their environments. 3) Decisions are made in the context of large-scale organizations. Decision-makers' perceptions of the situation affect and structure interactions which occur within and between these organizations.

From these statements, we constructed two macro propositions representing alternative explanations of the impact of situational factors on foreign policy. The first explanation argues that situation has a direct, unmediated impact on foreign policy behavior. The second explanation introduces the bureaucratic process as a mediating influence. From the perspective of the indirect model, the situation affects foreign policy only through its impact on the bureaucratic process.
The general purpose of this chapter is to draw the operational implications of our assumptions for testing the bivariate hypotheses of Chapter III and, ultimately, for evaluating the direct and indirect models of situational influence. Three issues are discussed: data-making, data analysis, and interpretation. First, we support the selection of event data and describe the specific data set to be used in the analysis—CREON. Next, we present specific operationalizations of the dimensions introduced in Chapter II. The final areas of discussion regarding the data-making procedures are reliability and validity questions. In our discussion of the data analysis issue we describe the analysis to be performed and defend the statistical techniques selected.

International Event Data

The notion of the "event" as foreign policy was presented in Chapter II. There we defined an event as an action by authoritative decision-makers directed toward elements of a nation's external or internal environment with the intention of influencing the behavior of an entity external to the acting nation. We described foreign policy as discrete actions or events viewed in the context of the problem, issue, or goals toward which they are directed. Assuming we accept the premise that national foreign policy can be described in terms of discrete, unaggregated events, what advantages are gained by incorporating event data into a situational explanation of foreign policy?

First, event data facilitate the linkage of stimulus and
response components in a situational perspective. As described in Chapter II, the situational perspective applies stimulus-response models of psychology to national foreign policy behavior. Viewed in these terms, foreign policy decision-makers respond to situations created by the actions (stimuli) of other nations in the international arena. The successful application of a stimulus-response model requires the differentiation of stimuli and the behaviors taken in response to those stimuli. If such a differentiation is not made, then the stimulus-response model cannot be used to describe foreign policy. By using international event data the researcher can break foreign policy decisions and actions into discrete, unaggregated components, thus allowing description of a sequence of events or actions for specific nations. Placed in the context of the situational cube, these discrete actions represent stimuli that elicit responses (or, subsequent actions) from another nation or nations in the international system. Defining foreign policy in terms of discrete events, then, aids in distinguishing the stimulus and response components of foreign policy interaction.

Two further advantages of international event data might be mentioned. Because situational characteristics vary over the short-term, the timing of actions must be explicitly recognized. Attributing a unique position in time to foreign policy actions is a prerequisite for establishing sequences and responses of behavior. If such information is unavailable, then sequences and responses cannot be constructed. One of the defining characteristics of an "event" in every event data project is the date on which the event occurred.
Thus international event data allow us to order foreign policy actions across time. Finally, high-level decision-makers represent the foreign policy actors in event data studies. This characteristic increases the visibility of events in public sources such as newspapers and chronologies, which generally serve as primary data sources for event identification.

Acknowledging the advantages of event data should by no means suggest the absence of problems in testing the utility of a situational perspective with such data. Perhaps the most disturbing problem arises from difficulty in describing the context within which specific events occur. Although situational characteristics may be attributed to discrete events, the importance of the larger context within which events occur cannot be denied. An action occurring in the context of cooperative relations between two nations may be defined as an opportunity, but the same action occurring in the context of less than cooperative prior relations might be defined as a threat. For example, if the United States sent the Seventh Fleet steaming toward Japan, the Japanese would probably not perceive a threat. But the same action directed against North Vietnam would most certainly be perceived by Vietnamese leaders as a threat. In short, attributing situational characteristics to discrete events without regard to the history of interaction among nations prevents an accurate description of the situation confronting decision-makers in a particular instance. As an initial research strategy, however, such a procedure will be followed. Contextual elements will be tapped in future research efforts.
Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON)

The Comparative Research on the Events of Nations project represents a multi-university international event data collection effort. Foreign policy events for 35 nations for randomly selected quarters of years across the period 1959-1968 comprise the CREON data set. A total of 11,583 events are available for analysis. Table 1 displays the number of events by country and year in CREON. Deadline Data on World Affairs serves as the data source. Representing a chronology of foreign and domestic activities for nations and international organizations, Deadline Data is organized by nation, organization, or substantive heading (e.g., Cold War, Disarmament, Inter-American Relations) and by date.

In CREON an event is defined as the discrete, unaggregated behavior of authoritative decision-makers directed at internal or external targets in an effort to influence the behavior of other international actors. Each event has an actor, target, action, date, one or more direct targets, and one or more indirect objects. Actors are represented by the authoritative decision-makers (those individuals with the capability of committing their nation's resources in the international arena) of the 35 selected nations. Direct targets are the immediate recipients of the action, and indirect objects are those entities the actor is attempting to influence through his behavior. The direct target is always implicitly an object of influence.

Three types of events are included in the CREON data set: (1) country events, (2) international organization context events, and
### Table 1

**Distribution of CREON Events by Country and Year**

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These nations are not coded as actors until they achieved independence.
(3) continuous military conflict events. Country events are those unilateral or bilateral activities of nations occurring outside the context of international world or regional organizations. The signing of a trade agreement between Canada and the Soviet Union, the American call for a ceasefire in the Middle East, and Uganda's detention of American peace corps volunteers all represent country events. International organization events are those unilateral or bilateral activities of nations occurring in the context of international world or regional organizations. Examples of this type of event include Iceland's approval of a NATO communique following a defense ministers meeting, France voting in the General Assembly to admit the Peoples' Republic of China to the United Nations, and Venezuela, in the Organization of American States, supporting American actions during the Cuban missile crisis. Finally, continuous military conflict events are those unilateral or bilateral actions of nations occurring in the context of ongoing military conflicts in which the actor is a participant. The American decision to mine Haiphong Harbor and its subsequent decision to withdraw from Vietnam in January, 1973 are prime examples of continuous military conflict events. Table 2 presents the breakdown by type of event in CREON. Although the country and international organization categories are mutually exclusive, military conflict events are drawn from both country and international organization events. Thus military conflict events are included in the country/organization totals, but are reported separately in addition for information purposes.

Coding events in CREON involves a two-step procedure. First,
events must be abstracted or identified from Deadline Data. An elaborate series of coding rules have been developed to ensure proper identification of the actor, target(s), object(s), action, and date for each event. Following identification, events are then classified according to a number of items or variables. Included among these items are the nature of the action (bilateral or unilateral, word or deed, conflictful or cooperative), aspects of the bureaucratic process (internal decision unit, announcer of action, channel by which action announced), goals expressed by policy-makers, the most immediate prior event by the same actor which can be linked to the present event (sequence), the action to which the present actor is responding (response), and situational characteristics of the prior stimulus. Table 3 illustrates the kinds of events that comprise the CREON data set.

Although CREON represents a major event data project, it is by no means the only such project. Thus the question might be raised: why select CREON as opposed to any other event data project to test alternative models of situational influence on foreign policy behavior? Several justifications may be given. In the first place, CREON attempts to identify a prior stimulus and its situational characteristics for each event. For every stimulus, an attempt is made to code the degree of threat or opportunity, extent of decision time, and level of awareness presented to decision-makers. Because these three variables define the situational cube presented in Chapter II, they permit a test of the alternative models using the cube dimensions. Furthermore, a number of items are coded which allow us to tap dimensions of the
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|                |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |
| **Military**    |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |
| Conflictb       | 5    | 18   | 92   | 147  | 64   | 178  | 119  | 75   | 166  | 64   | 929   |
| Non-military    |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |
| Conflict        | 867  | 803  | 994  | 1401 | 1282 | 1130 | 910  | 1042 | 1236 | 994  | 10654 |
| TOTAL           | 872  | 821  | 1086 | 1548 | 1346 | 1308 | 1029 | 1117 | 1402 | 1058 | 11583 |

*This distribution represents the CREON variable "name of formal organization or alliance" (deck 1, col 28-30). If coded other than 999, the event occurred in the context of an international organization or alliance. If coded 999, the event is a country event.*

*This distribution represents the CREON variable "military conflict event" (deck 3, col 61). If coded 1, the event occurred in the context of an ongoing military conflict. If not coded, the event is non-military conflict.*
Sample Events from the CREON Data Set

(11-24-62) Cuba begins demobilization of militia units called to arms on October 22, 1962 because of the missile crisis.

(10-7-62) U.S. announces completion of the withdrawal of all of its military forces from Laos.

(12-14-62) U.S.S.R. orders U.S. assistant agriculture attache Carlson to leave the Soviet Union.

(5-24-60) Premier Adnan Menderes of Turkey cancels a state visit to Greece as a result of the political crisis in Turkey.

(4-18-63) Venezuela receives a $6 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank to grant credits to cattle raisers for importing purebred beef, dairy, and pork livestock as part of a 3 year development plan.

(8-3-64) U.S. denies charges by North Vietnam that the U.S. and South Vietnamese warships shelled North Vietnamese offshore islands and that 4 U.S. jet fighters from bases in Laos attacked a North Vietnamese border post.

(5-19-60) In a NATO council meeting, France blames the Soviet Union (Premier Khrushchev) for the failure of the summit talks.

(11-19-68) The Spanish delegate to the United Nations General Assembly votes yes on a resolution proposed by Italy to set up a study committee on China.

(10-3-62) In a joint communiqué with the Organization of American States foreign ministers, Mexico expresses the opinion that the existing organizations and bodies of the inter-American system should intensify the carrying out of their respective duties with special attention to the situation created by the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba.

(9-16-64) Venezuela renews diplomatic relations with Guatemala.
bureaucratic process. This characteristic sets CREON apart from other event data collections. To our knowledge, CREON alone includes extensive variables relating to the decision process for each event. Finally, preliminary analysis of the CREON data reveals a complex structure of behavioral dimensions. Analysis of other event data sets have generally revealed two dimensions, one describing the affect expressed in behavior and the other the level of resource commitment. Four dimensions emerge from analysis of the CREON data set: (1) unilateral ideological behavior, (2) general activity, (3) aggressive activity, and (4) diplomatic activity. This richness in the CREON data provides another justification for its selection.

Operationalization of Concepts

The situational, bureaucratic process, and foreign policy behavior dimensions introduced in Chapter II can all be described by variables or combinations of variables in the CREON data set. Each dimension will be discussed in turn, the specific variables presented, and the construction of indicators described.

Coding the three situational dimensions—threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness—is highly dependent on the coding of two additional variables—goals and response. Threat-opportunity is directly related to goals, whereas decision time and awareness are indirectly related to goals. All three dimensions are dependent on the response coding. In fact, the process of coding demands the coder first address the goals item, then response, and then situational.
logic for goals and response before addressing the individual situational dimensions.

A goal is defined as "the statement of a future condition of domestic or international affairs desired by the acting nation" (Salmore and Brady, 1972: 61). The coder attempts to identify statements of desired futures, maintenance of the status quo, or general policy by means of an elaborate set of coding instructions. Among the questions asked are: Does the event consist of an activity plus stated purpose? Is the event a statement of policy, or of a general goal? Can a goal be identified in the immediate contextual material surrounding the description of the event in the data source? Both first order or primary and second order or secondary goals are coded. First order goals are those which can be attained immediately by the present action. Second order goals, in comparison, tend to be long-range and to be achieved require more activity than just the present event (Salmore and Brady, 1972: 78).

Information regarding the prior stimulus for the present behavior aids in coding the situational items. Designated as the "response" variable, the question addressed is: "Is the present event triggered or stimulated by previous externally-directed actions or the internal activity of some entity other than the governmental actor identified in the present event?" (Salmore and Brady, 1972: 92). The prior stimulus may thus be domestic, and can also represent the behavior of nonauthoritative actors both domestic or external. In some cases the present actor may specifically indicate the event to which he is responding. More often, either the data source will
link two events as stimulus and response or the coder will have to infer such a linkage.

After goals and a stimulus have been identified, the coder can evaluate the degree of threat or opportunity presented by the prior stimulus. Threat-opportunity describes the relationship between the acting nation and its goals, as affected by the prior behavior of another nation or domestic entity. Threat is defined as foreign policy decision-makers' perceptions of impending harm to desired values, goals, or conditions. An opportunity exists when decision-makers view the situation as an occasion to make progress or move closer to the desired value, goals, or condition. Similar to response, threat or opportunity may be related by the actor, stated by the data source in contextual material, or inferred by the coder. The coder first determines if the prior event involves a threat. If threat is not present, then the coder attempts to identify an opportunity. Threat therefore takes priority over opportunity in the coding: "although situations that pose threats may also be viewed as offering an opportunity, for the purpose of this item no opportunity should be coded if the event can be said to contain a threat" (Salmore and Brady, 1972: 105). The threat-opportunity situational dimension is dichotomized; prior stimuli are therefore coded as presenting a threat or opportunity, and degrees of threat or opportunity are not distinguished.

The extent of decision time available to decision-makers is coded, similar to threat-opportunity, in relation to the prior stimulus. As presented in Chapter II, the decision time dimension describes
the temporal relationship between the present actor and the situation created by the behavior of another nation or domestic entity. Decision time represents the amount of time participants in the foreign policy process feel they have in which to make a decision, before characteristics of the situation vary to the point at which the occasion for decision is transformed. Coders evaluate decision time as either short or extended, based on consideration of a series of questions. In general, less than ten days or any reference to the policy makers being under time constraints (regardless of number of days) is regarded as short decision time. More than ten days or indications of the absence of a rushed decision are regarded as extended decision time" (Salmore and Brady, 1972: 111). Decision time is also dichotomized; prior stimuli are coded as presenting decision-makers with short or extended time.

Awareness, the third situational dimension, describes the relationship between the present actor and the prior behavior of another nation or domestic entity, in terms of whether or not the actor expected the prior behavior. Surprise is defined as the condition in which foreign policy decision-makers are confronted with an unexpected situation in either their domestic or international environments. Anticipated situations, on the other hand, are expected by decision-makers. Among the questions asked by coders in determining surprise or anticipation are: Does the actor in the present event indicate he did not expect the prior event to occur? Did the prior event involve either a sudden (surprise) or gradual (anticipation) change in the status of an international problem? Is the actor in
the prior event merely repeating an activity or position he has taken previously? If so, the action was probably anticipated. Just as with threat-opportunity and decision time, awareness is a dichotomous variable; prior events either surprised the present actor or were anticipated.

In Chapter I we defined situational variables from the perspective of the foreign policy decision-maker. Situational variables thus represent policy-makers' perceptions or definitions of relevant dimensions of other nations' behaviors to which they must respond. We acknowledged our empirical analyses allow us merely to approximate description of those perceptions. For all three situational items, however, a policy-maker's explicit statement of his perception of the situation takes precedence over data source or coder inferences. For example, if a decision-maker perceives threat in a situation, then threat is coded. If a situation is viewed explicitly as not threatening or as an opportunity by a policy-maker, then conflicting inferences by the data source or the coder are ignored in coding the threat-opportunity variable.

Moreover, the questions asked by the coder if explicit situational definitions by policy-makers are not present require him to infer threat or opportunity by placing himself in the position of a decision-maker under similar circumstances. That is, the coder asks: would a policy-maker generally feel threatened if he were confronted with this type of situation? Or, would a policy-maker perceive an opportunity to move towards important goals under these conditions? Thus the coder looks for indicators of decision-makers' perceptions.
of threat or opportunity.

Similar arguments may be made for the decision time and awareness situational dimensions. In the absence of an explicit perception of short or extended decision time the coder attempts to determine whether a policy-maker would perceive short or extended decision time under the circumstances. The "ten day rule" described above provides an indicator of policy-makers' perceptions. Similarly, a "24 hour rule" enables the coder to estimate surprise or anticipation. If the prior event involves a sudden change in some international issue or the status of another actor in the international system, then the event probably came as a surprise to decision-makers. "For a change to be sudden, it should not have been perceived to have taken place more than 24 hours before the present event" (Salmore and Brady, 1972: 118). Thus coding rules for the situational variables have been developed in an effort to tap decision-makers' perceptions rather than objective characteristics of the situation.

For the purpose of this initial study dichotomous situational variables will be used. Since the variables are not by nature dichotomous, further distinctions of degree might be made. Attempts at further differentiation will not, however, be made here. Because one of our major purposes is to test the utility of the situational typology proposed by Charles Hermann, we can be satisfied with dichotomous dimensions. That typology only requires placement of a situation at one extreme or the other on each of these three situational dimensions. Although we intend to pursue the construction of ordinal and interval situational scales in future research, such scales are
not necessary for the purposes set forth in the introduction to this study.

Table 4 indicates the distributions by year for all three situational dimensions. Note that only a subset of 4353 events out of the total 11,583 events will be used in this analysis. Given the multi-dimensional nature of the situational cube, each event must be coded for all three situational items. Missing data on one or more of these items prevents classification of an event as a response to one of the eight situational types. Because of our desire to perform both the analysis of individual dimensions and of situational types on the same sample of events, we have chosen to exclude those events with missing data on one or more of the situational dimensions. The subsequent analysis and all remaining tables thus include only this subset of 4353 events.

The distributions in Table 4 illustrate some of the important situations which developed during this ten year time period. The large proportion of threatening situations in 1962 and 1967 reflect the Cuban missile crisis and the six day war, respectively. Likewise, these two years contribute the greatest proportion of short decision time and surprise situations. But what about other situations we might expect which do not appear--such as the August, 1961 Berlin crisis? In this case, the crisis occurred outside the three months sampled for 1961 (January - March). Because of the sampling procedure, then, it is possible that important situations have been excluded. But, in general, given the months sampled, those situations we would expect to be visible are reflected in the distributions.
### Table 4

Distribution of Events by Situational Dimension and Year

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Does use of only a subset of 4353 events out of the total of 11,583 events present problems? Although we would, of course, prefer a larger sample of events, our subset does not differ significantly from the complete data set on several dimensions. For example, if we compare the percentages of situations in our subset coded threat or opportunity, short or extended decision time, and surprise or anticipation with the same percentages for situations in the total data set coded on these dimensions, the results are encouraging. In our subset (see Table 4) 22.2% of the situations involve threat and 77.8% present opportunities. For the total sample the percentages are 19.6 and 80.4, respectively. Short decision time situations account for 30.6% of the events in the subset and 35.5% of the events in the total sample. And 15.3% of the situations in our subset are surprise situations. The corresponding percentage for the total sample is 13.4. Thus we can be reasonably confident that our subset parallels the total data set along these significant dimensions.

The two bureaucratic process dimensions have also been defined by variables selected from the CREON data set. In Chapter II we equated centralization of authority with the degree to which participation in the decision-making process is limited to the head of state, ad hoc groups, or private individuals in whom the head of state has personal confidence. Diffused authority results when participation extends to representatives of bureaucracies acting in their formal roles. Unlike the situational dimensions, centralization of authority must be tapped indirectly through a related variable in the CREON data set. For the purpose of this analysis, the extent to which approval
of a higher authority is required for the implementation of a decision
serves as an indicator of the degree of centralization of authority
in the decision-making process. If the head of state or his repre-
sentative participates in the policy-making process, authority is
centralized. If others participate and/or the action requires higher
authority approval on either its substance or concurrent financial
expenditures, then authority is diffused. The CREON variable acting
agency has needed authority defines the degree of centralization. Table 5
displays the frequencies for this variable. Centralization
of authority, like the situational dimensions, is a dichotomous vari-
able.

It should be noted that this interpretation of centralization
of authority is not necessarily consistent with the way the concept
has been interpreted in some organizational theory literature. We
suggest if action requires higher authority approval, then authority
is diffused. By this we mean that under these conditions the immedi-
ate decision is being made by lower level bureaucratic authorities.
Implementation of the decision, however, requires higher authority
approval. In this sense, authority in the present decision is decen-
tralized. Similarly, if the head of state or an ad hoc group partic-
ipates in the action, then authority is centralized. As we stated in
Chapter II, many organizational theorists would argue precisely the
opposite. That is, the necessity of higher authority approval indi-
cates a centralized authority structure, whereas no higher authority
approval indicates a decentralized structure (Hage and Aiken, 1967;
Mansfield, 1973). Although acknowledging these significant differences
Table 5

Frequencies for Bureaucratic Process Variables

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<tr>
<th>Acting Agency Has Needed Authority</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Absolute Frequency</th>
<th>Relative Frequency (Percent)</th>
<th>Adjusted Frequency (Percent)</th>
<th>Cumulative Adj Freq (Percent)</th>
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Internal Decision Unit\(^a\)

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<td>Foreign Affairs Bureaucracy</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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</table>

\(^a\) More than one internal decision unit may be coded for each event. Therefore, the total represents the number of times the IDU's were coded, and does not necessarily represent the number of events for which an IDU was identified.
of interpretation, we feel the coding rules and actual data collection procedures for the "acting agency has needed authority" variable allow us to tap our notion of centralization of authority, as defined in Chapter II. Needless to say, these differences of interpretation are important, and for that reason they are made explicit here.

Bureaucratic opposition also affects the policy process. Opposition was defined in Chapter II as the extent of disagreement within the government concerning a recommended policy decision or action. Domestic opposition on the part of nongovernmental groups or individuals does not enter into defining this variable. The argument recurs in studies of the decision-making process that bureaucratic participation encourages bureaucratic opposition. Bureaucrats, acting in their formal roles, possess goals and interests. Opposition naturally results when these bureaucrats interact (Halperin, 1970). Opposition, then, will be defined in this study as bureaucratic participation. If representatives of deliberative assemblies, military, foreign affairs, economic, intelligence, or internal affairs bureaucracies participate in the decision process, opposition will be assumed to exist. When such participation is not indicated, we will assume little opposition. The internal decision unit is coded, where possible, for each event in the CREON data set. Among the relevant units are those indicated above. Events for which one or more of these units participated in the decision-making process thus exhibited more opposition than those events for which no bureaucratic participants can be identified.

Frequencies for this variable are displayed along with the centralization of authority indicator in Table 5. Similar to centralization of
authority, bureaucratic opposition is a dichotomous variable.

Interval-level measures have been established for all three foreign policy behavior variables—hostility-cooperation, commitment, and specificity—thus allowing the subsequent t-tests and analysis of variance to be performed. Indicators for the first two behavior variables were constructed from the results of a factor analysis of the WEIS action codes.25 Table 6 shows the distribution of CREON events by WEIS code and year. The WEIS (World Event Interaction Survey) code is a three-digit code describing the nature of the foreign policy behavior.26 Thirty-five general types of behavior are included. Due to the small number of events of particular types (reduce relationship, expel, aid opponent, subvert, demonstrate, and increase military capability) in the sub-sample of CREON events, the decision was made to group some of these categories. Specifically, yield and grant have been combined, reduce relationship and expel form another group, and demonstrate, increase military capability, aid opponent, and subvert have been collapsed to form a third group. A log (X + 1) transformation was performed on the data.27 The thirty re-grouped behavior types were then intercorrelated, and a principle components factor analysis performed on the sub-sample of 4353 events. Two factors were rotated.28 The results of this factor analysis appear in Table 7.

We defined hostility as the degree of negative affect expressed by one nation toward another nation which serves as either the target or object of behavior. Cooperation, on the other hand, is indicated by positive affect. The first rotated factor, with such behavior
Table 6  
Distribution of Events by WEIS Action Code and Year

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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>COLUMN TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>252</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>438</td>
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<td>6.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
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</table>
Table 7

Factor Loadings for 30 WEIS Categories

(Orthogonally Rotated Matrix)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEIS Type</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative Comment</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuse</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Comment</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consult</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Request</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Propose</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Request</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Propose</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiate</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Intend</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reject</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warn</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Intend</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promise</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seize</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yield + Grant</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease Military Capability</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carry Out Agreement</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Relationship</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce Relationship + Expel</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrate + Increase</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Military Capability +
Aid Opponent + Subvert

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>% Total Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
types as accuse, warn, threaten, demonstrate, and force as high loaders, represents our notion of hostility-cooperation. Approve and agree are among the lowest loaders on this factor. For each CREON event a score for hostility-cooperation is obtained by assigning to that event the factor loading of its behavior type on this factor. Scores thus range from a low of .07 (agree) to a high of .82 (negative intend).

A similar procedure was followed to obtain scores for commitment. The second rotated factor resembles commitment. Earlier, we defined commitment as the extent to which physical resources as opposed to verbal statements or diplomatic, protocol resources are pledged in any particular foreign policy action. The highest loading WEIS types on factor two generally indicate a high level of commitment (negotiate, positive intend, increase relationship, carry out agreement, and reward). Those behavior types with lower loadings (negative request, protest) indicate less commitment. Similar to hostility-cooperation, each CREON event is assigned a commitment score based on the factor loading of its behavior type on factor two.

A specificity dimension did not appear in the results of this factor analysis, and no such dimension has appeared in analyses of other event data sets. Nevertheless, we have suggested the potential theoretical importance of specificity in describing foreign policy behavior. Thus we have adopted a different approach in constructing an indicator of specificity. In Chapter II specificity was defined as the extent of differentiation of the problem, issue, target, or resources expressed in the foreign policy action. Several variables
in the CREON data set appear to tap components of specificity. These variables include: method through which the action is announced, specificity of problem, specificity of addressee, specificity of kinds of resources, specificity of amount of resources, nature of first direct target, future time for the use of resources, and conditional for the use of resources. (Conditional appears twice in the data set—once as an analytic variable and again as a descriptive variable.)

A factor analysis performed on these variables produced three clearly distinct factors, indicating the multi-dimensional nature of specificity.

Table 8 presents the results of the factor analysis of specificity variables. Factor one accounts for 24.5% of the total variance and is composed of two main variables—specificity of kinds of resources and conditional for the use of resources. Accounting for 15.3% of the total variance, factor two is composed of one major variable—nature of the first direct target. Finally, factor three is also composed of one main variable—specificity of problem—and accounts for only 11.9% of the total variance. In short, three components of specificity emerge, referring to resources, target, and problem. All three components are included in our indicator of specificity. Specificity is defined by summing an event's scores on each of these four variables, and weighting the scores according to the percent variance explained by the respective factors. Because of our focus on common variance, specificity of kinds of resources and conditional are six times as important as specificity of problem. Nature of the first direct target is approximately twice as important as specificity
Table 8

Factor Loadings for Specificity Variables

(Orthogonally Rotated Matrix)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Channel</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specificity of Problem</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specificity of Addressee</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specificity of Kinds of Resources</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specificity of Amount of Resources</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional (Analytic)</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of First Target</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional (Descriptive)</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Time for Use of Resources</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>% Total Variance</th>
<th>Cumulative %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>51.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of problem, and the latter variable is given a weight of 1. In this way a composite specificity score was obtained for each event. Table 9 presents the frequencies for these four variables.

Table 10 illustrates the concepts making up the two models of situational influence and the indicators selected from the CREON data set. The situational dimensions and bureaucratic process variables are dichotomized; the three foreign policy behavior variables are interval measures. Detailed discussions of the selected indicators, including coding rules, may be found in the references noted. These citations refer to the two major coding manuals utilized in the CREON project. Beyond examining coding rules and frequency distributions, we must address the questions of reliability and validity. These issues form the basis for discussion in the remainder of this chapter.

Reliability

Reliability questions form a central concern in the quantitative study of international politics. In order for research to be cumulative, data collection procedures must be explicit and capable of replication. In O. Holsti's (1969: 135) terms, "if research is to satisfy the requirements of objectivity, measures and procedures must be reliable; i.e., repeated measures with the same instrument on a given sample of data should yield similar results." Two approaches to reliability have been identified. The first approach focuses on the extent of agreement among coders in order to evaluate individual coder reliability. A second approach emphasizes category reliability, essentially testing the explicitness of the coding rules rather than
### Frequencies for Specificity Variables

#### Specificity of Kinds of Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY</th>
<th>RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)</th>
<th>ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)</th>
<th>CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
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<td>16.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>279</td>
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<td>6.4</td>
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<td>MISSING</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>NO TRANSFER</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSING</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
<td>MISSING</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4353</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</table>

#### Specificity as to Time or Condition for Use of Resources

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY</th>
<th>RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)</th>
<th>ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)</th>
<th>CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>YES</td>
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<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>480</td>
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<td>11.0</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>MISSING</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>MISSING</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4353</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### Nature of First Direct Target

<table>
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<th>ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)</th>
<th>CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)</th>
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<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<td>3.9</td>
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<td>OTHER DOMESTIC AUDIENCE</td>
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<td>EXTERNAL ENTITY PARTICIPANTS SAME SETTING</td>
<td>2590</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>66.9</td>
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<td>EXTERNAL GOV'T RULERS NOT IN SAME SETTING</td>
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<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>71.6</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>71.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFFICIALS OF INTERNAT'L OR REGIONAL ORG.</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>72.1</td>
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<td>EXTERNAL, NONGOV'T GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
<td>76.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>UNDIFFERENTIATED</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
<td>MISSING</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4353</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Table 9 (continued)

**Specificity of Problem, Issue, or Topic**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
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<th>RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)</th>
<th>ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)</th>
<th>CUMULATIVE ADJ FREQ (PERCENT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>YES</td>
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<td>83.5</td>
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<td>16.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>MISSING</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>Concept</td>
<td>Indicator(s)</td>
<td>Reference</td>
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<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Threat-Opportunity</td>
<td>Threatopp</td>
<td>Salmore and Brady</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision Time</td>
<td>Dectime</td>
<td>(1972)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surprise-Anticipation</td>
<td>Surant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Process</td>
<td>Centralization of Authority</td>
<td>OK Needed</td>
<td>Hermann, et. al. (1973)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bureaucratic Opposition</td>
<td>Assembly, Milbur, Forbur, Ecobur, Intelbur, Intrnbur</td>
<td>Salmore and Brady (1972)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy Behavior</td>
<td>Hostility-Cooperation</td>
<td>WEIS</td>
<td>Hermann, et. al. (1973)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>WEIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specificity</td>
<td>Kindres, Condital, Nattargl, Specprob</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
evaluating the abilities of the coders themselves (O. Holsti, 1969). This second approach has been adopted here.

One of the most widely used coefficients of reliability is Scott's $\pi$.\textsuperscript{34} Applicable to nominal-level data, Scott's $\pi$ reports the percentage of agreement above chance between two coders for a specific variable. Because Scott's $\pi$ must be calculated for each pair of coders, calculations become very involved as the number of coders increases. Moreover, reliability coefficients for several variables may not be compared if they have been computed for varying numbers of coders. In effect, Scott's $\pi$ establishes the extent of agreement among individual coders, rather than the reliability of coding categories.

Because of these factors, and due to the "decision tree" nature of many of the coding items in CREON, Scott's $\pi$ was not selected as a measure of reliability. Instead, Krippendorff's coefficient of agreement was adopted.\textsuperscript{35} The Krippendorff coefficient measures the reliability of the coding instructions, rather than the individual coder reliability. Applicable to nominal data and adjustable for varying numbers of coders, this coefficient reports the percentage of agreement above chance achieved for a specific item. Most significantly for the purpose of this research, Krippendorff's coefficient can be applied to coding items structured in the form of decision trees. For such items, coding judgments at one level are dependent upon previous judgments. Most reliability estimates (such as Scott's $\pi$) evaluate decisions made at various levels independently. Krippendorff's measure, on the other hand, views the item as a single unit with
multiple decision levels, and calculates the reliability coefficient for the item as a whole. In short, Krippendorff's measure seems especially suited for many of the items in the CREON data set.

Table 11 reports initial reliabilities for the situational variables and all items selected as indicators for the bureaucratic process and foreign policy behavior variables. These reliabilities ranged from a low of .55 for awareness to a high of .94 for specificity of kinds of resources. During the initial pass through the data a number of changes and revisions were made in the coding rules. These changes in most cases involved making the coding rules for some items more explicit. In particular, rules for the situational and specificity items were refined and elaborated. As a consequence, several items were recoded and new reliability scores calculated. Table 11 also compares the original and revised reliability estimates for the recoded items. Note that the average improvement in the reliability coefficient for these categories is .25. This supports the fact that Krippendorff measures instruction reliability—as the instructions become more explicit, reliability tends to improve.

The question of establishing an "acceptable" level of reliability for coding categories has been widely debated. Most scholars recognize the difficulties inherent in establishing a set level of acceptability. O. Holsti (1969: 142) has argued that "...in formulating research designs the analyst may be forced to strike some balance between reliability and relevance of categories and units...." Moreover, "...the coefficient of reliability cannot be the sole criterion for making such decisions" (O. Holsti, 1969: 142). Although
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>ORIGINAL VARIABLE RELIABILITY ESTIMATE</th>
<th>RECODED VARIABLE RELIABILITY ESTIMATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat-Opportunity</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision time</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEIS(^a)</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specificity of Kinds of Resources(^a)</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional(^a)</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specificity of Problem</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of First Direct Target(^a)</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Initial reliabilities for these variables were judged sufficient. Therefore, these items were not recoded.
high reliabilities may be obtained in recording such easily measurable variables as defense expenditures, population figures, or the dollar value of international trade, reliabilities for such variables as goals or motives and perceptions of the situation would tend to be lower given the highly subjective nature of these concepts.36

It seems clear that many theoretically significant questions have been avoided in the comparative study of foreign policy because of the difficulty of attaining "satisfactory" reliability coefficients for highly subjective concepts. Although we are not arguing that any coefficient, regardless of size, should be deemed acceptable, we do feel that the potential theoretical relevance of particular concepts—such as specificity—merits inclusion of variables not attaining the often-mentioned .75-level. Thus we have judged the specificity of problem (.74) coefficient "acceptable" even though it fails to meet the .75 standard. Given the exploratory nature of this research, it was deemed more important initially to address the question of situational influences than to avoid the question because this variable failed to meet an "ad hoc" standard. Interpretation of the significance of our findings must, of course, take these reliability estimates into consideration, and we shall return to this question in succeeding chapters.

Validity

Closely related to the reliability problem is the question of validity. "Validity is usually defined as the extent to which an instrument is measuring what it is intended to measure" (O. Holsti,
Four types of validity have been identified: 1) content (face) validity, 2) predictive validity, 3) concurrent validity, and 4) construct validity. Our focus in this section will be on content validity. Content validity is generally "...established through the informed judgment of the investigator" (O. Holsti, 1969: 143). In establishing content validity the investigator examines distributions of his data to determine whether or not the data look "reasonable." Criteria of "reasonableness" are based on the investigator's knowledge of the reality of the phenomena he is observing. If the data approach his expectations of "real world" phenomena, then content or face validity can be established. If the data do not conform to his expectations, validity cannot be claimed.

The biases inherent in particular data sources often contribute to the validity problem. If a public news source reports a greater proportion of the activities of larger or more developed nations than smaller or less developed nations the possibility of bias in data collected from such a source is a real problem. That regional and world-wide sources report different kinds and amounts of activity for various nations has been established. The question we must address is whether Deadline Data exhibits so extensive a bias as to render data collected from the source invalid. Although Deadline Data reports world-wide as opposed to strictly regional activities, it does draw information from a wide variety of newspapers, radio broadcasts, and news services, thereby decreasing to some extent the possibility of bias. Munton (1973) compared Deadline Data reports of Canadian foreign policy events to Canadian policy-makers perceptions of those
activities, and found a high degree of correspondence. Addressing another aspect of the validity problem, Barbara Salmore (1973) is presently conducting a validity study to assess the ability of non-American coders to collect data from non-American sources on a subset of the CREON variables.40

What kinds of bias might we expect from Deadline Data? If, as has been suggested, Deadline Data over-reports the activities of large, developed nations at the expense of smaller, less developed countries, we would expect less missing data on events for the larger, more developed nations. Table 12 reports the percentage of complete data for the three situational dimensions for each of the 35 CREON nations. Contrary to our expectations, such nations as the United States and the Soviet Union do not exhibit the least amount of missing data. In fact, 18 of the 35 CREON nations have less missing data than the U.S., and 26 have less missing data than the U.S.S.R. Only 17% of events for Spain have complete data on the situational items; at the other extreme, 59% of East Germany's events have complete data on these same items. It would appear that less bias than first expected exists, at least in terms of the amount of missing data reported on the three situational dimensions.

On the other hand, when we turn to description by nation of the subset of events coded for all three situationals, some bias emerges. Table 13 presents the cumulative percentage of complete situational data for the 35 nations. As might be expected, the largest proportion of the 4353 events in our subsample are contributed by large and/or developed nations. Together the United States, Soviet Union, Belgium,
Table 12

Percentage of Complete Situational Data for CREON Nations

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<th>% of Nation's Events with Complete Data on Situational Items</th>
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Table 13

Cumulative Percentage of Complete Situational Data for CREON Nations

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<th>Cumulative %</th>
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</table>
France, West Germany, Italy, Canada and India account for almost 50% of the data. The United States accounts for two times the data of the next highest contributor--West Germany. Does this represent bias or merely a reflection of reality? Larger nations might be expected to engage in a larger proportion of foreign policy activities because of their increased resource base. But, do these proportions accurately reflect that resource base or, instead, greater journalistic interest in these nations? Although the issue cannot be settled definitively, the results presented earlier in Table 12 moderate our concern. As long as bias does not extend to the reporting of complete situational data for events of certain nations, we will argue that the cumulative percentage figures are not totally inconsistent with what we might expect in the real world.

Table 14 illustrates the distribution of events by situational type and year. Discussion of this distribution allows us to comment further on the validity of the data. Looking at the events by situational type across the ten year period, it seems reasonable that 63% of the events occurred in response to routinized (opportunity, extended decision time, anticipation) situations. Just over 10% of the prior situations were administrative (opportunity, short decision time, anticipation); this also seems reasonable given the large number of events occurring in the context of international organizations (see Table 2). Votes on proposals submitted in organizations often occur in response to administrative situations (e.g., the submission of a proposal earlier the same day). Although a larger percentage of crisis situations appear than expected, this is due to the specific
### Table 14

**Distribution of Events by Situational Type and Year.**

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months sampled from the ten year period. The large numbers of crisis situations in 1962 and 1967 reflect the Cuban missile crisis and the India-Pakistan border dispute in 1962 and the six-day war involving Israel and the Arab nations in 1967. Similarly, the large number of reflexive situations in 1967 and 1968 are a product of the six-day war, Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean, and American involvement in Vietnam. In sum, this distribution seems to mirror our notion of situations facing the 35 nations during the period 1959 through 1968.

Table 15 presents the distribution of events by situational type and nation for the 35 CREON nations. Several conclusions can be drawn after looking at the composition (by country) of the eight situational types. First, the United States and the Soviet Union rank first and second, respectively, in terms of the percentage of events contributed to each type for all types except innovative, crisis, and reflexive situations. For innovative situations, the Soviet Union ranks first and the United States second. This ranking receives support from studies arguing the greater potential for innovation exhibited by closed as opposed to open political systems.41 Israel ranks second behind the United States for crisis and reflexive situations, due to her involvement in the six-day war in 1967.

If we move beyond the United States and the Soviet Union, additional patterns emerge. As expected, Cuba and India contribute a reasonable proportion of events in the crisis category. The Peoples' Republic of China contributes heavily to the reflexive category; the parallel contribution of the Soviet Union is a product of the conflict
## Table 15

Situational Type by Nation for 35 CREON Nations

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between these powers which developed during this ten year period. Inertia situations tend to confront Canada more than any other nation. Interestingly, Canada, East Germany, Yugoslavia, and the Peoples' Republic of China experience the largest proportion of circumstantial situations, reflecting these nations' attempts to follow independent foreign policies during the decade. Rather than making decisions along pre-established lines, all four countries have considered the special conditions or circumstances surrounding the situations they confront. Japan, Belgium, France, and Ghana contribute heavily to the administrative category. This is no doubt a product of their participation in the United Nations and regional organizations (e.g., the EEC and the OAU). Finally, those nations faced with the largest proportion of routinized situations tend to be large and/or developed (e.g., U.S., U.S.S.R., Belgium, France, West Germany, Canada and Japan). The superior information-gathering and processing capabilities of these nations increase the probability that they will react to situations as routine.

Viewing the distributions for certain selected nations further increases our confidence in the validity of the data. From Table 15 we discover that 47% of American actions were in response to routinized situations. Reflexive and crisis situations were next most likely to confront the United States, as expected given her involvement in Vietnam and the Cuban missile crisis. The distribution of situational types for Canada is quite different, and reveals the special role she plays in international affairs. The largest proportion of Canada's events, similar to other nations, were responses to routinized
situations. But 13% of Canada's actions were reactions to administrative situations; in particular, most of these events involved activities within NATO, the Commonwealth, or the United Nations. This seems realistic, given Canada's traditional role of participation in international organizations. Better than 82% of Belgium's events were linked to routinized situations, with administrative situations occurring twice as often as any of the remaining six types; as with Canada, this reflects Belgium's activities within international organizations. Similar observations may be made for other nations. Table 16 provides substantive examples of event, stimulus, and situational coding.

It seems clear, then, that the requirements for face validity are fulfilled. This subsample of the CREON data reflects, in our opinion, the major behavioral trends in the international system during the decade 1959 through 1968. Although acknowledging the sizeable contribution made by large and/or developed nations, and in particular the United States, West Germany, and the Soviet Union, we feel reasonably confident that this contribution is not so large that it unrealistically describes the behavior of these nations during the time period. In the best of all possible research worlds, additional data sources would be used as supplements to Deadline Data, thus further reducing the possibility of bias due to reliance on one global source. But the absence of these sources does not, in our view, detract measurably from the validity of the CREON data. 42
Table 16
Examples of Event, Stimulus, and Situational Coding for the
Eight Situational Types

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<td>(12-10-62) Indian Prime Minister Nehru says that events have brought out PRG's expansionist and imperialist attitudes and that there is a long-term threat not only to India's independence and territorial integrity but also to other Asian countries.</td>
<td>(12-9-62) PRG demands clear and definite answer by India on whether she agrees to cease-fire, withdrawal of troops of both sides to the line of 11-7-59, and also demands a meeting of officials of both countries.</td>
<td>REFLEXIVE (High threat, short time, anticipated)</td>
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<td>(2-12-65) West German Chancellor Erhard declares West Germany will have to revise political and economic relations with the UAR if Ulbricht is received there.</td>
<td>(1-26-65) East Germany press agency announces Ulbricht will arrive in UAR on state visit on February 26.</td>
<td>INNOVATIVE (High threat, extended time, surprise)</td>
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<td>(2-18-65) Ghana's delegate to the UN General Assembly votes no on a proposal to restore normal voting procedures in the General Assembly.</td>
<td>(2-16-65) Albania's delegate to the UN General Assembly demands the General Assembly take a roll call vote on whether to continue the no-vote procedure it has been following since the beginning of the 19th session.</td>
<td>ADMINISTRATIVE (Opportunity, short time, anticipated)</td>
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<td>(6-2-63) PRG's foreign minister announces the release of all 3,213 troops captured in border fighting with India.</td>
<td>(12-28-62) India offers to repatriate PRG nationals captured in border war with PRG.</td>
<td>INERTIA (Opportunity, extended time, surprise)</td>
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<td>(3-21-61) U.S. opposes proposal giving U.S.S.R. veto over every phase of test ban implementation.</td>
<td>(3-21-61) U.S.S.R. delegate proposes that executive of nuclear control organization be headed by an administrative council of three members.</td>
<td>CIRCUMSTANTIAL (Opportunity, short time, surprise)</td>
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<td>(12-4-62) Cuban minister of industries Guevara says that in the face of an aggressor like the U.S., there can be no other solution than a fight to the death, inflicting maximum damage on the enemy.</td>
<td>(10-22-62) U.S. President Kennedy announces naval blockade of Cuba.</td>
<td>DELIBERATIVE (High threat, extended time, anticipated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2-12-61) Guinean President Toure denounces imperialist aggression covered by the UN flag in the Congo in a joint communiqué with Soviet Presidium Chairman Brezhnev.</td>
<td>(2-10-61) Congo Premier Lumumba is murdered and his death attributed to colonialists.</td>
<td>CRISIS (High threat, short time, surprise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5-4-60) Turkey's foreign minister endorses the aim of general and complete disarmament, to be achieved by stages under effective international control, in a communiqué at a NATO council meeting.</td>
<td></td>
<td>ROUTINIZED (Opportunity, extended time, anticipated)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Data Analysis and Interpretation

In Chapter III we introduced a series of bivariate propositions relating the three situational dimensions individually to three dimensions of foreign policy behavior. To test the significance of these relationships we will use t-tests. If any particular relationship is statistically significant at the .05 level, we will then calculate \( \eta^2 \) (omega squared)—the proportion of variance in the dependent variable (behavior) accounted for by the independent variable (situational dimension). This is an important procedure because, as Hays (1963) notes, a significant t conveys no information about the strength of the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. \( \eta^2 \) allows us to evaluate the strength of association.

From the results of these initial t-tests we will derive a series of propositions relating the eight situational types to the three foreign policy dimensions. For example, we might expect crises to elicit the greatest amount of hostile behavior because of the interaction of threat, short decision time, and surprise. Or, we might expect routinized situations to result in the highest level of resource commitment. In deriving these propositions, then, we are implicitly if not explicitly making statements concerning interaction among the three situational dimensions. To test these propositions and at the same time evaluate the interaction effects, we will use a three-way analysis of variance technique. The F statistic indicates the significance of the results, and \( \eta^2 \) will be used to determine the strength of association. In combination, the t-test and three-way analysis of variance allow us to answer the question—Is there a
relationship between situation and foreign policy?

Assuming some relationship emerges, we will next use a four-way analysis of variance technique to evaluate the impact of situational factors and the bureaucratic process on the three behavior dimensions. Two sets of analyses will be run, the first using centralization of authority and the second using the bureaucratic opposition factor. If interaction effects emerge between the situational and bureaucratic dimensions, we can conclude that some form of mixed model (including direct and indirect components) best describes the relationship between situation and foreign policy. If no interaction is present, then the relative utility of the direct and indirect models can be assessed. In the following chapter we present the results of the t-tests and derive the situational type propositions. Chapter VI then reports the results of the three and four-way analyses of variance.
Several approaches might prove relevant here. First, perhaps the best way to examine the contextual element of situational influences is by using the case study technique. By focusing on one nation's relations with another nation or nations through time, a more accurate understanding of the contextual element might be obtained. A second approach would attempt to aggregate events or actions. If events can be meaningfully aggregated, then the stimuli which elicit those events can be aggregated also. By aggregating stimuli we can approximate the contextual element of situational influences.

The membership and research interests of the CREON project were described in Chapter I, page 34.

The following quarters are included in the CREON data set:

1960 - April, May, June 1965 - Jan., Feb., March

Deadline Data was selected for a variety of reasons. It provides a continuous record of the activities of the world's nations since 1955. All nations and the major international organizations and alliances are included. This source draws information from newspapers, news services, and news agencies around the world. Both domestic and foreign policy activities are reported. And Deadline Data does not focus on one kind of behavior, such as trade agreements. Behaviors requiring diverse resources are included in the chronology.

For an elaboration of these and other rules used to identify an event, see Hermann (1970).

Coding rules for country and international organization context events (in terms of event identification) are identical, and are described in Hermann (1970). The peculiar problems which arise in identifying continuous military conflict events are addressed in Hermann and Swanson (1972).

See Hermann (1970) for the specific rules.
These items are described in either the analytic (Hermann et al., 1973) or the descriptive (Salmore and Brady, 1972) codebooks.

Studies finding two major dimensions include Munton (1973), Salmore and Munton (1973), and Kegley (1973).

Salmore, Hermann, and Rosen (1973) uncover these dimensions in the CREON data.

These items are described in detail in Salmore and Brady (1972), especially pages 61-80 and 92-121.

Coding rules for goals are described in Salmore and Brady (1972: 61-80).

Although labeled "response" in the CREON data set, this variable actually taps the stimulus for the present event. From this point on, we will refer to this variable as the stimulus to avoid confusion.

Both domestic and foreign stimuli are theoretically included in the CREON data. In fact, however, fewer than 100 stimuli represent domestic activities. Thus for the purpose of this analysis we are dealing basically with foreign stimuli. This point was made clear by the assumptions presented in Chapter I.

An elaborate series of coding rules allows the coder to infer a linkage between stimulus and response. These rules are described in Salmore and Brady (1972: 96-98).

For discussion of these coding rules, see Salmore and Brady (1972: 105-110).

These questions are described in Salmore and Brady (1972: 111-115).

These questions are formalized as coding rules. The awareness rules are described in Salmore and Brady (1972: 116-121).

To obtain complete data on even this small a subset of the CREON data a second pass through the 11,583 events was required. Initially, fewer than 1,000 events had complete data on all three situational items. Slight modifications of the original coding rules and a second pass through the data increased the good N to 4,353 events.

Tables for the complete sample will not be presented here, but are available upon request.

A similar procedure was followed and comparisons made for other significant variables, such as WEIS. In every case, differences
between the total sample and the subset were minimal.

22 This variable is described in Hermann, et. al. (1973).

23 For examples, see Allison (1971), Hilsman (1967), and Huntington (1961).

24 These variables are described in Salmore and Brady (1972: 51-55).

25 The use of factor analytic techniques to create the behavior scales was adopted after unsuccessful attempts to create guttmann scales of affect, commitment, and specificity. Numerous attempts to construct guttmann scales failed to produce satisfactory coefficients of reproducibility and scalability for any of the behavior dimensions. The suitability of factor analysis as a technique of scale construction is discussed in Rummel (1970).

26 The WEIS scheme was originally proposed by Charles McClelland (1968). The scheme used here is based on a modified version of that scheme developed by Walter Corson (1969). The original scheme and Corson's revisions are described in Brady (1971).

27 This transformation was performed because a number of the behavior types accounted for very few events, although other types accounted for a large proportion of the events.

28 Because we were attempting to generate hostility-cooperation and commitment dimensions, the decision was made to rotate only two dimensions rather than all dimensions with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0. Our purpose was not to determine what kinds of dimensions or factors exist in the data, but rather to create scales for two specific dimensions. This procedure was suggested by Don Munton.

29 The seize and force behavior types are perhaps the most obvious exceptions to this generalization. Regardless of the factor analytic techniques used, these behavior types failed to load highly on a commitment dimension. Benjamin Walter, a colleague at Vanderbilt, has suggested the small number of events in these categories may provide one explanation of these results.

The relatively high loadings of agree and approve can be explained by reference to coding rules peculiar to the CREON interpretation of these WEIS categories. Agree tends to be used instead of increase relationship, even if the agreement involves the potential use of resources. A general bias toward verbal coding may be one explanation for this result. Thus many events coded agree actually involve the use of physical resources. Approve tends to be used in the context of international organizations. Positive votes resulting in the transfer of resources are often coded approve rather than agree or increase relationship. Thus many approve events in fact may involve
the commitment of resources.

The results of this factor analysis are similar to those obtained from factor analyses of other event data sets, thus increasing our confidence in the two behavior dimensions which emerge—affect and commitment. Salmore and Munton (1973) uncover two similar dimensions in the WEIS data which they label affect and inverse commitment. Munton's (1973) factor analysis of PEACE data reveals these same two dimensions. And Kegley (1973) also uncovers affect and inverse commitment behavior dimensions in his factor analysis of WEIS data.

Salmore and Munton (1973), Munton (1973), Kegley (1973), and Salmore, Hermann and Rosen (1973) all fail to discover a specificity dimension.


This procedure was suggested by both Don Munton and Warren Phillips. The rationale for the procedure can be explained as follows: As Rummel (1970: 142-145) points out, the percent total variance of a factor measures that factor's importance to the total variance in the data. If we assume it is desirable to use a single composite indicator for specificity, then this summary indicator should reflect the empirical importance of the composite variables. If we assume the factor analytic results for specificity represent most of the theoretically possible variance in that concept, then the percent total variance for each factor would seem to be an appropriate weight to use in order to reflect this empirical importance. We are interested in the common variance accounted for by each factor. These figures are 64.3%, 25.0%, and 10.7%, respectively, for factors 1 through 3.

For a discussion of this coefficient, see Scott (1955).

This coefficient is described in Krippendorff (1971). M. Hermann (1974a) presents a summary of the technique and argues its relevance to many variables in the CREON data set.

Psychologists have argued this point. See especially Hill and Crittenden (1971). I am grateful to Margaret Hermann for this citation.

Other kinds of validity have been suggested, but these four appear most often in the literature. For a discussion of additional validity problems, see Hermann (1963).

Many event data studies address the problem of source bias. Examples of these analyses include Azar, et. al. (1972), Hoggard (1970), and Burrowes, et. al. (1971).

The 47 sources used by Deadline Data which have been identified in the CREON data are listed in Salmore and Brady (1972: 3).
Barbara Salmore, one of the CREON principal investigators, has received an NSF grant to study the validity problem. Currently data are being collected on a subset of the CREON variables by scholars in Norway and Lebanon.

See, for example, Farrell (1966).

The CREON investigators are committed at least theoretically to the use of multiple sources. Financial constraints obviously make this commitment difficult to implement.

The t-test is described in Hays (1963).

Although slightly dated, the clearest and most thorough discussion of multivariate analysis of variance techniques can be found in Lindquist (1953). The discussion in Hays (1963) has also proved useful.
CHAPTER V

SITUATIONAL DIMENSIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY:

SOME INITIAL RESULTS AND ADDED HYPOTHESES

Introduction

Thus far our discussion has remained generally at the conceptual level. In this chapter we will discuss the results of the bivariate analysis as a preliminary step in deriving a further set of hypotheses relating the eight situational types to the three behavior dimensions. For each hypothesis introduced in Chapter III the following questions will be addressed: 1) Is the hypothesis confirmed or rejected? 2) Are the results statistically significant at the .05 level? 3) What percentage of the variance in the behavior dimension is explained by the situational dimension? The specific answers to these questions will influence construction of the situational type hypotheses.

Once these bivariate hypotheses have been discussed, we can suggest relationships between the eight situational types and the three foreign policy behavior dimensions. Recall that each of the eight types is constructed by dichotomizing a particular situation on three dimensions—threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness. A crisis situation, for example, is characterized by threat, short decision time, and surprise. In determining the potential impact of a crisis situation on foreign policy we should consider the individual impacts
of threat, short decision time, and awareness. More than this, we also should consider the effects of these three situational dimensions taken together. For example, do conditions of threat and short decision time operating together influence foreign policy to a greater degree than either dimension acting independently? If greater influence exists when the joint states occur, then that influence should be reflected in variation in the dependent variables.

Each of the eight situational types will be discussed in terms of its impact on the levels of hostility-cooperation, resource commitment, and specificity in foreign policy behavior. Substantive examples are given for all eight types. Following this, the situational types will be ranked according to the levels of hostility-cooperation, resource commitment, and specificity expected under those conditions. These rankings constitute expectations which will be tested in the following chapter using analysis of variance techniques.

**Threat-Opportunity and Foreign Policy Behavior**

In Chapter III we hypothesized that under conditions of threat foreign policy behavior is characterized by hostility, a high level of resource commitment, and generality. In contrast, when confronted with an opportunity policy-makers tend to respond cooperatively, and with actions involving a low level or resource commitment and high specificity. Table 17 summarizes the results of the t-tests for these hypotheses.

Two of the three propositions are confirmed. As expected, threatening conditions elicit both hostile and generalized responses.
Summary of t-Tests for Threat-Opportunity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Significance level</th>
<th>t value</th>
<th>( w^2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under conditions of threat (as contrasted with opportunity), foreign policy behavior tends to be hostile rather than cooperative</td>
<td>confirmed</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>21.268</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under conditions of threat (as contrasted with opportunity), foreign policy behavior tends to involve a high rather than low level of resource commitment</td>
<td>rejected</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-21.587</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under conditions of threat (as contrasted with opportunity), foreign policy behavior tends to be highly generalized, rather than specific</td>
<td>confirmed</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-16.255</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contrary to our expectations, however, threatening situations lead to a low rather than a high level of resource commitment. Results for all three tests are significant at the .05 level. Threat appears to explain the largest percentage of the variance in resource commitment, followed by hostility-cooperation and specificity. Threat-opportunity does not, however, explain a large proportion of the variance in any of the behavioral dimensions, a point to which we will return after discussion of all three situational dimensions.

What explanation can be given for the unexpected relationship between threat-opportunity and resource commitment? We argued that under conditions of threat decision-makers would react in an effort to protect their goals. Furthermore, it seemed reasonable that policymakers would want to convey their commitment or intent to protect these goals. Such intent, we suggested, might best be communicated by acts involving the commitment of resources. Therefore, threat would tend to elicit high levels of resource commitment. Given the results of our analysis, several alternative arguments seem plausible. First, intent may be conveyed through behavior which does not involve the actual commitment of resources. Threats or warnings, although not requiring an actual commitment, are often persuasive. Moreover, in committing resources foreign policy decision-makers limit their flexibility in future actions. Because retaining flexibility and keeping options open are often crucial under conditions of threat, policymakers will tend to avoid actions involving definite commitments.

The relationship between threat and specificity lends further support to this alternative argument. We found that under conditions
of threat policy-makers engage in highly generalized rather than specific behavior. One of the purposes of this behavior is to keep open the options of both the threatener and the threatened nation. The requirement of flexibility, then, seems to spill over and thus affects specificity as well as commitment. There also appears to be a relationship between commitment and specificity. Actions involving a high level of resource commitment tend to be highly specific; those actions involving a low level of resource commitment are more often general in nature. This makes intuitive sense. When a nation commits resources pressures to account for those resources elicit a great deal of highly specific information regarding the action. On the other hand, the absence of a definite commitment enables decision-makers to get away with less explicit descriptions of their behavior. In sum, the alternative hypothesis relating threatening situations to low levels of resource commitment seems reasonable.

Decision Time and Foreign Policy Behavior

Under conditions of short decision time, we hypothesized foreign policy behavior would be hostile rather than cooperative, involve low levels of resource commitment, and be highly specific. Extended decision time, on the other hand, allows for cooperative responses characterized by a high level of resource commitment and a high degree of generality. Table 18 summarizes the results of the t-tests for decision time. Two propositions were accepted and one was rejected. Short time leads to hostile behavior involving a low level of resource commitment. At the same time, short decision time results in highly
Summary of t-Tests for Decision Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Significance level</th>
<th>t value</th>
<th>$w^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under conditions of short (as contrasted with extended) decision time,</td>
<td>confirmed</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>17.088</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign policy behavior tends to be hostile rather than cooperative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under conditions of short (as contrasted with extended) decision time,</td>
<td>confirmed</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-20.302</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign policy behavior tends to involve a low rather than a high level of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resource commitment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under conditions of short (as contrasted with extended) decision time,</td>
<td>rejected</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-15.084</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign policy behavior tends to be highly specific, rather than general</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
generalized behavior. Decision time appears to explain the largest percentage of the variance in resource commitment, followed by hostility-cooperation and specificity. All results are significant at the .05 level. But similar to our results for threat-opportunity, decision time fails to explain a large proportion of the variance in any behavior dimension.

Although the findings for specificity are unexpected, some justification may be given for these results. On the one hand, under conditions of short time decision-makers are pressured to act immediately with little time for deliberation concerning alternative courses of action. But it seems equally reasonable that they might respond generally as opposed to specifically when faced with short decision time. We argued in Chapter III that short decision time results in consideration of issues at the bureaucratic level where they are first perceived. Moreover, the lower level bureaucrats who often respond in short decision time situations tend to view the situation in terms of their organizations and the specific problem areas for which they are responsible. Under these circumstances decision-makers initiate a response based on generalization of the specific situation. Put differently, policy-makers will tend to react to the larger class of situations of which this specific situation is an instance, a class with which they have had prior experience. Thus a more general response may very well be forthcoming.

An argument similar to that made for the impact of threat-opportunity on specificity might be made as well for decision time. When faced with a short time in which to make decisions, policy-makers
are unable to carefully examine the implications of many specific actions. Consequently, they tend to respond generally to keep their future options open. This tendency may, in fact, be exaggerated in the behavior of lower level bureaucrats. Because they normally consider low-risk kinds of policies, lower level bureaucrats can more easily make general decisions and avoid suffering immediate, large-scale consequences.¹

**Awareness and Foreign Policy Behavior**

In Chapter III we suggested that decision-makers when confronted with a surprise situation react with hostility, low levels of resource commitment, and high specificity. Anticipated situations, on the other hand, tend to result in cooperative behavior, involving a high level of resource commitment, and high generality. The results of our analysis, presented in Table 19, lead to confirmation of two hypotheses and the rejection of one hypothesis. Surprise does seem to lead to hostile reactions involving a low level of resource commitment. Rather than leading to specific behavior, however, surprise situations encourage general responses. All findings are significant at the .05 level, with awareness explaining the largest percentage of variance in hostility-cooperation, followed closely by commitment and specificity. Similar to threat-opportunity and decision time, however, awareness explains minimal variance in any of the three behavior dimensions. In fact, awareness explains less variance than either threat-opportunity or decision time.

Surprise occurs when policy-makers face an unexpected situation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Significance level</th>
<th>t value</th>
<th>$w^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under conditions of surprise (as contrasted with awareness), foreign policy behavior tends to be hostile rather than cooperative</td>
<td>confirmed</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>12.565</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under conditions of surprise (as contrasted with awareness), foreign policy behavior tends to involve a low rather than high level of resource commitment</td>
<td>confirmed</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-12.318</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under conditions of surprise (as contrasted with awareness), foreign policy behavior tends to be highly specific, rather than general</td>
<td>rejected</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-10.422</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in either their domestic or international environments. The prior situation was not part of the cognitive map possessed by decision-makers. Given these conditions, decision-makers might well choose to respond generally as opposed to specifically. If surprised, policymakers normally do not have a specific response built into their collection of previously engaged in behaviors. In these circumstances policymakers are likely to adapt a more generalized response to the situation, rather than formulate a specific response to that particular situation. Thus conditions of surprise tend to result in highly generalized behavior.

What general conclusions may be drawn from the results presented in Tables 17-19? First, six of the nine propositions are confirmed, and all results are statistically significant at the .05 level. Two of the rejected propositions attempt to predict specificity, and one attempts to predict commitment. All three propositions predicting hostility-cooperation are confirmed. In terms of the percentage of the variance explained, threat-opportunity explains the largest percent of the variance in all three foreign policy behavior dimensions. Awareness, in contrast, explains the smallest percentage of the variance in the behavior dimensions. Hostility-cooperation and resource commitment appear easier than specificity to explain for each situational dimension--less variance is explained for specificity in every case. In summary, these bivariate relationships suggest threat-opportunity and decision time may be more important than awareness in explaining all three behavior dimensions. Moreover, less of the variance is explained in specificity than in the other two behavioral
dimensions by any of the situational variables.

In one sense, then, our results are favorable. Six of nine propositions are confirmed, and all are statistically significant. But the small percentage of the variance explained in any behavior dimension by any situational dimension is indeed disappointing. The largest proportion of the variance explained (10%) relates threat to decreasing commitment. These results obviously require us to modify our notion concerning the theoretical significance situational variables have in the explanation of foreign policy behavior. If the variable with the largest impact explains only 10% of the variance in the commitment dimension, then other variables or variable clusters must be influential. Thus a full explanation of this dimension requires consideration of other variables. Situational variables taken by themselves may not be useful predictors of foreign policy behavior.

But we can draw some general conclusions concerning the impact of situational variables on foreign policy? Although situational variables alone do not seem to explain a large proportion of the variance in foreign policy behavior, they do tend to influence the direction of relationships within the decision-making process and thus, ultimately, the direction of foreign policy behavior. For example, situations characterized by high threat increase the probability of a hostile response. When confronted with short decision time, decision-makers are less likely to engage in the large-scale commitment of resources. Under conditions of surprise, the probability of general foreign policy responses increases. In short, these situational dimensions tend the decision processes and foreign policy
behavior in particular directions. But their independent influence may, in fact, be minimal. We will return to this point in the concluding chapter.

The Situational Type and Foreign Policy

Up to this point we have focused on threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness as independent situational dimensions, each influencing dimensions of foreign policy behavior in particular directions. One of the purposes of this study, as stated in the Introduction, is to evaluate the utility of the eight-fold situational typology developed by Charles Hermann. In order to fulfill this purpose our attention must shift to interaction among the three situational dimensions. We must develop a series of hypotheses suggesting the kinds of behavior which result given the eight possible combinations of the situational variables. Before discussing the eight situational types, we will present a series of general propositions describing the effects of the situational dimensions taken two at a time. These propositions, however, will not be tested explicitly. Rather, they provide a theoretical foundation upon which the situational type propositions are built.

The t-test results suggest the probability of hostile responses increases with threatening situations. Short decision time also tends to elicit hostile foreign policy responses. And the likelihood of hostile reactions increases when decision-makers are confronted with unexpected (surprise) situations. If we examine these variables in pairs rather than singly, several general propositions or conclusions can be formulated. First, conditions of threat and short decision
time increase the probability of hostile responses. The co-occurrence of these two situational dimensions results in a higher level of hostility than either dimension viewed singly. When threatened, decision-makers seek to protect their goals and objectives. Conditions of short time decrease the probability that extensive search for alternative responses will occur. Decision-makers therefore are less likely to develop cooperative responses in situations of threat and short decision time. A similar argument relates threatening situations which come as surprises to policy-makers to the level of hostility characterizing their responses. Surprising situations indicate the absence of pre-formulated responses. When the situation also involves a threat to goals or objectives the probability of a hostile reaction increases. A threat which comes unexpectedly is more likely than an expected threat to elicit hostile responses. Decision-makers faced with an expected threat have greater leeway in formulating policy alternatives. Thus under these conditions the probability increases that cooperative solutions to the problem will be developed. Thirdly, and following from these initial arguments, short decision time and surprise situations often lead to hostile responses.

Parallel arguments can be suggested to explain tendencies toward cooperative responses. In the first place, situations viewed as opportunities which permit an extended period of decision time increase the probability of cooperative reactions. The tendency toward cooperative reactions which is apparent in opportunity situations is intensified when policy-makers have an extended period of time to make decisions. Faced with extended time, decision-makers
are more likely to fully explore the implications of an opportunity for the achievement of their goals. Their behavior will reflect the desire to take fullest advantage of the opportunity. Thus their responses are likely to be highly cooperative. Secondly, situations presenting opportunities which are anticipated by policy-makers increase the likelihood of cooperative reactions. If the opportunity was anticipated, the policy-makers are likely to have developed responses to take full advantage of the chance to make progress on their goals and objectives. Having developed these responses, decision-makers will tend to react with highly cooperative behaviors. Finally, anticipated situations allowing extended decision time increase the probability decision-makers will engage in cooperative responses. These dimensions independently elicit cooperative reactions, and their co-occurrence increases the extent of cooperation which can be expected.

The initial results of the bivariate analysis allow us to conclude resource commitment is at least partially dependent upon threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness dimensions. Specifically, conditions of threat elicit minimal levels of resource commitment. Decision-makers are less likely to commit resources when confronted with short decision time. And under conditions of surprise resources will tend not to be committed. How do these dimensions taken in pairs relate to the extent of resource commitment evident in any particular foreign policy response? To begin, threat and short decision time situations encourage minimal levels of resource commitment. When threatened, policy-makers seek to protect their endangered goals. But
the influence of short decision time discourages large-scale commitment of resources. Under these conditions decision-makers often respond with extremely hostile, verbal statements which condemn the actions of the threatening nation. Secondly, and for similar reasons, conditions of threat and surprise elicit only low levels of resource commitment. Because policy-makers are surprised by the situation, they generally must formulate responses from scratch. As we stated earlier, resource commitments require bureaucratic participation of some kind. This participation is less likely to occur when policymakers are threatened and surprised by the prior situation. According to a third proposition, situations of short decision time and surprise discourage the large-scale commitment of resources. Similar arguments apply here as well. When decision-makers are surprised and perceive short decision time, the likelihood of extensive bureaucratic involvement decreases. The absence of this involvement pushes the foreign policy response away from resource commitment.

Extensive commitments of resources are more likely to occur when decision-makers are responding to an opportunity created by the action of another nation. Under conditions of extended time, the probability of resource commitment increases. Finally, resources tend to be committed in response to anticipated situations. When we examine these dimensions in pairs, several conclusions seem obvious. First, situations presenting policy-makers with opportunities and extended decision time encourage the commitment of resources. Although the existence of an opportunity in and of itself is sufficient to encourage resource commitment, the presence of extended decision time
encourages further commitment. Thus we might expect a higher level of resource commitment in situations characterized by both opportunity and extended decision time. Next, resources are likely to be committed in anticipated situations which present decision-makers with an opportunity to make progress toward their goals. Because the situation was anticipated, decision-makers are likely to have formulated a wide range of possible responses. Moreover, under such conditions there is a greater probability that those programs involve resource commitments. A final general proposition asserts resource commitments are more likely in anticipated situations when policy-makers perceive an extended period of decision time.

The degree of specificity or generality in foreign policy behavior also varies with the three situational dimensions. As the results of our bivariate analyses show, threatening situations tend to elicit highly generalized responses. When faced with short decision time, policy-makers are likely to respond with general actions. And foreign policy behavior in surprise situations is very often general in nature. Looking at the situational dimensions in pairs, we can formulate three summary propositions. Initially, conditions of threat and short decision time promote highly generalized foreign policy responses. The utility of preserving ambiguity in threatening situations has already been discussed. When combined with short decision time, threat leads to even more general reactions. Not only are policy-makers attempting to maintain flexibility; they are also being forced to respond rapidly to the situation. Thus policy-makers tend to rely on general responses adapted from past experiences with
similar situations. Secondly, and for similar reasons, policy-makers tend to respond generally to threatening situations which come as a surprise. Because they did not expect the prior situation, decision-makers probably do not have at their disposal pre-formulated responses to that situation. Thus they will be forced to rely on responses which were successful in the past under similar circumstances. In conclusion, generalized reactions are elicited under conditions of short time and surprise. The absence of pre-formulated responses is here again probably most influential.

Threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness affect the degree of specificity as well as the degree of generality in any particular foreign policy response. When faced with an opportunity, policy-makers often act specifically to take advantage of the occasion to make progress on their goals. Furthermore, if the situation involves extended decision time, then responses are more likely to be specific. And if policy-makers anticipated the situation, then their reactions will probably be specific. In general, opportunity and extended time situations elicit highly specific responses. Because policy-makers have extended time in which to make a decision they can prepare responses to the specific issues at hand. Under these conditions they do not have to rely on more general responses from previous situational experiences. Secondly, when faced with an opportunity which they anticipated, decision-makers often respond with specific foreign policy actions. As we argued above, anticipated situations increase the probability pre-formulated responses exist. Here again policy-makers have available an alternative tailored to the specific
situation, and thus they do not have to rely on previously successful generalized responses. Finally, specific behavior is more likely to occur under conditions of extended decision time and anticipation. For reasons already suggested, these conditions allow formulation of specific responses to the immediate situation.

We have developed a series of propositions, each proposition relating two situational dimensions to a foreign policy behavior dimension. Having done this, we are now in a position to suggest relationships among the dimensions taken three at a time. That is, we can set forth propositions relating the eight situational types to the three foreign policy dimensions. For the purpose of this construction, we assume an additive model. Put differently, each of the three situational dimensions is given equal weight in determining the impact of a selected situational type on foreign policy. If two of three dimensions predict to higher commitment, for instance, then we hypothesize higher rather than lower commitment in that situation. The level of resource commitment would tend to be greater, however, in a situation where all three dimensions predicted higher commitment. Following from these propositions, the situational types can be ranked according to the degrees of hostility-cooperation, commitment, and specificity expected in the resulting foreign policy behavior. We shall discuss each of the eight situational types in turn, and present illustrations gathered from histories of foreign policy activities during approximately the past two decades.

A crisis is defined as presenting a threat to national goals or objectives, a restriction on available decision time, and a surprise
to decision-makers. The relationship between crisis and hostility-cooperation is straightforward. Because its position on all three situational dimensions indicates a hostile response should be forthcoming, we can expect a high degree of hostility under crisis conditions. Similarly, threat, short decision time, and surprise tend to elicit a lower level of resource commitment on the part of policymakers. These three conditions also increase the probability of highly generalized policy responses. As an initial case, then, crisis situations increase the probability of hostility, low commitment, and generality in foreign policy responses.

West German policy-makers were faced with a crisis situation in early 1966 when General de Gaulle announced that France would begin withdrawing from participation in NATO military activities, although formally remaining a member of the alliance. "De Gaulle specified later, in letters to his 14 NATO partners, that the troops to be withdrawn were the land and air forces stationed in Germany under the allied command in Europe.... At the end of March [1966], the French government issued a time table for the implementation of these policies; French forces in Germany would be withdrawn from NATO on July 1, 1966, and NATO bases in France had to be closed and the NATO command removed from France by April 1, 1967" (Willis, 1968: 354). This situation was perceived as a crisis in Franco-German relations. The possibility of French withdrawal posed a threat to West German security. Moreover, the establishment of a deadline for completion of withdrawal placed West German policy-makers under time pressure to respond. And the French action took West German decision-makers by complete surprise.
They had no reason to expect such action by the French government.

German Chancellor Erhard and his cabinet met on May 3 for six hours to draft a reply to General de Gaulle. The reply was hostile: "The menace weighing on the western world, and particularly Europe, has not ceased to exist" (quoted in Willis, 1968: 354). At the same time, the German reply was phrased in general terms, and did not represent a high level of resource commitment. As is the case in many crisis situations, in this instance the Government relied on hostile, verbal exchanges to convey its displeasure at the proposed French action.

When policy-makers are confronted with high threat and surprise, but perceive an extended period of decision time, an innovative situation exists. In an innovative situation we would expect hostile responses, although because of extended decision time these responses would tend to be less hostile than those occurring in crisis situations. The high threat and surprise components of innovative situations promote a low level of resource commitment, but not as low a level as for crisis situations given the influence of extended decision time. Generalized responses tend to characterize innovative situations. These responses are, however, less general (more specific) than responses in crisis situations, due to the influence of extended decision time.

In November, 1957 leaders of twelve communist nations gathered in Moscow to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the October revolution of 1917. Chairman Mao's address to the group on November 18 created an innovative situation for Soviet policy-makers. The
Chinese leader commented that Soviet weapons development (and especially the Sputniks) represented a turning point in the balance of forces between East and West: "At present, it is not the west wind which is prevailing over the east wind, but the east wind prevailing over the west wind" (quoted in Zagoria, 1964: 160). In short, Chairman Mao was arguing that "the socialist forces are overwhelmingly superior to the imperialist forces" (quoted in Zagoria, 1964: 160). This extreme statement, noting a qualitative change in the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, was unlike statements concerning East-West relations being made by Soviet leaders. Premier Khrushchev, in contrast, viewed Soviet weapons development "...not so much as an opportunity to begin revolutionary assaults on the West throughout the world--assaults which risked local war with the West--but primarily to begin his long climb to the summit" (Zagoria, 1964: 168). In many ways, then, the Chinese leader's statement presented a threat to Soviet goals and objectives. At the same time, Soviet leaders felt they had a reasonably long time in which to develop their responses. Chairman Mao's comments did, however, come as a surprise to Soviet decision-makers.

Premier Khrushchev's reactions to this situation, although not violently hostile, did not correspond to Chinese expectations. In fact, the situation marked the beginning of important differences between the two nations concerning strategy. Khrushchev wanted to avoid a confrontation with the United States, and thus chose to pursue minimal-risk policies. Mao, on the other hand, encouraged confrontation and high-risk policies. On November 27 Soviet Defense Minister
Malinowski reacted to the Chinese statement and desire to share Soviet nuclear weapons. Malinowski said the Soviet Union was only willing to give the Chinese technical help and training; implicit in his statement was that the Soviets were not interested in helping Peking to achieve an independent nuclear capability. The Soviet response, then, was hostile because it marked a decided conflict over strategy between Moscow and Peking. At the same time, the response involved minimal resource commitment and was highly generalized.

An inertia situation exists when decision-makers are faced with an opportunity to make gains on a desired goal, an extended period of decision time, and surprise. Under these conditions behavior will tend to be cooperative as opposed to hostile, given the combined influence of extended decision time and opportunity. Furthermore, because decision-makers have extended time in which to make a decision and view the situation as an opportunity, they will more than likely react with a high level of resource commitment. Behavior in an inertia situation also tends to be highly specific. Although the condition of surprise encourages generalized behavior, the joint influence of extended decision time and opportunity promotes specific foreign policy responses.

On June 1, 1958 General Charles de Gaulle was invested as French Premier by the National Assembly. This event created an inertia situation for the government of West Germany. In the first place, the situation provided West German officials with an opportunity to improve Franco-German relations. On June 2 the Federal government announced that it "...would do everything possible to pursue a policy of
friendly cooperation with the new government, especially, it emphasized, within the Atlantic alliance..." (Willis, 1968: 276). Moreover, German officials had an extended period of time in which to formulate responses to the new French regime. And because the shift in leadership represented a sudden change in the international system, German policy-makers did not anticipate the situation.

German reaction to the leadership change was cooperative, involved commitment, and was specific. On September 14, 1958 Chancellor Adenauer visited de Gaulle at Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises. This meeting marked the first direct, physical contact between the two leaders. The result of these discussions was an agreement based on reciprocity: "...the Federal Republic would aid France in her Atlantic and European ambitions, and France would give firm support to the Eastern policies of the Federal Republic. On reunification and Berlin, France was never to take any initiatives that did not first emanate from Bonn" (Grosser, 1967: 66). German policy-makers thus reacted to the shift in French leadership with cooperative behavior, and a strong commitment to the improvement of relations between the two nations. This behavior was specific as well, although not as specific or involving as great a resource commitment as routinized situations.

When faced with an opportunity to make gains on a desired goal, short decision time, and surprise decision-makers are confronted with a circumstantial situation. Under these conditions foreign policy behavior tends to be hostile, to involve a low level of resource commitment, and to be highly generalized. The hostility expressed in a circumstantial situation is a product of the short time and surprise
components of the situation. Similarly, low levels of resources are committed because of the influence of short time and surprise. And these two situational dimensions also encourage general rather than specific responses.

During the first half of 1959, a revolt occurred in Tibet. The Chinese Communist Army, arguing the revolt was an internal affair, intervened to suppress the action. This resulted in the flight of the Dalai Lama and many other refugees to India and neighboring countries. The Tibet revolt and subsequent intervention by the Chinese presented Burma's decision-makers with a circumstantial situation. In at least one important respect, Burmese officials perceived an opportunity to make progress on their goals and objectives. At this time Burma was in the process of resolving her border problem with China, and viewed the situation as a means by which she could convince the Chinese of her good intentions. Moreover, Burmese policy-makers had only a short period of time in which to formulate a response. The impact of the Burmese reaction on Burmese-Chinese relations might lessen the longer she waited before responding. Finally, the Chinese action came as a complete surprise to Burmese decision-makers, as it did to most of the world's leaders.

The Ne Win government reacted with mildly hostile behavior. Because of Burma's precarious position in relation to China, Burmese decision-makers expressed "shock" at the Chinese action but failed to engage in highly hostile responses. Furthermore, Burmese reactions involved a low level of resource commitment. The situation resulted in no significant change in Burma's attitude toward China. Rather
than narrowing their range of options in the future, Burmese decision-makers chose to respond generally to the situation. The goal of reaching a settlement with China on the border problem seemed to take precedence over Burma's stated policy of neutralism.

Conditions of threat, short decision time, and anticipation represent a reflexive situation to foreign policy decision-makers. Foreign policy behavior under these conditions is characterized by a high level of hostility, minimal resource commitment, and generality. The threat and short time dimensions of reflexive situations encourage hostility and generality and discourage resource commitment. Although the anticipation dimension influences foreign policy behavior in opposite directions, threat and short time together are more influential than anticipation alone.

In July 1964 General de Gaulle visited Bonn for the second working visit held annually under the Franco-German treaty. By intervening in the political struggle then occurring within the CDU, De Gaulle prompted the German Gaullists to mount a campaign against Chancellor Erhard while he was out of the country. At the Munich conference of the Christian Democratic party of Bavaria, these French sympathizers criticized the "dormant state of the Franco-German treaty" (Willis, 1968: 331). Chancellor Erhard countered by declaring that the direction of West German foreign policy was the decision of the Chancellor, and that a German union with France would cause difficulties with other EEC countries and the United States. The German cabinet approved Erhard's general European policy on July 15. Erhard's strong statement and the German cabinet's approval of his
position created a reflexive situation for French decision-makers.

The Chancellor's statement posed a threat to both the future of Franco-German relations and the development of an independent European stance on such significant international issues as the recognition of China, peace in Asia, and aid to the developing areas. De Gaulle reacted immediately to Erhard's charge, suggesting in his press conference of July 23, 1964 that the Franco-German treaty had been unproductive--France and Germany had not formulated a common policy. De Gaulle even went so far as to say the German action might lead to the breakup of the European Economic Community. De Gaulle's response to Erhard's statement was hostile, but involved a minimal commitment of resources. Moreover, De Gaulle's statement was cast at a high level of generality.

A deliberative situation exists when decision-makers are confronted with conditions of threat, extended decision time, and anticipation. Foreign policy behavior in deliberative situations tends to be cooperative, involves a high level of resource commitment, and is highly specific. The relative importance of threat in comparison with extended time and anticipation may result in less cooperative behavior than expected. In general, however, behavior will tend to be cooperative. The extended time and anticipation dimensions of deliberative situations influence the high level of resource commitment and specificity.

Developments in Cyprus during the early months of 1964 presented Canadian policy-makers with a deliberative situation. The situation posed more of a threat than might have been expected. Cyprus was a
member of the Commonwealth, and Britain maintained important military bases on the island. Furthermore, and perhaps more important from Canada's perspective, two NATO allies (Turkey and Greece) had troops on the island. Britain took the Cyprus issue before the United Nations Security Council on February 18, 1964. Canada had participated in prior peacekeeping efforts, and thus anticipated she would receive an invitation in this instance as well. Although the conflict was indeed serious, Canadian policy-makers realized they had a considerable period of time in which to formulate their responses to the situation.

On February 19, 1964 Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson announced Canada would participate in a UN peacekeeping force on Cyprus, assuming certain prior conditions were met. These included a fixed mandate concerning length of involvement, and Canadian approval of the selected mediator. These conditions were met, and on March 17, 1964 the Canadian contribution to the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was dispatched. In short, Canada's response to this situation was highly cooperative, involved an extensive commitment of resources, and was highly specific.

When decision-makers are faced with conditions of opportunity, extended decision time, and anticipation, they are dealing with a routinized situation. In terms of the three situational variables, routinized situations exhibit the exact opposite characteristics of crises. Therefore, we might expect the behaviors engaged in as responses to routinized situations to be exactly the opposite of behaviors during crises. Such is indeed the case. Under conditions of opportunity, extended time, and anticipation, foreign policy
behavior tends to be highly cooperative, involves a high level of resource commitment, and is specific.

In July 1952 the People's Republic of China proposed a series of talks to settle the problems of Indian rights and assets in Tibet. This proposal presented Indian policy-makers with a routinized situation. The Sino-Indian border conflict was long-standing; thus Indian policy-makers were not particularly surprised by the Chinese interest in negotiation. Little chance existed that the situation would change rapidly, and as a consequence Indian decision-makers had an extended period of time to consider their response. Moreover, the situation presented India with an opportunity to move forward toward resolution of at least this aspect of the Sino-Indian border conflict.

The results of the Chinese proposal did not emerge until two years later. India entered into negotiations in Peking with the Chinese, and on April 29, 1954 the two nations signed a treaty of trade and friendship concerning Tibet. Formally titled "An Agreement on Intercourse Between the Tibet Region of China and India," the treaty "...provided for the withdrawal of all Indian troops from Tibet, cession by India to China of control over that part of Tibet's postal, telephone, and telegraphic communications formally administered by India, the establishment of free travel facilities for religious pilgrims from both sides of the border, and the mutual establishment of three trade agencies by each country in the other country's territory" (Cheng, 1972: 32). As such, the agreement represented a formidable commitment by India—what could indicate a greater level of commitment then the cession of territory? By her action India was
attempting to end the long-standing border conflict with China; thus her behavior was extremely cooperative. Finally, the agreement provisions can be characterized as highly specific. That this treaty represented a significant improvement in Sino-Indian relations is evident in a memorandum issued by Nehru three months after the agreement was signed. In that memorandum Nehru charged the agreement marked a "new beginning" in India's relations with China and Tibet.

One final type of situation faced by decision-makers can be described as administrative. An administrative situation presents policy-makers with an opportunity to make gains on specific goals, short decision time, and anticipation. Because of the existence of an opportunity and due to the anticipated nature of the prior situation, there is a greater probability that foreign policy behavior will be highly cooperative. In addition, these same characteristics increase the likelihood of a high level of resource commitment. And, finally, opportunity and anticipation encourage highly specific rather than general foreign policy responses.

In October 1962 Chinese troops increased the extent of their incursions into Indian territory. On November 19 Prime Minister Nehru appealed directly to the United States for support and military aid. This specific episode in the continuing India-China conflict confronted American foreign policy decision-makers with an administrative situation. In many respects the situation represented an opportunity for American policy-makers to improve relations between India and Pakistan. The military threat to India from Chinese activities diverted Nehru's attention from disagreements with Pakistan. At
another level, the situation gave the United States an opportunity to woo India away from its steady policy of nonalignment by sending military assistance. The situation, in any event, did not represent an immediate, direct threat to American decision-makers.

The Chinese incursions did, however, severely constrain the amount of decision time available to the United States. India was fast losing its territory: "...large numbers of Chinese advanced almost at will into some twelve thousand square miles of Indian territory, going beyond even the disputed areas they had long claimed" (Sorenson, 1965: 747). Thus the status of the situation was changing suddenly and dramatically. In fact, President Kennedy sent a diplomatic mission to India merely twenty-four hours after receiving Nehru's pleas for support. Although the situation was deteriorating rapidly, American policy-makers were not surprised at the Chinese action. Incursions into Indian territory by Chinese soldiers were not new; major fighting had been going on since at least 1959. In short, decision-makers anticipated an eventual crisis between India and China over the issue of disputed territory.

The nature of the situation created by Chinese incursions into India influenced American foreign policy behavior. Cooperation rather than hostility characterized American actions toward India: "Kennedy promptly responded with substantial amounts of light weapons, mortars, ammunition and other items" (Sorenson, 1965: 748). Moreover, the American diplomatic mission sent to India attempted to convey President Kennedy's support for India's defensive moves against the Chinese. Although these actions obviously involved the commitment of resources,
commitment tended to be restrained due to a number of considerations. In the first place, US-Pakistani relations entered into the calculation: "...the more the United States gave India in an absence of a settlement, the more Pakistan would move toward an accommodation with Communist China, and there was clearly a limit to what the United States could give India and still maintain friendly relations with Pakistan" (Hilsman, 1967: 337). And given the more immediate concern with the emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba, widespread commitments of resources to India were less likely to be made. American policy-makers took pains to ensure their actions were highly specific in a further effort to prevent a Pakistani-Chinese agreement.

Conclusion

The three situational dimensions of threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness can thus be viewed collectively, and relationships established between situational types and foreign policy. On careful reading, however, the preceding set of relationships raises some questions. For example, both routinized and administrative situations lead to cooperative behavior, characterized by a high level of resource commitment and high specificity. If this is the case, how can the two kinds of situations be distinguished? Put differently, why present them as two situational types if they predict to the same kinds of behavior? A partial answer to these questions lies in the results of the t-tests for the individual situational dimensions discussed earlier in this chapter.

In brief, we can distinguish among the eight situational types by considering the percentage of the variance explained in each of
the behavior dimensions by each of the situational variables. Situa­tional dimensions explaining a larger percentage of the variance in the dependent variable should be given greater weight in determining the level of the dependent variable for a particular situational type. For example, threat-opportunity explains 10% of the variance of com­mitment, while awareness explains only 2% of the variance of that same behavior dimension. It seems reasonable, then, that situational types characterized by opportunity tend to elicit a higher level of commit­ment than situational types characterized by anticipation, other things being equal.

Comparing routinized and administrative situations illustrates the general point. Routinized situations are characterized by oppor­tunity, extended decision time, and anticipation. Administrative situations, on the other hand, occur under conditions of opportunity, short decision time, and anticipation. Opportunity and anticipation tend to elicit cooperative behavior. But short decision time often results in hostility rather than cooperation. Thus we might expect administrative situations to exhibit less cooperation (or, more hostility) than routinized situations due to the influence of short decision time. Similarly, administrative situations result in less resource commitment and less specificity (more generality) because of the influence of short decision time.

A more complex case can be illustrated by comparing reflexive and innovative situations. In this instance the situational types differ along both the decision time and awareness dimensions. Because decision time explains a larger percentage of the variance than
awareness for all three foreign policy behavior variables, the difference along this dimension will be more important in describing the behavior than the difference along the awareness dimension. Both reflexive and innovative situations are characterized by threat. But innovative situations involve extended decision time and surprise, whereas reflexive situations involve short decision time and anticipation. We would expect both types of situations to result in relatively hostile behavior, but would expect reflexive situations to be slightly more hostile than innovative situations given the greater influence of decision time as opposed to awareness. Following a similar procedure for commitment and specificity, we conclude that reflexive situations tend to elicit less specific behavior than innovative and that innovative situations tend to result in a higher level of resource commitment than reflexive.

These evaluations can be made for each of the eight situational types along the three foreign policy behavior dimensions, producing a rank-order of situational types along the behavior dimensions. These orderings are presented in Table 20. For each of the behavior dimensions the situational types are listed in order from the type exhibiting the lowest level of that kind of behavior to the type exhibiting the highest level of that behavior. Thus crises tend to result in the greatest amount of hostility and the least commitment and specificity. Routinized situations, on the other hand, encourage highly cooperative responses, resulting in the highest levels of commitment and specificity. To this point little has been said concerning interaction among the three situational variables. In fact, the rankings
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situational Type and Foreign Policy Behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>hostility</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(low) routinized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inertia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deliberative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>circumstantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>innovative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reflexive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(high) crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>commitment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(low) crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reflexive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>innovative</td>
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<tr>
<td>circumstantial</td>
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<tr>
<td>deliberative</td>
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<tr>
<td>administrative</td>
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<tr>
<td>inertia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>routinized</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>specificity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(low) crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reflexive</td>
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<tr>
<td>innovative</td>
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<td>circumstantial</td>
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<tr>
<td>deliberative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inertia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>routinized</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20
suggested here assume no interaction among these variables. The three-way analysis of variance performed in Chapter VI addresses the question of interaction and allows us to compare these hypothesized rankings with actual rankings obtained in that analysis.
NOTES

CHAPTER V

1 This alternative explanation was suggested by Charles Hermann.

2 General de Gaulle's announcement of French withdrawal from participation in NATO military activities, and subsequent West German reactions are described in Willis (1968).

3 Mao's east wind-west wind speech and its impact on Sino-Soviet relations are discussed at length in Zagoria (1964).

4 For extensive discussions of De Gaulle's rise to power and the impact on Franco-German relations, see Willis (1968) and Grosser (1967).

5 Burmese foreign policy, in general, and her reactions to Chinese intervention in this instance, in particular, are analyzed in Johnstone (1963).

6 This incident and its antecedents are described in Willis (1968).

7 Granatstein (1968) traces the history of Canadian participation in peacekeeping activities, including her activities in Cyprus.

8 The continuing border conflict between India and China is described in Cheng (1972) and Maxwell (1972).

9 American reaction to the Chinese intervention is discussed in Sorenson (1965), Schlesinger (1965), and Hilsman (1967).
CHAPTER VI

THE SITUATION, BUREAUCRATIC PROCESS AND FOREIGN POLICY:
TESTING TWO ALTERNATIVE MODELS

Introduction

In this chapter we turn from consideration of the three situational variables as independent dimensions to the question of interaction. The results presented in Chapter V gave us some information regarding the relationships between threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness on the one hand, and hostility-cooperation, commitment, and specificity on the other. But the question of interaction effects among the situational variables was not addressed. Although we derived a series of propositions relating eight situational types to the three foreign policy behavior dimensions, these propositions were based on results of the initial bivariate analyses. The rankings suggested at the end of that chapter are based on the assumption that no interaction exists among the situational dimensions. Put differently, up to this point our discussion has assumed an additive model. We have assumed the combined effects of threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness are equivalent to the sum of the simple effects of the individual dimensions. In this chapter we ask the question: are there interactive effects among the situational dimensions? Are the combined effects of two or three situational dimensions greater than the
Analysis reported in the preceding chapter has answered one of our initial research questions: there does appear to be a relationship between situational variables and foreign policy. Our results, however, were highly qualified. Namely, although a relationship exists the strength of that relationship does not measure up to our initial expectations. Situational variables do not explain a large percentage of the variance in any of our three behavioral dimensions.

In this chapter we address three additional questions. First, can we uncover a relationship between situational type and foreign policy? To answer this question we introduce a comparison of the expected rankings proposed in Chapter V and the observed rankings taken from the analysis of variance results. Secondly, can we identify interaction effects among the situational dimensions? Following this, can we uncover relationships among the situational and bureaucratic process dimensions?

Multivariate analysis of variance techniques allow us to address these latter questions. Three analyses will be performed. First, a three-way analysis of variance will be performed using the situational variables as factors and the three behavior dimensions as criteria. From the results of this analysis we can determine if interaction effects exist among the situational dimensions. Secondly, two four-way analyses of variance will be performed using the three situational variables and each bureaucratic process dimension in turn as factors. The three behavior dimensions are criteria in these analyses. From these latter analyses we can determine if interaction effects exist...
between situational and the bureaucratic process dimensions. On the basis of the results we can then evaluate the relative utilities of the direct and indirect models of situational influence.

**Situational Type and Foreign Policy: Some Initial Conclusions**

Evaluation of the results of the t-tests permitted us to establish three rankings of the eight situational types—one ranking for each behavior dimension. The rankings were generated by evaluating the percent variance in the behavior dimensions explained by each of the situational dimensions. These rankings represent our expectations concerning the impact of the situational types on the levels of hostility-cooperation, commitment, and specificity in foreign policy behavior. We expect crises to result in the lowest level of hostility (or, the highest level of cooperation). High levels of resource commitment tend to be associated with routinized situations, and extremely low levels of commitment with crises. Regarding specificity in foreign policy behavior, routinized situations increase the probability of highly specific behavior and crises are often associated with highly general behavior.

Table 21 presents a comparison of these expected rankings with rankings obtained from the initial three-way analysis of variance. These observed rankings are based on comparisons among the mean values on each behavior dimension for the eight situational types. The types are ranked from that having the lowest mean on a particular dimension to that having the highest mean. The rankings can be compared by means of the Spearman rank order correlation coefficient. Spearman's \( r \) allows us to evaluate the extent of agreement between two rank
Table 21
Comparison of Observed and Expected Situational Type Rankings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hostility</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Specificity</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Observed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>routinized</td>
<td>routinized</td>
<td>crisis</td>
<td>reflexive</td>
<td>crisis</td>
<td>reflexive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inertia</td>
<td>inertia</td>
<td>reflexive</td>
<td>crisis</td>
<td>reflexive</td>
<td>deliberative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administrative</td>
<td>administrative</td>
<td>innovative</td>
<td>deliberative</td>
<td>innovative</td>
<td>circumstantial</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>deliberative</td>
<td>circumstantial</td>
<td>circumstantial</td>
<td>innovative</td>
<td>circumstantial</td>
<td>crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>circumstantial</td>
<td>deliberative</td>
<td>deliberative</td>
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<tr>
<td>innovative</td>
<td>innovative</td>
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<tr>
<td>reflexive</td>
<td>crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>crisis</td>
<td>reflexive</td>
<td>routinized</td>
<td>routinized</td>
<td>routinized</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( r_s = .95 \)  \( r_s = .90 \)  \( r_s = .69 \)
orders (Hays, 1963: 644). A Spearman's r of +1 indicates two orders are identical, whereas a Spearman's r of -1 indicates two orders are inversely related.

The results illustrated in Table 21 are encouraging. Correlations between rankings range from a high of .95 for hostility-cooperation to a low of .69 for specificity, suggesting our expectations match quite well with the data. Two possible explanations of the discrepancies can be put forth. First, the arguments developed in Chapter V for each of the eight situational types may not have been as reasonable as first thought. On the other hand, since the expected rankings do not take possible interaction effects into account, the discrepancies may be due to the existence of such interaction effects. We shall address each of these alternative explanations in turn, for all three behavioral dimensions. The alternative argument explanation will be explored more or less on an intuitive basis, while the interaction explanation will be addressed more systematically through multivariate analysis of variance techniques.

Although the correlation between our expected and observed rankings for hostility-cooperation is high (.95), a number of unexpected findings emerge. Reflexive rather than crisis situations tend to elicit the highest level of hostility. And inertia and administrative situations are tied at the second lowest level of hostility. Both crisis and reflexive situational types exhibit high threat. The discrepancies seem to be due to differences along the third situational dimension--awareness. In contrast to our expectations, anticipation when combined with threat and short decision time leads to high
hostility. Given high threat and short time, policy-makers might very well be able to react with a higher level of hostility if the prior situation was anticipated rather than a surprise. Anticipated situations allow pre-planned responses and, more importantly, consideration of numerous alternatives. Perhaps highly hostile responses are more likely to be adopted if policy-makers have given considerable thought to the nature of the situation and the possible consequences of such behavior under those conditions. Thus the probability of a hostile response may be greater in anticipated situations which are also characterized by high threat and short time. The absence of a difference between inertia and administrative situations implies decision time and awareness have little impact (at least in situations also characterized by opportunity) on the level of hostility expressed in a particular response. The major differentiating factor appears to be threat-opportunity—all situations characterized by threat elicit a higher level of hostility than all situations characterized by opportunity.

Results for resource commitment are nearly as striking as those for hostility-cooperation. The correlation between the expected and observed rankings is .90. While the rankings are in agreement at high levels of commitment, disagreement occurs at the lower and middle levels. In particular, the order of reflexive, crisis, deliberative, innovative, and circumstantial situations does not coincide with our expectations. Our expected ranking assumed threat situations would tend to result in less commitment, other things being equal, than opportunity situations—with the exception that circumstantial
situations seemed to have less commitment than deliberative situations. Our results indicate the assumption without any qualification appears to be the case—in general, all situations characterized by threat tend to result in less commitment than all situations characterized by opportunity. If we accept this interpretation, then the revised rank for innovative situations corresponds with our initial expectations.

But how might we explain the reversed rankings of crisis and reflexive situations? Both situations are characterized by threat and short decision time; they differ only along the awareness dimension. We argued that decision-makers are less likely to commit resources when faced with surprise in comparison with anticipated situations. This appears not to be the case—at least for threatening situations. Other things being equal, anticipated situations lead to less resource commitment. Interestingly, this hypothesis helps to explain as well the deliberative-innovative ranking. These situations also differ only along the awareness dimension, and the anticipated situation (deliberative) results in less commitment. When policymakers are threatened and surprised their responses may involve the commitment of resources to reduce or eliminate the threatening situation. Furthermore, the combination of threat and surprise increases the probability resources will be committed. This relationship holds, however, only under conditions of threat. As we expected, when faced with an opportunity policymakers tend to commit resources if the situation also is anticipated.

Finally, the results for specificity are by no means as
encouraging or as clear as the results for hostility-cooperation and commitment. In this instance, the lowest correlation coefficient results (.69). Moreover, differences between the expected and observed rankings are more difficult to interpret. Unlike the findings for hostility-cooperation and commitment, these results cannot be interpreted by the threat-opportunity dimension. All threatening situations do not result in a lower level of specificity than all situations characterized by opportunity. In fact, crises tend to produce behavior more specific than initially predicted. Rather than leading to the most general kind of behavior, crises lead to more specific behavior than reflexive, deliberative, or circumstantial situations. And behavior in deliberative situations tends to be more general than originally expected. No clear alternative arguments seem to emerge from these results. The absence of such arguments may indicate complex interaction effects. It is to the exploration of these interaction effects that we now turn.

Situational Type and Foreign Policy: The Interaction Question

A three-way analysis of variance was performed to determine the main effects and interaction effects of the three situational variables on the foreign policy behavior dimensions. This technique allows us to answer the following questions: 1) are there any effects due to threat-opportunity? 2) are there any effects due to decision time? 3) are there any effects due to awareness? 4) are there any effects due neither to threat-opportunity nor decision time nor awareness alone, but instead to the combination of a particular value on one situational variable with a particular value on a second situational variable?
The first three questions determine the presence or absence of main effects, while question four permits evaluation of interaction effects.

This three-way analysis of variance represents a completely-crossed design and is based on a fixed effects model. Because the eight situational types include all possible combinations of levels of threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness, as we have conceptualized these variables, the design is completely-crossed. By a fixed effects model we mean that each value of the dependent variable is the sum of those effects associated with the experimental treatments (in this case threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness) plus a random error term. Put differently, the fixed effects model assumes that the experimental treatments administered represent the population of treatments about which conclusions may be drawn. As stated by Hays (1963: 357), "experiments to which Model I [fixed effects] applies are distinguished by the fact that inferences are to be made only about differences among the J treatments actually administered, and about no other treatments that might have been included."

Thus all conclusions drawn from the present analysis assume the eight situational types comprise the universe of situational types.

Table 22 presents results for the three-way analysis of variance. All three main effects are statistically significant for hostility-cooperation. Decision time and threat-opportunity are significant for commitment and specificity, but the main effect of awareness fails to achieve significance for either behavior dimension. In terms of the significant main effects, the t-test findings presented in Chapter V are supported. When faced with a threatening situation,
### Table 22

Three-Way Analysis of Variance Results for Individual Behavior Dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>F value</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>eta²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hostility-Cooperation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opponent x time x awareness</td>
<td>1.292</td>
<td>.255</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time x awareness</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>.707</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opponent x awareness</td>
<td>10.716*</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opponent x time</td>
<td>4.376*</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>awareness</td>
<td>5.957*</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time</td>
<td>58.102*</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opponent</td>
<td>710.169*</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Commitment** |         |       |       |
| threat-opponent x time x awareness | 1.336   | .246  | ----  |
| time x awareness      | 1.076   | .299  | ----  |
| threat-opponent x awareness | 4.586*  | .032  | ----  |
| threat-opponent x time| 3.522   | .060  | ----  |
| awareness             | 1.418   | .232  | ----  |
| time                  | 88.579* | .001  | .018  |
| threat-opponent       | 616.941*| .001  | .123  |

| **Specificity** |         |       |       |
| threat-opponent x time x awareness | 0.037   | .848  | ----  |
| time x awareness      | 0.000   | .986  | ----  |
| threat-opponent x awareness | 24.591* | .001  | ----  |
| threat-opponent x time| 22.945* | .001  | ----  |
| awareness             | 2.568   | .109  | ----  |
| time                  | 58.942* | .001  | .012  |
| threat-opponent       | 285.959*| .001  | .060  |

* p ≤ .05

a Less than one percent of the variance is explained by this main effect or interaction effect.
policy-makers are more likely to respond with hostility, low commitment, and generality. Under conditions of short decision time the probability increases that behavior will be hostile, represent low commitment, and be general. The awareness dimension fares less well. The only statistically significant relationship supports the t-test results. Surprise situations tend to elicit a higher level of hostility (lower level of cooperation) than anticipated situations.

Our findings support the general conclusions drawn by Hermann (1972) regarding the main effects of these situational variables on the decision process and frequency of action in crises. In brief, the results of his simulation analysis suggest awareness is least likely to predict variations in the decision process and foreign policy behavior: "...the situational quality of surprise may be relatively less important in the decision process than either threat or time" (Hermann, 1972: 208). From his crisis analysis based on interviews with U.S. State Department officials, Howard Lentner (1972) comes to a similar conclusion. Unexpectedness is not necessarily an element in crisis situations (Lentner, 1972: 122-123).

This analysis reveals several statistically significant interaction effects. The threat-opportunity and awareness interaction is significant for the hostility-cooperation, commitment, and specificity behavioral dimensions. When faced with an opportunity and an anticipated situation, foreign policy decision-makers tend to react more cooperatively than under any other conditions. These conditions also result in a significantly higher level of resource commitment. Put differently, within the class of situations presenting an opportunity,
those which were anticipated allowed a higher level of resource commitment than those which took policy-makers by surprise. Finally, this interaction also proves to be statistically significant for the level of specificity expressed in foreign policy behavior. The presence of an opportunity and an anticipated situation encourage highly specific responses.

Why might we expect to find a statistically significant interaction between opportunity and anticipation? As noted in Chapter V, we can establish a good argument relating opportunity and anticipation to cooperation, commitment, and specificity. When policy-makers are confronted with an opportunity, they are likely to respond cooperatively. The amount of cooperation which can be extended increases if the situation is anticipated. Thus we might expect the probability of cooperative response to be greater in opportunity situations which are anticipated. A similar argument can be made for resource commitment. The probability of resource commitment in opportunity situations increases with anticipation. Preparations for resource commitment can be made more easily if the situation encouraging that commitment has been anticipated. Similarly, foreign policy behavior is likely to be highly specific in opportunity situations which are anticipated. If the situation is anticipated, decision-makers probably have developed extensive plans to take advantage of the upcoming opportunity. Therefore, foreign policy behavior tends to be specific.

Turning to the threat-opportunity and decision time interaction, we find statistically significant results. Under conditions of threat and short decision time foreign policy-makers tend to respond with
hostile behavior. On the other hand, cooperative responses tend to occur under conditions of opportunity and extended time. In explaining the specificity dimension, the interaction of opportunity and extended decision time plays a key role. Behavior tends to be more specific than we might expect from the independent effects of opportunity and extended decision time. The interaction of threat and time is not significant at the .05 level for the commitment dimension. That interaction does, however, approach significance. Arguments similar to those made for the threat-opportunity-awareness interaction can be made for the threat-opportunity-decision time interaction. When confronted with an opportunity, policy-makers are more likely to engage in cooperative responses which are specific and represent high levels of commitment, if they have an extended rather than a short time in which to make decisions.

Thus we find the directions of these results generally encouraging. First, the statistically significant main effects of threat-opportunity and decision time for all three behavior dimensions support numerous studies. Secondly, the interaction effects of opportunity and anticipation, and opportunity and extended decision time (with the exception of commitment) are statistically significant.

Although tests of significance allow us to draw some conclusions regarding the relationships between situational variables and foreign policy behavior dimensions, such tests do not provide us with sufficient information to evaluate those relationships. Significance tests indicate the presence or absence of a relationship, but they tell us nothing about the strength of a relationship. Similar to our
discussion of the results of the t-tests in Chapter V, we must now ask: how strong are the relationships between situational variables and foreign policy behavior? Put differently, what percent of the variance in the behavior dimensions can be explained by the main effects and interaction effects of the situational variables?

Table 22 reports $\eta^2$ for each main effect and interaction effect. $\eta$ represents the ratio of between variance to total variance; $\eta^2$ is the percent variance explained by grouping situations into types. In Table 22 the $\eta^2$ represents the percent variance explained by that main effect or specific interaction effect. The $\eta$s thus allow us to evaluate the strength of the relationships between situational variables and foreign policy behavior dimensions.

The results reported in the third column of Table 22 are indeed disappointing. Only six effects explain one percent or more of the variance in any of the behavior dimensions. Threat-opportunity explains the largest proportion of the variance in each case—13% for hostility-cooperation, 12% for commitment, and 6% for specificity. Decision time explains only one percent of the variance in each of the behavior dimensions. The main effect of awareness and all interaction effects each explain less than one percent of the variance in any behavior dimension. What are the implications of these results? In the first place, although several main and interaction effects are statistically significant they explain a very small proportion of the variance in the foreign policy behavior dimensions. Thus, as we suggested in Chapter V, other variables must be taken into account in order to explain foreign policy. Situational variables tend behavior
in certain directions, but that behavior cannot be predicted accurately from knowledge of the situation confronting decision-makers. Secondly, the small proportion of the variance explained by any interaction effect suggests a typological approach to situations may not be justified. That is, the interaction of two or three situational dimensions fails to explain more of the variance than the dimensions viewed independently. We will return to these issues in the concluding chapter.

Situational Type, the Bureaucratic Process, and Foreign Policy

Two four-way analyses of variance were performed to permit evaluation of the relationships among situational and bureaucratic process variables. The results of the first analysis, using threat-opportunity, decision time, awareness, and centralization of authority as the four factors are presented in Table 23. Similar to our findings in the three-way analysis, interaction effects for threat-opportunity and decision time, and threat-opportunity and awareness (with the exception of the commitment dimension) are statistically significant. In addition, one of the second order interactions is statistically significant, although none of the third-order interactions attain significance. Just as in the three-way analysis, the main effects of threat-opportunity and decision time are significant for hostility-cooperation, commitment, and specificity. Because of differences among the behavior dimensions we will examine the findings for each dimension separately, rather than focusing on the significant interactions.

Four statistically significant main effects emerge for hostility-cooperation. Threats elicit hostile responses; opportunities promote
### Table 23

**Four-Way Analysis of Variance Results for Individual Behavior Dimensions (Centralization of Authority)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>F Value</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>eta²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hostility-Cooperation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opponent x time x awareness x centralization</td>
<td>2.989</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time x awareness x centralization</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>.725</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opponent x awareness x centralization</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>.913</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opponent x time x centralization</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>.842</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opponent x time x awareness</td>
<td>0.880</td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>awareness x centralization</td>
<td>0.888</td>
<td>.344</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time x centralization</td>
<td>2.288</td>
<td>.130</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time x awareness</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>.888</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opponent x centralization</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>.692</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opponent x awareness</td>
<td>5.703*</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opponent x time</td>
<td>4.030*</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>centralization</td>
<td>81.450*</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>awareness</td>
<td>4.981*</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time</td>
<td>56.167*</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opponent</td>
<td>640.396*</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Commitment** |         |      |       |
| threat-opponent x time x awareness x centralization | 1.319  | .250 | ---   |
| time x awareness x centralization | 1.687  | .193 | ---   |
| threat-opponent x awareness x centralization | 0.859  | .354 | ---   |
| threat-opponent x time x centralization | 0.395  | .529 | ---   |
| threat-opponent x time x awareness | 1.508  | .219 | ---   |
| awareness x centralization | 1.051  | .304 | ---   |
| time x centralization | 1.668  | .196 | ---   |
| time x awareness | 0.007  | .932 | ---   |
| threat-opponent x centralization | 2.695  | .101 | ---   |
| threat-opponent x awareness | 1.889  | .169 | ---   |
| threat-opponent x time | 7.316* | .007 | ---   |
| centralization | 1.618  | .203 | ---   |
| awareness | 3.027  | .082 | ---   |
| time | 70.920* | .001 | .015 |
| threat-opponent | 484.777* | .001 | .105 |

| **Specificity** |         |      |       |
| threat-opponent x time x awareness x centralization | 2.432  | .119 | ---   |
| time x awareness x centralization | 1.604  | .205 | ---   |
| threat-opponent x awareness x centralization | 1.450  | .228 | ---   |
| threat-opponent x time x centralization | 4.285* | .038 | ---   |
| threat-opponent x time x awareness | 0.001  | .977 | ---   |
| awareness x centralization | 2.659  | .103 | ---   |
| time x centralization | 0.956  | .329 | ---   |
| time x awareness | 0.000  | .993 | ---   |
| threat-opponent x centralization | 17.282* | .001 | ---   |
| threat-opponent x awareness | 21.016* | .001 | ---   |
| threat-opponent x time | 16.551* | .001 | ---   |
| centralization | 70.446* | .001 | ---   |
| awareness | 0.262  | .608 | ---   |
| time | 58.014* | .001 | .013 |
| threat-opponent | 262.642* | .001 | .059 |

* P ≤ .05

a Less than one percent of the variance explained by this main effect or interaction effect.
cooperation. As in the three-way analysis of variance, short decision
time leads to hostile responses; when faced with extended decision
time, policy-makers tend to respond cooperatively. Under conditions
of surprise, behavior tends to be more hostile. Finally, centraliza-
tion of authority is inversely related to hostility. When the bureau-
cratic process is centralized (as opposed to decentralized), decision-
makers react with a low level of hostility (high level of cooperation).
Decentralization increases the probability of hostile responses.
Several reasons may be suggested for this pattern. It might be argued
that responsibility for policies which are formulated under conditions
of centralized authority is easier to locate than responsibility for
policies formulated under conditions of decentralized authority. In
most societies norms against conflictful behavior may in fact discour-
age decision-makers from initiating overtly hostile responses, other
things being equal. An alternative explanation may be the fact that
events occurring in the context of ongoing military conflicts exhibit
both a high level of hostility and a decentralized policy-making
process. Consequently, decentralized authority structures appear to
be related to hostile responses. The two statistically significant
first order interactions for hostility-cooperation are identical to
those in the three-way analysis. Under conditions of opportunity and
anticipation, a high degree of cooperation seems to be expressed.
Furthermore, the level of hostility characterizing responses also
seems to be a function of the interaction of threat and short decision
time.

Results of the four-way analysis of variance for commitment are
less encouraging. Only two main effects are statistically significant--threat-opportunity and decision time. The effects of awareness and centralization of authority fail to achieve significance. Opportunity as compared with threatening situations encourage resource commitment. Short decision time decreases the probability of resource commitment. The potential for such commitment increases, however, when policymakers perceive an extended time in which to make a decision. Degree of centralization of authority is not related to level of resource commitment. How might we explain this result? While higher level bureaucrats are charged with responsibility for committing resources, the implementation of these commitments generally requires action by lower level bureaucrats. Thus actions involving resource commitment may be taken throughout the bureaucracy. The only interaction effect achieving significance for the commitment dimension is threat-opportunity and decision time. Opportunity situations characterized by extended decision time elicit the highest levels of resource commitment.

Results for the specificity dimension reveal the greatest total number of statistically significant effects--main and interaction. Three main effects (threat-opportunity, centralization of authority, and decision time), three first order interactions (threat-opportunity and centralization, threat-opportunity and awareness, and threat-opportunity and decision time), and one second-order interaction (threat-opportunity and decision time and centralization of authority) are statistically significant. Threatening as compared with opportunity situations encourage generalized responses. When presented with
short decision time, policy-makers react with generalized behavior; extended decision time, in comparison, allows development of highly specific responses. When decision-making authority is centralized, responses tend to be highly specific. Low level bureaucrats normally function according to standard operating procedures. Given this standardization, their responses to situations tend to be highly generalized. Individuals at higher authority levels, on the other hand are less likely to be constrained by such procedures and are more likely to react specifically to situations which they confront.

Threat-opportunity and centralization of authority represent a statistically significant interaction for specificity. When faced with a threat, policy-makers operating within the context of a decentralized in comparison to a centralized decision-making process respond with generalized behavior. Why might we expect this to be the case? As noted above, a decentralized authority structure increases the probability of generalized responses. When confronted with a threatening situation, lower level bureaucrats might be expected to react with behavior even more general than usual. General responses keep future options open and make the situation more flexible. If the threat is especially severe, higher level bureaucrats will eventually become directly involved in the decision-making process. By responding in general terms, lower level bureaucrats are maintaining flexibility for future decisions. Thus we might expect behavior in a threatening situation to be more generalized when the authority structure is decentralized. The threat-opportunity and awareness interaction also achieves significance. When decision-makers perceive an
opportunity and, in addition, have anticipated the situation, foreign policy behavior tends to be specific. Finally, a relationship exists between threat-opportunity and decision time. Decision-makers respond with specific actions when confronted with an opportunity and extended decision time. The second order interaction of threat-opportunity, decision time, and centralization of authority is also significant. Conditions of threat, short decision time, and a decentralized authority structure interact to produce highly generalized behavior.

What, in general, do the results of this four-way analysis of variance tell us about the relationship among situational and bureaucratic process (centralization of authority) variables? Although no interaction effects for these two variable clusters are statistically significant for the hostility-cooperation and commitment dimensions, results for the specificity dimension are significant. In particular, one first order and one second order interaction effect involving both situational and bureaucratic process variables are significant. In the first instance, the results suggest a relationship between threat and decentralization. Secondly, these results reveal a relationship among threat, short decision time, and decentralization. In both instances the interaction effects produce generalized foreign policy responses.

Although our results suggest the existence of a relationship among situational and bureaucratic process variables, the results indicate an extremely weak relationship. Table 23 reports the \( \eta^2 \) for each main effect and interaction effect. Similar to the results of the three-way analysis of variance, only the main effects of
threat-opportunity and decision time explain one percent or more of the variance in the commitment or specificity dimension. Threat-opportunity, decision time, and centralization of authority explain at least one percent of the variance in hostility-cooperation, but with the exception of threat-opportunity these percentages remain exceedingly small. None of the statistically significant interaction effects explains even one percent of the variance in a behavior dimension. Thus, although a relationship exists between situational and bureaucratic process variables, this relationship does not enable us to explain much of the variance in these foreign policy behavior dimensions.

Table 24 presents results of the four-way analysis of variance using threat-opportunity, decision time, awareness, and bureaucratic opposition as the four factors. Similar to the four-way analysis including centralization of authority as a factor, different main and interaction effects are statistically significant for the three behavior dimensions. In general, however, more effects are statistically significant using bureaucratic opposition than centralization of authority. Seven first order interactions, three second-order interactions, and a third-order interaction achieve a significance level of .05 or above. Main effects for decision time and threat-opportunity attain significance for all three foreign policy behavior dimensions. Because of differences in the significant interaction effects for the three behavior dimensions, we will adopt the same approach used in summarizing results of the first four-way analysis--each dimension will be discussed in turn along with the effects significant for that
Table 24

Four-Way Analysis of Variance Results for Individual Behavior Dimensions (Bureaucratic Opposition)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>F value</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>etc.²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hostility-Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opp x time x awareness x opposition</td>
<td>4.267*</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time x awareness x opposition</td>
<td>4.073*</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opp x awareness x opposition</td>
<td>2.072</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>threat-opp x time x opposition</td>
<td>3.238</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opp x time x awareness</td>
<td>0.853</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>awareness x opposition</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>.770</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time x opposition</td>
<td>13.111*</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time x awareness</td>
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<td>.558</td>
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<tr>
<td>threat-opp x opposition</td>
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<tr>
<td>threat-opp x awareness</td>
<td>10.863*</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opp x time</td>
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<td>.029</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opposition</td>
<td>35.087*</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>awareness</td>
<td>6.030*</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time</td>
<td>58.814*</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opp</td>
<td>719.010*</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opp x time x awareness x opposition</td>
<td>3.622</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time x awareness x opposition</td>
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<td>.023</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opp x awareness x opposition</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opp x time x opposition</td>
<td>6.100*</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opp x time x awareness</td>
<td>1.163</td>
<td>.279</td>
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<tr>
<td>awareness x opposition</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>.725</td>
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<td>time x opposition</td>
<td>2.430</td>
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<tr>
<td>time x awareness</td>
<td>0.968</td>
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<tr>
<td>threat-opp x opposition</td>
<td>26.167*</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat-opp x awareness</td>
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<td>.031</td>
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<tr>
<td>threat-opp x time</td>
<td>3.514</td>
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<td>awareness</td>
<td>1.431</td>
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<td>time</td>
<td>89.332*</td>
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<tr>
<td>threat-opp</td>
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<td>.001</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>threat-opp</td>
<td>286.572*</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.060</td>
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</table>

* p ≤ .05

a Less than one percent of the variance explained by this main effect or interaction effect.
particular dimension.

All four main effects are statistically significant for the hostility-cooperation dimension. When faced with a threat, policymakers respond with hostility. Conditions of short decision time elicit hostile responses, whereas extended decision time encourages cooperation. Surprise situations are likely to elicit hostile rather than cooperative reactions. The existence of bureaucratic opposition leads to cooperative rather than hostile behavior. In the absence of opposition, the probability increases that responses will be hostile. This seems to be a reasonable conclusion given our knowledge of bureaucratic politics. When bureaucratic opposition exists the likelihood of compromise increases. Representatives of bureaucracies involved in the decision-making process tend to moderate their views under these conditions. Because the resulting foreign policy action most probably represents a compromise among bureaucratic participants, it is unlikely that the response will exhibit a high level of hostility. Moderation of positions leads to accommodative and thus generally more cooperative responses. In the absence of opposition, on the other hand, the probability of moderation and, therefore, accommodative behavior decreases. Thus the resulting foreign policy behavior may often be more hostile.

Three first-order interaction effects are also statistically significant for the hostility-cooperation dimension. Under conditions of opportunity, policymakers react more cooperatively if they have an extended rather than a short period of time in which to make a decision. A perceived opportunity which is anticipated also leads to cooperative responses by decision-makers. Thirdly, the interaction of decision
time and opposition suggests that in periods of extended time and in the presence of bureaucratic opposition, foreign policy behavior will be cooperative. When policy-makers have an extended period of time in which to make a decision, they tend to be influenced to a greater extent by bureaucratic politics considerations. The consensus-building process is more likely to operate effectively in periods of extended time. Bargains can be made and persuasion attempts can be initiated more effectively if policy-makers have an extended period of time in which to act. Thus we might expect resulting behavior to be moderate and accommodative the more extended the period of decision time.

Unlike our results using centralization of authority as the fourth factor in the analysis of variance, using bureaucratic opposition two higher-order interactions are statistically significant for hostility-cooperation. The second-order interaction of extended decision time, anticipation, and bureaucratic opposition encourages extremely cooperative foreign policy responses. The arguments relating time and opposition have already been presented. Under these conditions, the effect of anticipation further increases the likelihood of a cooperative reaction. If the prior situation is anticipated rather than surprising, the likelihood of developing bureaucratic opposition increases. This additional effect encourages responses which are still more moderate and accommodative. Finally, the third-order interaction of opportunity, extended time, anticipation, and bureaucratic opposition is highly significant. The arguments previously discussed apply here as well. Moreover, the impact of an opportunity as compared with a threatening situation enters as a significant
factor. When confronted with an opportunity, policy-makers perceive an occasion to move toward their goals. Bureaucratic politics analyses suggest these goals may be personal and organizational, as well as national (Allison, 1971; Allison and Halperin, 1972). Under these conditions, we might expect more bargaining and negotiation than usual. Cooperative, moderated responses are, therefore, most likely in situations of opportunity, extended time, and awareness which, at the same time, encourage bureaucratic opposition.

Results of the four-way analysis of variance for commitment are less encouraging than the results for hostility-cooperation. Fewer effects, whether main or interaction, attain statistical significance. In this case, the only main effects are those attributed to threat-opportunity and decision time. When faced with a threatening situation, policy-makers respond with hostility. Short decision time decreases the probability of large-scale resource commitment, whereas extended time often permits such commitment and the preparations necessary for implementation. Unlike our findings concerning the hostility-cooperation dimension, neither awareness nor bureaucratic opposition significantly relate to this foreign policy dimension. Although bureaucratic opposition does predict cooperation, it tells us little concerning the level of resources which might be committed in any specific action.

Two first-order and two second-order interactions are statistically significant, however, and three of these interactions involve the bureaucratic opposition variable. Thus although opposition taken alone is not significantly related to commitment, the interaction of
opposition and the situational dimensions is statistically significant. First, perception of an opportunity and anticipation of the situation encourage commitment. Decision-makers are also more likely to commit resources when faced with an opportunity if bureaucratic opposition also exists. At first glance, this latter relationship may not seem reasonable. If bureaucratic opposition exists, it might be argued, policy-makers would be less able to effectively commit resources. The presence of opposition would, in any event, make implementation of such a commitment extremely difficult. It should be recalled from Chapter IV, however, that bureaucratic opposition was defined operationally as the participation of at least one bureaucratic representative. If effective implementation of a commitment decision requires participation by at least one bureaucratic representative, then we might expect the probability of commitment to increase under conditions of opportunity when such "opposition" or participation occurs. Therefore, upon close analysis this first-order interaction does not appear unreasonable.

Similar arguments support the second-order interaction among opportunity, extended decision time, and bureaucratic opposition. The probability of resource commitment increases with opportunity and extended decision time. Bureaucratic opposition further increases this probability, for reasons explained above. The existence of opposition (or, participation) supports implementation of commitment decisions. Policy-makers are more likely to make commitment decisions, other things being equal, the more extensive are existing mechanisms for implementing these decisions. Thus we would expect a greater
probability of resource commitment under these conditions.

Finally, in terms of the second-order interaction among decision time, awareness and bureaucratic opposition, perceptions of extended time, an anticipated situation, and the existence of bureaucratic opposition encourage high levels of resource commitment. Here, again, the interactive effects of time and awareness increase the probability of resource commitment. When faced with these conditions, decision-makers engage in even higher levels of resource commitment if at the same time bureaucratic opposition exists. As we have argued, this opposition supports implementation of resource commitment decisions.

Our results for the specificity behavior dimension are least encouraging of the three. Fewer effects are statistically significant here than for either of the other two behavioral dimensions. Initially, three main effects are statistically significant—threat-opportunity, decision time, and bureaucratic opposition. Threatening situations elicit general responses. Short decision time is associated with general foreign policy actions; extended decision time often leads to more specific responses. Surprisingly, bureaucratic opposition seems to encourage highly specific behavior. Intuitively, we would expect bureaucratic opposition to result in generalized behavior. If policymakers are attempting to achieve a consensus on the "lowest common denominator" policy, general rather than specific behavior would more likely meet this requirement. But an alternative argument can be suggested. We assume bureaucratic participants have conflicting objectives and interests regarding the substance of foreign policy
behavior. Highly specific policy may be functional under these conditions. Specific, limited policies tend to satisfy one set of bureaucratic participants without infringing on areas of interest to other participants. The interest of participants not achieving their goals on this issue will most likely be considered when the next issue or situation arises. Thus opposition within the bureaucratic process can most easily be controlled through highly specific, limited foreign policy responses. The incremental nature of policy-making makes the formulation of broad, comprehensive policy responses a difficult task.

Only two interaction effects are statistically significant for the specificity dimension, and neither interaction involves bureaucratic opposition. When confronted with an opportunity, decision-makers' responses are more specific the longer the period of available decision time. Furthermore, when decision-makers are faced with an opportunity, their responses are more likely to be specific if, at the same time, the situation was anticipated. Unlike our results for the hostility-cooperation and resource commitment dimensions, no second-or third-order interactions are significant for the specificity dimension.

What do the results of this four-way analysis of variance suggest regarding the relationship between situational variables and the bureaucratic process (bureaucratic opposition)? None of the interaction effects involving bureaucratic opposition are significant for the specificity behavior dimension. Several interaction effects are statistically significant, however, for the hostility-cooperation and commitment dimensions. In particular, extended decision time and
bureaucratic opposition interact, increasing the probability of cooperative behavior under these conditions. One first-order and two second-order interactions involving bureaucratic opposition are statistically significant for the commitment behavior dimension. Thus we can conclude that a relationship does exist between the bureaucratic process (bureaucratic opposition) and situational variables.

But how can we evaluate the strength of this general relationship? Column three of Table 24 reports the $\eta^2$ for each main effect and interaction effect. The results are not very encouraging. Only the main effects of threat-opportunity and decision time explain one percent or more of the variance in any behavioral dimension. No other main effects or interaction effects explain even one percent of the variance in any behavioral dimension.

What general conclusions regarding the relationship between situational and bureaucratic process variables can we draw from the results of these four-way analyses of variance? Do situational and bureaucratic variables interact? Does the nature of interaction vary with the behavioral dimension? As an initial observation, it seems clear that interaction effects exist. A total of three first-order, four second-order, and one third-order interaction, involving one of the bureaucratic process dimensions are statistically significant. Differences exist, however, between the two bureaucratic process dimensions. Fewer interactions are statistically significant for centralization of authority (2) than for bureaucratic opposition (6). Interestingly, the interactions involving centralization of authority both relate to the specificity dimension of behavior. The interactions
involving bureaucratic opposition, in comparison, relate to hostility-cooperation (3) or commitment (3), but not to specificity. This suggests that although both bureaucratic process variables are related to foreign policy behavior, each variable may explain distinct dimensions of that behavior.

On the other hand, none of the interactions between situational variables and characteristics of the bureaucratic process explain more than one percent of the variance in any foreign policy behavior dimension. Thus we come to similar conclusions on the basis of the results from the two four-way analyses of variance. Although main effects and interaction effects attain statistical significance, these effects—with the possible exception of threat-opportunity—explain extremely small proportions of the variance in the foreign policy behavior dimensions. It is to discussion of the implications of these results for the direct and indirect models of situational influence that we now turn.

Direct and Indirect Models of Situational Influence: An Evaluation

In Chapter I we introduced two models of situational influence on foreign policy. The direct model asserted situational variables have a direct and unmediated impact on both the bureaucratic process and foreign policy behavior. The indirect model, on the other hand, hypothesized situational variables affect foreign policy behavior only through their impact on characteristics of the bureaucratic process. These two models were presented as alternative situational explanations of foreign policy. Results of the analyses performed in this study now allow us to evaluate these models.
What do our findings suggest about the relationship between situational variables and foreign policy? The results of the t-tests reported in Chapter V indicate there is indeed a statistically significant relationship between individual situational dimensions and foreign policy behavior. When faced with a threat (as compared with an opportunity) policy-makers often initiate hostile responses, engage in little commitment of resources and react generally. Short (as compared with extended) decision time increases the probability of hostile behavior, low commitment, and low specificity. Finally, situations coming as a surprise (as compared with anticipation) to decision-makers increase the likelihood of hostility, low commitment, and low specificity. Viewing all three behavior dimensions collectively, threat-opportunity explains a greater percentage of the variance in each dimension than decision time and awareness, respectively. In no case, however, do we explain a large proportion of the variance in any behavior dimension by any situational dimension. Thus we conclude that although situational influences increase the probability of certain kinds of behavior, they are by no means sufficient to predict that behavior.

This question may also be addressed from the perspective of situational types, as opposed to simply the individual situational dimensions. Our results here also tend to support the existence of a relationship between situation and foreign policy. In Chapter V we derived rankings for the eight situational types on all three behavior dimensions. Earlier in this chapter we presented rankings obtained from the three-way analysis of variance and compared the expected and
observed rankings by means of the Spearman rank order correlation coefficient. The correlations for hostility-cooperation (.95), commitment (.90), and specificity (.69) are all relatively high. We can conclude from this that the individual situational dimensions may be meaningfully combined to form situational types, and that these types successfully differentiate kinds of foreign policy behavior. As with the results of the t-tests, we are most successful in terms of the hostility-cooperation dimension.

Finally, results of the three-way analysis of variance support the existence of a relationship between situational variables and foreign policy. Both main effects and interaction effects are statistically significant for the three foreign policy behavior dimensions. When faced with a threatening situation, policy-makers are likely to engage in hostile, low commitment, generalized responses. Short decision time increases the probability of hostile behavior, involving a low level of commitment, and low specificity. The tendency toward hostile reactions increases in surprise situations. Moreover, one first-order interaction (threat-opportunity and awareness) is significant for all three behavior dimensions. No second-order interactions attain statistical significance. However, there does seem to be a relationship between situational variables and foreign policy. Results of the t-tests, rank order correlation, and three-way analysis of variance point to similar conclusions—although situational variables do have an impact on foreign policy, the extent of that impact (in terms of percent variance explained) is limited. On the basis of these results we can evaluate the direct and indirect models of situational
influence.

Figure 5 illustrates the direct and indirect models of situational influence. Three linkages are represented by the two models: 1) situation → foreign policy, 2) bureaucratic process → foreign policy, and 3) situation → bureaucratic process. For the direct model to be valid linkage one must be supported. If linkages two and three are supported, then the indirect model of situational influence more accurately describes foreign policy behavior. Results of the two four-way analyses of variance permit us to evaluate the direct and indirect models of situational influence.

First, we conclude that linkage one is supported. For both four-way analyses of variance the main effects of threat-opportunity and decision time achieve statistical significance for hostility-cooperation, commitment, and specificity. Secondly, linkage two is also supported by our results. Main effects of centralization of authority are statistically significant for hostility-cooperation and specificity. Bureaucratic opposition effects are also statistically significant for hostility-cooperation and specificity dimensions. Bureaucratic process variables do not, however, significantly affect
commitment. Finally, linkage three is statistically significant. Three first-order, four second-order and one third-order interactions including both situational variables and bureaucratic process characteristics are significant for varying behavior dimensions.

If we examine these three linkages in terms of the percent variance explained, however, we come to different conclusions. That is, although all three linkages are statistically significant, all three are not necessarily substantively significant. Linkage one is obviously significant in a substantive sense. Threat-opportunity explains the largest percent of the variance in all three behavior dimensions. Using this criterion, linkage two is not significant. No main effects for the two bureaucratic process characteristics explain more than one percent of the variance in any behavior dimension. Thus we fail to uncover a significant relationship between the bureaucratic process (defined in terms of the degree of centralization of authority and the level of bureaucratic opposition) and foreign policy behavior. Although we cannot evaluate directly the substantive significance of linkage three, we can make several comments on the basis of our results. Because no interactions involving the bureaucratic process characteristics and the situational dimensions explain more than one percent of the variance in any behavior dimension, we conclude no substantively significant interaction effects exist.

What bearing do these results have on the utility of the direct and indirect models of situational influence? In short, although all three linkages are statistically significant only one linkage explains more than one percent of the variance in behavior. Threat-opportunity
explains 14%, 12%, and 6% of the variance in hostility-cooperation, commitment and specificity, respectively. Consequently, the direct model of situational influence seems clearly more appropriate here. That is, although statistically significant relationships exist between the bureaucratic process and foreign policy, and statistically significant interaction effects exist between situational dimensions and bureaucratic process characteristics, these relationships explain little of the variance in any foreign policy dimension. What little variance is explained can be attributed to the impact of situational variables, particularly threat-opportunity.

A note of caution should be introduced at this point, however. These results are, of course, highly tentative, and represent a preliminary attempt to analyze the complex relationships between situation and foreign policy. Because only one of our situational variables explains more than one percent of the variance in any behavior dimension, we cannot conclude that other situational variables would not explain more of the variance in behavior. Similarly, the fact that the two bureaucratic process characteristics used in this study explain less than one percent of the variance in behavior does not indicate that other bureaucratic process characteristics would not explain more of the variance. Stated differently, the results reported here support the direct model of situational influence as that model has been operationalized. It is to discussion of these issues and the direction of future research that we turn in the concluding chapter.
Lindquist (1953) and Hays (1963). The N size for this analysis was 4353 events. The PSTAT Manova program was used for the three and four-way analyses.

Stephen Salmore (1972) has used $\eta$ and $\eta^2$ in his analysis of Rosenau's genotypes. For discussions of $\eta$ see Salmore (1972) and Kerlinger (1964).

Differences in the values of $\eta^2$ and $w^2$ reported in Chapter V for the main effects of threat-opportunity, decision time and awareness can be expected. $w^2$ represents an approximation of the percent variance explained, calculated from t-values (Hays, 1963). $\eta^2$ is a more accurate interpretation of the percent variance explained.

The N sizes for these four-way analyses of variance differ slightly from the N size for the three-way analysis. This is due to the existence of missing data on the bureaucratic process variables and to the fact that the data file was updated after the initial analyses were performed. The differences are by no means significant, and do not affect the direction of our findings. These differences do, however, result in slightly different F values for the situational dimensions. In the four-way analysis of variance with centralization of authority as the fourth factor, $N = 4355$ events.

For this analysis, using bureaucratic opposition as the fourth factor, $N = 4345$ events.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Three general questions now need to be addressed. First, have we accomplished our original purposes in doing this analysis? Second, what questions remain to be asked? Third, what direction should our future research take? Each of these issues will be discussed in turn.

Our original aims as expressed in the Introduction were four. In the first place, one goal was to examine the impact of situational variables on foreign policy behavior. For the purpose of this study three situational (threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness) and three behavioral (hostility-cooperation, commitment, and specificity) variables were selected. We sought to uncover relationships between each of the situational variables and each behavior dimension. Evaluating two alternative models of situational influence provided a second focus for this research. Direct and indirect models of situational influence were proposed. A third aim was to evaluate the theoretical utility of a specific situational typology proposed by Charles Hermann. Composed of three situational dimensions (threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness), this typology was illustrated as a cube within which stimuli for foreign policy responses could be located. The eight situational types were hypothesized to result in varying decision processes and varying foreign policy behavior. Finally, one of the purposes of this study was to evaluate
the utility of international event data in general, and in particular
data collected by the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations
(CREON) project, for the study of situational influences on foreign
policy. To what extent have we addressed these aims?

What has this research contributed to an understanding of the
relationship between situational variables and foreign policy behavior?
In brief, we came to three major conclusions. First, foreign policy
behavior is influenced by decision-makers' perceptions of the situation
with which they are confronted. Threat-opportunity, decision time, and
awareness are significantly related, as independent dimensions, to
hostility-cooperation, commitment, and specificity. Threat-opportunity
tends to be more important than decision time and awareness (in terms
of the percentage of variance explained) in explaining foreign policy
behavior.

Although significant relationships do exist between situational
variables and foreign policy behavior, knowledge of these variables
in and of themselves is not sufficient to predict foreign policy
behavior at any point in time. In no case do any of the situational
dimensions explain more than 14% of the variance in a behavior dimen-
sion. Thus our conclusion requires qualification. Situational
qualities tend or influence the decision process and resulting foreign
policy behavior in specific directions; variations in these qualities
increase the probability of certain responses, but do not in and of
themselves cause these responses. In short, although situational
variables are related to foreign policy behavior, their influence is
not sufficiently strong to preclude analyses of other kinds of
variables.

A second indicator of our success in achieving the first purpose can be taken from results of the multivariate analyses. We found statistically significant first-order interactions among threat-opportunity and awareness, and threat-opportunity and decision time for all three behavior dimensions. Furthermore, the four-way analyses of variance indicate statistically significant interactions (both first and second order) among situational dimensions and characteristics of the bureaucratic process. Our second conclusion, then, asserts the existence of interactions among situational variables in explanations of foreign policy behavior. And our final conclusion suggests the existence of interaction effects among situational variables and characteristics of the bureaucratic process. On the other hand, only one situational variable—threat-opportunity—explains more than one percent of the variance in any foreign policy dimension. The interaction effects, although statistically significant, fail to explain more than one percent of the variance in behavior. Thus other variables obviously are influential.

How does the research described here move beyond most studies concerning situational influences on foreign policy? First, most studies focus on one situational variable ("threat" is a popular choice). One significant difference in this research is the inclusion of three situational variables—threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness. More than this, we have systematically examined interaction effects among the three situational variables. Thirdly, we have attempted to incorporate concepts from another possible explanation of
foreign policy in a multivariate analysis of variance. Centralization of authority and bureaucratic opposition were selected to represent theoretically important characteristics of the bureaucratic process. Although many studies of situational influence include bureaucratic process variables, rarely are these variables used as explanatory factors. Often bureaucratic process variables serve as dependent variables in these analyses, rather than as independent or intervening variables. Finally, we have attempted to define a specificity dimension of foreign policy behavior. Instead of relying on the two behavior dimensions most often adopted--commitment (or, inverse commitment) and affect, we have chosen for theoretical reasons to include specificity as a third dimension. Thus aim one seems to have been achieved. The research has contributed to understanding the impact of situational factors on foreign policy and, at the same time, has moved beyond most other studies of the problem.

Our second aim was to evaluate two alternative models of situational influence. The direct model asserts situational variables exert a direct and independent influence on foreign policy behavior. In contrast, the indirect model asserts situational factors influence foreign policy solely through their impact on the bureaucratic process. The indirect model, therefore, denies the direct linkage between situational variables and foreign policy. The results of our analyses led us to conclude that the direct model best describes the relationship between situation and foreign policy.

How useful is the eight-fold situational typology proposed by Charles Hermann? Answering this question provided a third focus for
our research. How can we evaluate the utility of the typology? At the most basic level, if the eight situational types enable us to differentiate foreign policy behavior described in terms of hostility-cooperation, commitment, and specificity, then the typology is useful. Put in a slightly different way, if knowing what type of situation confronts decision-makers allows us to predict their behavior, then the typology has utility. The results of our analysis allow us to give a qualified affirmative response to this question. Comparison of expected and observed rankings of the eight situational types on the three behavior dimensions resulted in high correlations. Mean scores for the eight types on the three dimensions were significantly different. On the other hand, results of the three-way analysis of variance indicate no second-order interaction effects. The main effect of decision time and the first-order interaction effects of threat-opportunity and awareness, and threat-opportunity and decision time were statistically significant, but failed to explain more than one percent of the variance in any behavior dimension. In sum, the successful rank comparisons do indicate the utility of the typology. The absence of second-order interaction effects leads us to qualify our judgment concerning the typology's utility.

Our final aim requires evaluation of the utility of event data in the study of situational influences on foreign policy. In the past several years a wide variety of studies have emerged using event data. Proponents of event data research have addressed numerous substantive issues in comparative politics and international relations. Are there any characteristics of this study which set it apart from most
others using event data? Most importantly, in this analysis we have attempted to use event data to define not only dimensions of foreign policy behavior, but also dimensions of the situation confronting decision-makers and characteristics of the bureaucratic process. Many event data studies rely on aggregate data of various types to define their independent and intervening variables. Using the event as the unit of analysis, we have tried to define situational and bureaucratic process factors in terms of information available for that particular event.

We think our efforts generally have been successful. Reliability coefficients for all three situational variables are remarkably high, especially given the highly subjective nature of the coding categories. (The lowest reliability coefficient is for awareness—.88.) Reliabilities for indicators of the bureaucratic process characteristics are also high (.85 for higher authority needed and .91 for internal decision unit). Our confidence in the reliability of the coding, then, is high. The issue of validity was also addressed. Do the data seem reasonable given our knowledge of the state of the international system over the ten year period? After examining a variety of distributions in Chapter IV we concluded that they do at least exhibit a high degree of face validity. In short, event data do appear to successfully tap situational and bureaucratic process dimensions.

But what problems arise in using event data to study situational influences on foreign policy? Two issues come immediately to mind. First, as we discussed in Chapters I and IV, it may be more useful theoretically to describe situational variables in terms of a larger
context rather than by referencing unique events. When viewed from this perspective, one of the main advantages of event data becomes a problem. Events allow us to describe foreign policy as discrete, unaggregated actions. This is obviously an advantage to the researcher wishing to use quantitative techniques. On the other hand, in concentrating on discrete units, aspects of the context within which those units exist tend to be ignored. And the simple aggregation of events over time may not be the best solution to the problem. If the context is lost when events are initially coded, then simple aggregation will not necessarily replace the lost information.

In general, by "context" we mean the milieu within which decisions are made and actions are taken. More specifically, context includes the history of relations between nations as well as events occurring at the same time in the domestic political arena. Using the event as the unit of analysis, the conceptual and operational development of contextual variables such as the current level of domestic violence or the extent of past violent (or cooperative) interaction with another nation would permit us to tap aspects of this important dimension. But a more difficult problem must also be addressed. That is, how can we take into account the influence of contextual factors on the substantive coding of other variables? For example, how can we determine the level of threat in any specific foreign policy behavior? The history of relations between two nations obviously influences the level of threat perceived in a specific action. If two nations have distrusted each other historically, then the slightest unfavorable cue will be interpreted as threatening. If, on the other hand, two nations
interact within the context of a long history of cooperative exchanges, then the likelihood decreases the action will be interpreted as a threat. Most of our indicators of threat or hostility fail to adequately include the notion of context. Thus we may be losing information concerning the multi-dimensionality of behavior by neglecting a broader conceptualization of context.

It seems obvious the kinds of contextual variables mentioned above might significantly affect foreign policy behavior. If a nation is exposed to severe internal disruptions, then that nation's ability to carry on an effective foreign policy may be curtailed. Under certain conditions, domestic conflict can be linked to foreign conflict behavior (Wilkenfeld, 1968). Furthermore, if two nations have traditionally solved their disputes through diplomatic channels, then it is unlikely that they will resort to the use of military force in a current situation. In sum, the broad context within which behavior occurs should be considered as a systematic influence on foreign policy responses.

A second problem is an outgrowth of the nature of the data source. The coding scheme allows situational variables to be coded from the perspective of the actor, the data source, or the coder. As we indicated in Chapter IV, the vast majority of situational variables were coded through use of coder inference decision rules. The absence of detailed information in Deadline Data results in the large proportion of "coder infers" decisions. The most significant consequence of this is that we are not getting as accurate a picture of decision-makers' perceptions as we might like. We are instead addressing the
question: what does the coder think the decision-maker thought about the situation? This may be less a problem with event data per se and more a problem of the nature of public news sources as opposed to governmental sources or personal papers and memoirs. In any case, use of event data coded from public sources does restrict the usefulness of such data in the study of situational influences on foreign policy.

In general, however, this study seems to have accomplished its initial aims. Our analysis has enabled us to suggest relationships between situational factors and foreign policy. Moreover, we have evaluated two alternative models of situational influence and have suggested a direct model more accurately describes the relationships among situation, the bureaucratic process, and foreign policy. The eight-fold situational typology suggested by Charles Hermann does appear to be useful, although further research remains to be done to evaluate the extent of that usefulness. Finally, event data have been successfully employed to study situational and bureaucratic process dimensions, although here too further research remains to be done.

Interestingly, our results support analyses done by Charles Hermann (1972b) using simulation techniques. In that study, Hermann (1972b: 207) found a multivariate conceptualization of crisis (high threat, short decision time, surprise) less successful than the independent dimension of time or the combination of threat and time dimensions in explaining variations in the decision-making process. Focusing on foreign policy behavior, we came to similar conclusions. The eight-fold situational typology is not as successful as we would have predicted. Independent dimensions of threat-opportunity and decision
time, and the interactions of threat-opportunity and time, and threat-opportunity and awareness are related to several foreign policy behavior dimensions. Because we have come to similar conclusions using different research methods, we are more confident of the validity of our results. This, in our view, marks a significant contribution of the study.

Where do we go from here? Two general areas of future research await our efforts: 1) methodological issues, and 2) theoretical development. Each general area will be discussed separately.

A number of methodological questions remain to be answered. As we have indicated, even though our inter-coder reliabilities for the situational variables were high, only the question of face validity was addressed. The validity issue remains a significant problem, and studies establishing concurrent and predictive validity remain to be done. Furthermore, widespread missing data on situational variables points up a second area of concern. Only a subset (just under one-half) of the total number of events in the CREON data set could be used in this analysis, because only that subset had complete data on the three situational variables. This suggests one of the problems involved in using news chronologies as sources of information regarding situational factors. Additional studies need to be carried out to evaluate the utility of other kinds of data sources. Such sources as diplomatic histories, memoirs, and personal papers may provide more complete data on situational factors.

Another methodological problem (perhaps better described as a limitation) arises from the three-month sampling technique which
determines the time frame for the CREON data. Although it is obviously advantageous to have data extended over a ten year period, continuous data over a shorter period of time would permit alternative models and the use of other statistical techniques. For example, time series analysis could be performed if the data extended over a period of one or two years. One avenue of future research, then, would require coding events for the 35 CREON nations for the missing nine-month segments for each year. Indeed, this represents an enormous task. A short-term solution might be to select one or two nations and completely code events for those countries.

The necessity for theoretical development in the comparative study of foreign policy has often been argued. Less often have students of international politics attempted to practice what they preach. Emphasis at this stage on theoretical development in the analysis of situational influences is especially crucial. As we indicated in the Introduction to this study, most discussions of situational influences on foreign policy are noticeably lacking in conceptual rigor. In what direction should we now proceed?

First, we will argue more attention needs to be paid to the concept of foreign policy. Rather than remaining content to define foreign policy as foreign policy behavior or events, students of foreign policy should think in terms of policy as a developmental concept. And this to us means more than simply aggregating events. The goals underlying foreign policy actions should be emphasized. Although factor analysis and related techniques have suggested two major dimensions of foreign policy behavior, we should not be content to allow such methods to
exclusively define our substantive notion of foreign policy. In this study we have moved a small step in this direction by including a specificity dimension, even though such a dimension does not appear in the results of most factor analyses of event data collections.

But more than this is required. The sum of all empirically identifiable dimensions may not provide us with a theoretically useful definition of foreign policy. To say that behavior is multi-dimensional and to list a variety of dimensions does not tell us what that behavior is in an important sense. Rather, we end up providing numerous independent ways of classifying that behavior. We need to begin looking at behavior from the top down, rather than from the bottom up. Foreign policy behavior seems inextricably linked to goals, and this fact may provide a profitable avenue for future research. In our view, foreign policy describes both the goals established by decision-makers and the means (actions) employed to achieve those goals. By adopting this perspective we are not implying that a "rational" model necessarily describes the decision-making process. Policy-makers are concerned with personal and organizational as well as national goals. What we are suggesting is that decision-makers engage in purposive behavior, and that examination of those purposes may tell us a great deal about the nature of foreign policy.

By no means does this suggest empirical research in general and the use of international event data in particular have been in vain. Empirical studies have generated important theoretical insights concerning foreign policy. But perhaps the time has come for us to step back from the data and reexamine our findings in the context of more
traditional discussions of foreign policy. The gap between theoretical and empirical descriptions of foreign policy is great, and that gap will not be closed if we simply continue to generate empirical analyses.

A second area requiring more theoretical efforts concerns the definition of situational variables. In this study we have focused on three situational variables—threat-opportunity, decision time, and awareness. Given the definition of situational variables elaborated in Chapter I, many other variables may be termed situational. Delineation of other situational variables and the interrelation of such variables remains a significant theoretical issue. In fact, variables other than the three selected here might be even more important in explaining foreign policy.

One possible approach might be to formulate more general situational dimensions of which these three are examples. We have, in fact, made an initial attempt to do precisely this. Three such dimensions are situational structure, affect, and intensity. By situational structure we mean the degree of ambiguity or clarity present in behavioral cues. The more structured the situation, the more formal the relationship established between two groups of decision-makers, and the greater the probability of expected demands and responses from both sides. Awareness taps this structural dimension. In general, the more anticipated the situation, the more structured the situation. Conditions of surprise tend to be related to ambiguity. Situational affect refers to the favorable or unfavorable impact of behavior on a nation's goals or objectives. If the situation has a favorable impact on goals, then we can attribute positive affect. A situation which has an unfavorable
impact is characterized by negative affect. Threatening situations represent negative affect; opportunities are generally positive affect situations. By intensity we mean the extent of pressure to respond. When confronted with an event to which an immediate response must be formulated, policy-makers face an intense situation. Conditions of short decision time often reflect intense situations. Conceptualizing situational variables in terms of dimensions such as these encourages development of a more general perspective within which a variety of more specific situational dimensions can be located. By adopting this approach, we can be more certain that the specific situational variables we elect to study are theoretically related to one another.

Perhaps the most important area for theoretical development involves the elaboration of multivariate explanations of foreign policy behavior. This study contributes to that development in two ways. First, we have included a number of situational variables and have attempted to describe the interactions among these variables. Secondly, and even more importantly, we have included bureaucratic process variables in our analyses and have described the interactions among situational and bureaucratic process dimensions.

Numerous alternative explanations of foreign policy can be found in the literature. Policy is variously attributed to personality characteristics of political leaders, aspects of the political regime, national attributes, situational factors, and the bureaucratic process, to suggest just a few. But most of these explanations remain alternative explanations. Rarely do we find a study which attempts to include concepts from two or more models as explanatory variables. Most often
one theoretical approach is presented and its propositions justified assuming "other things being equal." But, as we all know, other things rarely tend to be equal in the real world. Consequently, in one sense we need to become more eclectic and less specialized in our theorizing. At the same time our models should be no less rigorous. The conditions under which relationships hold should be made explicit.

Here, again, much more needs to be done. Our ultimate goal should be the integration of a number of alternative explanations of foreign policy. What requirements must be met before such a goal can be achieved? At the very least, the alternative perspectives must share some common assumptions and definitions. Successful integration cannot occur if the models are based on contradictory assumptions or definitions. Each model need not share exactly the same assumptions and definitions. It is sufficient that the assumptions and definitions be complementary as opposed to contradictory. How can we evaluate the assumptions and definitions introduced in Chapter I? Do other theoretical perspectives share any of these assumptions and definitions? Two perspectives seem particularly close to the situational. The first perspective argues the importance of foreign policy decision-makers personal characteristics as influences on foreign policy behavior (M. Hermann, 1974b). The second perspective focuses on bureaucratic politics explanations of foreign policy behavior (C. Hermann, 1973). We think a considerable overlap exists between the assumptions and definitions set forth in Chapter I and many explicit or implicit assumptions which support the personal characteristic and bureaucratic politics perspectives.
In the first place, both the personal characteristic and bureaucratic politics perspectives share our definition of foreign policy: foreign policy represents decision-makers' attempts to influence other international actors. Thus all three perspectives spring from a more general decision-making approach to the study of foreign policy. Put simply, all three assume the decision-making process "matters" in the explanation of foreign policy. Moreover, we have suggested situational definitions reflect values, goals, and images of the decision-maker, the organizational context, and the nation as a unit. This assumption is obviously compatible with the personal characteristic and bureaucratic politics perspectives. Other assumptions and definitions introduced in Chapter I do not conflict with these perspectives. In short, the situational, bureaucratic, and personal characteristic perspectives seem especially suited to integration. Although every assumption and definition presented here is not necessary for the bureaucratic and personal characteristic perspectives, none of our assumptions directly conflict with assumptions relevant to these perspectives.

How, in general terms, might these three perspectives be integrated? What linkages among the perspectives can we identify? Figure 6 illustrates some tentative linkages. As we have described elsewhere (Brady, 1974), the behavior of policy-makers acting for Nation A creates a situation for Nation B's decision-makers. This situation directly affects individual decision-makers, the bureaucratic process, and the foreign policy behavior of Nation B. Furthermore, personal characteristics of individuals in Nation B influence both the definition
Figure 6: Suggested Integration of Situational, Bureaucratic Politics, and Personal Characteristic Perspectives
of the situation and the bureaucratic process within that nation. Finally, the bureaucratic process in Nation B directly influences that nation's foreign policy behavior. Nation B's behavior in turn creates a situation for Nation A, and the influence relationships are repeated for that nation. Thus the perspectives can be linked, at least at the general level.

Of course, these linkages are only preliminary, and many more refinements are needed. In particular, specific propositions need to be developed which express relationships among concepts traditionally viewed from separate perspectives. How, for example, does the nature of the situation influence individual stability? Do personal characteristics of decision-makers affect the informal bureaucratic channels which are established? In short, the development of specific linkages within this general framework should be a primary research task.

The ultimate utility of our research for policy-makers is highly dependent on our ability to think in terms of multivariate explanations of foreign policy. Because the policy-maker daily confronts situations in which other things are far from equal, our models need to be as explicit as possible. This does not mean that we should shift our research goals from the development of general models to the prediction of specific events. Rather, we need to make our models even more general, while at the same time even more explicit.

That we have chosen to frankly discuss the problems and/or limitations of this study does not mean we do not recognize its contributions. To the contrary, the analyses reported here have added to our knowledge of the impact of situational variables on foreign policy.
But our results have at the same time forced us to reexamine the initial theoretical formulation. Further elaboration of that formulation will undoubtedly lead to additional empirical analyses.
NOTES

CHAPTER VII

1 These studies were cited in Chapter II.

2 See the discussion of bureaucratic politics research in Chapter II.

3 Munton (1973), Salmore and Munton (1973), and Kegley (1973) find these dimensions.

4 An extensive bibliography of event data studies can be found in Burgess and Lawton (1973).

5 Warren Phillips suggested this description of the actual results of the coding procedure.

6 James N. Rosenau has consistently argued this point. See, in particular, Rosenau (1968).

7 This is not meant to suggest the comparative study of foreign policy is theoretically barren. For important initial steps toward theory-building, see Rosenau (1966) and Hermann (1972a).

8 See Brady (1974).

9 These perspectives are described in East (1974).

10 Figure 6 and this discussion are adapted from a related argument in Brady (1974).


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