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THE MASS COMMUNICATION ROLES OF THE REPUBLICAN
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DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Thomas Charles Sawyer, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1973

Reading Committee:
William R. Brown
James L. Golden
John J. Makay

Approved by

Adviser
Department of Communication
For Debbie
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VITA


1967 . . . . . . B.A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1967-1968 . . . Assistant to the Vice President, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1968 . . . . . . M.A., Journalism, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1968 . . . . . . Teaching Assistant, School of Journalism, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1969 . . . . . . Instructor and Faculty Adviser, Department of Journalism, University of Wisconsin Center System, Madison, Wisconsin

1970-1972 . . . Administrative Associate to Chairman, and Teaching Associate, Department of Communication, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio


1973 . . . . . . Minority Counsel, Sub-Committee on Communications and Power, United States House of Representatives, Congress of the United States of America
PUBLICATIONS


FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Political Communication

Studies in Communication Theory. Professor Jack Douglas

Studies in Rhetorical Theory. Professors James L. Golden and John J. Makay

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Introductory Rationale

The literature has highlighted certain emerging trends in the nature and ingredients of American political campaigning, many of which imply that the political organization is playing a more diminished role in political communication. These trends show that significant change in media technology, the message, the audience, and communicator-manager of mass campaigns has evolved over the past two decades.¹

As communication technology advanced and media emphases changed, television emerged as a pervasive medium, technical advances sped news reporting abilities, and data-processing sophistication facilitated more precise audience analysis and message-targeting. In addition, automated telephoning and mailing rendered "personal appeals" possible. Hence, many campaigners emphasized the use of technology, instead of the Party, to convey their message.²

Moreover, the form of the political message itself changed.³ Time requirements and evident audience attention patterns led to more shortened, simplified messages.⁴ Much
campaign communication became more visual. With news, entertainment, and advertising increasing competition for attention to political messages, the "pseudo-event" and "spot" commercial overshadowed the longer, formal speech as a diffusing means. Other "fashionable" formats (e.g., five- to thirty-minute panel or informal group conversations) emerged and faded.

Concurrently, ticket-splitting grew. More voters coalesced around centerist positions, and many appeared to judge candidates more in terms of their personal style than of their partisan labels.

Not only voter behavior was different. Some candidate communicators built recognition rapidly via media and did not have to rise to nomination by climbing the party hierarchy. And, as many politicians realized the value of media for disseminating their message widely, they became oriented to requirements of these channels in scheduling and speaking. The newer modes and media of campaigning brought increased expenses, and also the need for technicians who could understand and implement the more modern methodologies.

Hence, the management and organization of campaigns also shifted to some degree, with many managers and doers coming from an area of communication expertise instead of from party organizations. Rising costs; the sophistication needed for audience research, message production, media buying; and the candidates' perceptions of "the opposition's
doing it," all seemed to necessitate more involvement of "professional" campaign communicators. Some parties apparently lost the ability to raise needed money for all slated candidates, putting more burden on the ad hoc, transitory candidate organization to do so. In addition, more government financial restrictions became law and further contributed to campaigns being run by "Committees For" instead of by party organizations. 11

Indeed, these factors may have significantly contributed to the demise of party organizations, especially national ones, as campaign instruments, but our system of government also set incipient limits on the national party's ability to develop as a strong, unified campaign force. 12 Significantly, our federal system divided power, and, consequently, more electoral prizes were at state and local levels around which party organizations built their machinery. Moreover, the electoral system mandated candidate nominations by state and local—not national—direct primaries. Candidate designations, thus, were not controlled or selected by a national party leadership.

Similarly, the Presidential electoral college vote was based on the votes of each state, so many campaign appeals have been directed to certain states with especially large electoral votes. Even at the national level, each party was further divided by the influence of separate
legislative and executive branches of government. Legislative branches, for example, have organized their campaign functions with their own committees, independent of other national party units.\textsuperscript{13}

Moreover, U.S. society has been marked by significant diversity and pluralism in terms of social spheres, economics, life styles, regional prejudices, and other uniqueness. So, the "national party" has become equivalent to many diverse sub-groups, personalities, and interests.\textsuperscript{14}

Significantly limited from becoming a strong, unified national force by the nature of the government and electoral system in which they functioned, national political parties as they had developed by 1972 had their campaign roles seemingly further diminished by evolving trends in political communication—changes in communication technology, the form of political messages, certain audience behaviors, and in campaign organization and management.

\textbf{The General Question for Inquiry}

Considering these factors led the researcher to pose a central question for inquiry: What are the communication roles of a national party in a contemporary general election campaign, and of what significance are these endeavors?\textsuperscript{15} Scholarly and popular literature, as the reader will see, has hinted at the question but has not directly confronted it.
Such a question can be answered only by increment, and certainly is not within the scope of a one-person study. Consequently, the researcher proposed a dissertation of narrower focus to analyze the question as it applied to one aspect of national party communication: the mass communication roles of the Republican National Committee central spokesman, Robert Dole (and staff), in the 1972 campaign period consisting of the last week in August to Election Day.

The "mass communication roles" are chosen because they involve communication with the largest number of voters, are most accessible for study, and, as the following literature review indicates, this area has received scant attention. Moreover, mass communication roles relate to the researcher's interests and studies. Finally, this focus confines the topic further, deliberately precluding study of the roles of intra-party communication and concentrating on Dole's communication with the mass audiences.

Dole (and staff) receive emphasis because he was the sole designated spokesman for the national Republican Party for its national audiences. Other more minor communication functions of the party involved considerably fewer attempts to diffuse messages, dealt with limited special interest spheres (fund-raising, young voter registration, women's socials, logistical support, etc.), concerned less
identifiable participants, more amorphous organization, and aimed at smaller audiences. Dole, for example, during his Republican National Committee tenure, beginning in 1971, traveled more than half a million miles to 46 states where he made over 300 speeches, held nearly as many news conferences, and became the most widely traveled Republican National Committee (RNC) Chairman, while maintaining a 93 per cent voting record in the Senate where he was a first-termer from Kansas.17

The Republican National Committee (RNC) was selected, rather than the Democratic, because its efforts to develop such communication activities have been decidedly more substantive, enduring, well-financed, and extensively staffed. The Democrats' party organization has been substantially more dynamic, fluid, often boasting only a skeleton staff, with dwindling financial resources.18 RNC efforts, in fact, received additional bolstering with the 1968 opening of the Eisenhower Republican Center which housed six floors of over 200 party personnel, communications professionals, and automated equipment for use in election campaigns. Importantly, because of his past research and experience, the researcher had access to many of these resources and personalities for inquiry. It is rare that academic research has access to such integral political communication operations. Moreover, the Democratic National Committee
principals at the time of research were widely dispersed, while the RNC staffers were available in Washington and Cleveland. For example, Jean Westwood, former Democratic National Chairperson, returned to Utah; one speechwriter, Blair Clark, moved to Carmel, California; and the other ghost went to Arizona, making unfunded inquiry difficult.

The basic September-November time frame is designated because it is the traditional campaign period and because it provides a criterion to further "fence off" the topic for manageable analysis of materials.

"Communication roles" is used deliberately because Dole and staff had communication roles other than development and diffusion of his speaking. One, for example, involved serving as an input channel from audiences to certain national campaign elements, according to Dole speechwriter Mike Baroody. References to "Dole" hereafter include his large ghostwriting and research staff, all of whom composed a composite "communicator."

The Specific Dissertation Questions and Objectives

What are the mass communication roles of the GOP National Chairman in the 1972 campaign? And of what significance are they?
The researcher attempts to answer these questions through an exploratory, inductively approached case study with these objectives:

1. To describe and analyze Dole's mass communication endeavors, generally.

2. To isolate and describe the combination of factors that influenced initiation, development, and emphasis of Dole's messages.

3. To identify, within specified limits, the communication creators and decision-makers of Dole's rhetoric, and to analyze the message conceiving-diffusing processes in which they participated.

4. To identify their deliberate and implied communication objectives and the strategies they used in goal-implementation.

5. To delineate and analyze strategy implementation -- targets, means-vehicles, and content.

6. To assess the implications of Dole's communication for the national party, the more local GOP organization (defined as the official State or County Republican Central Committee organizations and their member partisans), the communicators themselves, and--within limits--for the mass audience.

7. To integrate the specific findings of this dissertation with other selected literature and theories of
campaign communication (i.e., identification, diffusion), political party communication functions, audience behavior (i.e., selective perception, predispositions, reinforcement), the media "gate-keepers," the effect of communicator images and reference groups on the content they conceive, ghostwriting; in a word, to add to our knowledge of communication variables within advisable limits of generalization.

Review of Relevant Literature

The researcher extensively reviewed the literature of political communication which features works on "effects" of campaigns, journalists' views of specific elections, "insiders'" accounts, academic analysts' appraisals of press performance, rhetorical criticism of various political speakers, campaigns and events, overviews of campaign techniques, and research of political scientists that touches more tangentially on "communication."

Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Pool, for example, have written about the influence of campaigning, concluding it is mainly reinforcive.21 Campbell et al. have discussed the determinants of voting behavior, as have DeVries and Tarrance, highlighting respectively the notions of party identification and ticket-splitting.22

The major Presidential campaigns and some lower-level ones have received rather detailed attention from
journalists such as White and Chester et al. And the emphasis, fairness, and thoroughness of the media's coverage of many campaigns is covered in *Journalism Quarterly* by such scholars as Danielson, Higbie, and Stempel. Similarly, Lang and Lang have analyzed press performance, and broadcaster selectivity in particular. Dunn and Ross have focused on Statehouse press corps.

Michener, Pilat, Bliss, Staves, and Sawyer provide readers with detail about campaigns in which they participated, and the narrative is primarily from the experience of their own involvement. McGinnis wrote about the public relations emphasis of the 1968 Nixon campaign participants.

Rhetorical scholars have concentrated largely on individual speaking and speeches of politicians; some material has emerged on political events, the "whistle stops" and conventions.

Finally, political science literature touches on communication processes: analysis of the national committees by Cotter and Hennessey, and Bone, Marz's analysis of the *Democratic Digest*, this researcher's thesis on GOP state organization mass communicators, and Levin's detailed analysis of state-wide campaigns.

Several books deal with contemporary political campaigning techniques. Wycoff's *The Image Candidates*
summarizes primarily the visual aspects—film television production—of campaigns in which he and his firm participated. The American Institute for Political Communication (AIPC) has compiled a collection of articles on some contemporary campaigns (e.g., Muskie in 1958, Agnew's races in Maryland, Rockefeller in the 1964 California primary), but their detail is scarce. Two books focus exclusively on the subject of political communications firms. Kelley's book details the development and operation of one of the first such consultants, Whitaker-Baxter of California, and others, but his description is quite outdated. Nimmo surveys the functions of these persuaders, capsulizes their techniques, and describes the operations of the firms. Perry discusses the operations of a few consultants and highlights their application in some of the "star" campaigns like Nelson Rockefeller's.

Literature on communication of or by party organizations appears scarce. On the national level, a study by Bone touches only slightly on "public relations" of the two national committees. Limited attention to party communication is provided in Cotter and Hennessey, as is later detailed. But in terms of the specific topic of this dissertation, a search of the literature (books, articles, journals, monographs, theses, and research in progress) clearly reveals the topic in question has not been
extensively covered in the fields of speech communication, broadcasting, journalism, public opinion, political science, administrative science, or in "popular" publication. However, some contentions relevant to this dissertation are found in Cotter and Hennessey and in Marz.

Cotter and Hennessey summarize their RNC-DNC intern experience in a historical context, discussing in a few pages their conceptions of the national chairman's roles. They claim the party chairman plays several basic ones: image-maker, "hell-raiser," money-raiser, worker motivator, campaign manager, administrator--and with an incumbent President of their party--Presidential adviser and Presidential "fall guy."38

According to these political scientists, the ideal party chairman has to have a "feel" for mass communication. If they are to do their job well, they must be first and foremost, good PR men. They have a job fundamentally and increasingly of directing and coordinating the public relations efforts of many different people and groups.39

The researchers add that the first national political party committee staffers were newspapermen, and that a dozen Republican national chairmen have been newsmen. Significantly, they theorize that the chairman works within limitations.

He is expected to be an image-maker, without being a policy-maker. His hope is to make the audience identify or empathize with his cause by appealing
with emotional content. He has a prescription to avoid issues, yet to engage the emotions of the audience.\textsuperscript{40}

Cotter and Hennessey see the party image-maker role as having its parallel in the "institutional advertising" of industrial PR, "where generalized good will rather than specific sales is sought."

As the "hell-raiser," the chairman is the "partisan's partisan," they contend.\textsuperscript{41}

His style is continuously, openly, unremittingly partisan, to keep and increase the enthusiasm of the true believers . . . to provide a personal focus for the myths of party nationalism. The National Chairman functions to sharpen issues, even when the function of the President and Congressional leaders may be to blur the partisan edges.\textsuperscript{42}

The authors deduced that the fund-raising role and campaign managing functions are diminishing for the chairman.\textsuperscript{43} They point out that "specialization and bureaucratization is occurring," in fund-raising, with diversified sub-units fulfilling that burden. Growing more rare is the chairman who is also a campaign manager.

"The bureaucracy of each committee would function without them [the chairmen], but a Chairman's direction is needed for innovation of new ideas, services, adjustment of new power balances."\textsuperscript{44} Most of these leaders, Cotter and Hennessey claim, have been "attentive to the need for recognition of party workers, and have provided ongoing psychological satisfaction" to them.\textsuperscript{45}
With an incumbent President of the same party, the chairman can serve as an adviser to the President, with his influence related to how much the President wants a partisan role for himself, they claim. As former RNC Chairman Leonard Hall says, "The important thing is to have the ear of the President. That's all you need."46

A national chairman's frequent role, the authors claim, is as Presidential "fall guy" or "trial balloonist." "FDR, for example, appreciated the need to maintain some personal distance from the most highly partisan behavior of his chairman."47 Discussing the Kennedy years, the authors propose that if JFK had used his party strength too often or too blatantly, his public strength was likely to be weakened. "It is a common notion among people that sharp party attack and counter-attack is mud-slinging and the President cannot be thought of as a partisan mud-slinger."48 The President, the authors argue, also "wants to be a statesman, seeking to maintain some detachment in the public view from the grosser aspects of party battle, while keeping control over party pronouncements and policy," and, thus, "needs a buffer and front man."49 To what extent a chairman becomes the "fall guy," Cotter and Hennessey surmise, depends on a chairman's personal relations with the Chief Executive, his party base, and what stage "the Presidential cycle" is in.
Stressing that the manner in which the chairman plays all of these roles is determined, in large part, by "the presence or absence of the White House incumbent," the authors conclude that the major functions of the national chairmen have become "public relations, communications, and to the extent possible, integration of Party activity."50 "With an incumbent President, the in-party's national image rises and falls mainly on the strength of the Chief Executive's programs and popularity." There is little a national chairman can do independently of the White House to affect the party's fortunes.51

In contrast, they also postulate that the party out-of-power is "under heavy pressure to produce a spokesman."52 Hence, they report that the new staff increases and new programs of both the Republican and Democratic National Committees have occurred largely in out-party years. The authors add their contention that the national image of a party is to a degree a consequence of elections and party esprit de corps in each state.

Cotter and Hennessey provide a substantive and articulate discussion of past and current activities of both Committees. Many of the roles the political scientists discuss do suggest directions for the 1972 case study, and are integrated in the last chapter with findings of this dissertation.
Another pertinent research work was "The Democratic Digest: A Content Analysis" by Roger Marz. The Digest, started in 1953, was the "house-organ" of the Democratic National Committee. Marz concluded that the Digest was published in an attempt to create a Democratic viewpoint on political issues and personalities of national concern. The periodical was essentially a new form of activity in the American party arena, for though minor parties and one-issue political movements have often sponsored periodicals to further their causes, neither of the present major parties has previously done so on the national level.

He also stated the magazine's manifest content suggested certain conclusions not only about the Digest, "but perhaps also about all national political party mass communication activity in our party system." Marz added that the major test of a political party in the U.S. is winning elections and that the focal points of the parties' organization and activity have been at the state and local levels of government, "where there are the most elections to be won." He concluded that the Digest was symptomatic of change in this fundamental feature, and that it represented an "attempt to create an allegiance of rank and file members to some pattern of political preferences associated with the Democratic Party on a national scale."

Marz found that content of the Digest dealt almost exclusively with negative criticism of GOP incumbents, and
was aimed principally at Democratic stalwart audiences. He concluded that because each national party was so ideologically diverse across its membership, the only thing every member shared in common was negative opposition to the other party. Hence, the Digest, he inferred, stressed negative items about the GOP—the common enemy—in order to identify with partisan Democrats. This Digest, then, so reinforced the reader-member tie with each other, and with the Democratic National Committee, he hypothesized. On the basis of his findings, Marz theorized:

... It seems ironic that the self-directedness of political party mass communication should be coupled with an overwhelming attention to the activities of the opposing party. The loose ideological structure of the American party system is probably responsible for this pattern. Each party contains almost as much variation on political issues within its ranks as exists between the two organizations. Ideological orientation consequently is a shaky base for building party identification and encouraging the commitment of the rank-and-file to the support of national party activities.

It is possible that the ultimate goal of the Democratic Digest is to create a Democratic position on political issues, but the existing framework of political opinion in the United States precludes emphasizing this aspect of its activities at present. The safest standard around which to rally support for the Democratic Party as a national organization is the mutual preference which all Democrats have for seeing Democrats in political office. To be a Democrat implies being anti-Republican. In fact, that is almost all it necessarily implies. This being the case, the safe and sure focus of communicative activities of the national party is cheerfully lambasting or lampooning Republicans. 57

Marz claimed that the study results thus supported a "theory" of national political party mass communication
based upon four postulates: (1) national political party mass communication policy is self-directed; (2) this policy is oriented toward the opposition's activity; (3) the purpose of such a policy is to create an identity for the party and strengthen rank and file commitment to that identity; and (4) lack of a clear ideological division between parties makes it impolitic to create such an identity on the basis of specific policies.

Thus the nature of the research problem and the state of the literature relevant to this researcher's topic lead to the probable conclusion that an exploratory-descriptive approach would be a most realistic and productive one. Clearly, the goals here are generally acceptable exploratory efforts: to gain new insights about a phenomenon, to discover and identify important variables, to formulate tentative concepts, to develop hypotheses for later testing and definitive investigation. As Bowers notes, rhetorical criticism is at the pre-scientific stage, should produce testable hypotheses, and yield "statements accounting for the origin and effects of rhetorical discourse . . . ." The state of research on the topic seemingly has not advanced far enough to render other approaches apt or sound. Control of contaminating variables, manipulation of independent variables to determine effects, or any other
experimental level of approach does not seem in order, while concept refining, not concept quantification, does seem in order. Many of the research foci are \textit{fait accompli}. No research could control or account for all the variance in the many components of the rhetorical situation.

\textbf{The Case Study Approach}

Communication is a process, and a detailed study of a communication phenomenon should focus, if possible, on the phenomenon as a whole, trying to dissect the process involved, its relevant variables, and interrelationships.\textsuperscript{60}

As Brockriede advances:

\begin{quote}
Perhaps the most important single characteristic of rhetoric is that it is a matrix of complex and interrelated variables. . . . The theorist cannot meaningfully pluck from the system any single variable and hope to understand it apart from the others.\textsuperscript{61}
\end{quote}

A case study allows the analyst to gain an overview of a communication process as well as a good chance to see its components in interaction. In yielding new increments of information about various relationships in the process under scrutiny, additions can be made to several areas of the literature in communication. Seemingly, more insight is yielded by this approach to studying how communication works than by "plucking" out one or two variables for sterile analysis. Gaining \textit{perspective} is the goal.
Furthermore, the field of communication—from the classical rhetoricians to current theorists, from the inception of "attitude change" research to current experimentation—has concentrated in large part on the study of persuasion. Notable researchers, Fotheringham especially, in fact, have pointed out that persuasion is most productively studied as a campaign concept. This case study allows the reader to concentrate on the persuasion process as a campaign—a series of similar messages communicated to an audience through varying media over time.

In discussing rhetorical stance, for example, Booth essentially argues for the researcher to view the entire communication situation in trying to discern how well the communicator can achieve balance among himself, the message, the receivers, and the general situation.

In order to gain insight into communication, this dissertation embodies an exploratory case study approach. "When the purpose of a study is exploratory, a flexible research design which provides opportunity for considering many different aspects of a problem is appropriate."

The Specific Research Questions

The Inputs

What combination of factors determined and influenced the development of the objectives, content, and diffusion of Dole's rhetoric?
Here the researcher is surmising that the communicators under scrutiny developed the content, to a significant degree, as a result of the information inputs and influences to which they were exposed and which they perceived as salient and important. Hence, it is revealing in terms of their communication behavior to attempt to identify and assess the perceived importance of each such determinant. This approach to inquiry is stimulated in part by the need in the literature to study the effects of the intended audience(s) on the communicator, a focus which is relevant to reference group theory.65

The researcher is proceeding on the assumption that more insight about who or what influences the communicators can be elicited by looking at their total communication situation through their perspectives and their perceptions of the world "out there." This phenomenologically oriented approach essentially says that behavior is determined by and pertinent to a person's perceptual field.66 That is, his behavior is not so much a function of an external event as it is a product of the individual's perception of that event. As Gregg notes, man essentially symbolizes his environment into cognitive structures, then acts on the basis of these structures (images).67 Moreover, Boulding contends, the "image" is man's "subjective knowledge."68 Formed or emergent images interact with information inputs, and the result is certain behavior, according to these
theorists. Similarly, Barnard conceptualizes an executive, or decision-maker, as an information (input) processor. Other studies further confirm that a person's images significantly influence his communication in terms of content selection, organization, emphases, and recall.

Of course the general rhetorical situation had a number of influences on the Dole rhetoric, in both suggestive and limiting senses, as Chapter II will show. The organizational context in which the communicators functioned also served as a set of determinants, as the reader will see in Chapter III. But, a prime question remains, given the rhetorical situation and organizational context—a cluster of variables impinging on the communicators—which factors were to what degree salient in the communicators' minds and to what extent did each seem to be a significant determinant of objectives and content?

For each communicator (and for the group), a research goal was to identify his reference or orientation to the following inputs (persons, groups, forces) in order to estimate their importance to goal and message composition. For influential persons, as an example, one goal was to ascertain the frequency and nature (topics, settings, directiveness) of communication between influencer and influencee.
A second factor in the communication process, while actually the first question in the conduct of the research, deals with the communicators.

The Communicators

Who defined communication objectives and the means to attain them?

An important step was to identify who, along with Dole himself, contributed to processing the input identified above and actually decided on the communication goals, content, and means of his communication. Ghostwriting for a public figure is not a new phenomenon, but this study may unearth one of the most elaborate ghostwriting staffs assembled for a national campaign. For example, in 1972, Deputy RNC Chairman for Research, Robert Chase, and RNC Issue Development Director, Mark Harroff, directed a staff of 40 to 45 employees who researched, capsuled, and updated daily reports of administration achievements, statements, etc., and public statements, actions, etc. of the opposition, issuing summaries for use in the invention process. True, some Presidential incumbents and candidates, many U.S. Senators, and some governors have been the subjects of ghostwriting research and ethical criticism. But national committee spokesmen (plus mayors and legislators) have escaped such scrutiny. Since citizens base decisions, judgments, and knowledge of their governmental worlds to a
significant degree on what public figures say, it is important to determine the nature and extent of others' involvement in creating their rhetoric.

Moreover, most studies, except Bradley's thesis, Golden's article, and another essay, seem to have emphasized a mechanical process, whereas a more productive approach might be to try to determine more precisely what speechwriters contribute in terms of objectives, emphases, and content in comparison to the communicator for whom they function. What is the role of the ghost? Definition of objectives or themes? Information-gathering? Synthesis of others' inputs? Editing? Rephrasing? Within what prescriptive-prospective frameworks does he operate? Who sets his limits? Is he supplied "musts" or "must-nots" for inclusion? Who is the initiator of what kinds of content? Does the ghost attempt to approximate the communicator's ideas and views, ignore them, change them?

Another neglected area is the writer's relationship with the communicator. What is his proximity to, access to, frequency and nature of communication with the speaker? Who are the mediators? What are the topics of their communication? Has the communicator given instruction to the writer(s)? Have the ghost and speaker set policies or themes at critical junctures for subsequent development? Has the ghost learned the policy and predispositions of the speaker? Do he and the speaker have congruent images of
their audiences? Do they share the same sources of feedback? Many of these questions have been overlooked in most of the literature.

So has the question of decision-making. For example, generally in the speaker-ghost relationship, who decides (1) topics or themes, (2) information to be used, (3) approaches to be taken or appeals to be used, (4) language and style to be utilized and referents employed? Does the ghost have a required routine for approval? What image of the nature of man, of their audiences, do these political communicators hold, with what implications?

The literature sets a fascinating stage, but role explanation and too many "whys" are missing. The enumerated questions are pertinent for this case study. Perhaps the "answers," though tentative, will support the proposition that ghostwriting has become a bureaucratized organizational function, instead of part of a creative art.

Realistic limits on scope of question.—Interviews and observation indicated that the Dole operation was composed of specific groups working with each other:

A. Dole and his speech writer and scheduler.

B. The RNC Deputy National Chairman for Communication and his staff.

C. The communication staff of the Committee to Re-Elect the President and of the White House—found to be largely one-in-the-same.

D. The RNC research staff.
In this dissertation, the "Who" question is posed primarily in terms of A, B, and D, where the researcher can define these groups as fairly discrete in personnel, duties, and intercommunication. The other one is too amorphous, large, and inaccessible to be viewed in its entirety except through: (1) the representatives interviewed, Patrick Buchanan, Consultant to the President; and Herb Klein, Director of Communications for the Executive Branch, (2) the descriptions of A and B, and (3) the reports of newsmen who covered the campaign.

The following questions are applied to persons who had consistent day-to-day roles in conceiving and diffusing Dole's messages in the campaign period:

A. Who were they; what were their backgrounds?

B. What was the nature of the involvement of each in setting objectives, determining content, and the means of diffusion?

C. What was the nature of the communication and working relationship with Dole and each other--the network and the processes?

--Nature of relationship with Dole.
--The development process: varied-standardized.
--Person(s) contributing to objectives and content.
--Participation in deliberate decisions about communication.
--The decisions and their underlying rationale.

The Communications Objectives

If the aforementioned communicators partially set objectives, and fully implemented them, in relation to the
determinants discussed above under "Input," then the obvious question is: What were the objectives?

A key task of communication researchers is to unravel a source's strategy of persuasion. Bryant deals with how a speaker adjusts ideas to people and people to ideas. 75 Burke's influence motivates researchers to identify the bases of identification between communicator and audience. 76 Edelman focuses on how a politician "communicates the impression of knowing what is to be done." 77 In his research on Wallace, Makay unravels the Southerner's strategies of "illusion, image substitution," and "fear." 78 Brown identifies the methods and goals of the two rhetorical thrusts at the 1968 Democratic National Convention. 79

This section of the dissertation asks similar questions:

1. Did the communicators follow certain deliberate objectives in developing and diffusing their rhetoric? Were there any planned goals that guided their endeavors?

2. What were these objectives? Were they self-generated or imposed by others? What images did they attempt to impart on which voters?

   a) Target objectives: Did communicators deliberately define target audiences? What were they? Were some audiences perceived as instrumental to reaching others? How were targets defined? Did sources have access to polls?

   b) Content objectives: Did communicators try to include a consistent set of themes or convey a basic message through their communication? What were they (it)?
c) What end results were sought? What were the referents of their objectives?

Initial reading of Dole's messages combined with the researcher's orientation to the concepts of the Scammon voter behavior theory, ticket-splitting, assimilation-contrast, and rhetorical subversion influenced the hypotheses posited about the over-all Dole strategy or objectives.

 DeVries and Tarrance have described the apparent emergence of ticket-splitting in voter behavior. The ticket-splitter evaluates and decides on candidates by his scrutinizing criteria of (1) the candidate's evident general ability, (2) his personality, (3) his appearance as a problem-solver, and (4) his issue stands.

The ticket-splitter emerged as a complex voter who had a grasp of campaign issues and who was oriented toward problem-solving by candidates rather than toward political parties. There is an increasing importance of voters' perception of candidates and their ability to handle problems.

DeVries and pollster Robert Teeter were "fathers" of the concept of ticket-splitter, and were among the first campaigners to identify ticket-splitters in the electorate and so base election strategy. (Teeter was the chief pollster and public opinion adviser for the President's 1972 campaign.) The ticket-splitter advocates see "style of leadership" as a prime basis for voter evaluation of candidates. This school of thought strongly suggests that
campaign rhetoric concentrate on portraying a campaign as a choice between two men, as did Dole's rhetoric imply on first examination of its content.

Consider concurrently that Scammon and Wattenburg argue in a well-documented analysis that a candidate who becomes identified with "the middle ground" on "salient social or economic issues" has the best chance to win.83

Most Americans are unyoung, unpoor, unblack, middle-age, and middle-class in suburban or metropolitan areas. The single strategy for victory involves a drive toward the center of the electorate, a coalition that incorporates a large piece of the attitudinal center, tied to progressiveness on economic issues, and toughness on the social issue. The winning coalition in America is one that holds the center ground on an attitudinal battlefield.84

The "center ground on the attitudinal battlefield" is what Dole's rhetoric seemed to be identifying with Richard Nixon.

In a related vein, note that theory which asserts that a voter's attitude is best represented by a "range" of acceptance. Certain viewpoints that a person accepts (agrees with) on an issue fall within this range of acceptance on a continuum.85 Viewpoints on the issue with which he disagrees, he places outside his range of acceptance. Often a person will perceive such discrepant viewpoints "farther out" at the extremes (outside the range of acceptance) than they are in reality, the process of contrast. While Dole seemingly was trying to identify Nixon with most voters' "middle ground" in their range of
acceptance, he also appeared to be contrasting McGovern in every way with most voters' attitudes on issues. In fact, in terms of both style and issue-program stands, the RNC sources appeared to attempt to place McGovern well outside the range of acceptance of most voters' likely political attitudes. The communicators were dissociating the McGovern candidacy far from the mid-points of the range of what most voters were likely to accept on issues and personal style. In other words, all equivalents to McGovern appeared to be at the extreme, certainly not within the likely middle ground of American politics with which the RNC communicators tried to identify Richard Nixon.

Alleging that McGovern was at "extremes" in style and policy seemed to be the Dole strategy followed in hopes of dissociating the nominee from the hallowed middle. This goal was in some ways similar to Fisher's concept of subversion. Alleging that Richard Nixon personified the style and policies of the middle ground (the "accepted" traits) was their strategy of identification, though for Dole this positive identification appeared to be second priority to the exploitive rhetoric of dissociation. The rhetoric is termed "exploitive" because its references to McGovern seemed to probe statements, actions, instances of the nominee where he was perceived by communicators as weak or vulnerable—"exploitable."
Though the necessity of the GOP's garnering ticket-splitters might well explain why its rhetoric posed a choice between two men, the researcher would assert that asking whether messages are "source-centered" or "message-centered," as does Rosenthal, or pointing out the import of "ethos" or "credibility" is an incomplete question to ask about Dole's persuasion. This dissertation would contend that (a) issue stands and (b) personality, or style, are interrelated and meshed. As Dole speechwriter Baroody said in initial contact, for example, "We tried to exploit McGovern's weaknesses . . . in one sense . . . his indecisiveness by showing him as a waffler on the big issues. Our criticism of him as a person was in the context of his actions and stands on issues." 

Working hypotheses.—The following "working" hypotheses are posed as an aid to analyzing the data in relation to the preceding discussion:

1. A predominant objective was to dissociate the McGovern candidacy from the traits presumed (by the communicators) to compose "most voters'" conception of the style of leadership essential to or befitting a "President."

2. A predominant objective was to dissociate the McGovern candidacy from issue-positions held by "most voters." (Such issues as defined by the communicators.)

3. A predominant objective was to exploit (perceived) illustrations of McGovern's deviations from the above "accepted" style and positions: by devoting a major part of each Dole message
to criticism of McGovern statements, actions, proposals, which the communicators felt were "vulnerable."

4. A major objective was to link the President to the positive style of leadership traits (e.g., competence, decisiveness) and to "middle ground" policy positions.

5. A major objective was to build a new, refined general identity (or image) of the national Republican Party.

6. A major objective was to motivate and activate state and local Republicans.

7. A major objective was (for Dole) to serve as a communications channel between (a) state and local GOP personnel, and (b) national campaign elements.

8. A major objective of Dole's rhetoric was to aim at partisan Republicans and at ticket-splitters, the two principal audience targets.

9. A major objective for Dole's rhetoric was to target to newsmen to achieve national diffusion to the principal audiences.

10. A major objective for Dole's rhetoric was to activate partisans in his immediate audiences to act as subsequent sources, repeating his message to others who were not in the immediate audience.

Moreover, discovering who composed targets is especially intriguing because of the paradoxical behaviors the situation seemed to call for. First, the Republicans as a minority party needed to capture a good portion of Democratic votes to achieve a majority and, to do so, Dole and other Republicans seemingly had to avoid rhetoric that would offend Democrats. Yet, at the same time, the Dole rhetoric evidently was designed in part to arouse GOP
partisans through attacks on a Democrat. Concurrently, ticket-splitters with their documented grasp of styles and issues, and comparatively sophisticated, more non-partisan orientation, had to be won.

The Communication Means

Inquiry focuses next on the vehicles or means of communication Dole utilized in trying to attain the message objectives.

A. What were the vehicles used?
   1. Verbal messages
   2. Pseudo-events

B. Were different formats utilized? Which ones yielded best results—i.e., the widest national news coverage—in terms of each major objective? What was the particular applicability or role of speech-making?

C. What were the specific techniques used to engender identification and dissociation? Was identification with local audiences attempted?

D. Content: (1) What were the major, recurring themes and emphases? What were linked to McGovern and Nixon? (2) Did the Dole rhetoric manifest any particular style or approach?

The scant information resulting from national party communication content studies to date shows that they concentrate on negatively portraying the opposition. Is this trend evident in the Dole content?
Communication Consequences
In Perspective

In examining the consequences of Dole's rhetoric, the researcher is operating, to a great extent, on the assumptions of many rhetorical analysts that audience "response" is a major determinant of "effect" and that communication is most meaningfully assessed in the context in which it occurred. In doing so, the researcher attempts to seek perspective by interviewing sets of receivers, each of which viewed Dole's rhetoric from a different amalgam of self-interests, and in a different context. Thus interviewees include: newsmen who covered Dole in particular during the campaign, newsmen who covered the campaign generally, the partisans to whom Dole spoke, and the staffers who worked directly with Dole. Additionally, the researcher analyzes various news media during the campaign period to see the nature and extent to which Dole content penetrated the media and was available to the random mass news consumer. Also, as the reader will see, the partisans and newsmen were the audience targets for Dole communicators.

Adding his own assessment to the evaluations of those from varying vantage points, the researcher can hopefully achieve a more balanced view of the "consequences" of the Dole effort than he would by basing an analysis on only one perspective. As Thonssen et al. note, "conceivably, a
single measure may be neither possible nor desirable . . . . Accordingly, the critic may wish . . . . to use such combinations of standards as will give promise of strengthening the rhetorical evaluation. The selection of interviewees and the method of interviewing are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Specifically, this section attempts to assess the consequences of Dole's rhetoric for the national party, the state parties, the potential mass audience; the nature of campaign communication, for Dole; and the role of the Party Chairman. This goal is advanced with the realization that "conclusions" can only be tentative, incremental additions to the literature. Generally, these questions are posed:

A. Were Dole and his messages effective? Why or why not?

B. Did he evoke the same or different meanings across different sets of receivers? Why? Of what was this phenomenon a function?

C. Of the Dole attempts to generate national news coverage, how many succeeded? (The bases for this judgment, as will be explained, are the three national news magazines, three metropolitan newspapers of national circulation, and one network's total news presentations during the period of study.)

D. What was the general thrust of each published/aired story? Did the media stress what Dole intended them to stress? (Dole news releases set "leads.")

Based on initial inquiry, concepts of the literature, and his own ideas, the researcher formed the following
working propositions in analyzing the consequences of Dole's rhetoric. The evidence gathered and the probable conclusions to be drawn from the data will bear upon these propositions in a variety of ways. At this point in the study, the propositions are preliminary guidelines.

Consequences for the state-local party organizations/partisans.---The Chairman's speeches were vehicles around which to organize fund-raising and motivating events. He served as a two-way communications channel, reinforcing beliefs and venting frustrations.

He was an information-supplier to explain actions of Nixon and his Party/Administration subordinates, and to provide "attack ammunition" for criticism of McGovern.

He was a stimulator of interpersonal, intra-party communication about Nixon, McGovern, and the GOP, _per se_.

The immediate audiences served as part of his media "cast," giving him a forum, an occasion, adding legitimacy to the "news-peg." The immediate audience was thus part of the communicator for the mass audience. The whole event is, for the mass/news audience, the "source."

Consequences for the national party.---In terms of building or sharpening a public identity for the party nationally, Dole's rhetoric had little, if any, direct significance. His communication functioned primarily to
identify Nixon with certain "Presidential style" and policy traits "that all Americans share"; but to a greater degree, functioned to exploit negative aspects of the McGovern candidacy.

Coinciding with the Marz hypothesis, national party communication in this instance concentrated on negatively attacking the opposition. Because of the Presidential emphasis of the over-all campaign and the scant emphasis in Dole rhetoric on the party per se, there was no visible means in this communication of "connecting" symbolically the President and those on the state Republican tickets with "coat-tail" implications.

Consequences for campaign communication.—The Dole operation illustrated that ghostwriting was an institutionalized "system" in the 1972 national campaign, and showed that the "spokesman," the Chairman of the Republican National Committee, may be merely a verbalizer of rhetoric conceived and developed almost completely by others. This was the campaign of the ghosts.

Vehicles or formats for diffusion did vary in efficacy for attracting news coverage, as Mortensen argues that formats affect basic content stresses, and as Boorstin alleges.
The formal speech had a significant place in political communication primarily for the news coverage it elicited.

While considerable attempts were made to identify with national audiences, few attempts were made to identify with immediate ones.

The Dole operation illustrated the growing trend of the coming "ad-hocracy" in campaigning, that is, a tendency to operate campaigns with ad hoc organizations assembled only for the campaign, which disband at election time.

Consequences for the communicator.--Dole became a nationally known figure to many voters as a champion of the President.

His frequent speaking apparently served some definite needs of a great many state-local Republicans, and chances are that Dole earned many political "IOU's."

Consequences for the mass audience.--Chances seem high that the basic message Dole enunciated repeatedly, through varying illustrative themes, reached most voters over time as they saw or heard "bits and pieces" of Dole in the news here and there. His words--to them--probably contributed only some of the building blocks of their image of the McGovern candidacy.
Consequences for the role of the party chairman.—
The roles abstracted by Cotter and Hennessey are valid, in this case, only in part. New roles are evident.

Methods and Procedures

With the above research goals and working hypotheses as guides, the researcher formulated the methods of inquiry. Personal interviews of Dole, members of the White House communication staff, Dole's communication staff, and members of target audiences; systematic content analysis of his messages and their media coverage; and examination of other campaign materials (speaking schedules, RNC reports, etc.) were the major means of inquiry used.

The Interviews

The communication group.—The first step in the interviewing process was identifying the persons who could most directly provide information the research problem demanded, those who had participated in developing and diffusing the Dole rhetoric. Such identification was attempted through early and continuing scrutiny of the RNC campaign staff development, official RNC rosters, and preliminary phone interviewing. Since June 1971, sources in the RNC research Division provided ethical access to the organization's continuing staff development; and set up an interview for the researcher in September 1971 with Ed DeBolt, at that time charged with developing all
political and research aspects of RNC staffing for the campaign. Moreover, the official personnel rosters of the RNC staff, with listings of corresponding duties, were available for scrutiny. Third, in November and December 1972, a Senatorial and Congressional office made direct and open inquiries on the researcher's behalf with RNC liaison acquaintances to determine who were serving as Dole's principal communication aides. With this general ongoing picture of RNC staff development, plus confirmation through the rosters and direct third-party contacts, the researcher initiated preliminary discussions with Michael Baroody, RNC Director of Public Affairs (speechwriter); Mike Scanlon, Special Assistant to the Chairman (Scheduling and Advance); and Thomas Wilck, Deputy National Chairman for Communications in November and December 1972. Informally, he asked each, "How did you generally go about writing Dole's communication? Did you follow certain steps, or did any certain process develop? What was it?" In their general responses, the interviewees usually mentioned those persons involved. Then, the researcher reviewed those mentioned and asked, "Can you think of any others?"

A similar, but more detailed, approach was taken in the later personal interviews. As was the case throughout the research procedure, each respondent was interviewed independently; no one but the questioner and respondent was
present, and each personal interview was spaced days apart from each of the others. It was highly doubtful that any of the respondents conferred about the inquiry or their specific answers. In fact, each of the respondents seemed extremely open, candid and matter-of-fact in talking with the interviewer. Additionally, as one later commented, "The election's over; everyone is less uptight."\textsuperscript{97}

Further confirmation of "who was involved" in the Dole communication operation was derived from the two operating directors of RNC Research, Robert Chase and Mark Harroff, each of whom observed but was not a day-to-day participant in the Dole communication group.\textsuperscript{98} The general communication operation portrayed by the RNC respondents was further compared with the descriptions of it by Lou Cannon of the \textit{Washington Post}, R. H. Semple of the \textit{New York Times}, and R. Boyd, chief of the Washington Bureau of Knight Newspapers, each of whom, also interviewed for the "Consequences" section, had followed the RNC over the years.\textsuperscript{99} Their conceptions corresponded quite closely with those of the GOP respondents.

With the principal communicators so identified from these sources, the researcher conducted lengthy interviews with each participant. The questioning guide delineated later in this section was the basis for each of the interviews.
The interviewing method.—In order to obtain the most reliable complete and accurate information possible, the researcher felt it was of utmost importance that neither he nor the interview appear inhibiting. An informal, relaxed discussion about the campaign was attempted, as opposed to approaching the respondent with a structured "interview." Though each respondent was well aware of the purpose of the conversation, the interviewer took a passive-to-active role, progressing from general, broad stimulus questions to more specific probes of the respondents' comments. The goal was to stimulate the respondent to talk freely, in his terms, from his perspective about the areas of inquiry. The interviewer would interrupt often with "What do you mean by that? Could you elaborate . . . ?" "Who did you say?" and other such queries seeking specification or elaboration. Most often the respondent was encouraged to elaborate, with the questioner "taking him back" to certain relevant points he (the interviewee) had mentioned without detail. Occasionally such points were openings for another whole sphere of questioning. The objective was to cover all the points on the guide, while giving the respondent enough flexibility to "take the lead," and follow his own order of points. At times, of course, the researcher would have to mention another area, to "move on," until all key areas were covered. A formal order of
questions to be followed rigidly would have created a rather stilted, inhibiting atmosphere, unconducive to later probing, direct questioning and full responsiveness, it was felt. The exploratory nature of the study mandated an attempt to seek the respondent's restructuring of "what happened and why," in his frame of reference, in terms of the variables he felt were relevant. The interviewer sought to provide stimuli to the respondent, without imposing a structure within which his response had to "fit."

Researchers have argued, for example, that "the conversational interview, unstructured save for an interview schedule, listing principal points to be covered, permits greater depth of inquiry and response than does an interview in which the same questions are always asked in the same way of each respondent." 100

In large part, the interviews were focused ones, in the sense that Merton, Fiske, and Kendall describe:

The main function of the interviewer is to focus attention upon a given experience and its effects. He knows in advance what topics or what aspects of a question he wishes to cover. This list constitutes a framework of topics to be covered, but the manner in which questions are asked and their timing are left largely to the interviewer's discretion. He has freedom to explore reasons and motives, to probe further in directions that were unanticipated. Although the respondent is free to express completely his own line of thought, the direction of the interview is clearly in the hands of the interviewer. 101

Merton notes, for example, that persons to be interviewed "are known to have been involved in a particular
situation" and that the interview "is focused on the subjective experiences of persons . . . to ascertain their definitions of the situation."102

Such personal interviewing has been used productively to assess influence, unravel processes, and unearth facts in journalism "gatekeeper" studies, in communication theory research, and in general survey interviewing. For instance, in a recent study of mass communicators, Chaffee and Flegel noted:

In summary, it appears that the reporters on both papers were strongly directed in their reporting by their own opinions.

What is even more interesting is that these reporters recognized this pattern of influence and were willing to describe it in the questionnaires. Thus we may say that they ignored external social pressures, including those within their own occupational bureaucracies, but did not ignore their own personal convictions—and that this process was apparently a very conscious one.

The experience of this study carries implications for the conduct of mass communications research, and of education for journalism.

For researchers, the lesson seems to be that "introspective" data—based on a person's own description of his thinking—is not necessarily invalid. Indeed, it may be more valid than attempts to collect "objective" data about him, without his knowledge or cooperation. The great bar to research about behavior of professional communicators has been that it is impossible to "watch someone think."

No one can learn much about what reporters do so long as they cling to a methodological assumption that they are nothing more than units of analysis to be observed from a distance. . . . many of the most interesting intellectual processes can only be worked into empirical theory by asking the person who has done something what he thought about as he did it. He may not be able to say, of course; but it is self-defeating to assume that intellectual activity is subconscious and cannot be recalled or described.103
And, Dexter adds, referring to such technique:

[It] is very useful for the study of communicators' conceptions of audiences, or of audiences' conceptions of communicators; it can be used to throw light on, for example, what sort of readers or listeners are thought about in preparing a given document or speech. 104

The questions. — Specific questions for all interviews were formulated as carefully as possible to avoid biasing the response. Concrete, understandable vocabulary was sought. Care was taken not to "over-burden" the respondent with more than one question at a time, and sensitive topics, if not raised by the respondent, were left until the end of the interview for probing. The reasoning behind the method was that if sensitive topics alienated the interviewee, it was best to garner as much other information as possible before irritating him.

The questions were assessed by comparing them against methodological criteria in Kornhauser and Sheatsley's "Questionnaire Construction and Interview Procedure." 105

Because of the importance of corroborating the membership of the communication group and the influences on its inputs, decisions, and output, the questioning procedure in this area is described in detail in the interview guide in Appendix B.
Conflicting responses and cross-validation.--
Generally, each respondent provided similar consonant and consistent responses to each of the questions, though emphases and some interpretations differed. Where factual offerings were inconsistent—which was rare—the interviewer rechecked with disputants.

Each interviewee was regarded not only as an information source, but also as a validity check on each of the other respondents' offerings.

Cooperation was excellent, though in some instances tardy. Respondents all seemed anxious to talk about their experiences, though Dole at first appeared wary. He checked on the authenticity of the study and granted an interview only after several requests. However, once the interview began, he talked profusely, pausing often to add a detail, explain further, illustrate a point. Baroody, Wilck, Chase, and Harroff responded fully, but in some areas needed cues from the interviewer to keep questions and answers "flowing." Scanlon was the most verbal. In fact, before the interview began, he spent about twenty minutes outlining the different roles Dole had filled in his tenure. The interviewer frequently had to bring Scanlon back to the questions at hand, inasmuch as he evidenced considerable motivation to elaborate. White House speechwriter Patrick Buchanan was the most difficult to interview, as he
aggressively attempted to dominate the conversation, at first ignoring certain queries and launching into animated lectures.

The newsmen.--Newsmen were not only prime Dole audience targets, as keys to mass diffusion of his message, but, through their reporting roles, had viewed many national political communicators such as Dole. Consequently, they were seen as especially apt evaluators of Dole communication.

The RNC distributed Dole messages (speeches, statements, and news releases) to about 200 "national news drops," as Baroody and Wilck both phrased it, in order to generate as much national diffusion of their communication as was possible. This list, including all major broadcast and print media in the U.S., served as the population for selection of respondents. Rationale for selection included an attempt to seek geographical diversity, balance between print and broadcast media, and proximity of the interviewees to the campaign, particularly coverage of party activities. One exception to the rationale were three Kansas reporters the researcher contacted. Their coverage of Dole over the years, it was felt, could add special perspective. Even with follow-up, only one Kansan responded. It was reasoned that political reporters from large metropolitan papers in states with large populations and electoral votes were most
important targets and the most politically significant and respected keys to reaching large numbers of electoral votes. Hence, the researcher identified the major political reporters—at the papers listed—and wrote each seeking survey participation. In each letter, a postcard was inserted for the potential respondent to indicate his phone number and a suggested time for the interview. The lists represented those papers to which letters were sent. Those starred agreed to the interview.107

The Print Media

**East**
- *New York Times*
- *Washington Post*
- Philadelphia Inquirer
- *Christian Science Monitor*

**Mid-West**
- *Wichita Eagle*
- Chicago Daily News
- *Detroit Free Press*
- *Cleveland Plain Dealer*
- *Knight Newspapers*

**West**
- Los Angeles Times
- San Francisco Star

Follow-up letters were sent to non-respondents, but elicited no reply. The researcher interviewed the chief political reporter and/or Washington Bureau Chief for each participating paper. The phone interviews were generally about twenty minutes in duration. Phone interviews were chosen because the interviewer did not have the resources to interview geographically dispersed reporters in person and because it was estimated that interviews by phone scheduled at the respondent's convenience would boost the probability
of his cooperation. Additionally, phone interviews facilitated probing, registration of respondents' tone and emphases, and generally better data than would have a mail questionnaire. The goal had been to complete ten newsmen interviews in all, half of which (5) were to be print media in major markets. Seven print media interviews were completed.

The other five of the ten sought were to be from the nation's broadcast news media. Each of the three major broadcast news networks was contacted for names of newsmen who had covered and written newscasts about the campaign, especially party activities. Thus, as in the print media, the newsmen who were the writers, the decision-makers, were sought, not those who merely "read" the news on-the-air, or who were "the" famous names. From a list of the newsmen so identified, five potential respondents were queried from each network. Of the first fifteen letters sent, four broadcast newsmen responded, one agreeing to the interview and three seeking to know what kinds of questions would be asked. At this point, the researcher surmised that the second mailing might elicit a better return rate if the general nature of the questions was indicated. Hence, the original fourteen were mailed the questionnaire in
Appendix B, and these individuals responded and were subsequently interviewed by phone:

Don Gardiner, Editor, ABC-TV Network Radio News
Rob Sunde, CBS News (Radio and TV)
R. L. Hamilton, UPI Broadcast News
Bob Wilson, ABC News, New York
Gil Longin, ABC Network News
Tom O'Donnell, ABC-Radio Network News

One other CBS newsman and one other NBC newsman replied, but declined to participate due to their claimed cooperation with "too many other election surveys." So, five respondents were sought who had key reporting roles in national broadcast networks' news coverage of the campaign. Six interviews were completed.

It is well to point out again that the researcher attempted to tap a diversity of perspectives among the newsmen he selected to interview. That is why the selection was purposive, not completely random. It cut across media, networks, and geographical areas in order to seek this diversity. The researcher also thought it would be revealing to see if broadcast newsmen differed from print reporters in their responses. Each interview followed the general pattern of the questions listed on the questionnaire in Appendix B.

As in the approach to the Dole communicator interviews, questions were open-ended, the interviewer functioned as a stimulant, seeking as much detailed elaboration as possible. The order of questions and progression from one
area to another was more guided and rapid in the newsman interviews inasmuch as fewer questions were posed, and respondents generally offered less detail in response to each query. Though more comparisons are drawn in the "Consequences" chapter, one difference in responses should be noted here. The newspaper reporters were by far more detailed and specific in their interviews than were the more general, more disinterested broadcast newsmen who had paid seemingly less attention to Dole and the RNC in the campaign. In fact, the Washington Post, Cleveland Plain Dealer, New York Times, Detroit Free Press, and Knight reporters were quite verbose, adding much at their own initiative. All respondents, however, were quite cooperative, quite willing to "take time," and most were straightforward. Again, as with the communicator interviews, respondents were tardy and procrastinating. Once a willingness to participate was established, often several calls over a period of weeks were necessary to find the "right time" to talk.

The partisan audience.— It was anticipated that the Republicans sampled--all members of the RNC or state chairmen--might be rather hesitant to respond due to the fact they were in official roles, commenting on the performance of a fellow partisan with whom they might have later contact. Consequently, the researcher sent letters of invitation to
participate in the survey, with a general listing of the types of questions to be asked and a postcard for indicating preferable times for the interview. Thus, the respondent had the options of returning the questionnaire or postcard or both. Due to the researcher's fear of low response, he sent out fifty such letters.

Every other name was selected from the roster of the Republican National Committee, yielding the fifty names. These individuals were not only specified as the prime targets to the communicators but they provided geographical and political diversity as well. Moreover, each interviewee was significant because he or she, as one of two RNC members in each state, had witnessed many national political spokesmen, and was in the position in the state GOP hierarchy to be a probable opinion-leader among partisans. Responses occurred at the rate of about three per week; two follow-ups were sent to non-respondents. Surprisingly, twenty-eight interviewees responded, trickling in over a period of several weeks. Though all cooperated, completing the interviews was a major task, requiring several attempts in many cases. As with the newsmen, phone interviews were used due to the geographical dispersion of the subjects and the researcher's lack of resources to meet each in person. The procedure involved seeking the written response, then calling the interviewee, leading off with
general stimulus questions and probing responses. Once the interviews began, all went well, with some subjects elaborating at great length, and only one respondent providing some difficulty: "This sounds loaded to me." The question guide is listed in Appendix B.

The Content Analysis

Several communication researchers such as Lasswell, Berelson, and Budd have utilized content analyses, employing different approaches--measuring column inches, counting topics, recording numbers of front-page stories, using varying analyses units--the word, theme, assertion, sentence, paragraph, or article. In this dissertation with valid, reliable, methodological precedent, "content analysis" consists of objective recognition and categorization of manifest message content, according to the procedures described.

Procedures and objects of analysis.--Specific procedure was developed and guided by research objectives. One basic objective was to infer the gross, general thrusts of the Dole messages throughout the campaign period designated. Second, the researcher wanted to audit the message content across time against the communicator's objectives to see how closely the means matched goals. Indeed, he wanted to generalize about the portrayal of McGovern, Nixon,
and each of the parties. Third, Dole technique was important to unravel. Reading through the speeches consistently suggested a "linking" phenomenon. That is, the essence of the speeches seemed to involve repeated linking of men—primarily Nixon and McGovern—to traits, to issue stands, and to the past, and to project consequences of each serving as President. Consequently, it seemed relevant to discern what specific themes were associated with each referent of interest: Nixon, McGovern, the two parties, and party figures. Since the dissertation was aimed at the over-all situation, influences, goals, means, and "effects" of the campaign, the researcher decided to analyze all the content of Dole messages as a single unit, rather than expressing results speech-by-speech. Hence, no sampling was involved. The entire population (all 66 messages of the campaign period) was analyzed.

Unit of analysis.—The basic unit of analysis was the theme, recorded and categorized by its principal topic and frequency of occurrence across all messages. The word would have been a meaningless unit. The sentence would have been inappropriate as many sentences contained two or more clauses, each with two or more principal topics. Thus, deciding which of the topic referents was the principal one in each sentence would have been confusing and unreliable.
Analysis procedure: category construction.---The major referents of the Dole rhetoric of interest to the researcher were: (A) McGovern, (B) Nixon, (C) the Republican Party, (D) the Democratic Party, (E) Republicans other than Nixon, and (F) Democrats other than McGovern.

So, the first step was to determine what themes were linked to each of the above referents. Each sentence of every message was examined in order to list all themes for each major referent above. As the researcher compiled each list of themes, he saw that many were repeated and that themes could be grouped by the subject matter common to, or inferred from, various clusters of themes. Hence, when each list was finished it was reorganized, placing each theme under appropriate categories. For example, the themes linked to McGovern generally could be classified under one of these major areas.

A. McGovern

1. McGovern Campaign.


Analyzing the themes under each such category showed that themes could be further divided into sub-
categories. For example, the "McGovern Campaign" (A1) themes could be sub-divided into:

A. McGovern

1. McGovern Campaign
   --Devoid of substantive program proposals.
   --Filthiest, vilest of American politics.
   --Campaign of political stiletto.
   --Was a circus.
   --Had undercover operation of its own.
   --Etc.

So for each referent (A-F), theme categories were inferred by examination of the subject matter and frequency of each specific theme. In a similar way, sub-categories of themes were derived, which more specifically described the themes each subsumed. Each theme was then placed under an appropriate sub-category. All themes linked to each referent were so listed under the referent in such an outline organization.

Analysis procedure: the content portrayal.—Each organized list of themes thus served as the content analysis workchart. Using these charts, the researcher again went through each message sentence-by-sentence, recording a "1" in a space next to the respective theme each time the manifest theme appeared. The total mentions of each theme were summed and expressed as percentages. As one can see in the "Message" chapter, the percentages there are listed as functions of (1) total mentions of specific theme divided by
total themes across all speeches, or (2) total mentions of theme (e.g., McGovern campaign of political stiletto) divided by total references to the referent category (e.g., McGovern campaign), or (3) total mentions of theme divided by total references to the major referent (e.g., McGovern).

The end result sought was simply to achieve a means through which one could describe and generalize about content and content emphases, especially those of particular interest to the queries of this study. In this way, the analyst tried to use a method which would portray Dole's major content thrusts over time, and yet facilitate examination of Dole's treatment of specific issues, persons, themes, etc. Reliability of the procedure was pre-tested by having two other coders each so analyze the same sample speeches to determine if their results would correspond to the researcher's.

Documents Examination

"Official Reports to the Republican National Committee," First Monday (Jan. 1, 1973 summary issue), official RNC personnel rosters, the Kansas Secretary of State, records of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee (1948-1973), and State Profiles published by the RNC, and selected Kansas media as cited were sources of information for the chapter on the "Communication Group."
Dole's campaign map of state-by-state appearances, supplied by Scanlon, served as the data base for identifying Dole's schedule of speaking for the campaign period, i.e., the composite picture of targets.

Media visibility analysis.—Since one major objective of the communicators was to generate as much media "play" as possible to diffuse their messages nationally, the researcher examined how well this goal was attained by asking: Of the sixty-six attempts made to generate national news, how many succeeded in the campaign period? Since it was obviously not practical for the researcher to analyze all media, he selected three newspapers— the New York Times, Washington Post, and Chicago Tribune—and Time, U.S. News, and Newsweek, and one national television network, NBC, for analysis. The New York Times was selected because it provided the most comprehensive and concentrated daily coverage of the campaign. The Chicago Tribune was chosen because the communicators identified it as one of the "most sympathetic" to the GOP cause. Historically, it has endorsed GOP candidates almost exclusively and maintained a conservative stance. The communicators assessed the Washington Post as unsympathetic and "anti-Nixon." Hence, it was reasoned that the three papers taken together would provide a relatively balanced view of Dole coverage. Moreover, each of these three papers is usually included in analyses
of press coverage of major campaigns in *Journalism Quarterly* and are usually designated as elite opinion-leader papers by *Editor and Publisher* studies. NBC was selected by-and-large at "random." The three news magazines are the major mass circulation news periodicals.

Using the indices of the NBC computerized archives in New York City, the researcher obtained a listing of the date, time, and general substance of each Dole mention on every show on the network throughout 1972. He purchased copies of each of the three papers for each campaign day of the campaign and clipped each story covering or mentioning Dole. He did the same with the news magazines. With these data, it was possible to ascertain not only how many news-making attempts succeeded, but also to determine what was the major thrust of each news story. That is, did the media stress what the communicators wanted them to emphasize? In essence, the unit of analysis here was the whole article, as stories attempted (news releases) and news materializing are compared. Use of such a large unit of analysis is supported by Danielson.

Copies of Dole news releases and messages throughout the campaign period were furnished by the Republican National Committee. These messages, the news media sources, the RNC materials provided, the interviews with newsmen and partisans, and with RNC staffers, Chairman Dole, and White House personnel served as the principal data bases.
Summary

The topic question of this dissertation is: What are the communication roles of national political party organizations, and of what significance are these endeavors? Motivated by (a) a set of trends in the literature that imply a diminishing campaign role for the party organization, (b) by the curious absence to date of much research on the topic area, and (c) his intense interest in and access to party communication, the researcher specifies a manageable case study approach to the 1972 communication roles of the Republican National Chairman, Robert Dole, and staff. Due to the state of inquiry on the topic and the nature of the question, the method is exploratory, designed to generate new insights and hypotheses as they relate to communication theory.

These basic research areas are delineated, with corresponding sub-questions to guide the study: the rhetorical situation, inputs and influences on the communicators, their backgrounds and predispositions, the communication objectives, the means of diffusion, content and technique, and communication consequences.

Perspective is sought in analyzing "effect" or "consequences" of the Dole rhetoric. The two primary target audiences and Dole's own staff assess the significance of this rhetorical effort. Moreover, as an index to
the success of the Dole attempt at mass communication, content of one national television network, three national magazines, and three metropolitan newspapers is analyzed for Dole "visibility." What was the nature and extent of the availability of his message to news consumers—the potential voters?

Other means of inquiry include content analysis of the Dole messages, document examination, and interviewing with open-ended questions.

Since communication is a process of interacting variables, this study looks at Dole rhetoric as an over-all process, and attempts to unravel its essence—the relevant sets of involved variables and the nature of their inter-relationships.

Like all communication, the rhetoric of the 1972 Republican National Chairman did not emerge from a vacuum. It was in part the function of the rhetorical situation of political America in the early 1970's.
Notes


7 DeVries and Tarrance, pp. 73-78, 19-37, and 11-17.

8 DeVries and Tarrance, pp. 73-90.

9 Napolitan, p. 65; Mendelsohn and Crespi, p. 267.

10 Nimmo and Glick discuss this theme.

11 Regulations as mandated by Federal Election Campaign Act of the 92nd Congress of the United States set stricter limitations on amounts parties could spend on behalf of a candidate.


13 The Republican and Democratic National Committees, for example, operate separately from their respective Congressional Campaign Committees. The Congressional Campaign Committees service all national legislative candidacies to the extent resources of each allow.

14 Pomper, p. 3.


17 First Monday, January 1, 1973, and 1972 Annual Report to the Republican National Committee. (The Republican National Committee will be referred to hereafter as "RNC.")

18 George Rothwell, Press Secretary, Democratic National Committee, Interview, January 9, 1973; and Marie Cunningham, Administrative Assistant to Jean Westwood, Democratic National Chairperson, Interview, January 9, 1973, the Watergate, Washington, D.C.
Rothwell interview; Cunningham interview.

Interview with Michael Baroody, Director of Public Affairs, RNC, January 8 and 9, 1973, Washington, D.C. Baroody was the speechwriter for Dole.


J. Michener, Report of the County Chairman (New York: Random House, 1961); Oliver Pilat, Lindsay's Campaign (Boston: Beacon, 1968); Ray Bliss, Transcript,


Wycoff.

Glick.

Kelley.

Nimmo.


Bone.

Cotter and Hennessey.

39. Cotter and Hennessey, p. 68.
40. Cotter and Hennessey, p. 69.
41. Cotter and Hennessey, p. 70.
42. Cotter and Hennessey, p. 70.
43. Cotter and Hennessey, p. 73.
44. Cotter and Hennessey, p. 78.
45. Cotter and Hennessey, p. 62.
46. Cotter and Hennessey, p. 81.
47. Cotter and Hennessey, p. 90.
49. Cotter and Hennessey, p. 100.
50. Cotter and Hennessey, pp. 68, 80.
52. Cotter and Hennessey, p. 104.
53. Marz.
57. Marz, pp. 701-703.

Wallace Fotheringham, Perspectives on Persuasion (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1966).

Wayne Booth, "The Rhetorical Stance," College Composition and Communication, 14:139-145.

Sellitz, p. 78.


Bauer, p. 126; Zimmerman, p. 238; Schramm and Danielson, p. 282; Pool and Abelson, p. 42.


Bradley (1967); Golden (1966); and T. C. Sawyer, "Message Preparation in a Primary Campaign," in Makay and Brown, Rhetorical Dialogue.


DeVries and Tarrance, p. 74.

DeVries and Tarrance, p. 74.

Robert Teeter is the political director of Market Opinion Research of Detroit, Michigan, and guided all surveys upon which the ticket-splitting book is based.


Scammon and Wattenburg, pp. 56-58.


88 Baroody interview, January 8, 1973, Washington, D.C.


90 Marz, pp. 702-703.


92 Cotter and Hennessey, pp. 68-90.


94 DeBolt interview.

95 James Duerk of Senator William Saxbe's office (R-Ohio), and Jane Ross of staff of John Y. McCallister.

96 See Appendix B for interview listing.


99 See Appendix B for complete listing of interviews.

100 Sellitz, pp. 264-267.

101 Sellitz, p. 264.

102 Sellitz, pp. 264-265.


104 Dexter and White, p. 143.


See Appendix B for all interviews.

ABC response was significantly above that of other networks, due probably to the researcher's acquaintance with some respondents through his participation in a different ABC survey in 1971.


Guides to content analysis research were Wayne Danielson, "Content Analysis in Communication Research," in Ralph Nafziger and David White, Introduction to Communication Research (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), pp. 180-206; and Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research (Glenco, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952). For another source, R. Budd et al., An Introduction to Content Analysis (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1965).

Editor and Publisher, April 12, 1960, p. 12; Stempel, p. 115.

From complete listing of all Dole on-air appearances throughout 1972, furnished by the NBC Network in New York City to the researcher.

CHAPTER II

THE RHETORICAL CONTEXT

The Domestic Scene

Though the 1972 Presidential contest formally began the week before Labor Day, many events which, in part, shaped its nature and outcome had occurred well before the traditional fall campaign opening. 

Domestically, inflation and rising prices prevailed, but so did tranquility. The overt racial strife and campus turmoil prevalent in the late 1960's had nearly vanished, as had the "demonstration" as a prevalent mode of expressing dissatisfaction or focusing attention on an issue. Though prices and unemployment rose, Americans were also experiencing wage-and-price controls the President had initiated August 15, 1971, and were debating their effectiveness. The military draft had decreased significantly and had become to young men far less threatening due to the adoption of a lottery system. Their exposure to the draft was cut from seven years to one year. Though Richard Nixon had a new Attorney General and had influenced the Supreme Court membership with four rather conservative appointments, consistent with his 1968 "law and order" pledges, crime rates continued to skyrocket. And so
did the number of persons on welfare rolls. Proposals for welfare and tax reform flourished, but the reform failed to materialize. While cries to save the environment continued to proliferate, so did water, land and air pollution without significant diminution. And "power brown-outs" in several metropolitan areas signaled a growing concern for seemingly diminishing sources of energy.

Along with ecology, another major "cause" became prevalent in the news media: "women's liberation." Women's groups contended that discrimination against their sex had resulted in unequal opportunities for them in the economic and professional spheres, sexual exploitation, and unfair stereotyping of their role in society. Though much of the "women's rights" legislation was not adopted, another minority group had prospered electorally in the early seventies. The 26th Amendment, passed July 12, 1971, lowered voting age to 18. Still, many of Nixon's "Great Goals"--full employment, environmental restoration, government reorganization--announced in 1971, had resulted in little action.

In government, the Democrats retained solid majorities in both Houses of Congress, controlled 35 Statehouses, and most city halls in top metropolitan areas. National polls also showed that Democrats were in the majority. About 40 per cent of America's voters identified themselves
as Democrats, 27 per cent as Republicans, and 30 per cent as Independents. 4

The International Sphere

On the international scene, the United States took what Nixon called "dramatic initiatives in building a new structure of peace." The President continued to scale down U.S. ground troop involvement in Vietnam through a program of "Vietnamization" begun May 1969, in which Vietnam military forces replaced departing U.S. units. However, U.S. air support continued over not only Vietnam, but over Laos and Cambodia also. As fall of 1972 approached, administration efforts—headed by Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger—to secure what Nixon called "peace with honor" in Southeast Asia, received increasing play in the world news media as Paris negotiations between the involved countries grew in frequency and intensity over the July 19 to October 24, 1972 period. 5 By that summer it became apparent that some negotiated settlement might, indeed, become a reality. For such a rapprochement had precedent in other "agreements" with Communist governments the U.S. had achieved earlier in the year.

On July 15, 1971, President Nixon revealed that Kissinger had met secretly with key leaders of the People's Republic of China, and that these meetings had resulted in firm plans for Nixon's subsequent trip to Mainland China to
open communication with this long isolated adversary. The President's visit was to be the first by an American President to Communist China, and for the five days in February, he, his entourage of aides, and newsmen would be on the mainland to engage in and report on lengthy discussions with Chinese leaders, including Chairman Mao-Tse-Tung. Events also included tours and spectacular state dinners—all of which received massive, constant coverage by the U.S. news media. In order to further build "a new structure of peace in the world" and to encourage the fuller development of needed social, political, and economic interdependencies with another major political adversary, Nixon journeyed to Russia in June, 1972, to explore areas in which the two super powers could agree to aid one another and reduce international tension.

The two trips, plus another action—a strategic-arms limitation agreement signed on May 26, 1972—signaled, apparently, the intention of the U.S. to seek more conciliatory and cooperative relationships with the Communist giants. Such policy appeared to be a dramatic change from the previous Nixon posture of suspicious competition, ideological condemnation, and relative economic isolation of Communist worlds. Perhaps the moves were some concrete indication that the "old Nixon"—the cold war warrior—was trying to become the internationalist architect of
conciliation. As the President emphasized repeatedly, twentieth-century global realities demanded abandonment of old cold-war policies. Administration approval of admitting Red China to the U.N. coincided with this trend.

From a political standpoint, the foreign policy initiatives were news spectaculars, in which "The President" dominated the media for days at a time. His exposure as a "world leader" was profuse. As some sources alleged, "in a sense, then, his fourth year in office marked the grand finale of a four-year campaign for re-election." Others scoffed at the timing of these events, claiming they simply demonstrated the President's competence and statesmanship as a leader of the non-Communist world.

Democratic Competition at Home

But the internal politics of an election year produced spectaculars of its own. The Democrats started the fray, first running against each other, before their nominee faced, not a single Republican candidate, but "The President" and his vast powers of incumbancy.

Early speculation about the Democratic nominee centered on familiar names of the party's past: Senator Edmund Muskie, Senator Hubert Humphrey, Senator Henry Jackson, Senator Edward Kennedy, and Senator George McGovern. And, this year, another George--Wallace--decided that he, too, would again be a Presidential candidate, but this time
as a Democrat, not as the third party American Independent as was the case in 1968. McGovern was the first to declare his candidacy, a year early, on January 18, 1971, explaining that he needed the extra time to acquaint voters with his positions and his identity. "I seek the Presidency because I believe the people of this country are tired of the old rhetoric, the unmet promise, the image-makers, the practitioners of the expedient." His supporters claimed he would be the candidate of candor, honesty . . . the non-politician who would concentrate on issues. He began with support of 2 per cent of the national population, as sampled by Gallup et al. Kennedy steadfastly maintained that he would not be a candidate due to his family obligations in the context of the assassinations of his two brothers.

Four other candidacies were announced, but short-lived. Senator Fred Harris of Oklahoma, Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa, Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, and New York City Mayor John Lindsay (who switched from the Republican Party on August 11, 1971) all became Presidential hopefuls. Harris abandoned his effort on November 10, 1971, after only a few months, due to a lack of money and support. Hughes abruptly pronounced on July 15, 1971, soon after becoming "available," that his religious views could well become fatally controversial. Bayh dropped out on October 24, 1971, due to his wife's bout with cancer. Senator
William Proxmire of Wisconsin confirmed on November 6, 1971, that he would not run, while Los Angeles Mayor Sam Yorty announced that he did want to be President.

**The contenders.**--Hence, Democratic primary "season" consisted of McGovern v. Muskie v. Humphrey v. Jackson v. Lindsay, v. Wallace, while polls and commentaries from 1969 through 1971 had annointed Muskie as the front-runner. In fact, Muskie continually topped Nixon in national polls. As early as March 18, 1971, Harris claimed, Muskie led the President by 5 per cent. Gallup reported the New Englander was "far ahead" of his fellow Democratic primary rivals among partisans. But beginning with New Hampshire, his primary and state conventions wins were not as frequent and impressive as many observers expected. Concurrently damaging were instances in which Muskie, the immensely cool and composed candidate of 1968 and speaker of 1970 was said to evidence a flaring temper, and in one much publicized incident, the Senator wept, voice breaking, in full view of millions of television viewers in New Hampshire. Of all major Democratic primaries, Muskie won in only two. His momentum faltered badly, whereas Humphrey and Jackson gained little. Humphrey won four primaries and Jackson placed poorly in all. Lindsay withdrew from the race after his final loss in Florida.
The center momentum.--Where the momentum grew was with George McGovern. Before being elected to the Senate in 1963, the 49-year-old South Dakotan served as Food-for-Peace Director in 1961, and previous to that post, he had been a Member of Congress since 1957. McGovern was Executive Secretary of the South Dakota Democratic Party for several years in the 1950's. Through that he inherited the Peace Movement of the late sixties. The former Methodist minister flew 35 missions as a World War II combat pilot, after which he studied for and received his Ph.D. in history from Northwestern University.

South Dakotans re-elected him to a second term in 1968 with 57 per cent of the vote. He became Chairman of the Senate Sub-Committee on Indian Affairs, and also Chairman of the Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Need in the Senate. McGovern assumed much of the Robert Kennedy constituency and professional staff in 1968 when the Senator from New York was shot. McGovern was then overwhelmed by the party traditionalists led by Hubert Humphrey that year.

McGovern not only started his personal campaign a year early, in January 1971, but his loyalists began contesting and winning decisive power positions at the local levels of the Democratic Party well before primary preparations. In any event, traditional leaders, the labor chiefs,
the urban magnates in many states seemed to be outmaneuvered by McGovernites, and then out-voted in many parts of the country by these McGovern loyalists. It was this cadre in many states who fielded effective volunteer organizations in the primaries, and the margin of victory in the state conventions which pledged delegate votes to McGovern. Seemingly, much of McGovern's strength was usually identified with minority groups, youth, and those who fervently sought an end to Indochina conflict and a potent beginning of an era of new politics (i.e., more open government, greater attention to human needs, candor in public servants, and diminished influence of power centers, be they corporations, Presidents, or big-city politicians). McGovern sought to reduce military spending; he stressed "new priorities"—rebuilding cities, an effective war against hunger, and, of course, a job for every American who sought work. But, as McGovern's strength built, every campaign activity was interrupted by sickening violence.

The tragedy of Wallace.—The would-be spoiler of 1968 became a tragedy of 1972. During a May 25th campaign tour, with his strength also rising after substantial victory showings in the Florida, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and Tennessee primaries, George Wallace was shot in Laurel, Maryland. The overly friendly crowd of supporters shielded the presence of an apparently alienated
young man, Arthur Bremer, who sought some mysterious end through political assassination. Though Wallace survived his wounds, his campaign ceased, and his ability to use the lower half of his body was destroyed. The primary campaigning which followed this outrage took on a more muted tone; and George McGovern pushed, with a fresh California victory, closer to the nomination slated for Miami Beach in July.

As the campaigning progressed, still another major event intervened, an event which would influence the Democratic message of 1972: the June 17 night arrest of five burglars in the office of Democratic National Chairman Lawrence O'Brien, at party headquarters in the Watergate Hotel in Washington. The astounding aspects of this incident were that the "burglars" were "bugging" suite phones. Furthermore, one of those apprehended was a former White House consultant and another was Security Chief for the Campaign to Re-Elect the President (CREP), the campaign vehicle of the President. "The Watergate" became a symbol of the "corruption" to which Democrats would try to tie Nixon and his associates in the subsequent months. "The Watergate" was an often repeated theme of the Democratic National Convention, but it was one of the few themes upon which Democrats could agree in Miami Beach during their convention in July 1972.
An open convention.—Like most well-contested political conventions, the 1972 Democratic National Convention was composed of several factions, each coalesced around its particular candidate, each claiming victory was imminent or eventually probable, and each ascribing unfair tactics to the other. But George McGovern had recently won another major victory in New York, capping primary wins in Wisconsin, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Nebraska, Oregon, New Jersey, and California. He had 1,300 of the 1,509 votes needed for the nomination. Humphrey commanded 672 as of the end of June and as Senator "Ted" Kennedy again announced, "There are no circumstances under which I'd accept a nomination for national office this year." McGovern seemed assured of a first-ballot nomination. However, a crucial controversy centered around a Humphrey-led challenge to McGovern's California delegation. McGovern won this dispute, dominated the platforms decision, and won the nomination on the first ballot, July 12, 1972.

His Vice-Presidential choice, after Senator Edward Kennedy declined the offer, was Senator Thomas Eagleton of Missouri. The 43-year-old Eagleton had served as Attorney General of Missouri and as its Lieutenant Governor, before coming to the Senate in 1968.

The 1972 Democratic National Convention was indeed open. Due to the relaxed rules of operation, delegate after
delegate paraded before the cameras in an endless stream of platform proposals, nominating and seconding speeches. So numerous were the participants that each session endured into the early morning hours. In fact, its last session grew longer and longer, resulting in the two convention nominees delivering their acceptance addresses at 3-4 a.m. Speaking to a national audience which had hours before gone to sleep, McGovern sounded his familiar themes woven around the slogan "Come Home America."

Accepting his nomination, achieved "through the most open political process," McGovern complimented his defeated primary foes, "coveting every Republican, Democratic, and Independent." Labeling the President "our unwitting unifier and fundamental issue," McGovern voted, "never underestimate the power of Richard Nixon to bring harmony to Democratic ranks."

Referring to the alleged ITT scandal and "secret funds of the GOP," the nominee pledged to "open doors to government, and close the doors to war." He promised that within 90 days of his inauguration, "every soldier and prisoner will be back home." Calling for America to "turn inward to problems," the Senator asserted his hope to keep defenses strong.

His administration, he contended, would seek justice, and jobs for all, national health insurance, and a fair and
a just tax system. "There is a depletion allowance for oil wells, but no allowance for the depletion of a man's body in years of toil," declared the nominee. Then the Democratic Presidential nominee of 1972 concluded, "From secrecy and deception in high places, from Indochina and wasteful military spending, from special privilege and tax favoritism, from prejudice of race and sex, Come Home!"

Quest for unity.—But, the outcome of the long, competitive trek through the primaries and the agonizingly long convention sessions was that some Democrats went home troubled; for the intra-party disputes had seemingly damaged the McGovern candidacy. Hubert Humphrey had given the impression, especially in the California primary, that McGovern defense and foreign policies were dangerous and outside the domain in which the two parties usually competed. Jackson's rhetoric, too, had implied McGovern was out of the mainstream of defense and social issues. The primaries had given Republicans some of their best ammunition to use against George McGovern. 20

Significantly, too, the Convention battles wounded the power magnates of the party, including Richard J. Daley of Chicago and the AFL-CIO's George Meany—who had been beaten. Said Meany on July 20, "I will not endorse, not support, and not vote for George McGovern." 21 Chicago's Mayor Daley, a lifelong "party man," had even been unseated
with his slate of delegates from Illinois, and in their place was seated the "alternate" delegation, with the charismatic black leader, Reverend Jesse Jackson. This action was in large part a result of implementation of the new Democratic Convention rules, which assured that delegate selection processes would reflect socio-economic and racial proportions of each state's population. Some traditional Democratic powers had been alienated not only by their loss to young "newcomers" and by the new rules of delegate selection, but by some of McGovern's stands on Vietnam, amnesty, and by his identification with more controversial youth groups. George McGovern faced the task of securing the support he had lost among major traditional power bases in his party.

But, before his efforts at party conciliation and unification could begin, they were interrupted by a devastating revelation by the Knight newspapers on July 24, 1972. Senator Thomas Eagleton, the man George McGovern had proposed to be "a heartbeat" away from the Presidency, had suffered three bouts of mental depression for which he had been hospitalized and had received electric shock treatments.

The Eagleton Affair.--The media throughout the country gave the story lead play; so, on July 26, 1972, candidates McGovern and Eagleton held a joint news
conference during which the Vice Presidential candidate traced his medical history and confirmed the press revelations about his medical history. Senator McGovern immediately professed strong "1,000 per cent" support for Eagleton, noting emphatically that he would have selected the Senator "even if I had fully known" his medical history previous to the Vice Presidential designation. McGovern and Eagleton concurrently acknowledged that the Presidential nominee had not known about the Senator's health problems beforehand.

With McGovern continuing his public support of Eagleton, the Vice Presidential nominee campaigned throughout the country, meeting with Democratic leaders and friendly crowds during the following week. But, important Democratic and editorial voices called for his resignation over the period of July 27-31, stressing primarily the argument that the campaign issue would become Eagleton's health, rather than the other substantive issues and the candidate's stands on these issues. On July 31, shortly after their joint news conference, McGovern and Eagleton met the press again and announced they had concurrently decided Eagleton's withdrawal would be in the best interests of the Party.

McGovern's campaign was delayed as he began his search for a second Vice President. After five days of press speculation and McGovern invitations to notable
Democrats, the candidate announced a choice who had accepted the offer to run: R. Sargeant Shriver, ebullient 46-year-old Kennedy brother-in-law, former Peace Corps Director, Director of the OEO, a past Newsweek editor, and highly respected business manager. Shriver was also a candidate far closer to the traditional Democratic pillars than was McGovern, and a campaigner who viewed his challenge with relish. Hence, the Democrats again convened, but in lesser numbers, at a Washington, D.C. mini-convention on August 8, 1972, to ratify the new McGovern running mate.

**Pity poor Mr. Nixon.**—Accepting the ratification of the Democratic National Committee that evening, Shriver said, "I am not embarrassed to be George McGovern's seventh choice for Vice President. We Democrats may be short of money, but we're not short of talent. Pity poor Mr. Nixon, his first and only choice was Spiro Agnew."23 (Nixon had revealed his recommendation on July 17, 1972, to renominate Agnew.)

After a grueling season of primaries and delegate selection, pierced by the Wallace shooting, marked with fellow Democrats' severe criticism of him and visible alienation of some of the Party old guard, weakened by the demoralizing Eagleton affair, and plagued with national polls showing him far behind his opponent, George McGovern, still demonstrating vibrance, resilience, and optimism,
added campaign professional Lawrence O'Brien as his national campaign chairman, then turned his energies and rhetoric toward the task of defeating Richard Nixon.

The Visible President

The strategy.--However, in 1972, there was no Richard Nixon, the candidate, to campaign against. There was Richard Nixon, who as President, was going to carry out the "heavy burdens" of the White House, without descending to engage in partisan politics—for that matter, without mentioning his opponent. That was the strategy.24

Nixon had achieved much as President. He had done so and would continue to do so by devoting all his abundant executive competence, so said his aides, to being President. He was the leader of all the people, not just Republicans. Moreover, the challenges of our time, the argument alleged, were too great for partisan approaches. Americans needed a President who sought and received support from all segments of society. The nameless opposition was simply far out-of-touch with the principles and goals all Americans—whatever their party—agreed upon. Even worse, the opposition was phenomenally naive about the realities of governing the issues that faced Americans, and was indecisive and inconsistent in his approaches to each; 1972 was no time to take a chance, a scary chance, on such a candidate, the strategy contended. The problems required a President, one whose
achievements of the past could only signal an even better
repeat performance in a second term. The President had to
have four more years to complete such success. Moreover,
he deserved them. As *Newsweek* quoted a Nixon aide, "The
essence of our campaign is to keep the President, President.
George McGovern cannot win unless he de-Presidents' the
President." 25

The Nixon forces established corollary strategies
to complement this thrust. 26 First, there was to be no
Richard Nixon, the personality who had become a hate-symbol
for many Democrats. He was always to be depicted as the
President, and as a competent President, so Democrats and
Independents could more easily support him. Second, an
achieving and effective President had no time and too much
dignity to campaign. So, Cabinet members, governors,
senators, mayors would campaign for him as "Presidential
surrogates," and Nixon would not campaign actively. Third,
the campaign would be run not by a Republican Party, but
by a C.R.E.P., a group who could appeal to Independents,
Democrats, and ticket-splitters. There would be nothing
partisan about the President. So the Committee to Re-Elect
the President was established in 1971, run by former and
ongoing White House staffers. Fourth, a functioning
organization would be independently fielded, led by former
Democratic Governor and Navy Secretary, John B. Connelly, a
well-known LBJ protege. It would develop a separate media
campaign, a fund-raising arm, and personal appeals with Democratic leaders and voters. Fifth, major resources of the Republicans' campaign--fund-raising, staff, media, and all the advantages of incumbency--were to be directed to the Presidential race, operating on the coat-tail theory that if the top-of-the-ticket did well, others on the ballot would fare well also.

This campaign, according to White House strategy, would be President-centered. Americans would be asked to coalesce around a symbol that the Nixon group thought they could further sanctify, putting the nameless opposition at the polar opposite. Competence, insight, effectiveness, decisiveness, managerial efficiency were all labels to describe the Nixon Presidency, the campaigners contended.

According to Presidential Consultant Patrick Buchanan:

We did it in 70--attack, attack, attack, and within two weeks we had 'em on the run, changing their ads . . . everything . . . but we only had one issue . . . the social one and we had blown our wad by September 25 . . . and had to spend the rest of the time retrenching. This year we didn't want to do that. We went into the old man and showed him these issues and showed him how we could drop one at a time on McGovern, then reweave them all. . . . Look . . . our polls showed 55-63% were not especially for Richard Nixon, many did not even think he was an especially good President. You don't win them by running out saying "I'm Republican, I'm Republican." What you do talk about is "this McGovern, this radical," and attack, attack, attack to keep where he's weakest in the forefront. "Why he means acid, amnesty, abortion, welfare giveaways, cutting our defense in half." Maybe a
lot of these people wouldn't vote for Richard Nixon but you could get 'em to vote for the President.27

The GOP Convention.—On August 17, as Lyndon Johnson and Mayor Daley finally endorsed McGovern-Shriver, the GOP began gathering in Miami Beach. The Republican Convention was devoid of much controversy or conflict. The weak challenges to the President and his platform by California Congressman Paul McCloskey and conservative Ohio Member, John Ashbrook, never built an increment of momentum and were soundly defeated. In a meticulously scripted three days, August 22-24, the Republicans ratified the choice of Spiro Agnew, as had been recommended by Nixon in July, then listened to the old Nixon rival, Nelson A. Rockefeller, nominate the President for a second term. The GOP speeches, votes to confirm "winning team," and delegate events were all aimed to reach the largest possible media audience.

The new majority.—In August, with the Convention ended, the Republicans, encouraged by polls showing an overwhelming 34-point lead for the President, looked toward November with optimism, voiced caution against over-confidence, and began sounding the themes Nixon and Agnew had voiced in their acceptance speeches:

I ask everyone, Democrats, Republicans, Independents, to join our new majority, not the basis of the Party label, on your lapel, but on the basis
of what you believe in your hearts. . . . The new American majority is bound together not by a gain for power, but by common ideals. . . . To the Democrats we say come home, not to another Party . . . but to the great principles we Americans believe in together. The choice is not between no change and radical change, but between change that works, and change that won't work. . . . Americans don't want to be part of a quota, but part of America. . . . The way to end discrimination against some, is not to begin discrimination against others. . . .

Our opponents would destroy our system. I believe in it. If we accept their programs, the average American would work more for the government than for themselves . . . their platform means a 50% tax hike . . . . We want to go forward, not detour to the left. They offer incentives for welfare. [We say] get off welfare and go to work. [We want] to reduce taxes, cut inflation, develop new jobs . . . to strengthen peace forces over criminal forces. We oppose isolation and propose a new structure of peace . . . with a defense second to none. We seek peace with honor . . . to stand by our friends. Great progress has been made in Vietnam . . . the trips to Moscow and Peking have turned confrontation to negotiation . . . but we must be strong. The opposition would make us No. 2. But we must never negotiate from weakness. We have the opportunity to be peacemakers of the world. . . . Strength is the guardian of peace.28

Little reference was made to the Nixon welfare program, revenue-sharing, government reorganization or other "Great Goals" such as the massive anti-cancer program enunciated earlier in the term. Nor did "Watergate" surface.

A day after the Convention, Agnew held a news conference, candidly stating that his 1970 campaign style would not endure in 1972. I'm "issue-oriented," he said. The same day, Agnew's counterpart, Sargeant Shriver, unleashed an opening salvo representative of his coming
rhetoric, "Richard Nixon is the No. 1 warmaker of the world." 29

On August 28, George Meany reaffirmed AFL-CIO neutrality, and two days later McGovern predicted he would name Congressman Wilbur Mills as his Treasury Secretary, and unveiled clarified programs in tax and welfare reform. Also on August 30, John Connelly formally announced the "Democrats for Nixon," which would include former Johnson aides, sons of FDR, and entertainers Frank Sinatra and Sammy Davis Jr. Concurrently, RNC Chairman Robert Dole charged the Democrats with new violations of campaign law, shortly after the GAO alleged that the CREP had "irregularities" in their fund-raising operation. 30

The Campaign

The first week.—McGovern opened the formal campaign, 34 per cent behind Nixon on September 2, 1972, with the goal of "making news" by appearances in three media markets per day. "I am here to put down GOP distortions on abortions, pot, and amnesty," was his refrain. 31 He added repeatedly that his campaign would focus on the "great contrasts" between him and Nixon. RNC Chairman, Robert Dole, began his allegations that the McGovern campaign had violated the campaign laws, as the Washington Post intensified its coverage of "The Watergate" and its possible ties to the White House. 32 Beginning his sharp attacks on Nixon, Sargeant
Shriver said the President was a "hypocrite," while the incumbent Executive began its part in the campaign with Communications Director Herbert Klein's admonition to the GOP that by Election Day, the President would be only five points ahead of McGovern. Three days later, Senator Edward Kennedy joined Shriver in campaigning to "bring you the real George McGovern," and the CREP announced that the President was so involved in governing that thirty-five "surrogates" would campaign throughout the country, speaking on his behalf. Though not formally dubbed a "surrogate," Office of Management and Budget Director Casper Weinberger attacked McGovern's defense proposals as "reckless." The same day, Lawrence O'Brien of the Democratic National Committee protested that his phone was tapped.

The end of the week featured a Nixon pledge, announced through White House aide John Ehrlichman, of "no new taxes." And, the week marked the start of McGovern's emphasis of the White House link to Watergate and his allegations that Nixon was "a friend only of special interests." "Richard Nixon made a deal with U.S. grain speculators . . . ," he charged, in relation to a U.S.-U.S.S.R. wheat agreement. McGovern also spent much of the week explaining his statements about aide Pierre Salinger's Paris meetings with the North Vietnamese. An AP news story had reported that Salinger met with the North Vietnam
delegation in Paris on McGovern's behalf. McGovern at first denied he had so instructed Salinger, then later confirmed Salinger's North Vietnamese contact on his behalf. Finally, the first week also initiated several campaign appearances of the Nixon daughters and sons-in-law, opening CREP urban and suburban headquarters in major metropolitan areas of the country.

The second week.--In the second week, McGovern strengthened his rhetorical offensive, claiming Nixon was "a tool of the rich at the expense of the common man."38 Appearing with Kennedy at his side in Detroit, Cleveland, and Chicago, McGovern sounded the theme, "Richard Nixon is hiding . . . is afraid of the people."39 In Chicago, the nominee welcomed conciliation with Mayor Richard Daley, who again endorsed his candidacy. He also began his TV campaign of short, one- and five-minute commercials in which he conversed informally with small groups of people in "slice-of-life" settings, stressing the theme, "McGovern--Democrat for the People." Klein fired back that McGovern was "already using the tactics of desperation," and was grabbing for Kennedy as a "crutch," since the nominee still was 34 per cent behind "The President."40

But Richard Nixon, too, turned to a past party figure in his initial campaign public appearance. New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller journeyed with Nixon to
Philadelphia, where they joined Democratic Mayor Rizzo for a "non-political dedication," during which Rizzo and the President warmly lauded each other. Rizzo later crossed party lines to endorse the President's re-election.

The third week.--The First Lady noticeably entered the third week of the contest by opening a six-day campaign of her own, "taking the White House to the people." She toured seven states, concentrating on a minimum of words, but on high visibility in key electoral bastions of Illinois, Texas, and California. The President, meanwhile, undertook his second major campaign appearance, with brief stops in New York, Texas, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, for two days, emphasizing his "initiatives" in foreign policy and lauding the steps he had taken to curtail drug traffic. In a blow to the McGovern candidacy, the usually Democratic United Steelworkers Union declared their neutrality.

Concurrently, McGovern asserted that the administration had failed miserably in combatting drug abuse, and began the first of a series of 30-minute fireside chats on television in evening prime time. Former Johnson Defense Secretary Clark Clifford buttressed McGovern's proposed defense program by asserting that the U.S. could and should cut millions from its military budget. The role of Sargeant Shriver also became more evident. His goal seemingly was to create more unity among Democrats and his speeches were
replete with references to the "greats" of the Democratic Party. They were also infused with charges of "high unemployment, high prices, and unfair taxes," as he circulated throughout traditional Democratic strongholds such as Pittsburgh, Chicago, and industrial New Jersey, lambasting the familiar old common enemy of many Democrats: Nixon.

Less visible was his counterpart, Spiro Agnew, whose speaking appearances had not yet become frequent. However, as Watergate made larger headlines, as the defendants came to trial, Agnew stressed the theme that "the Watergate was a 'set-up' to embarrass the GOP." As the principals traded charges, the Party Chairmen, Robert Dole and Jean Westwood, signed a Fair Campaign Practices pledge, then each proceeded to verbalize statements charging the other with unfair tactics.

The fourth week.—McGovern persisted in portraying Nixon as a tool of special interests and as an ally of big business. He also claimed that the 1972 election was a "referendum on the future of the cities," and pledged greatly increased urban aid at a news conference held with ten big-city mayors. As the first month of campaigning ended, McGovern's attacks on Nixon increased in frequency and in ferocity. He accused Nixon of "lying about bombing . . . it is not for release of prisoners . . . but to prop up Thieu . . . ."

McGovern also became more strongly
defensive of himself as Republican attacks at him also accelerated. "I love this country; don't question my patriotism." New support soon appeared for the Democratic nominee. Nine unions endorsed him, Senator Hubert Humphrey and Mayor John Lindsay went on the campaign trail for him, while Shriver pursued his apparent goal of rallying Party loyalists.

As the Democrats carried on their day-to-day intensive multi-event campaigning, the President clung to his strategy of highly limited campaign appearances. During the last of the first month, Nixon made only one other foray: singular appearances in Baltimore, suburban New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. His basic message was the same: "I am bringing lasting peace to the world and forging policies that will sustain a strong economy with benefits for all Americans." Agnew's schedule increased, as did his hammering at the "naivete, danger, and foolishness" of the McGovern defense program.

The fifth week.---Some of the most blatant and serious charges of the campaign marked the first week of October. Eleanor McGovern, wife of the nominee, appeared on Meet the Press on October 1, labeling the Nixon Administration "the most corrupt regime in U.S. history." Her husband added to the charge the following day, "This Administration is characterized by opportunism and political
manipulation,49 and in the following five days, compared the GOP to the KKK, said that Nixon "follows murderous and barbaric policies," and said that his Administration, "the trickiest, most corrupt, and deceitful in history," had left Americans with a legacy of distrust and disbelief.50

More positively, McGovern announced if elected his government appointees would represent minorities proportionately, and he would soon unveil a plan to conclude the Vietnam War. He also expressed gratification that he had gained six points in the national polls. Shriver maintained his heavy speaking schedules, pointing out that "McGovern is in the Democratic tradition of FDR, Truman, and Kennedy," as the Vice Presidential candidate traveled throughout Ohio, Illinois, and Minnesota.51 Both Democratic nominees continued, also, to respond directly to GOP criticism, with McGovern extolling his own "credibility" and clarifying what he had said on amnesty, abortion, and marijuana issues. He also stressed, "I handled the Eagleton affair with compassion."52

The incumbents were hardly silent. The President sent written notices to all Social Security recipients to "inform" them of the 20 per cent boost in their benefits. The Vice President began expressing "deep concern about the 'smears' the opposition are resorting to." The television commercials of the Committee to Re-Elect the President
turned to attacking McGovern's defense proposals as severely weakening America's position in the world. The Nixon organization also initiated its mail campaign, distributing 12,000,000 "personalized" letters. Even Tricia Nixon Cox stepped up her appearances, appearing especially in southern cities, while RNC co-chairperson Anne Armstrong launched a bus tour of 40 cities. Committee to Re-Elect the President Director Clark McGregor pronounced that the campaign was between "We are organized vs. McGovern's 'we've got to get organized.'"54

The sixth week.—On October 8, the New York Times reported that its surveying showed that a national sample now indicated a 50-state sweep for Richard Nixon.55 Concurrently, the trips of Kissinger and aide, General Alexander Haig, to Paris for negotiations with the North Vietnamese, and to Saigon for talks with the South Vietnamese, became increasingly more salient in the news. Nixon himself reaffirmed his pledge to avoid new taxes and urged the Democratic Congress to impose a ceiling on government spending. In another rare public campaign appearance, the President motorcaded through Atlanta, speaking there of "a new American majority . . . the need for a strong national defense . . . [his] efforts to achieve peace with honor . . . and to strengthen the peace forces over the
criminal forces . . . ," while boasting of "a strong non-
inflationary economy."56

In detailed attacks on McGovern, Vice President
Agnew claimed the Democratic nominee would "cut the defense
budget to the bone . . . have a stripped-down defense . . .
bring America to isolationism . . . push by more government
spending, more Washington-directed social programs . . .
and was without a 'plan for America.'"57 He accused
McGovern of being "irresponsible, immature, desperate . . .
as one who relies on smear and innuendo . . . stirs hate
. . . and cannot turn to issues since he has changed [his
positions] them so often."58 The Vice President also
concluded that McGovern had no personal or political
credibility, and his campaign was one "absent of ethics and
efficiency." In contrast, the Vice President claimed,
Richard Nixon would mean "peace, security, prosperous
economic policies, full employment, sweeping governmental
reform, decentralization of the federal bureaucracy, while
restoring state and local government to equal partner-
ship."59

With candor, Herbert Klein noted in a public
statement that in 1972:

The No. 1 consideration is the Presidential race.
The Congressional elections are a secondary con-
ideration, but not a forgotten one. There is
nothing unusual about the fact our ads never mention
the Republican Party. We want to make it as easy
as possible for Independents and Democrats to vote for the President. We recognize the historical trend toward ticket-splitting.\textsuperscript{60}

The Democrats' scathing attacks on Richard Nixon continued. "He's put four million on welfare," spouted McGovern. "Under him, we have a never ending war. . . . a war that is one of the worst crimes in the history of the world."\textsuperscript{61} Added Mrs. McGovern, still campaigning heavily on her own schedule, "Richard Nixon means scandal, collusion, an immoral war . . . he has duped and cheated those on welfare . . . spends money on the military, but not at home."\textsuperscript{62} On October 10, McGovern spent thirty minutes of prime TV time airing his "plan" on Vietnam. Portraying the election as a choice between "four more years of war or four years of peace," the Democratic nominee pledged that all military personnel and equipment would be out of North Vietnam within 90 days of his inauguration, that Sargeant Shriver would go to Hanoi to negotiate release of the POW's, and that all support to Saigon would cease.\textsuperscript{63} He also accused Richard Nixon of unleashing "the heaviest air bombardment the world has ever known," and emphasized, "I am no radical." Shriver joined the attack, claiming that the President had failed the cause of justice, in fact had politicalized the federal criminal justice system, had instituted no reform, and had given special interests and contributors unequal access to "justice."\textsuperscript{64}
The seventh week.—Vice President Agnew retorted: "George McGovern is naive, inconsistent, and incompetent . . . would lead us into isolationism and economic chaos." President Nixon, meanwhile, ventured into suburban New York, sounding the theme "that it is time to stand up to the big spenders." Two days later, the President aired another nationwide radio talk, this one on federal aid and education, strongly reaffirming his stand against busing to achieve racial balance.

The Democratic nominee said that only he would "put people first," restoring an economic health. "Employment will be my No. 1 economic priority." He accused Nixon of "practicing a harsh and inhumane economic policy." McGovern claimed, too, that Nixon was "needlessly prolonging the Vietnam War to satisfy the right-wing." On October 25, the South Dakota Senator issued one of his most piercing condemnations of the President: "The U.S. faces a moral and constitutional crisis because of Richard Nixon's abuse of power." His is a "savage effort to intimidate the news media. . . . Corruption, sabotage, and wire-tapping are squarely in the lap of Richard Nixon." McGovern repeatedly called for debates with the GOP nominee, offering "to pay for all." Concurrently, the Democrats began a $2 million flight of radio and TV commercials, each of which criticized Nixon "failures" in crime control,
unemployment, inflation, Vietnam, and one of which linked him to the Watergate incident.

In fact, "Watergate" had now become a most prominent lead issue in the media. The Democratic nominee raised the "break-in" theme persistently, devoting his fifth television talk to morality in government, and to livid denunciation of the GOP.

Criminal activity and political subversion operate deep inside the White House. Men who collect millions in secret money, pass out special favors, order political sabotage, invade offices in the dead of night . . . he hired them to act on his behalf. He's hoping you'll mistake silence for innocence. The issue is who has the integrity needed to restore the bond of trust between electors and the elected.70

However, another major news story was growing at the same time, overshadowing Watergate and other campaign news. An increasing number of signs were showing that Henry Kissinger's now more frequent Paris-Saigon talks seemed to be succeeding, and a peace agreement appeared to be in the offing. On October 24, the New York Times and other media reported that the U.S. and North Vietnam had reached a peace settlement. The rumors were essentially confirmed on October 26, as Henry Kissinger held a news briefing about his five days of negotiations and declared "Peace is at Hand." At hand, that is, provided that the U.S. and North Vietnam agreed on final details of a nine-point provision. Hanoi promptly spelled out its version of
the agreement, with the admonition that the U.S. had until October 31 to sign the "agreement."

The eighth week.—As the campaign concluded, Spiro Agnew toured the South, and the President utilized his Presidential powers signing into law a consumer protection independent agency to set and enforce consumer standards, and an expansion of Social Security benefits. He also pronounced the draft, for all practical purposes, as "ended."71 Reinforcing these actions, Nixon campaigned with singular stops in Ohio, Michigan, Texas, New York, and Pennsylvania, and delivered a national address on defense policy, plus one on programs for citizens aged 65 and over.

Those who propose massive new cuts in military spending place peace and freedom in deadly jeopardy. Strength commands respect, and leads to peace. Weakness and naive sentimentality breed contempt . . . are an open invitation to pressure tactics.72

He asserted again his opposition to amnesty for draft evaders. He also emphasized tax relief for the elderly.

McGovern countered that "Richard Nixon means another 1932 depression. He'll veto us back to 1932."73 Shriver chorused, "Richard Nixon's mind is with Hoover and Coolidge."74 The Democratic nominee, reacting to criticism, told newsmen his "competence" was no issue.

As the candidates flailed, the media unearthed allegations that H. R. Haldeman, White House Chief of Staff,
was linked to "espionage" and subversion agents identified by the Washington Post and Time. Presidential News Secretary Ronald Ziegler denied the charges, and Vice President Agnew added, "The public is tired of corruption charges. There is nothing but smoke. We haven't seen a bit of fire yet." 

So as October ended, George McGovern pronounced that "this campaign is the first in history with only one candidate." The next day the New York Times announced the results of its latest national poll: 318-0 for Nixon in the electoral college, and 56 per cent to 30 per cent for the President in the popular vote.

The ninth week.--The end of the 1972 Presidential campaign brought no surprises from either camp. Appearing in his eleventh visit to New York City, McGovern slammed Nixon as "Mr. Veto . . . heedless of urban despair of the plight of the cities. He's afraid to stand up to the gold-platers and big-wasters in the Pentagon," the nominee alleged. Campaigning later in Minnesota, Ohio, Illinois, and Michigan, McGovern reiterated that, "it doesn't appear to me that peace is near," referring to the Kissinger declaration. He repeatedly said throughout his midwest tour that he and Humphrey shared the same views on the Vietnam War, adding, "It is strange that Richard Nixon waited until the closing hours of this campaign to announce
Sargeant Shriver pronounced that the proposed Vietnam agreement "won't work." "If that's peace with honor, I'd like to know what surrender is." John Lindsay began a tour of New York, lauding George McGovern. "He opened the Democratic Party." And, on November 3, Edward Kennedy again went "on-the-road," speaking for McGovern in Wisconsin, Ohio, and New Jersey, predicting a "Truman victory for the Democrats." Pollster Louis Harris, however, did not agree. He announced that his November 1 sampling showed that Nixon still led McGovern 60 per cent to 32 per cent. Two days later, Herb Klein announced his summary of the support of newspapers in the U.S.: 753 dailies had endorsed Nixon; 56 had supported McGovern.

As had been the case throughout the campaign, the ninth week marked another burst of criticism by an administration official at McGovern. Herbert Stein, Chairman of the Council on Economic Advisers, charged the candidate with "looseness, vacillation, naivete, and cynicism." "The cost of his proposals would not be covered by the tax increases he has suggested even with complete elimination of the U.S. defense establishment." Another surrogate, Nelson Rockefeller, initiated a speaking tour of New York, calling Nixon's "the most successful foreign policy of this century." Nixon himself announced that there would be no
final settlement in Vietnam until all issues were fully resolved to the satisfaction of the United States. Nixon closed his campaign with a brief speech on Election Eve, sounding the themes he had voiced in his relatively few campaign appearances, and, as before, mentioned his opponent not once, but enunciated a non-partisan appeal to join in his advocacy of "the great principles we Americans believe in together." 88

George McGovern spent his last day campaigning at a furious pace, speaking in New York City, Philadelphia, Wichita, Kansas; Long Beach, California. Richard Nixon, he concluded, was "guilty of the 'big lie' and deliberate conniving deception in Vietnam." 89

The landslide.--With the close of the contest came pollsters' predictions of its outcome. Gallup said Nixon would garner 61 per cent, McGovern 38 per cent. Their predictions were generally accurate as November 7th ended: President Richard Nixon was winning a landslide victory over George McGovern. The final popular vote was 60.7 per cent to 37.7 per cent for McGovern.

However, Nixon's popularity did not diffuse down the tickets in each state. The GOP lost two Senate seats, gained 12 House seats, and saw the Democrats gain one governorship. In addition to the massive ticket-splitting,
another phenomenon characterized 1972 voting: the turn-out, 56 per cent of eligible voters, was the lowest since 1948. 90

Summary

Such was the 1972 Presidential campaign, in brief. It was a contest in which one candidate spent much of his resources trying to identify with his party members, and the other tried significantly to dissociate his candidacy from his partisans. It was a campaign replete with harsh rhetorical denunciations on both sides. One candidate concentrated on condemning his opponent, while the other acted as if the source of these charges did not exist. The outcome always seemed apparent, as events shaped the rhetorical situation, usually to the advantage of the incumbent who used his Presidential newsmaking powers to the fullest extent possible.

The McGovern effort.--In fact, it was a campaign in which George McGovern started at a disadvantage. He faced ten competitors in a grueling contest, in comparison to Nixon, for his nomination. The internecine drive for the convention victory drained much money from already depleted Democratic sources. McGovern forces defeated old-line Democratic powers along the way, leaving significant residue of alienation remaining. More significantly, primary opponents' criticism of him gave eager Republicans substantial "quote" ammunition for the general campaign.
The Eagleton health revelations and resignation from the ticket weakened any evident momentum toward intraparty reconciliation after the convention. Further, it steeped him in negative national publicity for several days, in all probability reducing by some increment the over-all effectiveness of his organization. He began his fight a full 34 per cent behind the President.

The McGovern effort was waged at a furious pace, with each day packed with major appearances. His rhetoric stressed "Richard Nixon," linking him to special interests, picturing him as the elitist with no concern for the people. Nixon was the warrior who could never bring peace. He was more concerned with spending for the military than for human and social domestic needs. Worse yet, McGovern refrained, Richard Nixon was deceitful, not candid, manipulative, the trickster, void of ethics. Better yet, McGovern would bring peace, attend to human social needs of all the people, bring about open government filled with candid and honest public servants. It was to be a time for reordered priorities, with special attention to cutting military defense waste. And, McGovern continually asked, where is Richard Nixon? Why is he hiding from the people? As this rhetoric wore on, the Democratic nominee illustrated some of his charges with repeated references to the Watergate and (alleged) allied corruption of the Nixon administration.
Moreover, he spent a significant part of his time "clarifying" his previous statements, responding to Republican criticism.

The thrust of a President.--In contrast, Richard Nixon never mentioned his opponent by name, but fielded an organization of "surrogates" who attacked McGovern relentlessly. Nixon personally made few campaign appearances, opting instead for a series of radio talks, each on a different issue, far even fewer television addresses, and a smattering of on-the-road speaking in key electoral states. From China, Russia, and "Peace is at Hand," the President dominated the news frequently, fully utilizing his powers of incumbency. Dissociating himself from the GOP, Nixon appealed to Democrats and Independents to join him in a "new majority."

The President's campaign portrayed McGovern as naive, incompetent, indecisive, too liberal, and as guided by philosophies that simply did not coincide with those of most Americans, irregardless of their party affiliations. He would try to destroy our system, leave our defenses weak, they argued.

In comparison, Richard Nixon, as his achievements proved, according to his campaigners, was definitely competent, decisive, insightful, resonating with what most Americans wanted and needed. He was purely Presidential,
the argument contended, with significant capacity for governing well. And, he was ignoring Watergate and associated corruption charges, though aides rebutted them, by scoffing at their sources and denying their credibility.

Finally, the 1972 campaign was one of predictability. Most themes were consistent and repetitive. There were no rhetorical surprises in these ten weeks. Even the result was expected: A Nixon Landslide.

Implications for Dole.--As they looked at 1972 and the election, five facts were most evident to Nixon planners. First, the President had never been able to surpass a frustrating 43 per cent in the national polls over the past two years. Second, Muskie appeared to be moving strongly toward his party's nomination—the Muskie who was surpassing Nixon in the polls by 5-6 per cent. Third, only 27 per cent of Americans were identifying themselves as Republicans. Fourth, Nixonites had experienced two Presidential races in which their lead had completely vanished by one election day and nearly vanished by another. Finally, their own polls were showing that Nixon did not elicit overwhelming approval or excitement among the Democrats and Independents that they so vitally needed for victory.

Consequently, the strategy developed to run the President, not Richard Nixon, the minority party Republican.
A Committee to Re-Elect the President, as an extension of the White House, would plan and direct the campaign. As a President, Nixon could certainly not be associated with Republican candidates in their or his campaigns, for his Presidential appeal to Democrats and ticket-splitters had to be uncluttered with partisanship. His identity was that of a President, not a Republican.

For Dole, this strategy was of overriding importance. It meant that the White House-Committee to Re-Elect the President, not the RNC, would be the center of the campaign and its decision-making. It also included a widespread surrogate program that fielded scores of campaign voices which would be equivalent to the President's campaign. Dole, who had been the major Presidential political spokesman on the national scene, within days, soon had 35 competitors. Moreover, the strategy meant that even the National Republican Chairman had to observe a caution: do not alienate Democrats in your rhetoric. The strategy of Presidential dominance concurrently left Republicans across the country without a campaign helping-hand from the top of their ticket.

The failure of significant Democrats to support their nominee in some areas reinforced the strategy, as the Nixon campaign eagerly readied primary opponents' criticism of McGovern for wider diffusion and intensified the planned appeal to Democrats.
The situation that took shape as fall, 1972, approached clearly featured McGovern starting the general campaign at a disadvantage. The hard-fought nomination battle, the change in the Democratic Convention delegate make-up, and some of the nominee's early bases of support, rendered unification of Democrats difficult. The Eagleton affair was no plus, and loss of major labor support helped diminish McGovern's strength as a nominee and his ability to aggressively campaign at the start. The loss of Wallace as a third force in the race seemed to add a large measure of support to Nixon, also. Thus, a number of visible and identifiable events and actions involving McGovern or associated with him in the situation were essentially negative in many respects for the success of his candidacy.

In contrast, the opposition was equivalent not to a campaign of a candidate, but to the actions of a President. By design or coincidence, as the campaign began, the President was establishing visible, memorable indices of doing as President: China, Russia, and Vietnam negotiations, wage and price controls, for instance. As the incumbent, he could shape events and influence, if not make, news so that those ingredients of the rhetorical situation with which he was associated in the public eye positively reflected on him. Watergate was the significant exception. Would Dole have to respond to Democrats' charges on that?
The over-all rhetorical situation, then, was highly suggestive for what Dole messages might be especially appropriate and effective. He could cite clear, sharply defined "achievements" of the President to promote him. And, he could cite Democrats' critical quotes of McGovern. He could refer to the "$1,000 welfare giveaway," as well as the "1,000% support of Eagleton." The rhetorical situation was fertile with potential positive and negative ammunition. Or, he could rebut Democrats' charges. But the situation was constricting too. The well-defined strategy concentrated on only several basic themes. No controversial issues loomed. No surprises unfurled in the campaign. The contest was so predictable in many ways. The situation held great potential for becoming rhetorically stale. Furthermore, as the contest progressed, the level of rhetoric was low. An articulate spokesman could surface as unique amid the many voices of charge and counter-charge.

Many in the media audience probably realized that as one said, "all the action was at CREP." GOP audiences also developed predispositions relevant to the speaker they heard, as the reader will see in Chapter VIII. There was no role for the GOP. They were being "left-out" by the President. Their candidates were receiving no national help from the top of their ticket. Dole faced such media and GOP predispositions, most likely, in many of his forums.
Dole also had to compete with a plethora of sources trying to be heard in the campaign. And, as the reader will see, the President's big lead convinced him that victory for Nixon was assured, and bolstered Dole's advocacy at the White House for sharing more Presidential resources with state-wide candidates. Dole felt that the whole of 1972 had condemned McGovern to defeat before September. It was within this whole that Dole and his staff functioned in the 1972 campaign, responding to, influencing, and interacting with ingredients of this rhetorical situation, the context of his message.
Notes


2 Factual information in this and the following section can be found in "The Nixon Years," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972, pp. 108-114.

3 Based upon statistical abstracts provided by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice.


6 From Nixon's China speech, July 15, 1972, Office of the White House Press Secretary.

7 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972, p. 114.


9 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972, pp. 1042-1043.


Table of All 1972 Primary Returns, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972, p. 1059.

Table of All 1972 Primary Returns, Almanac, p. 1059.

"Is He Really Serious about Becoming President?" New York Times Magazine, May 2, 1971; and Biography issued by McGovern for President Committee, Washington, D.C.


McGovern Biography, McGovern for President Committee.

Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972, pp. 1039-1040.

McGovern press release of entire speech, July 14, 1972, McGovern for President Committee.

October television ads of the Committee to Re-Elect the President, for example, used Humphrey and Jackson quotes criticizing the McGovern defense stance.


Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972, p. 1042.

Shriver speech, August 8, 1972, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 1043.


Newsweek, September 4, 1972, p. 18.


New York Times, October 1, 1972, p. 46.

New York Times, October 1, 1972, p. 46.


New York Times, October 2, 1972, pp. 1, 30; October 3, 1972, pp. 1, 32.


81 New York Times, November 1, 1972, p. 27.
90 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1972, p. 1043.
CHAPTER III

THE COMMUNICATION GROUP

The group of individuals who conceived and diffused Dole's rhetoric on a day-to-day basis was clearly definable, as was noted in Chapter I. Besides Dole himself, the operation included sole speechwriter Michael Baroody; Tom Wilck, Deputy National Chairman for Communication; and Michael Scanlon, Special Assistant to the Chairman for Scheduling and Advance. These four men set communication objectives, planned the means to carry them out, and did, in fact, attempt to implement each over the campaign period. In doing so, they were responsive to a number of inputs, described later, and worked with considerable research support at the RNC.\(^1\)

Since Dole's communication was, in large part, a function of these principals, this chapter focuses upon their personal backgrounds and the organizational context in which they functioned.

The Republican National Committee

Although the organization which developed and disseminated Dole's communication was discrete and autonomous,
to a great degree, it was significantly interdependent with other units of the RNC. To understand more fully how and why the Dole operation worked as it did, one needs some knowledge of the total organization of which it was a part. As the administrative scientists contend, each sub-operation is to an extent influenced by its organizational environment. The reader may gain perspective on the communication endeavors in seeing how they related to others at the Committee. It would be inaccurate to leave the impression that Dole's speaking was the only contribution the RNC made to the 1972 campaign. And, while the thrust of this dissertation is on Dole as the primary communicator of the Committee, the significance of his role is heightened by realizing the total responsibilities he had in commanding the RNC staff.

Further, the already evident lines of inquiry into ghostwriting teams logically point to the value of a detailed look at one of the most extensive speechwriting support groups in any political campaign to date. In late 1970, RNC Chairman Rogers Morton was appointed Secretary of the Interior, and left this partisan post. At the recommendation of President Nixon, the RNC elected Robert Dole as his successor. In addition, Anne Armstrong, RNC Chairman for Women's programs, and Delaware Committeeman, Tom Evans, a long-time Nixon fund-raiser (and
east coast lieutenant in Nixon's 1968 nomination drive) was designated Co-Chairman for day-to-day operations at the Eisenhower Center.

The mission.--As the new Republican National Chairman, Dole became an ex-officio member of the President's Cabinet, and had three lengthy discussions with the President personally that year about the Committee's part in the upcoming 1972 campaign. Concurrently, Edward DeBolt, former Executive Director of the California State Republican Committee, who had been at RNC since 1968 as Deputy National Chairman of Research and Political Operations, defined RNC efforts on more specific levels with the Attorney General, John Mitchell, and pertinent of the White House staffers. These discussions led to recommendations that RNC staff be strengthened and that the RNC research operation serve as the resource center for the public information needs of the RNC, the Congressional Campaign Committee, and the GOP committees at state and local levels, as well as the soon-to-be-formed Committee to Re-Elect the President. Though more definitive Dole strategy later emerged, Dole stated that the early discussions among the new appointees, with the President, and with related subordinates, all revealed agreement on a general mission for the RNC "to hold the Republicans."

Following the new appointments of Dole and RNC staff members in early 1971,
the Republican National Committee organized its professional staff for the 1972 campaign into seven divisions for political, research, communications, women, first voters, special groups, and administrative areas.

The organizational basics.--In its pre-1972 planning, the Committee decided that one of its greatest contributions could be made in "basics" of identifying and registering "favorable voters," seeing that they voted, and insuring that the vote count was accurate, especially in counties with history of vote fraud. The political division had national responsibility for these objectives, dubbed "Target 1972." Its field men set up procedures and training techniques for local level implementation. "Ninety per cent of the major states and seventy-eight per cent of our key counties held drives using target techniques," according to Deputy RNC Chairman Ed DeBolt. "We contacted personally 15 million households, and added 1.5 million newly registered Republicans." This division also distributed a campaign organization timetable, "Sixty Days to Victory," and 200,000 copies of a "Poll Watchers Guide," which served as the strategy-planning vehicle for Election Day ballot security. Previous to all these efforts, the division assembled key campaign consultants and RNC professional staffers into teams which held several-day seminars throughout the country in 1971 for local GOP organizations.
Research.—One of the most massive components of the RNC was Research, which encompassed the computer services group, issue development, opposition research, and information retrieval. The computer services group served the state party organizations, the Committee to Re-Elect the President, as well as the RNC. Its staff gathered detailed reports and analyses on the voting history and demographic patterns in key local and state areas of the U.S. During late 1971 and early 1972, over a half-million precinct voting records were added to the computer file, and for the ten big electoral states, precinct analysis reports were made at the precinct level on a town-by-town coverage. The group circulated fifteen major analyses of voting and demographic trends in local-state areas during the campaign.

With inputs from data processing, RNC field men, and state Republicans, the Issue Development Department published an analysis of 1972 "Political Profiles" of each state for use by campaign staffs at all levels of the Party. But a greater amount of this department's resources went into gathering and editing material for the RNC 1972 Campaign Factbook, a 450-page, 28-chapter document which over 2,000 key GOP officials received well before the 1972 campaign officially began. To develop this reference source, staffers under the direction of Mark Harroff,
Director of Issue Development, took every major foreign and domestic "issue" topic, traced the evolution of the problem, cited most every proposal that had been advanced to meet the issue, and then gave special emphasis to Nixon programs and accomplishments. Complementing this comprehensive digest on each topic was a "Promise v. Performance" section, comparing Nixon statements and proposals with his actions and subsequent results. Using these basic data, Issue Development prepared special issue summaries using the same format for special voter groups. The summaries stressed in each case what Nixon had said and done in a particular area.

One of the most well-staffed operations of Research was the section focusing on "opposition." Beginning in early 1971, one staffer was assigned to each of the probable Democratic nominees, including McGovern. The staff member scrutinized the major media daily for "his" candidate's public statements, public actions, proposals, and the like. The staff also extensively researched each candidate's complete public record, including past votes, speeches et al. throughout the candidate's political career. The RNC dispatched researchers even to old home-towns of candidates to comb through newspaper files and libraries. Thus, their opposition research not only provided a current daily chronology of each contending Democrat's public utterances
and public activities, but also traced his political positions historically. The result was a notebook, subdivided by issue-topic, to which weekly summaries were added. After the Democratic nomination, most efforts, of course, turned to McGovern. The RNC developed a "McGovern Quotebook" and a "McGovern Manual," which were circulated to over 1,500 key Republicans.  

The RNC also utilized an on-premises microfilm Microcoder information retrieval system which stored over 600,000 documents—the end product of the daily research. This facility made it possible to "type-in" names of issues, topics, persons, dates, a researcher was interested in, and receive 8" x 11" copies of all data relevant to the question. The Microcoder could retrieve with a high degree of specificity and cross-indexing, and facilitated access to a certain candidate's record, by time frames and on a certain issue.

The Division was begun in 1969 when Robert Chase, twenty-six years of age, came to the RNC. A political science graduate of Brown University, the Massachusetts native had been an insurance underwriter for Liberty Mutual. His sister was a staff member for Congressman Rogers Morton, and joined the RNC staff when he became chairman. She was Chase's contact for his new role at the RNC. Chase worked with DeBolt, who had responsibility for RNC research, for
two years when he was appointed RNC Assistant Director for Research. Chase said that early in 1971 he and DeBolt began meeting with personnel of the emerging Committee to Re-Elect the President to plan implementation of the decision that was made where RNC would handle all research operations for the Party and the Committee to Re-Elect the President. He specified John Mitchell, Fred Malek (now Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Budget), and Jeb Magruder as the other participants in these meetings. "How to organize it was up to us, but everyone wanted an early start," stated Chase. The separate committee (CREP) was organized, Chase surmised, because "those involved were concerned with personal loyalty to the President and didn't trust strangers [referring to RNC staffers]."

Chase specified the "two responsibilities" he had. One was to "package" what Richard Nixon had done or proposed in thirty basic issue areas. Chase responded that he had identified these topics, assigned the research questions, and had done the final editing on each. Chase said they tried to estimate what would be the most frequently asked questions during the campaign. The second responsibility was to formulate an opposition research operation, already described. "We were to concentrate on the issue stuff of each possible Presidential candidate . . . what they had
said, voted, what they did legislatively, who their public associates were . . . ." \(^{16}\) Chase said they updated this material weekly, including reports on the speaking schedules of each Democrat. These reports at their inception, according to Chase, went to Jeb Magruder at the Committee to Re-Elect the President, Herb Klein, Patrick Buchanan, John Ehrlichman, Charles Colson and his staff, all of the White House, and to Victor Gold, Vice President Agnew's Press Secretary. \(^{17}\) During the campaign year, they also went to Al Abrahms, CREP Communications Director; La Von Shumuy, CREP Press Secretary; and Edward Failor, who "coordinated the attack on McGovern" for the surrogates. \(^{18}\) Failor, "the distribution point" for McGovern material, was in contact with Chase two to three times daily during the campaign period, Chase said. \(^{19}\) Failor was an administrator in the U.S. Bureau of Mines, and had been a campaign principal in Clark McGregor's Minnesota Congressional and Senate contests.

An invention base.—The Research Director added that they had developed "over 100 pounds of material on McGovern, and it sat for a year because no one thought we needed it." \(^{20}\) Chase stated he felt their eventual organization of research on McGovern resulted in "a three-pronged image" of the nominee. \(^{21}\) First, he was "a mediocre, unimaginative legislator." "He had no legislative
accomplishment. In fact, it was not until 1969 that he voted against the War." Second, "he was no leader, was not creative, had a mediocre record on each issue. His approaches were full of pitfalls." Third, "his initial strength had been that he was a man of his convictions, but later became 'another politician.'" Chase emphasized this was an image that "emerged" inductively from "our tracking his record, doing our homework, building a central information source over time. We didn't deliberately set out to create it."

Furthermore, Chase emphasized that he tried to keep their work "in context and as objective as possible" for two reasons. "One was accuracy. And we knew that people using the stuff, the surrogate speechwriters, etc., would bend it probably. To slant it here, then have them slant it or pull it out of context, well, that would have . . . ," Chase laughed and threw his hands in the air. "If the material was not documented and in context, our credibility would have become pretty strained."

In addition, he noted that much McGovern material distributed through their "Answer Desk" and weekly "Answer Desk Bulletins" and "Quote Book" provided the specifics for Party leaders and candidates to use to respond to many of the charges made by McGovern and Shriver. From 1971
through 1972, he had an average of 45 employees, and a peak of 105 during the campaign.

The Communication Division.—Equally involved in the whole RNC operation was the Communication Division, headed by Tom Wilck. This division undertook media relations, speechwriting, brochure production, publication of the RNC organ MONDAY, as well as the recording and distribution of radio actualities. These actualities were brief segments of speeches of prominent Republicans, Presidential surrogates, and of the nominees themselves. They were initially recorded for "same-day" distribution to over 2,000 radio stations in the U.S. MONDAY went to 185,000 Republicans every week, and the monthly version, FIRST MONDAY, was mailed to 350,000 loyalists. The media relations section set up RNC press conferences, wrote press releases, and responded to inquiries of newsmen. The Communication Division also conceived and printed various issue brochures for the President's campaign. Similarly, it edited "Talking Papers," single-sheet speech inserts praising the President and/or attacking the Democratic nominees. The "Talking Papers" were sent at the rate of three to four a week to over 8,000 candidates and officials of the GOP in each state, from mid-September to November 7, 1973. Much of the production and distribution work of Communication was done in cooperation with the Committee to Re-Elect the President.
Other important divisions.—"First Voters" was a newly created division of the RNC, including the Youth Issues Program, and the Special Young Republican programs. Youth Issues fielded two young RNC spokesmen (22-year-olds) who traveled to 250 major campuses in 35 states to promote Nixon efforts for youth. The team appeared in 135 campus radio interviews, 70 college television interviews, and 99 similar newspaper interviews. The Young Republican effort serviced local YR club efforts, aided organization of college young Republicans, and published the College Republican, a bi-weekly tabloid.

According to Women's Division Chairperson Anne Armstrong, "all publications, programs, and activities [of her division] were geared toward telling the American voter the record of the accomplishments of the Nixon Administration, and toward producing a trained campaign force." Those objectives were carried out by regional conferences, meetings of the National Federation of Republican Women, and with periodic newsletters, plus training publications such as "GOP Fair Ladies Kit" and "Women in Public Service," explaining Presidential efforts for females in the federal government.

Similar goals were followed in the Heritage Division, which targeted materials to various ethnic groups, showing what Richard Nixon "had done" for their special
interests. Lists of the ethnic media were identified. Election week telephone banks were organized for calling voters whose principal language was not English. Much of the activity of the Heritage Division was financed by the Committee to Re-Elect the President. Senior citizens and blacks were prominent targets.

The division which serviced the logistical, financial, and mechanical needs of all divisions of the RNC was the Administrative Division, headed by Tom Evans, RNC Co-Chairman and day-to-day staff administrator.

Summary of the organizational context and invention base.—Early in 1971, as a result of Dole's discussions with the President, and DeBolt's conferences with Mitchell, it was decided that the 1972 mission of the Republican National Chairman was "to hold the Republicans." This required the staff to be strengthened and divided into seven divisions. One, Research, was to serve the public information needs of all facets of the campaign, especially in "packaging the Nixon record" and in beginning and updating factual summaries about the opposition's public actions, statements, and votes. Mitchell, Malek, and Magruder, with DeBolt and Chase, planned the research goals, the results of which were sent on a weekly basis to White House staffers and, later, to personnel of the Committee to Re-Elect the President.
The invention process of the campaign originated in large part in the Research Division. With an average of 45 employees and a peak of 102 staff members, this effort assembled the basic information used in anti-McGovern and pro-Nixon rhetoric of Dole and other spokesmen. Three themes seemed to emerge from the research about McGovern. According to Chase, he was (a) "no leader," with approaches "full of pitfalls," (b) "a mediocre, unimaginative legislator," and (c) "a man of conviction who turned into (in the public eye) another politician."

Thus, with this informational base, general mission, and resources, four principles developed and diffused Dole's rhetoric. That rhetoric to a great degree was a function of one man: Bob Dole.

Robert Dole: The Principal Communicator

Personal background.—When Senator Robert Dole of Kansas was officially elected Chairman of the Republican National Committee in 1971 at age 48, he was completing his 24th year in public office.26 His political career had begun at age twenty-six, when his law school librarian, a Democrat, urged the second-year legal student to run for the Kansas Legislature, where he served in 1951-52. During that initial term, he completed his degree at Topeka Washburn University Law School, and then won four successive two-year terms as Russell County Attorney through 1960.
During his last year in this role, Dole ran for Congress, where he served as a Member of the U.S. House of Representatives through 1968. Robert Dole moved to the U.S. Senate in 1969, where he immediately became a vigorous supporter of Richard Nixon's performance and policies. Dole won the Kansas GOP nomination for Senator by 103,000 votes (68 per cent) against a former governor and five-term Member of Congress. He won the general election by a 175,000 vote margin.27

During the 1960's, Dole undertook a number of special assignments, including: surveying the food crisis in India in 1966, advising the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. at the Rome, Italy World Food and Agriculture Conference, and participation in the Congressional delegation to study the Arab refugee problem in the Middle East in 1967.

As his public career developed, Dole had overcome many competitors, but the principal struggle of his life had not been a political one. After completing high school in Russell, Kansas, his home town of 3,000 population, he began Kansas University, but interrupted college to enlist in the U.S. Army in 1943. As a platoon leader, Dole was in a drive across the Italian Po Valley when he was first hit with grenade fragments, then riddled with more fragments as a shell burst near him.28 They severely fractured neck vertebrae and damaged his spinal cord, and began for him a
tour of hospitals in Italy, Africa, Florida, Kansas, and Michigan, during which Dole lost seventy pounds and soon found that both his arms and legs were paralyzed. At one point during his illness, doctors assumed his death was imminent and used him as an experimental subject, the fourth in the United States, for a new "wonder drug," streptomycin. With heavy dosages of this drug, Dole overcame the injury-caused massive infection. Through later physical therapy, he regained use of his legs and partial use of his left arm only. Twice decorated for "heroic achievement," Captain Dole was discharged in 1948, when he returned to school under the GI Bill.

Evidently, his health ordeal heightened markedly his tendency to be an "intense competitor." As Senator Dole stated in an interview just after accepting the position of RNC Chairman:

When you're trying to button your shirt collar in the morning, and when you're looking in the mirror at yourself, and you're having trouble because you can't use your right hand and the other one is numb, it sort of reminds you that you've got to keep pushing because you're not quite a whole person. At least, I'm independent now. I can travel by myself and dress myself. I doubt that many people knew of these problems. We've never attempted to use that. You know ... Look at this poor disabled veteran, you know? One more term ... you know? When people question me about shaking hands with my left hand, I tell them my other hand is tired, and it is.

I've never looked back, never looked at it that way. [When talking about what his life might have been as a country doctor, his pre-injury ambition], I might never have made it through med school ...
I've had a lot of advantages, too, because I was wounded: the GI Bill, special typewriters, etc.30

In fact, it was during Dole's recuperation that he met his wife, Phyllis Holden, then a physical therapist. They had one daughter in 1953, and were divorced in 1971.

A Kansas product.---A closer look at the area in which Dole developed, then represented as a Congressman and Senator, might well give readers a better understanding of his behavior in those roles and his later one.31

The National Chairman had come from an overwhelmingly Republican state. In the last seven Presidential elections, the predominantly agricultural state had voted Republican six times, giving GOP nominees 60 per cent of its total vote. All Senate races since 1948 elected a Republican, with an average vote of 56 per cent. Congressional elections yielded a similar average since 1960, 59 per cent. The Kansas delegation has been 5-0 every year since 1960 except 1970, when one Democrat was elected. Republican margins have been 4-1 in the state Senate, except in 1964 when it was 2-1. In the Statehouse, Dole's party controlled 2-1. Only in the gubernatorial races have the results been less lopsided. In the last twelve elections, Republicans have won seven times, but with razor-thin margins and an average percentage of 50.1.

Dole won his first district seat in 1960 by 52 per cent, in 1962 by 57 per cent, dipped to 53 per cent in 1964,
then gained 68 per cent in 1966, before winning the Senate seat in 1968 by 60 per cent. Dole's district covered the whole western two-thirds of the state, hosts no big cities, but is responsible for much of the wheat and livestock production of the plains. In fact, the entire state is more rural than are most. Over a third of its population live in farm areas, as compared to the U.S. norm of 23 per cent. Its population, 2,249,071, has evidenced only a 3 per cent growth, compared to 13 per cent in the U.S. as a whole. The fourteenth largest state boasts only seven electoral votes, and is 96 per cent white. Median age of the voting population is 47 years old. Only 2 per cent of the Kansas population is on welfare. And, only three of its top ten cities (in population) have over 100,000 population. However, Kansas--home for Beechcraft, Cessna, and Lear--produces 60 per cent of all airplanes manufactured in the United States.

Thus, the Kansas constituency seemed solidly Republican, more rural than urban or suburban, with comparatively little growth or "big city" problems that required federal government aid. But, the state needed economic and government incentives for the growth of business. The Kansas voter usually was white, Protestant, middle-aged, and usually conservatively inclined. Dole identified with his constituents well, and, most likely, it was this Kansas
constituency that shaped Dole's political predispositions and inclinations as he developed as a public figure.

Political orientation.— An examination of Dole's voting record from 1960 through 1972 as a federal legislator reveals distinct and consistent trends in the Senator's political orientations. He has favored a strong defense and an aggressive posture against Communist countries; a limited role for the federal government in business, regulatory, health, and economic spheres; and long articulated a "hard" line on "law and order," welfare abuses, and the growth of government in general.

Dole referred to himself, at his own initiative, in the researcher's interview, as "a conservative Republican." Yet, in another interview, he shied away from any ideological label. Asked if he was liberal, conservative, or middle-of-the-road, the Senator replied:

I think "enlightened" is the word I would use. I would be the first to say that I've matured somewhat after coming to Congress. I think one modifies his views. On the controversial, I suppose I tend to be conservative. I've been faulted for voting for 18-year-old voting, rights for women, open housing for blacks, and to me, that isn't conservatism v. liberalism. On economic matters, I tend to be conservative. Now, I've voted against some bills. I've been accused of being against little children and education because I voted against some education bills that were over the budget. I don't know who's going to stop inflation, though, if we don't set some of the examples in Congress.
Conservative leader Barry Goldwater strongly backed Dole for the RNC post, "Why, I'm the guy who recommended him to be chairman of the National Committee. I told the President when that vacancy occurred that the best man we had down here in the Senate was Bob Dole. He said he thought so too, and that was the end of that!"34

Often-cited indices of ideological trends in Congress are "ratings" of major votes of Members given by the ADA and ACA, indicating the percentage of major votes with which the legislation in question coincided with each organization's position on the issues.35 Dole's rating by the ACA was 71 per cent, and 10 per cent by the ADA. He has been a constant critic of the Supreme Court for its "liberal" rulings "against" alleged law-breakers. He favors capital punishment:

I think there are certain crimes involving the killing of another person and treasonous acts . . . for which we shouldn't do away with the death penalty. In other areas, I would agree with the Court. It just seems to me that the forgotten person, too often, is the victim.36

Speaking on WMAL Radio against the position of lawyers who came to Washington to protest the President's Vietnam policy, Senator Dole stated:

They seem to forget that this President and this Administration were not responsible for America committing its forces in Vietnam or for escalating that involvement of more than 500,000 men. They appear to ignore the withdrawal of more than half the troops who were involved when President Nixon took office and the reduction of combat facilities by two-thirds.37
Dole did not, however, chorus the criticism some Republicans have heaped on the news media.

I would guess that the greatest percentage of reporters are neither for you nor against you. They're just reporting the news and some is not good, and you've got to accept that. I think we've made a few mistakes, as probably the Democrats have, in trying to discredit all the media, and we shouldn't have . . . . The essential bond between the media, the people, and the government should be one of trust. It rests on the implicit assumption that the news media will report events fairly and objectively, and we have every right to expect that this will be done. 38

When Dole's appointment as RNC Chairman was proposed, Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott opposed the Kansan. "He is too conservative, and the party doesn't need that image!" 39

A Party man.--The researcher is not trying to imply that Dole is an ideologue, or that he takes an "either-or" inflexible conservative position on all issues. Rather, the issue posed is whether Dole approached significant issues with certain sets or predispositions. His record indicates that, generally, he did. And, it is clear, his views and votes have been even close to those of Richard Nixon. In fact, Dole himself attributed his fast rise to the Party Chairmanship in part to his consistent and vocal support of the President. "I was one of the few constant lauders of him in the lean years. Other Republicans were pretty quiet then. The President recognized this allegiance." 40
Thus, one infers that Dole was sincere in his long advocacy through the years of what he called "the Republican approach" to problems, and of Richard Nixon and his objectives. He was a "Party man" in his political orientation, and it was a role he relished and undertook as seemingly a labor of love. Dole's motivation to strongly support almost anything "Nixon," his early ability to make national news doing it, and the rhetorical situation in 1968 and 1969 especially, which made his communication salient--all composed his base for attaining the chairmanship. In this role he worked closely with his speechwriter.

The Speechwriter--Michael Baroody

The sole speechwriter for Dole, as identified by all interviewees, was Michael Baroody, 26-year-old Director of Public Affairs for the RNC. Graduating from Notre Dame in 1964 with a BA in Government, Baroody entered the Navy where he served for four years. A native of the Virginia-D.C. area, Baroody applied for a Congressional job and was hired by Senator Roman Hruska (R-Neb.) to staff the minority side of the Mondale Sub-Committee on Equal Opportunities. In November, 1971, he heard RNC "was hiring," and interviewed with Lyn Nofziger, then RNC Deputy Chairman for Communications. (Nofziger, long-time communications aide to Ronald Reagan, returned to California shortly thereafter to head the Committee to Re-Elect the President in Nixon's
home state.) As Dole's speaking engagements grew, the Chairman had to dispense with his extemporaneous approaches, and his Senate staff was too occupied with other duties to prepare necessary drafts, so Dole turned to the RNC Communications staff. "I was just there," Baroody said. At first he shared some of the drafting duties with the new Deputy Chairman of Communications, Tom Wilck. But within a few weeks, Baroody took over all writing duties for Dole.

He noted that he and Dole talked at length in early 1972 on five or six occasions about his views, what he thought the Republican Party should be—should stand for—what he wanted to achieve in the campaign. "Most of all, though, the Senator often spoke about the 'ideal' Republican Party." Baroody said he always wrote with Dole's thinking in mind, and felt both were "in tune" on issues and emphasis. "Now, don't forget, even if a guy isn't on cue, you learn pretty fast what he wants, what his style is, after a few drafts come marked up, which they always did. His mind was always thinking, I guess, 'What more can we do here?'" Also, the speechwriter added that he and Dole had the same general political values. Baroody did seem to work with a fairly clear picture of Dole's thinking, a picture that was reinforced and added to via daily contact with the Senator and his editing. "And the Democrats made their vulnerabilities obvious. Anyone with an ounce of
political acumen could see what you should talk about . . . when it came to McGovern. Remember, too, I spent several months working for Hruska, a real conservative from a state right next door to Kansas."45

Baroody said that Dole's "incredible" schedule meant that as the campaign went into "full swing," his contact with the Senator had to be more by phone. Both Dole and Baroody said, independently, they "talked" at least once daily on the average. Baroody commented that he did not envision himself as a speechwriter.

I was hired for general duties in the communications area. A speechwriting staff is just like any other staff. A National Chairman has many functions which are so large in scope that he has to have assistance in every one. If you say, "we shouldn't have speechwriters," then you have to say, "Senators don't need staffs."46

Baroody reiterated that he had no speech or journalism training or experience of any kind, though he not only composed the speeches, but designated which themes and paragraphs should compose the lead of each covering, corresponding news release. As will be seen in the following chapters in more detail, Dole and Baroody were the two final participants in day-to-day decisions about "what to say."

In summary, Baroody was the Dole speechwriter, who had no close personal acquaintance with Dole, but who, through conversation, similar political predispositions, editing feedback from the Senator, and close, daily contact
with him, quickly learned Dole's thinking about what he sought to convey. With little formally acquired professional, political, or communications expertise, the young staffer, processing the inputs described in the next chapter, assembled Dole's rhetoric and designated which parts of it should receive "lead play" in the daily release to national news media.

Personally, the very polite Baroody possessed poise, openness, a serious intent, and a natural sense of humor in common with the Senator from Kansas. But, he was far more deliberate, soft-spoken, warmer, more easy-going, and less analytical, less fiercely penetrating than his mentor. In contrast to his RNC colleagues, Baroody seemed not at all flamboyant, more anxious to serve than to be visible. He struck the researcher as much older than his twenty-six years. Dole professed a similar description of his writer in labeling him "competent and mature." Evidently the Chairman was sincere in praise. Baroody now serves as Senator Dole's Executive Assistant.

The Scheduler--Michael Scanlon

Baroody's province was content; Scanlon's was targeting. After graduating in radio and television from John Carroll University in 1968, Scanlon worked as an "advance man" in the 1969 campaign of Cleveland mayoral candidate, Ralph Perk. After that initial exposure in
politics, he joined a college friend, another Ohioan, Paul Russo, in the emerging Senate campaign of Robert Taft in 1970. The two graduated to the positions of chief advance-men for Taft mid-way through his drive to beat Governor James A. Rhodes for the Senatorial nomination. In the general election campaign, Scanlon also coordinated "field operations" for Taft in Northeast Ohio. During that race, Senator Dole came to the Buckeye State for two campaign tours on behalf of the GOP ticket. For each of the tours, Scanlon did the advance work and traveled with Dole. "We hit it off well. It was that simple," alleged Scanlon. When Dole later became GOP Chairman, he called on Taft to recruit Scanlon and Russo for his newly needed personal staff at the RNC. Dole, who evidently had a good memory, said he was particularly impressed with his 1970 Ohio campaign schedule, and attributed such good works to Scanlon. In early 1971, Scanlon was appointed as Assistant to the Chairman, and in 1972 became "Special Assistant," to generate and process speaking invitations, and to designate, in consultation with Dole, where he would speak, to determine his over-all schedule, and to plan each event. Scanlon delegated advancing duties and frequently traveled with Dole. He probably spent the most time with and had the most proximity to the Senator.

With Dole, he planned several "phases" of where the Chairman would go, with corresponding objectives that the
schedule should fulfill. As the next chapter will show, he and the Chairman were receptive to ideas on where Dole should appear, but maintained considerable independence in planning and scheduling day-to-day appearances, and in deciding what in a general sense should occur at each.

Scanlon's prime duty, then, was to identify Dole's immediate audiences on a long-range and day-to-day basis. Talking with him made it apparent to the researcher that he did so with tremendous attention to "how much media play" Dole could stimulate with each appearance.

We followed a standard routine. He would go into a city, hold a press conference immediately, hand out copies of his speech, say "he stood by every word," then open himself to questions. The Senator would go to the function, speak, "with some ad-libbing for the local types," then again make certain he was available for at least 5-10 minutes more press inquiry.

Scanlon was quite domineering, aggressive, extroverted, and anxious to talk in detail about the campaign. From the interview, one could perceive that he was deeply concerned that Dole's appearances be as intricately planned as possible.

We felt it was extremely important to exhibit very visible efficiency. That is what anyone connected to Nixon really had to show. It is what the President wanted continuously demonstrated. We tried to be consistent and organized.

Referring to their potential audiences, Scanlon stressed that "first, you have to get their attention, then, second,
leave a good general impression. The impression that's left can be just as much a result of how you do it, as of what you say.”

In his two years of working with Dole, Scanlon said he planned for, scheduled, and guided advance work for 326 speeches. At this writing he serves as Communications Director to Cleveland Mayor Ralph Perk, a post he took soon after the November 1972 election.

The Deputy National Chairman for Communications--Thomas Wilck

Wilck, 40, coordinated the Communication Division, supervising primarily the production of campaign materials described previously and guiding general committee media relations.52

I worked in a limited partnership with Mike Baroody in doing the speeches. Most of the effort was his. I felt our Division was really a logistical support and supply effort for the RNC and CREP. I was also a conveyor of ideas from other elements of the Presidential to the RNC communication effort. We were a working tool for the RNC.53

The Deputy National Chairman, a graduate of UCLA where he took several courses in journalism and political science, came to Washington from Los Angeles after working in industrial-institutional public relations for several years, then running his own firm for ten years. "In 1971, some of the individuals at the White House, with whom I had been friends over the years, asked me to come over to
the RNC as a coordinator 'who could work well with the other
two elements of the campaign'--the White House and the
CREP."54 A year before his RNC service was spent as
Assistant Administrator of the Small Business Administra-
tion.

Wilck emphasized that he was a professional com-
munications technician who had no past political experience.
"The real political pros here at the Committee were a great help to me and I relied on their judgment frequently. I
never laid claim to any political expertise or ideological territory."55

After Inauguration Day, Wilck returned to his public relations practice in Los Angeles where he has a long
history of working with the Education Division of the Public Relations Society of America.

Summary

With a defined Republican National Committee mission
--to hold the Republicans--and an extensive organization,
Robert Dole, the principal communicator, worked closely on
rhetorical content with speechwriter Baroody, and on
rhetorical targets with scheduler Scanlon.

Coming from a rural, conservative Republican state
of predominantly white middle-class Protestants, Dole
mirrored his constituents well as he rose from a small-town
background, and near death, through a succession of Kansas
offices and Congressional terms, into the Senate. Demonstrating the drive and independence accented by his escape from a year of near-death, Dole fought for Nixon rhetorically as a freshman Senator, and his news-making prominence in a "lean" period for Nixon brought him to the Republican National Committee Chairmanship, capping at least temporarily his political career as a "Party man."

As his speaking commitments grew, the Chairman turned to a ghost, a relatively young man with little political experience, no communications background, but with a consonant political orientation. Because "he was there," Baroody became the sole speechwriter, unacquainted with but learning Dole's wants through several early discussions, editing feedback, and daily contact.

His counterpart for identifying forums and audiences, Scanlon, had some campaign experience, a domineering orientation to "media" requirements and keys to news play, and planned ingredients of Dole's schedule with youthful fervor.

All three, especially the ghost, worked with Wilck, a self-described "communications technician with no political experience," but one with considerable professional experience in public relations. He served all three as "a conveyor of ideas from other elements of the campaign," who saw the Republican National Committee as a "working tool," and his participation with speechwriting as "limited."
All in the group drew on an information base developed and updated by the well-staffed Research Division. And all in the group perceived certain inputs and influences as determinant in developing and diffusing Dole rhetoric. How each of these individuals perceived and interacted with the rhetorical situation and their working spheres is the subject of Chapter IV.
Notes


3 None of the ghostwriting literature, as cited in Chapter I, even begins to approximate the staff at the Republican National Committee (RNC), as described by Assistant National Chairman Robert Chase or RNC Issue Development Director Mark Harroff, respectively, on January 19, 1973, and January 7, 1973, in Washington.

4 Dole interview.

5 Dole interview, and Chase, January 9, 1973, interview.

6 Confirmed by responses in all personal interviews of Dole, Baroody, Chase, Wilck, Scanlon; and Presidential Consultant Patrick Buchanan, interview, September 6, 1973, in Executive Office Building, Washington, D.C.

7 First Monday (official RNC national periodical), January 1, 1973, pp. 6-7, discusses these organizational efforts.

8 First Monday, January 1, 1973, pp. 6-7.


10 Harroff interview, January 7, 1973, was the base for this information on Issue Development. The researcher also obtained copies of its publications for examination.


12 The researcher obtained copies of all McGovern material discussed.
Harroff interview, January 7, 1973; and Chase interview, January 9, 1973, are data sources for research discussion.


Chase interviews, January 9 and 18, 1973; confirmed by Dole interview and by Buchanan interview.

Chase interviews, Dole interview, Buchanan interview all confirmed this assertion.


Both Chase interviews.

Quotes on McGovern "image" all from Chase interview, January 9, 1973.


Biographical material on Senator Dole draws on information (undated) furnished by Dole's Senate office (Dirksen Building, Washington), Dole interview, and February 5, 1973, interview with Scanlon in Cleveland, Ohio; a lengthy life history of the Senator in the Kansas City (Mo.) Star Magazine, September 24, 1972; and on a transcript (undated) of an interview appearance of Dole on "Meet the Member," WMAL Radio, Washington, D.C.

All Kansas data and election statistics drawn from "Kansas Profiles" (1948-72) of the RNC, and on "Election Reports" (1948-72), published by the National Republican Congressional Committee.

29 Star Interview, p. 8.

30 Star Interview, p. 9.

31 Kansas information based on Kansas booklets supplied by Kansas Secretary of State, Elwill M. Shanahan, Topeka, Kansas; and on "Kansas Profiles," published by the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, Washington, D.C.

32 "Kansas Profiles," 1948-72, p. 22.

33 Star Interview, pp. 9 and 12.

34 Star Interview, p. 12.

35 From "Ratings Summary," published by Republican Congressional Campaign Committee.

36 Star Interview, p. 9.

37 Transcript of WMAL (undated) "Meet the Member."

38 Star Interview, p. 9.

39 Star Interview, p. 12.

40 Dole interview, June 27, 1973, source of Dole quotes in this section.


47 All quotes are based on Scanlon interview, February 5, 1973.


All Wilck quotes based on January 12, 1973, interview with him.

Wilck interview.

Wilck interview.

Wilck interview.
CHAPTER IV

THE INFLUENCES AND INPUTS

Based on the assumption, as explained in Chapter I, that content is conceived, in large part, as a function of (1) a communicator's perception of his intended audiences, and (2) his processing of other information, influences, and inputs, the researcher discusses in this chapter those factors that each communication group member identified as salient and significant in content development. Each individual's perceptions are delineated, and then their responses are analyzed collectively in order to determine—across individuals—those sets of variables that were prime determinants of Dole communication objectives and content.

Influences on the Chairman

Dole cited four basic sources of (1) his and his speechwriter's ideas, (2) the RNC research operation, (3) (Charles) "Colson's shop" at the White House, and (4) conversations with Clark MacGregor and John Mitchell. Dole stated that his own thoughts emanated from his view of "what McGovern was," Nixon's efforts to "bring peace," his frustration at the GOP internal history of ideological
warfare, and the polls showing Nixon's big lead. "I
operated on the assumption that there was no way McGovern
would win, so I felt this was the year Republicans in the
statehouses, legislatures, Congress and so on could really
swell over these guys [Democrats]." Dole said he thought
that 1972 also was an opportune time for Republicans to
forget ideological differences in the Party. "It was time
to stop worrying about who was what ideology, and get with
it, winning elections." Republicans had remained a
minority, Dole felt, because they had not been able to
unite.

The Senator said that McGovern had always struck
him as "a one-image guy . . . Vietnam, Vietnam, Vietnam,
nothing else ever." "As I have watched him in the Senate,
he impressed me as 'way-out' . . . at the extreme. He was
definitely not part of the Democratic Party of Muskie,
Humphrey--the guys I knew as Democrats. He was further out
. . . really something else." Those were the ideas that
"came to mind" when Dole thought of him as a Presidential
candidate originally.

Dole added that Johnson's conduct of the war had
irritated him tremendously, and that the uproar and riots of
the sixties really had seriously threatened "security at
home." In contrast, he thought Nixon "had performed well
domestically." The "peace achievement," then, Dole claimed,
had an impact on what he said.
In addition to his own ideas, Dole said he took guidance from the White House.

It was definitely Colson's shop . . . they would suggest specific themes . . . some of their stuff was quite good . . . but you really had to watch . . . some of the sheets they sent over were bad, really nasty. I have always believed you can easily overdo attacks. That does more harm to you than the criticism does to the guy you're trying to knock. I told Mike [Baroody] to closely watch their stuff for overkill, and we usually caught it, though a couple of times, some mean ones slipped through. Now, on the big shows, Meet the Press, CBS News, Face the Nation, I would talk with Mitchell or MacGregor beforehand. They would suggest responses to queries . . . points to emphasize.

Again, at his own initiative, Dole pointed to another source: RNC research summaries of McGovern. "Our research operation was keeping track of McGovern statements . . . they made it easy and obvious where to attack him."  

In campaigning, the Chairman said he was always conscious of the press and what they would "pick up." "Close attention was given to what played. We usually tried to anticipate what kinds of things they'd carry, and worked from that." Dole said he felt he had excellent relations with the media, and took advantage of them.

He added that his Co-Chairmen never suggested content. "They looked to me for that. Tom Evans had enough day-to-day worries at the RNC; Anne Armstrong ran her division." 8 Dole added that state party leaders and committeemen "seldom, if ever," talked to him about what to
say. Rather, they emphasized what Dole should do: persuade the Committee to Re-Elect the President to devote more attention and resources to the sub-Presidential level contests.

Dole did not envision his Senatorial constituency as a significant influence in his national speeches.

What I was saying in my appearances in other states was just as applicable to Kansas. It was supportive of Nixon. My increased national exposure was exposure in Kansas too.9 Dole implied that keeping his voting record high and visiting Kansas frequently was ample evidence of his determination to represent his state well.

Action and statements of other Democrats apparently had little impact on Dole. He mentioned his appearance with Jean Westwood at a Fair Campaign Practices meeting, and said he had originally felt Lawrence O'Brien should be criticized more because of his political effectiveness, but he claimed that when O'Brien failed to emerge as a strong Democratic force (in his opinion), the need to attack him vanished.

Dole reiterated that the White House had from the beginning delegated to the RNC a supporting role in the over-all national campaign, one in which it would build Republican strength.

No matter what party it is, no National Chairman with an incumbent President, is the campaigner. The President has his staff in the White House he
relies on day-to-day . . . they are the campaign. We all know I had no policy-making role. I was Party spokesman. The National Chairman can't be running back-and-forth every day to see the President. He naturally is not part of the White House Staff. Any guy who has been National Chairman can tell you that. The President and his staff call the shots. We were not part of the campaign as key decision-makers.

In summary.—The researcher saw these basic factors as having the most significant impact on what Dole said. He was irritated at Republicans' preoccupation with internal disputes based on ideological differences. This history motivated him to argue for enduring election-winning unity. The electoral situation—Nixon's massive lead—made such an argument even more timely, and made concentrating on it secure. Here was a chance to become a "Majority." Dole's view of Nixon as a "peacemaker" at home and abroad, and his conception of McGovern as a "one-issue," "way-out" Senator were also highly salient influences. The RNC research summaries well illustrated the weaknesses he perceived in McGovern, and rather blatantly implied appropriate lines of argument. Concurrently, his thoughts were dominated by his realization that the incumbency set policy for the campaign. That policy came to him from two specific sources: the White House office of Charles Colson, whose words damned McGovern, but often, Dole felt, suffered from "overkill." The second source was top management of the campaign—Mitchell and MacGregor—and usually applied only to top
televised national forums. This advice he seemed to welcome. All these sources were influences he defined as significant.

Others that the interviewer offered ranked much lower in impact--actions of other Democrats, initiatives from Kansas, other top Republicans, RNC staff. Only the press exerted influence, giving Dole a mental set of news values which no doubt helped determine his emphases. Of special note is the fact that the actual members of the RNC, over whom Dole was Chairman, offered no contribution to his message.

**Influences on the Speechwriter**

Baroody identified several factors that influenced the development of over-all objectives and specific content. Early in 1972, Dole directed him to keep five basic concepts in mind when writing. First, the Chairman's primary function was to be spokesman for the Republican Party, and as such he felt that he should espouse a "Republican" approach to problems. That meant, Baroody stated, that the GOP was not to tie itself to the massive social programs of the Democrats, or to the idea of federal involvement in basic problem-solving needed with key issues.

We felt Republicans should be allied with prosperity, calm, tranquility, and sound approaches to governing. The Senator wanted the contrast between the Democratic Sixties and what's happening under
the GOP to be clear. That is, he thought if they were reminded, most people would connect uproar, riots, war, distrust, divisiveness, no national spirit with the Johnson years.12

Second, Dole stressed that while the contrast should be drawn by implication, the GOP had to be cautious not to alienate Democrats who might vote for Nixon. Dole specified that his speeches never were to attack the Democratic Party directly by name.

He felt that McGovern did not appeal to or represent most Democrats, and McGovern and his supporters represented elitism—a band of ideologues—who were interested only in themselves. So, he wanted to avoid offending Democrats and at the same time appeal to those disenchanted.13

Third, Dole expressed great concern about what was used from the White House. "They would send over suggestions for attacking McGovern, and the Senator wanted to be sure we weren't overdoing it, and that we were softening the rough stuff."14

Fourth, while he did want to criticize McGovern, Dole felt that personal attacks were not the way. Rather, he wanted to stress his uneasy feeling about McGovern, that he, as well as McGovern himself, "really didn't know what the Dakotan would do as President, as more of the nominee's professed, but underdeveloped, ideas met the test of reality."15

Fifth, as always, Dole wanted his speechwriter to express strong support for the President, especially in foreign policy.
The second major source of speech ideas came from Tom Wilck, Deputy Chairman for Communications. "Tom met with the strategy group at the White House at least once a week, and would come back with designated themes we would stress."16 At times, Baroody said, Wilck returned with a page of specific language for use in attacking McGovern. Baroody said he and Wilck would generally use the general ideas the group suggested, but not always the language. "We'd play with it, then many times the Senator would edit it further."17 Wilck and Baroody usually discussed the general McGovern attack themes to be used during the upcoming week once every six or seven days, Baroody said. The speechwriter emphasized that "about 50 per cent" of the themes Dole enunciated throughout the campaign were recommended from the White House strategy group. All such content dealt with McGovern or a close associate and their actions and programs.

For example, one idea of the strategy group which was implemented in Dole's speeches was "McGovern debating himself," to illustrate his alleged inconsistency on positions, according to Baroody. "It was up to us how to use the themes suggested and where to use them."18 Baroody noted that no one, except Dole, directed that he include or emphasize certain content, but "obviously suggestions from the White House were taken very seriously."19 In addition,
he said he valued their (White House staffers) opinion and experience and would solicit their reactions to lines of content he conceived personally. "I would call around and sample opinions from appropriate people, such as Al Abrams [CREP Director of Communications]." Baroody stated the names he knew, from first-hand experience, to be in the strategy group were Abrams; Kenneth Clawson, Associate Communication Director for the Executive Branch; Edward Failor, coordinating Committee to Re-Elect the President liaison for surrogate speechwriters; White House Speechwriter, Patrick Buchanan; and Assistant to the President, Charles Colson. Baroody said he would usually talk to Abrams "a few times each week" to "get a feeling for what they were doing." Again, Baroody emphasized that "it got to be pretty obvious where you could go after McGovern." 

The speechwriter also cited the RNC research area publications on McGovern and Nixon as "quite suggestive," as they, for example, compared what McGovern had allegedly said on welfare, busing, taxes, Vietnam, drugs, amnesty, and so forth, showing the alleged change in his positions at different times and documenting them with attribution.

The Chairman's ghost reported that no one in the Administration, GOP Congressional Campaign staffs, RNC staff, the Democrats for Nixon, the state chairmen,
financial contributors, nor any of the surrogates or their speechwriters ever contacted him.

One thing we had to contend with and compensate for in the campaign was "the new Agnew." He took an almost pedagogic approach. He was almost grandfatherly, and his speeches were issue-explanations. I felt, as a consequence, our attack role had to be stronger. Another factor pushed Dole's rhetoric to a more negative posture: the roles the surrogates were playing. Each usually addressed himself to a special area: Volpe to what Nixon was doing for the ethnics; Butz on agriculture, the wheat deal; Laird on the McGovern defense plan; Weinberger on the "foolishness" of McGovern's tax plan, etc. Really, there was no one out there criticizing the over-all aspects of George McGovern.24

A salient influence, too, on Baroody as a conceiver and writer, was the "play" that the national news media gave his phrasing. "We tried to do two things with our speeches--enthuse partisans and get national press."25 He said he noticed that newsmen--across media--"picked up" and emphasized "the attack" on McGovern. "So, we almost always went with the attack as our news release lead because we found out that these were the things that would give us the most coverage."26 Baroody seemed to internalize and apply his own definition of what was "newsworthy" in the emphases he placed in speech content. He seemed acutely conscious, too, of newsmen's mechanical requirements, and told how the RNC would distribute speeches for the day early in the morning so reporters could have "plenty of time" to digest them. Baroody was aware, moreover, of the deluge of
releases, speeches that newsmen receive daily. So, he often called key newsmen to insure they had received major speeches.

The ghost never mentioned any contribution from or influence from Dole's personal constituency in Kansas, and seemed surprised that it was raised in the interview. He recalled no mention of any "Kansas considerations" in writing, and said he never "zeroed in on anything of particular interest" to the Dole state constituency. "No one from the Senator's office ever called or had contact from us. They were a separate operation. I never got any word from the Senator, or anyone else, about any Kansas situation, issue, or group." 27

In addition to outside suggestions, Baroody personally paid great attention to "what was exploitable in the McGovern campaign operation." "The weekly research summaries, in addition to the quotebook, were our sources here." He paid little heed to Jean Westwood, Dole's Democratic counterpart. As for McGovern, Baroody perceived the following items as having real potential for "exploitation": the "inconsistency" of many McGovern positions, especially on welfare, Vietnam, drug abuse, and support of Eagleton; McGovern's defense cuts; the apparent disorganization of his campaign, his personal indecisiveness, his alienation of old-line Democrats; the Pierre Salinger
incident, and the "extremes" of the McGovern attack on the President. He said they gave scant attention to Sargeant Shriver.

The ghost added that he never saw polls, image research, or any systematic measurements from the audience "out there." He emphasized, though, that he was influenced by his own conception of the audiences for whom he wrote--the "Republicans in the main."

They were the overwhelming majority of our listeners at these speeches. They were the ones who probably paid most attention to news reports of what Dole said. They have gut reactions to what Nixon or McGovern says or does, and they're hungry for someone to explain the "whys" of their gut reactions. They viscerally disagree or agree, and the Senator provided the information, the fillers, the reasons, the rationalizations for their reactions. Look at China--many Republicans were confused about why Nixon was making such overtures to this Communist giant. Bob Dole could explain things like that to them.

In essence, then, Baroody's image of his listeners at the individual level was composed of Republican partisans who needed explanation and rationale for their own purposes, and for passing on to others. Additionally, Baroody felt the lambasting given McGovern gave audiences real specifics to back their feeling of discomfort with him.

The general political situation was determinant in terms of the Agnew role, surrogate roles, and the fact the GOP had an incumbent President. "His programs, actions, statements built the record and the future direction."
These things, Baroody indicated, gave him specifics to underscore for Nixon's achievements, e.g., the Russia and China trips, the ending of the Vietnam war, the Kissinger activity, the volunteer Army concept, the 18-year-old vote, the new domestic spending priority. He expressed some frustration over his lack of progress in building some identity for the GOP. The President is the Party, he noted, and trying to build an identity as "Republicans" which was separate from the Administration was difficult, he explained. "You can't overshadow the President and when you're a minority party, the President really has to escape the 'party' label to win." The actions of the incumbent, in some ways, facilitated Baroody's job, yet the minority status of the GOP and their need to garner non-Republican votes worked against Dole's suggestion to the writer: speeches should evidence the Republican approach to governing.

_In summary: the point of convergence._—Baroody was the point of convergence of a significant array of factors. Of great importance to him were Dole's original directives. He was to illustrate the "Republican approach," tie it to resultant prosperity and tranquility, then contrast this picture with the turbulent sixties, hinting the latter were the result of Democratic tenure. Concurrently, he was to avoid directly attacking "Democrats" so they would not be
alienated, but vividly illustrate they were not one-in-the-
same with George McGovern. George McGovern was to be
portrayed as not knowing what to do as President, but
Baroody, in taking White House guidance through Wilck at
RNC and Colson at the White House, was to carefully avoid
their rhetorical overkill in criticizing the Democratic
nominee. In addition, audiences should know that Richard
Nixon had been a successful international peacemaker.

He also viewed RNC research summaries as suggestive
in illustrating the specific areas in which to blast
McGovern. They helped him rivet attention on alleged
McGovern "gaffs," mistakes which the speechwriter felt
"told him" as much as anything "what to talk about."

Other pressures seemed to push on him at the same
time: Agnew was simply not criticizing McGovern to any
extent, and the surrogates' venom was centered on only one
issue for each area. Such behavior, he felt, left a vast
vacuum for general criticism of the South Dakotan. Dole had
to fill it, and in doing so, was pushed to a more critical,
negative anti-McGovern stance. Accenting this tendency was
Baroody's reading of news values--the target newsmen were
"playing" only the McGovern attacks. The pro-Nixon material
never made it past the rostrum. So, increasing emphasis on
the McGovern attacks resulted in his news releases.

Baroody, moreover, perceived that his Republican
audiences sought informational ammunition in Dole's speeches
to use in proselytizing for Nixon and against McGovern. Besides, they needed details to support their visceral conclusions. Having an incumbent like Richard Nixon gave him specific "achievements" to point to, but having the campaign center around "The President" instead of his minority party label, rendered it difficult to build a separate GOP national identity through Dole's speaking.

**Influences on the Scheduler**

In traveling with Dole, and in planning his speaking itinerary throughout the campaign, Mike Scanlon had an almost day-to-day opportunity to contribute to the shape of each rhetorical situation. He also was in a position to witness the inputs to Dole's speech-making. Scanlon seemed to take his cues primarily from the Chairman, and was most oriented to Dole's personal fortunes as a Senator who had potential for future office.

**Targeting influences.**—In scheduling, Dole's audiences were selected according to a priority system in which the Kansas constituency played a big part. "Our first concern was that he was a Senator, and he reserved at least one week-end a month for Kansas visits."

Similarly, Scanlon said, Dole wanted his audiences scheduled, insofar as possible, around important Senate votes. And, his schedule was to be timed logistically, so he could fly back
if and when votes occurred. Scanlon noted proudly, "We maintained his 94% voting record."  

The second "priority" (a favorite word of the aide) came from a decision made "early in 1971" by Nixon, Mitchell, and Dole that "our basic job at the RNC was to get the Republicans, about 30% of voting Americans, registered, out working, and then get 'em out voting." The feeling was, obviously, that our minority party status demanded that we get all our own people out, or we'd never make it." So, Scanlon said, most of "the forums" were Republican organizations. 

A significant influence, too, came from the White House-Committee to Re-Elect the President strategy group. Scanlon said it was their feeling that Dole "should handle the one-to-one confrontations with top Democrats," usually on news shows such as "Face the Nation," "Issues and Answers," and other interview settings where the two campaigns would have to spar. "Decisions for these 'confrontations' would be made at a very high level." About "once every three weeks, Mitchell, MacGregor, and Dole would confer, usually by telephone, about what such invitations were pending, and which one of them should accept each." Occasionally, Bart Porter, Director of the Committee to Re-Elect the President surrogate programs, or Jeb Magruder, Deputy Director of the Committee to Re-Elect the President,
would suggest a specific "good" Dole appearance. Scanlon said these later suggestions were as seriously considered as were all invitations from all other sources, whereas the "national one-to-one confrontation opportunities" always took precedence.

Another determinant was "the media," Scanlon offered. Dole was "not scheduled for cities, but for media markets," he noted. "If it wasn't an area where you could get some splash, it was not worth going to." Scanlon added that, when possible, he tried to schedule Dole's press conference, if not the speech, "in time" for the media to develop their film or write their story before deadline.

The Senator's Special Assistant said that he heard from "scores" of GOP leaders all through 1972, each of whom wanted Dole to speak for local or state candidates, or to be a money-raising dinner speaker. He indicated that the states where Dole felt the situation really could be helped by an appearance, or where the electoral vote was high "got the best hearing. The size of each state's electoral vote was a most important factor." Scanlon scoffed at the notion that one input to their decision-making might be scrutiny of where McGovern or Westwood went. He said their schedules did not constitute any determinant of where Dole traveled. Surprisingly,
he pointed out, too, that Dole's schedule was not coordinated with those of the surrogates, except for major national TV appearances. He said he never encountered the problem of Dole and a surrogate "competing" for news in the same city. The scheduler replied, also, that he had no particular "images" of the audiences he sent Dole to. He felt most listeners were "quite alike"—"Republican, businessmen, Federation types." 40

Content influences.—As a frequent witness to Dole's speech-making process, Scanlon identified four influences he felt had a significant effect on what Dole said with what emphases.

The first was what Dole felt was a tradition of the Republican Party—which it could no longer afford--internal bickering over which ideological faction was currently in control, or which should be.

He had a real thing . . . I heard him talk about it again and again and again in conversation, that we had to be Republican, not conservative, not liberal, but Republican. He wanted to try to build the 'GOP' as a majority party and help expand its base. The intramural fights that characterized the Party really bothered him.

Another was the constant input we got from Charles Colson at the White House and his assistant at CREP, Ed Failor, who coordinated the day-to-day attacks on McGovern. Failor collected and summarized the anti-McGovern lines, and Colson and two or three writers in his office really had the ideas for the specific language to use on McGovern. 41

Scanlon described Colson's frequent calls to Dole, suggesting a specific criticism of the Democratic nominee. The
scheduler said that many times Dole thought the ideas were sometimes good, but exaggerated—and on a few occasions, "Dole blew up at Colson." "One instance, I remember him telling Colson, 'I can't say that about George McGovern. I have to see him every day in the Senate. If you guys want some of these things said, go out and say them yourself.'"\(^{42}\)

Scanlon added that on such occasions Dole would "really get his back up," and refuse, or criticize the overdone nature of the statements, then tell "Colson's shop" to "send 'em over." Then Dole would "tame them down."\(^{43}\)

The third influence the scheduler singled out was Dole's basic concurrence with Nixon's handling of the Presidency. He said Dole was convinced Nixon was one of our most effective Presidents and seemed anxious to praise his approach as model. Scanlon added that he thought Dole's respect for Nixon went beyond "the drummer-boy expectation," i.e., what praise he was expected to mouth as Party Chairman.

He stressed, too, that Dole often sensed a "left-out" feeling among Republican leaders because the campaign was so President-centered. "I think he came to each audience with a great sense of urgency to compensate for that feeling."\(^{44}\)

In summary.—Selection of the audiences to which Dole spoke was determined by Dole's obligations as a Senator,
by the scope of news media coverage available in each city, by the electoral vote of each state, and by the over-all campaign policies developed by the President's managers in response to the electoral situation. Dole's province had to be necessarily those in his Party. They must not stray. So, Dole's speaking targets were Republicans. Similarly, when traditional national forums called for putting a top Democrat partisan against a top Republican partisan, Dole was tapped for the confrontation through conversations with Mitchell and MacGregor. Occasionally, Scanlon, too, would receive suggestions from Committee to Re-Elect the President "surrogate" coordinator, Bart Porter.

The scheduler's perception of where the media could provide the most coverage to the greatest electoral markets was a major determinant in planning Dole's appearances, but no influence precluded the Senator's "priority" to visit Kansas once monthly and vote its interests almost daily. These cues were those to which Scanlon was most responsive.

A less pressing consideration was the competitive situation in each state. If invitations "competed," preference was given to the locale where Dole thought that the presence of a national figure could "make some difference." Even less attention was paid to schedules of Presidential surrogates or Democratic counterparts, or to the composition of potential audiences, whom the scheduler perceived as decidedly homogenous.
The basic message, Scanlon believed, was a net product of (a) Dole's genuine admiration for Nixon's Presidential achievements, (b) his often reluctant use of anti-McGovern attacks, (c) his perception that Republicans felt "left-out" at the state and local level, (d) his hope that the Party's history of ideological cleavage would pass, and (e) the Chairman's belief that he could help forge a new party unity.

Influences on the Deputy Chairman

"I was very conscious constantly of Bob Dole, what he wanted, what he needed to say," remarked Wilck. "He often expressed to me that he hoped our activities in communication could portray an open Party, seeking participation of a wide range of philosophies. It should be the 'Party of the open door.'" Wilck added, however, that President Nixon, his staff, executives of the RNC, including Dole, had all participated in the early 1971 policy decision made to support the President (as opposed to devoting resources to state and Congressional, Senatorial, gubernatorial races) at the RNC. Thus, Wilck said, supporting "The President" precluded to some degree "an attempt to build an image of the Republican Party, per se." 47

The Deputy Chairman added that an ongoing determinant of content, also, was the White House-Committee to Re-Elect the President strategy group. Wilck explained that
he attended their meetings at least once a week, and that he conferred frequently with CREP Communications Director, Al Abrams. These contacts occurred before and during the actual fall campaign when Wilck acted as "the conveyor" of ideas to the Dole speechwriter, Mike Baroody. The over-all initiation of campaign directions was "outside the committee," he reported. "I would talk from time-to-time to CREP personnel to see what they were doing that week, what they were thinking." Mike Baroody did the same, "but on a more systematic basis." Wilck added that he thought CREP had been created as an extension of the White House because of the "concept of loyalty." "At the RNC, loyalty (and focus) on the part of staff was to the entire ticket and entire party, whereas at CREP, it was only 'what is good for the President.'"

What the Presidential surrogates were saying seemed to influence Wilck to a considerable extent. Each of them, he pointed out, had certain targets or narrow subject areas, whereas Dole was "out there" as a politician and had to carry more of the negative burden.

The RNC communications chief felt he was aiming nearly all of his output to Republicans, who, he felt, composed Dole's audience target. And, Wilck perceived them as inattentive, which weighed heavily, he said, in approaches he took. "To get the message through to our own people was an extremely difficult chore."
He, like Baroody, dismissed the Kansas constituency of Dole as having any impact on content creation. Similarly, he confirmed that not once had any Congressional campaign committeeman, GOP officeholder, RNC staff member, committee-man, or committeewoman, GOP state official, Republican fund-raiser contributed content suggestions to him or Baroody.

The media did have apparent impact on the former advertising man, however.

We were quite sensitive to news values in what we did. You could always make the best news for Bob with a press conference. If you put different formats on a scale from 1 to 10, ten being the most play possible, I'd rate coverage of the pre-speech press conference 9 or 10, the news release alone on the speech 3 to 4, and just the issuance of "a statement" in Washington at 1 or 2.52

The personal picture of McGovern, Wilck conceived, was constantly reinforced by the Democratic nominee's behavior, he said.

I think that really had a tremendous effect on what I recommended. McGovern was vacillation. He had a seeming innocence of the world of politics. His record was one of contradiction. We exploited that.53

The Deputy Chairman claimed that he rarely was conscious of others on the McGovern staff. "When you have the Democratic nominee running around the country comparing the President of the United States to Hitler, that doesn't leave much for the Jean Westwoods."54
Wilck said he had no personal knowledge of any polling or audience research data, and that his division retained no consultants nor received any advice from such sources. The only other influence from "the general situation" Wilck identified was the fact that the President had such a commanding lead that his over-all campaign could always be on the offensive. Wilck said that he never felt Watergate was an important enough issue to respond to, and at no time did he receive any suggestions to mention it, disavow it, or to condemn it. "There was no reason for us at the RNC to bring the matter up," Wilck said rather matter-of-factly. He added that the CREP press people were the ones receiving the inquiries from newsmen and were the ones responding on the issue. "Personally, I felt that neither McGovern's corruption charges nor those of the Post were catching fire." 55

In summary.--Wilck seemed highly attuned to stressing the themes Dole personally wanted to emphasize: promoting an open party, in which persons of a wide range of philosophies could participate, a party of "the open door." At the same time, the RNC Communications Director was acutely sensitive to a higher priority to support "The President." As the self-described "conveyor belt" from the White House, he injected raw material to use in attacking McGovern, material that coincided with his own salient image
of the nominee as a vacillating innocent who contradicted himself constantly. He scrutinized what the surrogates said, finding their messages aimed at specific issue areas, thus leaving a vacuum, a need for a more general political attack on McGovern. That, he felt, was Dole's job. What others in the opposition camp said didn't seem to register with or to matter to Wilck.

As a communicator, Wilck visualized his audience of Republicans as unattentive and difficult to penetrate. In fact, he seemed far more concerned with how to obtain their attention than with what to say. Wilck's orientation to news values was always apparent, and it was evident he had given considerable thought to avenues to wide coverage. He was aware of no input from RNC staff, and concluded that Dole's Senatorial constituency had mattered little in conceiving what the Chairman said. And, while Wilck was a prime principal in the Dole operation, the Deputy Chairman stressed that he, himself, was an input to Baroody and Dole. He did not view himself as a final decision-maker.

The Determinants of Communication
An Overview

Analysis of each principal communicator's perception of the variables which influenced the development of Dole's rhetoric yields three major conclusions: Each individual had a fairly clear set of concepts which he could readily
identify as affecting the Chairman's message. Responses were specific, not amorphous and vague. The communicators also had definite ideas about which inputs had significant influence in content development and which did not. Third, each communicator's picture of the salient variables of the rhetorical situation which affected Dole's rhetoric was remarkably similar in terms of ingredients and in the importance of each. Thus, looking across their individual responses gives one substantial insight into what and who influenced formulation of the group's communication.

The probable voting behavior and the RNC mission.—One predominating determinant was the historical and probable voting behavior of the electorate, the potential audience. A strong appeal, without partisan flavor, had to be aimed at the ticket-splitters, the Independents, and the Democrats. Such voters probably would not coalesce around a "Republican," but they might well support "The President." Hence, the incumbent President became the symbol which much of the GOP campaign emphasized. To make that strategy credible, Richard Nixon had to appear as the functioning President, not as a campaigning personality. Since Richard Nixon had to remain a President, others would have to do the campaigning. And the surrogates did just that.

But, even if these votes were won, they would only comprise the margin for majority. The base electoral
strength of Richard Nixon was composed of those consistent Republicans, the reliable 27 to 30 per cent. However, if this base vote was to materialize, heavy campaigning was necessary to activate, enthuse, and catalyze the loyalists. Who could campaign more effectively for these loyalties than their own Party? Thus, the campaign would be three-pronged: the President in office and his surrogates in the field assisted by the Committee to Re-Elect the President would aim at Independents and ticket-splitters, building the Presidential image. The Connelly Democrats for Nixon would aim at their party members, and the RNC would aim at Republicans. And, each thrust had a two-edged mission: differentiate the candidates on the issue of Presidential competence; avoid attacking Democrats, as such.

Dole, Chase, Scanlon, Baroody, Wilck, Klein, and Buchanan all identified this same over-all campaign strategy, noting that it was generally conceived in "early 1971." All attributed the over-all approach as basically the President's personal idea, reinforced and implemented by John Mitchell, and later, in an operating sense, by Clark MacGregor, and the White House strategy group as well. Senator Dole, in general terms, had a large part of his role, as it related to the over-all campaign, defined early in his tenure: target to Republicans, build their party, then activate it. As the reader may have already surmised,
the Dole group clearly perceived this strategy but refined it further as a result of other components of the situation.

The common McGovern image.--One was the common perception all held of George McGovern, and their agreement that his behavior before and during the campaign often richly illustrated the image each held of the nominee. Dole and Baroody saw him as "way-out," generally inept, indecisive, and unsure of his direction across issues. Wilck envisioned McGovern as "vacillating, naive, and inconsistent." Chase portrayed him as mediocre, unimaginative, "another politician." Dole claimed his image of the South Dakotan was a result of knowing McGovern earlier as a Senator. Baroody formed his view of the nominee, he said, through personal observation, but more so by studying the summaries (of McGovern actions, votes, and statements) prepared by RNC Research. Wilck, the political novice, attributed his pre-campaign opinion to those summaries, as did Scanlon.

While such sources influenced formation of their conceptions of the Senator, all stressed specific behavior by McGovern and related incidents which occurred before and during the campaign that reinforced their original images, perhaps sharpening them. Most often cited were (a) alleged "inconsistencies" in McGovern statements on controversial issues, (b) alleged "absurd" proposals such as the proposal
to give those on welfare annual $1,000 grants, the go-to-Hanoi-and-beg quote, his alleged defense cuts, and tax plans, (c) alleged credibility-damaging actions such as his support, then release of Eagleton, (d) his alienation of key Democratic chieftains and union bosses, (e) the "many" Democrat refusals to run with him, (f) his comparison of the President with Hitler, (g) his internal campaign squabbles, (h) his denial, then affirmation, that Pierre Salinger met in Paris with North Vietnam representatives, and (i) fellow Democrats' critical quotes.

Stereotyped early, and continuously reinforced in their eyes, the negative image of George McGovern held by each of the communicators was a powerfully salient influence on the message. For their purposes, they said, he was the ideal of vulnerability. Constantly reminding the public of his alleged weaknesses was a "must," from their perspective, and a "natural."

The catalyzing White House input.—The strong tendency to continually attack the Democratic nominee was also constantly catalyzed by a third influence—the White House strategy group. The reports of Wilck, Dole, Baroody, Chase, Scanlon—confirmed by Buchanan and Klein—clearly identified Charles Colson, Patrick Buchanan, Kenneth Clawson, Edward Failor, and Al Abrams as its principal members, and tacticians, working under the over-all general
strategy conceived by John Mitchell and the President himself. As Dole said, "It was definitely Colson's Shop." And, Scanlon told of on-the-road phone calls between Colson and Dole. Baroody noted he received their thinking at least once per week via a weekly meeting which would suggest themes via Wilck. Wilck and Baroody, at their initiative, often called Abrams and Failor (CREP liaison with surrogate ghosts) in addition. Thus, the strategy group communication with the Dole group was frequent: Colson and Dole talked often, Baroody and Wilck repeatedly conferred more frequently with Failor and Abrams, or respective lieutenants. Moreover, not only themes were orally recommended. Specific written comments—never more than one-page—were sent by the White House strategy group to Dole communicators. But, all this interchange among the tacticians still was not sufficient for decisions on Dole's nationally televised appearances. In advance of these, the strategists—Mitchell and MacGregor—would personally confer with Dole. The communications were not all one-way. All involved would frequently act in the role of initiator. But the White House strategy group was probably more often directive and, as Baroody pointed out, all RNC people involved began to form a conception of expectations of White House preferences.

While the process of such input is revealing, the content of their recommendations is equally as significant,
for the message from the White House was explicit and singular: **Attack McGovern.** As Dole said, "The White House people had a strange mentality. They were totally pre-occupied with undermining McGovern and his associates." Dole found it bewildering that these staffers "spent so much time figuring out how we could 'get McGovern.'" "It was an overwhelming and almost all-consuming motivation to attack him, instead of devoting more resources to building the President and the Party." Dole emphasized that by "undermining" McGovern, he was referring to rhetorical efforts, "above and beyond, separate from this other stuff [Watergate]."

All in the communication group recalled no suggestions from the group that dealt with Nixon, or the Party. All concerned negative criticism of McGovern. It was apparent that the White House source was a most influential content determinant. At the campaign's beginning, its recommendation was to go on the offensive totally and completely, concentrating on negative blasts at McGovern. During the campaign, the White House group's input involved the tactics of implementing this objective. Weekly and often daily, their tactics would be tied to timely McGovern behavior they thought they could exploit rhetorically. The researcher had the distinct impression that the White House group was a strong, but not totally controlling, force.
The RNC research material.—The raw material of the McGovern attacks was provided by RNC Research. Its organization of information on the Senator was by issue over time, which strongly implied, accurately or not, the inconsistency trait. The information and its timeliness (constant up-dates), in all probability, pointed to fertile grounds for McGovern attacks, and gave the attackers a wide variety of verbal ammunition. As noted, these data originated at RNC, were sent to CREP, and to Baroody and Dole as well. On certain occasions, attack material went to the White House at its request, which then sent it back to RNC—this time to Baroody. Baroody, consequently, could at times detect where emphasis had been added by the White House filters and emphasizers!

The Nixon "achievements" notebook and the Nixon "Promise-Performance" book also produced by Research were the sources for Baroody's speech content praising Nixon. This division's input was labeled positively by all as a significant influence on Dole communication.

Presidential actions.—Nixon's past and ongoing Presidential conduct was obviously a determining factor. Dole was highly and originally motivated to praise Nixon. The over-all Presidential strategy also emphasized praise for Nixon. And, as President, what Nixon did heavily affected the ingredients of the over-all rhetorical
situation. His much heralded China and Russian trips, his economic "moves," his cessation of the draft, and his chief negotiator Henry Kissinger's news-commanding actions in Vietnam spheres, are all examples. Though the White House never directed tactics of Nixon's promotion to the Dole group, Dole said that in his major talks with the President about the campaign, Nixon had stressed his greatest goal and hoped-for achievement was to be a "peacemaker, the architect of a new structure of peace." Both Dole and Baroody felt this role was important to emphasize. Wilck stressed his personal belief that the President's greatest strength was "his deep concern for peace." Since peacemaking was a strength, Wilck reasoned, it should be talked about. Whether one felt Nixon's performance as President was empty and contrived, or was replete with achievement, he could conclude that Nixon's actions not only significantly shaped the rhetorical situation, but, in the eyes of the Dole group, provided illustrative referents for their over-all praise.

**Conception of news values.**—A more amorphous, but still potent influence on the communicators was their conception of news values. All realized that the only way to reach the mass audience was through the news media. And they realized that the media report a message only if it has news value. Consequently, all were constantly oriented
to making news. Scanlon selected, arranged, and timed Dole appearances to get "maximum coverage." If the Senator had time constraints on an appearance, it was the speech that was shortened so the Chairman could have time to distribute the news release reporting on the remarks, then respond to corresponding press inquiries. Scanlon claimed Dole had a "continuous honeymoon with the press," while the Senator expressed great satisfaction with the reporting of him. Dole said that newsmen "were half the reason for making a speech." He seemed to prize what he felt was his high credibility with the press, and appeared conscious of the "pro-" or "anti-Nixon" feelings in individual reporters. He said he felt Republicans had a special obligation "to be fair" with newsmen, since GOPers had been rather antagonistic towards them in the past. Dole claimed, too, that he tried to exhibit his sense of humor continually inasmuch as he perceived reporters evaluating too many Republicans as "serious to the point of being offensive." Dole seemed especially conscious of what Washington newsmen thought of him.

Baroody was so concerned with the reporting on his speeches that he "led" with McGovern attacks, since these attacks got "good play," and the praise of Nixon or calls for Party unity drew hardly a line or second on-the-air. And, it was the speechwriter who called the "important" news
outlets to assure they had seen his release that day. Similarly, Wilck noted that one of his greatest challenges was penetrating through the media.

Indeed, these communicators were acutely aware of the media. How newsmen defined news, what prominence they gave certain kinds of content, the degree of credibility they ascribed to Dole personally, and how they had viewed Republicans in the past affected not only the style, but the emphasis and content of the Dole rhetoric.

The competitive situation.--Over-all, the competitive situation, Nixon's large lead, had a considerable impact on Dole and Baroody. The commanding margin Nixon constantly held assured Dole that Presidential victory was virtually certain. Consequently, Dole's motivation to stress (a) the "Open Door" theme and (b) the admonition to de-emphasize internal ideological disputes in quest of building the Party became more pressing. Lecturing Republicans against internecine disputes and apathy became a sought-after higher priority for the Republican National Chairman, as did his promotional effort for a fresh party image.

But, the Republican Party had an incumbent President, and as Baroody, Wilck, and Dole himself pointed out, the incumbency made it difficult to establish a separate identity for his "Party." The incumbent President also had
a record to extol, that was the surrogates' job. But, especially Baroody and Wilck felt, each one of the surrogates proselytized in limited subject areas. And, the Vice President had abandoned his old partisan role for a higher plane. Thus, a vacuum for sharp partisan attack was created. Dole filled it.

**The partisan audience images.**—A general image of the audience preyed upon Wilck, Baroody, and Dole. Dole saw them as Republicans feeling "left-out" of the campaign, resentful that the focus was solely Presidential. Baroody agreed mildly, but he saw them more as wanting to support the President, but needing factual rationalization and verbal supplies to do so. These he tried to provide. Wilck envisioned neither picture, but was plagued by his perception, that they were inattentive and rather blase about the whole campaign. So, he pushed a "grabby style . . . memorable quotes . . . ."

Without influence or salience for the communicators were other incumbent Republicans, candidates, or party leaders at any level. Especially surprising was the unanimous report that no RNC member or contributor offered inputs! And, aside from the Democratic nominee, no Democrat received special attention. Perhaps a contributing factor was the Presidential prohibition on offending Democrats.
In review, one can see that each communicator was affected by basically the same similar sets of variables, discussed in their general order of importance to the communicators. No single set seemed totally controlling; they "acted" in combination on the communicators, each of whom identified the determinant variables of the rhetorical situation similarly, yet perceived several slightly differently from his colleagues. Concurrently, it became evident that the communicators attributed little significance to certain other facets of the rhetorical situation.

"Ignored" Influences

One area no one emphasized was attention to attacks on the President, GOP, or Administration by Democrats. McGovern, for prime example, constantly reminded voters Nixon had not ended the war, that military emphases dominated the budget, that the Administration pursued misplaced priorities, and was responsive only to special interests. A prominent tactic, too, was linking Nixon to corruption, expedience, distrust, and elitist power centers, as the reader saw in Chapter II. None of the Dole group acknowledged that such charges caught their attention for any sustained scrutiny. And, they claimed their offensive strategy precluded dignifying or responding to attacks. Insuring that McGovern, not his opposition, remain on the defensive, focusing where he was weak, was the goal. If
defense was necessary, Baroody claimed, usually surrogates responded, according to the issue the Democrats touched. They sought to leave the implication that McGovern's words "never caught on with the voters," that citizens perceived him as ineffectual and desperate, meriting no continuing comment from Dole.

Specifically, in discussing their perception of influences, no one raised Watergate, or associated phenomena, except Wilck. When the researcher raised this question, four basic points emerged. First, Nixon was winning massively with an offensive strategy. McGovern was to them on the defensive. The salient issues of the campaign should remain as those where he was vulnerable. Watergate notwithstanding, they felt the whole campaign was overwhelming him. Why change the approach? Second, the Committee to Re-Elect the President was the entity associated with Watergate. It was "getting the press for it," as Scanlon phrased it. With CREP as the appropriate "lightning rod," deservedly so, the Dole group implied, why should the RNC become involved? Third, at the time of the campaign, all said the issue seemed truly minor and disgusting to RNC personnel. Fourth, the researcher felt the Dole group and RNC personnel in general were resentful and scornful of CREP staff. They seemed to feel "above" CREP, implied Watergate was "absolute stupidity," and, as such,
aptly represented some CREP personnel. They perceived Watergate as not their responsibility, as if it should have been dismissed along with involved CREP personnel. To them, it was removed. With some hint of disgust and an "it serves CREP right" attitude, the RNC felt Watergate was not their concern. In terms of their initiative, it deserved ignoring, they asserted.

Baroody said in only one instance he knew of did the strategy group touch on a Watergate-related speech insert. They suggested the Chairman castigate Democratic "violations" of campaign law. Dole agreed, and made such charges in three successive speeches. The Chairman pointed out, too, that he did bring up Watergate at a White House strategy meeting early in the campaign, and "got largely silence" as a response. Consequently, he assumed that the subject was not to be brought up in any way. Buchanan essentially confirmed that the White House strategy was to "ignore" criticism of the incident.

We knew what McGovern would say . . . it would be Watergate all the time. By responding, the issue just got talked about more, and with response the media then had a "give-and-take" situation they could report on. If one side said little or nothing, the newsworthiness of the issue, we felt, would drop lower in each night's news. You just don't talk about areas where you're weak. You talk about areas where they are weak. You keep that stuff uppermost in the minds of the public, and news media. You make their weaknesses--do all you can--to make their weaknesses, not yours, the forefront of the campaign.64
Summary

The probable electoral behavior of the audience, the accepted RNC mission, the shared image of McGovern, its sharpening during the campaign, the White House-Committee to Re-Elect the President input emphasizing the attack, Presidential actions, news values, conceptions of the partisan audiences, and the general competitive situation were prime sets of variables influencing the Dole communicators. With these inputs impinging on them, the Dole communicators formulated general communication goals.
Notes

1 Dole interview, June 20, 1973, in U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., is the source of his comments in this chapter.

2 Dole interview.

3 Dole interview.

4 Dole interview.

5 Dole interview.

6 Dole interview.

7 Dole interview.

8 Dole interview.

9 Dole interview.

10 Dole interview.

11 The Baroody interview of January 8, 1973, in the Eisenhower Center, RNC, Washington, D.C., is the source of his comments in this chapter. The Baroody interview of January 9, 1973, was utilized primarily to clarify and confirm.

12 Baroody interview.

13 Baroody interview.

14 Baroody interview.

15 Baroody interview.

16 Baroody interview.

17 Baroody interview.

18 Baroody interview.

19 Baroody interview.

20 Baroody interview.
The membership of this group was confirmed by Dole in his interview; by Wilck in his, on January 12, 1973; by Scanlon in his, on February 5, 1973; by Chase in his, on January 9, 1973; and by Patrick Buchanan, Consultant to the President, in his interview on September 6, 1973.

Baroody interview.

Baroody interview.

Baroody interview.

Baroody interview.

Baroody interview.

Baroody interview.

Baroody interview.

Baroody interview.

The scheduler's comments are based on the interview with him on February 5, 1973, in Cleveland, Ohio.

Scanlon interview.

Scanlon interview.

Scanlon interview.

Scanlon interview.

Scanlon interview.

Scanlon interview.

Scanlon interview.

Scanlon interview.

Scanlon interview.
All Wilck comments are based on the interview with him at the RNC, January 12, 1973, Eisenhower Center, Washington, D.C.

In addition to interviews cited, this generalization is based on an interview with Herb Klein, Communications Director, Executive Branch, June 19, 1973, Washington, D.C. Reporting by the news media also confirmed this strategy, as noted in Chapter II.
Integrating their own ideas, their perceptions of the past and ongoing rhetorical situation, and others' recommendations, as noted in the preceding chapter, the four communicators--Dole, Baroody, Wilck, and Scanlon--designated objectives to guide the over-all Dole rhetorical effort, and defined a message and target strategy to implement their goals. Each of the four principals talked to one another informally about their goals during early May and June. During this period, general outlines of their intentions evolved. But all concurred that actual specification of objectives and related decisions occurred in meetings of the four during the week after McGovern's nomination.

The objectives remained intact and "operative," throughout the campaign, though they were refined and specified slightly in application by daily conversations between Dole and Baroody, weekly discussions between Wilck and Baroody, and occasional contact between the speechwriter and Scanlon. Though these one-to-one conversations occurred frequently and consistently, the group as a whole did not
meet formally after the objectives were decided upon. During the September-October period of the campaign when Dole's pace was intensive, he talked daily with Scanlon, but his direct communication with Wilck was more rare. Similarly, in the period after the GOP Convention, Scanlon's direct communication with Wilck was infrequent and usually by intermediary. These patterns seemed to be the function of the four principals' schedules and locations, rather than of any design.

It was each participant's conclusion, as well as this researcher's, that Baroody alone, though responsive to Dole's feedback on each planned speech, was the final interpreter and implementer of objectives. A standard message did indeed emerge for repeated inclusion in each speech.

The Communication Goals

The goals of the Dole rhetoric were: (1) to solidify, motivate, and activate Republicans to campaign and vote for the President and other GOP candidates; (2) to build a new, refined identity for the Republican Party and attract new members to it; and (3) to contribute via news coverage to the over-all thrusts of the Presidential campaign by derogating McGovern's competence, dissociating him from shared ideals and approaches of the majority of Americans, while identifying them with the
President whose achievements illustrated his competence and his right to a second term.  

The Message Objectives

In order to achieve these goals, the Dole communicators decided upon and sought to convey three basic messages in their campaigning.

The McGovern message.--Of primary importance was to portray George McGovern as an indecisive person, a potentially incompetent President, and an extreme ideologue whose vacillating approaches and naive policies were at wide variance from the vast majority of Americans, indeed the vast majority of those in his own party. The corollary implication was that McGovern was either a confused man, or a politician who changed his ideas to adapt to different audiences, or both. As Dole elaborated:

I tried to put a gulf between McGovern and the real Democratic Party, to separate him and his friends from the Party. I guess I was saying he was further out then most Democrats. We tried to get across the idea he was part of the limousine liberals . . . his approaches were far off base . . . not rational, especially considering the sophisticated problems a President had to face. We talked about McGovern as a guy who was really at the extreme, totally out-of-tune with what the country wanted and needed.  

More specifically, Baroody said he tried constantly to contrast Nixon and McGovern on the issue of Presidential competence. He enumerated several basic traits he tried to
identify as characteristic of McGovern. The speechwriter tried to build an image of the nominee "as a waffler who was indecisive and inconsistent." We tried to show that he was an "experimenter," and to demonstrate he had no allegiance to any values, no loyalty to any set of ideas. We tried to illustrate that McGovern and his campaigners were a "band of ideologues" and as elitists, were not really for the people. Another basic appeal was to disenchanted Democrats, with the theme that McGovern was responsible for the "theft of the Democratic Party." Baroody emphasized, also, that his message tried to convey a McGovern "so confused on his own positions that he's debating himself." "He was to be the 'embracer of radical policies and supporters'. . . the amnesty, acid, abortion type thinking." Wilck and Scanlon echoed these general McGovern themes, with the Deputy Chairman emphasizing that "one role was to take the attack on the nominee." 

The Nixon message.--In sharp contrast, Richard Nixon was to be identified as a capable President whose competence, insight, and strong sense of direction had brought domestic prosperity, calm, and an emerging "new structure of peace" in the world. With such demonstrated Presidential effectiveness, all Americans, regardless of party label, should join in re-electing him to a much-deserved second term. "We constantly emphasized that he
was the President who was creating a new structure of peace in the world," Dole stated.  

"Contrasted with the experimenter, the great promise, but little performance, was Richard Nixon, whom we tried to tie to a style of leadership," the speechwriter confirmed. This over-all style was composed of "imaginativeness, responsibility, competence, innovation, insight," Baroody claimed. "We tried to supply the details and rationale for his achievements," the ghost explained. Here were the "informational fillers," the "whys," the rationalizations Baroody felt were so essential for Republicans to have in hand. "I suppose you might say we tried to make Nixon and the President one-in-the-same. He personified the competent President--that was the message."  

Like Baroody and Dole, Wilck felt their efforts stressed that Richard Nixon was a "strong, insightful leader who was a thoroughly detailed planner," and "knew the directions he wanted to go." In general, Wilck said they emphasized "praise of the Administration, especially of Nixon's role as a peace-maker." The scheduler voiced a slightly different picture.  

"Capacity for leadership was the theme," Scanlon said. "The speeches always emphasized that we were choosing a President, and the choice would be between two men. Bob wanted to ask repeatedly, 'Which one has the capacity for leadership in foreign and domestic areas?"
The GOP message.—The President's alleged leadership, identification with moderate positions, seemingly imminent victory, plus "the theft by McGovern of the Democratic Party" pointed to a third theme, stressed especially by Dole: 1972 was the opportune year for Republicans to unite behind their whole ticket, disregarding ideological differences, and open the Party at all levels to Independents and to most Democrats who had been robbed of a political home. More than ever before, Republicans should actively campaign for all GOP candidates, work enthusiastically for a revitalized majority party. Dole remarked:

I urged Republicans to forget who was a conservative, who was a liberal, and to unify. It was an attempt to widen the base, and to build a new identity for the Party. I tried to dispel the notion that Republicans were all conservatives with no sense of humor who lived under logs.

We concentrated on party-building, on the idea that everyone, Democrats and all, were welcome. I told John Mitchell several times that the Party had to have a wider base, that Richard Nixon had it [victory], so why not make this a campaign more for the Party. We had the chance to start becoming the majority.19

Scanlon added, "Bob sounded an expansionary, not intramural note."20 But, unlike the other communicators, Wilck said their objectives included no concentrated attempt to build any party image per se, "because of our emphasis on the attack."21 He acknowledged that the speeches did include "mention" of the idea of an open party, one seeking participation of a wide range of philosophies.
The Message Objectives: An Analysis

Since the objectives were to guide the whole communication effort, one has to analyze their appropriateness in light of the nature of the known or given rhetorical situation. How well did the communicators "read" their audiences and situation? Were the situational components in balance?

The GOP message.— The Party theme did seem to address a real need in the partisan audience: to "turn-out" GOP voters. As the communicators surmised, partisans were complacent, as Chapter VIII will show in detail. They did need a push, due to the probable, assumed Nixon victory, and their "hurt" resulting from insufficient national campaign attention. The partisans probably did have common Republican beliefs; a reinforcive message appealing to stalwart traditions was apt. And, in the Presidential year, it was appropriate that someone serve as the living embodiment of a national party and demonstrate there was a national party with a national voice.

And, Dole's image of the partisans appeared accurate: they were activists and opinion leaders, major sources of intra-party communication. Baroody saw them as agents of personal diffusion, as "sources" themselves, as potential campaign warrior-communicators in their own network of interpersonal communication, who needed
information to fill in their own visceral evaluations. Yet, Wilck saw the partisans as only uninterested, difficult to penetrate, and Scanlon saw the partisans only as "part of the cast," legitimators for news purposes, who made the pseudo-event less pseudo. Similarly, the others saw this added value in their immediate audiences. Over-all, though probably accurate, their assumptions about the partisan audience were not flattering. They ascribed seemingly little sophistication or attentiveness to these receivers. For the message across all themes of the objective labeled and asserted, rather than explained and argued.

While the situational and audience needs did render such a Party theme appropriate, in many ways, it was not realistic. A decades-long history of ideological diversity and disputes could in all probability not be attenuated by a nine-week series of messages. Even if partisans were convinced to "open the door," nothing was said about what new members would receive when they came in. No inducements beyond "winning" were implied. The Party was to have a new or refined image, but the image had no ingredients. Moreover, the message was internally inconsistent implicitly. Dole was urging a new tolerance, welcoming a wider variety of points of view—essentially arguing that a more heterogeneous party was needed if the GOP was to become a majority. Yet, the argument stressed concurrently that
party members should drop internal disputes, unify and, essentially, become more homogeneous in thought.

Practically, while the Party theme might have significant impact on immediate audiences and their interpersonal communication, it would prove to have little news value. It would have little impact among the mass partisan audience because no medium would percolate it to the vast majority who would never hear Dole personally. And, while trying to promote such a Party theme in the year when scores of Presidential voices talked was admirable, it was also, to a great degree, futile, considering the Presidential strategy. Wilck's comments in this regard were probably apt.

The McGovern message.—The McGovern attack theme, basically a product of Chase's research and shaping, Buchanan's initiative, and Baroody's application, seemed appropriate, if not ethical, for salient situational and audience variables. The electorate probably sought competence, decisiveness, and moderation—so the theme put McGovern at variance with these qualities. They took selected visible parts of the rhetorical situation—alienated labor and Democrat statements, certain McGovern excerpts, actions and misfortunes (e.g., Eagleton)—and portrayed these (selected) most negative McGovern variables (parts) and projected them as the whole of his candidacy.
In essence, they borrowed selectively from the visibles of the rhetorical situation to build a negative McGovern image. By referring to "visibles," things that had happened, instead of just allegations, probably their portrayal was more effectively illustrated. And, such a strong offensive theme was needed to keep the rhetorical "heat" and public focus on McGovern's, not Nixon's, alleged weaknesses.

For the partisan audience, the McGovern theme appeared to be a potentially effective motivator. A frightening common enemy could be built. Even if partisans were irritated with Nixon, the non-campaigner, Nixon, the President, was far better than the horror of McGovern whose candidacy represented the opposite of every value and goal of Republicans, in fact, of nearly all Americans. McGovern must be stopped was the theme's implication and inherent motivation.

The Nixon message.--And, the Nixon theme was another symbol to rally round, even if it seemed to be a less motivating one. Again, the theme selected referents from the situation, in this instance only the most positive ones, and portrayed them as the whole of the candidacy. The theme facilitated knowing why Nixon deserved re-election by naming his visible actions, which allegedly illustrated his competence, moderation, and achievement. Actions are there,
not quite as disputable as promises, and perhaps more communicable. As the over-all strategy had recommended, Nixon, the President, was much easier to accept than Nixon, the person, and for non-Republicans, much easier to accept than Nixon, the Republican.

As one can see, the major referents of the objectives referred to no public figures in either party other than the President or McGovern. No specific philosophies were expressed, nor was there any attempt to explain or substantively discuss issues. Rather, the objectives sought to identify, link, or label each nominee with certain traits, to build associations in voters' thinking about the candidates.

The Audience Objective

Except for special top-level White House recommendations for Dole to make national television appearances for the campaign, Dole and Baroody alone set the target objective. It was to establish and utilize the official Republican organization or related organization forums to diffuse the basic message to immediate GOP-dominated audiences, and to newsmen covering the event, as well as the national mass audience of Republicans and other potential voting allies. Within this general target strategy, a sub-strategy called for Dole to be scheduled in areas with large media markets for optimum news coverage in states with
the larger electoral votes, with the exception of course of Dole's regular once-per-month week-end of speechmaking in Kansas.

"Generally," Dole said, "you go into an area for two reasons, to stir up the [immediate] audience, to enthuse them. And, to make news, so your basic message gets out to the larger numbers." Like the Senator, Baroody felt their over-all goals should be to "enthuse and motivate the partisans," yet appeal secondarily to Democrats and Independents too. To do so, "you had to get national press by focusing on the national campaign, most always attacking McGovern." Scanlon and Wilck concurred.

The immediate audience. -- The daily interpreter and implementer of the target objective, Scanlon, saw the members of each immediate audience as instrumental to diffusing the message through their later interpersonal communication with others who had not personally attended the Dole speech. He also visualized his immediate audience primarily as "part of the cast," as those whose presence merely legitimated the Dole event as real, as newsworthy. "Without such audiences and forums, you could not do a full-fledged speech and would have to just issue a statement which drew little play." Dole and Baroody appreciated and agreed, to a large extent, with this thinking, but attributed considerable
importance to the immediate audience in and of themselves, not as "diffusers." Dole saw them as the "major-domos" to move other Republicans in their state. Baroody concurred and also cited their potential to "pass on" Dole's message to others in the party or in other work, neighborhood, or social contexts. The speechwriter featured most in-person listeners as potential campaign warriors who needed to be armed with information for the fight. And, the reader will recall that Dole viewed his partisan audiences as complacent, as having to "get off dead center." At the same time, Dole saw them as knowing they "had been left out" of the campaign, forgotten by national campaign principals concerned with no one below the top-of-the-ticket.

Aside from these general images, the communicators' conceptions of their target remained rather vague. They had not given their receivers very specific consideration. The partisans were not differentiated by sub-audiences according to interests, issues, special needs, or past behavior. No explicit equivalents to audiences emerged. No specific informational needs were attributed to any audience. The communicators did attach a general interested-uninterested dimension to receivers, however. As Wilck's comments illustrated, Republicans were not featured as highly motivated to "tune in" to the campaign. And, evidently, no overwhelming sophistication was attributed to
the targets. Labeling and asserting rather than explaining and arguing seemed to the group to be the appropriate approach.

The national news audience.—Another target, newsmen, seemed to draw a more salient, specific image in the communicators' thinking. The researcher was struck repeatedly by the power that each communicator felt newsmen possessed to hinder or facilitate diffusion of their message. Scanlon described them as America's "new folk heroes."

Baroody saw them as needing content replete with attacks, accusations, conflict, and colorful quotes to compose a story. He also, as mentioned earlier, visualized them as deluged with information. Dole viewed newsmen as prizescandor, consistency, and outspokenness—all of which he tried to give them. He saw them—rightly or wrongly—as acutely sensitive and defensive with Republicans due to the media attacks of the Nixon years, due to the disproportionate snubbing and hostility they received from Republicans. Consequently, greater openness, levity, and amity were called for. He seemed almost preoccupied with identifying with newsmen, as if it not only increased one's effectiveness as a communicator, but rendered him as distinctly fashionable in Washington. National reputation, partisan inclination, past treatment of Republicans, unique issue interests, degree of laziness, personal fetishes,
types of story preferences, general intelligence, stature in profession, political perceptiveness or naivete, were traits that marked Dole's images of newsmen who covered him.

Scanlon saw the media as more concerned with visual splash, with format and style more than substance. He saw them not caring necessarily for what was said, so long as it gave them convenient raw material for the story they had to file.

The image antecedents.--These images of the Dole targets were almost totally the product of personal experiences. Dole especially had years of contact and observation of the GOP and the press corps. Baroody, with scant political and news background, developed images as he first worked at RNC. His conception of Republicans was probably a result, in part, of Dole's influence, and that of his earlier mentor, Lynn Nofziger, a long-time political public relations man. Wilck had experience with newsmen in general, but not with political reporters or Republicans, first-hand, over the years. Scanlon drew only on his Ohio experience in a Cleveland and two state-wide campaigns. Except for Dole, all were relative novices in dealing with the audience to whom they spoke.

Interestingly, no sophisticated criteria were utilized for scheduling or targeting. At no time did any of them have access to private state-by-state or national
opinion samplings. They plotted Dole's appearances without any source of systematic, ongoing feedback. Similarly, though Dole had general briefings on the areas where he spoke, not one of the four had access to research or information on any of the specific speech sites. Baroody pointed out that "knowing our specific audiences, their locale, and any unique local interests, problems, or issues... were areas where we really fell down." He said he usually made no attempt to relate a speech to specific aspects of the area of its delivery. "Whatever local or introductory audience identification was done, was pulled off by the Senator on the spot," the ghost remarked.

Though the over-all objectives, in part, emphasized reaching ticket-splitters, Independents, and homeless Democrats, Dole, except for TV appearances, appeared primarily at GOP partisan forums. And not one communicator had any specific idea of geographic location or demographic or behavioral traits of ticket-splitters or disenchanted Democrats. They simply accepted the proposition that "enough" non-Republicans were "out there listening" to be worthwhile targets for their message.

In conclusion, Dole's specific target areas were scheduled without the benefit of research about the areas he entered, without much of a specific conception of who his citizen listeners were or what they were like, but with
decided sensitivity to and a much clearer, more definitive image of the newsmen covering these speeches. Finally, no direct, systematic feedback was sought or utilized to govern or refine their targeting. To a great degree, the great mass they sought to reach remained homogeneous and undifferentiated in their thinking.

The Means of Communication

With the objectives defined, the communication group used four means to implement them: (1) the speech or statement delivered before primarily Republican organization audiences, (2) the news release distributed to national and local news media, (3) the press conference, and (4) appearances on the network news interview shows. The speech occasion was the principal vehicle for message distribution. For each of the sixty-six speeches Dole delivered, the communication group distributed news releases covering it. Additionally, Dole held a press conference before each speech to comment on its contents and answer questions from newsmen. During the campaign, consistent with the target objectives, Dole made sixty-six major speeches, with corresponding press conferences, and he appeared seven times in Kansas and seven times in California, delivered six separate speeches in Ohio, five each in New York, Michigan, and Florida, and four in Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Missouri. Three speeches were delivered in Virginia and
Arizona, and two in New Jersey, Maryland, Texas, and Wisconsin. The Chairman spoke twice in the Dakotas, and once in Kentucky, North Carolina, and Minnesota. These locales did afford Dole access to major media markets in states with large electoral votes. Perhaps the three trips to Arizona, a state with few electoral votes, may strike the reader as inconsistent with the objective. However, it is reasonable to assume that Dole's close association with Barry Goldwater, who recommended him as National Chairman, was largely responsible for the amount of time given to this small state. The Dakotas were included because of their hoped-for news value as McGovern's home state.

Scanlon tried to "break into" the national news interview programs with some success. Dole appeared on CBS's Face the Nation once during the campaign (September 24), on ABC's Issues and Answers (October 29), but never appeared on Meet the Press during the campaign period. However, he was interviewed on NBC's Today show three times (August 31, September 15, and October 11).

Everyone in the communication group agreed that almost every press conference called drew several local newsmen from the print and the broadcast media. Frequently, they claimed, representatives of the national media (the networks, news magazines, the large metro dailies) covered Dole on his speaking tours and corresponding press
conferences. All means of communication were verbal; no non-verbal "pseudo-events" were utilized.

Processes of Message Development

Development of each message was a function of two phases, a weekly planning process that generated broad themes to be used in the upcoming week's speeches, and a daily process in which each speech was composed. Generally, each process consisted of sequential steps, though in a few instances, time forced Baroody to "collapse" the process, omitting some steps. The following description is not meant to imply that speeches were developed in a totally unvarying, machine-like precision process. What does emerge is a planned, organized way of proceeding that principal communicators followed with considerable consistency. Recall, too, that everyone in the Dole group participated in formulating the over-all communication objectives--the general thrust, referents and targets of the message--which did not change over the period of the campaign. The developmental processes, seemingly, were set up in service of the objectives.

The planning process.--Scanlon would send Baroody Dole's "final" schedule of appearances plotted out for about five days usually about a week in advance of their occurrence. Occasionally, Senate schedules would change
abruptly, and the Senator's personal schedule would thus be altered. The speechwriter had advance notice of many major occasions several weeks in advance. Consequently, for the most part, Dole's schedule projections remained rather firm for speechwriting purposes.

Upon receipt of the advance schedule, Baroody would talk with Dole, generally about "what kind of affair" each would be—covering probable audience size, formality of the occasion, the presence of other national figures, the expected news coverage the speech might draw, and what approaches might be appropriate. Baroody stated these exchanges provided a good orientation to upcoming events for Dole.

The speechwriter would then look over the most recent research updates on McGovern actions and statements, eye recent or impending events, scrutinize recent Nixon moves, news stories, and the like, and try to "conjure up" ideas and approaches of his own for the coming week. He discussed these with Wilck who conveyed the recommendations of the White House strategy group as to "what tack to take with McGovern" in their impending speeches. Out of this conference between the Communications Director and the speechwriter would come some jointly conceived "general themes" that the speeches would employ.

After this consultation with Wilck, if Baroody still felt "wanting" for ideas, or if he wanted to test reactions,
he would call one or more of this group: Shumway, CREP press chief; Abrams, CREP communications head; CREP surrogate scheduler Porter; or surrogate coordinator for McGovern material, Failor, to "sample their ideas," to "get a feel for what others in different elements of the campaign were doing . . . what people like Clark MacGregor would be saying."

Occasionally, the themes developed in this total process would be refined or altered by Wilck and Baroody together at some point closer to the time of delivery to seize upon and exploit a timely McGovern "goof." Such was the case in Dole's speech references to McGovern's denial, then confirmation of Pierre Salinger's Paris meeting with North Vietnamese negotiators. With only slight exception, the themes developed in the planning process were negative attacks on the McGovern candidacy. This element of each speech supplied the "lead" in almost all press releases.

The development process.—Guided by the general objectives, planned themes, and knowledge of the scheduled forums, Baroody claimed that he, on a day-by-day basis, would survey informally and briefly the salient political situation and current news, and draw on the Nixon record to write the first draft. The ghost sent each draft directly to Dole's Senate office. As Dole confirmed, no intermediary edited or saw the draft. Almost always, Dole personally
inked in changes in every draft. Dole most often changed about 25 per cent of each draft, according to both. His most consistent editing softened the language of the "slams" on McGovern. The Chairman often added material to further specify or illustrate a certain point, or to suggest a further line of argument. The ghost said Dole rarely "zeroed-in" on other parts of the speech—references to the President or the Administration.

Dole would edit one to three speeches at a time, send them back to Baroody, who then incorporated Dole's suggestions into a second draft. On the basis of the second draft, Baroody would prepare the lead and following paragraph of a covering news release. He designated which other graphs in the speech were to be covered in the release, and his assistant completed the news piece.

He conferred with Dole daily, sometimes in person, sometimes by phone. In these conversations, Baroody would give Dole the "gist" of "tomorrow's speech(es)" (second drafts) and accompanying news releases. Most frequently, Dole would simply acknowledge this information, but at times verbally edit a sentence here and there in the second "final" drafts. After the daily conversation, the speech-writer would send the final draft of the speech and release for reproduction.

News aides of Wilck would distribute both to over 200 national news drops in D.C., and send several copies to
the Dole party for on-site news distribution and the Senator's delivery. Both would be marked for release on the day of the speech. The ghost's goal was to try, if possible, to get the package to newsmen a day in advance, or at least the night before or early in the morning of the appearance date. This advance gave newsmen a chance to read the messages and begin to prepare their story before Dole's delivery.

When he arrived for his speech, Dole or an aide would distribute copies to newsmen covering the event, announce he "stood by every word," then receive questions on the remarks before he began his scheduled speech. The speechwriter said Dole's speech was often "on the wires" before he had spoken the first word in it. Such advance preparation, he pointed out, allowed newsmen to "file" stories on Dole's message well before their own deadlines. Wilck, responsible for "servicing" the media, and Baroody both felt that giving newsmen as much lead time as possible resulted over the long term in better coverage for Dole. Less rush in preparing, they reasoned, led to a more accurate and fuller story on Dole.

Parenthetically, one should note that the daily Dole/Baroody conference enabled each to make last-minute logistical changes, or arrange for on-site reported news interviews and exchange feedback on previous speeches.
Dole always asked about the nature and extent of coverage accorded his remarks, and Baroody would elicit local reaction to the speech.

An integrating process.—Thus, Baroody, in frequent communication with Dole and other campaign elements, was the prime author of each speech, but the Chairman was the final decision-maker on the content and language of each speech. Moreover, the speechwriter was steeped in Dole's approaches, interests, policy preferences, and was aware not only of the over-all objectives, but of Dole's prescriptions and proscriptions.

The researcher drew the distinct conclusion that the process was an integrating one, and that each speech was a compromise product composed of content emphases from Dole, the White House group, GOP research on Nixon and McGovern, expected news play of content ingredients, plus Baroody's own ideas, and reactions of Baroody and those he contacted to the current ongoing over-all political situation. More than an approximater of what only Dole wanted to say, the speechwriter's role seemed to be part-synthesizer, part-creator, and part-editor. He worked as a surveyor of ideas and reactions, and as an information-gatherer. With data and appeals assembled, Baroody alone conceived the shape and organization of each speech, adding his own modes of expression. Dole's development role
included being a broad outliner, an editor of language style, and a final decision-maker regarding content emphasis. Together, the Senator and ghost worked as the collaborators. No one else checked or cleared content.

A closed system.--Significantly, this process or approach never changed to any degree, even though Dole's forums, geographical location, and audiences varied constantly. Similarly, the process denoted a strikingly closed communication system. Group members consulted only each other, or White House-Committee to Re-Elect the President counterparts. No outside feedback was sought, no ideas were solicited from, or tested on, "old pros" at the RNC or in state organizations, or at any level in the party structure. Perhaps Dole's apparent character as a loner, with no close political or social cronies in government, and Baroody's and Wilck's scant experience in politics accounted in large part for their relative lack of interpersonal communication with persons external to the group. Wilck suggested that by keeping the operation limited to a few, it could be more "efficient." Dole similarly emphasized, "we had to move things," whereas Baroody could offer no explanation about "who was consulted."
Summary

Four means of communication were thus emphasized: the speech, the news release, the press conference, and appearances on national interview shows. Dole gave sixty-six speeches, distributed as many releases on each, appeared on five such news shows, and held approximately sixty-six news conferences during the formal campaign period for diffusion to the mass and immediate audiences.

Two processes were involved in developing and diffusing these messages. In the planning process, Wilck and Baroody decided on basic themes to be emphasized the following week. Usually all severely criticized McGovern. With these themes, a knowledge of the general objectives, access to a few campaign counterparts, and other sources, Baroody would conceive a first draft, beginning the development process. Dole alone would edit this draft, which Baroody would re-write, check again with the Chairman, then distribute the speech and corresponding release to 200 national news drops.

The speeches were the result of an integrating process in which Baroody was part-creator, part-synthesizer, and part-editor. He collaborated with Dole, who was a broad outliner, editor of language and style, and final decision-maker on content. The whole process was rather a closed system of communication in operational and objective formulation phases.
In fact, the Dole group deliberately defined three communication objectives for consistent rhetorical implementation during the campaign: (1) to solidify, motivate, and activate Republicans to campaign and vote for the entire GOP ticket; (2) to build a refined national identity for the Republican Party, and expand and strengthen its membership; and (3) to contribute to the Presidential campaign by criticizing McGovern and by praising the President.

The national target for the basic message was primarily Republicans, and to a considerably lesser extent, through the news media, Independents, ticket-splitters, and disaffected Democrats. The forums used were GOP groups and organizations, predominantly in metropolitan media markets of states with large electoral votes. Once per month the over-all target strategy was pre-empted so Senator Dole could speak in his Kansas constituency. All the communicators felt national media diffusion of their message was the key to their basic effectiveness.

Though the group decided on a three-pronged basic message, Wilck's emphases were the most different from the others', initially and individually. He felt the attack role was of overriding importance, and felt that the attempt to build a changed image for the national party was nearly futile. Both Scanlon and Baroody felt the most important theme was the contrast between McGovern and Nixon on
leadership traits, while Dole saw the significance in "putting a gulf between McGovern and his Party," and praising Nixon's Presidential performance. All agreed stress should be placed on the President's peacemaking "accomplishments," and all sought to portray McGovern with essentially the same negative traits. Baroody, Dole, and Scanlon were consonant on the characteristics their emerging "Majority Party" should possess: openness, unity, ticket-wide effort, and a diminution of ideologically based intra-party conflict.

The objectives included no explanation or discussion of issues, aimed at triggering predispositions, and were based upon an assumption that considerable anti-McGovern sentiment existed in the electorate. Images of the audience were clearer for the news target than for the partisan one. Little feedback was available; little was sought. Identification with the immediate audience was also rarely attempted. The product of these objectives and means—the enunciated message—is described in the following chapter.
Notes

1 Researcher's conclusions about objective and strategy development are induced from interviews with Robert Dole on June 27, 1973; Michael Baroody on December 12 and 14, 1972, and on January 8, 1973; Michael Scanlon on December 12 and 14, 1972, and February 5, 1973; and with Thomas Wilck on January 12, 1973.

2 The sets of message objectives and target objectives, and the over-all objectives for which the first two seemed instrumental, are the researcher's collective summary based on communication group interviews. Each such interviewee mentioned all elements so summarized. All talked in terms of the message and target objectives being instrumental to over-all Dole objectives. Each communication group respondent seemed to rank each of the message goals/themes as of equal importance.

3 Dole interview.


5 Baroody interview, January 8, 1973.


9 Wilck interview.

10 Dole interview.


15 Wilck interview.

16 Wilck interview.


19 Dole interview.
21 Wilck interview.
22 Dole interview.
25 Chapter VIII elaborates on this point.
26 Deduction based on all interviews cited in chapter, and confirmed by interview with Patrick Buchanan, Consultant to the President, September 6, 1973.
27 Dole interview.
28 Dole interview.
34 Baroody interview, January 8, 1973.
35 Deduced from all interviews with RNC/Dole staffers and examination of speech texts, news releases, other materials at RNC, and those sent to researcher by Chase. The researcher obtained copies of many Dole speeches/releases (37), and had to examine others at RNC, January 8-12, 1973.
36 The schedule of Dole appearances was available by general state listing only.
38 Scanlon interview, February 5, 1973; list of state appearances; contacts with producers of these shows by the researcher; and the NBC Archives computer print-out supplied to researcher.
The picture of this process was built from information from each interviewee in the communication group, going into detail especially with Dole and Baroody. Queries were made as to the general process, then the interviewer returned to specific speeches and asked how these (2) were written.

Chapter II explains this incident.
CHAPTER VI

THE MESSAGE

In this chapter, the content, form, and expression of the Dole message are analyzed in order to identify the precise nature of the Chairman's rhetoric, to determine how closely it corresponded to message objectives, and to aid in explaining the effect of Dole's communication. The message was conveyed in speeches and in news releases. The speeches are discussed first.

Summary of All Themes

Nearly two-thirds of all the themes Dole enunciated dealt with the Democratic nominee. Only 18 per cent—almost a fifth—concerned Richard Nixon. The Republican National Chairman referred to the party he led in only 4 per cent of his themes, and to Republicans other than Nixon in a sparse 1 per cent of his themes. In contrast, 11 per cent of his themes dealt with the Democratic Party, and 2 per cent with Democratic personalities other than McGovern. The American people were the subject of 3 per cent of the themes. Analyzing the themes by campaign sides, one sees that 74 per cent (three-fourths) of them dealt with
McGovern and Democratic campaigns, whereas only one-fourth covered Republican or Nixon themes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme - Categories</th>
<th>% of Total References</th>
<th>% of All Theme References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. McGovern:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un-Presidential Person</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Issues</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Issues</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Governing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approaches</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Nixon:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Person</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Issues</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Issues</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Governing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approaches</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Parties:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Personalities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Personalities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. American People</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E. Others</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comparing all references to George McGovern with all themes of all speeches, the researcher can conclude that 21 per cent dealt with the McGovern campaign, 15 per cent with McGovern as a person, 10 per cent with McGovern's domestic proposals and/or policies, 10 per cent with McGovern's foreign issues, 3 per cent with his general governing approach, and 1 per cent with his past behavior as a Senator. Isolating all McGovern themes, one can see further that over one-third of them concerned his campaign, one-fourth pointed to the man personally, over a third referred to McGovern's stands on issues, and 2 per cent dealt with his Senatorial performance.

### TABLE 2

**ALL McGOVERN THEMES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal Subject - Theme</th>
<th>Per Cent of All Themes</th>
<th>Per Cent of All McGovern Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>McGovern:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un-Presidential Person</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Issues</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Issues</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Governing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approaches</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>60%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
McGovern Themes

The McGovern Campaign

Dole repeatedly labeled "the McGovern campaign" as "losing" and "desperate"; as composed of "zealots," "radicals," and "partners of permissiveness"; and portrayed the campaign as a separate entity sympathetic to "anti-war militants" and "welfare militant demonstrators." With about equal emphasis, he characterized the McGovern campaign as "the Great Debate between McGovern and himself," as one of "inconsistency, confusion, reversal, and hypocrisy." Such themes accounted for nearly half (43%) of all references to the Democrat's campaign. Other themes consisted largely of negative blasts at the tactics of the South Dakota Senator whose campaign was to the RNC "filled with the worst and lowest-level rhetoric." In fact, McGovern's rhetoric per se was the Dole subject of attack in 32 percent of the McGovern campaign themes. The Chairman accused the Senator of "the worst character vilification, character assassination, and smear," "despicable political rhetoric," "intentional obfuscation," "the filthiest, vilest, most reprehensible rhetoric," "inflammatory rhetoric," of engaging in the "campaign of the political stiletto," of "self-righteous venom," of "deceiving the American public," and of "campaigning at a hysterical pitch."
Furthermore, he continually chastized the nominee for comparing the American government to the German Third Reich, and Richard Nixon to Adolf Hitler. He claimed the McGovern campaign had "insulted American youth, working people, and most Americans," and was "a circus," rather than a sound political campaign.\(^5\)

Dole concurrently stressed that the McGovern campaign had "played fast and loose with election laws, and violated the Fair Campaign Practices Code, as well as the Federal Election Campaign Act."\(^6\) The Chairman emphasized that the Democrat's campaign "never rose above the viciousness, dishonesty, and chicanery of which it was born."\(^7\) Dole also charged McGovern's rhetoric indeed exhibited these traits because it was "devoid of issues or substance." Calling the effort the "low-water mark of American politics," Dole specifically charged that the McGovern campaign "had an undercover operation of its own," and rebutted that "McGovern's campaign charged the GOP with espionage to conceal its inability to sell its radical programs."\(^8\)

Again, such negative characterizations of the McGovern campaign accounted for 21 per cent of all Dole's rhetoric, and 36 per cent of all references to McGovern. (See Table 3.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Percentage of Total McGovern Campaign References Each Theme Represents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Losing, Desperate Campaign</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign of Zealots, Radicals, Militants, Permissiveness</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign of Inconsistency, Reversal, Confusion, Hypocrisy; &quot;Great Debate&quot; between McGovern-Self</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000% Support for Eagleton, then Dumped Him</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had No Issues or Substance</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compared American Government to Third Reich and Nixon to Hitler</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insulted Youth, Working People, American People</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign of Worst Character Assassination, Vilification, and Smear</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign of Hysterical Pitch</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign of Despicable Political Rhetoric</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filthiest, Vilest, Most Reprehensible Rhetoric</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign of Intentional Obfuscation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign of Political Stiletto</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign of Self-Righteous Venom</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign a Circus</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Inflammatory</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign was Low-Water Mark of American Politics</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign had Undercover Operation of Its Own</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Charged GOP Espionage to Conceal Inability to Sell Its Own Radical Programs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Deceived Public</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Never Rose Above Viciousness, Dishonesty, Chicanery of Which Born</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Not One of &quot;the People&quot; since It was Largely Financed by Few Big Contributors</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
McGovern, the Un-Presidential Person

The next most profuse set of references by Dole was to McGovern's personal qualities which appeared to portray him as an "un-Presidential" person. Nearly a third of these themes branded him as an inconsistent, indecisive person; over a fifth asserted his lack of credibility; a fifth linked him to radicals; and the remainder consisted of various specific criticisms. Analyzing the indecisive-inconsistent charge, one sees that 16 per cent of the "McGovern un-Presidential person" references charged McGovern with "switching positions and wavering" because he was an indecisive person generally. Another 13 per cent of these themes alleged that McGovern switched positions and constantly changed his mind because he was "expedient, opportunistic, and hypocritical."9

Similarly, direct accusations pointed to the credibility issue. The theme that McGovern lacked Presidential credibility composed 6 per cent of these "Person" themes, as did the "McGovern lacks leadership capacity" charge and the specific "lacks competence" theme. Dole noted in 3 per cent of the "Person" references that the South Dakotan had "no executive experience."10

The "radical" label emerged significantly, also. "McGovern is radical and out of step with his country and his times" accounted for 6 per cent of the McGovern "Person"
references; "qualified only for the SDS Presidency," 4 per cent; "supported historically by only radical fringes," 4 per cent; and "condones extremists, mob tactics historically," 5 per cent. In 5 per cent of his McGovern personal charges, Dole flatly stated, "McGovern doesn't have what it takes to be President." 11

Other Dole charges included allegations that McGovern exhibited "self-righteous assurance," "a lack of understanding of Americans and their government," and a personified "elitist ideology," was "naive," "confused," and "intemperate, not thoughtful or prudent." 12 Dole even accused McGovern of being a "demagogue," and of having "petulant cynicism as a trademark." 13 The Chairman said twice that McGovern as a Senatorial campaigner utilized similarly poor tactics, and pointed out that his Senate voting record on major issues was 30 per cent, as if to say McGovern really has not cared.

Thus, a fourth of all McGovern references damned his personal qualities as they related to his performance as a leader. Such "Person" criticisms accounted for 15 per cent of all of Dole's rhetoric in the campaign. They were blanket indictments, generally stated, usually without reference to specific issues or programs or actions. The table below summarizes Dole's treatment of McGovern as one unfit for the Presidency.
### TABLE 4

**McGOVERN AS PERSON**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Percentage of Total References to McGovern-Person Each Theme Represents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switches positions, inconsistent, wavering, indecisive</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switches positions, expedient, opportunistic, hypocritical</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has no credibility</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacks capacity for leadership</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacks competence</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical, out-of-step with his country and his times</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn't have what it takes to be President</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condones extremists historically</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supported in past by radical fringes</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualified only for SDS presidency</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exudes self-righteous assurance</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacks any executive experience</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is a demagogue</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacks understanding of Americans, their government</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is naive</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personifies elitist ideology</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petulant cynicism is trademark</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intemperate, not thoughtful or prudent</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is confused</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condones mob tactics</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacks insight</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 5

**McGOVERN AS SENATOR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Percentage of Total References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30% voting record on major issues</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senatorial campaign tactics poor</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**McGovern Issues and Programs**

However, a fifth of all Dole's rhetoric and well over a third (37%) of all McGovern references dealt with the Senator's actions, positions, and statements on issue questions.

**Domestic issues.**—Comprising the largest proportion of Dole's criticism of McGovern domestic policies were his attacks on the nominee's welfare proposals. In 22 per cent of the domestic issue McGovern references, the Chairman condemned "the $1,000 for every man, woman, and child in America" proposal, and he pointed out how McGovern had changed the proposal to advocate a third measure. "Which one is he for?" Dole would argue.

With less emphasis, he took the same approach to McGovern's tax reform plan. "He's taken different positions. Which one is he for? All are ridiculous." Dole claimed, too, with regularity that McGovern favored general amnesty, legalization of abortion, and marijuana, and planned to redistribute income. Another consistent charge was the "McGovern's only answer to crime was to put Ramsey Clark back in the Cabinet," implying that McGovern as President would indeed appoint Clark as Attorney General.

Other themes included charges that McGovern endorsed illegal strikes, had taken three different stands on farm
parity, had done a flip-flop on wage-price policies, advocated policies that would raise grocery prices, and felt busing was essential.\textsuperscript{16}

In 16 per cent of his McGovern domestic issue themes, Dole cited Senator McGovern's absence from key issue votes in the Senate, refraining, "He said he was concerned about [issue area] but evidently doesn't care."\textsuperscript{17} Dole would then intone a list of issues such as votes on state-local problems and revenue-sharing legislation, drug abuse prevention bills, the equal rights for women legislation, Social Security benefits, and legislation closing tax loopholes.

The implication again was that McGovern had taken extreme positions, and again appeared to be confused, indecisive, and expedient on which policies he really favored. Furthermore, Dole pictured him as insincere in professing concern for issues and groups, as evidenced by his absence when Congress acted upon important measures. In this content area, Dole was highly specific, citing dates and documentation of sources for McGovern's statements and actions. Dole's McGovern domestic issue themes accounted for 10 per cent of his total rhetoric and for 17 per cent of his themes about McGovern.
TABLE 6
McGOVERN DOMESTIC ISSUES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Per Cent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1,000 welfare proposal, then two others,</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which for? - all way-out</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For legalizing abortion</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For amnesty</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has different positions on tax reform,</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which one for? - all ridiculous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan to redistribute income</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For legalizing marijuana</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only answer to crime--put Ramsey Clark in Cabinet</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endorses illegal teachers' strike</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraged Ellsberg law-breaking</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taken stands on farm parity, which for?</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Says cares about state-local problems,</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>but absent on revenue-sharing vote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Says cares about drug abuse prevention,</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>but absent for vote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Says cares about rights for women, but</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absent from vote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Says cares about Social Security benefits,</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>but absent for vote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Says cares about closing tax loopholes,</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>but absent for vote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Says busing essential</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies will raise grocery prices</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flip-flops his position on wage-price controls</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Foreign issues.**—Nearly half of the McGovern foreign themes referred to his "policy of planned weakness for America" (9%) and his alleged plans to cut the defense budget in half (25%), charges that the South Dakotan would close most air bases (3%), "gut the Naval Fleet" (3%), "cut the Air Force" (3%), and would "cut the Army to below pre-Pearl Harbor level" (3%).18
Dole damned the nominee, also, for his "Vietnam cut and run policy," and projected that he "would be our first President to surrender" (18%). He claimed McGovern as President would "usher in an era of capitulation," and "abandon our allies" (9%) as an advocate of "a policy of old isolationism." The Chairman often reminded his audiences that the Senator had first denied that he sent Pierre Salinger to Paris to talk to North Vietnamese representatives, then confirmed it, offering another self-contradiction. (This incident is discussed in Chapter II.) Dole identified McGovern's "inconsistent" policies and statements on Vietnam (7%), and he pointed out that McGovern was not present for Senate votes on end-the-war legislation (4%), or on certain votes on aid-to-Israel.

In the foreign policy area, the Dole thrust was that McGovern would seriously impair our defense and our national security. Moreover, he was linked to the heinous concepts of "surrender," "capitulation," failing to help "friends in need." But, even in these areas, the argument stressed, McGovern demonstrated indecisiveness, uncertainty, inconsistency. He and his policies should be viewed as threatening, as deviating from the traditional American trait of strength, Dole implied. Further summarization is depicted in Table 7.
TABLE 7

McGOVERN FOREIGN ISSUES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Percentage of McGovern Foreign Issue References Each Theme Represents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would cut defense budget in half</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocates cut and run policy in Vietnam, would be first President to surrender</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denied, then confirmed, Salinger Paris trip, negotiations</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would abandon allies, usher era of capitulation</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocates policy of planned weakness</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had inconsistent Vietnam policies</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Says cares about ending war, but not present to vote on end-war legislation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocates policy of old isolationism</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would close most air bases</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would gut Naval Fleet</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would cut Air Force</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would cut Army manpower to below pre-Pearl Harbor level</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Says cares about aid to Israel, but not present for vote</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

General Governing Approaches

The Republican National Chairman also accused McGovern generally of following "permissive policies" (24% [percentages equal total number of each specific theme divided by the total number of "Governing Approach" themes]), "government-by-guess ... process of elimination policies" (34%), and of advocating "full federal control of every aspect of our lives" (24%). He attributed to McGovern the belief that "the system has failed" (20%), labeled his proposals "outrageous" and said that his "ideas border on the idiotic."
In Dole's rhetorical views, McGovern would clearly be a policy-maker who was at wide variance with established and accepted American approaches. Such condemnations comprised 3 per cent of all Dole's rhetoric and 5 per cent of that referring to McGovern.

**TABLE 8**

**McGOVERN GOVERNING APPROACHES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Percentage of Total McGovern General References Each Theme Represents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advocates full federal control of every aspect of our lives</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would run government-by-guess, by process of elimination policies</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocates permissive policies</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believes our system has failed</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideas border on idiotic</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocates outrageous proposals</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The Nixon Themes**

Whereas 60 per cent of the Dole themes dealt with the Democratic nominee, only 18 per cent of the themes of the Republican National Chairman were about Richard Nixon, his achievements, policies, or issue stands. In contrast to the heavy emphasis on the McGovern campaign, not one mention was made of the Nixon campaign. Perhaps this absence was a part of the Presidential strategy in which Nixon was too occupied with being the Chief Executive to be campaigning. Or, perhaps it evidenced a decision not to mention his campaign for fear it might remind listeners of Watergate.
Nixon, the Presidential Person

One-third of all references to Nixon ascribed to him general, decidedly positive traits of personal leadership, though no one single theme emerged with any dominance. One set of themes (39%) viewed together describe many of the dimensions of credibility. Dole prefaced many of them with "He knows . . . " "what America's goals are and should be," "how to successfully pursue goals," "what the country can accomplish," "knows our strengths and seeks to protect them; knows our weaknesses and seeks to correct them." 23

The Senator said that Nixon "had an understanding of America, what it means . . . what it has always stood for," and claimed Nixon "is a man we can trust in the White House, because he trusts us." 24 He described the President further as possessing the "needed experience," "capacity for leadership," "intelligence," and "insight."

The Chairman further identified Nixon with "courage," "vision," "imagination," "determination," and a "responsible, realistic" outlook. Dole emphasized that the President "stood for the greatness of America," and "proven progressive policies," claiming that "the world expects the Nixon brand of leadership from America." Themes about Nixon, the Presidential person, composed 6 per cent of all Dole themes, and 32 per cent of all themes about Nixon.
TABLE 9
NIXON, PRESIDENTIAL PERSON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Per Cent of Total References Each Theme Represents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knows what America's goals are and should be</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A man we can trust in the White House</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has imagination</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needs us</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knows how to successfully pursue goals</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has courage</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has intelligence</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is determined</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knows what country can accomplish</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knows strengths, seeks to protect them</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knows weaknesses, seeks to correct them</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understands America, what it means, has stood for</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is best for America</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is responsible</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better understanding of world</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has vision</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has experience</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has capacity for leadership</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is realistic</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stands for greatness of America</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proven, progressive policies</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World expects Nixon brand of leadership from America</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others at 1% each</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nixon Issues and Programs

**Domestic issues.**--Dole credited a number of domestic achievements to the President, mentioning three with particular frequency: revenue-sharing, crime reduction, and bettering the economy. Because of Nixon's revenue-sharing program (16%), he said, "local governments are freer to act on their own, with the necessary resources to do so." He also said that through this program, Nixon had begun the return of power to the people, moving away from central
control in government. Discussing the economy (24%), Dole claimed that Nixon "had established lasting prosperity," "increased economic growth," "achieved victory over inflation," "established economic goals we all share," and "raised employment to new highs." The Chairman also lauded Nixon for "achieving the lowest rate of crime growth in the last twelve years"; for "reducing crime as promised"; for "giving us the tools to reduce crime"; and for "quieting the cities and campuses." Such crime references accounted for 15 per cent of Dole's domestic Nixon themes.

The President was repeatedly recognized by Dole for ending the draft (11%) and establishing an all-volunteer Army concept. "He removed the spectre of draft uncertainty for America's young men," the Chairman emphasized, and was "restructuring the federal government" (8%). "He has ended the age of governmental regulation and regimentation, reforming, restructuring the government . . . entering into a period of voluntarism."

Nixon was also the object of praise for bringing more equal rights to more women, "revitalizing the national spirit from the crises of the last decade," catalyzing passage of the 26th Amendment, increasing agricultural abundance, and broadening the school lunch program as well as food stamp purchasing power.

Nixon domestic-issue themes accounted for 6 per cent of all Dole's themes, and for 31 per cent of all Nixon
themes. The table below illustrates the emphases by Dole.

**TABLE 10**

**NIXON DOMESTIC ISSUES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Nixon Domestic References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue-sharing; locals freer to act, have resources to, return power to people</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy: established lasting prosperity</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing all-volunteer Army; removed spectre of draft uncertainty</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helped establish equal rights for women</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revitalized national spirit from crises of last decade</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased economic growth</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieved victory over inflation</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raised employment to new highs</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quieted cities, campuses</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieved lowest rise of crime growth in twelve years</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing age of government regulation and regimentation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reforming, restructuring federal government</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced crime as promised</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given us tools to reduce crime</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helped pass 26th Amendment (18-year-old vote)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Began drug abuse prevention program</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deplored Watergate; has no place in electoral process</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established economic goals we all share</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased agricultural abundance, income for farmer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rendered it possible for three times as many students to receive free or low-cost lunches</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased food stamp purchasing power by 800%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since the McGovern themes on domestic issues composed such a major emphasis, it is interesting to recapitulate them at this point so the reader may compare them with the Nixon domestic emphases. Dole had emphasized these major McGovern domestic emphases: (1) $1,000 welfare proposal, (2) legalizing abortion, (3) amnesty, (4) tax reform, (5) income redistribution, (6) marijuana legalization, (7) appointment of Ramsey Clark as Attorney General, (8) illegal teachers' strikes, (9) law-breaking, (10) farm parity, (11) revenue-sharing, (12) drug abuse, (13) women's rights, (14) social security, (15) tax loopholes, (16) bus-ing, (17) food prices, and (18) wage-price controls.

The McGovern domestic emphases were more specific, explicit, and numerous. These domestic themes were usually documented with media quotes of McGovern. The Nixon domestic themes lacked such documentation. Nixon domestic emphases amounted to assertions without supporting quotes from print or broadcast media, and without illustrative detail.

Foreign issues.--On the foreign scene, most of Dole's message portrayed the President as the effective peacemaker. Over half the Nixon foreign references stressed that the President moved us closer to peace (25%), reduced world tensions (15%). Accordingly, the President "brought
us from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiations" (8%), "brought about international competition without armed confrontation" (2%), and "pulled us away from the edge of nuclear catastrophe." 28

Another fifth of the Nixon foreign themes concerned Vietnam. For example, Dole emphasized that Nixon had brought a half million men home, and had achieved zero casualties for the first time in seven years, while his Administration was engaged in "sensitive efforts to bring Vietnam peace."

One-fourth of the rhetoric in this area also reminded listeners that Nixon had opened the doors to China and Russia, improving United States relations through his trips to the giant Communist countries. Occasionally, Dole would underscore that the President successfully negotiated the first Strategic Arms Limitation, and had played a key role in keeping the peace in the Middle East. Indeed, the President, Dole reiterated, was effectively building a new structure of peace, as these visible policies, trips, and actions attested.

Although many critics could agree that Nixon's actions on the international front constituted some of his best performances in office, the Chairman cited these themes in only 5 per cent of all his rhetoric and in about a third of all his references to Nixon, proportions similar
to those describing domestic Nixon emphases. A tabular summarization follows.

TABLE II
NIXON FOREIGN ISSUES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Nixon Foreign Themes Each Theme Represents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moved us closer to peace</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opened doors to Russia, China; so improved relations</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced world tensions</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed era of confrontation to negotiation</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brought half million men from Vietnam</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efforts to bring Vietnam peace great</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero Vietnam casualties--first time, seven years of war</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successfully negotiated SALT</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulled us away from edge of nuclear catastrophe</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brought about international competition without armed confrontation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nixon General Approaches

On a broader level, Dole proposed that the Nixon "great beginnings" emphasized the need to let Nixon finish building. The Chairman claimed Nixon "started us along the road of progress," and "moved us closer to what we all want, a peaceful world and a better America." Though Dole noted that the incumbent "had not solved all the problems he found in 1969 in four short years," he had "put us on course" and was "mastering change before it conquered us." ²⁹

Such generalizations accounted for one per cent of Dole's total rhetoric and 8 per cent of all his references to Richard Nixon. (See Table 12.)
TABLE 12
NIXON GENERAL APPROACHES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Nixon General Approach References Each Theme Represents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Started us along road of progress; put us on course</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Made great beginning; need to finish building</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasn't solved all problems found in 1969 in four short years</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved us closer to what we all want: better America and peaceful world</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mastering change before it conquers us</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Parties

This study now turns to the treatment of the national parties by Dole. The individual parties were significant topics, too, comprising 15 per cent of all Dole's themes. The references were lopsided, 11 per cent for the Democratic side and 4 per cent for the GOP.

The Democratic Party and personalities.—Well over half Dole's themes clearly insisted that George McGovern and the Democratic Party were not one-in-the-same in 1972. The Chairman asserted in nearly a fifth of these references that "Democrats had their party stolen from them by George McGovern; they have been sold out to a small band of radicals." The candidate had said, Dole reminded, that he might walk away from the Party as he did in 1948 if he was not the nominee. He had, the attack continued, deviated from the Democratic platform, and "had nothing in common
with the Democratic Party." For, Dole claimed, "Democrats are Americans first, loyalists first to America," and "will sink the McGovern rowboat." The Chairman noted that the "great division in Democratic Party ranks was caused by McGovern," who had "walked over Democratic leaders in the nomination fight." Hence, Dole repeatedly alleged, "thousands of Democrats support the President," citing such names as John Connally. In horror, the chief Republican would also proclaim, "No Democrat ever cut our defense in half, gave away $1,000 to every citizen, and abandoned our allies." "The good Democrats have been forgotten." Interestingly enough, Dole at the same time blasted the Democratic Party in a third of his Democratic themes. He alleged that "during the sixties the country wavered from course under the Democrats," and that the Democrats were the party of bankrupt policies of big government and big spending. Moreover, the Democratic Congress was "obstructionist" because its members delayed the President's major reorganization programs. Furthermore, Dole chided that U.S. involvement in Vietnam began during Democratic Administrations. Such themes composed 11 per cent of all Dole's rhetoric, and 83 per cent of his Democratic references.

Concurrently, the Republican National Chairman criticized other Democrats. Senator Edward Kennedy received
the biggest share of barbs. "Teddy" was "McGovern's crutch," and was a "grandstander," but, Dole stressed, the millionaire had not given "$1 to the McGovern effort," though he had "loaned him a brother-in-law as a first favor." Lawrence O'Brien was linked to crime figures, and Dole parroted O'Brien's admonition to "cool excessive rhetoric." Dole warned Shriver to "cool his rhetoric," and claimed the Vice Presidential nominee was "threatening the Vietnam peace negotiations."

Personal references to Democrats accounted for 2 per cent of Dole's total themes, and 17 per cent of all themes about Democratic references. (See Tables 13 and 14.)

TABLE 13
DEMOCRATIC PARTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Democratic Party References Each Theme Represents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party stolen from real Democrats; sold out to band of radicals</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thousands of Democrats support Richard Nixon</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party and McGovern have nothing in common</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party could have suffered abandonment by McGovern in '48</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic platform deviated from (by) McGovern</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats Americans first, loyal to America, sink McGovern</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO should act against fund-raising abuses</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During 60's country wavered from course under Democrats</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of bankrupt policies of big government and big spending</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats have division in ranks because of McGovern</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Senators don't want to admit truth about McGovern</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 13—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Democratic Party References Each Theme Represents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Congress obstruction; sat on SALT</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic leaders &quot;walked over&quot; in nomination fight</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party stands for free, strong programs, U.S.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic National Committee violated law with debt pay-off</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic National Committee bilking taxpayer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Good&quot; Democrats were forgotten in 1972</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGovern is no Democrat</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Democratic spokesman is not McGovern, no Democrat ever cut defense in half, offered $1,000 year, abandoned an ally</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Vietnam involvement began in Democratic Administrations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 14

**DEMOCRATIC PERSONALITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Democratic References Each Theme Represents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy gave no money to McGovern</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy a crutch for McGovern</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy a political grandstander</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Brien link with organized crime</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Brien admonishes to cool rhetoric</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shriver threatening emerging Vietnam peace</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBJ turned away from McGovern</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meany turned away from McGovern</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connally and other loyal Democrats support Richard Nixon</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Republican Party and personalities.—The Republican Party received few references from its National Chairman. Over a fourth of them stressed how important it was to elect local or state Republican candidates, mentioning them by name. Another recurrent theme noted that "for forty years, the GOP has been a minority party. This year we can end that by electing Republicans at all levels," which Dole equated with "a victory for the country." The Senator stressed also that "November 7 could signal the beginning of a new coalition of common interest in American politics rooted in the values and traditions of the past . . . used to build a better, more secure future."37

Dole rarely linked the party to any trait(s), though on a few occasions he said the party course was one of "world peace and domestic health." He did cite traditional Republican apathy, warning his partisans, "we could win the election [Presidency] and lose the opportunity to build a new majority and new coalition of common interests in the U.S." And a few speeches bore the reminder that "you can tip the balance; 1972 can bring to fruition much of the work you've been doing to build the state party."38

The Senator invoked no former or current Republican national personalities or heroes in his rhetoric. References were to names of local or state-wide candidates or incumbents up for re-election. Such partisan themes in his speeches referred to party events only.
TABLE 15
REPUBLICAN PARTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Percentage of Total GOP References Each Theme Represents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elect local-state candidates (names)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 7 signal beginning of new coalition of common interests, rooted in past</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For 40 years, minority party; this year can end that by electing Republicans at all levels</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apathy could lose opportunity to build new American majority; restore GOP to deserved status as majority party</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 new trend in GOP direction, away from bankrupt policies and programs of Democrats</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOP has to communicate not only Richard Nixon record, but defend President against outrageous personal slander</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOP cause one of world peace and domestic health</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You Republicans can tip the balance in 1972</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 can bring to fruition much of work you've been doing to build state party</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The American People

Perhaps Dole talked almost as much about "the American People" as he did about the GOP. A fourth of the "American People" references proclaimed, "most Americans are in overwhelming agreement with the President." Another fourth asserted "most Americans support his resolve to fight crime." The Chairman asserted, too, that a "majority of Americans support the peace effort," and "a vast majority support the President's Vietnam efforts." "Most Americans agree with Richard Nixon's conviction that what's good about America is more important than its faults," emerged, as did
Dole's specifications that "60% of American youth [Gallup] support the President," and "millions of laborers support the President." 39

Over-all, the message of Dole seemed to be that not only did most Americans support Nixon, but they did so because of their common agreement with him on so many issues. This view is summarized in the table below.

**TABLE 16**

**THE AMERICAN PEOPLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Percentage of Total American People References</th>
<th>Each Theme Represents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most in overwhelming agreement with the President</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most support his resolve to fight crime</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority of Americans support his peace efforts</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vast majority of Americans support his Vietnam efforts</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Americans support the President</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Americans agree with Richard Nixon's conviction that what's good about America more important than faults</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americans need him</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Americans seek best for America;</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>best is Richard Nixon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millions of laborers support the President</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60% of American youth support the President</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the messages in which these themes appeared were marked by discernible trends, also, in technique, organization, and language of expression.
Message Expression

Indeed, even though the Dole speeches were a product of more than one writer, some patterns of style are evident looking across speeches.

Technique.—The major technique utilized in nearly every speech was contrast. McGovern was contrasted with McGovern on several topics, as Dole alleged that the nominee's proposals, statements, and behavior contradicted one another. For instance, on September 11, 1972, Dole said:

Indeed on all the issues, there is a similar confusion. It would seem that the great debate in this campaign is the one that's been going on for some months between George McGovern and himself.

So far on almost every major issue from tax reform to Vietnam--and even on most of the minor issues like Pierre Salinger--George McGovern has taken at least two positions and is still wrong.

In January, McGovern proposed "that every man, woman, and child receive from the federal government an annual payment . . . of almost $1,000 per person." In June, he said "the $1,000 per person figure . . . may have been a mistake." More recently still we were told he would revise the plan, and last week he proposed a supposedly "new" plan guaranteeing a family of four $4,000 a year from the federal government. Mistake or not--that is still $1,000 per person.40

Another contrast was frequently drawn between McGovern traits and those a President should possess and exhibit. As the Chairman declared:

For the truth about George McGovern is simply this--he doesn't have what it takes to be President. It takes experience to be President and
George McGovern doesn't have it. It takes imagination and insight to be President and George McGovern has neither. It takes a capacity for leadership to be President and George McGovern doesn't have it.

And it takes a simple understanding of America --of what it means today to its own people and to people around the world, and of what it has always meant--it takes that to be President and George McGovern doesn't have it. . . .41

Moreover, the contrast was repeatedly drawn between George McGovern and the Democratic Party, as the Chairman delineated in Madison, Wisconsin, on September 30, 1972:

No Democrat President has ever run on a promise to cut our national strength almost in half. And no such candidate, before this campaign, has ever been given his party's nomination.

No Democrat President has ever before run on a promise to give every American, whether he can or will work, a thousand dollars a year from the federal government. And until this campaign, no such candidate would ever have been taken seriously by either major party, much less by the electorate at large.

And no Democrat candidate for President has ever before run on a promise to abandon an ally--while he is still fighting for his very freedom--a promise, in effect, to surrender at the very time when prospects for a responsibly negotiated settlement seem, at long last, realizable.42

Finally, Dole would compare Nixon and McGovern directly, as he did in speaking to Ohio Republicans:

And we can put the country on record--and the world on notice--that the determined policies of Richard Nixon to win the peace in Vietnam and to keep the peace around the world, have the equally determined support of the vast majority of Americans.

And that George McGovern's policies of planned weakness for America have been resoundingly rejected.

We can put the country on record--and put the country's criminals on notice--that Richard Nixon's
resolve to win the fight against crime in this country has the people's support. And that the permissiveness of George McGovern—whose best and only answer to the problem of crime in America is to put Ramsey Clark back in the Cabinet—has been resoundingly rejected.43

The Chairman's rhetoric was replete with these techniques of contrast. Especially prevalent was use of a multi-step dissociation-identification process. Dole would verbalize general goals and positions most listeners favored, i.e., peace, prosperity, calm, etc. He would also cite traits which, in all probability, most receivers would want or expect in a good President, i.e., competence, knowledge, insight, a sense of direction, etc. These two content areas—program goals and Presidential traits—served as "common ground": all could agree on their desirability. But, then, the message would dissociate George McGovern from these goals and from any Presidential qualities. The final step would be to identify Nixon with the desired goals and with Presidential traits. Specific behaviors, actions, proposals, statements of each man were selected, then cited as illustrative or supportive of the claims Dole made. However, this supportive material used for Nixon consisted of citations of alleged actions, achievements, attempts he made as President. For McGovern the citations were usually selected from his behavior as a political candidate. The over-all implication, seemingly, was that McGovern was working for his own candidacy,
whereas the President was working for the country and for the Presidency.

Another frequent method was to express a statement of the custom, the "usual" or the "traditional" in campaigning or in governing, then pose the rhetorical question asking if George McGovern "fit" this usual pattern. The answer, predictably, was then stated in the negative, followed by specific items illustrating why the nominee was allegedly "out-of-step," "radical," and so on.

Occasionally, Dole used hyperbole, mock indignation, or other "gimmick-like" devices. He repeated his call frequently for the networks to give McGovern free time to debate himself. Similarly, he "announced" or "called for" a nationwide contest several times "to guess the amount Senator Edward Kennedy (who signed many McGovern financial appeal letters) had personally contributed to the nominee." Dole frequently "ad-libbed" sarcastic humor, pausing in his delivery, to interject one or a series of "one-liners."

Theme repetition was profuse, and usually adroitly woven in all parts of many speeches. The Senator would use one charge to introduce another, as illustrated by his October 14, 1972, remarks.

For his part, George McGovern has managed to miss more than 70% of his roll call votes in the Senate this session. For example, his 1,000% support for
end-the-war language in the Senate, went the way of Tom Eagleton when he failed recently to return for a Senate vote on the subject.46

Organization.--The organization of Dole's messages was less consistent than his use of techniques. On some occasions, the Chairman would launch into the essence of his remarks without introduction, or pattern. These speeches were "bare-bones" remarks, the body without transition, but with a quick, abrupt conclusion. In other instances, Dole would begin speeches by expressing his pleasure at being in (locale), then compliment the growth, success, and caliber of candidates exhibited by the state-local GOP, and point out the importance of electing Republicans in that locale and on the national level. This appeal would serve as transition to several paragraphs positively characterizing the President, which were followed by the greatest amount of content--the McGovern attack--and closed with a "choice-is-clear" appeal. Sometimes this pattern would change and another series of praise-the-President paragraphs would follow the McGovern attack. Another variation would be the introduction--a comparison of Nixon and McGovern on issues and leadership traits--followed by a harsh attack on McGovern, then the "choice-is-clear" close.

Special-interest audiences received a different pattern. Dole would make the "it's a pleasure" introductory
identifying remarks, delineate the nature and scope of the problems of the group (e.g., farm problem), claim that the problem had been turned into an "opportunity" by Nixon, then detail what the President had done in the area. The Senator would then remind his audience that their area was not the only one in which Nixon had acted. Then Dole would recite the "achievements" and qualities of "The President," concluding that Richard Nixon had kept his promises. The speech would finish with the standard "but,-look-at-McGovern" attack.

**Identification.**—As the patterns changed across speeches, so did the communicator's attempt to identify with his local audience. Usually Dole launched into his remarks with little or no attempt to "bring home" his message to the immediate audience through specific localizing themes. But, at times, he would invoke local personalities' names, and, less frequently, the impact of McGovern's or Nixon's actions would be directly translated into local consequences.

To almost 5,000 of the people who work at Ellsworth Air Force Base, his defense budget cut proposals would very possibly mean the loss of their livelihood. That is part of what it would mean to South Dakota if George McGovern won in November.

To the people of South Dakota and, indeed, to all Americans, it would mean an increase in federal taxes—an increase variously estimated from 35% to 100% or more. That is what his free spending big government policies would mean for us all.47
On balance, attempts to identify with the immediate audience were minimal. In fact, most of the content was aimed at a national audience, and remained at a highly general level.

Language.—While claims and accusations were rather generally stated, vocabulary was rather simple. Clarity was rarely a problem! Sentences were usually declarative, written in rather short, journalistic style, with many one-sentence in length. Occasionally, clumsy construction of the spoken word would appear, as in Dole's October 12, 1972, message.

The real issues in this campaign are the issues of war and how best to end it, of peace and how best to make it lasting, and of domestic progress and prosperity, and how best to maintain the one and enhance the other.48

Frequently, as the reader has seen, the rhetorical question was utilized. On the average, the speeches cohered and flowed well, with good transition. No special alliteration, parallelisms or other such devices were apparent. In a few instances a simile or metaphor appeared, e.g., the characterization of McGovern's corruption charge: "He clings to the issue like a drowning man clings to a piece of driftwood." Or, "the Democrats are helping to sink the McGovern rowboat."

The messages labeled, accused, asserted, and generalized more than they detailed, documented, or specified.
As discussed, the means seemed an attempt to link positive associations to Nixon, and negative ones to McGovern.

In summary.—Dole's language was clear. It left no doubt what message the communicators sought to convey, or what meaning they wanted to elicit. The messages utilized repetition, sarcasm, humor, unsophisticated yet not elementary vocabulary, few "devices," and frequently invoked rhetorical questions.

Contrast was the prime technique employed. Dole contrasted McGovern with McGovern, with Nixon, with the Democratic Party, with "the norm" in politics, with his promises, and with ideal Presidential traits in an attempt to cast the nominee in the worst light. Nixon was associated with ideal traits, achievements, and goals of the American people, with strong positive implications.

Organizational patterns of the message varied, and identifying references to local audiences were infrequent in this, the exploitative rhetoric of association and disassociation.

The News Releases

The reader will recall that Baroody, in addition to writing each speech, designated which part of it should be the "lead" in the news release covering the remarks. The "lead" is what message or thrust in the speech he felt was
most important to convey to the mass audience via the news media.

Examining each lead for every news release clearly shows that the McGovern attack was selected for the lead in the vast majority of news releases issued.

**TABLE 17**

**NEWS RELEASE LEADS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leads</th>
<th>Per Cent Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>McGovern Attack Leads</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party Attack Leads</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Personality Attack Leads</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Praise Leads</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post Attack Leads</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party Leads</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Personality Leads</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four leads (6%) dealt with the Democratic Party. One noted how many Democrats were supporting Nixon, two placed McGovern at variance with the Party, and one assailed the Democratic National Committee's allegedly illegal settlement of its campaign debts. Another 6 per cent referred to visible Democrats, ridiculing or condemning Senator Kennedy, Sargeant Shriver, and Lawrence O'Brien. Three leads (5%) praised Nixon as a peacemaker, and two leads (3%) attacked the creditability of the *Post*, charging it with collusion (in mud-slinging) with the McGovern campaign. The Republican Party was not in any lead, nor were
any GOP personalities. Nearly every lead associated George McGovern, his candidacy, or stands with a decidedly negative trait.

Whereas a fifth of all Dole speech themes referred to McGovern's campaign, over a third of his leads did so. A fourth of the leads damned McGovern as a person, but only 15 per cent of all Dole's themes did. A fifth (20%) of all Dole's themes hit McGovern's issue proposals or stands, as did about the same proportion of his leads. Total leads concerning Democrats (12%) similarly corresponded to corresponding total themes (13%). The President was praised three times as much in the speeches as he was in the leads, and where the Republican Party received little mention in the speech themes, it received none in the releases.

Baroody maintained and Wilck confirmed that the leads and corresponding content in each release were not only a function of what they felt was "most important" and wanted to "get across," but of what would be newsworthy enough to attract newsmen's attention and penetrate the competition for air time and print space. In any event, in terms of intended news emphasis and consequent communication to the mass audience, the Republican Party message objective was never implemented, and the Presidential message objective was barely operationalized.
The Objectives and the Message

As has been discussed, the communicators set definite message objectives as instrumental to achieving their over-all rhetorical goals. As one can see, the McGovern message goal was clearly and profusely implemented throughout Dole's speeches and news releases. Nearly two-thirds of all Dole themes portrayed McGovern negatively, and eight of every ten news release leads also attacked the Democratic nominee. Indeed, in content, emphasis, and repetition, Dole's message fulfilled the objective of castigating the South Dakotan. Moreover, the message went well beyond the group's objective in its fierce, acerbic blasts at the McGovern campaign, using a catalogue of invective, as this chapter has delineated.

Presumably, these negative characterizations were supplied to a significant extent from the White House staff whose contributions Dole had labeled as "excessive over-kill." One could speculate also that such criticism of the McGovern campaign was designed to keep the Senator on the defensive, and to mar the credibility of the Democratic nominee's charges of GOP corruption, and blur the whole issue of campaign ethics. In this way, perhaps, GOP sources could attempt to confuse voters' distinctions as to which side practiced "shady" tactics. After all, the total Nixon strategy included persuading voters to differentiate the
candidates only on the issue of Presidential competence. Seeing differences between the two campaigns in terms of ethics, tactics, and corruption, was not functional to the Nixon strategy!

The means contradicted the objective in one sense. About half of Dole's references to the Democratic Party criticized it, its actions, or its personalities. This trend was clearly a violation of an explicit Dole instruction to Baroody—do not attack or offend Democrats. Interestingly, Dole avoided damning McGovern on issues such as busing, education, environment, health, housing, hunger, unemployment, civil rights, senior citizens, or space—all major issues.

Emphasis on the Nixon message objective was less prevalent than Dole's concentration on McGovern. The Nixon references, as mentioned, comprised only 18 per cent of all enunciated Dole themes, and only 5 per cent of all news release leads. A series of positive traits was advanced about Nixon. Dole did not use the method here of repeating a few single themes. Few emphases developed. The content seemed to implement the objective with less precision and potency than had the verbiage about McGovern. In terms of stress, repetition, and frequency of illustrative theme expression, the Nixon objective fared badly. Several of the McGovern themes composed a substantial part of every
speech, regardless of the audience, occasion, or lead. But, only 26 per cent of all Dole's speeches contained any reference to Nixon, the President, his programs or "achievements." And in many of those instances such subject matter received only a few paragraphs.

Though no specific "bandwagon" objective was set, a number of themes stressed the American people's agreement and identification with "the President," and their consequent support of his goals, as well as candidacy. The common ground emphasized revolved around his peace efforts, resolve to fight crime and his belief that "what's good for America" was "more important than its faults," though such references were expressed infrequently.

Interestingly, the references to Nixon programs, issues, or "achievements" omitted the subject of fiscal responsibility, a long-time favorite topic of Republicans. Consumer affairs, drug abuse, education, environment and pollution, health, space, transportation, welfare, civil rights, minorities—all important problems and newsworthy grist—received minute and usually no attention. And only one theme, repeated twice, surfaced on Watergate. The President condemned it, asserting such actions had no place in American politics, Dole declared.

The Republican Party objective was barely implemented in the prepared speeches. Only 5 per cent of all
Dole's themes referred to the Republican Party, and it was the rare speech (15%) that carried any of this content. Only 3 per cent of the news leads had a "Republican" referent. When Dole did speak about the Party, he emphasized, as noted, the importance of "elected candidates" all down the Republican ticket. And, he did emphasize the opportunity "this election offers to end the GOP's status as a minority party, and to build a new majority." In a like vein, he warned against the dangers of apathy.

And, rarely did Dole's speeches urge his partisans to drop their internal personal ideological differences. The call to open the party to Independents and Democrats was scarce. They were cited as joiners of the Presidential bandwagon, but seldom invited to become part of the Party. Nor was there any substantive visible attempt to build an image, a picture of the Republican Party. No traits were identified as characterizing the Party. The Chairman gave his party no identity. Republicans were to despise McGovern, spread the plague on him, and revere the President, diffusing the story of the achievements his competence had nurtured. And, Republicans were to follow the goal of victory. But beyond winning, no substance, objective, or raison d'être was articulated for the party or as what the party represented. The National Chairman referred to his party infrequently, but when he did, it seemed to be an
amorphous entity, a vehicle for organizing a majority tally on Election Day. After that had been achieved and that day had passed, no goals seemingly endured.

Interestingly, Dole's message served as a rebuttal, a response to McGovern charges—both the nominee's general continuing criticisms and his specific accusations—much more than had the communicators' or their objectives alleged their rhetoric would.

The group's reaction.—Wilck expressed no surprise that Republican and Nixon references were comparatively scarce. He dismissed the low proportions, reminding the researcher, "We had an attack role." Dole and Baroody seemed surprised at the low percentage of Nixon themes. The Chairman could offer no explanation, but the speechwriter surmised that the failure of "the Nixon material" to draw coverage resulted in giving it a lower priority than intended. Both stoutly claimed the written speeches were supplemented by Dole (at the time of delivery) in terms of the Republican objective. Dole said he always ad-libbed at some length, but only on his themes of Republicans uniting, forgetting the past differences, and building a new majority. Scanlon acknowledged this claim. But Dole, Scanlon, and Baroody agreed that the Senator rarely went beyond the written speech in tying traits, ideologies, and so forth, or giving the party a specific identity. Baroody
said, "We were probably remiss in not emphasizing more invitations for newcomers to the party, and in not giving it some image, if that could have been possible."

Summary

The content of the Dole speeches and news releases emphasized severe criticism of McGovern, and to a much lesser extent, stressed praise of the President and his programs. Many of the attacks on McGovern castigated his personal qualities and the nature of the McGovern campaign. The Nixon content portrayed him as "Presidential" and as the leader of an administration replete with achievement. Neither political party received much reference from Dole, though the Democratic Party received twice as much mention as did the GOP. Discussion of issues and programs amounted to less than a third of Dole's rhetoric.

Thus, examination of content showed that in actual operation, the McGovern message objective was the principal guide, though the communicators originally claimed that the Party and Nixon objectives were to receive emphasis. The McGovern emphasis could well have been a function of daily input from the White House, and the recognition by the Dole group of the high news value of "the attack."

The message was expressed clearly, utilized primarily the technique of contrast, but rarely identified
with local audiences. The consequences of this communication are discussed in the following chapter.
Notes

As was explained in Chapter I, all Dole speeches in the study period were analyzed collectively to yield these percentages. The speech excerpts quoted are in many of the speeches—in fact, some themes are in nearly all speeches, though only one speech is cited as an example in each citation.

2 Dole speech, September 25, 1972.
3 Dole speech, September 11, 1972.
4 Dole speech, October 16, 1972.
5 Dole speech, September 12, 1972.
6 Dole speech, August 30, 1972.
7 Dole speech, September 30, 1972.
8 Dole speech, October 17, 1972.
9 Dole speech, September 28, 1972.
10 Dole speech, October 24, 1972.
11 Dole speech, October 24, 1972.
12 Dole speech, October 14, 1972.
13 Dole speech, October 25, 1972.
14 Dole speech, October 17, 1972.
15 Dole speech, November 1, 1972.
16 Dole speech, September 30, 1972.
17 Dole speech, September 26, 1972.
18 Dole speech, October 22, 1972.
19 Dole speech, September 30, 1972.
20 Dole speech, September 30, 1972.
21 Dole speech, September 21, 1972.
22 Dole speech, October 24, 1972.
Dole speech, October 16, 1972.

Dole speech, September 11, 1972.

Dole speech, September 21, 1972.

Dole speech, October 7, 1972.

Dole speech, September 11, 1972.

Dole speech, October 24, 1972.

Dole speech, September 28, 1972.

Dole speech, September 30, 1972.

Dole speech, September 30, 1972.

Dole speech, October 22, 1972.

Dole speech, October 14, 1972.

Dole speech, October 29, 1972.

Dole speech, October 27, 1972.

Dole speech, September 28, 1972.

Dole speech, September 28, 1972.

Dole speech, September 24, 1972.

Dole speech, October 14, 1972.

Dole speech, September 11, 1972.

Dole speech, September 11, 1972.

Dole speech, September 30, 1972.

Dole speech, September 28, 1972.

Dole speech, October 14, 1972.

Dole speech, October 14, 1972.

Dole speech, October 24, 1972.
Dole speech, October 12, 1972.

CHAPTER VII

COMMUNICATION CONSEQUENCES

The Rationale

In assessing the "effect" of the Chairman's communication, the researcher analyzed the responses Dole's rhetoric evoked in his two major target audiences—the GOP partisans (Republican National Committee members) and national political newsmen—and in his own staff, those who worked with and observed him on a day-to-day basis. Moreover, since a Dole objective was also to generate the maximum mass diffusion for his message through widespread national news coverage, the researcher also examined several media, as described in Chapter I, in order to gauge the nature and extent of actual Dole visibility in the media. The newsmen and RNC members not only represented Dole's two principal audiences, but each of these two groups was in a unique, appropriate position to judge the Chairman. The newsmen, for the most part, had considerable exposure to a wide range and diversity of national political communicators.

Significantly, too, the images of newsmen, as the literature shows, greatly influence their conception and
organization of news messages. In this case, they were keys to Dole's message diffusion. In a like vein, almost all members of the RNC had a long exposure to many GOP National Chairmen and similar political communicators on the national scene. Furthermore, as the newsmen were keys to the mass dissemination of Dole's message, National Committee members were prime opinion leaders in each respective state, and probable keys to the diffusion of Dole's message through party interpersonal channels. (The Republican National Committee is composed of two committee members, one of whom is often the State GOP Chairman, from each state.) And these audience members all did what the researcher could not do—personally observe the Dole communication in the context and at the time of its occurrence.

"Effect" here refers to the consequences of Dole's communication, in an attempt to answer the question: What happened, if anything, as a result of Dole's communication efforts? The interviews with all those identified thus sought from them a description of the (a) consequences of (b) Dole's communication as they perceived both. Each respondent was asked to provide an over-all effectiveness rating for the Chairman's rhetoric. Moreover, each was asked to identify in what terms they judged Dole's effectiveness. That is, Dole was effective-ineffective in terms of what perceived objectives? Thus, what were his
objectives? What targets did he try to reach with what stimuli, in an attempt to do what? In terms of these objectives (base lines) what happened? What was the result? Why? It was hoped that such sub-questions would stimulate interviewee responses that would be indices as to why and how Dole evoked the meaning he did and stimulated the effect he did. These questions are discussed first from the viewpoint of the partisan audience members, then compared to the newsmen's evaluations and to the Dole staff responses.

The View of the Partisans

Over-all effectiveness. — By a margin well in excess of the President's landslide, the partisans evaluated Dole's communication efforts most positively. Each interviewee judging Dole's over-all effectiveness could rate him as "best," "above average," "average," "below average," or "worst." The Chairman drew a decidedly positive evaluation from almost nine of every ten respondents (86%). Over a third rated him "best," half placed him "above average," and only a tenth at "average." With few exceptions, these Republican leaders felt that their Chairman's effectiveness stemmed in large measure from the fact that Dole had achieved his intended objectives.

The perceived communication objectives. — Most perceived the Chairman's objective as attempting to motivate,
energize, and activate Republican Party members. He was seen as the lone champion of all the Party, imploring partisans to work for GOP candidates in state-wide and Congressional races—"the rest-of-the ticket"—in a Nixon-dominated year. Bob Dole, in their eyes, tried to be the national voice for the whole party in a year it was otherwise the victim of a Presidential eclipse. The comments of the Virginia Republican National Committeewoman were typical, "Dole's job was to emphasize the whole GOP ticket, particularly to spur on the state and Congressional candidates."\(^4\) Similar comments came from the Executive Director of the 1968 Republican National Convention, a Nebraska committeeman, "Dole was out to spur them on by being the McGovern ripper, news attracter, and money raiser."\(^5\) "He tried to solidify the faithful, motivate work, and heighten esprit de corps," Ross said.\(^6\)

A few other respondents emphasized slightly different Dole communication objectives. Five viewed the Chairman's role as identical to the Presidential surrogates' goals: to stress Nixon accomplishments and promote solely the Presidential candidacy. An even smaller number (three) perceived the Senator seeking to be the Administration defender, rebuttal agent, and McGovern attacker. As Kansas RNC Committeeman McDill noted, "He set out to be the man for the tough rebuttal of criticism."\(^7\)
Interestingly, only one respondent was critical of Dole's goal. The New York party professional chided, "He was always just the negativist." He only zapped McGovern, as opposed to trying to tie the Party together, seeing that the Party was well represented, in the councils of the incumbent, or showing, symbolizing the general, broad differences between the parties.

And, though Agnew, Ziegler, MacGregor, and Connally drew much news coverage during the campaign, not one of the respondents used them as a comparison point of reference in discussing Dole objectives. Few recalled MacGregor's saying anything during the campaign; most dismissed Ziegler as working with the President day-to-day, as not a campaigner; nearly all claimed that Agnew simply was not that visible, as the California committeeman noted.

Actually, the Presidential surrogates were always cited as the basis for comparison. Dole was repeatedly contrasted to these Nixon spokesmen. He was seen as more general, more partisan, and more effective in the eyes of the overwhelming number (twenty-one) of respondents. Generally, they saw Dole working for them, the Party members, and perceived the surrogates as functioning only for Nixon.

The perceived target audiences.—Consistent with their general portrayal of Dole's over-all objective, nearly all (twenty-four) of these Republicans designated Republican
groups or workers as the Chairman's prime target. A third of them said these GOP faithful were the only intended receivers. But, significantly, half the partisans mentioned one way or another that Dole aimed too, at newsmen, since they were indispensable to dissemination of Dole's rhetoric to GOPers on the mass level. Little evidence appeared to suggest that they saw Dole as reaching outside the party to habitual Democrats, but an occasional comment that he sought to reach Independents and wavering Democrats did surface. If these objectives represented, to the partisans, what the Chairman sought to accomplish, what did they see as the result of his effort?

The perceived result.--The result squared almost exactly with the objectives. Most partisans (twenty-four) saw Dole's primary effect as being a decidedly successful motivator of the Party legions, as the animating voice for party-wide unified effort, and as the sole national symbol of the national GOP in 1972. The Arkansas Republican Committeewoman articulated most of her colleagues' feelings well, "Because of him, there was a national voice of concern with and for all Party candidates, who were our strong interest and concern."¹¹ "Many of us felt the RNC was overshadowed. He voiced this frustration and his concern for all the Party coincided with that of many Republicans."¹² Jones, the Pennsylvania State GOP Chairman, chorused, "He
was a spokesman without authority; yet he still had punch."¹³
And the Indiana Committeeman added, "Bob Dole gave us a
national figure who spoke as a Republican leader for all
Republican candidates."¹⁴

Only a smattering expressed "result" in more
specific close-to-home terms. A few partisans accented
their belief that Dole's speaking directly added votes to
Nixon's column, and three--the Idaho, Washington, and New
Jersey RNC members--felt Dole's visibility was too slight
to be of any consequence.

Dole's perceived success in achieving these results,
consonant with his communication objectives, seemed to
derive from certain communication means that he utilized to
leave impressions with which his Republican audiences
strongly identified.

**The perceived means.**--Dole's wit, independence,
natural manner, clear language, political credibility, and
techniques of audience identification rendered him an
effective political communicator in these Republicans' eyes.
All but a few of the respondents pointed to Dole's sense of
humor, his "quick wit," as a principal means of effective-
ness. People also mentioned the fact that his humor was
spontaneous, unplanned, and was without premeditation! One
Nebraskan explained Dole's success as stemming "from his
large repertoire of stories, his ability to entertain--but
most of all his obvious, apparent, enjoyment at ripping the opposition." About half the interviewees, in illustrating this wit at their own initiative, recounted a "story" Dole told such as this one:

The Chairman would, with great seriousness, tell the audience of the grave campaign problems he had to discuss personally with the President. He would then recount his numerous, but futile, attempts to see the President through one of the "Assistant Presidents." He would close by reporting that he "had given up," when one week later an "Assistant President" called and said, "Bob, do you still want to see the President?" "Yes," was the reply. "Then, tune in tonight on Channel 9 at 6 PM."

Being "natural" was another strength often cited, as was the comment that Dole exuded "independence." He was frequently described as "direct," "candid," and "frank." The Missouri Republican Committeeman, for example, noted Dole's "willingness to needle his own Republican associates and himself when it was called for." "He had a subtle ability to admit errors and failings of the Party, and of those people associated with it," the Nevada Chairman underscored.

Many listeners said Dole's simple language was the key to his success. "He lays facts on the line without complicated language," "uses incisive language," and "has great facility in selecting and arranging understandable words," represented some of the comments.

Some Committee members mentioned Dole's political credibility as his main strength. "It was evident that he,
in contrast with CREP, came to an audience with a great deal of political experience. You knew that he knew," one Hoosier Republican commented.²⁰

But, no matter what means they credited to Dole as the basis of his effectiveness, nearly every one of the respondents would mention with obvious intensity and emotion, that the Chairman shared with them the feelings and consequences of being "left out" of the action of the campaign, especially the national race. They, the Party members and leaders, had been overshadowed, bypassed, in large part ignored, they felt, by the national campaign of 1972. The Party people, they claimed, had no input, no part in the decision-making--or in sharing the huge sums of money collected. (On the state and national level the GOP usually solicits resources for the entire ticket, and so apportions it; their "Republican Finance Committees" have operated on a United Appeals concept, historically.) In 1972, all the GOP emphasis, to these respondents, in speeches, advertising, organizational effort, all campaigning, was on only "The President," leaving them perceiving a "Party-be-damned" attitude.

Frequently, at the beginning of the interview, parenthetically, in the middle of an answer, or after the question on "Means," nearly every respondent would so comment at his own initiative, stressing that the Party and
its national leaders had forgotten not only the GOP as such, but also its candidates below the Presidential level.

All the national leaders "had forgotten" except one, that is: Bob Dole. As the Arkansas Committeewoman said, "Many party people felt overshadowed; he voiced our frustration, and his expressed concern for all the party coincided with many Republicans'." Primarily through his humor and anecdotes, Dole became one with many of his listeners, by verbalizing the "left-out" feeling and resonating with their sensitive nerves. Better yet, with the Chairman's words, they could together laugh about their dilemma and, in one sense, laugh at that at CREP and the White House, who were the "in-group." It is the researcher's contention that Dole used these bruised GOP feelings to forge a sense of identification with his audience, buttressing his image of independence, candor, slight irreverence, and directness. Woven with his natural demeanor, easy-to-understand, "punchy" language, and his background as a loyal party workhorse, these qualities rendered Dole an effective political communicator for most of his partisans.

The perceived message.--While the over-all result of the Dole rhetoric, for partisans, was to enliven and motivate the GOP organizations, many of these receivers did not perceive the content of their Chairman's message as literally, or explicitly, telling them to act. In fact,
only 14 per cent of all respondents felt Dole's speaking had emphasized the party organization per se or its candidates below the Presidential level. As the Idaho Committeeman said, "He talked about need for general Party organization, the need for Republican Senators and Representatives." Boatwright, the Committee member from Connecticut, said, "Bob hit on the necessity for all Republicans to pull together for all of our candidates who were running, and to work hard at it."23

Despite the Chairman's emphasis on McGovern in his messages, only four partisans (14%) saw Dole's emphasis as predominantly anti-McGovern. The New York Committee member expressed her representative view, "His messages amounted to a cutting attack on McGovern . . . that he was not rational, that he was out-of-sync with reality, an incompetent who not only would make the wrong decision, but was not capable of any process of decision-making, period!"24

A slightly larger proportion (20%) saw Dole's content as including not only general praise of the President, but also attacks on McGovern. Ranson, the Kansas GOP Committee member, best illustrates these comments, "He emphasized that Richard Nixon was strong on foreign policy, trips to China and Russia, that he successfully curbed inflation, and restored quiet on campuses and on the street."25 "Bob told of how bad McGovern would be for the
country . . . that we needed more effort to assure he had nothing to do with governing.\textsuperscript{26} The GOP State Chairman of Pennsylvania commented similarly, "Dole pushed the theme that voters should back Nixon to the hilt, especially in his peace effort."\textsuperscript{27} "Dole was the negative man, too, but with levity."\textsuperscript{28}

Interestingly, half of the respondents reported that Dole's message amounted to promoting and urging support of the President and/or stressing his accomplishments. None in this group saw the McGovern attack as the emphasis or general message. Perceptions ranged in specificity, however, from Newberger in New Jersey, who summarized Dole's word as, "praise of the Richard Nixon years, and accomplishments, of course!" to Stacey of Wyoming, "Dole emphasized the President's efforts toward ending the Vietnam War, achieving world peace, taking draft obligations from seven years to zero, winding down rioting, and work on the drug and economic problems."\textsuperscript{29} So, even though 86 per cent of Dole's themes dealt with McGovern, half the interviewees felt that "support the President" and boasting his achievements was \underline{the} emphasis.

Two explanations for this perception seem plausible. First, perhaps these partisans regarded the major thrust of the whole campaign as being "The President" and did not differentiate Dole or his message as varying from that
emphasis. Thus, they assimilated Dole's over-all message and blocked out the blasts at McGovern at the time of exposure or in later attempts to recall. Since many felt the Presidential message so completely dominated the campaign, perhaps they recalled Dole as enunciating such an appeal. Consider, too, that these respondents might not have differentiated Dole-in-the-campaign from Dole-before-the-campaign. Previous to the formal campaign, Dole's seeming image, developed over a four-year period, was equivalent to 100 per cent support of Nixon. Recall, as is discussed in Chapter III, that the Senator had come to the Chairmanship primarily as a result of his Nixon advocacy in the Senate and on the media. Thus, the positive Nixon support image probably prevailed with many partisans over any image created by Dole's campaign-period speeches, which consisted of negative attacks over a two-month campaign period. The hypothesis that this positive image was stronger, dominating the negative attack Dole articulated during the campaign, is consistent with the theory that campaigns of a short time period usually have little effect in altering or replacing a previously held conception.

Consequently, in the long-term view, the emphasis of the Dole message could have well been "pro-Nixon," while concurrently the most meaningful dimensions of his campaign rhetoric to many Republicans were the Chairman's empathetic
admonitions not to forget the rest-of-the-ticket and the over-all motivating call-to-arms impression that he left, as their interview responses evidenced.

**Analysis of the Responses**

But no matter how each partisan described Dole's message, he attributed, generally speaking, the same rhetorical goals, means, and results to Dole's communication. Over-all, irrespective of the message they perceived, interviewees saw Dole's result as largely the same, as the researcher looked "across" respondents. What was most meaningful for receivers in the message was not the same for many partisans as the emphasis that was intended by the source or that was evident in manifest analysis of message content. While the researcher cannot delineate at what point in their perceptual processes--exposure, interpretation, or recall--that personal meanings were evoked, it seems apparent that the partisans' personal interests and predispositions did govern the particular meaning each respondent imputed to Dole's communication. Ego-involvement of many of the receivers in almost every aspect of the rhetorical situation probably influenced their perceptions to a great degree. Because of the partisans' personal involvement, interests, and predispositions, certain parts of the whole rhetorical effort appeared to be vastly more salient than the others. Moreover, in this case, the
over-all effect of the Dole communication—its meaning to these partisans—was a function not of just the spoken message, but was a function of both the source and the message.

The bases of these generalizations were derived from the interviewing, particularly in the section discussing Dole's means of communication. The intensity of the responses and comments, offered at the respondents' initiative, inductively pointed to these conclusions.

First, partisans apparently identified with Dole initially because they saw him in the same status and position as they were vis-a-vis the Presidential campaign—definitely in the "out-group." The significant factor was that Dole identified with the partisans' most salient predisposition, "given" to them by the strategy of the 1972 White House and Committee to Re-Elect the President. They felt left-out, ignored, overshadowed as Republicans in the national party. They felt that their state-wide, Congressional, and local tickets—the lifeblood of state and local party organizations—and the GOP as a national party were being submerged in importance. The very thing that enthused them and enlivened them as partisans—the national campaign, the every-four-year ritual resurrection—was going on without them, those who usually made it happen! In came Bob Dole, the only visible national Republican who "voiced our
frustrations," as one said. "Dole's concern for all the Party coincided with many Republicans'." And, with Dole, they could together laugh not only at their plight, but at those White House people, and then they--Dole and the Republicans--could be the "in-group." And Dole, hints in his speeches confirmed, was in the same plight, frozen out of policy-making. It was heady wine for those with bruised feelings and resentment.

Moreover, Dole seemed to leave with these partisans, as the Indiana Committeeman noted, a "we'll-show-them" feeling. That is, Dole's implicit message was a challenge to partisans to work hard and win for all the ticket to show "those White House people we could do it without them!" Dole so became one with them by being one of them. In this process of identification, he had activated, catalyzed, called attention to, "cued up" the saliency of their common substance, what they shared. The Chairman had identified their bases of commonness, then activated them, not only by what he said but by what he was, causing the audience to realize they were consubstantial with him.

In fact, Dole's means in this instance relate closely to Horton's concept of para-social interaction in which audience members and a communicator "symbolically unite" on the basis of "mutually shared experiences." Their continued association with him acquires a history, and the accumulation of shared experiences gives additional meaning to the relationship.
The commonness erases the lines that separate audience and communicator. Ordinary persons are treated as persons of consequence. While Horton's theory was stimulated in the mass communication setting, it has application for rhetorical efforts.

Identification and motivation.--It is the researcher's conclusion that this Dole-partisan identification facilitated his motivating purpose, and rendered Dole a more credible, effective persuader or influencer. The identification readied his audience for his motivating appeal. Its effects were additive, strengthening his ability to motivate. The actual motivating "go-Party" appeal came in his message, to a significant degree. It was the spectre of McGovern he built, in part. What McGovern stood for and represented had to be repudiated. Republicans simply had to rise-to-arms to prevent the showing McGovern and his programs—what he stood for—could make as a candidate, and the disaster that would result if he, by some chance, became President. Dole built a common enemy as a major rallying point for partisans. Together, they could all identify with the need not only to insure McGovern's defeat, but to overwhelmingly repudiate what he stood for: the most ire-evoking devil symbols for Republican partisans: "radicals," "demonstrators," "long-hairs," "surrender," reduced defenses and national security, amnesty, "acid," abortion, "pot"—all equated, of course, as one-in-the-same
with McGovern. Defeating McGovern became symbolically interchangeable with "go-Party." Hence, Dole was seen by partisans, to a significant extent, in terms of what he did during the campaign—motivating with a "go-Party" rhetorical thrust, appealing to repudiate what McGovern represented, and to show that they as Republicans could victoriously "go-it-alone" without White House help.

In trying to recall, however, Dole's specific themes or message, half the respondents cued up the dominant image of what Dole had said for four years—support and promote Nixon. Moreover, Dole also espoused a go-Party theme in his campaign speeches, though not with much quantitative emphasis or repetition.

Source, message, and predispositions. The over-all point to be emphasized is that these respondents illustrate the tendency for receivers to be affected by the meaning the combined source-message evokes in them, in relation to their predisposition. The importance that audience predispositions play, as the literature has shown, is again underscored. It is not simply a question of communication reinforcing political or philosophical predispositions of a partisan (i.e., ideological opinions, or ties to the party). Rather, it is just as important to ask what predispositions are acquired as a result of the current and past rhetorical situation. For example, in this study, the competitive
strategy of the President vastly conditioned these partisans and, in part, was responsible for their selective perception of Dole's rhetoric and the meaning it evoked for them.

This case also illustrates the significance of Rosenthal's argument for analyzing the extrinsic and intrinsic credibility of a communicator. Dole's extrinsic image—being outside of Presidential policy-making and so forth, his own irreverence, independence, and political background (rising through a series of elective offices and party chores)—seemed to have a tremendous effect on his over-all effect. Further, while Rosenthal's advice to determine if a communication is "person-centered" or "message-centered" in its reception might be a fertile one in some contexts, but it was not here. Source and message variables were interactive in determining effect, and were both interrelated with audience predispositions.

Activating interpersonal channels.—Finally, chances seem high that many of these partisans and those like them whom Dole addressed were motivated enough to be activated into "sources" themselves, consistent with the "opinion-leader" roles in theories of the multi-step flow of personal influence, which mediate the diffusion of mass communication. GOP respondents did seem generally enlivened by the Dole effort. It is not possible here to assess whether Dole
was the motivating influence, or the deciding increment in an additive process. But, it was clear he left a significant residue of enthusiasm and energizing effect.

As the reader has hopefully surmised, the "effect" question must be asked (with respect to) "of what on whom." For "effect" was not a monolithic concept for Dole. The consequences of his rhetoric were vastly different for newsmen.

The View of the Newsmen

The perceived result.--In identifying and assessing the "result" of Dole's communication efforts, newsmen generally looked at three criteria as they assessed the Chairman: his effect on his Party, his success in generating news coverage, and his ability to directly influence voters. All rated him a disaster as newsmaker, a decided failure in directly reaching and influencing the voter, and as slightly below-average as a Party motivator.

Three factors seemed to account for the near-failing marks Dole as a newsmaker drew. As a national political communicator, he was dominated by the President and other candidates and events. Second, his message, in the eyes of the newsmen, was too repetitious, and consequently, too predictable. Third, Dole was viewed as definitely outside the Presidential circle of decision-makers. It was "obvious" to most newsmen that Dole's voice did not
represent the Oval Office or anyone close to it. As Lou Cannon, who covered the RNC for the *Washington Post*, stated, "He was a weak news draw because Presidential leadership was so dominant, and events so dominant that he was buried." Rick Zimmerman, Washington Bureau Chief of the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, underscored Cannon's remarks. "People want to see and hear the President," and, "the center was the President," he said. "Dole was not especially effective because no one, including news guys, gets especially excited about seeing or hearing a Senator in a Presidential campaign." Representatives of the broadcast media agreed. As Rob Sunde, producer-writer for CBS NEWS (radio and television) stated, "Dole was entirely too predictable." "After the first few days of the campaign you knew generally that when the opposition said something, made a charge, Dole or a surrogate here or there would respond and you knew generally what the responses would be." So it was not that newsworthy, concluded Sunde, who covered the campaign for CBS NEWS in New York, and was producer-chief writer for the CBS Midwest Desk at both political conventions and on Election Night. "So much of the same, all the time, left little news value in Dole," Gil Longin, Editor of ABC Radio News, noted. And, Robert Semple, a senior political reporter for the *New York Times*, agreed. "Dole did not have news impact because he was too
repetitious, so loud, so much of the same," Semple said. 52
"Dole in October was the same as Dole in August." 53
"Besides, the focus of the media," he explained, "was on
the candidates." 54  "Not from any ideological basis or bias,
but because of the sameness of his approach and content, our
coverage [New York Times] dropped him lower and lower, then
dropped out on him early in the campaign." 55

Almost universally, these reporters assumed that
when Dole talked, it was "only" a Senator, "only" the GOP
Chairman, not one of the President's men speaking. If such
a political communicator did not speak for the President
directly or have his favor, they implied he could not in
this campaign be very newsworthy. "Because Dole was not a
part of the Presidential power sphere, I did not view him
as a voice that represented the GOP campaign," stated Remer
Tyson, Political Editor of the Detroit Free Press. 56  "He
was zero within campaign decision-making, and had little
effect with opinion leaders and the press because all sur­
mised he never had a handle on or in the campaign," Tyson
said. 57  Sunde of CBS confirmed this view. "You knew what
Dole said was probably not first-hand from the President." 58
"Dole was not part of the inner circle and to be an impor­tant
news figure nationally, a fellow had to be [speaking
for] the President." 59  Espousing a similar view was Robert
Boyd, Washington Bureau Chief of the Knight Newspapers, and
the reporter who first "broke" the story of Thomas Eagleton's medical history. "It was obvious that here he was Chairman of the Republican Party, frozen out of the campaign," Boyd observed. "With no inside track on the campaign, his words were hollow," the reporter claimed.

Most of the newsmen thought Dole had little direct effect on voters, not only because he failed to reach them, through the news media, but when he did, his openly partisan title and role diminished his credibility. These members of the fourth estate evidently felt that if a communicator came to a speaking situation openly identified as a partisan advocate, he was less credible. As Boyd stated, "He could not [be] and was not persuasive with Independents or Democrats because he came preaching as a Party man." "Thus," Boyd concluded, "he had no credible stature among these voters, those that make or break an election." An ABC News radio editor, Don Gardiner, commented similarly. "By his job, his position, people knew that anything he said would be pro-Republican or anti-Democratic." "He was prejudiced from the start; that was his job." "He couldn't be persuasive with the average voter." Tyson chorused, "In campaigns you have some communication that everybody recognizes as the Party ritual." "This is Dole, doing and saying the expected as Chairman, and the expected is largely dismissed as ritual." Hamilton briefly summed
it up, "His Party position stuck him with a partisan label wherever he went, and for most voters [who are] not tremendously political, this hurts any ability to be convincing."68

Finally, a few of the newsmen felt that the weight of Nixon and McGovern actions precluded any meaningful role for Dole. Semple pronounced, "Nixon would have won with the same margin with or without a Bob Dole."69 "One guy could have little effect among so many other currents and events."70 "Talking about result, McGovern himself blew it."71 "He was the one with the 'effect,'" according to Zimmerman.72 In an especially interesting assessment, Tyson reported on systematic samplings he directed for the Detroit Free Press:

It seems as if 95% of campaign speaking is just there and is usually wasted. Usually about 5% of campaign communication does something. . . . The real question is where is this 5%? From whom, how is it conveyed? That 5% in 1972 was Connally with the Democrats, our interviews with voters, selected on a scientific basis at the Free Press, showed. The responses usually were, "Now he's a Democrat, he has been a Democratic governor, he has served with JFK and LBJ . . . and he's for Richard Nixon!" It gave them a reason not to vote for Nixon, but against what George McGovern stood for. Connally had a tremendous effect. He always came up in interviews. Dole's name never came up. He was there to fill the gaps, gaps that never would have been noticed if he had not.73

Sunde reasoned that the issue makes a spokesman important or unimportant. "Dole never had the issues, never
Evaluation of Dole's "result" for the party loyalists was half positive and half negative. A thread that appeared throughout all the comments was that newsmen seemed to stereotype the role of the Party Chairman (as he related to his partisans) and attach communication expectancies to the stereotype. The Chairman that most all saw always speaks at Party dinners, salutes the workers, damns the opposition, glorifies the Party leader. They used this stereotype to judge the 1972 GOP Chairman. Boyd stated, "Dole was a good ticket seller for the Party dinners, and provided a good reward for Party workers." Al Polscynski, political editor of the *Wichita Eagle and Beacon*, Dole's home-state newspaper, assessed Dole as "great at raising money, going down-the-line for the Party, and getting the workers mad at McGovern." Cannon reported, "I talked to state chairmen and high-ranking Party professionals extensively who are able to judge a National Chairman, being in a spot to hear bitching from below and to know from above what limitations he works with." "All gave good marks to Dole for his Party speaking." Zimmerman concurred, calling Dole "adroit at turning on the Party people." Peter O'Donnell, news writer for the ABC News radio network, pointed out that "it was hard to promote the Party because
Nixon was not identified as a Republican." The consequence, he stated, was that Dole tried to motivate the GOP to work by emphasizing what could happen—a local loss to Democrats, and the respectable McGovern showing—if they did not work. Gardiner felt Dole had "performed well" at "symbolizing the life of the GOP," and at "exciting partisans by pointing to the consequences of the opposition, and by deifying the President." 81

The other seven respondents evaluated Dole's speaking as Party Chairman as having little effect on partisans. These homogenous remarks were generally negative. Hamilton, for instance, said, "No effect was apparent." 82 Joseph C. Harsh, Chief Editorial Writer for the Christian Science Monitor, stated, "Other than an occasional poke at the Democrats, I doubt if much registered." 83

In summary, the newsmen's identification and evaluation of the "result" of Dole's campaign communication were three-dimensional. As a newsmaker, he failed, due to the perception that his message was too repetitious, predictable, and thus, not newsworthy. Moreover, he was recognized as out of the policy-making Presidential campaign inner circle and, hence, was a voice without authority or political power behind it. Finally, the candidates and events of 1972 dominated the news, newsmen felt, obliterating Dole's attempts. Without access to the masses through the media,
he could have little effect on the average voter. What
effect he could have, the respondents felt, was further
diminished by the open partisanship of his role and
approach, which damaged his credibility with voters, most
of whom are not so partisan. In newsmen's view, the only
sphere where he could have positive effect was with GOP
partisans. Six rated Dole "below average," seven "average"
on his over-all effectiveness as a communicator (Appendix B).
Six respondents evaluated his effort at motivating party
loyalists favorably, while seven judged that any positive
effect in this sphere was not at all visible, though they
offered no specific reasons for this conclusion.

The perceived objectives.--Most all the newsmen
agreed that Dole sought to reach primarily Republican
partisans--both leaders and workers in the party. Nine of
the thirteen commented in some way that the Chairman
utilized party organization forums to disseminate his
message through news coverage of these events. If their
evaluation of his effectiveness as a newsmaker was valid
then, he directly reached few partisans, in their view,
beyond those in his immediate audiences. Three respondents
deviated from the majority assessment of the sought audi-
ence. For example, Tyson specified "the middle-class white
suburban worker," and "the patriotic American" was Longin's
conception of Dole's aim.84
Ten of the thirteen respondents visualized Dole as trying to arouse the loyalists and activate them to work for the GOP. Getting out Republican votes, catalyzing GOP workers to proselytize for their candidates were commonly cited objectives. These ten respondents saw Dole as the leader of his national party, rather than as a surrogate whose main function was to promote the President and answer Democratic charges. Yet, twelve of the interviewees mentioned a secondary goal for Dole—to help in the over-all attack on McGovern. Semple's comments provide specific illustration:

He was to keep right-of-center reflexive cold-war Republicans happy with Nixon. There seemed to be a fear on his part and among Party leaders that Nixon's China trip, the American recognition of China in the United Nations, his arms-control agreement with Russia, and his government intervention, such as wage-and-price controls, would run against their ingrained "education" for two decades that Communists were the stone-wall enemy, and the economy should be without federal controls. Dole tried to counter uneasiness over these things. He was there to remind them [of] how extreme McGovern was and would be as President.85

Hence, unhappiness with a President was to be rhetorically moved aside by a worse nemesis—McGovern. Longin perceived that Dole tried to "counter the unhappiness of most Republican leaders who were unhappy that the President and his crew did not do more to speak and work around the country for Republicans,"86 an astute observation in view of the partisans' comments to the researcher.
"When Dole first came to the Chairmanship, party people were suspicious of him because he was not a full-time Chairman," Cannon stated. They thought he was using the Party for his own purposes, so Dole set out to dispel these criticisms by being a Party man." The Washington Post reporter concluded, "Dole put himself in two roles, to push for party-wide victory, to stir up the party people at all levels, and to negatively cast McGovern." "But, the negative attack was secondary to him." "He was different from the surrogates by function since they were there only to promote Nixon." 

If one uses these perceived objectives as "base-lines" to judge Dole's results in the eyes of the reporters, he sees a party unifier and motivator aiming at primarily the faithful of his own party, but reaching few due to the contention that his messages rarely went beyond his immediate audiences.

The perceived means.—Significantly, the means newsmen identified—basically his independence, quick wit and sense of humor—as positively distinguishing Dole's means of communicating, rendered him a likeable person, and as an entertaining speaker, but, in their eyes, did not contribute much to his over-all rhetorical effectiveness. Because of his approach and his humorous demonstration of his independence, Dole achieved seemingly great personal rapport
with newsmen. They liked him and they laughed with him. He was the refreshing change from, as one phrased it, the "grims" (the White House and the CREP) who took everything, especially themselves, so seriously in their Presidential pursuits. All but one respondent noted, in essence, that Dole was successful as a speaker, audience-by-audience, in building good will, warmth, rapport, and in leaving a positive impression, but they also noted that these attributes were not enough to make him a significant figure on the national scene as a mass communicator. Semple elaborates:

Dole was, in person, witty, had a great sense of humor, was self-deprecating, and, to reporters, not one of them [the White House, CREP staffs]. He had great reporter rapport. I remember one incident that really represents Dole. He was briefing the press in Convention Hall the day before the Miami event opened. The PA was not working or was squealing, etc. So, Dole stopped and intoned, "I apologize for the PA, but some of our sound men have been preoccupied." It brought down the house. 

(At that time, the CREP and GOP were being linked by implication and by Democratic charges, as Chapter II notes, with "Watergate" electronic eavesdropping.) But, Semple pointed out, Dole was seen in White House eyes as "identified with the press and the Party and, therefore, not with the President." Again, Dole's wit made him more effective with his party audiences and personally attractive to newsmen, but seemed to place him out of favor with Presidential advisers. O'Donnell spoke for the
majority of the interviewees when he explained that Dole's humorous, consistent, outspoken exposition of his independence from the White House earned him high respect from members of the news media. "He was the only one who could be even half light-hearted about what was happening in the campaign."95

Thus, the qualities that were really the key to Dole's effectiveness with partisans were almost incidental to the newsmen's over-all evaluation. Bob Dole built an image for himself as personally likeable, respected, and independently candid with these newsmen. He exhibited the major components of credibility--likeability, honesty, and dynamism--yet other factors in his rhetorical context--the dominance of the principal candidates and events, the predictability of his message, his status as a White House outcast, his openly partisan role and approach--evidently outweighed the personal traits the newsmen identified as the means that enhanced his communication capability. Achieving personal rapport was not enough.

The perceived message.--Newsmen's perception of what Dole said coincided with manifest message emphases to a much greater degree than did Republicans' conceptions of what their Chairman had said. Nearly three-fourths (69%) of the interviewees readily recalled a Dole emphasis. They saw heavy negative concentration on McGovern, linking him (in
Dole's message) to labels of "radical," "incompetent," "absurd proposals," and "indecisiveness." A less dominant, but evident, concentration on lauding Nixon was also visualized by the reporters. They saw Dole tying Nixon to successful foreign policy, "Presidential" qualities, consonance with Americans' goals, and a refusal to "sell-out" in Vietnam. Nearly half of those recalling an emphasis reported the Chairman's urgings to "be Republicans first," to campaign for the entire GOP ticket, and to avoid apathy.

ABC newsman Wilson saw Dole emphasizing "attacks on McGovern and his positions, especially his welfare schemes, and his statement about going to Hanoi . . . down on his knees and begging." 96 "To a much lesser extent, he concentrated on Richard Nixon, his Vietnam troop withdrawals, his China trip, and foreign policy initiatives." 97 Boyd thought Dole's theme was totally negative, that McGovern "was out-of-tune with the majority of American people . . . that his thinking did not represent the American people in any way." 98 Polscynski stated a similar perception, "The theme was to establish Richard Nixon as Presidential and McGovern as not Presidential . . . there was a certain dualism . . . Presidential competence on one side, and on the other side, a lack of Presidential qualities." 99 "He also was there to speak for all candidates, rather than just for the President; his emphasis was on the whole ticket." 100 "The
Chairman was there to keep the Democrats on the defensive, primarily on the national security issues," according to Semple. 101

He was the trench fighter . . . the President needed troops to fight in the trench—to use language that would not befit a President. So, the message was this or that absurdity of McGovern. His "sell-out of the country" was the major theme. He kept reminding Republicans that Richard Nixon would not sell-out to the Commies; George would. Nixon would be a tough negotiator. 102

Tyson perceived Dole espousing "scare tactics about McGovern," hard-line conservative themes, voting for Richard Nixon because he epitomized what America stands for, and advocacy of "countering the counter-culture." 103 "He dropped quips about Watergate too, like 'you wouldn't pay for anything like that!'" 104

Bob Wilson, an ABC network political newsman, viewed Dole's message emphasizing that:

The greatest GOP weakness was overconfidence, and Republicans, as a consequence, would have to work harder. He stressed "the President's strong record" as justifying his re-election, and the fact that the Chief Executive had to be "a strong, forceful individual." By implication McGovern was not. The message was pro-Party . . . be a Republican first, before a conservative first; be a Republican first, before a Nixon man." 105

Analysis of the Responses

Assessing the responses of these newsmen confirms present insights about the behavior of media reporters, and adds new increments of knowledge to this study. The power
of newsmen is considerable, as the literature reports, and as the Dole communication group perceived. As Cohen, Dunn, and Rivers allege, a medium has the ability to focus (or withhold) public attention on an issue, personality, or message. And, it can set public priorities of attention. As Dunn notes, "It has even greater control over how these messages shall appear, that is, to what extent they will be conveyed with what favorable symbols, how much space they will receive, and what sort of display they will be given." And, Baroody's emphasis on the attack in the message because he felt that such content would draw more news play adds support for Dunn's other conclusion. "Decision-makers may be willing to alter the content of their message to insure that the messages will appear [in the news]." "They may be willing to alter them even more in order to have them appear with prominent display." This study shows, at least for the cited respondents, that they did follow and pay considerable attention to what Dole was saying. Moreover, they accurately perceived the emphasis and manifest content of his rhetoric. Yet certain factors led them to a conscious decision not to report on what Dole said. Herein lies their power vividly demonstrated inasmuch as "the control of information is central to power." In making that decision, as has been discussed, Dole's degree of proximity to Presidential power,
the newsmen's belief that reporting on the candidates should have priority, and the redundancy of his content were prime determinants. The candidate-reporting priority does not bode well for the success of surrogate speaker concept. Having other sources wholly articulate a candidate's cause would not seem to greatly aid his rhetorical success, if the data here are representative. And the newsmen's reaction to Dole content points to one of the greatest mistakes of the RNC communicators. They failed to understand what this researcher calls "the paradox of the mass communicator." Due to the known trends in audience behavior--selective perception, sporadic, limited attention patterns, "tuning in and out, here and there"--and the nature of news reporting--communication by selected excerpt and essential generalization--a mass communicator has to build great redundancy into each of his messages and into all of them over time. In this way, even if the "average" news consumer hears only "bits and pieces here and there," he still has a high probability of receiving a campaigner's general message. Paradoxically, though, as these newsmen have illustrated, to penetrate into news channels, a source has to say something unique or say it uniquely. "Uniqueness" makes news and is key to mass diffusion, but redundancy is necessary once a message is in the channels, so that receivers capture the essence of one's message.
Dole communication captured the need for redundancy, but failed fatally in realizing the need to say the same thing differently or uniquely across time. Instead, they intoned even the same phrasing and wording over time. They failed at the crucial second step, entering the news channels. The newsmen paid attention (first step, attention) and knew what the Chairman was saying, but did not convey it (second step, the decision).

The stereotyping of the Party Chairman's communication role by reporters seems to provide occupants of this role—in either party—with a built-in liability for mass communication success. Since the Chairman "is so openly partisan," they contended, his remarks "are not only predictable," but are to be approached, even before delivery with considerable skepticism. And, if party chairmen continue to reinforce this stereotype, as did Dole, they build a vicious circle from which escape is difficult. In the role, according to the argument, one is expected to damn "them" (the opposition) and deify "us." He did that. He thus failed to be a credible communicator to the "swing voters" who decide elections, or to the news reporters. So the forums for his effectiveness were limited to his own faithful. And, they, the loyalists, were reinforced by the traditional party rhetoric. Their responses reinforced the Chairman's emphasis and his perception of their expectations.
This communication circle is self-reinforcing, and disturbing for those who feel party spokesmen should go beyond these traditional roles of deifying and damning.

The determinants of news decisions, as discussed, appear more significant in view of the fact that nearly every one of the interviewees articulated them at his initiative.

CBS newsman Walter Cronkite once observed that broadcast news "can't be anything but a front-page news service." While this statement may well be debatable, the responses of the broadcast newsmen, when examined together as a category, were definitely more general than those of the newspaper reporters. The newspapermen's responses were definitely more detailed, and these interviewees elaborated at greater length. The print reporters appeared to be more fully informed on the nature and context of the Dole communication. Perhaps, as Gardiner of ABC said, "there's little time in a radio newscast to be analytical about the over-all aspects of a political campaign." "One reason why in our line, for broadcasters, someone like Dole doesn't stand out in specifics is that we are more likely to seek the principals and dwell on them in the few moments we have on the air." Perhaps this study lends support to the proposition that broadcast newsmen tend
to simplify and generalize the phenomena on which they report, more than do print media reporters.

Finally, as with the partisans' comments, source-message theory is not supported by these data.\textsuperscript{114} No respondent evidenced any particular orientation to focus more on the source than on the message or on the message more than the source. Attributes of the source, message, and situation interacted in determining "effect," for most of the newsmen.

And examination of the sample media confirmed their over-all assessment that Dole was not newsworthy, and that his communication rarely reached the level of the news consumer.

\textbf{Dole Visibility in the National Media}

\textbf{The Evidence}

The reader will recall that the researcher examined the three national news magazines, three metropolitan newspapers, and the news-political programming of one television network, consistent with rationale explained in Chapter I. This analysis was undertaken: (a) to assess the success of a Dole objective—to generate national dissemination of his message through news channels, and (b) to derive some indication of the nature and extent of Dole content available to the random news reader or listener. The analysis of his media visibility follows, and the data on which it is based are found in Appendix C.
Nature and extent.—Clearly, the one and only Dole message to draw widespread news coverage was the charge made on August 31, 1972, and supplemented on September 5, 1972, that McGovern had violated federal election laws in managing financial contributions. The Chairman made national television news three times in one day, plus leading the Washington Post front page. His rhetoric was given sustained impetus when national media carried on a following day (September 6, 1972) the McGovern refutation of Dole's charges.

About one of five of his attempts to generate national news succeeded in the national print media, whereas his broadcast media attempts succeeded a little over one out of every twenty efforts. About 60 per cent of the Dole "mentions" in the national print media were there as a result of a specific Dole attempt to make news. All but two broadcast appearances were sought, and less than half of all print mentions were stories that concentrated principally on a Dole behavior. More than half of these included him along with several other GOP or Nixon officials. All but one of the broadcast airings dealt solely with Dole as the principal subject. All but two Dole broadcast appearances consisted of McGovern criticism, and about three-fourths of the print "mentions" slammed McGovern. One broadcast interview featured Dole (NBC, September 15,
1972) deploring the Watergate incident and dissociating it from the GOP, and one (*Issues and Answers*) dealt in part with the same approach to the burglary, but largely with Dole attacks on McGovern.

**By medium.**—The Chairman fared poorly in the national news magazines, receiving one sentence in *Time* and one in *U.S. News and World Report*. *Newsweek* never carried a Dole remark, simply a small photo of him once. He received the most mention (ten instances) in the newspaper he attacked, the *Washington Post*, slightly less (eight) in the *New York Times*, and in the pro-GOP *Chicago Tribune*, only two! The *Post*, by far, gave him the most substantial and prominent play when it covered him, while the *New York Times* usually printed only a few paragraphs, when it reported on him.

Looking at the broadcast sample, one finds disappointing results for the Chairman. He "made" the network *Nightly News* only once in the campaign, the morning *TODAY NEWS* only twice, and was interviewed on *Today* only twice.

**By news days.**—Analyzing his diffusion according to different individual days, the reader sees that he was on the national broadcast news on five different days, and in the national print media on fifteen different days. His coverage was heaviest in September (eight days), half that
(four days) in October, and one day in November. On its face, that record appears rather poor, and the researcher concludes that Dole had minimum success as a newsmaker. His message was rarely available to the "average" news consumer, though the Dole staff thought it was. Their assessment of "effect" follows.

The View of the Communicators

The Dole assessment.—The effects of his rhetorical efforts on the news media, state parties, the RNC, the President's campaign, and on McGovern's attempt were assessed quite candidly by Dole. The Chairman felt that McGovern was a decided loser from the moment he was nominated. "After that Convention, that Eagleton thing, he was horribly vulnerable, open to attack." Thus, as the Chairman discussed, the campaign against McGovern reinforced and helped guarantee his loss. "I really was just one part of the effort to keep people reminded of how way out he was, in the last analysis." We probably helped along his margin of defeat, perhaps making it a little larger than it was without us."

He felt similarly about the campaigning for Nixon. "I was one of the voices supporting him, pointing out his strengths, helping build the trend growing toward the win." Dole seemed to feel he had been a bigger asset and a larger force for Nixon before the campaign because, "I was
one of the few supporters in the lean years who always spoke out for him.\textsuperscript{119}  

"But," the Senator added, he "felt a sense of substantial accomplishment during the campaign, getting Republicans off dead center, off their duffs, turning out." Working for the RNC, "I accomplished my Party mission, really got people to listen to my pitch about being broad-minded to all types of Republicans, broadening the base of the Party." "And, I certainly raised the money."\textsuperscript{120}  

Dole felt he had served local and state GOP organizations especially effectively. "I was the locals' only contact with the national Party. They saw me as the only one in the campaign really concerned with the Party."\textsuperscript{121}  

Again, Dole emphasized that his appearances had raised a considerable amount of money for these organizations.  

The Senator concluded that his campaigning probably was inseparable from his over-all tenure as RNC Chairman in his Kansas constituents' eyes. "In fact, the national exposure as the National Chairman of a party for which my home state usually went was very helpful to me."\textsuperscript{122}  

"Just the fact that when they would tune in one of the big shows [\textit{e.g.}, \textit{Today, Nightly News, Face the Nation}], I, their Senator from their state, was on a national show had its effect," the Kansan surmised.\textsuperscript{123}  

"I was there for Nixon and the GOP with whom most of them sympathized."\textsuperscript{124}
The Senator expressed great disappointment at the fact that GOP Congressional and state-wide victories were not more numerous. He said he had done all he could to convince campaign leaders such as John Mitchell that more funds should be channeled to other candidates, and that the President should personally campaign for Republican candidates throughout the contested states. Dole appeared to be greatly puzzled by the refusal of the Nixon campaign management to accept his suggestion. He indicated the argument was always made that the President had to be President, not a campaigning GOP leader, and the Nixon effort must have first priority on resources. "Without this attitude [White House refusal to aid GOP candidates], we could have been sitting in the Speaker's Chair and Majority Leader's office --and there wouldn't be any Watergate Hearings." "But, well, that's dreaming." 125

The former Congressman and disabled veteran described his relations with the media as "good," but said his attempts to stimulate news resulted in "only a fair" quantity of coverage. "They knew I was straight, independent, didn't mouth just anything I was given." 126 "I was the only guy who would joke with them. They gave me good attention while realizing I was not a policy-maker. I was always credible; they recognized this." 127 Dole said his remarks were never distorted, but claimed the media
never picked up a lot of his charges against the Democrats. "Probably," Dole concluded, "if I did nothing else, I did get across the theme that it was time to grow up in the Republican Party, that we had to broaden the base, to open the philosophical door wider . . . if we were going to really make it as a Party." 128

The ghost's conclusion.—Baroody was quite verbal in analyzing effect. He concluded that Dole had done well in diffusing his attacks on McGovern, that these attacks had received substantial news coverage, but that the pro-Nixon message had not gotten through because it had little news value. Therefore, he saw "considerable" success in their attempt to contrast the Democratic nominee with Nixon, feeling their portrayal of McGovern as an inconsistent, indecisive, incompetent had contributed to voters, mostly Republicans, forming the same image. He analyzed the pro-Nixon message effect as largely and successfully supplying partisans with the information necessary to explain to themselves and to others some of Nixon's more "liberal actions as President." The speechwriter thought Dole had "scored the biggest" as the contact point--both as a speaker and listener--with the great number of local state GOP leaders and workers who were frustrated in their attempts to participate in the campaign or to seek help from the White House and the Committee to Re-Elect the
President. "They knew the Senator was trying . . . was representing and voicing their interests." Baroody did not feel they had tried enough, nor had they succeeded in building or sharpening an identity for the Party. He claimed that "reasons varied across localities," for explaining why more GOP candidates did not win. "Why certain candidates in one state lost or won would be a different 'why' in another state." Baroody said, too, he tended to believe that there "is no national Republican Party, but more like 50 state Republican parties."

"These share certain broad general philosophic approaches—advocating less federal involvement in problem-solving, less national operation of social programs—but each differs in personalities it fields, and in terms of the peculiarities of each state." The ghost added that "voters make their voting decisions more through scrutiny of the individual, rather than by reacting to his party affiliation."

The scheduler's evaluation. — Scanlon concluded that Dole "enlivened" the GOP in states where he appeared, giving the national party "visibility and embodiment" for locals, in a year when evidence of a national party was "nowhere else to be seen." The scheduler felt that Dole had effectively "put down" Democratic spokesmen on national interview shows, having significant impact through such appearances in view of the educated, interested opinion-
leader minority who watched such telecasts. Scanlon claimed, too, he felt the Chairman had done a great deal to "energize" Republicans, "getting them out working and voting." "Bob helped build the anathema which George McGovern became to Republicans, which helped light the fire under them." He shrugged when asked what effect Dole had had on the President's race during the campaign. "The President was already there [winning] by Convention time," Scanlon concluded.

Scanlon reserved special enthusiasm for his commentary on the effect of Dole's rhetoric on the Kansas Senator's career. He surmised that Dole had "built up such a great image of candor, independence, loyalty as a party man, energy, and political acumen" that his coming Senatorial race would be vastly strengthened. Moreover, he predicted that Dole would probably be the "Vice Presidential, if not higher, nominee in 1976." Scanlon surmised that Republicans not only "liked" Dole, but in his 325 speeches, the GOP leader "had built up an awful lot of political IOU's."

The scheduler noted that "all emphasis at the top was on a large mandate for Richard Nixon . . . they [CREP staff] were out to prove 1968 was not a fluke." "The win was supposed to carry in the ticket, but it didn't work," Scanlon claimed, because of the media's growing
influence on voters. "With such instantaneous relay of information and the analysts' constant regurgitation of a candidate's personal qualities, nothing is taken at face value. The masses look at candidates as individuals, not as party affiliates. So you have ticket-splitting. This makes it nearly impossible in many cases to build a ticket-wide party identity."  

The deputy's judgment.— Wilck reiterated that he had no background in politics and would "hesitate to judge" the RNC rhetorical effort. He did say, though, he felt his area had done a "good production job in getting out requests." He also commented that "with more communication now available to the voter, each is able to--and does--view candidates more personally . . . than looking at his party . . . and that tendency is growing." Because of the evident ticket-splitting and "policy decisions in the campaign," he did conclude that Dole's over-all efforts had benefited "far and away . . ." the President in comparison to the national GOP.

An Analyzing Summary

In this chapter, the researcher focused on four sets of indices in an attempt to judge the consequences of Dole's communication. One such source was a sample of twenty-eight members of the Republican National Committee,
who provided the partisan perspective. They represented a principal target audience of Dole, and had viewed many such comparable national political communicators, over the years. Moreover, they served in key positions in each state party hierarchy and, thus, were in all probability partisan opinion leaders. They judged Dole as extremely effective as a communicator who served as the lone champion of the national GOP in a year when most public attention was dominated by their President, who strategically dissociated himself and significant campaign resources from his own party. The Chairman was seen by partisans as the animating voice for a party-wide work-and-win appeal. Republicans strongly identified with Dole due to his political credibility, his status--like theirs--out of Presidential favor, and the techniques, mostly humorous, that he used to remind his listeners of his independence from and irreverence for the staffs of the White House and the Committee to Re-Elect the President. His motivating technique, built upon this identification, was to urge repudiation of what McGovern represented, and to implicitly implore partisans to show what they could do "on their own," as he was, lest they lose their organizational lifeblood at home. "Effect" here was a function of the interaction of the source, message, and situational--not ideological--predispositions of the receivers. The Chairman's rhetoric, though, did not go
beyond the call to party victory. No identity or equivalents of the Republican Party were articulated by him.

The researcher could conclude, then, that Dole's principal communication effect was on such partisans, as compared to non-partisans, and depended to a great extent on how much communication these listeners stimulated through interpersonal channels after hearing Dole in the immediate audience. This conclusion is based on the fact that analysis of selected, yet major, media showed that Dole had little actual presence in the news channels, presence that was essential if his rhetoric was to be available for the mass-level news consumer, be he Republican or not.

The broadcast and print media newsmen interviewed provided insight into why the Chairman was not a newsworthy figure. These newsmen were valuable sources because they, with varying degrees of proximity, covered Dole, and all had considerable exposure to similar national political communicators. In addition, they supplied perspective of those who, in large part, governed the nature and extent of the news diffusion of Dole's rhetoric. In assessing the Chairman, they found him to be an entertaining speaker, engaging person, and respected politician. They pointed out, however, that the redundancy and, thus, predictability of his message precluded its news value. In addition, the Chairman was
dominated by the candidates who took priority coverage; moreover, the Dole voice was seen as no equivalent to the Presidential center of power. And, these reporters identified a stereotype of their own: a national party chairman was one who deified his party leaders and damned the opposition. Consequently, his rhetoric was, at the onset, suspect and devoid of credibility for most Americans. Most newsmen saw Dole fit their stereotype.

The newsmen's comments illustrate the power of their roles. They paid attention to Dole's message and perceived its manifest emphases accurately, unlike half the partisans who assimilated it; but the reporters decided not to cover much of his effort. Their responses also unearthed a strategic communications error made by the Dole group. The mass campaign communicator must build redundancy into his message so that intended receivers will capture its essence even if reporting of their message is fragmented, and even if listeners' attention is sporadic. Yet, paradoxically, the message must be unique in form or substance or both in order to be newsworthy. Dole's group built in the redundancy, but rarely varied the form—how they said it—a fatal flaw. Their messages were less newsworthy and, thus, less widely disseminated.

The Chairman recognized that his news coverage was not the best, yet he could not understand why. He felt that
he had added to the Nixon margin, though he guessed that 
the result was probably decided immediately after each Con-
vention. He concluded that he had served the state parties 
especially well, raising money, boosting morale, seeming 
concerned with their plight and transmitting their concern 
for more national attention to Nixon campaign leaders. 
Dole stated that had more Nixon campaign resources been 
shared with state GOP's, more Republicans would have been 
elected to Congress and to statehouses. The Kansas Senator 
surmised that his tenure as Chairman had boosted him at 
home inasmuch as his message as Chairman was equally as 
well received in Kansas, a long-time Republican bastion. 
He surmised that his biggest contribution as Chairman dur-
ing the campaign was in causing his GOP listeners to realize 
the futility of inter-party disputes based on ideological 
differences.

The speechwriter, on the other hand, said their 
greatest success had come at contrasting McGovern and Nixon 
in the public eye. He confirmed Dole's belief that an 
important part of the Chairman's communication function had 
been to listen, to serve as a two-way communications chan-
nel. He discounted Dole's ability to have influenced the 
outcome of state races due to the uniqueness of each state 
party, personalities, and situation. Wilck assessed that 
their (RNC) major effect had been "for the President, not
the party," while Scanlon estimated that the biggest effect of their communication effort was to launch Dole into contention for future national office. The Senator, he said, had earned a host of political "IOU's," had energized Republicans, shown his skill at "putting down" Democrats on television, but had not affected the outcome of the election much since Nixon would have won in any event.

Integrating these perspectives with his own, the researcher discusses the consequences of Dole's communication further in the concluding chapter.
Notes

1 Though the rationale for assessing "effect" in this way is explained in Chapter I, it was felt that the reader would find a recapitulation of method helpful at this point, due to the length of the dissertation. Note, also, that the respondent quotes cited throughout are intended to be illustrative and, as representative of most interviewees noted in the text, supportive of the generalizations therein. The quotes are included for this purpose even though their essence may occasionally be repetitive.


3 The following interviewees each rated the Dole effect. All quotes in the partisans' section are based on the following interviews (the states indicated are those the person represents on the RNC):

Mary Boatwright, June 11, 1973, Connecticut
James Boyce, June 18, 1973, Louisiana
Keith Bulen, July 25, 1973, Indiana
Bruce H. Crane, June 1, 1973, Massachusetts
M. S. Ginn, July 26, 1973, Missouri
John Haugh, July 5, 1973, Arizona
R. L. Hermann, July 1, 1973, Nebraska
Margaret Hill, July 3, 1973, Indiana
Clifford Jones, June 15, 1973, Pennsylvania
W. M. Laub, July 6, 1973, Nevada
David Little, June 4, 1973, Idaho
Boyd McDim, June 27, 1973, Kansas
Dorothy McHugh, June 27, 1973, New York
William McLaughlin, July 20, 1973, Michigan
Edward Mills, June 26, 1973, California
Ms. Collis Moore, July 3, 1973, Oregon
John F. Nagle, June 11, 1973, Missouri
Katherine F. Neuberger, May 5, 1973, New Jersey
Cynthia Newman, June 28, 1973, Virginia
Thomas Potter, May 23, 1973, West Virginia
Jack Ranson, July 3, 1973, Kansas
Don Ross, March 22, 1973, Nebraska
Kent Shearer, June 28, 1973, Utah
Thomas Thomas, June 1, 1973, Florida
Leona Troxell, May 22, 1973, Arkansas
4 Newman interview.
5 Ross interview.
6 Ross interview.
7 McDill interview.
8 Vine interview.
9 Vine interview.
10 Mills interview.
11 Troxell interview.
12 Troxell interview.
13 Jones interview.
14 Bulen interview.
15 Hermann interview.
16 Jones interview.
17 Ginn interview.
18 Laub interview.
19 Shearer interview, Nagle interview, Haugh interview, respectively.
20 Hill interview.
21 Troxell interview.
22 Little interview.
23 Boatwright interview.
24 McHugh interview.
25 Ranson interview.
26 Ranson interview.
27 Jones interview.
28 Jones interview.
Neuberger interview, and Stacey interview. 

The process of assimilation is summarized in M. Sherif, C. Sherif, and R. Nebergall, Attitudes and Attitude Change (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1965).


Troxell interview.

Troxell interview.

Bulen interview.

Quote from Newman interview.


"Consubstantial" is also a Burke concept.


Terms repeated ad infinitum in Dole speeches.


These three criteria emerged from the interview responses; they were not offered in interviews by the researcher. All newsmen quotes are from these interviews:
- Don Gardiner, June 6, 1973, ABC
- Gil Longin, June 18, 1973, ABC
- P. O'Donnell, June 4, 1973, ABC
- Al Polscynski, April 4, 1973, Wichita Eagle and Beacon
- R. B. Semple, April 6, 1973, the New York Times
- Rob Sunde, August 21, 1973, CBS
- Reemer Tyson, June 5, 1973, Detroit Free Press
- Bob Wilson, May 23, 1973, ABC
- Rick Zimmerman, April 3, 1973, Cleveland Plain Dealer

Cannon interview.
Zimmerman interview.
Zimmerman interview.
Sunde interview.
Sunde interview.
Longin interview.
Semple interview.
Semple interview.
Semple interview.
Semple interview.
Tyson interview.
Tyson interview.
Sunde interview.
Sunde interview.
Boyd interview.
Boyd interview.
Boyd interview.
Gardiner interview.
Gardiner interview.
Gardiner interview.
Tyson interview.
Tyson interview.
Hamilton interview.
Semple interview.
Semple interview.
Zimmerman interview.
Zimmerman interview.
Zimmerman interview.
Tyson interview.
Sunde interview.
Boyd interview.
Polscynski interview.
Cannon interview.
Cannon interview.
Zimmerman interview.
O'Donnell interview.
Gardiner interview.
Hamilton interview.
Harsh interview.

From Tyson, Longin interviews.

Semple interview.

Longin interview.

Cannon interview.

Cannon interview.

Cannon interview.

Cannon interview.

Cannon interview.

Cannon interview.

Cannon interview.

Cannon interview.

Semple interview.

Semple interview.

O'Donnell interview.

Wilson interview.

Wilson interview.

Boyd interview.

Polscynski interview.

Polscynski interview.

Semple interview.

Semple interview.

Tyson interview.

Tyson interview.

Wilson interview.

Cohen, Dunn, Rivers.

Dunn, p. 169.
Source-message theory argues that certain receivers are predisposed to focus more on sources or messages, across varying communication situations. See, V. L. Stone, "Source-Message Orientation and Attitude Change: A Research Monograph," University of Wisconsin, 1970 (mimeographed).


Baroody interview.

Baroody interview.


Scanlon interview.

Scanlon interview.

Scanlon interview.

Scanlon interview.

Scanlon interview.

Scanlon interview.

Scanlon interview.

Scanlon interview.


Wilck interview.
CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In concluding this dissertation, the researcher recapitulates the findings of this inquiry, specifies the communication roles Dole served, and discusses their significance for communication research and theory.

The Rhetorical Context

The 1972 political situation was a vastly significant influence on the conception and communication of Dole rhetoric. This context determined the events, candidates, and issues that were salient in the campaign, rendered some roles appropriate and inappropriate for the Chairman, and supplied, for the voters, antecedent and ongoing points of reference—bases of judgment—for citizens' interpretation of the words, principals, and images of the contest. Basically, five sets of situational factors were prime determinants of Dole's communication—the Presidential promotion strategy, the related activity of the incumbent, the content and consequences of the Democrats' struggle, the McGovern message, and the large Nixon lead in public opinion polls.
Due to the Republicans' status as a minority party and their finding through survey research that Richard Nixon personally evoked no great enthusiasm among voters, Presidential strategists surmised that they could not successfully promote "Richard Nixon, the Republican." Hence, they had to promote "The President," through an appeal that could transcend party lines, inducing "Americans," not Republicans or Democrats, to visualize the incumbent as one-in-the-same with the best of the Presidency. Such a strategy could not be credibly implemented by a partisan vehicle such as the GOP, so the Committee to Re-Elect the President (CREP) was organized to plan and implement the re-election effort. Moreover, a President was too preoccupied "achieving" to play campaigner, especially since appearing with Republican candidates would resurrect "Richard Nixon, Anti-Democrat," and detract from the building of a Presidential image. Consequently, a group of thirty-five surrogates was fielded by CREP to speak for the President. And, though the CREP, surrogates, and "Democrats for the President" would aim at ticket-splitters, Independents, and Democrats, Republicans could not be ignored for, however contaminating as partisans, they composed Nixon's base electoral strength. So, the President, Campaign Manager John Mitchell, and Dole
"discussed" and decided upon the RNC mission: "to hold the Republicans in 1972."

Lending legitimacy to the promotion-of-the-President strategy were the most visible activities of the incumbent. Motivated by politics or the public interest, Nixon undertook in late 1971 and 1972 several sharp news-making actions in China, Russia, Vietnam, and the domestic economy. Whatever their substantive value or detriment, they were memorable indices for voters and referable evidence for use by Dole of the actions of a doing President.

During about the same time frame, the publicly visible "equivalents" to the Democrats were intra-party conflicts and a string of primary campaigns in which the bevy of Presidential candidates built a public record, later highlighted by the GOP, of criticizing one another. In contrast to the nearly automatic Nixon nomination, McGovern experienced a grueling, weakening contest, due in large measure to the profuse number of competitors, and to the fact that McGovern derived his early support from non-traditional power bases of the Democratic Party. In addition, the well-reported frustrating search for a replacement for Thomas Eagleton, who resigned as the Vice Presidential nominee due to a sensationally discovered health history, steeped that ticket in negative publicity.
for days. The Nixon and Dole strategists perceived these 1972 Democratic happenings as vulnerable for exploitation. The Democratic primary also furnished raw material for attacks on McGovern and the programs he had specified in detail for his primary campaign constituencies.

But, George McGovern also articulated a message with frequency and fervor. Nixon, not "The President," was the perpetual militarist who could not bring peace, who gave social and human needs low priority, and governed for the privileged power brokers, not for the people's needs. Even worse, Nixon and Company personified corruption and government by deceit-and-deed as Watergate, the ITT affair, and campaign "tricks" evidenced. Probably to his detriment, McGovern also often responded to the White House attacks, attempting to reassert his maligned credibility and to defend his candidacy. In response to both McGovern thrusts, the White House accentuated its attacks on the nominee, through Agnew, Dole, Connally, and the surrogates. And, throughout the campaign, Nixon led McGovern in polls, with a 28 per cent to 34 per cent margin. But the Nixon lead had vanished in 1960 and almost totally eroded by Election Day, 1968. Probably as a result of such a history, Presidential strategists collected and concentrated all Republican campaign resources in the 1972 race for the top-of-the-ticket.
Such situational factors affected Dole, his messages, and his audiences. The RNC assigned mission suggested a narrower audience target for him: GOP partisans rather than voters-at-large. And these Republicans developed an intensely felt predisposition which affected their perception of Dole communication. They and their organizations had been left out by and overshadowed by the Presidential, not Party, focus at the national level. Further, these receivers and the news media realized that the decision-making action was at the White House and CREP, not RNC. Dole's stature and news value so suffered. In fact, the Chairman went from a principal Presidential spokesman to one among many, as the surrogate program of thirty-five communicators began operation.

Since many of these voices droned similar themes, they posed another challenge for Dole to emerge and be heard. But, the surrogates generally stressed more specific programmatic topics as they rebutted McGovern or adorned Nixon. Seemingly, then, the situation called for Dole to assume a more general, more partisan stance. The situation also suggested an apparently inconsistent set of themes for Dole. As the Republican National Chairman, talk to Republicans and praise the President, but tie him not to our Party. Damn the Democratic nominee, but do not offend Democrats who could "cross-over." Even though the
incumbent's actions and perceived McGovern vulnerabilities offered ready message referents for his use, some of these variables placed Dole in the role of responding to news questions such as, "Senator Dole, were the Watergate burglars connected with the GOP?" or, "As Republican National Chairman, can you tell us why the President is not campaigning for other Republicans?" It was perhaps this last question Dole often asked of himself and campaign principals as Nixon's lead remained wide and party subordinates' requests for help grew.

The Communication Group

If the RNC organization had a limited part in making the decisions of the 1972 Republican national campaign, it did have an extensive role in implementing some of them. In fact to carry out its mission, to "hold the Republicans," the RNC operated an organizational field force to identify, register, and organize Presidential supporters; various divisions to appeal to special interest groups; a Communications Division for media relations, and materials production; a Research Division; and the Dole communications group—the prime vehicle for developing and disseminating RNC mass communication in the 1972 campaign.

Responsive to the rhetorical context each member perceived, the Dole group—composed of the Chairman; his sole speechwriter, Michael Baroody; his scheduler, Michael
Scanlon; and the RNC Deputy National Chairman, Thomas Wilck--defined and implemented the Dole rhetorical objectives. Thus, to a significant degree, the Chairman's rhetoric was a function of each of these men. Bob Dole came to the chairmanship as a comparative novice in national mass communication, but as a Republican who had risen in his party through the more traditional route of party service, and successive political victories in his home state, Kansas. A GOP bastion, Kansas had voted overwhelmingly through the years for Republicans, and boasted a constituency of primarily white, middle-class, middle-income, Protestant voters with few of the urban problems that required federal intervention. A product of such a state, Dole represented its political values and manifested rather conservative political predispositions consonant with most in his party. And, because Bob Dole had traveled the elective route, winning elections at every level of government until he reached the Senate, he had considerable political credibility for Republicans, especially in contrast to most of the White House and CREP staffers who had never run for office, much less spent decades going to party meetings.

Described as an effective, poised, penetrating speaker and independent, candid personality, Dole had been on the national scene only a few years when he attained the
chairmanship through his rhetorical advocacy of Richard Nixon, a President he admired and a man with whom Dole shared political approaches and philosophies. In contrast, what George McGovern represented was repugnant to the Chairman and, as a campaigner, Dole would find it philosophically comfortable to attack the nominee's stance. But the Chairman, who had functioned as lone spokesman for the President and had risen through his personal initiative, would find it difficult to respect the White House-CREP personnel "who had never even run for office, much less won!" The Chairman worked with only one speechwriter, one scheduler, and the Deputy National Chairman for Communication.

Baroody, with little experience in politics and none in campaigning or in communications, joined the RNC shortly before Dole did, coming with a year's experience on a Congressional committee staff and several years' Navy service. Baroody, who did not view himself as a speechwriter, wrote with an accurate picture of "Dole's thinking in mind" on issues and emphases. Though he had no prior acquaintance with the Senator, he had several discussions with Dole about his views and what an "ideal" GOP should stand for. Daily contact between the speaker and ghost, plus Dole's editing of Baroody's drafts, refined the writer's conception of what the Chairman sought to
articulate. The ghostwriter was a content compromiser, integrating Dole's preferences, Wilck's suggestions with his own ideas and with other inputs in authoring speeches. He showed great concern for the content of what was said, but to a large extent governed his message emphases with estimates of what would "play" the best in the national media.

On the other hand, scheduler Scanlon was totally oriented to "news play," was enamored with the power of the media, and with the lure of campaigns. His predominant personal concern was "appearance" in major media markets. Evidencing some disdain for White House-CREP personnel, Scanlon seemed wholly oriented to Dole's personal fortunes and how to structure speech occasions to garner the most print space and broadcast minutes. With scheduling and "advance" experience in three campaigns and professional broadcast training, Scanlon, though young, did indeed keep Dole "on the move," consistent with the Chairman's preferences. For example, if time planned for a Dole appearance had to be shortened, it was the speech that "got cut so we wouldn't miss the press conference."

In comparison, Wilck, while sincerely responsive to Dole, filled a role for the White House-CREP at the RNC. He served at RNC at White House invitation to help assure that RNC communications carried out the "policy decision"
that the RNC resources would be "far and away for the President." Though Wilck was a conveyor of themes from the White House-CREP to Baroody, in practice, he did not participate in actual writing. His attention was more on his first love: the mechanics of servicing the media, and his specialty was infusing quality into the production of the wide variety of written-photo materials that the RNC distributed. He was the in-residence professional communication technician representing the CREP, with most of his attention focused on Richard Nixon, not on the whole party. But that emphasis was not surprising. For Wilck's background was not in politics, not in Republican Party service, but was in public relations firms, where the client is always king.

Together the group members conceived and carried out a rather extensive mass political communication program. Yet, of these four, only one was a political professional, Bob Dole. And, of the four, only one had professional background as a mass communicator, Tom Wilck. As individuals and as a group, they "read" their political environment similarly and agreed on fairly consonant communication objectives.

**Inputs and Influences**

In fact, each identified a clear and remarkably similar set of variables as highly influential in their
formulation and implementation of communication objectives. And, with few exceptions, Baroody, Dole, Wilck, and Scanlon attributed generally the same degree of influence to each factor.

One highly important influence was rationale and substance of the over-all Presidential strategy. All had a clear understanding of, but reluctant appreciation for, the strategic non-partisan appeal of "The President" and the consequent partisan mission of the RNC.

A second factor was the group members' common perception of McGovern's "vulnerable" image. Dole and Baroody thought he was "way out," "a one-issue guy," "inept," and "indecisive." Wilck featured him as "vacillating," "naive," and "inconsistent." Scanlon felt he "lacked the capacity for leadership." The group cited McGovern's "inconsistencies," "absurd proposals," "credibility-damaging actions," the "low-road" tenor of his campaign, his campaign organization troubles, and Democrats' criticism of McGovern, as obvious illustrations and reinforcing of their negative conception. The communicators stereotyped McGovern early, saw that image repeatedly underscored in their eyes, and seemed highly motivated to remind the public of his "weaknesses." Seen as the ideal of "vulnerability," McGovern was a "natural" for criticism, a "must" for emphasis, they felt.
This common predisposition was catalyzed by the input of the White House strategy group, composed of Charles Colson, Patrick Buchanan, Kenneth Clawson of the White House, and Al Abrams and Edward Failor of CREP. They were the tacticians of the attack, deriving their power from the President who, as Dole said, "called the shots" in such a national campaign through his White House staff. Their general input to the objective-formation was "take the offensive totally and completely." And once weekly during the campaign, this White House group, through Wilck, sent Baroody a page or two of written content recommended for inclusion in Dole speeches. Communication between the Dole group and White House strategy group was frequent and at the initiative of each group. Colson and Dole talked often by phone. Wilck attended the weekly strategy group sessions in the White House. Baroody contacted Abrams and Failor frequently so he "could get a feel" of what each was saying or doing. But, all this contact seemingly was insufficient for planning Dole's national televised appearances. Before each he would converse with Mitchell or MacGregor about possible on-the-air responses and emphases that were appropriate for such national forums. The message from the White House was always the same: attack McGovern. This exclusive emphasis, Dole said, was an "all-consuming, all-involving motivation on their part to undermine
McGovern" rhetorically. "They had a strange mentality of attack," according to the Chairman, and suffered from "overkill." The White House group was a strong, but not totally controlling, force in the formulation and application of Dole communication objectives.

In addition, the specific input of the RNC Research Division was also identified as a potent influence. Its personnel had researched all past McGovern public statements, actions, votes, proposals et al. and summarized them in a "McGovern Notebook," which was updated once weekly throughout 1972. Through the Research staffers' selection and organization of McGovern data, they greatly influenced the configuration of the attack on McGovern, since the Dole group, the White House, and CREP used this notebook as the central source of public information about the nominee. Concurrently, the researchers assembled a Nixon notebook, "documenting" Nixon achievements over his first four years in a "Promise v. Performance" format. The communicators utilized this invention source also, but it did not seem as prominent an influence as did the McGovern material.

But the conduct of the Nixon Presidency, per se, did impact greatly on the communicators. Not only did he supply referents for praise, they claimed, but all felt since his goal was to be the world peace-maker, Nixon's efforts in this area were appropriate for speech emphasis.
The communicators similarly identified "news values" as a major determinant in conceiving the objectives, style and emphasis of Dole rhetoric. All felt "making news" with one's message was the only path to the mass audience. As Dole said, "Half the reason for doing a speech was generating press coverage." The Chairman appeared acutely conscious of what reporters thought of him, and attributed to them considerable omnipotence. Scanlon, Baroody, and Wilck were most conscious of how newsmen defined news, decided prominence of certain kinds of content, and ascribed credibility to Dole.

Dole was also mightily attuned to the large Nixon lead, and the inference on his part that victory for the President was certain. Hence, he would admonish partisans to use the probable landslide as an opportunity to build the GOP into a majority party by working for all candidates and by discarding demands for internal ideological purity. Baroody and Wilck were in sympathy with the goal, but both emphasized the difficulty of establishing a GOP identity separate from the active incumbent. And, since Wilck was more influenced by need to give exclusive priority to the Presidential strategy, he really gave only "lip service" to Dole's preference in this sphere.

The group members' images of their GOP audience were also a significant influence. Dole thought these
Republicans felt ignored and overshadowed by the top-of-the-ticket and were concerned (more than the norm) about their local-state tickets. Baroody concurred with his mentor, but a more salient image of the ghost portrayed the partisans as viscerally evaluating Nixon actions on the policy front and as needing details from Dole to rationalize Presidential behavior, to themselves and to explain it to others. The need was for "informational ammunition."

Wilck felt the partisans were blase, complacent, inattentive, and required "grabby style, memorable quotes" to penetrate.

No RNC members, GOP candidates, leaders at any level in the party, other personalities or factors were mentioned as influences. One exception was the personal Dole constituency in Kansas, an influence on targeting objectives, but not especially on message objectives.

In concluding this section, one must necessarily compare the elements of the rhetorical context with those factors that the communicators perceived as influencing objective-message definition in order to assess what situational variables, if any, were overlooked by these four respondents. Two seemed glaring.

First, the situation seemed to call for Dole to fulfill to some degree more of a rebuttal role against Democratic charges. But, Dole communicators claimed, the
defense amounted to simply a stronger offensive, to keep McGovern's weaknesses, not his opposition's, in the campaign forefront. And, of course, the sought implication was that Democratic charges were simply so invalid they merited no attention.

Second, how did "Watergate" influence them? Dole said he brought up the question of "how to handle it" at an early White House meeting and the definitely cold response he received convinced him the issue should be rhetorically ignored, per implied White House wishes. The reasoning was simply: on the defense, one's emphasis and subject matter were his weakness; on the attack, the focus was on the opposition's vulnerabilities.

It is essential, however, to emphasize that no one factor or single influence was wholly determinant of Dole rhetorical emphasis and goals. "Influences" on the communicators were a function of each of these factors as they interacted. Dissonance among the factors was minimal, images of each corresponded, and the priorities each communicator assigned to each factor were relatively similar. Based on these influences and inputs, the Dole group formulated objectives to guide their campaign.

**Communications Objectives and Means**

As early as May 1972, the four communicators discussed Dole communication objectives for the campaign, and
during this period the general outlines of their intentions evolved. But it was not until shortly after McGovern's nomination that the four met to explicitly decide on their over-all rhetorical objectives, which guided the Dole effort throughout the campaign. Daily conversations between Dole and Baroody, weekly discussions between Wilck and Baroody, and occasional contact between Scanlon and Baroody refined and specified implementation of the objectives, as the contest progressed. However, it was clear that Baroody alone, responsive to Dole feedback, was the final interpreter and implementer of objectives on a day-to-day basis.

The communication objectives designed to guide all Dole rhetoric were: (a) to solidify, motivate, and activate Republicans to campaign and vote for the entire GOP ticket, (b) to build a refined national identity for the Republican Party and strengthen its membership, and (c) to contribute to the President's campaign goals by criticizing McGovern's alleged: indecisiveness, inconsistency, radicalism, and incompetence; and by praising the President's alleged: leadership, program positions, and achievements, especially in foreign policy.

A target and message strategy were also defined to achieve these objectives. The message strategy called for stressing three basic themes in each Dole communication. First, McGovern was to be portrayed as an indecisive person,
a potentially incompetent President, an extreme ideologue whose vacillating and naive approaches were at wide variance with those of most citizens. He was either confused or expedient, or both. Second, Richard Nixon was to be featured as a competent President, who had wise middle-of-the-road directions firmly in mind, and whose effectiveness demonstrated why all Americans should join in electing him for a deserved second term. Third, 1972 was an opportune year for Republican Party members to: unite behind their entire ticket, forget intra-party ideological disputes, "open the door," and campaign actively for all candidates to build a majority party.

This basic message was to be aimed nationally at Republicans and to a considerably lesser extent, Independents, ticket-splitters, disaffected Democrats. All communicators identified newsmen as the audience which was key to national media diffusion of their message, and as essential to full achievement of the group's basic objectives. The forums used for coverage were GOP group organizations predominantly in metropolitan media markets in states with large electoral votes.

The researcher formed the impression that at the time of decision-making, Dole took the leadership role, with Baroody and Scanlon in broad agreement with him. Though "agreeing" with the defined objectives, Wilck conceptualized
priorities differently in some cases. All did designate the same principal target: Republicans. And all agreed on the necessary content of the McGovern attack and Nixon promotion objectives.

Baroody and Scanlon identified with Dole's preference, that the party theme should be an indispensable part of the basic message. Wilck, however, felt there should be little concentration on building any new or refined party image. Their role was for the President to attack McGovern, he stressed. Besides, such a dominant President would overshadow any Dole moves to build a "separate" identity for the party. This latter comment had been voiced also by Baroody.

Some disagreement on emphases prevailed. All but Wilck assigned equal emphasis and importance to each of the three message themes. Again, Wilck saw the McGovern attack as most important to stress. And, while Baroody "agreed" with Dole on the emphasis question, recall that he had said that only the McGovern attack generated the coveted news play.

With the objectives defined, the communication group used four means to implement them: the speech or statement delivered before primarily Republican organization audiences, the news release distributed to most national and some local news media, the press conference, and appearances
on the network news interview shows. The speech was the principal vehicle for message distribution, and for each of the speeches Dole delivered, a covering news release was distributed. Additionally, Dole held a press conference before each speech to comment on its contents and to answer questions from newsmen. During the campaign, consistent with the target objectives, Dole made sixty-six major speeches, with corresponding press conferences, appearing in nineteen separate states.

Scanlon tried to "break into" the national news interview programs with some success, inasmuch as Dole appeared on CBS's *Face the Nation* once during the campaign, on ABC's *Issues and Answers* once, and was a guest on the *TODAY* show three times. All in the communication group agreed that every press conference called drew "several" local newsmen and frequently, they claimed, representatives of the national media—the networks, news magazines, the large metro dailies—covered Dole on his speaking tours. All means of communication were verbal; no non-verbal "pseudo-events" were utilized.

Development of each message was a function of two phases, a weekly planning process that generated general themes to be used in the upcoming week's speeches, and a daily process in which each speech was composed. Generally,
The planning process occurred about once weekly upon receipt by Baroody from Scanlon of the Chairman's speaking schedule. Baroody, usually by phone, would go over it with Dole, explaining for each event the nature of the audience, the likely formality of the occasion, the probable presence or absence of particular newsmen and party personalities. While this step was originated to elicit speech ideas from Dole, it usually amounted only to an orientation for him. Baroody would then try to "conjure up" ideas on the basis of the RNC Research updates, Nixon materials, the ongoing rhetorical situation, impending events, etc. Then he would meet with Wilck who, in turn, supplied the White House-recommended anti-McGovern themes timed for use in the coming week. Both would discuss these themes and finalize which ones or combinations they would use in the upcoming messages. If Baroody still "felt wanting" for ideas at that point, he would talk with CREP counterparts "to get a feel" of what other campaign principals were doing or saying.

With the anti-McGovern themes so defined, Baroody would survey research summaries, news events, past or impending Presidential actions, and other aspects of the situation, and author a first draft, which was sent
directly to Dole. Dole usually edited one to three speeches at a time, primarily "softening" anti-McGovern language, adding illustration, and further specifying points in the margins and in long-hand on extra sheets. Baroody would then rewrite the draft, incorporating the Chairman's additions. The ghost then wrote the lead of the news release covering the speech. The day before the speech, Dole and Baroody would again briefly talk about the next day's address and release and, at times, Dole would verbally "edit." Baroody at that time would send the final speech and release to Communications, which would distribute them to over 200 news drops and to the Dole traveling party.

Thus, Baroody, in frequent communication with Dole and other campaign elements, was the prime author of each speech, but the Chairman was the final decision-maker on the content and language of each speech. Moreover, the speechwriter was steeped in Dole's approaches, interests, policy preferences, and was aware not only of the over-all objectives, but of Dole's prescriptions and proscriptions. The researcher drew the distinct conclusion that the process was an integrating one, and that each speech was a compromise product composed of content emphases from Dole, the White House group, GOP research on Nixon and McGovern, plus Baroody's own ideas, his reaction to the ongoing political situation, and his estimate of the expected news play of
different content. More than an approximater of what only Dole wanted to say, the speechwriter's role seemed to be part-synthesizer, part-creator, and part-editor. He worked as a surveyor of ideas and reactions, and as an information-gatherer. With data and appeals assembled, Baroody alone conceived the shape and organization of each speech, adding his own modes of expression. Dole's development role included being a broad outliner, an editor of language style, and a final decision-maker regarding content emphasis. Together, the Senator and ghost worked as the collaborators. No one else checked or cleared content. And, the process connoted a closed system. No one outside the RNC Communication group or CREP was ever consulted. No "old pros" of the party, much less RNC members, were sought for advice or suggestions.

Moreover, it was a process evolved or structured to facilitate the input of the White House anti-McGovern themes. Note, too, that it was the McGovern attack themes which Baroody designated as the "news" lead, illustrating that in terms of mass diffusion, Wilck and the White House were "there" at a crucial point in the process, but Baroody and Dole were still final gate-keepers. But, the "gate was often open."
In summary, the Dole message was a catalogue of invective attacking the McGovern candidacy. Nearly two-thirds of all Dole themes attacked McGovern, only a fifth praised Nixon, and only 4 per cent dealt in any way with the GOP as such. About a tenth of all themes referred to the Democratic Party.

Of all themes about McGovern, about a third damned his campaign, a fourth asserted he was unfit for Presidential leadership, and approximately another third chastized or ridiculed his position on issues. Many of the personal criticisms attacked his credibility, another fifth branded him as a radical. On his foreign issue attacks, much criticism centered around the charge that McGovern policies threatened our defense and basic national security. A predominant domestic topic was the nominee's $1,000 and subsequent welfare proposals.

Without any doubt, the message carried out the McGovern message objective. Dole's rhetoric was overwhelming in its acerbic castigation of McGovern. He was allegedly incompetent, indecisive, expedient, radical, vacillating, unknowing, offering absurd programs that could never work. He didn't understand America, its problems, much less how to govern. The Dole rhetoric did violate its own prohibition on alienating Democrats; and failed to
criticize McGovern on any of these major issues: busing, education, health, housing, hunger, unemployment, environment, civil rights, or senior citizens.

In contrast, no Nixon themes referred to his campaign. A third of the Nixon themes built Nixon as a Presidential person, a third praised his domestic achievements and stands, a third promoted his foreign pluses. Of all the personal Nixon themes, about a third boasted his credibility traits and another third touted his leadership qualities. Revenue-sharing, crime-stopping, and economy-improving were salient domestic achievements. Internationally, Nixon emphases concerned his role as peacemaker, his China and Russia trips, and his efforts to conclude the Vietnam War. Again, such an emphasis—peacemaking—offensively built Nixon strength on a topic where McGovern had begun—urging peace—his criticism of two incumbent Presidents.

But the Nixon portrayal was in more general terms than was that of McGovern. The image was less sharp, less detailed. And Nixon's "achievements" and performance on fiscal responsibility, consumer affairs, drugs, education, environment, health, space, transportation, welfare, or civil rights never appeared in the Dole messages, though all did in RNC research (invention) summaries.
While the content of the message applied the Presidential praise message objective, emphasis did not to any great extent. Several anti-McGovern paragraphs appeared in every Dole speech, but only about one-fourth of them had significant Nixon references.

The GOP objective fared even worse in the message. Only 4 per cent of all Dole themes dealt with the Republican Party. In fact, 11 per cent referred to Democratic themes. The message about the GOP built no new or refined image. It offered no invitation to non-Republicans to join the Party, and beyond the call to-work-and-win, articulated no substance for the GOP or what it represented. Really, in the message, the GOP appeared as an amorphous entity, only as a vehicle for organizing a majority tally on election days.

Analysis of the news releases yielded the same emphases as the message, but to a greater extreme. None of the release leads referred to the GOP per se, though 12 per cent attacked the Democratic Party or its personalities (other than nominees), while a whopping 80 per cent of the leads attacked exclusively the McGovern candidacy. The Nixon promotion was the subject of only 5 per cent of the leads.

In sum, only the McGovern attack objective was fully implemented. A distinct minority of all themes and
speeches applied the Presidential promotion objective and the Party objective and barely operationalized, though Dole claimed much of the Party message objective found implementation in his standard delivery ad libs. The partisan responses tended to confirm this assertion. However, as news releases showed, the news and mass audience received an emphasis that was almost exclusively McGovern. And, over time, the essence of the message changed little.

Stylistically, the basic technique was contrast. McGovern was contrasted (1) with himself—e.g., two alleged inconsistent positions or actions on the same issue, or his alleged promise versus his alleged inconsistent performance—(2) with Nixon—e.g., on leadership traits—and (3) with "the norm" in government or politics.

In a sense, a simple linking phenomenon was used in which McGovern was associated with negative traits, through repetition of declarative statements about every aspect of his candidacy—his campaign, his personal qualities, his issue stands, his proposals. The message technique was almost a classical conditioning process in which McGovern was paired over and over with "devil" concepts, with the hope that "McGovern" would evoke "indecisiveness," "radical," "incompetent," etc., and the stigma already attached to them. Then, alleged McGovern behaviors were cited to reinforce the bonds.
Concurrently, a process of dissociation emerged. Receivers were constantly reminded that George McGovern was the polar opposite of what "most Americans" sought in a President, and in policies. As Dole said, "I tried to put a gulf between McGovern and the Democratic Party." And, Baroody asserted, "We tried to contrast the men in terms of their stands on the issues."

Communication Consequences

In an attempt to judge the consequences of Dole's communication, the researcher focused on four sets of indices. One such source was a sample of twenty-eight members of the Republican National Committee, who provided the partisan perspective. They represented a principal target audience of Dole, and had viewed many such political communicators over the years. Moreover, they served in key positions in each state party hierarchy and, thus, were in all probability partisan opinion-leaders. They judged Dole as extremely effective as a communicator who served as the lone champion of the national GOP in a year when most public attention was dominated by their President, who strategically dissociated himself and significant campaign resources from his own party. The Chairman, then, was seen by partisans as the "animating" voice for a party-wide work-and-win appeal. Partisans strongly identified with Dole due to his political credibility, his status, like
theirs, out of Presidential favor, and the techniques, mostly humor, he used to remind his listeners of his independence from and irreverence for the White House and CREP staffs. His motivating technique, built upon his identification, was to urge repudiation of what McGovern represented, and implicitly to urge partisans to show what they could do on their own, as was he, their Chairman, without the help of the White House, lest they lose their organizational lifeblood at home. "Effect" here was a function of the interaction of the source, message, and audience predispositions, predispositions that related to the situation, not necessarily to political philosophy or ideology. Dole's rhetoric, though, did not go beyond a call to victory. No identity or equivalents of the Republican Party were articulated.

The researcher would conclude, then, that Dole's principal communication effect was on such partisans, and depended to a great extent on how much communication these kinds of listeners stimulated through interpersonal channels after hearing Dole in the immediate audience. This conclusion is based on the fact that analysis of elected, yet major, media showed that Dole had little actual "presence" in the news channels, visibility that was essential if his rhetoric was to even be available for the mass-level news consumer, Republican or otherwise.
The broadcast and print newsmen interviewed provided insight into why the Chairman was not a newsworthy figure. These newsmen were valuable sources because they, with varying degrees of proximity, covered Dole, and all had had considerable exposure to many comparable national political communicators. In addition, they supplied perspective of those who, in large part, governed the nature and extent of the mass diffusion of Dole's rhetoric. In assessing the Chairman, these newsmen found him personally engaging, respected him, and judged him an entertaining speaker. They pointed out, however, that the redundancy and thus predictability of his message precluded its news value. In addition, the Chairman was dominated by the candidates who took priority in coverage and, moreover, the Dole voice was seen as no spokesman for the Presidential center of power. And they identified a stereotype of their own—a National Party Chairman was one who deified his own and damned the opposition only. Thus, his rhetoric was, at the onset, suspect and devoid of credibility for most Americans for these reasons; they did not cover him frequently, as the results of the media analysis confirmed. The newsmen followed and accurately perceived Dole's message (unlike half the partisans who assimilated it) but they decided not to cover it. In effect, they precluded mass diffusion of his message.
In evaluating his own effort, Dole recognized that his own coverage was not the best and concluded that he had little effect on the outcome of the Presidential race in which, he felt, McGovern had always been the decided loser. He surmised that he had accomplished the most for Republican partisans at the state and local levels, raising money and *esprit de corps*, motivating a ticket-wide party work effort, and seeming concerned about their plights. Dole estimated his campaign had been a "plus" in his Kansas constituency inasmuch as he had heightened his visibility as "chief Republican" in a GOP-dominated state. Over-all, he felt his most substantial campaign achievement was the positive response he obtained to his call for disposing of ideologically based intra-party disputes.

In some contrast, Baroody concluded they had been most effective at sharpening the voters' contrast of Nixon and McGovern. He also felt Dole had been an adroit communicator and empathizer, and should share no blame for Republicans' failure to match the Presidential victory at lower levels. Scanlon's analysis was also positive in alleging that Dole had served as the visible embodiment of the GOP, energizing partisans, effectively "putting down" key Democrats in national television encounters, and earning scores of Party "IOU's" that would aid in Dole's quest for national office. He agreed with Dole and Wilck
that Nixon would have won "in any event," though Wilck stressed that his personal rhetorical efforts had been "far-and-away" for the President.

Indeed, Dole and his staff performed many communication roles in the 1972 campaign, and their study holds significant implications for communication theory.

**Conclusions**

As Republican National Chairman, Robert Dole served largely as a stimulator of interpersonal party communication, a motivator to activate partisan campaign activity, an event-maker for state-local GOP organizations, a mitigator for the lack of Presidential campaigning, an information-supplier for many of his audiences, a promoter of his personal political career, and as a ritual reinforcer for the national party organization.

It was evident through the newsmen's evaluations and the analysis of sample media that Dole reached few receivers through the mass media because his message rarely entered their channels. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that his primary effect was on receivers who heard him in person, or heard about his rhetoric through such an audience member. And, since Dole's audiences, by design, were composed of nearly all Republican partisans at GOP organization forums, those who heard and carried his message (or the meaning they perceived in it) most likely
were Republican Party activists. And the means for communication among these activists and other partisans were probably present to a great extent. The campaign period would offer more chances for partisans' interaction as they participated together in more meetings, workshops, and other GOP organizational-social efforts. Additionally, previously established communications patterns endured among the faithful from past Party and campaign endeavors. So the opportunities for increased interpersonal and group communication were existent, and Dole's rhetoric seemingly was a stimulant in activating that communication.

The situational predispositions of the Republicans in 1972, the identifying, motivating nature of their Chairman's communication, and the absence of any other visible national party leader all pointed to this role of activating and stimulating intra-party communication. Such a role was implicit in the Dole group objective and in the audience image Dole and Baroody acted upon. To say Dole's principal impact was primarily achieved through interpersonal channels is not meant to minimize his impact. It can be justifiably assumed, if the findings of diffusion and influence studies are valid, that activists in an organization such as a political party are likely to be rather profuse and frequent communicators themselves, within the social and organizational spheres of which they are members. Members of
Dole's immediate audience, then, could well have re­
transmitted Dole's "message" frequently, catalyzing similar
"source" behavior in others to whom they talked.

Further, the intensity of the partisans' positive
evaluation of Dole, the newsmen's observations, and the
nature of the Dole rhetoric lead to the conclusion that he
did, indeed, enthuse partisans and motivate them to
actively campaign. Associating McGovern with symbols
repugnant to Republicans, Dole built a "devil" that evoked
in these partisans a will to repudiate. The message had
its impact in subverting and undermining the entire McGovern
candidacy, making him "consubstantial with Satanic attri-
butes," arousing the audiences to anger. In Cronkhite's
terms, the object concept (McGovern specifics) was paired
with a motivational concept (traits, positions already
established as anathema to Republicans). The nominee was
contrasted to the "accepted" norms of politics and ideology.
Concurrently, the Chairman motivated by warning of the dire
consequences (local losses) of a failure to work, and by an
appeal to the partisan pride of the party loyalists to show
that they could win without the help of the White House or
its associates.

No doubt the Chairman also fueled the partisans with
rhetorical ammunition for use in their attacks on the
nominee. And, to the limited extent that his message
reached the non-Republican, through the media or through interpersonal communication initiated by a partisan, Dole's message probably added an increment of reinforcement to the negative image of McGovern that was being built by other Nixon sources. Since the Nixon emphases were far less prevalent and less specific, it is unlikely that the Dole source supplied the faithful with any usable informational specifics for promoting "their" President. Further, the Nixon content could not "rationalize" the President's actions for the dubious, because this rhetoric did not explain or illuminate. It only accused, labeled and asserted, with few, if any, attempts at supporting such generalizations. Basically, the information supplied was negative and, essentially, the source was a conveyor of damning cliches.

In fact, this study adds evidence to the contention that the level of rhetoric in the U.S. is sinking lower. If one followed Nilsen's call to examine what image of man this rhetoric raised, he would be disappointed. The listener in this case seemed to be viewed as a Stimulus-Response organism who, if exposed to the stimuli long enough, will emit the sought response.

But, both the Chairman and his message did provide state and local Republican organizations and slated tickets with a multitude of productive events. Dole's speeches
served as vehicles to attract ticket sales for GOP coffers and to attract news (inasmuch as he was a national political figure) for these more local Republican candidates and officials. The presence of a Bob Dole helped assemble audiences and brought out newsmen to cover an "outside" personality "from Washington." Local and state figures could stand beside him at the press conferences and be photographed with him at the speaker's table for added publicity. Moreover, personal association with or proximity to the National Chairman confers prestige, reward, and psychological satisfaction (as Cotter and Hennessey allege) for the avid partisan worker and leader. Chairman Dole, in this case, was the center around which Republican loyalists built such events--Party events which are key to raising needed funds, building esprit de corps, exposing local-state candidates, and exciting the people who carry the Party cause. In a sense, such events can offer one of the most real, visible means of meeting the party workers' need to "belong," to participate, and can help strengthen the party bond to a member.

It was through these events and others that Dole also fulfilled a mitigating role. He was a mitigating influence for the incumbent's failure to function as leader of his party in the electorate. The Chairman was the symbolic evidence in 1972 that the national party system in
which loyalists repose confidence and from which they derive satisfaction actually was operating. He personified through his rhetoric that the national GOP was "alive," and provided legitimacy of its functioning. As such a personal focus, Dole helped state and local GOP principals vent frustrations, and did carry their message--pleas for Presidential campaign resources--to national campaign leaders. With Dole's implicit urging, the GOP faithful could view themselves more as the "in-group" and view the White House-CREP personnel as the "out-group"--due to their political inexperience. The Chairman could not fully substitute for the President, but he could mitigate the effects of his absence in the GOP campaign effort. In the long run, this role benefited not only the President, but also Bob Dole.

Over-all, Dole's campaigning boosted his career as a Republican officeholder and national leader. As the chief "Party man," Dole had championed the "Party people" and their candidates when few other national GOP leaders had done so. He raised considerable funds for scores of state organizations and boosted party events, and his means for identifying with loyalists were not only effective, but memorable. He was seen by Republicans as loyal to his party and independence before he was loyal to "superiors." And, his travels placed him on a first-name basis with GOP powers in most all states. Consequently, it is likely that
Dole built a considerable reservoir of good will and political "IOU's" among many Republicans, for he fulfilled a number of their needs in the campaign.

Moreover, he became known to national newsmen as an independent source of wit, candor, and color. And, if being out of the White House inner circle was an asset in identifying with the party faithful in the campaign, it became a greater asset in the following months, for Dole never was connected with any stigma of "Watergate" or associated incidents. There seems no doubt that his campaign roles increased his exposure and built his stature among those upon whom he is dependent for further national office. But the implications of the Dole rhetoric have greater meaning in relation to the national party organization. In fact, as this dissertation has unfolded, so has considerable support for the working hypotheses presented in Chapter I regarding the over-all objectives, targets, and McGovern, Nixon, and Party message strategies. However, the party question requires special emphasis, for the Dole rhetoric built no new or refined identity for the Republican Party. Though Dole sought to do so, his rhetoric did not, due to the process in which content was developed, the message itself, and newsmen's and partisans' dismissal of the theme.
First, because of the nature of the planning and writing process, the McGovern objective dominated others. This dominance resulted in large part from the availability of McGovern attack material, the common predisposition to expose McGovern's vulnerabilities, and the strong, consistent White House pressure to impose the attack, and its perceived news value in sources' eyes.

Moreover, newsmen totally ignored the Dole call to forget ideological differences. It was part of the expected ritual message of a party chairman. And, it was never in the news releases, only "ad-libbed," usually by Dole. Even Dole's immediate audiences--the GOP faithful--saw next to nothing about the GOP per se in the Dole message beyond an occasional call to join ranks to win. And this, for them too, was expected ritual.

Indeed, the message content did not articulate any but the most bland general equivalents to the Republican Party. It was identified with no programs, proposals, or ideology; in fact, with no personalities! The Dole rhetoric largely identified, in broad terms, what Republicans were against, rather than trying to articulate what they were all for. What the Party was, what it represented, what it could become, was never touched upon. "Winning"—meaning defeating Democrats, repudiating McGovern's ideas and associates,
and showing electoral prowess and self-sufficiency—were the only espoused goals in Dole's rhetorical essence.

Hence, it seems apparent that the Dole rhetoric fit the stereotype of national party communication that the newsmen described, rhetoric that predominantly damned the opposition and, to a lesser extent, deified one's own leaders. Nothing more. For the national party, this ritualistic communication seems hard to escape for two reasons. Such rhetoric is internally and externally pragmatic and effective. Second, it is "self-reinforcing" rhetoric. A national party, as Marz points out, is ideologically diverse. Its leaders often disagree. So, a national chairman of all the party cannot base his appeals, it is contended, on specific programs or ideological stances, or he will voice opinion of only (a) segments of his heterogeneous membership. Thus, finding common substance within the party is difficult. So a spokesman looks outside the party for a common enemy around which he can build identification and strengthen member bonds with the "Party."

Concentrating on the opposition also has the advantage of placing maximum public focus on "their" weaknesses and vulnerabilities, not those of one's own party. The "issue" of the campaign can be their incompetence, poor record, and so forth. Also, it would seem that the problems
of the Seventies are so complex and their "solutions" so sophisticated that emphasizing programmatic issues would sustain little mass attention and elicit even less fervor. Besides, personality contrasts, conflicting charges, not issue complexities, are the stuff of the media and the keys to entering these channels. Hence, the party chairman practices ritualistic rhetoric, reinforcing the stereotype of party communication and the vicious circle it activates.

Since newsmen give little attention to party chairmen, apparently because they "do the expected"—damn and deify—the partisan leader seems to reach few in the electorate-at-large. So he turns to, or is assigned to speak to, "his own" in the party, reinforcing their hates and beliefs. Their response reinforces his expectations of what gratifies them, so he persists in the ritual and further builds the partisan stigma around him and his rhetoric. Then, newsmen see their stereotype reinforced and . . . .

The results of this communication circle are significant. The effect, as in this case, is that a party chairman's reach is confined to his partisans and those they talk to, who are probably much like themselves, probably Republicans. Little expansion of membership is enhanced. Similarly, one must question what the national "Republican Party" will mean if its rhetoric boosts an
image that is empty. Granted, dominant personalities of a party, historical associations with its label, and with its past issue stands, all provide residues of meaning for each party in an individual's thinking. But, if the media focus on candidates as individuals continues; if the trend toward ticket-splitting continues; if the number of "Independents" grow in the electorate, party rhetoric seems to hold little potential for countering a possible over-all trend: diminishing voter use of the party as a reference group in political decision-making.  

Furthermore, if national parties continue to articulate no identity, how can they continue to remain a substantive symbolic entity linking voters, slated candidates, labels, and governing approaches? Literally, what meaning will "the GOP" evoke as a national party? Will it become meaningless? Without sustained articulation of purpose, identity, approach, over-all image, what will be equivalent to its label in voters' minds? 

The value of continuing research (based perhaps on the roles, questions, and reasoning in the preceding discussion) aimed at building a theory of political party mass communication is indicated here. The findings of this study, for example, are consistent with the attempt of Marz in this endeavor. He concluded that such communication is self-directed, opposition-oriented, aimed at creating a
party identity and strengthened worker commitment. He hypothesizes, too, that heterogeneous membership is behind the stress on the other party. And, some of Cotter and Hennessey's observations were confirmed. Dole's major functions as Chairman were "communication and integration of party activity." Dole was, in part, "a front man for attack and counter-attack," and was "the partisan's partisan," who tried "to keep and increase the enthusiasm of the true believers." But, their claim that a chairman attempts to be "an image-maker," without being a policy-maker, was not valid in the Dole case. Dole was an image-maker for McGovern, to a lesser extent for Nixon, but not for the GOP, and did try to set policy.

Yet, the Dole case does suggest a new role for a national party organization. The 1972 RNC was shown to be a well-organized supplier of communications materials and services. Perhaps the party organization of the future will play that role to a greater extent. As costs of campaigning, media, production, and opinion sampling rise, especially on an individual basis, the party organization could assemble and dispense campaign services and expertise to its slated candidates. The organization would thus become a potent campaign force; its role would grow, not diminish.
It is clear, then, that Robert Dole, the 1972 Republican National Chairman, supported by an active, productive RNC organization, played several significant communication roles in the 1972 campaign. He was a stimulator of interpersonal party communication, a motivator of partisan campaign activity, an event-maker for state-local GOP organizations, a mitigator for the lack of Presidential campaigning, an information-supplier, a promoter of his own career, and a reinforcer of the ritualistic rhetoric of national parties.

Further Theoretical Implications

This study illustrates the value of a multi-disciplinary approach to communication research. The fields of political communication, like others, are not easily confined to merely "communication theory" or "rhetoric and public address" or "broadcasting." Increasingly, a combination of approaches, not one narrow approach, is necessary to unravel communication phenomena. Moreover, "effect" cannot be productively viewed as being the same for each sub-audience of a communication. Certain sub-groups in an audience may well make different responses to the same content, a point, for instance, that Fotheringham proposes.\(^\text{13}\)

In fact, this study adds further evidence to the validity of the theory of selective perception.\(^\text{14}\) Different
sets of receivers each imputed different meanings here to the same basic content. The importance of looking at the interaction of the source, message, and operative receiver predispositions was underscored by this research. And, certain predispositions, as was shown in this case, can be activated by elements of the rhetorical context. Even if the context is political, the predispositions operating in receivers are not necessarily related to ideological or political beliefs.

The rhetorical situation, thus, should be examined not only for what it suggests to the communicator, but for what predispositions it activates in certain receivers. As the communicator is analyzed, the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic credibility is important to explicate also, as was highlighted by findings in this dissertation. What a communicator is before his message can have as much or more significance as his message content.

Moreover, the role of the formal speech was underscored as a means to activate interpersonal communication, influence opinion-leaders, and create news coverage of one's message. The immediate audience at such an occasion was seen in a new role—as legitimizing a speech as a bona fide news event. The audience in many instances served as part of the source's "cast."
This research added further evidence, too, to the contention that a communicator and the content he conceives are affected by their envisioned audiences. The questions to ask are: what audiences are salient? how are they perceived by the communicator? and what needs does he attach to each? This dissertation illustrated, furthermore, that communicators can readily identify whom they perceive to be significant influences on content development. Certainly more study of encoders is called for as the politician seems to see these newsmen as controllers of mass diffusion, and "news play" almost as an end in itself. Too often only editors have been the subject of such inquiry. The reporter is just as much of a gate-keeper and governor of news selections.

Moreover, this dissertation showed that ghostwriting is not necessarily a deceitful practice in which the principal communicator has no influence or control over content. The speaker and ghost shared beliefs, objectives, and "ground rules." They spoke daily and cross-edited each other's work, while the principal was the final decision-maker. Interestingly, as ghostwriting becomes more of a group effort, such groups could be studied as open or closed systems of communication affected in process and output by their internal degree of balance. Why do they work as they do? To what influences are they open?
How do variations in these influences change content?

In fact, the results of the content analysis of this dissertation may serve as a fertile beginning to conceptualizing more generally about the content of political party campaign messages. For example, the induced categories in this inquiry point to more abstract ways of categorizing and, thus, analyzing political communication, as is noted below. Perhaps, it could be contended that these themes are indeed the major recurrent ones of the American political campaign experience:

**Opposition Candidate**

**Unfit for what office demands:**
- Intemperate
- Incompetent
- Indecisive
- Inconsistent
- Inexperienced
- Unknowledgeable
- Naive

**Deserts ideals for self-gain:**
- Expedient
- Opportunistic
- Hypocritical
- Cynical

**Unreflective of, out-of-tune with people's (constituents') values**

**Associated with Devil figures:**
- Lawbreakers
- Militant radicals
- The unethical
Opposition Issue Stands

Professes concern, yet takes no action;
Associated with devil stands:
   Weakness
   Abandonment
   Surrender
   Illegality

Not well-conceived plans

At variance with what Americans want:
   Extreme
   Way-out

Threaten basics of security:
   Cut defense
   Tax salary
   Take away personal freedoms
   Reduce forces of order

Increase level of uncertainty in life

Opposition Party

Abuse position-power
Members place personal interests ahead of people's welfare
Lethargic, ineffective problem-solvers
Seek more power over individual
Responsible for all past difficulty, problems
Do not resonate with great majority of Americans

Opposition Campaign

Unethical
Inflammatory
Smears, villifies
Obscures real issues
Void of substance/programs
Deceptive portrayal
Replete with devil figures
Insults voter

Own Candidate

Personifies qualities office demands:
   Imaginative
   Courageous
   Determined
   Progressive
   Responsible
Intelligent
Trustable
Successful

Can achieve for America:
Productive problem-solver
Knows what needs to be done—how to do it

Understands constituents:
Needs
Interests
Values

One with god-like American values:
Prosperity
Equality
Security

Own Candidate's Issue Stands
Will increase security
Will improve lot in life, quality of life
Will benefit all segments of America
Will raise level of certainty of life
Give more power, freedom to individual
Boost government efficiency

Own Party
Represents best of America
Seeks victory
Stands for achievement for people
Linked with great hero figures
Governs best
Needed by America

Own Campaign
Replete with problem-solutions
Edifies voters, illuminates issues
Issue, not personality oriented
Ethical, high-toned
Does not descend to opposition's tactics

Such a schema could be used for analyzing future or past campaign content and, with further refining, could yield more explanatory abstractions.
In closing, the researcher would call for more studies of similar leading national political communicators. Many of these men make decisions that govern our lives, and voters judge and select these individuals, in large part, according to what they seem to say. Yet, insight into the communication of most national politicians and officeholders still seems fragmentary. Access to study such figures is difficult, and completing inquiry on their rhetoric is a challenge, but the significance of their communication is great. If we are to further understand the rhetoric, how it was and is conceived and why and with what effect, rhetorical scholars must fill the informational voids. Indeed, if they do not, the motivations of national political communicators may remain largely unknown, their "effects" will be interpreted by only a few commentators, and the communication roles they serve in seeking and holding office will remain vapidous.
Notes

1 Citations are not included in the Summary section inasmuch as all sources and references mentioned therein have been repeatedly footnoted in previous chapters.


9 Marz, pp. 702-703.

10 Cotter and Hennessey, pp. 68-73.

11 Cotter and Hennessey, pp. 68-73.

12 Cotter and Hennessey, pp. 68-73.


APPENDIX A

INTERVIEWS--BY GROUP
INTERVIEWS--BY GROUP

Dole Communication Group


Other RNC Personnel


White House Staff

Patrick Buchanan, Special Consultant to the President, Executive Office Building, Washington, D.C., September 6, 1973.

Herbert Klein, Director of Communications for Executive Branch, conversation, National Association of Broadcasters, Washington, D.C., June 19, 1973.

Newsmen


Al Polscynski, Political Editor, Wichita Eagle and Beacon, April 4, 1973.

Partisans

(State listed by each name indicates interviewee's home state he/she represents on Republican National Committee.)

Mary Boatwright, Connecticut, June 11, 1973
James Boyce, Louisiana, June 18, 1973
Keith Bulen, Indiana, July 25, 1973
Bruce H. Crane, Massachusetts, June 1, 1973
M. S. Ginn, Missouri, July 26, 1973
John Haugh, Arizona, July 5, 1973
R. L. Hermann, Nebraska, July 1, 1973
Margaret Hill, Indiana, July 3, 1973
Clifford Jones, Pennsylvania, June 15, 1973
W. M. Laub, Nevada, July 6, 1973
David Little, Idaho, June 4, 1973
Boyd McDill, Kansas, June 27, 1973
Dorothy McHugh, New York, June 27, 1973
William McLaughlin, Michigan, July 20, 1973
Edward Mills, California, June 26, 1973
Ms. Collis Moore, Oregon, July 3, 1973
John F. Nagle, Missouri, June 11, 1973
Katherine F. Neuberger, New Jersey, May 5, 1973
Cynthia Newman, Virginia, June 28, 1973
Thomas Potter, West Virginia, May 23, 1973
Jack Ranson, Kansas, July 3, 1973
Don Ross, Nebraska, March 22, 1973
Kent Shearer, Utah, June 28, 1973
Thomas Thomas, Florida, June 1, 1973
Leona Troxell, Arkansas, May 22, 1973
B. L. Vine, New York, May 31, 1973
APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW GUIDE
Interview Guide—Dole Group

1. Objectives

Sometimes in campaigns participants find it best to write messages on a day-by-day basis, as a campaign proceeds. In other instances, they set objectives for their communication at the beginning or even before the campaign and "work from" these goals with various degrees of flexibility as the campaign progresses.

Would either one of these descriptions characterize your operation? Which one?

Did you have deliberate objectives in mind, any planned goals to guide your endeavors?

Did you deliberately set goals for Dole's rhetoric? When? What were they?

A. Targets

Whom were you trying to reach? Why? How were Audience Targets defined? Could you describe them? What are they like? On what do you base your picture of each of these audiences? Did you or any of your colleagues have access to or see any research--polls, consultants' opinions, audience analysis data on them? Did anyone else at RNC?

Probe: Now you've mentioned ________. Any others? ________ What about ________? Were one or some of these audiences more important to reach than others? Why? Did you view some of these audiences as instrumental to reaching others?

B. Message Objectives

What were you trying to convey, to stress to these people? What themes were you trying to "get across"? Were there any "basic" messages?

Probe: About Nixon, McGovern, the GOP, the Democratic Party, other Republicans, other Democrats, certain issues or topics? Did you or your colleagues feel one or more of these themes were more (most) important to stress than others? Why?
C. The End Result

You have mentioned certain people or groups you tried to reach, and messages, themes you attempted to convey. What, on an over-all basis, were you trying to accomplish? That is, what "end result" were you trying to accomplish?

To insure I've read you correctly, let me state generally what you told me... Is there anything I've forgotten? What have we left out?

D. Objective Definition

You have discussed the fact you did work from definite objectives. How were these objectives defined? Set? Was there a general process?

Probe: Who was involved? Anyone else? Were there any specific conferences, meetings? When? Who participated? What was the time frame? Besides basic objectives, did any content prescriptions or proscriptions emerge? Were any decisions made on "musts" or "must-nots" for inclusion? Any instructions given? By whom? Was implementation--the "how-to-do-it"--discussed in specifics?

Other than the persons involved in these meetings and conferences, who else, if anyone, was directly involved in setting objectives?

2. Influences and Inputs

In defining and deciding on content objectives, targets, etc., no doubt a great deal of the group's conclusions were a result of your own ideas, your own thinking, as well as, perhaps, of ideas from other people, sources, events.

Now, as you thought about these speeches, statements, thought about what they should do... what they should convey, who or what came to mind as important to consider?

Who else or what else would you say influenced, contributed, or had an input in the formation of these objectives, themes, emphases, etc.?

What kind of influence or input did each of these people or factor(s) have on the formation of objectives?

Probe: What was the nature of the input influence? Was it suggestive or directive? Could you estimate (great to little) influence each had upon the objectives?
and their implementation? To what extent did each seem to be a major determinant of content?

3. The Means

Senator Dole made a considerable number of speeches during the campaign. Did you use these speeches as the principal means to convey your message, or were other vehicles, formats, etc., used?

Probe: Speech occasions; event occasion; press conference; statement, release; group discussion.

A. Formats

Why were different formats used? Which ones yielded the best results? What was the particular applicability or role of speechmaking?

B. Specific Techniques

Some sources employ specific techniques in speeches, attempt certain styles, certain means of phrasing, word choice, injection of local color, etc., to make their points especially clear, relevant, memorable, or effective. Other sources dismiss such technique as little help.

Would you say your communication employed such techniques or not? What were they?

If a listener were to label the style of a Dole speech as "unique," how would you react? Agree or disagree? Why?

Were there any characteristics of content or delivery of your messages that made them especially effective, unique, different from the "norm"?

C. Content

Now, if you were to look at the content of the Dole rhetoric over the campaign period, what would you say were its major recurring themes and emphases?

Probe: What specifically, if anything, did you try to link to McGovern, Nixon, etc.? Did you find you were talking more about candidates, per se, or more about issues?

Did your communications center more around issues, would you say, or around people?

Would you say your messages concentrated more on the national than on local topics? To what extent did
you attempt to include content or mention personalities of special interest to the local immediate audience?

Probe: How about mention of the local candidates? The local Party? Local issues? Did you find you were stressing some issues or topics more than others?

Probe: Social v. economic? Strive for any certain position?

Probe: Middle ground?

E. Scheduler—Means
Respond to invitations or generate own?
Any rationale for scheduling—goals?
Seek certain occasions, forums? Why?
Who involved in planning, deciding schedule?
Who made suggestions...final approval?
Who saw schedule before finalized? Had inputs?
Any general procedure for planning schedule and setting up events?
What part did Dole's Senatorial role play?

Scheduler—Means
Your role included what?
Who else involved in mechanics?
How often did you communicate with Dole, Wilck, Baroody, others? Nature? Content?
How often did you talk with Baroody and Wilck?
Coordinate schedules with during campaigns?
How much lead time did you give them?

(Wilck)
What else did you do? Basic responsibilities?

4. The Process
A. How:
Could you describe, basically, how the speeches and releases were written?
Did this process vary over time? By speech? Or, was it a fairly standardized procedure?
Who, basically, supplied the materials, resources for speeches?
Who was involved in writing drafts?
Who wrote the final drafts?
B. **Who:**

How was each of the following sources involved?
(Repeat list.)

How often did you communicate with each regarding
topics, content, emphasis of a speech?

How often did others you mentioned communicate with
Dole, or the speechwriter?

**Probe:** Nature of communication: suggestive, directive,
one-way? Who initiated it? In writing messages, how
conscious were you of this source (greatly, not at all)
(always, never)?

The influence of each on end product (great to
none)? Their suggestions accepted (any, all)?

5. **Patterns of Communication**

How often did you talk with others of the group as
the campaign progressed? About what?

6. **The Communicator-Ghost Relationship**

Did you and the Senator (speechwriter) ever talk
about your positions on issues, general philosophies?
Hopes for the campaign? The Party? When? How fre­
quently?

Before this, did you have any acquaintance with the
Senator, his positions, basic approaches, etc.? How did
you know what he wanted to say? To avoid?

During the campaign, how often did you talk with him
(daily, weekly)? Directly or through mediators?

Did he see, have input (on), edit every speech?
Did anyone else but you and he participate in the actual
writing and editing?

What decisions did you make? (1) topic, (2) approach,
(3) content, (4) lead-emphasis?

Generally, what proportion of a speech did you con­
tribute to? Did he? Did he generally specify themes?
General ideas? Rewrite? What?

Did any trends develop as to what kinds of content
Dole contributed? You contributed? Others contrib­
uted?

7. **The Releases**

Who decided on the content and emphasis of each
news release? Who received them? Who identified who
received the releases? Were the recipients the same
for each release? Did you feel some news targets were more important than others? Taking this speech, for example, could you reconstruct, generally, the process through which it was written?

How about for this one (minor partisan)?

8. Your Role

How would you look at your role as a speechwriter—an originator, editor, collator, coordinator, principal author, outliner, collaborator? Info-gatherer? Rephraser?

Who had to approve the final draft? Was there a specific routing for approval?

Did anyone else we haven't talked about ever write a Dole speech?

Did the Senator (you) ever write an entire speech without assistance?

9. Feedback

Did you ever have the time or opportunity to see or hear how certain Dole content, themes, etc. "played" in the media?

Which of these media did you look at frequently or with regularity?

Did you have any other guides or sources of feedback . . . any other ways, of finding out how a speech or release had "gone over"? What effect it had?

Probe: Dole; Dole aides; local on-site GOP partisans; on-site media; national media-names; personal contact with newsmen?

What kinds of feedback did each of sources you named provide?

Did you find that media in general or any certain medium consistently "played" and/or consistently ignored any certain emphasis or themes, kinds of content?

How did the feedback you described affect what was subsequently written in the speeches and releases?

10. Effect

A. Generally speaking, what effect did the Dole rhetoric have on the state and local GOP's?
Probe: Center of fund-raising
Motivator of effort
Reinforcing beliefs
Venting frustrations
Info-supplier for attacks on McGovern
Info-supplier for rationalizing Nixon
actions
Info-supplier for promoting Nixon
Add newsworthiness and prestige to locals
Initiator of diffusion
Booster of local ticket

B. On the National GOP?
Probe: Build or sharpen identity of RNC/GOP as above?

C. For Dole?
Probe: Kansas re-election
Future office
As RNC Chairman
National image: which was (Party, news
media, masses)

D. The News Media?
Probe: Personal image
Extent and nature of coverage
Instrumentality for communication goals

E. On National Candidates?
Probe: Nixon-Agnew
McGovern-Shriver

F. On Mass Audience?
Probe: GOP partisans
Undecideds-Independents-Ticket-splitters
Democratic partisans
Elucidation, attitudes, politics, apathy
"Bits and Pieces" exposure, or whole
picture

G. On Campaign Communication, Generally?
Probe: Practice of ghostwriting
Certain vehicles and formats
The place and value function of the speech
Issue articulation and explanation
Development of new techniques
Modus operandi
Speeches: ritual or ceremony or substan-
tive effect
11. **Over-All Effect**

Generally, then, do you feel the objectives were attained?

Was Dole effective? Why? If Dole was effective, why weren't there more party-wide victories up and down state tickets?

How did what Dole rhetoric achieved differ from the results of the:
--Presidential surrogates
--Campaign Manager MacGregor
--Jean Westwood, Democratic National Chairwoman

12. **Personal Background**

Political experience background
Government experience background
Communication experience background
General political affiliation-philosophy
Other personal background:
  education
  work experience
  geographical bases
  demographic data

What were other Republican National Chairman duties?
Trace scope-ingredients of activities at Republican National Committee.

What was Dole like as a person?
Questions/Probes for Partisans
and Newsmen

1. **Message**

   Thinking back to Dole's speaking during the 1972 campaign, what basic themes or general message, if any, do you remember him emphasizing?

   Probe: Could you be more specific? . . . Which one of these, if any, did he emphasize especially?

2. **Goals**

   What did Dole try to do in his 1972 campaign speaking? What was Dole trying to accomplish in his 1972 campaign speaking?

   Probe: Which ones were most important? How did his goals . . . what he tried to do in speaking differ from other campaign spokesmen? MacGregor? Agnew? Ziegler?

3. **Targets**

   Who do you feel were Dole's principal audience targets?

   Probe: Anyone else? Who particularly did he try to reach?

4. **Means**

   Generally, did Dole use any means or approaches in his speaking that made him especially effective or ineffective?

5. **Result**

   What was the result or effect of his campaign speaking? What was accomplished by his 1972 campaign speaking efforts?

   Probe: How did his speaking effort in 1972 relate to the fact that ticket-wide party victories were few? Build a Party ID?

6. **Rating**

   Generally, how would you rate Dole's over-all effectiveness as a political communicator in the 1972 campaign?

   ____ Best Ever  ____ Above Average  ____ Average
   ____ Below Average  ____ Worst Ever
APPENDIX C

MEDIA ANALYSIS
MEDIA ANALYSIS

NYT - New York Times, date indicated
Post - Washington Post, date indicated
Tribune - Chicago Tribune, date indicated
NBC - National Broadcasting Company Television Network

Results of print media analysis are listed first, followed by results of broadcast media analysis. First numeral is date of appearance in medium, followed by page number, if print medium.

August

29, NYT, p. 4: Dole hits McGovern hate drive against Nixon by comparing him to Hitler, etc. Calls for Fair Campaign Practices Committee investigation for . . . worst kind of character assassination and political slander.

31, Post, front page: Republicans mount counterattack on campaign fund-raising charges, accusing McGovern campaign of purposeful, intent to be less than totally honest in revealing true identity of contributors.

31, NYT, p. C25: Dole charges half-dozen violations (same).

September

4, U.S. News & World Report, p. 16: One-sentence mention, in mid-story on campaign of Nixon. "The RNC led by Senator Bob Dole, is to work with the Party organization around the country concentrating on GOP voter registration and a get-out-the-vote drive."


5, NYT, p. 38: Dole charges 7 new "serious" violations of law . . . . Asks Justice Department, "Are criminal charges appropriate?"

5, Tribune, p. 10: Dole charges 7 "serious" McGovern law violations. Asks if criminal charges are appropriate.
September (continued)

6, NYT, p. 33: Dole charges refuted by McGovern officials.

8, Post, p. A9: American Federation of Teachers denies Dole charge that it "paid off" McGovern [with campaign contribution in return for endorsement of their strike].

8, NYT, p. 22: Fact Dole appears with MacGregor et al. at series of NYC appearances. No remarks.

12, Post, pp. A1, 12: Meeting of Nixon campaign national, regional leaders in D.C. reported. Dole's comments, mid-article warn against overconfidence and apathy.

12, NYT, p. 32: Report of same meeting, with Dole commenting, mid-story, "very enthusiastic and well-attended meeting."

20, Post, p. A9: Picture, no comment, on Dole and Westwood signing Fair Campaign Practices pledge.

20, NYT, p. 20: Dole leads "signing" story with series of "Perhaps now . . . we will see an end to [McGovern's Hitler-Nixon comparisons, etc.]."

22, Post, p. 23: Dole says McGovern criticism undermining important wheat sales.

25, NYT, p. 42: Dole leads story on his "Issues and Answer" appearance with O'Brien, charging Democrats have failed to make a public-gripping issue of Watergate.

Newsweek, p. 30: Article on Nixon campaign featured picture, no quote, of Dole and others of "The Men from CREEP."

October

7, Post, front page: GAO cites McGovern campaign errors originally charged by Dole.

12, Post, p. 15: Story capsuling GOP comments on unveiled McGovern defense plan, including, mid-story, Dole's "a promise of surrender."


30, Post, p. 2: Wrap-up article on surrogates, includes Dole comments, mid-story, "McGovern offered the most irresponsible and dangerous proposals on foreign policy and national defense ever put forth by a candidate for this nation's highest office."

November

5, Post, p. 18: Dole charges that McGovern taken advantage of a tax loophole to shelter his income.

Broadcast Appearances

August

31, NBC TODAY Interview: 8 min. 7:42-7:56 a.m. Dole commented unfavorably on McGovern tax and welfare proposals.

31, NBC TODAY News: 1 min. 23 sec. Chairman accuses McGovern organization of hiding financial sources.

31, NBC NIGHTLY News: 1 min. 15 sec. Dole charges on Democratic campaign fund abuses.

September

15, NBC TODAY Interview: 11 min. 8:38-8:49. Dole appeared as a guest to discuss Watergate incident.

27, ABC ISSUES AND ANSWERS: 30 min. Appeared with O'Brien.

October

29, CBS FACE THE NATION: 30 min.

11, NBC TODAY News: Dole criticized McGovern's Vietnam proposals, noting "no new concepts except sending Shriver to Hanoi." "Nixon will win."
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