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The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1973
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WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR.: SPOKESMAN FOR CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN CONSERVATISM--A CLASSICAL-WEAVERIAN
RHETORICAL ANALYSIS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Floyd Ernest Merritt, B.A., A.M.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1973

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose and Methodology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Sources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THE CONSERVATIVE MIND AND TIMES</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Prosperous 20's and the Great Depression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt and the New Deal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hundred Days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Second New Deal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Supreme Court and the New Deal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rise of Contemporary American Conservatism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamental Conservative Tenents--The Liberal-Conservative Conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. RICHARD M. WEAVER: CONSERVATIVE RHETORICAL THEORIST--HIS HIERARCHY OF TOPICS</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weaver--The Nature and Function of Rhetoric</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical Proof--The Noble Lover</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logical Proof--The Hierarchy of Topics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argument From Genus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argument From Similitude</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argument From Testimony and Authority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critique of Weaver's Hierarchy of Topics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In his presidential address to the Speech Association of America Convention in Chicago in 1949, Dr. James McBurney chose to speak on the topic "The Plight of the Conservative in Public Discussion." Dean McBurney's address was subsequently published in the Quarterly Journal of Speech.\(^1\) In his address, drawing from his long experience as moderator of the Northwestern University Reviewing Stand, he lamented the scarcity of spokesmen able and willing to articulate the conservative point of view. He said further, "I have the temerity to argue that the conservatives in America have become inarticulate to a point where their voice does not do credit to their ideas and often does their cause a positive disservice."\(^2\)

While McBurney did admit some conservative bias and confessed that at times he found himself wanting to come to the aid of the conservative spokesmen, his concern in the address was professional. He argues the point that


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 164.
"discussion is the essence of the democratic process" and that whenever it is weakened, America is weakened. "A monolithic society is not conducive to vigorous discussion of public questions. We need differing points of view, and we need articulate spokesmen for those points of view." Thus, Dr. McBurney established a rationale for vigorous discussion of conflicting viewpoints in a democratic society in the tradition of Plato, John Stuart Mill, Zechariah Chafee, Justice Black, and classical rhetoric and dialectic.

In his classic work, the Rhetoric, Aristotle cited four "uses" of rhetoric and thereby established a rationale for its use and study, viz.: (1) by it truth and justice maintain their natural superiority; (2) it is suited to popular audiences since they cannot follow scientific demonstration; (3) it teaches us to see both sides of a case and to refute unfair arguments; and (4) it is a means of self-defense more natural to man than actual physical self-defense. In elaborating on the first of these "uses" of rhetoric, Aristotle says . . . "Rhetoric is valuable, first, because truth and justice are by nature more powerful than their opposites; so that, when decisions are not made as they should be, the speakers with the right on their side have only themselves to thank for the outcome. Their neglect of the art needs correction." While none of us would

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3 Ibid.
4 Lane Cooper, trans., The Rhetoric of Aristotle (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1932), i, i.
content that conservatives are right all of the time, even the most liberal of us would admit that they are right some of the time. But even if they were wrong all of the time, the democratic process would suffer from the absence of a well articulated conservative point of view. This argument has formed the rationale for a certain recent Supreme Court decision.5

In the years immediately following World War II, conservatism was in eclipse. There were few articulate conservatives of national reputation—Senator Taft being a notable exception. McBurney testified that it was most difficult to find capable spokesmen to represent conservative viewpoints on the Northwestern University Reviewing Stand. He further described the ineptness of those that they did succeed in getting to appear on the program.

As moderator of these discussions, I frequently find myself wanting to come to the aid of the conservative spokesmen. Often they are nervous and inarticulate. Especially is this true when their basic assumptions are challenged. They lack facility in verbal analysis and synthesis, in give and take argument, in rebuttal and refutation. More often than not they are no match for rhetorically seasoned liberals, with long experience on every kind of platform from a cracker barrel to a radio microphone. There are notable exceptions, but my description is faithful to the rule.6

5New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). "Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. . . ."

McBurney contends that the scarcity of articulate conservatives is not confined to radio programs alone, but that in the larger arena of discussion that goes on all over America "...we can witness the full measure of the rhetorical bankruptcy of the conservative."\(^7\)

Ironically, as McBurney was decrying the "rhetorical bankruptcy of conservatives," a young man, soon to become the acknowledged spokesman of American conservatism, was finishing his senior year at Yale. His conservative affinities and ability to articulate the conservative viewpoint were already apparent. He "exploded" on the national scene in 1951 with the publishing of his first book, God and Man at Yale, a scathing attack and exposé of liberal and socialist tendencies of faculty members in the teaching of religion, economics, and politics at his Alma Mater.\(^8\)

In 1955 Buckley founded National Review, the most widely circulated and best known conservative opinion magazine in the United States, which he continues to edit. In 1966 he began a weekly program "Firing Line," which is seen on 207 Public Broadcasting System stations. Since his first book, Buckley has been author or editor of thirteen books in addition to writing a thrice-weekly syndicated column, "On the Right," carried by 310 newspapers. He is in wide demand as a lecturer and spokesman for conservatism and has been

\(^7\)Ibid.

\(^8\)William F. Buckley, Jr., God and Man at Yale (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1951).
active in politics. He ran for mayor of New York City in 1966, participated in presidential campaigns, and contributed to his brother's successful New York Senatorial campaign.

Buckley's position as the chief spokesman for conservatism is almost unanimously acknowledged by his contemporaries. In the Introduction to *Up From Liberalism*, Senator Goldwater wrote, "The recent renewal of interest in conservative principles was brought about, as far as I can see, not by the older members of the American community, but the younger. . . . William Buckley acted as a leader of this movement."9 Russell Kirk in the Introduction to *Rumbles Left and Right* said, "A born debater, Mr. William F. Buckley, Jr. has made himself into a formidable knight-errant of twentieth-century politics and letters."10 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. refers to Buckley as "the scourge of American liberalism."11 A reviewer in the *New York Times* describes him as "the most readable and articulate spokesman for the right."12 Charles Lam Markmann, reviewing Buckley's latest book for the *Nation*, characterizes him as the "intellectual paladin" of American conservatism.13

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a recent article entitled "Bill Buckley: Blithe Spirit of the Right," noted, "Buckley defies convention with a winning sprightliness and downright swinging style. He is a waspish debater, a literate, stylish writer, and a personality who was oozing charisma when only people like himself knew what the word meant."\textsuperscript{14} John Leo wrote of him in the \textit{New York Times Magazine}: "Buckley is probably the nation's finest debater. He comes prepared for total war, with a startling array of oratorical weapons in his arsenal—charm, wit, verbal agility, a faultless sense of pace and timing, plus a mesmerizing voice. . . ."\textsuperscript{15} Levy and Young, general editors of the American Heritage Series, wrote in the Foreword to \textit{American Conservative Thought in the Twentieth Century} edited by William Buckley:

Mr. Buckley is the foremost expositor of rational, humanistic conservative thought in America today. He is a man for all conservative seasons: author, politician, TV star, popular lecturer, and editor-in-chief of the nation's leading journal of conservative opinion, \textit{National Review}. . . . Famed as a tough-minded adversary, an entertaining and brilliant conversationist, and a scintillating stylist, he is also an enormously learned and serious thinker.\textsuperscript{16}

Buckley's position as editor-in-chief of \textit{National Review}, moderator of the television program "Firing Line," nationally-syndicated newspaper columnist of "On the Right," challenger to Senator Goldwater as the most eagerly sought-after spokesman of conservatism, and reigning guru of the


conservative intelligentsia earn him the appellation of "Spokesman for American Conservatism." Most astute observers of American conservatism will concur in Reddy's appraisal of Buckley:

That this blight spirit of the right first burst upon the public scene only 20 years ago hardly seems possible. In the intervening two decades, he has stuck to his ideological guns with remarkable consistency, and established himself as the most eloquent, tireless, and entertaining voice of conservatism.\(^7\)

Since Dean McBurney's pronunciation of the "rhetorical bankruptcy of conservatism" and despite the Goldwater debacle of 1964, there has been a resurgence of conservatism in the United States. The phenomenon has been observed, analyzed, confirmed, or anathematized by a number of political analysts in books of recent vintage.\(^8\)


Further evidence of the resurgence of conservatism as a viable force in American politics may be adduced from the fact that Editors-in-Chief Robert M. Hutchins and Mortimer J. Adler featured a debate with Senators Goldwater and Javits as protagonists on the resolution "Does America's best hope for the future lie in political conservatism?" in the 1962 volume of The Great Ideas Today. The 1970 volume featured "The Idea of Revolution: A Symposium" choosing William F. Buckley, Jr. to represent the conservative viewpoint. And as previously cited, general editors Levy and Young of the Bobbs-Merrill American Heritage Series chose Buckley to be editor of American Conservative Thought in the Twentieth Century. In the Foreword to this volume the general editors write:

Belatedly we add to the American Heritage Series a volume that provides a new perspective by offering the best of American Conservative thought in the twentieth century, under the editorship of William F. Buckley, Jr.

To ignore, to be unmoved, or to be unprovoked by Mr. Buckley and his fellow conservatives within these covers

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is to risk the charge of being dead to ideas or, what is equally damning, so prejudiced that nothing can move or remove encrusted, ritualistic beliefs of whatever hue.\textsuperscript{21}

Clearly two facts may be posited—that conservatism is a dynamic force in American politics today and that William F. Buckley, Jr., is the acknowledged, unchallenged spokesman of contemporary American conservatism. While it is granted that much of Buckley's credentials as conservatism spokesman derive from his literary abilities, one must also acknowledge his platform skills as demonstrated by his wide popularity as a lecturer and debater and his performance on his TV program. Sufficient rationale, it would appear, is present to warrant a dissertation presenting a rhetorical analysis and criticism of his speaking.

\textbf{Purpose and Methodology}

In distinguishing between rhetorical criticism and literary criticism, Herbert Wichelns in his classic essay, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," says of rhetorical criticism:

\textit{... its point of view is patently single. It is not concerned with permanence, nor yet with beauty. It is concerned with effect. It regards a speech as a communication to a specific audience, and it holds its business to be the analysis and appreciation of the orator's method of imparting his ideas to his hearers.}\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{21}Buckley, \textit{American Conservative Thought in the Twentieth Century}, pp. x, xi.

Since Wicheln's 1925 essay a strong rationale has been developed for the practice of rhetorical criticism. The functions of rhetorical criticism have been enumerated and a modus operandi developed by some of our most mature and ablest didactics and practitioners of the art—stalwarts such as Hoyt Hudson, Everett Lee Hunt, W. Norwood Brigance, Donald Bryant, A. Craig Baird, Lester Thonssen, Wayland Parrish, Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Earnest Wrage, Albert J. Croft, Carroll Arnold, J. Jeffery Auer, Wilbert Howell, Karl Wallace, Edwin Black, et al. The rationale is predicated upon an understanding of the nature of rhetoric, a recognition of its vital role in society, and the benefits that accrue from rhetorical criticism: descriptive, proscriptive, prescriptive, and heuristic.

Aristotle's definition of rhetoric, "the faculty of observing in the particular case the available means of persuasion," is almost universally accepted as proscribing the nature of rhetoric. Bryant described rhetoric in an essay "Rhetoric: Its Function and Its Scope" in a way that is consonant with Aristotle's definition: "The art of rhetoric was the art of discovering arguments, adapting them, ordering them, expressing them in clear and proper words, and of using one's personal qualities to enhance the whole

\[23\] The Rhetoric of Aristotle, I, i.
rationale of persuasive discourse. Marie Hochmuth Nichols writes, "I use the term 'rhetoric' then, to apply to verbal activity primarily concerned with affecting persuasion. . . . Rhetoric operates in the area of the contingent, where choice is to be made among alternative courses of action." Edwin Black, in his text *Rhetorical Criticism*, traces the use of the term "rhetoric" from classical to modern times and found that only two major writers on rhetoric—Quintilian and Campbell—had used the term to denote any type other than persuasive discourse. Both of these rhetorical theorists—while passing on to posterity aberrant definitions of rhetoric—nevertheless emphasized in their works the persuasive nature of rhetoric. A search of modern textbooks on persuasion reveals that "persuasion" is used as a synonym for the classical term "rhetoric" and that modern authors of persuasion texts—Fotheringham, Cronkhite, Oliver, Brembeck and Howell, Minnick, Scheidel, etc.—consider themselves dealing with the same phenomenon that Aristotle dealt with in the *Rhetoric*. In considering then the nature of rhetoric and rhetorical criticism, we are led to accept Edwin Black's


conclusion that ". . . the subject matter of rhetorical criticism is persuasive discourse."27

The vital role of speech in our modern world, particularly in a society such as ours, is readily apparent to the enlightened citizen. The increase in population, modern technology, and increasing industrialization have increased and facilitated the opportunities, power, and prestige of speakers. One cannot understand and appreciate our present civilization or past history without taking cognizance of the "voices of history" as A. Craig Baird refers to them:

American history, economic, political, social and cultural, is studded with the speeches of men who have importantly influenced attitudes and events. . . . These speechmakers, in their legislative, forensic, religious, and other roles, have each loomed large in the total social perspective. They have been the "voices of history."

They have been the spokesmen for the moods and needs of the hour. . . . Any full account of the American scene must encompass the speaking careers and important utterances of these platform figures. To ignore or disparage them is to neglect a major constituent in the interpretative and evaluative process.

The cracker barrels, street corners, courtrooms, conference chambers, legislative halls, and lecture rostrums continue to have their virile talkers.28

Prerequisite to rhetorical criticism is the identifying of the rhetorical constituents. Persuasive speaking takes place in a social matrix--many elements contribute to its origin, its development, and its success or failure.

27 Ibid., p. 15.

These elements or constituents must be identified and analyzed in rhetorical criticism of speeches. Baird identifies the constituents of the rhetorical act as speaker, audience, the speech itself, and the occasion averring that "a given communicative act . . . is properly described as the interplay of these four factors."  

Marie Hochmuth Nichols compares the rhetorical situation to a multi-celled organism, admonishing us not to push the analogy too far, "... we may compare the speech with a multi-celled organism whose units consist of speaker, audience, place, purpose, time, and form. In order to evaluate the speech, all these elements, verbal and nonverbal, must be examined."  

Wichelns goes into some detail identifying the constituents of the rhetorical act which the critic must deal with:  

Rhetorical criticism is necessarily analytical. The scheme of a rhetorical study includes the element of the speaker's personality as a conditioning factor; it includes also the public character of the man—not what he was, but what he was thought to be. It requires a description of the speaker's audience, and of the leading ideas with which he plied his hearers—his topics, the motive to which he appealed, the nature of the proofs he offered. . . . Nor can rhetorical criticism omit the speaker's mode of expression and his manner of delivery from the platform. . . . "Style" . . . must receive attention. . . . Finally the effect of the discourse on its immediate hearers is not to be ignored, either in the testimony of witnesses, nor in the record of events.

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29 Ibid., p. 3.  
31 Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," p. 35.
The approach to rhetorical criticism suggested by these and others of the same school of criticism has been styled by Edwin Black as "neo-Aristotelian" because of its reliance on Aristotle's Rhetoric for its nomenclature and components. There are four parts to the scheme: (1) the classification of rhetorical discourse as forensic, deliberative, or epideictic; (2) the classification of "proofs" or "means of persuasion" into logical, pathetic, and ethical; (3) the assessment of discourse in the categories of invention, arrangement, delivery, and style; and (4) the evaluation of rhetorical discourse in terms of its effect on its immediate audience.\(^32\)

Rhetorical criticism serves a useful function. It is not merely descriptive, nor prescriptive, or even prescriptive—all of which are useful functions—but can be and often is heuristic as well. Thonssen and Baird cite four functions of rhetorical criticism: (1) to clarify and define the theoretical basis of public address; (2) to set up a standard of excellence; (3) to interpret the function of oral communication in society; and (4) to indicate the limits of present knowledge in the field of public speaking.\(^33\)

Croft suggests that "the standard forms of rhetorical criticism treat theory as a closed-fixed system" that "we have made rhetorical criticism a dead-end street."

\(^{32}\)Black, Rhetorical Criticism, p. 31.

Consequently, rhetorical criticism has come to be thought of by many in our field as sterile at best and onerous at worst. Croft believes that this has resulted from "a naive notion of the relationship between theory and criticism." He recommends the "creating of a dynamic interaction between theory and criticism." He avers, "...we must encourage creative theorizing as a part of criticism." In other words, rhetorical criticism should serve an heuristic function as well as those already enunciated by Thonssen and Baird.

While the approach taken in this dissertation will be generally the classical rhetorical analysis (neo-Aristotelian—as per Black), it will deviate in its analysis of "proofs" focusing mostly on logical proofs or logos and analyzing these in terms of Richard Weaver's "Hierarchy of topics." This decision is made, not because the author questions the viability of the classical approach or the validity of its categories, but because he feels the Weaver approach more productive and facilitating in analyzing the conservative rhetoric of Buckley. Further, Weaver's theory of rhetoric and rhetorical criticism has not been used as


the primary basis for analysis in any thesis or dissertation as far as this investigator is able to determine. Yet he is regarded by many competent judges in our field as having postulated rhetorical theory well worthy of our consideration. Croft writes:

For a long time now much of the really interesting literature on rhetoric has been written by scholars outside the field of Speech. Examples of what I call creative theorizing and criticism can be found in Kenneth Burke's *Rhetoric of Motives*, Richard M. Weaver's *Ethics of Rhetoric*, or in the works of I. A. Richards.\(^{36}\)

Ralph T. Eubanks, Virgil L. Baker, Richard J. Johannesen, and others view Weaver as "a brilliant rhetorical theorist."\(^{37}\) and assert that "his view of rhetoric and rhetorical criticism certainly provides provocative insights,"\(^{38}\) and that "as a rhetorical theorist Weaver deserves further intensive consideration and examination."\(^{39}\) Maurice Natanson, a Professor of Philosophy and Edward P. S. Corbett, Professor of English, have also expressed high esteem for Weaver as a rhetorical theorist. While Burke and Richards have received much attention as rhetorical theorists beginning with the

\(^{36}\) Croft, "The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism," p. 111.


\(^{39}\) *ibid.*
work of Marie Hochmuth Nichols and their theories used in a number of theses and dissertations, Weaver has not received comparable attention and his rhetorical theory has not been sufficiently synthesized and applied.

In *The Ethics of Rhetoric*, Weaver suggests something relative to the nature of liberal and conservative argument that is of more than passing interest to this investigator. He discusses three types of argument: (1) argument from definition (i.e. genus or the nature of things); (2) argument from similitude (i.e. analogy or the invoking of essential correspondences); and (3) argument from circumstances (i.e. reading the "facts standing around" and accepting them as coercive). Weaver avers that "the argument from circumstance is the argument philosophically appropriate to the liberal" and, conversely, that argument from definition is philosophically appropriate to the conservative. However, Weaver finds that Lincoln consistently argued from definition while Edmund Burke, just as consistently, argued from circumstance. This presents a paradox since Burke is generally

40 Weaver, *The Ethics of Rhetoric*, pp. 55-114. Note: Weaver's "Hierarchy of Topics" developed more fully in other books and articles actually involves five kinds of argument: (1) argument from definition or genus; (2) argument from similitude; (3) argument from cause and effect, including argument from consequences; (4) argument from circumstances. These four modes of argument are classified as "internal" sources. The fifth kind of argument is argument from authority or testimony and is classified as an "external topic" of argument.

regarded as the "Father of Conservatism" while Lincoln "has become a patron for liberals and pragmatists." Weaver suggests that "a man's method of argument is a truer index to his beliefs than his explicit profession of principles."

Another consideration that makes a Weaverian analysis of Buckley's arguments particularly appropriate is the personal influence that Weaver exerted on the contemporary conservative movement in general and on Buckley in particular. Weaver authored six books and forty major articles in addition to scores of reviews. Practically all of these books and articles expounded a conservative point of view and explicated a philosophy and theory of rhetoric that is consistent with that view. Weaver was active in the contemporary conservative movement and is credited by men such as Frank S. Meyer, editor of Modern Age, as giving it great impetus, perhaps even being its originator: "... the publication of Ideas Have Consequences can well be considered the fons et origo of the contemporary American conservative movement."

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42 Rossiter, Conservatism in America, p. 16.
"Burke's Reflection on the Revolution in France (1790) is rightly considered the first and greatest statement of consciously conservative principles."

43 Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 56.

44 Ibid., p. 58.

He further writes "The Ethics of Rhetoric is probably the most acute discussion of rhetorical problems written in the twentieth century." 46

Weaver, who was a member of the English faculty at the University of Chicago for two decades prior to his death in 1963 at the age of fifty-three, was listed in National Review as a contributor from its founding until his death. He was associate editor of Modern Age at the time of his death, having been on the editorial board from its founding. He wrote numerous articles for both publications. He spoke at colleges and universities in behalf of Young Americans for Freedom, the national organization for conservative college students begun by William Buckley, and organized chapters on many campuses. In 1963 he was the recipient of a national award from YAF. He frequently lectured on the subject "How to Argue the Conservative Cause" (perhaps he had read McBurney's article lamenting "the rhetorical bankruptcy of conservatives" and was trying to remedy the situation).

Through my research, including a personal interview with Buckley, I discovered that Weaver had considerable influence on Buckley as well as on other leaders of the conservative movement such as Wilmoore Kendall, Frank S. Meyer, Russell Kirk, and others. It is evident that his influence on Buckley in particular, and the conservative movement in general, was considerable and well worth analyzing. When Weaver

46 Ibid., p. 244.
died suddenly and prematurely of a heart attack at the age of fifty-three, Buckley wrote in the National Review:

We stagger under the news of the untimely, inexplicable death of our friend, colleague, and mentor, Richard Weaver, professor of English at the University of Chicago. His old friend, Russell Kirk, writes the obituary, which will tell you something about this remarkable man, and the great pain his death means for all who knew him, and read and pondered his great works.47

In the obituary articles that Buckley referred to entitled "Richard Weaver, RIP," Kirk in the course of the eulogy wrote:

Dr. Weaver wrote slowly, though with power; so he will live only through two books— Ideas Have Consequences (1948) and The Ethics of Rhetoric (1953)— textbook in composition, and some pamphlets and periodical pieces. But these works made their mark in this land. Ideas Have Consequences, a dissection of modern nominalism in America—and surely the first to find a wide and devoted audience. The Ethics of Rhetoric, which proves how men's words both reflect and form their actions, reminded the academy that the Word still may be either holy or diabolic.48

Almost no one is satisfied with the contemporary state of rhetorical theory. Whether one takes "a conservative view of a progressive rhetoric;" views rhetoric, "whether conservative or progressive;" moves "toward a contemporary Aristotelian theory of rhetoric;" or "toward a new rhetoric;" or accepts something "in lieu of a new rhetoric;" the fact is that "all of the Indians are restless."


48 Ibid., p. 308.
In his recent book, *Contemporary Theories of Rhetoric: Selected Readings*, Johannesen treats the rhetorical theory of Richard Weaver along with that of Kenneth Burke, I. A. Richards, Chaim Perelman, Stephen Toulmin, and Marshall McLuhan as a "survey of the pluralism and ferment that characterize contemporary rhetorical theorizing." Contemporary political events—the current presidential campaign, the continuing Vietnam War debate, the economic situation and how best to deal with inflation and unemployment, concentration of power in the federal government, the President's trip to China, etc.—have brought into sharp focus liberal and conservative rhetoric. Perhaps the study of the rhetorical theory of a man like Weaver and the rhetorical practice of a man like Buckley can help us explore the nature and bases of conservative rhetoric. For instance, when Buckley returned from China and immediately blasted the President in a speech in New Hampshire in behalf of the candidacy of the conservative Ashbrook for making the trip to China and "selling out the Nationalist Chinese to the Peking murderers," was he arguing from definition and were those who approved of the President's actions in going to China arguing from circumstances?

The major task of this treatise, beyond the conventional requirements of a rhetorical analysis, will be to make


50 Ibid., p. 1.
a Weaverian analysis of Buckley's arguments. A secondary purpose is to determine if there does exist an essential difference in the nature of liberal and conservative argument—if they are based on different philosophies, different premises, different views of the world—and are these differences revealed in the structure, nature, and source of the arguments. A third objective will be to trace the influence of Richard Weaver on William Buckley's rhetorical mode, arguments, and style. It is instructive to note that these three goals are well within the scope of the classical analysis since they involve identifying the topoi or loci of Buckley's (and possibly conservative) arguments.51

Organization

The dissertation chapters and their content will be as follows:

Chapter I Introduction
Chapter II The Conservative Mind and Times
Chapter III Richard M. Weaver: Conservative Rhetorical Theorist—His Influence on Buckley
Chapter IV Buckley—The Epitome of the Conservative Ethos
Chapter V The Buckley Logic—A Weaverian Analysis
Chapter VI God, Devil, and Charismatic Terms in the Lexicon of William F. Buckley, Jr.
Chapter VII Summary and Conclusions

Chapter I is concerned with the purpose, rationale, and methodology of the study. The purpose is to analyze and evaluate William Buckley's speaking utilizing the classical rhetorical instruments as modified and refined by Richard Weaver. The justification for the study is based on the premise that conservatism is a dynamic and significant force in America today and that Buckley is one of the prime movers of that force.

Chapter II deals with the historical context of Buckley's speaking. It identifies and assesses the properties, attributes, and exigencies that encouraged and produced contemporary American conservative inclinations and rhetoric. The years from 1930-72 were selected as an adequate time frame for the historical context of the study.

Chapter III presents a biographical sketch of Richard M. Weaver and synthesizes his rhetorical theory. The critical apparatus for the study are developed and explicated in this chapter. Weaver's "hierarchy of topics" is used to analyze Buckley's arguments and his concept of the nature of rhetoric and his ethical standards required of the rhetorician are used in analyzing Buckley's speaking and assessing his ethos.

Chapter IV, entitled "Buckley--The Epitome of the Conservative Ethos," views Buckley through the classical and modern concepts of ethos. The molding influence of
family, home environment, education, religion, and professional experiences are examined and evaluated. Buckley's attitudes and motivations are closely examined to determine whether he lives up to Weaver's "noble lover" concept of the rhetorician.

Chapter V—"The Buckley Logic—A Weaverian Analysis"—deviates most from the classical rhetorical analysis. It makes an analysis and assessment of Buckley's arguments using Weaver's "hierarchy of topics" to locate the source of his arguments, judge their strength, and to determine whether Buckley is a true conservative in the Weaverian sense.

In Chapter VI, "God, Devil, and Charismatic Terms in the Lexicon of William F. Buckley, Jr.," four of Buckley's speeches are analyzed for the use and prevalence of Weaver's ultimate terms in contemporary rhetoric. Further analysis and evaluation of Buckley's use of pathetic appeals using Weaverian criteria is made.

Chapter VII summarizes the study, draws conclusions, and recommends areas for further research and investigation.

Research Sources

Research materials on Weaver were numerous and reasonably accessible. A complete bibliography of "The Published Writings of Richard M. Weaver" by Paul Varnell published in The Southern Tradition at Bay proved most

helpful in researching Weaver's writings both on rhetoric and conservatism. The bibliography, including reprints and book reviews, numbers 126 items including 37 National Review articles. A copy of Weaver's unpublished lecture "How to Argue the Conservative Cause" was made available to this writer by Richard L. Johannesen, one of the foremost authorities on Weaver. Excluding book reviews, Weaver authored six books and about forty major articles. All of these books and many of the articles were perused to synthesize Weaver's rhetorical theories and critical apparatus. Particularly useful in this synthesizing process was the explicatory and interpretive work on Weaver by Richard L. Johannesen, Rennard Strickland, and Ralph T. Eubanks. Resource materials on William Buckley also proved numerous and readily accessible. The thirteen books which Buckley has authored or edited were examined for Buckley's political ideology and views on rhetoric. Numerous "On the Right" columns were scrutinized and "Firing Line" programs viewed for pertinent data. Friendly and unfriendly, laudatory and critical articles and book reviews on Buckley which abounded in the newspapers, popular and opinion magazines, and journals were also studied.

The writer was granted a personal interview with Buckley in his NYC National Review office. This recorded

53 Johannesen, Strickland, and Eubanks, Language is Sermonic.

54William F. Buckley, Jr., interview held in New York City, May 30, 1972, Appendix A. (Hereinafter referred to as Appendix A.)
interview was most helpful in garnering information on Buckley's concepts and views of rhetoric and ideological matters. Buckley's speech to the graduating class at the University of Virginia was taped by the writer and analyzed.55 Other speeches were obtained in manuscript and taped form and used in the analysis.

Buckley also made available a privately published volume written in tribute to his father and intended only for members of the family and close personal friends. This volume, which was entitled, WFB, An Appreciation, was especially helpful in providing personal information about the Buckley family.56 Mrs. Babcock of Catherine Babcock, Inc., Buckley's agent who schedules his speeches on the lecture circuit, was interviewed by phone and correspondence for pertinent information.57 Since there was no scarcity of resource data, the investigator's biggest problem was in familiarizing himself with the mass of materials and extracting and using the most relevant and useful ideas.

Summary

In summary, this study purports to analyze the speaking of William F. Buckley, Jr., editor of the National Review, host of the weekly TV program, "Firing Line,"

55William F. Buckley, Jr., Commencement Address, University of Virginia, June 4, 1972, Appendix D. (Hereinafter referred to as Appendix D).


57Correspondence with Mrs. Catherine Babcock, Appendix B. (Hereinafter referred to as Appendix B).
syndicated columnist of "On the Right," and leading spokesman for contemporary American conservatism. Critical instruments for the study are developed from classical rhetorical sources and the writings of Richard M. Weaver. Research materials for the study are gathered from speeches, newspapers, book reviews, TV programs, interviews, and sources of rhetorical criticism. The plan of the study is to examine the Setting, the Man, and the Speaker. The study is unique in that it involves both the leading contemporary American conservative rhetorical theorist and practitioner.
CHAPTER II

THE CONSERVATIVE MIND AND TIMES

It is the consensus of rhetorical theorists that any rhetorical or persuasive effort must be appraised within the confines of its social matrix. The classical constructs of analysis of the audience and occasion imply such, Kenneth Burke's concept of "scene," Bitzer's concept of "the rhetorical situation" and "the exigence," Marie Nichol's multi-celled organism analogy in which the constituents of the rhetorical effort are the speaker, audience, place, purpose, time, and form are consonant with the emphasis of Wichelns, Brigance, Bryant, Thonssen, et al. on the significance of the context in which the speech developed and was delivered.

Typical of the stress placed on the rhetorical context of the speech is the emphasis of Thonssen, Baird, and Braden:

... the speech as a literary genre is an exception. Speeches find their cause for being in the heat of the forum, the drama of the court room, or the solemnity of the church. ... not operating in a vacuum, the speaker and the listeners interact within the social and political context of the moment. ... As we have stressed earlier, the critic must search out those causal factors that shaped the speech as it was delivered by the speaker to a particular audience at a particular time.¹

Dr. Nichols expresses the importance of the speech's context in these words:

If we examine the critical process clearly, we may discern at least three aspects. It involves identification of what is to be evaluated; it recognizes what is to be evaluated as a cultural product of a particular time (emphasis mine, FEM); it finally involves a judicial act of determining what is better or worse.  

Bitzer presses the point by posing the question: "What characteristics, then are implied when one refers to 'the rhetorical situation'--the context in which speakers or writers create rhetorical discourse?" He responds to his question, viz.--

When I ask what is a rhetorical situation?, I want to know the nature of those contexts in which speakers or writers create rhetorical discourse: How should they be described? What are their characteristics? Why and how do they result in the creation of rhetoric?  

The purpose of this chapter, then, as its title suggests, is to present an adequate sketch of the times, men and events that produced the contemporary American conservative movement--such is imperative if one is to understand and evaluate Buckley's speaking and the influence of the movement on him and him on the movement. The writer realizes the magnitude of such a task and acknowledges that he must, of necessity, abstract in order to accomplish in a chapter what to be thoroughly achieved would require a rather large

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book or even several volumes. In respect to this admission he finds the words of Thonssen, Baird, and Braden both relevant and comforting:

The rhetorical critic therefore accepts as one of the limitations of his task the conclusion that he cannot get all facts necessary for complete reconstruction of the social setting in which a speech occurred. Despite that concession, the critic can still get a workable conception of the whole pattern of a social event. In order to appreciate the design of a fabric, it is not necessary to examine every thread.4 For purposes of this study the writer regards the contemporary American conservative movement as a post-depression American phenomenon. He realizes that many conservatives acknowledge Edmund Burke as the "Father of Conservatism" and consider his treatise Reflections on the Revolution in France as "the first and greatest statement of consciously conservative principles."5 Some would locate the origin of conservatism in the Industrial Revolution; others in the values and institutions of Western Civilization derived from Israel, Greece, Rome, and all Christianity. However, while acknowledging this legacy, this writer regards the attempt to establish such an historical continuity a tedious and dubious undertaking--one that is unnecessary to fulfill the requirements of this investigation.

4Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, Speech Criticism, p. 382.
5Rossiter, Conservatism in America, p. 16.
The Prosperous 20's and the Great Depression

On November 11, 1918, the Armistice was signed ending what was by far the costliest and bloodiest war the world had ever known. Total casualties amounted to 10,000,000 dead and over 20,000,000 wounded. The United States put 3,500,000 men in uniform, shipped 2,000,000 of these overseas with 1,300,000 seeing actual combat and suffering 115,000 deaths and 200,000 wounded. The Armistice announcement was received with great jubilation by a war-weary country.

The Armistice was followed by a period of unplanned demobilization, retreat from responsibility abroad and, at home, general complacency toward morality in government and private affairs and the pursuit of prosperity, profit, and pleasure. Coolidge managed to scrub the White House clean of the scandal of the Harding Administration and bowed out of the political limelight in 1928. The Republican Convention nominated Herbert Hoover on the first ballot as its standardbearer in the 1928 campaign. In spite of the problems of demobilization following World War I, the scandals and ineptness of the Harding Administration, and the rapid changes of the 20's, the period was one of general prosperity and growth for the country. In the presidential election of

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1928 Hoover with his own reputation of integrity and competency aided by the general prosperity and by the issue of the Democratic nominee's religion (no Catholic had ever been elected president), overwhelmed his opponent, winning all but eight states with an electoral college margin of 444 to 87.

In his inaugural address Hoover said, "I have no fears for the future of our country. It is bright with hope." In March, 1929, the future indeed appeared bright with hope. A period of optimism and euphoria based partly on the economic prosperity and partly on the public's confidence in Hoover followed his inauguration. The stock market soared during the last months of 1928 and the early months of 1929 goaded on by unbridled speculation of investors and stock manipulations by brokers and large companies. The boom continued—the morning after Labor Day the New York Times average of selected stocks stood at 452, up more than 200 points since early 1928. On through September and October the market wavered and steadily moved down, but there was not an abrupt drop to cause undue alarm. Then on October 23, security prices plunged in a frenzied wave of selling. The next three weeks saw the market collapse in massive stock liquidations by investors who had borrowed at

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high interest to invest and companies that were operating on
a narrow margin. By mid-November the New York Times average
had plunged to 224; in the next two years the country sank
progressively deeper into the depths of depression until in
July, 1932, the Times average hit bottom at a mere 58.

The extent and depth of the depression is revealed
in the relevant statistics: from 1929 to 1932 the dollar
value of American exports dropped nearly 70 per cent, approxi­
mately 5,000 banks failed, and unemployment rose from nearly
1,500,000 on the eve of the stock market crash to nearly
14,000,000 three years later. Many who were fortunate
enough to keep their jobs had to accept severe pay cuts or
go on a part-time basis. Debts increased and savings dis­
appeared for people in all kinds of jobs and professions.
Mortgages in the thousands were foreclosed on farms and city
property. Mayer and Forster described the picture of human
misery that statistics are not able to paint:

... statistics fail to provide an adequate picture of
the way in which the depression assaulted human dignity,
comfort, and morale. Thousands of citizens, brought up
to regard charitable institutions as the refuge of the
chronically lazy, could not avoid applying for help from
such agencies. ... Many of those who recoiled from the
inquisitorial methods of social workers, particularly the
young unmarried men, became vagabonds. They rode rail­
way boxcars from place to place, picking up meals at
soup kitchens and sleeping in little hobo villages
built of scrap lumber and tin--bitterly referred to as
"Hoovervilles." Men with families struggled patheti­
cally to find some means of self-support. ... 9

9Mayer and Forster, The United States and the
Twentieth Century, pp. 445-46.
Hoover made some efforts to bring the country out of the depression, but they were largely ineffectual. Neither Hoover nor anyone else at the time was really able to comprehend the nature of the depression, its complex causes, or its worldwide extent. The country had not had to deal with a depression of such proportions before and the experience and the economic safeguards and methods were simply not available. Too, Hoover's basic philosophy and dedication to free enterprise precluded his taking, even temporarily, the radical measures necessary to bring the country out of the depression.

Clinton Rossiter in *Conservatism in America* characterized contemporary American conservatism as an anti-Roosevelt movement:

> The contemporary Right in my opinion, includes those who now admit to distaste for the dominant political theory and practice of the twenty years between Hoover and Eisenhower—for New Deal and Fair Deal, Roosevelt and Truman, service state and welfare state, reform at home and adventure abroad. . . . I would assert without hesitation that the conservatism of the modern Right is essentially a posture of anti-radicalism or anti-liberalism—a many sided yet integral reaction to the New Deal, its leader, and his political heirs. The decisive factor in the shaping of modern American conservatism was Franklin D. Roosevelt.

> . . . Samuel Lubbell has told us about "the Roosevelt coalition." I would suggest that there is today, in Congress and among the people, an "anti-Roosevelt coalition," and that it may be labeled for what it is: the American Right. . . .

This investigator regards Rossiter's analysis of the origin and thrust of contemporary American conservatism as essentially correct. The purpose of this chapter then will be to

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focus in on the ingredients of the New Deal and its sequels—Fair Deal, New Frontier, and Great Society—and to identify programs, issues, attitudes and, finally, to describe and analyze the conservative reaction to these programs. It is in this complex matrix that the speaking of William F. Buckley, Jr. developed and was delivered.

Roosevelt and the New Deal

Hoover and Curtis were renominated by the Republican Party as its standardbearers in the 1932 presidential campaign. The Democratic Party nominated Franklin D. Roosevelt, Governor of New York, and John N. Garner of Texas, Speaker of the House of Representatives, as its presidential and vice-presidential nominees. Rightly or wrongly, responsibility for the depression fell on Hoover and the Republican Party. Although Roosevelt did not propose policies radically different from Hoover during the course of the campaign, his style and personality was in sharp contrast to Hoover's cautious, pessimistic, doleful manner. In this time of distress the country apparently needed a rich uncle instead of an austere father. Roosevelt won handily with Hoover taking only six states and 59 electoral votes as opposed to Roosevelt's 472.

Roosevelt flew to Chicago to accept his party's nomination before the convention adjourned. In the acceptance speech he told the cheering delegates,

Let it . . . be symbolic that . . . I broke tradition. . . . Republican leaders not only have failed in material things, they have failed in national vision,
because in disaster they have held out no hope. . . . I pledge you, I pledge myself to a new deal for the American people.\textsuperscript{10}

During the campaign while being deliberately vague about specific proposals, Roosevelt indicated that government should take a more active role in economic planning while at the same time he spoke in favor of fiscal responsibility and a balanced budget. The public had to wait until Roosevelt was in office to get the details on the New Deal legislation. The election apparently gave Roosevelt a mandate for change and experimentation in solving the country's economic problems. Roosevelt's landslide carried large Democratic majorities into both houses of Congress to make the going easier especially in the earlier part of his first term.

\textbf{The Hundred Days}

By the time that Roosevelt was inaugurated on March 4, 1933, the country had settled deeper into the throes of depression and a deep pall of gloom had settled on the nation. Hoover had been resoundingly rejected by the electorate, making his long lame duck period particularly agonizing and any efforts to stem the depression or to raise the morale of the people completely ineffective. The economic system was especially imperiled; banks were closing daily and state governors were finding it necessary to declare bank holidays to prevent the collapse of even the

large urban banks. John Blum and his associates present a graphic description of the despair that gripped the nation on the eve of Roosevelt's inauguration:

The winter of 1932-33 was a season of despair unique in American history. The ever-deepening depression, the lengthening bread lines in the cities, the angry mobs of farmers in the countryside, the apparent immobility of the national government, the spreading misery and resentment—all combined to stamp society with an unprecedented sense of bewilderment and defeat. Some Americans were even beginning to feel that the traditional system of democratic capitalism had reached the end of its tether. Talk of alternative systems was in the air—of communism, of fascism, and of strange new local panaceas, like Technocracy, which sought to substitute for the price system an economy based on the measurement of electric energy. Never had Americans been so baffled and so desperate.11

Problems demanding Roosevelt's immediate attention were stopping the bank panic and getting the country's finances back on a sound basis, providing immediate relief for the hungry and impoverished and jobs for the millions unemployed, instilling again confidence in the democratic system of government, capitalism, and free enterprise, and raising the spirit and morale of the people from the doldrums of despair and depression.

In his inaugural address Roosevelt proclaimed,

"... the only thing that we have to fear is fear itself—nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance."12


day following his inauguration Roosevelt proclaimed a national bank holiday and called Congress to meet in special session on March 9, thus beginning the famous "Hundred Days" in which the bulk of the New Deal legislation was presented to Congress. An emergency banking bill was ready for consideration when the lawmakers arrived in Washington. In the ensuing 104 days of the special session, Roosevelt bombarded Congress with legislation relating to agriculture, business, labor, homeowners, and unemployment. The following pages will sketch the most important items of the New Deal legislation, especially those that immediately or eventually brought about conservative opposition.

The Emergency Banking Law, which was shouted through by the House and Senate in a record eight hours, conferred emergency powers on the government to control gold and currency movements, prosecute hoarders, prevent the reopening of unsound banks, and created a new circulating medium. Federal Reserve bank notes which in contrast to the old Federal Reserve notes requiring a forty per cent gold backing, could be issued by banks against all sound assets. A companion measure was passed two days later permitting the president to cut federal salaries fifteen per cent and reduce the pensions and allowances of war veterans. The result of the emergency legislation was to take initial steps toward a balanced budget, restore confidence in the monetary system, and, at the same time, provide more currency.
On June 15 the Glass-Stegall Act was passed giving the government power to restrict speculative activity by Federal Reserve member banks and providing a depositor's guarantee against losses up to $2,500. The latter provision, a novel idea, was received with great enthusiasm and proved to be one of the most practical means of restoring confidence in the nation's banks. Following the first of Roosevelt's "fireside chats," calculated to convince Americans that their money was safer in a reopened bank than "under a mattress," sound banks were reopened on March 13. The emergency legislation and Roosevelt's psychology were so successful that within a week eighty per cent of the banks belonging to the Federal Reserve system were open and by mid-April three quarters of the state banks were operating.

Subsequent New Deal legislation sought to regulate further the sale of securities and to move the country off of the gold standard. The Securities Act required a registration statement containing the character and scope of new security issues in interstate commerce. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 broadened the coverage to include old security issues and placed the supervision of all sales under an independent bipartisan board of five members. This Securities and Exchange Commission (known as the SEC) was granted wide supervisory power over stock exchanges and brokers.

Roosevelt had already instituted an inflationary policy under his emergency banking powers. Using the power
granted to him under the Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12, 1933, he issued an order on April 15 requiring all gold to be exchanged for other coin and currency and on April 19 prohibited the exportation of gold. The effect of these policies was to inflate the dollar and bring about a passive devaluation. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was authorized to buy gold at a figure substantially above that of the world market. The effect of this was to devalue the dollar forty per cent in the nine months since Roosevelt's inauguration. Initially, both the general public and businessmen were enthusiastic toward Roosevelt's monetary policies; however, the business community became less enthusiastic and eventually hostile as his policies tended further from a balanced budget and placed more regulations on investments and business activities.13

One of the most pressing problems confronting the president was to provide immediate relief and employment for the impoverished. Roosevelt proposed programs to provide immediate relief for the deprived, loans for those facing foreclosures, and federal work projects for the unemployed. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration was set up under the direction of Harry Hopkins to provide money through the states for direct relief. In November, Hopkins was appointed to head a temporary Civil Works Administration which

13 Mayer and Forster, *The United States and the Twentieth Century*, pp. 463-64.
anticipated the Public Works Administration. By the following spring, Hopkins had employed four million people and spent $33 million through the temporary agency. Congress appropriated an unprecedented $3.33 billion for the more permanent Public Works Administration. The Civil Works Administration concentrated on light public works while the PWA built dams, bridges, irrigation systems, aircraft carriers, and so forth.

Another public works project was the Civil Conservation Corps. The CCC recruited young unmarried men eighteen to twenty-five years old to work in conservation projects. They were paid $30 per month plus room and board to work in various areas of the country developing reservoirs, watersheds, forests, and parks. Nearly 300,000 young men participated in CCC working on much needed conservation projects and sending (as required) $25 per month to their families providing much needed relief at home.

Roosevelt sought to provide relief for the millions of urban and rural families facing foreclosures on their homes and farms. The Emergency Farm Mortgage Act empowered the Federal Loan Banks to refinance farms on terms highly favorable to farmers. The Home Owner's Loan Corporation was set up to extend the same benefits to urban residents. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was authorized to make loans to thousands of banks and small businessmen facing bankruptcy. During this most critical time the RFC "loans"
became actual grants to prevent the collapse of thousands of banks and small businesses.

The Hundred Days legislation sought not only immediate relief, but to provide regulations and standards that would place the banking and business of the country on a sound basis. The most important legislation in this respect was the National Industrial Recovery Act. The NIRA set up two agencies, the Public Works Administration under Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes already alluded to and the more controversial National Recovery Administration under General Hugh S. Johnson. The immediate goal of this agency was to end the price-cutting, wage-cutting spiral that had been so disastrous to industry and workers and to curb the cutthroat competition that many contended was the cause of the economic stagnation and massive unemployment. The long-range goal was "to bring about permanent re-employment by raising wages and shortening working hours. In the social field, it sought to bring about long overdue reforms: the abolition of child labor, an improvement of working conditions, an encouragement of labor organization, and extension of fair-trade practices."14 The more controversial aspects of the NRA was the attempt to set up a "blanket code" for industry involving standards on minimum wages, maximum hours, fair competition, etc. and the labor provision, Section 7A of the NIRA, requiring every code agreement to

contain a collective bargaining clause which gave great impetus to trade union organizing and embittered many employers.

The nation's farmers were particularly hard-pressed in the spring of 1933 and some means of relief had to be devised. Per capita cash net income fell from $162 to $48 between 1929 and 1932; farm prices had fallen fifty-five per cent while industry prices were not falling correspondingly. As a result the farmer's purchasing power was only sixty per cent of what it had been in 1929. Foreclosures were imminent for thousands of farmers who, in many cases, were not even able to clear the cost of production. If he increased his production, matters were only made worse as the glut of the market drove prices down further. The Agricultural Adjustment Act passed on May 12 sought to establish parity (at the 1909-14 level) for farm products and to restrict production to preclude glutting of the market. Since most of the crops had already been planted by the time the bill was enacted, the summer of 1933 produced one of the great ironies of history: in the midst of want crops were plowed up and animals destroyed. Ten million acres of crops were plowed up and five million small pigs were slaughtered. Henry Wallace, the Secretary of Agriculture, recognized it as a tragic irony, but believed it to be an absolute necessity under the prevailing circumstances. Although much of

\[15^{*}\text{Ibid., p. 653.}\]
the surplus of agricultural goods was used in direct relief for the poor, this destruction of food and livestock brought much criticism. Most farmers, however, complied with the AAA program and the reduced production coupled with the severe drought of 1934 sent farm production down and prices up resulting in a twenty-five per cent increase in farmers' purchasing power.16

Perhaps the most imaginative and challenging program of the Hundred Days' legislation and also the one that caused most conservative opposition was the Tennessee Valley Authority. This legislation sought to transform the area of the Tennessee River basin—a blighted, depressed area covering parts of seven states—by establishing a public corporation to build dams, generate electricity, manufacture fertilizer, and engage in a number of conservation activities including flood control, soil erosion, forestation, and the withdrawal of marginal land from cultivation. Liberals generally hailed TVA as a demonstration of what the government should and could do for underdeveloped areas while conservatives and the private electric companies opposed it as the fore­runner of a number of such "socialistic" schemes. The TVA turned out to be one of the most permanent and most dramatic successes of the New Deal programs.

The Hundred Days ended with the adjournment of Congress in mid-June. Roosevelt had sent fifteen messages to

16Mayer and Forster, The United States and the Twentieth Century, p. 474.
Congress and the lawmakers had responded with fifteen major bills. The President stayed in almost daily touch with the nation with his radio "fireside chats" and his twice-a-week press conferences. No previous president had been so visible to the American public or seemed so close to their daily lives, and few had been so popular as was Roosevelt during the mid-thirties. In the congressional elections of 1934, the popularity of the president and the support that he received was demonstrated as the administration gained seats in both houses of Congress and reduced Republican control of state houses to a mere seven.17

Roosevelt's popularity was not as universal as it might seem, however, and in 1934-35 he began to be confronted with opposition from both the left and the right. Though the mood of the country was considerably more optimistic, actual conditions were not greatly improved. The type of nation-wide recovery from depression that both Roosevelt and the country were looking for had so far alluded them. In the spring of 1935 the gross national product was up $20 billion from 1933, but was still $30 billion less than in 1929, and although four million more people were employed than in 1933, nine million were still unemployed.18


On the left radical new social and economic schemes were being proposed by Senator Huey Long, former Governor of Louisiana, Dr. Francis E. Townsend, a retired California physician, and Father Charles E. Coughlin, the famous "radio priest" of Royal Oak, Michigan. Senator Long proposed a "Share Our Wealth" program calling for the redistribution of the nation's wealth. Dr. Townsend proposed a $200 monthly pension for all over sixty-five and Father Coughlin called for the nationalization of the nation's banks. These schemes received wide support from certain segments of the population and may have exerted a leftward pull on Roosevelt. On the right conservative businessmen and politicians—including some Democrats—formed in 1934 the American Liberty League to oppose actively New Deal policies. It was also becoming apparent in 1935 that much of the New Deal legislation would suffer adverse rulings from the Supreme Court. It was the ensuing struggle with the Supreme Court and the controversy that surrounded it that would ultimately be the most severe blow to Roosevelt's prestige and galvanize conservative opposition. As Congress convened in 1935 Roosevelt received wide general support, but actual conditions were only slightly better than in 1933 and storms were threatening on both the left and the right.

The Second New Deal

The second New Deal legislation was not so prodigious as the first; nonetheless, a number of important bills were passed including the Works Progress Administration
bill, the National Youth Administration legislation, the Social Security Act, the Wagner Labor Relations Act, the Public Utilities Holding Company Act, the Banking Act of 1935, and the tax law of 1935.

The Works Progress Administration was created May 5, 1935 with Harry Hopkins, who had headed the short-lived CWA, as administrator. With an appropriation of $4.8 billion dollars the agency put 2,500,000 people to work repairing and constructing public buildings, roads, parks, bridges, sidewalks, sewers, and dams. It also employed artists, actors, playwrights, musicians, authors, and architects to engage in cultural activities, present public performances, and enhance public buildings. The National Youth Administration aided some 3,000,000 high school and college students whose families were on relief by providing employment through the institutions that they were attending.

The Social Security Act of 1935, destined to become one of the most permanent institutions of the New Deal, established a national old-age pension plan and a federal-state plan of unemployment compensation. The original bill covered most wage earners except agricultural laborers and domestic servants and was financed by a tax (initially one per cent) paid jointly by employer and employee on the salary of the employee. Initially, social security was opposed by businessmen and conservatives as "welfarism" and "creeping socialism," but has since become an accepted part of American life by all but the staunchest and most doctrinaire conservative.
The Wagner Labor Relations Act was hailed by the unions as Labor's Magna Charta. Roosevelt gave strong support to the act after the Supreme Court ruled Section 7A of the NIRA unconstitutional. The new act re-enacted the collective bargaining provision of NIRA Section 7A and listed five unfair labor practices (by employers) which it explicitly outlawed. The act was strongly prolabor and anti-business. It greatly stimulated union organizing and aroused the ire of businessmen. Union membership grew from 4,000,000 in 1935 to 11,000,000 in 1941. Roosevelt's strong prolabor stance manifesting itself in the Wagner Act and many other ways converted the urban laborers from the Republican to the Democratic Party during the mid- and late-thirties.

Roosevelt further alienated the business community by pushing through Congress the Public Utilities Holding Company Act, after one of the most bitter fights of the New Deal era. The act required all holding companies to file information on their organization with the SEC, outlawed holding companies beyond the second degree (i.e. prohibited pyramiding beyond three levels), and limited each holding company after 1938 to a single integrated public utility system. The tax law of 1935 favored small businesses over


the big businesses by substituting a graduated for a uniform corporation income tax. The Banking Act expanded the power of the Federal Reserve Board over the purchase and sale of government securities in order to control the money base, reducing the power of private banks in this area.

The Second New Deal was decidedly more pro labor and antibusiness than the First. The increased restrictions placed on business, the imposition of heavier tax, the pro-labor legislation, and the deficit spending of the Roosevelt Administration caused considerable despair in the business community:

The opposition of the business community did not exhaust itself in worry over the threat of national bankruptcy. The spectacle of government directly employing vast numbers of citizens was an open challenge to the private enterprise system. Despite repeated assertions by Roosevelt that the program was a temporary response to emergency, businessmen denounced it as creeping socialism. They did not believe that the government would withdraw if economic conditions improved. In fact, they saw the rapidly growing TVA experiment as the pattern of the future and anticipated ruinous competition from subsidized corporations which did not have to show a profit in order to continue operations. . . .

Bankers and their sympathizers took particular offense at the inflationary aspect of the debt and the monetary policy which cheapened money and reduced interest rates. . . .

The final reason why businessmen were opposed to a growing debt was the high cost of servicing it—and of all their anxieties, this was the one most immediately justified. . . . Indeed, the combination of public spending and tax policy drove an ever-deeper wedge between business and the New Deal.21

21Mayer and Forster, The United States and the Twentieth Century, pp. 482-83.
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., writing in *The National Experience*, compares the First and Second New Deals:

... the Second New Deal was economically more conservative but politically more radical than the First. It was economically more conservative in the sense that, while the First New Deal had accepted the logic of the administered market and tried to invent new institutions to do what competition had once done to keep the economy in balance, the Second New Deal revived the classical model of a free competitive market as the objective of policy. It was politically more radical in the sense that, while the First New Deal had sought government-business cooperation to achieve national objectives, the Second New Deal, persuaded that free competition could be restored only through rigorous government enforcement of the rules of the competitive game, was zestfully anti-business in rhetoric.22

The business community's alienation and apprehension over New Deal policies was not reflected in the general public as the 1936 presidential election neared. The Democratic Party renominated Roosevelt and Garner while the Republican Party, with little hope and enthusiasm, nominated Governor Alfred M. Landon of Kansas and Frank Knox, a newspaper publisher from Chicago, as its nominees. On the left the forces of Coughlin, Townsend, and Long—who had been assassinated in 1935—formed the Union party and nominated Congressman William Lemke of North Dakota for the presidency. Roosevelt approached the election with confidence that he would achieve a landslide victory of even greater proportions than his '32 election. James A. Farley, campaign manager, predicted that Roosevelt would carry forty-six states in spite of the poll published by the *Literary Digest* forecasting

an overwhelming victory for Landon. When the results were in Roosevelt had achieved the greatest landslide victory in history carrying forty-six states—all except Maine and Vermont—and piling up 523 electoral votes to 8 for Landon. The splinter parties received a bare fraction of the vote: Lemke and the Union party 900,000 votes, Norman Thomas of the Socialist party 190,000 and Earl Browder of the Communist party a mere 80,000 votes.

The Supreme Court and the New Deal

Immediately following the 1936 election, Roosevelt launched an attack on the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had made adverse rulings on many of the most important features of the New Deal. Roosevelt had apparently decided in 1935 to revamp the Court, but had bided his time until after the presidential election. The Supreme Court had begun ruling on the New Deal legislation in January, 1935, and the rulings went uniformly against the New Deal; the rare bills that escaped adverse rulings did so by a narrow 5-4 margin. On January 7, the Court ruled against Section 9A of the NIRA in the "hot oil" case (Panama Refining Co. v Ryan). In early May the judges invalidated the Railroad Retirement Act which appeared to presage the same fate for the Social Security Act. The last straw for Roosevelt came on May 27, the "Black Monday" of New Deal annals, when the Court dealt a triple blow to the New Deal: the Frazier-Lemke Farm Moratorium Act and the code-making sections of
the NIRA were declared unconstitutional and the President's removal of William E. Humphry from the Federal Trade Commission was declared illegal. By the end of their 1936 term the justices had ruled on nine New Deal cases: seven of these rulings were adverse to New Deal legislation including the three "Black Monday" rulings which were unanimous verdicts. With such key New Deal legislation as the Social Security Act, the Wagner Act, and the Holding Company Act apparently heading for the same fate, Roosevelt felt compelled to take some action.

Roosevelt's attack on the Court was thinly disguised in a plan submitted to Congress to reorganize the federal judiciary and increase its efficiency by appointing a new Supreme Court justice for each justice aged seventy or over. The make-up of the Court at the time would have permitted Roosevelt, under the plan, to name immediately six new justices. The plan was probably ill-conceived, definitely ill-planned and ill-timed, fooled no one, antagonized many of his own most ardent supporters and gave conservatives a cause celebre around which opposition was galvanized:

...The maneuver was just clumsy enough to create suspicion regarding Roosevelt's motives and to confirm the dark insinuations about his hunger for power which Republicans had circulated in the 1936 campaign. Radio commentators, ministers, and deans of law schools made angry statements. The anti-New Deal press, which had not completed its postelection demobilization, was glad to launch a new war on the administration. Front-page stories gave prominence to the views of critics, and editorial pages gleefully reminded leaders that they had
been warned about Roosevelt's despotic temper. The most telling blow was the repeated charge that he wanted to pack the Court and become a dictator.23

The plan to "pack" the Supreme Court failed to clear Congress and Roosevelt's prestige was badly damaged; however, in spite of this the effort did benefit Roosevelt and the New Deal. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed its direction as Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts deserted the conservatives (McReynolds, Van Deventer, Sutherland, and Butler) and swung behind the liberal members of the Court (Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo) to permit the endangered legislation, the key New Deal measures, to pass the scrutiny of the Court. The complexion of the Court changed rapidly in subsequent years as Roosevelt was able to appoint new justices to replace retiring members of the bench. By 1942 conservatives viewed the Court as a rubber stamp for New Deal legislation as Roosevelt had appointed seven new members.

The Supreme Court fight had so wearied and preoccupied Congress that it adjourned without taking up any other New Deal legislation. The 1938 congressional elections revealed that Roosevelt's popularity was seriously damaged as the Republicans for the first time since 1932 gained in both houses of Congress picking up six Senate and seventy-one House seats. With conservative congressmen from the

Democratic party mostly from Southern and border states forming a coalition with Republicans, New Deal legislation was now effectively blocked. Mayer and Forster have the following comment on the results of Roosevelt's confrontation with the Supreme Court:

Neither side could take pride in the results of the controversy. The President had tried to undermine the separation of powers after winning re-election on a platform that ignored the issue. Not only had he been decisively defeated but he had unwittingly brought to the surface all the disruptive tendencies in the Democratic party. What Roosevelt's policy now did was to precipitate the split at the moment of his greatest triumph and thereby destroy the prospect for any significant extension of the New Deal.  

Schlesinger ratifies Mayer and Forster's appraisal of the Roosevelt-Supreme Court controversy and its ultimate impact on New Deal legislation.

The Court fight, the new aggressiveness of organized labor, and the resumption of the spending policy all tended to widen the gap between the liberal and the conservative wings of the Democratic party. The liberals were mostly Northerners, the conservatives mostly Southerners, and other events of 1938 hastened the alienation of the Bourbon Democrats from the New Deal. . . . Conservative Democrats in Congress prepared to resist; and the alliance between Southern Democrats and the Northern Republicans, tentatively initiated in 1937 during the Supreme Court fight, began to hardened in 1938 into a major obstacle to further New Deal legislation. . . .

By 1938 the drift toward World War II was well under way. The United States had been preoccupied with domestic problems for most of the decade and in the process and in

24 Ibid., p. 528.
reaction to the complexities and intrigues of European politics had turned isolationist. Roosevelt in his own preoccupa-
pation with domestic affairs and the New Deal programs for bringing the country out of the depression had acquiesced in the turn to isolation, but the ominous developments abroad would no longer allow him the luxury of isolation. The con-
centration of his attention on the situation abroad doubtless made it easier for him to accept the end of the New Deal and its urgent nature gained for him the support of Congress and the country when he otherwise would have been in serious political trouble. Schlesinger comments on the fate of the New Deal in 1938: "The year 1938 marked the end of the for-
ward thrust of the New Deal. The public demand for reform seemed to be slackening, and the drift toward war in Europe was leading both the President and the people to shift their attention to foreign policy."26

The Rise of Contemporary American Conservatism

It is often difficult to pinpoint the fons et origo of a movement that spans decades and incorporates millions of people and the efforts of scores of leaders. Most move-
ments do not have a single definitive beginning or a single originator, but result from the convergence of many attitudes, many minimovements, and the efforts of many leaders that finally coalesce out of their affinity for one another and

26 Ibid.
their common attitudes and aims. Such is the history of contemporary American conservatism. It is quite apparent that opposition to the New Deal began to form in 1934. The opposition subsided almost entirely as the country rallied to support Roosevelt during World War II. That opposition began to reassert itself and grow when the war was successfully concluded. Truman's Fair Deal; the Cold War with the resulting loss of China and the whole of Eastern Europe to Communist domination; cold and hot wars in Berlin, Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Indonesia, etc.; disappointment with the United Nations; the growing concentration of power in Washington; the proliferation of welfare legislation and programs; huge deficits in the federal budget; Russia's growing arsenal of atomic weapons; civil rights legislation; etc.; produced a growing breach between those who stood on opposite sides of these issues. The purpose of this section of Chapter Two is to sketch the history of the contemporary American conservative movement, examine its philosophical base, and to identify the main issues involved in the liberal-conservative dispute.

Conservatism in America began to coalesce into a political, social, and intellectual movement in the late 40's and 50's. This is the "period of inception" as spoken of by Leland M. Griffin at least in terms of a conscious movement.27 No single event, publication, or person can be

identified as the *origo* of the movement. During the 40's and early 50's Senator Robert A. Taft was the most visible and articulate leader of American conservatives. Garber and Grossett write, "For many years Robert Taft was the acknowledged leader of Republicans in Congress and the most articulate and respected conservative spokesman in the country. . . . he was often called 'Mr. Republican' and was linked with conservative principles. . . ."28 Schlesinger pays tribute to Taft's leadership in Congress during the post-war 40's: "The dominant figure in the Eightieth Congress was Robert A. Taft of Ohio, son of the former President and a senator of inexhaustible force, knowledge, and self-confidence. His admirers regarded him as the epitome of old-fashioned American wisdom; others said that he had the best mind in Washington. . . ."29

Taft lost out to General Eisenhower in a bitter contest for the Republican presidential nomination and died in 1953 just as the conservative movement was "beginning to flower into public notice." Senator Taft was well-known and admired by conservatives for his authorship of *A Foreign Policy for America* (1951) and his co-authorship of the Taft-Hartley Act (1947).

28Garber and Crossett, eds., *Liberal and Conservative*, pp. 233-34.

Frank S. Meyer, himself an important figure in the resurgence of conservatism, pinpoints the publication of Richard M. Weaver's *Ideas Have Consequences* 30 (1948) as the *fons et origo* of the contemporary American conservative movement:

Three years before that other trumpet call, *God and Man at Yale*, five years before Russell Kirk's *The Conservative Mind*, seven years before the founding of *National Review*, nine years before the founding of *Modern Age*, the publication of *Ideas Have Consequences* can well be considered the *fons et origo* of the contemporary American conservative movement. 31

Russell Kirk also exalts Weaver and his writing in the revival of conservatism: "*Ideas Have Consequences*, a dissection of modern nominalism, was one of the first works in the revival of conservatism in America—and surely the first to find a wide and devoted audience." 32 William Buckley gave credence to the impact of Weaver's book in the formative period of the movement. He calls the book "catalytic" and relates that it was recommended to him while a student at Yale by his political science instructor, Professor Willmoore Kendall. He indicates that he understands that the book had much to do with Kendall's turn to conservatism. 33 A more detailed study of Weaver's background

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33 Interview with William F. Buckley, Jr., *Appendix A*, p. 271.
and political, social, and rhetorical theories is reserved for Chapter Three. In addition to his seminal book, *Ideas Have Consequences*, Weaver authored *The Ethics of Rhetoric*, was on the founding editorial staff of *National Review* and *Modern Age*, was active in organizing chapters of Young Americans for Freedom, and frequently presented a lecture entitled "How to Argue the Conservative Cause."\(^{34}\)

Acknowledging the role of Weaver and Peter Viereck in the revival of contemporary conservatism, Allen Guttmann taps Russell Kirk as the dominant person in conservatism's resurgence:

Although the postwar revival of traditionalist conservatism might be dated from Richard M. Weaver's *Ideas Have Consequences* (1948) or from Peter Viereck's *Conservatism Revisited* (1949), the outstanding figure is Russell Kirk and the decisive date is 1953. In 1953, Kirk published *The Conservative Mind*. . . . His most significant contribution after the magnus opus was the quarterly journal *Modern Age*, which he founded in 1955.\(^{35}\)

Schlesinger, too, recognizes Kirk as the most prominent leader of the "New Conservatism." "The return of conservatism to political power in 1953 created a favorable climate for a conservative political philosophy. The historical and philosophical basis for this effort was laid by Russell Kirk in *The Conservative Mind* (1953)."\(^{36}\) Other prominent leaders

\(^{34}\)Richard M. Weaver, "How to Argue the Conservative Cause," speech at an Intercollegiate Society for Individualists forum, Chicago, September 22, 1962.

\(^{35}\)Guttmann, *The Conservative Tradition in America*, pp. 159-60.

named by Schlesinger are Friedrich von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Henry Hazlitt, William F. Buckley, Jr., Senator Barry Goldwater, Peter Viereck, and Clinton Rossiter, all of whom he describes as leaders of the "New Conservatism."37

M. Morton Auerbach in *The Conservative Illusion* divides the New Conservatives into two groups—the "reactionary" conservatives and the "adjusted" conservatives. The adjusted conservatives are those who have made peace with and largely adapted their conservatism to the New Deal. The reactionary conservatives are those who continue to oppose the main tenets and programs of the New Deal. Peter Viereck and Clinton Rossiter are seen as the leading adjusted conservatives while Russell Kirk and Richard Weaver are the leaders of reactionary conservatism.38 William Buckley rejects Rossiter as a spokesman for conservatism and would likely reject Viereck on the same basis.39

The mid-fifties, to adapt the lyrics of a popular song, "were very good years" for American conservatives. 1955 witnessed the founding of *National Review* and 1957 saw the first issue of *Modern Age*. *National Review*, a fortnightly publication, is the leading popular opinion magazine promulgating the conservative line. *Modern Age* is the leading

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39 Interview with William F. Buckley, Jr., *Appendix A*, p. 269.
academic publication espousing conservatism. Frank S. Mayer's remarks: "Only in recent years has there emerged a consistent, cohesive conservative movement, based upon a broad consensus of principle, challenging Liberal assumptions and Liberal power all along the line. In its origins, intellectual, (it) centered among a group of writers gathered around the old Freeman, National Review, Modern Age. . . ."40

The writer has already reviewed William F. Buckley's role in the revival of conservatism. The publishing of God and Man at Yale catapulted him into the public arena in 1951 and into the forefront of the conservative movement. In addition to authoring the aforementioned book, he is responsible for initiating and serving as the only editor of National Review, writing the best known conservative column "On The Right," serving as moderator on the television program "Firing Line," founding the conservative youth organization Young Americans for Freedom, and is generally recognized as contemporary American conservatism's most articulate spokesman. A more detailed presentation of his background, political, social, philosophical, and rhetorical theories and positions are reserved for Chapter Four of this treatise.

When the writer asked Mr. Buckley to name some of the leaders of contemporary American conservatism he

40Goldwin, Left, Right and Center, p. 4.
responded,

... I think the easiest way to answer that question is to look at the mast of National Review. Obviously as an editor my job has been trying to get the most articulate conservatives to write regularly for National Review. They aren't all listed there because in one or two cases other commitments don't permit them to appear.

A look at the mast of a recent issue of National Review adds to those already cited as leaders of contemporary conservatism the names of William A. Rusher, publisher; James Burnham and Jeffery Hart, assistant editors; and Greg Davenport, W. H. von Dreele, M. Stanton Evans, Nika Hazelton, Will Herberg, James J. Kilpatrick, D. Keith Mano, William F. Rickenbacker, Francis Russell, and Ralph de Toledano as contributing editors. Others who have had a prominent place on the masthead of National Review but are no longer listed there because of death or other reasons include Richard Weaver, Frank S. Meyer, Whitaker Chambers, Max Eastman, John Chamberlain, Henry Hazlitt, Gerhart Niemeyer, Willmoore Kendall, Frank Chodorov, Hugh Kenner, Garry Wills, etc.

When asked to cite some leading conservatives who are practicing politicians, Buckley named Senators Barry Goldwater, Strom Thurmond, (his brother) James Buckley and John Tower, Representative Phil Crane and Vice President Spiro Agnew.

A close relationship has been maintained between National Review and Modern Age from the beginning of both publications. Especially active in behalf of both

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41 Interview with William F. Buckley, Appendix A, p. 270.
publications, Russell Kirk and Richard Weaver served as editors of Modern Age. Frank S. Meyer has been active in the business affairs and prolific as a writer of both publications. The masthead of Modern Age for Spring 1965 lists Eugene Davidson as editor, David S. Collier as publisher and associate editor, Eliseo Vivas and J. M. Lalley as associate editors, Robert C. MaKay, business manager, and Rudolf Allers, Donald Davidson, Ludwig Freund, James J. Kilpatrick, William M. McGovern, Frank S. Meyer, Felix Morley, Wilhelm Ropke, Harry Rudin, Leo R. Ward, Frederick Wilhelsen, and Francis Graham Wilson as editorial advisors. Generally the editorial staff and writers for Modern Age are drawn from the ranks of academia—many are professors of history, political science, English, economics, etc., at such universities as Columbia, Harvard, Yale, Northwestern, and other universities of high academic rank.

No account of the rise of contemporary American conservatism, however brief, could neglect the person and role of Senator Goldwater. More than on any other man, the mantle of Senator Taft fell on Barry Goldwater of Arizona. First elected to the Senate in 1952, Goldwater soon became the leading spokesman for conservatism in the Senate. The publishing of The Conscience of a Conservative in 1960 helped to catapult him into the presidential arena as the Republican party nominee in 1964. In spite of a disastrous defeat at the polls by Lyndon B. Johnson, Goldwater was

42Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative.
subsequently re-elected to the Senate and contemporary American conservatism has rallied from the apparent debacle.

Another important figure in the conservative movement already alluded to is Willmoore Kendall. Kendall was long-time professor of political science at Yale. Buckley cites him as one of the strongest influences on his political views and the person who introduced him to the writings of Richard Weaver. Kendall's seminal work on conservatism, *The Conservative Affirmation* (1963), is one of the most definitive explications of conservative thought.43

Frank S. Meyer, alluded to and quoted a number of times already, has been one of the most prolific and explicatory apologists for contemporary American conservatism. An ex-Communist, Meyer was closely associated with the business affairs of both *National Review* and *Modern Age*, served on the editorial staff of both publications, edited *What Is Conservatism?*44 (1964), and wrote numerous articles and books in explication and defense of conservatism, and was active in the founding of the American Conservative Union (1964).

The works of Peter Viereck and Clinton Rossiter have been valuable contributions to the resurgence of conservatism. These two referred to as "adjusted" conservatives by some and "liberal" conservatives by others are not in the

43Kendall, *The Conservative Affirmation*.

"mainstream" of "New Conservatism," but have contributed greatly to conservative thought and apologetics. Both are historians of reputation (Rossiter is now deceased) who have made extensive study of the history and rationale of conservatism. Viereck's *Conservatism Revisited*45 (1949) is regarded in league with Weaver and Kirk's works to have contributed greatly to the revival of conservatism. Clinton Rossiter published a definitive work, *Conservatism in America*, 46 in 1955 and is referred to by Willmoore Kendall as "the leading academic authority on conservatism."47

The philosophical basis of conservatism, statement of principles, and explication of liberal-conservative issues to follow in this treatise are gleaned primarily from the writings of leading conservatives clustered around *National Review* and *Modern Age* supplemented by the perspectives of more liberal conservatives such as Viereck and Rossiter and others who are critical of conservatism such as Auerbach, Guttmann, Schlesinger, McEvoy, Forster and Epstein, Bell, et al.48 This utilizes the primary works of all of the


46Rossiter, *Conservatism in America*.


"New Conservatives" of the Bobbs-Merrill Series anthology, The New Conservatives\(^{49}\) and most of the definitive works on contemporary American conservatism cited in the very extensive bibliography found in Buckley's American Conservative Thought in the Twentieth Century\(^{50}\) from the American Heritage Series.

**Fundamental Conservative Tenets—The Liberal-Conservative Conflict**

To admit that one has difficulty giving precise definitions to the terms "liberal" and "conservative" is not to deny the fact of a liberal-conservative cleavage. Almost everyone who has written on the topic has lamented the problems and difficulties in defining the terms. The liberal-conservative conflict involves in part metaphysics, philosophy, socio-economic principles, perspectives of history, and--even when the goals are agreed upon by liberals and conservatives--different affinities and styles in method. Buckley has somewhat humorously if not exaggeratedly described the almost psychic affinity that exists between conservatives.

... I feel I know, if not what conservatism is, at least who a conservative is. I confess that I know who is a conservative less surely than I know who is a liberal. Blindfold me, spin me about like a top, and I will walk up to the single liberal in the room without zig or zag and find him even if he is hiding behind the flower pot.\(^{51}\)

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\(^{50}\)Buckley, American Conservative Thought in the Twentieth Century.

\(^{51}\)Ibid., p. xviii.
While it is not possible to define conservatism so that one would have a Geiger counter type apparatus that would always inerrantly identify a conservative, it is possible to identify principles and positions essential to contemporary American conservatism that both conservatives and liberals would agree constitute conservative tenets. Elaborate and ingenuous efforts have been made by men such as Kirk, Rossiter, Viereck, Meyer, Buckley, Auerbach, McEvoy, and others to identify these fundamental articles of faith. Whether the distillation process is conducted by conservatives or liberals, they are in remarkable agreement on what constitutes the fundamental tenets of conservatism— liberals, of course, would object strenuously to the validity of these tenets.

Kirk in *The Conservative Mind* has enunciated six "canons of conservative thought":

1. Belief that a divine intent rules society as well as conscience, forging an eternal chain of right and duty which links great and obscure, living and dead.

2. Affection for the proliferating variety and mystery of traditional life, as distinguished from the narrowing uniformity and equalitarianism and utilitarian aims of most radical systems.

3. Conviction that civilized society requires orders and classes.

4. Persuasion that property and freedom are inseparably connected, and that economic levelling is not economic progress.

5. Faith in prescription and distrust of "sophisters and calculators."
(6) Recognition that change and reform are not identical, and that innovation is a devouring conflagration more often than it is a torch of progress.52

In contrast, Kirk has attempted to extract from the various forms of radicalism (liberalism) articles of faith or premises that are antithetical to conservative principles. He succeeds in extracting four which he believes to be common to all radical philosophies and schemes:

(1) The perfectibility of man and the illimitable progress of society: meliorism.

(2) Contempt for tradition. Reason, impulse, and materialistic determinism are severally preferred as guides to social welfare, trustier than the wisdom of our ancestors.

(3) Political levelling. Order and privilege are condemned; total democracy, as direct as practicable, is the professed radical ideal.

(4) Economic levelling. The ancient rights of property, especially property in land, are suspect to almost all radicals; and collectivistic reformers hack at the institution of private property root and branch.53

A fairly close correlation exists between Kirk's "canons of conservative thought" and McEvoy's list of "pervasive themes" of the American right:

... I have made some fairly strenuous efforts to define the core beliefs of the American rightist elite. ...

... Among the pervasive themes of these movements are intense nationalism, the need for severe restriction of the social welfare functions of government, concern for traditional morality, and intense anticommunism.


53 Ibid., p. 9.
Limited government, a regionally dominant nationalism, militarism, patriotism, individual responsibility, militant anticommunism, and traditional morality are six major themes of concern that mobilize the opinion leaders and spokesmen of the contemporary right.  

In personal interview with this writer when asked what constituted the most important conservative-liberal issues of the last two or three decades, Buckley cited attitudes and policies toward Communism and the role and size of the federal government as the most critical issues. Buckley's statement appears to confirm McEvoy's identification of the "pervasive themes" of conservative rhetoric.

Leonard Lief in *The New Conservatives* cites seven areas in which conservatives generally find common ground. His list constitutes perhaps the best effort to state succinctly and objectively contemporary American conservatives' articles of faith:

1. For the most part, a deep belief in God and a concern with religion in the daily affairs of men
2. A suspicion of big government and a reliance upon local administration of public affairs
3. A belief in the imperfect nature of man and a hostility to any scheme--political or social--that suggests a Utopian world
4. A conviction that social equality is not, in and of itself, a desirable end
5. An admiration for tradition and the past
6. A respect for the importance of property and free enterprise in stabilizing society and spurring individual incentive
7. An abhorrence for Communism

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54McEvoy, *Radicals or Conservatives?*, pp. xi, 3.
Perhaps the best effort to state the philosophy and creed of contemporary American conservatism is the Statement of Principles of the American Conservative Union. The inclusion of this document should serve a useful purpose in our understanding of conservatism.

The American Conservative Union holds firm the truth that all men are endowed by their Creator with unalienable rights. To a world floundering in philosophical anarchy, we therefore commend a transcendent moral order against which all human institutions, in every commonwealth, may confidently be judged.

We believe that government is meant to serve men: by securing their rights under a rule of law that dispenses justice equally to all; and in times of danger by marshalling the might of the commonwealth against its enemies.

We remark the inherent tendency of government to tyranny. The prudent commonwealth will therefore labor tirelessly, by means agreeable to its peculiar genius and traditions, to limit and disperse the power of government. No task should be confided to a higher authority that can be performed at a subsidiary level; and whatever the people can do for themselves should not be confided to government at all.

We believe that the Constitution of the United States is the ideal charter for governing the American commonwealth. The checks and balances that distribute the power of our national authority, and the principle of federalism that reserves to the states or to the people all power not confided to the national authority, are the cornerstones of every freedom enjoyed in this commonwealth. To their integrity we pledge a jealous defense.

We have learned that man's liberty, no less than his material interests, is promoted by an economic system based on private property and directed by a free, competitive market. Such a system not only enlarges the scope of individual choice but by dispersing economic decisions provides a further bulwark against the concentration of political power. And no other system can assure comparable living standards and growth. As against the encroachments of the welfare state, we propose a state of welfare achieved by free, collaborative endeavor.

Today the American commonwealth, as well as the civilization that illuminated it, are mortally threatened by the global Communist revolution. We hold that permanent co-existence with Communism is neither desirable
nor possible. Communism would enslave the world by any means expedient to that end. We deem no sacrifice too great to avoid that fate. We would parry the enemy's thrusts—but more: by maintaining American military superiority and exerting relentless pressure against the Communist empire, we would advance the frontiers of freedom.57

Summary

Contemporary American conservatism is viewed as a rightist response to the ideology and programs of the New Deal, New Frontier, and Great Society programs. The conservative response manifests itself in a strong belief in God or in a moral order in the universe, concern for the dignity of the individual, a strong fear of big government, a skepticism for utopian schemes, an admiration for tradition and a fear of change unless a strong rationale is present, a concern for property rights and free enterprise, and abhorrence for Communism. The legacy of the New Deal, the rapid spread of Communism following World War II, and the breakdown of traditional values and institutions form the milieu in which Buckley's speaking has developed.

57 Goldwin, Left, Right and Center, pp. 9, 10.
CHAPTER III

RICHARD M. WEAVER: CONSERVATIVE RHETORICAL THEORIST—HIS HIERARCHY OF TOPICS

Richard M. Weaver had a profound influence on the contemporary American conservative movement in general and on William F. Buckley, the subject of this dissertation, in particular. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze Weaver's theory of rhetoric and to develop critical instrumentation from his writings on rhetoric that will be used in subsequent chapters to analyze Buckley's rhetorical efforts. This investigator does not deem it necessary to explore in depth the philosophical, epistemological, or metaphysical basis of Weaver's concepts of rhetoric in order to develop a critical apparatus. When he does discuss these aspects it will be not as an objective within itself, but only as incidental to the development of the methodology.¹ Although some mention has been made already of Weaver's works on rhetoric and of his role in the contemporary American conservative movement, more information on his

background, education, and the development of his political and rhetorical views might be useful as well as interesting.

Weaver was born in Weaverville, North Carolina, the Piedmont section of the state, in 1910. His family moved to Lexington, Kentucky, where he grew up and where he received his undergraduate education at the University of Kentucky. While at the University of Kentucky, Weaver came under the influence of a number of professors who were "social democrats." Weaver in the most detailed account of the development of his early political and idealogical views relates their influence on him:

The professors who staffed this institution were most earnest souls from the Middle Western universities, and many of them—especially those in economics, political science, and philosophy—were, with or without knowing it, social democrats. They read and circulated The Nation, the foremost liberal journal of the time; they made sporadic efforts toward organizing liberal or progressive clubs; and of course they reflected their position in their teaching very largely. I had no defense against their doctrine, and by the time I was in my third year I had been persuaded entirely that the future was with science, liberalism, and equalitarianism, and that all opposed to these trends were people of ignorance or malevolence.²

Weaver soon became a zealous advocate of socialism. In the same year that he graduated (1932) he joined the American Socialist Party. He served as secretary of the "local" for two years, but soon found that while socialism had a kind of intellectual appeal, the practical work in behalf of socialism produced disillusionment. During this time Weaver

enrolled at Vanderbilt University which was the chief seat of the Southern Agrarian school of philosophy and criticism. Here he came under the influence of John Crowe Ransom, Donald Davidson, Robert Penn Warren, Allen Tate, et al., and was strongly affected by such books as Ransom's *God Without Thunder* and *I'll Take My Stand: The South and The Agrarian Tradition*.3

Weaver received his M.A. in English from Vanderbilt in 1934 and continued there for two years of work on the doctorate before accepting a position with a Texas college. His metamorphosis from socialist to archconservative occurred over a period of years and with considerable dissonance:

... I left Vanderbilt poised between the two alternatives (socialism and traditional American political views). I had seen virtually nothing of socialism and centralism in practice, and the mass man I had never met; there was also reluctance over giving up a position once publicly espoused, made somewhat greater by a young man's vanity. Nevertheless, I had felt a powerful pull in the direction of the Agrarian ideal of the individual in contact with the rhythms of nature, of the small-property holding, and of the society of pluralistic organization.4

After teaching in Texas for three years and becoming further disenchanted with liberalism as a result of his observations and experiences there, Weaver enrolled at Louisiana State University to pursue a doctoral program. He spent the summers studying at the Sorbonne, Harvard, and the University


4Weaver, "Up From Liberalism," p. 23.
of Virginia. Receiving the Ph.D. in 1943, he accepted a position in the Department of English at the University of Chicago where he taught for twenty years until his premature death in 1963 at the age of fifty-three.

At the University of Chicago Weaver lived the studied life of a bachelor scholar with three main interests: his classes, his writing, and his extra-classroom lectures. He was a dedicated man; a man with a mission. Much like the prophets of the Old Testament, he lived an austere, almost ascetic life, dedicated to diagnosing the maladies of a society that he believed to be gravely sick, but not sick beyond the remedial power of the proper medicine. The analogy is not inappropriate for Weaver once referred to himself as a "doctor of culture."^5

Weaver's three main efforts at diagnosing the disease that had infected the "body politic" and prescribing the proper remedy are *Ideas Have Consequences* (1948), *The Ethics of Rhetoric* (1953), and *Visions of Order* (1964) appearing a month after his death.^6 In these books and numerous articles appearing in *Modern Age*, *National Review*, *Sewanee Review*, *Commonweal*, etc.,"... he conducted a memorable defense of those orthodoxies centering in Christianity, political conservatism, and Ciceronian humanism."^7

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^6Weaver, *Ideas Have Consequences*; *The Ethics of Rhetoric*; and *Visions of Order*.

^7Johannesen, Strickland, Eubanks, *Language is Sermonic*, p. 5.
Most vital to the restoration of health was the revitalization of rhetoric:

Weaver saw the importance of rhetoric in its ancient and honorable sense, as no other thinker among us, I dare say, has seen it; and it was his sense of the degradation rhetoric has suffered that furnished him with some of the grounds he had for fear about the future of our culture.8

Weaver's close friend, Ralph T. Eubanks, wrote:

In the fulfillment of his duty and destiny he became the man he described in a letter to the writer— one of "the embattled friends of traditional rhetoric." In Weaver's judgement these men were "the upholders of our society." That is, they were the prime conservators of the values essential to cultural cohesion.9

Weaver—the Nature and Function of Rhetoric

While Richard M. Weaver is generally placed with the "New Rhetoric" theorists, he is also acknowledged as perhaps the most classical of the New Rhetoric proponents. Indeed, he constitutes a bridge between the classical rhetorical neo-Aristotelian sequels and the New Rhetoric theorists such as Burke, Richards, Korzybski, Perelman, Toulmin, Black, and others. He is strongly classical in his orientation and highly ethical in his emphasis. Richard Johannesen discovered two basic orientations of primary importance in Weaver's rhetorical views: political conservatism and Platonic


9Johannesen, Strickland, Eubanks, Language is Sermonic, p. 4.
idealism. Thonsson, Baird, and Braden describe Weaver as "The most traditional and the most classical of (the) advocates of an alternate frame of reference for traditional rhetoric. . . ." Scott and Brock classify Weaver as semantical-grammatical in his approach to rhetorical criticism. Eubanks and Baker emphasize the strong value orientation of Weaver's rhetorical views and commend him as a model of an axiological rhetoric.

In "Language is Sermonic," Weaver gives his most detailed explication of "the office of rhetoric:"

Rhetoric seen in the whole conspectus of its function is an art of emphasis embodying an order of desire. Rhetoric is advisory; it has the office of advising man with reference to an independent order of goods and with reference to their particular situation as it relates to these. The honest rhetorician therefore has two things in mind: a vision of how matters should go ideally and ethically and a consideration of the special circumstances of his auditors.

Rhetoric then is always functioning in a persuasive context. The rhetor always has a purpose; he has a clear vision of the ideal situation or solution or at least the

11 Thonsson, Baird, Braden, Speech Criticism, P. 280.
principles, attitudes, and standards that should be operative and he seeks to lay these before the audience with such clarity, logic, and persuasiveness that they will accept them. To put it more succinctly, Weaver defined rhetoric as "persuasive speaking in the service of truth" (which should) "create an informed appetite for the good."\textsuperscript{15}

Weaver views man as the "symbol-using animal." Symbol using becomes "the distinguishing characteristic which separates him from all of the other creatures with which he shares animal attributes" and is "the faculty which has enabled man to create cultures and civilizations. . . ."\textsuperscript{16} Language is "'the supreme organon of the mind's self-ordering growth.' It is the means by which we not only communicate our thoughts to others but interpret our thoughts to ourselves."\textsuperscript{17}

A successful rhetoric must recognize the true nature of man as a cognitive, affective being operating always in a historical context. For Weaver rhetoric is the "most humanistic of the humanities." It

\ldots makes use of the resources of both language and literature, but its focus is always upon the human being. In any given case its concern will be with a group of men in their historical, not their general or abstract, situation, for without this concern there is no basis for appeal. It must take into account not

\textsuperscript{15}Weaver, \textit{Life Without Prejudice}, pp. 116-118.
\textsuperscript{16}ibid., p. 46.
\textsuperscript{17}ibid., p. 51.
only their generic nature, but what they know, what they have experienced, how they feel, and what the chances are of changing their attitude, if that is desired.18

Man, to Weaver, is a creature of choice or volition who is responsible for the choice he makes. He is a highly complex, multinatured being who can and must be appealed to in different ways. He has

cognitive, aesthetic, ethical, and religious faculties or means of apprehension. The first is the inquiring faculty, which gives him knowledge; the second, which is essentially contemplative, enables him to enjoy beauty; the third enables him to determine the order of the goods and to judge between right and wrong; and the fourth, which is essentially intuitive, gives him glimpses of his transcendental nature and his destiny.19

Weaver recognizes both the cognitive and affective nature of man, but he does not draw a rigid dichotomy. Rhetoric must be addressed to the whole man— to man in history. Its purpose is to

move man's feelings in the direction of a goal. . . . it is concerned not with abstract individuals, but with men in being. Moreover, these men in being it has to consider in relation to forces in being.

begins with the assumption that man is born into history. . . . must have historicity as well as logicality.20

Weaver is very much in tune with Plato, Aristotle, and the classical rhetoricians in his insistence

18 Weaver, Life Without Prejudice, pp. 116, 117.
19 Weaver, Visions of Order, p. 85.
20 Ibid., p. 63.
that the rhetor understand the nature of rhetoric, the nature of man, and that he analyze the historical context in which the rhetorical effort is made:

... for the most obvious truth about rhetoric is that its object is the whole man. It presents its arguments first to the rational part of man, because rhetorical discourses, if they are honestly conceived, always have a basis in reasoning. Logical argument is the plot, as it were, of any speech or composition that is designed to persuade. Yet it is the very characterizing feature of rhetoric that it go beyond this and appeals to other parts of man's constitution, especially to his nature as a pathetic being, that is, a being feeling and suffering. A speech intended to persuade achieves little unless it takes into account how men are reacting subjectively to their hopes and fears and their special circumstances.

Weaver agreed with Aristotle that "rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic." Both are essential, the one the handmaid of the other. "... dialectic always tries to discover the real syllogism in the argument whereas rhetoric tries to discover the real means of persuasion." Dialectic without rhetoric is sterile, "knowledge in a vacuum," "mere cognition," "social agnosticism," and when operating "alone in the social realm is subversive." Without rhetoric, dialectic does not heed the imperative of living. Rhetoric as the handmaid of dialectic

... tries to bring opinion closer into line with the truth which dialectic pursues. It is therefore cognizant of the facts of situations and it is at least understanding of popular attitudes. ...

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22 Weaver, *Visions of Order*, p. 63.
speaks to man in his whole being and out of his whole past and with reference to values which only a human being can intuit.23

Having noted that for Weaver the purpose of rhetoric is "to move man's feelings in the direction of a goal," one must ascertain what that goal is, especially since it is the goal that makes Weaver's rhetorical views so unique. The goal of rhetoric in Weaver's view is to preserve and conserve the best of one's culture and civilization. Weaver was a conservative in political and social views. He not only tolerated the appellation, but acknowledged its validity and accepted eagerly its obligation. Its appropriateness has been noticed by all who knew him personally or who were acquainted with his writings. While confessing that "my instincts are libertarian," Weaver writes "I am sure that I would never have joined forces with the conservatives if I had not been convinced that they are the defenders of freedom today."24 Weaver sees the Twentieth Century conservative as occupying the same ground that the Nineteenth Century liberal occupied--that of the defender "of maximum individual liberty and minimum state interference."25

To Weaver "the true conservative is one who sees the universe as a paradigm of essence, of which the phenomenology of the world is a sort of continuing approximation. Or, to

23 Ibid., pp. 63-72.
24 Weaver, Life Without Prejudice, p. 157.
25 Johennesen, Strickland, Eubanks, Language is Sermonic, p. 132.
put this in another way, he sees it as a set of definitions which are struggling to get themselves defined in the real world. Weaver rejects relativism, positivism, nominalism, existentialism, determinism, or any other philosophy that denies the metaphysical. He does not insist that one believe in or speak in terms of "God," but only that he believe in and respect a metaphysical order:

It is my contention that a conservative is a realist, who believes that there is a structure of reality independent of his own will and desire. He believes that there is a creation which was here before him, which exists now not by just his sufferance, and which will be here after he's gone. This structure consists not merely of the great physical world but also of many laws, principles, and regulations which control human behavior. Though this reality is independent of the individual, it is not hostile to him. It is in fact amenable by him in many ways, but it cannot be changed radically and arbitrarily. This is the cardinal point. The conservative holds that man in this world cannot make his will his law without any regard to limits and to the fixed nature of things.

Weaver's conservatism is not born of fear, inertia, temperament, nostalgia, or a lack of imagination or intelligence. It is not mere "stand-pattism" or even the idea that we should return to some era of "the good ole days."

Weaver's conservative (and his ideal rhetor) has a "vision of order" a "hierarchy of goods" and advocates change, restoration, or reform (or he defends the status quo) that will bring the ideal into reality: "The conservative wants to conserve the great structural reality which has been given

26 Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 112.
27 Weaver, Life Without Prejudice, pp. 158-59.
us and which is on the whole beneficent."^{28} Weaver's conservative "is sometimes found fighting quite briskly for change. . . ."^{29}

Like most (whether conservative or liberal) who have sought to give man a utopian view, Weaver has not filled in all the details. Johannesen, Strickland, and Eubanks find Weaver condemning the following societal weaknesses: scientism, nominalism, semantic positivism, doctrinaire democracy, uncritical homage to the theory of evolution, radical egalitarianism, pragmatism, cultural relativism, materialism, emphasis on techniques at the expense of goals, idolization of youth, progressive education, disparagement of historical consciousness, deleterious effects of the mass media, and degenerate literature, music, and art. They find his program for the restoration of health to Western culture calling for the development of a sense of history; balance between permanence and change; reestablishment of faith in ideas, ideals, and principles; maintenance of the "metaphysical right" of private property; education in literature, rhetoric, logic, and dialectic; respect for nature, the individual, and the ideals of the past; reemphasis on traditional education; and control (but not elimination) of war.\^{30}

^{28}Ibid., p. 159.
^{29}Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 113.
^{30}Johannesen, Strickland, Eubanks, Language is Sermonic, pp. 15, 16.
A Platonic Christian metaphysics lies at the base of Weaver's rhetorical philosophy and rationale. One cannot comprehend his views of the nature and role of rhetoric without understanding this base: "Rhetoric," held Weaver, "is axiological; it kneads values into our lives. Rhetoric is the cohesive force that molds persons into a community or culture."\(^{31}\)

In summary, at the base of Weaver's concept of rhetoric one finds Platonic idealism, political conservatism, and Christian metaphysics. Rhetoric is "persuasive speech in the service of truth" and its object is the preservation and conservation of Western culture and civilization. With this view of Weaver's conception of the nature and role of rhetoric in the foreground, we are prepared to analyze his views of ethos and logos and develop criteria therefrom to analyze selected speeches of William Buckley.

**Ethical Proof--The Noble Lover**

Weaver recognizes the classical categories of ethical, logical, and pathetic proofs. Like Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintillian, and other classical rhetoricians, he places a heavy emphasis on the importance of ethical proof. In his essay "The Phaedrus and the Nature of Rhetoric" and subsequent essays in *The Ethics of Rhetoric* is found his seminal treatment of the importance of ethos in rhetoric. In his interpretation of the *Phaedrus*, Weaver

\(^{31}\) *ibid.*, pp. 17, 18.
views the three speeches—one by Phaedrus repeating a speech which he heard Lysias deliver just before he encounters Socrates as he is on his way out of the city to the countryside to rehearse and meditate upon Lysias's speech and two by Socrates—as representing three eulogies. The speech by Phaedrus is a eulogy of the non-lover; the first by Socrates a eulogy of the base- or evil-lover; and the second by Socrates a eulogy of the noble-lover.

The thesis of Phaedrus' speech on the surface is that one should grant favors to non-lovers rather than lovers for a number of reasons which are argued in the speech. Weaver avers, "Beneath the surface of repartee are mock seriousness, he (Plato) is asking whether we ought to prefer a neuter form of speech to the kind which is ever getting us aroused over things and provoking an expense of spirit." This neutral form of language or "semantically purified speech" would embody only cognitive or rational elements; it would have no emotional elements. It would observe the most rigid objectivity and betray no tendency, impulse, or partiality. Its object would be a pure notation of structural reality, the pure scientific notation advocated by the General Semanticists.

For Weaver such a goal is undesirable on the whole and at any rate impossible to achieve—impossible first because of the nature of man and second because of the

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32Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 5.
nature of language. The thesis of Weaver's essay "Language is Sermonic" is that man is a creature of feeling, that he can never be a "depersonalized thinking machine," and that language is always expressing tendency: "In short, as long as man is a creature responding to purpose, his linguistic expression will be a carrier of tendency."³³

The second speech in the dialogue is delivered by Socrates (ostensibly sincere) and turns out to be a speech on the base- or evil-lover.

. . . Love (ἔρως) is defined as the kind of desire which overcomes rational opinion and moves toward the enjoyment of personal or bodily beauty. The lover wishes to make the object of his passion as pleasing to himself as possible; but to those possessed by this frenzy, only that which is subject to their will is pleasant. Accordingly, everything which is opposed, or is equal or better, the lover views with hostility. He naturally tries to make the beloved inferior to himself in every respect. . . . In brief, the lover is not motivated by benevolence toward the beloved, but by selfish appetite; and Socrates can aptly close with the quotation: "As wolves love lambs, so lovers love their loves."³⁴

Weaver has previously asserted that there are but three ways that language can affect us: "It can move us toward that which is good; it can move us toward that which is evil; or it can, in hypothetical third place, fail to move us at all." He views Socrates' first speech as advocating "speech which influences us in the direction of what is evil. This we shall call base rhetoric because its end is . . . exploitation. . . . "³⁵ The base-lover is concerned only with


³⁴Weaver, *The Ethics of Rhetoric*, p. 10.

³⁵Ibid., p. 11.
self-gratification. He has no real interest in the welfare or development of the object of his gratification. He seeks to make his lover completely dependent upon him and to preclude any contact or interest that would develop independence or vie with him for the lover's attention.

Weaver finds the parallel in the type of base-rhetoric which shuns rational discourse in lieu of emotional pleadings. The base-rhetorician relies solely upon emotional appeals materials and is not scrupulous about the means of achieving his goal or of the ethical quality of his goal. Base-rhetoric is exemplified by the "impassioned language of journalism and political pleading:"

... The techniques of the base lover ... would make a long catalogue, but in general it is accurate to say that he seeks to keep the understanding in a passive state by never permitting an honest examination of alternatives. Nothing is more feared by him than a true dialectic, for this not only endangers his favored alternative, but also gives the "beloved"—how clearly here are these the "lambs" of Socrates' figure—some training in intellectual independence. What he does therefore is dress up one alternative in all the cheap finery or immediate hopes and fears, knowing that if he can thus prevent a masculine exercise of imagination and will, he can have his way. By discussing only one side of an issue, by mentioning cause without consequence or consequence without cause, acts without agents or agents without agency, he often successfully blocks definition and cause-and-effect reasoning.36

The second speech of Socrates represents an about-face from his first speech, ostensibly after some strickening of conscience. He now declares both his and Phaedrus' speech to be sacrilege, a defamation of love: "If love is,

36Ibid., p. 11, 12.
as indeed it is, a god or something divine, he can do nothing evil; but the two speeches just now said that he was evil." Socrates then proceeds to give another speech in which there is an elaborate allegorical treatment on the nature of rhetoric. In the allegory Plato portrays love as a kind of madness, a divine madness, in which the lover is torn between his intellectual and aesthetic love and his carnal desire to possess his beloved. In the allegory is found the most elaborate development in the Platonic system and the most detailed classical treatment of the nature of man. The true-lover conquering his base desires after exercising the utmost discipline develops a reverence and awe for the beloved. His love is noble, generous, and selfless:

Now the attitude of the noble lover toward the beloved is in direct contrast with that of the evil lover, who, as we have seen, strives to possess and victimize the object of his affections. For once the noble lover has mastered the conflict within his own soul by conquering appetite and fixing his attention upon the intelligible and the divine, he conceives an exalted attitude toward the beloved. 38

To extend the parallel and draw the concepts together, Weaver views rhetoric as a type of "madness." Persuasive speech is a kind of "love." The noble-lover or noble-rhetorician is always "possessed" and cannot be otherwise. Weaver finds that the problem of the Phaedrus and of other

37 Ibid., p. 12.
38 Ibid., p. 13.
Platonic dialogues is "if truth alone is not sufficient to persuade men, what else remains that can be legitimately added?" This is the question that Socrates puts into the mouth of personified Rhetoric: "I do not compel anyone to learn to speak without knowing the truth, but if my advice is of any value, he learns that first and then acquires me. So what I claim is this, that without my help the knowledge of the truth does not give the art of persuasion." As has been brought out previously in this treatise, Weaver sees dialectic and rhetoric in complementary roles: "Dialectic is a method of investigation whose object is the establishment of truth about doubtful propositions" while "rhetoric as we have discussed it in relation to the lovers consists of truth plus its artful presentation. . . ."

In the Aristotelian scheme ethos had three elements—intelligence, character, and good will. The purpose of this part of the dissertation will be to bring together under the Aristotelian rubrics Weavers' treatment of ethos and to thus enunciate criteria to evaluate Mr. Buckley's ethos.

Weaver variously referred to the rhetorician as a dialectician, a scientist, and a teacher; all of these designations would indicate that he expected a high level of intelligence and competency. In the Weaverian scheme

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39Ibid., p. 15.
40Ibid.
41The Rhetoric of Aristotle, II, 1.
"dialectic always tries to discover the real syllogism in the argument whereas rhetoric tries to discover the real means of persuasion."  

Therefore, Weaver avers:

Any piece of persuasion, therefore, will contain as its first process a dialectic establishing terms which have to do with policy.

There is, then, no true rhetoric without dialectic, for the dialectic provides that basis of "high speculation about nature" without which rhetoric in the narrower sense has nothing to work upon. . .  

Weaver's ideal rhetorician has the bent and knowledge of the processes of the philosopher and dialectician. As a dialectician he is able to ascertain truth and as a rhetorician he is able to present it in the most rational and appealing mode to his audience.

Weaver's ideal rhetorician is also a scientist. Although he expressed skepticism of many conclusions drawn from science in the sociological and theological realm and warned against the uncritical acceptance of everything put forth under the guise of science, he recognized the great prestige of science and its contributions to society.

Defining rhetoric thus as the art of persuasion does not, however, divorce it entirely from scientific knowledge. My view is that the complete rhetorician is the man of knowledge who has learned, in addition to his knowledge, certain arts of appeal which have to do with the inspiring of feeling. . . . A rhetoric without a basis in science is inconceivable, because people are moved to action by how they "read" the world of phenomena of existence, and science is the means of representing these in their existential bearings. 

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42 Weaver, *Visions of Order*, p. 63.
43 Weaver, *Ethics of Rhetoric*, p. 17.
Weaver, however, saw a distinct difference in the scientist and the rhetorician. The scientist's responsibility is to discover facts and relationships in the physical realm while the rhetorician puts the scientific data in perspective and places it in an axiological system. The scientist qua scientist should be concerned only with "positive" terms; when he employs "dialectical" terms Weaver becomes increasingly skeptical of him. The respective spheres and duties of the scientist and rhetorician are delineated by Weaver:

The difference is that science is a partial universe of discourse, which is concerned only with facts and the relationships between them. Rhetoric is concerned with a wider realm, since it must include both the scientific occurrence and the axiological ordering of these facts. For the rhetorician the tendency of the statement is the primary thing, because it indicates his position or point of view in his universe of discourse. Rhetorical presentation always carries perspective. The scientific inquirer, on the other hand, is merely noting things as they exist in empirical conjunction. He is not passing judgment on them because his presentment, as long as it remains scientific, is not supposed to be anything more than classificatory. 45

The rhetorician must also be a teacher or educator. The "evil-lover" (or base-rhetorician) "seeks to keep the understanding in a passive state by never permitting an honest examination of alternatives. Nothing is more feared by him than a true dialectic. . . . The beloved is thus emasculated in understanding in order that the lover may have his way." 46 The attitude of the "true-lover" or noble


46 Weaver, Ethics of Rhetoric, pp. 11, 12.
rhetorician would be just the opposite. He would attempt to stimulate thinking and independence on the part of the beloved and would strive for an honest examination of the alternatives. As a "lover of truth" genuinely concerned for the well-being of his beloved, he would have no fear of the most honest and penetrating examination of the issues and alternatives. Thus, to Weaver "The complete man (ideal rhetorician), then is the "lover" added to the scientist; the rhetorician to the dialectician."47

The second element of Aristotelian ethos is character or integrity. As already indicated by the use of the terms "true-rhetorician," "Virtuous rhetorician," "honest rhetorician," "noble-lover," "true-lover," etc., Weaver demands a high level of integrity of the rhetorician. He is a "lover of truth," a "noble lover of the good," who "will not urge a perversion of justice. . . ."48

In keeping with the third element of the Aristotelian scheme, the noble rhetorician is a man of good will. He is not interested in his own self-aggrandisement or self-gratification, but is genuinely interested in the welfare and well-being of the beloved. In contradistinction to the evil-lover or base-rhetorician who is exploitive, the noble lover is benevolent: "The noble lover . . . 'follows the beloved in reverence and awe.' So those who are filled with this kind of love exhibit no jealousy or meanness toward the

48 Ibid., pp. 10-17.
loved one, but endeavor by every means in their power to lead him to the likeness of the god whom they honor. 49

Weaver's conception of ethos—its nature, elements, and importance—is very much in the classical mold with perhaps even a little more emphasis on the moral aspects and obligations of the speaker. Thus for him, "... the orator is a teacher, and a moral teacher at that." 50 So strongly does Weaver perceive this moral obligation that he labels the rhetorician as a preacher:

Language ... is ... sermonic. We are all of us preachers in private or public capacities. We have no sooner uttered words than we have given impulse to other people to look at the world, or some part of it, in our way. Thus caught up in a great web of inter-communication and inter-influence, we speak as rhetoricians affecting one another for good or ill. That is why I agree with Quintilian that the true orator is the good man, skilled in speaking—good in his formed character and right in his ethical philosophy. When to this he adds fertility in invention and skill in the arts of language, he is entitled to that leadership which tradition accords him.

... finally, we must never lose sight of the order of values as the ultimate sanction of rhetoric. No one can live a life of direction and purpose without some scheme of values. As rhetoric confronts us with choices involving values, the rhetorician is a preacher to us, noble if he tries to direct our passion toward noble ends and base if he uses our passion to confuse and degrade us. ... 51

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49 Ibid., p. 13.

50 Weaver, Visions of Order, p. 67.

51 Johannesen, Strickland, Eubanks, Language is Sermonic, pp. 224, 25.
Logical Proof—The Hierarchy of Topics

Richard Weaver's theory of rhetoric is most unique in his treatment of logos. In analyzing and synthesizing these concepts it is impossible to separate his rhetorical theory from his conservatism and metaphysics, so intricately are they intertwined. He is in his treatment of logos primarily concerned with the sources and means of the rhetoricians's arguments. As Aristotle originally, and Cicero, Quintilian, and others subsequently formulated a list of topics for argument, so Weaver developed a "hierarchy of topics" which reflect his own view of reality and of the nature and function of rhetoric. "Topics" (τόπος) constitute a set of "places" (loci) or "regions" where one goes to find the substance of persuasive argument or according to Cicero "the seat of an argument."

Weaver believed that the proper place to begin a rhetorical study of a speaker's argument is with his sources. He believed that the sources and means of argument would reveal the speaker's philosophy or metaphysics. He further felt that one could properly label a speaker "liberal" or "conservative" on the basis of his habitual choice of arguments:

... the reasoner reveals his philosophical position by the source of argument which appears most often in his major premise because the major premise tells us how he is thinking about the world. In other words, the rhetorical content of the major premise which the speaker habitually uses is the key to his primary view of existence. We are of course excluding artful choices which have in view only ad hoc persuasions. Putting the
matter now figuratively, we may say that no man escapes being branded by the premise that he regards as most efficacious in an argument. The general importance of this is that major premises, in addition to their logical function as part of a deductive argument, are expressive of values, and a characteristic major premise characterizes the user.52

Weaver's premise is that a speaker's method of argument must of necessity reflect his concept of the world and his values: "... we suggest here that a man's method of argument is a truer index in his beliefs than his explicit profession of principles."53 The writer has discovered some problems in Weaver's analysis and some apparent contradictions which he will deal with later, but on the whole he finds the Weaverian analysis meaningful, applicable, and most appropriate to the analysis of William F. Buckley's speaking.

The honest rhetorician according to Weaver has two things in mind: "a vision of how matters should go ideally and ethically and a consideration of the special circumstances of his auditors."54 His responsibility to the "order of goods" or to "the hierarchy of realities" will determine his use of the topics:

When we think of rhetoric as one of the arts of civil society ... we see that the rhetorician is faced with a choice of means in appealing to those whom

52Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 55.
53Ibid., p. 58.
54Nebergall, Dimensions of Rhetorical Scholarship, p. 54.
he can prevail upon to listen to him. If he is at all philosophical, it must occur to him to ask whether there is a standard by which the sources of persuasion can be ranked. In a phrase, is there a preferred order of them, so that in a scale of ethics, it is nobler to make use of one sort of appeal than another? . . . Obviously this question cannot be answered at all in the absence of some conviction about the nature and destiny of man. Rhetoric inevitably impinges upon morality and politics; and if it is one of the means by which we endeavor to improve the character and the lot of men, we have to think of its methods and sources in relation to a scheme of values.

To focus the problem a little more sharply, when one is asking men to cooperate with him in thinking this or doing that, when is he asking in the name of the highest reality, which is the same as saying, when is he asking in the name of their highest good? Weaver continues in some detail to reveal his own meta-physics. In doing so he also indicates that his hierarchy is one of priority not just or necessarily of effectiveness but more important of ethics. One should utilize arguments or sources beginning at the top rung of the hierarchy because he is morally obligated to do so:

Naturally, when the speaker replies to this question, he is going to express his philosophy, or more precisely, his metaphysics. My personal reply would be that he is making the highest order of appeal when he is basing his case on definition or the nature of the thing. I confess that this goes back to a very primitive meta-physics, which holds that the highest reality is being, not becoming. It is a quasi-religious metaphysics, if you will, because it ascribes to the highest reality qualities of statis, immutability, eternal perdurance—qualities that in Western civilization are usually expressed in the language of theism. That which is perfect does not change; that which has to change is less perfect. Therefore, if it is possible to determine unchanging essences or qualities and to speak in terms of these, one is appealing to what is most real in so doing. From another point of view, this is but getting people to see what is most permanent in existence, or what transcends the world of change and accident. The

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55 Nebergall, Dimensions of Rhetorical Scholarship, p. 55.
realm of essence is the realm above the flux of phenomena, and definitions are of essences and genera.  

Weaver's hierarchy is derived from concepts that have enjoyed currency among philosophers for centuries and relate to the world of reality:

In reading or interpreting the world of reality, we make use of four very general ideas. The first three are usually expressed, in the language of philosophy, as being, cause, and relationship. The fourth, which stands apart from these because it is an external source, is testimony and authority.  

In more specific terms the hierarchy is:

1. Argument from genus or definition
2. Argument from similitude
3. Argument from cause and effect
   a. Argument from consequences
   b. Argument from circumstances
4. Argument from authority or testimony

The first three sources are "internal" because "they involve our own interpretation of experience;" the fourth is "external" because it "utilizes the interpretation of others."  

Argument From Genus

The argument from genus always constitutes the top rung of Weaver's hierarchy of topics thus ". . . the speaker 

56 Ibid., p. 212.
57 Ibid., p. 53.
is making the highest order of appeal when he is basing his case on definition or the nature of things.\textsuperscript{59} The process is to predicate an argument on the essential nature of things: "It depends for its force upon the principle that there are fixed classes, and that what is true of a class may be imputed to every member of that class. In other words, any object will have the generic attributes of the class to which it belongs."\textsuperscript{60}

This mode of argument reflects a teleological concept of the universe, and is more natural to one of fundamental religious beliefs or of Platonic idealism. It has strong moral or axiological tendencies. Weaver's definitions reflect the "ought" imperative rather than merely the "is" of human reality. He avers that rhetoric impinges on morality and politics and constitutes a means for improving the character of man. Therefore it must be concerned with values, essences, and fundamental principles:

\textsuperscript{59}Nebergall, \textit{Dimensions of Rhetorical Scholarship}, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{60}Weaver, \textit{Rhetoric and Composition}, pp. 137-38.
top of the hierarchy. If the real progress of man is toward knowledge of ideal truth, it follows that this is an appeal to his highest capacity—his capacity to apprehend what exists absolutely.61

Arguments from genus and from definition are essentially the same in character. In both cases one argues from the nature of a thing or from a fixed classification. In argument from genus the classification is already established; in the argument from definition, the classification must be established in the course of the argument. Weaver also considers argument from example to be an argument from genus since the example is exemplary or exemplifies, i.e. implies a general class.62

Arguments from genus are made through induction and deduction. The argument from example would of course be an inductive process. It presents a series of examples and infers a general class thus producing its conclusion or generalization. Argument from genus and definition proceeds deductively by taking established propositions—or in the case of definition, establishing the proposition during the argument—and drawing (deducing) the conclusion. Weaver cites the classical syllogism—All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; Socrates is mortal—as an example of the argument from genus. Since the attribute "mortal" is attributed to all members of the class—man—it is attributed to the

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61 Nebergall, Dimension of Rhetorical Scholarship, pp. 55,56.

62 Weaver, Rhetoric and Composition, pp. 137-40.
individual man, in this case, Socrates. In addition to the "categorical" syllogism, Weaver treats the "hypothetical" and the "alternative" (disjunctive) syllogisms. 63

Since argument from genus most often appears in rhetorical discourse in the form of the enthymeme, Weaver has sought its explication and to emphasize its special utility for the persuasive speaker. He conceives of the enthymeme or rhetorical syllogism as a syllogism with one of the premises missing. The speaker can afford to leave it out because the audience will immediately supply it—it is implicit and to articulate it would be awkward and superfluous and perhaps even condescending to the audience since one would be stating that which is perfectly obvious to the auditors: 64

. . . dialectic makes use of inductions and syllogisms, whereas rhetoric makes use of examples and enthymemes . . . . Now the example is something taken from life, and the force of the example comes from the fact that it is or was. It is the thing already possessed in experience and so it is the property of everyone through the sharing of a common past . . . .

The relation of rhetoric to "things in being" appears even more closely in the "rhetorical syllogism." The enthymeme, as students of logic learn, is a syllogism with one of the propositions missing . . . . Propositions which can be assumed in this manner are settled beliefs, standing convictions, and attitudes of the people. They are the "topics" to which he goes for his sources of persuasion.

Through employment of the enthymeme, the rhetorician enters into a solidarity with the audience

63 Ibid., pp. 119-32.

64 This is true of the noble-rhetorician; the "politician" and "ad" man may leave his out to sneak a shaky premise by an unwary audience.
by tacitly agreeing with one of its perceptions of reality. This step of course enables him to pass on to his conclusion.65

Weaver used his hierarchy of topics to analyze the rhetorical efforts of a number of well-known orators. He cites John Henry Newman as one who "regularly argues from genus; he begins with the nature of the thing and then makes the application."66 His most extensive analyses in which he uses the hierarchy of topics is applied to Abraham Lincoln and Edmund Burke. His analyses led him to conclude that Burke "characteristically" argued from circumstances while Lincoln "habitually" argued from genus.

Those who prefer to argue from genus are idealists. They are able to move past the peripheral and ephemeral to the center or heart of the issue. Weaver finds that Lincoln formed very definite attitudes and premises about the nature of man early in his youth:

The evidence that Lincoln held such belief is overwhelming; it characterizes his thinking from an early age; and the greatest of his utterances (except the Gettysburg Address, which is based on similitude) are chiefly arguments from definition. . . . (He) came to the conclusion that human nature is a fixed and knowable thing. Many of his early judgments of policy are based on the theory of what the human being qua human being will do in a given situation.67

Lincoln's personality and rational approach to situations and problems ideally fitted him to deal with the issue of

65 Weaver, Visions of Order, pp. 63, 64.
66 Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 56.
67 Ibid., p. 87.
slavery. Weaver asserts that when all of the excitement and side issues are stripped away, the conflict between North and South was really another debate about the nature of man:

Yet while other political leaders were looking to the law, to American history, and to this or that political contingency, Lincoln looked—as it was his habit always to do—to the center; that is, to the definition of man. Was the Negro a man or was he not? It can be shown that his answer to this question never varied. . . .68

Weaver demonstrates how rhetorical criticism employing the hierarchy of topics would proceed in his essay on Lincoln. In addition to examples from numerous speeches by Lincoln, he takes his First Inaugural Address—"surely from the standpoint of topical organization one of the most notable American state papers"—and analyzes it in detail: "of the fourteen distinguishable arguments in this address, eight are arguments from definition or genus. Of the six remaining, two are from consequences, two from circumstances, one from contraries, and one from similitude. The proportion tells its own story."69 Weaver articulates and analyzes the eight arguments showing how they are predicated upon definition or genus thus giving a practical lesson on how his rhetorical criticism might be carried out.

Weaver believed that "a much surer index to a man's political philosophy is his characteristic way of thinking,

68 Ibid., pp. 90, 91.
69 Ibid., p. 87.
inevitably expressed in the type of argument he prefers."

The type of argument chosen most clearly reveals the speaker's principle of integration. Weaver believed that Lincoln's approach to argument gave him one quality in which he was unrivalled by any other American leader—the quality of perspective: "To define is to assume perspective; that is the method of definition." Thus Weaver concludes that "those who prefer the argument from definition, as Lincoln did, are conservatives in the legitimate sense of the word."^70

Weaver concludes that an analysis of Lincoln's sources of argument reveal him to be a model conservative in spite of the fact that "he has become a patron for liberals and pragmatists."^71

**Argument From Similitude**

Argument from similitude—including analogy, metaphor, figuration, comparison, and contrast—ranks second in Weaver's hierarchy of topics although he is somewhat tentative about placing it in this position and points out its weakness. Weaver points out how it differs from argument from genus;

Whereas those who argue from genus argue from a fixed class, those who argue from similitude invoke essential (though not exhaustive) correspondences. . . . If required to characterize the outlook it implies, we should say that it expresses belief in a oneness of the world, which causes all correspondence to have probative

^70 Ibid., p. 112.
^71 Ibid., p. 56.
value. Proponents of this view tend to look toward some final, transcendental unity, and as we might expect, this type of argument is used widely by poets and religionists.\textsuperscript{72}

Weaver's Platonic idealism is revealed in giving such high ranking to argument from similitude. He believed that some of our profoundest intuitions about the world are made in the form of analogies. He saw this type of observation and mode of argument as particularly characteristic of poets whom he praised as offering "the fairest hope of restoring our lost unity of mind" and "the quickest to comprehend necessary truth."\textsuperscript{73} He cites John Bunyan and Ralph Waldo Emerson as constant users of the argument from similitude and Lincoln's Gettysburg Address as a model of this type of argument.

Argument from similitude proceeds by an inductive process although it lacks the strength of an inductive argument. It rests on the theory that known similarities between two things implies still further similarities:

"Thus if A is known to have a certain set of characteristics and B is known to have all of the same characteristics save one (but is not known to lack that one), it is probable that B has the one characteristic which has not yet been ascertained." Analogy, then, is used to establish probability instead of proof in the strictest sense and "is used to show

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., pp. 56, 57.

\textsuperscript{73}Johannesen, Strickland, Eubanks, \textit{Language is Sermonic}, pp. 48-55.
that something which cannot be directly observed probably exists or is true." It is a subvariety of induction in that it is a means of reaching conclusions on the basis of comparison or similarity, but it differs in that it does not establish a general class. In inductive argument there must be a minimum of two examples or instances to form the generalization. Analogy, however, moves from the single instance to the instance about which the predication is to be made: "Accordingly, analogy rests upon fewer than two known instances of any phenomenon. It does not pass through a general class." 74

Weaver did not want to destroy all confidence in argument from similitude, however: "This must not be taken to mean that analogy has no value as argument, because probability is a relative matter. It may range all the way from the negligible to that which falls just short of certainty." 75 Weaver further explained by use of a hypothetical syllogism how argument from similitude works. The major premise asserts the principle of similarity, the minor premise then asserts the fact of the similarity, and the conclusion asserts the probability of still further similarity:

If S resembles P in X particulars, it is probable that S resembles P in one or more further particulars. S does resemble P in X particulars.

74 Weaver, Rhetoric and Composition, p. 116, 117.
75 Ibid., p. 117.
Therefore it is probable that $S$ resembles $P$ in one or more further particulars.\footnote{Ibid., p. 142.}

The strength of the analogy will depend on the number and pertinency of the similarities between the two instances. There must, of course, be no negative evidence or the argument is weakened or destroyed.

**Argument From Cause and Effect**

The argument from cause and effect was to Weaver a less exalted source of argument; he acquiesced to its use "only because we are historical men."\footnote{Nebergall, *Dimensions of Rhetorical Scholarship*, p. 56.} The two sub-varieties—argument from consequence and circumstance—were especially undesirable to him. His aversion to this type of argument results as already discussed from his metaphysics and Platonic idealism. To Weaver such an argument is completely devoid of all reference to principles and defined ideas: "It is the least philosophical of all the sources of argument, since theoretically it stops at the level of perception of fact."\footnote{Weaver, *The Ethics of Rhetoric*, p. 57.}

The cause-effect argument seeks to forge a cause-effect linkage convincing to the audience:

It affirms that a given cause implies an effect of proportionate gravity, or that a given effect implies a cause of proportionate gravity. Accordingly, if there is a serious cause, we shall find ourselves in a serious plight; if we are now in a serious plight, there must exist a serious cause.
Weaver makes the method of the cause-effect argument clearer by showing how it might appear in a syllogism:

Extravagance produces want.
This is a case of extravagance.
This is a case which will produce want. 79

If we accept the cause-effect relationship asserted in the major premise, we may be moved to accept the remedial action or policy that is advocated. The causal argument was not quite so undesirable to Weaver as its subvarieties—consequence and circumstance—since it did at least go beyond the mere perception of facts and attempt to analyze the cause-effect relationship.

The two subvarieties are distinguishable in that consequences focus in on effect—neglecting cause—while circumstances centers in on present conditions without a thorough analysis of effects: "Whereas the argument from consequences attempts a forecast of result, the argument from circumstances attempts only an estimate of current conditions or pressures." 80

Weaver asserts that those who are partial to cause-effect arguments are pragmatists. He finds this type of argument most frequently in journalistic articles, political speeches, and commercial advertisements. Such generally consists of a series of arguments from consequences completely devoid of reference to principles and defined ideas.

79 Weaver, Rhetoric and Composition, p. 142.
80 Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 57.
This type of source easily converts to the sensational and "plays too much on the fears of the audience by stressing the awful nature of some consequence or by exaggerating the power of some cause."81

The argument from circumstances is to Weaver the least philosophical and admits of the least perspicaciousness of any mode of argument. It is used when one doesn't know any other thing to argue; thus he might say, "There is nothing else to be done about it." Another common form of this argument is the frequently heard, "We must adapt ourselves to a fast changing world." Weaver felt that this type of argument constituted "a surrender of reason." It simply "reads the circumstances or the 'facts standing around'--and accepts them as coercive, or allows them to dictate the decision."82 As Weaver expressed it in another essay, "It simply cites a brute circumstance and says, 'Step lively,'"83 For this reason he concluded "As the name suggests, it is the nearest of all argument to purest expediency. . . . By thus making present circumstances the overbearing consideration, it keeps from sight even the nexus of cause and effect."84

81Nebergall, The Dimensions of Rhetorical Scholarship, p. 56.
82Ibid., p. 57; Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 57.
83Nebergall, The Dimensions of Rhetorical Scholarship, p. 57.
84Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 57.
Weaver was not denying the effectiveness of argument from circumstances, but in the long-run he felt it was an unwise choice and that it revealed a basic philosophical and ethical weakness on the part of its habitual user.

... As far as mere methods go, there is nothing to object to in the argument from circumstances, for undeniably it has a power to move. Yet it has this power through a widely shared human weakness, which turns out on examination to be shortsightedness. ... When all the criteria are brought to bear, then, this is an inferior argument, which reflects adversely upon any habitual user and generally punishes with failure.85

Weaver felt that argument from circumstances "savors of urgency rather than of perspicacity; and it seems to be preferred by those who are easily impressed by existing tangibles." He believed that "the argument from circumstance is the argument philosophically appropriate to the liberal."86 Although it would at first appear strange to most people, he cites Edmund Burke as one who habitually used the argument from circumstance.

... Edmund Burke's famous speech on conciliation with the colonies is filled with appeals to this source. Indeed, the central point of the speech may be called an argument from circumstance, for Burke was saying to Parliament: since the American colonies are so strong now, and have such a mighty potential for the future, and are so far removed from us, what are you going to do except make peace with them through concessions? The statement often quoted from this speech, "I do not know the method of drawing up an indictment against a whole people," is again purely an argument from circumstance, because it maintains that the circumstance of the offenders' being a whole people overshadows the normal course of the law. But the source is seen in its clearest aspect when Burke, after reviewing

85 Ibid., p. 83.
86 Ibid., pp. 57, 58.
the fierce spirit of the colonists, declares: "The question is not, whether this spirit deserves praise or blame, but—what, in the name of God, shall we do with it?"87

Weaver's analysis of the sources of Burke's arguments led him to conclude that Burke "must be described as a liberal" in spite of the fact that many regard him to be the "Father of Conservatism."88

This section of the dissertation has sought to explicate the "internal" sources of Weaver's hierarchy of topics. Perhaps the best summary of these sources is that given by Weaver himself:

. . . If a leader asks only consequences, he will find himself involved in naked competition of forces. If he asks only circumstances, he will find himself intimidated against all vision. But if he asks for principle, he may get that, all tied up and complete, and though purchased at a price, paid for. Therefore it is of first importance whether a leader has the courage to define. Nowhere does a man's rhetoric catch up with him more completely than in the topics he chooses to win other men's assent.89

Argument From Testimony and Authority

Standing apart from the "internal" sources of argument is the "external" topic of testimony and authority. This source makes use of the internal sources not as they are used and interpreted by the speaker himself, but as they are seen through the eyes of others, hence they are imported

87 Weaver, Rhetoric and Composition, p. 141.
88 Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 112.
89 Ibid., p. 114.
from the outside. In appraising the rhetorical force of such arguments, one must regard them not as fact but as testimony or authority. Argument from testimony introduces the statements or arguments of someone else who is presumed to be in a position to know. The source of argument he presents must be judged on the same basis as the type of internal source that it constitutes. Argument from authority "brings in a great name or some other exalted source whose word on the subject is recognized as final. Such arguments reflect a supposition that it would be presumptuous to go beyond the authority." 90 Weaver recognized the necessity for this type of argument and suggests a sound maxim for judging it: "... As the world piles up bodies of specialized knowledge which no person can hope to command, arguments based on authority are certainly not going to disappear. The sound maxim is that an argument based on authority is as good as the authority." 91

Critique of Weaver's Hierarchy of Topics

The most obvious observation on Weaver's hierarchy of topics is that it represents his own thinking and reflects his own philosophical views. Naturally everyone will not accept his hierarchy as valid in spite of his strongly articulated rationale. Secondly, to expect a person to

90 Weaver, Rhetoric and Composition, p. 145.

91 Nebergall, Dimensions of Rhetorical Scholarship, p. 57.
practice such consistency over a lifetime in the selection of his sources of argument is to expect a lot from human beings. John Henry Newman and Abraham Lincoln may have exhibited a very high degree of consistency, but one suspects that they represent the exceptions rather than the rule. Weaver himself demonstrated remarkable consistency—during his mature years, after his early flirtation with socialism—but his was obviously the case of a man who once having arrived at a philosophical position mapped out a rhetorical strategy over a period of decades to validate that position. Weaver was himself a master rhetorician; as suggested by his close friends, Donald Davidson, Ralph Eubanks, Eliseo Vivas, George Core, and M. E. Bradford, the explanation of his rhetorical system was a necessary prerequisite to achieving his goal—acceptance by the general public of the principles and ideas embodied in Platonic idealism, Christian metaphysics, and Southern Agrarianism.\textsuperscript{92}

There are some possible contradictions between Weaver's hierarchy of arguments and other aspects of his rhetorical theory. He places considerable emphasis on audience adaptation while strongly insisting that the speaker employ arguments from genus, definition, and similitude and that he shun arguments from cause-effect, consequences, and circumstances:

\textsuperscript{92}Weaver, \textit{The Southern Tradition at Bay}, pp. 10-24; Weaver, \textit{Life Without Prejudice}, pp. vii-xvii; Johannesen, Strickland, and Eubanks, \textit{Language is Sermonic}, pp. 3-6.
Yet there is one further fact, more decisive than any of these to prove that rhetoric is addressed to man in his humanity. Every speech which is designed to move is directed to a special audience in its unique situation. . . . Here is but a way of pointing out that rhetoric is intended for historical man, or for man as conditioned by history. It is part of the conditio humana that we live at particular times and in particular places. These are productive of special or unique urgencies, which the speaker has got to recognize and to estimate. . . .

. . . The honest rhetorician therefore has two things in mind: a vision of how matters should go ideally and ethically and a consideration of the special circumstances of the auditors. Toward both of these he has a responsibility. . . .

. . . This means that the speaker or writer has got to have a rhetorical perception of what his audience needs or will receive or respond to. He takes into account the reality of man's composit being and his tendency to be swayed by sentiment. He estimates the pressures of the particular situation in which his auditors are found. In the eyes of those who look sourly upon the art, he is a man probing for weaknesses which he means to exploit.93

This poses a problem for the rhetorical critic; how can he ascertain when the speaker's choice of argument reflects his own philosophical position and when does it reveal audience adaptation? While one might wish to present a high-level argument reflecting a strong philosophical and dialectical base, wisdom might dictate a low-level argument—for example, argument from circumstance—because of the intellectual level of the audience, the urgency of the present conditions, or because the higher-level arguments might be lacking in emotional stimulation. To employ an analogy, a medical doctor often has to prescribe medicine to alleviate symptoms. He knows that the symptoms are not the disease

93 Nebergall, Dimensions of Rhetorical Scholarship, pp. 51, 54, 58.
and that they will disappear with the curing of the disease, but he also knows that the prescription is necessary to give the patient the relief and peace of mind that is necessary for optimal recovery conditions. Too, doctors know that many illnesses will cure themselves in time; thus they relieve the symptoms so that the patient is comfortable during the passing of the healing process of time. The point is that often present conditions (i.e. circumstances) present such exigency that they overshadow root causes, principles, and ideals and the speaker finds himself forced to deal with them even though he recognizes them as peripheral, ephemeral, and symptomatic.

Weaver also admits the possibility of ad hoc arguments on the part of the speaker:

... But the reasoner reveals his philosophical position by the source of argument which appears most often in his major premise because the major premise tells us how he is thinking about the world. In other words, the rhetorical content of the major premise which the speaker habitually uses is the key to his primary view of existence. We are of course excluding artful choices which have in view only ad hoc persuasions. ...  

Again, how does the critic distinguish between those arguments which truly reflect the speaker's philosophical position and those that are merely ad hoc or artful choices?  

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94 Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 55.

To both of these questions Weaver would reply that regardless of arguments that are sometimes a tactful adaptation to one's audience or are simple an ad hoc choice, there will be a "prevailing source" which gives to the argument an "aspect" that can be analyzed and will reveal the philosophy of the speaker.

... Since almost any extended argument will draw upon more than one source we must look ... at the prevailing source, or the source which is most frequently called upon in the total persuasive effort. ... this predominating source gives to the argument an aspect. ... no man escapes being branded by the premise that he regards as most efficacious in an argument. The general importance of this is that major premises, in addition to their logical function as part of a deductive argument, are expressive of values and a characteristic major premise characterizes the user.96

Summary

In spite of some questions and problems involved in applying Weaver's hierarchy of topics as a method of rhetorical criticism, this investigator believes that they constitute no more than the usual difficulties involved in applying a particular method of rhetorical criticism. He believes that valuable insights can accrue from scrutinizing more closely the philosophical base and analyzing the sources and validity of the speaker's arguments. Therefore, the major task of this dissertation is to utilize Weaver's hierarchy of topics in analyzing selected speeches of William F. Buckley, Jr.

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96 Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 55.
Buckley's Heritage and Primary Influences

Traditionally rhetorical criticism has viewed the speaker as a product of his forebears and social and cultural influences. The Dean of rhetorical criticism, A. Craig Baird, wrote: "The speaker . . . is the product of the home, school, associates, and the other earlier experiences and relationships that mold his speaking personality and capacities. . . . these formative influences are important in accounting for his later speaking characteristics."\(^1\)

This emphasis on the factors that shape the speaker's personality and determine his abilities and attitudes are consonant with Richard Weaver's view that the individual is uniquely a product of historical factors: " . . . rhetoric is intended for historical man, or for man as conditioned by history. It is part of the conditio humana that we live at particular times and in particular places. . . . man . . . is not a creature abstracted from time and place. . . . As long as man is born into history, he will be feeling and


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responding to historical pressures."^2 While Weaver is here speaking of humans as auditors or members of the audience, the observation would obviously be just as true of man when he is speaker. In keeping with this idea and the rhetorical tradition, the purpose of this chapter is to describe, interpret, and evaluate influences in the life of William F. Buckley, Jr. that have molded his personality, determined his abilities and attitudes, and made him so uniquely the epitome of the conservative ethos.

William F. Buckley, Jr. was born in New York City November 24, 1925. The place of his birth, however, belies the areas of the country and of the world and the cultural influences that have been the strongest in forming his personality and philosophy. Therefore, one must closely scrutinize those factors that have been most potent in molding what is universally recognized by those who know Buckley through his writing or speaking as a strong and inimitable personality. Those influences that have been strongest in molding Buckley and shaping his career are the influence of his home and family, education, religion, associates, and professional experiences. Each of these will be examined to determine the nature and extent of the influence.

**Home and Family Influence**

The first direct ancestor of the Buckleys to arrive in America emigrated to Canada from Ireland in the mid

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^2Nebergall, *Dimensions of Rhetorical Scholarship*, pp. 51, 52.
1800's because of the Catholic-Protestant agitation in his native Ireland. This great-grandfather of William F. Buckley, Jr., an Irish Protestant who married a Catholic, settled with his family in Ontario, Canada, where he reared his family in an atmosphere free from the intense religious antipathy that had developed in Ireland. Although a Protestant, he permitted his children to be raised as devout Catholics and family legend reports that he accepted the last Sacraments just before he died. However, upon hearing this as it was told to William F. Buckley, (Sr.) by his mother, the skeptical father whispered in his young son's ear: "He must have been unconscious."

From Ontario one son, John Buckley moved to Texas. John served several terms as sheriff of Duval County located in the extreme southern part of Texas near the Mexican border. According to family history, John was in the family tradition a man of strong will and convictions, "Like his father--and his son--he was prone to unpopular attitudes: he was a sheep raiser in cattle country, and (although sheriff for several terms) never used a gun in his life." He died at the age of fifty-four in 1904 from a stroke leaving his widow and five children, the eldest of whom was William F. Buckley.

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3Buckley and Buckley, W.F.B.--An Appreciation, p. 5.
Van Zandt Wheeler, a close friend and neighbor of William F. Buckley, wrote of William F. Buckley, Jr., "As a writer, speaker, and debater, his son, Bill, was the essence of all W.F.B. himself had stood and fought for politically." This writer is convinced that the strongest molding influences on William F. Buckley, Jr. were parental and family, that the paternal was predominate, and that it is impossible to understand and evaluate his personality and attitudes without knowing his history and biography. Buckley's father, William F. Buckley, Sr., was born in Texas on July 11, 1881, and was raised in San Diago, Duval County, where his parents had moved from Washington County when he was one year old.

San Diago was a typical Spanish-Mexican town of 2,000. Approximately ninety per cent of the citizenry were Mexican or Spanish in origin. The rest of the inhabitants represented many states of the United States as well as many foreign countries. Though English was the official language of the state, county, and the public schools, with about ninety per cent of the population of Spanish or Mexican descent, the Spanish language predominated in business and social circles. Social activities centered around such activities as were typical in the Mexican-American towns along the border at the turn of the century—dancing, horseracing, cock-fighting, plays, circuses, medicine shows, itinerant entertainers from Mexico, celebrations of national (Mexican and American) holidays and religious observances. Although

\[4\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 257.}\]
the general area was strong Baptist country, the Catholic Church was a strong influence in the communities which Irish families like the Buckleys as well as the Mexicans found congenial and pervasive in their lives.

In this atmosphere William F. Buckley grew to manhood and formed strong impressions and convictions which were strengthened and reinforced by subsequent experiences in earning a law degree, getting started in the law profession in Mexico during the period of frequent revolutions, and learning his way as a pioneer independent speculator in oil which he passed on to his own children and grandchildren. After graduating from high school, William taught school near San Diego for two years. In 1902 at the age of twenty-three he matriculated at the University of Texas in Austin. William had learned to speak Spanish fluently while growing up in San Diego and teaching in a school where ninety-five per cent of the students were Castilian. His mastery of the Castilian language later proved invaluable to him both while he was a student in the university and in later life. At the University of Texas he was a student assistant in Spanish and while he was still a student secured a job as Spanish Translator of the General Land Office of the University of Texas thus earning much of his support as he pursued the bachelor's and law degree.

Buckley remained in Austin one year after attaining the law degree as an employee of the American Security Company. In 1908 he moved to Mexico City and began
practicing law with his brother Claude. They soon opened an office in Tampico, the center of Mexico's oil industry, in order to capture the legal business of the many large oil firms operating in the area. Buckley and Buckley soon became the area's leading law firm representing most of the large oil companies. William deplored the lack of honesty and respect of many of the oil speculators from the United States and other foreign countries as they sought to exploit the innocence and ignorance of the Mexican people and their government officials. He identified more with the Mexican people and was appalled at the avarice and unscrupulousness of the foreign investors who sought only to become wealthy at the expense of the Mexican people and the untapped resources of the country.

During the years between 1908-14, Buckley gained considerable prominence as a lawyer, real estate developer, and oil investor. When the United States Marines captured Vera Cruz in 1914, ostensibly to protect the lives and investments of American citizens during the turbulent revolutionary period, the Wilson Administration asked Buckley to serve as Civil Governor of the province, but Buckley indignantly refused, sharply disagreeing with Wilson's policy. He was subsequently appointed counsel to the Mexican government at the ensuing "A.B.C." conference in Niagara Falls that was set up to mediate the situation. Buckley opposed the policy of the Wilson administration throughout this
period and gave extensive testimony before the United States Subcommittee on Foreign Relations in 1919.5

Buckley founded the Pantepec Oil Company of Mexico during this period. He was expelled from Mexico in 1921 as a "pernicious foreigner" after leading the American opposition to the recognition of the revolutionary government of General Alvaro Obregón who received the covert support of the United States government. He had to abandon $1,000,000 of properties and barely escaped with his life. In 1924 he was invited to return to Mexico by President Callas, but long and bitter experience had taught him that Mexico's politics was too unstable for foreign investors, even for those who would have settled permanently like himself.

After a thorough personal investigation he secured the oil concessions on 3,000,000 acres of promising land in Venezuela and transferred his oil company to that country. From the Pantepec Oil Company in the next three decades there sprang almost a dozen other companies. Oil rights were attained in Florida, Canada, the Philippines, Israel, Australia, and Guatemala. Buckley's method of operation was to discover promising oil fields ahead of the major oil companies, tie up the oil concessions, and then convince the major corporations to bear the expense of drilling for (usually) half of the profits. In 1947 Buckley formed the Catawba corporation with headquarters in New York City to

5The full manuscript of this testimony is reprinted in W.F.B.—An Appreciation, pp. 51-133.
provide the brains and expertise for the other Buckley companies. From the big oil strike in Venezuela on the eve of World War II by Standard Oil Company on Buckley's land through the 40s and 50s, Buckley's fortunes rose rapidly: "In 1956 . . . Buckley saw ten oil and gas producing fields . . . and eight listed companies holding several million acres in six countries." The net worth of the companies was about $110,000,000. At his death in 1958 William Buckley left $17,000,000 to each of his ten children.

In 1917 William Buckley married Aloise Steiner of a prominent New Orleans family. Ten children—four boys and six girls—were born into the Buckley family. In 1921 when the family had to leave Mexico, they moved first to New York City and then to Sharon, Connecticut, and established the family home at a large, pre-revolutionary mansion purchased in 1922 called "Great Elm." In 1938 a beautiful Southern antebellum mansion, "Kamschatka," was acquired in Camden, South Carolina for a winter home. In addition to the residences in Connecticut and South Carolina, the Buckleys lived several months stints in England, France, Spain, and Venezuela.

While the constant presence and strong character of the mother undoubtedly had a strong impact on the Buckley children, they developed a special sense of awe, almost a

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6Buckley and Buckley, W.F.B.—An Appreciation, p. 166.

reverence for their father. He served as a model for almost every phase of their life—their religion, their social and cultural interests, their attitudes, philosophy, manner and demeanor. In addition to his personality, so dominant when he was present, in his absence or when the children had become scattered in pursuit of education, he developed the habit of sending memoranda to the children. Usually, with but few exceptions, the memoranda would bear the names of all of the children, even though the message might be obviously directed to certain ones of the children. The memos served as a kind of newsletter and pulpit forum for the entire family.

When William Buckley and Aloise Steiner married in 1916 he was thirty-six years old and she was twenty-two, fourteen years his junior. Their ten children—Aloise, John, Priscilla, Jimmy, Jane, Billie, Patricia, Reid, Maureen, and Carol—were born between 1919 and 1938 when their father was 39-57 years old and their mother 25-44. For the children in many ways it was more like having grandparents than parents. These were no "doting grandparents" though! While they bestowed much affection on their children, they also set strong examples for them to follow and were generally strict disciplinarians.

William Buckley had been strongly affected by his childhood on the Texas prairie. He developed strong convictions, rigid habits, and lasting cultural affinities
which he sought to inculcate in his children. He was deeply religious, having developed a strong loyalty and most conservative orientation to the Roman Catholic Church. He developed a strong love and feeling of loyalty to his country. Patriotism was not something to be ridiculed; the traditions, institutions, and symbols of America were to be respected and revered. He had learned to work hard and to respect and expect the fruits of industry and persistence. The dearth of culture and educational opportunities on the Texas frontier contrasted with the culture and tradition of Mexico and educational institutions that he subsequently came in contact with developed an aristocratic appreciation for culture, tradition, and education. The unstable character of Mexican politics with frequent revolutions and unbridled excesses led him to be skeptical of revolutionary activities throughout his life. On this point William, Jr. writes of his father: "He went to Mexico to practice law, and saw the revolution against the benovelent and autocratic Porfirio Diaz, and what followed in its wake: and learned and never forgot, his distrust of the revolutionary ideology." Such were the ideas and ideals, attitudes and convictions, affinities and habits of the friendly "autocrat"

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of the Buckley clan and he worked hard and spent money un-
stintingly to pass on this heritage to his posterity.

Apparently there was little if any conflict between parents either in their philosophies or affinities. Aloise Buckley, as already mentioned, was from a prominent Southern family, a collateral descendent of Robert E. Lee. She was deeply religious (Catholic), patriotic, Southern aristocratic, and conservative in religious, political, and social orientation. The youngest of the Buckley children, Carol, once observed, "Mother has always been ten degrees to the right of Father, Bill, and Jim, if that's possible." The direction and intensity of Mrs. Buckley's ideology is revealed in a recent interview with a McCall's reporter:

... One day last spring (1971), Mrs. Buckley, a sprightly woman of seventy-six who wears an American flag pinned to the lapels of her coutmmade suits, described Communist China as "the yellow peril"; blamed the racial violence of recent years on the late Martin Luther King, Jr.; and expressed her absolute approval of such "benign dictators" as Franco. "The South American countries need dictators until they grow up a bit," she said. Mrs. Buckley thinks "the country is a mess because of the liberals" and is a supporter of the war in Vietnam. "I'm an old-fashioned patriot, a 'my country, right or wrong' American, and when my country is in trouble, I stick by her," she said. "I think Senator McGovern is guilty of treason for saying we ought to set a deadline for pulling out of Vietnam." 9

The Buckleys not only sought to instill in their children their political and social views, but also their high moral and ethical standards. Industry, self-reliance, honesty, integrity, responsibility, good health habits,

compassions, etc., were traits that they continually
cultivated in their children both by example and precept.

Cecilio Velasco, a Mexican employee of Buckley in the early
years of his law practice in Mexico, relates that despite
good business and rising profits

"financial aid to colleagues in the Capital, loans to
friends in need, new business projects, etc., etc.,
kept my cash box empty, and the accounts always with
debit balances. To begin with, there was the problem of
Buckley's generosity. It was irrepressible." 10

Susan Sheehan describes how these traits continued to be
appreciated by the senior Buckleys and passed on to their
children:

One gets a sense of Mrs. Buckley's personal
qualities when she talks about her favorite subject--
her ten children, each of whom she considers "great."
The first time she uses the adjective, one assumes she
thinks her children are "great" because of their worldly
accomplishments, as many mothers would. One is mistaken.
To her, Bill isn't great because his column appears in
315 newspapers, but because when he saw a National
Review employee in tears over the fact that the mortgage
on her parents' home was about to be foreclosed, he
wrote out a blank check and handed it to her; because
when her daughter Aloise was stricken with a cerebral
hemorrhage, Bill flew to Camden to break the bad news
more gently to their mother than he could have done over
the telephone; and because when one of Bill's childhood
nurses thought she was dying and didn't want to die
without seeing her former charge, he canceled all his
engagements and flew to Mexico to her bedside. 11

The memoranda already alluded to constituted one of
the primary means which the patriarch of the Buckley family
used to exhort his brood and impress on them proper attitudes
and conduct. The memos might arrive from almost any place

10 Buckley and Buckley, W.F.B.—An Appreciation, pp.
27, 28.

on the globe or when the children were away from home might follow them to college or even into their own homes after they were married. Such subjects as keeping one's promises, paying one's debts promptly, developing good health habits, speaking distinctly, improving one's handwriting, protruding teeth, romances, careers, college grades, smoking, etc., were all apt subjects for Buckley's pen and counsel. Some of these memos which are typical of their hortatory character and reveal the father's subtle humor and literary abilities read:

Memorandum to the Buckley Children:

I have been much concerned of late with the apparent inability of any of you, at any time to go anywhere on foot, although I am sure your Mother would have informed me if any of you had been born without the walking capacity of a normal human being.

A few of the older children, notable Priscilla, occasionally walk a few hundred yards behind a golf ball, but all the others "exercise" exclusively by sitting on a horse or a sailboat.

Concurrently, I have noticed that the roads around Sharon are crowded with Buckley cars at all hours of the day and night, and it has been years since any of you has been able to get as far as the Town Clock, much less the Post Office without a car, or if under 16, a car and a chauffeur.

All the cars are left out every night in all kinds of weather, undoubtedly because of the dangerous fatigue involved in walking from the garage to the house. I think that each of you should consider a course of therapy designed to prevent atrophy of the leg muscles if only for aesthetic reasons, or you might even go to the extreme of attempting to regain the art of walking, by easy stages of course. The cars might then be reserved for errands covering distances of over 50 yards or so.

Affectionately,

Father
February 16, 1940

My Dear Billy:

I think more strongly than ever that you should take hold of your handwriting situation and work on the new system along the lines that I had discussed with Miss Reilly. You will never be able to take your present handwriting and do anything with it, in my opinion. It is not very intelligent to go through life with a handwriting that people cannot understand. Aloise has done that and has almost incapacitated herself for writing. I am sure that you will get down to work with Miss Reilly and correct this situation.

Affectionately,
Father

"Father" Buckley was concerned with almost every aspect of his children's behavior, grooming, and personality development as the following memos demonstrate:

My dear John:

On Sunday you told me that you would see Mr. Tuttle Monday and would write me that day the name of a book on saddle horses. You did not do this Monday, Tuesday or Wednesday.

My getting a letter from you about this matter is not of great importance, but it is very important that you do what you promised to do. I have noticed invariably that those of my friends who keep their slightest promise are successful and those who don't keep their small promises are not successful.

This is a very slovenly habit to get into and one which promises to be a lifelong habit with you and Aloise if you don't correct it right away. After this, when I ask you to do anything I wish you would think it over seriously and if you decide it is too much trouble tell me than that you won't do it. I quite understand that your training in doing things has been very deficient, but you and Aloise are now old enough to do some thinking for your self and develop your own character.

Affectionately,
Father

Memorandum to William F. Buckley, Jr.:

Jane tells me that Reid has quite extensive sideburns. When he started growing them I mentioned them to him very casually and he said that that was required of the Glee Club—which sounds rather extraordinary. If you could gently suggest to him that he remove them, it would be a great relief to the family.
I would rather he would not belong to the Glee Club.

Father

My dear Billy: (received at age 15)

In thinking over my letter to you it may have appeared very critical and I hope you did not take it that way. Your Mother and I like very much your attitude of having strong convictions and of not being too bashful to express them. What I meant was that you would have to learn to be more moderate in the expression of your views and try to express them in a way that would give as little offense as possible to your friends.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHILDREN:

As you probably know, Americans are famous for being the poorest conversationalists in the world. Education and cultivation of the mind do not seem to improve us. We can't stay on a subject and we are constitutionally incapable of listening. As a people we are always thinking of something we are going to tell the "bore" as soon as he stops talking. A political conversation is never a "give and take," but leads to a monologue—usually by the least interesting and least informed present.

I am enclosing an article from December's Reader's Digest, which you should all read again and again. It is the best thing I have ever seen written on this subject.

Father

The famous Buckley memos and wit was not reserved exclusively for the children. The following memo was sent to Bill's future father-in-law:

Memorandum to Austin C. Taylor:

I have tried for many years to interest my children in conventional sports, but I have not been very successful. Billie is easily the worst in this regard, having no interest in tennis, golf, or other activities which satisfy the great majority of the nation. If you expect to entertain him, you will find it necessary to furnish him with 1) a horse, 2) a yacht, or 3) a private plane.

Aloise joins me in affectionate regards to you and Babe.

Will
Father Buckley continued to send his memos and advice to the children, much of which went unheeded—especially advice to Maureen about gobbling her words, Bill about his poor handwriting, Aloise about her constant smoking, and to all of the children about too little walking and too much driving—into their adulthood. The following memo was sent to his thirty-six year old daughter from Austria two weeks before he suffered a fatal brain hemorrhage:

My dear Priscilla,

Since you and Carol plan to spend several weeks in Mexico, I think you should know that young ladies of good families do not go unescorted in Mexico City. This is a custom I think you girls should respect. . . .

Affectionately,
Father

The Buckley children developed a reverence for their father and to suggest that they imbibed his attitudes and spirit would be a gross understatement. Perhaps the fact that the age differential was greater than the normal parent-child gap or because he was away from home frequently for long periods of time in some distant part of the world or because, seemingly, he was always able to provide them with whatever they needed or wanted, he took on an almost god-like statue in their eyes. Aloise, the oldest daughter,  

describes her father as viewed through the Buckley children's eyes:

Papa is the biggest man in the world and the smartest. He can lasso children by the leg while they're running. He is the strongest man in the world but also the kindest, which keeps him from beating up other children's Papas. He has the bluest eyes and the pinkest cheeks in the world and he is 99 years old (Mama is 16). He is the handsomest man in the world, and aside from the King of England, the richest: he owns personally ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS. He has never told a lie in his entire life except for jokes and kneels by his bed every morning to say his prayers. God will, naturally, send him straight to Heaven when he dies, except for perhaps an hour or so in Purgatory so as not to show favoritism. He is the most modest man in the world, because he says none of these things are true; that Mama made them up to show that good taste she had when she proposed to him. He is the funniest man in the world.

Papa is George Washington and Douglas Fairbanks, Will Rogers and Robin Hood, King Arthur and Stonewall Jackson. . . . 13

Bill in writing his father's obituary gives us his child-perspective of his father: "... as children we were never aware of his tribulations. We only knew that the world revolved about him, and that whether what we needed was a bicycle, or an excuse to stay away from school for a day, or the answer to an anguished personal problem, he was there to fill the need..." 14

The Buckley children absorbed the spirit and convictions of their father and inherited his literary and rhetorical talents in expounding their political and social

13 Ibid., p. 204.

views. Nine of the ten children have had publishing experience; several of them, especially Bill, are remarkably prolific. Evidence of their strong convictions and their determination to express their views became available for most of them—especially Bill—at very tender ages. Dan Wakefield wrote of Bill Buckley:

Though most men whose lives are devoted to a mission seem to follow the pattern of Paul, who had to wait until manhood for his revelation on the road to Damascus, William F. Buckley, Jr. seems to have had his vision at birth. If he had cried upon entering the world, one feels it would not have been in confusion or fear, but in an attempt to warn the doctors of the dangers of socialized medicine.\(^{15}\)

When Bill was six years old he wrote a letter to the King of England demanding that England pay her war debt. Within two days of his matriculation at Beaumont College (near Ascot, England) at the age of ten, Bill called at the office of the President, a distinguished scholar, and reported that there were a number of things about the school that he did not like. While the President sat mute, too shocked to speak, Bill explained the deficiencies of the venerable college. Later while a student at Millbrook School, Bill burst uninvited into a faculty meeting to report that "a member of the faculty had deprived him of the right to express his political views in class and proceeded to expound to the stunned faculty on the virtues of isolationism, the dignity

of the Catholic Church and the political ignorance of the school staff."

One of Bill's professors at Yale is quoted as having said of him, "That boy took a course under me last year on politics and I give you my word he talked twice as much as I did during the entire year!"\(^\text{16}\)

Bill seems to have developed early into a professional "set-the-world-straighter" and complainer. His father recorded a humorous anecdote that occurred when Bill was in his early teens:

> It was decided to send Patricia to the Ethel Walker School when she was about thirteen years of age in spite of the misgivings of Billy. Based on his experience with the weaker sex he felt that the girls at the school were not sufficiently refined for Patricia, although his sister Jane had been attending the school for a couple of years without any protest from him. As we left her at school we could see a look of consternation on Billy's face. He had, in his preoccupation with global affairs and some correspondence with congressmen overlooked a very important item. He felt that the girls' dresses at Ethel Walker were a little too short, so he located Patricia at a distance from the car of about 30 feet, and then had her reach up with the right hand and then the left hand until he found the proper length for her dresses. Then he pinned her dress in the right places and gave instructions for alterations.\(^\text{17}\)

Another incident that illustrates Bill's compulsion to set-the-world-straight occurred near the end of his stint in the army. After World War II he was transferred to San Antônio Military Base when demobilization began. After being on the base forty-eight hours, he wrote a letter to the Commanding

\(^{16}\)Buckley and Buckley, \textit{W.F.B.--An Appreciation}, p. 244.

\(^{17}\)\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 243, 244.
General informing him that "he had found a great waste of manpower and his staff was inadequate, and expressed surprise that such things could be." He submitted his own plan redesigning the entire system. Fortunately, the letter was intercepted by one of the General's subordinates who intervened precluding an immediate court martial. 

Bill developed a forceful personality, strong convictions, and an unbridled impulse to articulate his views. His father testified in a humorous speech about him that was written to be delivered on the eve of his wedding. "Billy has always been regarded by the rest of the family, except Patricia, as being slightly deficient in a sense of humor, and unbearably arrogant and dictatorial. The latter quality, I gather from chance remarks, they attribute in part to the former defect." Within the Buckley clan Bill was sometimes referred to as "The Young Mahster" by his brothers and sisters. In an article entitled "Why Don't We Complain?," published in Esquire, Buckley eloquently demonstrates that his determination to express his views and complaints has become a philosophy--almost a religion--for him:

Every New Year's Eve I resolve to do something about the Milquetoast in me and vow to speak up, calmly, for my rights, and for the betterment of our society, on every appropriate occasion. . . .

. . . Henceforth I would conquer my shyness, my despicable disposition to supineness. I would speak out

\[18\text{Ibid.}\]

\[19\text{Ibid.}, \ p.\ 242.\]
like a man against the unnecessary annoyances of our time.

I think the observable reluctance of the majority of Americans to assert themselves in minor matters is related to our increased sense of helplessness in an age of technology and centralized power. For generations, Americans who were too hot, or too cold, got up and did something about it. Now we call the plumber, or the electrician, or the furnace man. The habit of looking after our own needs obviously had something to do with the assertiveness that characterized the American family familiar to readers of American literature. With the technification of life goes our direct responsibility for our material environment, and we are conditioned to adopt a position of helplessness not only as regards the broken air conditioner, but as regards the overheated train. It takes an expert to fix the former, but not the latter; yet these distinctions, as we withdrew into helplessness, tend to fade away.

Perhaps it is not so surprising that his own father recommended that he learn to present his views in a less offensive way. Buckley seems, however, incapable or unwilling to follow his father's advice. Wakefield observes on this point:

... He is a declared enemy of what he has called "the passion for modulation," and in his latest book he deplored the current prevalence of that style in which:

"... we address our bitterest enemies 'Dear Sir,' and speak of 'passing away' when we mean dying; of 'detention' when we mean imprisonment; of 'under-development' when we mean primitive; of 'retarded' when we mean half-witted; of 'idealistic' when we mean confused; of 'unaware' when we mean ignorant." 21

Buckley realizes that his personality and style is often offensive and abrasive. When asked by this writer what he regarded as the weakest feature of his speaking, he replied:

20William F. Buckley, Jr., "Why Don't We Complain?," Esquire, LV (January, 1961), 48.

"I think probably my weakest is that I antagonize; I antagonize members of an audience. . . . The art of oratory has in it a seductive component and mine is not in perfect function. I am better at scoring than I am at persuading."22

That Buckley has not fallen victim to "the passion for modulation" is apparent from any number of quotations from his virulent pen or caustic tongue:

Professor Galbraith is horrified by the number of Americans who have bought cars with tail fins on them, and I am horrified by the number of Americans who take seriously the proposals of Mr. Galbraith.23

I grant that following Mrs. Roosevelt in search of irrationality was like following a burning fuse in search of an explosion; one never had to wait very long. . . . Mrs. Roosevelt was a leading if sentimental mouthpiece of contemporary liberalism, and the fact that she was one of history's truly remarkable women has nothing whatever to do with the fact that she was also a fountain of confusion.24

I welcome Mr. Mailer's interest in the American right wing. On behalf of the right wing let me say that we, in turn, are interested in Mr. Mailer, and look forward to coexistence and cultural exchange with him in the years to come. I hope we can maintain his interest, though I confess to certain misgivings. I am not sure we have enough sexual neuroses for him. But if we have any at all, no doubt he will find them, and in due course celebrate them in a forthcoming political tract. . . . The American right wing, of whom I am merely one member, is clumsily trying to say what Norman Mailer with his superior skills would be saying so very much better if only he would raise his eyes from the world's genital glands. . . .25

22Appendix A, p. 265.
24Ibid., pp. 11, 12.
25Buckley, Rumbles Left and Right, pp. 54, 56.
Drop a little itching powder in Jimmy Wechsler's bath and, before he has scratched himself for the third time, Arthur Schlesinger will have denounced you in a dozen books and speeches, Archibald MacLeish will have written ten heroic cantos about our age of terror, Harper's will have published them, and everyone in sight will have been nominated for a freedom award.26

There are persistent rumors that Buckley has mellowed in his "old age." A survey of his recent articles and speeches should squelch any such idea. While Buckley may be a little less inclined to engage in verbal fencing, he is just as capable as ever when aroused:

William Kunstler should be disbarred, or the canons of legal behavior should be pickled and sent to the Smithsonian as antiquarian relics or another civilization. . . .

Let madmen be madmen. Eventually the froth turns off the listeners, and the madmen go off to live and sweat in the fever swamps. But I think the time is overdue for sane members of the community, Left and Right, to draw the line. . . . I do not wish Mr. Kunstler to be put in jail, unless that is what the law of criminal libel requires. But I do wish that he should experience the isolation which he has earned from the civilized community.27

About twice a week, Mayor Lindsay denies that he is seeking the Presidency; indeed one can imagine a press conference at the end of which Mr. Lindsay would accidentally say, "You forgot to ask if I am running for President. The answer is No."

Mr. Lindsay's aides are less demure than their coy master, and the morning's news is that they are making a systematic study of the nation's primary laws, the better to concert the Presidential drive. On the lighter side, a staff member reports that the Mayor has been sent a "Lindsay for President" bumper sticker from a fan club in Los Angeles, which is about the closest you can get


27William F. Buckley, Jr., Inveighing We Will Go (New York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1972), pp. 228, 229.
to New York City and escape the odor of Mr. Lindsay's spectacular maladministration. But as we know the Presidency does things to people, and vanity is wonderfully resourceful. One simply cannot doubt that Mr. Lindsay gets up in the morning, looks into the mirror, asks, "Who is the fairest mayor of them all?," and blushes boyishly.28

Educational Influence

William F. Buckley, Sr. was especially interested in the education of his children. He assumed personal responsibility for their education and gave them the best education money could provide. The typical education of a Buckley child included private tutors, elite private schools, and Ivy League Universities. Priscilla wrote of her father: "There was nothing complicated about Father's theory of child-rearing: he brought up his sons and daughters with the quite simple objective that they become absolutely perfect."29 The senior Buckley was interested in more than "readin', writin', and 'rithmetic;" he was especially interested in the cultural development of his offspring: Patricia explained "Father wanted us above all to be cultivated. Coming as he did from an arid Texas town, Mexico's old culture made a lasting impression on him. He never thought adding up a column of figures was as sensible a pursuit as seeing a beautiful cathedral."30

28Ibid., p. 254.
29Buckley and Buckley, W.F.B.--An Appreciation, p. 218.
imported a host of private tutors to his Sharon estate and at one time or another provided private professional instruction to his offspring in apologetics, art, ballroom dancing, banjo, bird-watching, building boats in bottles, calligraphy, canoeing, carpentry, cooking, driving trotting horses, French, folk-dancing, golf, guitar (Hawaiian and Spanish), harmony, herb-gardening, horsemanship, history of architecture, ice-skating, mandolin, marimba, music appreciation, organ, painting, piano, playing popular music, rumba, sailing, skiing, singing, Spanish, speech, stenography, swimming, tap-dancing, tennis, typing, and wood-carving.31

Although the Buckleys' received a liberal arts education in schools which were as often as not liberal, the home and family atmosphere predominated. The personal influence of the parents and the home atmosphere incalcated the children with conservative philosophies and doctrines. The author of a *Newsweek* article on the Buckley family wrote:

> ... the Buckleys, as is well known, are pure American and delightfully, deliberately, incorrigibly creatures of the eighteenth century. The ten children of William F. and Aloise S. Buckley were born between the years 1919 and 1938, but from the beginning their lives assumed the pattern of an earlier age. They were educated as little philosophies, sheltered on great estates, escorted on grand tours.

The precepts in which they were instructed—the faith of Roman Catholicism, the doctrine of individual responsibility, the sanctity of graceful English prose, the solidarity of the family—had a slightly old-fashioned air about them. But somehow, mostly through an ample capacity for amusement whose first subject was themselves, they survived without turning into prigs or bores, and now another of them—James—has joined his younger brother Bill in the spotlight of American celebrity.  

Susan Sheehan confirms the role of Mr. Buckley in instilling in his children his political and social views: "Mr. Buckley's conservatism was successfully transmitted to his children. In 1940, the older children founded a local newspaper in Sharon devoted to the advocacy of isolationism and to this day, as Priscilla says, 'None of us are renegades.'"  

William, Jr.'s education was typical of other Buckley children. In addition to private tutors, he attended the St. Thomas More School in London and St. John's, Beaumont, in Old Windsor, England. He received his preparatory work at the Millbrook School in Millbrook, New York. In addition to the regular curriculum, his extracurricular activities included music, the yearbook, and the school paper. In 1943 before entering the army, he studied for one year at the University of Mexico. After his discharge from the army in 1946, he entered Yale University. He received his B.A. with honors in 1950. He remained as a teacher of Spanish until 1951, a position that he had held since 1947.  

In his academic courses, he concentrated on history, political science, and economics. He was a member of the debate squad, and distinguished himself as a member of the debate team that defeated Oxford University and as class day orator. He belonged to the Torch Honor Society, Fence Club, and Skull and Bones and was chairman of the university student newspaper, the *Yale Daily News*. His editorials for the *Yale Daily News* were decidedly conservative in tone, a most atypical situation in the Yale tradition. Wakefield wrote of Buckley's stint as editorial writer of the *Yale Daily News*: "Mr. Buckley sharpened his pen for the social and political wars as chairman of the *Yale Daily News*, where he wrote editorials that, as one observer put it, almost nobody agreed with but everybody read."\(^{34}\)

According to the "Foreword" to his first and most controversial book, *God and Man at Yale*, Buckley matriculated at Yale fresh from a two year stint in the army with "a firm belief in Christianity and a profound respect for American institutions and traditions."\(^{35}\) He believed strongly that free enterprise and limited government had made America great and should be continued. He expected to find at Yale University allies against secularism and collectivism. Instead, he contended that he found that most


\(^{35}\)Buckley, *God and Man at Yale*, pp. xiv-xix.
of the faculty and courses undermined these traditional American values in favor of secularism and collectivism. Van Zant Wheeler, a close friend of W.F.B., Sr. who shared his political philosophy, wrote: "The Buckley sons and daughters had all gone through college at a time when unbridled liberalism was the order of the day and they had emerged, as Will put it, uncontaminated by all the social and political quackery to which they had been subjected." The Buckley children often found themselves at odds with their professors and the general trends of education at the institutions that they attended:

The Buckleys seem to have also inherited the adventurous and bellicose spirit of W. F. Buckley, Sr., who was once kicked out of Mexico when he attempted to alter that country's revolution to his own liking. Schooled in their youth by private tutors, the Buckleys' children were appalled by what they considered the socialist and atheistic leanings of the colleges they attended, and three of them carried on vigorous campaigns against their alma maters: Patricia wrote an anti-Vassar article, Aloise wrote letters to her fellow Smith alumni exposing "red" professors, and William, Jr. got off the biggest blast with his book, God and Man at Yale, which attacked old Eli. As Time Magazine summarized the onslaught: "U.S. higher education managed to survive--but it will not soon forget the Buckleys."

Religious Influence

Both of the Buckley parents were devout Catholics--the father had served as alter boy in the San Diego Catholic

36 Buckley and Buckley, W.F.B.--An Appreciation, p. 256.

Church for fifteen years and regarded Father Bard, the local priest, as his mentor. They lived in Mexico during the early years of their marriage and later for periods of time in France, Spain, and Switzerland, all countries where Catholicism is the dominant religion and a pervasive influence in family and social life. Thus Buckley grew up in a family that was dedicated not only to political conservatism but also to religious conservatism. Speaking of the religious influence of his childhood, Buckley wrote, "I had always been taught, and experience had fortified the teachings, that an active faith in God and a rigid adherence to Christian principles are the most powerful influences toward the good life."³⁸

Buckley's religion has had a strong influence on both his writing and his speaking. In his first and most controversial book, God and Man at Yale, Buckley, in chapter one entitled "Religion at Yale," goes into considerable depth analyzing the religious courses, the religious attitudes of the professors, and the general religious atmosphere at the institution. He charges that the form is there but that the spirit is not—that a number of even the professors of religion are less than enthusiastic Christians if not confessed agnostics. In the same chapter, Buckley makes clear what "religion" means to him:

I make no apology for defining "religion" in the Christian sense, and eschewing the nebulous, personalized definitions given to that term by so many latter-day

³⁸Buckley, God and Man at Yale, p. xiii.
psychologists, sociologists, et al. Here and elsewhere, along with Webster, I mean by religion a belief in a Supreme Being, "arousing reverence, love, gratitude, the will to obey and serve, and the like." . . . In February, 1951, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, a prominent Protestant spokesman, addressed the Yale University Christian Association, and was unequivocal: "Christian faith stands or falls on the proposition that a character named Jesus, in a particular place at a particular time in history, is more than a man in history, but is a revelation of the mystery of self and of the ultimate mystery of existence."39

From the publishing of Buckley's first book through the pages of National Review, "On the Right" columns, his speeches, to his most recent book in which one of the division headings is "The Decline of the Catholic Church,"40 one finds frequent discussions of religion and topics that are generally regarded as religious or moral issues. In The Jeweler's Eye, Buckley deals with the following religious or moral issues: Decision making for Christ, John Lennon's gaffe (that the Beatles were more popular than Christ), The repeal of the homosexual laws, The case of the unfettered pornographer, and The weed (smoking).41 As a rule Buckley takes what would be regarded as a conservative position although he does advocate repeal of criminal sanctions (but not the moral or social sanctions) against homosexuality between consenting adults and has spoken out for shorter sentences for users but not pushers of marijuana. He often

39Buckley, God and Man at Yale, p. 8, footnote.

40Buckley, Inveighing We Will Go, p. 324.

finds himself at odds with the liberal element of the Catholic Church, especially in recent years with their anti-war and civil rights activity and opting for change in compulsory celibacy and the liturgy. Buckley, who refers to himself as a "Catholic fundamentalist," writes, "In National Review we have printed, I say unblushingly, some articles and editorials of spectacular spiritual and strategic moment; and yet I never had a note about them, or a friendly nod, from any member of the Catholic Liberal community."

Buckley continues to be a regular communicant of the Catholic Church, but is dissatisfied with much of the modern trend in Catholicism such as changes in the liturgy, "jazzy" music, the waning of the former strong anti-communist stand of the Catholic Church, and the relaxing of its position on many moral issues. In Cruising Speed, a documentary of one week in his life, Buckley describes his impressions while attending Mass:

The church is very nearly full, and I am reminded, as I am every Sunday, of what an aesthetic ordeal this has become, going to Mass, ever since the advent of the new liturgy: the dread vernacular, the conscripted congregational responses--to think that the architects of this profanation claim to have done it for us!

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42 Buckley, Inveighing We Will Go, p. 327.
43 Buckley, Rumbles Left and Right, p. 110.
Influence of Associates

In addition to the influence of his heritage, parents, religion, and education on him, Buckley has singled out two persons as having profoundly influenced him—Willmoore Kendall and Richard Weaver. He explicitly mentions these two as having a part in re-enforcing if not shaping his philosophy and ideology. Willmoore Kendall was a professor of political science at Yale University under whom Buckley studied and apparently was one of the few allies he found on the Yale faculty. Buckley described him as "the finest teacher I knew at Yale."^45 Kendall wrote The Conservative Affirmation, was one of the founding editors of National Review and one of its most prolific writers for several years, and was regarded as one of the leading apologists of contemporary American conservatism.

Buckley's own concept of the conservative-liberal conflict closely parallels that of Kendall. In The Conservative Affirmation Kendall developed the conservative-liberal ideological war metaphor:

... Current usage of the terms "conservative" and "liberal" clearly implies (a) that there is a line, on one side of which we may fairly expect to find conservatives who are consistently "conservative," standing over against, on the other side, Liberals who are consistently "liberal," and therefore (b) that the line exists, and falls where it does fall, for good reason. ...

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^45 Ibid., p. 73.
all our market-place commentators seem to forget that the line in question is a line of battle, a line of battle moreover in contemporary American politics and a line of battle between two sets of combatants, each fighting to defeat the other. Moreover, current usage implies that there is a battle in progress, even a war in progress, one that is about something sufficiently intelligible to all the combatants to seem worth fighting over. Drawing the line, then, if we are willing to be really attentive to our metaphor is a matter not merely of locating some point on the line at which the battle is raging, but also of locating the line in its entire extension.

My thesis, then, is that the line we are looking for is a battleline, and that that line stretches from the bottom of the chart of American politics all the way to the top, passing through pretty much every issue that enters into our politics. My further thesis is that the battle-line is a battle-line in a war actually in progress, between Liberal troops on the left of the line (note that the usage on which we are depending is very clear that the line divides a Left from a Right)—and Conservative troops on the right of the line.

We stand, I am saying, in the presence of a Liberal Revolution; that revolution is a revolution sensu stricto, and one that means business. Its purpose is to establish in America, in Machiavelli's phrase, new modes and orders. Conservatism, I am saying, is first and foremost the resistance to that revolution. And the line that divides Conservatism from Liberalism, the line that is implied in current usage of the terms "conservative" and "liberal," is the line that passes through all the battles and skirmishes about this or that issue of public policy, that the resisters are today fighting to prevent further advances by the Revolution. To put it in slightly different terms: The Liberals are the supporters of the Liberal Revolution, the Conservatives are its opponents. . . .

Doubtless this is the kind of material and ideas that Buckley heard as a student under Kendall for two years at Yale. The terminology and metaphor is remarkably similar to Buckley's description of the conservative-liberal conflict: "The

46 Kendall, The Conservative Affirmation, pp. 2-10.
defensive strategic war in which we have been engaged over a number of years on myriad fronts cannot be prosecuted by voluntary associations of soldiers and scientists and diplomats and strategists. . . . Buckle y expressed his esteem and affection for Kendall and suggested the influence Kendall had on him in the obituary he wrote and published in National Review:

Willmoore Kendall died . . . in Dallas, Texas on Friday, June 30. He was indisputably among the two or three most brilliant political scientists in the United States. . . .

After the war, Mr. Kendall went to Yale University where he had a turbulent time arguing with his colleagues and with the administration, at every conceivable opportunity, over every conceivable difference. ("Every time I ask Yale for a leave of absence," Kendall quipped, "I find it insultingly co-operative.") Finally, Yale and Kendall settled on an alimony payment, and Yale let go the most exciting teacher of politics of the postwar generation.

Kendall will be remembered forever by his students. Others will turn to his book on Locke, and to his collection of essays, The Conservative Affirmation, published in 1963. . . .

Willmoore Kendall was among the founding editors of NATIONAL REVIEW, and some of his stylish NR paragraphs have already been anthologized. His colleagues express their sympathy to the two surviving Mrs. Willmoore Kendalls, his wife and his mother, and swear eternal allegiance to the fraternity of those who learned from a great teacher.48

The other person outside of his immediate family other than Kendall who had a profound influence on William F. Buckley, Jr. was Richard Weaver, already referred to

47 Buckley, American Conservative Thought in the Twentieth Century, pp. xxiii, xxiv.

extensively in this treatise. Buckley reports that Weaver's first book, *Ideas Have Consequences*, was recommended to him while a student by Kendall. Buckley relates that he had read all of Weaver's books, except possibly his last and mentions especially *The Ethics of Rhetoric* as the only modern book on rhetoric that he had read. In attempting to define "conservatism," Buckley frequently quotes Weaver and it is apparent that Weaver (and Kendall) was a master-builder in the construction of the superstructure of Buckley's conservative house:

I am asked most frequently by members of the lecture audience, "What is conservatism?"... Those who are obstinate I punish by giving, with a straight face, Professor Richard Weaver's definition of conservatism as "the paradigm of essences towards which the phenomenology of the world is in continuing approximation"—as noble and ingenious an effort as any I have ever read. ... 

To conservatives, I would say that this volume at least suggests that the struggle avails, having said which I hasten to add that the struggle is also permanent. Surely Mr. Weaver's intricate definition of conservatism seems to suggest the twin conservative concerns for advance and prudence. A conservative is properly concerned simultaneously with two things, the first being the shape of the visionary or paradigmatic society toward which we should labor; the second, the speed with which it is thinkable to advance toward that ideal society with the foreknowledge that any advance upon it is necessarily asymptotic; that is, we cannot hope for ideological home runs and definitive victories. What American conservatives have achieved is not only the dismay of local radicals but of European intellectuals, who find the rise of conservative thought in America utterly baffling.50

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49 Appendix A. p. 262, 271.

Professional Experiences

William Buckley has been one of the most active journalists and speakers on the national scene in the last two decades. He is a prolific writer and one of the most sought after speakers in America. He began his writing career as Chairman of the Yale Daily News where, as one scribe put it, "he cut his teeth in polemic journalism through antiliberal attacks that furthered circulation along with controversy." Shortly after graduation, he was catapulted into public controversy with the publishing of God and Man at Yale which "accused the Yale faculty, in sweeping terms, of teaching along anti-Christian and anti-capitalistic lines. . . . It became a pro and con reference point for political eggheads of both the left and right." The success of this book and the prominence it gained him as a leading conservative spokesman, led Buckley to give up a promising business career in Mexico. Returning home, he became associate editor of American Mercury and began a prodigious writing career. Through 1972 he was author of ten books, editor of three, had contributed to eight others, and had written a spade of magazine articles.

In 1955 Buckley founded the National Review, a conservative journal of opinion, which, in Buckley's opening editorial, "stands athwart history yelling, 'Stop!'" By

53 Buckley, "Publisher's Statement," p. 5.
1960 NR had already become one of the leading journals of opinion with a circulation exceeding both of its veteran liberal competitors, New Republic and Nation. Through National Review Buckley sought to "purify" conservatism and provide a rallying point for its adherents. He drew to the mast of National Review many of the leading theorists and proponents of conservatism such as Russell Kirk, Richard Weaver, Willmoore Kendall, James Burnham, Whittaker Chambers, Milton Friedman, Frank S. Meyer, Ralph de Toledano, John Chamberlain, Jeffery Hart, Max Eastman, Henry Hazlitt, et al. In 1962 Buckley began a thrice-weekly newspaper column "On the Right" which by 1971 was carried in 315 newspapers greatly extending his influence among the general public.

Buckley's reputation and influence derives as much from his speaking as from his writing. As a lecturer, epideictic speaker, debater, and television personality, he has become known to the American public as conservatism's leading spokesman. He began his speaking career also at Yale University where he debated under the tutelage of Rollin Osterweis, professor of history. He distinguished himself as a member of the debate team that defeated Oxford University and was selected as the undergraduate speaker for the annual February Alumni Day, but withdrew from the program rather than change his speech when a controversy

54 "Angry Voice on the Right," p. 54.
developed over its content. During the mid-fifties, Buckley became increasingly more popular as a lecturer and forensic speaker. He faced leading socialist and liberal polemists such as Norman Thomas, John Kenneth Galbraith, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., James Wechsler, Ramsey Clark, Dick Gregory, etc., and crossed verbal swords with Norman Mailer, Gore Vidal, William Kunstler, Eldridge Cleaver, Truman Capote, Drew Pearson, Murray Kempton, and numerous others. According to Catherine Babcock of M. Catherine Babcock, Inc. --- "Premier Lecture Agency For Leading Conservatives" -- Buckley's agent, "We think it would be fair to say that Mr. Buckley has spoken at every major college in the United States and numerous smaller ones. . . . Mr. Buckley receives more invitations to speak than probably any other speaker in the country." Buckley charges a set fee for his speeches -- "$2,250 to colleges and $2,500 for all other talks. All of this money goes to help underwrite the deficit of the magazine."^6

Buckley's widest exposure to the American public has been as host of the public television program "Firing Line" first aired in 1966. Over 300 programs have pitted leading spokesmen of conservative and liberal positions on most of the controversial issues of the day. As host of the

^55 God and Man at Yale. The circumstances surrounding this speech are described in chapter iii; the speech is printed in appendix vi.

^56 Appendix B, p. 278.
television show, Buckley has developed the reputation of a sharp—if not always impartial—questioner and of an exquisite showman. John Reddy described his television style in detail in a recent article:

Elegantly tailored, his lean athletic frame slouched casually in a swivel chair, he confronts his guest with the cheerful air of a barracuda contemplating a sardine. The cultivated voice changes from a soft purr to a sharp edge as he shifts gears from condescension to polysyllabic savagery. His tongue flickers as he licks his lips in anticipation of his next riposte. The eyes pop to emphasize a sally, and the eyebrows yo-yo eloquently. Sometimes, when his opponent is making a point, Buckley closes his eyes as though faint from boredom, or raises them heavenward as if to invoke divine protection from such nonsense. Words like "energumen" and "oxymoronic" are tossed about as airily as an emperor would toss coins to the peasantry.57

In spite of his strong personality, arrogant nature, and often caustic tongue, many who vehemently disagree with his views find him to be a warm and amiable person. Sheehan describes this paradox:

... Bill Buckley has long presented a particular problem to liberal journalists. They disagree with virtually all of his views and are put off by his television style—the raised eyebrows, the triumphant leers, the arrogant tone. But when they meet him, in nine cases out of ten they like him.

Joe McGinniss, the author of The Selling of the President, 1968, has expressed the situation well.... "If there was one thing in this world of which I was almost certain, it was that William Buckley was a supercilious, effete snob. Turns out he is one of the warmest, most gracious, genuinely charming people I've ever met. We ride back on the plane together, and he even shows me all the ammunition his research staff has

prepared for him to use against me. . . . He is a prince, goddam it, and who is there left to hate?"\(^\text{58}\)

As a writer and speaker Buckley has received many honors and recognitions including the Distinguished Achievement Award in Journalism, 1968; The Emmy Award for Outstanding Program Achievement, 1969; and numerous honorary doctorates. A number of quotations have been cited already relative to both his effectiveness and style as speaker and writer. Charles Lam Markmann reviewing Buckley's most recent book, *Inveighing We Will Go*, for the Nation wrote of him:

... He is one of the leaders—certainly the intellectual paladin—of a force that is regaining the allegiance of the majority here as in so much of the world; the stifling force of reaction and retrogression mislabeled (by itself as by its enemies) conservatism. At the same time he is one of the very few persons of genuine culture in American public life, one of the very few concerned to maintain that civility that he intuitively recognizes as an essential element in the survival of any society of more than one person. Louis XIV may be a political disaster; but he remains an aesthetic asset.\(^\text{59}\)

**Summary of Buckley's Heritage and Primary Influences**

In summing up the influence of Buckley's heritage and family on him, one must conclude that it was profound. His strong convictions, conservative ideology, and compulsion to articulate his views are clearly the result of his unique background and his father on his thinking and personality. Wakefield agrees with this assessment of the genesis

\(^{58}\text{Sheehan, "The Battling Buckley Women," p. 155.}\)

\(^{59}\text{Markmann, "Looking Back to the Future," p. 282.}\)
and source of Buckley's conservatism:

Bill Buckley's faith seems to be in a large measure inherited, and one must look to his ancestors to understand its roots. The Buckley family history describes the full circle of a class American pattern in the space of only four generations: great-grandfather Buckley left Ireland after feuding with the Orangemen and came to the new world; one of his sons, John, went West and became the sheriff of Duval County, Texas; one of the sheriff's sons, William, struck oil; William's sons went to Yale.

A family historical sketch . . . proudly records that the Irish Buckley, the sheriff Buckley, and the oilman Buckley were all "prone to unpopular beliefs" (e.g. the sheriff was "a sheep rancher in cattle country"). But there is no indication that those beliefs were formed into the present family code until the time of William Sr., a successfully unorthodox oilman who passed on to his family not only a considerable oil empire . . . , but also a rigid ideology based on free enterprise and the survival of the fittest. . . .

Buckley's religion has been an important influence in his life and in the formation of his political, social, and moral philosophy. Reared by very devout, conservative Catholic parents, he regards himself as a Catholic fundamentalist. He often writes and speaks on religious and moral issues and, more often than not, advocates a very conservative position.

Buckley's formal education had less influence in the formation of his political and social philosophy. He was strongly opinioned and very conservative from an early age. In the sense that he often found the formal classroom a hostile atmosphere and much of what was taught the antithesis of his own beliefs and attitudes, one could say that

it served in a negative way to strengthen his convictions and attitudes and increase his determination to articulate his own views.

Outside of his immediate family, Buckley appears to have been most influenced in his political and social views by Willmoore Kendall and Richard Weaver. The influence of Kendall was personal and direct as Buckley sat under him in the classroom for two years and was closely associated with him as founding editors of the *National Review*. The influence of Weaver on Buckley was almost entirely through his writings. Although Weaver, too, was on the editorial staff of *National Review*, there was relatively little personal contact between the two.

Buckley's professional experiences have been instrumental in preparing him for his role as chief spokesman for contemporary American conservatism. He is a prolific and capable writer and speaker. He is founder and editor of the leading journal of conservative opinion in America, author of the most widely circulated conservative newspaper column, and host of the best known and most widely aired television program presenting a genuine conservative-liberal dialogue. These experiences have gained him wide exposure and served as a crucible forcing him to present definitive conservative positions and programs.
The purpose of this section of Chapter Four is to determine whether Buckley measures up to Weaver's concept of the "noble lover" and to ascertain whether he meets the requirements of Weaver's ideal rhetorician. The writer once heard someone say "Buckley is brilliant. He would have to be a genius to come right out of college, realize that the liberal leadership positions were already filled, and form a conservative movement in which to carve out a leadership role." The speaker's remark implies that he questions Buckley's sincerity—at least initially—that his conservatism is more self-serving than real. It is quite possible that many others might have the same impression. Buckley's personality and style might very well lead people to question his motives. Too, Buckley does have a vested interest in conservatism—he is the founder and editor of the National Review, generally regarded as the organ of the contemporary American conservative movement and he is the movement's leading spokesman. The most salient question then is: "Is Buckley's conservatism sincere or feigned; Is he a noble or base lover?" The conclusion of this writer based on his research as recorded in the first part of this chapter is that he is sincere. His conservatism appears to be quite consistent with his heritage, home environment, and training. He appears to have been remarkably consistent in his attitudes and philosophy. Those who question the validity of
his views do not, as a rule, question his sincerity. Certainly one must conclude that Buckley is "mad" in the Platonic-Weaverian sense!

Weaver's noble lover must not only be sincere and "mad" in the Platonic sense, but he must permit the "beloved" an honest examination of the alternatives. Instead of keeping the beloved in a passive state of mind solely dependent upon him through a one-sided emotional presentation, the noble lover seeks to develop the independence of the beloved by the presentation of a true dialectic. While the main analysis of Buckley's arguments appear in the following chapter, it is precisely at this point that Buckley would see himself as a noble lover. He would contend (as he has) that he is providing a conservative alternative in an arena where liberalism has carried the standard, unchallenged for decades. It is not difficult to find many (even many liberals) who would agree with him.

Lionel Trilling writing the "Preface" to The Liberal Imagination in 1950 averred, "In the United States at this time liberalism is not only the dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition. For it is the plain fact that nowadays there are no conservative or reactionary ideas in general circulation." Trilling went on to observe that as fortunate as this might appear to many liberals, it was, in fact, the opposite—"it is not conducive to the real strength
of liberalism that it should occupy the intellectual field alone. In the same year Harry K. Girvetz was lamenting the fact that "the great debate (liberal-conservative) has gone unargued. . . . . . there have been too few conservatives with whom to debate because conservatism in this country has so often succumbed to reaction. We very much need the revival or birth, as the case may be, of a responsible conservative tradition in this country."62

Writing the "Publisher's Statement" in the first issue of National Review, Buckley sets forth the purpose and motivation for the paper:

There are, we like to think, solid reason for rejoicing. Prodigious efforts, by many people, are responsible for NATIONAL REVIEW.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . There are those of generous impulse and a sincere desire to encourage a responsible dissent from the Liberal orthodoxy. . . . Our political economy and our high-energy industry run on large general principle, on ideas--not by day-to-day guess work, expedients, and improvisations. Ideas have to go into exchange to become or remain operative; and the medium of such exchange is the printed word. A vigorous and incorruptible journal of conservative opinion is--dare we say it?--as necessary to better living as Chemistry.63

In American Conservative Thought in the Twentieth Century general editors Levy and Young wrote in the "Foreword" section:

61 Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1953 \(c\ 1950\)), p. 5.


63 Buckley, "Publisher's Statement," p. 5.
Conrad M. 161

Conservatism, ironically a form of dissent within the liberal tradition also deserves a hearing from any serious student of American history. We believe that every age needs men who redeem their time by living with a vision of things that were as well as things that ought to be. We believe, too, that wisdom derives from a variety of sources, even from those who see little good in the world, think that almost everything is going to the dogs, and believe that most people are rascals. Belatedly, we add to the American Heritage Series a volume that provides a new perspective by offering the best of American conservative thought in the twentieth century, under the editorship of William F. Buckley, Jr. The result will force many readers to defend cherished first principles against incisive attack. 64

Buckley in the "Introduction" of the book states its purpose:

"Notwithstanding efforts, some of them greatly ingenious, either to make American "conservatism" go away or to deprive it of substantial meaning, it is still very much with us.... This volume is an honest effort to transcribe one American conservative's understanding of some of the recent sources of the illumination he lives by." 65

Leonard Lief wrote in The New Conservatives that during the 1950s "there was no outpouring of essays and speeches by conservatives, no Conservative party, no clear attempt to state the conservative ideology, no general circulation magazine such as the National Review"--in other words, no nationally articulated conservative philosophy. He further states that the cold war now and again flashing

64 Buckley, American Conservative Thought in the Twentieth Century, p. x.
65 Ibid., pp. xv, xvi.
hot such as in Korea with the democratic way of life being seriously threatened and no new ideas forthcoming produced a disillusionment with liberalism. He continues, "Into this apparent void stepped the conservatives. . . . Led by the young William F. Buckley, Jr., with his book, God and Man at Yale. . . . and by a general, if limited, discontent, the conservatives began to gain a hold on the American scene, as evidenced by Buckley's magazine, the National Review."66

Buckley appears genuinely interested in presenting a conservative alternative to liberal programs and propositions—in a genuine conservative-liberal dialectic. In demonstration of this he has been willing to face Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., John Kenneth Galbraith, Gore Vidal, Norman Mailer, et al. in public debate; has made a sincere effort to secure able proponents of conservative and liberal positions to appear on his "Firing Line" television program, and has published a number of polemic books. All of these he sees as an effort to provide a conservative alternative to an audience already satiated with the liberal line.

**Buckley—Weaver's Ideal Rhetorician**

In the previous chapter the writer explicated the character of Weaver's ideal rhetorician. He was described by Weaver as a dialectician, a scientist, and a teacher. The dialectical efforts of Buckley are analyzed and evaluated in depth in the following chapter. By "scientist" we

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66Lief, The New Conservatives, pp. 9, 10.
take Weaver to mean not in the narrow sense of one actually trained as a specialist in the technical sense in a discrete area of science, but in the general sense of one able to comprehend the theory and speak the language of science. By "teacher" we take him to mean not a professional pedagogue, but one capable of explaining his ideas clearly to students of his writing and speaking. In all of these characteristics, the writer finds Buckley meeting the requirements of Weaver's ideal rhetorician. This is not to imply that he meets them in an absolute sense, but when judged in a relative sense as all humans must be judged, he is Weaver's ideal rhetorician. He is intelligent, articulate, has a good grasp of logic, and has had excellent academic training. Levy and Young described him as:

the foremost expositor of rational, humanistic conservative thought in America today . . . a man for all conservative seasons: author, politician, TV star, popular lecturer, and editor-in-chief of the nation's leading journal of conservative opinion, National Review. In every capacity he is an outstanding educator, though not an academician . . . an enormously learned man and a serious thinker.67

Lief concurs in this assessment: "William F. Buckley, Jr., writer, editor, lecturer, television personality, and recently candidate for mayor of New York City, offers cures for what he sees as present ills. He fits Meyer's description of the intellectual conservative who uses reason and logic, rather than tradition, to build a conservative program."68

67Buckley, American Conservative Thought in the Twentieth Century, p. x.

68Lief, The New Conservatives, p. 11.
CHAPTER V

THE BUCKLEY LOGIC--A WEAVERIAN ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter of the dissertation was to analyze Buckley's logic using Weaver's hierarchy of topics. The criteria for analysis were explicated in Chapter Three of the dissertation under the heading "Logical Proof--The Hierarchy of Topics." The analysis sought to answer the following questions: (1) Is there a discernible and consistent pattern in Buckley's arguments? (2) Does it support Weaver's hierarchy of topics thesis that conservatives argue most frequently from definition and with decreasing frequency down the hierarchy seldom arguing from circumstances? (3) What conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of Buckley's logic that have practical and theoretical significance for rhetoric and public address?

The writer chose for the analysis two speeches, one debate, and one interview from among the scores of Buckley's speaking efforts that he heard and read. These four efforts represent approximately five hours of speaking time. They were chosen for a number of reasons: (1) They are all polemical and thus suited for an analysis of persuasive speaking and logic; (2) They appear to be typical of Buckley's
polemic efforts; (3) They deal with a wide variety of political, philosophical, academic, social, and economic issues; (4) The speaking efforts all occurred during 1970-72 and have not been analyzed in any previous thesis or dissertation; and (5) They involve platform, forensic, and dialectic speaking.

The two speeches are "Reflections on the Current Disorder" delivered at Yale University, November 24, 1970, and an untitled commencement address presented at the University of Virginia, June 4, 1972. The debate was held at the Cambridge Union, Oxford University in 1971. Buckley denied the resolution, "The Market is a Snare and a Delusion." John Kenneth Galbraith affirmed the proposition. The interview was conducted by David Butler of the editorial staff of Playboy and was published in the magazine's May, 1970 edition; it was reprinted in Inveighing We Will Go.

The analysis of the speeches required several close readings in which the investigator sought to identify and label each line of argument advanced by Buckley under the Weaverian hierarchy of topics categories:

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1William F. Buckley, Jr., "Reflections on the Current Disorder," speech presented at Yale University, November 24, 1971. Appendix C. (Hereinafter referred to as Appendix C.)

2Appendix D.

3Buckley-Galbraith Cambridge Debate, "The Market is a Snare and a Delusion," November, 1971. Appendix E. (Hereinafter referred to as Appendix E.)

A. Internal arguments or sources (They involve the speaker's own interpretation of reality):
1. Argument from definition or genus
2. Argument from similitude
3. Argument from cause and effect
   a. Argument from consequences
   b. Argument from circumstances

B. External argument or source (Involves someone else's interpretation of reality):
1. Testimony or authority

The analysis revealed that there was a predominate configuration of argumentative modes and sources throughout the speeches analyzed. Almost invariably Buckley began by defining, analyzing, or explaining the subject; or by explicating basic principles; or by delineating the scope. He would then support and illustrate his definition or thesis using examples, analogies, and testimony or authority. He seldom used cause and effect and even less frequently its subsidiary forms consequence and circumstances. On the few occasions that he used the latter forms, he did so not so much as a line of argument or proof, but to illustrate or as post facto justification.

In "Reflections on the Current Disorder" the configuration is more evident than in the other speeches although it is easily discernible in the other three. The entire speech is an attempt to define the Constitutional "freedoms;" to ascertain their nature, rationale, and boundaries; to
determine the thinking of our fore-fathers on the question; to ascertain how far the government can go in a democracy in limiting the freedoms; and to determine whether the demonstrations and "revolutionary" activities were sanctioned by the Constitution. Buckley organized the speech under five propositions calculated to present comprehensively his case:

**Proposition One:** The opinion-making community misunderstands the usefulness of repression.

**Proposition Two:** The absolutizers, in their struggle against what they call repression, are doing their best to make the Constitution of the United States incoherent.

**Proposition Three:** Such self-proclaimed revolutionists as Messrs. Hoffman, Rubin, Dellinger and Seale, and such others as, for instance, Tom Hayden and William Kunstler, do not appear to understand the historical, let alone the theoretical rights of counter-revolutionists.

**Proposition Four:** So far have the professionally tolerant gone towards fanaticism that we stand in danger of losing the salutary force of public sanction.

**Proposition Five:** Although such men as Eldridge Cleaver can be extremely specific ("kill the pigs"), the vagueness of the revolutionary program of much of the New Left is its most singular strength, confronting the republic with its subtlest extra-legal challenge.

In order to illustrate the typical Buckley pattern of argumentation from this speech, the first two propositions are analyzed in the following pages:

**Proposition One:** The opinion-making community misunderstands the usefulness of repression.

The use of propositions gives the impression of a logical analysis. This is typical of the Buckley style. He often uses propositions, syllogisms, letters or numbers to itemize or divide. The form of logicality is present even
if the substance is not. Even if one did not analyze the arguments presented in this speech, he would get the impression that Buckley is strong in organization and logic.

I mean by this proposition to draw attention to the great success that the recent mentors of American civilization have enjoyed when they suggest that repression is the kind of thing practiced by storm troopers and rationalized in Mein Kampf; or, in other situations, by such as Lester Maddox in his chicken restaurant, driven by theories of white supremacy.

This is an introductory paragraph. The Mein Kampf and Lester Maddox examples are used to illustrate rather than as a line of argument. However, they are intended to imply that rational people—people other than Hitler and Maddox—can under some circumstances advocate repression.

There is no evidence in early American history that I know of to suggest that the men who wrote the Constitution believed that all thought was in some way equal, simply because they went on to devise a Bill of Rights that forbade the Congress from enacting any laws abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.

This clearly is the beginning of an attempt to define the Constitutional freedoms. "Are they absolute?" is his implicit question. His strategy is to demonstrate that our fore-fathers did not so regard them even though they prohibited laws intended to circumscribe or proscribe them.

When Thomas Jefferson spoke about the virtue of tolerating even those who seek to repeal our republican forms of government, it is clear from his other writings, and from the lapidary record of his own activities, that what he meant to say was that the toleration of certain kinds of dissent is a tribute to the good sense of the American people who will always reject the blandishments of the anti-republican minority. So then, why interfere with the minority who wish to practice tyranny? It is, after all, a form of democratic self-confidence to be
able to stroll peacefully through Hyde Park and listen to the orators who denounce our free institutions. It summons to mind the cozy child's dream, wherein you wake up suddenly in a jungle surrounded by wild beasts who however are powerless to harm you, because you are protected by an impenetrable bubble of glass which is proof against their aggressions.

This paragraph attempts to distinguish between permissible and impermissible dissent. Jefferson—author of the Declaration and one of the main architects of the Constitution—is invoked as authority. Buckley says "it is clear from his other writings and from . . . his own activities . . ." that he did not regard the First Amendment freedoms as absolute. He does not present at this point any direct testimony or any actual examples of Jefferson's activities in support of his interpretation. The Hyde Park example is used more as an illustration of the type of dissent that is permissible. Implicitly it says that a democratic society can tolerate a lone, non-violent dissenter or a small minority of dissenters, but that there is a point at which the society or the majority have the right to restrict or suppress dissent. The child's dream illustration must be regarded as a hypothetical illustration or a figurative analogy. Both of these must be considered as illustration rather than proof. Weaver—and others—require at least two examples to constitute an argument from example while one can argue from analogy with only the single instance. As illustrative material these are effective; as proof they are weak.

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5Weaver, *Rhetoric and Composition*, p. 118.
Abraham Lincoln the polemicist pulled a fast one, Professor Jaffa reminds us, when he began his Gettysburg Address by dating the beginning of the American Republic not with the Constitution but with the signing of the Declaration of Independence. His old adversary Stephen Douglas, during the famous debates, based his case on the Constitution alone--with exclusive reference to which it could indeed be argued that the Dred Scott decision was meticulously correct in forbidding the free-soil states from refusing a slave-owner the right to take residence there along with his slaves. Lincoln cited the beginning of the United States as having taken place "four score and seven years" before Gettysburg. That is to say in 1776, with the adoption of the Declaration of Independence. Accordingly--said Lincoln in effect--the metaphysics of the Declaration of Independence animate the Constitution, so that when scholars and statesmen disagree--as they would do with progressive heat in the years that led to the explosion of civil war--on how to reconcile the postulates of America with the survival of slavery, it was to the Declaration of Independence that the abolitionists ideally repaired for guidance. Because the Declaration of Independence spoke of "self-evident" truths. Among them that men are born equal.

Buckley continues to define or explain the First Amendment freedoms, whether they are absolute or whether under certain circumstances it is consistant with the Constitution and the fore-fathers to restrict them. In this paragraph he invokes the authority of Lincoln in the definition--explaining Lincoln's Gettysburg Address and subsequent actions in a way so as to support the limiting of the Constitutional freedoms under severe circumstances. Buckley is saying in effect that sometimes immediate freedoms have to be forfeited for more permanent freedoms. Notice the rhetorical force of "Abraham Lincoln the polemicist pulled a fast one. . . ." By labeling Lincoln a "polemicist," Buckley intends for us to understand that when Lincoln
composed the Gettysburg Address he was not merely eulogizing, but that he was involved in a polemic effort. Thus Lincoln's dating of the United States from the Declaration of Independence rather than from the Constitution was not a mere oversight or poetic license, but a calculated part of his rhetorical strategy. Buckley uses Jaffa as authority to support his interpretation of Lincoln's understanding and strategy.

The initial toleration of slavery, in the understanding of Lincoln, was a historical accommodation. The accommodation of a great weight on America's neck; a birthmark. To be recognized by its leaders as such; so that step by step they might direct public policy towards emancipation by attrition. Professor Jaffa reminds us that "no American statesman ever violated the ordinary maxims of civil liberties more than did Abraham Lincoln, and few seem to have been more careful of them than Jefferson Davis." And then he adds the point which is so striking in the contemporary situation, "Yet the cause for the sake of which the one slighted these maxims was human freedom, while the other, claiming to defend the forms of constitutional government, found in those forms a ground for defending and preserving human slavery."

Buckley continues his long explication or definition of the nature of the First Amendment freedoms and of Lincoln's interpretation of the freedoms and his actions or policies respecting them. He cites direct testimony from Professor Jaffa--whose identity is not given and credentials not elaborated--in support of his definition of the First Amendment guarantees. He offers no examples of Lincoln's violating or suspending civil liberties or of Jefferson Davis' special efforts to preserve them--although he could have cited examples in both cases. Implicitly, Buckley is
presenting the paradox that a government can limit immediate liberties to secure permanent liberties and that a government can capitalize on liberties to preserve the antithesis.

It is instructive to meditate on this apparent paradox at a moment when so much of the liberal community is disposed to denounce such modest little efforts as are nowadays being made to enhance the public order.

Buckley's use of the term "paradox" in the concluding paragraph under Proposition One of the speech is calculated to remind the audience that there is a problem of definition that should be meditated upon. The "liberal community" that Buckley refers to would doubtless question whether the "law and order" actions that he alludes to are "modest little efforts."

In this section of the speech "Reflections on the Current Disorder," Buckley used two lines of argument from the Weaver hierarchy: argument from definition and the "external source" argument from testimony and authority. This entire portion of the speech is an attempt to define the Constitutional First Amendment freedoms. He contends that neither the framers of the Constitution—he specifically mentions Jefferson—nor Lincoln believed that the freedoms were absolute. He implied that both Jefferson and Lincoln's statements and actions supported his contention. He presented the paradox of Lincoln's suppressing civil liberties in order to preserve the republic while Jefferson Davis capitalized upon the guarantees to preserve slavery. No direct testimony or specific examples from Jefferson,
Lincoln, or Davis are presented to support his contention. His only specific support of his interpretation of Jefferson and Lincoln's understanding of the nature of the Constitutional freedoms is Professor Jaffa's testimony. He used a few examples and one analogy to illustrate, but did not develop a line of argument using either of these sources.

Buckley continues in Proposition Two in the same vein defining the rights of dissenters and the rights and powers of the established government in a republic to deal with dissent and revolution. Proposition Two reads:

Proposition Two: The absolutizers, in their struggle against what they call repression, are doing their best to make the Constitution of the United States incoherent.

An analysis of the arguments under this proposition reveals that Buckley continues to argue from definition. He advances three theses or arguments and supports these with explication, examples, testimony, and authority. The three theses and supporting materials are:

**Thesis One:** It ought to be obvious that it is impossible to absolutize any single freedom without moving it in the way of another absolutized freedom!

**Example One:** How can you simultaneously have an absolute right to compel testimony in your own behalf (Amendment VI), while others have the absolute right (Amendment V), to refuse to testify lest they incriminate themselves?

**Example Two:** How can you have absolute freedom of the press (Amendment I) alongside the absolute right (Amendment VI) to a fair trial?
Example Three: How can you have absolute freedom of speech (Amendment I) alongside other people's absolute right (Amendment XIV) to their property, including their good name?

Buckley follows these examples with an illustration from Oliver Wendall Holmes in which Justice Holmes sought by use of illustration to define a fanatic, i.e. "absolutizer." This leads into Buckley's second thesis. He reasons that the implicit maxim of the "absolutizers" is that all ideas are equal and hence all ideas are protected under the Constitution. Buckley's second argument or thesis is:

**Thesis Two:** All ideas are not equal and do not have to be treated impartially in a republic.

*Reasoning, example, authority of Declaration of Independence and the Constitution:* If that maxim ("absolutizer's") were accepted, white superiority would long since have been accepted as truth in parts of this and other countries. In any event, the statement is hard to reconcile with the notion that some truths are "self-evident." Certainly it is hard to reconcile with the attitudes of the men who urged the adoption of the Constitution.

*Testimony and Authority - Federalist Papers, Hamilton did not regard all ideas equal:*  

Hamilton argued that the federal government must have the power to enforce its laws and punish violators: Concerning the problem of indigenous threats to the republic, Alexander Hamilton wrote most directly. His plea for the proposed Constitution was not merely a plea against the anarchy that every schoolboy knows he abhorred. He warned also of the dangers of despotism. "It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy," he wrote, "without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy."

Hamilton criticized the Articles of Confederation for not granting sufficient power to the government: Hamilton wrote in criticism of the Articles of
Confederation that the government as then composed
had "no powers to exact obedience or punish dis­
obedience to /its/ resolutions, either by pecuniary
mulcts, by a suspension or divestiture of privileges,
or by any other constitutional mode." Unless that
situation were remedied, he warned, the United
States would "afford the extraordinary spectacle of
a government destitute even of the shadow of con­
stitutional power to enforce the execution of its
own laws.

Thesis Three: In those situations in which republican
government is threatened by an assertive minority or
a passive majority or a combination of the two, the
government has the right to protect the republic against
insurrection.

Testimony: "The idea of restraining the legislative
authority, in the means of providing for the nation­
al defense," Hamilton ventured, "is the one of those
refinements which owe their origin to a zeal for
liberty more ardent than enlightened." He argued
that "It is better to hazard the abuse of that
confidence than to embarrass the government and
endanger the public safety by impolitic restrictions
on the legislative authority."

Reasoning, Testimony: So then, was Hamilton
encouraging something which nowadays would go by the
name of "repression"? Precisely. "The hope of
impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the
dread of punishment, a proportionable strong dis­
couragement to it." Over and over again Hamilton
leans on the assumption that the general majority
are as a practical matter going to be content with
laws which are after all of their own devising.
Nevertheless, Hamilton implicitly acknowledged that
irrationality could now and again raise its ugly
head. To assume that the government in a demo­
cratic society will not ever have to use force to
assert its laws is naive. ". . . the idea of gover­
n ing at all times by the simple force of law (which
we have been told is the only admissible principle
of republican government)," he writes acidulously,
"has no place but in the reveries of those political
doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of
experimental instruction."

The analysis of Proposition Two revealed that Buckley
continued to argue primarily from definition as he had in
Proposition One and as he continued to employ as his primary mode of argument throughout the remaining three propositions of the speech. He supported his first thesis or subproposition by evoking examples from the Constitution, an inductive process which is a type of argument from definition under the Weaverian rubrics. He supported his second and third theses or arguments with explanation and testimony. Since one may define by explication, citing examples, and by quoting someone else's definition or understanding of something, it is clear that Buckley's mode of argument under Proposition Two is predominately, if not almost exclusively, argument from definition.

Analysis of University of Virginia Commencement Address

In the commencement address, Buckley takes an excerpt from a book by Jean-Francois Revel, *A Future Without Marx or Jesus*, and uses it as the text for his speech. The excerpt reads:

*There is in America an increasing rejection of the society motivated by profit, dominated exclusively by economic consideration, ruled by the spirit of competition and subjected to the mutual aggressiveness of its members. . . . Indeed, beneath every revolutionary idea we find a conviction that man has become the tool of his tools, and that he must once more become an end and a value in himself. The thrust of Revel's indictment is that Americans are disillusioned with their economic system and that they*
are rejecting the free market, profit, competition, and other features of capitalism. Buckley, in fact, in the introduction correlates Revel's conclusion with Galbraith's thesis "the market is a snare and a delusion." Buckley's purpose in the speech is to analyze and, in part, refute Revel's (and Galbraith's) contention. Buckley admits that "disillusion is in the air," but he sees other causes of the disillusion. There is a semblance of cause-effect argument running through the speech; however, it is apparent that Buckley's purpose is to define the nature of the disillusion, diagnose its causes, and prescribe its remedy. He first deals with the economic facets of the disillusion. He begins his analysis by arguing: (1) "I do not know of any society that is dominated exclusively by economic considerations. (2) . . . our own is not or else we would be more straightforward in some of our international enterprises. (3) . . . we have seen rather the continuing disposition of some people to ascribe an economic motivation to every human transaction."

Having begun the refutation by offering his analysis of the economic facets of the disillusion, Buckley follows his thesis with arguments from example and analogy:

(1) Example: This temptation, as we all know, antedated Karl Marx and was penetrated as false before Karl Marx wrote his celebrated book.

(2) Analogy: But like the philosophical determinism of B.F. Skinner, economic determinism is no less fashionable for having been repeatedly discredited theoretically and empirically.

(3) Example: It was only a year ago that an organization
of militant ladies who call themselves Another Mother for Peace bombarded the Congress of the United States with six hundred thousand signatures of Americans who protested the Vietnam War, after being advised by another mother that the war was actually being fought in behalf of the oil interests in America. And indeed it transpired that a report has been circulating the United States to the effect that oil companies were poised to take 400 million barrels of oil per day out of the Indo-Chinese shelf beginning on the week that South Vietnam wins its victory. What proved wrong with the story, a congressional committee patiently discovered, was that (a) 400 million barrels of oil per day is indisputably a lot of oil— in fact, it is ten times as much as is taken daily out of the rest of the entire world combined, (b) the United States owns no concessions off Indochina, and (c) no oil has yet been discovered off Indochina.

The purpose of the two examples and the analogy is to prove and illustrate the "disposition of some people to ascribe an economic motivation to every human transaction."

Concluding the Another Mother for Peace example, Buckley says, "But that minor correction and others like it will not significantly diminish the number of pilgrims who will continue to believe that the principal motive of the United States in Southeast Asia is economic."

Buckley then moves into the second part of his speech-- an analysis of the cultural aspects of the disillusion which he believes is more significant than the economic aspects. He states as his analysis of the disillusion, "My own feeling is that the (revolutionary) movement is less concerned to reject profit than to reject society."

He supports this contention with further analysis, examples, authority, and causal argument:
(1) **Analysis of nature of student riots with examples;**
During the most vociferous years of the late 1960's, there were student riots— not only in Chicago and Berkeley, but in Paris and Madrid, Tokyo and Berlin, New Dehli and Mexico. On and on they came, their coordinates unpredictable so that the taxonomists finally threw up their instruments in dismay after attempting to correlate the dissatisfactions with private enterprise, or the Vietnam War, or racism, or clitoral orgasm, which I suppose is a comprehensive list of the major concerns of that decade.

(2) **Use of authority to support causal argument on nature of disillusion:** If I may say so, the despair whose existence we cannot dispute did not greatly surprise social observers whose richer scales are less easily ruffled than the New York Times. Christopher Dawson and David Riesman, a historian and a sociologist, had for instance long been aware among others of the phenomenon of anomie— the great fault in human nature, which like the geophysical faults that cause elemental disturbances beneath the surface of the earth or cause deracinated man to shudder with fright and loneliness and despair. But men are disposed even as they exercise their freedom implicitly to reject the uses of it to inquire into the true cause of their discontent; are disposed indeed to talk disdainfully about those human institutions which are arranged to give them as individuals the greatest scope.

(3) **Use of testimony in support of free enterprise, profit system:** The restlessness continues, and meanwhile, it is unfashionable— I intended to say unprofitable— to adduce in defense of economic freedom the utilitarian argument that led Dr. Johnson to remark that "man is seldom so innocently engaged as when in pursuit of profit. . . ."

(4) **Argument from definition by exposing fallacious reasoning:** I pause to pay that argument historical deference, and confess to being more shaken by the extra-economic suggestion that the free market place introduces mutual aggressiveness. Surely that is the climactic effrontery, the notion that it is an act of aggression to lay before the individual a choice, whether of canned soups or economic textbooks. By that token, it is an act of aggression to write another song or paint a canvas or set down a verse or write another judicial opinion on the grounds that by doing so one muscles into territory already spoken for.
In order to bring Buckley's argument into sharper relief, one can cast the preceding in syllogistic form. Buckley does this implicitly or enthymematically. Revel's major premise (implicit) is, "It is an act of aggression to do what someone else has already done." Buckley supplies the minor premise, "Someone else has already written an economics textbook." The conclusion would be: "It is an act of aggression to write another economics textbook." Perhaps what we have here is a problem of "semantics" or definition. What Revel calls "aggression" Buckley calls "competition." Buckley calls Revel's suggestion that the market place introduces mutual aggressiveness "the climatic effrontery." Revel would doubtless call Buckley's enthymeme "simplistic." Probably neither argument is strong enough to convince an auditor who is not already leaning in its direction.

In the third part of his speech, Buckley analyzes the philosophical aspects of the disillusion. Here we are presented with Weaver's argument from definition in its purest form thus far.

We arrive, I think, at the complaint that underlies the ever phenomenal complaints that shatter away on contact with orderly thought. It is, of course, three, a philosophical complaint more than an economic one; namely, that man has become the tool of his tools, ceasing to be an end and a value in himself. Paradoxically, there is a correlation between our advance toward anonymity and our advance towards the kind of statism beloved of such as my friend, John Kenneth Galbraith. The complaint of those who worry about the gradual disappearance of the individual as the center of
civilized concern is made without reference to the cause of the blight. The causes are many and complicated and it may be that we will end up dumbly acquiesing in Professor Oakeshott's haunting historical insight that we are individuals marquee, that the burden of freedom proved over the centuries too great, but meanwhile, the battery on the individual intensifies and wears us down. Its success is partly the result of internal fatigue--partly the result of external fright. Our defenses have grown weak as individuals and our fortiori as a nation.

Buckley diagnoses the disillusion as a philosophical malady. Americans have lost their bearing. With no purpose to guide them, no metaphysics to sustain them, they suffer from a philosophical disorientation, a spiritual malaise. Buckley follows his diagnosis of the disillusion or argument from definition with five rather detailed examples with four analogies interweaved. In the Weaverian hierarchy of topics, the former represents induction a form of argument from genus or definition and the second argument from similitude which constitute the first and second rungs of his hierarchy. Some typical examples of these are:

Example 1:
It was ten years ago that I heard a most devastating analysis touching on the quick of the problem by a stylish young skeptic who put it this way: Once upon a time it was worth dying for two reasons. The first was that heroism was rewarded in another world, and the second was that heroism was rewarded in the memory of man. But now, he said, now that we know from the scientific evidence that there is, in fact, no other world, no future world, no Christian heaven, and now that we have invented weapons which are capable of destroying all of mankind and therefore all of human memory along with it, what is the reason left for heroism, for war, for the risk of war?

The vector of our thought becomes clearer. The sharp edges of the argument nowadays stress, not so much the nuclear war that would abolish mankind, as the senselessness of any war. The senselessness even of a
threat of war, indeed derivatively the senselessness of a convincing army, navy, and air force—tools of tools of tools—why? What is the justifying point of an armed service?

Analogy: It used to be that finding oneself in such a corner that one had merely to reach into one's arsenal and pull out the arrow that has freedom written on it, touch it down on the skeptic, and he would waste away like the witch come in contact with water. You will have noticed that it does not work anymore. Our freedom is increasingly understood as a condition discernible only by subjective analysis.

Example 2: Professor Ross Terrill of Harvard, author of the two most influential articles that have appeared in our time on the subject of Red China, is to be sharply distinguished from the famous apologists for Stalin's Russia who made their way by simply denying the crimes imputed to Stalin—Professor Terrill denies nothing, apart from the form of atrocities which he ignores. He does not disguise the condition of life in China today, not for a minute. After informing us that in China there is no freedom to practice religion, nor to vote, nor to express oneself, nor to read books or periodicals one desires to read, nor to change one's job, nor to travel to another city, or another region or another country, he notes ingenuously—people ask me "Is China free?" He answers with great difficulty: "It depends on what you mean by freedom," he says. "Freedom is always defined with reference to the limitation of the relevant entity. An whereas the operative entity in the West is the individual, the corporation, or the labor union, in China it happens to be the whole state." And he illustrates: "Consider the writer Kuo Mo-jo, in the 30's," he explains, "Kuo wrote books for a mere four or five, or at the most eight thousand people, but now—now he is required by the new state to write books that will appeal to twenty, thirty, or fifty million people." "Is that wrong?"—the Harvard Professor asks.

Then there is the researcher at Peking University, another illustration, whose affinity was for abstract science, but who was recently directed to concentrate exclusively on pest control. "Is that wrong?"—Terrill asks anathorically, and we begin to understand the quality of the ideological egalitarianism that rushes in after practical diplomacy.

In the second speech, Buckley admits that there is widespread discontent in America with the economic system
and institutions, but he challenges Revel and Galbraith's diagnosis of the discontent. He analyzes the disillusion to define its nature and symptoms. He does not, however, simply assert causes and then build a brief for his "causes." Hence, while the speech bears a semblance of cause-effect argument, it is argument from definition in the Weaverian schema. He uses induction or argument from example, argument from analogy, and argument from authority to support his diagnosis of America's disillusion.

Analysis of Buckley's Arguments in the Buckley-Galbraith Debate

The Buckley-Galbraith Debate was held at the Cambridge Union, Oxford University in 1971. The resolution, "The Market is a Snare and a Delusion," was dictated by John Kenneth Galbraith who affirmed; Buckley denied. An analysis of Buckley's speech reveals that his strategy was to argue from the nature of the market place, i.e. to argue from definition. He supports his argument from definition almost exclusively with testimony and authority. Thirteen different persons are quoted directly or invoked as authority by Buckley, including Galbraith whom he quotes against himself. The only other distinguishable line of argument is developed from example which Weaver categorizes as induction, a type of argument from definition. The forensic nature of the occasion undoubtedly had some influence on Buckley's approach, but as has already been revealed from the two previous
analyses, the heavy reliance on argument from definition is characteristic of Buckley's polemic style.

A portion of the case which Buckley presents leaving out the introductory material and the interruptions from the audience, is presented for an argument by argument analysis of sources. Buckley's persuasive strategy is indicated early in the speech when he labels the issue as a problem of epistemology. He begins by arguing from the nature of the market place and then analyzing the nature of the case against the free market:

If I were plenipotentiary, I'm sure I would be willing to do without the free market place. What would be the need of the free market place if I could make all the decisions, Mr. President? Surely it would not occur to Mr. Galbraith that they would be necessary to the survival of the mechanism of an organization that might come to conclusions contrary to his own. So I say, Mr. Galbraith does this rather innocently, and I don't think it would be right at all for anyone to encourage the suspicion that he harbors within him any totalitarian instincts. I am sure he believes that dissent has its place, properly situated and properly modulated. But there is one thing about the free market place that he has never been able to understand, and that is that it is a mechanism by which people can come to conclusions different from his own. Not necessarily conclusions that you favor or conclusions that I favor.

Buckley begins his defense of the market by plunging into an argument from definition. He argues from the nature of the free market. The market is a mechanism through which people exercise choice or volution. Through excellent rhetorical strategy, Buckley identifies the market with freedom and liberty--conditions that liberals such as

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6 Appendix E, p. 319-327.
Galbraith are usually found opting for—and subtlety suggests that to be against the free market is to harbor totalitarian instincts. In the next section of his brief, Buckley continues his argument from definition supported by authority:

Professor George Stigler, a man, if I may say so, of very considerable eminence in the economic world and I do hope and pray that those of you who study economics have heard of him, says that he greatly deplores the findings of the market place. He greatly deplores, for instance, the fact that one needs to subsidize symphony orchestras rather than that they should simply continue successfully as a result of public patronage. He greatly deplores the fact that most Americans believe that after you get your B.A. degree, you don't have to read another work of non-fiction, with the exception of Mr. Galbraith's works, and he goes on to say he greatly deplores that more people have, in fact, read The Affluent Society than have read The Wealth of Nations, but he is not about to reorder the market place system in order to turn it away from readers of Mr. Galbraith's works to readers of Adam Smith's works or even in the sublimer cause of requiring people to listen to symphony orchestras.

In the next section of the debate, Buckley focuses in on Galbraith's position. He claims to find a contradiction between Galbraith's present position and the position he formerly held. He attempts to state Mr. Galbraith's position—that the majority of decisions that are made in the economic world today are made by, what he calls, the techno-structure which controls and dictates what the consumer will buy; hence there is no "free" market today—and then to refute it by giving examples which prove that the techno-structure does not have that kind of control and that the buyer still rules the market place.
It is a complicated question in my judgment, ladies and gentlemen, because it does get mixed up, I think, with basic problems of epistemology. As I understand it, Mr. Galbraith's thesis is very simply this: namely, that the majority of decisions that are made in America today in the economic world are made by, what he calls, the techno-structure. People who in fact are so totally in control of the economic situation that they can in fact predict that you will buy their product, and under the circumstances it is nothing more than mystification to suggest that anything of the free market place remains. In his earlier book, he seemed to be saying something rather different. He seemed to be saying that there was this strong, oligarchic industrial management group which, however, had to face up to certain countervailing pressures that came in from government, that came in from labor unions. But now that has changed. Now somehow the latter two have been subsumed by it and the techno-structure is completely in command. What are the characteristics of that techno-structure—Survival, Prosperity, Security? He published this book in 1967 persuading everybody that finally expertise within principal American industries, taking into account the military-industrial complex, taking into account the wiles of advertising, made it absolutely predictable that all of us would forever oblige these firms in essential economic decisions.

Buckley supports his argument from definition with an inductive argument. Using examples from the "principal American industries" that he had just referred to, Buckley argues that the techno-structure was not able to control the market in $E_1$, $E_2$, $E_3$, $E_4$ and $E_5$; therefore, it is evident that the techno-structure does not have the power that Mr. Galbraith claims it has.

At the time he wrote, Raytheon was selling for $58, and now it is selling for $22. Sanders, a paint tack especially for the services of the United States, was selling for $77, now selling for $13. General Dynamics, that giant, was selling for $67, now $21. Collins Radio, $400 million a year, certainly in the taxonomy of Mr. Galbraith, a splendid example of the inperturbability of the techno-structure undamageable by the market place, selling then for $115, now you can get it
This inductive argument is very convincing. Some of the companies selected represent blue chip stocks. Unless the figures are wrong or there is some other explanation for the extraordinary drop in the cost of the stock over the short period of four years, one would have to accept Buckley's conclusion that market is still contingent upon the choice of the people. This investigator checked the New York Stock Exchange quotations for the companies cited and found them approximately correct, now knowing the exact dates that Buckley was using. Although the market does reflect political and economic contingencies, this simply reflects people's responding to these contingencies. The people are still able to exercise choice and volition.

Buckley continues to press his argument from definition analyzing Galbraith's thesis and definition of the market. In the following section Professor Gordon, Mr. Heilbroner, a socialist, and Professor Lange are quoted or invoked as authority to support Buckley's analysis of the nature of the market, and Galbraith is quoted against himself.

Now it seems to me that Mr. Galbraith, who has profound instincts for self-preservation, tends to maneuver out of the way of his own theses when they become especially damaging, and thus it was that when Professor Gordon, of Indiana University, said to him that, in effect, he has proclaimed that the market place is a snare and a delusion—what it is that we are arguing here tonight—all of a sudden Mr. Galbraith said exactly the contrary of what you have heard him say.
here tonight. Remember, he said that the market place is a snare and a delusion. He didn't say those who believe that the market place will usher in the Kingdom of God believe in a snare and a delusion. He said the market place is a snare and a delusion. When he was accosted with some analysis by a colleague, he turned around in his reply and said with rather rare and commendable docility, "I have never suggested that the revised sequence," that is what he calls the non-market mechanism—the revised sequence—he's given to these antique formulations—"has replaced the accepted sequence"—he means the market—"outside the industrial system, beyond the limits of the large corporations the market mechanism still rules. Within the industrial system it is of diminished importance in relation to the non-market mechanism. Here too, the consumer can still reject persuasion and, in consequence, through the market, he and his fellows can force accommodation by the producer." In other words, Mr. Galbraith has said (a) the market does work—outside the techno-structure, and (b) it continues to work to a certain extent within the techno-structure. He can actually succeed in rejecting the imperatives of the techno-structure.

Mr. Heilbroner has, seems to me, having absorbed the work of Mr. Galbraith, having absorbed and studied deeply the British experience in particular, the last few years, in an essay on the future of socialism—he is himself, Mr. Chairman, a socialist—writes a few weeks ago, "thus the debate on socialistic planning has come to a curious conclusion. If the theoretical dispute has been settled in favor of socialism, the practical question seems to have gone the other way. The giant corporations of capitalism have outperformed the lumbering ministeries of production at every hand. It has brought about a belated move in every advanced socialist nation in the direction urged by Oscar Lang, a colleague of Mr. Galbraith's at Harvard, away from centralized toward decentralized planning and, in particular, away from the directives of the monolithic central planning board toward the autonomy and flexibility of the market based system.

The speech continues in the same vein. Buckley supports his argument from definition using eleven authorities or direct testimonies from persons on both sides of the issue to buttress his argument. In the debate the strong analytical nature of Buckley's polemic style is most evident. He perceives the issue as a problem of epistemology and
focuses in on the nature of the market place theoretically and, to a lesser extent, in its practical operation. His basic premise is that the market provides both the investor and consumer a free choice and that this is most consistent with man's nature. He attempted to prove his contentions by developing arguments from example and testimony or authority. The main weakness of his speech—as is suggested by Miss Hewlett when she interrupts him—is that he does not prove, although perhaps he could have, that the consumer has much leverage in the market. His speech is more theoretical than practical which is to be expected when one concentrates on argument from definition. Such an approach will appeal to scholars and thinkers, but may fail to convince the average person who needs more concrete examples and practical arguments. It did prove successful in this instance. Although the Cambridge Union audience would be expected to be more in sympathy with Galbraith's point of view, the vote was in Buckley's favor, defeating the motion with 118 yea, 200 nay, and 45 abstentions.

Analysis of Arguments from Playboy Interview

The Playboy Interview provided an excellent opportunity to analyze Buckley's logic in the dialectic situation. The interview was conducted by David Butler who questioned Buckley on many of the more controversial issues of the day. In order to analyze Buckley's method of argument in the
dialectic situation, a typical portion of the interview was analyzed to be included in this chapter. The entire interview is published in Appendix F.

An analysis of arguments from the Playboy Interview revealed Buckley's strong affinity for the argument from definition or from the nature of things. In spite of the fact that the questions often seemed to dictate an argument from circumstances or consequences, Buckley invariably turned to the argument from definition. He was consistently analytical. He assumed perspective and sought out the basic principles involved in the issue. This does not mean that his analysis was always correct or convincing, but that it is his typical approach. He is more concerned with the philosophical aspects of the issue than the mere consequences or circumstances. When he utilized the latter arguments, they were clearly subsidiary arguments employed to support the argument from definition and seldom constituted the primary line of argument.

The Playboy Interview and analysis follows:

PLAYBOY: It's already a cliche to say that the sixties were a remarkable decade. Looking back, what event or development stands out in your mind as most important?

BUCKLEY: The philosophical acceptance of coexistence by the West.

PLAYBOY: Why "philosophical"?

BUCKLEY: Because a military acceptance of coexistence is one thing: that I understand. But since America is, for good reasons and bad, a moralistic power, the philosophical acceptance of coexistence ends us up in hot pursuit of reasons for that acceptance. We
continue to find excuses for being cordial to the Soviet Union; our denunciations of that country's periodic barbarisms—as in Czechoslovakia—become purely perfunctory. This is a callousing experience; it is a lesion of our moral conscience, the historical effects of which cannot be calculated, but they will be bad.

Why "coexistence"? And why "philosophical"?

"Coexistence" because to Buckley the most important conservative-liberal issue of the postwar era was "the great issue of how to deal with the Soviet Union." "Philosophical" because policies and actions derive from philosophy. Buckley seeks to analyze the nature of the issue. Although bad consequences are hinted at as the result of coexistence, they are not used to constitute the primary line of argument. One gets the impression that the philosophical acceptance of coexistence would be "morally" wrong regardless of the consequences. While the argument would be impressive to one with the same concern for moral and philosophical aspects as Buckley, it would probably be simply disregarded or considered a luxury by one who perceived no desirable alternative (consequences) to coexistence or who felt the circumstances dictated coexistence.

PLAYBOY: Among the reasons cited for a détente with the Soviet Union is the fact that the money spent on continuing hot and cold wars with the Communist bloc would be better spent for domestic programs. With the $150 billion we've spent in Vietnam since 1965, according to some estimates, we could have eliminated pollution throughout the country and rebuilt twenty-four major cities into what New York's Mayor Lindsay has said would be "paradises." Do you think our priorities are out of order?

7Appendix A, p. 268.
BUCKLEY: When I find myself entertaining that possibility, I dismiss my thinking as puerile. But first let me register my objection to your figures: It's superficial to say that the Vietnam war has cost us $150 billion. It has cost us X dollars in excess of what we would have spent on military or paramilitary enterprises even if there had been no war. That sum I have seen estimated at between $18 and $22 billion a year. Now, suppose I were to tell you that if Kerenski had prevailed in Russia in 1917, we would at this point have a budget excess sufficient to create the city of Oz in Harlem and everywhere else. The correct response to such a statement for grown-ups, is twofold. First, we are not--unfortunately--in a position to dictate the activity of the enemy; we cannot ask him please to let down because we need money for Harlem. Second, there are no grounds for assuming that the American people would have consented to spending the kind of money we're spending on the Vietnam war for general welfare projects. They might have said, "No, we'd rather keep the money and do what we want with it." I suspect that they would have said just that, and with justification: the bulk of the progress that has been made in America has been made by the private sector.

The question could have been easily answered with arguments from consequences and/or circumstances: "Consider the consequences of our refusing to intervene in Vietnam." or "Let's look at the circumstances necessitating our going into Vietnam." or "Regardless of the rationale for our intervention, we cannot pull out unilaterally because...."

Nonetheless, Buckley chose to argue from the nature of the issue. The Kerenski analogy provides graphic illustration, but weak proof. The first point in Buckley's argument is "semantically" valid; "we are not in a position to dictate the activity of the enemy." The anti-war response would be that we might be able to modify or change his actions in other ways than war. The second point--"there are no grounds for assuming that the American people would have consented
to spending the kind of money we're spending on the Vietnam war for general welfare projects"—invites the obvious response, "there are no grounds for assuming that the American people would have consented to spending the kind of money that we are spending on the Vietnam war on the Vietnam war!"

PLAYBOY: With reference to the first part of your answer: At the strategic-arms-limitation talks, aren't we actually asking the Russians to let down their guard if we let ours down?

BUCKLEY: Yes, we are. And, ideally, there would be massive, universal disarmament. But we don't live in an ideal world. The fact is that the Soviet Union is prepared to make remarkable sacrifices at home in order to maintain its military muscle abroad. It is prepared to do so in a world that has seen the United States pull out from dozens of opportunities to imperialize. We have walked out of twenty-one countries—I think that's the accepted figure—that we've occupied in the past thirty years. The Soviet Union has walked out of Austria, for very complicated reasons. Under the circumstances, one must assume that the arrant armament expenditures by the Soviet Union—for instance, $20 billion to develop its ABM system and its MIRV's—have to do with the attraction of a first-strike capability. There is only one known explanation, for instance, for the known "footprint"—the configuration—of the MIRV's the Soviet Union has been practicing with. Those missiles are exactly patterned after our Minuteman installations. If the Soviets intended their MIRV's only as a deterrent to an American first strike, they would aim those missiles at American cities. But they aren't being fashioned that way. Now, I don't think the collective leadership of Russia would dream of making a first strike for so long as we are in a position to inflict insupportable damage in a second strike, whatever the urgings of their Dr. Strangloves, who are not without influence. But, manifestly, America is not preparing for a first strike. If we were, we would be aiming our weapons not at Russia's population centers but at her military installations—and we're not.

The argument is basically an argument from the nature of the kind of world that we live in, the nature of the
United States' foreign policy as compared to Russia's, and the nature of the Soviet Union's missile buildup. The argument from circumstances is one of the infrequent times that Buckley employs this type of argument and is clearly subsidiary to the argument from definition. The argument from the nature of the Soviet missile pattern is probably too sophisticated for the average audience and must be accepted on the basis of Buckley's ethos.

PLAYBOY: The best information available—from hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at which Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard appeared—is that we are well ahead of the Soviet Union in the development of MIRV's, and it's generally conceded that we conceived the system. Doesn't this suggest both that the threat posed by the Russian MIRV's is less than you imply and that their MIRV's may have been developed as a defense against ours?

BUCKLEY: Look. The intellectual attempting to evaluate the military situation, tends to fasten on a frozen position. He says, "Assuming apocalypse were tomorrow, how would the two sides stand?" But it is the responsibility of the military to understand how military confrontations actually work—which means that you cannot prepare for Tuesday by being absolutely prepared for Monday. In a world in which it takes between four and eight years to develop what is actually intended as a first-strike defensive system, you may, in the course of preparing for that system, find yourself temporarily with a first-strike superiority. A caricature of what I'm talking about is the sudden apprehension by Darryl Zanuck when he was filming The Longest Day—on the Normandy invasion—that he actually found himself in command of the third largest military force in the world. Presumably, he would not have used it even to attack Otto Preminger. You need to ask yourself the subjective question: Do I know people in the United States whose hands are on the trigger, who are actually conspiring to opportunist on the temporary military advantage? It seems plain to me that the recent history of the United States ought to be sufficient to appease the doubts of the doubters. In fact, we have had such superiority even at moments when the enemy was at its most provocative—and yet we haven't used it.
PLAYBOY: Hasn't it been authoritatively asserted that U.S. superiority is overwhelmingly beyond the defensive or offensive necessity of any conceivable threat from another nuclear power?

BUCKLEY: That's a military judgment and I don't feel qualified to pronounce about it. I feel confident only to make an elementary philosophical point. I tend to believe that what the lawyers call "an excess of caution" is not something we should penalize the military for. I want an excess of caution, because I understand a mistake in that direction to be apocalyptic in its consequences. Now, if you say, "I can establish that we are spending money to develop a redundant weapon," my answer is: Go ahead and establish it. Meanwhile, I would rather side with the cautious, the prudent people. And here I find myself wondering how it is that Robert McNamara—who, for some reason, tends to be rather beloved by the liberals—how come he didn't object to the technological-military evolution that nowadays strikes so many people as untoward. And, again, why have we so drastically reversed our attitudes concerning what was for so long considered the liberal thing to do? During the fifties, the great accent was on defense. The military-industrial complex—as you know—used to be called the "Arsenal of Democracy." Now, all of a sudden, when you talk about ABM's, the same people who encouraged us to spend $50 billion—yes $50 billion—on defense during the fifties object to spending an extra $5 billion on defense in the sixties.

Buckley's argument is based on the nature of the nuclear race and the nature of military confrontations—i.e. arguments from definition. He argues that the nature of nuclear warfare with the length of time required for developing, testing, and operationalizing new weapons is such that a country can never be content with parity or superiority at any particular time, but must plan years in advance to guarantee superiority or at least parity in the future. The Longest Day analogy provides graphic illustration, subtle humor, but dubious proof. His claim to make only a "philosophical" point about the charge that we have
a weapons system now "overwhelmingly beyond the defensive or offensive necessity of any conceivable threat from another nuclear power," and his use of the lawyer's concept of "an excess of caution" further reveal the nature of his argument. He hints at the consequences of failing to exercise the caution—"apocalyptic"—but does not develop the line of argument. He supports his case by invoking the authority of Robert McNamara—"who, for some reason, tends to be rather beloved by the liberals"—and points out that what is now derogatorily called "the military-industrial complex" used to be called, by liberals as well as conservatives, the "Arsenal of Democracy."

Thus Buckley continued in the same style throughout the long interview utilizing as his primary mode of argument the argument from definition. Some of the other questions that he treated in this interview in this manner involved the United States and imperialism, Vietnam and civil war, the right of dissent and oppression, the concept of just war, the meaning of conservatism, the concept of civil disobedience, and so forth. It is possible that the interview, as it tends to dictate a more dialectic approach, made the argument from definition more natural in this case. Yet Buckley invariably argued from definition even when the questions appeared to make a simple causal argument more natural.
Summary

It is apparent from the preceding analyses that Buckley's natural mode of argument was, in the Weaverian hierarchy of topics, the argument from definition. Even in contexts which appeared to make a causal argument or an argument from consequences or circumstances more natural, he habitually defined or argued from genus or the nature of the thing. He most frequently supported his basic argument with analogies, examples, and the external source, testimony, or authority. He seldom advanced a causal argument. He seemed to have an aversion for arguments from consequences or circumstances. His natural inclination was to define, to seek out basic premises, to delineate the scope of the thing, or to explicate its characteristics or operative principle. His educational emphasis in history, political science, and economics, his wide reading and journalistic experience provided him with a ready reservoir of historical analogies, examples, and testimonial materials to use in support of his definitions. When he occasionally used causal arguments, he used them as subsidiary arguments or as post facto justification for his definition rather than as a primary line of argument.

From the foregoing analysis it is clear that Buckley supports the Weaverian thesis that the conservative predominately argues from definition and tends to avoid the argument from circumstances. To generalize from this study
that this is typically true of conservatives is, of course, impossible. To affirm that it is true in Buckley's case because he is a conservative is hazardous. It may be true of Buckley more because of his personality, his journalistic experience and discipline, his "Firing Line" and debate experience, or because of habits developed as a result of family and educational influences. When this investigator asked Buckley if he consciously followed Weaver's hierarchy, he replied in the negative. He revealed that he was familiar with Weaver's hierarchy, that he thought it was natural for him to argue from definition, but that he sometimes used arguments from consequences and circumstances to support his basic argument. He said that he was often moving against basic assumptions held by others or the general public and he indicated that he did so by exposing their fallacies or weaknesses and then using other modes of argument to buttress his basic argument.8

We live in a world increasingly given to ideological conflicts, to propagandizing, and to, even if nothing worse, a "knowledge explosion." In a world such as this, especially in an open society governed through democratic processes, the ideal citizen should be able to think logically and speak lucidly. He should be able to analyze propositions and arguments, ferret out basic premises and

8Appendix, A, p. 273.
assumptions, and test them by realistic criteria. He should also be able to foresee consequences (for Ideas Do Have Consequences) and evaluate circumstances. The findings of this analysis, therefore, have special implications for those who teach communication and public address. The results suggest that we should not be satisfied with the usual superficial treatment of the modes of reasoning, lines of argument, and types of supporting materials, but that we should be especially concerned with teaching those argumentative modes and skills associated with dialectic and logic.
CHAPTER VI

GOD, DEVIL, AND CHARISMATIC TERMS IN THE LEXICON OF WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR.

Richard M. Weaver had much to say about the use of language.¹ The number and quality of these articles bear witness to his keen interest in the use of words. In these treatises he is concerned with the use of language in terms of grammar, linguistics, semantics, symbolism, and rhetoric. The primary concern of this writer, however, and his analysis of Buckley's use of language is rhetorical. Buckley's use of language from the grammatical, linguistic, semantic, and symbolic standpoint, while doubtless of worth, are beyond the thrust of this dissertation and when touched upon will be only incidental.

In this chapter criteria will be developed from Weaver's theory of the rhetorical use of language to evoke

emotions and will be applied to the same four speeches of Buckley's that were analyzed in Chapter Five. The speeches will be analyzed first for Buckley's use of God, Devil, and Charismatic terms. Secondly, there will be an analysis of Buckley's use of language, in Weaver's term, to "actualize."

The concept of God, Devil, and Charismatic terms is explicated in Chapter Nine of The Ethics of Rhetoric, "Ultimate Terms in Contemporary Rhetoric." Weaver's thesis is that "rhetorical force must be conceived as a power transmitted through the links of a chain that extends upward toward some ultimate source." A term is defined as "a name capable of entering into a proposition." Even a single term is an incipient proposition in that it creates an expectancy of propositional embodiment. Given the term "patriot" one expects it to be followed by "Brutus," or "Washington," or "Parnell": given the term "hot" one expects "sun," "stove," and so on to follow. Thus Weaver avers, "single terms have their potencies, this being part of the phenomenon of names."2

In the following paragraphs, I shall enunciate those terms Weaver regarded as ultimate terms in contemporary rhetoric with some explanation of his rationale, but not a detailed explication of each term's etiology. Since values do change, however slowly, it is not possible to specify

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2 Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 211.
ultimate terms for all time; the best that one can do is to
determine those that function for a particular culture in a
particular time. The speeches were examined for the use of
ultimate terms according to Weaver's list as well as for
other terms which were not on his list but which Buckley
employed as ultimate terms.

Weaver defines "god term" as "that expression about
which all other expressions are ranked as subordinate and
serving dominations and powers. Its force imparts to the
others their lesser degree of force, and fixes the scale by
which degrees of comparison are understood." He finds that
the one term that carries the greatest blessing and whose
antonym carries the greatest rebuke in our day is "progress."
"This seems to be the ultimate generator of force flowing
down through many links of ancillary terms. If one can
'make it stick,' it will validate almost anything." Since
the nature of humans dictates that their lives revolve
around some concept of value, and in recent centuries the
concept of personal salvation has waned, progress appears
to be the "salvation" that man is placed upon earth to work
out. The frequent use of this term in propositional form
attests to its rhetorical force: "Progressive leader,"
"progressive community," "Progressive party" (since there is
no longer a viable "Progressive party" today, both major
political parties would seek to commend themselves to the
public as the "progressive party"), "progressive education,"
and so forth. There is hardly anyone or anything whose
proponents would not commend to the public under the aegis of "progress." Weaver opines "there is no word whose power to move is more implicitly trusted than 'progressive.'" One can extend any challenge and demand any sacrifice of the public in the name of "progress."

Having illustrated the nature of Weaver's rationale for the selection and order of ultimate terms in detail for the ultimate god term, "progress," I will enunciate the remaining god terms in descending order. The second god term in rank is "fact." Weaver reasoned:

"... Today's speaker says "It is a fact" with all the gravity and air of finality with which his less secular-minded ancestor would have said "it is the truth." "These are facts"; "Facts tend to show"; and "He knows the facts" will be recognized as common locutions drawing upon the rhetorical resource of this word."

Number three in the hierarchy of god terms is "science." Weaver explained "if there is good reason for placing 'progress' rather than 'science' at the top of our series, it is only that the former has more scope, 'science' being the methodological tool of 'progress.'" Any common expression beginning with "Science says," "Science knows," "Science proves," or "Science demonstrates" will readily remind one of the rhetorical force of this term. The proposition must always be in the above form for full rhetorical force as can be easily seen by the diminished force of

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3 Ibid., p. 213.
4 Ibid., p. 214.
5 Ibid., p. 215.
statements such as "A majority of scientists say" or "Many scientists believe." According to Weaver...

...the term "science" like "progress" seems to satisfy a primal need. Man feels lost without a touchstone of knowledge just as he feels lost without the direction-finder provided by progress...

Once God or his ministry was the depository of such knowledge, but now with the general decay of religious faith, it is the scientists who must speak ex cathedra, whether they wish to or not.⁶

The term "modern" occupies the fourth rung of Weaver's hierarchy of god terms. He noted:

The term "modern" shares in the rhetorical force of the others thus far discussed, and stands not far below the top... Where progress is real there is a natural presumption that the latest will be the best. Hence it is generally thought that to describe anything as "modern" is to credit it with all the improvements which have been made up to now.⁷

Fifth in Weaver's list of god terms is "efficient." In explaining the high position given to this term in the hierarchy, Weaver wrote, "Another word definitely high up in the hierarchy we have outlined is 'efficient.' It seems to have acquired its force through a kind of no-nonsense connotation. If a thing is efficient, it is a good adaptation of means to ends with small loss through friction."⁸

"American" occupies the sixth and last rung in the hierarchy of god terms enunciated by Weaver. In spite of its position it carries considerable rhetorical force, not

⁶Ibid., p. 216.
⁷Ibid., p. 217.
⁸Ibid.
only in the United States but in foreign countries as well. It derives its power from those god terms which precede it in the hierarchy. While there is definitely the factor of national egotism involved as far as we are concerned, the rhetorical force of "American" comes from the fact that America represents to most citizens and many foreigners the epitome of progress, science, efficiency, and modernity.

Theoretically the hierarchy of god terms would continue through the possibilities, but Weaver stops at this junction. In the following analysis, I will enunciate some terms that Buckley uses as god terms that are not in Weaver's list.

The opposite of god terms are "devil terms" or terms of repulsion. The skilled rhetor uses god terms in a positive way to enhance a person, thing, or concept and devil terms in a negative way to make the competing person, thing, or concept repugnant to his audience. Weaver wrote of these terms: "Some terms of repulsion are also ultimate in the sense of standing at the end of the series, and no survey of the vocabulary can ignore these prime repellants." He identifies three terms in contemporary rhetoric which have extraordinary power to repel: "un-American," "Communist," and "prejudice."

Weaver found that "in the popular consciousness of this country 'un-American' is the ultimate in negation."

9Ibid., p. 219.
This is doubtless due to national pride, patriotism, and to the widely-held view that America represents the future, modernity, prosperity, freedom, and a standard of fairness and justice envied and aspired to by the rest of the world. Weaver illustrates how un-American is the ultimate of negation by relating the story of one of the major tobacco manufacturers of some years ago who found damaging rumors being spread about his product. Unless the rumors were squelched, the sale of his product would drop off precipitously. The executives of the company huddled with some of the top advertising people in the country to plan a strategy to stop or blunt the force of the rumors. After much deliberation they came up with the ultimate of negation and launched an expensive and successful advertising campaign labeling the rumors as "un-American."¹⁰

Weaver points out that while the average American will accept the pretentiousness of a "Committee on Un-American Activities," we would think it strange at least if not completely ridiculous were there a "Committee on Un-British Activities" or a "Committee on Un-French Activities." While we congratulate one who has left his country to become an American citizen, we wonder how one could be so mentally unbalanced as to give up his American citizenship to become a citizen of another country. In fact, we hardly conceive of the process of naturalization as going in but one direction.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 219.
The second most effective term of negation according to Weaver is "Communist." He explained that there seems to be a deep-seated psychic need for a scapegoat, an enemy, or something to personify "the adversary." He ruminates on the psychology of this phenomenon:

... If a nation did not have an enemy, an enemy would have to be invented to take care of those expressions of scorn and hatred to which peoples must give vent. When another political state is not available to receive the discharge of such emotions, then a class will be chosen, or a race, or a type, or a political faction, and this will be held up to a practically standardized form of repudiation.11

Americans at different times in their history have employed many such devil terms: "Troy," "Rebel" (in the North), "Yankee" (in the South), "pro-German," "Nazi," "Fascists," and so forth. "Now 'Communist' is beyond any rival the devil term, and as such it is employed even by the American president when he feels the need of a strong rhetorical point."12

The third of Weaver's devil terms is "prejudice." He wrote, "No student of contemporary usage can be unmindful of the curious reprobative force which has been acquired by the term 'prejudice.'" He observed that etymologically it means nothing more than a prejudgment or a judgment before all of the facts are in and since we all must frequently engage in such judgments, the word should arouse no more excitement than "hypothesis." However he noted:

11Ibid., p. 222.

12Ibid., pp. 222, 223.
... But in its rhetorical application "prejudice" presumes far beyond that. It is used, as a matter of fact, to characterize unfavorably any value judgment whatever. If "blue" is said to be a better color than "red," that is prejudice. If people of outstanding cultural achievement are praised through contrast with another people, that is prejudice. If one mode of life is presented as superior to another, that is prejudice. And behind all is the implication, if not the declaration that it is un-American to be prejudiced. 13

The third category of terms endowed with special rhetorical efficacy are charismatic terms. Charismatic terms are

... terms of considerable potency whose referents it is virtually impossible to discover or to construct through imagination... It is the nature of the charismatic term to have a power which is not derived, but which is in some mysterious way given... In effect, they are rhetorical by common consent, or by "charisma." 14

Weaver discussed a number of these terms that have been operative in the past and cited five that he believed to be still endowed with rhetorical potency: "freedom," "democracy," "U S," "FBI," and "aggressor." He pointed out that though their charismatic quality apparently derived from the general will of the populace, the referents which the average man attached to the terms are most obscure. Weaver was skeptical of the use of such terms as "U S" and "FBI." Such abbreviated or telescoped forms he found almost void of referent and the form "nearly always used with even more reckless assumption of authority..." It suggests... an abstract force out of a new world of forces, whose

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13 Ibid., p. 223.
14 Ibid., p. 227.
will is law and whom the individual citizen has no way to placate." The term "aggressor" is viewed by Weaver as a secondary term that

...under the stress of feeling or preoccupation can be moved up to the position of ultimate terms, where (it) will remain until reflection is allowed to resume sway.... The likelihood is that "aggressor" will soon become a depository of all the resentment and fears which naturally arise in a people. ... Manifestly it is of great advantage to a nation bent upon organizing its power to be able to stigmatize some neighbor as "aggressor," so that the term's capacity for irrational assumption is a great temptation for those who are not moral in their use of rhetoric. This passage from natural or popular to state-engendered charisma produces one of the most dangerous lesions of modern society.15

In summary of Weaver's concept of ultimate terms in contemporary rhetoric, we find three categories of terms that have special rhetorical force: god terms, devil terms, and charismatic terms. The source of this power is in some cases clear and evident, in others obscure. In some instances the rhetorical power adheres because of the spontaneous will of the people; in others it is granted by the government or some other agency. These terms may be used by the rhetor to create propositions which, if accepted by the audience, will validate or nullify according to the speaker's purpose. These terms and their categories in order of their potency according to Weaver are:

15Ibid., pp. 231, 232.
The purpose of the following part of the dissertation was to examine the pattern of Buckley's use of these terms and to determine what significant conclusions could be drawn from the data. The four speeches previously cited representing approximately five hours of speaking time on a variety of subjects and issues were examined for the frequency of occurrence of these terms.

**Buckley's Use of God Terms**

In analyzing Buckley's use of god terms as enunciated by Weaver, the most striking observation is that most of Weaver's god terms are not a part of Buckley's lexicon—at least that they are not natural to his working vocabulary. Two of the terms—"science" and "efficient"—did not even appear in the four speeches. Two others—"progress" and "modern"—were used only once in the four speeches and, in the case of "modern," then not as a god term. "Progress" is used as a god term in the statement, "The bulk of the progress that has been made in America has been made by the private sector." No effort was made to "make it stick" in this case, i.e. to validate the contention; no examples, testimony, or other means of support follow the assertion.

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16 Appendix F, p. 329.
Many people today conditioned to federal programs and federal financing would doubtless challenge the contention in the absence of strong supporting material. The only use of "modern" occurred near the end of an extended analogy in which Buckley said:

... The old man with the oddment of cloth is fingerling some of the great truths that permit us to penetrate the anfractuosities by which we are somehow persuaded that we serve the individual by moving against the principle institution through which the individual exercises what freedom of movement our modern architects have left him with. ... 16

In this instance "modern" is not used in a positive way as a god term, but rather in a negative way. Our "modern architects" have stripped us of individual initiative, freedom of movement, and so on.

Of the two remaining god terms, "fact" occurred fairly often, but not in its strongest rhetorical form. It occurred twenty times in the form of "in fact," seven times in the form of "the fact that," twice in the form of "the mere fact," and once in the form of "as a matter of fact." "Fact" never appeared in its strongest rhetorical or propositional forms such as "The facts prove," "The facts are," "It is a fact," and so forth. When Buckley refers to a "fact" or the "facts," he does so almost incidentally or as a matter of syntax rather than to capitalize upon the term's rhetorical force.

The reason that Buckley has an aversion for the use of "fact" or "facts" in their strongest rhetorical form is perhaps hinted at by Weaver when he explains the ascendance of "fact" as a god term. Its ascendance was synonymous with the ascendance of science and the descent of religion as the source of authority. For the same reason Buckley avoids the use of "science" as a god term—although he does sometimes use scientists as authority to support his contentions as he did twice in invoking the opinion of scientists on the subject of marijuana. Science emphasizes empirical means and measurements. Science discovers "facts"; religion or its agents reveal "truth." Weaver noted:

... The word "fact" went into the ascendent when our system of verification changed during the Renaissance. Prior to that time, the type of conclusion that men felt obligated to accept came either through divine revelation, or through dialectic, which obeys logical law. But these were displaced by the system of verification through correspondence with physical reality. Since then things have been true only when measurably true, or when susceptible to some kind of quantification. Quite simply, "fact" came to be the touchstone after the truth of speculative inquiry had been replaced by the truth of empirical investigation.

This also explains Buckley's sparse use of the other god terms "progress" and "efficient." Since, as Weaver explained, "science . . . (is) the methodological tool of 'progress,'" and "efficiency" is a result of science and progress, the values and metaphysics of a conservative such as Buckley would place less value and emphasis on all of these.

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18Appendix F, p. 371.
This explanation is corroborated by the findings of Donald P. Garner in his dissertation on another leading conservative spokesman, George S. Benson. The difference in perspectives of the liberal and the conservative is reflected in the modes of argument natural to each, their epistemology or sources of knowledge and authority, and their values or appeals. Garner wrote:

... there is a fundamental difference between liberal and conservative argument. ... conservatives tend to argue from principle while liberals argue from circumstances.

The significance of this dichotomy, broadly stated, is that liberals tend to be more concerned with present needs, problems, and the most efficacious solution. Conservatives, on the other hand, hold traditional values above present problems. Thus, the liberal will favor the expansion of federal welfare to solve problems and the conservative will hold that a higher value, individual independence, is more important than the somewhat easier solution. The conservative also would place a heavy emphasis on any traditional policies which may be eliminated by such an alternative.

The one god term from Weaver's list that Buckley regularly employed is the last one on the list, "American." Buckley used the term fifty times in the four speeches. However the referents for "American" are different for Buckley from those which Weaver cited as the reason for its rhetorical potency— that it represents to the average citizen progress, science, modernity, efficiency, and so forth. For Buckley, "American" has referents such as freedom, individual

initiative, private enterprise, private property, constitutional government, the free market, and freedom of religion.

Buckley and conservatives use such terms as god terms in place of those which Weaver distilled from a society in which Trilling testified and Girvetz confirmed "liberalism is not only the dominant, but even the sole intellectual tradition." In the four speeches, Buckley used the term "the free market" or some variation of it—"Free market place," "market," "market place," "price system," "free enterprise system," "capitalism," and "market based system"—about forty times. "Constitution" or "constitutional government," another god term or charismatic term for conservatives, was used fifteen times. The rhetorical implications of these facts is that conservatives must work doubly hard to establish their referents for "American" or to validate their hierarchy of values in contemporary American society.

Buckley's Use of Devil Terms

Clear and significant implications arise from an analysis of Buckley's use of devil terms. Of the three devil terms identified by Weaver—"un-American," "Communist," and "prejudice"—"un-American" does not appear at all in the four speeches, "Communist" appears twelve times and "Communism" twice, and "prejudice" appears five times but not as

a devil term. While many theories and practices are clearly un-American to Buckley, he does not use the term per se to so label them. One might postulate that Buckley would not be content with so mild an appellation. "Anti-American" is found once which might lend credence to this supposition.

Buckley employed the term "Communist" or "Communism" a total of fourteen times. The reason that the term does not appear more often is because he employed a number of terms that are synonymous or near synonymous. "Socialist" and "socialism" occur twelve times, "Marxism" appears twice, and "the enemy" or "the enemies" were used seven times. In addition another devil term has emerged in recent years to challenge "Communist" as the leading devil term in the conservative lexicon, at least in Buckley's--"revolutionists." Buckley's frequent use of this term provides evidence of its rapid rise in the conservative lexicon and of its rhetorical potency as a prime repellent. He uses "revolutionists" fifteen times, "revolution" twelve times, "revolutionary" twice, and "revolutionize" once. Some form of the term is employed thirty times, a fact which provides clear evidence of its efficacy as a devil term.

"Revolutionists" appears to be an euphemism for "domestic communists" in Buckley's usage. Buckley and his fellow conservatives are skeptical of revolutions. This is partly because the purpose of a revolution is to overthrow the established order, but, even more important, because they
are often instigated by communists or eventually lead to communism as in Cuba. Buckley would, of course, be for revolution in Russia, China, Hungary, and other communist-dominated countries.

If this analysis is valid, then "revolutionists" gains its rhetorical force as a devil term from its implicit meaning "communist revolution," and Weaver's statement, "Now, 'Communist' is beyond any rival the devil term," still holds. If all of these other terms--"socialists," "Marxists," "revolutionists," "the enemy," etc.--implicitly mean "communist," or draw their rhetorical potency from the term, then Buckley calls upon its power of negation sixty-five times in the four speeches. This is understandable in the light of Buckley's answer to Butler's question, "Do you also take a serious view of the population problem?" He responded, "Yes I do. I think it is the second most important problem in the world, after ideological communism."23

Buckley employs a number of other terms such as "relativism," "determinism," "positivism," "atheism," "agnosticism," "egalitarianism," and, occasionally, even "liberalism" as devil terms. In general, any theory or ideology (i.e. any "ism") that challenges the democratic-republican form of government, the free enterprise system, or Christianity enters the conservative lexicon as a devil term with some degree of rhetorical potency.

22 Weaver, *The Ethics of Rhetoric*, pp. 222, 223.

23 Appendix F, p. 366.
The absence of "prejudice" as a devil term in the five speeches may not be so strange, even though Weaver found it to be a devil term. Apparently Weaver himself questioned its validity as a devil term. In explaining its etiology as a devil term, Weaver wrote:

If the rhetorical use of the term has any rational content, this probably comes through a chain of deductions from the nature of democracy; and we know that in controversies centered about the meaning of democracy, the air is usually filled with cries of "prejudice." If democracy is taken crudely to mean equality, as it very frequently is, it is then a contradiction of democracy to assign inferiority and superiority on whatever grounds. But since the whole process of evaluation is a process of such assignment, the various inequalities which are left when it has done its work are contradictions of this root notion and hence are "prejudice"—the assumption of course being that when all the facts are in, these inequalities will be found illusory. The man who dislikes a certain class or race or style has merely not taken pains to learn that it is just as good as any other. If all inequality is deception, then superiorities must be accounted the products of immature judgment. This affords plausible ground, as we have suggested, for the coupling of "prejudice" and "ignorance."24

As an antidote to what he apparently considered to be an extreme exploitation of the term and a denial of all bases for evaluation, Weaver quoted Mark Twain's statement, "I know that I am prejudiced in this matter, but I would be ashamed of myself if I weren't." However, he concluded that it would take more than the "therapeutic insight" and "wit" of Mark Twain's statement "to make headway against the repulsive force gathered behind 'prejudice.'"

If the term "prejudice" gains its power to repulse from the concept that it is anti-democratic to be prejudiced,

24Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 224.
this likely explains why conservatives, as a rule, do not use it as a devil term. One may note from these four speeches, as well as from liberal and conservative writing in general, that liberals prefer to refer to our political system as a democracy or democratic form of government while conservatives place the emphasis on its republican aspects. When Buckley uses the term "prejudice," he does not use it as a devil term, but is defensive or apologetic in using it. When Butler pressed him on the question of race relations with the question, "Could your concern for the good nature of the white majority be interpreted as acquiescence to their prejudice?" he replied—apparently somewhat irritated:

The word prejudice becomes a little strained, used in that way. Look, 95 percent of the white people who live in Washington are Democrats, political liberals who give speeches in favor of integration and vote for politicians who favor integration—and then take their children out of the public schools when Negroes enter those schools. If you call them prejudiced, they reply that that isn't it, but that they want for their children a better education than they will get at the public schools in Washington.25

It is clear from the preceding analysis that Buckley made frequent use of devil terms. Although no assessment of their effectiveness can be made, one can surmise that the more conservative members of his audience would be moved by them; the more liberal members would probably come expecting to hear them, drawn to his speeches because of his oratorical ability, his wit, or his acknowledged position as conservatism's "most articulate and exciting spokesman." The

25Appendix F, p. 354.
devil terms in the conservative lexicon center around those theories and ideologies that challenge the political, economic, and religious premises of America, especially Communism since it is viewed by conservatives as the most serious threat to America.

**Buckley's Use of Charismatic Terms**

Charismatic terms were defined by Weaver as terms whose referents are ambiguous, but which have almost mystical power to attract or repel. The power may derive from the spontaneous consensus of the public or may be endowed by the government or some other agency. They differ from god and devil terms primarily in the ambiguity of their referents and their degree of potency. Of the five charismatic terms identified by Weaver, Buckley employed "freedom," the highest ranking one in Weaver's hierarchy, forty-five times and "aggressor," the one he most feared, two times. The charismatic form "U S" did not appear in the four speeches although Buckley frequently used "United States" as a substitute for "America." "FBI" also did not occur in the speeches— one suspects that in recent years "CIA" has usurped its place as a charismatic term. In fact, in recent years both "FBI" and "CIA" have lost much of their charismatic force with the general public and both terms have become devil terms in the lexicon of the New Left.

The term "democracy" occurred only once in Weaver's designated form. The form "democratic" was used four times.
but not always in its usually charismatic way, i.e. in a positive or complimentary way. Two of these times, Buckley uses democratic in a context that does not commend democracy. In the Playboy interview he reminds us that Hitler came to power "democratically," and in "Reflections on the Current Disorder" he reasoned:

So the Constitution that Hamilton and the others advocated was adopted; and inasmuch as it expressly guarantees republican government to each constituent state, we get a little historical focus on Thomas Jefferson's vainglorious boast about the nation's toleration of those who would tear down our republican forms of government. Hamilton went on--in his analysis--to commit the same sin of civic pride that Jefferson was to commit more flamboyantly a few years later; that John Stuart Mill would elevate to democratic dogma in a generation; and that Oliver Wendell Holmes took to the final extreme in 1919.26

The use of "democratic" in juxtaposition to "dogma" and the context indicates that "democratic" is not used in a positive way. By contrast, Buckley used "republic" or "republican" to describe the American form of government ten times, always in a positive or complimentary way as is also illustrated in the above quotation. The term "democracy" is not a term of endearment for Buckley and conservatives; the explanation for their ambivalence toward the term has been given already.

The charismatic term "aggressor" was employed twice by Buckley, both times in response to Butler's question: "Is your claim that the leaders of South Vietnam have been

26 Appendix C, p. 284.
motivated by a desire for independence consistent with their near-total reliance on the U.S.? Buckley replied:

Of course they've depended on us. They are waging war not against an autarchic aggressor that is satisfied to use its own resources but against an aggressor that—from the very beginning—has been armed by great powers, namely, Red China and the Soviet Union. The South Vietnamese didn't have a rifle factory in 1954. As far as I know, neither do they now. And neither did the North Vietnamese.27

The writer suspects that Buckley might have used the term "aggressor" much more often had not terms such as "the enemy," "the enemies," and the other devil terms already treated—in all a total of over sixty instances of the use of devil terms—forced "aggressor" into a position of such infrequent use. As was discussed in the introduction to this chapter, Weaver greatly feared the rise of this term to the position of "ultimate 'bad' term . . . a depository for all the resentments and fears which naturally arise in a people." It is ironic that this elevation must be mainly attributed to conservatives, those with whom Weaver most closely identified.

Of the five charismatic terms, "freedom" is by far the one most frequently employed by Buckley. This term appeared forty-five times in the four speeches, almost always utilized for its charismatic value. In addition, freedom is hinted at often through the use of "free." The term "freedom" is used most of the time without any specifying referent. However, it is often found in the form of

"freedom of choice," "freedom of movement," "freedom of expression," "freedom of speech and of the press," and so forth. It comes close to being a god term for conservatives; perhaps it is in spite of the ambiguity of its referent.

In summarizing Buckley's use of god, devil, and charismatic terms, I found that of the god terms, progress, science, modern, and efficient are seldom used, not one of them having been used more than twice by Buckley. "Fact" is not used in its strongest rhetorical form. When employed, most of the times in the form of "in fact" or "the fact that," it is almost incidental or as syntactical accommodation. Only "American" of the six god terms is frequently utilized and then not to suggest progress, science, modernity, and efficiency—the reasons that Weaver cited for its potency as a god term—but with the referents free market, private property, individual initiative, freedom, constitutional government, and so forth.

Of the devil terms, un-American did not appear in the four speeches analyzed; prejudice appeared five times, but not as a devil term. "Communist" is frequently employed and is by far the most potent devil term in the conservative vocabulary. In recent years, "revolutionists" has rapidly risen to the top as a conservative term of reprobation and actually appeared more often than "Communist," but, on analysis, it is still subordinate since it draws its power
from "Communist." In the Buckleyian context, "revolution" almost always implies "Communist revolution."

Buckley frequently employed the charismatic term "freedom," most often without a specific referent. He seldom used "democracy" as a charismatic term, his conservative bias favoring some form of the term "republic." He used "aggressor" only twice; its scarcity of use explainable by the fact that there were over sixty uses of such devil terms as "Communist," "socialist," "revolutionist," "the enemy," and other substitute terms pushing it into the background. Buckley's infrequent use of many of Weaver's ultimate terms may be partly explained by the fact that Weaver's list was compiled about twenty years ago. However, this investigator believes that his aversion to many of these terms are for the reasons already cited.

The vector of the conservative dilemma becomes clearer (as Buckley would put it): conservatives have tried gallantly but mostly in vain to sell their values and principles to the American people utilizing appeals that Americans apparently won't buy and a vocabulary that sounds to most of them archaic. Buckley, because of his manifest intelligence and oratorical ability, has enjoyed an extraordinary measure of success; most of the rest apparently have not.
Buckley's Use of Language to Actualize

Richard Weaver wrote, "The honest rhetorician therefore has two things in mind: a vision of how matters should go ideally and ethically and a consideration of the special circumstances of his auditors. Toward both of these he has a responsibility." The first of these responsibilities which is concerned with "the order of the goods or to the hierarchy of realities..." determine his use of the topics" has already been dealt with. The second of these responsibilities, Weaver defined as that of "actualization."

Concerning this responsibility, Weaver wrote:

... the ancients recognized two qualities of rhetorical discourse which have the effect of impressing an audience with the reality or urgency of a topic. In Greek these appear as energia and enargia, both of which may be translated "actuality," though the first has to do with liveliness or animation of action and the second with vividness of scene. The speaker now indulges in actualization to make what he is narrating or describing present to the minds' eyes of his hearers.29

Acknowledging that rhetoric has often been accused of unethical, if not immoral, practices in utilizing emotional appeals—"He goes beyond what is fair, the critics often allege, by this actualization of a scene about which the audience ought to be thinking rationally"—Weaver refutes the charge by illustrating with the famous passage from Webster's speech for the prosecution in the trial of John

28 Nebergall, Dimensions of Rhetorical Scholarship, p. 54.

29 Ibid., p. 58.
Francis Knapp. He then explains:

By depicting the scene in its fulness of detail, Webster is making it vivid, and "vivid" means "living." There are those who object on general grounds to this sort of dramatization; it is too affecting to the emotions. Beyond a doubt, whenever the rhetorician actualizes an event in this manner, he is making it mean something to the emotional part of us, but that part is involved whenever we are deliberating about goodness and badness. . . . Our attitude toward what is just or right or noble and their opposites is not a bloodless calculation, but a feeling for and against. As Whately indicates, the speaker who arouses feeling may only be arousing it to the right pitch and channeling it in the right direction.\(^\text{30}\)

Weaver's concept of actualization and his defense of it here is consistent with what was presented in Chapter Three where Weaver's concept of the nature of rhetoric was treated. Weaver emphasized throughout his writings on rhetoric that:

\[\ldots\] the most obvious truth about rhetoric is that its object is the whole man. It presents its arguments first to the rational part of man, because rhetorical discourses, if they are honestly conceived, always have a basis in reasoning. Logical argument is the plot, as it were, of any speech or composition that is designed to persuade. Yet it is the very characterizing feature of rhetoric that it goes beyond this and appeals to other parts of man's constitution, especially to his nature as a pathetic being, that is, a being feeling and suffering.\(^\text{31}\)

The purpose, then, of this part of Chapter Six is to illustrate and evaluate Buckley's use of emotional appeals to actualize. Although one of the most obvious features of Buckley's speeches is organization and logicality, he is at times extremely capable in actualizing. He appears to have

\(^{30}\text{Rbid., p. 59.}\)

\(^{31}\text{Rbid., p. 51.}\)
a natural ability to develop metaphors, extended analogies, and to employ graphic language. His pathetic terms center around those god, devil, and charismatic terms already discussed in this chapter and other needs and issues that are vital to humans. At times his prose develops a meter and cadence which comes close to poetry and is especially effective in stirring the emotions and giving the impression of movement or animation and vividness, the elements which Weaver assigned to actualization. Some examples of Buckley's actualization from the speeches follow:

In the first example, Buckley is diagnosing the cultural aspects of the revolutionary movement. The animation and vividness (energia and enargia) of Buckley's prose is especially evident in this passage:

. . . During the most vociferous years in the late 1960's, there were student riots--not only in Chicago and Berkeley, but in Paris and Madrid, Tokyo and Berlin, New Dehli and Mexico. On and on they came, their coordinates unpredictable so that the taxonomists finally threw up their instruments in dismay after attempting unsuccessfully to correlate the dissatisfactions with private enterprise, or the Vietnam war, or racism, or clitoral orgasm, which, I suppose, is a comprehensive list of the major concerns of that decade.

The following examples are taken from the same speech Buckley delivered at the commencement exercises at the University of Virginia.

. . . Paradoxically, there is a correlation between our advance toward individual anonymity and our advance towards the kind of statism beloved of such as my friend, John Kenneth Galbraith. The complaint of those who worry about the gradual disappearance of the individual as the center of civilized concern is made without reference to the causes of the blight. The causes are many and complicated and it may be that we
will end up dumbly acquiesing in Professor Oakeshott's haunting insight that we are individuals marquee, that the burden of freedom proved over the centuries to be too great, but meanwhile, the battery on the individual intensifies and wears us down. Its success is partly the result of internal fatigue—partly the result of external fright. Our defenses have grown weak as individuals and our fortiori as a nation.

The vector of our thought becomes clearer. The sharp edges of the argument nowadays stress, not so much the nuclear war that would abolish mankind, as the senselessness of any war. The senselessness even of a threat of war, indeed, derivatively the senselessness of a convincing army, nay, and air force—tools of tools of tools—Why? What is the justifying point of an armed force? It used to be that finding oneself in such a corner that one had merely to reach into one's arsenal and pull out the arrow that has freedom written on it, touch it down on the skeptic, and he would waste away like the witch come in contact with water. You will have noticed it does not work anymore. Our freedom is increasingly understood as a condition discernible only by subjective analysis.

One might think that Buckley's style—his use of polysyllables and words often not familiar to the average person and his affinity for organization and logicality—would preclude or hinder his ability to actualize. Sometimes his style does hinder the process of actualization, but at other times it shows remarkable animation and vividness in spite of these characteristics.

The following quotation is only the concluding part of a very long analogy developed by Buckley in the commencement address:

As we meet in America, so often for the purpose of deploring the free market, in Russia the people go to the black market and pay their 80 rubles, a month's wages, for a novel by Solzhenitsyn. And there in Russia, whose rulers denounced the market place fifty years ago with a blaze of trumpets and a reign of bullets aimed righteous at the temples of teenage girls and a hemophiliac boy in the celler at Achenterinberg. There,
in Russia, fifty years after the advent of socialism, there are old men and old women, and young men and young women who transcribe by hand, not for profit, from radio Liberty, risking prison by the very act of listening to it, the latest novel by Solzhenitsyn, word after word, sentence after sentence. A process that takes them months to complete, resulting not in thousands let alone millions of copies, but in a few dozen, or perhaps a few hundred—the oddments of cloth—it is worth it if we are to rescue man from the tools of ideology; worth everything to preserve those oddments—to make them available to those who are graced with a thirst for them. The books of Solzhenitsyn accumulate, even as the introspective disdain with the institutions of freedom perversely accumulates. For an understanding of which paradox we find no help in Marx, but considerable help in Jesus whose servant, Paul observed that though the outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day. My prayers are with you, of course, and, of course, the nation's hope is in you.

The following example of Buckley's use of the emotions to actualize is taken from the peroration of his speech in the Cambridge Debate:

Those who believe that the market place is the best friend of individual people making individual decisions, very trivial decisions by the cosmic standards that we approach here today, but decisions that mean a great deal to them; those who believe that the market place ought to be overturned because it has not given us Paradise, are in fact criticising people who have said about the market place that it would give us Paradise. Mr. Davidson doesn't believe it will, neither does Mr. Evans, neither do I. All I say is that in a world increasingly complicated, increasingly overridden by bureaucrats, increasingly dominated by the military, we must watch always to preserve those little mechanisms that are left over to us that are not subject to political manipulation. Ilya Ehrenburg, that great Communist hack who served out his life for Joseph Stalin, nevertheless found himself shaking through in his novel "The Fall" and he wrote that incandescent sentence—"Someday," he said, "when the whole of the world is cemented over, a blade of grass will grow, and it will cause a crack in the pavement and through that crack, freedom will be restored." It is surely our obligation to encourage whatever little leverage we have to determine on our own behalf what we desire to do, whom we desire to serve, and in which way.
According to Weaver, the orator achieves actualization by stressing the importance of the topic, determining what feature of a question is most exigent and using the power of language to make it appear so, dwelling in great detail on the significant aspects of the question, and using an excess of imagery or modifiers to evoke the senses. He does not believe that this is unethical or immoral unless it is done in an immoral or unethical cause or some other aspect of the effort makes it immoral. These examples and others in the four speeches indicate that Buckley is exceptionally skilled at actualizing in the Weaverian sense.

Summary

Much of Buckley's reputation as a speaker derives from his mastery of words. First, of course, is his extensive vocabulary which must be intimidating to the average person. Strangely, in spite of the intimidating nature of his vocabulary, it does not seem to hinder his effectiveness. The reaction of an unidentified middle-aged woman may explain this paradox: "He's so brilliant he frightens me. But I love it." Buckley's extensive vocabulary and intellectual approach may be taken by the average person as a compliment to his intelligence and may actually work to Buckley's advantage. In my interview with Buckley, I asked him whether he adapted his speech to the audience. He answered in the negative:

No. No, I am very bad about that. I don't adapt to audiences. I speak exactly the same way to all audiences. . . . It is in part laziness and in part a lack of any sense of skill in the art of adaptation. I would deliver the identical speech to the Harvard Graduate School that I would give to local Rotarians. For one thing, it is easier to not write two speeches, but for another, I have never felt that I command the skills which you need to change the way in which you speak so as to make it suitable to audiences of different intelligence, background, and everything.33

Buckley apparently means that in the speech proper, he makes no attempt to adapt to the specific audience. In the introduction he usually attempts to ingratiate the audience in some way. The introduction in the Cambridge debate, for instance, is quite extended, very humorous, and very effective.

The second observation about Buckley's speaking is his felicitous use of language. He is an acknowledged word-wizard. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in an unguarded moment during a debate with Buckley which he subsequently had frequent occasion to regret, said: "Mr. Buckley has a facility for rhetoric which I envy, as well as a wit which I try clumsily to emulate."34 As might naturally be expected, Buckley picked up the quote and capitalized on it in advertising his next book. His use of the quote caused a lot of controversy and a threatened lawsuit. Whether or not Schlesinger would still stand by his statement, reviewers and critics of Buckley have almost universally praised his

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33Appendix A, p. 273.
34Buckley, Cruising Speed, p. 170.
style and use of language.

The preceding analysis revealed that Buckley is exceptionally skilled in the use of language to evoke emotions and to actualize. When the force of his convictions and sincerity comes through in his voice, as it inevitably does, he can be very persuasive indeed!
Twenty-five years ago William F. Buckley, Jr. was unheard of as far as the general public is concerned and conservatism was, to say the least, dormant. Today Buckley is regarded as one of the most able and exciting conservative speakers and conservatism is a viable force in American politics and culture. McBurney, Trilling, Girvetz, Lief, and others have testified that at the beginning of the 1950's there were no nationally known articulate spokesmen for the conservative position. The conservative-liberal dialogue simply was not taking place in a society in which Trilling said, "Liberalism is not only the dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition. For it is the plain fact that nowadays there are no conservative or reactionary ideas in general circulation." While this might appear to liberals to be a circumstance for rejoicing, Trilling felt just the opposite: "... it is not conducive to the real strength of liberalism that it should occupy the intellectual field alone."\(^1\)

\(^1\)Trilling, *The Liberal Imagination*, p. 5.
Buckley first came to the attention of the American public with the publishing of his first book, *God and Man at Yale*. The book catapulted him into the center of public controversy and he has not been able to escape since, nor has he tried. The book accused Yale, his alma mater, of attempting to seduce unwary students into atheism and collectivism under the guise of academic freedom. As one scribe put it, Buckley's book "blew up an academic storm. Buckley had shaken the groves of academe. The conservative Buckleys who had always shunned the public eye, suddenly found themselves afloat on a sea of pandemonium, with Bill lashed to the mast and shouting above the storm."^2

The resurgence of conservatism, to a large extent, paralleled Buckley's rise to prominence. Conservatism was a post-depression reaction to the liberal programs of Roosevelt. The main post-war catalyst for its revival centered around the question of Soviet-American relations and how to deal with ideological Communism, but the debate covered the whole gamut of social-political issues. In responding to a request to enumerate some of the most critical conservative-liberal issues of these years, Buckley replied:

> Beginning with, let's say, after the war, there was the great question of how to deal with the Soviet Union. Roughly speaking, I think it is fair to say that the conservatives took the harder line at various junctions. They were most critical of Yalta, most

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critical of our support of Tito, most critical of our support of the Lublin government in Poland and, going on, we were most critical of any move prematurely to stop the development of our atomic weapons. We were most critical of an ineffective Indo-Chinese military policy. . . . It would probably be the conservatives who opposed the proposed disarmament treaty or whatever it will be called signed by Nixon last week. Domestically, the conservatives, of course, have opposed the growth of state power and the extension of powers that were thought to lie properly in lesser political units so that through the 50's and 60's the conservatives on the whole have disputed with the liberals the extension of state power for social-domestic purposes.3

The realization that every man is the product of his heritage and the major influences that have molded his personality, attitudes, and philosophy required a close examination of Buckley's life to identify and assess those major influences. The examination of Buckley's life revealed five major influences: his home and family, especially his father; education, religion, associates, and his professional experiences. A summary of each of these major influences revealed the nature and extent of the influence.

Summary of Criteria

The criteria for the study was developed from the writing of Richard M. Weaver on rhetoric. Weaver has become recognized as a scholar of considerable merit and one of the outstanding rhetorical theorists of the twentieth century. In recent years his rhetorical theory has received the notice and acclaim of a number of prominent members of the

3Appendix A, p. 268.
speech profession and is commended to the student of rhetoric in most of the rhetorical texts of the last decade. The fact that Weaver and Buckley were personal friends and editorial associates was incidental to the more important consideration of applying criteria from the leading conservative rhetorical theorist to the rhetoric of the leading conservative speaker.

The study examined Buckley's rhetoric from the classical constructs of ethos, logos, and pathos. The criteria, however, were developed from the rhetorical theory of Weaver, who, although classified as a New Rhetoric theorist, is acknowledged as "the most classical of the New Rhetoric proponents." Buckley's ethical proof was examined to determine if he qualifies as Weaver's "noble-lover." His arguments were analyzed in two speeches, one debate, and one interview in terms of Weaver's hierarchy of topics to determine the kinds of arguments employed and whether they support Weaver's hierarchy of topics thesis that the conservative consistently argues from definition, seldom from circumstances. Buckley's pathetic appeals were


5Thonnsen, Baird, and Braden, Speech Criticism, p. 280.
examined to ascertain his use of Weaver's God, Devil, and Charismatic terms and his ability to "actualize."

**Summary of Buckley's Ethical Proof**

The noble-lover in Weaver's interpretation of Plato's *Phaedrus* has succeeded in conquering his carnal or base desires after exercising the utmost discipline. Thus he views the subject of his rhetoric or persuasion as the "beloved," a creature to be loved and benefited and not as a victim to be exploited. Rhetoric is viewed as a kind of "madness"; persuasion as a kind of "love." The noble-lover is "possessed," afflicted with a kind of "divine madness." In contrast, the base-lover makes no attempt to control his base desires, but is concerned only with self-gratification; he seeks to victimize or exploit his lover. The non-lover seeks the favors of his lover while disavowing any feelings at all toward the lover, surely an unrealistic and impossible situation, but one espoused with some degree of apparent logic in Phaedrus' speech.

Weaver sees the three speeches—the eulogy of the non-lover, the eulogy of the base-lover, and the eulogy of the noble-lover—as representing three types of speakers. He explains that there are but three ways that language can affect us: "It can move us toward that which is good; or it can move us toward that which is evil; or it can, in hypothetical third place, fail to move us at all."6 Relative

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6Weaver, *The Ethics of Rhetoric*, p. 11.
to the first speech, Weaver avers "Beneath the surface of repartee are mock seriousness, he is asking whether we ought to prefer a neuter form of speech to the kind which is ever provoking an expense of spirit." Thus to Weaver the first type of speech represents a "semantically purified speech" embodying only cognitive or rational elements devoid of any emotional elements. Weaver dismisses this type of speech as undesirable on the whole and impossible to achieve: first because man is by nature affective as well as rational and second because his language is always showing tendency, is never completely neutral: "In short, as long as man is a creature responding to purpose, his linguistic expression will be a carrier of tendency."

The evil-lover has no real interest in the welfare or development of the object of his gratification. He is exploitive; interested solely in fulfilling his base desires. He seeks to make his lover completely dependent upon him and is jealous of any assertion of independence on the part of his lover. The base-lover represents the demagogue, the yellow journalist, the super-salesman who is interested only in his commissions and the volume of his sales and has no real interest in the customer's well being or needs. He relies solely on emotional appeals and is not concerned with the means or ethical quality of his goals.

7Ibid., p. 5.

8Nebergall, Dimension of Rhetorical Scholarship, p. 61.
The noble lover is in direct contrast to the base-lover. He is genuinely interested in the welfare of the beloved. He seeks to make the beloved independent and to develop his lover's mental and emotional faculties. He is concerned about the ethical quality of his goals and of the means of achieving his goals.

In addition to the "noble-lover" concept or attitude towards the audience, Weaver described the noble-lover as a dialectician, a scientist, and a teacher. The noble-lover must be a dialectician because rhetoric if it is honestly conceived must be directed first to man's rational nature. The role of dialectic is to "discover the real syllogism in the argument"; the role of rhetoric "to discover the real means of persuasion." As a dialectician he is able to ascertain truth and as a rhetorician he is able to present it in the most rational and appealing way to his audience.

Weaver's ideal rhetorician or noble-lover must also be a scientist. He explained, "A rhetoric without a basis in science is inconceivable, because people are moved to action by how they "read" the world or the phenomena of existence, and science is the means of representing these in their existential bearings." The complete rhetorician is the man who has learned in addition to his knowledge how to make his topic clear and appealing to his audience.

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9 Weaver, *Visions of Order*, p. 63.
10 Johannesen, et al., *Language is Sermonic*, p. 141.
Finally, Weaver's noble-lover is also a teacher. While the evil-lover would seek to keep the understanding of his lover in a passive state by not permitting an honest examination of alternatives, the true-lover is just the opposite. He would seek to stimulate thinking and provide an honest examination of alternatives on the part of his beloved. He has no fear of a true dialectic.

When Weaver's noble-lover criteria were applied to Buckley, the application revealed that Buckley is a "noble-lover" in the Weaverian sense. This does not mean that he measures up in a perfect sense, but that he meets the criteria in the only way that humans can be judged, in a relative sense. First Buckley appears to be "mad" in the Platonic sense. He is a man with a mission—a "possessed" man. No evidence was found to indicate that his conservatism is feigned. His ideology is perfectly consistent with his heritage and with the major influences in his life. Over a period of nearly twenty-five years in the public forum, he has maintained remarkable consistency. One suspects that Buckley will die at his desk with pen in hand grinding out another editorial for National Review or another "On the Right" column, or perhaps in some polemic forum espousing and explicating in his own inimitable way the basic tenets of conservatism.

Buckley's style and approach suggested the dialectician. In addition to the obvious stylistic suggestions—
use of propositions, syllogisms, numbers and letters to divide, etc.—a close examination of his arguments revealed that he predominately argued from definition. He sought to look at the nature of the thing, to pose basic analytical questions, to determine the operative principles, delineate scope and boundaries—in effect to define. He often employed deductive and inductive arguments and arguments from example. He appeared to be interested in a genuine conservative-liberal dialectic. From his opening editorial in National Review through all of his polemic efforts—via the pen or podium—he has conceived of his mission as that of offering a conservative alternative in a society where the liberal banner had been flying for two decades without any serious challenge. While McBurney lamented and Trilling, Girvetz, Schlesinger, and others observed the absence of a rationally articulated conservative alternative to liberalism, Buckley came on the scene and made prodigious efforts to produce it.

Weaver's ideal rhetorician or noble-lover required that he be a scientist. Not that he actually hold the degree in some discrete area of science, but that he be able to understand scientific laws and principles and speak the language of science. The noble-lover was also to be a teacher—not a professional pedagogue, but one who is able to explain his ideas clearly to others.
In both of these requirements, this investigator's research revealed that Buckley met the criteria for Weaver's ideal rhetorician. Buckley is intelligent, articulate, has a good grasp of logic,\textsuperscript{11} and has excellent academic credentials. Buckley is didactic in all of his speeches. One reading his speeches or essays would tend to think of him as a teacher or even a preacher, another term that Weaver often used especially in presenting his thesis that "language is sermonic."

The conclusion of this researcher is that Buckley is the very epitome of Weaver's ideal rhetorician, his noble-lover par excellence. As Levy and Young put it "a man for all conservative seasons: author, politician, TV star, popular lecturer, editor. . . . In every capacity. . . .an outstanding educator. . . .an enormously learned and serious thinker. . . ." They concluded: "Mr. Buckley is the foremost expositor of rational, humanistic, conservative thought in America today."\textsuperscript{12}

**Summary of Buckley's Logical Proofs**

Buckley's logos or logical arguments were analyzed in terms of Weaver's hierarchy of topics to determine the

\textsuperscript{11}This is not to say that one has to accept his premises. Obviously, most liberals would not. Many of them, though, have observed that if you accept his premises, you must accept his conclusions. Liberals, as a rule, operating from a different metaphysics, a different political and social philosophy, simply reject his premises, i.e. they reject his definitions of the nature of things.

\textsuperscript{12}Buckley, *American Conservative Thought in the Twentieth Century*, p. x.
sources of the arguments, whether there was a discernible pattern to the arguments, and, if so, whether the pattern supported Weaver's hierarchy of topics thesis. Weaver classified all arguments into four categories: argument from definition or genus; argument from similitude; argument from cause and effect with its subsidiary forms, argument from consequences and circumstances; and argument from testimony or authority. Argument from definition or the nature of things included all deductive and inductive arguments and arguments from example. Argument from similitude encompassed all arguments developed from analogy, metaphor, comparison, and contrast. Argument from cause and effect proceeded by arguing that some known cause of magnitude would produce an effect of magnitude or that some known effect of magnitude was the result of some cause of magnitude. Argument from consequences attempts to predict the results of some course of action or phenomenon. Argument from circumstances was to Weaver the least philosophical and the least desirable because it simply "reads the facts standing round" and recommends capitulation to them. Hence it represents the nearest thing to pure expediency and was the least analytical of all modes of argument. Argument from testimony and authority was, of course, to quote someone directly or to invoke his authority. A sound maxim to remember, Weaver said, is that "an argument based on authority is as good as the authority." The first three arguments are "internal"
because they represent the speaker's interpretation of reality; the last is an "external" source because it relies on someone else's interpretation of reality.

Weaver felt that a speaker had an ethical obligation to use the higher level arguments. He further believed that "a man's method of argument is a truer index in his beliefs than his explicit profession of principles." He felt that the argument from definition was natural to the conservative, while the liberal consistently employed the argument from circumstances. In Chapter Three the writer elaborated on some of the weaknesses and difficulties that one encounters with Weaver's hierarchy of topics thesis and deals with them again in discussing the implications of this study.

Four of Buckley's speaking efforts were analyzed utilizing Weaver's hierarchy of topics to determine the sources of arguments. These speeches, all polemical, include two platform speeches, one debate, and one interview (dialectic) and represented about five hours of speaking time.

The analysis revealed that there was a predominate configuration of arguments in the four speeches. Buckley's habitual and primary approach was to argue from the nature of the thing—to argue from definition. He took this approach even when he might have easily argued from consequences or circumstances such as in responding to questions.

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13 Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 58.
put to him in the interview. When he used causal arguments, they were clearly subsidiary to the argument from definition. He frequently used testimony or authority along with arguments from example and analogy to buttress his definitional arguments. He invariably sought to explicate, to seek out operative principles, to delineate, to set boundaries—to define.

In the first speech, "Reflections on the Current Disorder," he used five propositions to define the nature of the Constitutional freedoms, to determine whether they are absolute, whether the government in a democracy can limit them and under what circumstances, and the implications of this for the contemporary "revolutionists." He was analytical and definitive throughout the speech. He frequently quoted from or invoked the authority of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Federalist Papers, Jefferson, Hamilton, Lincoln, and contemporary authorities. He further supported his contentions with argument from examples and analogies. Although he hinted at the possible consequences of the revolutionists' activities, he developed no causal arguments either in the primary mode or in the subsidiary modes, consequences and circumstances.

In the second speech, a commencement address delivered at the University of Virginia, Buckley sought to

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14 Appendix C.
15 Appendix D.
analyze and refute the thesis of Jean-Francois Revel in his book, *A Future Without Marx or Jesus*. The thesis is, in effect, that Americans are disillusioned with the free market, the profit system, competition, i.e. with capitalism. Buckley admits that "Disillusion is in the air," but when he analyzes the disillusion in terms of its economic, cultural, and philosophical aspects, he arrives at a different diagnosis of its nature than Revel's. This speech had a semblance of cause-effect, but Buckley did not develop cause-effect arguments. He sought throughout the speech to analyze or define the nature of the disillusion. He used argument from authority and from example about equally to support his diagnosis of America's disillusion.

In the Buckley-Galbraith Cambridge Union debate, Galbraith affirmed and Buckley denied the proposition, "The Market is a Snare and a Delusion." In the debate Buckley strove throughout his speech to define the nature of the market in theory and in practice. He developed one line of argument from examples to prove that the market is not, as Galbraith contended, under the control of the "techno-structure." Other than this his speech is almost entirely expository or explicatory with thirteen pieces of testimony to support his definition of the market system. Twice during course of his speech he declared that the issue is basically one of epistemology, which further indicated the approach that he was to take in the debate.

16Appendix E.
In the *Playboy* Interview, Buckley argued most frequently from definition. In response to almost every question, he sought to define the question or issue. Among those that he treated in this way were co-existence, detente, imperialism, Vietnam as a "civil war," the First Amendment freedoms, civil disobedience, prejudice, and so on. He frequently used authority, examples, and analogies to support his definition. He used consequences and circumstances very infrequently and then clearly as subsidiary arguments, often only hinting at them rather than developing an argument from them: "I want an excess of caution, because I understand a mistake in that direction to be apocalyptic in its consequences." Buckley's response to the following question is typical of his method of argument in the *Playboy* Interview. In his answer he argues from definition with four examples of analogous situations (five if General Petain is counted as separate from French appeasers) to support his definition.

**PLAYBOY:** Then it *is* a civil war and not a case of Communist expansionism exported from Russia and China?

**BUCKLEY:** Yes, it is a civil war, providing one is prepared to define any war as a civil war if one finds a significant number of collaborationists within the indigenous population. There are South Vietnamese Communists, even as there were Norwegian quislings, Northern Copperheads and French appeasers. General Petain was sentenced to death for obliging the Nazis less effusively than the Viet Cong have done the northern imperialists. If the "civil" insurrection in

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17Appendix F.
Vietnam had depended on its own resources, it would have lasted as long as the insurrection of the Huks in the Philippines.

It is evident from the four analyses that Buckley employed a predominant mode of argument. He sought first to define the nature of the thing and then to support his definition with deductive and inductive arguments, arguments from analogy, and arguments from testimony and authority. When he did use causal arguments they were clearly subsidiary to the primary mode of argument. Argument from circumstances was the least used of the Weaver hierarchy of topics categories. In his habitual method of argument, Buckley tends to support the Weaver thesis that the conservative most often argues from definition, least often from circumstances. How far one can generalize from the results of this study is treated in the implications of the study.

**Summary of Buckley's Pathetic Proofs**

Weaver believed that a successful rhetoric had to be addressed to the whole man. If it was honestly conceived, it was addressed first to man's rational nature, but the real object of rhetoric is to move man in the direction of some goal. This cannot be achieved without appealing to man's affective nature. Weaver treated two ways of appealing to man's emotional nature. One is through the use of God, Devil, and Charismatic terms and the second is through actualization.

Ultimate terms are terms of great potency which have special power to attract or repel. God terms are conceived
of as terms which because they are identified with the highest values of a culture have extraordinary power to validate. Devil terms are those which have extraordinary power to repel because they are identified with some idea or thing that is most repugnant in a given society. Charismatic terms are terms that have almost mystical power to attract or repel. Their referents are ambiguous, but this does not diminish their power or preclude their use. Weaver conceived of these terms in a hierarchy with links extending up to the highest or ultimate value or anti-value. The four speeches by Buckley were analyzed for the frequency of use of Weaver's ultimate terms. The ultimate terms which Weaver identified in our society and the frequency of their occurrence in the speeches are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>God Terms</th>
<th>Devil Terms</th>
<th>Charismatic Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Progress 1</td>
<td>Un-American 0</td>
<td>Freedom 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fact 30 (Never</td>
<td>Communist 14</td>
<td>Democracy 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in strongest</td>
<td>Prejudice 5 (but</td>
<td>(twice used in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rhetorical</td>
<td>not used as a</td>
<td>a negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>form)</td>
<td>devil term)</td>
<td>sense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science 0</td>
<td></td>
<td>U S 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern 1 (but</td>
<td></td>
<td>FBI 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not as a god</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aggressor 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>term)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American 50 (but with different referents than Weaver's)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of Weaver's god terms, Buckley used only two of them with any degree of frequency. Only one—"American"—is clearly a god term in Buckley's lexicon. "Fact," although used thirty times, was never used in its strongest rhetorical
form: "The facts prove," "It is a fact," "The fact cannot be disputed," and so on. It appeared most frequently—twenty times—in the form of "in fact." When Buckley used the term it seemed almost incidental, more of a syntactical accommodation than for its full force as a god term. "American" is clearly a god term with Buckley, but he gives it different referents than those that Weaver cited as the reason for its efficacy. He felt that it derived its rhetorical power because it represented progress, science, modernity, and efficiency to most citizens and many foreigners. The referents that Buckley gave to "American" are freedom, individual initiative, private enterprise, Constitutional government, the free market, freedom of religion, and so on.

This investigator identified some other terms which Buckley used as god terms and which apparently have considerable potency in the conservative lexicon. The one most frequently employed was "the free market" or some variation such as "free market place," "market," "price system," "free enterprise system," and "profit system." These terms were used over forty times. "Constitution" or "Constitutional government" was used fifteen times. The term "republic" or "republican" appeared ten times to describe our form of government, while the term "democracy" or "democratic" was used only five times, two of these in a clearly negative way. The use of these terms as god terms
indicates that for conservatives (at least for Buckley) the highest values and the terms with the greatest potency revolve around our political-economic system. The failure to use "progress," "science," "modern," and "efficient" as god terms indicates that Buckley did not perceive these as the ultimate or highest values in our society. In fact, he used some of these terms, when he used them at all, in a negative way.

Of Weaver's three devil terms, "un-American" was not used at all. "Prejudice," while used five times, was not used as a devil term. "Communist" or "Communism" was used fourteen times. In addition other devil terms were identified. "Revolutionists" was used fifteen times and "revolution" or some other form of the term was used an additional fifteen times. Other terms which designate political, economic, or religious ideologies antagonistic to America such as "Marxist," "socialist," and a number of "isms"--"relativism," "determinism," " positivism," "agnosticism," "egalitarianism," and, occasionally, "liberalism"--were used as devil terms. If "revolutionists" to Buckley means "communist revolutionists," as appears to be the case, then there are over sixty terms referring to Marxism-Communism. Thus, "Communist" remains the ultimate reprobative term in the conservative lexicon and any other ideology--political, economic, or religious--that is antagonistic to the American tradition works its way into the conservative lexicon as a devil term.
Of the five charismatic terms, "freedom" is used most often, forty-five times. It is used most of the time without any specifying referent; at times with freedom of speech, religion, press, movement, etc., as referents. "Democracy" or "democratic" appeared five times, but not always for its charismatic value. As already indicates, conservatives prefer to speak of our form of government as a "republic"; liberals as a "democracy." "U S" and "FBI" do not appear in the four speeches. "Aggressor" appeared only twice. Its infrequent use doubtless explainable by the fact that terms such as "the enemy" and "the enemies" were used seven times and the various "Marxist-Communist" terms were used over sixty times.

Buckley used god, devil, and charismatic terms frequently, and one suspects effectively with much of his audience, to stir the emotions. He used god terms to make America and its political, economic, and religious institutions and traditions attractive and devil terms to make any competing ideology or system repugnant to his audience.

The second means of stirring the emotions of the audience which Weaver treated is actualization. This is the process of focusing in on something in the fullness of detail by stressing the importance of the topic, determining what feature is most exigent and using the power of language to make it appear so, dwelling in great detail on the significant aspects that appeal to man's affective nature, and using an excess of modifiers or imagery to appeal to the senses.
Weaver wrote that "the ancients recognized two qualities of rhetorical discourse which have the effect of impressing an audience with the reality or urgency of a topic. In Greek these appear as energia and enargia, both of which may be translated 'actuality.'"¹⁸ Weaver explained that the first term had to do with liveliness or animation of action and the second with vividness or scene. Actualization is achieved when the speaker uses language to make his speech "animated" and "vivid." If he succeeds in actualizing, he will appeal to the senses of the audience and evoke their emotions.

The analysis of the four speeches revealed that while Buckley does not attempt to actualize so often, when he does he can be extremely effective. His extensive vocabulary and skill in organization produces a felicitious selection and arrangement of language and his prose at times develops a meter and cadence that approaches poetry. He is especially adept at developing analogies which add imagery and graphic quality to his speeches. At times his affinity for polysyllables and structural indicators hinders his ability to actualize, but often, in spite of these impediments, he is extremely skillful at actualizing. When the force of his sincerity and strong convictions make their impact on the audience, as they very often do, Buckley is in the first rank of persuasive speakers.

¹⁸Nebergall, Dimensions of Rhetorical Scholarship, p. 58.
Conclusions and Implications

A number of conclusions and implications arise from the study. Looking first at Buckley _qua_ rhetorician, it is clear that he receives his highest marks in invention and disposition, his lowest marks in style and delivery. His wide-reading, education, and years of journalistic experience provide him with a ready reservoir of examples, illustrations, analogies, testimonial evidence, and inductive and deductive arguments. Generally these are well organized if not, at times, over organized. His debater or dialectical style often hinders his attempts to move an audience. He is by his own admission "better at scoring than at persuading." Nonetheless, he is a formidable foe, a "knight-errant" of contemporary American conservatism as many of his liberal foes have discovered and acknowledged.

His style and delivery are, however, often abrasive if not caustic. By a strange paradox his very strength becomes his greatest weakness. His inability to restrain his emotions and to moderate his attack produces a rhetoric that is titillating to the "true-believer" conservative listener, but one which drives the liberal and many moderates further from him personally, if not from his conservative position. Buckley has himself recognized this deficiency as a speaker and given us some insight as to its cause in one of his most recent books. Reflecting on his debate with Galbraith, he wrote:
... would I have won, at Cambridge, if I had been less sardonic, leering, etc., I don't know. It is very hard for me to appeal, without protective covering, directly to an audience, because the audience might turn me down; and as a conservative grown up in the knowledge that victories are not for us, I must not give the audience the power to believe that its verdict matters to me. There is my failure, as a public figure, and my strength.\(^\text{19}\)

Another implication of the study involves Buckley's philosophical or exiologi cal premises. It has been remarked that if one accepts Buckley's premises, he must accept his conclusions. Obviously, not everyone is going to accept his premises. Buckley may rely too heavily on argument from definition. Even many who acknowledge that Buckley is very intelligent and logical within the framework of his premises are not willing to accept his conclusions---his definitions of reality. It is likely that he would be more effective if he advanced more causal arguments, more arguments from consequences and circumstances. Even Aristotle noted that the masses are not able to understand scientific demonstration. Hence rhetoric is to be preferred to dialectic when one is concerned with persuading the average person. Buckley is much more dialectical than rhetorical in style. Another strength becomes a weakness. If he could strike more of a happy medium, he would, doubtless, be more successful in oral discourse.

Another implication of the study is that it is possible and desirable to analyze the conservative \textit{qua}

\(^{19}\)Buckley, \textit{Cruising Speed}, pp. 157, 58.
conservative. Rhetorical criticism has focused, for many reasons, on the liberal, the activist, the innovator, the proponent of social change. Hence the leaders of the various social and political movements—women's suffrage, abolition, labor, social gospel, socialist, populist, progressive, civil rights, and so forth—have been generally subjected to rhetorical criticism. A unique aspect of this study is that it has applied critical apparatus from the leading conservative rhetorical theorist to the speaking of the leading conservative rhetorical practitioner. Whereas the premise of most rhetorical theorists and critics seems to be that the function of rhetoric is to bring about change within a society or culture, Weaver asserts that the function of rhetoric "is to conserve and preserve the best of Western culture and civilization." A study such as this permits a conservative perspective and provides some balance for the speech teacher who sees most of the rhetorical criticism directed toward the liberal-left.

There are some implications relative to the Weaverian criteria in a more specific sense. While one does encounter difficulty in applying the criteria, on the whole it is useful, meaningful, and places the emphasis in the right place. The axiological emphasis is therapeutic in a world in which the power of rhetoric has been too often used for destructive and inhuman purposes. With the communication media revolution making it possible for a speaker to address millions, if not billions, of his fellowmen instantaneously
with the same speech, it is more important than ever that he be a "noble-lover." To insist in addition that he be a dialectician, a scientist, and a teacher would preclude the type of Hitlerian demagogue who could do infinitely more harm today than the original.

Of the noble-lover criteria, it is relatively easy to determine whether a speaker is a dialectician, a scientist, or a teacher. One need only to examine his speech and to assess it in these terms. It is considerably more difficult to judge his sincerity and motives. One can examine his background, his words, and his actions to determine their consistency and to see if they reveal demagogic or malevolent tendencies, but it is a difficult and hazardous enterprise. Then, too, one realizes that even though a speaker may be sincere and have noble motives, the ultimate results of his efforts may be malevolent. In applying the criteria, one can only make an informed human judgment.

Some problems arose in applying the hierarchy of topics criteria. If one must consistently utilize the high level arguments, does he have the leeway for maximum audience adaptation? Weaver may be inconsistent here. He urges audience adaptation, but also insisted that the speaker is ethically obligated to employ the high level arguments. Too, he allowed the speaker to engage in ad hoc persuasive efforts. In applying the criteria, how does the critic know whether the speaker is being true to his own philosophy, whether he is adapting to his audience, or whether he views
the speech as an _ad hoc_ effort which does not require the expense of time and effort necessary for the high level arguments? Weaver's response to these questions would be simply to examine enough of his speeches to determine "the prevailing source, or the source which is most frequently called upon in the total persuasive effort. . . . No man escapes being branded by the premise that he regards as most efficacious in an argument." Weaver concludes: "The general importance of this is that major premises, in addition to their logical function as part of a deductive argument, are expressive of values, and a characteristic major premise characterizes the user."^20

There is also the question of exigency. In the context in which many speeches are given and decisions made, there are exigencies which simply cannot be ignored. Sometimes there are impending consequences which appear catastrophic and prevailing circumstances which do not vanish with a defining of the problem or issue regardless of the validity of the analysis or definition. Symptoms must sometimes be treated before one can possibly attack root causes as every medical doctor knows. It appears to this researcher that a society needs both kinds of persons: those who can analyze and discover root causes and operative principles, who can properly diagnose and define; and those who can deal with and relieve immediate symptoms—consequences and circumstances—so that the patient or society will enjoy

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^20Weaver, _The Ethics of Rhetoric_, p. 55.
the physical relief and peace of mind most conducive to the
restoration of health.

There is also a problem with the hierarchy of topics
thesis that the conservative consistently argues from
definition, the liberal consistently from circumstances.
First, of course, one must remember that Weaver had his own
definition for the conservative, viz.:

The true conservative is one who sees the
universe as a paradigm of essences, of which the phenom­
omenology of the world is a sort of continuing approxi­
mation. Or, to put it another way, he sees it as a set
of definitions which are struggling to get themselves
defined in the real world.21

One wonders, does Weaver's "conservative" always correspond
to the contemporary American "conservative"? Does not the
liberal, if he is at all philosophical, also "see the uni­
verse as a paradigm of essences, of which the phenomenology
of the world is a sort of continuing approximation"? His
metaphysics may be different, his premises different, but
his view paradigmatic. One should also remember that when
Weaver applied his hierarchy of topics to Lincoln, he dis­
covered that he was a "true conservative." When he applied
them to Burke, he discovered that he was a "liberal." Both
discoveries must have been surprising if not shocking to
conservatives and liberals alike.

In spite of these problems, apparent contradictions,
and criticisms of Weaver's criteria, the researcher found

21 Ibid., p. 112.
them to be meaningful and worthy criteria for rhetorical analysis. The difficulties that arose in applying them are probably no more and no worse than those that occur in applying any theory or criteria for the purpose of rhetorical analysis.

The final implication of this study is directly relevant to the field of speech-communication. In a world increasingly given to ideological struggles, where the battle for the minds of men rages unremittingly, where propaganda is sent through all of the communication media that our modern science and technology has provided us, we who are professionally engaged in teaching the principles and methods of communication simply must do a better job. We need to draw from the ancient art of dialectic and teach our students its modes and skills, and we need to get our axiological bearing from a man like Weaver to make certain that we do not turn out "depersonalized thinking machines," but students and citizens who both think and feel.
APPENDIX A

TRANSCRIPT OF TAPE RECORDED INTERVIEW OF

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR.

Conducted by Floyd E. Merritt
National Review Office NYC
May 30, 1972

Note: The interview is complete in form except for the removal of the "uhhs," "ands," "ahs," etc. of running speech to make the script easier for reading.

MERRITT: Mr. Buckley, would you recount for me your formal education, the schools that you attended.

BUCKLEY: Now is there any point in my giving you what you can find in things like Who's Who?

MERRITT: Well, no, I guess not. I just had that one preliminary question to give you. Did you have any courses in speech or rhetoric in secondary or prep school?

BUCKLEY: No.

MERRITT: Did you engage in debate, individual events, or drama activities in secondary or prep school?

BUCKLEY: Yes, I did. Yes, I was on the debating team at the Millbrook School. We didn't do,—it was during the war—so we didn't do a hell of a lot of traveling around but it was mostly intramural debates.

MERRITT: Did you enjoy it very much?

BUCKLEY: I enjoyed parts of it very much, parts of it lesser.

MERRITT: What about in college? Did you have courses in rhetoric or speech?
BUCKLEY: No.

MERRITT: Not at all?

BUCKLEY: No, they didn't offer any at Yale.

MERRITT: Did you take part in intercollegiate debates?

BUCKLEY: Yes, I was on the freshman team and then on the varsity team.

MERRITT: Can you tell me who was your debate instructor?

BUCKLEY: Yes. Professor Rowlin Osterweis of the History Department.

MERRITT: Right. All right, I think I found that--his name--in God and Man at Yale or somewhere.

BUCKLEY: Yes.

MERRITT: All right. Have you had any type of special tutoring or been a member of a club or society which stresses speech? Have you been in Toastmasters or anything like that?

BUCKLEY: No, I don't believe I have.

MERRITT: All right. What books on rhetoric, speech, public address, or communication have you read--are you familiar with the classical works?

BUCKLEY: No, I don't think so.

MERRITT: Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian?

BUCKLEY: No. I am not. I have read, obviously--I've read--fairly extensively the authors you've cited. But I don't remember ever studying any of their theses as specifically directed to rhetoric.

MERRITT: For instance, Plato's, the Gorgias or the Phaedrus?

BUCKLEY: Of sure. I've read all of his dialogues. Yes.

MERRITT: You've read all those?

BUCKLEY: Yeah.

MERRITT: Any that deal more specifically with rhetoric?--Aristotle's The Rhetoric?
BUCKLEY: In fact I haven't read that, I'm ashamed to say. I intend to one of these days.

MERRITT: What about Cicero's De Oratore?

BUCKLEY: No, I have not read that.

MERRITT: Okay. Are there any of the more modern or contemporaneous books on rhetoric or speech that you have read?

BUCKLEY: I've read Weaver's The Ethics of Rhetoric, but I can't think of anything else that I've read.

MERRITT: All right. Who, if anyone, do you regard as having the most influence on your speaking or your rhetorical training?

BUCKLEY: I guess my answer is I don't know. I'm glad you said "if anyone." The answer is no.

MERRITT: Do you then regard your speaking as mostly the result of your own personality, your own style, your own self-training or development?

BUCKLEY: I suppose so. Yes, I suppose so.

MERRITT: Do you regard yourself as a self-made man when it comes to your speaking style and speaking ability?

BUCKLEY: I think that statement is a little over emphatic because it's one thing to say I don't know who singly has most influenced my development and then to say it follows from that that my development was auto-development—that I was an auto-didactic—I am sure that's not true. I am sure that I simply got a great deal from lots of people.

MERRITT: Could you name for me just a few names of persons who may have directly or indirectly influenced your speaking style, ability, etc.?

BUCKLEY: Well, that would be pretty much a catalogue of the important public figures and public performers of my time. I listened to Franklin Delano Roosevelt on the radio and I listened to Churchill give a number of his speeches. My professors at Yale—many of them were gifted in rhetoric. I should think if I had to single any one of them it would probably be Willmoore Kendall, Professor of Political Science. Because I did study under him--there was no course offered by Professor Osterweis at the time--but in the course of studying
under Willmoore Kendall for a couple of years, I observed him very closely and undoubtedly was influenced by him. He had a very pronounced and very distinctive dialectical manner.

MERRITT: These were political science courses you were taking under him?

BUCKLEY: Yes, you're right.

MERRITT: But still you observed and you were impressed at least by his speaking.

BUCKLEY: Very much, very much. Yes.

MERRITT: Are any of your speeches ghost written?

BUCKLEY: No.

MERRITT: They're all then entirely your own work and effort?

BUCKLEY: Yes. The only thing I ever uttered that I didn't write for myself was a paper prepared for me when I ran for mayor. I simply ran out of time but it was not in the form of a speech, it was in the form of a paper.

MERRITT: Can you describe somewhat the manner in which you prepare your speeches? Beginning with how you select your topic, formulate your purpose, determine your approach, etc.

BUCKLEY: Now you're talking about the formal speeches? Or are you talking about ad hoc speeches?

MERRITT: No, I'm thinking more of the formal platform speeches.

BUCKLEY: That I might deliver to ten, twenty, thirty, forty people?

MERRITT: That you would deliver in a lecture.

BUCKLEY: What I normally do is every September I sit down and look over everything that I have written during the preceding year and I try to think in terms of a thesis that would be most interesting—like something that takes a while to express. Then I look at the material I've written and snatch from it here or there that which feeds into the inventory of potential, useful material. Then I propose the balance and come up with a speech. I do that
at least once a year, sometimes twice a year, but then there are a hell of a lot of speeches I give that are written for the occasion. For instance, a week ago, a testimonial dinner to Henry Regnery—two weeks ago, a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Those, as I say, start with sitting down at the typewriter with a lot of blank sheets of paper and trying to decide what to say.

MERRITT: From the standpoint of content or invention, where do you get most of your content, illustrations, examples—what do you use mostly for the content of your speeches?

BUCKLEY: Well, I use what suggests itself, whether the allusions are from something you saw that morning in the New York Times or something you remember from the reading of history. Or whatever, but I don't have a sort of obvious stockpile that I turn to.

MERRITT: Do you deliver your speeches as memorized speeches or manuscript speeches or when you deliver them are they delivered extemporaneously? From an outline or from a manuscript?

BUCKLEY: No, I write my formal speeches out word for word. I do not memorize them—not because I don't wish I could but because I don't have that faculty. When I speak extemporaneously in a debate situation or in a situation in which I don't have time to prepare a formal speech, I usually have a page of notes which can vary from seven or eight words to several hundred words if for instance I wanted, in the course of that speech, to quote a particular statement. But seldom more than one sheet of paper.

MERRITT: What would you regard as the strongest features of your speaking, or should I ask that question?

BUCKLEY: By my strongest would mean what as you use the word?—most effective?—most distinctive?—what?

MERRITT: Most effective. Or, what you are most satisfied with in your speaking?

BUCKLEY: Most satisfied with? That's a hard one, isn't it? I think I have a workable capacity for exploring the logical scaffolding of an argument as it is
presented. I think I have, in the sense that most people who are engaged in this kind of thing need to have, a sort of x-ray vision into the premises of an argument.

**MERRITT:** Incidentally, I did not ask you earlier—did you have courses in logic?

**BUCKLEY:** Yes, I had a philosophy course that dealt exclusively in logic for the first semester.

**MERRITT:** What would you regard as the weakest feature or features of your speaking? Maybe that's one I shouldn't ask.

**BUCKLEY:** I think probably my weakest is that I antagonize. I antagonize members of an audience.

**MERRITT:** Do you feel like you are coming across abrasively at times or coming on too strong? Is that what you mean?

**BUCKLEY:** The art of oratory has in it a seductive component and mine is not in perfect function. I am better at scoring than I am at persuading.

**MERRITT:** You're better then, you think, as a debater than as a persuader?

**BUCKLEY:** That's right. That's right.

**MERRITT:** Incidentally, will you give me your definition of rhetoric? Since you have begun to define your thoughts on the nature of rhetoric.

**BUCKLEY:** Well, I don't have a definition—so far as I know that is distinctive. In fact I don't have to define it. I simply think of rhetoric in the classical sense as that appeal in which is assumed logic and drama and that rhetoric is therefore, ultimately the highest form of inter-communication.

**MERRITT:** All right, I want to go over that a little bit more in a few moments when I get to Richard Weaver. Now, this probably fits in better—maybe I don't need this question at all at this point. Has there been any person who served as a model for you as a speaker and you mentioned perhaps Willmoore Kendall.
BUCKLEY: No, I didn't. I didn't say he was a model for me. I said that he was somebody that—you asked me to give you the names of people who might have influenced me—and I gave you him. Not as a model.

MERRITT: All right then. Has there been anyone?

BUCKLEY: No. No.

MERRITT: Could you mention a few books or sources or persons that you regard as good sources of information on you? Who can you recommend to me for research on you?

BUCKLEY: As what? As a speaker?

MERRITT: Yes, a speaker. Of course, as a person.

BUCKLEY: Well, hell, as a person, anybody I know who's written about my family. As a speaker there is a guy—I think didn't I tell you his name?

MERRITT: Thomas Mader?

BUCKLEY: Yes, yes.

MERRITT: Yes, I corresponded with Mr. Mader.

BUCKLEY: Well, he's got a Ph.D. thesis on my speaking style. Somebody did a M.A. a couple weeks ago on my style as a column writer which I will be glad to give you. I'll give you anything I have. I will be glad to help you in any way I can. But there is no sense in which your task is biographical is there?

MERRITT: Well, it is somewhat because I'll have a chapter which is biographical material on you.

BUCKLEY: Well, my papers are at Yale; and on the other hand, they have been awfully hard-nosed about letting people look at them. Because there is some sort of one of those automatic twenty-five year—there is probably nothing much there that would be all that useful to you.

MERRITT: Well, one reason that I am inquiring is that because in the classical concepts of ethos, pathos, and logos that I will have a chapter dealing with your ethical suasion. Which, of course, I have to look into your biographical background, your personality, and things like that.
BUCKLEY: Well, I tell you, there is so much material it just—I am horrified at what you have set out to do. But, for instance, there are all of my "Firing Lines" and that itself—there are transcripts that go to that so that you can actually sit down and read if you have the stomach for it. My handling of 275 primary Americans of public interest in the last six or seven years—so that should give you an awful lot to work on in terms simply of my sort of biographical background. There is a guy writing a book on me, a trade book, who I am sure would be glad to talk to you if you want to trace him down. His name is Larry DuBois.

MERRITT: And where is he from?

BUCKLEY: He is in Washington. He used to work for Time magazine. He is now a free-lancer.

MERRITT: Has there been any other biography of you published or will this be the first actual biography you published?

BUCKLEY: It will be the first. It will be the first. Yes, there have been a 100 million pieces published here and there, but that would require a certain amount of effort to track them down. Have you looked in the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature? You can do that if you want. That gives an awful lot of entries there—the advantage obviously is that you can hunt down right in the periodical shelf in a major library.

MERRITT: All right. Why don't we move to the political philosophy. What books, persons or events have influenced your political philosophy most?

BUCKLEY: Oh, God, I really don't—I just honestly wouldn't know. I really wouldn't know. I'm not trying to be difficult at all, but I just plain flatly don't know. It takes an intensive amount of self-study to which I am not given—you know—to situate in your life in some higher optical order that which influenced you. I mean if you say to me "how much were we influenced by the assassination of Kennedy, how much were we influenced by Pearl Harbor?" I wouldn't be able to tell you. In a sense, it would be meaningless to you.

MERRITT: When one speaks of the contemporary conservative movement, what does conservatism mean?
BUCKLEY: Well, it means a lot of things to a lot of people and it depends extensively on the context of the conversation. I don't think you can define it absolutely. I have an essay on this subject in my book, *Twentieth Century Conservative Thought*—the first chapter in which I sort of say everything I can think to say on that subject.

MERRITT: Right, I've read that. Can you enumerate to me six or eight of some of the most critical conservative-liberal issues of the past two or three decades?

BUCKLEY: Well, I can try. Beginning with, let's say, after the war there was the great issue of how to deal with the Soviet Union. Roughly speaking, I think it fair to say that the conservatives took the harder line at various junctures. They were most critical of Yalta, most critical of our support of Tito, most critical of our support of the Lublin government in Poland; and going on, we were most critical of any move prematurely to stop the development of our atomic weapons. We were most critical of an ineffective Indo-Chinese military policy. We sided with those who believed that opposing subversion wars were relevant and consistent with imperatives of free government. We, taking us right to the current day—-it would probably be the conservatives who opposed the proposed disarmament treaty or whatever it will be called, signed by Nixon last week. Domestically, the conservatives, of course, have opposed the growth of state power and the extension of powers that were thought to lie properly in lesser political units on over to central political units so that all through the 50's and through the 60's the conservatives on the whole have disputed with the liberals the extension of state power for purposes of social-domestic purposes. So you can pick out as many issues as you want I think from that general description.

MERRITT: Can you give me some of the basic philosophical differences between the liberals and the conservatives?

BUCKLEY: They are illustrated in my book. When I can refer you to something to which I have devoted hours and hours of time in order to get it said exactly right, there is no point in my just "winging it" in this casual conversation. This conversation, I should think, ought primarily to be in order to give you information which you can't find elsewhere,
of course, I will try to be as helpful as I can concerning where you can find it.

MERRITT: Right, and not only you; but, for instance, Russell Kirk, or Kendall, or Rossiter have enumerated the basic philosophical differences and you generally would accept those?

BUCKLEY: Yes. Yes, in the case of Kirk and Kendall. No, in the case of Rossiter.

MERRITT: Maybe this leads to the next question then. What books would you refer me to as the most effective statement or defense of contemporary conservatism—your own then or others—and I am sure the one in the American Heritage series you would refer me to.

BUCKLEY: Well, there again I would refer you to the bibliography.

MERRITT: You have simply referred me to the bibliography that you have and it is very extensive—can you cite me some of your speeches in which you have best stated, explained or argued the conservative position? And, hopefully, that are in tape or manuscript form.

BUCKLEY: I don't think I can answer that question because my speeches have always dealt with one or another aspect of the conservative position and it would hardly be any point in—let's say—giving you a speech in which I came out against the expansion of nuclear testing and say this is better or worse than another speech I gave against federalizing medicine.

MERRITT: There is no one or two speeches which you give on the lecture circuit that would be pretty much a defense or an apology of the conservative position?

BUCKLEY: Not comprehensively. The speech I published in Cruising Speed—have you read that?

MERRITT: No, I have not—that is one of your books I don't have.

BUCKLEY: I have a speech that I reproduced there which is useful. I wouldn't put it you know, necessarily, above or below others.

MERRITT: Well, that would be my responsibility then.
BUCKLEY: Sure, sure. That is an entact speech which I delivered quite widely last year.

MERRITT: Was it taped and then put in manuscript form or was it manuscript and then you delivered it just that way?

BUCKLEY: Yes. It is a speech I composed using, actually, the basis for an article I wrote for The Great Ideas Today, 1970.

MERRITT: Oh well, I have that. Could you cite just some of the best-known or most articulate leaders of the conservative movement of today--maybe practicing politicians, they may be educators, authors, philosophers--just give me an idea of some of the people that you consider most articulate conservatives today--the most influential conservatives today?

BUCKLEY: Well, I think the easiest way to answer that question is to look at the masthead of National Review and obviously as an editor my job has been trying to get the most articulate conservatives to write regularly for National Review. They aren't all listed there because in one or two cases other commitments don't permit them to appear.

MERRITT: Oh, that's okay. On there I notice, though, that there are not any who are current politicians. Would you mention the people--of course, like Goldwater?

BUCKLEY: Well sure, Goldwater, or my brother are certainly among them--the ones that come to mind readily--Strom Thurmond, I would consider very conservative; John Tower, you got him in the House; Representative Phil Crane--

MERRITT: What about Vice-president Agnew?

BUCKLEY: And Agnew--oh sure, absolutely.

MERRITT: Let's get to Richard Weaver.

BUCKLEY: Sure.

MERRITT: I guess this is too broad a question, maybe. How well did you know Richard Weaver?
BUCKLEY: I knew him quite well, without saying that I knew him extremely well. I probably saw him a total of seven or eight times between 1952 and his death which was what '64, '63?

MERRITT: '63. Could you tell me what influence he had on you in terms of your political or social philosophy or in terms of rhetorical theory or strategy?

BUCKLEY: I am not aware that he had any influence at all--this doesn't mean that he didn't--it simply means I haven't made a study of his influence on me. I think I've read all of his books. I may not have read that last book of essays.

MERRITT: *Life Without Prejudice and Other Essays?*

BUCKLEY: That's right.

MERRITT: Well, then could you tell me, do you remember when you read his first book, *Ideas Have Consequences*, and what impact it had on you?

BUCKLEY: Yes. I read that at college at the urging of Professor Kendall. I don't remember the impact any book had on me. Which doesn't mean that these books don't have impact on me, but it is something that happens automatically.

MERRITT: You've read so much that any single thing---but, for instance, Frank Meyer and also Russell Kirk say that this book was one of the most significant, if not perhaps the most significant, book in the contemporary conservative movement and in the revitalizing of the conservative movement. Is that correct? Was it that important?

BUCKLEY: Well it was. It was very important. Whether it was catalytic, I don't know. He seemed to be challenging essential liberal assumptions and he did so quite unsparingly. That had the effect of opening up a lot of thought that simply hadn't been thought of as open; and in that sense, he invited an awful lot of heuristic endeavor. I know that he influenced Willmoore Kendall very widely; and the fact of Willmoore Kendall's being influenced was important because he in turn influenced an awful lot of people. Russell Kirk was always a conservative. Willmoore was not, and Frank Meyer, of course, was a communist. So, necessarily, anybody who influenced them had a definite role, I think, in history.
MERRITT: Okay. What was his role in the contemporary conservative movement?

BUCKLEY: Who?

MERRITT: Richard Weaver's--other than what you have said.

BUCKLEY: Not much. He did, before he died, associate himself from time to time with some ISI formal schools—Intercollegiate Society of Individualists as it was then called—that was in a sense a formal affiliation. Also, he appeared on National Review's masthead, which was in a sense a formal affiliation. Beyond that he was the most bookish of men who spent all of his time in his academic shop fussing with his books and teaching his students and so on. He came to hear my debate against Norman Mailer in Chicago in 1962, but that is the only public function at which I saw him.

MERRITT: Now, he was also associate editor of Modern Age, wasn't he?

BUCKLEY: Well, that's right. He was on the editorial board. I forgot that. That's right.

MERRITT: And if I'm not mistaken, I think I found thirty-nine articles, which would include book reviews, etc., credited to him in National Review.

BUCKLEY: Is it that many? That's a lot.

MERRITT: I think I found thirty-nine. Many of these were book reviews and not major articles.

BUCKLEY: Yes.

MERRITT: In his The Ethics of Rhetoric—do you remember his hierarchy of topics in there or his hierarchy of arguments as he calls them? He has five of them and the first one he says is argument from genus or from definition. And he says this is the argument that is most basic to the conservatives.

BUCKLEY: Yes, as opposed to the argument of circumstances. Yes, what are the other three?

MERRITT: Right. Argument from cause and effect; argument from consequences; and then argument from authority or testimony which he has as an external argument. Number two was argument from similitude.
Do you argue from definition or from genus—is that more in keeping with your style or your method? Or does this mean anything to you at all?

BUCKLEY: Oh yes, sure.

MERRITT: Do you think consciously?

BUCKLEY: No, no, I don't do it consciously.

MERRITT: Is it natural for you to go to that type of argument?

BUCKLEY: I think it is. It is, yes.

MERRITT: Do you find yourself at times arguing from circumstances?

BUCKLEY: Sure, sure. An argument, especially an argument from definition, is often reinforced by argument from circumstance. I'll give you an example. If you start off saying empirically, "look, states ought'nt to engage in social enterprises," at least there is a strong presumption against it. You then back that up with all kinds of arguments from circumstances giving, for instance, examples of where the state has failed by violating that—I am moving against that presumption. There is a superb example of that done in the current issue of National Review—a little one-page article on the shortage of public power written by William Rickenbacker. It is a combination of argument from circumstances in order to prove an argument of definition.

MERRITT: So you would, in any particular case, try to have a basic premise, the basic argument from definition or principle or whatever, and then you would use examples and illustrations and things like that to reinforce it or to show a modern application or whatever.

BUCKLEY: I think so, yes, I think so.

MERRITT: And of course you would try to adapt all of that to the present audience?

BUCKLEY: No. No, I am very bad about that. I don't adapt to audiences. I speak exactly the same way to all audiences.
MERRITT: Is that because--well, why is that?

BUCKLEY: It is in part laziness, and in part a lack of any sense of skill in the art of adaptation. I would deliver the identical speech to the Harvard Graduate School that I would give to local Rotarians and as I say, for one thing, it is easier not to write two speeches; but, for another, I have never felt that I command the skills which you need to change the way in which you speak so as to make it suitable to audiences of different intelligence, race, background and everything.

MERRITT: Do I understand that Mrs. Babcock has complete responsibility for your speaking schedule?

BUCKLEY: Yes.

MERRITT: You doubtless get numerous invitations to speak?

BUCKLEY: Yes.

MERRITT: How does she, or how do you decide which ones to accept?

BUCKLEY: Well, we meet twice a year. We meet in July and in December, and in July we make up the fall speaking engagements, and we give priority on several bases. One is how long has that college asked for you. If it's asked for you for four straight years, then we try to put them on top of the pile. Then we have to combine that with things that make some sort of geographic sense. Sometimes a college will say we want you anytime in February. I'm never there in February so that automatically gets knocked out. And by sort of shifting and sifting and so on and so forth and trying to put coherent geographical patterns, we come up with the schedule.

MERRITT: Now, how do you decide on the theme or the topic?

BUCKLEY: Well, years ago we used to give them a choice of five topics. I don't do that anymore. I put the same topic on all. If they insist on a topic then I always call it "Reflections on the Current Disorder" simply because if they like to put something on a poster or an announcement, at least they've got something. But you can tell them anything you want to. I have never in my life had anybody complain, with one exception, about a shift in topic. Or they just put "Mr. Buckley's Choice." Because if you commit yourself to a speech four or five months from now, it could very well be that the topic that they desire at this point and that you thought you
were brushed up on is strangely irrelevant at that moment. So it is easier to switch. They don't care.

MERRITT: So you want to be flexible if there is a crisis--if there is the Bay of Pigs, if there is the missile crisis, whatever there is then you want to be flexible to speak to it or to any number of other issues.

BUCKLEY: Yes, it is very seldom, for instance, I would not tomorrow--if I were scheduled to give a luncheon speech--I would not give a speech on the SALT talks. I would perhaps make some reference to them in a fresh introduction, which I write each time, as a rule, to my prepared speech to give as I come on; but mostly I want the freedom to be able to give the speech from my current repertoire that I want to give tomorrow; if I thought for whatever reason that I want to give this particular speech, I want to give it without any interference. And, as I say, I have never found any . . . . It is different if you are invited to a symposium, let's say; I've got to give a speech a week from now in California that touches on the agricultural policies, so that's sort of different.

MERRITT: So the theme is pretty much decided for you?--or at least the subject?

BUCKLEY: That's right.

MERRITT: All right. I think that's going to do it. Thank you, Mr. Buckley.
APPENDIX B

CORRESPONDENCE CONDUCTED WITH MS. CATHERINE BABCOCK
OF CATHERINE BABCOCK, INC., SPEAKERS BUREAU
REPRESENTING WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR.

October 14, 1972

Questions Submitted and Answers Received

QUESTION: How long have you represented Mr. Buckley?

ANSWER: 18 years.

QUESTION: Are you responsible for scheduling all of Buckley's speeches or only those before college audiences, etc.?

ANSWER: All of them.

QUESTION: How many invitations has he received year-by-year since you have represented him? (If the data is not available, please give me some estimate so I can gauge his growth in popularity as a speaker.)

ANSWER: We don't have a record. You must keep in mind that we receive many requests for specific dates as much as two years before the event. These we cannot consider—we book only a few months in advance. Also, we receive a goodly number of requests for talks that are non-commercial and, of course, Mr. Buckley speaks for a fee, all of which goes to help underwrite the deficit of the magazine.

QUESTION: If possible, give me a list of the engagements that you have scheduled for him over the years, naming the college, club, organization, location, etc.

ANSWER: This would indeed be a very long list, and we think it would be fair to say that Mr. Buckley
has spoken at every major college in the United States and countless smaller ones.

QUESTION: How does this compare with the number of invitations received for other speakers that you represent—particularly conservative speakers like Buckley?

ANSWER: This is really not a fair question since Mr. Buckley receives more invitations to speak than probably any other speaker in the country.

QUESTION: How do you and Mr. Buckley decide which invitations he should accept?

ANSWER: Several things come into play—we try to honor requests on the basis of receipt and we have many holdovers from season to season and these are considered first. We have to work with a travel plan that makes sense and this becomes a determining factor. (When he decides to make a western swing, we pick off the possibilities that can fit into the schedule in that particular area.) Some programs are of particular interest.

QUESTION: Do the invitations usually include requests for a special topic, question, or for a special speech by title or topic?

ANSWER: Often they do, but only as a guide to their general interest. Question and answer periods are usually included in a straight lecture type program. Of course, many programs feature seminar, discussion or debate type format.

QUESTION: List the names of other speakers that you represent.

ANSWER: We enclose mini notes for other of our speakers.

QUESTION: What is Buckley's role and how would you assess his influence and speaking in the conservative movement?

ANSWER: (No response—"Attached is a sheet giving answers to some of the questions that you sent along. We skipped the questions asking for judgments.")

QUESTION: Do you usually get any feedback following Buckley's speeches? What is the nature of that feedback? Can you give me some specific examples or some typical feedback?
ANSWER: We get uniformly excellent comments (with two exceptions) from all groups and it makes no difference whether they are "liberal" or "conservative."

QUESTION: Do you have manuscripts or tapes of some of Buckley's speeches? If so, please send me a list of the titles or the speeches themselves and I will pay you for any cost involved.

ANSWER: No.

QUESTION: How would you describe and assess Buckley's speaking--nature of his speaking, strong points, weak points, characteristics unique to Buckley, etc.?

ANSWER: (No response)

QUESTION: What is the typical fee Buckley receives? Does he charge a set fee? (If you feel that this question is out of order, you may disregard it.)

ANSWER: Yes, he charges a set fee--$2,250 to colleges and $2,500 for all other talks. All of this money goes to help underwrite the deficit of the magazine.

QUESTION: Please provide any other information that you feel might be useful to this study.

ANSWER: (No response)
APPENDIX C

REFLECTIONS ON THE CURRENT DISORDER
(No. 3)

PROPOSITION ONE: The opinion-making community misunderstands the usefulness of repression.

I mean by this proposition to draw attention to the great success that the recent mentors of American civilization have enjoyed when they suggest that repression is the kind of thing practiced only by storm troopers and rationalized in Mein Kampf; or, in other situations, by such as Lester Maddox in his chicken restaurant, driven by theories of white supremacy.

There is no evidence in early American history that I know of to suggest that the men who wrote the Constitution believed that all thought was in some way equal, simply because they went on to devise a Bill of Rights that forbade the Congress from enacting any laws abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.

When Thomas Jefferson spoke about the virtue of tolerating even those who seek to repeal our republican forms of government, it is clear from his other writings, and from the lapidary record of his own activities, that what he
meant to say was that the toleration of certain kinds of dissent is a tribute to the good sense of the American people who will always reject the blandishments of the anti-republican minority. So then, why interfere with the minority who wish to practice tyranny? It is, after all, a form of democratic self-confidence to be able to stroll peacefully through Hyde Park and listen to the orators who denounce our free institutions. It summons to mind the cozy child's dream, wherein you wake up suddenly in a jungle surrounded by wild beasts who however are powerless to harm you, because you are protected by an impenetrable bubble of glass which is proof against their aggressions.

Abraham Lincoln the polemicist pulled a fast one, Professor Harry Jaffa reminds us, when he began his Gettysburg Address by dating the beginning of the American Republic not with the Constitution but with the signing of the Declaration of Independence. His old adversary Stephen Douglas, during the famous debates, based his case on the Constitution alone--with exclusive reference to which it could indeed be argued that the Dred Scott decision was meticulously correct in forbidding the free-soil states from refusing a slave-owner the right to take residence there along with his slaves. Lincoln cited the beginning of the United States as having taken place "four score and seven years" before Gettysburg. That is to say in 1776, with the adoption of the Declaration of Independence. Accordingly--said Lincoln in effect--the metaphysics of the Declaration of Independence animate the
Constitution, so that when scholars and statesmen disagreed—as they would do with progressive heat in the years that led to the explosion of civil war—on how to reconcile the postulates of America with the survival of slavery, it was to the Declaration of Independence that the abolitionists ideally repaired for guidance. Because the Declaration of Independence spoke of "self-evident" truths. Among them that men are born equal.

The initial toleration of slavery, in the understanding of Lincoln, was a historical accommodation. The accommodation of a great weight on America's neck: a birthmark. To be recognized by its leaders as such; so that step by step they might direct public policy towards emancipation by attrition. Professor Jaffa reminds us that "no American statesman ever violated the ordinary maxims of civil liberties more than did Abraham Lincoln, and few seem to have been more careful of them than Jefferson Davis." And then he adds the point which is so striking in the contemporary situation, "Yet the cause for the sake of which the one slighted these maxims was human freedom, while the other, claiming to defend the forms of constitutional government, found in those forms a ground for defending and preserving human slavery."

It is instructive to meditate on this apparent paradox at a moment when so much of the liberal community is disposed to denounce such modest little efforts as are nowadays being made to enhance the public order.
PROPOSITION TWO: The absolutizers, in their struggle against what they call repression, are doing their best to make the Constitution of the United States incoherent.

It ought to be obvious that it is impossible to absolutize any single freedom without moving it into the way of another absolutized freedom. How can you simultaneously have an absolute right to compel testimony in your own behalf (Amendment VI), while others have the absolute right (Amendment V) to refuse to testify lest they incriminate themselves? How can you have absolute freedom of the press (Amendment I) alongside the absolute right to a fair trial (Amendment VI)? How can you have absolute freedom of speech (Amendment I) alongside other people's absolute right (Amendment XIV) to their property, including their good name?

Oliver Wendell Holmes, asked to define a fanatic, said something to this effect. Look, everyone will agree as a matter of common sense that a houseowner owns the space above his roof, such that, for example, he can legally prevent his neighbor from constructing a lateral extension reaching out over his own house. The fanatic, by contrast, will carry the argument forward absolutely. He will reason from his ownership of the space above his roof to ownership of a shaft of air that projects straight out into the heavenly spheres, such that no child's kite or supersonic transport can overfly him, without written permission. It is ironic
that it is to a famous dissent of Oliver Wendell Holmes that
the absolutizers (which is to say the fanatics) turn, when
insisting that all ideas are to be treated with absolute
impartiality. It was Justice Holmes who said that "the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market." If that maxim
were accepted, white superiority would long since have been
accepted as truth in parts of this and other countries. In
any event, the statement is hard to reconcile with the notion
that some truths are "self-evident." Certainly it is hard to
reconcile with the attitudes of the men who urged the adop­
tion of the Constitution.

After all, the Federalist Papers stressed among other
things the usefulness of a federal government in guaranteeing
freedom within the individual states. Concerning the problem
of indigenous threats to the republic, Alexander Hamilton
wrote most directly. His plea for the proposed Constitution
was not merely a plea against the anarchy that every school­
boy knows he abhorred. He warned also of the dangers of
despotism. "It is impossible to read the history of the
petty republics of Greece and Italy," he wrote, "without
feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distrac­
tions with which they were kept in a state of perpetual
vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy." But he went on to argue that historical advances in the
science of government now permitted the granting of powers
sufficient to avoid anarchy, yet insufficient to promote tyranny.

Hamilton insisted that the government dispose of such power as is necessary to make its laws obeyed. Such power, it might be argued, the exercise of which the contemporary revolutionists, and their fellow travelers, are quick to criticize, invoking an absolutized version of the Bill of Rights. Hamilton wrote in criticism of the Articles of Confederation that the government as then composed had "no powers to exact obedience or punish disobedience to /Its resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or divestiture of privileges, or by any other constitutional mode." Unless that situation were remedied, he warned, the United States would "afford the extraordinary spectacle of a government destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the execution of its own laws."

So the Constitution that Hamilton and the others advocated was adopted; and inasmuch as it expressly guarantees republican government to each constituent state, we get a little historical focus on Thomas Jefferson's vain-glorious boast about the nation's toleration of those who would tear down our republican forms of government. Hamilton went on—in his analysis—to commit the same sin of civic pride that Jefferson was to commit more flamboyantly a few years later; that John Stuart Mill would elevate to democratic dogma in a generation; and that Oliver Wendell Holmes took to the final extreme in 1919. Hamilton simply
assumed that as a general rule a republican form of government would more or less predictably commend itself to the people, so as to make it obviously futile for a numerical minority to have any hope of repealing or frustrating it. He ambled along contentedly—up to a point—with the great syllogism that modern revolutionists are now bent on challenging, namely, that if the government is of the majority, there is no reason to suppose that there will be much latent support for revolutionary disruption. "Where the whole power of the government is in the hands of the people," he said "there is the less pretence for the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional distempers of the State. The natural cure for all ill-administration...is a change of men."

But what about those situations in which republican government is threatened—whether by an assertive minority, or a passive majority, or a combination of the two? How much power should a government have in order to protect the republic against insurrection? A very important question, which is being fought out today in Congress, in the courts, and among the opinion-makers.

On this matter the absolutists—for instance, the American Civil Liberties Union—feel perfectly at home with all the old rigidities. But they are not winning all the constitutional debates. It is currently being tested, for instance, whether the government may punish those who, in the opinion of the court, conspired to go to Chicago for the
purpose of abridging the freedom of others to transact their business at the Democratic Convention. Never mind, for the purpose of this analysis, the inflamed question: whether the trial judge behaved as inexcusably as the defendants. The question arises: Is the 1968 Act, under which the Chicago 7 were tried and convicted, constitutional? "The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of providing for the national defense," Hamilton ventured, "is the one of those refinements which owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened." He argued that, after all, "confidence must be placed somewhere," and that, "it is better to hazard the abuse of that confidence than to embarrass the government and endanger the public safety by impolitic restrictions on the legislative authority."

So then, was Hamilton encouraging something which nowadays would go by the name of "repression"? Precisely. "The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the dread of punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it." Over and over again Hamilton leans on the assumption that the general majority are as a practical matter going to be content with laws which are after all of their own devising. Nevertheless, Hamilton implicitly acknowledged that irrationality could now and again raise its ugly head. To assume that the government in a democratic society will not ever have to use force to assert its laws is naive. "... the idea of governing at all times by the
simple force of law (which we have been told is the only admissible principle of republican government)," he writes acidulously, "has no place but in the reveries of those political doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental instruction."

Very well then, if we concede that the right to attempt to bring down the republican forms of government is not absolute, either in theory or in the historical experience of America, does it follow that we are bound to indulge, let alone applaud, such expressions of public impatience as for instance are embodied in the 1968 Act—which was the basis for the prosecutions in Chicago during last winter?

We come to

PROPOSITION THREE: Such self-proclaimed revolutionists as Messrs. Hoffman, Rubin, Dellinger and Seale, and such others as, for instance, Tom Hayden and William Kunstler, do not appear to understand the historical, let alone the theoretical, rights of counter-revolutionists.

In the beginning—for our contemporary revolutionists—was the American Revolution. It is their charter, the touchstone of their thought, their polemic and their action. It is argumentatively as important to the defense of their dogma and to their behavior, as Prohibition is to the defense of the young pot-smoker who says if the older generation could drink unconstitutional booze, why can't we smoke illegal grass. The revolutionists insist that this country
was after all baptized in revolution, that revolution is genetically a part of the American way.

I do not find anywhere in the informed literature of that period any suggestion that it was other than the accepted right of the British throne to resist the American Revolution. Edmund Burke, whose sympathies were plainly with America, never suggested that King George was violating any known canon of civilization by sending a large army to America to say No to the army of George Washington. And if Washington had been caught and hanged, Burke would no doubt have deplored royal punctilio; but there was no higher law around to appeal to than had been available to Vercingetorix to use against Julius Caesar. By the same token, the United States is entitled by all conventional standards--to hang its revolutionists.

I should not think that the time to do this has come, but certainly the time has come to remind the revolutionists what are the possible consequences of their activity. As Dr. Johnson told us, "The knowledge that you are going to be hanged in two weeks concentrates the mind wonderfully."

If then, the contemporary revolutionists can find no historical right to revolt against our society under immunity from repression, can they find any abstract "right" to commend their enterprise? The wording of the Declaration of Independence clearly shows the mark of the social-contract theorists. "Governments are instituted among men" in order "to secure" certain "rights," said the Declaration. These governments derive "their just powers from the consent of
Here is an interesting distinction—obviously done in passing—between "just" and "unjust" powers; a tacit acknowledgment that even those governments that are licensed by the governed typically exercise both powers that are just and powers that are unjust. The contemporary revolutionist argues that those unjust powers the government exercises are not in fact intelligently sanctioned by the majority (Marcuse goes in for that kind of thing, in a tortured sort of way), but, rather, are institutional accretions. What is to be done about them?

Mr. Jefferson's Declaration of Independence acknowledges the "right of the people to alter or abolish" their government and "to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness."

The Declaration goes on to enumerate the grievances of the colonies. It is a stirring catalogue, but it finally reduces to the matter of the source of power, i.e., who should rule? "He [King George] has refused his assent to laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good," said the Declaration. Who is to decide what are the laws most wholesome and necessary for the public good? Why, the people—the people who are affected by those laws. The American Revolution was about who should rule. Everybody?
Mr. Jefferson, perhaps from a sense of tact—perhaps even from a sense of cunning—introduces into the peroration of his manifesto a subtle distinction. "We, therefore, the representatives of the United States of America, in general Congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the name, and by the authority of the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish and declare . . . ." The good people of these colonies? A ritual obeisance? Or a sly recognition that there are plenty of colonials around who oppose secession? Bad people?

Mr. Jefferson always acknowledged the existence of bad people, in a way that Oliver Wendell Holmes had difficulty in doing, so absolute was his relativism. But Jefferson's rationalist's faith in the inherent power of good ideas to defeat bad ideas in the marketplace was ringingly proclaimed in his later years. "Those who wish to dissolve the union or to change its republican form should stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it." It isn't of course suggested in this passage what is the indicated course of action if reason should fail in the performance of its delegated duty, but we know from Jefferson's own autocratic habits that he often gave reason a helping hand; and we know from the Declaration of Independence that he dubbed some truths as self-evident; and, derivatively, that he judged those people who acknowledged
those truths, as "good," and those who did not—as something else. It was also Jefferson, presumably in a more skeptical frame of mind, who said, "Let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution."

From all of which one infers that in Jefferson's America, a) there is, on some very basic points, a right and a wrong position; that b) the probability is that the people will opt for the right position, prodded by reason to do so; but that c) it sometimes becomes necessary to resist the bad people, whether they are numerous, or whether they are, simply, the King of England. Abbie Hoffman is not the King of England, but the point of course is that he seeks a kind of metaphorical accession to the throne, by the use of any means, and the corollary point in our troubled times is: shall we restrain him, a); and if so, b), how; and c), how shall we protect not so much the White House from his occupation of it, but how shall we protect lesser folk than the President—you and me—from such a denial of our rights as Mr. Hoffman and his mini-legions are capable of denying us, in their quixotic but not altogether toothless campaign for revolution. The Jeffersonian ideal continues to be exemplary: the Hoffmans and the Dellingers and the Cleavers should be laughed, or disdained, into impotence.

Even so, there is a creeping difference between, for instance, the way in which the whole of the American public reacted against the white racists who assaulted the civil
rights advocates during the sixties, and the way in which
the community reacts now to the disruptions of the New Left
revolutionaries. Mr. Allard Lowenstein recently told me
that it is not a new experience for him to be silenced, and
even threatened and clubbed down, by those who disagree with
him. But when he was given such treatment by Ku Klux-types
in the South, in the early sixties, the whole of America
reacted in horror and registered its solidarity with him
and the others who worked for a continuing attrition of
the birthmark that the Civil War did not altogether succeed
in erasing. A few months ago, addressing a university
audience at Columbia, Mr. Lowenstein was hooted down and
literally silenced for defending the right of Professor
Herman Kahn to speak unmolested, and faculty members in that
audience countenanced and even egged on the Jacobinical
furies that ruled the crowd—who needless to say went un-
punished, even unreprimanded, although they most indisputably
conspired together to abridge the civil liberties of two
men, Herman Kahn and Al Lowenstein, who have never by word
or deed disparaged the civil liberties of any American
citizen.

PROPOSITION FOUR: So far have the professionally tolerant
gone towards fantacism that we stand in danger of losing
the salutary force of public sanction.

It is always least desirable to have to write new
laws, or even to have to invoke laws that have become
flaccid from disuse. Consider a recent incident.

If it blurs in the mind just what and who are the Black Panthers, why they are an organization founded a few years ago on the doctrine that the United States is a racist-oppressive country best dealt with by the elimination of its leaders and institutions. Suggestive of its rhetorical style is the front page of its house organ which featured on the day after his death a photograph of Robert Kennedy lying in a pool of his own blood, his face transformed into the likeness of a pig.

Do you think Robert Kennedy was a pig? I asked Eldridge Cleaver a while ago. Yes, he said. Did Mr. Cleaver believe in the elimination of pigs? Yes, he did. Well, why not begin with Nixon; surely he is the chief pig? I observed. Mr. Cleaver, who has had intimate experiences with the law, advised me that he knew enough not to counsel directly the assassination of the President, but that if in fact someone did kill him, that would surely be one less pig in the world. Those who believe that Cleaver, and derivatively his followers among the Panthers, have mellowed may look at the introduction Cleaver wrote to Jerry Rubin's book, published last spring by the august house of Simon & Schuster—putting us in mind of Lenin's comment that when the last of the bourgeois is hanged, a capitalist will sell the hangman the rope—in which introduction Mr. Cleaver, an official of the Black Panthers, urges his disciples in America, black and white, to "rise up and kill pigs," and recalls
as the most precious memory of his political experience in America a shoot-out in Oakland, California, at which he observed that after one salvo, "a pig white lay dead, deep fried in the fat of his own bullshit."

Mr. Cleaver is not in this country, his career as visiting professor at Berkeley having been interrupted by a parole court. We cannot do anything about him.

So what do we do about the other Black Panthers, of which Mr. Cleaver is the spiritual leader? Well, that depends on who we are. If we are Leonard Bernstein, the conductor, we have a big cocktail party (a party about which Mr. Tom Wolfe has had absolutely the last say) to which we invite a local representative of the Panthers, and summon wealthy and artistic men and women, at which party money is raised for the Panther defense fund.

Mr. Bernstein was modishly dressed, in turtleneck sweater and double-breasted jacket, and had obviously been studying up on the idiom of the times; indeed so thorough is Mr. Bernstein that it is altogether possible that he staged a rehearsal or two, because a dialogue with a Black Panther is every bit as difficult to perform as, say, a symphony of Schonberg. Anyway, the Black Panther, Mr. Cox, began by announcing that if business didn't provide full employment, then the Panthers would simply take over the means of production and put them in the hands of the people, to which prescription it is recorded that Mr. Bernstein's reply was, "I dig absolutely."
Mr. Cox told the gathering how very pacific he and his confederates are, that ultimately of course they desire peace, but that they have been attacked in their homes and murdered in their beds and have the right to defend themselves. "I agree one hundred per cent," Lenny said, neglecting to ask Mr. Cox to explain to what defensive uses his confederates intended to put the hand grenades and Molotov cocktails that were discovered in the raids.

I remember in the hour I spent with Mr. Cleaver the one thing I said to him that made him truly angry. It was that the Black Panther Party exists primarily for the satisfaction of white people, rather than black people. The white people like to strut their toleration, and strip themselves of their turtleneck sweaters to reveal their shame. The Panthers have only a few thousand black members, because the mass of the black people are too proud, too unaffected, to join the Panthers, to attend Leonard Bernstein's parties. Meanwhile, that party will serve, for a long time one hopes--I hope--as the symbol of total moral confusion; as a black mass on the altar of toleration. It suggests at the very least the failure of even aristocratic public opinion to rise to the responsibility of elementary moral distinctions.

PROPOSITION FIVE: Although such as Eldridge Cleaver can be extremely specific ("kill the pigs"), the vagueness of the revolutionary program of much of the New Left is its most singular strength, confronting the republic with its subtlest extralegal challenge.
It is commonplace to observe that those of a rebellious spirit in our midst do not know what they want. And even that they do not know by what means to achieve the conditions they cannot specify. I consider these data rather less reassuring than otherwise. If the revolutionists were committed to an identifiable program, they might be approached with demonstrations that their program, or any approximation of it, is not producing the goods (in Cuba, say, or in the Soviet Union). Curiously, the failures of Communism are more often treated as a joke than as a tragedy. (As in the current jollity: What would happen if the Communists occupied the Sahara? Answer: Nothing—for 50 years. Then there would be a shortage of sand.) But precisely the loose-jointedness of their mode—the de-ideologization of their movement—the disembodiment of the eschaton—leaves the revolutionists in a frame of mind at once romantic and diffuse, and the rest of us without the great weapon available to King Canute, who was able to contrive what would nowadays be called a Confrontation between—the ineluctable laws of nature and the superstitions of his subjects.

So that the idea of revolution continues to excite the political and moral imagination. It is necessary, in making one's complaints against the society we intend to replace, to be vague and even disjointed. To be specific, or to be orderly, is once again to run the risk of orderly confutation. General charges are not so easily denied;
indeed they are not really deniable. How do you deny, for instance, the sweeping charge that "all of politics is the organization of greed"? Misery abounds" is a descriptive phrase which could accurately be used about every society that was ever organized on the face of the earth.

What ails them? Or—if you prefer—us? I quote now not from any of the better known advocates of revolution. I reach instead for a stretch of prose unencumbered by sophistication of thought or of style; what one might call the Volkswagen of revolutionary manifestos. Here it is, from a professor of political science at Hunter College in New York City, published in Volume I, Number 1 of a "revolutionary" journal.

The established system, he complains, "comprises elements of the archaic Judeo-Christian theocratic traditions, elements of the dark-age autocracy, feudalism, militarism, zoological capitalism /I am not quite sure what he means by that, but I have a feeling I am one/, corporate monopolism and plutocracy, with an admixture of 19th century liberalism and trade union socialism."

Now there is no doubt that these are indeed some of the historical, cultural, and philosophical tributaries that flow into America. But hear what the professor says they have produced.

They have produced to begin with an "anti-social orientation, based on the private profit motivations." This in turn "produced most . . . of the evils of the present
system. Among those evils are the following: the transformation of man into an instrument of production; an indiscriminate exploitation of natural and human resources; the promotion of vulgarity; an excessive consumption co-existing with poverty; the scarcity of housing; the pollution of air, water and food; unemployment; urban decay; the reduction of woman to a sex symbol; crime; racial discrimination; and the transformation of universities into an instrument of the military-industrial complex."

How can one argue with the man who holds America responsible for all the evils, all the ugliness, all the distractions we see, hear, and know about in America? It is not my purpose here to argue with the revolutionist the justice of his several indictments, or the merit of his "solutions." It is all very well to take the revolutionists by the scruff of the neck and show them that, as Professor Toynbee preaches, revolutions historically have not brought about the ends explicitly desired, but something very like their opposite; but the success of such demonstrations presupposes a clinical curiosity on the part of the observer, and such is not the temper of those in America who are talking about revolution. The point to stress is that the allure of revolution, and the importance of revolutionary attitudes in contemporary political and social affairs, are bound to grow, in the existing climate, not only because the sanctions of stability are not being pressed, but precisely because every modern aggravation
--as we have just seen--is nowadays transformed into yet another cause for revolutionary commitment; and the ideologists of revolution are careful, as in the passages above, to tread a line enough on the specific side of generality to describe a recognizably American situation, yet far enough short of specificity to permit them constantly to nourish the revolutionary imagination—to stimulate the confidence that liberation lies just over there on the other side of the barricades, even as Nat Turner dreamed that if only he could make it to the Dismal Swamp, the world would begin anew.

There is very little hope in arguing with those who are attracted to the religion of revolution. James Baldwin, in his furious and moving polemic *The Fire Next Time*, argued that "the only thing the white people have that black people need, or should want, is power." Power, that great amulet. Power to do what? As one observer forlornly asks, in an essay on Stokely Carmichael, "What makes Stokely Carmichael think that the Negroes will use Power to better advantage than the whites have been able to use it? I know there is no great point in describing the disappointments of freedom to the untutored man. He may hope that the Negro would master Power rather than be mastered by it, but his tutoring must have acquainted him with the dictum of Confucius: 'He who says, "Rich men are fools, but when I am rich I will not be a fool," is already a fool.'"
Nor is that difficulty unique to the black revolutionists. The critic Professor John Aldridge has said of the young white revolutionists that one "becomes aware of paradoxes and contradictions which suggest that their actions derive not from a coherent ideology or even a coherent emotional attitude but more nearly resemble a series of random gestures enacted in a climate of metaphysical confusion."

Professor Aldridge brings together a few of the relevant paradoxes and inconsistencies of the young revolutionists:

— "their preoccupation with style and their boundless appetite for banality;"

— "their indifference to standards of personal conduct when applied to them by adults, and their insistence upon the most exemplary standards of conduct when applied by them to adults;"

— "their obsession with the nature and quality of university instruction and their interest in ideas, imaginative literature, and the values of the humanistic tradition;"

— "their passion for individuality and their belief in collective action and their practice of group conformity;"

— "their mystical belief in the primacy of intense feeling, the soul-rejuvenating benefits of fresh emotional experience, and their deep fear of uncertainty, contingency,
and risk—all those situations of adventure and test which give the edge of fatality to life."

"Although"—Professor Aldridge concludes—"they have more freedom of action, feeling and opinion than any generation before them in our history, they are outraged by the existence of forces which in the slightest degree threaten to restrict or program or manipulate their responses. Yet if their dream of a problem-free society could ever be realized, it would very likely be a society in which the full horror of IBM-card anonymity had descended, in which all human responses would be programmed, probably at birth, the last hope of individual freedom of distinction erased by technocratic egalitarianism, and misfits and rebels, the scruffy, unwashed, and bizarrely costumed, would most certainly be the first to perish under the sword."

So that reason is not availing, not in the current mood. Reason cannot reach the revolutionary vapors on which the men and women we speak of are stoned. What is required, I think, is among other things a premonitory Sign; let's not say what it is, but let's hope that the academic community will help in devising it, in making it firm, yes, but humane; such a sign as Hamilton foresaw might from time to time need to be shown. A sign that suggests a corporate reaffirmation of the community's ideals, the most pressing one being its decision to survive—all this keeping in mind the words of Belloc, who, observing the rise of Hitler in Europe, wrote:
"We sit by and watch the Barbarian, we tolerate him; in the long stretches of peace we are not afraid. We are tickled by his irreverence, his comic inversion of our old certitudes and our fixed creed refreshes us; we laugh. But as we laugh we are watched by large and awful faces from beyond; and on these faces there is no smile."

And so, unsmilingly, we face the requirements of the current situation; and these are that we stand firm, and say No, our justification being that for all its faults, this is, and we pledge that it shall continue to be, a lovely country.
Members of the graduating class, you have given me this moment of high leverage on your attention, in the closing hour of your undergraduate life in this awesome institution. What to do with it except to select a necessary at random thought among many that pass through the mind which suit two criteria: One, that it interest me; and two, that perhaps it will interest you; hoping, though the odds are always against it, three, that it will stick for a little while in your memory, that you will find it useful, and that you will not be dismayed by so low a return on your generosity.

A month ago, I listened attentively to Professor John Kenneth Galbraith and to Professor Jean-Francois Revel. Mr. Galbraith, as we all know, is pretty well committed to the notion that capitalism is an abstraction—that, as he once formally put it—the free market place is a snare and a delusion. Mr. Revel, as you will perhaps recall,
has written tantalizingly a notorious book about a future without Marx or Jesus. I can quite understand a future without Marx, but it has always seemed to me that if our future is indeed to be without Jesus, the decision will likely be his, not ours. And that in any event, Jesus is not bound even by the deliberations of best-selling French philosophers, not that he should disdain them—Jesus desires a good press—even in France. Though to be sure he is most often ignored in the press, I have no doubt that the great revival in America will occur only after Jack Anderson reveals that on the third day, in fact, Christ arose. Mr. Revel joined Mr. Galbraith in deploring economic assumptions of America. So it goes that the book section of the *New York Times*, the following Sunday, was devoted pretty solidly to despair over American economic institutions as if the various reviewers had been graduated as drill masters for a haunting passage from Mr. Revel's book because he had written, "there is, in America, an increasing rejection of the society motivated by profit, dominated exclusively by economic consideration, ruled by the spirit of competition and subjected to the mutual aggressiveness of its members"—concluding, "indeed beneath every revolutionary idea we find a conviction that man has become the tool of his tools, and that he must once more become an end and a value in himself." Disillusion is in the air. Disillusion with America; and this season in particular, disillusion with the price system. Concerning this drift, a few observations:
One, I do not know of any society that is dominated exclusively by economic consideration. Certainly our own is not—else we would be more straight forward in some of our international enterprises. I think that we have seen rather the continuing disposition of some people to ascribe an economic motivation to every human transaction. This temptation, as we all know, antedated Karl Marx and was penetrated as false before Karl Marx wrote his celebrated work. But like the philosophical determinism of B. F. Skinner, economic determinism is no less fashionable for having been repeatedly discredited theoretically and empirically. It was only a year ago that an organization of militant ladies who call themselves Another Mother for Peace bombarded the Congress of the United States with six hundred thousand signatures of Americans who protested the Vietnam War, after being advised by another mother that the war was actually being fought in behalf of the oil interests in America. And indeed it transpired that a report had been circulating the United States to the effect that oil companies were poised to take 400 million barrels of oil per day out of the Indo-Chinese shelf beginning on the week that South Vietnam wins its victory. What proved wrong with the story, a congressional committee patiently discovered, was that a) 400 million barrels of oil per day is indisputedly a lot of oil—in fact, it is 10 times as much oil as is taken daily out of the rest of the entire world combined, b) the United States owns no concessions off Indo-China,
and c) no oil has yet been discovered off Indo-China. But
that minor correction and others like it will not significant-
ly diminish the number of pilgrims who will continue to be-
lieve that the principle motive of the United States in
Southeast Asia is economic.

Two, assuredly, once we have freed ourselves from
the psychotropic embraces of formal Marxism, which after a
few doses of realism—we soon discover are only a "paper
tiger," we grapple with the most significant point which is
cultural. As suggested by Mr. Revel's notion that our
society, motivated by profit, is therefore subjected to the
mutual aggressiveness of its members. My own feeling is
that the movement is less concerned to reject profit, than
to reject society. During the most vociferous years in the
late 1960's, there were student riots—not only in Chicago
and Berkeley, but in Paris and Madrid, Tokyo and Berlin,
New Dehli and Mexico. On and on they came, their coordinates
unpredictable so that the taxonomists finally threw up their
instruments in dismay after attempting unsuccessfully to
correlate the dissatisfactions with private enterprise, or
the Vietnam War, or racism, or clitoral orgasm, which I
suppose is a comprehensive list of the major concerns of
that decade.

If I may say so, the despair whose existence we cannot
dispute did not greatly surprise social observers whose
Richter scales are less easily ruffled than the New York
Times. Christopher Dawson and David Riesman, a historian
and a sociologist, had for instance long been aware among others of the phenomenon of anomie—the great fault in human nature, which like the geophysical faults that cause elemental disturbances beneath the surface of the earth or cause deracinated man to shudder with fright and loneliness and despair. But men are disposed even as they exercise their freedom, implicitly to reject the uses of it, to inquire into the true cause of their discontent, are disposed indeed to talk disdainfully about those human institutions which are arranged to give them as individuals the greatest scope. The restlessness continues, and meanwhile, it is unfashionable—I intended to say unprofitable—to adduce in defense of economic freedom the utilitarian argument that led Dr. Johnson to remark that "man is seldom so innocently engaged as when in pursuit of profit," though I pause to pay that argument historical deference and confess to being more shaken by the extra-economic suggestion that the free market place introduces mutual aggressiveness. Surely that is the climatic effrontery—the notion that it is an act of aggression to lay before the individual a choice, whether of canned soups or economic textbooks. By that token, it is an act of aggression to write another song or paint a canvas or set down a verse or write another judicial opinion on the grounds that by doing so one muscles into territory already spoken for.

We arrive, I think, at the complaint that underlies the ever phenomenal complaints that scatter away on contact
with orderly thought. It is, of course, three, a philosophical complaint more than an economic one; namely, that man has become the tool of his tools ceasing to be an end and a value in himself. Paradoxically, there is a correlation between our advance toward individual anonymity and our advance towards the kind of statism beloved of such as my friend, John Kenneth Galbraith. The complaint of those who worry about the gradual disappearance of the individual as the center of civilized concern is made without reference to the causes of the blight. The causes are many and complicated, and it may be that we will end up dumbly acquiescing in Professor Oakeshott's haunting historical insight that we are individuals marquee—that the burden of freedom proved over the centuries to be too great, but meanwhile, the battery on the individual intensifies and wears us down. Its success is partly the result of internal fatigue—partly the result of external fright. Our defenses have grown weak as individuals and our fortiori as a nation.

It was ten years ago that I heard a most devastating analysis touching on the quick of the problem by a stylish young skeptic who put it this way: "Once upon a time, it was worth dying for two reasons. The first was that heroism was rewarded in another world, and the second was that heroism was rewarded in the memory of man." But now," he said,"now that we know, from the scientific evidence that there is, in fact, no other world, no future world, no Christian heaven, and now that we have invented weapons which are
capable of destroying all of mankind and therefore all of human memory along with it, what is the reason left for heroism, for war, for the risk of war?" The vector of our thought becomes clearer. The sharp edges of the argument nowadays stress, not so much the nuclear war that would abolish mankind, as the senselessness of any war. The senselessness even of a threat of war, indeed derivatively the senselessness of a convincing army, navy, and air force tools of tools of tools—Why? What is the justifying point of an armed service? It used to be that finding oneself in such a corner that one had merely to reach into one's arsenal and pull out the arrow that has freedom written on it, touch it down on the skeptic, and he would waste away like the witch come in contact with water. You will have noticed it does not work anymore. Our freedom is increasingly understood as a condition discernible only by subjective analysis.

Professor Ross Terrill of Harvard, author of the two most influential articles that have appeared in our time on the subject of Red China, is to be sharply distinguished from the famous apologists for Stalin's Russia who made their way by simply denying the crimes imputed to Stalin—Professor Terrill denies nothing, apart from the form of atrocities which he ignores. He does not disguise the condition of life in China today, not for a minute. After informing us that in China there is no freedom to practice religion, nor
to vote, nor to express oneself, nor to read books or periodicals one desires to read, nor to change one's job, nor to travel to another city, or another region or another country, he notes ingenuously—people ask me "Is China free?" He answers with great difficulty. "Depends on what you mean by freedom," he says. "Freedom is always defined with reference to the limitation of the relevant entity. And whereas the operative entity in the West is the individual, the corporation, or the labor union, in China it happens to be the whole state." And he illustrates: "Consider the writer Kuo Mo-jo, in the 30's," he explains,"Kuo Mo-jo wrote books for a mere four or five, or at most eight thousand people, but now—now he is required by the new state to write books that will appeal to twenty, thirty or fifty million people." "Is that wrong?" the Harvard Professor asks?

Then there is the researcher at Peking University, another illustration, whose affinity was for abstract science, but who was recently directed to concentrate exclusively on pest control. Is that wrong?—Terrill asks anathorically, and we begin—I think—to understand the quality of the ideological egalitarianism that rushes in after practical diplomacy. Such that Richard Nixon who went to China to establish a dialogue with Mao Tse-Tung, ends by likening Mao's revolution to America's revolution—ends by proclaiming that we will have a long march together as if to say that Mao, too, is entitled to his Villa Bella
Rosa. Why should we not ecumenically share our own with him—where is that a conferree? And there is Mr. Nixon seated next to Madam Mao Tse-Tung watching, resignedly, ballet become agitprop, a violation of art as well as of manners. It was as if we had invited the presidents of the Black African republics to the White House to show them a ballet on the theme of "Little Black Sambo." And Mr. Nixon, returning to the United States, proclaiming at Andrews Air Force Base, the great enthusiasm the Chinese people feel for their government—which are the tools? Indeed the Chinese have done much to illustrate ways of generating enthusiasm for their government; and, no doubt, Mr. Nixon is professionally fascinated by them. But we see through him, the movement of Western opinion. What really is so bad about Red China? Their ways are not our ways, to be sure, but is it seriously proposed that we should be prepared to die if necessary in order to avoid living by their word rather than by our own—which is, in any case, corrupt, racist, decadent, and above all materialist? The search for a revolution that restores meaning to the individual is up against the most conspicuous revolutions of this century, whose exterpativse passion, however, was to eliminate the individual. Yet in today's climate, set as it is by the revolutionary left, metaphysical defenses of man are somehow just a little embarrassingly irrelevant. Even Whittaker Chambers, the ardent counter-revolutionist, would
make gentle scorn of the inflexible defenders of the individual. For instance, he commented about the late Frank Meyer, whose implacable book which he called "In Defense of Freedom," was current when the Republicans suffered their great congressional defeat of 1958: "If the Republican Party does not find a way to appeal to the mass of the people," Chambers wrote me at the time, "it will find itself voted into singularity. It will become then something like the little shop you see in the crowded parts of great cities in which no business is done or expected. You enter it and find an old man in the rear fingering, for his own pleasure, oddments of cloth—caring not at all if he sells any. As your eyes become accustomed to the gas light, you are only faintly surprised to discover that the old man is Frank Meyer."

I submit to the critics of American society that if they are concerned about the restoration of the individual, they should begin by focusing on him. Focusing on those oddments of cloth, by familiarity with which a few men know to hesitate not at all when someone asks the question, "Is it wrong for the State to tell the writer what to write?" "Is it wrong for the State to tell the scientist what to study?" Those few who don't hesitate for a moment to answer, "Yes, it is wrong; it was always wrong; it is now wrong; will forever be wrong." The old man with the oddment of cloth is fingering some of the great truths that permit us to penetrate the anfractuosities by which we are somehow
persuaded that we serve the individual by moving against the principle institution through which the individual exercises what freedom of movement our modern architects have left him with. Or that we can make a profitable beginning by renouncing the religion which tells us in the words of Ecclesiastes --that God has made man upright, but quickly adds, as if anticipating such mutilations as Mr. Galbraith's price controls--but they have sought out many inventions. The whole subject is strangely, quietly saddening. As we meet in America, so often for the purpose of deploring the free market, in Russia the people go to the black market and pay their eighty rubles, a month's wages, for a novel by Solzhenitsyn. And there in Russia, whose rulers denounced the market place fifty years ago with a blaze of trumpets and a reign of bullets aimed righteously at the temples of teenage girls and a hemophiliac boy in the cellar at Achenterinberg. There, in Russia, fifty years after the advent of socialism, there are old men and young women who transcribe by hand--not for profit--from radio Liberty--risking prison by the very act of listening to it--the latest novel by Solzhenitsyn, word after word, sentence after sentence. A process that takes them months to complete, resulting not in thousands let alone millions of copies, but in a few dozen, or perhaps a few hundred--the oddments of cloth--it is worth it if we are to rescue man from the tools of ideology; worth everything to preserve those oddments--to make them available to those who are graced with
a thirst for them. The books of Solzhenitsyn accumulate, even as the introspective disdain with the institutions of freedom perversely accumulates. For an understanding of which paradox we find no help in Marx, but considerable help in Jesus whose servant, Paul, observed that though the outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day. My prayers are with you, of course; and, of course, the nation's hope is in you.
APPENDIX E

CAMBRIDGE DEBATE—BUCKLEY VS. GALBRAITH

"The Market Place is a Snare and a Delusion"
William F. Buckley--Opposition to the Motion
November, 1971
(Transcribed from Tape Recording)

Thank you, Mr. President, Miss Hewlett, Mr. Riddle, Mr. Galbraith, ladies and gentlemen. I am very happy to be here again. I have to confess that my being here is not necessarily a tribute to my intelligence. The last time I was here, before I opened my mouth, the gentleman who was opposing the resolution received a standing ovation. And that was before he opened his mouth. It seemed to me then that the Cambridge Union was trying to tell me something. So here I am back to defend the unfashionable notion that there is some virtue left in the free market place. And to do so, moreover, under circumstances which have, if I may say so, underwritten this incapacity of mine. Mr. Galbraith makes reference to my having been appointed, which is true—I was—to a small commission of the United States Information Advisory Commission. And it is true that when Mr. Nixon appointed me to that post—by the way, the law requires that not more than three members be of the same party, so he had
also to appoint two Democrats—I thought to accept primarily because it seemed to me obvious that I would be blocked by Senator Fulbright, a distinction for which I confess I yearned. I was greatly disappointed, and in due course confirmed and received, as one does—Mr. Galbraith would tell you having received several of them in the course of his long and memorable career—what they call a commission. A commission is a piece of paper on which appears the script and four blank spaces: one for your name, one for the position to which you have been appointed, a third for the duration of your appointment, and a fourth begins with the printed words IN RECOGNITION OF:_____________. In my blank space was written: "his integrity and ability." I thought it very nice that Mr. Nixon knew about my integrity and ability, Mr. President; but in due course, I started to wonder what was the inventory of adjectives from which those two had been plucked. The lawyers say "numero unius exclusio alterius" and in due course I became restive about this. And then a few months later in Saigon talking with Mr. Bunker, he was called out, and I saw his commission hanging on the wall and I rushed over to see what was written in his blank space. IN RECOGNITION OF "his ability, integrity, and prudence." "In prudence," I suppose helps when one moves against the Zeitgeist in recognition of the surviving virtues of the free market place.

Mr. Galbraith, is, as you know, a great tease. I've known him for many years— I cherish his friendship. The
first time we met—not exactly the first time we met—but the first time we engaged in any corporate enterprise was on the ski slopes in Grestaad. He asked me to ski with him one day about five or six years ago and I did so. After seeing him come down a rather gentle slope with considerable difficulty, I wondered what would be the appropriate way to comment on the way he had negotiated that slope given his venerability, his senority in all matters, intellectual and moral. So I said, "Ken, how long have you been skiing?" Hoping that he would say, "I just began yesterday." And he said "thirty years." I said, "Oh, that's as long as you've been studying economics, isn't it?" I have been a close student of his mind and his work ever since, and I certainly hope that the rest of you will do so. Certainly that would be a justification of the market place. But in any event, I have found in him certain altogether endearing habits of mind. He is very self-assured. He is quite certain that which he understands to be for the benefit of mankind is for the benefit of mankind. His views are always available to the least supplicant. In America, we have AP, UP, Roiters, and Galbraith. He is always here to tell us exactly what to do under any circumstances, however pinched. He also seems to proceed on the assumption--have you noticed?--that executive power is everything. Mr. Nixon has been elected president of the United States. I and the editors of the National Review supported Mr. Nixon; ergo shouldn't
it follow that Mr. Nixon should have succeeded in disman­
tling those socialist accretions of which we disapprove.
It did not occur to Mr. Galbraith to mention in the course
of asking you to mediate on this anomaly that the Senate
of the United States is dominated by the Democratic Party.
It did not occur to him, presumably, to remind you that it
is the House of Representatives and the Senate of the United
States that passes laws and not the President of the United
States. And this is not necessarily because Mr. Galbraith
is disingenuous and does not want to pass on to you the
elementary facts of American constitutional government. It
is because of his sort of, if I may say so, autocratic
turn of mind. He's never quite understood things like
Haldenhost or faculties or, if I may say so, even voters.
I'm a great admirer of his diaries that he wrote while he
was ambassador to India, and I congratulate him with the
candor with which he presented them to the listening--to
the reading public. The diaries are full of engrossing
entries; and, if I may say so, I think many of them are
far more illuminating on the question of the market place
than anything which he has written in the arid prose in­
tended for economic specialists. For instance, there was
that entry sometime in 1962 when he came back from India
and he said, "I have been in Washington one week, and I ate
in the White House three times." "There is nothing," he
went on "quite to match the feeling of being 'in.'" And
of course there is nothing quite like matching the experience of being "in."

If I were plenipotentiary, I'm sure I would be willing to do without the free market place. What would be the need of the free market place if I could make all the decisions, Mr. President? Surely it would not occur to Mr. Galbraith that they would be necessary to the survival of the mechanism of an organization that might come to conclusions contrary to his own. So I say, Mr. Galbraith does this rather innocently, and I don't think it would be right at all for anybody to encourage the suspicion that he harbors within him any totalitarian instincts. I am sure he believes that dissent has its place, properly situated and properly modulated. But, there is one thing about the free market place that he has never been able to understand, and that is that it is a mechanism by which people can come to conclusions different from his own. Not necessarily conclusions that you favor or conclusions that I favor.

Professor George Stigler, a man, if I may say so, of very considerable immence in the economic world, and I do hope and pray that those of you who study economics have heard of him, says that he greatly deplores the findings of the market place. He greatly deplores, for instance, the fact that one needs to subsidize symphony orchestras rather than that they should simply continue successfully as a result of public patronage. He greatly deplores the fact that most Americans believe that after you get your B.A.
degree you don't have to read another work of non-fiction, with the exception of Mr. Galbraith's works; and he goes on to say he greatly deplores that more people have, in fact, read *The Affluent Society* than have read *The Wealth of Nations*, but he is not about to reorder the market place system in order to turn it away from readers of Mr. Galbraith's works to readers of Adam Smith's works or even in the sublimer cause of requiring people to listen to symphony orchestras.

It is a complicated question in my judgement, ladies and gentlemen, because it does get mixed up, I think, with basic problems of epistemology. As I understand it, Mr. Galbraith's thesis is very simply this: namely, that the majority of the decisions that are made in America today in the economic world are made by, what he calls, the techno-structure. People who, in fact, are so totally in control of the economic situation that they can, in fact, predict that you will buy their product; and under the circumstances, it is nothing more than mystification to suggest that anything of the free market place remains. In his earlier book, he seemed to be saying something rather different. He seemed to be saying that there was this strong, oligarch-politic industrial management group which, however, had to face up to certain countervailing pressures that came in from government, that came in from labor unions. But now that has changed. Now somehow the latter two have been subsumed by it and the techno-structure is completely in command. What are the characteristics of that techno-
structure—survival, prosperity, security? He published this book in 1967 persuading everybody that finally expertise within principle American industries, taking into account the military-industrial complex, taking into account the wiles of advertising, made it absolutely predictable that all of us would forever oblige these firms in essential economic decisions. At the time he wrote, Raytheon was selling for $58, and now it is selling for $22. Sanders, a paint tack especially for the services of the government of the United States, was selling for $77, now selling for $13. General Dynamics, that giant, was selling for $67, now $21. Collins Radio, $400 million a year, certainly in the taxonomy of Mr. Galbraith, a splendid example of the inperturbability of the techno-structure, undamageable by the market place, selling then for $115, now you can get it for $15. Boeing—Boeing, $113, it was selling for the day Mr. Galbraith's book hit the streets—selling for $13 today.

Now it seems to me that Mr. Galbraith, who has profound instincts for self-preservation, tends to maneuver out of the way of his own theses when they become especially damaging, and thus it was that when Professor Gordon, of Indiana University, said to him that, in effect, he has proclaimed that the market place is a snare and a delusion—what it is that we are arguing here tonight—all of a sudden Mr. Galbraith said exactly the contrary of what you have heard him say here tonight. Remember, he said the market
place is a snare and a delusion. He didn't say those who believe that the market place will usher in the Kingdom of God believe in a snare and a delusion. He said the market place is a snare and a delusion. When he was accosted with some analysis by a colleague, he turned around in his reply and said with rather rare and commendable docility, "I have never suggested that the revised sequence,"--that is what he calls the non-market mechanism, the revised sequence,--he's given to these antique formulations--"has replaced the accepted sequence,"--he means the market--"outside the industrial system, beyond the limits of the large corporations the market mechanism still rules. Within the industrial system, it is of diminished importance in relation to the non-market mechanism. Here too, the consumer can still reject persuasion and, in consequence, through the market, he and his follows can force accommodation by the producer."

In other words, Mr. Galbraith has said a) the market does work--outside the techno-structure, and b) it continues to work to a certain extent within the techno-structure. He can actually succeed in rejecting the imperatives of the techno-structure.

Mr. Heilbroner has, seems to me, having absorbed the work of Mr. Galbraith, having absorbed and studied deeply the British experience in particular the last few years, in an essay on the future of socialism--he is, himself, Mr. Chairman, a socialist--writes a few weeks ago, "thus the debate on socialist planning has come to a
curious conclusion. If the theoretical dispute has been settled in favor of socialism, the practical question seems to have gone the other way. The giant corporations of capitalism have outperformed the lumbering ministeries of production at every hand. It has brought about a belated move in every advanced socialist nation in the direction urged by Oscar Lange, a colleague of Mr. Galbraith's at Harvard, away from centralization toward decentralized planning and, in particular, away from the directives of the monolithic central planning board towards the autonomy and flexibility of the market-based system." I submit, Mr. President, that what we are face to face here tonight is this . . . . Miss Hewlett (interrupts)

"Thank you very much, Mr. Buckley, for that nice introduction--I was just about to point out that you are quite right in saying the proponents of the market have no interest in making public enterprise succeed. This is quite clearly shown in the American society by subjecting the customers to expensive delays in delivering their stock and by arousing apprehension as to whether, in fact, any particular transaction would be accomplished. Various brokerage houses have recently engendered that about capitalism even to resistant minds so that they will switch, but this simply proves that the techno-structure, under the argument you are supporting, is merely inefficient in expecting the public to accept its basic inefficiencies. You are not proving that it does exist."
Mr. President—I think that is the most cogent argument advanced on the other side throughout the evening. I wish if I may, in the few minutes—in the few minutes that remain.

"Mr. Buckley, is it true that you took results in the stock market to prove your argument because you failed to prove your argument in all other markets?"

Madam, I don't know what markets you patronize. Mr. Chairman, what I'm attempting to say is that, in my judgment and in the judgment of Mr. Davidson and Mr. Evans, we are moving precisely towards an epoch in history where it becomes all the more important to preserve such leverage as the individual can conceivably exercise. Professor Means of Price College here in Cambridge, commenting on Mr. Galbraith's book, points out the fact that precisely the use of computer technology invites the possibility that the individual choice will be received and that it will be transmitted through the vaguaries of economic complexities even more sharply than it was in highly fundamentalist economic situations. He points out, as for instance, as Mr. Merris pointed out, that there is no reason to suppose that those people who manage the techno-structure would be less sensitive than the actual stockholders to any abrupt decline in the profits of a particular corporation. And Mr. Gordon points out, and others who have studied the work of Mr. Galbraith, that it is, in the words of Professor Solow of MIT, "drivel" to suggest that the socialist
countries in East Europe have done anything less than discover in the market place some means through which to reintroduce into the idealistic lunacies some element of practicality, the purpose of which is, I remind you, to help human beings. Mr. Heilbroner, who has for so many years, been so ardent an advocate of socialism now says, of course, socialism continues to have a triumphant responsibility; and that triumphant responsibility is to use its political power to reintroduce the market place. Indeed that would be ironic if that were, in fact, what the socialists of the world were now to unite in order to do to redress some of the errors they have made.

Let me say this, and say this without any attempt to dissimulate. I do believe that the principle reason why the market place got this reputation that causes people to sneer at its mere mention is because, in the excitement of nineteenth century rationalism, it was taken primarily to have metaphorical meaning. It became a process of epistemology. As it was suggested by Mr. Evans, it was through the market place that we were going to come to eudaemonia. It was through the market place that we were going to come through Democracy to Paradise. It was, as Professor Oakeshott has described the situation, the rationalist making politics as the crow flies. And, under the circumstances, we expected that the market place would give us a situation which was in every respect constantly an improvement over the predecessor situation. Not merely
in economics, but also in philosophy, also in culture, also in architecture. "The best test of truth," said Oliver Wendell Holmes, "is its ability to be accepted in the market place." This is the basic axiom of the religion, and I use the word decisively, of logical positivism. "I have no reason to suppose that champagne is preferable to ditch water," said Holmes, "I have reason to suppose it, but there is no way to prove that the cosmos does." But precisely that invitation to relativism gave the market place its bad name.

Those who believe that the market place is the best friend of individual people making individual decisions, very trivial decisions by the cosmic standards that we approach here today, but decisions that mean a great deal to them,—those who believe that the market place ought to be overturned because it has not given us Paradise, are in fact criticizing people who have said about the market place that it would give us Paradise. Mr. Davidson doesn't believe it will, neither does Mr. Evans, neither do I. All I say is that in a world increasingly complicated, increasingly overridden by bureaucrats, increasingly dominated by the military, we must watch always to preserve those little mechanisms that are left over to us that are not subject to political manipulation. Ilya Ehrenburg, that great Communist hack who served out his life for Joseph Stalin, nevertheless found himself shaking through in his novel, *The Fall*; and he wrote that incandescent sentence--
"Someday," he said, "when the whole of the world is cemented over, a blade of grass will grow, and it will cause a crack in that pavement and through that crack, freedom will be restored." It is surely our obligation to encourage any step whatsoever that will preserve to the individual whatever little leverage we have left to determine on our own behalf what we desire to do, whom we desire to serve, and in which way.
PLAYBOY: It's already a cliché to say that the sixties were a remarkable decade. Looking back, what event or development stands out in your mind as most important?

BUCKLEY: The philosophical acceptance of coexistence by the West.

PLAYBOY: Why "philosophical"?

BUCKLEY: Because a military acceptance of coexistence is one thing; that I understand. But since America is, for good reasons and bad, a moralistic power, the philosophical acceptance of coexistence ends us up in hot pursuit of reasons for that acceptance. We continue to find excuses for being cordial to the Soviet Union; our denunciations of that country's periodic barbarisms—as in Czechoslovakia—become purely perfunctory. This is a callous experience; it is a lesion of our moral conscience, the historical effects of which cannot be calculated, but they will be bad.

PLAYBOY: Among the reasons cited for a détente with the Soviet Union is the fact that the money spent on continuing hot and cold wars with the Communist bloc would be better spent for domestic programs. With the $150 billion we've spent in Vietnam since 1965, according to some estimates, we could have eliminated pollution throughout the country and rebuilt twenty-four major cities into what New York's Mayor Lindsay has said would be "paradises." Do you think our priorities are out of order?

BUCKLEY: When I find myself entertaining that possibility, I dismiss my thinking as puerile. But first let
me register my objection to your figures: It's superficial to say that the Vietnam war has cost us $150 billion. It has cost us X dollars in excess of what we would have spent on military or paramilitary enterprises even if there had been no war. That sum I have seen estimated at between $18 and $22 billion a year. Now, suppose I were to tell you that if Kerenski had prevailed in Russia in 1917, we would at this point have a budget excess sufficient to create the city of Oz in Harlem and everywhere else. The correct response to such a statement, for grown-ups, is twofold. First, we are not—unfortunately—in a position to dictate the activity of the enemy; we cannot ask him please to let down because we need money for Harlem. Second, there are no grounds for assuming that the American people would have consented to spending the kind of money we're spending on the Vietnam war for general welfare projects. They might have said, "No, we'd rather keep the money and do what we want with it." I suspect they would have said just that and with justification: The bulk of the progress that has been made in America has been made by the private sector.

PLAYBOY: With reference to the first part of your answer: At the strategic-arms-limitations talks, aren't we actually asking the Russians to let down their guard if we let ours down?

BUCKLEY: Yes, we are. And, ideally, there would be massive, universal disarmament. But we don't live in an ideal world. The fact is that the Soviet Union is prepared to make remarkable sacrifices at home in order to maintain its military muscle abroad. It is prepared to do so in a world that has seen the United States pull out from dozens of opportunities to imperialize. We have walked out of twenty-one countries—I think that's the accepted figure—that we've occupied in the past thirty years. The Soviet Union has walked only out of Austria, for very complicated reasons. Under the circumstances, one must assume that the arrant armament expenditures by the Soviet Union—for instance, $20 billion to develop its ABM system and its MIRV's—have to do with the attraction of a first-strike capability. There is only one known explanation, for instance, for the known "footprint"—the configuration—of the MIRV's the Soviet Union has been practicing with. Those missiles are exactly patterned after our Minuteman installations. If the Soviets intended their MIRV's only as a deterrent to an American first strike, they would aim
those missiles at American cities. But they aren't being fashioned that way. Now, I don't think the collective leadership of Russia would dream of making a first strike for so long as we are in a position to inflict insupportable damage in a second strike, whatever the urgings of their Dr. Strangeloves, who are not without influence. But, manifestly, America is not preparing for a first strike. If we were, we would be aiming our weapons not at Russia's population centers but at her military installations—and we're not.

PLAYBOY: The best information available—from hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at which Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard appeared—is that we are well ahead of the Soviet Union in the development of MIRV's, and it's generally conceded that we conceived the system. Doesn't this suggest both that the threat posed by the Russian MIRV's is less than you imply and that their MIRV's may have been developed as a defense against ours?

BUCKLEY: The question of who conceived the system is immaterial. Who makes it operational is what matters. It is only a happy coincidence that Jules Verne was a non-Communist. On the question of whose MIRV's are more advanced, a) your information is, unhappily, incorrect and b) it is irrelevant to the question of whether MIRV's are designed for offensive or defensive purposes.

PLAYBOY: MIT professor Leo Sartori, writing in the Saturday Review, implies that some of our ICBM's are aimed at Russia's missiles rather than at her cities. Doesn't this indicate that the U.S. is prepared—to the point of overkill—for a massive first strike against the Soviet Union?

BUCKLEY: Look. The intellectual, attempting to evaluate the military situation, tends to fasten on a frozen position. He says, "Assuming apocalypse were tomorrow, how would the two sides stand?" But it is the responsibility of the military to understand how military confrontations actually work—which means that you cannot prepare for Tuesday by being absolutely prepared for Monday. In a world in which it takes between four and eight years to develop what is actually intended as a first-strike defensive system, you may, in the course of preparing for that system, find yourself with a first-strike superiority. A caricature of what I'm talking about is the sudden apprehension by Darryl Zanuck when he was filming The Longest Day—on the
Normandy invasion—that he actually found himself in command of the third largest military force in the world. Presumably, he would not have used it even to attack Otto Preminger. You need to ask yourself the subjective question: Do I know people in the United States whose hands are on the trigger, who are actually conspiring to opportunistically exploit the temporary military advantage? It seems plain to me that the recent history of the United States ought to be sufficient to appease the doubts of the doubters. In fact, we have had such superiority even at moments when the enemy was at its most provocative—and yet we haven't used it.

PLAYBOY: Hasn't it been authoritatively asserted that U.S. superiority is overwhelmingly beyond the defensive or offensive necessity of any conceivable threat from another nuclear power?

BUCKLEY: That's a military judgment and I don't feel qualified to pronounce about it. I feel confident only to make an elementary philosophical point. I tend to believe that what the lawyers call "an excess of caution" is not something we should penalize the military for. I want an excess of caution, because I understand a mistake in that direction to be apocalyptic in its consequences. Now, if you say, "I can establish that we are spending money to develop a redundant weapon," my answer is: Go ahead and establish it. Meanwhile, I would rather side with the cautious, the prudent people. And here I find myself wondering how it is that Robert McNamara—who, for some reason, tends to be rather beloved by the liberals—how come he didn't object to the technological-military evolution that nowadays strikes so many people as untoward. And, again, why have we so drastically reversed our attitudes concerning what was for so long considered the liberal thing to do? During the fifties, the great accent was on defense. The military-industrial complex—as you know—used to be called the "Arsenal of Democracy." Now, all of a sudden, when you talk about ABM's the same people who encouraged us to spend $50 billion—you, $50 billion on defense during the fifties object to spending an extra $5 billion on defense in the sixties.

PLAYBOY: You seem to delight in reminding people that liberals are capable of changing their minds in the light of changing circumstances. Why?
BUCKLEY: Quite apart from the fact that delightful pursuits are delightful, it is important for any ideological grouping to confront historical experience. For one thing, it makes the ideologists less arrogant; or it should. That ought to be a national objective, after we eliminate poverty.

PLAYBOY: Ten years ago, wasn't there more reason than there is now to believe that the Russians wanted to bury us, militarily as well as ideologically?

BUCKLEY: That is an exercise in ideological self-indulgence. How do you account for the anomalies? Such as the crash program the Soviet Union has developed in ABM's and MIRV's.

PLAYBOY: One can only repeat that the U.S. is developing these systems as furiously as Russia is; and many observers feel that the Soviets have, therefore, just as much reason to suspect our intentions as we do theirs. But we'd like to return to your observation that the United States has walked out of twenty-one countries in the past thirty years and ask this: Doesn't the fact that we've also walked into Vietnam and Santo Domingo, tried to walk into Cuba at the Bay of Pigs and attempted to control many other countries through quasi-military, CIA-type operations leave us open to the charge of imperialism you impute to the U.S.S.R.?

BUCKLEY: Of course, but we are always at the mercy of the naive. Imperialism suggests the domination of a country for the commercial or glorious benefit of oneself. The Soviet Union began its experience in imperialism not merely by jailing and executing people who disagreed with it but by systematic despoliation. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, they took one, two, three billion dollars' worth of capital goods and removed them physically to the Soviet Union. Far from doing anything of the sort, we did exactly the contrary: we sent our own capital goods to places like France and England and Spain and Latin America. I can't think of any country that we've "dominated" or "imperialized" —in the sense in which you use those words— that is worse off as a result of its experience with America than it would have been had we not entered into a temporary relationship with it.

PLAYBOY: One could argue that South Vietnam is such a country.
BUCKLEY: South Vietnam? My God! Above all, not South Vietnam. Not unless one is willing to say that South Vietnam would be better off satellized by North Vietnam—and derivatively by Asian communism—and consigned to perpetual tyranny. Put it this way: I will assent to the proposition that South Vietnam has been harmed by America's efforts during the past five years only to somebody who would say that France was harmed by the efforts of the Allied armies to liberate it during the Second World War.

PLAYBOY: We won't say that, but we will agree with the increasingly popular opinion that our adventure there has been a disaster—to us, as well as to South and North Vietnam—from the beginning. Yet you said recently that "the indices in Vietnam are good," which is something even McNamara and Westmoreland stopped saying three years ago. Why?

BUCKLEY: Because the indices are good, right down the line: First, there is the prestige of Thieu and our increased identification with him. A week or so after the 1968 Tet offensive, Professor J. Kenneth Galbraith gave it as the conventional wisdom that Thieu's government would fall within a matter of weeks. I predict that in the next election, he will get a significantly greater vote than he got the last time. Second, there is a lower rate of infiltration from the North. Third, the area controlled by the good guys is now much greater than it has ever been. The fourth positive index is the introduction in South Vietnam of a nonregular army, the equivalent of a militia, which makes it possible for people simultaneously to till their land during the day and yet be part of a large constabulary. Still another indication is the relative rise in South Vietnamese casualties and decrease in American casualties, which shows that they are beginning to shoulder even more of the human burden of the war.

PLAYBOY: How do you feel about Thieu's suppression of dissent among his political opposition—even moderate Catholics and Buddhists who have done nothing more subversive than suggest consideration of a postwar coalition government?

BUCKLEY: I am not in a position to judge whether Thieu suppresses more or fewer people than he should suppress in order to achieve his goals. I know that my own countrymen were prepared to take tens of
thousands of innocent Japanese and threw them in jail during World War II. And I know that moral-political revulsion over that act didn't come until years later—when we recognized that what we had done to the nisei was, in fact, historically unnecessary. But it remains that a man who was tempered by four centuries of parliamentary experience—Franklin D. Roosevelt—thought it an altogether appropriate thing to do. I am not, under the circumstances, confident that I can authoritatively advise Thieu what is the right kind of suppression to engage in during a civil war.

PLAYBOY: Then it is a civil war and not a case of Communist expansionism exported from Russia and China?

BUCKLEY: Yes, it is a civil war, provided one is prepared to define any war as a civil war if one finds a significant number of collaborationists within the indigenous population. There are South Vietnamese Communists, even as there were Norwegian quislings, Northern Copperheads and French appeasers. General Petain was sentenced to death for obliging the Nazis less effusively than the Viet Cong have done the northern imperialists. If the "civil" insurrection in Vietnam had depended on its own resources, it would have lasted about as long as the insurrection of the Huks in the Philippines.

PLAYBOY: You frequently use the fact that Thieu has fired twelve hundred civil servants to demonstrate what you consider his opposition to corruption. But weren't many of those firings really intended to get rid of his political opponents?

BUCKLEY: I didn't think to ask Thieu when I was over there. I assume it is because they were corrupt—at least the ones I'm talking about. I don't know how many he has fired for opposing his policies. I don't know how many officials Lyndon Johnson fired because they opposed his policies, or exactly how many F.D.R. did—plenty, I assume. Incidentally, I thought John Roche made a rather good point when he said that the critics of Thieu fail to account for the fact that he moves about without any difficulty at all—without bodyguards or any other protection—throughout South Vietnam. And they fail to point out that he has done something no tyrant ever does, which is to arm the citizenry. The very first thing he did, when he became president, was to ask Westmoreland to increase the arming of the people. In Cuba, if you're caught with an unlicensed rifle, you're liable to be executed.
PLAYBOY: Your satisfaction with the relative rise in South Vietnamese casualties indicates that you believe in Vietnamization. If, as Presidents Johnson and Nixon have claimed, we have a moral and legal commitment to defend the South Vietnamese, why are we now disengaging?

BUCKLEY: We're not disengaging. We have a moral and legal commitment to give aid to the South Vietnamese in resisting aggression, pursuant to the protocol that extended the SEATO treaty to that area. We did not specify in SEATO the nature of the aid we would give. It is Nixon's strategy to arrive at a realistic formula: indigenous manpower and external material aid, precisely the way the Soviet Union and China have been handling the situation in behalf of North Vietnam. I advocated such a formula five years ago. Allowing for the culture lag, it is time for its adoption.

PLAYBOY: Do you feel it was wrong, then, to send our troops in the first place?

BUCKLEY: No, we had to. The South Vietnamese were not prepared to defend themselves.

PLAYBOY: In other words, though it was right to send them in when we did, it's right to withdraw them now. Are you saying that everything we've done there has been correct?

BUCKLEY: Not at all—there are plenty of things we've done wrong. We shouldn't have stopped the bombing of the North and put the restrictions on it that we did. And, above all, I continue to believe that Japan is the key to that part of the world and that we may very well wish, before this decade is up, that she had the defensive nuclear weapons the non-proliferation treaty denies her.

PLAYBOY: Do you think that if America remains steadfast in Vietnam—with or without the support of our allies in Asia or Western Europe—the Communists will be less likely to test our commitments elsewhere in the world?

BUCKLEY: It's hard to say. In order to answer that question, you have to ask yourself: What is the point of view of the enemy? I have always maintained that the Soviet Union has been delighted over our experience in South Vietnam. It has cost them very little. But, at the same time, the Soviet Union has to reckon with the psychological realities. The psychological realities in the case of Vietnam are that America isn't prepared to do this sort of thing two or three times a decade. We did
it in Korea and we're doing it in South Vietnam. If the Soviet Union decides to mount a challenge—let's say in the Mideast—it will probably have to reckon with the fact of a shortened American temper. The shortened American temper could result in one of two things. It could result in isolationism, which would please the Soviet Union dearly and encourage it; or that shortened American temper could result in our saying, "Since we cannot afford protracted, graduated South Vietnam-type resistances, we're going to go back to another kind of resistance. We're going to knock the hell out of you."

PLAYBOY: Do you think that bellicose attitude will develop—and can you imagine it resulting in a nuclear strike by the U.S., say, over Berlin or in the Mideast?

BUCKLEY: Only if the Soviet Union is capable of a miscalculation on an order that is unimaginable, on the basis of our historical experience with a society that on the one hand is ideologically rabid but on the other appears to have a positively Rotarian instinct for survival.

PLAYBOY: Critics of the war point to the alleged massacre at My Lai to prove our indifference to the lives of Vietnamese civilians. How do you react to that incident, as it has emerged in the press?

BUCKLEY: If, indeed, there were no extenuating circumstances in the case—if everything that Captain Medina has said is proved wrong, for instance—then either we have a case of collective hysteria or we face the appalling alternative that what happened there expresses a trend within America. I find it extremely difficult to indulge that conclusion, for the reason that if it were so, we would have had many more such incidents.

PLAYBOY: In January, 1967, ten Marines were court-martialed on charges resulting from the murders of a farmer, his mother, his sister, his three-year-old son and five-year-old niece and the gang-rape of his wife. From the beginning of 1966 through October, 1969, twenty-seven soldiers were convicted by U.S. courts-martial of murdering Vietnamese civilians; and since March, 1965, twenty-one sailors and Marines have been so convicted. The speculation is that most such crimes by U.S. military personnel
against civilians in Vietnam go unreported. So it would seem that there have been many other such incidents, though perhaps on a smaller scale.

BUCKLEY: They are either so routine as to go unremarked—like say, the incremental murder in Manhattan—or so spectacular as to be unbelievable. It took the most extraordinary coordination of ineptitudes to fail to bring the My Lai incident to light. Here we have a Pulitzer Prize-winning story—I predict that it will get the Pulitzer Prize—and yet the two newspaper people who had the story couldn't interest anybody in it for months. Editors wouldn't buy it precisely because they couldn't believe that kind of thing could have been committed on such a scale.

PLAYBOY: Do you think there should be or will be extensive war-crimes trials of American servicemen and policy makers, conducted either by the United Nations or by us?

BUCKLEY: No. There shouldn't be and there won't be. The whole Nuremberg Doctrine, I continue to believe, is an elaboration of the crime of losing wars. It was, for one thing obviously and intrinsically contaminated by the presence on the tribunal, in the capacity of judges, of the principal massacre-makers of the twentieth century, namely, the representatives of Stalin. America is not about to invite the United Nations to preside over trials of American soldiers. Those people who have been guilty will be punished, most of them, by America. I grant that we have a technical problem of how to reach out and get some of those individuals who apparently ought to be defendants, but my guess is we're going to crack that problem.

PLAYBOY: Do you see a moral difference between what is alleged to have happened at My Lai and the aerial bombardment of free-fire zones where, it's generally granted, some civilians almost always get killed?

BUCKLEY: Of course. It's a difference explicitly recognized in Thomistic doctrine, where the whole definition of a just war was arrived at. If, in order to achieve a military objective, someone gets killed, that is on one scale of morality—on the permissible scale of warfare. If, however, someone is killed simply for the sake of killing him, unrelated to any military objective, that's different.
Nobody would have thought twice about My Lai if there had been a machine-gun nest there and we had plastered the village from the air, resulting in an identical loss of life.

PLAYBOY: But, of course, there wasn't a machine-gun nest there. Most critics of the war put little trust in those who decide which villages and which other targets are legitimate military objectives. Do you?

BUCKLEY: I trust that somewhere along the line there is a constant monitoring of the criteria that are used by people who have that kind of authority. In the specific case of Lyndon Johnson, I am informed that only he personally could authorize the bombing of certain targets where considerable civilian carnage might have resulted. I believe that he took that kind of meticulous concern not merely out of political considerations but because he was always very sensitive to the notion that he was an indiscriminate killer.

Let me digress at this point: A few months ago, in Hawaii, a professor informed my audience that we had dropped one and a half times as many bombs on a very small area of Vietnam as were dropped on Germany throughout World War II. That statistic, he claimed, proves that we are committing genocide in Vietnam. I read the figures differently. It seems to me that if we have dropped that many bombs and killed as few people as we have--there are an awful lot of live Vietnamese left, no matter how you look at it--it must mean that an enormous effort is being made to drop bombs where people aren't.

PLAYBOY: According to official sources, several hundred thousand North and South Vietnamese civilians have been killed by American bombing raids. In view of those statistics, do you think the bombing has been justified?

BUCKLEY: It depends on whether there was an alternative, less bloody means of achieving the military objective. How many of those dead would be alive today if the North Vietnamese had desisted from infiltration as their principal technique? And if historical contexts interest you, bear in mind that we killed about as many German civilians in the course of a couple of raids over Dresden as we have killed Vietnamese in the five years in Vietnam.
PLAYBOY: For all our bombing—precise or indiscriminate—we have not yet won the war. Do you think North Vietnam could successfully have resisted the most powerful military nation on earth for this long if it didn't have the support of most Vietnamese, North and South?

BUCKLEY: There are both extensive and succinct ways to answer that. The succinct way is for me to ask you: Could Nazi Germany have triumphed over France without the overwhelming support of the French? My answer is—obviously—yes, Germany could, and did. The South Vietnamese situation is one in which the critical weapon was terror. I have great admiration for my countrymen, but I haven't the least idea whether or not we would have the stamina to resist an enemy that had strung up an equivalent number of our elite in the public squares. Roughly speaking, what the South Vietnamese suffered during the high period of terror from 1959 to 1963 would be the equivalent of, say, 3,000,000 of our politicians, teachers, doctors, engineers and civil servants being executed. How we would behave under the circumstances I don't know. I tend to reject the ethnocentrically arrogant assumption that we Americans are uniquely valiant. I think it's not at all impossible that years from now, people will think of the South Vietnamese resistance through this entire period as one of the truly heroic historical efforts.

PLAYBOY: Weren't many of the South Vietnamese elite, during this same period, jailed or killed by the Diem regime?

BUCKLEY: What you're saying is: Did Diem and the rest of them go to lengths they needn't have gone in order to effect what they wanted to effect, which was the independence of Vietnam? My answer is—I don't know. A very good argument may be made that they didn't go to great enough lengths. In fact, such an argument could appropriately be engraved on Diem's tombstone.

PLAYBOY: That sounds like an endorsement of political imprisonment and assassination.

BUCKLEY: In time of war? Of course. The detection and shooting down of Admiral Yamamoto was one of the triumphs of American intelligence during the Second World War, and it gets described at least once every ten years in the Reader's Digest. You do remember, don't you, how Walter Pidgeon almost
assassinated Hitler at Berchtesgaden? Do you remember the political prosecutions during the Second World War, when the New Deal decided that *pro-Nazi* authors George Sylvester Viereck and Lawrence Dennis should be put behind bars, so that we could get on with the War? I think we overdid it. I hope the South Vietnamese aren't as jumpy as we were.

**PLAYBOY:** Is your claim that the leaders of South Vietnam have been motivated by a desire for independence consistent with their near-total reliance on the U.S.?

**BUCKLEY:** Of course they've depended on us. They are waging war not against an autarchic aggressor that is satisfied to use its own resources but against an aggressor that—from the very beginning—has been armed by great powers, namely, Red China and the Soviet Union. The South Vietnamese didn't have a rifle factory in 1954. As far as I know, neither do they now. And neither did the North Vietnamese.

**PLAYBOY:** Since you applaud the fact that we rushed to the assistance of the besieged South Vietnamese government, do you also think we should oppose any war of national liberation that happens to have Communist support?

**BUCKLEY:** No, I wouldn't be willing to make that generality. I'd want to know where it was, what the surrounding situation was, how important it was to either Russia or China at the moment in short, what the consequences might be. I would like to note that neither of those countries has ever supported a real war of national liberation—in lower-case letters—that is, a war in which the objective really was national liberation. When the Communist powers get involved, the point is never national liberation always satellization. Now, it seems to me that the United States position ought to be to support whatever elements in a particular country are heading in the better of the apparently available directions. John Stuart Mill says that despotism is excused as a temporary arrangement, provided the purpose of that despotism is to maximize rather than minimize freedom.
PLAYBOY: Isn't the idea of despotism maximizing freedom a contradiction in terms—at least in practice?

BUCKLEY: No. Lincoln put it well when he argued that it could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution to sacrifice all future prospects for freedom in order to celebrate constitutional punctilio.

PLAYBOY: Isn't it true that most indigenous Communist movements in Southeast Asia are motivated more by nationalism or by economic needs than by ideological communism?

BUCKLEY: No, it isn't. Most troops simply do what they are told. Intermediaries interpret the formulation that will most inspire a particular group of soldiers to act enthusiastically in obedience to orders—whether that's a matter of telling them that their kamikaze raids will instantly elevate them into the heavenly spheres, to live forever after in glory, or that they will become large landholders, or whatever. But the people who are directing the drives in that part of the world are, in my opinion, genuinely committed to a Communist vision. The general Western assumption has been that time erodes that vision; but it is, nevertheless, true that there is a fundamentalist Marxism-communism rampant in China today. It may be inevitable that time will overcome that ideological pretension, but that is not the kind of thing around which one writes a foreign policy for the here and now.

PLAYBOY: It is also part of liberal orthodoxy—based on his long-standing animosity toward China—that Ho Chi Minh would probably have reached a Titoist accommodation with Peking had he succeeded throughout Vietnam. Do you think that might have happened?

BUCKLEY: I have no doubt that Ho Chi Minh would have preferred to be the master of Vietnam rather than merely the surrogate in that area for Mao Tsetung. But we have to recognize that Ho Chi Minh is dead and that it was foreseeable even six or seven years ago that he would be dead in due course, since he was an old man even then. The usefulness of Ho to Mao had to do with the veneration of Ho as an individual figure, which veneration would not and did not flow to his successor. In Chinese, Vietnam means "farther South," a fact that suggests
the ancient Chinese attitude toward the area: that it was never really licensed as a separate territory—the same feeling they have toward Tibet.

PLAYBOY: Considering your hard-line view of China, how do you feel about Nixon's recent diplomatic overtures to Peking?

BUCKLEY: I don't really see why our attitude toward Red China ought to be different from our attitude toward the Soviet Union. The principal international leverage we have at this particular moment has to do with the Russian-Chinese feud. It strikes me as supremely intelligent to constantly advertise to the Soviet Union that, just as we were prepared to side with the Soviet Union in order to effect a victory over Hitler, so are we prepared to understand the potential desirability of a flirtation with Red China in order to contain the Soviet Union. Or the other way around. This strikes me as simply a return to traditional diplomacy.

PLAYBOY: Do you think that we should—and will—recognize Red China?

BUCKLEY: I think we should not recognize her—and that it is unlikely that we will. For one thing, it becomes increasingly apparent that all of the old arguments for recognition of Red China are meaningless. The old arguments were, first, "You can't ignore a nation of 800,000,000 people." But it has gradually become manifest that we are hardly ignoring a country by failing to recognize it. As a matter of fact, we are sort of super-recognizing it. The easy thing to do is to recognize; if you don't recognize, you're giving it very special attention. Point two: The notion that if we recognize Red China, we would then be able to transact some differences with her—to talk about them—has been discredited by experience. We've had hundreds of meetings with Red China: we are probably having one tonight. So we go ahead and have the meetings anyway. Number three: We have discovered from the British experience that the mere fact of having an active consulate or an ambassador in Red China has no effect at all in terms of a thaw. The English have not been able to show that they've accomplished a single thing—even concerning the protection of their own citizens—that they might not have accomplished if they hadn't had their people there. Number four,
and finally; It was Lyndon Johnson who said that he would agree to give passports to Americans who wanted to visit Red China—journalists and so on. What then happened, of course, was that Red China refused to grant visas. So that we are therefore left with no adverse practical consequences of a diplomatic nature having to do with the recognition of Red China, but purely with symbolic consequences. And those consequences, in my judgment, argue against recognition.

PLAYBOY: So far, you haven't disagreed with any aspect of President Nixon's foreign policy. One critic has suggested that you may feel a sense of obligation to him for appointing you to the advisory commission of the USIA.

BUCKLEY: Oh, for God's sake. The point is that when I look around the world today and ask myself what it is that I truly care about in international affairs that Nixon has let me down on, I don't come up with anything. On the other hand, I acknowledge that there may be a feeling of restraint deriving not from my appointment to the commission but from the fact that I have seen him once or twice privately. I have discovered a new sensual treat, which, appropriately, the readers of Playboy should be the first to know about. It is to have the President of the United States take notes while you are speaking to him, even though you run the risk that he is scribbling, "Get this bore out of here." It's always a little bit more difficult to be rhetorically ruthless with somebody with whom you spend time. For example, I find it more difficult to be verbally ruthless with Hugh Hefner after meeting him as my guest on Firing Line and seeing him on a couple of other occasions. Beyond that, if I'm kind to Nixon, it's also because I think he needs to be protected from that part of the right whose emphasis is unbalanced in the direction of the paradigm.

PLAYBOY: Is Nixon conservative enough for you?

BUCKLEY: My ideal conservative President would be one who would strike out for certain radical reforms that, in my judgment, would greatly benefit America and augment human freedom. But such a President cannot be elected—at this time—and couldn't get his programs through Congress. It is also true, I think, that the paramount need of this highly
divided society at this particular moment is for conciliation; and Nixon—who is making gradual progress while attempting to fortify the bonds of common affection—is a good President from the conservative point of view.

PLAYBOY: Do you think that Vice President Agnew served the purpose of conciliation when he referred to the leaders of last October's Moratorium as "an effete corps of impudent snobs"?

BUCKLEY: No, he served other purposes. There are other purposes to be served, such as isolating the sources of discontent and the agitators and merchants of it. Some Presidents do that kind of thing adroitly, some don't. At a moment when we needed reconciliation after Pearl Harbor, I think it was wrong for F.D.R. to call those who were against the War "the New Copperheads." But history appears to have forgiven him.

PLAYBOY: To many liberals, Agnew's attacks on the media late last fall brought to mind the Chinese emperors who executed messengers bringing bad news. Do you think that the press is as objective as it professes to be?

BUCKLEY: When Mr. Nixon in November said that North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States, only Americans can do that, he meant that if the American people refuse to back an enterprise that—in the judgment of the men they elected to write their foreign policies—is essential to the good health of this country and of this century, then one must face two alternative explanations for their failure to do so. One is that they have run out of stamina. The other is that they have been constantly hectored into taking an erroneous position because they are insufficiently aware of the dimensions of the problem. He would obviously prefer the latter explanation to the former, as would I. He tends to feel that the majority of morally alert people in America have, for the most part, heard only a single side on the Vietnam issue—in the universities as well as in the press. He is absolutely correct. It is almost impossible, you know, to work your way through Yale or Harvard or Princeton and hear a pro-Vietnam speech. This is a pure caricature of academic freedom?
PLAYBOY: Aren't campus conservatives free to speak—and don't they, often and at length?

BUCKLEY: Well, you must mean students, because there are very few conservative professors. At Princeton, for example, 65 percent of the faculty voted for Humphrey in 1968, 7 percent for Dick Gregory and 7 percent for Nixon. And it's the professors I'm talking about; their capacity, at a college, is to instruct.

PLAYBOY: Then you're suggesting that the faculty allows its political bias to creep into every course.

BUCKLEY: Constantly. In any course in the humanities or social sciences. And not only in their teaching but in the books they assign. It seems to me that the entire academic community collaborated in the demonstration of academic bias when Walt Rostow and Dean Rusk went around looking for an academic post after they left Lyndon Johnson. What kind of a demonstration do you need beyond that? Here are two people whose academic credentials are absolutely first-rate. But all of a sudden, you find MIT—that paragon of academic freedom and scientific devotion—saying that they assumed Walt Rostow has "forgotten" what he knew about economics as the result of his stay in Government. That was one reason given by a senior faculty member; even James Reston made fun of it. You will notice nobody at Harvard went around saying that Galbraith "forgot" what he knew about economics as the result of his service for John Kennedy. Though I don't know. Maybe they hoped he had.

I think the health of any university is damaged by this monopoly of opinion. I spoke at the University of Minnesota a few months ago. A professor—a very distinguished historian—stood up and said that there are fifty professors of history at the University and one Republican, himself; that is, the ratio is fifty to one. Now, how much real political dialogue is the typical student at the University of Minnesota going to be exposed to, under the circumstances? And if he is not subjected to a true dialogue, then he tends to think dialogue is unnecessary, that what you need is asseveration. Placard justice: "Hey, hey, L.B.J.—how many kids did you kill today?"
PLAYBOY: Don't you think most students get the pro-Vietnam argument from their fathers?

BUCKLEY: That's unrealistic. Students are terrific snobs. I was one myself, though I had no right to be with my own father. The fact is that unless your father is right up with the academic vernacular—unless he's read Douglas Pike as recently as last week—you tend to feel that he's not equipped to discuss serious intellectual matters with you. In any case, I think that this hegemony of thought within the colleges is something that—perhaps without even knowing it—Agnew is scratching up against.

PLAYBOY: In his speech on TV news, the Vice President's avowals of distaste for censorship, coupled with his allusions to the power of the FCC to withhold broadcasting licenses, struck many liberals as hypocrisy. How do you feel about it?

BUCKLEY: I think they were entitled to think of it as at least potentially hypocritical. I find absolutely mysterious the way in which the debate was ultimately joined. My devoted friend Frank Stanton, who emerged as the spokesman for the victims of this pogrom—or intended pogrom—didn't, for instance, pause to remark that Congress has already withheld total freedom from the industry. The whole equal-time provision is an effort by the Congress of the United States to say to the networks and television and radio stations, "Certain freedoms you don't have." The FCC finds as much in the fairness doctrines every year as the Supreme Court finds in the First Amendment.

PLAYBOY: So it was really unnecessary for Agnew to refer to licensing?

BUCKLEY: It may be that Agnew's speech will serve some sort of a maieutic function—that it will tease out of the system a public policy concerning the tendentious limits to which an individual station owner may go. Such a policy would be a refinement of the fairness doctrine, which was not only accepted but applauded by liberals as recently as four or five years ago. In any case, I would like to say: Let any radio or TV station owner do what he wants. If he wants to put only Benjamin Spock on from midnight to midnight, let him do it. But make it as hard as possible for him to achieve monopoly status—by licensing pay-TV, which is precisely the way to wed the individual eccentric with his individual network or station.
PLAYBOY: What was your reaction to the Vice President's blast at the liberal Washington Post and New York Times?

BUCKLEY: If the press is so easily intimidated as to feel threatened by three speeches by the Vice President of the United States—if all those effete snobs are moral pygmies after all—then I ought to be even more worried about the press than I am. Mr. Agnew is not Mussolini; for better or worse, he cannot close down the New York Times. To sum up: I think what Mr. Agnew was attempting to say to the American people was that, particularly in New York, the networks and the commentators tend to reflect a single point of view—they lock and act like the Rockettes—and that it is necessary for people to escape from the assumption that that is the only point of view. I think he has done an extremely useful service. Of course, it isn't just Mr. Agnew who came to such a conclusion: The identical conclusion was arrived at a few weeks earlier by Theodore White, who is a renowned liberal, on my television program. Agnew was simply accenting the obvious; and the obvious, when it has been taboo to state it, tends to hurt. Ce n'est que la verite qui blesse, as Mr. Agnew would put it.

PLAYBOY: How would you feel if Agnew were to become President?

BUCKLEY: I have been persuaded for several years that the office of the President is so staggeringly complicated that nobody can, by conventional measurement, be "a good President." That is to say that nobody can conceivably oversee the range of activities that, technically, the President is responsible for overseeing. Under the circumstances, whereas it is widely supposed that the President needs to be a man of more and more complicated attainments, I tend to feel that he needs to be less and less a man of complicated attainments. A hundred years ago, a President really had to run the Post Office, among other things. Today, what one needs most from a President is goodwill, a working intelligence and sound character. The people who praise Harry Truman were willing to point this out at the time, incidentally, but were not willing to remember the thought when it looked as though Goldwater might be nominated by the Republican Party. Second, I do think that when a man becomes President, a transmogrification takes
place; that which was theretofore inconceivable becomes somehow conceivable. Nobody could really imagine Harry Truman—even himself, as he subsequently confessed—as President, until all of a sudden, he was President. Allen Drury dwells on this in one of his books. On Monday, the man is just that vicious, sniping, polemical, Nixonite Vice President; on Tuesday, he's inaugurated and suddenly things happen not only to his critics and to the people but also to him. In short, Agnew wouldn't sound like Agnew if he were President—and, in a sense, properly so.

PLAYBOY: When you list goodwill, a working intelligence, and sound character as what we need most from a President, do you mean regardless of ideology?

BUCKLEY: A man can't have a working intelligence, as distinguished from an abstract intelligence, without a reasonably sound "ideology"—a word I don't use much.

PLAYBOY: By reasonably sound, you mean reasonably conservative.

BUCKLEY: Yes, conservatism is the politics of reality.

PLAYBOY: Do you think the Administration is using Agnew in an attempt to wrest away some of the support for George Wallace in the South?

BUCKLEY: I hope so. Anybody who can take the 9,000,000 votes that went to George Wallace, baptize them and rededicate them to a hygienic conservatism certainly has my best wishes. It would be as though Adlai Stevenson had addressed the Communist Party and urged them to desert and follow the Democratic Party.

PLAYBOY: Kevin Phillips, in The Emerging Republican Majority, argues that Republicans can strengthen their current national advantage by building an alliance of heretofore solid Democratic voters in the South, already conservative citizens in the traditionally Republican heartland states, and middle-class whites everywhere who are disenchanted with costly Democratic social engineering. Do you think this so-called Southern strategy is a correct one for the Republican Party?
BUCKLEY: Any strategy is correct that isn't practiced in such a way as to persecute the people who do not acquiesce in the goals of the winning party. Kevin Phillips is saying that a single politics, in fact, can, given the foreseeable future, appeal to the majority of the American people. If it follows that that particular appeal is at the expense—indeed has as its intention the persecution—of people who do not agree with it, then one would have to renounce it. But in all the criticism I have seen of Mr. Phillips' book, I have never seen that made plain. Of course, I start on the heretical assumption that Southerners are people and that, under the circumstances, it is not immoral to appeal to somebody merely because he is a Southerner. If you're going to appeal to Southerners by promising to re-enslave the black people, then I consider that to be immoral, but I don't see any suggestion of this in Mr. Phillips' book. I think, actually, that the horror Mr. Phillips has inspired in such people as George McGovern derives not from any moral abhorrence of the thesis but out of a recognition by a very shrewd professional—which Senator McGovern is—that Mr. Phillips has the clue to how to stitch together a winning majority. Franklin D. Roosevelt, McGovern's patron saint, found such a clue, which remained operative for an entire generation.

PLAYBOY: Whatever the intention of Phillips' Southern strategy—which you seem to be endorsing, with some qualifications—its effect is clearly to exclude blacks from the "emerging Republican majority." And we note that in citing the West's acceptance of coexistence as the most significant development of the sixties, you apparently downgrade the importance of the black revolution, which many consider the milestone of the decade. Why?

BUCKLEY: I think that the important philosophical fight in the area of American black-white relations was won by Abraham Lincoln, who insisted on the metaphysical fact of human equality. This was the great achievement of the American nineteenth century. The next milestone, as far as the Negroes are concerned, will come when whites turn to—and seek out—Negroes as a result of their individual achievements. This has come in some places and will come in others, but it is going to take time. It is certainly open to speculation whether all of the activities of the past fifteen years have significantly accelerated that emancipation.
PLAYBOY: Do you think the black struggle in the past fifteen years has retarded that emancipation?

BUCKLEY: America has, lately, given herself over to the promulgation of unrealizable goals, which doom her to frustration, if not to despair. Voegelin calls it the immanentization of the eschaton--broadly speaking, consigning that which properly belongs to the end of life to the temporal order. That can lead only to grave dissatisfaction. The very idea of "Freedom now" was an invitation to frustration. Now means something or it means nothing. When months and then years went by and the kind of dream that Martin Luther King spoke about in 1963 in Washington didn't come true, a totally predictable frustration set in. It is one thing to engage in great ventures in amelioration; it is another to engage in great ventures in utopianization.

PLAYBOY: Couldn't it be argued that the career of Martin Luther King—even if it didn't create freedom--inspired a sense of dignity in the masses of black people?

BUCKLEY: It could. It could also be argued that the dignity was already there. What Dr. King inspired was more nearly self-assertion, which sometimes is and sometimes isn't the same as dignity.

PLAYBOY: Your belief that black Americans had dignity before the appearance of King strikes us as less important than the fact that millions of blacks themselves didn't think so.

BUCKLEY: Look. There was anti-black discrimination pre-King, there is anti-black discrimination post-King. If dignity is something that comes to you only after you succeed in putting an end to discrimination, then the blacks didn't have dignity then and don't have it now. If dignity is something that comes to you by transcending discrimination, then I say they had it then even as they have it now. What some blacks—and a lot of whites—now have, which is distinctive, is a greater tendency to self-assertion. I am trying to insist that that isn't the same as dignity.

PLAYBOY: In an Atlantic magazine interview on the occasion of your unsuccessful candidacy for membership in the Yale Corporation two years ago, you made the unluckily timed crack: "It was only a very few
years ago that official Yale conferred a doctor of laws on Martin Luther King, who more clearly qualifies as a doctor of lawbreaking." A few weeks later, Dr. King was assassinated. Did you regret the publication of your quote? And do you think of Martin Luther King as a pernicious force in American history?

BUCKLEY: I regret but am philosophical about the fact that there is a lead time in journalism, so that you sometimes find yourself reading something that is inappropriate the day you read it, which, however, was altogether appropriate the day you wrote it. Look magazine's cover, after J.F.K.'s assassination, had on it "Kennedy Could Lose." As regards what I wrote, I think it was correct. I wrote it a couple of days after Dr. King threatened massive civil disobedience if the forthcoming demands of his poverty marchers were not met. I don't want to answer your question about whether he will be seen as a good or a bad force in history, because I don't know. He was clearly a bad force on the matter of obeying the law. His attempt to sanctify civil disobedience is at least one of his legacies; if it emerges as his principal legacy, then he should certainly be remembered as a bad force. If, on the other hand, his principal legacy emerges—the wrinkles having been ironed out by the passage of time—as a spiritual leader of an oppressed people whom he urged on to great endeavors, then he will be a great historical force.

PLAYBOY: Could you yourself ever justify breaking a law?

BUCKLEY: Yes. I would justify the breaking of a law that, by more or less settled agreement on the separation of powers since the time of Christ, is ontologically outside the state's jurisdiction. For instance, when the government of Mexico, beginning a government or two after the overthrow of Diaz, forbade Mexicans to attend church, hundreds of thousands of them did so anyway, in underground churches. It seems to me that this is an excellent example of justified breaking of the law, against which there could be no reasonable recrimination.

PLAYBOY: Then it depends on the individual's idea of the character of the government as well as of the laws.
BUCKLEY: No, it doesn't. I didn't say the individual's idea and I didn't say the character of the government. I said the settled idea of the separation of powers and I said the character of the law, not of the government. Scholars, secular and religious, have agreed for two thousand years that the state has no business interfering in the traffic between man and his God; and any attempt to do so breaks the legal bond that the government has over the individual. I assume, of course, that we are talking about free or relatively free societies. If we're talking about totalitarian societies, the essential relationship of the subject to the slavemaster ought to be mutinous.

PLAYBOY: Since you have referred to the religious justification for lawbreaking: Do you think a young man has the right to use the Fifth Commandment—"Thou shalt not kill"—as justification for refusing induction into the Armed Forces?

BUCKLEY: The Fifth Commandment obviously is not a proscription against taking another man's life under any circumstances. Moses led a pretty robust army even after he came down from Mount Sinai. The rendering should have been, "Thou shalt not murder." I am not correcting God—He had it right. The imprecision was King James'.

PLAYBOY: You said that the essential relationship of subject to slavemaster ought to be mutinous in totalitarian societies. Aren't there degrees of unfreedom—and isn't there a point at which the erosion of freedom must be resisted, perhaps by civil disobedience?

BUCKLEY: There is a point at which an individual citizen rejects his society. He has at that point several options. One is to leave. The society ought not to hinder his doing so. A second is to agitate for reform. The society ought to protect his right to do so. A third is to drop out. The society ought to let him alone, to the extent it is possible to disengage reciprocating gears. A fourth is to disobey the laws or to revolutionize. In that event, the society ought to imprison, exile or execute him.

PLAYBOY: You've identified what you consider the utopianism of Martin Luther King's call for "Freedom now" as a negative aspect of the civil rights revolution. Do you see any positive aspects to that revolution?
BUCKLEY: Yes, several. I supported Dr. King in Montgomery. I very much believe in voluntary boycotts. If Woolworth's isn't going to let you sit down and buy a Coca-Cola, then, goddamn it, don't patronize Woolworth's. I certainly believe in equal access to public accommodations and I have always opposed the denial to anyone of any constitutionally specified right, by reason of race, color or creed.

PLAYBOY: Including the right to vote?

BUCKLEY: Yes.

PLAYBOY: But you have argued, haven't you, for limiting the franchise?

BUCKLEY: Yes. I think too many people are voting.

PLAYBOY: Whom would you exclude?

BUCKLEY: A while ago, George Gallup discovered that 25 percent or so of the American people have never heard of the United Nations. I think if we could find that 25 percent, they'd be reasonable candidates for temporary disfranchisement.

PLAYBOY: How would you find them?

BUCKLEY: Ask the Ford Foundation where they are. Incidentally, there's an interesting paradox here. I think that as power is centralized, one can make less of a case for extending the vote. In the ideal world, where power is decentralized—in my kind of a world—one wouldn't have to know what the United Nations was in order to assess intelligently the local situation and express yourself on it.

PLAYBOY: You didn't include the school-desegregation decision of the Supreme Court in your list of the beneficent results of the civil rights movement. Why?

BUCKLEY: When Brown vs. Board of Education was passed, we at National Review called it "bad law and bad sociology." I continue to think it was lousy law, historically and analytically. There are, unfortunately, increased grounds for believing that it was also bad sociology. Coerced massive integration is simply not working at primary and secondary school levels, and I notice that, for instance in Harlem, the voters don't list integrated schooling as among their principal demands.
What they want, and should have, is better education. The superstition that this automatically happens by checkerboarding the classroom is increasingly apparent to blacks as well as to whites. Meanwhile, in the total situation, you are taking very grave risks in jeopardizing the good nature of the white majority.

PLAYBOY: Could your concern for the good nature of the white majority be interpreted as acquiescence to their prejudice?

BUCKLEY: The word prejudice becomes a little strained, used in that way. Look, 95 percent of the white people who live in Washington are Democrats, political liberals who give speeches in favor of integration and vote for politicians who favor integration—and then take their children out of the public schools when Negroes enter those schools. If you call them prejudiced they reply that that isn't it, but that they want for their children a better education than they will get at the public schools in Washington.

PLAYBOY: If every school in the country were integrated by law in the next two years, wouldn't you have a generation twenty years from now that was relatively free of race prejudice?

BUCKLEY: I fear not. There is still anti-Italian prejudice in Jewish sections of New York and anti-Jewish prejudice in Italian sections of New York, and they've been going to school together for more than twenty years. It may be, ages hence, when the final sociological report is stapled and submitted, that we will discover that it all had something to do with numbers. It may be that a school that has 10 percent Negroes will be successful and a school that has 30 or 40 percent Negroes won't make it; either the whites will pull out or racial antagonisms will disrupt the school. Meanwhile, the things to stress and restress are better education and better job opportunities for Negroes.

PLAYBOY: How should black demands for better education be met—or do you think they shouldn't be met?

BUCKLEY: The discussion so far has been within the context of the existing system. I have always been attracted to the twin notions that what we need are many more private schools and that public schools ought to approximate private schools as closely as
possible, which means that public schools ought to have the same rights as private schools. These are among the reasons why I am so strongly attracted to the so-called voucher plan, which would work this way: A parent would be given a voucher for \$500—or whatever it costs to educate a child—which the parent would then take to any school, public or private, close to home or distant, where he wanted to matriculate that child. The school would get its money by cashing in these vouchers. The virtues of the plan are the virtues of the free-enterprise system—concerning which, incidentally, you are strangely uncurious. Specifically, it gives freedom of choice to the parent, whether he's rich or poor. Under the voucher plan, schools would become more competitive; they would strive to serve their customers—namely, the students.

PLAYBOY: How much do you think remains to be done to improve black job opportunities?

BUCKLEY: Plenty. I am convinced that the truly important way for the Negro to advance is economically. We should, first deprive labor unions of their monopolistic privileges. In fact, I'd do that anyway, even if no Negroes existed. But when we know that those privileges are being exercised in part to prevent Negroes from getting jobs in certain industries, the very least the Government ought to do is act in those cases. Second, we should encourage preferential hiring in situations where there isn't unemployment. It's unrealistic to think that you can refuse to hire a white in order to make room for a Negro if there is wide unemployment. Point three: A revival of the whole apprenticeship idea would be extremely useful at this point. It would involve, among other things, modifying—and preferably repealing—many of the minimum-wage laws. I digress to say that the minimum-wage laws are, of course, the great enemy, especially of teenage Negroes. Professor Milton Friedman has shown that there was approximately a 100 percent relative rise in Negro teenage unemployment after the last increase in the minimum wage. Further, I would like to see somebody draw up a sophisticated table of tax deductions given to individuals who hire Negroes as apprentices, the idea being to teach them a profitable trade—in construction, in electricity, in plumbing, in newspaper offices, wherever.
PLAYBOY: Beyond increasing job opportunities, what else can be done to eliminate poverty in America? Specifically, are you in favor of President Nixon's welfare-reform proposals?

BUCKLEY: We are eliminating poverty in this country faster than any society ever has. There is a downward-bound graph that begins with about 50 percent of the population poor at the turn of the century and dips to the present, where there are about 9 percent poor, using the same indices. So my first comment is that I don't want anything to interfere with the direction of that graph, which the overhead costs and economic strategy of many social-welfare programs tend to do. Now, it may be that the curve is asymptotic, that it will never quite close. The residual poor will, of course, have to have some kind of a relief program, even as they do now. I myself would buy the Moynihan plan, or the Nixon plan, or the New Federalism—whatever you call it—as a substitute for all existing measures. It may well come down to a matter of American know-how moving in on a congeries of welfare systems to make welfarism both more manageable and an instrument that itself might break the so-called vicious cycle that everybody agrees has discredited the existing system.

PLAYBOY: What sort of program—if any—do you favor for eliminating hunger?

BUCKLEY: I'm attracted to the notion of giving out four basic food materials, free, to anybody who wants them. The cost, according to one economist, would come to about a billion dollars a year. The idea is that these ingredients would be available at food stores to anybody—you, me, Nelson Rockefeller—because it simply wouldn't be worthwhile trying to catch anyone who was taking the free food and didn't need it. With such a plan, you could officially and confidently say that the residual hunger in America was simply the result of people not knowing how to utilize these materials.

PLAYBOY: What are they?

BUCKLEY: Powdered skim milk, bulgur wheat, soybeans, and a kind of lard. You can make very good bread out of them, for instance. This bulgur wheat, incidentally—which is a staple in the Mideast—is not much liked by Americans and yet Alice Roosevelt Longworth loves it, considers it a delicacy.
PLAYBOY: Do you agree with those analysts who feel that—in part because of the black revolution and because of Federal "handout" programs—the general electorate is moving to the right?

BUCKLEY: There are all sorts of conflicting indices. The Moynihan plan that we just talked about is left by orthodox conservative standards; if it has been proposed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1933, it might have gotten even him impeached—and yet the people seem willing to accept it. But looking at the broad indications, I do feel that there is a move to the right. I've always believed that conservatism is, as I said a while ago, the politics of reality and that reality ultimately asserts itself, in a reasonably free society, in behalf of the conservative position. An excellent example was the race riots of the mid-sixties. Even the participants discovered that those Gadarene experiments were futile.

PLAYBOY: Mayor Daley's celebrated order to the Chicago police to maim looters in the rioting that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King confirmed the feeling of many young people—black and white—that American society places a higher value on property than on human life. Do you think looters should be shot?

BUCKLEY: I reject the notion that a property right is other than a human right—that is, it's not an animal right or a vegetable right. The commitment of the state to the individual is to protect the individual's freedom and property, property being one of the things that materialize from the exercise of freedom and, therefore, in many senses, are the fruits of freedom. So I elect a mayor to protect me and my property effectively, with graduated responses to various conditions. If theft is an aberration—as it is, for instance, in the Scandinavian countries—I would consider a mayor who orders his men to shoot thieves to be absolutely barbaric. But if theft reaches near-epidemic conditions, a different response is indicated. I wish there were something in between simply shouting, "Hey! Come back!" and shooting somebody in the leg. Unfortunately, I fear that when that in-between thing is discovered, liberals are going to come up with elaborate reasons for not using it—Mace being an excellent example.
PLAYBOY: Mayor Daley's shoot-to-maim order, and his handling of demonstrators at the Democratic Convention that summer, struck many observers as proof of an authoritarian and ugly aspect of America's turn to the right. If you had been mayor of Chicago, would you have handled the protesters as he did?

BUCKLEY: No. I've been pretty well satisfied that it was a basic mistake not to open up Lincoln Park. You simply can't require people to evaporate—incorporalization not being a typical human skill. But with the exception of his ruling on the use of the park, and the workaday tactical errors, I think Daley's resoluteness was justified. Obviously, the excesses of his police were not justified, but a lot of Americans were glad the demonstrators got beaten up. They were glad for the commonplace reason—there's a little sadism in all of us—but they were also glad because they knew goddamn well that the chances of the demonstrators' breaking the law with impunity were overwhelming. It was sort of a return to posse justice. If you knew absolutely that Abbie Hoffman and the boys were never going to spend a night in jail—which was a good guess at the time—then people figured, "What the hell, beat 'em up. At least get satisfaction out of it."

PLAYBOY: Is that the way you felt?

BUCKLEY: No. But I understand the feeling.

PLAYBOY: Liberals Carl Stokes and John Lindsay were both re-elected mayor last year. Do these elections contradict your general thesis of a move to the right?

BUCKLEY: No, they don't. Lindsay's re-election is certainly a special case. A perfectly reasonable assumption is that if there had been a runoff between him and Procaccino, even Procaccino might have beaten him. I don't think one can conclude very much of an ideological nature from the event in New York City. In the matter of Stokes, it seems to me that there are a great number of people who practice, for reasons that I applaud, an inverse racism; many Cleveland whites voted for Mr. Stokes precisely because he is a Negro. The idea is that, among other things, it is a good investment in conserving America to remind a population that is always being urged toward cynicism that it is possible to rise up the ladder. But I think that Stokes is one of the four or five truly brilliant politicians
I've ever run up against, so I'm prejudiced in his favor.

PLAYBOY: Would you practice this kind of inverse racism?

BUCKLEY: Yes, I think there's a very good argument for voting for a Negro because he's a Negro--until such time as it becomes simply redundant to make such a demonstration. I wouldn't vote for a Jew because he was a Jew, because it seems to me that the time has long since passed when it was necessary to demonstrate that a Jew can rise as high as he wants to. This is not the case with the Negro.

PLAYBOY: Haven't you used this argument to suggest that America should have a black President?

BUCKLEY: Yes, I have. I would take great pleasure in the pride that would come to the black community if there were a Negro in the White House. I think it's worth working for.

PLAYBOY: The possibility of a black American President seems remote in a decade that is opening with a widespread crackdown on such militant black groups as the Black Panthers. Do you think there is a campaign to exterminate the Panthers?

BUCKLEY: No. But I think there should be. I mean, obviously, to exterminate the movement, even as I favor the extermination of Ku Klux Klanism, though not necessarily Ku Kluxers.

PLAYBOY: Why?

BUCKLEY: Because I am persuaded that the Panthers have solemnly registered their basic goals, which are to rob people, by category, of their rights to life, to liberty, to freedom, and because they are arming themselves for that purpose. Any organization caught--as the Panthers have been caught time and time again--with caches of machine guns and grenades and Molotov cocktails is presumptively guilty of non-Platonic ambitions. Every state in the Union forbids that sort of stockpiling of arms.

PLAYBOY: Where have the Panthers indicated that their basic goal is to rob people of their rights?

BUCKLEY: In their literature. Read it. I don't carry it around. It is as thoroughly impregnated with genocidal anti-white racism as ever the Nazis' was with anti-Semitism. And it makes no difference
to the Panthers where on the left-right spectrum the white politician stands. On the death of Bobby Kennedy, the Black Panthers' national newspaper ran a photograph of him lying in a pool of his own blood in the Ambassador Hotel with the head of a pig replacing the head of Mr. Kennedy. The rhetorical totalism suggested here, combined with the doctrinal genocidal passions, suggests to me that whatever was the appropriate attitude toward Goebbels in, say 1930, is appropriate, in 1970, toward the Black Panthers.

PLAYBOY: Doesn't the publication of such a picture, however repugnant, come under the protection of the First Amendment?

BUCKLEY: It does, formally; which is why I included actions—the Panthers' stockpiling of weapons—among the reasons why I think their extermination as a movement is desirable. But I would like to note that it is a naive liberal assumption to think that the Bill of Rights protects every manner of written or spoken dissent. In the heyday of McCarthyism, Professor Samuel Stouffer from Harvard did one of those Travels with Charley bits around the country to discover the extent to which the Bill of Rights was an article of practical faith held by the American people. He found out that something like 75 percent of us didn't believe that members of the Communist Party should enjoy any rights. Needless to say, he wrote a horrified book about his findings. Now, it is extremely easy for people with an ideologized knowledge of American history to suppose that this is something new, let alone that it is impossible to compose a theoretical defense of it. But it is apparent to me that the profoundest studies of what, for instance, Thomas Jefferson or Abraham Lincoln meant by freedom was a freedom that was severely limited, even theoretically, in the right it absolutely granted to anyone to call for the persecution, let alone the liquidation, of others. When Jefferson said, "Those who wish to dissolve the Union or to change the republican form of government should stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it," I am convinced by such scholars as Harry Jaffa that he meant not that we should grant freedom to the enemies of freedom because they are entitled to it but that we should grant freedom to the enemies of freedom because we can afford to indulge
them that freedom. Accordingly, it becomes a practical rather than a theoretical consideration whether, at any given moment in American history, a particular group of dissenters whose dissent is based on the desire to rob other people of their freedom ought to be tolerated.

PLAYBOY: Are we at such a moment in history--when we can't afford that freedom to a few hundred out of 200,000,000 Americans?

BUCKLEY: Quite possibly. I don't think the Panthers are in a position to take over the country, any more than the Klan was. But the Klan deprived particular people in particular places of their effective freedom. So have the Panthers, by the use of the same weapons: intimidation and, it is now alleged by one or two grand juries, both murder and conspiracy to murder. So I say: Let's do to them what I wish we had done to the Klan fifty years ago.

PLAYBOY: When you say that we should not tolerate a group of dissenters such as the Panthers, what do you propose we do about them?

BUCKLEY: Society has three sanctions available for dealing with dissenters of this kind. There is the whole family of social sanctions; if they don't work, we then have legal sanctions; if the legal sanctions don't work, we are forced to use military sanctions. As an example of the social sanctions, I give you what has happened to Gerald L. K. Smith, the fierce anti-Semite. Would Smith be invited to join the sponsoring group of the Lincoln Center? If he gave a $1,000 contribution to the President's Club, would he be admitted as a member? No. Gerald L. K. Smith has been effectively isolated in America, and I'm glad that he has been. After such an experience as we have seen in the twentieth century of what happens--or what can happen--when people call for genocidal persecutions of other people, we have got to use whatever is the minimal resource available to society to keep that sort of thing from growing. If the social sanctions work, then you have the Jeffersonian situation, in which libertarian rodomontade is onanistically satisfying--a society in which the least possible force is the effective agent of that society's cohesiveness. I would like to see people like Bobby Seale and Eldridge Cleaver treated at least as badly as Gerald L. K. Smith has been. But no: They get
applauded, they get invited to college campuses, they get listened to attentively on radio and on television—they get invited to Leonard Bernstein's salons—all of which makes rather glamorous a position that, in my judgment, ought to be expropriated.

PLAYBOY: They also get jailed, exiled and even shot.

BUCKLEY: Cleaver was jailed for committing rape, which Gerald L. K. Smith hasn't done, so far as I know. And he was wounded after a shoot-out with Oakland police. Huey Newton was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. A gang of them are up now for murder and conspiracy to terrorize. Now, I'll grant you this: I have not been satisfied that the killing of Cleaver's buddy in that particular battle in Oakland—the young man who walked out of the house in his shorts and T-shirt—was justified. The policeman who killed him may have panicked, as others of us have done, with less tragic consequences, to be sure. But he wasn't acting on orders from J. Edgar Hoover, whose sins, if there are any, are explicit rather than implicit. But to return to my point, if I may, about the attention lavished on such people: The same, to a certain extent, was true of George Lincoln Rockwell, who got an extensive ventilation of his views in this magazine. For as long as that kind of thing happens, you encourage people to consider as tenable a position that in my judgment ought to be universally rejected as untenable. The whole idea of civilization is little by little to discard certain points of view as uncivilized; it is impossible to discover truths without discovering that their opposites are error. In a John Stuart Mill-type society—in which any view, for so long as it is held by so much as a single person, is considered as not yet confuted—you have total intellectual and social anarchy.

PLAYBOY: On the other hand, by publishing an interview with a George Lincoln Rockwell, one might encourage him to expose the untenability of his views and thus help discredit both himself and his philosophy, even among those who might previously have been sympathizers.

BUCKLEY: I acknowledge the abstract appeal of the argument, but I remind you that it can be used as an argument for evangelizing people in Nazism, racism or
cannibalism, in order to fortify one's opposition to such doctrines. The trouble is that false doctrines do appeal to people. In my judgment, it would be a better world where nobody advocated tyranny; better than a world in which tyranny is advocated as an academic exercise intended to fortify the heroic little antibodies to tyranny.

PLAYBOY: If the evils of a particular doctrine are so apparent, what harm is there in allowing someone to preach that doctrine?

BUCKLEY: What is apparent to one man is not necessarily apparent to the majority. Hitler came to power democratically. It's a nineteenth-century myth to confide totally in the notion that the people won't be attracted to the wrong guy. George Wallace, not Nixon or Humphrey, got the highest TV ratings. Take, once more, the Panthers. There are, I am sure, hundreds of thousands of Americans who would like to hear a speech by Eldridge Cleaver. One reason they would like to do so is because they like the excitement. Another is that they like to show off. People like to show their audacity, their cavalier toleration of iconoclasm—it's the same kind of thing, in a way, as shouting "F—Mayor Daley" in a loud voice in the middle of a park in Chicago. Moreover, the views expressed by Eldridge Cleaver, et al., have not been proscribed by settled intellectual opinion, because, thank God, we have not experienced in America the kind of holocaust that Caucasians visited against the Jews in Germany. I contend that it is a responsibility of the intellectual community to anticipate Dachau rather than to deplore it. The primary responsibility of people who fancy themselves morally sophisticated is to do what they can to exhibit their impatience with those who are prepared to welcome the assassination of Bobby Kennedy because that meant one less pig. Their failure to do that is, in my judgment, a sign of moral disintegration. If you have moral disintegration, you don't have left a case against Dachau. If you don't have that, what do you have? Make love not war? Why?

PLAYBOY: Do you think that a more concerted police attack should be launched against the Panthers?

BUCKLEY: I would support a full legal attack, with the passage of new laws, if necessary, as we have done in other areas. For instance, I don't think we have
enough legal weapons against people who push heroin. People who are practiced in the profession of trying to halt the flow of heroin see themselves as engaged in a losing fight—primarily because by the time the agent can gain entry to the home or apartment where he suspects there is a stash of heroin, it has been flushed down the toilet. The so-called no-knock provision of the President's new crime bill was written precisely to overcome that problem. Now, I know—everybody knows—that that provision is capable of abuse. But I think a libertarian ought always to ask himself: What is the way to maximize liberty?

PLAYBOY: In what way does the no-knock law maximize liberty?

BUCKLEY: Directly. In Manchild in the Promised Land, Claude Brown identifies heroin as the principal problem in Harlem—not housing, not education, not discrimination, not the absence of economic opportunity. Heroin. If the heroin traffic in Harlem were brought under control, we would see—in his judgment—a dramatic drop in crime and a lessening of those restrictions on freedom that accompany a high crime rate.

PLAYBOY: Would you disagree with former Attorney General Ramsey Clark's contention that eliminating poverty is the key to reducing crime?

BUCKLEY: I would. Drug abuse and crime both have to do with the state of the ethos; and the ethos is not a function of poverty. Consider Portugal or Ireland: Poor people don't necessarily commit crimes.

PLAYBOY: A few minutes ago, you referred to the moral disintegration of some Americans. Would you make that a general indictment—applicable not only to those who tolerate the Panthers but to most Americans?

BUCKLEY: Yes. The most conspicuous attribute of the twentieth-century American is his self-indulgence. In a marvelous book called The Odyssey of the Self-Centered Self, Robert Fitch traces the principal concerns of civilization through the past 200 or 300 years; our concerns were, he says, first predominantly religious, then predominantly scientific, then humanistic—and today are essentially egocentric. I think that ours is an egocentric society. The popular notion is that there is no reciprocal obligation by the individual to the
society, that one can accept whatever the patrimony gives us without any sense of obligation to replenish the common patrimony—that is, without doing what we can to advance the common good. This, I think, is what makes not only Americans but most Western peoples weak. It comforts me that that also was the finding of Ortega y Gasset.

PLAYBOY: How does the increasing social awareness and involvement of young people fit into your thesis?

BUCKLEY: I don't say that somebody who spends the summer in Mississippi trying to bring rights to black people is primarily self-centered, although such a case could be made concerning some young people and by using less intricate psychological arguments than, for instance, the liberals fling around to prove that we are all racist. I'm talking about the general disease of anomie, which is the result of people's, by and large, having become deracinated, suspended from any relationship to the supernatural and prescinded from the historical situation. A lot of them retreat and think about themselves, even exclusively about themselves—the drug people—the dropouts, formal and informal. Certain others venture into utopianism, which, as I've said, necessarily and obviously breeds frustration and despair, conditions that some of them prefer even to drugs. But the lot of them, I think, fail to come to terms with the world, fail to come to terms with the end of life. They have absolutely no eschatological vision, except a rhetorical sort of secular utopianism. A related phenomenon: When I was last on the Johnny Carson show, he announced to his mass audience, "Well, after all, the reason the Soviet Union arms is because we arm," the implicit axiom being that there is obviously no difference between them and us. What makes it possible for the man who has the largest regular audience of anybody in the United States—not excluding the President—to say blandly something like that is testimony to wave after wave in the successful intellectual offensive against epistemological optimism—against the notion that some things are better than others and that we can know what those things are.

PLAYBOY: Do you think this moral relativism is at least partially a consequence of the decline in religious belief?
BUCKLEY: Yes. In orthodox religious belief. It's a commonplace that there is no such thing as an irreligious society. The need for religion being a part of the nature of man, people will continue to seek religion. You see the Beatles rushing off to listen to the platitudinous homilies of that Indian quack, Maharishi—what's-his-name, but they'd rather be caught dead than reading Saint Paul. Young people who have active minds tend to be dissatisfied with the ersatz religions they pick up, and yet so formal is the contemporary commitment to agnosticism—or even to atheism—that they absolutely refuse to plumb Christianity's extraordinary reservoirs of rationality. I doubt if you could get one of these kids, however desperately in search of religion—who will go to any guru, who will even talk to Joan Baez and attempt to get religion from her—to read Orthodoxy by Chesterton or any book by C. S. Lewis.

PLAYBOY: Perhaps orthodoxy—lower case—is at fault. Many young people would say they think Christ was a great man; they might even know a good deal about Him. But they are appalled by Saint Paul's horror of the body and of sex.

BUCKLEY: I'm sure that among the vast majority of students, the knowledge of Christ is superficial and that the only thing they know about Saint Paul is that he was "anti-sex." In fact, Saint Paul's anti-sexuality was, I think, a mode by which he expressed the joys of asceticism, the transcendent pleasure of the mortification of the flesh. By no means is this distinctive to Christianity. In fact, Christianity in its formal renunciation of Manichaeism took a position concerning the flesh that is far more joyful than, for instance, that of the Buddhists or of a number of other religions.

PLAYBOY: One of the reasons many people have difficulty accepting your religion, Roman Catholicism, is that they have been convinced by experts that there are soon going to be more people on the globe than the earth can support, yet the Church does its not-inconsiderable best to prevent the spread of birth-control information. Do you also take a serious view of the population problem?

BUCKLEY: Yes, I do. I think it is the second most important problem in the world, after ideological communism.
PLAYBOY: Then the Church's position on birth control distresses you?

BUCKLEY: No. It is not established by any means that the influence of the Church is very direct on the matter of the increase in population. It happens that the birth rate is the greatest where the Church has no influence: India, for instance, or Nigeria. It is impossible to establish a correlation between the birth rate in Latin America and the prevailing religion on that continent. The Catholic position on birth control is, therefore, something against which we agonize rather more theoretically than practically.

PLAYBOY: What do you think we can do, then, to keep the population down?

BUCKLEY: Get people to stop reading Playboy.

PLAYBOY: Very funny. What's the real answer?

BUCKLEY: Well, the real answer is to make sure that people who don't want more children and who have no religious scruples against the use of birth control paraphernalia are aware of how they can get and use them. My own assumption is that we are moving toward the discovery of a chemical that will prevent conception, that will be generally dispensed—perhaps in the water supply—and can be readily neutralized by any woman who desires to do so.

PLAYBOY: Should the U.S. volunteer birth-control information and devices to such overpopulated nations as India?

BUCKLEY: They don't need any more information. They can get it from the Encyclopaedia Britannica. As to giving them the pill—sure, if they ask for it.

PLAYBOY: Do you have any other sexual opinions that might shock your bishop?

BUCKLEY: I didn't give you a "sexual" opinion. I don't know that giving free pills to India is heretical. Would American rabbis object to free pork for India? Heresy? I don't think so. I happen, for example, to favor the legalization of private homosexual acts committed between consenting adults and of prostitution. The second is the more important. Legalizing prostitution would provide a
ready outlet for pubescent lust and greatly facilitate the hygienic problem, pending the domination of the appetite and the restoration of morality. Also, it would cut down the profits and power of the Mafia, the existence of which enrages me.

PLAYBOY: How else would you combat the Mafia?

BUCKLEY: By making gambling— but not gambling debts— legal.

PLAYBOY: Advocating the legalization of gambling, prostitution, and homosexual acts between adults puts you in agreement with most liberals. Do you also agree with them in the area of censorship? Would you defend the right of the state to, say, stop performances by Lenny Bruce?

BUCKLEY: I'm troubled by that problem. By the way, do please try to remember that the conservative opposes unnecessary legislation. I've written about the censorship dilemma. Obviously, a perfectly consistent, schematic libertarianism would give you an easy answer— let anybody do anything. Including cocaine vending machines. But a libertarianism written without reference to social universals isn't terribly useful. Here, I think, is where the science of sociology becomes useful. If sociology suggests that societies don't survive without the observance of certain common bonds, certain taboos, then we can maintain that in the long run, we diminish rather than increase freedom by protecting people who violate those taboos. Having said that, let me add that I'm perfectly well aware that this particular argument can be abused by people who want a narrow conformity. But once again, let's reach for an example: When Salvation, the rock musical, was produced in New York City, the reviewer for Time magazine listed the things that it takes to make a successful rock musical nowadays. It has to be dirty, anti-American and anti-religious. Under the last category, he said: It will no longer do to attack Protestantism, because Protestantism has become so etiolated as to have no potential for shock. You can't shock anybody by making fun of the dogma of the Bishop of Woolwich. Second, it can't be anti-Jewish, because the playgoing community on Broadway tends to be heavily Jewish and the Jewish people hold that certain things should be held in reverence. For instance, no jokes about Buchenwald can be made in New York City. Therefore— attack the Catholics!
There's still a certain amount of awe in the Catholic religion, but the Catholics are a politically unorganized group in New York City and you can get away with ridiculing them. So, the writer gives the audience the iconoclast's thrill, but safely: They're not going to lose at the box office. Now—should society in general defer to the specially pious concerns of significant groups within that society? We extend certain protections against public affronts. For instance, the courts recognize a limit to what a storekeeper displays in his window. But what about his shelf? Or the stage? Is it right to have laws forbidding, let us say, a comedy based on what happened at Dachau? I know all the theoretical arguments against it, but there's a tug inside me that says that society perhaps has to maintain the right to declare certain kinds of aggressions against the venerated beliefs of the people as taboo. This is a codification of grace, of mutual respect.

PLAYBOY: Would you admit that the tug inside you to ban certain kinds of irreverence may be irrational?

BUCKLEY: Yes—absolutely. But there is a place for irrationality. Many of the conventions of any society are irrational. The obsequies shown to the queen of England, for example, are utterly irrational. Oakeshott has made the demonstration once and for all that rationalism in politics—which may be defined as trying to make politics as the crow flies—is the kind of thing that leads almost always and almost necessarily to tyranny.

PLAYBOY: Can you give us a specific way in which society might suffer from a comedy—however tasteless and debased—about what happened at Dachau?

BUCKLEY: Yes. You can hurt a people's feelings. A people whose feelings are hurt withdraw from a sense of kinship, which is what makes societies cohere. Moreover, a society so calloused as not to care about the feelings of its members becomes practiced in the kind of indifference that makes people, and the society they live in, unlovely.

PLAYBOY: But if a taboo has to be maintained by force of law, is it still a taboo?
BUCKLEY: It depends. Some taboos are codified, some aren't. Some laws protect what isn't any longer taboo. I don't think Lenny Bruce would be arrested in New York, the movement having been in the direction of permissiveness in the past four or five years. The question really is: Do we—or do I, I guess—approve of the trend, and I'm not so sure that I do. A society that abandons all of its taboos abandons reverence.

PLAYBOY: Doesn't society abandon something even more precious by attempting to preserve that reverence by force?

BUCKLEY: Again, it depends on the situation. If you have a society that is corporately bent on a prolonged debauch—determined to wage iconoclasm a outrance—then you've got a society that you can't effectively repress. I mean, you have a prohibitive situation, but if you have a society—as I think we still do—in which the overwhelming majority of the people respect their own and others' taboos, the kind of society that, say forbids a lawyer from referring to Judge Marshall as a nigger, or Judge Hoffman as a kike, then it isn't much of an exertion on the commonweal to implement such laws as have been on the books in New York for generations. My final answer to your entire line of questioning is ambiguous: If you ask simply: Does the individual have the absolute right to do anything he wants in private contract with another party? then my answer is: No, only the presumptive right. A sadist cannot contract to kill a masochist. John Stuart Mill reduces the matter of sovereignty to the individual's right over himself. The state hasn't the right to protect you against yourself—which is a good argument against my being required to wear a helmet when I ride my Honda.

PLAYBOY: Doesn't Mill's dictum against the state's right to protect you from yourself also argue for the abolition of most drug laws?

BUCKLEY: Does it? Take heroin. Except under totally contrived circumstances, there is no such thing in America as a person inflicting purely on himself the consequences of taking heroin. If a man goes that route, he deserts his family—if he has any; he becomes an energumen who will ravish society to sustain the habit, and so on. Most
important—as far as I'm concerned—he becomes a Typhoid Mary of sorts. I know that I'm using a metaphor, but I can defend the use of this particular metaphor. We know from serious studies that heroin users desire to communicate the habit to other people and often succeed in doing so.

PLAYBOY: Do the same arguments apply to marijuana?

BUCKLEY: Not really, or not so severely. The first and most obvious thing to say about marijuana is that the penalties for using it are preposterous. But I don't believe that it ought to be legalized yet; the consequences of its use have not been sufficiently studied. It seems crazy to me that in an age when the Federal Government has outlawed Tab, we are wondering whether we ought to legalize marijuana. Now, it may be that marijuana is harmless, although at this moment, I am persuaded by those scientists who emphatically believe the contrary. It may be that we would be much better off persuading everybody who now drinks whiskey to turn on instead. But we don't know. Some scientists say that middle-aged people who take marijuana risk special dangers because they have gradually concatenated their own quirks, latent and active, into a moderately well-adjusted human being. Psychotropic drugs can shatter that delicate equilibrium. Conversely, it is speculated that marijuana can keep some young people from making the individual adjustments they need to make. Some scientists claim that prolonged use of marijuana wages a kind of war against your psyche, the final results of which are not easy to trace.

PLAYBOY: Your attitude toward grass typifies your agreement with middle-class Americans on some issues. Are there any contemporary American middle-class values that you dislike?

BUCKLEY: You'd have to make me a list of them. If ostentatious forms of material achievement are a middle-class value, I don't much like them, though I wouldn't go out of my way to evangelize against them; we all have our little vanities. I am told that in certain big corporations, it is unseemly for the junior V.P. to own a more expensive car than the senior V.P., and absolutely verboten for his wife to have a mink coat if the wife of the senior V.P. doesn't have one. But who does approve of Babbitry? Not even Babbitt. He
merely practiced Babbitry. The middle-class values I admire are husbandry, industry, loyalty, a sense of obligation to the community and a sense of obligation to one's patrimony. When Winston Churchill died, Rebecca West said that he was a great affront to the spirit of the modern age because he was manifestly superior. I said in introducing Clare Boothe Luce, when we did a TV program in Hawaii a few months ago, that her documented achievements are evidence of the lengths to which nature is prepared to go to demonstrate its addiction to inequality. It is a middle-class value to defer, without animosity, to people of superior learning, achievement, character, generosity.

PLAYBOY: To whom do you personally feel inferior?

BUCKLEY: Millions of people, living and dead.

PLAYBOY: Who among the living?

BUCKLEY: To begin with, anyone who knows more than I do, which would be millions of people—or hundreds of thousands of people—right there. I also feel inferior to people who regulate their lives more successfully than I do, to people who are less annoyed by some of the petty distractions that sometimes annoy me, to people who are more philosophical in their acceptance of things than I am.

PLAYBOY: Does that includes (sic) Mrs. Luce?

BUCKLEY: She's much more talented than I am.

PLAYBOY: Norman Mailer?

BUCKLEY: Much more talented than I am. Now, there are certain things in which I am Mailer's manifest superior. Politically, he's an idiot. And he's botched his life and the lives of a lot more people than I've botched, I hope. On the other hand, he's a genius and I'm not.

PLAYBOY: Among other contemporaries, how about T. S. Eliot?

BUCKLEY: You're talking about birds of paradise now. Like Whittaker Chambers. I make it a point to seek the company—intellectually, above all—of people who are superior to me in any number of ways, and I very often succeed.
PLAYBOY: To whom do you feel superior—and why?

BUCKLEY: To those who believe that they are the very best judges of what is wrong and what is right.

PLAYBOY: Would you please name names?

BUCKLEY: Would you please expand your printing facilities?

PLAYBOY: As long as the discussion has become personal: To what extent has your feud with Gore Vidal developed into a publicity stunt from which you both have benefited?

BUCKLEY: In my case, at least, to no extent at all. I don't see how one profits a) from being publicly libeled or b) from walking into a situation in which one pays legal expenses several times the value of anything one earned after industrious work preparing for television programs or doing an article.

PLAYBOY: Would you care to add anything to what you said about him on the air during the 1968 Democratic Convention and in response to his subsequent comments about you?

BUCKLEY: No.

PLAYBOY: Why did you agree to appear with him in the first place?

BUCKLEY: I agreed to appear in November of 1967 because I thought I could use the forum effectively to advance the conservative viewpoint. I was informed in April that Vidal had been selected to appear opposite me. My alternatives then were to break my contract or to proceed. I decided not to break the contract, even though Vidal was the single person I had named as someone I would not gladly appear against.

PLAYBOY: You have been publicly active for nineteen years. How successful do you think you have been in advancing the conservative viewpoint?

BUCKLEY: Very successful. That success has come primarily through the instrumentality of National Review, which has the second highest circulation of any journal of opinion in America. It repeatedly furnishes the reading public with the very best
conservative thought, whether philosophical, critical, strategic or social. It has had the effect of consolidating the conservative position, causing many people to abandon—however unhappily—their resolution to dismiss the conservative alternative as anachronistic, superficial and inhuman. I don't say that National Review, or something like it, would not have been created had I not been around; it most certainly would have—in fact, I only midwifed it—but I'd say that the mere fact of having done so renders me, as midwife, very successful.

PLAYBOY: Which failures of the conservative movement in the past ten to twenty years most distress you? The fact that Goldwater didn't get more votes than he did?

BUCKLEY: No, not at all. It was a foregone conclusion that he wouldn't get many votes from the moment Kennedy was assassinated. It's very hard to explain to militant pro-Goldwaterites like myself that in a strange sort of way, an inscrutable sort of way, voting against Goldwater was explainable as a conservative thing to do. The reason I say that is because a nation convulsed in November of 1963 as ours was reached for balm, for conciliation, for peace, for tranquillity, for order. To have had three Presidents over a period of fourteen months would have been dislocative beyond the appetite of many conservatives. Now, this doesn't mean that I side with those conservatives who voted against him—I happen to be more adventurous than some conservatives—but I can respect their point of view. In any case, that was not by any means my idea of the great disappointment of the sixties. That was the failure, on the whole, to verbalize more broadly, more convincingly, the conservative view of things. The conservative critique has been very well made, but it hasn't got through with sufficient force to the opinion makers. It is still hard as hell to find a young conservative with writing talent. That distresses me deeply. Most of the people who write the really finished essays in the college newspapers are liberals, New Leftists. I don't know exactly why and I'm vexed by it, but there were only a dozen—or fewer—conservatives in the sixties who have become writers of some achievement.

PLAYBOY: Personally, what do you expect to do during the next five years? Do you plan any more political candidacies?
BUCKLEY: There was a lot of pressure on me to run against Goodell. By the way—I haven't told this before to anybody, but what the hell—I had decided back in 1967 to run against Bobby Kennedy in 1970. I reasoned that Johnson would be re-elected and that Bobby would go for President in 1972. He was, in 1967—as, indeed, later—the symbol of left opposition to Johnson. I resolved to challenge his politics in the Senatorial race. When he died, I abandoned any idea of running for Senator in 1970. Along came Goodell—and the pressures on me to challenge him. The principal moral allure was that it was something I deeply wanted not to do. Quite apart from the sort of inertial disadvantages of running against Goodell, and the gruesome prospect of campaigning, I had to face the fact that I would automatically be stripped of those forums to which I had gained access. No more thoughtful television programs, no more columns—because it has now been more or less agreed among American editors that they won't carry a column written by a practicing politician. I think of Galbraith's adage: The Senate is a good place to be if you have no other forum. If I were Senator from New York, it isn't at all clear to me that I'd have more influence than I have today, with my various outlets.

PLAYBOY: Did running in the 1965 mayoral race in New York strip you of those forums?

BUCKLEY: Yes and no. In the first place, it was a local contest and I never wrote about it in my columns. The television series was postponed precisely on account of my running. Another thing: It was sometime after 1965 that many newspaper editors reached their decision to embargo writer-politicians. They faced the problem directly when Senator Goldwater, a columnist, ran for President, lost, resumed his column and ran for Senator in 1966.

PLAYBOY: How would you feel about running for a seat in the House?

BUCKLEY: God, no. Not unless I can have all the seats simultaneously.

PLAYBOY: If there were a conservative Administration in this country—say, if Ronald Reagan became President—would you be tempted to accept a high post in the Administration?
BUCKLEY: No. In the first place, I don't like it much. In the second place--

PLAYBOY: Don't like what much--Washington?

BUCKLEY: That's right.

PLAYBOY: Cabinet meetings?

BUCKLEY: I don't much like any kind of meetings. Besides, I have no reason for supposing that I'm a skillful administrator; I may be or I may very well not be. But the kind of thing that I am practiced in requires considerable freedom of expression, and freedom of expression is obviously something you need to be very continent about when the point of the thing is to advance the collective endeavor.

PLAYBOY: With or without your own involvement in an official capacity, are you optimistic about the conservative movement in America?

BUCKLEY: I am, mildly. There has been some encouraging de-ideologization of politics in the past twenty years. When I went to college, Henry Wallace was still able to grip a lot of people with hopped-up visions like the nationalization of the steel industry. We've watched the experience of England since then and studied nationalized industries elsewhere, and no one will go to that parade anymore, no one except the types who squat in the fever swamps of ideology. The collapse of the poverty program as a Federal enterprise strikes me as significant. It strikes me as significant, too, that Patrick Moynihan got up at an A.D.A. meeting a year or so ago and said, Let's face it, gang, conservatives know something intuitively that it takes us liberals years of intellectualizing to come up with--namely, that the Federal Government can't do everything it wants to do. Peter Drucker, who is certainly not considered a conservative fanatic, says now that the only things the Government has proved it can really do competently are wage war and inflate the currency.

We've seen what's-his-name, that nice guy Kennedy sent down to South America to screw things up--Richard Goodwin--predict in Commentary that the great struggle of the seventies will be over the limits of state power. Which is exactly what conservatives wanted to fight about in the thirties.
We've seen Arthur Schlesinger call a couple of dozen Kennedy types into his apartment for a daylong "secret" seminar—nobody was supposed to know about it, but I knew about it—in which they reconsidered their enthusiasm for executive power, because executive power, it turns out, can be administered by the likes of Lyndon Johnson! These are pretty encouraging indices. They suggest to me that there is a wide concern over the survival of the individual in the machine age and over the limits of Federal and executive power. They may, in turn, stimulate a curiosity about the ontological role of the state. That is conservative territory, but admittance is free.

PLAYBOY: Even if you don't intend to run for office again, do you plan to keep writing?

BUCKLEY: Yes. We've kept an alternative landing field in operation, you see. When the liberals fly in, thirsty, out of gas, they'll find it in full working order—radar OK, bar open, Coca-Cola and coffee on the house. We know it's necessary to assimilate the experience of the modern age. Cardinal Newman said in a related contest—between the logical positivists and the conservatives—that one of our great challenges is constantly to incorporate new experience, so as not to leave ourselves with a piece of brittle lace, the touching of which would cause it to crumble.

PLAYBOY: Don't most dogmas, theological as well as ideological, crumble sooner or later?

BUCKLEY: Most, but not all.

PLAYBOY: How can you be so sure?

BUCKLEY: I know that my Redeemer liveth.
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