INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or “target” for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is “Missing Page(s)”. If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in “sectioning” the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from “photographs” if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of “photographs” may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
Chapter I
Background

Political, social and economic conditions in 1920's China

In the 1920's, China was in chaos and confusion. The period between the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1916 and the Northern Expedition of the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1926-27, is generally called the period of warlordism in modern Chinese history. Yuan, who was called the "Father of Pei-yang Army," was the gravity in the Chinese power politics after the fall of the Manchu court in 1912. His death removed the keystone of the unity of Pei-yang Army and thus created a period of power-vaccum in China. After Yuan's death, the struggle for power was initiated among the Pei-yang Army's chiefs, and then the non-Pei-yang military units joined the games. These militarists challenged one another and wars broke out very often among them.

One of the most important characteristics of warlordism was war. "Not all warlords were ambitious to expand their holdings, but all were interested in maintaining what they had against those who sought more. And since there were always those who sought more, local and regional wars were frequent." Between 1915 and 1922, there were ten major civil wars which
the cadres to engage in the peasant movement. Since this study is intended to limit its scope in the urban masses, not further discussion on the peasant movement will be pursued.

In the urban areas, the working class was the main object of KMT's urban mass politics. In order to gain the support from this group, the trade union was legalized in KMT's Trade Union Regulations in November 1924. There were 21 articles in the Regulations which recognized the rights of employees to form unions, though some restrictions were imposed on the union activities. The first article of the Regulations stated that the workers above the age of 16, belonging to the same occupation or industry or trade, might organize unions or form organizations of similar nature. The trade union or employees' organizations (the term "employees" here applied to industrial workers, teachers and other government employees,) were not held responsible for any individual action not in connection with the organization concerned. The Regulations further defined the aims and activities of the trade union as followings: (1) to promote the welfare of all members, (2) to conclude contracts with employers, (3) to establish co-operative societies, saving banks and social insurance in the interests of its members, (4) to enrich the knowledge of its members and to enhance their opportunity for learning by providing a vacational education, (5) to investigate and report on the economic conditions of
its members and (6) to improve the general welfare of its members, including a higher standard of living and better education. The right of the workers to declare strikes was also recognized in the Regulations.

It is clear that the KMT not only used anti-imperialism to stimulate the rise of nationalistic feelings of the workers as the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the KMT and Sun's May Day speech did, it also proclaimed its intention to improve the workers' lot to incite them to participate in KMT's political movement. Since the principal causes of early strikes were the high cost of living and depreciation of the copper coins, KMT's promises and the labor regulations no doubt won the tremendous support from the workers who were usually more interested in the immediate economic gain than the ideological arguments in the early 1920's.

With the sponsorship of the KMT, the Second National Labor Congress was held in Canton in May 1925, and a manifesto was issued under the control of the CCP group of the KMT. The Manifesto in its Resolution on Economic Struggle demanded the 8-hour day, better treatments for the female and child labor, social insurance, abolition of the system of contract-labor (pao-kung-chih), and the minimum living wages. And in its Resolution on Political Struggle, it
declared that there was antagonism between the interests of the working class and imperialism. Thus, the political struggle was necessary for the working class to achieve their economic goal. The national revolution was regarded as the only life-way (sheng-ju) in China which was ruled and controlled by imperialism and the warlords. The Manifesto thus called the working class to join the national revolutionary movement.  

It is obvious that the KMT had combined the economic and political demands of the workers with the purpose of bring the mass participation of the working class into its political movement.

Another important group of the urban dwellers were the merchants. The policy of the KMT to the merchants was a much more complicated story, and could be divided into two periods. In the first period, the KMT regarded the merchants as an object under the KMT rule. The KMT only asked the passive obedience of the merchants to the KMT regulations and the payments of taxes by the merchants.

Although Sun Yat-sen supported the formation of the Merchants' Volunteer Corps in Canton, and even presented the Corps with its official banner on the day of their inauguration,  Sun and his KMT did not pay too much attention to the merchant movement or organizations among the merchants.
As a matter of fact, the Department of Commerce of the CEC of the KMT was not established until November 1924. The peasant and labor policy of the KMT was misrepresented by the enemies of the KMT as a means to oppress the merchant class. The admittance of the CCP members into the KMT and the alliance with Russia were regarded as a symptom of the immediate disaster of communism. The KMT propaganda materials, favored the peasant and labor movement, and Sun's personal view on the function of the merchants further seemed to confirm the distrust of the merchants on the KMT.

In his first lecture on Kin-sheng chu i on August 3, 1924, Sun first made an analysis of the development of the trade system and the monetary economy, and then criticized that under the existing system of merchant distribution, the consumers unconsciously were suffering heavy losses. Thus Sun after stating that "the merchant buys the commodities at the lowest possible price from the producer and then sells them to the consumer; by this one transaction, he earns a large commission," he appreciated a socialized distribution by saying," recent studies have showed that the trade system can be improved upon, that goods do not have to be distributed by merchants but can be distributed through social organizations or by the government." In his criticism on Marxist theory of surplus value, Sun even optimistically predicted that the rise of cooperative so-
sieties would eliminate the existence of the merchant class. Sun's attitude towards the merchants no doubt strengthened merchants' dislike for Sun's KMT government. Merchants' hostility towards the KMT can be revealed from the incident of the Merchants' Volunteer Corps in October 1924.

The discontent of the Canton merchants was further exacerbated by the British and their Chinese compradores in Hongkong. In August, 1924, a full-scale rebellion led by Ch'en Lien-po, a local compradore of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, broke out on the pretext that the Canton Government had detented their imported rifles (the number was near 10,000). Ch'en even managed to persuade the Hongkong authorities to threaten Sun if his troops fired on the area under the control of the Merchants' Volunteer Corps.

Early in October, the government softened and made a compromise by giving 5000 rifles to the Corps, for which the latter were to pay $200,000 to government. The Corps at first consented to such an agreement. On October 10, the guns were shipped to the Corps. KMT's appeasement policy seemed to strengthen the ambition of the Corps. It was on the same day, that the Corps opened fire on the unarmed crowds who were parading in celebration of the Double Ten. And on the following day, the Corps even distributed handbills accusing the KMT government of giving them less than half of their guns, and threatened to close their shops.
unless all their guns were given back to them. Meanwhile, the Corps sent out members to patrol the streets and forced to close some shops which had opened for business. 79 To deal with the Corps, the KMT government in Canton mobilized all troops under its control with the cooperation of the student cadets of the Whampoa Military Academy and the Peasant-Labor Army (kung-nung-ch'un), to launch an offense on the morning of October 15. On the same day, the Merchants' Volunteer Corps was disarmed. 80

When the Merchants' Volunteer Corps Incident was still in process, the KMT realized that it had not been making much effort to win the support of the merchants, so it decided to change its policy towards the merchants. The Department of Commerce in the CEC of the KMT was established in November 1924, though there was still without Bureau of Commerce in the branches of the Party. A Merchant Movement Institute was founded in October, 1925 to train cadres to engage in the merchant movement.

The Second National Congress of the KMT further passed the Resolution on the Merchant Movement and the regulations over the organizations of the merchants' associations. The Bureau of Commerce was also established in various party branches of the KMT. 82

The Merchant Movement Resolution divided the merchants into two categories. One was un-revolutionary, which included
compradores, merchants selling foreign goods and the bankers who had business of the joint capital with foreigners, for these people all had the close economic interests with imperialism. Another group was revolutionary members who were the national industrialists, merchants of native goods, and bankers in Chinese-capital banks, for they were the oppressed of imperialism. The Resolution stated that the KMT would induce the potential revolutionary merchants to pay more attention to the political struggle and and should also awaken their political consciousness to form a united front with the peasants and the workers. The Resolution also declared that the merchant movement could co-exist with the peasant movement and the labor movement, for they were all parts of the united front in the national revolution, and all three groups were under the oppressions of the warlords and imperialism.

It is obvious that the KMT at last realized the important role of the merchants in its mass politics, and thus adjusted its policy towards them. The theory of anti-imperialism was utilized to call the merchants to participate in the political struggle by telling the merchants that the vital enemy of the merchants was the economic oppression of the foreign powers, and their heavy burden came from foreign imperialism and its running does, the warlords and the compradores. In order to relieve their burdens, the merchants must unite with the
masses of peasants and workers to overthrow the oppressions of foreign imperialism and the warlords.

Now, the KMT at last built up a more solid united front in its national revolution and thus moved the workers and students from isolation in the cities, and the peasants in the rural areas. And it was in here that the KMT not only used anti-imperialism to satisfy the patriotic sentiments of the merchants, but also used anti-imperialism as a tool to promote the economic interests of the merchants. The policy of combining the patriotism and economic interests made anti-imperialism have the function of satisfying merchants' profit-orientation.

KMT's policies for organizing and mobilizing mass movement

Though Sun Yat-sen and his KMT were interested in China's economic and social problems, they had not been able to reach the great masses of the country with their revolutionary principles. As late as 1923, Sun himself admitted that even the majority of the KMT members did not understand his principles and policies, not to mention the common
people.

Chang Kuo-t'ao recalled that in his first meeting with Sun Yat-sen in 1919, he and other student leaders accused for his ignorance on the student movement, the New Cultural Movement as well as the workers, merchants in the cities and the common people in the countryside, and his concentration on the military forces. After ridiculing Sun for his failure in the past even having commanded tens of thousands of armed forces, they warned Sun, "it is not easy for one to see the emergence of new situations and new forces. But if a revolutionary leader fails to see a new age clearly, if he ignores the trend of the masses, he just might be left behind." Sun admitted that he had not paid enough attention to the student movement and the New Cultural Movement, and that his propaganda work had not been executed in adequacy, thus the youth and the masses did not understand his principles.

This conversation seems to have had some impact on Sun's propaganda work. In the very last days of January 1920, Sun sent a "Letter to Overseas Comrades," asking to build a new printing organization in order to propagate KMT ideas and principles. In this letter, Sun appreciated the New Cultural Movement and the May Fourth Movement, and predicted that these movements would have great influence on the revolutionary progress. Although Sun's project did not succeed, a
Min-chih Bookstore was established to serve as the KMT printing organ. 86

In 1919, the KMT had only three departments in its central party organization, however, Sun added a propaganda department in November 1920. 87 One year later, in a meeting at Wuchow, Sun instructed the KMT members to propagate his ideas and principles in the hope that the revolutionary principles would reach the masses. Only then, Sun told the KMT members that a military occupation would be regarded as useful and successful. 88

Sun's efforts on "propaganda" were particularlly intensified in the KMT reorganization period of 1923-1924. Sun seemed to have been convinced that the control of several thousand armed forces was not matched for the impact of effective propaganda work. Such a new emphasis was revealed in Sun's long lecture before the KMT meeting on December 30, 1923 in Canton. 89 Sun told the KMT members that "the reorganization of the KMT this time is going to change our methods of struggle--we are going to emphasize the propaganda work and de-emphasize the military work." He cited the case of Wuchang Incident in the Revolution of 1911 as a successful example of the propaganda work, for it had convinced the soldiers in the Manchu armies to give up their resistance to the revolutionary army. Then Sun urged the KMT members to unite all people under the KMT flag to build a peaceful and
lasted altogether for 48 months. The direct victims of these wars often were the noncombatants, the common people. When a war was fought, there was always the possibility that either the victors or the defeated would loot the nearby villages, towns and cities. The common people often suffered directly from the abuse of the disorderly troops.

Although the central government spent more than one third of its expenditure on military and the warlords were living a splendid life, many soldiers were underpaid and their pay was "so forever and hopeless several months in arrears." So the "pickings" were just about what each soldier chose to make.4

Besides the direct hardships imposed by the warlords' troops, the high taxation and oppression contributed to a widespread banditry and piracy. As the North China Herald reported in 1924, "With an exception here and there of some commander who was cleaning house, banditry and piracy were growing worse everyday." 5 No estimate can be made of the loss of life and property which resulted these bandit activities, but there is no doubt that many Chinese of all ages and both sexes must have been subjected to such violence.

The high taxation, banditry, piracy and the forced planting of opium instead of food crops by some warlords caused many famines or near-famine conditions in this period. 6

The constant internal strife also brought special problems to the intellectuals. The military budgets in the provinces as well as in the central government usually expanded at the
wealthy New China by propagating his San Min Chu I to the masses. From then on, Sun concluded in his lecture, that the KMT should concentrate its efforts on propaganda work rather on military actions.

To enlarge its propaganda function, the KMT set up newspaper reading rooms and a Training Institute of News Reporters in Shanghai in 1923. The Kuomintang Weekly, Republic Daily (Min-kuo jih-pao), Hsian-kian Morning News and Hsin-wen Pao were either established or brought in the same year. Also some periodicals were subsidized by the KMT.

Besides the above efforts, the KMT established a Propaganda Training Institute in July 1924 to sharpen the propaganda skills of the KMT cadres. Sun announced that this Institute was as important as the Whampoa Military Academy for the revolutionary progress. In his inauguration address, Sun recalled that since the establishment of the Republic, the great majority of the KMT members engaged in military struggle but few of them in propaganda struggle for the revolution. However, due to the lack of propaganda, the downfall of the Manchus did not bring the success of the Revolution. Sun quoted an old Chinese saying that "to seize a city is inferior than to win the hearts of the people" (kung-hsin wei shang, kung-ch'eng wei hsia), to warn his audience. Sun also demanded the cadres of the Institute to equip themselves with the revolutionary principles and to persuade the masses to
follow the principles for the sake of the revolutionary movement. 91

Due to the lack of materials, no further study is possible on the Institute right now. However, from Sun's address, there is no doubt that the KMT after the reorganization had a clear design for training the propaganda cadres to engage in propaganda work in order to influence the masses with its principles and policies.

The tendency of putting more and more attention on propaganda by Sun and his KMT also can be detected from the increment of the numbers of the KMT official declarations and Sun's public lectures. During the Hsing-chung Hui period (1895-1905), there were only two declarations and one public lecture. In Tung-men Hui period (1905-1912), the declarations were increased to 7 and public lectures to 24. In the first Kuo-min-tang period (1912-1914) the declarations dropped to 3 while the public lectures increased to 42. However, I found that most of these lectures were given either in banquets or welcome meetings and did not deal with much of Sun's revolutionary principles or policies. 92

Table 4 The Numbers of Sun's Public Lectures, 1919-1925

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1922</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1924</th>
<th>1925</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lectures</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 shows that in Sun's last years, most of his public lectures were done in the KMT reorganization period and its immediately following years. It seemed that only the death prevented Sun to give more public lectures.

It is also noted from Figure 2 that most of KMT's official declarations were issued between 1923 and 1926. Among these declarations, at least 9 directly dealt with the mass movements while 42 with political affairs. As to the public lectures in this period, 16 dealt with propaganda work and
23 with the revolutionary principles and policies. From the contents of these declarations and public lectures, we can easily find that the KMT after the reorganization had made great efforts in its propaganda work in order to win the support of the masses.

The writing-style of these declarations also was gradually changing. Prior to 1923, all of them were written in modern classical Chinese, aiming at the politicians, KMT's own members and the intelligentsia. However, the declarations after 1923 started to adopt the semi-vernacular Chinese. Some of them even were written in vernacular. This change is quite possible due to the influence of the New Cultural Movement. However, it can also be regarded as a new tendency for promoting the propaganda on the revolutionary principles and policies among the great masses.

A good example is the "Declaration on the National Humiliation Day" of September 7, 1924. The Declaration was written in semi-vernacular language, appealing directly to the masses with very strong anti-imperialist tone, and could be understood by people with little education. In a conversation style, it started by asking the readers, "What day is today?" Then after giving the answer that "Today is September 7," it traced back the "Boxer Uprising" in 1899, and made an analysis on the happening. According to the Declaration, the Uprising was an unavoidable happening under the
foreign political and cultural oppressions. It declared that "The Boxer Uprising was bound to happen because of the existence of foreign imperialism in China." Although it denounced that the Boxers did not make the distinction between the fanatic anti-foreignism and anti-imperialism, it did appreciate the patriotic sentiments of these Boxers. The Declaration further asked the people to unite together under KMT's revolutionary banner to beat down foreign imperialism and thus to relieve China from the national humiliation.

After recognizing the important role of the masses in the revolutionary movement, the united front under the leadership of the KMT gradually waged its propaganda works with the most popular language and writing style at the time in order to reach the masses. Efforts to promote propaganda on the revolutionary principles and policies were made to lead and channel the resentments of the masses towards the foreigners into anti-imperialist feelings and actions. Propaganda thus became an effective and important tool for the united front to mobilize the masses in the Chinese national revolutionary movement.
Notes To Chapter II


5. Ibid., pp.357-358.

6. KMT hsuan-yen, p.46

7. Ibid., p.47.


11. Wen-san Hsu, op.cit., pp.517-520.

12. Ibid., pp.839-840.

13. Ibid., pp.902-922.


17. Ibid., p. 115, 413

18. For more detailed understanding on Liang's ideas about imperialism, see Hao Chang, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-1907, Cambridge, 1971, chapter 6 and chapter 8.


20. Wen-san Hsu, op. cit., pp.481-495.


22. Ibid., pp.280-284.

23. Ibid., pp.29-34.


25. Sun Yat-sen, Tsung-li kuan-yu ch'ing-nien ti i-chiao, Nanking, 1929, pp.73-77.


32. English translation in Shao-chuan Leng, op.cit., p. 79.

33. Ibid., p. 139.


36. Ibid., pp.417-418.

38. Ibid., p. 456.


40. Lao-kung shih, p.

41. Wen-san Hsu, op. cit., pp. 675-683.

42. San Min Chu I, pp. 53-54.

43. Wen-san Hsu, op. cit., pp. 398-399.

44. San Min Chu I, pp. 119-121, p. 54.

45. Wen-san Hsu, op. cit., pp. 151-173.

46. San Min Chu I, p. 213.

47. Ibid., p. 214.

48. Ibid., p. 480.

49. Ibid., p. 452.

50. Ibid., p. 503.

51. Ibid., pp. 506-508.

52. Ibid., pp. 508-511.

53. Ibid., pp. 508-509.


55. KMT hsuan-ven, pp. 60-67.

56. Ibid., pp. 78-104.


60. Shao-chuan Leng, *op. cit.*, p. 68.


62. KMT hsuan-ven, pp. 29-34.


66. Ibid., pp. 408-409.


69. Lao-kung shih, pp. 322-326.


76. Wen-san Hsu, *op. cit.*, p. 341.


80. Lao-kung shih, p. 320, 326.
81. Chao-nien Huang, op.cit., pp. 6-7.
82. Ibid., pp. 8-10.
83. Ibid., pp. 31-47.
84. Wo ti hui i, pp. 71-72.
86. Lu Tsou, op.cit., p. 561.
87. Ibid., p. 48.
89. Ibid., pp. 950-955.
90. Lu Tsou, op.cit., pp. 70-71.
Chapter III
Mass Politics in Action (I)
The May Thirtieth Movement

Under the sponsorship and leadership of the CCP/KMT, the mass movement developed rapidly after 1924. The re-organized KMT, which now had such organs as the Departments of Peasants, Labor, Youth, Women and Merchants, and was strengthened by the democratic centralism party system, launched a campaign for the causes of the masses. Meanwhile, it tried to bring the masses to participate in the political activities led by the Party. The labor movement which had been the main target of the CCP was particularly active after the reorganization of the KMT, for the CCP under the coverage of the KMT had a much easier access to the masses.

Party cells and party fractions (tang-t'uan) were organized by the KMT and in most cases by the CCP members of the KMT, in many labor organizations, peasant associations and organizations of the intellectuals. The tactics were to increase the role of the party members in these organizations to such an extent that they could overthrow the leadership of the non-party members and and assumed control themselves when the proper time came.
expense of educational expenditures. The salaries of the teachers were often several months in arrears. And the public schools in Anhwei, Honan, Kiangsi, Szechwan and Kwangtung all had been closed down one time or another due to the lack of funds. Sometimes the wars between the various warlords would not only rule out educational expenses, but also virtually forced the schools to close due to wars. In one case, the public schools in the provinces of Chekiang and Kiangsu were ordered to close by the warlords of these provinces.

Furthermore, though most of the warlords were uneducated or had only limited education, they tended to have great interests in interfering with the curriculum and educational activities according to their own taste. They distrusted any new innovation in education. For instance, both the Ministry of Education of the central government and the Educational Association of All China proclaimed the adoption of vernacular Mandarin as the basic course in schools. However, many local warlords not only refused to follow the instruction, but instead announced the prohibition of the use of vernacular Mandarin in the areas of their control.

Most of the warlords and their followers had no law except that of their interests and power. To them, might is right. They mistreated the people. They beat and killed the intellectuals as well as the other common people without trials. They harassed the intellectuals in their meetings. In a lantern
To induce the young intellectuals to join the national revolutionary movement, Kwangtung University was established with Tsou Lu, the Minister of the Youth Department of the CEC of the KMT, as the President in early 1924. The principles and policies of the KMT were an essential part of the curriculum of the University. In addition to the University, the KMT set up several tens of schools for the common people in order to instill in the general masses some political consciousness. Meanwhile, for strengthening KMT's influence among the students, financial aids were granted to the National Students' Federation which had declared its support to the KMT in August 1923. The Shanghai University which was founded by the veteran KMT Yu Yu-jen and directed by the CCP member Ch'u Ch'iu-p'ai, also received financial aids from the KMT. This University soon became an important place for training young revolutionaries, and was regarded as the "Bolshevik University" by the International Settlement authorities in Shanghai. In a student strike against the administration of the Anglo-Chinese College in Amoy (Hsia-men Ta-hsueh), the students withdrew from the college en masse in June 1924. The KMT leaders were able to gain leadership in the founding of a Ta-hsia University in Shanghai for these ex-students of the Anglo-Chinese College in November 1924.

In 1924, the National Students' Federation passed resolution unholding the principles of "Down with Foreign Im-
perialism" and "Down with Warlordism," and declared that the students would serve as vanguard of national revolution.

During the Hongkong-Shameen Strike of 1925-26, the Federation sent several circular telegrams to ask student organizations throughout the nation to denounce British blockade against Canton and to show their sympathy with KMT government in Canton. It is obvious that the Federation by this time had very close relations with the reorganized KMT and was working for the benefit of the national revolutionary movement.

The Eighth National Conference of the Students, with the sponsorship of the KMT, was again held in Canton in 1926. In this conference, the Federation formulated the organizational regulations of the students at various levels. The democratic centralism was formally put into effect in order to tighten the student organizations. Its resolutions declared that the national revolution was the only way to bring about liberty and equality in China, and the Northern Expedition of the KMT should be supported. To support the Northern Expedition, the Federation demanded the local students' organizations to propagate among people the reasons for the national revolution, to organize the people to support the KMT government, and to join the task of the Northern Expedition. Furthermore, to consolidate the strength of the people in the process of revolutionary movement, the Federation asked the local student unions to mix with the workers,
peasants and merchants in order to organize united front organizations such as the federation of peasants, workers, merchants and students. In order to practise their anti-oppression activities, the Federation also passed its Resolution on the Students' Activities in the School Seasons and Vacations. The resolution demanded the students to hold lectures and debates dealing with the current social and political problems. The students were told to open evening schools, publish wall-papers and perform modern drama in the public places in order to reach the common masses. The resolution also directed the students to visit the countryside to gain good will of the peasants and to awaken their patriotic feelings.  

To popularize their ideas, more than 100,000 posters containing "Down with imperialism," "Abolition of unequal treaties," and "Peasants, workers, merchants and students unite" were distributed in many places all over the country through the efforts of the local student unions in 1926. In some places, revolutionary songs were taught in schools.

In order to keep the students united and to boost their morale, the Chung-kuo hsueh-sheng chou-k' an (Chinese Students' Weekly) was published by the National Students' Federation in 1926. The Weekly intended to guide the students in their attitudes towards the student movement, and explained the
relationship between the Chinese warlords and foreign imperialism. 14

In March 1926, the KMT organized boy scouts in various schools in the areas under its control. 15 The Department of Youth of the CEC of the KMT further organized a Youth Corps (Ch'īn- nien kung-tso-t' uan). The purposes of the Corps were defined as: (1) to provide practical knowledge for the youths, (2) to improve the life of the poor youths, (3) to channel the activities of the youths, and (4) to lead the youths to join the national revolution through the youth movement. 16

It seems that though the KMT might not have directly controlled the students' organizations and the National Students' Federation, it did have great influence in these organizations. The National Students' Federation not only several times held its national conferences in Canton, but also had received financial aids from the KMT. More than once, the Federation explicitly declared its support for the KMT government in Canton and the Northern Expedition. It also had worked for the benefit of the KMT on many occasions. From the resolutions and the activities of the student unions, we can detect that the KMT did penetrate into these student organizations in many provinces. As to the student organizations in the provinces of Kwangtung and
Kwangsi, the KMT had a tight control over them. Sun Yat-sen's *San Min Chu I* was not only taught in colleges, but also in lower level schools. In July 1926, the Educational Administrative Committee of the KMT government passed a resolution to demand the students in schools to join the KMT. For strengthening the KMT influence and control, the KMT Second National Congress passed the Youth Movement Resolution in January 1926. The Resolution instructed the KMT cadres to maintain a close relation between the political struggle activities and the self-interests of the youths, in order to bring the youths closer to the KMT and also into the national revolution.

Through the efforts of the youth movement cadres, the KMT was able to have a firm control over the students in Kwangtung and Kwangsi. In Canton, even the most conservative Canton Christian College had about 40 to 50 KMT members among its 800 students. On June 23, 1925, these KMT students were able to incite the whole student body to join the demonstration to support the Shanghai students and workers. After the great efforts of the KMT cadres, the students of this college gave their support to the KMT and joined the anti-imperialist movement. "Even the meekest and most backward demanded the removal of the British teachers" for the college.

As for KMT's activities among the merchants, the KMT
made its hard efforts in order to bring the merchants under its banner. After the establishment of the Department of Commerce in the CEC of the KMT in late 1924, the merchant movement was formally launched. Nevertheless, the first merchants' association did not appear until early 1925 only after the great effort of the merchant movement cadres. And because there was not Bureau of Merchants in the local KMT branches until 1925, the organizers of the merchants had to be sent directly by the central KMT headquarters into various localities.21

The KMT Second National Congress in 1925 passed the Resolutions on the Merchants' Movement which regulated the scope of the activities of the movement as well as the means to wage the movement.22 Although some local merchants' associations were organized in 1925, the Federation of the Merchants' Associations of Kwangtung was not established until May 1926. By 1926, besides the Canton Merchants' Association, there were also merchants' associations over 24 counties in Kwangtung.

The Federation of the Merchants' Associations of Kwangtung was established under the direction and assistance of the Department of Commerce of the CEC of the KMT. The Federation declared: (1) the support of the Merchants' Movement Resolutions of the KMT Second National Congress, (2) the support for the KMT government, (3) the support for the
Hongkong-Shameen Strike, (4) the unity of the peasants, students, merchants and workers, (5) presentation of a petition to KMT government for the cancellation of various extra-taxes, (6) the establishment of the business schools, and (7) the founding of a daily news of merchants.  

However, the merchant movement and organizations were still inactive outside Kwantung Province. It was only after the KMT army brought other provinces under its rule in 1926 that the merchant movement initiated in other areas.  

Since the founding of the CCP, the labor movement had been the main target of its activities, for the CCP regarded itself as the party of the proletarians. The establishment of the Labor Secretariat in 1921 further provided the CCP members with a unified organ for their labor activities. The headquarters of the Labor Secretariat was located in Shanghai, and a weekly entitled Lao-tung chou-k' an (labor weekly) was published to give directions and guidance to the labor movement. The labor movement cadres of the Secretariat were provided with minimum living expense for their activities. The labor movement thus gradually developed under the efforts of these cadres. Meanwhile, the KMT also engaged in labor activities in the early 1920s. However, its activities appeared only largely on paper.
The failure of the February Seventh Strike in 1923 no doubt dealt the new rising labor movement a heavy blow. The Strike not only broke the link between the CCP and warlord Wu P'ei-fu and ended in a tragedy, but it also brought about the severe suppression from the warlords in the Northern China upon the labor activities. Many labor unions were either destroyed or driven underground. Many CCP members were thus forced to switch their attention to Canton. And a majority of delegates to the Third CCP National Congress thus agreed Marina's proposal of joining the KMT by the CCP members en masse.

The first move in the labor movement after the formation of the united front between the KMT and CCP was the establishment of the National General Union of the Railway Workers on February 7, 1924. During the days of the First National Congress of the KMT, Chang Kuo-t'ao went back to Peking and secretly prepared the summoning of the Congress of the Railway Workers. About 20 or so delegates from the underground labor unions of 9 major railway lines convened in Peking and then announced the founding of the General Union. Although the General Union was raided and many of its leaders were arrested by the warlord authorities in May of the same year, the formation of the General Union indicated that the labor movement which had been silenced for a while, was now revived again.
The reorganized KMT, with its CEC located at Canton, established executive departments of the CEC in Shanghai, Peking, Wuhan and Szechwan. As a branch of the CEC, the executive department had full authority to direct party affairs in its own area. Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei were to be in charge of the Shanghai Executive Department with Mao Tse-tung, its secretary, as the administrator. Shanghai, one of the most important cities in China, was regarded as the most important center outside Canton to develop the KMT activities. Important KMT leaders, Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei, Yu Yu-jen, Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang and Chang Ching-kiang were assigned as members to the Executive Department of Shanghai, and the CCP members Mao Tse-tung, Shao Li-tzu, Yun T'ai-ying and others were appointed as secretaries of various departments in the Executive Department. The main reason for such arrangement was that Sun Yat-sen wanted the veteran KMT leaders to assume nominal leadership of various executive departments, while the new comrades were elevated to do the actual work.

Meanwhile, because that the CCP still regarded the labor movement and the youth movement were the most important tasks of it, and Shanghai was the city where the CC of the CCP located, nearly all the important figures of the CCP were assembled in Shanghai. So far as we know, Ch'en Tu-hsiu himself, Ts'ai Ho-shen, Hsiang Ching-yu, Teng Chung-hsia,
Liu Shao-ch'i, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Chang Tai-lai, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, 
Li Li-san, Shen Tze-min and Yun T'ai-yin were all in Shanghai, and devoted most of their time in developing the mass movement, particularly the labor movement.33

Acting in their new capacities as members of the re-organized KMT, these CCP labor movement cadres established evening schools for workers in various districts of Shanghai, and a Hu-hsi kung-jen chh-lo pu (west Shanghai workers' club) was also founded in Hsiaoshatu in early 1924.34 Meanwhile, the Federation of Labor Organizations at Shanghai, which was organized by some of the ex-communists and moderate labor union leaders in August 1923,35 was gradually infiltrated by the CCP members, and by early 1925, the Federation was in fact under the control of the CCP labor movement cadres.36

As the labor movement was revived after 1924, the CCP prepared the convention of the Second National Labor Congress. The Congress was nominally sponsored by the Federation of Labor Organizations at Shanghai, the Kan-yeh-ping General Union, the General Union of Railway Workers, the Canton Workers' Delegates' Congress and the Seamen's Union of Hongkong, though it was the Labor Movement Committee of the CC of the CCP actually making the preparations for the Congress.37

On May 1, 1925, the Second National Labor Congress was convened at Canton with 277 delegates representing 540,000
parade in 1923, 120 students were wounded due to the brutality of the Peking police. In another case, some 400 students were massacred by the troops of a warlord under the pretext that these students might have helped the KMT Army. The famous news editor Shao Pi'ao-ping was shot without a trial by the warlord gendarme. The notorious warlord Chang Tsung-ch'ang even shot a news reporter only because the unfortunate reporter had a long title in his call-card.

Besides the heavy taxation, disorders, emotional frustration towards the warlordism, the continuous existence of the likin system also brought direct and indirect hardship on all classes of the Chinese population. Likin was a tax imposed upon goods in internal transit, initiated in 1853. By 1920, likin stations existed at all large towns and were placed along the main routes of commerce. The native goods were subjected to pay likin at every likin station. Thus the Chinese merchants and manufacturers were directly and the common masses were indirectly under the yoke of the likin which was collected by the local warlords to support their oppressive troops.

In the urban areas, besides all the burdens which were created by warlordism, the working class further endured the hardship of primitive industrial development, namely the long-hour, low-wage, female and child labor problems and the lack of social insurance and medical care.

Because of the low wage, the workers were not able to maintain a normal living. Thus the children and women were
organized workers. Liao Chung-k'ai, the Minister of the Department of Labor of the CEC of the KMT, represented the KMT, and Chang Kuo-t'ao, the Director of the Labor Movement Committee of the CC of the CCP, represented the CCP to the Congress. Both of them gave congratulatory addresses. In the meetings of this Congress, the slogans "Close cooperation between the KMT and CCP," "Down with the warlords," and "Down with foreign imperialism" were the prevailing language. And it was in this Congress, resolutions were passed to ask the Chinese labor class to join the national revolution in order to overthrow the yoke of imperialism and warlordism. At the same time, the Congress also passed its Economic Struggle Resolution which advocated the reduction of working hours, the increment of wages, and the struggle for the freedom of speech, print, association and formation of the labor unions.

"The Congress proceeded with considerable smoothness as a consequence of the role that the CCP and the CYC played." Important CCP members were working within the group of communist delegates, promoting its guideline for the Congress from behind the scenes. They prepared all the resolutions and had them passed in the Congress. And it was in this Congress that the All-China General Labor Union was established. Since the CCP had formed the party fraction within the delegates of the Congress, the CCP was able to enlist nearly
all its labor movement cadres in the lists of candidates of the Executive Committee of the General Labor Union. Among the 25 members of the Executive Committee, at least 23 of them were CCP members. Lin Wei-min was elected chairman of the Executive Committee, Liu Shao-ch'i and Liu Wen-sung were elected vice-chairmen. Teng Chung-hsia was secretary-general of the Committee and the director of its Propaganda Department. Li Shen was the director of the Organization Department and Sun Yung-p'eng was director of the Economic Department. The headquarters was located in Canton, and a branch office was in Shanghai, with Chang Kuo-t'ao as its chief. Besides the above famous CCP members, Su Chao-cheng, Kuo Liang, Hsiang Ying, Li Li-san and Liu Erh-sung were all on the Executive Committee. On the other hand, nearly all the moderate labor movement leaders, including the famous right-wing KMT labor movement leader Ma Chao-chun and other labor leaders who had held hostile attitudes towards the CCP were all condemned as the "labor traitors" by the Congress. Because the Minister of Labor Department of the CEC of the KMT was busy in the financial problems and never expressed disagreement with the CCP in the labor movement matter, his secretary, Feng Chu-po, a communist, was in fact controlling and directing the Department. Thus all the motions of the Second National Labor Congress were regarded as legal and legitimate by the KMT, and the All-China General Labor
Union was nominally under the supervision of the Labor Department of the CEC of the KMT, though it was in fact controlled entirely by the CCP.

Through the efforts of the labor movement cadres, many new labor unions were organized, and the labor activities were intensified. The labor movement which had been silenced for a while after the February Seventh Strike, now gradually recovered from the stagnation and reached its peak in 1925-1926.

Figure 3 The Number of Labor Unions Founded in Shanghai, 1919-1927

Source: J. Chesneaux, *Les Syndicats Chinois*, pp. 49-68
It is noted from Figure 3 and Figure 4 that the development of the labor movement which had received a big blow after the February Seventh Strike in 1923, gradually revived in 1924, and the efforts of the labor movement cadres at last had their rewards in 1925-1926. They May Thirtieth Movement enabled the CCP/KMT union leaders to organize many more new unions in the high tide of anti-imperialism. The growth of the labor movement did not cease until the split between the KMT and CCP in 1927. As a matter of fact, nearly
all the unions founded in 1927, were established in the first half of the year.

Throughout China, the number of strikes increased. There were only 47 strikes in 1923 and the figure only slightly rose to 56 in 1924. It was in the year of 1925 that the labor activities were intensified under the slogan of anti-imperialism. The May Thirtieth Incident alone incited 135 strikes, while the total number of the strikes reached the mark of 318 in 1925. The labor unrestness continued in 1926 and the number of strikes increased to 535 in the year. In Shanghai, where the CCP/KMT had put great efforts in the labor movement, the number of the strikes increased rapidly after the revival of the labor activities in 1924 (see Table 5).

Table 5  The Number of Strikes in Shanghai and Canton, 1921-1926

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Strikes in Shanghai</th>
<th>Number of Strikes in Canton</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ch'en Ta, Chung-kuo Lao-kung Wen-ti, Shanghai, 1929, p. 150, Table 15.
Nevertheless, there were only few strikes in Canton, though the labor organizations were very well developed there. Such a strange phenomenon can only be understood through KMT's ideology and policy towards the mass movement. In the eyes of the KMT, the labor movement, as a part of its mass movement, was used to fight foreign imperialism and warlord oppressions. Thus, in the areas where were under the control of the warlords, the workers were incited to strike. However, in the power base of the KMT, the strikes were more or less regarded as a negative force which hindered the development of the KMT strength. Therefore, the strikes were not to be allowed to occur too often. As a matter of fact, most strikes occurred in Canton, were aiming at foreign imperialism. For instance, all strikes in 1925 in Canton were the direct results of the May Thirtieth Incident. The great number of labor unions but with only few strikes in Canton, may well indicated that the KMT had a very tight control over its labor movement.
The May Thirtieth Movement

In the summer of 1925, the CCP cadres formed a night school in Hsiaoshatu in the west Shanghai which later turned into the famous Hu-hsi Workers' Club in the end of the same year. The cotton mill worker Sun Liang-hui, a CCP member, was the head of the Club. The Club had about 80 members. However, all of them were very active in their working places. Also the CCP had developed its party fraction among these members.47

In early February, 1925, there was a dispute between the Chinese workers in the Naigai Wata Kaisha and their Japanese management over the lay-off. The CCP labor movement cadres utilized the opportunity and distributed handbills demanding the improvements of the economic conditions of the workers and the recognition of legitimate position of the workers' club in the negotiation. The high-handed policy of the Naigai in dealing with the workers enraged the workers. The workers of the No. 5 Mill of the Naigai started the strike on February 9, 1925.48

When the strike started, the workers left the factory and met in the open field just outside the factory. Many workers of other factories also joined themselves in the meeting. The CCP labor movement cadres installed a post with the poster "Oppose the beating of Chinese by the
Japanese" to gain the emotional support of these angry strikers. The adoption of such an inflammatory slogan no doubt immediately received the favorable attention of these workers. Meanwhile, the CCP cadres in the meeting furthermore adopted a surprise offensive tactics by announcing the founding of the labor union of the cotton textile factories and thus organized these workers into a more solid unit in the mass protest. And then, the workers were asked to follow the guidance and directions of the newly founded union. 49

The worker-student Liu Hua, supported by the CCP and with his own ability in oration and organization, became the leader of the cotton-mill workers and established his headquarters in Tantzewan. The CC of the CCP also appointed two more experienced cadres, Li Li-san and Teng Chung-hsia to direct the strike. 50

By February 14, the strike had extended to six different Japanese companies in the Western and Yantzepoo Districts of Shanghai, involving no less than 31,328 workers. 51 The strikers demanded: (1) prohibiting the beating of workers, (2) increasing wages by 10%, (3) payment in every two weeks, (4) reinstating the dismissed men, (5) abolishing the compulsory saving system, (7) not to fire or lay off the workers without reasons, and (8) releasing the arrested workers. With the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce as
mediator, the Japanese mill owners and the Chinese laborers reached a settlement on February 27, and the strike ended on the same day. The terms agreed upon were: (1) the cruelty towards Chinese workers would be prohibited, (2) re-instatement of strikers, (3) bonuses would be paid out according to existing rules and at the appointed time, and (4) fortnightly payment of wages. 52

Although the strike only won a partial victory, the workers were impressed by the success of the union and thus the union members in these Japanese mills increased rapidly to 9,000. 53

It was during this strike that the CCP developed some strategies and tactics to lead the labor movement. The student-worker Liu Hua in order to establish the labor organizations, lived among the workers in the union house, trained the delegates of various factories in their struggle with their employers, and strengthened their fighting will through individual conversations and the group meetings. Anti-Japanese feelings were fanned up and the anti-Japanese imperialism slogans were shouted. 54 For encouraging the morale and steadying the steps of the workers, the leaders changed their patterns of activities often. Everyday there was a mass meeting with folk-song style news handbills. Pickets were selected among the mass to be trained to execute their missions, while the mass was organized according
to their working units. Anti-Japanese lectures were given in these meetings. Thus the strikers were gradually organized into a solid unit.\(^5\) Their primary slogan of "Opposing the beating of people by the Japanese" not only won the vigorous support from the workers, it also won over many gangsters who were usually the obstacle of the strike, and the appeal to the patriotic sentiments even weakened the intervention of the Chinese police.\(^6\)

Furthermore, in order to win the support of other groups, the strike was limited only to Japanese factories. The strike leaders sent out propaganda information stating that the strike was aimed at the Japanese cotton mills and thus would benefit the Chinese cotton mills. The slogans "boycott against the Japanese goods" and "Japanese cotton mills should be in Japan" further pleased the Chinese cotton mill owners who even contributed $1,000 to support the strike.\(^7\)

The foreign community in Shanghai realized that the strike was directed by the labor movement cadres. As a report from the *North China Daily News* stated, "That agitators of the educated class were behind the strikers was evident by the good composition used in the handbills and by the presence among the workers of students and others connected with seats of learning notorious for their extremist proclivities."\(^8\) According to another report, the strikers
forced to seek employment in the factories. They were paid at much lower rates than men, but they had to endure the same long hours and harsh treatment. Female and child labor was especially prevalent in the textile industry, particularly in Shanghai. According to a data of 1930, female labor constituted 56% of the total workers of Shanghai, and child labor 9.2%. In 1924, there were 168,885 child laborers in Shanghai. Among them, 147,414 boys and girls were between 13 and 16 years old, while many children were only 6 or 7 years old.

As for the working conditions, the working hours varied from 8 to 14 hours daily with 12 hours as the most frequent length of the working day. On Sunday, there was no day shift but there was a night shift as usual. Therefore, day shifts worked 72 hours a week and night shifts 84 hours a week. The air in the factories was dirty and unhealthy, and the sanitary conditions were poor. The result was inevitable fatigue and serious accidents. It was estimated that there was at least 10,000 accidents annually in the cotton textile industry with a number of 241,554 operatives. In a survey of 26 establishments of flour mills, electricity plants, paper mills and other industries in 1928, there were 1007 accidents among 18,890 workers in one year. Of course, these figures were incomplete and served only to give the readers some idea of the problem.

Although there was considerable variation in wage-rate between different industries or even within the same enterprise,
were encouraged in a strike meeting to fight to a bitter end by "Lee Zunr, a well-known Kuomintang agitator and Sun Liang-hui." 59

Although the strike of February was settled, neither the strikers nor the Japanese mill-owners felt satisfied about the situation. The workers were seeking bigger victory, while the mill-owners wanted to limit the activities of the workers. The formation of the "Shanghai Cotton Mill Union" during the strike no doubt had brought some uneasiness for the mill-owners. The tension at last led to the explosion of May 30 Incident.

On May 7, 1925, the Japanese cotton mill owners met and then announced that the organization of the labor unions was illegal, and warned that the labor unions, if they agitated the workers to strike, the mill owners would punish the workers or close the factories. The warning did not quiet the discontent of the workers. On the contrary, it stired up the pre-existing anti-Japanese sentiment among the workers. As a matter of fact, the labor-management disputes in the Japanese cotton mills subsequently arose. The dismissal of two workers by the Naigai on May 14, 1925 brought an immediate strike.

The conflict between the workers and the management reached the high point next day, when a worker named Ku
Cheng-hung was shot to death by a Japanese foreman. The death of Ku Cheng-hung was served as the immediate cause of the May 30th Movement.

The death of Ku Cheng-hung gained the sympathy of the students in Shanghai. On May 21, two students of Wen-tzu University were arrested on the charge of disturbing the peace for their activities of asking contributions from the public to support the strike. On May 24, there was a big demonstration in Chapei, Shanghai, in honor of Ku. In the memorial ceremony, a number of speakers addressed to the crowd of 7,000 to 10,000 people. The story of the killing of the deceased was retold by the speakers, and it was reported that after the meeting, lecturers were dispatched to various areas of Shanghai to address in various meetings and to distribute handbills bearing on the strike. Ku Cheng-hung then became a martyr in the eyes of the strikers. It was after the memorial meeting, four more students from Shanghai University were arrested for distributing pamphlets and charged by the Settlement police for calculating to aggregate disaffection among the employees of the Naigai Wata Mills.

The refusal of the Settlement authorities to release these arrested students eventually antagonized the whole student body in Shanghai. These arrested were scheduled to appear in the Mixed Court for trials on May 30th, 1925.

For supporting the financial needs of the strikers, the
KMT had already made great efforts to grant assistance to the strikers. The KMT locals of various districts in Shanghai had held several meetings to discuss the matter and decided to establish a subscription group for the purpose of helping these strikers.65

In addition to the financial aids, the famous KMT labor organizer, Ma Chao-chun, who was in Shanghai at the time making efforts to gain support among the KMT right wing for the Sun Yat-senist Society, also called for a mass demonstration in Chiu-mou-ti to show the sympathy of the people for the arrested students and the strikers. Ma claimed that his proposal for holding a mass demonstration on May 30 had received favorable response from the Shanghai Students' Federation.66

As the strike in the Naigai mills was going on, and the relations between the students and the Settlement police were deteriorating. The Settlement authorities furthermore alienated the Chinese general public in Shanghai by proposing the so-called "four bills." The "four bills" were the proposed bylaws concerning an increase in wharfage dues, press control over Chinese newspapers published in the Settlement, regulations of stock exchange and child-labor regulations. These "four bills" were scheduled to be voted on at a meeting of ratepayers on June 2. Since all of these new measures would increase the burden of Chinese merchants who did not have a voice in the ratepayers' meeting, the mer-
chants as a whole were in a mood to oppose the Settlement authorities.

During this crucial period, the Central Committee of the CCP held several emergency meetings prior to May 30 to discuss the situations. In the meeting of May 28, the CC of the CCP decided to hold more demonstrations for "the combined purpose of further commemorating Ku Cheng-hung and of stimulating an all-out fight against the Treaty Powers."68 It was also in this meeting, that the CC of the CCP decided to turn the economic struggle of the workers into a national political struggle against foreign imperialism in order to save the defeating tendency of the strike due to the shop-closing tactics of the Japanese mill owners. Furthermore, the CC decided to organize the anti-imperialist demonstration in the Settlement on May 30, and thus to combine all the anti-imperialist forces with the economic struggle of the strikers.69

The Shanghai Students' Federation, led jointly by the KMT and CCP, was also stirring the students to show their expression of indignation in public.70 In its meeting of May 29, the Federation resolved to dispatch speech squads to speak for the causes of the strikers and the arrested students on May 30. Each school was assigned to a certain area of Shanghai, and each speech squad was going to have 5 to 7
students. Under the guidance of the Federation, about 2,000 students were organized into the speech squads. And it was decided that the street speeches and demonstration were to be held on May 30, the very day of the trial of the arrested students.

On May 30, students were out in the streets and making speeches and distributing handbills on the subjects of the killing of Ku Cheng-hung, the arrested of the students by the Settlement police, and the abolition of the "four bills." The anti-imperialist elements were mixed in their speeches and appeared in their handbills and banners.

To gain the support from various groups, various kinds of slogans and speeches were prepared and presented in front of the populace. The slogan "Down with imperialism" was followed after the denouncement of the foreign control of the Chinese customs and the close relationships between warlordism and imperialism. A handbill of the Shanghai Students' Federation stated, "imperialists commonly lend money to our warlords and take away railroad and mining rights. The warlords borrow their money and then collude with their gangsters to buy arms to carry on warfare, so that our own lives are placed in jeopardy." Besides the denouncement of the evil doings of the imperialists, the students appealed to the immediate interests of the populace by denouncing the proposed "four bills." Meanwhile, they shouted out the
slogan "Shanghai is the Shanghai of the Chinese people," to incite the patriotic sentiments among the audience.75 Also many emotional slogans were adopted by the students. Such as "The Japanese has torn our national flag," "Abolition of the extraterritoriality," "Let us rescue the students who have been arrested," and "Cancel all unequal treaties, Restore all foreign settlements to China," all appeared on the banners which the students carried.76

In order to crush down the activities of the students, the Settlement police made many arrests and intervened the activities of the students. Minor conflicts between the students and the police occurred in many locations in the afternoon of May 30. However, it was the remaining of the accused students after the trial at the Mixed Court and the transfer of them to Louza Police Station brought more students in front of the police station at Nanking Road where the conflict between the students and the police mounted. The police and the crowd pushed each other back and forth in front of the police station. The push between the police and the students and the continuous arrests of the student speakers among the crowd gradually intensified the excitement. As time passed, the students drew more people into the crowd. By 3:00 p.m., more than 10,000 people were in the crowd. Now, the crowd became a "heaving, surging mass."77

According to a testimony of an eyewitness, "Banners and
pennants filled the air. The students slapped their knees with open hands, struck their chests and arms and worked themselves into a mechanical frenzy...They shouted in thin, raucous tones their favorite slogan...as they shouted, they moved their hands in a wild rhythm, as though there were striking with a knife." No doubt, these actions intensified the tension between the crowd and the police.

When the mass approached the police station gates, the police inspector Evenson who was in charge of the Laoza Police Station, gave the order to fire. More than 40 shots were fired. In addition to 13 deaths and 20 or so serious wounded, many more were wounded and went away themselves. This was the famous Nanking Road Incident of May 30, 1925. This incident was also called "May 30th Massacre" by many patriotic Chinese.

The shooting at Nanking Road brought the hatred of the Chinese masses towards the imperialists up to the boiling point, and had a far-reaching consequence in the development of the anti-imperialist movement in China.

The very evening of May 30, Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang, Ma Chao-chun and other KMT leaders in Shanghai held an emergency meeting in the KMT office at 44 Vallon Road. Many "notable" persons in the social, commercial and educational circles were present. In an angry mood, the meeting resolved to
launch a general strike covering the students, merchants and laborers next day, and to telegraph the student, labor, merchant and peasant organizations throughout the whole nation for help. 

In the same evening, the CCP leaders also held an emergency meeting at the home of Chang Kuo-t'ao to discuss the incident. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Li-san, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Liu Shao-ch'i, Ts'ai Ho-sen, Yun T'ai-ying and other important CCP members all attended the meeting. Each member reported on the conditions in his particular field of work. All reports indicated that "the entire city of Shanghai was seething with anger." Li Li-san and Liu Shao-ch'i said that the workers in the factories were in a state of great agitation and demanded a general strike. The student movement cadres reported that the schools and popular organizations were thoroughly enraged and were holding meetings to discuss the situation. Yun T'ai-ying, who in addition to his CCP position was then serving as secretary of the Youth Department of the KMT Executive Department at Shanghai, further reported that "all the KMT people were highly indignant and were discussing countermeasures. Some of them...had been so moved that they beat their breasts and shed tears."

The CCP thus decided: (1) to launch a series of strikes to resist foreign oppression—strikes that would close business houses, factories and classrooms, (2) to draw up an out-
line of the demands including the requirements that the Settlement authorities must accept the blame for the criminal massacre and be responsible for making restitution, (3) to demand the abolition of the unequal treaties and consular jurisdiction, and (4) to demand the withdrawal of foreign troops from China.

The meeting also decided to organize a central machinery to lead the anti-imperialist movement. Shanghai General Labor Union would be organized at once, and this new organization together with the National Students' Federation, the Shanghai Students' Federation, the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce and various street federations of merchants, were to be organized together into a Federation of Workers', Merchants' and Students' Organizations, which was to form the leadership core of the movement. The CCP estimated that the big merchants might not be resolute enough, so it planned to use the strength of the masses to force the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce to take concerted action. For gaining the support of Chinese merchants, the CCP also decided to minimize the possible economic losses of the Chinese merchants. By the same token, the CCP decided that the strike of workers would not spread to Chinese factories. "And since such public utilities as power and water affected the livelihood of everyone, no strike would be called against them for the time being."

The very night, as soon as the meeting was over, the CCP
cadres threw themselves into their activities immediately. They set up a "Temporary Office of the Shanghai General Labor Union" on T'ien Tung Road in Chapei next morning, while the morning papers carried its announcement calling upon all labor unions to send representatives to register with it on May 31. The mood of the Shanghai people inclined towards fervent opposition to foreign oppressions. The cry for strike was heard everywhere.

In the evening of May 31, during a united assembly of the labor unions, Li Li-san took the advantage of the angry mood of the workers towards the Nanking Road Incident, proposed to establish a "Shanghai General Labor Union" formally in order to unite all the strength of the workers in their struggle with the imperialists. Li's proposal immediately won the support of the audience. With the supports from the CCP members in the meeting, Li was asked to lead the new founded "Shanghai General Labor Union." Thus, CCP's plan to set up a general labor union in Shanghai under its control was fully materialized.

On June 1, a new rented house on Faoshan Road was set up as the new headquarters of the Shanghai General Labor Union. At two o'clock in that afternoon, the Shanghai General Labor Union convened its first congress with about 600 delegates attending it. After a number of spirited speeches,
the higher wages usually went to some skilled workers and lower wages to the unskilled workers. The majority of the workers received rather low wages. Although a full survey on the living conditions of Chinese urban workers was not done by any scholar, the existing sources did suggest that the average workers spent about 60% of their wages for food. "Even a large percentage of their income was spent on food, it did not more than provide them with a diet that was monotonous, of poor quality and lacking in nutritive value."  

The low wage of the urban dwellers was further hurt by the rising price of the consumer goods. Although the increment of wages might not always lag behind the rising price of the rice, the main diet of the southern Chinese, and the rising price of all-commodities as a whole, it was often far behind the rising price of fuel and light, another essential expense for the poor (see Table 1).

Since the index numbers of wages of China's masses and the price covering the whole China are unavailable for me, I am only using the index numbers of wages covering Canton and other ten counties in Kwangtung and the index numbers of the prices in Canton to serve as a sample.
the congress elected Li Li-san president of the Union, Liu Shao-ch'i chief of General Affairs, Yang Chien-hung, a KMT member, chief of Public Relations. It also unanimously adopted a resolution calling upon Chang Kuo-t'ao to remain in the union to guide its work. The congress also resolved to participate in the Shanghai Federation of Workers', Merchants' and Students' Organizations. Thus the newly founded Shanghai General Labor Union was under the full control of the CCP and served as an important tool in leading the masses in the May Thirtieth Movement for the KMT/CCP. And the General Labor Union from the day onward, became the center of strikers. By June 5, there were more than 170 labor unions affiliated with the General Labor Union.

As the Shanghai General Labor Union was being organized, the masses in Shanghai were demanding the general strike against foreign imperialism. A mass meeting was held in the building of the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce in the afternoon of May 31, to discuss the policy which should be adopted by Chinese residents of the Settlement in connection with the shooting at Nanking Road on the previous day. The majority of 1,500 people who were present in the meeting were students and laborers, while the minority included representatives from the street unions and more than one hundred secondary organizations. A representative of the Shanghai Students' Federation urged the audience to act
and proposed to have a general strike immediately. He even prostrated himself on the platform and emotionally appealed to the audience to express their agreement with his views. His action, of course, received the sympathy from the audience. After some more discussion, the meeting resolved to summon the Acting Chairman Fong Chu-pa of the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce and to demand him to show the stand of the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce.86

Prior to the mass meeting, Fong had already been approached by many students on the subject and urged to issue an order for a general strike, a request which he refused. "A number of students then knelt before him and cried, praying that he would avenge the deaths of their fellows." Because of his persistent refusal, Fong was threatened by the students who refused to leave the building and would not let Fong leave either. At last, Fong capitulated.87

After about one hour delay, Fong came to the mass meeting, and agreed that the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce would issue circulars on June 1 to residents worded as: "In view of the assassination of our brethren, we have decided to go on a general strike. Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce, May 31, 14th year of the Republic of China."88

Before the gathering dispersed, the audience led by one of the "agitators," shouted in unison: "Let us overthrow modern imperialism," "Let us abolish all unequal treaties,"
"Let all laborers, merchants and students join in one body and fight together for the common cause."

In this meeting, 12 radical resolutions were passed. These resolutions included a boycott against all foreign bank notes, the recognition of the rights of workers to organize unions and to strike, the prohibition of the cruelty towards female and child labor, and the abolitions of the proposed bylaws for the control of printed matter, increase of wharfage dues and license regulations for the stock exchanges.89

Beginning from June 1, the scope of the strike spreaded as the anti-imperialist feeling arose. The students, workers and other city dwellers in Shanghai were distributing handbills and lecturing all over the city.90 To minimize the conflict and loss, the Shanghai Students' Federation decided to continu the anti-imperialist campaign with the non-resistance principle. Each speech squad reduced its members to 2 or 3 persons, and the speakers were instructed not to resist any arrest. In case of the arrest, the Federation told the students that those who were not the subjects of the arrest should not follow the police to the police station in order to avoid the unnecessary conflicts between the students and the police.91

Nevertheless, the conflicts between the Settlement
The foreign police opened fire again on the crowd on June 1 resulting with 4 deaths and 8 wounded. In order to arouse the masses, the Shanghai Students' Federation resolved in the evening of May 31, to ask all students in Shanghai to walk out from their classes and intensify their anti-imperialist activities. A daily news, Hsieh Ch'ao (the tide of blood), was published by the Federation to present the true picture of the May 30 Incident and to direct the masses in their anti-imperialist actions. Several propaganda cadres were assigned to retell and explain the origins and development of the May 30 massacre to the workers, and to edit the easily understood wall papers to keep the workers adequately informed. For reaching the grass-root among the masses, the Federation made great efforts to improve its techniques of propaganda, for it had realized that the handbills were the best means to stimulate the emotion of the masses. Emphasis was put on producing short and easily understood slogans. Their efforts plastered the whole Shanghai with fully decorated pamphlets, posters and pictures of anti-imperialist nature, though the police in the Settlement removed the majority of these inflammatory handbills from the Settlement. The posters in the native city of Shanghai were more decided and virulent in nature. One of the most anti-imperialist posters, according to a foreign reporter, was a poster with a picture of "a huge heart
in which was stuck a huge dagger, representing the heart of the Chinese which had been pierced by the foreigners.\textsuperscript{95}

In addition to these activities in Shanghai, the Federation sent out propaganda squads to various cities to ask for help and sympathy. Each school was assigned to a certain portion of China for the propaganda works.\textsuperscript{96}

Furthermore, individual students were sent to interview the shopkeepers and urge them to close their premises.\textsuperscript{97} The anti-imperialist mood among the Shanghai people was aroused to a point that the wearing foreign apparel and in some cases foreign hats was regarded as treacherous behavior as being "foreign slaves."\textsuperscript{98}

The Department of Women of the KMT local branch in Shanghai even composed a stage drama entitled "the Death of Ku Cheng-hung" to fan the anti-imperialist sentiments of the masses.\textsuperscript{99}

Although the cadres had intended to restrain the masses from taking any direct action against the foreigners, individual violent actions against the foreign residents occurred many occasions. For instance, the tram cars in the Settlement were stoned and attacked by the Chinese many times.\textsuperscript{100}

In Shanghai, as the strike went on, many foreign organizations lost their Chinese employees. Many of them walked out due to the propaganda of the "agitators." And the anti-
imperialist feeling rose up to a point that in some cases, the payment in foreign banknotes became the cause of the strike against the foreign firms.  

Many ships were held up at the wharves because all the coolies went on strike, except that at the China Merchants' wharves where the men were not to handle anything but Chinese cargo. The strike of these wharf coolies forced the foreign companies to divert all their shippings from Shanghai, except those which were absolutely necessary. Furthermore, the workers in the tramways, the bus company, the power plant, the telephone company, as well as domestic servants in foreign homes and sanitary coolies all joined in the strike. There were even some Chinese policemen joined the strikers' ranks.

By June 10, more than 130,000 workers had walked out from 107 foreign establishments, while there were only 11 Chinese-owned factories with 26,000 workers on strike during the same period. Among these 26,000 strikers, more than 9,000 went back to work before June 13, for many of them were just to have one day sympathy strike.

In the business circle, most of the shops in the Settlement were closed or had their shutters up, while those in the native city of Shanghai remained open and did a considerable amount of business. However, some of the shops in the native city also were closed in sympathy for the murdered students. The Chinese Bankers' Association and the Native
Bank Guild after a lengthy discussion of the situation in a joint meeting, decided to address a letter to the Shanghai Municipal Council of the Settlement demanding the punishment of those who fired into the crowd on May 30 or those who ordered the firing. The Chinese Advisory Committee to the Shanghai Municipal Council even resigned on the ground that "in view of the tragic and cruel affairs of last Saturday (May 30) and of added casualities of these few days, and in view of the absence of any desire on the part of the Shanghai Municipal Council to punish the culprits and to do justice to the Chinese...".

To support the strikers, many Chinese organizations and individuals gathered contributions to assist them. Not only the Chinese factory-owners contributed to the strike fund, the Peking Government made a heavy contribution to it as well. The students in various cities held parades and then visited the stores and homes to collect contributions to help carry on the strike in Shanghai. As a matter of fact, even the notorious warlord Chang Ts'ung-ch'ang sent $5,000 for the strike fund. The native factory-owners contributed to the fund because they were benefited from the strike, which decreased the foreign competitions for the native products. Of course, they were also motivated by the patriotism. The motives of the Peking Government and various warlords were mainly political in nature in order to consolidate their power by showing their patriotism.
On June 4, the Shanghai Students' Federation formulated twelve demands dealing with the negotiation with the British and Japanese. These demands ranged from the withdrawal of the foreign troops, punishment of the murderers, abolition of the Mixed Court, avocation of the "four bills" to the rights of the workers to strike and organize the labor unions. These demands were nearly entirely included in the 17 Demands which were passed in a meeting of the Federation of Workers', Merchants' and Students' Organizations on June 7.

On June 11, the Federation of Workers, Merchants' and Students' Organizations summoned a big demonstration with more than 200,000 people attending. A procession was held in the native city of Shanghai after the meeting. The anti-imperialist mood of these attendants was very high.

The British in the Settlement adopted a policy of trying to fragment the national anti-imperialist movement by attacking the radicals. On June 6, the Public Work Bureau of the Settlement issued a "Council's Notice to the Peaceable Chinese of Shanghai" warning that sooner or later the rioters and strike agitators would be beaten down, and that all troubles had come from people outside of Shanghai who did not care about the welfare of the residents of Shanghai. The Notice also asked the Shanghai residents to cooperate with the Settlement authorities so as to eliminate the threats to
Table 1: The Index Numbers of Wages & Prices in Kwantung, 1912-1926 (1913=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Wages (1913=100)</th>
<th>Rice Price (1913=100)</th>
<th>Prices of Fuel &amp; Light (1913=100)</th>
<th>Prices of All Commodities (1913=100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>111.5</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>107.3</td>
<td>107.3</td>
<td>104.8</td>
<td>115.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>118.7</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>147.8</td>
<td>123.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>130.6</td>
<td>132.8</td>
<td>146.9</td>
<td>132.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>144.6</td>
<td>130.5</td>
<td>169.0</td>
<td>144.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>158.2</td>
<td>156.6</td>
<td>184.2</td>
<td>153.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>162.8</td>
<td>173.8</td>
<td>204.5</td>
<td>161.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>177.4</td>
<td>168.4(Jan.)</td>
<td>209.3</td>
<td>163.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>188.2(July)</td>
<td>276.9</td>
<td>179.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>186.6</td>
<td>179.5(Jan.)</td>
<td>238.6</td>
<td>170.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>187.3(July)</td>
<td>205.7</td>
<td>168.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>189.9(Dec.)</td>
<td>233.5</td>
<td>173.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1 shows that the absolute living standard of the urban wage-earners did not decline, though it did not improve. Nevertheless, the stagnancy of their life-style and living standard in a rapidly changing society would mean that the relative standard of their living was falling back when it compared with that of other sectors of the Chinese society, such as the new middle class. Many new facilities, such as the electric light, were still far from reaching of the poor people, though the electricity had been expanded from 22 cities in 1919 to 115 cities in 1925 in the Southern China.
Another Order was issued by the Council a few days later which explicitly told the readers that "International Settlement was set apart by the Chinese Government as a place where foreigners could live and trade with Chinese...Recently young students and agitators from outside, who do not understand that the Settlement was set apart fro foreigners...have tried to arose the people to make disturbances. They make inflammatory speeches in the streets and collected disorderly crowds...The Municipal Council is determined to maintain peace and order...Agitators and bad characters are now trying to persuade people to strike and cause disorder. Do not be led away any such evil advice but help to save the situation by carrying on your ordinary business. The Council will protect all persons who work in the Settlement." 116

Meanwhile, the British in the Settlement devoted its best efforts to slander the anti-imperialist movement as a general anti-foreign actions, in order to line up all the foreign powers against China. Any action against the British interests in China was regarded as an action of anti-foreignism. 117 As a whole, the foreign communities in Shanghai did worry about a general anti-foreign movement, and various nations sent marines to Shanghai. Also many foreign warships rushed to Shanghai. By June 8, there were 26 foreign warships around Shanghai. 118 The North China Herald published
a list of locations of more than 60 foreign warships which were in China's waters at the time, as a warning to the Chinese people. The news stated, "The delusion seems to have become current that by strikes and anti-foreign riots, the students can over-awe the Powers and evade all law and order but they seem to have omitted any consideration of the very large squadron of naval vessels (sixty vessels) which are at present stationed on the Yangtze." 119

The presence of a large squadron of foreign vessels of course gave evident assurance to the foreign communities in Shanghai that the Treaty-Powers had taken firm stand to guard their interests and people in China. Backed by these military forces, the Settlement authorities adopted a high-handed policy in dealing with the general strike. Killings of Chinese were heard frequently, while Shanghai University was raided and the students were forced to leave the campus. Within a few days, T'ung-chih University, Ta-hsia University and Nanyang University all met the same fate as that of the Shanghai University. 120

As early as June 1, the Shanghai Municipal Council declared a "state of emergence" and warned anything tending to disturbance of public order would be suppressed. It prohibited "any procession or assembly or any action that might cause a crowd to collect in the public streets or in any
place, or the-delivering any speech, or printing, publishing, distributing or exhibiting any document, picture, flag, banner, or any other device which might stir up animosity, ferment trouble, cause public alarm or incite to a breach of the peace. 121

Under the proclamation, many Chinese who distributed handbills were charged at the Mixed Court and fined. More than 20 Chinese were arrested by the Settlement police for tearing down the notices of the Municipal Council. And some were sent to prisons for hurling bricks and stones at the foreign police. 122 Many more were killed because of their anti-imperialist actions. According to the collections of Ch'en-pao in Peking, there were more than 60 Chinese killed and more than 70 seriously wounded between May 30 and June 10. 123

As the strike dragged on, the patriotism of the big merchants waned out. The Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce which was reluctant to issue the general strike order in the beginning of the strike, now expressed its desire of having a quick settlement about the strike. The close-shop policy was hurting their business. By the end of June, Yu Cha-ching, the Chairman of the General Chamber openly expressed his hope of a quick resumption of the business activities. He stated that the strike had gone on for some time, that the Chinese merchants had suffered greatly, and that since the strike was a patriotic movement pure and simple as an expression of
the disapproval of the Chinese residents of Shanghai concerning the Nanking Road affair, it would be better to call off the strike, at least temporarily. As a matter of fact, these big merchants had been making use of the spirit of the masses to gain some concessions from the Settlement authorities. On June 11, the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce revised the 17 demands that the Federation of Workers', Merchants' and Students' Organizations promulgated on June 8, into 13 much milder demands. According to the General Chamber of Commerce, the rendition of the Mixed Court and the question of municipal franchise for the Chinese were the primary and fundamental causes of the trouble, and such viewpoints were taken serious by the Chinese Delegation sent by the Peking Government. Since the revised 13 demands were mainly for the interests of the big merchants and did not even mention the abolition of the consular jurisdiction, the rights of free speech, print, and publication of the Chinese in the Settlement, and the rights of the workers to strike and organize the labor unions, the Federation of the Workers', Merchants' and Students' Organizations fiercely opposed the revision. Nevertheless, the CCP regarded the preservation of the united front among the merchants, students and workers as the most burning question for the time being, the CCP sent Chang Kuo-t'ao to call upon the delegates of the Federation to coolly discuss the issue. With the
efforts of the CCP, the 600 delegates of the Federation unanimously decided "that in order not to undermine the united front of workers, merchants, and students, there was nothing we could do for the moment but protest the revisions made by the General Chamber of Commerce while expressing the hope that the General Chamber would sincerely cooperate with the Federation of Workers', Merchants', and Students' Organizations to present a united front in dealing with outside forces."  

The efforts of the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce to resume the business resulted in a resolution at a meeting held in the headquarters of the General Chamber of Commerce on June 19 with 110 delegates representing 76 Chinese public organizations, to announce the suspension of the general strike and resuming the business activities on June 21. And the meeting also appointed 7 delegates to report these decisions formally to the street unions and the student unions and to secure their views. On June 20, the Shanghai General Labor Union also held a meeting, attended by 130 delegates from the affiliated unions to discuss the situations. In this meeting, it resolved to continue the struggle. The decision of the big merchants to resume business on June 21 (May 1 in the lunar calendar) was also bitterly rejected by the street unions who represented the small merchants, for June 25 (May 5 of the lunar calendar) was the seasonal
settlement day and they might not be able to honor their financial obligations. Thus they rejected the decisions of the General Chamber of Commerce on the pretext that as the Nanking Road affair had not been solved, the sudden resuming of the business was a shame. The Shanghai General Labor Union understood the earnest desire of the small merchants to resume their business and their reluctance of resuming the business before June 25. Therefore, it proposed at a meeting of the Federation of Workers', Merchants' and Students' Organizations to call off the strike in the business circle on June 26, in the hope that the small merchants would continue their cooperation with the students and workers. Although such a retreat tactics did not bind the small merchants permanently to the united front, it did gain some good will from the small merchants. Thus, the Federation was able to promulgate the continuous boycott against British and Japanese goods in its announcement of resumption of business.

Nevertheless, the resumption of business marked the beginning of the decline of the anti-imperialist movement in Shanghai. The withdrawal of the merchants had weakened the united front. The coming of the summer further weakened the strength of the student unions, because most students left the schools in the summer. Thus the labor group was gradually left to fight the battle itself.
Since the beginning of the strike, the strikers had received some allowance from the various groups which were formed to relieve the hardship of the strikers. The Shanghai Students' Federation, Shanghai General Labor Union and some big merchants had formed a Chih-an-hui (relief society) to operate the strike funds. The wharf coolies, seamen and cotton mill workers all received the strike pay from the Chih-an-hui. The strike pay, though much less than the ordinary work pay, provided the strikers subsistent living. As time passed by, the strike funds ran out.

The lack of the strike fund created the immediate economic pressure on the strikers. To prevent the desertion, the Federation of the Workers', Merchants' and Students' Organizations met and decided to ask the big merchants to make some more contributions. Of course, the demand was not welcome by the big merchants. In fact, the Chih-an-hui, which was under the control of the big merchants, had already informed the Federation that it would not accept any further responsibility for the relief of strikers in the early July.

Facing the lack of the strike funds and the possible desertion of the workers, the intimidation campaign was launched and then intensified by the labor unions. Threats and physical violence against the strike breakers were employed by the union pickets. In some cases, the workers who
broke the strike were kidnapped by the union activitists and taken into the Headquarters of the Shanghai General Labor Union in Chapei where they were tortured.  

As the strike continued, the Fengtien army which occupied Shanghai area since May, gradually adopted a policy of oppression which might be due to the encouragement of the Settlement authorities. On July 9, the Fengtien military commander in Shanghai Shing Shi-lien (Hsin Shih-lien) severely warned the union pickets not to force others or to stop others from working. In addition, he required all unions to send their regulations to the local authorities which would either approve or dissolve these unions according to the "Laws of Meetings and Associations" of the Peking Government.  

By July 25, the students' newspaper Hsieh Chiao was suspended in Chapei by the Fengtien military authorities, while Seamen's Union and six other unions were said to have been closed down by the military. The Shanghai General Labor Union was forced to move from its office in Chapei to an unknown address. Meanwhile, many union pickets were arrested by Shing's troops, while the local police in Chapei who had refused to cooperate with the Settlement authorities in interfering with the activities of the labor unions were now forced to act. Shing also repeatedly warned against the economic boycott activities of the students against British and Japanese goods.  

A big procession which was to have been
conducted under the auspices of the Association for the Advocacy of the Use of Chinese National Goods, was postponed indefinitely, because Shine "absolutely refused to permit these people to meet in Chinese territory to carry out their strike agitation or their attempts to boycott the British and Japanese." 140

Under these pressures, the strike wave began to decline. In order to preserve the newly organized unions and the victory already gained, the CC of the CCP decided to make a tactical retreat. Anti-imperialist national revolutionary slogans were replaced by economic demands and political demands of a local nature. And the overthrow of the Fengtien military rule was regarded as the primary target for current situation. 141

The KMT local in Shanghai at this time, was infiltrated heavily by the CCP, and its policy was mainly the one of the CCP. The decisions of the CCP were usually carried out in the name of the KMT. Nevertheless, the KMT leaders in Shanghai were still able to impose their traditional viewpoint that Great Britain was the primary enemy for Chinese revolution, on their CCP comrades. In the eyes of most KMT leaders, the central theme of anti-imperialist movement at this time was anti-British movement. In order to concentrate their strength and energy to fight against Great Britain,
they wanted a quick settlement with the Japanese. 142

By mid-August, a settlement of the Japanese mill strike was reached. In the settlement, the Japanese mill owners agreed to recognize the labor unions as the representatives of their employees when the Chinese Government promulgated the Labor Union Law. They also promised that no arms would be carried by Japanese in the mills under the ordinary conditions and no workers would be dismissed without just cause. Although the mill owners would not recognize the principle of strike pay, they pledged to grant $100,000 dollars as a token of sympathy for the hardship of the strikers. In addition, they agreed to recall the two Japanese staff members responsible for the death of Ku Cheng-hung and to pay 10,000 dollars in compensation to the family of Ku Cheng-hung. On August 25, the striking workers went back to work in the Japanese mills. The Shanghai General Labor Union issued the work resuming notice which explained to the workers that the current situation restricted the continuing strike. Thus it had decided to call off the strike after gaining a little victory. In addition, it reminded the workers to unite together in order to win a greater victory in the future. 143

The strikers in other fields also began to go back to work. The seamen in Japanese ships went back to work on August 28. 144
Industrialization and the growth of new social forces

In 1920's China was essentially an agricultural country as her industry was still in its infancy. Nevertheless, industrialization had been going on since the middle of the nineteenth century. Although the light industries, such as textile industries, developed much more rapidly than the heavy industries, the modernization in the basic industries, such as the productions of coal, iron ore and pig iron, also gradually progressed. In 1912, there 170,000-ton pig iron was produced by traditional methods while only 7,989-ton by modern methods. Twenty five years later, the former was outnumbered by the latter about 200,000 tons. The constant increment in the productions of modern methods indicated that the Chinese industries were gradually moving towards modernization.

Meanwhile, in the productions of the coal and iron ore, not only the total tonage increased, the modern methods were also gradually outdating the traditional methods (see Table 2).
Because the electricity had been cut off from the Chinese and Japanese mills by the Public Work Bureau of the Settlement authorities since July 6, the ending of the strike in the Power Plant became an essential problem for the resuming the work in many Chinese and Japanese mills. Through the efforts of the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce and the Cotton Mill Association, the workers of the Power Plant went back to work on September 6. Since the Settlement authorities demanded the resuming of the work in British firms as an exchange condition for the supplying the power to the Chinese and Japanese mills by the Public Work Bureau, the striking workers of the British firms were persuaded to reach a settlement with their British employers on September 26, and went back to work on September 30. Thus by the end of September, only seamen in the British ships were still striking and in the end only less than 20% of them went back to the British ships.

The office of the Shanghai General Labor Union, which had more than 200,000 members, was officially sealed by the Fengtien military authorities on September 18, though the General Labor Union continued to operate its activities underground. The CCP labor movement cadres, such as Li Lisan, Liu Hua and others were outlawed by the Fengtien military authorities, while Liu Hua was at last captured and then executed in December 1925.
The anti-imperialist movement and labor unrestness started in February, reached the peak in July-August, were declined after the mid-August and at last ended in September, though the impact of them had long-lasting effects in the development of Chinese revolutionary movement. And the famous Hongkong-Shameen Strike was an offspring of the May Thirtieth Movement.
Notes to Chapter III

2. Chih-p'in T'ing, op.cit., p. 110.
4. Ibid., p. 458, Chia-min Yang, op.cit., p. 3.
7. Chih-p'in T'ing, op.cit., p. 113, 114, 117.
8. Chia-min Yang, op.cit., p. 3.
9. Ibid., p. 11, p. 73, p. 90.
10. Ibid., p. 70, Tsun-p'eng Pao, Chung-kuo ching-nien yun-tung shih, p. 128.
11. Chia-min Yang, op.cit., pp. 73-79.
12. Ibid., pp. 85-90.
13. Ibid., p. 4.
15. Chih-p'in T'ing, op.cit., p. 129.
17. Chih-p'in T'ing, on.cit., p. 130.
18. Ibid., p. 132.
22. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
23. Ibid., pp. 11-13.
24. Ibid., p. 10, n. 15.
25. Wo ti hui i, p. 165.
26. Ibid., pp. 74-75.
29. Ibid., p. 33, p. 33; Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., p. 117.
35. Ibid., pp. 119-120; Lao-kung shih, pp. 259-262.
41. The list of the Executive Committee members see Chien-min Wang, op. cit., p. 165; Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., p. 170.
42. Lao-kung shih, p. 250, p. 360; Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., p. 119.


45. Ta Ch' en, *Chung-kuo lao-kung wen-ti*, Shanghai, 1929, p. 150, Table 13.


52. *Ibid.*, 1926, p. 918; NCH, February 21, 1925; Chung-hsia Teng, *op.cit.*, pp. 139-140.


59. NCH, February 21, 1925.

60. Chung-hsia Teng, *op.cit.*, pp. 142-143.


63. NCH, May 30, 1925.

64. *Lao-kung shih*, p. 377; Ti i tzu kung-jen, p. 68.
65. Details see the Trial of Rioters, a supplement of NCH, July 25, 1925.


69. Yin-shen Hua, op. cit., pp. 94-96.


72. Ti i tzu kung-ien, p. 68.


74. NCH, June 6, 1925; Kuo-t'ao Chang, The Rise of the CCP, p. 425.

75. Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., p. 183.

76. NCH, June 6, 1925.

77. NCH, June 6, 1925; Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., p. 183.

78. NCH, June 6, 1925.

79. Lao-kung shih, p. 378; Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., p. 182; Ti i tzu kung-ien, pp. 67-68.

80. Lao-kung shih, p. 378.

81. Details see Kuo-t'ao, Chang, The Rise of the CCP, pp. 426-428.

82. Ibid., pp. 428-429.

83. Lao-kung shih, p. 382; Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., p. 185.


85. Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., p. 185.
86. NCH, June 6, 1925.
87. NCH, June 6, 1925; Shanghai hsueh-sheng lien-ho-hui, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
88. NCH, June 6, 1925.
89. NCH, June 6, 1925.
90. Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., p. 185.
91. Shanghai hsueh-sheng lien-ho-hui, op. cit., p. 5.
92. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
94. NCH, June 6, 1925, June 13, 1925.
95. NCH, June 13, 1925.
96. Shanghai hsueh-sheng lien-ho-hui, op. cit., p. 12.
97. NCH, June 6, 1925.
98. NCH, June 13, 1925.
100. NCH, June 6, 1925.
101. NCH, June 13, 1925.
102. Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., p. 188; Kuo-t'ao Chang, The Rise of the CCP, p. 432.
103. Ti i tzu kung-jen, pp. 72-79.
104. Ibid., pp. 78-79; NCH, June 13, 1925.
105. NCH, June 6 & June 13, 1925.
106. NCH, June 6, 1925.
107. NCH, June 13, 1925.
108. NCH, June 13 & June 20, 1925; China Year Book, 1926, p. 1005.
109. NCH, June 13, 1925.


111. Ibid., p.435; China Year Book, 1926, p.1005.


113. Lao-kung shih, pp.379-381; NCH, June 13, 1925.

114. Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., p.189.

115. NCH, June 6, 1925.


117. NCH, June 6, June 13 & June 20, 1925.

118. Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., p.185.

119. NCH, June 20, 1925.

120. Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., p.187.

121. The whole text of the announcement see NCH, June 6, 1925.

122. NCH, June 13, 1925; Trial of the Rioters, p.20.

123. Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., p.187; Ch'en Pao, Wu san tung shih, Peking, 1925, pp.10-47.

124. NCH, June 27, 1925.

125. Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., pp.196-200; NCH, June 20, 1925.


127. NCH, June 27, 1925.


129. NCH, June 20, 1925.

130. Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., p.205.

131. Ibid., p.206.

133. Chung-hsia Teng, op.cit., pp.204-206.
134. Lao-kung shih, p.384.
135. NCH, July 11 & September 5, 1925.
136. NCH, July 11, 1925.
137. NCH, July 11, & July 18, 1925.
138. NCH, July 11, 1925; Chung-hsia Teng, op.cit.,p.209.
139. NCH, July 11, & July 25, 1925; Shanghai hsueh-sheng lien-ho-hui, op.cit.,p.10.
140. NCH, July 25, 1925.
142. Ibid.,p.204; Lao-kung shih, p.427.
144. Lao-kung shih, p.428; Chung-hsia Teng, op.cit.,p.212.
146. Lao-kung shih, p.429.
147. Ibid.,p.429; Chung-hsia Teng, op.cit.,p.213.
Chapter IV
Mass Politics in Action(II)
Hongkong-Shameen Strike

Upon hearing the Nanking Road tragedy, the people in various cities held demonstrations and processions to show their sympathy and support to the Chinese masses in Shanghai. In many places, students and workers struck and collected contributions for the aids of the striking Shanghai workers. Anti-imperialist actions broke out in Nanking, Wu-chan, Peking, Kaifeng, Hankow, Canton, Ichang, Kiukiang, Anking, Honchow, Chinshiang and Chungking.1

However, it was in the areas around Canton, the power-base of the KMT, that the Nanking Road Incident had the most drastic and long-lasting effects. The Hongkong-Shameen Strike lasted for more than one year, demonstrating the strength of the mass mobilization under the leadership of the Canton Government in its struggle with the "imperialist" powers.

The Nanking Road tragedy created a very strong reaction from the people living in Hongkong and Canton who
Table 2 The Productions of Coal and Iron Ore, 1912-1930 (unit: ton)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Coal modern methods</th>
<th>Iron Ore modern methods</th>
<th>Coal traditional methods</th>
<th>Iron Ore trad. methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>5,165,862</td>
<td>22,280</td>
<td>3,902,000</td>
<td>502,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>7,973,930</td>
<td>505,140</td>
<td>6,208,400</td>
<td>502,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>9,482,917</td>
<td>629,456</td>
<td>6,499,702</td>
<td>502,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>11,109,265</td>
<td>999,019</td>
<td>7,323,020</td>
<td>502,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>14,130,543</td>
<td>1,336,285</td>
<td>7,188,282</td>
<td>502,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>14,040,646</td>
<td>858,916</td>
<td>7,080,272</td>
<td>502,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>18,624,732</td>
<td>1,265,732</td>
<td>7,256,143</td>
<td>502,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>15,616,713</td>
<td>1,033,011</td>
<td>7,423,406</td>
<td>528,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>17,980,450</td>
<td>1,474,900</td>
<td>7,111,310</td>
<td>528,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>19,892,177</td>
<td>1,773,536</td>
<td>6,144,387</td>
<td>478,950</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The numbers of modern factories were also steadily increasing. Prior to 1912, China had only 171 modern factories, and from 1912 to 1918, 294 new modern factories emerged. In the decade of 1918 and 1928, a tremendous growth appeared, for there were 1,077 more modern factories established in these years. And the year of 1929 alone added 205 more. The trend of industrialization was also reflected by the increasing imports of machines during this period. In 1912, there were only 5.9 million taels of silver spent in buying machinery. The figure only slightly increased to 6.5 million taels in 1916. However, a big jump occurred immediately after the WWI. The value of machines imported to China, increased to 15.3 million taels in 1919. Two years later, the figure reached its peak at 57.3 million taels. Although the figures
had great experience dealing with the British and had been well exposed to the anti-imperialist propaganda of the KMT for a period of time. Students and workers paraded in sympathy with the Shanghai students, and circulated letters denouncing imperialism of Great Britain and Japan. However, the Canton Government was busy in preparation to suppress the insubordinate local warlords Liu Cheng-huan and Yang Hsin-min at this time. Thus the mass movement leaders did not adopt any further step to echo back the anti-imperialist movement immediately in Canton. Nevertheless, the All-China General Labor Union did decide to hold a mass strike against Great Britain after the war against Liu and Yang was over.

Agents were sent by the All-China General Labor Union to Hongkong and Shameen to stir up the strike in early June 1925. The handful CCP/CY members among the working population in Hongkong, distributed handbills in factories and held discussion meetings with local labor union leaders in order to fan the anti-imperialist sentiments among the Hongkong workers. Since Hongkong did not have a unified labor organization at that time, a liaison conference among various labor unions was established. It was in this liaison conference, the Manifesto of the Strike was prepared, the date of the strike was set, and the route for the strikers to leave Hongkong for Canton was marked out. And it was in the liaison
conference, a Federation of Hongkong Labor Organizations was organized. The elimination of the forces of Liu and Yang by the Canton Government on June 13, 1925, speeded up the preparation of the strike. The Canton Government officially promised full support for the strike.

Meanwhile, the laborers in Shameen, a foreign settlement near Canton, also were organized and ready to start the strike after the efforts of some CCP cadres. On June 18, the Provincial Government of Kwangtung in Canton, summoned the representatives of Canton merchants and told them that the "workers of Shameen, supporting the Shanghai strike, have successfully organized a strike, so the merchants in Canton should give them financial support." The representatives agreed to support this move.

After the efforts of many agents, the preparation of a mass strike against the imperialist powers, particularly Great Britain, was ready to act, though some of the moderate union leaders were still adopting the attitude of wait and see. To overcome the reluctance of these moderate union leaders, the CCP/CY members in Hongkong decided to order those unions which they had the strongest influence, such as Seamen's Union, Printers' Union and the Tramway Union, to initiate the strike on June 19, and some workers in Shameen also would go on strike on the same day. Meanwhile, the Canton Government was asking the merchants to contri-
bute strike funds. After the strike started, the Department of Labor of the CC of the KMT sent agents to receive these strikers who came to Canton.11

Within 15 days, about 250,000 workers went on strike. The strike scope covered seamen, printers, dockers, mechanics, employees of foreign firms, street car operators, cooks, domestic servants, hotel employees, janitors and sanitary workers.12

The Strike Manifesto of the Hongkong Workers denounced the British rule in Hongkong and declared its support of the 17-article demands of Shanghai strikers. It also demanded that the Chinese people in Hongkong should have various civil rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, print and strike. And the foreigners and Chinese should be equal before the law, as well as the Chinese residents in Hongkong should have the rights to elect their representatives to Hongkong legislative assembly. Furthermore, it demanded the Hongkong authorities to promulgate the labor legislation to regulate the minimum wage, 8-hour system, the abolition of contract-labor system, and the improvement of female and child labor conditions.13 The Manifesto also included a strong anti-imperialist statement. It denounced that since the Opium War, the foreign imperialism not only engaged in economic, political and cultural aggression, but now it also used the brute military force to massacre
the unarmed Chinese. The Manifesto predicted that imperialism would use gun-boat policy to suppress the strike and the strikers would suffer a great sacrifice. But it declared that "the Chinese nation may die when we struggle with the imperialists. But it will die, if we do not fight with imperialism. So, we would rather die with struggle than die without struggle, for our struggle will bring a historical glory for our nation. Thus, we are not afraid and decide to fight a battle of life and death against the Might."  

The strikers of Shameen also announced a similar Manifesto, and passed resolution to ask all employees of British firms or companies in Canton to participate in the strike within 24 hours.  

On June 22, the employees of Hongkong dairy factories, employees of foreign companies, printers of the Western language printing companies, and 500 students from Prince's College in Hongkong went on strike and came to Canton.

For preventing the strike, the Hongkong authorities announced martial law and prohibited the export of food stuff, gold and silver coins, and paper currency. The gun-boats were patrolling in the sea and the marine corps landed in Hongkong. The Hongkong authorities not only employed some loyal Chinese gentry members to "explain" the current situations to the workers in order to pacify their anti-British sentiments, it also warned it would use the severe methods
to deal with those who encouraged the strike. Furthermore, it announced it would reward $250 to everyone who reported and led to the arrest of the order disturbers. The situation in Shameen was also in a state of tension. By June 22, the steel-gates of both East and West Bridges which connected Shameen and Canton, were closed, defensive sand-bags were piled up, and the whole island of Shameen was closely guarded. And there were 3 British warships, 2 American warships and 3 Japanese warships in the water nearby. On June 22, all Chinese employees in Shameen went on strike. The General Union of the Transfer-boat of Canton declared to stop all the transferrings of the foreign goods on the same day. The antagonistic tension between the Chinese and the foreign settlement was thus intensified as time passed.

The Shaque Incident of June 23, 1925

The Union To Deal With Foreign Problems of Canton which was organized on June 18, held an executive committee meeting on June 22. The chairman of the Union was Li Shen, a famous CCP member and the Director of the Organization Department of the All-China General Labor Union. The meeting decided to hold a mass rally and a mass demonstration on the next day to protest the concentration of foreign warships in Canton water. The procedures of the mass rally and demonstration were strictly regulated
as in the followings: (1) announcing the cause and reasons for the rally, (2) giving addresses by the top KMT leaders, (3) passing various resolutions, (4) shouting the oral slogans such as "Down with the British, Japnese and American imperialism," "All oppressed people united," "Long life for the Chinese national liberation," (5) parading, and (6) dismiss. The social components of the rally and parade were to include workers, peasants, students, merchants and soldiers. Each group was asked to prepare its own banners, handbills and flags. Meanwhile, the marching route of the parade was clearly marked. At the same time, the Union also asked the Provincial Government to order its subordinate organizations to have June 23 as a day off for the convenience of their staff members who wanted to attend the rally. It also suggested the Canton Government to give order to lower the flags at half staff for 7 days to commemorate those who died in the May 30th Incident. Furthermore, the Union asked the Provincial Government to prohibit the export of food stuff for preventing the lack of food in Canton area.

The proposals of the Union were accepted by the Canton Government. On the same day, the Provincial Government of Kwangtung ordered its subordinates to follow the proposals of the Union. Meanwhile, the All-China General Labor Union ordered all strikers of Hongkong and Shameen to attend the rally in groups. The Canton Students' Federation not only
asked all students to attend the rally, but also requested the students to wear the native-cloth clothes and to have a black band on their arms for those who died in Shanghai. The Secretariat of the CEC of the KMT instructed the Departments of Youth, Labor, Peasant and Propaganda to pay special attention to the rally and demonstration. It instructed these Departments to put their efforts on propaganda work and to prevent accidental violence. It stated that the function of the rally was to awaken the people to realize the national crisis and the cruelty of foreign imperialism. 22

At noon on June 23, a mass meeting took place in the East Drill Ground of Canton as the Union To Deal With Foreign Problems of Canton had planned on the previous day, to protest against the imperialist actions in China. More than 100,000 students, merchants, peasants, workers and the representatives of the armed forces and the Whampoa cadets attended the rally. Each attendant carried a small paper flag written with "Down with imperialism,""Abolition of unequal treaties,""Support Shanghai masses in their anti-imperialist struggle," and other emotional anti-imperialist slogans. The East Drill Ground was divided into three fields to accommodate these demonstrators. The laborers and peasants occupied the central field; students and merchants, the left field, and the armed forces the right field. Nearly all the important KMT leaders attended the rally. The central
field was presided by T'an P'ing-shan, the Minister of the Organization Department of the CEC of the KMT and a CCP member, the left field by Tsou Lu, the Minister of Department of Youth of the CEC of the KMT, and Wu Chao-shu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Canton Government, and the right field by Wang Ching-wei, a Standing CEC member of the KMT. Hu Han-min, the Acting Grand Marshal of the Canton Government and a Standing CEC member of the KMT, read the KMT resolution on anti-imperialist movement. The resolution stated that the brutality of foreign imperialism in Shanghai and Hankow would only awaken the Chinese masses to realize the urgent need to recover the foreign concessions and reinforce their decision to resist foreign imperialism. The resolution also blamed the unequal treaties as the real and basic cause for the tragedies in Shanghai and Hankow. Thus, it declared that the abolition of the unequal treaties would be the central theme of anti-imperialism. Liao Chung-k'ai, Sun Po and other KMT leaders also gave speeches. Li Shen read the resolution of the rally.23

After the rally, the crowd marched through the streets which were marked on the previous day. Armed with posters, the crowd passed out handbills as they proceeded. The airplanes of the Air Navigation Bureau of Canton Government also dropped propaganda handbills. The parade was very orderly. In the parade, the laborers were in front, followed
by the peasants and merchants, then by students, while Whampoa cadets and the representatives of the regular soldiers marched behind the procession. When the procession turned into Shakee Road which was separated by a narrow channel from the foreign concession Shameen, order was strictly maintained. Police and military men, Whampoa cadets and pickets of various groups, armed with white or red flags to guard and maintain the order of the procession. As the students approached near the West Bridge and the Whampoa cadets near the East Bridge, a burst of gunfire killed 52 and wounded over a hundred Chinese. Although the Chinese cadets and soldiers were ordered not to return fire, some did fire back and killed one French, wounded 3 Japanese, 2 French and 3 British. There was no consensus as to which side started the firing. The numerous reports from various groups seemed to indicate that the British and French opened fire first. Nevertheless, the British Consular General and French consular insisted that the shooting was started by the Chinese.

The demonstrators, apart from the cadets and the representatives of the regular soldiers were entirely unarmed. The medical examinations showed that the dume bullets which were barred by the international law were used by the British and French forces in the incident. The Chinese demonstrators were clearly unprepared for anything in the nature
of violence. On the part of the British and French, well-preparations had been made. Thus, German merchants in Canton and the American staff of the Canton Christian College all stated their conviction that the responsibility rested with the Shameen authorities.

The demand of the Canton Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and the suggestion of some of the foreign consuls in Canton for having an independent Commission of Enquiry, on which the American and German consuls might sit, were rejected by the British Consular-General Sir James Jamieson. Jamieson insisted "I have let it be known...that I am quite prepared to assist in procuring such evidence, but that I will not permit any Chinese official or Commission to impune the veracity of my statement as to what I actually saw with my own eyes, i.e. that the firing was opened from the Chinese side."

With such a self-righteous attitude from the British side, the concession made by the Canton Government to organize an independent Inquiry Commission thus did not have any result.

"Before the Shakee Massacre, relations between Canton and the British authorities had already become strained, as a result of the 'walk-out' of June 18, when several tens of thousands of Chinese workers went on strike in Hongkong in protest against the incident of May 30. As these workers had
showed some decrease in 1920's, the lowest figure in this period still surpassed that of 1919. And in 1930, the figure again raised to 47.5 million taels. The above figures show that the pace of industrialization in China was particularly fast in the 1920's.

The flour industry, which was one of the most rapidly developed industries in China, grew very fast in the years immediately following the WWI. The output of flour increased about two-fold between 1911 and 1917. There only moderately grew between 1917 and 1920. However, the output capacity of flour increased 100% in the years between 1929 and 1923. And the output capacity continued to grow until 1930. Besides the flour industry, the textile industries also had tremendous development in the period immediately after the WWI. In 1914, there were about one million cotton spindles in China. By 1918, the numbers of the spindles were still only a little more than one million. However, there was a rapid growth between 1918 and 1922. The number of the cotton spindles was more than double in these four years. The cotton textile industries also continued to grow in the 1930's, though the pace of growth slowed down after 1930.

Of course, the above figures can only indicate that China was moving towards industrialization and the pace of industrialization was particularly fast in the years immediately following the World War I.

With the exception of mining, most of other important
gone to Canton, the Government of Hongkong charged the Government at Canton with the responsibility for the walk out, and, on June 20, had decided, by the Order-in-Council, to blockade Canton. The incident of Shakee made the relations between Canton Government and the British authorities from bad to worse.

Immediately after the Shakee Incident, the Canton Government and the CEC of the KMT issued declarations and open letters to both Chinese and the foreign people. These declarations and letters, after giving a brief description on the procession and the massacre, violent denounced imperialism in general and the violent action of the British and French in particular. Nevertheless, these declarations all explicitly announced that the Canton Government did not intend or encourage any narrow retaliation by force. The Canton Government even asked the Chinese to stay away from area near Shameen.

The KMT further utilized the special occasion to propagate its revolutionary principles and policies. Propaganda squads were organized and sent to various parts of China and foreign countries by the KMT to denounce the imperialist actions of Great Britain and France in China. The circular telegram sent by the KMT leaders to the Peking Government and various warlords not only described the Shakee Incident in details with emotional language, it also took this oppor-
tunity to denounce the Peking Government for its acceptance of the unequal treaties. It declared that the unequal treaties were the bases of imperialism in China, so the Peking Government should for the sake of the national independence of China and the peace of the world, announced the abolition of these unequal treaties.\(^{34}\)

The student unions, labor unions, merchants' associations and various popular organizations also sent out waves of declarations, open letters and circular telegrams to all kinds of people all over the nation.\(^{35}\) Sympathetic response came from Shanghai, Nanking, Wuchow and many cities of various provinces. Even some warlords in the North also expressed their anger towards the brutality of the British and French imperialism.\(^{36}\) Under such circumstance, the Peking Government did not have other choice but to show its willingness to form a united front with Canton Government in dealing with the diplomatic problems concerning the incident. For appeasing the angry populace, the Peking Government even showed its anxiety for the abolition of the Mixed Court,\(^{37}\) though the British Government had given definite warning to Peking that no change of the extraterritorial rights in China would be considered "till disorder ceases and the foreigners are protected."\(^{38}\) Furthermore, the official circle in Peking also indicated that a blockade of Canton would be regarded as an affront to the nation as a whole. These
officials of the Peking Government warned, "There could be no question but that isolated action against Canton would involve the rest of China." As a matter of fact, the Canton Government won so much public trust and admiration throughout the nation that the Peking Government found it wise to state that it was ready to cooperate with the South in foreign affairs.

Only four hours after the tragedy, the CEC of the KMT issued its declaration concerning the massacre. The declaration made a clear distinction between anti-imperialism and anti-foreignism. It stated that the Chinese people were not anti-foreign at all, but they did decide to fight the foreign oppressions. And the KMT vowed to abolish the unequal treaties which were regarded as the bases of the foreign oppressions. However, the declaration indicated that Chinese should not adopt the narrow retaliation method or violence to achieve the abolition of the unequal treaties.

On the following day, Hu Han-min with his associates went to the hospitals to comfort the wounded. The Department of Women of the CEC of the KMT also organized visitation groups to visit the victims, and so did the student unions, labor unions, and the military units.

The dead were regarded as the martyrs and received the highest honor in their funerals. The Canton Government
through the Headquarters of the Generalissimo proclaimed that those who died for the sake of patriotism and were killed by the machine guns of imperialism, deserved to have the honor of "National Funerals."

The funeral ceremony was solemn and impressive. The ceremony hall was decorated with pictures of the dead and the slogans of "Down with imperialism," "Struggle for the independence of China," "Eliminate the traitors," "Economic boycott against Britain, France and Japan," and so on. The public was invited to pay final respect to these martyrs. The peasants, laborers, merchants, students and various groups totally more than 300,000 persons attended the ceremony or came to pay their respect to the dead, while the KMT leaders, Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, T'ang Yunk'ai and others gave addresses in the ceremony. The Command of the Cantonese Army also distributed propaganda handbills to remind the public that China was in a state of crucial crisis and to ask the Chinese people to fight a life and death battle with imperialism. Many official pictures of the dead were displayed in the city, and more than 20,000 booklets concerning the massacre were distributed among the people in order to incite the populace.

Within a short period after the tragedy, the National Salvation Society, the Foreign Mediation Relief Society, the Student Union of the University of Hong-
kong, Federation of Merchants' Associations and the General Labor Union of Kwangtung all demanded the economic boycott against Great Britain and France. A "Ten Negative Resolutions" against Britain and France was formulated. The Resolutions were confirmed by the KMT on June 28 in the KMT Canton Municipal Branch meeting which was presided by Sun Fo and were attended by several thousands KMT members. The meeting even passed a resolution to cancel party membership to those who did not follow the "Ten Negative Resolutions." These resolutions included: (1) do not buy or use the British and French goods, (2) do not accept British and French paper currency, (3) do not deposit money in the British and French banks, (4) do not trade with the British and French firms, (5) do not supply the British and French with any foodstuff, (6) do not serve as servants, interpreters and waiters for the British and French, (7) do not lease houses to the British and French, (8) do not enter their schools, hospitals and churches, and not hiring any British or French teacher and doctors, (9) do not rent houses from the British and French, and (10) do not communicate or speak with the British and French.

Similar boycott placards were distributed in Honan Province which was under the control of Feng Yu-hsiang's Kuo-min-chun.

For memory of the Shakee massacre, the name of Shakee Road was renamed "June 23rd Road" by the KMT.
The students of the Kwangtung University established a Institute of Canton Students’ Army to recruit those students who were willing to receive the military training. Uniforms and expanses for room and board were to be provided by the students themselves, while the Government would provide the weapons, ammunitions and instructors. The training period was to be seven weeks. By July 12, the student-soldiers had been organized and were given a full training. A propaganda squad using various foreign languages to speak for China’s cause before various foreign peoples was organized by the students of the Kwangtung University too. In addition to the above activities, the Canton Students’ Federation sent representatives to Shanghai to ask the National Students’ Federation to pass a resolution to ask all Chinese students to join the national revolution. The students in Canton also posted and distributed many posters and cartoons against the British in order to stimulate the populace.

On June 29, the Department of Commerce of the CEC of the KMT summoned four important merchants’ organizations, namely the Canton General Chamber of Commerce, Federation of Chambers of the Commerce of Kwangtung, Canton Municipal Chamber of Commerce and the Merchants’ Association, and representatives from rice-shops to discuss the methods of economic
boycott and the organization of the Economic Boycott Committee. In this meeting, the merchant representatives passed resolution: (1) all Chinese should refuse to accept the foreign currency and all foreign currency should be exchanged into Chinese paper currency issued by the Central Bank, and (2) the foreign goods which were already in the warehouse's would be marked and then allowed to be sold, but no more British, French or Japanese goods were allowed to be ordered by the merchants. Furthermore, the meeting decided to increase 25% subtax in order to accumulate the capital to develop native banking system and native industries.\

The indiscriminate boycott against the products of Great Britain, France and Japan by the Canton Government, and the bar on export of various commodities by the Hongkong Government created problems of scarcity of foodstuffs and disposal of local products in Canton. Because of the strike and boycott, trade in Canton dropped down below what it had been in the months of July, August and September of the previous year. Thus by mid-August, the merchants started to resent the boycott, and asked the abolition of the "permit system" of export and import. In order to solve the economic problems of Canton but continue the boycott, the Strike Committee made considerable concessions by abolishing the "permit system", advocating the "unity
of labor and merchants" and adopting a new boycott policy. The new policy allowed the coming of all ships of any nationalinity except Britain, with one condition that these ships should omit Hongkong on their way to and from Canton. As soon as this policy of selective boycott was adopted, port activities at Canton increased and the non-British ships and cargoes rushed to Canton. By the end of October, the trade of Canton had surpassed that of the previous year. The economic prosperity helped to gain support from the merchants. In January 1926, the representatives from the Four Merchant's Organizations proclaimed that the merchants would firmly support the strikers for achieving the goals of the strike. KMT's merchant movement policy of combining patriotism of the merchants and their business interests was proved successfully here. With the backing of the political powers, the KMT was able to guarantee the economic interests of the merchants who in turn would support KMT's anti-imperialist movement for their self-interests and patriotism.

It is without doubt that the most active and effective demonstration of anti-imperialist action towards the Shakee Incident came from the labor groups. The sympathetic strike for supporting the Shanghai students and workers was originally planned to last only a few days. The tragedy of Shakee Road turned the sympathetic strike into a long-lasting
strike and boycott movement against the imperialist powers, particularly Great Britain.

The Shakee Incident further stimulated the pre-existing anti-British mood in Canton and Hongkong. The brutality of the British and French soldiers in Shakee Incident gave the militant labor movement cadres and the KMT government in Canton good opportunities to extend its anti-imperialist activities and to make attempt for the economic independence of Canton.

After the Shakee Incident, the All-China General Labor Union called a meeting of the union leaders of Canton and Hongkong to intensify the strike in Hongkong and Shameen, and to put a strangletion on Hongkong by means of a total boycott of all ships and goods having Hongkong as their destination.50

The Mechanics' Union in Hongkong, which was regarded as a "tool of Hongkong imperialism" by the leftists, was reluctant to attend the strike at first.60 After the Canton Mechanics' Union sent agents to Hongkong to agitate the strike among the mechanics, there were only 1500 out of 5000 mechanics came to Canton. Since the strike was essentially a political move rather than an economic unrestness, some militant strikers decided to use violence to enforce the strike. Many bombs were installed in various big factories in order to scare the mechanics to follow suit. The
explosion of a bomb in the Kowloon dock brought the immediate walk-out of the mechanics in the place. When the Chinese machine factories announced to close themselves on July 1, the Mechanics' Union at last decided to start the strike on the same day.

With a flood of propaganda and the sending over of a swarm of emissaries, the strike in Hongkong had rapidly spread. By mid-July, practically every form of labor and industry had been affected. Furthermore, the militant strikers intensified their campaign of intimidation and thus brought that hitherto unaffected workers into striking. Several bombs were exploded in Tramway cars, and "traitor's" premises. A series of threats, some of them delivered over telephone, became more intensive. These threats included warning to blow up certain essential service stations, and to murder any employee who did not immediately quit his job.

In his report to London, the Governor of Hongkong blamed the strike was nothing else than an attack organized by the agencies of disorder and anarchy outside the Colony. Thus he stated, "the main reason for the spread of the strike during the past fortnight had been the cowardice and folly of the working classes who allowed themselves to be intimidated with the most shadowy threats." The report of the Hongkong Governor was certainly overexaggerating the function...
KU, Hung-ting, 1941-
URBAN MASS POLITICS IN THE SOUTHERN CHINA,
1923-1927: SOME CASE STUDIES.
The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1973
History, modern

Hung-ting Ku
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.
industries developed around the cities, particularly in the trade ports, such as Shanghai, Tientsin, Canton and Wuhan. For instance, the textile industries were concentrated in Shanghai, Wuhan and Canton, and the centers for oil pressing industries were Shanghai, Wuhan and Wusih. In the flour industries, Shanghai, Tientsin, Wuhan and other three cities had more than 53% of total factories of China in 1928. In the cotton textile, Shanghai alone had 48% of total cotton mills in 1930.

New urban labor

Since most industries developed around the cities, the more industrialized China became, the more industrial workers were brought together in the urban areas. Meanwhile, there were many wage-earners who were closely related to the rise and development of the new industrial enterprises emerging and growing in these urban areas.

Due to the lack of any reliable data, the number of the new urban labor was still far from general agreement. According to the report of Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, the number of Chinese factory workers was 648,000 in 1915 and the total number of industrial workers was 1,749,339 in 1918 which included 324,362 in the foreign factories and 530,885 in mining industries. In 1927, Su Chao-jen, the Minister of Labor of the KMT Government in Hankow, estimated that there
of the activities of these militant strikers and oversimplifying the strike movement, for there many workers had struck voluntarily long before the terrorism prevailed in Hongkong. Nevertheless, the report did shed some light on the spot which was usually overlooked by most people.

To counteract the spread of the strike, the Hongkong authorities announced the substantial rewards for the detection and apprehension of agitators and intimidators, as well as a promise of compensation for the relatives of any "loyal" employee who lost life while carrying on in employment. In the late June of 1925, the Hongkong Government issued a notification guaranteeing full protection of life and property. The notification stated, "If any person loses his life as a direct consequence of being engaging in carrying on his customary work, the Government will pay his family $2,000." For tranquilizing the populace, the Hongkong authorities further produced several thousands posters which intended to minimize the threats of the militant strikers by ridiculing that the workers were fooled by the baseless threatening letters.

However, the efforts of the Hongkong Government did not have too much pacifying effects. As a British reporter said that the Chinese populace was in a "senseless, fanatic stampede" to Canton. All the available trains and Chinese teamers were packed. By the end of June, over 150,000 workers
had left for Canton. One week later, the number of the strikers rose to 209,000. The strikers were warmly received by the Canton Mechanics' Union, Kwangtung General Labor Union and the Canton-Hongkong Strike Committee, and were also provided room and board.

In order to receive and organize the strikers, the Department of Labor of the CEC of the KMT divided the whole Canton city into 8 local district offices to register and assign housing and feeding places for these strikers. The unoccupied houses, unused stationary railway coaches, improvised dormitories and gambling promises which had been closed since the war (in early June) were all converted into living quarters for the strikers.

For carrying out the strike effectively, a Strikers' Delegates' Assembly of 800 members (one for every 50 strikers) was established on July 6, 1925. The Assembly was the highest authority concerning the strike activities. A thirteen-member Strike Committee, nine of them from Hongkong and four from Shameen, was in turn elected by the Assembly as the executive organ. Since the Department of Labor of the CEC of the KMT was in fact under the control of Feng Chu-po, a CCP member, and the All-China General Labor Union was also entirely controlled by the CCP, those strikers who came to Canton first were strongly influenced by the CCP, the CCP thus was able to "manipulate"
the elections of the Assembly and the Strike Committee, which in turn controlled the whole strike movement. Thus the handful CCP/CY members among the working classes, through the strict party organization, exploited the opportunity and thus controlled the whole strike movement and organizations.

The active CCP/KMT member Su Chao-cheng was elected as the Chairman of the Strike Committee with Teng Chung-hsia, an important CCP labor movement cadre, as his chief adviser. Other CCP members, such as Lo Teng-hsien and Ch'en Chuan, also played important roles in the strike. The Strike Committee worked very closely with the responsible members of the All-China General Labor Union, such as Liu Shao-ch'i and Hsiang Ying. Thus, the strategy and organization of the strike were essentially in the hands of these active CCP cadres, though both Liao Chung-k'ai and Wang Ching-wei also had their names in the Strike Committee.

Under the Strike Committee, there were seven bureaus: the administration or general affairs, secretariats, communication, public relations, recreation, propaganda and receptions. Also there were several committees, such as road-construction, finance, control, regulation-draft, and so on, in the Strike Committee. As a matter of fact, the Strike Committee even established jail and court to deal with the strike or boycott breakers. Teng Chung-hsia men-
tioned in his book that the Committee had the full power to deal with any affairs concerning the strike, and such power was beyond the control of the Canton Government. And the court had the authority to impose either fine or prison sentences, though it did not have the power to execute the striker-violators. In fact, a kind of workers’ government was parallel to the Canton Government at this time, and the Strike Committee was called by both its friends and its enemies as the "No. 2 Government." The power and responsibility of the Strike Committee went far beyond the ordinary activities of a mass movement organization dealing with the anti-imperialist movement.

The Strike Pickets (chiu-ch'a-tui)

The Strike Committee with the sanction of the Canton Government, owned its own armed force of several thousand men to carry out the boycott against Hongkong. Since the beginning of the strike, various unions organized their own pickets to boycott against Hongkong. The founding of the Strike Committee in early July, brought the various units of the strike pickets together and formed a unified picket corps under the direct control of the Strike Committee. A headquarters of the pickets was established with a chief commander, a discipline-director and a chief
instructor. Under the headquarters were 5 battalions, containing more than 324 men, which in turn were organized into units at various levels, from companies down to squads of twelve. These pickets were trained by the Whampoa cadets, dressed in blue with red armbands, armed with about 400 rifles, 12 small gunboats and several electric-motor-boats. They stationed in various sea ports along the coast, maintaining the order, stopping the export of foodstuff, detaining the goods of British manufactured and the smugglers, as well as examining the merchandise arriving at or departing from Canton by land or sea. Meanwhile, they also inspected the arrivals and departures of individual persons in order to carry out the strike and boycott successfully.

To make the boycott more effective, the activities of the strike pickets were extended to all the areas under the control of the Canton Government. After the "Second Eastern Expedition" the whole coastal area of Kwangtung was brought under the rule of the Canton Government, thus the whole coast from Swatow to Chin-yai was patrolled by the pickets. The entire coastal area was divided into seven regions, and Swatow was under the joint control of detachments of pickets from Canton and from Swatow itself.
The Boycott and the Strike

Since Canton was a urban metropolis, its foodstuffs had been deeply dependent on the import through Hongkong. The blockade by the British in Hongkong and the boycott from Canton itself, would destroy the existence of Canton. For counteracting such double threats, the Strike Committee at last formulated a workable policy that commodities with the exception of British goods or those goods carried by British vessels, or by way of Hongkong, were permitted to be imported. Such a policy, not only relieved Canton from external isolation, and the discontent of the Canton merchants, but it also attracted enough Chinese as well as foreign vessels to bring the necessary commodities to Canton.

Following this policy, the Canton Government officially announced a maritime rule regarding to coastal navigation on August 16, 1925. The regulations stated: (1) steamers of any nationality except Britain and Japan, would be allowed to run to and from any port, provided they omitted Hongkong, (2) upon entering port, all steamers must positively be subjected to inspected by the picket corps of an anti-imperialistic union, and (3) no export of foodstuffs or any other raw material to be allowed from inland districts.

Under the above regulations, a kind of "permit" system
was issued. Steamers of various nations applied the permits in order to come to Canton. The permits were co-signed by the Strike Committee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Security Bureau and Commerce Bureau. The communications between Canton and other ports were thus opened. To please the merchants further, the permit system was abolished in the end of August, and replaced by a simpler "entrance and departure card" system which could be obtained without any charge from the Strike Committee, and the principle of boycott against Hongkong was postered with the co-signature of the Strike Committee and the four important Associations of the Merchants. With such strategy, the strikers brought the merchants closer to their side. Under the new policy Canton enjoyed her prosperity without Hongkong as the middleman. Such as un-declared economic war against Hongkong by the masses with the sponsorship of the KMT, of course, was seriously affecting the business of Hongkong and in fact brought the economic stagnation of Hongkong. The business circle in Hongkong was alarmed by such situation and well aware of the impact of the boycott. These Hongkong merchants cried for help, for "the Canton authorities have set themselves to stop this Colony's trade as much as possible and to make the City of Rams itself independent of this port." Thus they met several times and demanded the British Government to adopt drastic actions to save Hongkong from ruin.
They even asked the British Government to send ultimatum to Canton authorities for dissolving the Whampoa Military Academy, expelling the Bolsheviks, restoring the trade and communication between Hongkong and Canton, and stopping the anti-British propaganda.

The combination of strike and boycott no doubt had the great physical, psychological and economic effects on the life in Hongkong. The strike of the garbage collectors and sanitary workers, for instance, created air pollution problems. Hongkong which meant the port of fragrance physically became the port of stink. The strike of the domestic servants also brought some inconvenience to the British in Hongkong. However, it seems it was the strike of the dock coolies and the seamen created the greatest problems for the British. The great number of the strikers in these two groups made the replacement impossible.

The strikers were well aware of the results of their strike. A resolution passed by the Strikers' Delegates' Assembly in early August, 1925, stated that the "most effective method of fighting the imperialist is that of the strike, which gets more powerful results than that of the boycott because by a strike we tie up shipping and business. We are certain of our victory because we hold the life of Hongkong in our hands."

The combination of boycott and strike against Hongkong
on one hand, and opening of Canton to non-British cargoes and ships on other hand, brought the decline of trade in Hongkong but the prosperity in Canton. In 1924, there were 76,492 ships with total tonnages of 57,000,000 coming to Hongkong. The daily shipping was 156,154 tons. But since July 1925, the figure dropped down to 55,819 tons. The value of the stocks of the Hongkong Fei-feng Bank dropped 11.5%, while the price of land fell by half and the rent of the houses down 40% by 1926. On the other hand, Canton enjoyed its prosperity. The trade rose up since the October of 1925, and by January 1926, the figure of trade surpassed 40% above the figure of the previous year. "Hitherto, Hongkong had been able to exercise control over Canton's trade through the warehouses it had there, and also because its paper currency, used throughout the province (Kwangtung), enjoyed greater confidence than the banknotes issued by the Kwangtung provincial government. Now, however, this control was lost, and it was the provincial government's banknotes that soared in value."

For struggling for the economic independence of Canton from Hongkong, the building of the Whampoa Port was initiated by the Strike Committee. The highway connecting Whampoa and Canton, with length of 7.5 li was undertaken by the strikers under the supervision of the Road-construction Committee of the Strike Committee. In memory of Sun Yat-sen,
the highway was named Chuns-san kung-lu (Sun Yat-sen Road). Since it was built by the strikers, it was also Kung-jen lu (The Workers' Road).

Although the opening of Whampoa as a trading port which was meant to compete with Hongkong was not yet completed at the time, it had great impact on the awareness of the importance of this port among the Chinese populace. As the communication line between Canton and Hongkong broke down, the communication lines between Canton and other ports grew. A foreign reporter who visited Canton in 1926 reported, "Canton has never known such prosperity in shipping... The average number of ships in the harbor is 30. These ships are Chinese, Japanese, Norwegian, Danish, German... Ships arriving from Hongkong are liable to be heavily fined." The record of the Maritime Custom Revenue showed that Canton enjoyed a particular prosperity during the period of strike and boycott (see Table 6).

Table 6 Total Maritime Custom Revenue of Canton, 1924-1927

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Revenue in HK Tls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>3,741,074.369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>3,008,977.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>4,618,288.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>2,963,281.884</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: China Year Book, 1929-30, p. 136.
were 2,750,000 industrial workers in China. Su's figure included factory workers, seamen, railway workers, other industrial workers, police and municipal employees. Of course, Su's figure was very inaccurate, for it included police and municipal employees who were usually not regarded as workers.

In addition to the above industrial workers, there were rickshaw pullers and street porters. They both had a close relation with the development of the industrialization and urbanization in China, and had made great contribution in the labor movement in China. It goes without saying that the sources on the figures of them were scarce and scattered. It was said that there were 50,000 rickshaw pullers in Shanghai in 1924 and 8,000 in Canton at the same time.

Of course, all of these new urban labor were only the potential participants of the mass politics in China, and in fact, only a part of them did participate in the mass politics. Thus, the figure of these new urban labor was not as important as the figure of the organized workers in China in this period.

Through the great efforts of the devoted labor movement cadres, there were 270,600 organized workers in 1923. After the reorganization of the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1924, the labor movement was particularly stressed by the reorganized KMT, which included both CCP members and KMT members. In 1925,
The economic prosperity seemed to strengthen Canton Government's support on the mass movement, and allowed the strike pickets to make arrests, to examine cargoes and to punish the violators of boycott and strike.

Besides the delegation of some her political authority to the Strike Committee, the Canton Government also provided $10,000 dollars for the Strike Committee monthly. 93

With the positive approval and support of the Canton Government, the strike and boycott against Great Britain were enforced effectively, though the intensity might be varying from time to time.

The Settlement of the Strike and Boycott

In late September, the Committee of Political Commisariars of the Canton Government decided that the time to settle the strike had come, thus it summoned the Strike Committee, Federation of Hongkong Labor Organizations and Shameen Union of Foreign Firms' Employees to discuss the scope of demands for the solution of the strike on September 24, 1925. The next day, the demands were formulated which included the payment of the strike pay, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, press, strike, patriotic movement and procession, equality of treatment for Chinese, improvement
of labor conditions, the increment of the rights of Chinese residents to vote and be elected, the police force in Sham­meen should be entirely of Chinese race, and etc.94 Since many of these demands were involving the political affairs rather the economic improvement, and the Canton Government refused to deal with the Hongkong Government directly, the Hongkong authorities declined to accede to these demands.95 Meanwhile, the Hongkong Government had put its hope on the ousting the "Red KMT" government in Canton by supplying the weapons, ammunitions and money to the local warlords and bandits.96 Thus the preliminary negotiations failed on several occasions. And it was not until July 15, 1926, the representatives of both Government met in Canton to negotiate for a settlement of the strike and boycott.97

From July 15 to July 23, 1926, there were five sessions of the negotiation. During the negotiation, the British proposed to make an industrial loan for the development of the Port of Whampoa conditional on the construction of the loop-line connecting the Canton-Hankow and Canton-Kowloon railways. The loan would serve as a substitute for the payment for the dead and injured families of the Shamkee Incident. The Canton Government declined to accept such proposal and the conference between the Canton Government and Hongkong authorities stopped.98

While the negotiations were engaging, the Northern Ex-
pedition had been launched. On July 9, 1926, Chiang Kai-shek took office as the Commander-in-Chief of the KMT Northern Expedition Army and announced the expedition. More than 50,000 people attended the ceremony, and about 2,000 strikers formed a delivery corps to assist the KMT army in the expedition. The workers in the Canton-Hankow, Canton-Kowloon, and Canton-Sanhsiu railways organized engineering corps, tele-communication corps and transportation corps attaching to the expeditionary troops. Propaganda squads organized by the strikers also joined the expedition and moved in advance of the regular troops in order to smooth the national unification movement. 99

By the end of August, the Expeditionary Army reached the Yangtze Valley. The rapid advancement of the KMT army moving northward shifted the attention of the Canton Government from Canton to the Yangtze Valley. Because the Yangtze Valley was the British sphere of influence at this time, the friction between the Canton Government and Great Britain increased as the KMT army moved northward. On September 4, 1926, three British gunboats entered into the Canton harbor and the sailors landed in the Hsi-ti dock of Canton. To prevent the further intervention of Great Britain to the Northern Expedition, the Canton Government decided to have a quick settlement of the strike and boycott. 100 In the end of September, the KMT Labor Movement Propaganda Committee announced "the Outline of Propaganda on Altering Policy of
the Canton-Hongkong Strike. The Outline analyzed the reasons of calling off the blockade of Hongkong by the strike pickets, and assured the strikers that the KMT would levy a new subtax on the imports and exports to supply the living of the strikers. Following the Outline, the Strike Committee summoned its 166th meeting on September 30, to discuss KMT’s new policy. In the meeting, the KMT representative explained the new policy which was to eliminate the British excuse of the intervention. Teng Chung-hsia, the chief advisor of the Strike Committee directed the workers to follow the decision of the Government. The Strike Committee then passed a resolution unanimously to accept the new policy.

On October 10, 1926, the blockade of Hongkong was formally abolished by the Strike Committee. The pickets were withdrawn from various sea ports. On the same day, an enlarged anti-British demonstration was held, and a mass procession was organized to express the popular support on the voluntary cancellation of the blockade against Hongkong. Next day, a 25% subtax was attached to the custom duties, managed by the Strike Committee and the Canton Government to serve as a means to supply the living of the strikers. Although the Strike Committee was not forcibly dissolved by Wang Ching-wei until October 1927, most people regarded the Hongkong-Shameen Strike ended in October 1926 when the blockade was lifted.
Some analyses

The Hongkong-Shameen Strike lasted more than 15 months with more than 200,000 people involved, was no doubt a tremendous manifestation of the organized mass movement under the leadership of the united front between the KMT and the CCP in. The movement included all the important sectors of the new social forces as well as the political powers of the Canton Government.

It is generally agreed that the strike and boycott could last more than one year was mainly due to the positive support of the Canton Government and the effective leadership of the militant union leaders who essentially came from the CCP. Although the rightists of the KMT had more than once to show their distaste towards the strike and boycott and some of them even attacked the Strike Committee vigorously from time to time, the leftists who held the power of the Canton Government from August 1925 to March 1926, were on the whole giving their supports to the strike and boycott. Even after the "Chung-shan Gunboat Incident" of March 20, 1926, Chiang Kai-shek who obtained the supreme authority in the Canton Government by the incident, still allowed the Strike Committee to act as usually. Thus it is clear that the strike and boycott from the beginning to the end were generally supported and approved by the Canton Govern-
ment, though the strength of the support varied from time to time.

Politically, without the approval and support of the Canton Government, the strike and boycott would not lasted more than a few months just like other similar activities in the areas under the control of various warlords. As a matter of fact, the Shanghai strike only lasted about three months, and the Shanghai General Labor Union was closed down by the warlord authorities on September 18 and its activities were driven underground. On the other hand, the Strike Committee in Canton owned its own military forces and made arrests and trials of the violators of the strike and boycott. The armed pickets, issuance of trade permits and open distribution of the anti-imperialist materials without intervention, and many other political activities which entitled the Strike Committee the "No. 2 Government in Canton," all indicated the strike activities had a full approval and support of the Canton Government. Furthermore, the timing of the strike, the date of ending the blockade, the training of the armed pickets and the formation of the new policy towards Hongkong, all indicated that the Canton Government had direct and indirect control over the strike activities and the strikers. The decisions of the Canton Government were usually closely followed by the Strike Committee, while many proposals of the Strike Committee were
fully accepted by the Canton Government. It seems that the KMT authorities, through its party organs, such as the Department of Labor and Department of Youth, could transfer its decisions quickly and effectively to the mass organizations, and in turn, these mass organizations would reflect the moods of the masses to the party organizations.

Without the sponsorship of the KMT, the strike would not have spreaded into many fields. The moderate union leaders in Hongkong had more than once to ask the positive support of the Canton Government before they decided to join the strike. It was the positive answer of the KMT that gave many workers encouragement in joining the strike. The mass rally and procession on June 23, 1925, also showed that the Canton Government had played an active role in bringing the huge number of people from various groups into action. The Canton Government was so closely related to many mass organizations. For instance, the resolutions passed by the Union to Deal With Foreign Problems and other popular organizations could be transferred into governmental announcements within a few hours. Furthermore, the mass rally initiated and summoned by these organizations, were attended by the top leaders of the KMT. The slogans used in the mass meetings and processions were identical with the official policies of the KMT's Canton Government.

Economically, the cost of the strike and boycott was
heavily depended on the Canton Government. According to the report of the Strike Committee in July 1926, the strike fund came from many sources: 2,000,000 yuan collected in China, 1.13 million from overseas Chinese, 2.8 million advanced by the Canton Government, 400,000 from the sale of merchandises seized by the union pickets in their boycott activities, and 200,000 raised in fined imposed by the pickets. The strike fund "was a very large amount of money, equal to 15 million day's wages for a Chinese worker at that time." A contemporary KMT official recalled a few years later that the economic burden of the Canton Government for the strikers created a very real embarrassment to the Government, for "the direct subsidy alone, that strike meant a financial sacrifice to the Government of about 300,000 dollars a month, during its height form June, 1925, to March, 1926, which was equal to the cost of maintaining an Army Corps on a war basis." 

In retrospection, the financial support of the Canton Government was one of the essential factors to maintain the strike and boycott alive for more than one year. The Canton Government not only assisted the strikers by way of temporary employment and saved them from starvation, it also provided funds for the Strike Committee to develop its activities. Teng Chung-hsia, the chief advisor of the Strike Committee once said that without the financial aids of the
KMT's Canton Government, the strike could not last more than a few weeks, for the problem of room and board alone would destroy the courage of the strikers to continue the strike. It is obvious that the Canton Government through its financial aids alone could exercise great influence on the strike activities. And the financial support of the Canton Government was essential to the success of a massive strike activity at that time.

An analysis on the components of the mass

On June 23, 1925, there were many organized and unorganized groups in the procession. From the lists of the dead and the wounded, I am making an attempt to analyze the components of the mass in the demonstration. Of course, the lists which only consisted a tiny number of the demonstrators among the huge numbers of the masses, and thus my analysis may quite possible be a bias. However, I do think it would throw some light on the understanding of the social components and the age groups of the masses, and the information of these one hundred or so persons would be able to serve as a sample useful for understanding the mass politics during this period.
It is noted from Table 7 that the students and military cadets were the central forces in the procession while the workers and the merchants also played important roles in the movement. Of course, the vast numbers of casualties in the first two groups in this Incident might be due to the fact that these two groups were much closer than the other two groups to the foreign concession when the shooting started. Nevertheless, Table 7 does show that the mass movement in this case had successfully brought all the important social groups in a city into its activity and made them all participate and involve in the movement.

Table 7 Social Components of the Demonstrators
June 23, 1925

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town people (common people)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military cadets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unkown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As for the ages of the mass, it seems they were quite young. Most students and cadets were in their late teens or early twenties. Figure 5 shows that the majority of them
there were 540,000 organized labor. The figure doubled only one year later. By 1927, Su Chao-jen could boast that the All-China General Labor Union had a union membership of 2,800,000.

The new merchants

As the industry developed, a group of new industrialists and merchants emerged in China. This group refers to those who manufactured, imported or distributed modern machine products. "As contrasted with their predecessors they were more concerned with developing nation-wide than local markets. They were also more articulate and influential in national politics." The size and growth rate of this group in China in the 1920’s are difficult to estimate. However, from the growth of the Chinese industries and banking business, we can get an impression that this group of new merchants grew more and more important as time passed by.

The World War I which was fought nearly entirely in Europe granted Chinese good opportunities to develop their enterprises. Except the challenge from Japan, Chinese manufacturers enjoyed a golden period in their home market. The years immediately following the War brought the economic boom to the peak for the Chinese manufacturers, because the Euro-
were under 25 years old. It seems that the mass movement was a movement of the young people, though some older people did also join them in their activities. It seems to me that such phenomenon was quite natural in a mass movement, for the younger generation with their idealistic and sensitive minds were much easier than the older generation to feel the shame of national humiliation and thus more willing to act.

Figure 5 The Age Groups of the Mass, June 23, 1925

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 &amp; below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>above 40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Among the dead and wounded, there were only 3 women and all of them were 20 or so. It is obvious that the mass activities, at least this time, was predominant a
young male movement. Such a phenomenon might be due to the comparatively small number of female students in China, and the Chinese tradition that women should not participate in public activities, particularly the political activities.

The function of party fraction in the mass activities

The mass demonstration of June 23, 1925 was attended by more than 100,000 people. But its parade procedure, various activities, such as the distribution of handbills, the procession route, and wild anti-imperialist slogans and oration but mild action, were all led and controlled by a tiny minority. The decisions of these tiny minority were closely following the official policy of the KMT and the top leaders of various unions were usually the KMT/CCP members. It seems that these tiny number of the KMT/CCP members in various unions could and did bring these unions to follow KMT's policy.

A good example of the function of the party fraction was revealed in the initiation of the Hongkong-Shameen Strike. The small number of militant CP/CY members and their sympathizers in the Seamen's Union and Printers' Union concentrated their efforts and acted uniformly to bring both unions to start the strike. And these two unions, in turn
served as the leaders for the other unions in the strike activities. Through the party fraction organization, the small number party members could and did act as a solid unit and thus they could utilize the opportunity to win a huge number followers who might quite be unaware that they were led by these small number of party members.

The organizations of the Strike Committee and the Strikers' Delegates' Assembly also showed the function of the party fraction in controlling the masses. As we know, the number of the strikers reached 250,000 in the peak of the strike. However, only 40,000 of them attended the election. Through the party's efforts, at least more than half of the Assembly's 800 delegates and Strike Committee's 13 members were either KMT/CCP members or their supporters and sympathizers. During the election of the Strike Committee members, the All-China General Labor Union, which was controlled by the CCP, proposed to distribute the committee membership among certain unions. Although many moderate union leaders rejected the proposal and asked a non-nomination free election, the results of the free election were entirely coincided with the proposal of the All-China General Labor Union. From this election we can see that a small but tight organized group might and did easily gain the key position within a large and loose organization, not to say the un-organized mass. The efforts of the party
cells among the masses did bring the KMT in general and CCP in particular the leadership in the mass activities.

Although the CCP members were supposed to work as individuals among the masses and to appear to be representatives of various movements in the CCP, rather than the executors of the Party's policies and tasks while participating in these movements, the function of party fraction can not be denied in the relationship between the Party and the masses. A resolution of the CCP stated in 1925, that "the cell is the Party's ears, eyes, arms, and legs among the masses. The Party must have cell organization before it can understand the demands of the masses and the masses can recognize the guidance of the Party. Only thus can the Party function among and lead the masses."  

During the Hongkong-Shameen Strike, Teng Chung-hsia recalled that he had summoned the CCP/CY members to discuss the situations during a crucial period. As a matter of fact, prior to the massive Hongkong-Shameen Strike, Borodin in his discussion with Wu Chao-shu about the timing of the strike, told Wu that he had ordered the labor unions to start the strike already. What Borodin meant is that the KMT, through its party organization could control the actions of the labor unions. It seems that even without the formal control over the mass activities by the Canton Govern-
ment, the KMT as well as the CCP can in fact order some of the mass organizations to act according to the party decisions.

The control over the labor movement as well as other mass movements was usually through two separate but close related systems. The Canton Government was used to serve as the formal administrative organ in organizing and mobilizing the masses, while the party served as the hand behind the scene in controlling the mass activities.
Notes to Chapter IV

1. NCH, June 6, 13, 20 & 27, 1925.
2. NCH, June 6, 1925.
3. Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., p. 222.
4. Ibid., p. 223.
5. Ti i tzu kung-jen, p. 121.
7. Yin-sheng Hua, op. cit., p. 50.
10. Ibid., pp. 224-226.
12. Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., p. 225; Ti i tzu kung-jen, p. 121.
15. Lao-kung shih, p. 401.
16. Ibid., p. 403.
18. Lao-kung shih, p. 404; I-chang Ch'ien, Sha-chi tung shih, (Shanghai, 1925), hereafter will refer as Sha-chi tung shih, p. 30.
21. Sha-chi tung shih, pp.6-7; Lao-kung shih, 404.
22. Sha-chi tung shih, pp.7-8.
25. Sha-chi tung shih, p.17.
26. Ibid., pp.22-29.
28. Sha-chi tung shih, pp.60-63.
29. Ibid., p. 16; NCH, July 18, 1925.
32. Ibid., p.200.
33. Sha-chi tung shih, pp.55-8.
35. Sha-chi tung shih, pp.114-133.
36. NCH, July 25, 1925; Sha-chi tung shih, pp.140-160.
37. NCH, September 5, 1925.
38. NCH, July 11, 1925.
39. NCH, September 5, 1925.
41. Sha-chi tung shih, p.6.
42. Sha-chi tung shih, pp.52-53.
43. Sha-chi tung shih, pp.48-51.
44. NCH, July 18, 1925.

45. Sha-chi tung shih, p. 49.

46. Texts see Sha-chi tung shih, pp. 114-118, 120-123.

47. Sha-chi tung shih, p. 72, 166.

48. NCH, July 25, 1925.

49. Sha-chi tung shih, p. 72.


51. NCH, July 18, 1925.

52. Sha-chi tung shih, p. 113.


55. Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., pp. 235-237; NCH, August 29, 1925; Sha-chi tung shih, pp. 134-139.


57. Ti i tzu kung-jen, pp. 137-139.

58. Sha-chi tung shih, p. 100.


60. Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., p. 226.


62. NCH, July 18, 1925.

63. NCH, July 11 & August 15, 1925.

64. NCH, July 18, 1925.

65. NCH, July 11, 1925.

66. NCH, June 27, 1925.

67. NCH, July 18, 1925.
68. NCH, June 27, 1925; Sha-chi tung shih, p.31; Lao-kung shih, p.410.

69. Jean Chesneaux, Chinese Labor Movement, p.292; Lao-kung shih, p.411; NCH, June 27, 1925; Chung-hsia Teng, op.cit., p.228.

70. Lao-kung shih, p.411; Chung-hsia Teng, op.cit., p.227.

71. Chien-min Wang, op.cit., p.113, 16; Chung-hsia Teng, op. cit., pp.224-228.


75. Jean Chesneaux, Chinese Labor Movement, p.293; Chung-hsia Teng, op.cit., p.228.

76. Lao-kung shih, p.411; Chung-hsia Teng, op.cit., p.230; NCH, April 24 & May 8, 1926.


78. Ibid., p.230; Lao-kung shih, p.411.


80. NCH, August 22, 1925; Lao-kung shih, p.453.

81. Chung-hsia Teng, op.cit., p.236.

82. Ibid., p.237.

83. NCH, August 25, 1925.

84. Lao-kung shih, p.453; NCH, August 1, 15 & 29, 1925.

85. Ti i tzu kung-jen, p.120; Sha-chi tung shih, p.42.

86. NCH, August 8, 1925.

87. Ti i tzu kung-jen, pp.14-16.

89. Chung-hsia Teng, op.cit., p.241; Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labor Movement, p.239.


91. Ti i tzu kung-jen, p.165.


94. Lao-kung shih, pp.44-457.


96. Chung-hsia Teng, op.cit., pp.242-244.


98. China Year Book, 1926, p.982; Ti i tzu kung-jen, pp.146-8; Lao-kung shih, pp.551-556.


100. Ibid., pp.583-584.

101. The whole text see Lao-kung shih, pp.587-590.

102. Ibid., pp.585-586.

103. Ibid., pp.586-588.


105. Ibid., p.253.

106. Ibid., pp.244-245; Ti i tzu kung-jen, pp.140-141.

107. Ibid., pp.128-140.

108. Ibid., pp.145-146.

pean manufacturers not only were hurt at home by the War and could not export goods to China for a while, but the storage of supplies of foreign goods in China had also gradually been consumed. Thus, there was a continued rapid development of Chinese industries in this period.

Cotton textile and flour milling were two of the most prosperous light industries during this period. In Cotton textile, the Chinese manufacturers owned 544,780 spindles in 1914. The figure increased to 842,894 in 1920. By 1927, the native Chinese manufacturers had more than two million spindles. The number of cotton weaving machines also increased from 2,300 in 1914 to 12,109 in 1927.

Flour milling industries also profited greatly from the temporary absence of Western goods in China market during and immediately following the World War I. Prior to 1914, China had only 73 flour mills, and from 1915 to 1922, 92 new mills emerged and made the total number of the mills to 165. In fact, 20 new flour mills were established in the year of 1920 alone. The rapid development was halted only after 1922 due to the resumed import of foreign products.

In the field of heavy industries, the native Chinese industrialists also gradually obtained some gain in the control of coal production. In 1913, foreign capital controlled 93% of coal product in the field of modern-method production. The figure dropped to 80.2% in 1916, 77.3% in 1918 and 74.6%


Chapter V

Mass Politics in Action (III)

The Recovery of Hankow British Concession

As the Northern Expedition forces advanced, the scope of areas under the KMT rule expanded. Along with the progress of the KMT army went a corresponding growth of the mass organizations and activities. The political agents of the KMT penetrated the northern lines and undermined the morale of the northern soldiers, while the mass organizers tried to break down the old social organizations and founded many new labor, peasant, student and merchant organizations. By mid-September, 1926, the KMT troops reached the Yangtze Valley and Wuhan cities were completed under the control of the KMT after October 10.

Under the auspices of the KMT authorities, the mass organizations developed rapidly in Wuhan where was a highly developed urban area with a great number of wage-earners. Among various kinds of mass movements, the labor movement was the most prosperous one at Wuhan. The labor activities which had been suppressed since 1923 by the warlords, now
were revived vigorously. Between November 1926 and May 1927, more than 80 new labor unions with 300,000 members were organized.  

Since the founding of the CCP in 1921, Wuhan had been one of the main targets of CCP's labor movement activities. With the efforts of its labor movement cadres, the CCP was able to organize about 10 labor unions in 1922, and the membership of these unions reached 30,000 in the eve of the February Seventh Strike in 1923. The organized labor was suppressed by the warlords after the Strike. Not only was there not a single new union organized between February 1923 and October 1926, but most pre-existing labor unions were driven underground and lost many of their members due to the suppression.

Figure 6 will show that the labor organizations began in 1921 and relatively succeeded in 1922. After the failure of the February Seventh Strike, the stagnation of the labor movement at Wuhan continued throughout the years between 1923 and 1926. It was only after the arrival of the KMT army in the end of 1926, the labor movement cadres got their golden opportunities to develop the labor organizations. These more than 80 new labor unions were organized within six months after the arrival of the KMT's revolutionary forces.
Meanwhile, the labor organizations also emerged in various counties in Hunan and Hupei since the arrival of KMT army. Between November 1926 and May 1927, there were more than 60 counties or cities in Hupei having the general labor unions with more than 200,000 organized laborers.
The All-China General Labor Union moved its headquarters from Canton to Wuhan shortly after the KMT Government went there. By the spring of 1927, it claimed more than two and a half million members, double the figure reported at the Canton convention in the previous year. Also it was strong enough to call a Pan-Pacific Trade Union Congress to meet in Hankow in May 1927.4

In Wuhan, with the support and sponsorship of the KMT, the labor unions were allowed and even encouraged to form the union pickets. Union members between the ages of 16 and 35 were organized into the picket organization. These pickets received the military training and some of them even owned arms. By the day of its establishment in mid-October, 1926, the Hupei General Labor Union, which was under the control of the CCP, had about 3,000 armed pickets.5

The mass organizations among the merchants also developed along the advance of the KMT troops. A special bureau was set up in the General Political Department of the Northern Expeditionary Army to organize the merchants.6 The General Merchants' Association of Kwangtung was not established until May 1925, but, only within two years, Hunan, Kiangsi and Hankow Municipal all had the general merchants' associations.7 It was said that as soon as the KMT army arrived at a place, the merchants of the place were
organized.\textsuperscript{8} By the end of 1926, 9 counties in Hupei, 29 in Hunan and 40 in Kiangsi had the merchants' associations.\textsuperscript{9} By the middle of 1927, there were 2710 local merchants' associations in 10 KMT occupied provinces with more than 300,000 members.\textsuperscript{10}

As to the student movement, the students in Kwangtung had been well organized by the KMT/CCP cadres. However, the students in many other southern provinces were still out of the reach of the KMT. As late as January 1926, the KMT admitted that in the provinces under the control of warlords, the KMT cadres had only gained the control over various federations of the student unions and the student unions in the big cities. But the students in the small cities and towns "had not been stirred up."\textsuperscript{11} In order to unify the strength of the students, the National Students' Federation which had close relationship with the KMT, decided to adopt the democratic centralism as its organizational foundation, and ordered to establish a Department of Labor and Peasant in the local students' unions.\textsuperscript{12}

Under the guidance of the National Students' Federation, the Hupei Students' Federation was established in January 1926, the Kwangtung Students' Federation in April 1926, and Kiangsi Students' Federation in May 1926. By June 1926, there were 16 provinces having the students' federations in the provincial level, and with more than
320 locals in these provinces. All of the above student unions were affiliated with the National Students' Federation. 13

The influence of the united front between the KMT and CCP in these student unions increased as time passed by. For instance, the students of Hunan held their First Provincial Congress in December 1925. The goal of this Congress was to denounce the illegal re-examinations of the warlord authorities over the graduating seniors. This kind of action did not have any political implication. However, less than one year later, the Hunan Students' Federation passed resolutions to declare its supports to the KMT and the strengthening of the revolutionary united front. 14 The influence of the KMT/CCP over the Federation thus could be manifest at a glance.

The participation of the students in the national revolutionary movement alarmed the warlords. On August 8, 1926, Wu P'ei-fu, the leader of the Chili clique, ordered the garrison in Wuchang to arrest the "revolutionary" students. Eight students were arrested and then executed by the order. 15 Warlord T'eng Ju-chu even massacred 400 students in Nanchang for their alleged assistance to the KMT army. 16

Due to the lack of materials, I can not make further discussion on the students' activities in the Wuhan areas.
However, from the above evidence and the discussion in Chapter III, we can realize that the students in the southern China were more or less attracted by the KMT/CCP and their national revolutionary movement. Although the KMT itself had not organized the student organizations in the areas under the rule of the warlords, it had indeed through its control or influence over the National Students' Federation and various students' federations in many urban areas sown its ideas and political programme into the hearts of many students who in turn gave a disproportionate influence upon the general masses in the southern China.

With the efforts of the cadres and the supports from the KMT authorities, not only the number of mass organizations increased, the mass activities also were intensified. Mass meetings, processions and many other kinds of activities were held to give welcome to the coming of the KMT's revolutionary troops. The cadres made their efforts to guide the masses to follow and support the KMT authorities. Their efforts seem to have their rewards.

Following its traditional policy, the KMT singled out Great Britain as the main target in its anti-imperialist movement. As the KMT army moved northward, the anti-imperialist activities spreaded into those newly occupied areas. Great Britain which had the greatest influence and interests
in the Yangtze Valley, and opened China with the notorious Opium War was naturally regarded as the main obstacle for the development of Chinese nationalism by the patriotic Chinese.

In the area around Wuhan, the anti-British feelings had always existed. The workers and coolies at Wuhan had many conflicts with the British prior to the coming of the KMT army in 1926. For instance, in the so-called "Hankow Massacre" of 1925, 10 Chinese were killed and about 30 were wounded by the British police for their sympathetic strike in support of the Shanghai workers and students during the May Thirtieth Movement. The pre-existing anti-British sentiments were strengthened by the KMT. And it was the KMT which directed the masses to make a distinction between the foreigners and the imperialists. As a common saying among the people of Wuhan at that time stated," Among foreigners there are good ones and bad ones: the Soviet Russians are the best, the German come next, while the British are the worst." The attitude of the general public at Wuhan towards the British and Russians quite coincided with the official policy of the KMT. The hatred towards the British might come from the historical conflicts between the British and Chinese at Wuhan. However, the friendly feelings towards the Soviet Russians was no doubt the efforts of the KMT/CCP.
In 1925, although foreign capital was still predominant in the coal production, it seems that the Chinese entrepreneurs were making their head-way into the modern heavy industries which required much more financial power.

In the field of banking, from 1897 to 1913, there were only 16 Chinese native banks established, but 125 new native banks were founded between 1914 and 1925. In fact, 23 of them were established in the year of 1921. Although the financial bases of these native banks were not stable, and more than 70% of 186 banks which were established between 1912 and 1927 closed down before 1937, the total capital of the native banks had increased more than four times from 1912 to 1925.

Although the above figures can not be used to find out the size of the new merchants, they do suggest that the influence of this group steadily increased.

Meanwhile, the numbers of Chinese chambers of commerce also increased from 794 in 1912 to 1103 in 1918. The membership of these chambers in the coastal areas had not increased, but the numbers of chambers and their membership did grow rapidly in some hinterland provinces. The increment of the numbers of the chambers of commerce which were "a modern innovation aimed specifically at developing mutual cooperation by members of this new group," can be regarded as an indicator of the increasing importance of these new merchants in organizing themselves into a group in their dealing with
The tension between the KMT and the imperialist powers was also intensified by the announcement of Chiang Kai-shek in November, 1926. In his interview with foreign reporters at Nanchang on November 19, 1926, Chiang stated that the present revolution would not cease until the foreign concessions, extraterritoriality and the unequal treaties were all abolished. He also indicated that he would not agree to the gradual abolition of extraterritoriality, but "after the successful termination of the revolution, all the foreign treaties would instantly be abrogated. Foreign supervision of the Customs, the Post Office and the Salt Gabelle would be abolished."¹⁹

Chiang's statement revealed the official policy of the KMT towards the foreign powers and created some anxieties among the foreign communities in China. It also gave some encouragement to the Chinese people in their anti-imperialist actions. In view of Chiang's pronouncement, a union of Chinese employees of Customs was formed "with avowed object of taking control of the Customs from the hands of foreigners."²⁰ And the fear that the KMT army might enter into the foreign concessions also created alarm among the foreign residents in Wuhan.

Since the complete occupation of the Wuhan cities by the KMT army in mid-October 1926, the number of the mass organizations had increased and their activities had been
intensified. It seems that those participants of the mass movement such as the workers, students and other groups of people felt that their days had come. A general anti-imperialist boycott and general strike against the British was called on December 4, 1926. Although the general strike and boycott did not materialize because of the truce between some of the employers and the labor unions, the situation in Wuhan was still very serious. British marines landed at Hankow on December 4 to assure the residents in the British Concession at Hankow that Great Britain would protect her interests with the military forces.

Nevertheless, in view of the rapid advance of the KMT army and the growing strength of the KMT, Great Britain wanted to make some compromises with the KMT. The newly appointed British Minister to China Sir Miles Lampson was instructed to visit Wuhan before his proceeding to Peking. The visit of Miles Lampson to Wuhan did temporarily ease some anti-British actions. As a foreign columnist of the North China Daily News reported, "When Lampson arrived in Hankow in the middle of December, the general strike was forgotten and most of the smaller strikes were settled, and the whole Wuhan cities were quiet," for the Political Council of the KMT wanted quiet and a semblance of order. The conversations between Lampson and Eugene Ch'en, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the KMT Government, were very cordial according to the British reports.

Nevertheless, the temporary rapprochement between the KMT and the British did not change KMT’s anti-British policy. Almost immediately after Lampson’s departure, strikes broke out again. On December 17, the Servants’ Union demanded that the members of the union could not be dismissed or in any way oppressed, that employers must provide medical attention, and a three weeks’ holidays annually, and that wages must be increased by increments ranging from 10% in the case of higher-paid members to 100% in the case of lower-paid members. The excesses of labor movement “agitator” frightened many foreigners who had originally taken a friendly view towards the KMT.

The case of the raid of the local KMT headquarters in British Concession in Tientsin by the British police and the arrests and transfer of these KMT members to the Fengtien military authorities served as the spark to light up a new anti-British campaign.

On December 20, a meeting of 3500 delegates from many organizations was held with the presence of many important KMT leaders. Borodin, Madame Sun Yat-sen, Sun Fo, and Hsu Chien all gave speeches. In this meeting, Borodin declared that the revolution was only half through and the other half that remained was the most important part: that was
the overthrow of the British and their ally Chang Tso-lin. Only when this was accomplished, would the country be peaceful and prosperous.

In the same meeting, Sun Fo, the Mayor of the Wuhan cities, even gave a detailed programme of anti-British movement. He began his speech by pointing out that "many believe that the British are friends of China. This is a mistake. For decades they have played off one Chinese party against another and have continued to stir up strife every time the Chinese people have made a step towards gaining their freedom. Their Minister has been here with sweet words but his heart was sour. The British are working behind our backs in order to destroy us." Thus Sun Fo suggested to have a complete boycott of everything British, and urged all the people to be ready to act at the next insult offered by the British. In fact, Sun Fo even called the laborers to back the KMT army to drive the British out of China. Following the anti-British speeches of these KMT leaders, anti-British propaganda was intensified by the cadres.

When the KMT carried on her anti-British campaign, Great Britain was attempting to woo the KMT and appease the rising nationalism in China. The new British policy towards China which was secretly revealed by Lampson in his
visit to Hankow, was officially announced in the end of December, 1926. In her Memorandum to the Powers, Great Britain intended to shift Chinese distaste for Great Britain to other powers by stating that Great Britain had been always willing to negotiate with the Chinese on treaty revision and allow the Chinese to manage her Washington Surtaxes— the surtaxes along with the tariff which were granted to China at the Washington Conference in 1922. But the other powers, the Memorandum continued, insisted to put such surtaxes under foreign control and use them for the consolidation of China's unsecured debts. Now, the Memorandum proposed, it was the time to let the Chinese to collect and use the surtaxes unconditionally throughout China. 30 Since China did not have a unified government, the Memorandum suggested to let the local authorities of each region to "decide all questions as to the disposition and banking of these additional revenues." 31

Because most trade ports were still in the hands of KMT's enemies, the KMT thus boldly rejected the British proposals on the Washington Surtaxes. In its reply to the Memorandum, the KMT denounced Great Britain on the ground that "in spite of the elaborately-worded sentiments in the British Declaration, the real meaning of the proposal is that two-thirds of the new revenue will go to our political enemies who... will be able to continue the civil war that bleeds the nation and delays the liberation of China from
...foreign imperialism." Also the KMT warned that the British proposals would make Shanghai and other trade ports became the theatres of bloody struggle since millions of dollars would be collected there.

The general public in China also reacted unfavorably to the British proposals. The Shih Shih Ksiao-pao (Chinese Times) criticized the Memorandum by saying, "the decision to grant China a surtax was agreed to at the Washington Conference, but the claim of the Chinese representatives then, as in the cry of the Chinese at the present time was for absolute tariff autonomy, hence it is unnecessary for foreigners now to interfere. It is all or nothing." After the full text of the Memorandum was revealed, The Minkuo-pao announced, "Unless imperialism is overthrown once and for all, the change of the British policy will be looked upon with the utmost suspicion."

It seems that the KMT was entirely not moved by the British proposals and totally disregarded the friendly gesture of Great Britain. Four days after the announcement of the Memorandum, in a meeting of the Joint Conference of the KMT Central Headquarters and the KMT Government Council, Borodin proposed to order the local branches of the KMT to summon mass meetings to protest the arrests and transfer of the KMT cadres in Tientsin by the police of the British Concession to the Fengtien authorities. Nevertheless, Borodin
warned to avoid any direct confrontation with the British, though he advocated the recovery of the foreign concessions on the ground that these foreign concessions had become the havens of the anti-revolutionary activities. Borodin's proposals were accepted by the Joint Conference.\textsuperscript{35}

The decision of the Joint Conference seems to be carried out properly. Only four days after the meeting, a mass rally, presided by the famous mass movement cadre Li Li-san, was held in Wuhan with more than 100,000 people participating. The mass meeting passed many anti-British resolutions and issued an anti-British manifesto. These resolutions denounced Great Britain for her proposed loan to the Fengtien military authorities to prolong the civil strife in China, the announcement of martial law in the British Concession in Hankow, and the arrests of the KMT members in the British Concession in Tientsin. The resolutions also demanded the withdrawal of the British army and navy in China, and advocated an economic boycott against Great Britain.\textsuperscript{36}

On December 26, 1926, the Propaganda Committee of the CEC of the KMT, based on Borodin's report on Britain's new China policy, formulated the propaganda outline to intensify the anti-British movement. The outline advocated the struggle with Great Britain but instructed to avoid direct military conflict between Chinese nationalism and foreign
imperialism. The outline also blamed Great Britain for her various activities in China. Meanwhile, the outline intended to enlarge the gulf between Great Britain and Japan by assuring Japan that the success of Chinese revolution would not destroy Sino-Japanese trade. But it warned Japan that if she continued her cooperation with Great Britain, she would be put at a great disadvantage. 37

It is very clear that the KMT and her supporters would not abandon their anti-British attitude even when Great Britain was making some compromises. Under the leadership of the KMT, the anti-imperialist movement in general and anti-British imperialist movement in particular was intensified. The constant anti-imperialist propaganda gradually worked the mood of the Chinese people up to the boiling point. The direct confrontation between the Chinese masses and the British forces in China thus became almost inevitable. And the so-called "Hankow Incident" of January 3, 1927, at last broke out.

In the first two days of January 1927, meetings were held by the people under the direction of the KMT in Wuhan to celebrate the victory of the Northern Expedition, and the third day was dedicated to a day of mass rally of anti-British nature. 38 In the morning of January 3, "the Anti-British Association agitators" held mass meetings at various
points around the British Concession, and by noon the developments were serious enough for the Concession authorities to call up the marines. Placards depicting John Bull in various uncomplimentary attitudes were displayed and fiery speeches were delivered by uniformed orators. The propaganda corps of the Central Military and Political Academy that gathered a considerable number of people just outside the Concession seemed to have led the audience into conflicts with the British Marines who came to interrupt. As time passed, more and more men waving flags and inciting the people. Then the stone-throwing started. The British marines retrained themselves from firing and called up the Fire Brigade. At the sight of Chinese firemen who were manning the hose-lines, the crowd's temper turned wild. "A heavily built Chinese, with the typical mannerisms of the 'Dare-to-Die,' came through the crowd and, advancing to within a few feet of the line of the British marines, dared them to kill him." The defence forces showed great forbearance and did not shoot him. Then the crowd made a sudden rush to the foreshore where hundreds of Chinese people, armed with stones and bamboo poles had a skirmish with a small party of the British marines who were armed with rifles and fixed bayonets. The confrontation resulted in a few wounded.

Both the KMT and CCP sources indicate that the leaders
of both parties did not have any previous knowledge of the conflict. When the news of the conflict came to the Joint Conference, Borodin and other KMT leaders were shocked. Borodin even worried about the possible consequences of the incident. After some discussions, the Joint Conference passed resolutions which were proposed by Borodin. The resolutions included: (1) to send Hsu Chien, the Chairman of the Joint Conference, and Chiang Tso-pin to the spot to tell the masses that the KMT authorities regarded the actions of the masses as proper and would adopt necessary methods to protect the lives of the Chinese people, but the masses should withdraw from the British Concession, and (2) to demand the British authorities to withdraw the marines immediately, or else the KMT would not guarantee the security of the British. Following the instruction of the resolutions, Hsu Chien and Chiang Tso-pin went to the British Concession in order to disperse the masses. Upon his arrival, Hsu made a rousing speech in front of the masses, with his back to the defence works of the British Concession, announcing the anti-imperialist and anti-British decisions of the KMT, but appealing to the masses to leave the Concession and wait for the settlement of the incident by the KMT Government through diplomatic channels. In the meanwhile, Chang Kuo-t'ao, an important CCP labor movement leader, who reached the scene after the conflict, also
other sectors of Chinese society.

The new intelligentsia

The term "intelligentsia" refers to the intellectuals as a fluid group, including the more or less well educated people, teachers, scholars, students in middle or higher schools, gentry, as well as other professionals, such as artists, writers, lawyers and journalists. And "new intelligentsia" here refers to the afore-mentioned groups with a somewhat new education or Western learning.\(^5\)

Since the late 19th century, many new style schools emerged. The abolition of the Civil Service Examination in 1905 further stimulated the growth of these new style schools. The new schools increased and the numbers of the new style students also grew as time passed. There were only 102,767 students in 1905, and the figure increased twenty-eight-fold to 2,933,387 in 1912. By 1923, there were 6,615,772 students in the schools.\(^5\) The numbers of the new style schools also increased from 87,272 in 1912 to 179,654 in 1923(see Table 3).

It is noted from Table 3 that the education above secondary schools was still reserved to just a few selected groups who were financially well supported, though the elementary
sought out responsible members of some mass organizations on the spot and persuaded them to obey the instruction of Hsu and to lead the masses away from the scene. Finally, the masses were persuaded to leave. At 7:45 p.m. there was a general retirement. By 8:00 p.m. the whole Bund was clear and was held by a line of Chinese soldiers.

Next morning, some of the propaganda corps of the trade unions and a large groups of citizens entered into the British Concession without the notice of the union leaders. Although nothing drastic had occurred, a considerable crowd had gathered in front of the British Consulate shouting, "Restore the British Concession to China," and other slogans. Chang Kuo-t'ao, Li Li-san and other mass movement leaders entered the Concession and notified the responsible members of various trade unions to restrain the masses and persuaded the masses to withdraw from the Concession. Very soon after that, Sun Fo and other members of the KMT Government also arrived, and they went into the Consulate to discuss the situation with the British consul. An agreement was reached in the morning between the British Concession authorities and Chinese officials that British marines, sailors and police would be withdrawn, and the Chinese authorities would police and maintain peace and order in the Concession with the assistance of their own armed troops. An eyewitness stated, "Accordingly, yesterday (Janu-
ary 4) afternoon the foreshore off the British Bund was marked with groups of armed Nationalist soldiers, and the Bund itself with Chinese armed police. All British special civilian police and foreigners of the regular police were withdrawn. The Chinese took over. The news that the KMT Government had taken over the British Concession created great excitement among the Chinese. Many of them flocked in to see what it looked like under the new rule. The same witness reported that the foreigners who appeared on the Bund were greeted with rocks, and that "The Chinese police and soldiery were helpless. They argued with the crowd and pleaded with them, but to no effect."46

Meanwhile, the representatives of the students, peasants, merchants, laborers and soldiers met and delivered a 72-hour ultimatum which contained five articles: the apology of the British authorities to the Chinese Government; the abolition of the volunteers in the Concession and the withdrawal of the British gunboats from Wuhan; the rights on the part of Chinese in the British Concession to hold mass meetings and processions, and to make speeches; and the rights of Chinese Government to send civil and armed police into the Concession to maintain peace and order, and the establishment of a garrison troops' headquarters there. 47

It was again on January 5, the crowd after gathering around the Concession, started to remove the barricades and
sandbags which had been used to block the entrances to the Concession by the British. "The crowds howled as they went through the streets tearing down the parapets, and the Chinese police were putty in their hands." In the evening, the crowd grew even larger than in the daytime. They gathered before and shouted at the British Marine headquarters. The labor unions brought along a huge quantity of anti-British literature and had it distributed among the crowd. "The doors, windows and walls outside the Consulate buildings were plastered with handbills. 'Beat Up the Police Chief,' 'Burn the Police Station,' and 'Chase away the Police Runningdogs' were the loud cries raised by the several hundred carrying and ricksha coolies gathered outside the British Police Station." In order to control the anti-British feelings, the General Labor Union sent out pickets in an endeavor to persuade the infuriated masses to go home and leave the foreigners alone for the night, while Chinese armed troops made a continued effort to prevent any serious breakout.

At 9:00 p.m. on the same day, a mass rally was held with the presence and speeches of Hsu Chien, Sun Fo and Li Li-san. At 10:00 p.m., the British Volunteers began to evacuate their headquarters, moving all guns, ammunition, equipment to the British gunboats. As the Volunteers were moving out, Chinese troops moved in and occupied
the headquarters. These troops and armed police in addition, occupied the British Concession, reinforced by about two hundred pickets. 51

On January 5, another mass rally was held in Hankow, presided by the KMT Party representative of Hankow KMT Branch, with Li Li-san as the Commander-in-Chief of the procession. 52 The procession of students, pickets, and soldiers, carrying banners, singing and yelling passed through the British Concession. 53 On the same day, Eugene Ch'en, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the KMT Government issued a notice stating that the KMT Government would take the responsibility of protection of the lives and property in the Concession areas and asked the people to cooperate with the Chinese Government. 54 Ch'en's assurance was disregarded by the foreign communities, for the foreign residents regarded the situation in the British Concession as very serious and thus preferred to leave. The majority of the American community and the British women and children evacuated the Concession and boarded the steamers, while some of them went to the American Consulate in the afternoon of January 5. 55 By the evening of January 5, all members of the British Police Force, Chinese, British and Sikh alike, were all withdrawn, leaving the maintenance of order to the KMT troops and pickets. "Pickets restrained Chinese from collecting in groups and saw that all those entering
the Concession kept on their way without gathering into crowds." Now, with the withdrawal of the British, the Concession was entirely in the hands of the KMT authorities. On January 5, the Joint Conference resolved to organize a temporary Management Committee of the Concession which included representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Communication of the KMT Government, the Garrison Command of Wuhan, and the Party representative Joint Conference. Two days later, the Joint Conference decided to have the Minister of Foreign Affairs as the chairman of the Committee, while the Ministers of Finance and Communication would be the members of the Committee. Under the control of the KMT, the order of the Concession was restored in the evening of January 6.

Immediately after the January 3 Incident, Great Britain sent Owen O'Malley, Counsellor of the British Legation in Peking to start the negotiation with the KMT authorities. Upon his arrival at Hankow, O'Malley entered into negotiations with Eugene Ch'en.

Although Borodin proposed that the KMT should communicate with the British Labor Party directly in order to bring pressure on the Conservative Party which was in power at the time in Great Britain, he also suggested that the KMT should issue a declaration to other power to let them know that the entering of the Chinese troops into the Bri-
tish Concession was due to the requisit of the British au­

thorities of the Concession. Thus following Borodin's proposals, a manifesto was issued on January 22. In the mani­

festo, the KMT declared that the KMT Government was ready to negotiate with any Power for a settlement of the Treaty, and "other cognate questions on a basis of economic equality and mutual respect for each other's political and territorial sovereignty." The manifesto also pointed out that the "extension of Nationalist control to the concession has been due less to the entry of armed Chinese forces (which took place with British consent) than (a) to the landing... of armed British marines... and (b) to the abdication by the British Municipal Council of its powers... with the con­

sequent establishment of the present Nationalist Commission for the Administration of the Concession."

From the proposal of Borodin and the manifesto, we can see that the KMT had regarded the occupation of the British Concession by the KMT forces as an inevitable result of the British actions in China, and the chance of the British re-occupation of the Concession was slim. Eugene Ch'en in his report to a meeting of the Joint Conference on January 28 stated that he had boldly rejected British request for the return of the Concession to the British authorities.

In order to avoid the similar happenings in other British concessions in China, and to cool down the anti-
British sentiments among the Chinese people, Great Britain sent the KMT a memorandum, dated January 27, promising to recognize Chinese jurisdiction over British subjects in China, the abandonment of the rights of buying lands by the British subjects in China, and the applications of Chinese laws to the British churches, educational organizations and hospitals in China. The promise was made on the condition that the KMT Government would change the status of the British concessions and settlements only through peaceful means, such as negotiations.  

Under such circumstance, the negotiations made great progress. The agreement relating to the British Concession at Hankow was signed between the KMT Government and Great Britain on February 19, 1927. The ex-British Concession at Hankow was then officially handed over to the Chinese Government.

The Hankow Incident of 1927 revealed that the KMT had a very strong control over the mass organizations and the activities of the masses. KMT's policy of singling out Great Britain as the representative of imperialism in China was properly carried out by the masses. Anti-imperialist movement was at least temporarily interpreted as an anti-British movement under the leadership of the KMT organs. When the British Concession at Hankow was attacked by the
Chinese masses, the French and Japanese concessions in the same place were not really disturbed. As Chang Kuo-t'ao recalled, there had not even had been a movement to boycott Japanese goods in Wuhan. Although the violence of the Chinese masses against the British Concession was met by the magnificent coolness and restraint of the British, Great Britain was still regarded as the vital enemy by the Chinese masses in the Wuhan areas. Such a strong anti-British sentiment among the populace no doubt at least partially came from the efforts of the KMT cadres. The effects of KMT's anti-British propaganda can also be revealed from a report of a hunting party in the early January of 1927. The hunting party near Hankow was informed by the local people that "had they been British, they would have been killed, as such was the duty of every true Chinese."67

The anti-British feeling of the Chinese people was so obvious, and even realized by the British themselves. For instance, the Labor ex-Premier Ramsay MacDonald of Great Britain, after expressing his sympathy to the Chinese in the cause of the recovery of the concessions, asked "why do the French and Japanese Concessions remain?" Therefore, he regarded the Hankow Incident not as an expression of Chinese nationalism, but of anti-British hatred.68

From the above events and evidence concerning the origin and developments of the Hankow Incident, it is clear
that the KMT, as a tightly organized revolutionary party, was able to mobilize the masses into her mass organizations or to make them follow her policy in the anti-imperialist movement. Even through the masses might not fully understand the ideological bases of the KMT policy, they could be stirred up by the emotional language or the patriotism. In order to preserve the spirit of the masses for further usefulness, the KMT authorities sometimes would permit the masses to exercise some judgement in their activities and allow time to quiet the activities of the masses. Nevertheless, the masses were never allowed to challenge the authority of the KMT over the decisions of the vital policies. Through various mass organizations, the policies of the KMT were carefully and properly carried by the masses.
Notes to Chapter V

2. Chung-hsia Teng, *op. cit.*, p. 19, 30, 31, 39, 40; *Ti i tzu kung-jen*, p. 11.
education had become available to more than six million youths in 1923, who were still a tiny minority among the mass of 45 million in China.

Table 3 Number of Students and Schools in China, 1912-1923

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Number of Schools</th>
<th>Total Number of Students</th>
<th>Number of Secondary Students</th>
<th>Number of Students in Sec. Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>87,272</td>
<td>2,933,386</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>59,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>108,448</td>
<td>3,632,206</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>72,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>122,286</td>
<td>4,075,338</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>82,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>129,739</td>
<td>4,207,251</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>87,929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>121,119</td>
<td>3,974,444</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>75,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>178,433</td>
<td>6,819,486</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>118,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>179,654</td>
<td>6,550,392</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>103,385</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As for the college students, they increased from 19,825 in 1917 to 34,880 in 1923. 54

Without doubt, the number of new intelligentsia was quite small in comparing with the huge population in China. Nevertheless, these tiny minority became the main source of inspiration in Chinese society. The long tradition of political orientation of the educated Chinese encouraged these new intelligentsia to speak for and serve as the leaders of the other common people. They enthusiastically participated
22. NCH, January 1st, 1927.
23. NCH, December 4, 1926.
24. NCH, December 18, 1926.
25. NCH, December 24, 1926.
26. NCH, December 24, 1926.
27. NCH, December 18, 1926.
29. NCH, January 15, 1927.
30. NCH, December 31, 1926.
32. NCH, January 8, 1927.
33. NCH, December 31, 1926.
34. NCH, December 31, 1926.
36. Ibid., pp.95-96.
37. Ibid., pp.97-98.
39. NCH, January 8, 1927.
40. Detailed description see the eyewitness' report in the NCH, January 15, 1927.
42. Ibid., pp.101-102.
44. NCH, January 15, 1927.


47. *NCH*, January 8, 1927.


55. *NCH*, January 15, 1927.

56. *NCH*, January 8, 1927.


60. *China Year Book*, 1928, p.738.


62. The whole text of the manifesto see *NCH*, January 29,1927.


65. The text of the agreement see *China Year Book*, 1928, p.741.


68. *NCH*, January 22, 1927.
Chapter VI
Conclusion

Only about three months after the Hankow Incident, Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters split with the KMT leftists. On April 10, 1927, Chiang ordered to dissolve the General Political Department of the Northern Expeditionary Army and declared that the Political Department, dominated by the CCP members and the KMT leftists, was an obstacle to the national revolutionary movement. Two days later, Chiang launched the famous April 12 Coup against the left-wing KMT, the CCP and the mass movements they led. The armed gangsters in Shanghai, supported by Chiang's troops, disarmed and arrested the workers' pickets who were organized in March, 1927, to help KMT's troops to enter Shanghai. By April 15, the mass organizations in various cities which were under the control of Chiang's forces, were all dissolved and reorganized, and the important mass movement cadres were arrested and purged. On April 18, 1927, Chiang and his supporters established another KMT Government in Nanking.

With the fall of the KMT Government at Hankow in early autumn of 1927 and the elimination of the CCP members and
the KMT leftists from the political arena, the KMT Government at Nanking became the sole authority of the KMT, and its attitude towards the mass movement was thus applied to the most parts of the southern China. The KMT Government at Nanking now formally adopted a new policy towards all mass movements. It tended to suspect all mass activities and wanted to have very tight control over the mass movements. KMT's new policy towards the mass activities was formally announced in its resolutions of the Four Plenum of the CEC of the KMT in February, 1928. These resolutions not only barred the students from participating in any political activities, but also abolished the Departments of Women, Youth, Merchants, Peasants and Labor of the CEC. As a matter of fact, since the April 12 Coup, a full-scale purge against the mass movement cadres had been launched by Chiang and his supporters. By the end of 1927, more than 1,000 women movement cadres had been killed and 32,316 other members and cadres of the mass organizations were sent to prison, while 37,985 were killed or executed.

The suspicion and distrust of the masses by the KMT in turn fostered the apathy and indifference of the masses towards the mass movement under the KMT rule. The elimination of many cadres and KMT's new suspicious or even suppressive attitudes towards the mass activities at least temporarily halted the development of the mass movement.
In retrospect, during the united front period, the re-organized KMT employed various kinds of policies towards peasants, merchants, students, women and laborers, in order to stimulate them to join the national revolutionary movement. The propaganda work was intensified by the cadres to reach the grass-root of the common people. The urban masses as a whole, were more or less exposed by or even attracted to KMT's ideas and political programme.

Among the urban masses, the urban labor seems to have been more influenced and led by the re-organized KMT. The laborers who were poor, usually hoped to gain a better treatment and living conditions. In order to attract the labor masses, the cadres generally adopted the practice of advocating the economic improvement for the laborers. In case of strike, the cadres would often add some economic demands into the strike demands to keep the constant interests of the working people. Shorter hours, higher wages, better treatment and the right to organize the labor unions were the commonest terms in strike demands.

Although a strike might be initiated by a patriotic action, the economic gains or prospective gains usually were important factors to keep a strike alive. Furthermore, in order to keep a strike alive until the proper time had come for a settlement, the cadres must give some strike pay to the strikers to provide them with a subsistent living. With-
out the strike funds, the strike would usually be short-lived, and the strikers would lose their desire to strike.

The students who mainly a group of young males, tended to get excited easily by the names of "justice," "national pride," and "equality." Thus KMT's ideas of national revolution, social justice and anti-imperialism had a great attraction to them. The cadres thus would usually appeal to their patriotism and their social conscience towards the oppressed masses. Nevertheless, the lack of economic independence, their seasonal campus life and their high rate of turnover prevented them from waging a persisting struggle.

However, their advanced knowledge made them naturally the leaders of the mass activities. Although they were seldom the main body of the mass movement, their presence in the mass rally, procession, demonstration, and speech squads often gave people the impression that they were forming the main body of the mass politics.

As to the merchants, whose self-interests were usually not identical with the national cause, at least not in a foreseeable future, were hard to be organized. The spontaneous founded organizations of the merchants were often just for self-interests. Their self-interests in most cases were in conflict with KMT's policies. Although the KMT formulated its merchant movement policy based on the assumption that self-interests of the merchants in China would coincide
with the national revolutionary causes, the mass action in the anti-imperialist movement was often directly against the self-interests of the merchants. Thus, except in the areas under the KMT rule, the merchants were usually out of reach of KMT's cadres. Occasionally, the merchants might act in cooperation with the cadres because of patriotism. But in most cases, they acted against, or at least acted passively towards the decisions and leadership of the cadres. Of course, in the areas under the KMT rule, the KMT could and did use its political power to crush the resistance of the rebellious merchants and organized them into a branch of KMT's mass organizations. Nevertheless, even in this case, the KMT must employ its political power to enable the merchants to have some economic gains. Otherwise, they would still not follow the guidance of the party cadres.

Comparing the merchants' role in the May 30th Movement with Hongkong-Shameen Strike, we find that the merchants in Canton on the whole were vigorous and willing to support the boycott against the British goods while those in Shanghai were reluctant to follow the decision of the boycott. According to available records, there were only a few merchants among the masses who adopted the hostile attitude towards the foreign imperialists in Shanghai, while the merchants in Canton played an important role in the mass action against the imperialists. Why did they have such different
attitude towards the foreign imperialists? I think that it might be partially due to the different degrees of exposure to anti-imperialist propaganda of these two places. However, the main reason was the problem of self-interests of these two groups of merchants. The Strike Committee at Canton, backed by the KMT Government, only asked the merchants not to deal with the British goods and not to trade with Hong Kong. The boycott against Hong Kong and the British goods turned out to be a bliss to the Canton merchants. But the situation in Shanghai was much different from that in Canton. The Federation of the Workers', Merchants' and Students' Organizations at Shanghai demanded a general strike which meant shop-closing for the merchants in the International Settlement. The close-shop policy would and did hurt the livelihood of many small merchants and cause the big merchants to suffer severe business loss. Although there was no lack of patriotic feeling among the Shanghai merchants, self-interests often surpassed it. Therefore, patriotism wore out as time passed in Shanghai, while patriotism of the Canton merchants was strengthened by economic profits.

For realizing its control over the masses, the re-organized KMT sent out many able cadres to organize the masses. These cadres were usually devoted party members. In order to have a close relationship with the masses and under-
stand their problems, many cadres lived and worked with the masses. Sometimes, cadres were selected from the active members among the masses. Therefore, these cadres all had first hand experience with the groups they worked with.

Once the cadres had broken into the groups, they used their ability and knowledge to provide leadership and information for the masses. Supported by other party members within the same group, the cadres sought opportunities to gain control over the existing organizations or establish new organizations for the group.

Since these cadres had very close relationship with the masses or they were a part of them, they were quick to perceive the mood of the masses. They could thus pick up an issue and then develop it. A minor incident might be utilized to serve as a spark for a great campaign. Meanwhile, according to the party regulations, the party members in the same popular organization would always form an inner secret party unit or so-called party fraction within the organization. Thus this inclusive group in the same organization would act as a whole and brought unproportional weight to bear on the decision-making or the elections of the organization. Under the instructions of the upper-level party authority, these cadres as information leaders, would provide the masses the necessary information on issues through personal conversations, public
speeches or wall papers. As an information leader, the cadre could and did in fact censor the information and let the masses know what he wanted or the party wanted the masses to know. For instance, the concept of imperialism was imposed on the minds of the masses through great efforts of the cadres. The hatred or dislike of foreign residents by the Chinese was not new in the history of modern China. However, it was the re-organized KMT which channeled the general dislike of the masses into a concrete concept of anti-imperialism. The general public was told and educated by the united front of the KMT and the CCP that there was a clear distinction between foreigners and imperialists. According to the interpretation of the united front, there were friendly foreigners and imperialistic foreigners. The imperialistic foreigners refer to those foreigners who enjoyed the extraterritorial rights in China or whose nation was still oppressing China through the unequal treaties. The efforts of the united front did have a great impact on the thinking of the general masses. Even during the heyday of the Hongkong-Shameen Strike in 1925-1926 and the Hankow Incident in 1927, the friendly foreigners, such as Russians and Germans, could walk freely among the Chinese masses and safe from harm. The only foreign victim besides the British in the Hankow Incident was a German who was mistaken as a British by the masses.7
in politics. The corruption and nepotism in the Peking Government, and the warlordism in the various provinces blocked their way to personal career as well as their personal concerns over the politics. Thus the new intelligentsia was in a mood to act. The Western learning in the new style schools further added the courage of these new intelligentsia to question the traditional values and the political authority.

Numerically speaking, this group constituted only a very tiny minority of China's vast population. However, most of the secondary schools were located in the cities, while the colleges were exclusively in the political and economic centers of China. Thus the active members of the new intelligentsia were concentrated in the urban areas. Except in Peking and its contiguous area, schools were particularly concentrated in the southern China. Kiangsu, Chekiang, Hunan, Hupei and Kwangtung had 63,762 secondary school students, more than half of the total number of China's secondary school students. And more than one third of China's college students were concentrated in a few cities in the southern China. The new educational system which brought these youth, 90% of them male, together at schools in the relatively few cities, provided them with better opportunities to discuss, criticize and protest against the existing government. Their influence was very significant, because they were located at the strategic points.
Nevertheless, in the areas where the KMT did not have political control, such as Shanghai in 1925, the efforts of the mass movement cadres were counteracted by the suppression from both the local warlord authorities and foreign imperialism. Therefore, the masses did not have enough knowledge to see the differences between the friendly foreigners and imperialistic foreigners. When the news of the Nanking Road Incident reached the masses, a general anti-foreign sentiment showed among most of Chinese residents in Shanghai, where the victims included Japanese, British, Germans as well as Russians. However, the masses, once being mobilized and organized, were still able to make the distinction between the anti-foreignism and anti-imperialism. The resolutions of various mass meetings during the May Thirtieth Movement all indicated that the masses in the mass organizations had not only been exposed to the main ideas of the anti-imperialism, but in fact also had followed the guidance of the reorganized KMT's policy.

Since the united front intended to organize the masses into political forces to undertake the national revolution, the pickets of these mass organizations, armed and unarmed alike, were employed as helpers to engage in the revolutionary activities. The common members of these mass organizations were also enlisted to assist the united front to gain the political power. Mass rallies, processions and de-
montrations not only served as the symbols of the popular support of the national revolution, but also were used as warnings to warlords and foreign imperialists. The working men's strike was employed as a direct threat to the enemies of the united front. The presence of organized masses itself would bring much social, economic and political pressure on the warlords and foreign powers as well as other common people.

Within the mass organizations, the cadres not only served as the responsible officials of these organizations, they also were the links between the high party authority and the masses. Through the chain of command, the decisions of the top party authority could easily be transferred to the lower-level units and individuals. The cadres in the mass organizations in turn fed back the opinions and reactions of the masses to the up-level authority.

As we know, most of the mass rally, parades and strikes were usually well planned by the cadres who made the decisions themselves following the general guideline of the united front or sometimes merely carried out the decisions of the party. Thus the cadres usually have a previous knowledge of the happenings and could predict the possible results of the mass actions. The masses might act orderly or disorderly, but the organized masses were usually well under the control or influence of these mass movement cadres. Oc-
casionally, the behaviour of the masses might temporarily get out of hand. However, with some efforts, the party authority was able to regain control over the masses through direct appealing to the masses by the party leaders on one hand, and through chain of command within the party and mass organizations on the other hand.

In an unorganized or loosely organized mass, the cadres still had the ability to move them, though once they moved, they might create many unexpected incidents. However, when an incident occurred, the cadres usually would immediately take advantage of the incited masses by providing them the necessary leadership and then led the masses to follow the policies of the united front. The other cadres and the members of the organized mass within the unorganized mass would then lead the entire body of the unorganized mass to act in concord with the policies or decisions of the united front. In fact, the organized masses would and did act under the guidance of the cadres to serve as the collective leaders for the unorganized masses in a mass action. These organized masses, led by their leaders performed certain actions to incite or restrain the behavior of the unorganized masses. Since the cadres had great influence over the organized masses, thus in turn they had great influence over the entire body of the unorganized masses.

The ability and capacity of the cadres over the masses
is illustrated in the case of the Hankow Incident. As we have mentioned in Chapter V, that even during the time of conflicts between the British marines and the Chinese masses, the KMT had the ability to restrain the actions of the masses. When the KMT decided to avoid any physical violence against the British after they learned the confrontation between the British and the Chinese masses, they sent out agents to appeal directly to the masses on one hand, and sought out various responsible leaders of various mass organizations on other hand. The leaders of various mass organizations were instructed not only to order their members not to employ force and to leave the British Concession, but also to ask their members to persuade and influence the people nearby to follow suit. In retrospect, we know that the decisions of the KMT was quickly and effectively carried out. The entire body of the unorganized masses in fact did follow the directions of the KMT exactly. And the goal of using mass movement as an instrument for the united front in its political struggle against its selected enemy was fully realized in this case. Thus we can say: (1) that a small number of devoted cadres can organize the masses into various controllable units, (2) cadres' ability of control over the masses depended on how much the masses had been exposed to the ideas that the cadres advocated, (3) under the leadership of the cadres, the organized masses
had served as collective leaders for the unorganized masses, and (4) on the whole, the urban mass politics led by the united front, was successful.

After 1927, the united front was broken, and the mass movement which was one of the important characteristics of the united front, was also brought to an end. Urban mass movement to the extent, it continued to exist after 1927, was largely conducted by the CCP or by the politically agitated intelligentsia under the impact of nationalism. In the post-1927 urban mass movement, the KMT had little part to play. The fact that the KMT was largely cut out from the masses was one important factor which eventually led the KMT to fall from power.
Notes to Chapter VI


7. NCH, January 8, 1927.
Bibliography

Periodicals and Newspapers

China Weekly Review, Shanghai, 1921-1927.
Title varies:
June 4, 1921-July 1, 1922—Weekly Review of the Far East.
July 8, 1922-June 16, 1923—Weekly Review.
June 23, 1923 on—China Weekly Review.


Chung-kuo nien-chien(The Chinese yearbook), Shanghai, 1924.

Chung-kuo hsueh-sheng(The Chinese students), Shanghai, May 1925-December 1926.

Hsiang-tao(The Guide Weekly), Shanghai, 1922-1927.

Hsien-tai p'ing-lun(Contemporary Review), Peking & Shanghai, 1924-1928.

Hsin Ch'ing Nien(New Youth), Canton, 1919-1926.

Hung-chi p'iao-p'iao(The unfurling of the red flag), Peking, published at irregular intervals, 1957 on.

International Labor Review, 1921-1927.


South China Morning Post, Hongkong, 1924-1926.

Tung-fang tsa-chih(The Eastern Miscelleny), Shanghai, 1923-1928.
BOOKS


Chang, Kuo-chun. Tu Yeh-sheng chuan(The biography of Tu Yeh-sheng), Taipei, Biographical Literature, 1967.


Chang, Kuo-t'ao. Wo ti hui i(My memoirs), Hongkong, Min-pao tsa-chi she, 1971.
Chang, Kuo-t'ao and others. I-ko kung-jen ti kung-chuang chi ch'i ta (The confession of a worker and other essays), n.p., 1938.

Chao, I-po. Chung-kuo chih-kung yun-tung wen-hsien (Documents on the Chinese labor movement), Shanghai, Shih-nien shu-pao she, 1946.


Ch'en-pao pien-chi-pu. Wu-sa t'ung-shih (The painful history of May 30), Peking, 1925.


Ch'ien, I-chang. Sha-chi t'ung-shih (The painful history of Shakee Incident), Shanghai, n.p., 1925.


Ch'in, Hsiung-pai. Min-kuo cheng-hai so-mi (The secrets in the republican politics), Hongkong, Yu-tsuou shu-pao she, 2 Vols., 1964.


Ch'in, Sheng. Pei-fa ts'ung-chun tsa-chi (A miscellaneous records in the Northern Expedition), Shanghai, Hsien-tai Bookstore, 1927.


Chung-kuo-kuo-min-tang, Tang-li yen-chiu-hui. Chung-kuo-kuo-min-tang li-nien hsuan-ven hui-k'an (Collections of the manifestoes of the Kuomintang), Nanking, 1929.

Similar to the position of the new intelligentsia, new merchants and new urban labor also located mainly in the cities and towns which usually were the nerve centers in Chinese society. The new urban labor particularly concentrated in some important trade ports. Due to the lack of exact figures, it is impossible to estimate the percentage of the new urban labor to the total population in the various cities. According to the study of Fang Fu-an, there were at least 450,000 workers in Shanghai in 1924. This figure included 288,000 factory workers, 100,000 transportation workers, 30,000 rickshaw coolies and 50,000 wharf coolies. Thus the total working population which included workers and their dependents was more than half of the total population of Shanghai which was estimated at 1,500,000 in 1924. Also it was said that there were more than 800,000 organized labor in Shanghai in 1927. The percentage of this group in other urban industrial settlements might not be as great as that in Shanghai, but these urban labor still occupied an important position in these urban areas. For instance, there were 280,000 organized labor in Hankow in 1927, and 290,620 in Canton in the same year. Therefore, the working class, though only a minute fraction among the vast population of China, constituted a significant minority, sometimes majority, in some of the key urban centers. Thus, regardlessness of its absolute numerical weakness in its relation to the Chinese


Huang, Chao-nien. *Chung-kuo-kuo-min-tang shang-min yun-tung ching-kuo* (Records of the KMT's merchant movement), Shanghai, San-min Bookstore, 1928.


Ku, Ch'i-chung. *Tsu-chiez yu Chung-kuo* (Foreign settlements in China), Shanghai, Ching-yun Bookstore, 1928.


Li, Ang. *Hung-se wu-tai* (Red stage), Peking, Min-tsun Bookstore, 1946.


Liao, Chung-k'ai. Liao Chung-k'ai chi (Collection of Liao Chung-k'ai), Peking, Chung-hua, 1963.

Lien, D.K. The Growth and Industrialization of Shanghai, Shanghai, 1936.


Ma, Chao-chun. Chung-kuo lao-kung wen-ti (Problems on the Chinese labor), Shanghai, Min-chih Bookstore, 1927.


Pick, Eugene. translated by Chu, Min. *Pao-lo-ting chih tsuie* (The evils of Borodin), Canton, Ping-she, 1927.


Shanghai hsueh-sheng lien-ho-hui. *Wu-sa hou chih Shang-hai hsueh-sheng* (Shanghai students after May 30), Shanghai, 1925.


Sun, Wen (Sun Yat-sen).  Tsung-li kuan-yu ching-nien ti i chiao (The teachings of President Sun to the youth), Nanking, KMT Central Executive Committee, 1929.

Sun, Wen.  Tsung-li kuan-yu min-chung yun-tung chi i chiao (The teachings of President Sun on the mass movement), Chungking, Chung-yang she-hui-pu, 1940.

Sun, Yat-sen.  San Min Chu I (The Three Principles of the People), translated by Frank W. Price, Shanghai, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1927.


Tchou, T.  Housing and Social Conditions among Industrial Workers in Shanghai, Shanghai, Industrial Department of the National Committee of the Y.M.C.A. in China, 1926.


Ti-i-tzu kuo-nei ko-ming chan-cheng shih-ch'i ti kung-ien yun-tung (The labor movement during the first revolutionary civil war), Peking, Jen-min-ch'u-pan-she, 1953.

Ti-i-tzu kuo-nei ko-ming chan-cheng shih-ch'i ti nung-min yun-tung (The peasant movement during the first revolutionary civil war), Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1953.


Tyan, Min-chien.  Two Years of Nationalist China, Shanghai, Kelly & Walsh, 1930.


Yang, Chia-min. *Min-kuo shih-wu-nien hsueh-sheng yun-tung k'ai-kuan* (A brief description on the student movement in the year of 1926), Shanghai, Kuan-hua, 1927.

Yang, Tzu-lieh. Chang Kuo-tao fu-jen hui i lu (The memoirs of Madame Chang Kuo-tao), Hongkong, Chi-lien ch'u-pan-she, 1970.

Yang, Yeh. ed., Chung-kuo hsueh-sheng yun-tung ti ku-shih (Story of Chinese student movement), Nanking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1957.


population as a whole, it was able to bring much more weight to bear on Chinese society as well as politics than its actual size. And it was these working people in the various cities and towns who had provided the back-bone of the participants of the mass movement in the urban areas.
URBAN MASS POLITICS IN THE SOUTHERN CHINA, 1923-1927:
SOME CASE STUDIES

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Hung-ting Ku, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1973

Reading Committee:
Dr. Hao Chang
Dr. Samuel Chu
Dr. Tien-yi Li

Approved By

Adviser
Department of History
Foreign imperialism

In addition to the internal conditions, the foreign imperialism such as the foreign concessions and settlements in China, the foreign control over Chinese maritime custom house and the restricted tariff, also played a very important role in stimulating the rise and the development of the mass movement in the southern China.

Concessions and settlements were areas in certain parts of the trade ports that had been declared "open" for foreign trade. Here the foreign powers had their own municipal administration, police forces and taxation authority.\(^{64}\)

Originally, the administrative authority of the concessions and settlements was in the hands of Chinese officials. Only after the coming of the Taipings to the Yangtze Valley in 1853, did the Chinese officials allow the foreigners to have their own police to maintain order. Nevertheless, the Chinese who lived in these concessions at the time, were still under the jurisdiction of the Chinese government.\(^{65}\)

As late as 1863, the Diplomatic Corps in Peking still recognized that "the Chinese not actually in foreign employment shall be wholly under the control of Chinese officials as much as those Chinese in the Chinese city."\(^{66}\)

Nevertheless, the foreign powers had expanded their
controls over the concessions and settlements since the mid-eighteenth century. By 1920, Chinese jurisdiction over the Chinese residents in these concessions also ceased to exist.\(^67\) Although the Chinese authorities, in theory, still held the power to tax the Chinese who resided in these areas, but in fact, these Chinese did not pay taxes and the Chinese authorities could not do anything to enforce the collection due to the incooperation of the foreign authorities in these concessions.\(^68\) Thus these foreign concessions and settlements were regarded by the contemporary Chinese as "states" within China. In 1923, there were about 30 of these concessions and settlements in China.\(^69\)

Outside the concessions and settlements, foreign people in China enjoyed extraterritoriality and thus escaped from the jurisdiction of the Chinese court. In cases in which the defendant was Chinese, the Chinese authorities would have jurisdiction over the case, but the consul of the foreign plaintiff had the right to attend the Chinese court and even had the right to debate for his subjects.\(^70\)

The existence of these concessions and settlements within the Chinese territory presented a living picture of the national humiliation for the Chinese people and particularly for the patriotic intelligentsia. And the physical presence of the foreign residents who were armed with extraterritorial rights further created dislike or even hatred from the
Chinese populace. The personal irritations against these foreign people might easily develop into an anti-foreign sentiment.

In addition to restrictions over judicial powers, the foreign powers also had signed many unequal treaties with China to restrict her administrative powers, such as the navigation of internal rivers and the establishment and administration of the foreign post offices and telegram systems in China. In 1922, there were a total of 150 foreign post offices in China.71

One of the most serious restrictions over Chinese sovereignty was the tariff restriction. Since the signature of the Nanking Treaty between Great Britain and China in 1842, China could not collect more than 5% custom duties on foreign imported goods. In 1858, the Treaty of Tientsin allowed the Chinese authorities to levy 2.5% internal transit tax in addition to the 5% custom duties. However, after paying the above 7.5% duties, the foreign goods were exempted from all other taxes, such as the likin.72 As a matter of fact, the Chinese Maritime Custom House, headed by Englishmen since 1863,73 often levied custom duties much less than the 5% standard. For instance, the average import-duty was only 3.1% in 1921, 3.8% in 1926 and 3.5% in 1927.74 In such a situation, the infant Chinese native industries were not protected by their own tariff but in fact were hurted by the
tariff, for the foreign products paid less than 7.5% import taxes, while the native products were paying 5% custom duty plus much higher internal transit tax, the likin. The unfavorable balance between the imports and exports in China was thus often regarded as the result of such unprotective tariff policy. Although the unfavorable balance might not be entirely due to the tariff policy, the restrictive tariff did more or less obstruct the development of the native industries. The rapid growth of Chinese native industries in the years of WWI and the immediate post-War years stopped after the return of the foreign products. For instance, the unfavorable balance between the imports and exports of the flour products in 1914, suddenly became a favorable balance in 1915. And the favorable balance continued until 1922. The balance between new import and net export of all goods drew close for the first time since 1894 in the years between 1915 and 1919. After the period, the gap between the net import and net export grew wide again, and the unfavorable balance hindered the development of the native industries. Many native factories which enjoyed prosperity, now became bankrupt.

The foreign oppression not only disturbed or even blocked the developments of Chinese native industries, it also brought a feeling of national humiliation to the Chinese people as a whole. The constant encroachment of Chinese sover-
eighty by the foreign powers, had always bothered the patriotic Chinese. Many individual as well as mass protests had been waged against the foreign powers and their agents in China. The presence of a group of specially privileged foreigners in China was an eyesore for any patriotic Chinese. The demands to maintain or enlarge their privileges in China by the foreign powers often created a general anti-foreign sentiment among the intellectual circle who often took the leadership in resisting the foreign demands. The May Fourth Movement of 1919 can be regarded as an example of explosion of such patriotic feelings.

Upon receiving the news of China's failure to renounce Japan's privileges and rights in Shangtung and the treaty between China and Japan based on the Twenty-one Demands in the Paris Conference, the disappointed students in Peking broke out a massive patriotic demonstration on May 4, 1919. The mass meeting was a protest against the unjust settlement in international politics and the treacherous officials within the Chinese government responsible for China's 1918 commitments to Japan. After the May Fourth Incident, "the intelligentsia soon became aware that they must awaken the masses of the people to the national crises and to the people's own interests and then organize and lead them, if
the nation were to be saved and strengthened. Mass movement, propaganda, organization and revolutionary disciplines were consequently regarded by the young intellectuals as significant and justifiable techniques for their struggle against world power politics and warlordism. In the movement, street speech groups were sent out, and printed handbills, leaflets and newspapers in the vernacular language were widely distributed. The patriotic activities of the students received immediate sympathy and support from people in other cities, and "what began as a local incident in Peking soon developed into a nation-wide movement." Within a short period, the movement affected more than two hundred large and small cities in over 22 provinces.

The reaction from Shanghai was stronger than from any other place. On May 7, 1919, the Shanghai Students' Federation initiated the boycott against the Japanese goods. The merchants, industrialists and urban workers, stirred by the mass arrests of the students by the Peking Government, began to follow the leadership of the new intelligentsia in united, if limited, action. In Shanghai, the small merchants organized themselves by the streets where their business houses were located. Each street formed a union, the street union. A central organization uniting all the street unions was also established, theech was the Federation of the Street Unions of Shanghai. These street unions
were very effective in carrying out the boycott. Under the pressure of both the students and the petty merchants, the most reactionary Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce also promised to join with the Association of Education of Kiangsu in a petition to the Peking Government in favor of the students. Concerning their relations with the merchants and urban workers, the Shanghai students established a labor department in the student union to keep contact with labor, and to dispatch liaison groups to merchant societies. With the efforts of the students, a general commercial strike was held on June 5, 1919 in Shanghai. "This meant that...a city with a population of 1,538,000 was seized by an impromptu and sketchily organized commercial strike in support of the 13,000 striking students." Although the immediate effects of the May Fourth Incident were the fall of Ch'ien Neng-hsun's cabinet on June 13, 1919, and the refusal of the Chinese delegation to sign the Peace Treaty in Paris on June 28, 1919, the impact of the Movement was more far-reaching. The slogans of "wai cheng kuo ch'uan" (externally, struggle for sovereignty), and "nei ch'u kuo tse" (internally, get rid of the traitors), later had great influence on the development of nationalism in China.

Through the efforts of the intellectuals, particular the students, the nationalist zeal was transferred into the
less educated masses. Merchants, urban labor and other urban dwellers who might ignore politics in the past, found themselves now participating in the mass protests against Japan for the sake of the national interests.

Due to the increased activities of the intellectuals among the workers, there sprang up many new labor organizations. Many free night schools were set up for the poor by the intelligentsia to educate the people. Sometimes, even the young girls stood on boxes to explain the national humiliation to peasants and workers. Indeed, the Chinese society was shaken by the Movement, and more people were aware of the national crisis. The urban dwellers were further exposed to the concepts of nationalism through the mass broadcasting system. The advocacy of the vernacular by the new intelligentsia in the Movement also helped to spread the new ideas to the urban masses. Meanwhile, many social groups were organized or helped to be organized by the intelligentsia. The political consciousness of the Chinese people as a whole and urban masses in particular, was thus greatly awakened after 1919.
The founding of the Chinese Communist Party

The May Fourth Incident indeed accelerated the awakening of the Chinese intelligentsia to the idea of national independence, and also pushed Chinese youths to the left. With influence from the international communists via Voitinsky, a Ma-ke-ssu hsueh-shuo yen-chiu-hui (Society for the Study of Marxist Theory) and a C-lo-ssu yen-chiu-hui (Society for the Study of Russia) were organized in March, 1920, under the inspiration of Li Ta-chao. Through the efforts of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, a famous liberal in the May Fourth Movement, the Shanghai cell of the Chinese Communist Party was founded in August, 1920. One month later, the Peking cell of the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Li Ta-chao was also born, though the nation-wide communist party was not yet established.

As the communist cells were organized in Peking and Shanghai, the Socialist Youth Corps was simultaneously established with somewhat more members. Since the communist party should be a party of proletarians, Ch'en Tu-hsiu and other communists decided to organize the workers and propagate the communist ideas among the workers in order to absorb some of the liberal workers and then turn them into communists. Thus, Lao-tung che (The Laborer) was published by the Shanghai cell, and Lao-tung yin (The Voice of the Labor)
On July 1, 1921, the First National Conference of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Shanghai with 12 delegates representing seven local cells. Delegates came from the communist cells of Canton, Shanghai, Peking, Hunan, Tientsin, Hankow and Chinese communists in Japan. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was formally founded.

In the First Conference, "The First Decision as to the objects of the Communist Party of China, 1921" was passed. The Decision was regarded as the guideline for the development and organization of the CCP. In this Decision, the CCP put great emphasis on the labor organization and the propaganda works among the workers. The Decision stated that the organization of the industrial unions was the chief aim of the Party; in any locality where there was more than one kind of industry, an industrial union ought to be organized; if there was no large industry in a certain locality but only one or two factories, a factory-union could be organized; magazines, daily publications and pamphlets should be under the management of the Central Committee of the Provincial Central Committee; each locality could publish a union magazine, a daily newspaper and a weekly paper according to its needs; as a labor supplementary school was the preparatory step in the organization of an industrial union, such schools should be formed within the units of various industries; labor supple-
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my adviser, Dr. Hao Chang, for his valuable advice, guidance and criticism. I would also like to thank Mr. David Hu of the Ohio State University Library. His gracious assistance was invaluable in writing this dissertation.
mentary schools should gradually become the centers of labor organs, otherwise they should be closed or reorganized by the Party; and two most important tasks for the CCP were to awaken the class consciousness of the workers and to organize labor unions. 100

Under the CCP, the Labor Secretariat was organized in September 1921 to direct the labor movement. Most of the CCP members and SYC members participated in the activities of the Labor Secretariat which became one of the most active organs in the CCP. 101

Congress of Toilers of the Far East

The exclusion of Russia from the Washington Conference which was held in the fall of 1921, brought immediately hostile reaction from the Soviet Union. The Narkomindel, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, 102 of the Soviet union, called a Congress of Toilers of the Far East at Moscow on January 21, 1922. Both the KMT and CCP sent their representatives to this Congress. 103

In this Congress, Safavor, a member of the presidium of the Congress, presented the Chinese delegation a three-point
program: (1) to start the organization and agitation so that the soviet system might gain roots among the masses, (2) to launch the struggle against foreign imperialism, and (3) to oust the native usurers in the villages and bourgeoisie in the cities. Safarov also urged the KMT to work among the peasant masses. As he pointed out that it was not enough to advocate its political programme in a small circle of so-called educated society.

One of the most important impacts of this Congress on the Chinese revolutionary movement was the discussions on imperialism in China. It was at this Congress, that anti-imperialism was singled out as the most essential task in the process of the Chinese revolutionary movement. So was imperialism linked with the reactionary forces in China. The reactionary forces were regarded as only the tools of imperialism, and the success of the Chinese revolution depended on the success of anti-imperialism. The conception of the "anti-imperialism united front" was also conceived in this Congress. This concept was later developed and served as the foundation of the cooperation between the KMT and CCP.
The Third National Congress of the CCP

At its Second National Congress in 1922, the CCP proposed a two-party alliance to the KMT, and announced that there would be a two-stage revolutionary process in China, in order to dispel the possible suspicion from some KMT members. Meanwhile, it stressed the importance of the establishment of a united front of workers, poor peasants and petty bourgeoisie. Also it declared its support on the democratic revolution. This "bloc-without" proposal was rejected by Sun Yat-sen, who would nevertheless allow the CCP members to join his KMT.

Maring, the delegate of the Comintern to China, criticized the "bloc-without" policy of the Second National Congress of the CCP as an impractical leftist resolution, and stated that the Comintern regarded the joining of the CCP members to the KMT as a workable means to reach the establishment of a united front in the national revolution in China. Maring's criticism brought up a hot debate within the CCP top circle.

In August 1922, a Central Committee meeting was summoned at West Lake in Hanchow to discuss the workable policy of cooperation with the KMT. It was in this meeting, that the CCP decided to order some of its responsible members to join the KMT. And within a month after the meeting, nearly all important CCP members joined the KMT.
In May 1923, Maring brought back a special order of the Comintern from Moscow, demanding the CCP to enlarge its cooperation with the KMT and to summon the Third National Congress immediately, which was held in June of the same year. The special order explicitly instructed the CCP that the national revolution was the current task of the Chinese revolution, and the KMT was the gravity center of the national revolution. Therefore, the CCP members should join the KMT and work hard within the KMT in order to overthrow imperialism and its tools, the warlords. After another violent debate between Maring and his supporters, and Chang Kuo-t'ao and his supporters, a 9 to 8 majority passed Maring's interpretations on the Comintern's order that all CCP members should join the KMT, all revolutionary works belonged to the KMT, and that the CCP only had some functions in educating the working class in the national revolution. Thus, the Manifesto of the Third National Congress of the CCP in June 1923, formally announced that "The KMT should be the central force of the National revolution and should assume its leadership." The Manifesto also asked all the revolutionary elements in China to rally to the KMT for speeding the completion of the national revolutionary movement. It also declared that "It is our (CCP's) special task to do propagandistic and organizational work among the workers and peasants. Still more central is our task to lead the workers and peasants into joining the national revolution." Nevertheless, the Manifesto
proposed that the KMT should discard its two old notions, namely the reliance on foreign powers and concentration on military action, and pay more attention to political propaganda among the people in order to create a true central force for the national revolution. The "bloc-within" policy was thus given official endorsement by the CCP, and the formation of the united front was made possible so far as the CCP was concerned.

The formation of the united front between the KMT and CCP

In the early 1920's, China was divided into many semi-autonomous areas under the rule of various warlords. In the North, Wu P'ei-fu, Ts'ao K'un and their Chili clique were predominant, besides Chang Tso-lin's Fengtien clique in Manchuria. In the South, Hunan, Szechwan, Yunan, Kweichow, Fukien, Kwangsi and Kwangtung were nominal under the control of the Military Government at Canton. However, as a matter of fact, the situations in the southern China were even worse
than that of the northern China. Although it was Sun Yat-sen who established the Military Government in 1917 to denounce Tuan Ch'i-jui's illegal summons of a new provisional parliament, and Sun held the title as the Grand Marshal of the Military Government, the actual power was in the hands of various local warlords. In theory, Sun had the power to nominate and appoint men as ministers of foreign affairs, domestic affairs, army, navy, finance, etc., but in fact, all the important affairs were dominated by the local warlords, such as Lu Jung-t'ing and Chen Pi-kuang. Sun's appointed ministers were powerless. In order to deprive Sun any independent military force, the guards of the Military Government were even arrested and shot by the local warlords under the charge of being bandits.

The lack of a true revolutionary military force weakened Sun's position to fight the various warlords and forced him to make alliances with any warlord who proclaimed to support his revolutionary principles. As early as December 1921, Maring presented Sun three proposals to reorganize the KMT. One of these proposals was to establish a revolutionary force and a military academy.

Besides the lack of its own revolutionary troops, the KMT also had many internal defects in its organizational and disciplinary aspects. Since the establishment of the republic in 1912, many opportunists had joined the Party.
"Many were members of the Party without an understanding or a belief in the principles the Party stood for. A great part of the members were old-style intellectuals, officials and militarists who bargained and negotiated with feudal lords and politicians, and sought to get into a place of power, on the basis of the reputation of Sun Yat-sen, whom they made a habit of betraying. There was no unity of purpose, there was no concerted action..."121 The lack of sincerity of the great majority of the Party members towards the revolutionary movement and the loose organization of the Party were realized by Sun himself. In 1923, Sun pointed out these defects at a reunion gathering of the KMT by saying, "While there are many who devote themselves to the Party work and really struggle for its principles, the majority of the members of the Party just look upon joining our Party as a short-cut to high government position."122

Ch'en Chiang-min's revolt on June 16, 1922, gave Sun's already weak military control over the Kwangtung base a further blow. Ch'en who had been a long-time protege of Sun, revolted and forced Sun to flee from Canton to Shanghai in August 1922.

The revolt seemed to have a great impact on Sun's decisions on the admittance of the CCP members into the KMT, the reorganization of the KMT and the alliance with Soviet Russia. During the process of Conflict between Sun Yat-sen and
Ch'en Chiung-min, Sun not only temporarily lost his power-base but also brought his prestige to a low ebb. When Hsu Shih-ch'ang was forced to resign his Presidency of the Peking Government by the Chili clique in June 1922, many people also demanded to abdicate in Canton. Ch'en Chiung-min not only had the support from Wu P'ei-fu and other warlords, but also had the sympathy of the so-called liberals in the intellectual circles for they regarded Ch'en's uncooperativeness towards Sun's Northern Expedition in accord with the general desire of the people for peace. Many famous scholars, such as Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei and Hu Shih, expressed their desire of having Sun resign. Even many important KMT veterans deserted Sun. Wu Chih-hui, Wang Ch'ung-hui and 47 other KMT leaders also telegraphed Sun, asking for his retirement.

Ch'en's revolt not only surprised Sun but also brought him great frustration. Sun even heavily blamed himself for trusting the wrong man. In his open letter to KMT members about Ch'en's revolt, Sun sadly said that Ch'en had ordered his troops to attack and bombard Sun's headquarters, and had done what Sun's enemies dared not and would not do to him. Indeed, Ch'en had betrayed Sun's trust. On the eve of Ch'en's revolt, Sun had already received enough information about Ch'en's plot, but Sun refused to believe such information. Sun was quite confident that Ch'en, as a revolutionary member of the KMT, dared not openly revolt against him. Furthermore, Sun had regarded Ch'en as his trusted military
After 56 days of fighting with Ch'en's troops in Canton area, Sun at last came to Shanghai in August. Immediately after Sun arrived in Shanghai, the important CCP leaders and the Comintern agent Maring went to see Sun and discussed the possibility of the admittance of the CCP members into the KMT with Sun. Sun accepted their proposal and promised to cancel the ceremony of finger-printing and the declaring loyalty to Sun personally. Sun also promised to reorganize the KMT. Thus all the important CCP leaders joined the KMT in August and September, 1922, though the enrollment of the CCP members en masse was not carried out until 1923.

Just about half year ago, when Maring proposed the co-operation between the KMT and CCP and an entente between the KMT and Soviet Russia, Sun coolly declined. But now, Sun was earnest to consider the cooperation though he still refused the two-party alliance. Sun's drastic change alarmed some of his followers. For instance, Ma Chao-chun, the KMT labor movement leader, secretly memorialized Sun eight times asking Sun to reconsider his decisions, but was refused on the ground that the admittance of the CCP members into the KMT would thus bring the youths who were fans of Marxism into the national revolutionary movement. Such a belief was reconfirmed by Sun in his reply to Chiang Kai-shek's report on
his visit to Russia in 1923. Sun was very confident that "the only way to deter the Chinese Communists from inciting class conflicts and sabotaging our National Revolution was to place them under the leadership of Kuomintang and to subject them to our Party's unified direction."32

Meanwhile, the alliance between Sun's KMT and Soviet Russia was being negotiated. Between 1920 and 1921, the Bolsheviks, Voitinsky, Dalin and Maring, had made several contacts with Sun.33 After Sun's flight to Shanghai, Joffe, the new head of the Soviet delegation to China, sent an agent to meet Sun in the late August, 1922.34 They engaged in a series of negotiations dealing with the agreements on the nature and scope of their future cooperation, the position of the CCP in China, and the issues on Outer Mongolia and the Chinese Eastern Railway.35 Joffe who came to Peking in August, 1922, made several attempts to have the Chinese Government in Peking to recognize the new Soviet government in Russia. His request was repeatedly rejected by the Peking Government.36 After his diplomatic setback in Peking, Joffe shifted his attention to the KMT. On December 12, 1922, Joffe sent an article back to Moscow. The article, entitled "China Puzzle," stated that the KMT was "the organization closest to being a genuine political party in China, serving as the meeting point for nationalism and revolution," and thus proposed Soviet Russia to stand for support of the KMT, for "in
VITA

August 13, 1941... Born-Kwangtung, China
1963............... B.A., Tunghai University, Taiwan
1964-1966........... High school teacher, history, Tainan, Taiwan
1968............... M.A., University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, Iowa
1969-1973........... Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

Fields of Study

Major Field: Modern China. Professor Hao Chang

Minor Fields: Japan. Professor Richard Minear

Medieval Islam. Professor Sydney Fisher

American Constitutional History. Professor Bradley Chapin
China there has already been born a mass, national-revolutionary movement, so, on it depends the fate of China." 137

In January 1923, Joffe himself went to Shanghai to discuss an alliance with Sun Yat-sen directly. Before he left Peking, Joffe sent another article back to Moscow stating that Wu P'ei-fu and his Chili clique cooperated with imperialism to fight against Sun Yat-sen's national revolutionary movement and that he regarded both the warlords and imperialism as the main obstacles to the unification of China. 138

The negotiations between Sun Yat-sen and Joffe resulted in the famous Joint Manifesto of Sun Yat-sen and A.A. Joffe of January 26, 1923. The Manifesto announced that : (1) both parties held that "the communistic order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China. M. Joffe... is further of the opinion that China's most important and most pressing problems are the completion of national unification and the attainment of full national independence. With regard to these great tasks, M. Joffe has assured Dr. Sun of the Russian people's warmest sympathy for China, and of their willingness to lend support;" (2) The Russian government was ready to enter negotiation with China on the basis of the renunciation by Russia of all the treaties and exactions which the Tsardom imposed in China; (3) both parties were of the same opinion that the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway should be temporarily reorganized
after an agreement had been reached between the Chinese and Russian governments; and (4) Russia would not pursue an imperialistic policy in Outer Mongolia or cause it to secede from China.139

Although the Joint Manifesto was just a diplomatic document concerning the relationship between Soviet Russia and Sun Yat-sen’s KMT, and nothing about the amalgamation of the KMT and CCP was mentioned, Liao Chung-k’ai, an important left-wing leader of the KMT, was sent to Japan by Sun to continue the negotiations with Joffe on the “practical methods” of carrying out the entente.140 And “on the basis of these negotiations, Sun agreed to adopt the Soviet system of party, government, and army organization.”141 In September 1923, the Chiang Kai-shek Mission was sent to Moscow to study the post-revolutionary party system and the political and military organizations of Soviet Russia.142 Meanwhile, the Comintern ordered all the CCP members to join the KMT.143

For helping the KMT to reorganize, Michael Borodin, an experienced organizer, was recommended to Sun by Leo Kara-khan. After his arrival in Canton in October 1923, Borodin won Sun’s confidence and became the “political advisor” of the KMT and was appointed to undertake the task of training of the KMT members.144 Several months later, Borodin was even appointed by Sun to draft the constitution of the KMT.
which closely followed the pattern of the Russian Communist Party by adopting the principle of "democratic centralism." According to the principle, the minority should submit absolutely to the decision of the majority and the subordinates, individual party members as well as the lower level party branches, should obey absolutely the higher party authority, though free discussion would be allowed within the party until a decision had been made.

The similarity between the KMT constitution and Bolshevik constitutions of various nations even surprised one of the important young CCP leaders, Chang Kuo-t'ao, who regarded the KMT constitution as a version of the communist constitutions of various countries and was afraid that such a Bolshevik type constitution, with a strictly disciplinary system, would restrict CCP's activities within the KMT.

Sun Yat-sen's decision to "learn from Russia" was also partially due to his disappointment towards the Western powers which were often ignoring his appeal for friendly cooperation and assistance. The United States, which was very dear to Sun's mind and heart, had repeatedly failed to respond to his call. The liberal President Wilson, in fact, gave his support to Yuan Shih-k'ai rather to Sun Yat-sen. In one case, the State Department of the United States even refused to transmit a personal letter of Sun Yat-sen to President Harding and, instead, instructed the American Consulate
General in Canton not to make "itself a vehicle of official communication for an organization in revolt against a Government with which the United States is in friendly relations." Great Britain, which had a base in Hongkong, was often a direct threat to the existence of Sun's government in Canton.

Sun's disappointment towards the foreign powers, except the newly founded Soviet Russia, can be easily seen from his marginal comments on an accusation against the CCP, presented to him by some KMT veterans in December 1923. Sun's comments stated, "The Chinese revolution has never been welcome by the foreign powers, which have often helped our opponents in attempts to destroy our Party... Sympathy can only be expected from Russia, the oppressed nations, and the oppressed peoples. It was... Russia's idea to befriend us..."

Sun's policy of "alliance with Soviet Russia" grew stronger as time passed. In October, 1924, on the occasion of welcoming the visit of the Russian fleet to Canton, Sun, in his letter to the commander of the fleet, stated that Soviet Russia was the closest friend of his Republic and both nations should strengthen their already very close relationship in fighting imperialism. Before he died, Sun sent a letter to the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. expressing his confidence on the cooperation between his KMT and Soviet Russia.
Sun's letter stated:

While I lie in a malady against which men are powerless, my thoughts are turned towards you and towards the fates of my Party and my country. You are the head of the union of free republics—that heritage left to the oppressed peoples of the world by the immortal Lenin. With the aid of that heritage the victims of imperialism will inevitably achieve emancipation... I charge the Kuomintang to continue the work of the revolutionary nationalist movement... With this object I have instructed the Party to be in constant contact with you. I firmly believe in the continuance of the support which you have hitherto accorded to my country. 152

The policies of "alliance with Soviet Russia," "support of the peasants and labor" and "the admittance of the CCP members into the KMT" were at last formally announced in the First National Congress of the KMT in January, 1924. And it was during this Congress that Li Ta-chao, the leader of the CCP delegation, submitted a memorandum to the KMT. In the memorandum, Li assured the KMT that "We (the CCP members) join this Party as individuals, not as a body... Before joining it, we have made a detailed study both of the theories and of facts. Dr. Sun has given un permission to retain our relationship with the China branch of the Third International... Since we have joined the Party and so long as we remain its members, we shall carry out its political program and abide by its constitution and bylaws. We shall obey the disciplinary measures or punishment imposed by this Party in case we fail to do so." Furthermore, Li announced
that they joined the KMT because they had something to contribute to it and the cause of China's national revolution. They did not have any intention to take advantage of the situation to propagate communism in the name of the KMT.153

In this Congress, most of the important members of the CCP were nominated and elected as members or alternative members of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the KMT. The policy of the admittance of the CCP into the KMT was thus formally endorsed by the First National Congress of the KMT, though some of the KMT leaders still had doubts about the motives of the CCP. Nevertheless, by 1924, the Kuomintang was reorganized into a tight revolutionary party, and the united fighting front between the KMT and CCP was theoretically firmly established.
Notes To Chapter I

4. *North China Herald* (hereafter refers as NCH), February 2, 1924.
5. NCH, February 2, 1924.
6. NCH, February 2, 1924 and March 8, 1924.
8. Ibid., p. 114.
10. Ibid., p. 133.
11. Ibid., p. 103.
12. Ibid., p. 135.
20. Ibid., p. 37.
22. Fu-an Fang, op. cit., pp. 41-42.
23. Ibid., p. 39, 40.
24. Ibid., p. 51.
34. Ibid., p. 18.
35. Ibid., p. 17.
36. Tse-tsung Chow, op. cit., p. 381; Ti i tzu kuo-nei ko-ming chan-cheng shih-ch'i ti kung-jen yun-tung (Peking, 1943, hereafter will refer as Ti i tzu kung-jen), pp. 4-5.
38. Chung-kuo nien-chien, 1924, 0.614, cited in Jean Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 40.

40. Ibid., p. 50.


42. Helen Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 9; The figure was 2,900,000 in *Ti i tzu kung-jen*, p. 49.


45. Ibid., p. 313.


48. Ibid., p. 324.

49. Ibid., p. 322.


51. Ibid., p. 380.

52. Ibid., p. 9.

53. Ibid., p. 378.


55. Ibid., p. 413, pp. 332-333.


57. Ibid., 1924, pp. 241-251.

58. Ibid., 1924, p. 251.


63. Jean Chesneaux regarded that the working class was only a tiny minority even in the cities (see Jean Chesneaux, *op.cit.*, p.47.) However, according to my own study, the working class did sometimes constitute a majority in some urban centers.


Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vita</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations of Terms</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Background</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Ideology, Policies and New Orientation of the United Front Towards the Mass Politics</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Urban Mass Politics in Action (I), The May Thirtieth Movement</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Urban Mass Politics in Action (II), Hongkong-Shameen Strike</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Urban Mass Politics in Action (III), The Recovery of Hankow British Concession</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Conclusion</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
83. Ibid., p. 226.
85. Ibid., p. 143.
86. Ibid., p. 153.
87. Ibid., p. 375.
88. Ibid., p. 166.
89. Ibid., p. 256.
90. Ibid., p. 193.
91. Min-chien Tyan, Two Years of Nationalist China (Shanghai, 1930), p. 21.
92. Tse-tsung Chow, op. cit., p. 4; Kuo-t'ao Chang, Wo ti hui i (Hongkong, 1971), p. 130.
93. Tse-tsung Chow, op. cit., p. 244.
95. Ibid., p. 106.
96. Ibid., p. 97.
97. Ibid., p. 106.
99. Ibid., p. 108.
100. Ibid., pp. 108-109.
103. Ibid., p. 78.
104. Ibid., p. 78.
105. Ibid., p. 84.
106. Ibid., p. 80.
107. Ibid., p. 84.
108. Kuo-t'ao Chang, Wo ti hui i, p. 207.
109. Ibid., p. 208.
112. Ibid., p. 245; Harold Issacs, op. cit., p. 58.
114. Ibid., pp. 287-291; the full text see Conrad Brandt, op. cit., pp. 71-72.
115. Ibid., p. 72.
121. Leang-li T'ang, op. cit., p. 152.
123. Chien-nung Li, op. cit., p. 423, 419.
125. Kuo-t'ao Chang, op. cit., p. 249.
127. Ibid., pp. 798-799.


129. Ibid., p. 257.

130. Chien-min Wang, op. cit., p. 94.


135. Shao-chuan Leng, op. cit., p. 59.


137. Allen Whitting, op. cit., p. 201.


139. The full text see Conrad Brandt and others, op. cit., pp. 70-71.


141. Conrad Brandt and others, op. cit., p. 66.


145. Conrad Brandt and others, op. cit., p. 72; Chien-min Wang, op. cit., p. 119.

146. Ibid., p. 104; Robert North, Moscow and Chinese Communism (Stanford, 1969), p. 75; Chien-min Wang, op. cit., p. 104.


150. Conrad Brandt and others, *op.cit.*, p. 73.


Chapter II
Ideology, Policies and New Orientation
of the United Front Towards the Mass Politics

During the period of the United Front (1923-1927), Sun
Yat-sen provided undisputed leadership for the KMT. His San
Min Chu I was regarded as the fundamental ideology for the
KMT in its national revolutionary movement. In addition, the
CCP also recognized the leadership of the KMT in their co-
operation period. The reinterpreted San Min Chu I of 1924 was
accepted as the primary theory in the national revolution by
the CCP. Thus, the official policies of the KMT and Sun's
ideology can be considered as the representatives of princi-
pies and policies which directed the movement in this period.

Min-tsu chu i

Prior to the Revolution of 1911, Sun’s Min-tsu chu i (the
Principle of Nationalism) was known as the principle of ra-
cial struggle to serve as a weapon against the Manchus. It
was the corner-stone in Sun's revolutionary theory. By empha-
sizing the racial distinction between the ruling and ruled
classes, the entire Chinese population was presumed to be
united together to fight against the Manchu dynasty. With the
establishment of the Republic, this principle became less important. The Declaration of Chung-hua Ko-ming-tang in 1915 did not even mention Min-tsu chu i along with other two Principles. The Declaration stated, "Following the First Revolution which resulted in the transformation of the form of state and the system of government, our Party has considered as its sole duty henceforward the consolidation of the Republic and the implementation of the Principles of Democracy and People's Livelihood." 

The Manifesto of the First National Congress of the KMT in 1924 developed Sun's Min-tsu chu i into two-fold aspect. The Manifesto announced that "there are two aspects to this principle—namely, the self-emancipation of the Chinese nation and the equality of all races with Chinese territory." It further declared: (1) externally, "all unequal treaties such as those providing for leased territories, extraterritorial privileges, foreign control of the custom tariff, and the exercise of political authority on Chinese territories which impair the sovereignty of the Chinese nation, should be abolished, and new treaties should be concluded on the basis of absolute equality and mutual respect for sovereign rights;" and (2) internally, with regard to the racial equality within China, the KMT would promote the interests of the minority groups and would solemnly recognize the right of self-determination of all the minority people." After the success of
the national revolution, the KMT promised that China would be a free union of peoples organized on the principle of self-determination.²

Although the Manifesto formally incorporated the doctrine of self-determination by racial minority into Sun's Min-tsu chu i, Sun never gave up his idea of uniting all the races in China to form a great Chung-hua nation on the basis of cultural assimilation of other minority people by the Han people. In one of his public lectures, Sun Yat-sen stated in June 1924, that "In the future, no matter which people would join China, we must make them assimilate into Han people in order to build a single state of Chinese nation."³

Min-chuan chu i

The ultimate objective of Min-chuan chu i (the Principle of Democracy) was the formation of a constitutional government based on popular sovereignty. The people as a whole should have four political powers to control the government directly. The four political powers of the people were the power of election, the power of recall, the power of initiative and the power of referendum on the passed bills.⁴

In addition to the political powers, there would be five administrative powers of the government. Sun proposed the Five-Power Constitution to grant the government powers
of legislation, administration, jurisdiction, examination and control. Sun proudly announced that such a constitution would supplement the shortcomings of the prevailing system of representative government. He defended his political creation by saying, "If we now want to combine the best from China and the best from the other countries, and guard against all kinds of abuse in the future, we must take the three Western governmental powers—the executive, legislative and judicial—add to them the old Chinese powers of examination and censorship... Such a government will be the most complete and the finest in the world, and a state with such a government will indeed be of the people, by the people and for the people." 

The Manifesto of the First National Congress of the KMT repeated the above theory on the four people's political powers and the five governmental powers, and regarded Sun's creation as antidote for the possible abuse in common election system, for "the so-called modern system of popular government is often a monopoly of the property class, to be used as an instrument of oppression, whereas the Principle of Democracy is for the masses and not for the few." 

To protect the revolutionary results, the Manifesto denounced the doctrine of natural rights and upheld the doctrine of revolutionary rights of people. It declared that only citizens of the Republic would be allowed to enjoy the people's political rights and the Party should see to it that these
people's political powers would not fall into the hands of those who opposed to the Republic, and be used as an instrument against it. In short, "Only those who are loyal to the Revolution, and opposed to Imperialism will enjoy the benefits of the Revolution. The enemies of the people and the traitors to the country will be debarred from the exercise of the privileges of citizenship."?

**Min-sheng chu i**

Ever since the foundation of the Tung-men-hui in 1905, Sun's Min-sheng chu i (the Principle of People's Livelihood) had been part of the revolutionary programme. However, Sun admitted this principle had never been popular with the majority of the Party. During the period of the Nanking Government of 1912, Sung chiao-jen, a very important leader in the KMT, even advised Sun to stick to the first two principles and "to talk no longer about the Principle of People's Livelihood."10

When Sun first proposed his San Min Chu I in 1905, Min-sheng chu i was interpreted to mean solely the equitable redistribution of land. It was not until 1912 that Sun added to it some vague conceptions of the control of capital in order to prevent the emergence of big capitalists in the future.12 What Sun's idea of controlling the capital was to
nationalize the land and establish the big enterprises by the State. He stated, "if the land and big enterprises belong to the State, they will thus be for the benefits of the people." At this time, nevertheless, Sun's mind was still concentrated on the land problem; for he believed that a fair tax on the land would eliminate automatically the tyranny of big landlords and big capitalists.13

As time passed, Sun gradually realized that the labor problem was very prominent in the social revolution. In a conversation with Tai Chi-tao, Sun stated that he hoped to promote the development of Chinese industries and business on one hand, and raise the living standard of the workers on the other hand.14

The Manifesto of the KMT of January 1, 1923, formally announced that the KMT "recognizes that unequal distribution of property, the cause and source of disputes, is... the defect of the European and American economic system." And it upheld the theory that China's extreme poverty could be relieved by active development of the country's natural resources. As for the equalization of the land, it proposed that "A value on individual landholdings must be set and reported to the state, and on the basis of this declared value the state shall levy taxes or purchase such lands as exceeding the legal limits for individual holdings." To control the capital, the Manifesto announced that the railways, mines, forests, irrigation works and other capital holdings for in-
List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>The Index Numbers of Wages &amp; Prices in Kwangtung, 1912-1926</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>The Production of Coal and Iron Ore in China, 1912-1930</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Numbers of Students and Schools in China, 1912-1923</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>The Number of Sun Yat-sen's Public Lecture</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5</td>
<td>The Number of Strikes in Shanghai and Canton, 1921-1926</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6</td>
<td>Total Maritime Custom Revenue of Canton, 1924-1927</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7</td>
<td>Social Components of the Demonstrators, on June 23, 1925</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
dustries and commerce properly belonged to the whole people would then be governed and managed by the state. The Manifesto also promised to improve the living conditions of the workers and peasants as well as the gradual progress of the status of the workers and peasants until they reached the equal position with the employers and the landlords.\(^{15}\)

The Manifesto of the First National Congress of the KMT repeated the above ideas on its Min-sheng chu\(i\) clause with some additional policies to meet the immediate needs of the mass, such as the promises on agricultural credits by the state, factory and labor legislation, unemployment relief, old age pensions, improvements of the irrigation works and the state grants of land to landless peasants.

The majority of people regard the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the KMT had enlarged and reinterpreted Sun's San Min Chu\(i\). Many scholars, after intensive research, agree that Sun's original ideas and basic theory on San Min Chu\(i\) are still intact.\(^{16}\) The primary goal of his Min-sheng chu\(i\) is still to solve the problems of people's livelihood. Several months after the issuance of the Manifesto, Sun in his lectures on Min-sheng chu\(i\) still upheld that "livelihood is the central force in social progress, and the social progress is the central force in history; hence the struggle for a living, not material forces determines history." In Min-chuan chu\(i\), the newly added the doctrine of revolution-
ary rights of the people, is only regarded as a tool to assist the forming of a constitutional government based on popular sovereignty. The ideal political system remained to be the five-power government which was advocated by Sun as early as 1906. Therefore, the anti-imperialism is the most important new element in the reinterpreted San Min Chi I.

As Mr. Ts'ui Shu-ch'in said, "It is... not unfair to observe that the chief innovation in the revised Three Principles of 1924 was the harnessing of anti-imperialist sentiment, which was then popular with the more forwarding-looking elements of the country, to give the party a new battle cry and to accelerate the downfall of its enemies. The other aspects of the Principles were of no urgent important at the moment and they were still vague and obscure." 17

Anti-imperialism

The resentment against foreign invasion or encroachment was not new in China. However, there was not a systematic theory or political programme to deal with all foreign political, cultural and economic domination or oppression in China during the 1920's. Although Liang Ch'i-chao, one of the most famous scholars in Republican China, had discussed the economic imperialism as well as political imperialism in his
Hsin-min ts'ung-pao as early as 1900, the general public in 1920's China was still ignorant about "imperialism" in China.

In the May Fourth Movement, the students advocated "Wai-kang ch'iang-ch'uan" (externally, resist the great powers), but their primary goal was the abolition of Japan's legal rights based on the 21 Demands. They were disappointed with the response from the international community in helping China to abolish the 21 Demands. They, nevertheless, did not regard all foreign powers which had special privileges based on the "unequal treaties" as the imperialist powers, neither did they propose to abolish all the "unequal treaties" in order to restore China's independent status. The existing unequal treaties as a whole were not challenged. It was not until Sun Yat-sen and his KMT under the influence of the Russians, the anti-imperialist concept was gradually spreaded among the Chinese intellengtsia as well as the great masses.

When Chang Kuo-t'ao of the CCP and Chang Chiu-pai of the KMT brought back from Russia the concept of "anti-imperialism as a key to solve China's economic and political problems, Hu Shih even published a series of articles in the Nu-li chou-pao (The Endeavor) to ridicule them, and treated such concept as a strange joke from abroad. Hu Shih considered that the Chinese had not been oppressed by the
"imperialists," and on the contrary, the "imperialists" had given China many benefits, and treated the Chinese very well. Thus it was groundless to accuse them of insulting the Chinese. Hu's arguments might represent a great many contemporary Chinese intellectuals. As a matter of fact, Chang Kuo-t'ao and other student leaders of the May Fourth Movement admitted that they did not know what was meant by imperialism during the May Fourth Movement.

Similarly to Chang Kuo-t'ao, Sun Yat-sen and his KMT did not have any concept of anti-imperialism, though Sun had expressed resentment of foreign intervention on numerous occasions. Nevertheless, his Min-tsu chu i had always been exclusively aiming at internal unification of China until 1924.

In his written version of San Min Chu I of 1919, Sun did not have any idea about imperialism, and there was no mention of imperialism in the text at all. He declared that his Min-tsu chu i had two aspects: negatively, it brought the downfall of the Manchu rule; and positively, it should unite all races in China, based on cultural assimilation, to form a great Chung-hua nation. This concept of Pan-Hanism persisted in Sun's mind until his last days. Citing the United States as an example, Sun advocated the uniting of all races which inhabited China, into one nation. To Sun, this was the true meaning of nationalism and a "positive"
nationalism. And he also regarded this was the "positive" duty of the KMT to the Chinese people.

As a revolutionary leader, Sun Yat-sen from the beginning of his revolutionary movement aimed at remodeling China from within. He sought constantly the friendship and cooperation of the foreign powers to help him to build a new China. One of his first actions as the Provisional President of the new Republic was sending an open letter to the foreign powers. In this letter, Sun promised to respect all indemnities, debts, rights and privileges which the foreign powers gained from the Manchus, in order to get the cooperation and friendship from them. Ten years later, Sun's Canton Government issued its Foreign Policy Declaration in 1921 and 1923. Both of them requested the foreign powers to renounce the diplomatic relationship with the Peking Government and to recognize his Canton Government. Sun argued that the Canton Government was the only legitimate government and the foreign powers should not interfere with the internal politics of China by having the diplomatic relations with the Peking Government. In addition to the above appeal, Sun promised to respect all foreign rights and the treaties and to open China for further foreign investments.

In the Manifesto of the KMT of January 26, 1923, Sun's Min-tsu chü i was proclaimed aiming at the elimination of
unequality among various nations. Nevertheless, the emphasis was still on building a great Chung-hua nation. The slight color of anti-imperialism was overshadowed by Sun's strong "domestic" reform ideas in the Manifesto. Such an approach was quite understandable, for both the reformers and revolutionary movements in modern China was started by the urgent need for national survival. The concept of self-strengthness was regarded as the basis of political goal. Most revolutionary leaders as the reformers believed that if a domestic revolution or reform succeeded, foreign aggression would be automatically checked. Sun's domestic orientation predominated his thinking at least till the end of 1923.

In October 1923, the Senate of the National Student's Federation held its convention in Canton, and Sun gave an address to the meeting. In his lecture, Sun considered that the boycott policy against the foreign goods was futile. According to Sun, diplomacy relied on a nation's internal strength. If China was strong, there would not have any external problems, otherwise, there would be no diplomacy. Sun said, "If we succeeded in our revolutionary movement, the so-called 21 Demands would be very easy for us to do away with. China, as a giant compared to Japan, yet was oppressed by the latter, should be ashamed of herself, and blamed for her own weakness." Three months later, in one of his famous
lectures to the students, Sun told the students that the gunboats nearby Canton demonstrating the foreign threats, were the symbols of national shame, and asked the students to study hard for obtaining more knowledge to build a new and powerful nation. Citing the American Independence as an example, Sun urged the students to be one mind and one heart to build China as a second United States. To Sun, a wealthy and powerful China through the internal reforms, would entitle her a position among the first rank nations, and thus eliminated the national shame. However, Sun did not advocate any anti-imperialist sentiment or action. It was again in 1923, Sun sent Mr. Cohen to U.S;A. and Eugene Ch'en to Great Britain to ask for assistance.

It is obvious that the anti-imperialism was not yet clear in Sun's mind, and he was still looking for foreign cooperation with his domestic reform effort in order to create a unified China. The theory that imperialism and warlordism were the two sides of a coin and their mutual dependence had not yet convinced Sun.

However, Sun's anti-imperialist sentiment grew as the foreign powers continuously supported Sun's foes. The alliance with Russia further brought heavy influence on the development of the concept of anti-imperialism. The Russian influence could not be denied, for even the leader of the right-wing KMT, Hu Han-min, gave much credit to the Bolsheviks for their
anti-imperialist lesson or inspiration to the Chinese.27

There was an incident over the custom surplus late in 1923 which intensified Sun's policy to ally with Russia and detached himself from his domestic reform orientation. The incident concerned the refusal of the Chinese Maritime Custom Service under the control of the foreign officials, to pay Sun's Canton Government a portion (13.0% of the custom surplus. In December, Sun announced that his Government would employ force to collect the surplus if it deemed necessary. Sun's action was met with demonstration of foreign gunboats in the Canton harbor and the threats from the Foreign Diplomats' Corps in Peking. These threats really outraged Sun. In his conversation with a reporter of North China Daily News on December 7, 1923, Sun said that his government decided to seize the surplus and if the Custom House refused to pay him, the General Supervisor of the Maritime Custom Service would be fired by him. Even if his government was not yet strong to fight the foreign powers, he would try. In this conversation, Sun also implied that his government would seek the cooperation of Soviet Russia. Nevertheless, Sun still expressed that his government earnestly hoped to maintain friendship with the foreign powers, particularly with Great Britain.28

Meanwhile, an official declaration was issued to denounce the gunboat policy of the various powers.29 The De-
clarion pointed out that the division of the custom sur-
plus was solely an internal affair and the powers should fol-
low the international laws and tradition not to interfere with
it. The Canton Government, the Declaration implied, would
still hope to solve the problem with compromise.

Sun threw his last hope to the Western powers in the middle of
January 1924. In an interview with a reporter of Chicago Tri-
bune, Sun proposed that the United States should summon a
peace conference in Shanghai to solve the problems of China's
civil wars, for the Chinese trusted the United States. It
seems this was Sun's last attempt to win the friendship from
the West, and from then on, he would reluctantly give up his
hope upon the West and launched the anti-imperialist movement
against all powers which had special privileges in China.

Sun's anti-imperialism sentiment at last showed in the Mani-
fest of the First National Congress of the KMT. It seems
to me, the years of 1923 and 1924 were a turning-point period
in Sun's thinking. The cooperative attitude was replaced by
the anti-imperialist policy.

The Manifesto first recalled the history of the Chinese
revolution and the revolutionary party. It stated that the
first revolution was a failure for its making compromise with
the reactionary forces and foreign imperialism. The compro-
mise was due to the pressure from the link between the
counterrevolutionaries and the foreign imperialists, and the
hope of the revolutionary leaders to avoid the possible prolonged civil wars. The compromise not only held back the process of revolution, but brought disasters for China. "Furthermore, by indirectly supporting China's civil wars, the foreign powers secure the services of the warlords in conflicting many foreign powers who themselves have competing spheres of interest in China." The cooperation of the warlords and the foreign imperialism was described as the main cause for reducing China into a country of semi-colonial status. The Manifesto also made an analysis on the interdependence between the warlords and foreign imperialism as below:

The leaders of the northern militarists were always conspiring with the imperialists, and all the reactionary classes of absolutism, such as the militarists and the politicians, depended upon them for their livelihood...the fact that the militarists were not able to live independently drove them to establish connections with the imperialists closely. The so-called government of the Republic being under the control of the militarists, was utilized by them to court favor with the foreign powers so as to strengthen their own positions. The imperialists, in turn, utilized these militarists by means of loans to instigate civil war and thereby to safeguard their special privileges and spheres of influence in China. From this point of view, it is evident that the chaos in China has been caused by the imperialists, who have gained advantages through the militarists' bloody hands. Moreover, the internal strife has prevented the development of native industries and has enabled foreign goods to reign supreme in our own markets... The arbitrary rule of the militarists and the invasions of the imperialists are getting worse everyday, cause China to sink deeper and deeper into the hell of a semi-colonial condition.32

So far as the meaning of the anti-imperialism was con-
List of Figures

Figure 1. The Frequency of the Term "Imperialism" in the Official Declaration of the KMT, 1919-1928 ................................... 85

Figure 2. The Frequency of Official Declarations of the KMT, 1919-1928 .................................................. 103

Figure 3. The Number of Labor Unions Founded in Shanghai, 1919-1927 ................................................ 124

Figure 4. The Number of Labor Unions Founded in Canton, 1919-1926 ................................................ 125

Figure 5. The Age Groups of the Mass, June 23, 1925 .......... 210

Figure 6. The Number of Labor Unions Founded in Wuhan, 1919-1927 ................................................ 223
cerned, Sun Yat-sen had never accepted Lenin's theory on imperialism, and "at no time did he identify imperialism with capitalism; still less did he regard imperialism as "the latest stage in the development of capitalism."" However, he did accept the idea that in a semi-colonial country such as China at the time, the overthrow of the foreign oppressions was the most urgent task for the revolutionary movement. To reach the goal of building a new China, anti-imperialism was the prerequisite. To Sun, imperialism was solely meant the political oppressions on China by the various foreign powers. The chief characteristic of imperialism was the political oppressions which might be conducted by any power over another country. To Sun, once a nation denounced her special rights in China, she would not be regarded as an imperialist power any more. Soviet Russia was considered as a trustful ally. And Japan also could be appealed to give up her design on China, and be potential friend for China to fight foreign imperialism. Such an interpretation on imperialism was obvious due to Sun's strong patriotic feeling and his rejection of the Marxist concept of class warfare. Sun's anti-imperialist objective was to eliminate the obstacle for an independent China. Thus, though Sun advocated "the class war of the nation" between might and right, between the oppressors and oppressed, he never accepted the idea of class struggle within China. According to Sun, China as a nation was oppressed
by the foreign powers both politically and economically, therefore, the working class should not fight with their native employers but should unite together under the banner of the KMT to build a new China. As Sun once said, "All of us have a share in the distressing poverty of the Chinese people. There is no especially rich class, there is only a general poverty. The 'inequalities between rich and poor' which the Chinese people speak of are only poor and the extremely poor." 36

Although Sun did not accept Lenin's theory on imperialism anti-imperialism was formally incorporated into his Min-tsu chu i. As the Manifesto declared that the Min-tsu cu i having two aims: the liberation of China by the Chinese people; and the establishment of equal rights for all the races living in China. In supporting of the first aim, the KMT proposed to secure the recognition of the freedom and independence of China among the nations of the world. Furthermore, it announced that "in the eyes of the masses the fight for the emancipation of the Chinese people is an anti-imperialist movement. Nationalism is a powerful weapon against imperialism. When imperialism has been beaten down, the people can then enlarge their activities and unify themselves to accomplish the other aims of the revolution... " 37

To restore the independent status of China, the Manifesto declared in its foreign policy as follows," All unequal
treaties are to be abolished; foreign leased territories, consular jurisdiction, foreigners' management of customs duties, all political powers exercised by foreigners in China at the cost of Chinese sovereignty...Any nation voluntarily surrendering special rights and abrogating all treaties which violate Chinese sovereignty will be accorded status as 'most favored nation'...The Chinese people will not undertake responsibility for repayment of such foreign loans as were contracted for by an irresponsible government, such as the Peking government, to maintain the power of the warlords through bribed elections and other misappropriations, loans not contracted for the purpose of serving the welfare of the people...

The Manifesto was drafted by Borodin and Wang Ching-wei, but was granted with Sun's full approval. From it one can more or less detect the intention and new orientation of the KMT leaders, including Sun Yat-sen. It seems to me, 1923 and 1924 were the crucial years for Sun's theoretical transformation. After the First National Congress of the KMT, Sun made anti-imperialism as an inseparable and essential part in his San Min Chu I. He and his followers were then convinced that the foreign imperialism (political oppression) in China was the main cause for the past failure of their revolutionary movement. Imperialism was regarded as the source of all their troubles. The food shortage, imbalance
between import and export, the slow development of Chinese industries were all caused by foreign imperialism. The elimination of foreign imperialism in China, which was the most urgent and important task for the revolutionists, would mean the end of the civil wars, the prosperity of Chinese economy, the rapid development of native industries and the emergence of a wealthy and powerful new China. The end of foreign imperialism would also mean the collapse of foreign economic domination or oppression. In short, anti-imperialism became the panacea to Sun and other KMT leaders.

Such a view on imperialism became the official viewpoint of the KMT after the Congress. And in the following months after the Congress, Sun launched the anti-imperialist campaign in his lectures and the KMT declarations, which I shall discuss in the following pages.

Along the same line, Sun blasted at imperialism in his May Day address before a group of more than 10,000 workers. Sun's long speech was entitled "The Harmful Effects of the Unequal Treaties on the Chinese Workers." Sun declared that China had become the common slave of various powers due to the unequal treaties, and the position of the Chinese workers was thus much lower than that of the workers in the foreign countries. Under the unequal treaties, the Chinese custom house was in the hands of foreign people. Therefore, the policy of protective tariff could not be adopted. The
Chinese custom house became the foreign agency which helped the foreign goods to dominate Chinese market and thus hurt native industries. Under such situation, China became the colony of various powers in the economic sense. Sun estimated that the unfavorable imbalance between the import and export made China lose $500,000,000 dollars yearly. Thus, according to Sun, all the hardship of the Chinese workers originated from the economic oppression of the foreign capitalists who were backed by the unequal treaties. Therefore, the abolition of these unequal treaties was the vital issue.

Sun Yat-sen, as a patriotic, regarded foreign political oppression, which was called imperialism by him, was the most important obstacle to the independence of China, though he always related the foreign economic oppression with the political oppression closely. Nevertheless, Sun had made a very clear distinction between these two different types of oppressions. Sun did consider the foreign economic oppression was a negative force for the independence of China, and the huge unfavorable trade balance pushed China to the edge of national bankruptcy. So did Sun regarded the foreign economic oppression was "worse than millions of soldiers ready to kill us." 42 However, Sun believed that the foreign economic pressure and the invasion of economic forces from abroad could be checked by the policy of protective tariff. Sun cited the case of the industrial development in the United States under the
pressure of the industrialized European nations to show that the native industries could be developed under the shield of a protective tariff. Sun was quite confident that if China could adopt the policy of protective tariff, Chinese industries would be able to compete gradually with foreign goods, and thus relieved China from foreign economic oppression.

In the series of lectures on San Min Chu I from January 27, 1924 to August 24, 1924, Sun repeatedly stressed that China was in a position of hypo-colony. And he warned the audience that the racial extinction was not far away under the combination of the population problem and the foreign political and economic oppressions, unless the Chinese could find a way to break them. According to Sun, the way to break these pressures was to revive nationalism by awakening the people of the immediate danger of racial extinction, and then allied with all the oppressed people to fight the oppressors. Meanwhile, Sun urged the Chinese to enlarge their clan system to form a Chinese nation to resist the foreign oppressions through the struggling against the powers and engaging the noncooperation towards the powers.

The anti-imperialist elements not only became an important part in Sun's Min-tsu chu i, but also repeatedly appeared in his two other Principles. For instance, Min-chuan
chu i in Sun's written version of San Min Chu i entirely deals with the political system, four direct people's political powers and the plan of the period of tutelage. In his lectures on Min-tsu chu i, Sun still advocated the direct people's powers and five administrative powers, and the idea of tutelage. But now Sun added that liberty was given to a "nation" rather than an "individual person." Thus, though the individual had the rights to control the government, he should not exercise too much liberty. As Sun said, "To make the nation free, we must each sacrifice his personal freedom... Why do we want the nation to be free? Because China under the oppression of the Powers has lost her national standing. She is not merely a semi-colony; she has indeed become a hypo-colony." To Sun, only after China was free from the foreign oppressions, the Chinese people would be really free. The anti-imperialist element thus merged into Sun's second Principle.

In a similar way, Sun brought the anti-imperialist elements into his Min-sheng chu i. When Sun talked about the problems of the people's livelihood, he blamed the shortage of foodstuff in China on the economic oppression of the foreign powers. Sun pointed out that the unfavorable trade balance forced China to export foodstuff to the foreign nations as the payment. Sun stated, "our imports and exports do not offset each other...we have no other goods to give in payment, so we can only offer the food which our people
sorely need as a settlement. For this reason, millions in China are without food." Thus Sun bitterly said, "No wonder Chin's food problem is unsolved."

In his last lecture on Min-sheng chu i, Sun made a detailed analysis on the effects of foreign economic oppression upon Chinese cotton industries. Sun claimed that the low tariff not only made it impossible for the native hand-made goods to compete with foreign goods, but it also ruined China's new-born modern industries. Although the Chinese industrialists adopted the new foreign machinery and with the advantages of short transportation route as well as the cheaper labor cost, their products, still could not compete with foreign products, for the Maritime Customs were restricted by the unequal treaties which fixed the customs due at $\alpha$, though $\alpha$ more of likin was charged if the goods circulated in the interior of China. However, the chinese-manufactured goods had to pay $\alpha$ duty even manufactured in China, the same as upon the imported goods, and a likin tax at every likin station. So Sun complained and said, "If China stood on an equal political basis with other nations, she could compete freely with them in the economic field and be able to hold her own without failure. But as soon as foreign nations use political power as a shield for their economic designs, then China is at a loss how to resist or to compete successfully with them."
Nevertheless, Sun realized that on the whole, Chinese industry was still at its infancy and its machinery was not as adequate and effective as foreign machinery, and the discipline and organization in the factories were not as complete as those in foreign factories. Therefore, even without the paying of likin taxes and custom duties, the Chinese industry would still found it difficult to compete with that of other countries. Therefore, Sun advocated to use the political power to protect them, which meant to adopt the protective tariff policy to resist the invasion of foreign goods and protect the native goods. Once again, Sun found that the only solution for the livelihood problems was not in the economic field but in the issue of recovery of Chinese sovereign powers. The abolition of all unequal treaties and the recovery of the control over the customs thus became the prerequisite for the development of Chinese industry. Sun no longer just regarded imperialism as the cause for the prolonged civil wars which blocked the development of native industries as the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the KMT stated, but further considered that the political oppression of the foreign powers was the source of economic oppression which in turn was the main cause for the undevelopment of Chinese native industries. Now, Sun at last found his answer to all the crises facing China. The elimination of foreign imperialism became the
answer to solve China's crises.

As to how to eliminate foreign imperialism in China, Sun did not have a clear policy yet, though he repeatedly said that the foreign oppression ought to be resisted and the customs control ought to be taken back in his San Min Chu I. In the end of his Lecture V on Min- tsu chu i, he did proposed two ways to resist the foreign powers, namely the revival of the nationalism to struggle against the powers and the adoption of the noncooperation resistance. However, his proposals were very vague and impractical. Several months later, Sun realized his second proposal was too unrealistic and admitted:

We have agitated for this (the boycott against foreign goods) I don't know how many times, but the nation has never acted in unison and the movement has been unsuccessful... With foreign cloth cheaper than native cloth, as is the case at present, we can not expect the people, however patriotic they may be, always to refuse foreign cloth in favor of native cloth... It might be willing to sacrifice such a waste one under the stimulus of patriotic feeling, but this sort of emotional impulse contradicts economic principles and cannot last long. 53

Since the uncooperative policy was impractical, Sun again suggested to abolish the unequal treaties and gained back control over the Maritime Customs as the answer to break the foreign economic invasion. But the means of abolishing the unequal treaties was not even mentioned in this lecture. It was not until November 11, 1924, Sun explicitly presented his answer in his famous address "Pan-Asianism." 54
Abbreviations of Terms

CC   Central Committee (of CCP)
CCP  Chinese Communist Party
CEC  Central Executive Committee (of KMT)
CSC  Central Supervisory Committee (of KMT)
CY   Chinese Communist Youth Corps
KMT  Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party
NCH  North China Herald
San-min Chu-i Three People’s Principles (of Sun Yat-sen)
SY   Socialist Youth Corps
Wuhan Cities of Wuchang, Hankow and Hanyang
this address, Sun first made an analysis on the differences of basic values between the Eastern culture and Western culture by stating the former as the wang-tao (kingly way), and the latter the pa-tao (the way of might). Wang-tao employed the humanity, righteousness and moral superiority to win the respects of the other people, while pa-tao used the military forces to conquer other people. Sun pointed out that the whole Asian people were now under the oppressions of the Western powers. Thus the whole Asian people should unite together with the traditional culture as the basis, to recover the independent positions of Asian nations. However, Sun warned that the employment of the values of humanity and righteousness to demand the return of the sovereign rights back from the Western powers would be out of possibility. Therefore, Sun advocated, "for recovery of our sovereign power and rights, we must appeal to military force!"

The establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy in late June, and the suppression of the revolt of Merchants' Volunteer Corps in October seemed to give Sun more confidence in his revolutionary military forces. Although the untimely death prevented Sun to develop or elaborate his new theory, it is obvious that Sun at last had found the way to cope with foreign imperialism.
After a comparison of the above documents, we can see there is a progressive trend in Sun's political thinking upon the Min-tsu chu i. The documents before the end of the January, 1924 are all aiming at the formation of a new China through the efforts of the revolutionary party within, and the cooperation of the foreign powers from without. There was no criticism on the political and economic oppressions of the foreign powers, and not by any means anti-imperialist in character. In other words, Sun put his hope on the friendship of these foreign powers.

Sun an idea was given up when the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the KMT was issued. Foreign activities in China was denounced and the slogan "Down with imperialism" was repeated time and again in the documents after January 1924. Imperialism was at first regarded as one of the two main causes for the prolonged civil wars which in turn hindered the development of Chinese industries and endangered the people's livelihood. As time passed, imperialism was denounced as the most fundamental cause of all the crises China had. The methods to deal with imperialism were from the vague suggestions of awakening people and uniting them together to resist foreign powers, to the clear decision of employing the military forces to gain back the lost interests and rights.
After the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925

The death of Sun did not stop the adoption of anti-imperialism as KMT's official policy. On the contrary, anti-imperialism campaign was promoted more vigorously after Sun's death.

The resolution of "Accepting Sun Yat-sen's Will by the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the KMT" on May 24, 1925 clearly indicated that Sun's San Min Chu I would be KMT's eternal principles, and Sun's anti-imperialist ideas would be carried out. Along the tone of the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the KMT, the resolution reminded the KMT comrades that the compromise with the reactionary forces was in fact the compromise with imperialism, and such compromise was the root of the failure of the revolutionary movement in the past. The resolution further announced that the Northern Expedition would be launched to eliminate the warlords and their supporters, the foreign imperialists. It also instructed the KMT members that the abolition of unequal treaties was one of the two most urgent tasks which should be completed within the shortest time.

In a series of declarations, the Third CEC Plenum called on all KMT members to devote unceasing efforts for the realization of the two objectives specifically mentioned by Sun in his Will, namely the convention of the National Assembly
and the abolition of the unequal treaties.

Sun's anti-imperialist theory was carried even further by his followers after his death. The Second National Congress of the KMT, which was convened on January 1, 1926 in Canton, issued a more radical anti-imperialist Manifesto. After making an analysis of the current situations of China and the world, the Manifesto declared that all the warlords, bureaucrats, compradores and local despots (t'u-hao) were merely the tools used by imperialism to harass the national revolutionary movement in China in order to keep her as a semi-colony permanently. The big warlords under the protection of imperialism, manipulated the central government, while the lesser warlords maintained their grips on their local power-bases, with the support of imperialism.

Anyone who reads the Manifesto will very easily and quickly see that the main theme of the Manifesto was anti-imperialism. As a matter of fact, the term "imperialism" appears 98 times in the single document.

A study of anti-imperialist symbols in the official documents of the KMT in the years from 1919 to 1927 will help us to trace the origin and development of anti-imperialist sentiments of Sun Yat-sen and his KMT during this period.
Figure 1 shows that the anti-imperialist theory and movement started in 1924, and thus confirms my argument in this chapter that the anti-imperialist movement is a new phenomenon in the KMT. Before 1924, though some resentment against the foreign powers did exist, the term "imperialism" had never appeared in KMT's official documents. The Mani-
festo of the First National Congress of the KMT first inaugurated the anti-imperialism campaign with using the term "imperialism" 13 times. Then the anti-imperialist mood grew rapidly. The term "imperialism" was employed 63 times in 1924, 106 in 1925, 206 in 1926, 23 in 1927 and zero in 1928. During these years, 1926 was the peak of the anti-imperialism movement. It was in this year, the Northern Expedition was launched, and the great Hongkong-Shameen Strike was in its heyday. The Manifesto of the Second National Congress of the KMT alone used the term "imperialism" 98 times. The rapid drop of anti-imperialism symbols might mostly possible due to the split between the KMT and the CCP. It seems to me that the split within the KMT and then the split between the KMT and virtually brought the anti-imperialism campaign to an end.

KMT's new orientation to mass politics

When Sun Yat-sen first engaged in the revolutionary activities against the Manchus, he recruited his followers mainly from the members of the secret societies and overseas Chinese communities. Most of them were either low or lower middle class people. However, the founding of Tung-meng-hui
in 1905, shifted Sun's emphasis from the former groups to the intelligentsia. Since then, he regarded this group as the natural leaders in his revolutionary movement and his recruitment of the party members was concentrated on this group. After the success of the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, many former officials and opportunists joined the KMT. Thus in the eve of the reorganization in 1923-24, the KMT had become a very loose and complex political body. As some contemporary KMT members observed, that the "Kuomintang consisted largely of China's intellectuals of the old style—former officials, academicians, graduates of Japanese, American and European, especially French universities," and those who sought to get the place of power by virtue of the reputation of Sun.

It was the communists, such as Maring, Karakhan and Borodin who advised Sun to broaden the bases of the KMT by seeking the active support of the masses, especially the peasants and workers. Maring in his meeting with Sun Yat-sen in December 1921 presented Sun three proposals. The first one of them was to suggest Sun to ally with all classes, especially the proletariat and peasantry. Although Sun did not give Maring an immediate answer to the proposal, the idea of this proposal no doubt left some marks in Sun's mind. After Maring's proposals, Karakhan, the Soviet Minister to China in
Peking, wrote Sun and urged him to carry out land reform platform and to mobilize popular support. The coming of Borodin to Canton in October 1923 further speeded up Sun's shift to a new orientation in his party organization and revolutionary movement. Shortly after his arrival, Borodin pointed out to Sun that one of the most serious shortcomings with the KMT was its lack of popular basis in the form of the organization of the masses.

These criticism and proposals initiated and strengthened the formation of the new orientation. The changing attitude of Sun Yat-sen towards the masses was first showed in the Manifesto of the Kuomintang of January 1, 1923, which declared that the KMT would promote the interests of labor class and the peasants through the gradual reforms to adjust the relationships between the landlords and tenants, capitalists and workers. Meanwhile, the Central Headquarters of the KMT set up the Committees for Women, Peasant and Labor, Military Affairs and Political Affairs to investigate the situations and conditions of various aspects and then provide the solutions for reforms.

A more concrete policy towards the masses was formulated in the First National Congress of the KMT. The Manifesto of the Congress officially announced KMT's policy of "supporting the labor and peasant movement." The Manifesto made a direct
appeal to peasants and workers. The Manifesto stated:

Throughout China, from north to south, from the commercial cities to the villages, destitute peasants and exploited workers are found everywhere. Because their sufferings are so similar, and because their desire for emancipation is so pressing, both of them possess the powerful will to oppose imperialism. Therefore, it is beyond doubt that the success of the national revolution will depend upon the participation of the peasants and the workers of the whole country. The Kuomintang, on the one hand, is to help peasant and labor movements, and to raise the economic status of these two classes, in order to strengthen the national revolution; on the other hand, it invites the peasants and workers to join the Party to make continuous efforts for the promotion of the revolutionary movement...to participate in the struggle of the Party is to struggle for the two classes' own interests.\(^63\)

For recruiting the support of the masses, and keeping the masses under the control of the Party, the Constitution of the KMT of January 1924 provided a guideline in its Chapter 12, which stated that in the secret, semi-secret and open organizations which did not belong to the Party, such as the labor unions, clubs, schools, city councils, chambers of commerce, etc., the KMT members in each and every organization should form a party fraction within it, in order to enlarge the KMT influence and direct its activities.\(^64\) Through the organization of the party fraction, the KMT members in each popular organization would then act as a solid unit. Thus the party members in a popular organization, even in a minority, would be able to control the inactive and loosely organized majority.
For directing the masses, the KMT established the Department of the Youth, Department of Workers, Department of Propaganda, Department of Women and Department of Peasants shortly after the close of the Congress. These departments all served as the organs of the KMT to win the support of the masses and to recruit the masses to participate in the revolutionary movement.

Various daily newspapers and periodicals were published under the Department of Propaganda, and handbills in huge quantity were handed out to the people in order to propagate KMT's ideas and policies to the masses. The prenatal clinics for the poor, women's hospitals and a Peddler's Training School for the Women were found under the Department of Women. In Kwangtung, the student unions in various schools were brought under the supervision of the Department of the Youth. The KMT also set up many free schools for the common people. All of these efforts were aiming at reaching the masses.

However, the emphasis was still put on the movements among the peasants and the workers. On June 19, 1924, the First Declaration on Peasant Movement was announced by the KMT. It urged the peasants to organize the peasants' associations. It also permitted the peasants' associations to organize the self-defence corps with the power to disarm the non-members of the peasants' associations in the villages. Meanwhile, a Peasant Movement Institute was established in 1924 to train