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RHETORIC AS ARCHITECTONIC: BURKE, PERELMAN, AND TOULMIN ON VALUING AND KNOWING

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Richard Ellsworth Crable, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1973

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the assistance of several people who have been instrumental in the development and completion of this project. First, I am indebted to the theorists upon whose work this study is built. American literary critic Kenneth Burke, Belgian philosopher Chaim Perelman, and British epistemologist Stephen Toulmin were all kind, understanding, and helpful in my individual interviews with them. My appreciation of the breadth and depth of their treatment of argumentation and rhetoric arose mainly from observing them apply their own theorizing to concrete human activities. For the privilege of such observation, I am much appreciative.

Secondly, though I wish to acknowledge the encouragement of many of my instructors and peers at The Ohio State University, two instructors deserve special thanks. Professor James L. Golden has been a constant source of inspiration, information, and wise counsel. A great scholar in his own right, I am especially indebted to him for allowing me to share in his research activities and concerns for the field. My adviser, Professor William R. Brown, deserves recognition for his tireless efforts to challenge my thinking in the project. He is an exceptionally fine and demanding critic, but I thank him most for the stimulating dialogue we
have shared over the past year—dialogue which never failed to reveal some new idea or potential insight.

Finally, I want to acknowledge the help of my wife, Ann. When I experienced the traditional pangs of frustration, she responded with support and reassurance beyond normal expectations. She is a comfort, a good critic, and—though we had not planned it that way—the typist of the manuscript. It was only with her help, and the assistance of our families, that the project could have been completed.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In The Prospect of Rhetoric, Richard McKeon speculated about rhetoric as an "architectonic art": "an art of structuring all principles and products of knowing, doing, and making."¹ McKeon's suggestion—as did the Prospect itself—prompted both applause and criticism:² applause from those who advocated a revision and expansion of the traditional scope of rhetoric; and criticism from those who warned a field without reasonable boundaries is no field at all. Amidst mingled applause and criticism, however, I began to wonder if the notion advanced by McKeon was, in fact, novel in nature: all he had said was that an architectonic art "should be positive in the creation, not passive in the reception, of data, facts, consequences, and objective organizations. It should be an art in which what any one says to be the case, judges to be good or evil, connects


²I refer especially to the several discussions I had about the book and the paper while I attended the SCA Doctoral Honors Seminar, "The 'New' Rhetoric of Chaim Perelman," Temple University, Dec. 3-5, 1972.
in relations, and establishes with some show of system and principles, is relevant as subject-matter, content, and product.\(^3\) Could rhetoric indeed be an all-encompassing structuring method? More to my immediate concern: was not it thought of largely as such already by several major contemporary theorists?

Kenneth Burke, for example, has delineated four "perspectives" that one could bring to bear on the world: the poetical, the scientific, the philosophical, and the rhetorical.\(^4\) Anything, Burke contended, could be analyzed from (say) the rhetorical perspective. The results of the analysis, of course, will vary. One can analyze a rock\(^5\) from the rhetorical perspective; the yields will be minimal. But what about human behavior—all of it? Cannot it all be analyzed in the light of rhetoric? Burke's answer: There is rhetoric in all such behavior; that is, nearly everything can be examined for the rhetorical aspects of the behavior. In the context of such a potential, cannot rhetoric be viewed as an essential structuring system of human behavior? Is it not therefore at least somewhat "architectonic"?

Philosopher Chaim Perelman also interprets the study of rhetoric broadly—especially as opposed to the narrow intellectual

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\(^3\)McKeon, "Uses of Rhetoric," p. 63.


\(^5\)Ibid., the rock example is precisely the one Burke used when we discussed the matter.
Perelman's primary contention is that rhetoric is simply informal reasoning and argumentation; that is, he has argued, any reasoning process not confined to the realm of the formalized is a part of the activity known as rhetoric. Perelman agrees that the logician's goal of formalizing "everything" is a worthy one; on the other hand, Perelman asks, what is to be done with human affairs while we await the formalization of "everything"? Perelman's answer is that we study the importance of argumentation in the world of human conduct. The vast territory awarded to informal (i.e., rhetoric) assures the centrality of argumentation in nearly all aspects of human activity: does rhetoric not then become "architectonic" in its structuring of our non-formal and symbolic world?

Finally, Stephen Toulmin has attacked the inadequacies of "analytic" reasoning, especially as it relates to epistemology. Toulmin's concern for the role of generalized argumentation in the creation, the justification, and the reformation of "claims" seems especially relevant. The world of the analytic ideal is an extremely limited realm; the world of the "substantial," in contrast, is the sphere of real human decisions, activities, and claims to knowledge. —Though Toulmin denies any real study of or interest in rhetoric, his critique of formal logic and

6Interview with Chaim Perelman, Temple University, Dec. 5, 1972.

his development of a "rational, but not logical"\textsuperscript{8} alternative to the formal ideal have placed him squarely in the tradition of rhetoric. Has not Toulmin's concept of a "substantial" epistemology been, in part, the development of what we can call a "rhetorical" architectonic art?

In short, my study of Kenneth Burke, Chaim Perelman, and Stephen Toulmin—and especially my conversations with them—convinced me that McKeon's speculation was not only worthy of analysis; it was, moreover, a potential implied in the works of Burke, Perelman, and Toulmin. While none of the theorists, to my knowledge, makes specific reference to rhetoric as architectonic, their generalized conceptions of rhetoric nevertheless provide the ground from which such an architectonic art can be developed.

This study will not pretend to exhaust the concerns suggested by the term architectonic. Rather, I shall be concerned with the development of one particular facet of the task: the knowing and valuing of academic statements. Clearly, "knowledge" is a much discussed, much studied, and much exalted object of human contemplation. The nature of that "knowledge," however, remains unclear. What does it mean to "know?" Why is "fact" so easily juxtaposable to "value?" Why is rhetoric considered normally the realm of values, and not fact. A conception of rhetoric as architectonic of valuing and knowing implies that

\textsuperscript{8}The distinction between the logical and the rational will be of great concern early in the chapter formulating the theoretical framework on valuing and knowing.
what we call "facts" and what we call "values" may be related inexorably; it implies a structuring of one in relation to the other.

Specifically, my concern for a rhetorical development serves not only to express my professional interest, but also to set certain limits on the present study. My focus will be the explicit comments and implications of Burke, Perelman, and Toulmin. While the study is not a "figure study" in the usual sense of the term, I shall not feel obligated to examine analyses of theorists other than these three; that is, I shall investigate the possibility of integrating some of the philosophic thrusts of these "rhetoricians" into a meaningful and useful conception of knowing—especially in relation to valuing. The project requires a careful analysis and interpretation of the works of Burke, Perelman, and Toulmin; a certain amount of admitted synthesizing on my part; and certain critical "tests" of the usefulness of the synthesized theoretical structure. These are the tasks of "Rhetoric as Architectonic: Burke, Perelman, and Toulmin on Valuing and Knowing."

The Relationship Between Valuing and Knowing

A study purporting to structure valuing and knowing in relation to one another is immediately susceptible to the charge of intellectual heresy. Such a study would be pursued in the face of a tradition largely committed to the separation of "facts" and "values," "knowledge" and "conjecture," or "truth" and
"opinion." While the distinction between (for example) truth and opinion dates to ancient times, the authority for the contemporary separation of knowledge and values seems traceable to David Hume and his Treatise. Hume considered is statements to be "entirely different" from ought statements; that is, the interpretation goes, "There is a class of statements of fact which are logically distinct from a class of statements of value." Hume's contention of mutual exclusion, moreover, is repeated today. The distinguished philosopher Gustav Bergmann, for example, defends the existence of "the dichotomy of fact and value," and calls it "the basic issue . . . for all social science." Bergmann, thus, justifies the boundaries of what scientist-sociologist-philosopher Michael Polanyi has termed skeptically the "frontier which is said to separate sharply the knowledge of facts from the appreciation of values." In sum, we may conclude that there is widespread belief in the difference between our "descriptions" of how things "are" and our "evaluations" of how things are or "ought to be." From this perspective, "values" and "preferences" are in one category; "facts," "knowledge," and "reality" are in

10Ibid., p. 469.
12Gustav Bergmann, "Ideology," Ethics, 61 (April 1951), 206.
This alleged dichotomy, though, is not accepted universally. Several perspectives assume some relationship between knowledge and values. These arguments, as well as arguments supporting the dichotomy, must be examined as a method of formulating a context against which rhetoric as architectonic of valuing and knowing can be specified and investigated. I shall introduce first the hypothesized rhetorical perspective on valuing and knowing based upon analyses of Burke, Perelman, and Toulmin. Next I will review briefly several alternative perspectives from which the possibility/impossibility of the relationship has been examined; the logical, the philosophical, the perceptual, the semiotical, and the ideological are all perspectives which I shall contrast with the rhetorical view. Such a procedure, it seems to me, will clarify the hypothesized formulation of rhetoric as architectonic of valuing and knowing.

The Perspective of Rhetoric as Architectonic of Valuing and Knowing

The rhetorical concern for the relationship between valuing and knowing can be expressed by these questions:

(1) Can valuing and knowing be structured in relation to one another?

(2) If such a structure is developed, will it enhance the understanding of human knowing and valuing activities?

The questions represent both a theoretical and a critical concern for valuing and knowing.
The intentional structuring of human activities by a single architectonic art implies an active creation, not a passive critique, of those activities. If we reject the view that a "reality" exists which human beings are capable of perceiving perfectly, then we must be prepared to acknowledge a diversity of "realities." The staggeringly complex nature of human activity requires that the stimuli be organized and systematized to varying degrees. The present study investigates the possibility that rhetoric can be developed into an architectonically productive art: an art that intentionally structures activities that heretofore were not clearly related. The first question, then, relates to the development of such a theoretical framework or structure.

The second question relates to the value of the structure that is being considered. Even if the structure can be created, the question remains: What insights do we have or can we gain that we could not without the theoretical structure? In other words, when the theoretical framework of valuing and knowing in the rhetorical perspective is, in fact, developed, what value is it when applied to concrete situations of human valuing and knowing activity? In a real sense, this concern is for the application of the framework.

The rhetorical perspective on valuing and knowing entails concerns both for the theoretical structure and the critical application of a framework of valuing and knowing. In order to understand the characteristics of this perspective more clearly,
let us examine it against a background of other perspectives on the valuing-knowing relationship; let us, that is, examine certain alternative perspectives.

Alternative Perspectives

The logical perspective

The logical perspective is that which seems most nearly to reflect the orientation attributed to Hume. In his *Treatise*, Hume calls "altogether inconceivable" the idea that "ought" statements can be derived or deduced from statements of fact. The explicit question from this perspective, then, is whether analytically\(^\text{14}\) we may express a series of factual descriptions (statements of fact) and then proceed to conclude that because of these facts, we should do one thing or another (a value-judgment). The controversy over this aspect of the relationship between the "is" and the "ought" is sharp, indeed; the writing on the issue is voluminous.\(^\text{15}\)

Karl Popper represents those scholars who agree with Hume and Bergmann. Popper has said, "Perhaps the simplest and most important point about ethics is purely logical. I mean


\(^{15}\)In addition to the sources cited in this review, see, for example, William S. Bruening, "Moore and 'Is-Ought,'" *Ethics*, 81 (Jan. 1971), 143-49; George I. Mavrodes, "'Is' and 'Ought,'" *Analysis*, 25 (1964), 42-44; A.C. MacIntyre, "Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought,'" *Philosophical Review*, 68 (1959), 451-68.
the impossibility to derive nontautological ethical rules—imperatives, principles of policy, aims, or however we may describe them—from statements of facts. Popper's contention, however, is denied from a number of logical standpoints by several philosophers. Max Black, for instance, has argued emphatically that "some non-factual conclusions do follow and can be shown to follow from factual premises." In particular, Black is convinced that "if the consequences of doing some action differ from those of abstaining from that action only by producing avoidable pain, then that action ought not to be done" (emphasis added).

In other words, the statement of pain is factual; the statement of the avoidability of pain is factual; the statement of the possibility of not doing the act is factual; and yet, the logical conclusion is evaluative, advisory, (i.e.) "valuing."

From the perspective of symbolic logic, logician Edgar Morscher has mounted a second attack upon the Humian dichotomy. He concludes that many theoretically descriptive statements contain, in addition, an element of evaluation. Because of the "mixed" nature of these statements, no clear and always-defensible distinction between the descriptive and the normative can be

18 Ibid.
19 Edgar Morscher, "From 'Is' to 'Ought' Via 'Knowing,'" Ethics, 83 (Oct. 1972), 84-86.
Morscher, in fact, suggests that the "is" - "ought" controversy is much less important than the real question of the distinction between normative statements and these "mixed" statements; a distinction which, unfortunately, Morscher admits he does not know how to analyze. In a related manner, philosopher John Searle of the University of California has pointed out the ambiguous quality of words or phrases that contain terms such as "promise." Such statements, he says, contain both a descriptive and an evaluative element which makes them hopelessly imprecise for categorization by logical analysis.

R.M. Hare provides another aspect of the logical perspective in his discussion of "entailment." Hare is not concerned with the logical derivation of an imperative from a factual statement; instead, he contends that certain imperatives are entailed by or contained in some statements of fact. Consider the following statement: "I am going to work all the mathematical problems on page two." The statement is indeed factual in nature, yet certain imperatives are implied or are logically entailed by the factual statement. Hare, in introducing the term "hypothetical imperative," says, for example, "If you are going to work all the problems on page two, then you should work problem number

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20Ibid., p. 86.

21Ibid.

22Searle, "How to Derive," p. 58.

three which appears on page two."^{24} No new ideas are inferred. The imperative is simply entailed in the factual statement that all the problems are to be done: the working of each of the problems is entailed in the working of all the problems. In this perspective, then, the "ought" is formally contained in the "is."

In sum, the logical perspective implies a concern for the existence of a formal "ought" in relation to a formal "is." This concern seems to center upon "imperative" valuing and upon a "one-way" relationship between knowledge and values. Although in this study the logical perspective will not be the operative one, it will serve as a part of the background against which we may understand the rhetorical perspective.

The philosophical perspective

Several general philosophical viewpoints respond to the problem of the relationship between valuing and knowing but do not imply a concern for the formally logical analysis. Max Black, for example, has discussed the "is"-"ought" problem from a perspective that not only provides a philosophic stance but also a second way to interpret Hare's concept of entailment.\textsuperscript{25} Black has pointed out that some philosophers and ethicists have conceived of entailment in metaphorical terms. Such an interpretation

\textsuperscript{24}The illustration is my own. See Hare, especially pp. 32-38.

\textsuperscript{25}For bibliographical material in this section, I am indebted to Bruce E. Gronbeck, "From 'Is' to 'Ought': Alternative Strategies," \textit{Central States Speech Journal}, 19 (Spring 1968), 31-39.
allows the viewer to conclude that an imperative may be psychologically entailed without being formally contained in the factual statement.²⁶ This viewpoint stresses inference and human judgment in ways specifically extraneous to the logical perspective. Yet because the notion is of entailment, we may consider this philosophic view a compromise of the extreme logical position discussed earlier.

A final representative of the philosophical perspective is moral philosopher P.H. Nowell-Smith.²⁷ In what may be labeled "contextual terms," Nowell-Smith analyzes various interpretations of the concept "good," which, obviously, has been treated as one of the key terms in the philosophic inquiry into the nature of values and, at times, knowledge. His conclusion, perhaps not surprisingly, is that "good" functions in several ways, depending upon the context into which the word is introduced: as an "aptness" term, a "descriptive" word, or a "gerundive" (e.g., praiseworthy) term. Nowell-Smith claims that such phrases as "good," "filthy," "disgusting," "beauty," and "foulness" gain meaning only through context: they "are not purely descriptive, and they cannot be understood to mean anything at all if the presence of human beings and their tastes and interests are excluded."²⁸ From this perspective, the relationship between valuing and knowing is a function of context.


²⁸ Ibid., p. 74.
These viewpoints are rather more varied than similar. They share, however, a bias against formal logic, which provides background and support for the rhetorical perspective.

The perceptual perspective

The perceptual perspective on the relationship between valuing and knowing is obviously complex, but we may at least introduce the notion perhaps most relevant: the concept of psychological set or expectational perception. Implicit in this view is that human beings are surrounded by so much stimulation that "screening" is a necessary part of life: we tend to "see" what we think is important; that which is unimportant, we tend to ignore. In this manner, what to us is is closely related to what is important or valued. The value judgments we have made in the past constitute a basis for our expectation of the future. As psychologists Solley and Murphy explain, the world perceived by an individual is, in part, a world formed by expectation. They submit, "We ready (sic) the environment, so to speak, by our expectancies, and in terms of any conception of learning this would stack the deck in favor of our receiving what we expect to perceive."29 Moreover, Solley and Murphy contend that this is a completely justifiable process: "The ebb and flow of experience is such that we are constantly being bombarded

by stimuli, and it is only by developing expectancies and schemata\textsuperscript{30} that we are able to deal effectively with this array of stimulation."\textsuperscript{31} More important to the present study are explanations of what this expectancy "means" in terms of valuing. F.B. Kilpatrick, for instance, interprets this expectation as a "best bet." He suggests that "the perceptual organization of the moment cannot be an absolute of what \textit{is}, but is instead a sort of 'best bet' based on the consequences of past dealings, is expressed in awareness as perceiving, and serves as a directive for future dealings with the environment."\textsuperscript{32} A more detailed explanation of the expectancy in perception has been advanced by Ittelson who stresses not only probability, but the probability of "significance": what we do not feel is important will not be perceived. "The assumptive world of any particular individual at any particular time," says Ittelson, "determines his perceptions, that is, provides him with predictions of probable significances. His assumptive world is, therefore, in a very real sense, the only world which he knows."\textsuperscript{33}

The perspective of selective perception has been examined only briefly; yet we will see that this view--with its emphasis

\textsuperscript{30}Schemata are defined by the authors as cognitive frames of reference, p. 172.

\textsuperscript{31}Solley and Murphy, \textit{Development}, p. 156.

\textsuperscript{32}Cited in \textit{Ibid.}, p. 155.

upon the probable and the significant--while not itself rhetorical in nature, will make an important contribution to our understanding of the rhetorical perspective.

The semiotical perspective

Readily admitting his debts to the analysis of George Herbert Meade,34 Charles Morris has examined in detail a position which we will term the "semiotical" perspective. Morris has delineated several primary functions of language clearly related to earlier works in semantics and other linguistic studies. The functions include designative, appraisive, and prescriptive.35 In his explanation of how linguistic signs function, Morris explains,

A sign is designative insofar as it signifies observable properties of the environment or of the actor, it is appraisive insofar as it signifies the consummatory properties of some object or situation, and it is prescriptive insofar as it signifies how the object or situation is to be reacted to so as to satisfy the governing impulse. In these terms, usually 'black' is primarily designative, 'good' is primarily appraisive, and 'ought' is primarily prescriptive.36

The designative and the appraisive functions are, of course, the most obvious analogues to "knowing" and "valuing," although the prescriptive function is closely related to the logical perspective-bias which we examined earlier.

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
These functions, however, are not viewed as being wholly discrete. Morris says that "many signs which are designative also have a recognizable appraisive element (such as 'honest,' 'thief,' 'coward,' 'inconsiderate'). And appraisive signs are frequently prescriptive." Moreover, Morris contends insightfully that the signs are not only ambiguous; they function in ways that can be termed mutual interaction. In discussing the "is-ought" controversy from the semiotical perspective, Morris concludes:

Thus the 'is' and the 'ought,' while not identical and while not deducible from each other, are in fact in dynamic interaction and mutually influence each other. The knowledge of what is and what will be under certain conditions is one factor in the control of conceived values as to what ought to be, and the acceptance of certain conceived values is one factor in the determination of what is and what will be.

So, the semiotical perspective, while differentiating sign functions, also includes the awareness of a dynamic relationship between language functions analogous to valuing and knowing.

The ideological perspective

One further element of the background against which the rhetorical perspective may be seen clearly is what Bergmann has termed the "ideological." He explains that ideology is crucial to our study of the relationship between valuing and knowing:

The motive power of a value judgment is often greatly increased when it appears ... not under its proper logical flag as a value judgment but in the disguise


38 Morris, Signification, p. 38.
of a statement of fact.
A value judgment disguised as, or mistaken for, a statement of fact, I shall call an 'ideological statement.'

More specifically, Bergmann discusses a special class of ideologies which he terms "scientific": he contends that value structures seem often to affect the "facts" discovered by scholars and researchers. "We sometimes find in scientific and methodological discussions of writers whom we otherwise greatly admire passages which . . . [while] not literally either value judgments or ideological statements, they yet assert facts or, rather, alleged facts and logical connections or, rather, alleged logical connections which the author, if he has or had consciously attended to the matter, has or would have thought congenial to his values." Bergmann asserts the existence of alleged facts that are consistent with, to the point of being perhaps caused by, value judgments. Bergmann's examples will clarify this: J.S. Mill's belief in the reducibility of sociology to psychology, says Bergmann, may have reflected "Mill's commitment to the dignity of the individual and to the pre-eminence of individual ethics over social expediency." Similarly, Bergmann cites British literary figure Herbert Spencer's "notorious argument" against "poor relief." Says Bergmann, "The motive behind this particular piece of scientific ideology is . . . Spencer's fierce nonconformist devotion

40 Ibid., p. 215.
41 Ibid., p. 216.
to freedom of the individual from all interference by the state, including even benevolent interference. Perhaps enough has been said to illustrate the relationship between valuing and knowing implicit in the "ideological perspective."

Alternative Perspectives in Contrast to the Rhetorical

The rhetorical perspective can be understood more specifically in contrast to these other perspectives. No pretense is made here to exhaust the details of any of these viewpoints; our concern is not really with any of these particular points of view. We are concerned, rather, with how these viewpoints differ from the rhetorical. With this goal in mind, let us examine briefly how these viewpoints differ from our main task.

In general, the rhetorical perspective is unique precisely because of factors related to the two earlier questions. First, none of the viewpoints introduced entails the rhetorical concern for intentionally structuring valuing and knowing in relation to one another. Varying viewpoints on the relationship between valuing and knowing are revealed in these alternative perspectives, but none of those perceived relationships are because of the architectonic nature of the perspective. The result is that, while the valuing and knowing are perceived, their relationship is not clearly described in an overall structure; there is no actively-structuring art.

\[42\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 216-17.}\]
These alternative perspectives, second, do not respond to the need voiced earlier for a framework for knowing and valuing that can be used to critique and understand actual human activities of valuing and knowing. Again, while certain of the perspectives can be used as critical frames of reference, the application of the theory will not be the application of a formative and structuring art; the critiques will be instances of conventional criticism—the passive kind—anathema to an architectonic perspective.

Justification of the Study: The Importance of the General Question of Rhetoric as Architectonic of Valuing and Knowing

The importance of the inquiry into the hypothesized development of rhetoric as architectonic of valuing and knowing can be illustrated best by considering a number of potential outcomes. First, the study may be another step in the development of rhetoric as a fully-formulated architectonic art. Second, the rhetorical framework may provide an immediate framework for valuing-knowing problems that exist in other fields. Then, too, diverse approaches to knowledge such as those of the humanities and the physical sciences may be clarified by the inquiry. Finally, potential insight into rhetorical criticism may be gained by the integration of some of the theoretical thrusts of Burke, Perelman, and Toulmin. These potential "yields" may appear more clearly with further amplification.

First, the study addresses the immediate concerns of
the discipline of rhetoric. It may provide light on the scope of rhetoric. While I identify with neither the "expansionists," the "reductionists," nor the "traditionalists" in establishing boundaries for the discipline of rhetoric as a whole, I am interested in questions of academic merit that have implications for the discipline. Recall McKeon's conception of an architectonic art: "an art of structuring all principles and products of knowing, doing, and making." If the present analysis can be used to critique any "level" of "knowing," then rhetoric would seem to go far in fulfilling the criteria of an architectonic art. Relatedly, if the study reveals a perspective from which rhetoric can be viewed as being architectonic, then implications for the scope of rhetoric seem sure to arise. Thus, the relationship between valuing and knowing should be interesting to modern theorists of rhetoric.

Second, pursued against the background of several perspectives on the relationship between valuing and knowing, the study might serve as a complement to such viewpoints. The rhetorical perspective both accommodates and rejects certain aspects of each alternative. The rhetorical approach, thus, would seem to promise an insightfully eclectic framework from which to view valuing

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43 I am aware of the controversy over the criteria for a discipline; "discipline" is here used as a convenient construct only.

44 I am indebted for terminology to an unpublished lecture by Dr. James L. Golden, The Ohio State University.

and knowing. To be sure, certain proponents of one or the other of the perspectives may not be interested in such an integrative strategy; on the other hand, questions of valuing and knowing are, I submit, omnipresent in any type of research or scholarship. Thus, scholars from many fields may be aided by and responsive to an analysis of valuing/knowing issues bound to no formal disciplinary tradition on the "is"-"ought" question.

Third, the inquiry seems promising because of its proposed treatment of the relationship between "valuing" and "knowing" in a general and consistent form. As I will develop more fully later, the second substantive part of this study will apply theoretical aspects of the relationship between "valuing" and "knowing" to selected statements in the humanities, the social sciences, and the physical sciences. This proposed application to such diverse "types" of "knowledge" or "research" and "scholarship," if insightful, would seem to represent an important advancement in our understanding of these supposedly dissimilar arenas of academic endeavor. If crucial value judgments are implicit in the investigation of physical scientists, then is there not an essential similarity between the physical sciences and the humanities? If the interpretation of findings and measurement in the social sciences is, in part, a function of preference and choice, then is there not a clear analogue in the humanities? Finally, if similarities exist in these seemingly diverse academic

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46 See the "Method of Inquiry."
enterprises, then do we not understand one better in relation to the others? In short, it may well be that insights into all "levels" of human research can be gleaned from the analysis of "knowing" in relation to valuing.

A fourth justification for the study arises from the advantages inherent in the selection of the major theorists upon whom the inquiry is based. Burke, Perelman, and Toulmin are among the major living influences on contemporary rhetorical theory; yet I am not aware of any study attempting to analyze and synthesize any of the central themes implicit in each theorist's work. With its emphasis on combining differing views on knowing and valuing, this study is one aspect of such a synthesis. The likely result is that, in addition to increased understanding of knowledge and values, increased understanding of Burke, Perelman, and Toulmin is achieved: certainly, each might be better known if viewed in relation to the others on points of essential similarity. Too, out of such synthesis some original theory may develop.

A related, but more specific, idea is that this study could contribute to methodology in rhetorical criticism: part three, in fact, will be criticism of statements at three "levels" of "knowledge." If statements by physical scientists, social scientists, and humanists can be critiqued effectively on grounds discovered by this project, then a critical approach to rhetoric as an architectonic art will be evident.

The cumulative effect of these potential yields seems to be the justification of an inquiry into the hypothesized
architectonic relationship between valuing and knowing.

A Review of Selected Relevant Literature

Any scholarly study depends to a degree upon relevant material already extant in published and unpublished form. Some of this material I have reviewed previously as it related to alternative perspectives on the relationship between valuing and knowing. In the field of rhetoric and speech communication, specifically, much writing considers the theoretical positions of Burke, Perelman, and Toulmin—yet little work has been done in areas relevant to the particular question at hand. Several essays, however, are notable exceptions and should be reviewed with reference to the relationship between valuing and knowing.

A Rhetorical View of Knowing

Robert Scott has given impulse to the study of rhetoric as "epistemic," basing his analysis on Stephen Toulmin's epistemology. Scott concludes that by speaking about things, we come to know them: "In human affairs, then, rhetoric . . . is a way of knowing"; further "Man must consider truth not as something fixed and final but as something to be created." The brief inquiry which led Scott to these conclusions will provide a solid foundation for a more detailed examination of rhetoric and epistemology—especially from Toulmin's perspective. A

48 Ibid., p. 17.
somewhat similar article, which purports to "reappraise" Toulmin's "philosophic stance," also alludes to epistemologic issues, but does little more than proclaim the importance of Toulmin's epistemology to his "rhetorical" insights. Consequently, this study by Lewis is of less value for the present examination.

In another essay including some attention to the relationship between rhetoric and epistemology, Ray Dearin discusses the theory of knowledge in which Chaim Perelman's rhetoric is grounded. From a series of rather lengthy Perelmanian quotations emerges the conclusion that "knowledge" is that which we can claim and defend as justified; Dearin, however, does not provide any more-expanded explanation. The details of Perelman's epistemologic stand will need much explication and illustration. How do we "know" what to "defend"? How do we "know" when something has been "defended"? These issues will become important in the study ahead.

A Rhetorical View of Valuing

Perhaps the landmark article in the area of rhetoric and valuing is Eubank and Baker's "Toward an Axiology of Rhetoric."51

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Essentially, the essay is a defense of the teaching of a value-oriented rhetoric rather than a "nihilistic" rhetoric. The "central function of rhetoric," they say, "is to crystalize and transmit human values, the 'what-fors' of a culture." Obviously, I do not condemn these scholars' goal of creating a rhetoric of "commitment to values." Their essay, however, has little to say about the aspects of valuing with which I am most concerned. They do not deal with the process of valuing itself, nor the impact of that activity upon the process of knowing.

A second influential comment upon values in the realm of rhetorical studies can be described best as a "social psychologist's description-of-what-is." Milton Rokeach's work is, it seems to me, considered the definitive work in the area and is often quoted by rhetorical scholars. Yet Rokeach's work is just what it says: an analysis of the organization and change of beliefs, attitudes, and values. Even the exhaustive description of values, value structures, and value changes does not respond to the present concern for the relationships between valuing and knowing.

Ray Dearin's article on Perelman needs also to be considered here as a treatment of valuing and values in the rhetorical perspective. Dearin appears to me to err when he reports that

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52 Ibid., p. 331.
54 Dearin, "The Philosophical Basis."
Perelman views values as "logically arbitrary" in nature. In the 1940's, that is exactly what Perelman concluded—but that was prior to the ten years of study which culminated in the *New Rhetoric*. Since then, and much before Dearin's essay was written, Perelman has denounced that opinion: values are not arbitrary, says Perelman, but rather are susceptible to rhetorical handling. I would suggest that if Dearin missed this point, further examination of Perelman's rhetoric and values is indicated.

A Rhetorical View of the Relationship Between Valuing and Knowing

Several studies have in some measure considered the relationship of rhetoric both to valuing and knowing. Bruce Gronbeck's article, already cited, considers the alternative strategies by which a debater, in particular, can move rationally from his knowledge of "what is" the situation in regard to public welfare (i.e., knowledge of facts), to a position of advocacy (i.e., value judgment). Gronbeck's treatment of intuitive logic, the logic of entailment, and contextual logic have already been helpful in structuring part of the background against which the rhetorical perspective can be seen. Insofar, however, as he does not examine in detail the relationship between the knowing and the valuing, he does not advance the development of what I have called the

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56Gronbeck, "From 'Is' to 'Ought.'"
rhetorical perspective.

A second essay, "Speech and the 'New' Philosophies," by A. Craig Baird, needs to be considered more for what it implies than for what it develops explicitly. Corresponding closely to one hypothesis of this study is Baird's comment that rhetoricians "have assumed that the wide gap between scientific and humanistic learning is without logical or practical justification"; Moreover, in expanding the notion of the relationship between valuing and "reality," we shall echo and explicate Baird's words: "What then is this logical judgment? It is of the time, place, and experience."

Another relevant article on the valuing-knowing question is Karl Wallace's "Rhetoric and Advising." Without discussing the dynamics of the valuing-knowing relationship, Wallace does isolate some of its manifestations: "A student may ask, 'How do I make a speech on juvenile delinquency to the Urbana Rotarians next Tuesday?' The [teacher's] reply will consist of specific information and advice. A mixture of fact and counsel, the reply is in the frame of what should or ought to be done." In sum,

57 Central States Speech Journal, 8 (Autumn 1962), 241-246.

58 Ibid., p. 243.

59 Ibid., p. 245.

60 The Southern Speech Journal, 29 (Summer 1964), 279-287.

61 Ibid., p. 282.
says Wallace, "The technical judgment, the expression that at first glance appears to be a statement of fact, may in reality function as a piece of advice." Wallace's intimations of the covert relationship between the function of valuing and knowing are especially insightful when contrasted with what Bergmann derogatively termed "scientific ideology." The contrast will reflect both on the essential nature and tone of the rhetorical approach.

Finally, in what is essentially a review of several books, Hauser examines "Rhetoric as a Way of Knowing" in a recent issue of Today's Speech. Hauser explains how the books considered give keys to the development of a theoretically-sound rhetorical perspective on "truth." Taking a cue from Dewey, Hauser defines reality as related to the point of view brought to that "reality." Echoing this neo-Kantian view allows Hauser to assert that rhetoric--as much as ethics or politics--implies a point of view on reality that is, in fact, unique. The process of validating that rhetorical perspective is Hauser's concern. Though the analysis is relevant to the present concern for rhetoric, valuing, and knowing, Hauser employs "rhetorical" as a term to denote a disciplinary-like viewpoint. In contrast, this inquiry is investigating the notion that all such viewpoints--and their effect on "knowing"--are

62Ibid., p. 283.
64Especially his Art as Experience.
rhetorical in nature. Thus, although Hauser's use of the term is generally more limited than its use in this study, even in respect to my use of "rhetorical," he interprets Burke as broadly: "For Burke rhetoric . . . [is involved with] . . . significant symbols which shape our perception of the world and our reactions to it. In this way rhetoric leads man to ever clearer views of Reality." Burke's comments do not refer to a narrowly-defined perspective, but characterize the general impact of all perspectives upon reality--a rhetorical impact in the general sense.

This brief review of relevant contributions to the study of the relationship between valuing and knowing has fostered, perhaps, a better notion of the particular yields that this study may provide. On this basis, let us proceed to a description of the specific research hypotheses and strategies proposed.

**Specific Hypotheses**

Before the hypotheses of the study are listed, an explanation of their use is in order. "Hypothesis" is conceived here as a "testable proposition." At the outset of a study seeking to create and test a theoretical framework, I submit that the term "hypothesis" is entirely justifiable; ground does exist to entertain the possibility of an insightful development, but the development is by no means certain to be successful. Thus, while the study is theoretical and philosophical rather than quantitative, it

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does involve a testable proposition; while it relies upon case study results rather than levels of confidence, it does measure success; and finally, while the study operationalizes "hypothesis" in ways relevant to a qualitative methodology, it does no more than that which is required in the transfer of the hypothesis concept from the physical sciences to the social sciences: I submit that concepts—including "hypothesis"—need always to be adapted to the methodological perspective in question.

The study, then, will investigate two primary hypotheses, two testable propositions, related to the general question of the relationship between valuing and knowing; hypotheses, that is, which refer to the questions discussed earlier as being entailed in the rhetorical perspective.

(1) Valuing and knowing can be structured in relation to each other in a rhetorical perspective.

(2) Such a theoretical perspective can be used as a critical tool for the insightful analysis of "knowing" in diverse academic fields.

The first hypothesis reflects the architectonic concern for the structuring of activities in relation to one another. The second hypothesis, based upon the first, reflects my belief that the examination of the relation between valuing and knowing will yield a method for the critique of various "statements" by, for example, such diverse scholars and researchers as humanists, social scientists, and physical scientists. If it seems accurate to contend that knowing and valuing are intimately involved with
one another, then it is reasonable to expect that any human "knowledge"--at any "level" of "scientific" development--might profitably be analyzed and evaluated by the same critical strategies. This hypothesis, then, is the practical counterpart to the first, more theoretically-oriented one.

**Method of Inquiry**

Two major analyses comprise the investigation of the hypotheses. One is the development of a theoretical structure of rhetoric as architectonic of valuing and knowing. The framework will be built upon the theorizing of Kenneth Burke, Chaim Perelman, and Stephen Toulmin, yet there will be no attempt to treat with equal time each of the theorists: indeed, the inquiry is not of the men or their individual theories, but rather of what they may have to contribute to a rhetorical perspective on valuing and knowing. The formulation of rhetoric as architectonic, while based upon the thinking of Burke, Perelman, and Toulmin, will not be limited to their explicit comments of valuing and knowing; instead, the theoretical framework will be an integrating, synthesizing, and creating structure. That structure, it seems to me, can be formulated if the following analyses are successful:

1. The Justification for Knowing: Valuing and the Appraisal of Claims;
2. The Standards for Knowing: Valuing and the Selection of Criteria;
3. The Framework for Knowing: Valuing and the Featuring
of Reality; and

(4) The Standardization and Evolution of Knowing: The Encasement and Revision of Valuing.

These analyses, then, should be capable of providing the means for the investigation and evaluation of the hypothesis that knowing and valuing, in fact, can be structured in relation to one another in a rhetorical perspective.

The second substantive part of the study, "Case Studies in Rhetoric as Architectonic of Valuing and Knowing," is the more practical counterpart to the theoretically-oriented first part. This second section will be a series of three case studies of knowing activities; three statements of knowing by representative scholars and researchers in the humanities, the social sciences, and the physical sciences. Included in the series are examinations of humanist Kenneth Burke's "The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle,'" social scientist B.F. Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity, and physical scientist Max Planck's "The Unity of the Physical World-Picture." Specifically, the critique of these statements from the architectonically rhetorical perspective ought to be sufficient to test the second hypothesis: namely, that such an architectonic framework can be used as a critical tool for the insightful analysis of "knowing" in divers academic fields.

The case studies, however, are not ends in themselves. While the examinations may reveal insights into these specific instances of valuing and knowing, the insights will be valued as indicators of the success of the structure, as well as the
success of the critiques. The case studies, as tests and applications of the theoretical framework, then, constitute an integral part of the development of rhetoric as architectonic of valuing and knowing.

Finally, the case studies are identifiable as academically representative statements of knowing. Kenneth Burke, himself, will be the object of a study of the humanist's approach to "knowing." I have selected Burke's celebrated criticism of "Hitler's 'Battle'" as the focal point of one analysis. Clearly, the humanist "values," he attaches "significance," he "decides"—but what does all that have to do with "knowing"? Rhetoric conceived as architectonic should provide an answer to the relationship between knowing and valuing from the humanist perspective.

A second case study involves B.F. Skinner's book, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*. The book represents, apparently, the culmination of the study, research, and writing that Skinner has conducted for many years. More importantly, it is a social scientist's statement and interpretation of knowing aimed at a mass audience. The rhetorical perspective, if developed successfully as an architectonic art, should provide new insights into the knowing of social scientists—even social scientists who, as Skinner does, feel they are not affected by human "values."

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Finally, the noted physicist and philosopher of science, Max Planck, will be the object of a critique. His debate with Mach on the essentials of theoretical physics will be an interesting contrast to each of the other two statements. Here Planck is not discussing the Jew as scapegoat or man as a conditioned being, but rather the whole "world-picture," the entire "physical reality." Here, also, the same analytical techniques and strategies will be employed to study the nature of the "knowledge" discussed in relation to the value judgments made by the German theoretician.

I submit that the theoretical analyses of Burke, Perelman, and Toulmin on those several aspects of knowing and valuing, coupled with the application of the analysis to three appropriately different statements by scholars and researchers, constitute a practical and potentially valuable study within the realm of rhetorical theory. Indeed these two major sections should be able to investigate the hypotheses isolated and, thus, contribute to the formulation of rhetoric as architectonic of valuing and knowing.

The final chapter will be an indispensible part of the study. At that time the two hypotheses can be evaluated in a manner consistent with the qualitative method employed in the study. On the basis of the critiques of Burke, Skinner, and Planck's "knowings," we should be able to ascertain if, in fact,

the framework hypothesized and developed in chapter two allows insightful answering of the question "How do we know?" Moreover, it is at that time when the whole of the study can be evaluated for further implications for rhetoric and intellectual pursuits in general.
CHAPTER II

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF RHETORIC AS
ARCHITECTONIC OF VALUING AND KNOWING

Introduction

The question "How do you know?" is ambiguous. On the one hand, the question may refer to the actual mental processes that constitute the activity called "knowing." From such a perspective, the concern is for what kind of "things" happen "inside" the mind. From Piaget onward, notes Stephen Toulmin, some researchers have been involved in the collection of vast amounts of data on human language acquisition, intellectual capacities, and the development of human understanding.¹ This trend in research is psychological in orientation and a posteriori in nature. The assumption is that if enough data can be collected, eventually we will "know" how we "know"—in terms of cognitive mechanisms.

On the other hand, the philosophical concern for "knowing," Toulmin suggests, is vastly different. "The purpose of such questions [as 'How do you know?'] . . . is not to bring to light

¹The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1969), p. 211. The empirical approach that Toulmin attributes to Piaget existed earlier, of course, in less structured and more speculative forms.
the hidden mechanism of a mental activity called 'cognising.'

More in keeping with philosophical concerns is the question aimed at eliciting "the grounds, qualifications or credentials" of whoever is making the claim to knowledge. The question thus is really "What makes you think you know?" The answer is not an explanation of the mechanism of knowing, but rather, a statement of the grounds for a claim. The philosophical approach, as such, has been a priori in design. Philosophers have erected standards of one kind or another to be used as criteria for judging whether something is indeed "known."

In the context of these differing approaches, epistemology has been something of a compromise between the psychological and the philosophical perspectives. Epistemologists, that is, have been concerned with the psychological mechanisms in relation to the philosophical standards. Toulmin makes the point succinctly: "Epistemology, in short, has comprised a set of logical-looking answers to psychological-looking questions." Epistemologists, that is, have created a priori philosophical standards by which they have analyzed the psychological activity that they believed to have occurred in the mind—in the process of knowing. The result, implies Toulmin, is that epistemology has been hopelessly confused with its intermixing of the descriptive and the

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2 Ibid., p. 214.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. 211.
prescriptive; the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*; the psychological
and the philosophical; and the empirical and the qualitative. 5

Nevertheless, epistemologists, from classical to modern times,
have searched relentlessly for an approach to transcend the ambi-
guity of the question "How do we know?"

In classical times as well as today the ambiguity of
the epistemological question has been worsened by the perceived
need for certainty and necessity in the knowing activity: epistem­
ologists, that is, have felt compelled to erect philosophic
standards for mental activity which are somehow perfect and exact.
After all, if something is "known" as opposed to "highly probable,"
that "known," they felt, should be timeless, absolute, and immutable.
This concern, claims Toulmin, led the epistemologist as well as
the philosopher to the analytic ideal. Here was a system of
logic founded upon the principles of immutability and necessity.
"Ever since the Greeks fell in love with geometry, ever since
Plato introduced formal geometry as the model of what true knowledge
would have to be like," says Toulmin, "philosophers have been
obsessed by the idea that there . . . should eventually be some
uniquely rational system of ideas and propositions which would . . .
incorporate a truly rational view of the world." 6 Formal logic
based upon the geometric model, thus, promised to furnish immutable

5 Toulmin is explicit about the epistemological confusion
that has existed; the aspects of that confusion, as delineated,
are my interpretation.

6 Interview with Stephen Toulmin, Tampa, Florida, May 17-
19, 1972.
and necessary standards by which to judge the psychological activity of knowing. Analyticity promised, in a word, the epistemological ideal.

More specifically, the geometric model promised a method of human activity and analysis that was "above" the short-comings of human reasoners:

'objectivity' in the sense of impartiality, became equated with the 'objectivity' of timeless truths; the rational merits of an intellectual position were identified with its logical coherence; and the philosopher's measure of a man's rationality became his ability to recognize, without further argument, the validity of the axioms, formal entailments, and logical necessities of which the claims of the authoritative system depended.7

The epistemologist, therefore, became similar to the formal philosopher in his ability to proclaim the necessity of his claim: each could contend, as Perelman has observed about the philosopher, that his conclusion was certain—even "self-evident"—since it was derived methodically from principles and by procedures already accepted as being above question.8 The arguments—or more exactly—the manipulation of premises, thus, says Toulmin, "were conceived as detached from the personality and activities of the people who are putting them forward."9


8Interview with Chaim Perelman, Brussels, Belgium, March 13-17, 1972.

9Interview with Toulmin.
Another inherent advantage in the geometric model, besides its perceived ability to respond to an ambiguous question in an immutably valid manner, was related to the lack of human manipulation. If no human personality and activity were needed in the method, then, obviously, no human activity could distort the method: the knowing activity could not be affected by variations in the degree and kind of human valuing. The fact that formal or symbolic logic is computerizable illustrates graphically the advantage seen in the geometric model; even a machine can derive the proper conclusion.

In sum, the analytic ideal, translated into the epistemological ideal, seems capable of treating the query "How do we know?" when the question has epistemological intent. Despite this aura of perceived absoluteness and timelessness, however, Toulmin concludes that such an ideal can never be reached. "Claims to knowledge, however well-founded they may appear in practice, are never going to come up to the philosopher's ideal standard." Toulmin's justification for that claim is really a well-developed criticism of the limitations of the analytic ideal operationalized as the formal syllogism, "an unrepresentative and misleadingly simple sort of argument."  

The syllogism is of limited practical use for epistemology, first, because the conclusion, which we are attempting to "know,"

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10Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 223.

11Ibid., p. 146.
must be already "known"—and, moreover, entailed in one of the premises. This requirement is why Toulmin is reluctant to call formal logic or the syllogism a part of argument at all; no allowance is made for a novel conclusion, a conclusion not already entailed. Perelman has observed the same limitation in the analytic mode of reasoning. He argues that no real decision is ever made by way of formal logic; one, rather, arranges and rearranges premises by following certain rules. This appearance of routine, of automatic results, accounts for Toulmin’s remark that formal logic is "philosophic embroidery" or "intellectual crochet," an activity interesting in its own right and perhaps complex, but incapable of providing any new insights, any unentailed conclusion. Since, therefore, the analytic ideal can only give us insight into a particular aspect of something we already "know," that ideal has a serious inherent limitation: at times, epistemologists will be concerned about a proposition whose encompassing proposition is not already known.

A related epistemological attack upon the analytic ideal concerns the inherent limitation that premises and conclusions must be of the same logical type: that is, only statements that are structurally and semantically correlated can fit into the formal mold. Since, in a sense, each kind of sentence has its

12 Interview with Toulmin.

13 Interview with Perelman.

14 Interview with Toulmin.
own logical type, many epistemologically-relevant propositions cannot be analyzed by the procedures of formal logic because these propositions would require a "type-jump." Such situations, which are not analytically relevant, are numerous and important.

We make assertions about the future, and back them by reference to data about the present and the past; we make assertions about the remote past, and back them by data about the present and the recent past; we make general assertions about nature, and back them by the results of particular observations and experiments; we claim to know what other people are thinking and feeling, and justify these claims by citing the things that they have written, said and done; and we put forward confident ethical claims, and back them by statements about our situation, about foreseeable consequences, and about the feelings and scruples of the other people concerned.

In all these situations, the ideal geometrical conclusion cannot be claimed; it cannot be entailed in the premises because the statements, for example, about the past are a different logical type from statements about either the future or the present.

While such type-shifts are often required in epistemological studies, such shifts illustrate a limitation of the analytical ideal.

Unfortunately, problems arise even when the statements are of apparently the same logical type. It would seem, for

15Stephen Toulmin, *Reason in Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1968), p. 83. Toulmin even posits here that "each" sentence will have "its own logical criteria." Toulmin admits that such an implication is extreme, but it does serve to indicate the difficulty of meeting the requirements of the analytical ideal in actual situations. The act of considering premises and conclusions of different logical "types" as "compatible" would be a "type-jump."

example, that statements exclusively about the present could be analytically-sound if the correct procedures were performed. Such is not the case. If the conclusion or one of the premises involves an object out of sight or earshot or in some other way not immediately "present," the argument, again, is still one in which type-shifts are imminent; on the basis of what we "have" here, we make claims about what we do not "have" here--and these are, to Toulmin, logically different kinds of statements. 17

At this point one might suppose that he may attain analytical certainty only when all objects important to all statements are "observable." Yet even this is not the case. Our claims to knowledge at such times would be on the basis of "seems to be" and "looks like," which is sense-oriented empiricism that is, itself, antithetical to the ideal of analyticity. Questions of "seeming" and "looking," moreover, are "logical-types" each individually distinct from statements of "knowing." 18 These logically-different statements are of no help in establishing the logical necessity of a claim to knowledge.

Toulmin is careful to point out the distinction between attacking analyticity per se and attacking the limitations of analyticity as an approach to epistemology. 19 While the limitations are serious and several in number, they do not necessitate concluding

17 Ibid., pp. 222-23.
18 Ibid., p. 223.
19 Interview with Toulmin.
that formal logic is completely incapable of dealing with epistemological questions. The limitations, however, would have to be overcome by some sort of human manipulation. At times, a human agent would have to make allowance for the inability of the conclusion of interest to be entailed in the major premise; the agent, at other times, might have to compensate for a type-shift made necessary by the nature of the situation or the object or event of epistemological concern; the agent, in still other instances, might have to accept "things" out of earshot and sight as the same logical type as something present; finally, the agent may have to ignore his dependence upon empiricism in the derivation of a conclusion. All these possibilities demonstrate that, while the limitations in the analytical model are serious, they can be overcome.

The crucial point, however, is that the possibility of the analytical weaknesses being overcome puts the analytico-epistemological ideal in jeopardy. Epistemologists pursuing this ideal may choose to ignore the situations in which the geometric model does not apply exactly. Disregarding the fact that Toulmin, for one, believes that no human behavior fits that formal model,\textsuperscript{20} the limitation itself in the scope of the epistemological model signifies a fall from epistemological perfection and a destruction of that ideal.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid. Toulmin believes that much of human activity is "rational"—done for reasons—but that the categories of formal logic, as he understands them, "do not apply" to human behavior.
The alternative to ignoring situations in which the geometric model does not apply, unfortunately, is worse. If the modifications of the system are made, if the limitations are compensated for, then the analytic model—in direct contradiction to its intent—has been distorted by human valuing activities. A human agent will determine if the modification will be made; a human agent will determine what modification to make; and a human agent will determine when the modification is sufficient. Any modification, any transcending of the limitations, will be implemented by a human agent judging the nature of the situation, choosing an appropriate modification, and deciding when the modification is adequate. The epistemological ideal, by way of the alternative of modification also will not be reached.

The implications of the partial failure of the epistemological ideal are far-reaching. If some epistemological questions are ignored, then some additional approach to epistemology is necessary. Similarly, if modifications in the analytic model are implemented, then those alterations must also be grounded in some non-formal epistemology. Clearly, in light of the failure of a timeless and immutable ideal, a need arises for another epistemological approach. As Toulmin says, "The belief that human knowledge should be governed by fixed principles may retain a certain attraction as a philosophical dream; but when it comes to understanding and appraising the actual basis of our claims
to knowledge, that belief is no longer of any help to us."

What is needed, in contrast to the goals of formal epistemology, is an approach both more inclusive and more flexible; one grounded in human activity rather than geometrical operations; one not only acknowledging human valuing as an influence upon knowing, but providing a method for the study of that influence. These essential attributes, it seems to me, are found in a rhetorical perspective on knowing. The explication of that perspective is the task of four related analyses:

(1) The Justification for Knowing: Valuing and the Appraisal of Claims;
(2) The Standards for Knowing: Valuing and the Selection of Criteria;
(3) The Framework for Knowing: Valuing and the Featuring of Reality; and
(4) The Standardization and Evolution of Knowing: the Encasement and Revision of Valuing.

On the basis of these investigations, we will be able to appreciate more fully, rhetoric as architectonic of valuing and knowing.

**The Justification for Knowing: Valuing and the Appraisal of Claims**

Implied in the rhetorical perspective is the belief that a "claim-to-know" is not a unique activity conducted on a cognitive plane above other human activities. A claim-to-know is, as

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Burke has observed, an "act of assertion." Toulmin agrees when he reminds us that "when we say of someone else 'He knows,' we claim for him a position of authority, or endorse a claim he may himself have made." Clearly, these contentions indicate that claims-to-know are best understood first as claims in general and only second as claims that are in any way unique. Such a concern for claims in general leads to a discussion of argumentation in general.

Toulmin is explicit about the nature of claims as they occur in human activities and relate to the concept of argumentation. If the claim or proposition is offered for some sort of approval, it may be accepted without question. In such an instance, no argument transpired: a claim was simply offered, acknowledged, and accepted. Claims, however, need not be accepted unquestioningly. Rather we may challenge them; we can "demand to have our attention drawn to the grounds (backing, data, facts, evidence, considerations, features) on which the merits of the assertion are to depend. We can, that is, demand an argument." Perelman notes that the demand for an argument is essentially a demand to know why the claim should be accepted; it is, therefore,

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24Interview with Toulmin.

a demand for reasons, for justification. At the point such justification is advanced in response to a challenge, an argument has been formulated.

While justification may be of several different kinds "according to the nature of the context," it takes in general, a form unlike the analytic or empirical ideal. Perelman and, to a lesser extent, Toulmin illustrate the process of justification as the process of "giving reasons"--which becomes, in a sense, a technical phrase. They invoke the image of the courtroom judge's procedure in "arriving" at a verdict. The judge does not deduce--or induce, or intuit, etc.---a verdict; he is, in fact, not attempting to "arrive" at a verdict at all. The judge already "knows" the potential decisions that comprise the alternatives: "guilt," "innocence," and their gradations such as "first degree" or "involuntary." Since he is aware of the


28 Toulmin explained in interviews that the judicial model was added afterward as a fitting comparison. Perelman's use of the model was central to his development of argumentative conceptions.

29 The technical sense is important because, unlike the "common sense" use of "reasons," we are concerned here with the actual creation of the factors that become reasons.

30 "Judge" is used here in a general sense; we can include "juries" and, more important, "audiences" under the label "judge."
potential verdicts, he begins a process of "weighing" the justification for each verdict. In making a "decision," he pronounces as "just" the alternative which he feels is most "justified"—the one for which the "best" reasons were given.

The procedure is not one of necessity or geometric perfection, but it seems clearly analogous to other forms of argumentation in human affairs. All human agents are involved in the distinctly human activity of "weighing" reasons and "giving judgments." In relation to the question of accepting or not accepting a claim, we already "know" the potential decisions. Moreover, "being face-to-face with arguments pro and con, neither of which is compelling, we decide that one side has more weight, and in doing so we take a final step" in decision. The decision implies that we have accepted the justification for the claim; we have judged, that is, that the reasons for one alternative outweighed the reasons for any other alternative.

The process, it should be pointed out, is not one of "counting" reasons or "measuring points in favor." Perelman, particularly, contends that the traditional statue of Justice with her Scales is more than tradition: it is a physical representation of the cognitive process in which the courtroom judge is engaged. The judge "weighs" the "reasons" for and against the proposition of guilt, and then makes a decision. On the

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31Chaim Perelman, "How Do We Apply Reason to Values?," The Journal of Philosophy, 52 (Dec. 1955), 802.

32Interview with Perelman.
other hand, the statue as iconic model has built-in limitations: unlike "physical" weight, the weight of reasons cannot be determined by blind comparison. Whether something is a reason cannot be ascertained by anything intrinsic to the factor itself: "It is not the form of the dialectical pattern, whether alone or in conjunction with the attitude of the speaker and hearer, that makes the utterances . . . 'reasons.'"\(^\text{33}\) Rather, "reasons" are "reasons" only to the extent that those particular justificatory statements are judged significant by the audience: "As we shall have occasion to remind ourselves, the 'factors' or 'considerations' which serve as 'reasons' for a man, can do so only if he recognizes them as 'carrying weight': in fact, such considerations can carry weight with him at all only to the extent that he does so recognize them."\(^\text{34}\) What, then, is a "reason"? A reason is some factor judged and valued by a human agent to be relevant and significant as justification for a claim.

The justificatory process in general, envisioned as the analogue of legal reasoning, thus is one of valuing activities: not only must the reasons be "weighed" for each alternative, but the "reasons" themselves must be "created" by the assignment of significance to various factors. In this context, the rhetorically-oriented perspective clearly seems divergent from the ideal of an immutable and necessary philosophical ideal. The rhetorical

\(^{\text{33}}\)Toulmin, *Reason in Ethics*, pp. 70-71.

\(^{\text{34}}\)Toulmin, "Reasons and Causes," p. 4.
perspective acknowledges and incorporates human valuing activities in the appraisal and acceptance of the justification of claims.

The "appraisal and acceptance of claims"--as opposed to the "yielding of necessity"--inherently implies the existence of someone capable of "doing" the appraising and accepting: in a word, the concept of acceptance or agreement involves the idea of "audience." All argumentation, all justification, is directed toward someone having the power to appraise and accept the reasons for a particular proposition, and, further, toward someone whose adherence is being sought. The exact nature of the justification that will be judged acceptable will vary, of course, with the specific audience and the occasion. "There is only one rule in this matter," says Perelman: "Adaptation of the speech to the audience, whatever its nature." Clearly, a study of the appropriate justification for a claim must be grounded in detailed knowledge of the claim, the occasion, the audience, and other data related, for example, to the agent.

Nevertheless, Perelman has presented what seems to me to be an insightful categorization of audience-types indispensible


in a rhetorical examination of the justification of claims. He finds it useful to differentiate three general classes or categories of audiences:

The first such audience consists of the whole of mankind, or at least, of all normal, adult persons; we shall refer to it as the universal audience. The second consists of the single interlocutor whom a speaker addresses in dialogue. The third is the subject himself when he deliberates or gives himself reasons for his actions.38

While the substance and form of the justification should be determined upon the basis of a particular audience in a specific situation, we, nonetheless, can make some important generalizations about the justification of claims in relation to each of these classes of audience. Those generalizations can best be made by examining each class of audience separately, beginning with the self as audience.

Perelman's isolation of the self as audience should not be interpreted as being tantamount to equating mentalistic operations with persuasive or justificatory discourse. At times, Perelman agrees, we probably "think" without "weighing two sides" of the issue at hand.39 On other occasions, Perelman is convinced that we engage in this kind of "debate" with ourselves: we consider both sides of a controversy in light of the reasons that exist for the alternative decisions.40 In this sense, the self does

38 Ibid., p. 30.
39 Interview with Perelman.
40 Ibid.
become an audience that both provides the potential justifications and weighs relevant reasons. The task of adjusting arguments to this audience of one is much simpler than with other audiences because of the subtle, automatic, and generally unconscious nature of the adaptation.

A more complex level of audience construct is what Perelman calls the *interlocutor*, which whether it is one person or a specific group, can be termed a "particular" audience. Appeal to a particular audience is more complex since the presence of one other (or more) individuals, by definition, creates a situation of various attitudes, beliefs, and viewpoints that may differ from those of the speaker himself. Perelman explains that adaptation to the particular audience requires cognizance of and adaptation to these differences. On the other hand, the particular audience is characterized by a *limited* number of divergent beliefs and attitudes. Rather than having to appeal to all possible people with all possible characteristics, "the speaker needs to appeal only to certain opinions and certain values, considered as the only ones relevant to the occasion, and enabling him to neglect all others." The appeal and adaptation should

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41"Audience," as Perelman uses it, is a construct. The "speaker" conceptualizes the nature of his audience and adapts his arguments to that concept. We shall find this especially important later when we discuss the "universal audience."


be to the overriding values and value hierarchies that, in fact, make "it possible to describe a particular audience." 44

Both the self and the particular audience represent somewhat homogeneous audiences. The specific aspects of homogeneity are, for example, the defining characteristics of particular audiences. When an agent presents either audience-type with a claim, he can adapt his "statement of reasons," his justification, rather narrowly to the beliefs, attitudes, and presumptions of these particularized audiences. The agent is not obliged to offer his audience the same "reasons" which he himself considered justification for the claim. 45 Since reasons are not "formal," but are "created" by valuing activities, a claim may be seen as "justified" by any number of different "reasons." The agent's task is to determine what factors most likely will be considered "reasons" by his particular audience and to utilize them in the justification of the claim. The justification for a claim, therefore, may be narrowly adapted and extremely partisan in nature depending upon what seems most efficacious to the agent.

Perelman posits, however, that the efficaciousness of argumentation should not be the sole criterion by which justification is judged. Another dimension of justification is its


45 Interview with Perelman. The issue is important when, for example, we question the ethics of a speaker for attempting to persuade with arguments that he himself does not find persuasive.
"quality," a characteristic expressing the relative narrowness or universality of the justification:46 "quality," and its relationship to the justification of claims-to-know, can be best illustrated by examining Perelman's third class of audience-types, the universal audience.

The universal audience, for the speaker, transcends the narrow interests and limited characteristics of any other audience. The universal audience is composed of all the people envisioned as meeting two requisites: first, that they be rational and, second, that they be competent in the particular matter at hand.47 These same qualities are reflected in Toulmin's conception of the "Court of Reason." While some justification can be so narrowly adapted that it is accepted only by (in Perelman's terms) the self or a particular audience, other justificatory reasons so transcend limited interests that the justification can be accepted as universally rational: says Toulmin, "Rationality, we shall argue, has its own 'courts' in which all clear-headed men with suitable experience are qualified to act as judges or jurors."48 Since this universal audience construct, integrating Perelman's and Toulmin's analysis, is the agent's conception of rational and clear-headed people who are competent and experienced in the matter at hand, the justification offered to this audience must

46 Perelman, "How Do We Apply," p. 800.

47 Interview with Perelman.

48 Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 95. Emphasis added.
be of the highest relevancy and cogency.

This "highest-quality" justification is the requisite justification for knowing. Just as the strength of claims in general is dependent upon the perceived strength of the justification for the claim, "the soundness of our claims to knowledge turns on the adequacy of the arguments by which we back them."\(^{49}\) A claim-to-know is not justified by "reasons" that appeal only to admittedly biased or partisan audiences; it is justified by the best of reasons, reasons acceptable to anyone reasonable and competent in the matter at hand. Toulmin summarizes that "a man who puts forward some proposition, with a claim to know that it is true, implies that the grounds which he could produce in support of the proposition are of the highest relevance and cogency: without the assurance of such grounds, he has no right to make any claim to knowledge."\(^{50}\) The justification for knowing is, therefore, justification acceptable to the universal audience, as well as, perhaps, some particular audiences.\(^{51}\)


\(^{50}\)Ibid., p. 218.

\(^{51}\)Audiences recognize what they consider to be values as well as what they consider facts. Instances may arise when, for example, the values clearly dominate any so-called factual description—and the audience may realize it. The difficult problem is that most audiences, according to Perelman, consider themselves a part of the universal audience, a claim that cannot be "disproved" any more than "proved": who can claim to be a part of the universal audience at a particular point and not be vulnerable to a challenge of the self-claimed status?
An agent putting forth a claim-to-know probably will not appraise his claim in terms of the universal audience per se. The agent, in demonstrating his regard for the quality of the claim's justification, will propose some surrogate conception of the universal audience. The agent may reflect his belief in the universality of his claim's justification with such phrases or implied questions as "Who (being competent and rational) would not accept this justification?" or "How can this claim be (rationally and competently) challenged?" Whether the terminology is the same as that utilized here, a claim-to-know will be a claim whose justification is valued as acceptable to the universal audience. Consider the following illustration.

In the fall of 1972, I was visiting my wife's parents' retirement home at Cobb Hill, Kentucky. One evening a neighbor and I were sitting on the porch watching a beautiful clear sky. I commented that it was difficult to conceive of a trip to the moon. His reply startled me: "Do you think they really did that?" I was surprised because, for some time, I had "known" that man was traveling in space and the moon-journey seemed a logical consequence of such travel. I had never considered that anyone might interpret the "moon-walk" as "another simulation"; I was confident in other words, that all rational and competent people would acknowledge the acceptability of the evidence supporting the occurrence of the walk. In the context of my "knowing" that the walk had occurred, I tended to perceive the "disbeliever" as being outside the membership of the universal audience: "What
does he know about it? He just tends to be untrusting. Both my judgment of the acceptability of the claim and my decision about the effect of the comment upon what I "knew" are obvious examples of the human valuing inherent in the justification of knowing.

The acceptance by the universal audience, then, is the ideal against which claims-to-know are evaluated, but an ideal much different from the analytico-epistemological ideal. The rhetorical perspective, for example, rather than seeking to eliminate the influence of human agents, presumes the importance of human valuing. Since the universal audience is a cognitive and philosophical ideal, no "self-evident" way exists to determine if, in fact, the whole body of rational and competent people would accept or have accepted the claim as valid. In the absence of any sort of "polling" process, it remains for the agent putting forth the claim-to-know to posit the universality of his claim, the quality of his justification.

Such a task is complicated by the fact that particular audiences and agents themselves, who are characterized by limited views and narrow interests consider themselves to be the universal audience incarnate. \(^\text{53}\) Though the justification they may accept appears narrowly adapted to them, we should not expect them to

\(^\text{52}\) Since then, I have found so many people who at least question the authenticity of the landings that, now, the original instance would not be surprising; my claim of the universal acceptability of the landings has been revised.

\(^\text{53}\) Interview with Perelman. See also, note 51 above.
realize the low quality of the justificatory arguments: who, indeed, is able even to be "sure" that what appears to be "low quality" is "really" inferior? Who is capable of acting as judge of the justification of claims-to-know? Individual agents, without the benefit of perfect, immutable, and necessarily-valid procedures, weigh the merits of the claim against the rhetorical ideal and conclude that the claim is of universally high quality. Such a task is not in the realm of analyticity, empiricism, or any highly structured system; the postulating of universal acceptability is, rather, an instance of human evaluation and judgment.

The rhetorical-epistemological ideal differs from the analytical ideal, secondly, in its presumption of the mutability of human claims-to-know. Toulmin contends that "there may have to be second thoughts about matters which had been thought to be settled."\(^{54}\) The claim-to-know, while it may appear acceptable to the universal audience at present, may have to be refined later. Toulmin makes the point succinctly when he contends, "Let our intellectual and sensory equipments be perfect, the future will remain the future and the present the present--only in a timeless universe would there be no possibility of reconsidering our judgements in the light of later events."\(^{55}\) Clearly, rhetorical epistemology differs from analytical epistemology in its presumption of the mutability of claims-to-know.

\(^{54}\) Toulmin, *Uses of Argument*, p. 238.

\(^{55}\) Ibid.
In sum, the justification for knowing is involved inherently with human valuing and the appraisal of claims. Claims, in general, are established by the acceptance of reasons offered as support for claims. What constitutes a reason, however, is dependent upon what is significant to individual human agents; the attributing of significance is therefore tantamount to the "creation" of "reasons." When an agent puts forth a claim-to-know, he implies that the justification for his claim is of the highest quality—reasons that would appear acceptable to the universe of rational and competent persons. While the agent assumes that certain particular audiences might also accept that justification, his concern is for the perceived universality of the claim. This epistemological ideal differs from the analytical in that the postulation of universal acceptability is an admitted valuing activity. Moreover, that postulation is seen as subject to appropriate revision in the course of time. A human agent, seen from the rhetorical perspective, shares the responsibility that Perelman has attributed to the philosopher, an awareness "that the advancement of knowledge will shake and modify the convictions which today appear to him acceptable to the universal audience."\(^{56}\) Such an awareness is the responsibility implied by a rhetorical perspective on the justification of knowing.

An architectonic view of rhetoric, however, implies that the valuing-knowing relationship involves more than the

\(^{56}\)Perelman, *Justice*, p. 86.
The justification for knowing. "A claim," Toulmin argues, "need be conceded only if the argument which can be produced in its support proves to be up to the standard." "Acceptability to the universal audience"—or some analogous conception—is the "standard" against which claims-to-know must be "measured." Yet human activity such as that which is involved in the appraisal of purported claims-to-know is crucial also in relation to this standard itself. This second aspect of human valuing in relation to knowing will become evident as we examine "The Standards for Knowing: Valuing and the Selection of Criteria."

The Standards for Knowing: Valuing and the Selection of Criteria

The justification for claims-to-know is, as we have seen, the postulation of the universal acceptability. Yet judging the acceptability of the claim, which is a valuing activity, is dependent upon other simultaneous valuing judgments. When the claim is said to be "acceptable to the universal audience," certain "criteria" or "standards"—probably tacit in nature—are invoked. These criteria themselves, I shall argue, do not exist as the "objective standards for knowing"; they are, rather, products of human valuing which are utilized consciously or implicitly as the crucial elements against which justifications for knowing are judged. More specifically, "acceptability to the universal audience" may be the "justification for knowing," but that judgment

57Toulmin, Uses of Argument, pp. 11-12.
of acceptability is based upon criteria, first, for "acceptability," and second, for "the universal audience." These criteria—upon which the valuing of justification depends—are themselves selected by human valuing processes.

Initially, the assertion that a claim is universally acceptable implies that every rational and competent person (or some analogous conception) would agree that the claim comes up to certain standards. Toulmin remarks in relation to claims in general, "A sound argument . . . is one for which a case can be presented coming up to the standard required." While ordinary justificatory arguments serve only to destroy a claim's status as "fact," a certain kind of justification is necessary: the postulating of the acceptability of the claim to the universal audience. Implied in that statement—but not expressed—is that the claim is universally acceptable, because of its ability to meet the standard required. Even universal "acceptability," therefore, is defined in terms of appropriate criteria.

"Appropriate" is used to emphasize the absence of any formal standard of "acceptability" for a claim—even a claim-to-know. As Toulmin has suggested in relation to claims to knowledge, "The standards of adequacy are, naturally, field-dependent." Toulmin, who defines "field" in terms of "logical types," is

58 Ibid., p. 8.
59 Ibid., p. 240.
60 Ibid., p. 14.
convinced that what can be called the "appropriate" criteria will vary tremendously: "We must expect that every mode of reasoning, every type of sentence, and (if one is particular) every single sentence will have its own logical criteria."\textsuperscript{61} If the philosophical possibility exists for each single sentence to have its own criteria, then we may speculate safely that each claim to knowledge—which is a much higher order expression—will have its own "standards of adequacy." In proclaiming the "acceptability" of a claim-to-know, the agent implies that this specific claim meets its particular and most stringent standards.

The nature of these standards becomes more clear when "standards" are thought of as certain characteristics in a given field that a claim must exhibit. Toulmin, for example, observes that science in general traditionally recognizes three standards that must be met—three characteristics that must be present in a claim: reliability, coherence, and convenience.\textsuperscript{62} In general, for a claim to be acceptable in science these qualities must be exhibited. If a claim, on the other hand, cannot be said to be reliable, coherent with other accepted claims, and convenient, that claim—since it fails to meet the appropriate standards—is not acceptable. The appropriate standards are, therefore, the means both of accepting and ruling out a claim.

Yet even the general and still-to-be-operationalized

\textsuperscript{61} Toulmin, \textit{Reason in Ethics}, p. 83.

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 101.
standards of reliability, coherence, and convenience do not simply exist as immutable and self-evident criteria. These standards were created by human valuing activities. Human beings examined claims and postulated what characteristics were most important for a claim to exhibit, what qualities that would be used to determine the distinction between "acceptable" and "unacceptable" claims. In discussing the formulation of such criteria for judgment, Perelman and I had the following exchange:

Perelman: So these elements should be criterial, the complete criterion for this question . . .

Crable: If you could, hypothetically, arrive at all the distinctions, this would . . .

P: But how do you know? . . . How do you know what are all the distinctions?

C: No, but if you could . . .

P: Then it would be equivalent [quantitative and qualitative judgments]. But then the question would be "What importance do we attach to this element or that?"

C: So you get into a hierarchical . . .

P: Ah, you see already what a job.63

"Criteria," thus, may be formulated--as they are in science in general--but the questions remain: are these all the criteria? Is each accorded proper "weight" as a standard of judgment?

More specifically, the standards for claims-to-know

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63 Interview with Perelman.
will vary with the individual claim in question. The positing of universal acceptance implies that the claim has met the most stringent and exacting standards—standards that are claim-dependent. Human valuing activity is essential for the formulation of these standards of "acceptability." The standards themselves, first, must be selected. The agent offering the claim as acceptable must select, from all the potential elements of distinction, which elements are criterial to the claim in question. If one element is, in general, "reliability," then "reliability" must be operationalized into a standard adapted specifically to the nature of this claim-to-know. In order to be most stringent, the standard must be finely moulded to apply to each claim. Yet even when standards are formulated and refined, the problem of assigning significance hierarchically remains: in a situation in which both "reliability" and "coherence" (specifically operationalized) are deemed "criterial," one element may have to be accorded more importance in the comparison of claims-to-know. The ordering of the standards, as well as the selection of the standards themselves, is thus the product of human valuing activities.

An agent, then, in positing a claim's acceptability to the universal audience is judging also the nature of standards it meets. The claim must be judged by standards which do not exist apart from the human activities of selecting and ordering the criterial elements of the matter at hand. While we may say, as before, that the postulating of the claim's acceptability is a valuing activity, we must add also that the standards for that
acceptability are the result of much the same valuing.

This aspect of the selection of the standards for knowing, however, calls attention to a related judgment of criteria, the criteria for the universal audience. Since the universal audience never really "exists," its inception, its "incarnation," will be a product of human valuing activity. Moreover, if human agents "create" their own conception of the universal audience, or universal courts of reason, then they also interpret the characteristics of those courts. Perelman chooses the elements of rationality and competence; Toulmin uses the terms reasonableness and experience; and other agents, no doubt, employ still other terminology. "Rationality" and "competence" are utilized here because they seem to me to be most precise in isolating the qualities both of potential and ability implied in assertions such as "everyone would agree" and "who would deny . . .?" While making valuing decisions about the acceptability of a claim to the universal audience, or a surrogate term, human agents operationalize "rationality" and "competence," or they substitute and operationalize analogous terms. In this aspect of the issuing of a claim-to-know, as with the nature of "acceptability," the problem is one of selecting and ordering the criterial elements.

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64 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, "Act and Person," p. 103. Perelman uses the phrase "incarnation"—giving of flesh—to illustrate how audiences are given life by the conceptualizing of the speaker. Interview with Perelman.
of (e.g.) "rationality" and "competence"; a problem that will be solved, although perhaps tacitly, by human valuing activities.

Perelman, for example, stresses the variability of the membership of the universal audience because of the factor of competence. "Who" is competent will depend upon the exact nature of the claim at hand; a great physicist, that is, may not be a member of the universal audience if the claim is extraneous to his expertise. Judgment of the necessary competence will be a function of an agent's weighing of the claim's content in relation to who he judges is experienced and qualified to judge its validity.

Just as much a valuing decision will be the judgment of who is rational or of what it means to be rational. Certainly the conception of rationality will vary from agent to agent; "rationality" as "analyticity" is not tantamount to "rationality" as "intuition" or "empiricism." Moreover, such conceptions will be affected by the norms of relevant intellectual communities, and, in fact, the norms of the time in history. Toulmin, for example, believes that the "standards of rational judgment" a man acknowledges depend "not on the characteristics of universal 'human nature,' or the intuitive self-evidence of his basic ideas alone, but also on when he happened to be born and where

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65 Explicit surrogate phrases or implicit criteria may replace the elements that Perelman uses. "Capability" and "qualification," however, are still central concerns.

66 Interview with Perelman.
he happened to live."\(^{67}\) Whether the standards of rationality are influenced by individual philosophies, intellectual community, or the milieu in general, it seems to me that they will be much dependent upon human valuing activities.

The selection of standards both of acceptability and the universal audience is, then, a process of human judging. Consider the following example: in 1927, in his 614-page book *The Outline of Man’s Knowledge*, Clement Wood defended the "new concept" of psychoanalysis by contending that

There are those who deny the existence of a subconscious mind. A moment's reflection will convince any intelligent person of its existence, and its immense range.

You had breakfast yesterday morning. You sat in a certain place, alone or with certain people; you ate certain food, said certain things, thought certain thoughts. Now that you are reminded of it, this all comes back to you: you can picture the whole process. Where was this mental picture before you commenced this paragraph? It was not non-existent. . . . It was not in your consciousness. . . . It was, of course, in your subconsciousness.\(^{68}\)

Wood's comment implies clearly that he valued the existence of the subconscious as "fact"—a claim acceptable to the universal audience; the comment, moreover, reveals the standards Wood employed in postulating universal acceptability. The criteria for "acceptability" seem to be, first, "consistency with common sense," since a "moment's reflection" establishes the veracity of the claim, and second, the "method of residues," since the "picture" of the breakfast could have been nowhere else but

\(^{67}\)Toulmin, *Human Understanding*, p. 50.

\(^{68}\)(New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1927), p. 305.
in the subconscious. The subconscious is, to Wood, a "fact" because the criteria of acceptability—chosen by Wood—have been met.

Those standards of acceptability, however, are selected in relation to that which he incarnates as the universal audience. Wood's conception of such a court of reason is seemingly characterized by "intelligence" and "willingness to reflect"—criteria which delineate all those persons relevant to the issue at hand. The subconscious is a "fact," then, because all intelligent, thoughtful people would agree that it is consistent with common sense and the only viable explanation for situations such as the recollection of the breakfast scene. The creation of this universal audience, which implicitly rejects the views of traditional psychologists, is an obvious valuing activity.

Both the criteria for "acceptability" and the standards for the "universal audience," then, are the result of tacit or overt valuing and selecting by human agents. Moreover, each of the selected standards becomes important when a claim-to-know is offered: while, clearly, the postulating of universal acceptability is a valuing activity, that "universal acceptability" is defined by the selected criteria. The nature of a claim-to-know, thus, is as dependent upon the valuing of standards as it is the valuing of the justification for knowing.

The standards for knowing, however, do not exist apart from other aspects of the knowing process; they will depend largely upon certain perceptions of reality itself. Certain
standards will seem more appropriate than others when a particular view of life or conception of reality is accepted. Hence, just as the justification for knowing cannot be examined adequately without an analysis of the standards for knowing that have been accepted, these standards themselves must be analyzed in conjunction with the human "creation" of reality. This valuing sub-process is our next concern: "The Framework for Knowing: Valuing and the Featuring of Reality."

The Framework for Knowing: Valuing and the Featuring of Reality

In a prior analysis, the attempt to specify a timeless and immutable method to justify knowing was deemed futile; such justification, from the rhetorical perspective, is, rather the appraisal of claims as acceptable to the universal audience. Similarly, that appraisal is in relation to certain standards, which are conceived of as the human evaluation of the essential characteristics of "acceptability" and the "universal audience"; the existence of self-evident and necessary standards has been termed anathema to the rhetorical perspective on knowing. Both the valuing of justification and standards for knowing, however, occur within and depend upon a "reality" that serves as the intellectual context for claims-to-know, the framework for knowing.

When the rhetorical perspective is adopted in relation to reality, though, the concern is not for the "discovery" of "Reality" that exists "out there," but rather, for the discovery of how human beings interpret their reality through symbolic
interaction. Philosophically, it seems to me, we may admit the existence of "a Reality," but we must admit that the human perception of this "Reality" will lead to the experiencing of many "realities," many value-infused interpretations that form contexts for knowing.

These subjective evaluations, contends Burke, are characterized by differing views on the motivation, or "true" causal factors, for acts and situations. Human beings manifest a concern not only for what happened or is happening, but why it happened or is happening—a feeling that they must consider the "motives" of actions and choices. The result, as might be expected, is that the why of any particular act is largely dependent upon the who evaluating the why. In short, we must explore the framework for knowing by examining motivational interpretations: "differences in our ways of sizing up an objective situation" are "expressed subjectively as differences in our assignment of motive." The understanding of what a situation "is" is bound up inherently in the judgment of why the action occurred.

The interpretation of motivation, however, is not an unstructured, unguided activity, but rather the product of motivational frames of reference characteristic of human agents.

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69 The issue here is not whether "a Reality" exists, but rather, whether such a "Reality," even if possible, could be perceived flawlessly by human agents.


71 Ibid., p. 35.
Varying individuals bring different frames of reference to an allegedly objective situation, and these "different frameworks of interpretation," says Burke, "will lead to different judgments as to what reality is." A motivational interpretation, therefore, implies that whatever judgment is made will be the result of the motivational frame of reference characteristic of the agent. From this perspective, any judgments of "reality" are, more precisely, reflections of the motivation of the human perceivers.

The divers motivational frameworks of human agents are made possible because of the complexity of the concept of motive. In strict physical or physiological terms, the why of an event would be the actual, physically-discernible forces which caused the event. "Motivation," it seems to me, implies a concern for what human beings attest is the force without which the act would not have occurred. The distinction between motives and causes, from this perspective, is that the study of motivation does not presume that the actual "cause" can be isolated; instead that which can be isolated is what human beings interpret as the why of an act. To understand "cause" is to be able to examine and measure physical force-effort relationships; to understand "motive" is to be able to perceive the diversity of potential interpretations of what "force" was the sine qua non of the action.

72 Ibid.

73 The distinction is over-simple, but it serves to illustrate the basic difference between the search for "causes" and the search for "motives."
This concern for "motive," though, may be disturbing. Is there not one and only one "valid" interpretation of an event? Was not one and only one potential force "really" the motivation by which the action can be explained? The answers, from the rhetorical perspective, must be negative. The study of motive concerns what human beings interpret as being "behind," or "responsible for" what they experience—what is the essence of their world. From the rhetorical viewpoint such concerns are inherently in the realm of valuing and discovering. The valuing of what is "real" is an evaluation of what is "substantial" as opposed to what is "illusory"; the rhetorical perspective, in a word, leads to a concern for "substance"—that which "lies under" or "supports." Burke explains: "Men's conception of motive . . . is integrally related to their conception of substance. Hence, to deal with problems of motive is to deal with problems of substance." In essence, then, the framework of interpretation that creates "reality" is based upon judgments of motive, and thus, substance. Motivation, as we shall see, is "substantial" and therefore is necessarily the object of human valuing.

"Motives" are "substantial" from several perspectives, based on three conceptions of the term substance. The "geometric" aspect of substance refers to the nature of an object's placement in its context or supportive frame. Because, in a sense, a thing does not exist without a context that "contains," "underpins,"

\[74^*\text{Burke, Grammar, p. 337.}\]
or otherwise "supports" it, the object is, actually, a part of its context. In Burke's view, the thing and its context are constituent elements of a "substantial" relationship. Similarly, motives can be interpreted in "geometric" terms: the motive can be interpreted as being an integral part of the act itself. To discuss the act without reference to the motive which underlies the act would be as imprecise as discussing the motive without reference to the act which it underpins. Either discussion would ignore what, from this geometric viewpoint, is the "substantial" relationship between motives and acts. 75

In contrast, the familial character of "substance" implies that one "thing" is substantial with another since one springs from the other. 76 A father-son relationship is therefore "substantial" since the offspring is "derived" from the father. Motives, too, can be explored in terms of ancestral cause and derivation. One sense in which the motive underlies the act is that the act is seen to arise from the motivational "force." Just as the son could hardly exist without an ancestral force (his father), an act can be deemed necessarily dependent upon

75 This discussion of substance is based upon my conversations with Burke, Englewood, Florida, Mar. 23-24, 1972, and his Grammar, pp. 21-58. Other critics have examined Burke's view of substance, but apparently, the idea of motives being substantial is not discussed elsewhere. For an example of a critic dealing with substance with no reference to motives, see Marie Hochmuth (Nichols), "Kenneth Burke and the 'New Rhetoric,'" Quarterly Journal of Speech, 38 (April 1955), p. 137.

76 Family "trees" demonstrate graphically how one thing can be seen to spring from or branch off from another.
the motivating force behind it; moreover, each instance is one of familial substantiality.

Finally, a directionally substantial relationship exists when a tendency toward action—but no real action—is exhibited. A person may be said to be "inclined" to do something, whether or not that action is ever taken. The impulse or inclination to act can be similar in direction to the actual act of doing; thus, the relationship is "substantial." The perceived force (which an agent may choose to call a motive) is, it seems to me, by definition tending toward a particular direction. This force and actual action in the same direction can be termed substantial. Moreover, the act itself can be interpreted as being the result of the inclination; conversely, the motive can be seen as the ground or support for the real act.

Motivation and acts are, as we have seen, "substantial": motives can be interpreted geometrically as the contexts or supportive frames out of which acts emerge; motives can be seen familially as the ancestral forces of acts; and motives, finally, can be interpreted directionally as the inclination or impulse toward the act itself. A complication exists in this discussion of motives and substance, however, in that the "word 'substance' used to designate what a thing is, derives from a word designating something that a thing is not."77 Thus, when something is said to be "substantially" something-or-other, the implication is

77Burke, Grammar, p. 23.
that it is not synonymous with that something-or-other; the substantial relationship means that differences, in fact, do exist. Burke labels this situation the "paradox of substance" and this paradox creates what we shall see is the existence of "paradoxical motivation" which makes necessary the human valuing of reality.

Thus, in the "geometric" view of the object in relation to its context, we know that while a thing is a part of its context, it is also, paradoxically, a "separate" thing. As Burke notes, "a thing's context, being outside or beyond the thing, would be something that the thing is not." Similarly, from the geometric perspective, the act may be said to be discussible in terms of the motive which supports it and underpins it; yet this viewpoint should never obscure the fact that the motive and the act are indeed separable: the act may be considered and examined apart from the force which is said to support it. Clearly, in interpretations of reality, audiences can ignore the forces which have been called the motives by other audiences; that process would be termed valuing activity.

Concerning the implications of "familial" substantiability, human agents may acknowledge the relationship between the act and the motive which is said to have given it life. Yet the fact that act and motive are substantially the same demonstrates that act and motive are also somewhat different--just as father and

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77 Ibid.
son are somewhat different. The alleged motive may be dissociated from the act, so that an audience viewing the act may or may not "recognize" the purported close relationship between the act and this motive. The acknowledgement or denial of the familial substantiality will be a result of valuing by an audience.

Finally, the paradoxical nature of "directional" substantiality must be analyzed. While a thing may be "tending toward" action, such a situation also means that the action has not occurred as yet. Hence, an agent may contend that his motivation is "toward" a particular action and yet (even "ethically") he may not be actually taking steps in the direction implied by his espoused motivation. The perceived motivation, while directionally substantial with the action, may be separable in practice.

In sum, then, the study of motivation is the study of both what is and what is not. The forces which are said to comprise the motivation for an act will be "substantial" in nature: at once a part of and distinct from the act; at the same time both giving impetus to an act and being separable; simultaneously exhibiting the direction of an act while not having to evolve into action. The result is that a potentially motivating "force" can be "featured" as the motive by an audience in its interpretation of an event—or it can be almost completely discounted. Since motives both are and are not, human audiences must "decide" whether the potential force was significant.

Complicating the substantiality of motivation is the pervasiveness of such potential forces. Burke recognizes "the
fact that in everything there is a power, or motive, of some sort." The problem is that while the creation of reality depends upon an interpretation of motives, they are pervasive. How may we begin to understand the concept of motives in human affairs? The necessary approach must not only relate specifically to the substantiality of motivation but also encompass all human activity. Burke's hexad seems to me to meet both criteria. First, the dramatistic method was developed for motivational analysis in literature; the hexad, second, is composed of elements or categories which can be used to examine any human symbolic action. The hexadic approach seems suitable to the task of investigating reality as a product of motivational interpretation.

Burke's hexad, which is meant to treat all human activity in drama-oriented terms, includes the following elements:

- the **Act**: the human action; that which is done.
- the **Agent**: the human instigator of the act within the scene.
- the **Scene**: the complex of persons, events, and ideas that form the total environment of the human action.


80 Burke's pentad is, of course, a familiar rhetorical conception. In my conversations with Burke, he expressed regret that a sixth term—"attitude"—was not included in his original treatment of motives and human action. We shall deal more with this later.

81 Burke explained to me that his dramatistic method of analysis sprang from his needs, as a writer and critic, to explain and critique human motivation in literary works.

82 Interview with Burke.
the Agency: the form, medium, or instrument used by the human agent to accomplish the act.

the Purpose: the espoused or implied reason the agent acts.

the Attitude: the predisposition to act purposively; an "implicit" act with all the characteristics of an "explicit" act.\textsuperscript{83}

Burke, consistent with his belief that "motives" are pervasive, argues that each of these elements is the categorical locus or the potential locus of motivational force.\textsuperscript{84} An examination of each of these elements—and its potential as the locus of motivation—will demonstrate how varying valuing of motive constitute divergent views of the "reality" of an event.

Consider the following situation: the Vice-President of a large university presented an evaluation of the institution's recent reorganization to the University Senate. The report consisted of a number of specifically designated problem areas, but did not include a rationale for the designation of such problems; actual flaws in the organizational plan were alluded to only in the vaguest of terms. Several members of the University Senate, who had predicted what they termed purposeful ambiguity, expressed displeasure with the report even before it had been presented officially. One particular member of the Senate, Professor "Smith," had close personal relationships with some parts of this material originally appeared in Richard E. Crable and John J. Makay, "Kenneth Burke's Concept of Motives in Rhetorical Theory," \textit{Today's Speech}, 20 (Winter 1972), 12.

\textsuperscript{83}Burke, Grammar, p. 65.
of the more out-spoken members, but earlier had not taken a stand in public. Smith became convinced that the report needed extensive clarification, but also felt that the Senate and the university administration had to work cooperatively if the reorganization was to be successful. After much contemplation of what he considered the "relevant" factors in the situation, he decided to speak on the floor of the Senate--for the first time. In his remarks, he admitted that he knew of the flaws in the reorganization review; he said, however, that he also knew that the Senate and the administration had to work cooperatively. Therefore, he concluded, he knew that the solution was a substantially, but not radically, expanded study of reorganization.

The incident is comparatively simple; a man issued certain claims-to-know in interacting symbolically with other people. We understand his statements as postulations of the universal acceptance of his claims; we understand these postulations, in turn, as predictions that the claims meet the criteria for "acceptability"--"acceptability" to those who meet his standards as members of the universal audience. How, though, do we understand his predictions of what will be "acceptable" to the universal audience? In short, how does Smith select the standards for his claim-to-know? Smith's selection of standards, I submit, depends upon a simultaneous prediction of his universal audience's valuing or featuring of reality--a reality that, as we shall see, implies standards for knowing.
Let us examine six different perceptions of "reality" each "created" by an audience "featuring" or emphasizing the importance of factors associated with an element of the hexad. Each perception of reality not only provides a different framework for Smith's claim-to-know, but, consequently, also entails divergent standards for the judging of Smith's claim.

Smith's claim might be perceived by an audience that "features" purpose in its motivational frame of reference. The claim is not perceived in isolation, but is viewed within the framework of this version of reality. Burke, I think, would agree that the purpose itself is always the categorical locus of potential motivation. The relationship between purpose and motive seems so close that some contemporary theorists, for example Walter Fisher, appear virtually to equate motive with purpose in examining the "why" of human action. This association of motive and purpose is more than the attributing of significance to a hexadic element; it is, in addition a view of the "reality" of the event created by the audience's interpretation of motivational forces—a perception of Smith's perception of the situation. If Smith's claim-to-know is placed in this framework of reality Perelman also emphasizes that different audiences will exhibit different perceptions of "reality." Interview with Perelman.

stressing purpose, the appropriate standards for knowing arise almost automatically. The claim-to-know, based on purpose, is measured against the standards of "ambiguity" and "lack of constructivity," and Smith is seen as claiming that the universal audience would agree that the claim meets these standards. Smith's statement, therefore, depends upon his assessment of the universal acceptability of the claim, an acceptability that depends upon standards for knowing, and the standards for knowing that depend upon his prediction of the reality-featuring of his universal audience. While this featuring of the espoused purpose dictates a certain framework for knowing, it is not the only possible framework.

Smith's act, secondly, might be perceived by an audience disposed to "feature" the act in their considerations. Human action can be seen as prompted by the appeal of the act itself; it can be seen as done for the sake of its own symbolism. As Burke argues, "There must, in brief, be some respect in which the act is a _causa sui_, a motive in itself."87 The fact that man is by definition the symbol-using animal provides a clue as to how a "motive" can be seen to arise from the act. Burke says, "If man is characteristically the symbol-using animal, then he should take pleasure in the use of his powers as a symbolizer, just as a bird presumably likes to fly or a fish to swim."88

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87 Burke, _Grammar_, p. 66.

In other words, contends Burke, regardless of the content or form of the symbolic act, some of man's motivation for acting symbolically will be his ability to do so. Not surprisingly, some audiences develop motivational frames of reference which, when applied to "objective" situations, create a reality based on the intrinsic motivation of acts themselves. The result is more than an interpretation mediated by the motivational framework of an audience: it is also a judgment of the reality of the event that has implications for the standards for Smith's claim-to-know. While in respect to the previous perception of the reality of the event, the standards seemed to be "ambiguity" and "lack of constructivity," this second perception implies standards intrinsic to the act of claiming: the merit of the claim as a symbolic expression or the skill of the act of claiming-to-know. While these standards may seem anathema to the rhetorical perspective, they are nonetheless criteria of the kind implied in an "act-featured" reality.

A third kind of audience might "feature" factors related to agency in an interpretation of Smith's action. Burke, for example, interprets McLuhan's work on the media as revolving around the belief that the medium (or agency) dictates the nature of the message. Such a belief adopted in relation to Smith's claim creates an agency-oriented reality; a reality that implies certain standards for claims-to-know. Among the standards

\[89\text{Ibid., p. 410.}\]
appropriate for this reality might be the clarity of the claim's expression, the logical ordering of the claim's elements, and the faithfulness in following certain established procedures.

From a fourth perspective, an audience might view Smith's act in relation to a reality "featuring" scenic forces. This featuring of the agent's environment is a reflection of the scene's potential as the categorical locus of motive—a potential that Lloyd Bitzer also indicates in his explication of the "rhetorical situation." Human agents can be impelled in response to an audience, an exigency, or constraints within what we call the scene. Clearly, research on group and social pressure provides rationale for an audience's emphasis upon the impact of scenic factors. When such an emphasis is employed in viewing a claim-to-know, however, it not only creates a reality of the event, but suggests appropriate standards for knowing. The standards might include the consistency of the claim with other claims-to-know, the appropriateness of the claim to the audience, or the consistency of the claim with the intellectual community or discipline. These and similar standards would be the determining factors of the claim's acceptability to an audience featuring the scene.

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90 "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 1 (Jan. 1968), 1-44.

91 We shall discuss this point later in the context of the featuring of audience inherent to the rhetorical perspective; from this perspective, rhetoric can be considered "scenic" in orientation.
In analyzing Smith's claim from the perception of four motive-mediated realities, we have seen how the featured reality dictates the nature of the standards for knowing. The fifth traditional element, agent, now can be examined. In an earlier study of the "pentad" and "motives," John Makay and I explained the motivating force arising from the agent, as Burke had, primarily in respect to attitudinal forces. However, in later conversations with me (and now in his Dramatism and Development), Burke has expressed regret that he did not differentiate a sixth motivational term, making his cycle of elements a "hexad." Attitude, says Burke in retrospect, should be considered as an element comparatively distinct from agent. Although Burke has not explored publicly the implications of this different treatment for either agent or attitude, let us now attempt that exploration.

Apart from the impulse generated by motives associated with the act, the scene, the agency, and the purpose, the agent will be impelled unquestionably by relevant and salient attitudes. That attitudes can provide motive to action is as obvious to rhetorical scholars as it is to experimental researchers. An audience inclined to "feature" attitude might evaluate Smith's claim as it relates to attitude theory; standards posited for claims-to-know might be the degree to which the claim is merely

92Crable and Makay, "Burke's Concept," pp. 15-17.
93(Barre, Mass.: Clark Univ. Press, 1972), p. 23.
94Interview with Burke.
the result of (knowledge-function) attitudes or the utility of the claim in any dissonance-reducing activities in which Smith might be involved. Either standard relates to the acceptability of the claim-to-know—but only to the extent the claim is seen in the context of an attitude-featuring reality.

In examining agent in comparative isolation from the forces most conveniently "located" under act, agencies, and even attitudes, there is, perhaps, a temptation to regard motives "arising" from agents simply as "natural desires" and inclinations. Such forces, contends Burke, are in the realm of motion (the biologist's concern) rather than in the realm of action (Burke's concern). In contrast to the biological drives, Burke implies that the crucial activating force within the agent is man's "perception of generic divisiveness which, being common to all men, is a universal fact about them." This perception of "division" or "isolation" prompts man to reach out to his fellows; to act symbolically in efforts to "induce cooperation" in beings that respond to symbol usage. Communication may be seen, therefore, as an act of compensation to this inherent human division.

95 The term relates to Katz' theorizing about the functions of attitudes. See, for example, Chester A. Insko, Theories of Attitude Change (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967), p. 335.


97 Ibid., p. 43.

98 Ibid., p. 22.
Moreover, this "generic motive" can be interpreted as the force explaining virtually any (or a part of any) symbolic act. An audience could view Smith's claim in the context of such an agent-featured reality. The standards for knowing dictated by that created reality might include: the utility of the claim in solidifying the relationship between the Senate and the administration and the extent to which the claim serves to expand the communion of knowledge.

This examination of six divergent perceptions of Smith's act illustrates that the same allegedly objective situation may have a variety of motive-mediated "realities," each created by an audience that "features" a different hexadic element in its motivational interpretations. Such featuring explains why different audiences demand different standards for the acceptability of claims—even claims-to-know. Smith's task—indeed the task of any "knower"—is to predict the reality-featuring of "his" universal audience; that prediction of reality allows him to select the most stringent relevant standards for claims; to note, as Toulmin has suggested, the considerations which "carry weight" with that audience. That selection, in turn, permits him to posit "universal acceptability" for his claim-to-know. His

99Burke, Permanence and Change, p. 271.

100The treatment here, of course, does not exhaust the various "realities" that might be perceived by human agents. This should indicate, however, the importance of motive as a factor in the perception of situations.

101Toulmin, "Reasons and Causes," p. 16.
prediction of the reality-featuring which serves as a framework for knowing is therefore a valuing judgment of what the universal audience will value in a specific situation.

In sum, human conceptions of reality vary because of different motivational frames of reference that human agents bring to an allegedly objective situation. These various interpretations of reality are possible because motivation is "substantial"—existing as a potential force, without being the unquestionable "cause." Whether the "motive" was what prompted the action is a question to be answered by the valuing activity of the agent and audience. Different audiences can perceive the same situation as different "realities"—realities mediated by the motivational featuring that is characteristic of that audience.

Since these "realities" serve as the framework for knowing, the featuring of controlling factors is crucial to what we called earlier the "selection of the standards for knowing." That valuing activity involved the selection of what was and was not criterial to the matter at hand. The requisite characteristics for a claim-to-know included whatever was the most stringent claims for his conception of the universal audience. That selection process, we can see now, is dependent upon the knower's evaluation and prediction of the reality-featuring of his universal audience. That featured-reality serves both as a guideline for the selection of standards and as the framework in which knowing activity occurs.

Justification for knowing depends upon the valuing of standards; the valuing of standards for knowing, in turn, depends
upon the valuing of reality itself: what is relevant and what is not, what is weighty and what is not, what is criterial to the situation and what is not. As such, "reality" becomes a framework within which the standards and justification for knowing "exist," and the valuing of justification, standards, and reality occurs simultaneously at the time of postulating a claim-to-know.

This emphasis upon the individuality and diversity of the valuing implicit in knowing need not suggest that valuing and knowing are immutably personal activities untouched by conformity or undirected by other forces. On the contrary, while valuing and knowing are distinctly human processes, both activities—and the relationship between them—are subject to certain "standardizations." Our next concern is, therefore: "The Standardization and Evolution of Knowing: The Encasement and Revision of Valuing."

The Standardization and Evolution of Knowing: The Encasement and Revision of Valuing

A rhetorically-oriented perspective on epistemology treats "knowledge" as "a claim-to-know." Inherent in this perspective, it seems to me, is the belief that human knowing cannot be discussed accurately without acknowledging the human valuing implicit in the claiming-to-know: the valuing of the justification for knowing; the valuing of the standards for knowing; and the valuing of the framework for knowing. These valuing activities, which are the sine qua non of human knowing from the rhetorical perspective, necessitate the conclusion that human knowing is not a process of timelessly valid "cognizing." It is as Toulmin
earlier pointed out: "Claims to knowledge, however well-founded they may appear in practice, are never going to come up to the philosopher's ideal standard." 102 

What is termed "knowledge," however, does "exist" and particular "facts" are presented to counterbalance "opinion." The apparent discrepancy between "knowledge" (in common sense terms) and "knowing" (in rhetorical terms) is erased when what is called "knowledge" is thought of, not as "immutable," but as "traditional." Perelman, for example, claims that "Ab initio all knowledge is tradition, instruction, and conformity." 103 This "ready-made" knowledge, "which is passed on from generation to generation... raises scarcely any problems as long as rules and methods which have already been elaborated can be applied without difficulty to new situations." 104 This "knowledge," in other words, is that "fact," or set of "facts," which has proved its usefulness to knowers and has been retained for its value and convenience. On the one hand, "Certainly, every statement in a science should conceivably be capable of being called in question, and of being shown empirically to be unjustified; for only so can the science be saved from dogmatism." 105 

102 Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 223.  
104 Ibid.  
other hand, says Toulmin, "A time comes when we have produced in support of our conclusions data and warrant full and strong enough, in the context, for further investigation to be unnecessary." Toulmin cites an example of how an idea or system can achieve this status of "knowledge":

Students learn the mathematical techniques of Euclidean geometry and formal mechanics, . . . not as theories, but as theorems. And this is a perfectly appropriate heading since from a scientific point of view, the ideas and calculations involved in the use of these techniques are no longer scientifically problematic. Having reached a definitive form, the concepts concerned are—as such—past further rational criticism, challenge, or change.107

Having met so well the necessary criteria in relation to other alternatives, Euclidean geometry—while not immutable or absolutely valid—can be accepted as knowledge: Euclidean geometry is, therefore, an instance of the standardization of knowing.

This standardization of knowing, this placement of the claim above further criticism, occurs as the result of the development and organization of human intellectual activities. Argue's Perelman, "To avoid all discussion on a question, it is encased in a discipline, the bases of which are assumed to be accepted and whose criteria can form the object of an explicit or implicit agreement of universal scope. In this case, and in this case alone, does the validity of the fact lie beyond the reach of all argument from authority."108 Thus, in relation to Toulmin's

example of Euclidean geometry, that mathematical system is "past further rational criticism, challenge, or change" only because those concepts have been deemed so by particular scientific and mathematical disciplines.

Occurrence of such standardizations of knowing is pervasive. As Perelman concludes, virtually every human agent is involved in such standardization of intellectual activities: "Before arriving at a personal outlook, each man . . . has been initiated into one or other of the innumerable sciences and technologies of his age"—an initiation which includes "not only language, common as well as technical, but also the rules and methods of verification and proof." The standardization of knowing appears to me an omnipresent process.

The encasement of human valuing, moreover, is an integral aspect of the standardization process. As human knowing becomes standardized in disciplines and fields, human valuing itself becomes standardized; valuing activity becomes encased in the mold of a discipline. Since knowing has been discussed in terms of the valuing of justification, standards, and reality, let us examine each valuing activity as it becomes encased in a discipline.

The justification for knowing is, as we have seen, postulating the acceptability of the claim to the universal audience or some surrogate conception. That postulation is possible because human agents have the ability to appraise the claim as

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"universally acceptable." The human valuing involved in this appraisal of the justification of a claim-to-know is not always a matter of human caprice; the valuing, rather, can be guided or controlled substantially by evaluative procedures and methods dictated by the community or discipline. The nature of a "fact," of that which is deemed the focus of a claim-to-know, can vary with the valuing procedures of a discipline. Toulmin provides an example from the discipline that is his chief interest.

"To talk, in the philosophy of science, of theoretical physics falsifying by abstraction, and to ask for the facts and nothing but the facts, is to demand the impossible, like asking for a map drawn to no particular projection and having no particular scale." The methods for evaluating (valuing) claims-to-know vary with the discipline. Choosing the "facts" of the situation, says Perelman, is a dominant factor in scientific debates: choice of the facts deemed relevant, choice of hypotheses, choice of the theories that should be confronted with facts, choice of the actual elements that constitute facts. The method of each science implies such a choice, which is relatively stable in the natural science, but is much more variable in the social sciences.111

The justification for claims, the valuing that is implicit in the appraisal of claims-to-know, can thus be encased in disciplines.

Further, such valuing of justification for knowing is dependent upon simultaneous valuing of the standards for knowing--

110Toulmin, Philosophy of Science, p. 129.

standards of "acceptability" and "universality." These standards, while they may be determined by individual effort, can also be standardized in an intellectual discipline. Toulmin, for example, talks of the "selection-criteria employed" in various disciplines. That these criteria for the assessment of claims are closely tied to intellectual pursuits is obvious. Says Toulmin, "Standards of judgement, criteria of relevance, rational ideals, and intellectual ambitions emerge from, develop along with, and are refined in the light of the explanatory, practical, and/or judicial activities in which scientists, lawyers, and other 'rational craftsmen' are engaged." Especially important here, the "standards of judgment" and the "rational ideals"—those criteria crucial to the valuing of the standards for knowing—can be encased in the development of the discipline.

These standardizations of the valuing implicit in knowing imply another aspect of the encasement of valuing, the featuring of reality. Perelman argues that "To try to impose on the philosophical hearer standards of fact or value which must be accepted without discussion is already to depend on a particular philosophy and to carry on the reasoning within its framework." The featuring of a certain motivational force, as we have seen, creates a particular interpretation of reality. That valuing or featuring,

112 Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 251.
113 Ibid., p. 313.
however, does not have to be an unguided activity; it can be, in fact, a philosophical predisposition. "The mere fact of giving a preference to a certain interpretation, or even of believing in the existence of a single valid interpretation, may indicate a particular system of beliefs," says Perelman, "or even a conception of the world."\footnote{115}{Ibid., p. 122.} That conception of the world, incarnated in a philosophic or disciplinary perspective, serves as the framework within which knowing activities occur: the perspective dictates the limits of the field of study, the nature of relevant inquiries, and the standards for the success of the inquiry. What could be a case of individual valuing of these factors that relate to reality and knowing, can be encased also in a philosophical perspective. "We learn to single out certain relationships," Burke contends, so that "we group events in the because of, in spite of, and regardless of categories."\footnote{116}{Burke, \textit{Permanence and Change}, p. 36.} The "materialist," for example, stresses the importance of the "scene" since materialism assumes that action occurs because of persons, events, and ideas existent in the agent's environment . . . and in spite of the efforts of the agent himself, his attitudes or purposes. In contrast, an "idealist" interpreting the same "objective" situation would feature the agent, his attitudes and his purposes as the motivating forces of the action--regardless of the forces present in the scene. The valuing and featuring of reality--thus encased
in a discipline or philosophic perspective--creates a "standardized" framework for "standardized" knowing.

The standardization of knowing by means of the organization of intellectual pursuit is, by no means, a situation in need of "correction." Standardization is, rather, the logical outgrowth of the attempt to systematize the quest to know. Toulmin has explained:

For, though Nature must of course be left to answer to our interrogations for herself, it is always we who frame the questions. And the questions we ask inevitably depend on prior theoretical considerations. We are here concerned, not with prejudiced beliefs, but rather with preformed concepts; and, to understand the logic of science, we must recognize that 'preconceptions' of this kind are both inevitable and proper—if suitably tentative and subject to reshaping in the light of our experience.117

The tentativeness of standardized knowing and encased valuing is crucial to the rhetorical perspective on valuing and knowing. Reminding us that, "we are confronted with a fact only if we can postulate uncontroverted, universal agreement with respect to it," Perelman warns us that "no statement can be assured of definitely enjoying this status."118 Clearly, the standardization of knowing must be as amendable as claims-to-know themselves. The evolution of "knowledge," however, is not simply a function of the passage of time; rather, certain revisions of human valuing activity account for the destruction of previously


118Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, New Rhetoric, p. 67.
accepted "facts" and, thus, the advancement of learning. Perelman isolates two primary methods by which a claim can lose the status of fact. The first is that doubts may be raised in the universal audience about a claim which heretofore had been accorded unqualified support. As Perelman explains, "Mere questioning of a statement is thus sufficient to destroy its privileged status." The point here, alluded to earlier, is that it seldom occurs to any rational and competent person to question some claim that is an agreed upon "fact." When the claim is challenged, however, an alternative claim is entertained and the first claim's aura of universality diminishes. The interlocutor, however, must still justify his attack upon the previously unquestioned claim. The lack of sound justification probably would result in the interlocutor's being labeled irrational or incompetent or both—in short, not qualified to challenge a claim accepted by the universal audience. Perelman summarizes:

If an interlocutor wishes to combat the prestige attaching to what has been admitted as a fact, he will not be satisfied in most cases with a simple denial that might be considered just ridiculous. He will endeavor to justify his attitude either by showing the incompatibility of the statement in question with other facts and attacking it for its inconsistency with the coherence of reality or by showing that the so-called fact is simply the conclusion of an argument which, by its very nature, is not compelling.120

In the context of a serious challenge, the claim will be seen

119 Ibid., p. 68.
120 Ibid.
as clearly not "universally acceptable"; it will no longer be valued as standardized knowledge or "fact."

A second manner in which the status of a fact can be destroyed appears when the nature of the universal audience changes; additions to the audience can affect the judgments of the past. If these additional persons (e.g., a "new" generation) are labeled rational and at the same time competent to judge, their refusal to grant the claim the status of fact may be sufficient to destroy that status. When the universal audience is thus expanded, "it can effectively be shown that the audience admitting the fact is only a particular audience and that its views are in opposition to those of an enlarged audience." In this case, as when doubt is created successfully by criticism, a loss of the status of fact is the product of an apparently universally accepted point of agreement being valued now as less than universally acceptable.

Just as the positing of universal acceptance was a valuing decision requiring a human agent, the revision in "what is known" is the task of valuing activities. The attack upon the previously unchallengeable will have to be evaluated: is the attack—and its implied counter-claim-to-know—now the claim that is acceptable to the universal audience? Or is the question raised one whose validity would be granted exclusively by a particular audience? Similarly, the actual impact of the enlargement of the universal audience has to be evaluated and judged. Are the additional

121 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
members, in fact, rational and competent? Is their opposition enough to destroy the factual status of the claim? These questions must be answered, either directly or implicitly, when a claim-to-know is called into question; the answers, however, cannot be gained by the faithful following of any kind of automatically valid system of evaluation. The decisions, rather, will be the result of human agents weighing the universality of the respective claims.

Illustrative of the rhetorical perspective on the standardization and evolution of knowing and the encasement and revision of valuing is the following interpretation of a familiar story: In 1686, Newton published his *Principia* containing among other points his "First Law of Motion": Every body continues in its state of rest, or of moving with constant velocity in a straight line, unless acted upon by some external force. Newton's law did not exist as "fact" in a timeless and impersonal world; rather, it was a claim put forward by a human agent—a claim that was to be accepted for over two hundred years. After the claim's acceptance by the audience of people rational and competent to judge such a theoretical postulate, the law was above criticism and the need for justification. Indeed, in the years before Einstein and his contemporaries, any discussion of the "straight line movement," for example, was explanation of what everyone accepted rather than justification of the claim. The "fact" was not treated as a claim needful of justification, but as a point of agreement that was universally acceptable; would-be
disputants, while not advised of the acceptance of the universal audience, *per se*, nonetheless were told probably that "everybody knew" that bodies could move in such a manner—and, further, that those who did not agree were, for example, incompetent to judge or irrational. The law enjoyed the privileged status of being universally accepted as a "factual description" of the movement of bodies.

Einstein's work on the nature of time and space represented a kind of challenge to Newtonian mechanics. The theories of the relativity of time and space presented doubt about the mere existence of, for example, a straight line. The attack was not granted universal acceptance until after the 1919 eclipse demonstrated that light does not travel in straight lines where there is gravitation, but rather moves in "curves." That claim, indirectly challenging the existence of such things as straight lines, had implications for Newton's law, as well as Euclidean geometry itself. The Newtonian view of movement and velocity, once accepted as universally "valid," was replaced by a successful attack upon the "fact."

The rhetorical perspective does not view Newtonian mechanics as a quaint reminder of more primitive days; Newton's law was, rather, a claim that once was valued by agents and audiences as universally acceptable. The "knowing," therefore, was the result of the activity of human agents. The rejection of certain aspects of that view, at present, is not a conversion to truth, but instead, the consequence of agents and audiences valuing another claim
as universally acceptable. Einstein's claim, no less than Newton's, is subject to modification; it is not a timeless and immutable truth that exists outside the realm of human contemplation. There may yet come an expanded universal audience or a successful disputant with Einstein's theory. Until that time, it is difficult to criticize the theory, or to resist the labeling of it as "fact"—we are, after all, a part of the universal audience that grants the claim "universal acceptability."

The standardization of knowing is explained, in the rhetorical perspective, as the encasement of the valuing of claims, standards, and reality; the evolution of knowing is explained similarly as the result in the revision of encased valuing procedures and activities. That perspective of knowing and valuing accounts for the existence of "facts" and "knowledge" despite the failure of the epistemological ideal. Human knowing, whether encased in a disciplinary mold or embodied in a claim-to-know, is nonetheless the product of human valuing. Says Toulmin,

Neither the rationality of theoretical concepts nor the rationality of practical procedures can be judged definitively, timelessly, or once-for-all. The Practical Reason like the Pure Reason must have an eye, not to the Good or the Best, and still less to the Only-Coherently-Conceivable, but rather to the Better; and the rationality of collective human enterprises being what it is, this means always the Better-for-the-Time-Being. 122

The rational development of knowing activities occurs simultaneously with human valuing activities.

122 Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 371.
Summary, Synthesis, and Speculation: The Theoretical Framework of Rhetoric as Architectonic of Valuing and Knowing

Summary

Though the question "How do we know?" is centuries old, the quest to find an absolute and perfect answer largely has been unsuccessful. The implications of the failure of the epistemological ideal are far-reaching. If some epistemological questions are ignored, then some additional approach to epistemology is necessary. Similarly, if modifications in the analytic model are implemented, then those alterations must also be grounded in some non-formal epistemology. Clearly, in light of the failure of a timeless and immutable ideal, a need arises for another epistemological approach.

What is needed, in contrast to the goals of formal epistemology, is an epistemological approach that is both more inclusive and more flexible; one that is grounded in human activity rather than geometrical operations; one that not only acknowledges human valuing as an influence upon knowing, but provides a method for the study of that influence. These essential attributes, it seems to me, are found in a rhetorical perspective on knowing—a perspective that is architectonic in its ability to structure human knowing in relation to human valuing. An explication of that perspective includes four related analyses:

(1) The Justification for Knowing: Valuing and the Appraisal of Claims;
(2) The Standards for Knowing: Valuing and the Selection of Criteria;

(3) The Framework for Knowing: Valuing and the Featuring of Reality; and

(4) The Standardization and Evolution of Knowing: The Encasement and Revision of Valuing.

The justification for knowing is involved inherently with human valuing and the appraisal of claims. Claims, in general, are established by an audience's acceptance of reasons offered as support for claims. What constitutes a reason, however, is dependent upon what is significant to individual human agents; the attributing of significance is therefore tantamount to the "creation" of "reasons." When an agent puts forth a claim-to-know, he implies that the justification for his claim is of the highest quality—reasons that appear acceptable to the universe of rational and competent people. While the agent assumes particular audiences might also accept that justification, his concern is for the universality of the claim. This epistemological ideal differs from the analytical in that the postulation of universal acceptability is an admitted valuing activity; moreover, that postulation is seen as subject to appropriate revision in the course of time. A human agent, seen from the rhetorical perspective, shares the responsibility that Perelman has attributed to the philosopher: an awareness "that the advancement of knowledge will shake and modify the convictions which today appear to him
acceptable to the universal audience.\textsuperscript{123} Such an awareness is the responsibility implied by a rhetorical perspective on the justification of knowing.

An architectonic view of rhetoric, however, implies that the valuing-knowing relationship involves more than the appraisal of knowing. An agent, in postulating "universal acceptability," simultaneously is judging the criteria for "acceptability" and the "universal audience." The claim must be appraised on the basis of appropriate standards--standards which do not exist apart from the human activities of selecting and ordering the criterial elements of the matter at hand. This valuing process calls attention to a related judgment of the criteria for the "universal audience" itself. Since it never really exists, its nature will be determined by human agents evaluating and selecting the standards for "rationality," "competence," or surrogate criteria. Clearly, while the postulating of universal acceptability is a valuing activity, that "universal acceptability" is defined by the selected criteria. The nature of a claim-to-know, thus, is as dependent upon the valuing of standards as it is upon the valuing of the justification for knowing.

The standards for knowing, however, exist not in isolation but in a context of "reality." Human "conceptions" of reality vary because of different motivational frames of reference that human agents and audiences bring to an allegedly objective

\textsuperscript{123}Perelman, \textit{Justice}, p. 86.
situation. These various interpretations of reality are possible because motivation is "substantial"—existing as a potential force, without being the unquestionable "cause." Whether the "motive" was what prompted the action is a question to be answered by the valuing activity of the agent and the audience. Different audiences can perceive the same situation as different "realities"—realities mediated by the motivational featuring that is characteristic of that audience.

Since these "realities" serve as the framework for knowing, the featuring of controlling factors is crucial to the "selection of the standards for knowing." That valuing activity involved the selection of what was and was not criterial to the matter at hand. That selection process is dependent upon the knower's evaluation and prediction of the reality-featuring of his universal audience. That featured-reality serves both as guideline for the selection of standards and as the framework in which knowing activity occurs.

This emphasis upon the individuality and diversity of the valuing implicit in knowing need not suggest that valuing and knowing are immutably personal activities untouched by conformity or undirected by other forces. On the contrary, while valuing and knowing are distinctly human processes, both activities—and the relationship between them—are subject to certain "standardizations." Such standardization occurs as a result of the development and organization of human intellectual activities. When certain claims-to-know become so well evaluated, so well accepted, and
so well established that they are "considered" above further constructive debate, they cease being claims-to-know (in the rhetorical sense) and become "knowledge" (in common sense terms).

Inherent in the standardization of knowing is the "encasement" of valuing in disciplines and intellectual pursuits. The valuing of the justification for claims, for example, can be guided substantially by the evaluative procedures and methods dictated by a discipline, and the nature of "fact" will vary with the particular encasement of valuing. Further, the criteria by which the claim-to-know is judged can be standardized; "universal acceptability" can be given a constant disciplinary "meaning."

Finally, the valuing or featuring of reality does not have to be an unguided activity; it can be a philosophical predisposition incarnate in a sector of the intellectual community. In short, the standardization of knowing--the natural result of the organization of intellectual pursuits--implies also the encasement of valuings of justification, standards, and reality.

The standardization of knowing, however, is tentative. The encased "universal acceptability" of "facts" can be shown to be less than universally acceptable by means of a successful attack upon the "fact" or an enlargement in the "universal audience" that results in the claim being seen as limited in acceptability. Either instance is an example in the revision of valuing which results in the loss of status of some "facts"--and the evolution of knowledge. Therefore, while the standardization of knowing
depends upon the encasement of valuing, the evolution of knowing depends upon the revision of human valuing.

Synthesis

This rhetorical perspective on knowing and valuing is more than a viewpoint from which such activities can be critiqued; more than a set of principles for the *a posteriori* analysis of what is known and valued. The rhetorical viewpoint is, instead, architectonic in nature. As such it reflects what McKeon has described as the burden of an architectonic art: "It should be positive in the creation, not passive in the reception, of data, facts, consequences, and objective organization." When the rhetorical perspective is brought to bear on knowing and valuing, the result is not the description of the characteristics of these activities as they occur, but a creation of the activities themselves. Rhetoric as architectonic, in short, does not describe the structure of the "principles and products of knowing, doing, and making" (45); it creates that structure. Let us examine several aspects of that creation.

The emphasis upon "audiencing" is perhaps rhetoric's most unique architectonic characteristic. Claims-to-know are postulated on the basis of the "universal acceptability" of the claim--acceptability, that is, to a universal audience. That

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"acceptability," in turn, is posited in relation to the most stringent standards relevant to the claim. Such standards are selected, again, in respect to the universal audience's demand for stringency. Finally, that postulation of standards for knowing reflects the knower's prediction of the universal audience's reality-featuring. Clearly, such justifying, criterializing, and featuring are inherent to human knowing, and rhetoric as architectonic justifies, criterializes, and features audiencing as the *sine qua non* of human knowing and valuing. Audiencing, as an aspect of traditional "verbal rhetoric," does indeed "provide the principle, in both the sense of beginning-point and of guideline, for the construction of an architectonic productive art of rhetoric and philosophy which can be used to create a method productive of the arts and a subject matter substantive to the problems of an age of technology" (63). An expanded conception of the "audience" of traditional rhetoric, therefore, serves as the pivotal concept in an architectonic rhetoric.

The "audiencing" that is characteristic of rhetoric as architectonic implies that knowing, from this perspective, occurs within—not apart from—other human activity. This quality of integration is one sought by McKeon in his call for an architectonic rhetoric. "We need a new art of judgment to relate experience to existence," he says, "an art of recovery or recognition of facts to be used with the art of discovery or apperception of data to provide instrumentalities for our contemporary respect for concrete facts of experience and our determination to adhere
to them and use them in the formation of knowledge and attitudes, in the constitution of science, experience, and expression" (56). The treatment of facts in regard to, not apart from human life is both architectonic and rhetorical; it provides a framework within which we can "apply our methods to concrete facts, to what is happening in the world here and now" (55). Such a framework results from the rhetorical justifying, criterializing, and featuring of the audiences of knowing activity; the making and valuing of claims, the selection and utilization of standards, the featuring and creation of reality are all seen as inherently involved in human expression, human experience, and human science.

The architectonic integration of human knowing with other activities has implications for the perceived "divergence" of the knowing activity itself. The dichotomization of the humanities, the social or behavioral sciences, and the "hard" sciences, for example, loses its clarity in an architectonic perspective. The architectonic rhetoric developed here implies that such "diverse" academic "communities" can be examined by much the same approach, one stressing the valuing of claims, standards, and realities by various "universal audiences." Rhetoric as architectonic cannot critique, for instance, the subject matter of biology as well as organized biologists can; the subject matter, however, is not what is of most concern. McKeon contends that "the arts and sciences will not be organized according to differences in the subject matter which they treat, but according to differences of question, action, statement, valuation, and judgment" (48).
These factors are precisely the ones that rhetoric as architectonic can best analyze, criticize, and, most importantly, structure. The immediate effect is that the humanities, the social sciences, and the physical sciences do not seem so widely divergent; the potential long-term effect might be creation of new "divisions" of intellectual labor.

If we reject the view that human beings can perceive an absolute and timeless "reality," then we must be prepared to acknowledge the legitimacy of divergent human conceptions of "reality." The rhetorical conception of valuing and knowing is not "Truth" in the sense of an epistemological ideal, but "rhetoric" can serve human agents as a methodological approach that creates order out of epistemological chaos: human knowing can be seen as a result of the valuing of justification, standards, and reality--valuing that always impliesaudience; human knowing can be seen as integrated with the whole of human activity; and diverse instances of human knowing activities can be seen as comparable in their emphasis upon statement, valuation, and judgment. Such perceptions of the nature of knowing, however, do not exist apart from human agents; they are created in the development of rhetoric as architectonic.

Speculation

As the critique of "statements" by humanist Burke, social scientist Skinner, and physical scientist Planck approaches, certain speculation seems appropriate. Are the claims implicit
in these "statements" considered "truly" "claims-to-know" by their respective authors? Part of the difficulty in answering this question is that, as we have seen, the nature of knowing is by no means "established." We should not be surprised to find the absence of such phrases as "I know" or "It is known." Further, if asked whether his statements are unquestionable "facts," each author would probably avoid an affirmative answer. Nonetheless, the statements do contain "claims" which are treated as universally-acceptable starting-points for argument or explanation. Whether or not such claims are labeled "facts," as that which is "known," they function as "claims-to-know" in the rhetorical perspective, and can be critiqued as such. The detection of these implicit claims-to-know is an integral aspect of rhetoric as architectonic.

Relatedly, controversy about the strategy of analyzing such diverse academic statements is unavoidable. McKeon, in tracing the "fragmentation" of human knowledge, contends that the ancient distinction between art and nature developed into a distinction between values and facts, which, in turn, developed into a distinction between the humanities and science (50). Can the rhetorician critique the humanities as the realm of "knowing" as well as "valuing"? More controversially, can the rhetorician critique the social and physical sciences as the realm of "valuing" as well as "knowing"? The uniform treatment of the humanities, the social sciences, and the physical sciences, is made possible by an architectonic view of knowing and valuing, and will be somewhat unique in character and implication.
Rhetoric conceived as architectonic, however, is paradoxical. On the one hand, "everything" is deemed subject to rhetorical structuring; on the other, the rhetorical structure is only one of many potential architectonics. Rhetoric as architectonic, therefore, emerges as a perspective that seeks to structure everything—including that which is also trying to structure everything. The paradox, which should be evident in the critiques, has already been encountered in the rhetorical emphasis upon "audiencing."

When the featuring of reality was examined, various characteristic "motivational frameworks" were explicated. One of those frameworks, the one we called "scenic-oriented," was closely related to the whole of rhetoric conceived of as architectonic. Just as scenic-orientation implies a concern for the "audiences, exigencies, or constraints" of the scene, rhetoric "features" the audience. Such a featuring, as we have seen, creates a reality different from other reality-featuring. The implication is clear that, while the rhetorical perspective admits divergent featuring, those featurings will be interpreted by the scenic (qua audience) featuring of rhetoric. Just as "there are wheels within wheels," the following critiques include instances of perspectives within perspectives, a crucial, but wholly predictable, situation that merits further consideration at the end of the study.

The explication of the theoretical framework of rhetoric as architectonic of valuing and knowing is complete. The standard by which that perspective should be evaluated is the insight into concrete instances of human knowing generated by such an
architectonic. The "test-cases" lie ahead as we examine Burke's "The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle,'" Skinner's *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, and Planck's "The Unity of the Physical World-Picture," as we examine "Case Studies in Rhetoric as Architectonic of Valuing and Knowing."
CHAPTER III

CASE STUDIES OF RHETORIC AS ARCHITECTONIC
OF VALUING AND KNOWING

Introduction

The theoretical framework has created a general response to the question "How do you know?" From the rhetorical perspective, we "know" when we postulate the universal acceptability of claims via our prediction of a universal audience's valuing of the justification, the standards, and the framework for knowing. Claims-to-know, in general, are seen rhetorically as the result of human valuing. The theoretical framework, therefore, serves as methodological approach, or more precisely, a model, for the understanding of "what it means" when an agent says "I know."

Characteristic of theory-building, however, is that the theoretical structures are developed, not for themselves, but because they are instrumental in understanding certain other events or occurrences. The most important aspect about the case studies which we are about to begin is their inherent role as "applications" of the theoretical framework. While the theoretical structure has been an attempt to create a flexible, inclusive, and human perspective on valuing and knowing, the case studies are specific "tests" of the success of that framework. The case studies seek to generate specific responses to diverse questions.
of human knowing and valuing. The relevant question will not be
"How do you know?" but rather, "How does Burke know?," "How
does Skinner know?," or "How does Planck know?" These studies of
"The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle,'" Beyond Freedom and Dignity,
and "The Unity of the Physical World-Picture" comprise the divergent
authors, topics, fields, and methods demanded as "test-cases"
for a theoretical framework that seeks to structure valuing and
knowing.

Perhaps the term "test-case" as used here should be clarified.
Though the studies are intended to be tests of the theoretical
framework, the "tests" are not questions of whether the "elements"
of the framework can be seen in particular instances. On the
contrary, I take it as "given" that theories "feature" certain
elements and provide a consistent view of the relationships between
the elements. The result, it seems to me, is that those "elements"
and "relationships" will be "discovered" as a matter of course
when the framework is brought to bear on specific cases. More
specifically, the rhetorician can expect to "find" the valuing
of justification, standards, and frameworks for knowing when he
examines epistemological questions; the architectonic quality
of the structure itself guarantees that the valuing will be
"discovered." The case studies, therefore, are not "tests" of
the existence of rhetoric as architectonic of valuing and knowing.

The studies, instead, are "tests" of the value of the
perspective itself. Though we may be assured of "finding" the
elements of an architectonic rhetoric, the question is really
"What gains do we make when we find them?" We have noted from
the outset several perspectives on the relationship between valuing
and knowing; we have acknowledged from the first the extensive
consideration that has been given the question "How do you know?"
To provide one more perspective—without additional yields—is no
contribution to the knowing about either valuing or knowing.
To claim support for the second hypothesis, we shall have to under­
stand the knowing of Burke, Skinner, and Planck better from the
rhetorical perspective than we can otherwise. That judgment,
of course, must await the completion of the case studies; it must
await, that is, the test of the theoretical structure.

The success of the "test," however, depends partially
upon the degree to which the cases selected constitute a meaningful
diversity of claims-to-know. Such, I think, is the case. First,
the discipline-influenced universal audiences of the three knowers
are varied. Burke's claim is made in respect to a select audience
with a high degree of competence: his essay, which was first
printed in a literary journal\(^1\) and later collected in The Philosophy
of Literary Form,\(^2\) was addressed, of course, to an audience that
was humanistic in approach and literary in interest. Burke, then,
"creates" a conception of the universal audience based upon his

\(^1\)Kenneth Burke, "The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle,'"

page references appear in the text.
prediction of his immediate audience's incarnation of that audience. Skinner, on the other hand, while he bases his claim-to-know solidly upon social science research, incarnates a universal audience of mass proportion—an appropriate incarnation because of the nature of his claim-to-know. Finally, Max Planck's lecture is before a group of apparently knowledgeable physicists, theorists, and philosophers of science. His claim-to-know, therefore, is posited in respect to a universal audience that is highly discipline-oriented. Though Planck, no doubt, could expect to address scientists and theorists of varying specialities, he nonetheless could predict a radically different incarnation of the universal audience than could either Burke or Skinner.

More important than the diversity in universal audience conceptions, however, is the fact that the cases are representative of claims-to-know in the humanities, the social sciences, and the physical sciences. Significantly, none of the cases presents any actual research; that, however, is as it should be. Rhetoric structured as architectonic is concerned here, not with research per se, but with the claims-to-know that are posited on the basis of that research. Burke, thus, posits a claim-to-know grounded in scholarship on Hitler and Hitler's Mein Kampf; the humanist's research provides the basis for his claim-to-know. Skinner does not report actual research findings, but clearly, he builds his claim-to-know on the foundation of theory, analysis, and research—social science research. Planck, then, derives his claim-to-know
from research findings in the physical sciences; his analysis of the probability calculus as it relates to the concept of entropy and the second law of thermodynamics is, again, not a claim-to-know itself, but serves rather as the ground for a claim-to-know. The research that is central to these claims-to-know, then, is widely diverse and, moreover, representative of research pursued in the humanities, the social sciences, and the physical sciences—diverse research that is utilized in the establishment of claims-to-know.

Despite these divergencies, however, the case studies may be perceived as being strikingly similar. The reason, I think, is that while the audiences and the research are varied, the studies are of claims-to-know—claims that human agents make on the basis of grounds and in relation to audiences. The claims are propositions presented for assent. That basic similarity, then, is not unique to these case selections; rather, that "audiencing" would occur regardless of the topic, the claim, or the audience incarnated. A claim-to-know, in a word, will entail a proposition, an audience, and the desire for assent; such entailed characteristics explain both the basic similarity and the reason why rhetoric is uniquely capable of structuring such representative claims-to-know.

More specific remarks, however, will clarify the nature of the case studies. In "The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle,'" for example, Kenneth Burke claims to know the spontaneity of
Hitler's "Jewish policy." While it was clear to the non-facist "universal audience" that Hitler used the Jewish "race" as scapegoat for Germany's ills, Burke claims that the policy must also be understood as a strategy that arose in response to Hitler's personal needs. From the rhetorical perspective our concern is for the valuing of justification that Burke posits is "universally acceptable"; we are concerned about the standards that he predicts his universal audience will value in its appraisal of the justification; we are concerned about the "reality-featuring" that he predicts in his universal audience; and we are concerned about how Burke utilizes what he considers "standardized knowledge" and "encased values." These concerns, I submit, lead us to a clearer understanding of what Burke "means" when he claims to know the spontaneity of the Jewish policy.

Similarly, we shall find that Skinner in Beyond Freedom and Dignity claims to know that mankind must be controlled by environmental conditioning. The universal audience that Skinner incarnates, while decidedly "American" in quality, is nonetheless the ideal against which Skinner postulates the valuing of justification, standards, and frameworks for knowing. We shall see here also that Skinner utilizes certain standardized knowings and encased valuations of his universal audience to support his claim to know. Skinner's claim will be better understood, not only in relation to its inherent valuing, but also in relation to Burke's knowing and valuing.
Finally, we shall examine Max Planck's claim to know the nature of the future world-picture. We shall investigate the physical scientist's claim as the result of certain valuings—an ironic approach because of Planck's stress on the need for destroying the anthropomorphic aspects of physical theory. Nevertheless, if we can see the valuing in Planck's claim, we shall see more clearly what it "means" when Planck says "I know."

The critiques reveal, not just the detail of knowing as an activity involved with valuing, but also the dynamic relationships among the justification, the standards, the frameworks, and the standardization of knowing. Burke, for example, "features" the justification of his claim-to-know more than the standards or the framework for knowing; while he becomes involved with all the phases of the valuing implicit in knowing, we shall see him "build" on the encasement of the valuing of standards and realities in order to establish his claim-to-know via the valuing of justification. In the same way, we shall observe Skinner "featuring" the valuing of reality by using encased valuings of justification and standards as "starting-points" for his claim to know the necessity of environmental control of human beings. Planck, on the other hand, claims to know the future of the world-picture, primarily, by emphasizing the valuing of a standard for knowing; his concern for the valuing of justification and "realities" is, not surprisingly, comparatively less. Though these various "featurings" will become more clear in the critiques, the dynamism of the relationships between valuing
and knowing activities should be introduced as a further and more specific yield of the rhetorical perspective on valuing and knowing.

In sum, the case studies are not merely adjuncts to the formulation of rhetoric as architectonic of valuing and knowing. They constitute the tests of the value of the rhetorical perspective. We shall discover whether the statements of Burke, Skinner, and Planck are better understood, in isolation and in conjunction, when the rhetorical perspective is brought to bear on them; we shall discover if the question "How do you know?" can be answered insightfully by rhetoric as conceived as architectonic.

**A Case Study of Valuing and Knowing in the Humanities: Kenneth Burke's "The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle'"**

What we don't know about Hitler, says Burke, can hurt us. *Mein Kampf* may have been published as the disclosure of Hitler's battle of the past, but it can also provide us with a blueprint for an anti-Hitler battle of the future. With such a blueprint, Hitler's battle may result in the winning of the fascist war. The more we know, therefore, the better prepared we are.

In the context of that belief, Burke's "Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle'" must be viewed as a delicate balance between literary criticism and political pamphleteering; between description and interpretation; between valuing and knowing. The balance is dictated partially by Burke's equivocal identity both as socio-political critic with the style of the literati and as literary critic with the style of the politicist; partially by what Burke calls Hitler's
tendency to treat his "political activities as an extension of his artistic ambitions" (185); and partially by the fact that the audience Burke addressed, while interested in literary criticism, still lived in anticipation of the next Nazi movement. The resultant criticism embodied in "The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle'" is a collage of valuings and knowings from the humanistic perspective.

The collage, however, becomes more clear when we understand Burke's claim as a prediction of the valuing of his universal audience. The claim, seen from the rhetorical perspective, is built upon certain standardized knowings or "facts" that, since they are recognized by this incarnated universal audience, can be used as the "starting-points" for the claim about which Burke is concerned. Further, we shall find Burke is most concerned about one particular aspect of the valuing implicit in knowing--the valuing of justification. We shall find him assuming certain encased valuings of standards and reality, and using those encasements as "givens" in his establishment of a claim-to-know. Finally, we shall recognize that what Burke uses as "standardized knowing" and "encased valuing" can only be considered so in respect to the particular characteristics selected by Burke in his incarnation of a universal audience; rhetoric features "audiencing" as the *sine qua non* of valuing and knowing.

Standardized Knowing as Starting-Point

The primary problem Burke saw in the treatment of the
published *Mein Kampf* was that it had been handled so extensively and so superficially that the comments in essence were "vandalistic"--characterized more by menacing hostility than by fundamental "breaking-apart." Clearly, says Burke, little effort is required to follow what had become accepted form: the knocking off of a few "attitudinizings" (164). In contrast, Burke pledges to analyze thoroughly Hitler's "Battle" while combatting the trend in criticism that contributed "more to . . . gratification than to . . . enlightenment" (164). Burke's task, as he sees it, is to dig more deeply--to delve below the level of the rut that other critics had channeled. Certainly, "everyone" agreed that *Mein Kampf* was "exasperating, even nauseating" (164), but, queried Burke, is that all we want to know about it?

The roots of the critical vandalism perceived by Burke appear to me to lie in the status that Hitler's villainy had reached. "Everyone" agreed in condemning the book, its strategy, and the author--"everyone," that is, who could be labeled part of the non-fascist, American "universal audience" by Burke or his immediate audience. Hitler's villainy was more than a matter of individual analyzing and valuing; it was a claim-to-know valued as universally acceptable. Whatever criteria demanded by any reality-featuring were met in the evaluation of the claim-to-know. Hitler's seeming derangement, the blindness of his intention, the cruelty of the German scene, the shocking bluntness of the "cards he lay on the table," his mad quest for communion
based on conquest: whatever standards one could postulate as being criterial to the evaluation of Hitler as a known force of evil seemed sure to be met. The claim, therefore, transcended the universality normally attributed to particular creations of reality. The claim was more than a claim-to-know; it was a matter of "fact."

The status of virtual fact--the standardization of the claim-to-know--is explained by the encasement of human valuing, not in a scientific discipline or philosophic perspective, but in the belief system of the non-fascist world. As the valuing became a matter of form, a predictable activity in relation to the claim-to-know, the judgment became a statement of fact. Conversely, Burke's difficulty in getting past the contemporary critical judgments of the day was that such critiquing had become encased. Burke suggests, for example, that the author of such conventional valuings has a "guaranty in advance that his article will have a favorable reception among the decent members of our population" (164). When claims become standardized by the encasement of such valuing, any alteration in approach or valuing strategy will be noticeable--and needful of explanation.

On the basis of such an explanation, Burke proceeded to deal with another "fact" that served as starting-point for some less well-recognized valuing judgments. Burke quotes Hitler: "As a whole, and at all times, the efficiency of the truly national leader consists primarily in preventing the division of the
attention of a people, and always in concentrating it on a single enemy" (166). Hitler, says Burke, believed in a strategy of consolidating the enemy into a single symbolic opposition force.

"As everyone knows," Burke posits, "this policy was exemplified in his selection of an 'international' devil, the 'international Jew'" (166). At the time of Burke's critique the newspaper, radio, and newsreel accounts of the Nazi movement could have left no doubt about the veracity of the claim. The claim that Hitler utilized the Jewish as the Aryan enemy incarnate was again a "fact"—a claim-to-know standardized by a non-fascist world.

Since "everyone knew" about the Jewish policy, Burke spent no time in producing grounds for his own particular claim to know the strategy of enemy-consolidation. As a "fact" accepted in practice by all the rational and competent (i.e., non-fascist) people, the claim was under no seriously-regarded attack. The judgment of the Jewish policy, having been encased as standardized knowledge, needed no justification; the "fact" that Hitler chose the Jews as the common enemy of the Aryan race was not relevant as a claim to be discussed and justified.

The Claim-to-Know

The "fact" of Hitler's Jewish strategy was important, however, in its capacity to serve as starting-point for the claim-to-know which constitutes the heart of Burke's critique. On the basis of "everyone knowing" Hitler's villainous activity and his use of the Jew as the devil incarnate that unified his Aryan
nation, Burke built his basic thesis as a claim-to-know: the
Jewish policy, the "cure for what ails you," the "snakeoil" for
the Aryan race, was first a prescription for Hitler himself. The
"Nazi Magic," claims Burke, was concocted from Hitler's own
symbolic medicine. The Jew as projective device was both a response
to Hitler's personal needs and a strategy that Hitler employed
in response to a rhetorical situation.

Clearly, Burke considers his burden of proof to lie in
his contention of spontaneity; he assumes that "everyone knows"
the calculated aspect of the Jewish policy. Early in his analysis
he asks the crucial question, "Was his selection of the Jew as
unifying devil-function, a purely calculating act? . . . I believe
that it was not" (168). Then later, Burke considers again
whether Hitler is sincere or deliberate, whether his
vision of the omnipotent conspirator has the drastic
honesty of paranoia or the sheer shrewdness of a demagogue
trained in Realpolitik of the Machiavellian sort.
Must we choose? Or may we not, rather, replace the
'either--or' with a 'both--and'? (180-81).

Burke's analysis of Hitler's "Battle" led him to the "both calculation
and spontaneity" belief—a belief that he supports as a claim-
to-know. Late in the critique he asks, "Have we not by now
offered grounds enough for our contention that Hitler's sinister
powers of [we may add, "calculated"] persuasion derive from the
fact that he spontaneously evolved his 'cure-all' in response to
inner necessities?" (181). Who, in other words, can doubt the
cogency of the support for the claim? The spontaneous evolution
of what became strategy was, it seems, something that Burke "knew."
The Featuring of the Justification for Knowing

The grounds that Burke offers to support the claim-to-know are interesting because of their diversity. Burke seems to emphasize the importance of the justification and appraisal of the claim more than the valuing of standards or the featuring of reality. His task, as he apparently sees it, is to present as much diverse support as possible. Burke does not develop any of the aspects of the standards in detail; nor does he make explicit the reality-featurings that serve as his framework for claims-to-know. What occupies most of his attention is the gathering of diverse justification for his claim; from any one of several "causal" perspectives, in regard to any one of several operationalized standards, Burke can assert the universal acceptability of his claim. The understanding of this strategy can be enhanced by examining the manner in which Burke uses the encased valuations of standards and reality to establish the justification for his claim-to-know. Again, the encased valuations serve the knower with starting-points for his claim-to-know.

The Use of Encased Valuations of Standards and Reality

Since Burke's claim involves the motivation for the Jewish policy, he wisely chooses to invoke standards for knowing that relate to human "causality." Burke, by implication, contends that if it can be shown that the claim of spontaneity is "coherent" with already encased valuations of motivation, then the claim-to-know
can be established; if it can be shown that the "known" Hitlerian strategies are consistent with the ways that human beings solve their own problems, the reasoning goes, is there not strong reason to believe that the strategies were both persuasive in relation to the masses and medicinal for the agent? The demonstration that the Jewish policy was a strategy coherent with the need-fulfillment activities of Hitler himself would provide cogent support for the claim to know. "Coherence," therefore, is criterial to the matter at hand; it becomes, for Burke, a standard to be met in the establishment of his claim's justification.

The nature of "coherence-with-causal-interpretation," of course, varies with the motivational frame of reference posited by the knower. Burke does not postulate one reality-featuring of the universal audience or one causal interpretation that implies one conception of the coherence standard. Instead, since Burke's concern is for the justification for his claim, he presents as much diversified support as possible—diversity defined in terms of adaptation to various causal interpretations; that is, he operationalizes the coherence standard in several ways depending upon different reality-featurings. Burke, while deciding not to emphasize the standards of reality-featuring of his claim, nonetheless uses several different encased valuings of standards and reality-featurings in his claim-to-know. Neither standards nor reality-featurings are developed, but they need not be: they are already encased by various audiences and are utilized as
building material for Burke's claim-to-know. In brief, Burke presents diverse justification for his claim to know the spontaneity of Hitler's strategies by interpreting those strategies (for the scenic-oriented) as "consistent with Hitler's own response to an insecure economic environment;" (for the attitudinally-oriented) as "consistent with Hitler's own response to his need for dignity;" (for the purposively-oriented) as "consistent with Hitler's own need for direction;" and (for the agent- or generically-oriented) as "consistent with Hitler's need for unity and communion." Let us examine in detail Burke's justification for knowing in relation to the encased valuing of various coherence standards.

Coherence encased in a scenic-reality

Justification exists, says Burke, because the spontaneity of the Jewish policy is coherent with a scenic-featuring view of human motivation. Burke, who is unconcerned with positing one view of reality, contends that if the universal audience is scenically-oriented, it will recognize the environmental forces which ensured the success of Hitler's strategy. Burke observes that Hitler—and everyone else—knew that post-war German capitalism was not "going well." He says that the middle class simultaneously "have a cult of money and a detestation of this cult"—a situation that is problematic only in times of economic stress (168). How can business be improved? Hitler, according to Burke, provided the answer embodied in the elimination of the Jews and their "bolshevism." The Aryan businessmen became convinced that economic
security could be improved and "that they could conduct their business without any basic change whatever, once the businessmen of a different 'race' were eliminated" (174). Burke concludes that a scenic-oriented audience can indeed feature the economic conditions as the key factors in the success of the Jewish policy.

At the same time, Burke posits that his claim to know the spontaneity of the policy is consistent with this particular "causal" interpretation; he claims, that is, that his claim is coherent with a universal audience of scenic-orientation. The Jewish policy can be understood, according to Burke, as a natural response to Hitler's own needs—needs, again, adapted to an encased scenic-reality. Burke finds evidence for Hitler's need in Hitler's own account of his entrance into Vienna.

It seems that, when Hitler went to Vienna, in a state close to poverty, he genuinely suffered. He lived among the impoverished; and he describes his misery at the spectacle. He was sensitive to it; and his way of manifesting this sensitiveness impresses me that he is, at this point, wholly genuine, as with his wincing at the broken family relationships caused by alcoholism, which he in turn relates to impoverishment (168).

Hitler's personal needs, in a nation of economic insecurity, claims Burke, prompted a search for the "reasons" for the economic ills of the German state; a search that ended in the isolation of the Jew as the cause of the insecurity. "At this point," Burke concludes, "I think he is tracing the spontaneous rise of his anti-Semitism. He tells how, once he had discovered the 'cause' of the misery about him (i.e., the Jew), he could confront it" (169). The Jewish policy was in part, therefore, a response
to Hitler's personal need for a secure economic environment; in part, that is, spontaneous. The spontaneity, then, is a claim that should be universally acceptable if the universal audience is, in fact, characterized by a scenic-orientation: the encased reality-valuing leads to an encased interpretation of "coherence"--and the acceptability of Burke's justification.

Coherence encased in an attitudinal-reality

Since Burke features the justification of his claim, however, he does not rely upon one reality-orientation or one interpretation of the coherence standard. Rather, he observes that the Jewish policy can also be interpreted in terms consistent with an attitudinal-orientation. The Jewish policy can be described as a strategy developed by Hitler to fulfill a German need for dignity. Burke recalls the German situation after the war: "A people in collapse, suffering under economic frustration and the defeat of nationalistic aspirations, with the very midrib of their integrative efforts (the army) in a state of dispersion, have little other than some 'spiritual' basis to which they could refer their nationalistic dignity" (176). In that context, the success of the Jewish policy can be explained in attitudinal terms: Hitler developed a strategy of "dignity by superiority" and, by so doing, gave his people a vision "whereby the 'Aryan' is elevated above all others by the innate endowment of his blood, while other 'races,' in particular Jews and Negroes, are innately inferior" (173). The scapegoat policy, therefore, was not only the spontaneous
result of Hitler's personal quest for dignity; "The categorical dignity of superior race was a perfect recipe for the situation" (176) of the audience that Hitler confronted. Such an interpretation of the success of the Jewish policy is possible, but it requires an audience which is oriented toward an attitudinal view of reality.

If the universal audience evaluating his claim-to-know is similarly oriented, then, implies Burke, his justification for the claim is still coherent—this time as defined in attitudinal terms. Burke cites Hitler's story of his personal attainment of dignity by way of the projection of the Jew as scapegoat. Hitler contends that "this was a time in which the greatest change I was ever to experience took place in me. From a feeble cosmopolite I turned into a fanatical anti-Semite" (quoted on 169). The attitudinally-oriented audience will acknowledge the potential force of such powerful attitudes and feelings, so, Burke predicts, if the universal audience is attitudinally-oriented, the claim of spontaneity will be seen to meet the standard of coherence—defined in terms of an attitudinal-reality. In relation to this possibility, also, Burke can cite the persuasiveness of his justification for knowing.

Coherence encased in a purposive-reality

Another interpretation of the success of the Jewish policy is related to the need of the German people for a sense of direction and purpose. An audience oriented toward a purposive view of man
will be especially inclined to recognize the motivational potential in the Jewish policy as symbol of movement and direction. Burke makes the point succinctly:

The projective device of the scapegoat, coupled with the Hitlerite doctrine of inborn racial superiority, provides its followers with a 'positive' view of life. They can again get the feeling of moving forward, towards a goal (a promissory feature of which Hitler makes much) (174).

The policy, therefore, can be interpreted as successful because of its ability to provide the Aryan "race" with direction.

Burke posits that his claim is, again, coherent with such a purposive-orientation. He explains that *Mein Kampf* reports that Hitler considered himself "nameless" in the early years before his forces were "organized and effective." At that time, reports Burke, he did not engage in protest or overt activity. When the party was indeed organized and began working to take over Germany--when the party developed direction in relation to Hitlerite strategy--he experienced symbolic rebirth, and the beginning of a life of Aryan superiority. While the rebirth into Aryan superiority served as a way of "persuading his audiences that he [was] offering them the way to a 'new life'" (170), it also provided orientation and direction for Hitler's own life. Such an interpretation is consistent with a purposive motivational framework, and moreover, reveals this third reality-featuring in the context of which Burke's claim is coherent.
Coherence encased in an agent-reality

Burke submits that the need for unity also can be seen as explaining the success of the Jewish projection. Burke describes the disunity of the post-war German state:

For the parliament, at its best, is a 'babel' of voices. There is the wrangle of men representing interests lying awkwardly on the bias across from one another, sometimes opposing, sometimes vaguely divergent. . . . The parliament of the Habsburg Empire just prior to its collapse was an especially drastic instance of such disruption, such diaspora, with movements that would reduce one to a disintegrated mass of fragments if he attempted to encompass the totality of its discordancies (171-72).

Hitler's answer to the disunity was a strategy of channeling the will of the people in one direction; a strategy of channeling efforts against a common and convenient enemy. Burke quotes Hitler:

As soon as the wavering masses find themselves confronted with too many enemies, objectivity at once steps in, and the question is raised whether actually all the others are wrong and their own nation or their movement alone is right.

Also with this comes the first paralysis of their own strength (156).

The success of the Jewish policy, then, can be attributed to the need for unity and the magic of a unifying scapegoat.

If an audience is disposed to feature such motivational force, concludes Burke, then that audience will also accept the claim of spontaneity; the unifying scapegoat also served to meet Hitler's own need for a unified German state. Hitler's own response to the disunity of the German state was confusion; he came to "take this parliament as the basic symbol of all he would move
away from" (172). In his displeasure for an answer to the German
disunity, he experienced a "yearning for some integrative core"
(172); a core he found as a strong leader of a people sharing
one common enemy. With such personal needs being met with so
public a strategy, cannot an audience that features the motivating
force of disunity, also accept the claim that Hitler's Jewish
policy was spontaneous as well as calculated?

In sum, Burke is most concerned with the justification
for knowing; he develops this aspect of the valuing implicit in
knowing by contending that the claim is "coherent" with a variety
of reality-determined conceptions of that standard. While Burke
does not explicate either the various reality-featurings or the
several interpretations of the coherence standard, he uses them
as starting-points or bases upon which to conclude regardless
of the nature of the universal audience or its featurings of reality
and standards, his claim to know the spontaneity of Hitler's
Jewish policy is justified as universally acceptable. What better
support could he provide? Burke, I think, feels that he has
presented the strongest support relevant to the most stringent
standards--coherence with already encased valuations of reality
and standards.

Reliability: the second standard

The adaptation of the "causal explanations" to several
reality-featuring perspectives, however, serves a function other
than the adaptation to a number of potential universal audiences;
it provides a second criterion by which to judge the claim: "reliability." Though any one of several reality-featuring universal audiences might accept the coherence of Burke's claim with its particular causal framework, the "accumulation" of such perspectives is tantamount to the repeated (and consistently similar) measurement of a variable in the social or physical sciences. Burke's "characteristic" strategy of "repeated beginnings," therefore, serves as some sort of reliability index. Whatever reality-featuring constitutes the audience's framework, is it not persuasive to understand the claim as "reliably" coherent? Having met that standard also, Burke claims the acceptability of his justification for knowing.

Burke's claim about the spontaneity—as well as the calculation—involved in the policy of Jewish persecution, in sum, must be viewed as a claim-to-know—"knowing," that is, characterized by Burke's valuing of the justification, standards, and frameworks for knowing. Burke utilizes the encased valuings of standards and realities and certain standardized knowings to establish his primary concern: the acceptability of the justification for knowing. That valuing is inherently involved in the humanistic perspective is obvious; what is not so readily understood is that some of the valuing is for the purpose of justifying the humanist's claim-to-know.
The Claim-to-Know as Starting-Point for Valuing

The examination of Burke's claim to know the spontaneity of Hitler's strategy, however, reveals only one side of what I termed earlier the "delicate balance between literary criticism and political pamphleteering" -- the critical side. Burke skillfully interweaves his literary criticism with concise political advocacy. Certainly, Burke is interested in Mein Kampf for professional reasons, but his interest is not limited to his role as critic. At the outset of his work he makes his overriding purpose clear. "Let us try also to discover what kind of 'medicine' this medicine-man has concocted," suggests Burke, "that we may know, with greater accuracy, exactly what to guard against, if we are to forestall the concocting of similar medicine in America" (165). As Burke establishes his claim to know the spontaneous as well as calculated "reasons" behind them, he simultaneously makes valuing judgments about the best course of action for a concerned America. At the point that his "knowing" of Hitler becomes his "valuing" of political strategy, Burke tips that delicate balance and becomes a pamphleteer.

Burke's concern for the threat Hitler represented was by no means unfounded; his concern for "what political move is to follow Munich, and what move to follow that move, etc." (165) undoubtedly was reflected in the thoughts of millions of the world's citizens. Burke's disquietude, though, was more specifically the result of his analysis of the American scene -- and its parallel
to the post-World War I German scene. Burke takes the sarcasm out of Sinclair Lewis' words and suggests, "It can happen here."

That valuing judgment, interestingly, seems to rest upon what Burke "knew" of the spontaneity of Hitler's successful strategy.

When Burke spoke of the poor economic environment which impells the revelation of the love-money/hate-money ambivalence of the middle class and the search for an expedient economic scapegoat, he is evaluating capitalism in general. If such conditions prompted Hitler to seek a convenient way out of insecurity, can it not prompt someone else somewhere else? When Burke speaks of the loss of dignity during a time of frustration and defeat of aspirations, he is setting no national boundaries on human needs. If such contributed to the rise of Hitler, can it not stimulate other movements for power? When Burke observes the direction and unity that are essential to a nation, he is not limiting his comment to Germany. If these are that which is necessary to a people, is it not possible that they will find them in a way as questionable as that of the Aryan "race"?

Not accidentally, I submit, is it that the needs for economic security, dignity, direction, and unity--those factors isolated as criterial to the claim of Hitler's spontaneity--are observed also in America in the late 1930's. Burke speaks openly of the "cacophonous verbal output of Congress" (172), of "the swarm of barter schemes and currency-tinkering that burst loose upon the United States after the crash of 1929" (183), and of the fact
that "already, in many quarters of our country, we are 'beyond' the stage where we are being saved from Nazism by our virtues" (164). Burke "knows" that much the same situation resulted in the spontaneous rise of Hitler's Jewish policy and strategy; on the basis of that knowing activity, he evaluates the American situation as "dangerous." Burke makes the point succinctly:

True, the Germans had the resentment of a lost war to increase their susceptibility to Hitler's rhetoric. But in a wider sense, it has repeatedly been observed, the whole world lost the War--and the accumulating ills of the capitalist order were but accelerated in their movements towards confusion. Hence, here too there are resentments that go with frustration of man's ability to work and earn. At that point a certain kind of industrial or financial monopolist may, annoyed by the contrary voices of our parliament, wish for the momentary peace of one voice, amplified by social organizations, with all the others not merely quieted but given the quietus (189).

Burke's evaluation, based upon what he knows of the rise of Hitler's strategy, is that the factors are present; it can happen here.

Conclusion

The fact that that delicate balance between Burke the critic and Burke the pamphleteer was examined "separately" should not indicate that the roles are indeed separable. Burke the critic happens also simultaneously to be Burke the pamphleteer; 'The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle'' as literary criticism happens also simultaneously to be "The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle'' as political pamphlet. The roles of the author and the levels of his product are no more separable than the knowing and valuing
that simultaneously are conducted by "each" Burke and appear in "each" "Rhetoric." Valuing activities are indispensable to the establishment of a claim-to-know in the humanities; moreover, as we have seen, as the knowing is established, it can simultaneously be utilized as the basis for what are "meant" to be evaluative statements. The valuing and the knowing occur simultaneously and omnipresently in Burke's statement on "The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle.'"

A Case Study of Valuing and Knowing in the Social Sciences: B.F. Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity

The cover of B.F. Skinner's latest bestselling book proclaims that Skinner is "the most influential and controversial psychologist of our time." Such is perhaps the case. "Operant conditioning" is nearly synonymous with Skinner; "Skinnerian psychology" is a familiar, if not always honorific, term; and no beginning psychology text is complete without reference to the pigeons and the Skinner box. Further, Skinner's influence and exposure have been enhanced by his "bestselling" works which explain the intricacies and defend the virtues of behaviorism; chief among these is Walden Two, a novel depicting in detail a community built upon the philosophy of operant conditioning. Beyond Freedom and Dignity lacks the charm of the Walden Two experiment, but that is as it should be. By 1971, said

Skinner, civilization was beyond the point at which one could visualize a controlled environment as viable alternative; in 1971, such an environment was a necessity for the continued survival of civilization. Man could no longer dream of the personal advantages of a "utopia," as the Thoreaus and the Alcotts had done; he must now fear the impending destruction if such a dream is not realized. Mankind, says Skinner, is beyond the point at which freedom and dignity can be valued as being indispensable—a claim to know about valuing that makes Beyond Freedom and Dignity an important focus in the rhetorical perspective on valuing and knowing in the social sciences.

More specifically, we shall see Skinner engage in the same kinds of valuing activity that we observed with Burke. He will appraise certain claims as "standardized," as "facts," and he will utilize these standardized knowings as starting-points for the claim-to-know in which he is most concerned. The universal acceptability of the claim, as with Burke, will depend upon the universally acceptable valuing of justification, standards, and frameworks for knowing. Similar to Burke, also, is Skinner's "featuring" of one aspect of the valuing implicit in knowing. In contrast to Burke, on the other hand, we shall find that Skinner is most involved with the valuing of "reality," specifically, a "scenic-reality." Skinner, as we shall see, relies heavily upon encased valuings of justification and, especially, standards in order to establish his claim to know the necessity of intentional
environmental control of human behavior. The critique that follows, therefore, not only highlights the valuing implicit in knowing, but illustrates further the dynamism of the relationships among the aspects of that knowing and valuing.

Standardized Knowing as Starting-Point

Some of Skinner's controversial book is virtually indisputable. The beginning of the book is, for example, an all-too-familiar cataloguing of the world's ills. The problems of nuclear holocaust, famine, disease, poverty, and pollution, while not a complete listing, are probably all universally acknowledged "facts." All mankind unquestionably lives within an environment threatened by some or all of those problems. The universal audience whose acceptance Skinner posits is indeed encompassing. Whether everyone agrees about the causes, consequences, or solutions to the threats to the survival of mankind, that same "everyone" at least can probably agree that such threats do exist. The report of the world's ills is, therefore, a claim encased in the non-disciplinary mold of "common knowledge," a claim not crucial in itself, but instrumental as the starting-point of analysis and, as we shall see, a claim-to-know.

The next phase of Skinner's work deals, again, with "facts" standardized in the mold of common "knowledge": it is an interpretation of the failures of contemporary society to respond to those problems. The problems have been attacked by what Skinner calls our strength: science and technology. He summarizes
attempted solutions:

To contain a population explosion we look for better methods of birth control. Threatened by a nuclear holocaust, we build bigger deterrent forces and anti-ballistic-missile systems. We try to stave off the world's famine with new foods and better ways of growing them. Improved sanitation and medicine will, we hope, control disease, better housing and transportation will solve the problems of the ghettos, and new ways of reducing or disposing of waste will stop the pollution of the environment (1).

These efforts, says Skinner, have been largely unsuccessful. Despite the technology that we have brought to bear upon the problems of mankind, those ills are not cured. Skinner claims, furthermore, that the technology utilized often contributes to the deterioration of the situation rather than the improvement of it. Our gains in medicine have worsened the threat of overpopulation; our nuclear defense raises the danger of mankind's annihilation; the quest for ever-better standards of living moves us ever closer to ecological despoliation. Skinner contends that these failures are not surprising. Though "our strength" may lie in the physical and biological sciences, the application of these alone "will not solve our problems because the solutions lie in another field" (2). Skinner's critique of the failure of society to respond to its ills, therefore, is based upon the ill-adaptedness of the solution to the problem.

The Claim-to-Know

Here Skinner becomes somewhat more controversial. His claim-to-know involves the advisability of a different approach to the world's problems, an approach that confronts directly
the problem of human behavior. The justification for the claim is valued by Skinner as being consistent with common sense and common knowledge:

Better contraceptives will control population only if people use them. New weapons may offset defenses and vice versa, but a nuclear holocaust can be prevented only if the conditions under which nations make war can be changed. New methods of agriculture and medicine will not help if they are not practiced, and housing is not a matter of buildings and cities but of how people live. Overcrowding can be corrected only by inducing people not to crowd, and the environment will continue to deteriorate until polluting practices are abandoned (2).

We need, claims Skinner, a new approach to the old problems. "In short, we need to make vast changes in human behavior, and we cannot make them with the help of nothing more than physics and biology, no matter how hard we try" (2).

The superficial aspects of Skinner's claim are, in fact, not so controversial. The development of nuclear defenses was, it seems to me, an explicit attempt at changing the behavior of would-be aggressors; the distribution of contraceptives was an effort to curb the child-conceiving behavior; housing renovation was an attempt to alter the ghetto life-style; and new pollution and control devices were meant, it seems to me, to check the polluting behavior of man and industry. On the surface it seems that Skinner's "new plan" is not as "stunning" as Skinner's editor would have us believe.

Skinner's claim, however, is more radical and untraditional than might appear obvious at first. Though Skinner builds his
claim-to-know solidly upon certain "factual" material, the conclusion of his analysis is markedly unconventional. While the claim deals with behavior modification, this claim differs from other claims that critics have made about "changing behavior" in that Skinner seeks to change behavior by controlling the environment directly and, therefore, by controlling man indirectly. Rather than a plan to encourage lower international aggression and, thus, war, Skinner wants to preclude war-like behavior itself; rather than attempt to foster the favorable attitudes toward birth control devices, Skinner seeks to control the child-bearing behavior itself; and rather than a strategy to cultivate ecologically-constructive values, Skinner wants to condition and extinguish the polluting behavior more directly. Skinner is straightforward in his claim to know that environmental control is necessary. "The intentional design of a culture and the control of human behavior it implies are essential if the human species is to continue to develop" (167).

The Featuring of the Framework for Knowing

The most important aspect of the claim is what Skinner calls a "fact." He asserts that we must look to the environment as the key to behavior modifications because, in fact, the environment controls all behavior. "It is the environment," Skinner claims, "which is 'responsible' for the objectionable behavior, and not some attribute of the individual, which must be changed" (70). In positing the environment as that which is in need of
change, Skinner is fulfilling the task which he said must be completed. "Behavior," he says, "can be changed by changing the conditions of which it is a function" (145). He urges the acceptance "of the fact that all control is exerted by the environment" (77). The "fact" that the environment should be the central focus in the search for what everyone agrees should be the change of behavior is, however, not a "fact" at all in the rhetorical perspective.

For the claim to be a fact, it must be standardized in relation to the universal audience that is appropriate for the claim. Clearly, the "featuring" of "scene" in motivational analyses is encased in the realm of behaviorism and operant conditioning, but it is not encased in relation to the nondisciplinary audience which Skinner implies is his audience. The universal audience which Skinner appears to incarnate is not the followers of behaviorism exclusively, and since "scenic-featuring" is not universally encased, not an aspect of standardized knowing for that universal audience, the "fact" of scenic-reality is not a fact at all.

On the other hand, the postulating of a scenic-reality is important because it constitutes the aspect of valuing implicit in knowing with which Skinner is most concerned. Skinner, as we shall see, treats the justification and the standards for knowing, but his claim to know the necessity of environmental control of human behavior rests primarily upon his postulation of the valuing of a scenic-reality. Just as Burke emphasized
the justification for knowing as he utilized already encased valuings of standards and reality, we shall see Skinner feature the valuing of the reality or framework for knowing by utilizing already encased valuings of standards and justification.

The Use of Encased Valuings of Justification and Standards

Skinner seems to have followed the same line of reasoning as we have: he assumes that no one will doubt his interpretation of the state of the world's health; further, he presumes that "everyone" will agree that human behavioral change is necessary to cure those obvious ills; however, Skinner also realizes, as we have acknowledged, that behavioral change does not entail "behaviorism," "environmental control," or "operant conditioning" to that same "everyone." The method of behavioral change—and, therefore, Skinner's claim—must be evaluated in relation to the most stringent justification and standards; justification and standards that Skinner analyzes, reinterprets, and rank-orders in relation to the reality-featuring that he defends so fiercely.

Justification and the encased standard of freedom

Skinner deals, first, with "freedom." Controlled behavioral change, predicts Skinner, will be evaluated by the criterion of freedom, and perhaps, found wanting. Skinner begins with a basic analysis of freedom by suggesting that "almost all living things act to free themselves from harmful contacts" (24). Freedom is a factor when a "person sneezes and frees his respiratory passages
from irritating substances" (24), and when a "person escapes from a hot sun when he moves under cover" (25). "Over the centuries, in erratic ways men have constructed a world in which they are relatively free of many kinds of threatening or harmful stimuli--extremes of temperature, sources of infection, hard labor, danger, and even those minor aversive stimuli called discomfort" (25). While these escapes to freedom are clearly not the kind in question in Skinner's claim, they do serve as a starting-point from which Skinner can get to the main point of control by other people. "Escape and avoidance," admits Skinner, "play a much more important role in the struggle for freedom when the aversive conditions are generated by other people" (25). Skinner says that while human escape-behavior is omnipresent, "the struggle for freedom is mainly directed toward intentional controllers--toward those who treat others aversively in order to induce them to behave in particular ways" (27). Not only is the struggle against such control pervasive, but there has grown up a body of lore and literature grounded in the struggle--a literature that expresses and encourages the escape from control. Says Skinner, "What we may call the 'literature of freedom' has been designed to induce people to escape from or attack those who act to control them aversively" (27).

Skinner's primary point is that, unfortunately, authors of the "literature of freedom" have tended to label indiscriminately all forms of control as evil. "The literature of freedom," summarizes Skinner, "has encouraged escape from or attack upon
all controllers. It has done so by making any indication of control aversive" (38). Skinner calls this an "extreme position" (38) and contends that the problem of assuring freedom is not the problem of destroying all forms of control, but of destroying all aversive forms of control. The concepts of freedom and control are not so simple. "Freedom," says Skinner, "is a matter of contingencies of reinforcement, not of the feelings the contingencies generate" (35). We can have, therefore, techniques of control which do not seem "aversive" because they provide effective reinforcement. In examining how "freedom" is ambiguous in the context of certain reinforcers, Skinner gives several examples, among them certain medical experiments. He cites

the practice of inviting prisoners to volunteer for possibly dangerous experiments—for example, on new drugs—in return for better living conditions or shortened sentences. Everyone would protest if the prisoners were forced to participate, but are they really free when positively reinforced, particularly when the condition to be improved or the sentence to be shortened has been imposed by the state? (36).

Skinner's point is that the literature of freedom has dangerously overgeneralized its sanctions against control. The danger in the overgeneralization is the implied attack upon forms of control which are actually beneficial. "What is overlooked," contends Skinner, "is control which does not have aversive consequences at any time. Many social practices essential to the welfare of the species involve the control of one person by another" (38).

Skinner contends that, while his claim to know the necessity of environmental control is inconsistent with the "feeling-of-
freedom" criterion, it is consistent with the reinforcer concept of freedom. A controlled environment can best structure non-aversive "free" and reinforced behavior. The proper step "is not to free men from control but to analyze and change the kinds of control to which they are exposed" (40). In doing so, Skinner visualizes a claim to know about the necessity of control consistent with the criterion of freedom.

Justification and the encased standard of dignity

Skinner also believes that his claim-to-know will be evaluated by his audience in respect to "dignity." Skinner, using dignity as the generalized term for the pride and self-respect of autonomous man, realizes that the "Americanized" universal audience to which his claim must be acceptable values dignity as a criterial factor in appraising claims-to-know involving human activity. Consequently, the second standard for knowing invoked by Skinner is the criterion of "dignity." Dignity, for Skinner, is simply a positive reinforcement. Skinner makes the point that "when someone behaves in a way we find reinforcing, we make him more likely to do so again by praising or commending him" (41). Perhaps the most unique aspect of Skinner's interpretation of dignity is his view that praise is given most when little reason for the behavior exists—little reason, we must add, that is "located" in the scene as an "observable reinforcer."

Skinner says, "We do not, for example, ordinarily commend a person for responding reflexively" (42). On the other hand,
soldiers are most highly honored when their conduct was brave in the face of all odds; when no hope was left, they continued to fight. "We give credit generously," says Skinner, "when there are no obvious reasons for the behavior" (43).

The term "obvious" is crucial here. Skinner's thesis about the nature of dignity is posited clearly in light of the scenic-orientation: the unobservable pride or dedication or patriotism of the soldier cannot be included as a "reason" for "bravery" because it would be, in fact, unobservable and, from the scenic perspective of behaviorism, non-obvious. Nevertheless, the scenic-orientation to dignity forces Skinner to conclude that controlled human behavior, as a claimed necessity, does not meet a criterion that he feels is essential to the universal acceptability; it does not meet the standard of dignity. "There is no point," claims Skinner, "in commending a person for doing what he is going to do anyway" (47). Under the Skinner plan, the person will do "what he is going to do anyway" because that will be the structure of the culture. In that situation, according to Skinner, "a scientific conception seems demeaning because nothing is eventually left for which autonomous man can take credit" (54).

Survival: the most stringent standard

Since claims-to-know are posited in relation to standards for knowing, it may be surprising that Skinner's claim to know the necessity of environmental control has fared so badly. The
claim meets only the standard of "freedom"—if Skinner's own behavioristic conception of freedom is adopted. The second criterion, "dignity," is nearly completely opposed to the idea of controlled behavior. One may ask how Skinner can make the claim-to-know in the light of these failures-to-meet-standards. The answer, of course, lies in the title of his book. While freedom and dignity may once have been appropriate criteria by which to judge the merits of a claim to know about behavior change in general, the world is past that point; in other words, says Skinner, the world situation is so serious that we can no longer be concerned with the prescientific lore of autonomous man. We are beyond freedom and dignity.

In the rhetorical perspective, however, claims-to-know must be judged in relation to the most stringent relevant standards. Being beyond freedom and dignity does not preclude the need for appropriate standards by which the agent values and posits the acceptability of claims. On the contrary, Skinner postulates his claim-to-know on the basis of a criterion transcending the anachronisms of freedom and dignity. That standard is survival, and the question becomes "Is the control of the environment consistent with the standard of survival?" If it is, then the most stringent relevant criterion will have been met. Skinner contends that survival is the one crucial value which, in the rhetorical perspective, becomes Skinner's standard for knowing. "Survival," predicts Skinner, "is the only value according to which a culture
is eventually to be judged, and any practice that furthers survival has survival value by definition" (130).

The obvious implication is that claims meeting the criteria of freedom and dignity are not as likely to promote survival of the culture and the species. Skinner becomes explicit late in the book:

Our culture has produced the science and technology it needs to save itself. It has the wealth needed for effective action. It has, to a considerable extent, a concern for its own future. But if it continues to take freedom or dignity, rather than its own survival, as its principal value, then it is possible that some other culture will make a greater contribution to the future. The defender of freedom and dignity may then, like Milton's Satan . . . find himself in hell with no other consolation than the illusion that 'here at last we shall be free' (173).

Specifically, Skinner describes the advantages in environmental control in relation to its ability to foster new practices geared to the survival of the culture and species. In an "uncontrolled" setting such changes in practices do occur and, if they are helpful in the survival of the culture, they are passed on to others. "There is no virtue," however, contends Skinner, "in the accidental nature of an accident" (155) that is favorable to survival. Cultures do evolve "as new practices appear and undergo selection," but in the context of a much-plagued world, "we cannot wait for them to turn up by chance" (155). Environmental control, therefore, meets so well the survival standard because "explicit design promotes [the acceleration of] the evolutionary process" (137). More survival-oriented behavior will result from the control because the control can increase the number of
"happy accidents" in the evolution of a culture. In sum, then, survival of the culture and species is of paramount importance; Skinner claims to meet that criterion despite the claim's inconsistency with the standards of freedom and dignity.

The standard of survival is, however, not merely a product of Skinner's own behavior; it is also a prediction of the universal audience's selection of standards. Clearly, while Skinner recognizes the standards of freedom and dignity as highly valued criteria by his readers, he predicts that survival will be seen as the more basic criterion. "When it becomes clear that a culture may survive or perish, some of its members may begin to act to promote its survival" (127). If survival can be seen by the audience (in the role of the "universal") as most stringent, then Skinner's claim to know the necessity of environmental control can be judged as universally acceptable.

Reality-Featuring and the Ordering of Standards

Skinner's valuing of the survival standard as preeminent, re-introduces his featuring of the valuing of reality. The standards of freedom and dignity are valued highly in motivational frames of reference which feature "agent," "attitude," or "purpose"; in such a framework, these standards might be valued even more highly than survival: might not that explain the soldier "giving up" his life (i.e., spurning survival) for sake of his duty (i.e., dignity)? Clearly, perspectives do exist in which survival does not take preference over the standards of freedom and dignity.
Skinner, however, is featuring the valuing of a scenic-reality—what he calls, mistakenly, "fact." In the context of that framework for knowing, the preeminence of survival over freedom and dignity is assured; in that context, his claim to know the necessity of intentional environmental control needs only to meet the most stringent standard: survival. Skinner summarizes his point:

We have seen how the literatures of freedom and dignity, with their concern for autonomous man, have perpetuated the use of punishment and condoned the use of only weak nonpunitive techniques, and it is not difficult to demonstrate a connection between the unlimited right of the individual to pursue happiness and the catastrophes threatened by unchecked breeding, the unrestrained affluence which exhausts resources and pollutes the environment, and the imminence of nuclear war (204).

The valuing of scenic-reality, according to Skinner, entails the featuring of the survival standard.

The most significant point of Skinner's work, then, is its featuring of scenic-reality. Though he deals at length with the justification for claims and the standards for knowing, that reality-featuring is uppermost in his thinking. Skinner, ironically, can even acknowledge the importance of freedom and dignity—those standards that he has attacked so diligently—if they are defined in scenic-oriented terms. In visualizing the glories of environmental control, he concludes that

all this is possible, and even the slightest sign of progress should bring a kind of change which in traditional terms would be said to assuage wounded vanity, offset a sense of hopelessness or nostalgia, correct the impression that 'we neither can nor need to do anything for ourselves,' and promote a 'sense of freedom and dignity' by building a 'sense of confidence and worth' (205).
Indeed, Skinner's emphasis upon the standards for knowing is more an emphasis upon the interpretation of those standards—an interpretation that he wants always to be scenically-oriented. If that orientation is accepted, then the ordering of the standards for knowing is automatic: survival of the culture certainly takes preference over more personalized criteria such as freedom and dignity. Skinner can accept freedom and dignity only if they are reinterpreted in scenic terms. The "abolition" of autonomous man, which Skinner calls "a step forward" (205), is clearly the abolition of all but the scenic-orientation. With the acceptability of that framework for knowing come both the standards and the justification for knowing the necessity of controlled human behavior. The valuing involved in reality-featuring is, therefore, the valuing most emphasized in Skinner's knowing.

Conclusion

Skinner's *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* is, in sum, an extended analysis of the measures needed to cure the world's ills. He builds his primary claim-to-know solidly on the foundation of the "factual existence" of such ills and what he interprets as the human tendency to agree that man's behavior must change in order to ensure the survival of mankind. The nature of the desired change is, of course, where Skinner must be at his strongest. Environmental behavioral modification and control imply the death of autonomous man—the "inside" being who is given so much credit for so much of human behavior; his demise, says Skinner, is untimely.
only in the sense that it is overdue. The abolition of autonomy and the recognition that the environment does, in fact, control human behavior, signals the acknowledgement of scenic-reality-featuring. Skinner, in placing "causal" efficacy in the environment, erects the criteria of freedom, dignity, and survival as those relevant to his claim to know the necessity of scenic control. That the claim does not meet the standards of traditionally-defined freedom and dignity is not surprising; they are of the featuring of agent, attitudes, and purposes of autonomous man—and he is dead. Survival, therefore, emerges as the one fundamental criterion his claim must meet. By accelerating and reinforcing "mutant" behavior that is favorable to survival, environmental control leads to increased chances of the "happy accidents" which may save the human culture and species. That survival is consistent with Skinner's claim is also expected; the death of all but the scenic-orientation leaves, it seems to me, no other motivational framework and dictates the emphasis upon man's environment.

Skinner does introduce much justification for his claim-to-know—"factual material" (already standardized knowledge) and criteria by which to evaluate his claim. Most important to Skinner, however, is the reality-featuring that he postulates as now universally acceptable. With that valuing of reality, the valuing of justification and criteria follow almost automatically in the process of knowing. Clearly, Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity is understood more precisely in the perspective...
of rhetoric as architectonic of valuing and knowing in the social sciences.

A Case Study of Valuing and Knowing in the Physical Sciences: Max Planck's "The Unity of the Physical World-Picture"

Ten years before his winning of the Nobel Prize for Physics, German physicist and philosopher of science, Max Planck, was asked to lecture at the University of Leiden. He began his statement with an appropriately modest introduction. "Gentlemen," he said, "when I received your kind invitation to address you here on some aspects of my studies, my first thought was how diligently physics is studied here in Holland, what distinguished and world-famous names you have constantly before you as shining examples, and how little really new material a lecture on theoretical physics, here in Leiden of all places, can have to offer you" (3). In concluding the same address, Planck remarked, "Now it would certainly be a grave illusion on my part if I hoped to have been convincing, or even comprehensible to all of you. . . . Much more will certainly be thought, and written, about these basic questions, for there are many theorists, and paper is long-suffering" (27). Between the claim to modesty and the statement of uncertainty, however, lie certain less reserved claims—claims that can be thought of in the rhetorical perspective as claims-to-know in the realm of the physical sciences.

Planck indicates clearly the purpose of the Leiden lecture; it is "to try to outline the main features of the physical world-picture as it has been shaped, and will presumably continue to be shaped, by the experiences and opinions at my disposal" (3). Planck's claim-to-know, as we shall see, becomes a prediction of the future physical "world-picture," and, thus, the future division of intellectual labor in physics. Planck begins the establishment of his claim-to-know with a detailed review of the development of the world-picture, a review that is basically standardized in relation to the disciplinary audience that Planck addresses. We shall observe Planck presuming a universal reality-featuring—a featuring which assumes that progress in physics is prompted by the "discovery" of "Reality." In light of Planck's belief in how developments in the scenic-picture impel man's physical enterprises, Planck, not surprisingly, features a scenic-reality and standards which are criterial to that reality: empirical validity and the "unity" of the discovered "Reality." Indeed, while Planck engages in the valuing of justification, standards, and frameworks, he—as Burke and Skinner did—features one aspect of that valuing that is implicit in knowing: namely the valuing of the standard of unity. We shall see Planck, first, make a claim to know the future of the physical world-picture, and then, discount the importance of the claim itself; what is paramount, he says, is the standard of unity as the preeminent element in the development of physics. Though he engages in the valuing and use of the encased reality and certain standardized
knowings, his primary concern is for the standard for knowing in physical science.

Standardized Knowing as Starting-Point

Planck begins his claim to know the future of the physical world-picture by reviewing the development of physics—a review that utilizes the standardized knowing of a universal audience of physical scientists. This review is crucial to Planck, since, for him, the past is the logical determinant of the state of the future. Says Planck, "There is only one way of discovering in which direction physical science is developing: by comparing its state today with that in an earlier epoch" (5). He, therefore, uses what he calls the "main features" of the past as an indicant of the "main features" of the future; the standardized knowing of the past becomes a starting-point for the knowing of the future.

Planck's review begins with the selection of what he feels characterizes the state of scientific development: "the way in which it defines its basic concepts and separates its various branches" (5). On the basis of that selection he explicates in detail the paradoxical manner in which the development is typified, first, by a dependency upon sense data but, second, by a turning away from the imperfection of sense data (6). On the one hand, while "the physiological element is predominant in all physical definitions" (5), "specific sense impressions have been completely eliminated" from much of science. Tone and color,
once purely sensory, are now defined by frequencies and wave lengths; similarly, "force" and "temperature" are now no longer associated with specific sense impressions. While the senses may have been pivotal in the initial development of the concepts, the further development of the concepts is characterized by the elimination of the sense impressions.

This development of concepts and theories, says Planck, is reflected in the evolution of scientific subdivisions. What was once the study of heat, as "a homogeneous branch of physics," is now partly attached to optics or electrodynamics and partly to mechanics (6). Electrodynamics and mechanics, in fact, says Planck, have become the replacements of heat, acoustics, etc., etc. as the primary divisions of work in the physical sciences. The problem of this new division, according to Planck, is that, as was the case with the other divisions, the boundary between electrodynamics and mechanics is not as clear as once was thought. Where do you "place" the study of electron movement? The "fact" that it involves no "ponderable matter" might lead one to consider it electrodynamic in nature. On the other hand, considerable evidence suggests that electron movement is better explained in relation to the kinetic theory of gases, an aspect of the mechanical division. The boundary line between the divisions is, thus, not altogether clear. In the context of such a problematic subdivision of physics, Planck poses the question that carries him from historical description to speculation about the future. "What viewpoint," he asks, will "provide a definitive foundation for the subdivision
of the system of physics?" (7); what will be the next, and perhaps
final, step in the evolutionary process? Planck's answer takes
the form of a claim-to-know.

The Claim-to-Know

Planck proposes an answer to the question of the definitive
form of the world-picture that is based upon the second law of
thermodynamics, the concept of entropy, and the probability
calculus. The concepts of entropy and probability, contends
Planck, allow the modification of the second law so that it can
be expressed by saying that "there are irreversible processes
in nature" (9). The law, modified thusly, becomes the focus
of what Planck knows about the future of the world-picture and
the division of physics. He makes the claim succinctly after
analyzing the implications of modification: "I hope that the
foregoing considerations will suffice to make it clear that the
distinction between reversible and irreversible processes is
a much more profound one than that between mechanical and electrical
processes, and that this difference is therefore better entitled
than any other to form the chief basis for the classification of
all physical events, and should be allotted the principal role
in the physical world-picture of the future" (14). Planck's
modification of the second law of thermodynamics, then, is the
object of his claim-to-know.
Planck's claim is based upon certain already established research and theory in physics; it is, therefore, based upon justification that Planck assumes is encased in the universal audience of physical science. Since that encased justification is essential as a starting-point for his claim, let us examine Planck's description both of the law and the improvements that have been made in it.

The second law of thermodynamics, as Planck suggests, can be expressed by saying that there are both reversible and irreversible processes in nature. While some processes are periodic or reversible without residual change (e.g., free fall in a vacuum), other processes occur so that no reversibility is possible except by the compensation of other forces. The thermal conduction of heat is an example. Once heat is transferred from a warmer body to a cooler body, a "preference" exists for a given state; that is, the "entropy" or "natural preference" for the warmer body decreases and the entropy of the cooler body increases--the fact that transfer is away from the first body reveals the lack of natural preference. In reversible processes, since no preference exists for either of two states, no entropy increase occurs (12-13). Since the magnitude of entropy is measurable, the distinction between reversible and irreversible processes becomes a distinct and clearly measurable one: "In the light of the foregoing discussion," remarks Planck, "you
will understand why I proceed to express the opinion that, in the
theoretical physics of the future, the first and most important
division of all physical processes will be into reversible and
irreversible processes" (13).

Planck, however, is not thoroughly pleased with the entropy
principle despite its seeming superiority. He concludes that
modifications must be made "if the distinction between reversible
and irreversible processes is really to be of lasting significance
for all time" (14). Planck applauds the life-work of Ludwig
Boltzmann as providing the necessary improvement. Boltzmann's
relating of the entropy principle to the concept of probability
allows, says Planck, the "calculation of the precise degree of
probability" (17) for a certain state of nature; the "preference"
for one state becomes statistical product. Such a product permits
the "exact" discrimination between reversible and irreversible
processes and, therefore, provides the "definitive" basis for
the future subdivision and development of physics. On the grounds
of already-established valuations of justification, then, Planck
postulates his claim to know the future world-picture.

The Featuring of the Standards
for Knowing

Planck's concern for the specific force of his claim
is, no doubt, genuine. On the other hand, however, it seems to
me that Planck's purpose in the lecture was more than the justifi-
cation of a claim-to-know; it was, in addition, a forum for the
reconfirmation of the criteria by which, in Planck's opinion,
physical science developed. In fact, the bulk of the lecture is devoted, not to a defense of the claim or the justification of the claim *per se*, but rather, to an explanation of how well the claim meets the standard that Planck says a claim in physics ought to meet. The concern, in the bulk of the text, is for the standard and not the claim. In the rhetorical perspective, then, Planck's claim can be seen as a statement that features, not the justification as Burke's did, nor the reality that Skinner's did, but the valuing of the standard for knowing. This interpretation becomes more clear when we examine Planck's standards in relation to his claim-to-know.

The standard of empirical validity

The first standard employed by Planck is the standard of empirical validity. From the first, Planck confirmed the importance of experience in the initial stages of scientific development. "True to the law that all our experiences are derived from our sense perceptions, the physiological element is predominant in all physical definitions," concludes Planck (5). Empirical validity is so dominant, in fact, that Planck can justify the consideration of certain problematic situations as "not important" simply because, though the "possibility" exists, the situations are "not nature as we know it" (17). Indeed, Planck's whole defense of the application of the probability calculus is that, while it "eliminates" certain "peculiar possibilities," it does not preclude the consideration of all that is experienced in
nature. The empirical standard is so important to Planck that he applauds specifically those gains of the second law that are empirically validated: "The fertility of the new definition of entropy is apparent not only in the kinetic theory of gases but also in the theory of radiant heat. It has led to the establishment of laws which are in perfect agreement with experience" (18). The empirical standard is, for Planck, a standard to be used in the practical concerns of physical development.

While the empirical standard is important to Planck, it clearly is not the only relevant standard for claims-to-know in physics. Planck's whole view of the development of physics was, as we have seen, a belief in the paradoxical relationship between physics and sense data. On the one hand, all science is based upon the observable; on the other hand, science is characterized by a turning away from the imperfection implicit in sense data. The development of science, says Planck, involves inherently the sophistication of raw sense measurement into less anthropomorphic measures—that we saw evident in Planck's treatment of the history of physics. Further, however, Planck observes that physicists regularly surpass the boundaries of what they can validate empirically. "Daily in physics," says Planck, "we go beyond directly observable facts and draw conclusions that can never be tested by human observations" (23). While empiricism is the starting-point of physics, Planck concludes, it in no way circumscribes the domain of physical research.
Planck's acknowledgement of the limits of the empirical standard is manifested in his claim-to-know regarding the future of physics. Says Planck, "We must admit that the world-picture of the future . . . appears noticeably pale and prosaic, and lacking in direct evidence; and this last seriously detracts from its usefulness to an exact science" (21). Despite Planck's conviction that empiricism is indispensable to science as a starting-point and as a standard, he can defend a claim "lacking in direct evidence;" despite his belief "that complete elimination of sense impressions is quite impossible" (21), he can claim to know a future scientific structure transcending sense perception. In other words, Planck claims to know in direct opposition to one of his chief standards for knowing. Such a position is possible within the rhetorical perspective because Planck and all other human agents not only employ standards for universal acceptance, but employ those standards hierarchically; and, for Planck, the empirical standard is not highest-ordered.

The standard of unity

The criterion that Planck selects as supereminent is the concept of "unity." Planck realizes the failings of his claim to meet the standards of, for example, empiricism, but he nonetheless claimed to know. He explains:

What, then, is the special impetus which, in spite of these manifest disadvantages, gives the future world-picture such a decisive superiority that it supersedes all previous ones? It is simply its unity: unity of all individual features, unity of all places and times, unity of all researchers, all nations, all cultures (21).
"Unity," therefore, serves Planck as the standard for knowing so crucial that claims-to-know could be established in opposition to other standards for knowing. Such an interpretation by Planck is not unexpected; his lecture, in fact, tacitly assumes the preeminence of that standard: "The Unity of the Physical World-Picture." "From time immemorial," says Planck at the outset of his statement, "as long as there has been any natural science, its ultimate supreme goal has been the combination of the motley diversity of physical phenomena into a unified system or even single formula" (3). His lecture is not, then, so much a statement to which he brings standards for knowing as it is a standard for knowing to which he brings claims; the emphasis, as alluded to earlier, is on the criteria for knowing—and more specifically, the ultimate criterion for knowing.

Planck implies that this ordering-of-standards is universally acceptable to the physical science court of reason. That such is not the case can be demonstrated by an analysis of Planck's operationalization of the constituent elements within the standard that Planck calls "unity." They are two in number: first, unity as coherence with "established" physics; and second, unity as constancy, above the influence of time or man. Let us examine those sub-criteria implied in Planck's conception of "unity."

Planck's concern for coherence with the established tenets of physics is evident, it seems to me, in his obvious preference for the "evolutionary" method of scientific development. Early in his lecture Planck contrasted two distinct—if at times
complementary--methods that physical scientists and theorists utilize in their research on the nature of physical reality. One method (obviously not Planck's) is characterized as what we can call "revolutionary"; "it is more youthful in character. It grasps boldly at the whole, speedily generalizing from individual experiences, and immediately concentrates on a single concept or proposition, within which it attempts with more or less success to confine the whole of nature and all its manifestations" (4). On the other hand, Planck describes an approach which, in contrast, we can call "evolutionary": "it is more cautious, modest and reliable, but it is less forceful than the first and took much longer to be accepted. To begin with it does not aim at conclusive results; it adds only those individual features which appear to be completely guaranteed by direct experiences" (4). This latter, clearly the one favored by Planck, is the one implied in his perception of the history of physics. In opposition to, for example, Ernst Mach's "revolutionary" "economical" physical theory, Planck contends that the building of the scientific edifice is to be accomplished by the building of steps, one upon the other. Planck is therefore more inclined to applaud a "further step toward the unification of our world-picture" (17) than he is to appreciate the creation of a whole new perspective.

Evidence of Planck's emphasis upon unity-as-coherence occurs especially when he notes the result of applying atomic theory and statistical approaches to the concept of entropy. He observes:
The known laws of general dynamics, mechanics and electrodynamics, taken together, can then be applied to the interactions of single atoms.

By this reinterpretation—at a single stroke—the second law of thermodynamics is removed from a position of isolation, the mysterious character of nature's preference disappears, and the entropy principle becomes linked as a well-established theorem of the probability calculus to the introduction of atoms into the physical world-picture (17).

Planck demonstrates his pleasure with the coherence of the second law's modification—a coherence which, for Planck, was integral to the unity that he sought in his physical world-picture; he remarks about the "fertility of the new definition of entropy" in relation, for example, to the kinetic theory of gases and the theory of radiant heat. Clearly, Planck's featuring of the "unity" criterion is, in part, explained by his valuing of the evolutionary and coherent nature of what he claims to know about the world-picture.

Planck's conception of "unity," however, implies a factor that seems more central to his philosophy than coherence; this second factor is that of "constancy." A major theme in Planck's review of the history of physical research was that physics, which inevitably began anthropomorphically with its reliance upon sense impressions, is characterized by a turning away from such sensory data. "Looking back," Planck contends, "we can summarize all this by saying that the whole development of theoretical physics until now has been marked by a unification achieved by emancipating the system from its anthropomorphous elements, in particular from specific sense impressions" (6). Planck, in fact, seems
to be satisfied with nothing short of self-evidence. The objects
of his praise are, for example, the constants of gravity or
heat radiation in free ether; these, he says, have "a universal
character and involve no reference to any special substance or
any special body" (19). These constants meet what must be the
most stringent of standards; they are valid even for "the inhabi-
tants of Mars" (19).

Not surprisingly, Planck's criticism of an unmodified
second law of thermodynamics stems from the lack of constancy
and the dependence upon human activity. "In fact," claims Planck
at the beginning of his lecture, "the second law of thermodynamics,
at least as generally understood, is still decidedly anthropomorphous
in character" (8). In introducing the probability calculus to
this second law and its concern for entropy, however, the second
law is placed in the same enviable position as the first law.
With the application of probability, Planck suggests that "to
calculate entropy we no longer need . . . to perform a reversible
process whose realizability always appears more or less in doubt;
we are independent of human technical skills. In short, the
anthropomorphous element is completely eliminated from this
definition, and in this way the second law, like the first, is
given a firm basis in reality" (18).

Planck's concern for unity-as-constancy, therefore, is
demonstrated by his differential reaction to differing levels
of constancy among principles; that concern is further demonstrated
by Planck's critique of Mach's "economical" perspective on physics
and physical reality. In predictably disapproving tones, Planck interprets Mach's position as being that "there is no reality apart from our own impressions, and all natural science is in the last resort merely an economical adaptation of our thoughts to our impressions, to which we are driven by the struggle for existence" (23). Without exploring the accuracy of Planck's synopsis of Mach's position, we can posit the issue of constancy as the basic point of controversy. Planck was aware of Mach's claim of the "continuity" of such an anthropomorphic perspective on reality, but continuity, contended Planck, was not "constancy."
The significance of Mach's research, Planck claims

is, at bottom, only a formalistic one, which does not affect the essence of natural science. This is because the outstanding characteristic of all research—the demand for a constant world-picture, independent of changing times and peoples—is alien to it. The Machian principle of continuity is no substitute for this; continuity is not constancy (25).

Clearly, Planck's attack upon the economic perspective of Mach is symptomatic of his defense of the unity-as-constancy standard.

The Use of the Encased Valuing of Reality

Planck explains that his standards of unity-as-coherence and unity-as-constancy are closely aligned with the universal reality-featuring of the physical scientist; claims not meeting those standards—claims exemplified by Mach's theorizing—are, consequently, inconsistent with that reality-featuring.
one more argument, which will perhaps make more impression on those who are still inclined to adopt the "human-economical" point of view as the really decisive one than all the foregoing objective considerations. When the great masters of the exact sciences introduced their ideas into science . . . "economical" points of view were certainly the last to fortify these men in their battle against traditional attitudes and overriding authorities. No: it was their unshaken faith . . . in the reality of their 'world-picture'; they spoke about 'the world' or about 'Nature' itself (27).

Planck, then, cites the scenic-orientation as the encased reality-featuring of physical science: the conception of reality is prompted by the existence and discovery of Reality. In contrast to Mach who would cite the development of reality anthropomorphically, Planck takes as "given" the scenic-orientation.

Planck's use of what he considers the encased valuing of reality is illustrated clearly when he discusses the principle of the conservation of energy early in his lecture. While "in its origin, the energy principle was . . . anthropomorphous in character," remembers Planck, "nowadays, our expression of the energy principle makes no reference to human or technological aspects . . . we no longer regard the accuracy of this statement as dependent on the precision of the methods now available to us" (8). Planck asks later, "Is there today a single physicist worthy of serious consideration who doubts the reality of the energy principle? Rather, the recognition of this reality is nowadays a prerequisite for winning any scientific respect" (25). Reality, says Planck, does exist; it functions as the motivating influence in our world-picture; it functions as the framework for knowing in physics; and, contends Planck, it functions as indicator
of the importance and validity of "unity" as the standard for knowing in physical science.

The Final Emphasis upon the Standard

Interestingly, Planck's lecture takes a decidedly different course than that which he espouses in his opening discussion. Planck does not "outline the main features of the physical world as it has been shaped, and will presumably continue to be shaped" (3). Late in the lecture, he explains that, "Certainly, one cannot establish general rules to indicate how far we may carry our confidence that we have determined the main features of the world-picture of the future. The greatest caution is called for here" (26)--caution, we may add, that Planck does not exhibit in the heat of his critique and development of the second law. The claim that he made at one time, even the justification for the claim-to-know, seems somehow lost at the conclusion of the lecture.

What is not lost, but rather highlighted, is Planck's defense of his "unity" criterion, especially unity-as-constancy. After retracting his claim to know the features of the future world-picture, Planck--astonishingly--says that such features or predictions are not really important. "These questions," he suggests, "are only secondary ones." What is crucial, he says is that a goal is recognized; that goal is the constancy of the physical world-picture. "The goal," he contends, "is not the complete adaptation of our ideas to our impressions, but
the complete liberation of the physical world-picture from the individuality of the creative mind" (26). Planck begins his statement with a claim-to-know based upon certain predictions of what "his" universal audience would demand as standards; he concludes his lecture with abandonment of his claim but tenacious defense of one of his standards.

Conclusion

In sum, Planck's Leiden lecture can be seen, from the rhetorical perspective, as an instance of valuing and knowing in the physical sciences. Clearly physical science is the realm of knowing--regardless of the use of surrogate terms such as theorems and principles. This lecture by a noted philosopher of science and physicist reveals also the valuing implicit in that knowing activity. On the basis of his review and criticism of the present subdivisions of physics, Planck claimed to know the future of the division of physics and the features of the world-picture. The criteria Planck utilized for the claim-to-know were, first, empirical validity (which he takes to be an accepted and encased criterion of physics) and, second, "unity," which again he sees as almost a self-evident physical criterion. Interestingly, Planck's claim-to-know does not meet the standard of empirical validity. The situation is not problematic, however, since Planck considers the other criterion, "unity," more important. "Unity," as conceived by Planck, is hardly the universally acceptable criterion that he postulates. He defines it first as
unity-as-coherence, which seems, for example, to preclude the more revolutionary research approaches; and, second, unity-as-constancy which excludes such physicists as Ernst Mach from Planck's conception of the universal audience. In short, Planck's lecture, seen from the rhetorical perspective, is more Planck's defense of the standards for knowing than it is a statement of the justification for knowing. Certainly, Planck does justify his claim to know the future features of the world-picture; he does introduce the standards that he predicts will be criterial to his physical science universal audience; and he does demonstrate the reality that is encased in the physics perspective. While Planck's universal audience is, of necessity, select and restricted, his treatment of the controversial criterion of unity as a standard for knowing implies a defense of the standard and not a defense of the claim: he even later relegates the claim itself to a minor position.

Planck's lecture is, then, an instance of valuing and knowing in the physical sciences. On the one hand, though Planck claims to know, his claims are based upon the standards for knowing that he values and selects. His postulation of the justification, the criteria, and the reality-framework of the claim are all examples of the valuing implicit in knowing. When we combine that valuing-knowing activity with Planck's valuing decision to disregard his claim and to stress his criterion, have we not further evidence of the importance of valuing to knowing in the physical sciences?
Summary and Synthesis

"The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle,'" Beyond Freedom and Dignity, and "The Unity of the Physical World-Picture" represent a diversity of academic authors, topics, fields, and methods. The names Max Planck, B.F. Skinner, and Kenneth Burke form a remarkably heterogeneous listing of prominent academicians. The topics of the "Jewish policy," "mankind's survival," and the nature of "physical reality" constitute a diverse agenda of obviously important problems. The fields of literary criticism, behavioral science, and physics seem, again, only remotely related. The methodologies of the humanities, the social sciences, and the physical sciences, finally, appear to be disparate. These case studies, indeed, seem to represent wide diversity within the realm of academic studies.

From the rhetorical perspective, however, the differences noted above are transcended by a common essential similarity. The major thrust of each work is its claim-to-know: Burke claims to know the spontaneity of Hitler's persecution of the Jews; Skinner claims to know the necessity of environmental control of human behavior; and Planck claims to know the nature of the future world-picture. The claim-to-know, as structured by rhetoric, is therefore the first point of essential similarity. Moreover, each claim is characterized as a claim-to-know by the valuing that the agent makes in relation to his prediction of the "universal audience's" valuing of the justification for knowing, the standards for knowing, and the featuring of reality. The justification,
standards, and reality-featuring did vary of course among authors, topics, disciplines and methodologies; such justification, standards, and reality-featuring did exist, however, and the valuing of these is the second point of essential similarity: all the knowing implied in the case studies was the result of simultaneous valuing.

Interestingly, each case represented a different emphasis in the valuing implicit in the knowing. Burke was much more concerned about his justification for knowing; as a result, he tended to spend much time establishing that justification—in relation to several standards and several potential reality-featurings. For Burke, the valuing of that justification for knowing was paramount. Planck, on the other hand, was much more concerned about the criterion of "unity" that he valued as universally necessary for a claim-to-know in the physical sciences; while he, too, valued the justification and the reality-framework of his claim, Planck's primary concern was the defense of his valuing of standards. Skinner, in contrast to both Burke and Planck, emphasized most strongly the valuing of reality; if, Skinner seems to reason, the featuring of scenic-reality can be valued as universally acceptable, then the standards and the justification for his claim to know the necessity of environmentally-centered control follow easily. Clearly, the valuing of justification, standards, and reality occurs in all three statements; that valuing is inherent in the rhetorical perspective on knowing. More importantly, however, the rhetorical perspective allows the detailed view of the valuing implicit in knowing—a view,
even, that permits the discrimination among the functions of the valuing activities in the establishment of claims-to-know.
CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS OF RHETORIC AS ARCHITECTONIC OF VALUING AND KNOWING

Summary

In The Prospect of Rhetoric, Richard McKeon speculated about rhetoric conceived of as an "architectonic art." Such an art structures all aspects of human activity instead of being merely a part of that activity. The emphasis, said McKeon, should be on the active creation, not the passive reception of the stimuli around the structuring art. My conversations with American literary critic Kenneth Burke, Belgian philosopher Chaim Perelman, and British epistemologist Stephen Toulmin had reinforced a belief I had held previously: namely, that rhetoric could indeed be developed into an architectonic art. Moreover, the theorizing of Burke, Perelman, and Toulmin--while not expressly formulating a "rhetoric as architectonic"--implicitly provides a base for such a development.

The study is limited to the development of rhetoric as architectonic of valuing and knowing--a study not meant to involve

all the possibilities suggested by the concept of architectonic.

While much work in many fields has been done in the areas of valuing (or values), knowing (or knowledge or facts), and the relationship between valuing and knowing (or their surrogates), no perspective entails the concerns of a rhetorico-architectonic perspective on valuing and knowing. Perspectives such as the logical, the philosophical, the perceptual, the semiotical, and the ideological clearly treat valuing and knowing, but none of the frameworks actively seeks to structure valuing and knowing in relation to one another; no architectonic seems even to be contemplated. Moreover, none of these perspectives provides a method for the analysis of valuing that seems actually to occur in human statements of knowing.

The major characteristics of an architectonic rhetoric of valuing and knowing can be phrased in two hypotheses: first, that valuing and knowing can be structured in relation to each other in a rhetorical perspective; and, second, that such a theoretical framework can be used as a critical tool for the insightful analysis of "knowing" in diverse academic fields. The hypotheses, being architectonically-oriented, ought to create a conception of what it is to "know" in the rhetorical sense; ought to provide a coherent statement of the relationship between valuing and knowing; and ought to explain why the rhetorical viewpoint hypothesized is indeed architectonic.

Two major thrusts comprise the investigation of the hypotheses. One is the development of the theoretical structure
of rhetoric as architectonic. That analysis involves four foci:

1. The Justification for Knowing: Valuing and the Appraisal of Claims;
2. The Standards for Knowing: Valuing and the Selection of Criteria;
3. The Framework for Knowing: Valuing and the Featuring of Reality; and
4. The Standardization and Evolution of Knowing: The Encasement and Revision of Valuing.

The second primary focus is a study of three diverse statements of knowing by scholars and researchers in the humanities, the social sciences, and the physical sciences. Included are examinations of Kenneth Burke's "The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle,'" B.F. Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity, and Max Planck's "The Unity of the Physical World-Picture." The development of the theoretical framework of rhetoric as architectonic of valuing and knowing and these three case studies provide the analysis necessary to investigate the two hypotheses.

The study of knowing—regardless of the perspective—must begin with the awareness that the question "How do you know?" is ambiguous, and that divergent interpretations of the question lead to various answers. In the context of the psychological concern for "cognizing" and the philosophical concern for a priori standards, the epistemological viewpoint has been, in a sense, a compromise of these divergent perspectives; it has tried, characteristically, to erect a priori standards and
then to analyze the meeting of those standards as a judgment of how the person, in fact, "cognizes."

The epistemological ideal, traditionally, has been assumed to be the analytical ideal. That perfect, necessary, and timeless system based upon the geometric model has been seen as the logical mold for epistemology—an epistemology, which being in contrast to opinion and values, should be perfect, timeless, and necessary. The analytico-epistemological ideal, however, fails to be ideal. The built-in limitations of the geometric model necessitate the conclusion that either the model must be modified by some non-formal system to include instances normally outside the sphere of the analytical or the system must be augmented, again, by a non-formal system. In either case, the geometric model's aura of universality and perfection is seen to diminish when the model is applied to actual human epistemological concerns.

What is needed in contrast to the geometric model, is a system which actively relies upon human activity; upon human knowing and not knowing in the abstract. The system must be both more flexible and more inclusive than the epistemological ideal of the Greeks. Such a system, it seems to me, is the rhetorical perspective on knowing and valuing as implied in the theorizing of Burke, Perelman, and Toulmin.

"Knowing" is more clearly thought of in the rhetorical sense when the term claim-to-know is used; when someone claims to know something, he postulates a claim that resembles other claims, and knowing becomes less abstract when the similarity
is recognized. Claims, in general, are established by an audience's acceptance of the reasons offered in support of the claim. The audience "weighs" the significance of the reasons and arrives at a "verdict" about the merits of the claim. What constitutes a compelling reason—or any reason at all—is the audience's judgment that, in fact, the factor presented is important enough to warrant being a reason. The audience, in activity similar to the courtroom judge's, both "creates" the reasons (by attributing significance) and renders a "justified" verdict (by then weighing the relative support for the alternative verdicts). From this perspective, claims, in general, are established by the valuing of human audiences.

Claims-to-know are established similarly. When an agent puts forth a claim-to-know, he implies that the justification for his claim is of the highest relevance and cogency—justification that is acceptable to the universe of rational and competent people. While the agent assumes that some "particular audiences" might also accept the justification, his concern transcends the narrowed interests of any particular audience. The universal audience, then, serves as the "ideal" of the rhetorical perspective, but an ideal unlike the analytical ideal. First, the postulation of universal acceptability is an admitted valuing activity—an activity involving the appraisal of claims. The rhetorical ideal differs from the analytical, secondly, in the former's acknowledgement that any postulation of such acceptability is subject to revision in light of the development of new information.
or new procedures.

While the human agent posits universal acceptability of the claim-to-know, he can do so only to the extent that the justification meets appropriate standards. For the standards to be utilized as standards for knowing, they must be the most stringent relevant to the claim; in short, the most cogent justification is provided by the claim's meeting of the most stringent criteria available. Implied in the appraisal of "universal acceptability" are criteria, first, for "acceptability" and, second, for the "universal audience." What is "acceptable" for a claim-to-know is a matter of human judgment. Human agents select the factors which are criterial to the claim and postulate these as the standards that a claim-to-know must meet; the selection and the ordering of these factors are distinctly valuing activities of an agent in relation to his prediction of the universal audience's valuing of standards. The criteria for the universal audience itself are also dependent upon human activity. In the context of the "conceptual" nature of the universal audience, the selection of the characteristics of the audience is a task that remains with the agent positing the claim. Clearly, the agent postulates but that postulation is the result of the selection of the criteria for "acceptability" and "universality"--criteria that become the standards for knowing.

The standards for knowing, however, are not selected in isolation or by caprice, but in relation to the agent's prediction of the universal audience's "featuring" of reality. Different
audiences bring different frameworks of interpretation to an allegedly objective situation, and perceive divergent "subjective" realities. The rhetorical viewpoint, indeed, is not concerned with the philosophic possibility of "a Reality," but with the various "realities" that are created by the motivational frameworks brought to bear on "objective" situations. What serves as "criterial" to the matter at hand—and therefore a standard for knowing—is dependent largely upon the interpretation of the audience. It may be, for example, "scenically-oriented" and tend to perceive events as if factors in the environment (audiences, exigencies, constraints) "caused" the event; a different audience, perceiving the same event but exhibiting an "agent" orientation, might interpret the event as being "caused" by factors related to the agent. Whether the perception is a motivational perception or whether it is merely motivated by such "causal" perspectives, the result is that divergent "reality-featurings" create different judgments of what factors in a situation are criterial. The "featuring" of reality serves therefore as both a framework in which claims-to-know are judged and as a guide to the prediction of the universal audience's standards for knowing. Here again, the importance of such featuring is obvious in the postulation of claims-to-know—and the featuring is a human valuing activity.

The rhetorical perspective explains "knowledge" and "facts" on the basis also of the valuing of the justification, standards, and framework for knowing. A "fact" is simply a claim-to-know that has been so well-accepted that its validity is no
longer questioned; "everyone" knows it. The fact is, then, an example of standardized claims-to-know that occur in relation to a discipline (or surrogate) mold. Euclidean geometry, for example, is no longer subject to further speculation. The disciplines concerned with it are so well satisfied that the system is held to be "above further discussion"; it is now an instance of standardized knowing being protected by the disciplinary mold. Such standardization of knowing also implies the encasement of relevant valuing; the valuing of the justification, standards, and framework for the claim to know Euclidean geometry is, itself, standardized—encased in the disciplinary mold that provides the claim with standardization.

Regardless of how well the "fact" is accepted or how long it has been encased, "knowledge" in the rhetorical perspective is always subject to revision. Revised valuing of the justification, standards, or framework destroys the "fact" and advances learning and knowledge. Newtonian mechanics, once universally acceptable and standardized in the mold of theoretical physics, has been replaced in part by the theories of Einstein who broke the encasement of valuing and provided a step in the evolution of knowledge.

This rhetorical perspective on valuing and knowing is not simply a passive viewpoint from which valuing and knowing in human affairs can be observed. The rhetorical perspective, rather, "creates" the structure of valuing and knowing as it has been described. Other perspectives exist, no doubt, from which
different conclusions about the relationship between valuing and knowing can be gleaned, but the rhetorical viewpoint does seem to offer an insightful architectonic perspective. The most unique feature of rhetoric as architectonic is the rhetorical emphasis upon "audiencing." The agent's justification is postulated in relation to his prediction of the universal audience's "acceptance"; the standards for knowing are the result of the agent selecting which factors will be criterial to, again, the universal audience--whose characteristics he interprets; the agent's featuring of reality is really a prediction of the valuing that the universal audience will do; and finally, the standardization and the evolution of knowing is the result of the encasement and revision of the valuing of a disciplinary (or surrogate) audience that serves as the universal ideal for the claim. "Audiencing," therefore, cannot be divorced from the development of rhetoric as architectonic of valuing and knowing.

The rhetorical emphasis upon "audiencing" allows the theorist to perceive human knowing and valuing as part of other human activity. The consolidating effect of realizing the integration of knowing with other activities is clearly a goal implied in the formulation of an architectonic art. Relatedly, the "diversity" of human knowing and valuing in the humanities, the social sciences, and the physical sciences is perceived in the rhetorical perspective as unhelpful. The valuing of justification, standards, and reality is prevalent in all intellectual endeavors and serves as a point of cohesion for the development
of rhetoric as architectonic. The knowing of claims occurs also in such widely diversified realms, though the justification, the standards, and the frameworks vary—and here, again, the humanities and the hard sciences can be included under a single architectonic perspective.

The theoretical framework of rhetoric as architectonic of valuing and knowing is indeed useful as an approach to the critique of statements of knowing. Burke, representing the humanist methodological perspective, claims to know that Hitler's Jewish policy was as much a spontaneous response to his personal needs as it was a conscious strategy. He provides much justification for his claim. The justification is so important to Burke that he introduces several potential "universal audience" reality-featurings and several divergent criteria, and then demonstrates that his justification for the claim meets all the standards for all the reality-featurings—the justification, says Burke, is especially strong. The result is Burke, literary critic and political pamphleteer, postulating a humanistic claim-to-know on the basis of the valuing of justification, standards, and frameworks for knowing.

Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity, on the other hand, is basically a claim to know that modern man must create an environment to control his own behavior. Skinner, confident of some initial agreement on the extent of the world's ills, asserts confidently that man's behavior must be intentionally and environmentally controlled. He emphasizes the "scenic-reality"
featuring in positing the unparalleled "causal" force of the environment; problems exist, Skinner contends, but the environment must be controlled to solve those problems. Skinner's defense of the scenic framework for knowing allows him to invoke certain standards for knowing relevant to the matter at hand. Of the three he introduces, "freedom," "dignity," and "survival," only survival is consistent with the scenic-orientation—the others die with the death of "autonomous man." Since survival is so crucial—and it is the only standard consistent with scenic-orientation—Skinner's claim seems assured of universal acceptance. Skinner's claim to know the necessity of environmental control is similar to Burke's claim, in being an example of the valuing and knowing of academic statements, but it differs primarily in its emphasis upon the reality-featuring.

Max Planck's claim to know the future world-picture is an example of a claim-to-know in the physical sciences. Planck's contention is that the difference between reversible and irreversible physical processes will be the dominant feature of the world-picture and the deciding factor in the future division of physics. While the claim does not meet the standard of empirical validity, Planck clearly indicates a concern more important than the empirical standard for knowing; that concern is for the "unity" of the world-picture. Planck emphasizes the standards of unity-as-coherence and unity-as-constancy, eventually, to the exclusion of concern for his original claim-to-know. The criterion of unity, he says, is most important—and claims to
know the future of the world-picture can never be "proved" and are, in addition, of secondary importance. Planck's attack upon Ernst Mach and the "revolutionary method" of physical progress in general provides solid reason to conclude that, though Planck valued justification and a featured-reality, his chief concern was for the standard for knowing.

Clearly, the three case studies are examples of diverse authors, topics, fields, and methods. These differences seem of minor significance in comparison to the major similarity of valuing and knowing that is exhibited by each statement. The interesting difference that does emerge is the varying emphasis that the authors placed on various aspects of the valuing that is implicit in knowing—a point best left for comment later.

Conclusions in Relation to the Hypotheses

The hypotheses of the study were, first, that valuing and knowing can be structured in relation to one another in the rhetorical perspective; and, second, that such a framework can be used as a critical tool for the insightful analysis of knowing in apparently diverse academic fields. Those hypotheses can now be discussed and evaluated.

The conception of rhetoric as architectonic, it seems to me, does provide a method to structure the relationship between valuing and knowing. To the questions posed in regard to the hypotheses, we can reply that "to know" means to be able to postulate the universal acceptability of claims based on universally
acceptable standards that are criterial to the reality-featuring of the universal audience. We "know" by tacitly or overtly specifying the valuing we predict for the universal audience. The relationship between valuing and knowing is such that "knowing" without "valuing" seems a contradiction in terms. The "knowing" question is so inherently involved with the human valuing of justification, standards, and frameworks, that knowing is seen as the result of valuing. The valuing-knowing relationship is indeed a close one as structured by rhetoric as an architectonic art.

The value of that structuring, however, is another question which brings us to a concern for the second hypothesis; namely, that such a framework can be useful in the critique of diverse academic statements of knowing. On the basis of the case studies of Burke, Skinner, and Planck, I submit that the judgment of the hypothesis should be positive. While differences in topics, fields, and methods were obvious, none of these differences precluded a consistent approach to valuing and knowing. Burke, the humanist, made claims-to-know similar to the claims of the physical scientist Planck; while his justification, standards, and featured reality differed from Planck's, Burke's claim was nonetheless the postulation of universal acceptability based on his valuing of reality and standards. The claim-to-know, as structured by an architectonic rhetoric, did not seem out-of-place in the humanities.

On the other hand, Skinner and Planck's claims-to-know were revealed as results of the same valuing made by Burke. Their claims, seen in this perspective, are not the reports of
revealed "Truth"; on the contrary, the claims were justified, and that justification was deemed universally acceptable. Skinner and Planck each appraised their claims, selected what they valued as the most stringent standards, and featured the reality which, in their judgment, seemed most universally acceptable. While the standards and the nature of the justification varied, the basic relationship between valuing and knowing--as structured by rhetoric as architectonic--remained consistently capable of answering insightfully "How does he know?"

Support for both hypotheses was found. Valuing and knowing, it seems, can indeed be structured coherently in relation to one another, and that architectonic framework can serve as a fruitful approach to the study of statements of knowing at various academic levels.

Implications of the Study

The implications of the study are not limited to those directly related to the hypotheses. The results suggest several other conclusions related to the study of rhetoric, intellectual pursuits in general, and the nature of knowing specifically. First, this study suggests that a conception of rhetoric as architectonic--in all its aspects--is indeed feasible. The human activities of knowing and valuing are omnipresent, but they do not exhaust the concerns of an art that structures all doing, making, and knowing; the structuring of valuing and knowing in relation to one another is only one of many tasks implied in
the development of an architectonic art. The analysis here, 
however, may serve as evidence that such tasks are possible and 
potentially insightful.

Relatedly, the possibility of a rhetoric as architectonic 
has implications for the scope of rhetoric. The present study 
provides refutation that rhetoric can be conceived as operative 
in only the realm of values. Clearly, the traditional rhetorical 
emphasis upon valuing is prizeable, but the rhetorical structuring 
of valuing in relation to knowing suggests that "knowledge," 
"facts," "epistemology," and human-reported "Truth" are all within 
the realm of rhetorical studies. Epistemology can be studied 
in any number of fields; it is rhetoric, however, which is perhaps 
uniquely capable of examining all fields. That capacity is revealed 
in the present inquiry.

The study also has implications for intellectual pursuit 
in general. The study of values and the study of knowledge, 
for example, are not always considered consonant or even related 
remotely. The architectonic perspective on knowing, however, 
presumes that valuing activities are inherent in human knowing. 
This examination, in fact, provides support to doubt the existence 
of any clear distinction between the human activities of valuing 
and knowing. When knowing is conceived as the result of simultaneous 
valuing of justification, standards, and frameworks for knowing, 
is there not occasion to ask, "Then is not knowing merely multi­
faceted valuing?" The question is not unique. Rhetoricians, 
more than others, perhaps, have been at times willing to dispense
with the man-made walls between inseparable processes and things; on the other hand, this study provides a detailed rationale for the claim that valuing and knowing are not two separable processes. The transcending of the valuing-knowing dichotomy is not only implied, but expected, in the application of an architectonic art to intellectual pursuits.

Further, if we may report doubt about the advantages to be gained by "separating" knowing and valuing, we may also conclude that the "divisions" among the humanities, the social sciences, and the physical sciences are not totally distinct. This study presents reason to conclude that, for example, "knowing" is not alien to humanistic studies; nor is "valuing" absent in the physical sciences. Burke, Planck, and Skinner's statements all contained reflections of their author's belief that "he knew." Though the nature of justification, standards, frameworks, and encasement-standardizations varied, the claims-to-know—and the activities that can be seen entailed in the claim—are remarkably similar. That the application of the theoretical structure accounts for some of this perceived similarity is undeniable; on the other hand, those "similarities"—even if partially "created"—are not to be spurned, but to be pursued in the attempt to structure, rhetorically, and architectonically, human intellectual pursuit.

It seems to me, moreover, that we cannot ignore the implications of the study in relation to "knowledge" itself. From the rhetorical perspective, "knowledge" is not something to be
discovered; it is something to be, first, generated as a claim-to-know, and then, standardized in an intellectual mold. The rhetorical framework, seen in this light, is wholly, and unapologetically, anthropomorphic: man did not "create" the atom, but on the other hand, our conception of "atom" is, in fact, a thing that has been created. That "creation," that "generation of knowing," is the legitimate task of an architectonic productive art. Rhetoric creates the relationship between valuing and knowing by creating a conception of that relationship--a conception that could, in fact, become standardized itself.

Related to the question of the creation of knowing is the question of the structure of knowing activities. While each study revealed a human agent valuing justification, standards, and frameworks for knowing, each author tended to emphasize a different aspect of the valuing activities; Burke emphasized the appraisal of justification, while Skinner stressed the featuring of reality, and Planck emphasized the selection of standards. My first reaction to the surprising situation was that here might be a way in which to better structure intellectual pursuit--on the basis of its efforts to present justification, defend standards, or feature reality.

That first reaction, I now feel, was unwise. While Skinner's featuring of scenic-reality served what I saw as a context for a claim-to-know, it was not essentially different from a "real" claim-to-know. Whether the valuing judgment served
to appraise justification, to select standards, or to feature reality, the valuing is largely indistinguishable—except by function—in relation to other valuations. Just as knowing as the result of valuing is not essentially dissimilar from valuing per se, the aspects of that valuing are also not formally distinct.

A Final Question and the Ultimate Implication of the Study

The "use" of standardized knowings and encased valuations in the establishment of claims raises a crucial final question: "Is not the structure of rhetoric as architectonic merely an extended enthymemtic device?" The answer, I think, is a firm "no." First, the architectonic framework developed here is a much more detailed approach to the use of "implied premises." The knowing that is standardized and the valuing that is encased interact among the aspects of the claim-to-know more dynamically than a single missing premise. If this is merely an elaboration of the enthymeme, then, I am still satisfied: the modification developed here provides the kind of advance in intellectual pursuit that we discussed as the "evolution of knowledge"—an unashamed building, borrowing, and refinement of standardized knowing. That advance is a yield of the study.

The second response to the question of the enthymeme is more significant. The enthymeme, according to Aristotle, is to be used in the establishment of non-certain propositions or propositions that are only probable; the syllogism, in contrast, is seen as the vehicle for the development and presentation of
"facts," "certain propositions," or "truth." The present alteration in that classical analysis is, first, that the syllogism is inadequate to deal with some important human questions of knowing; and, second, that an architectonically-refined "enthymeme" (if one wants to use the term at all), is a legitimate approach to "facts," "knowledge," and human-reported "truth." That alteration in the realm of classical study seems to be a significant advance.

While rhetoric conceived as architectonic differs meaningfully from the classically-defined and utilized enthymeme, the traditional use of the enthymeme suggests what is probably the ultimate implication of the development of an architectonic rhetoric. The ancients envisioned the enthymeme as both a vehicle for the interpretation of arguments and a model for the generation of arguments concerning the contingent; the result is that the enthymeme allows us both to understand and create arguments about probable situations. Similarly, while the study is of an architectonic rhetoric that allows the interpretation of claims-to-know, might it not also be utilized as a tool for the generation of claims-to-know and, ultimately, "knowledge"? The result would be analogous to the yield from the use of the enthymeme: we could not only understand, but also, create human knowledge via the formulation, establishment, and justification of claims-to-know. That ultimate implication of rhetoric responds to the ultimate character of an architectonic art. An architectonic art should create, not merely critique, the elements it structures. Such
a responsibility is fulfilled as rhetoric is conceived as an art that generates human knowing in the context of human valuing.

The conclusion, I think, is apparent. The rhetorical development of the relationship between valuing and knowing is one that emphasizes human activity and human responsibility for the generation, justification, and standardization of knowing. Knowing is inherently involved with what, traditionally, we have called valuing—the weighing of justification, the selecting of standards, the featuring of a perspective on reality, and the deciding of the status of standardized knowings and encased valuations. Rhetoric as architectonic demands that knowing is viewed as a result of valuing and that both valuing and knowing are perceived as distinctively human activities.
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