INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeib Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
THE EAGLE AND THE CRESCENT: AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1861-1870

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Jean Haythorne Braden, B.S., A.M.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1973

Approved by

[Signature]
Adviser
Department of History
PREFACE

Whatever one may think of the state created by the descendants of Osman (or Othman), the Ottoman Empire was for long the most important political fact in the Middle East. From Mehmet II's reception of the Italian ambassadors until the reign of Sultan Abdul Aziz, the Turks experienced continual political and commercial relations with other nations and gained considerable "expertise" in foreign relations. In the nineteenth century the Sick Man of Europe grew steadily weaker, yet the ministers of the Sultan retained their old diplomatic skill. The roar of cannon from a United States naval warship during the Barbary Wars announced to the Turks that a new nation, on the western edges of George III's dominions, had been born. Henceforward, Americans and Turks entered into increasingly intimate relations.

The purpose of this dissertation is to trace the course of Turkish-American relations during Edward Joy Morris' tenure as Minister Resident to the Sublime Porte. Morris, a Philadelphia journalist and dilettante politician, displayed considerable skill in smoothing Turkish-American relations during the darkest days of the American Civil War. Although appointed as Minister because of his political machinations on behalf of Lincoln, Morris quickly developed his latent facility for learning Eastern languages. Of Morris' despatches, no less a historian than Harry N. Howard has remarked: "They well repay
further study, not merely for his record of honorable service to the United States in what was then a far off corner of the world, on the periphery of American interest, but for what he was and what he thought about men and matters." (See "President Lincoln's Minister Resident to the Sublime Porte: Edward Joy Morris (1861-1870)," Balkan Studies, Volume 5, No. 2, 1964, p. 220).

At the other extreme, this present work attempts to outline American diplomacy's impact upon Turkey, during the crucial years of political reform under Fuad Pasha and Ali Pasha. Turkish politicians of the liberal party were mightily concerned with attitudes toward them displayed by the avowedly liberal government in Washington.

Although the United States possessed little in the way of trading interests in the Middle East, cultural ties were strong. Palestine, ruled by the Caliph, was biblical country which God-fearing Americans regarded with reverential awe. Missionaries sent by the American Board of Commissioners for the Foreign Missions, continually alerted Protestant churchmen to important events in the Eastern Mediterranean. The missionaries made certain that a continuous flow of information was maintained from the Near East to the Far West.

Insofar as a dissertation devoted to Turkic historical studies requires a theoretical framework, communications theory fills the need. It is evident that Americans were interested in the Middle East to a far greater extent than their trading interests could
justify. A large part of American interest in that region must fall under the rubrics of religion, sentiment, and information. Hence, in this study particular attention is devoted to the role the press played in shaping public opinion about the Near East. One fact is obvious at the outset: it is that the information provided by missionaries for the folks back home was biased and antipathetic to Turkish interests. Many missionaries and western journalists proceeded upon the confident assumption that the Terrible Turk belonged to a retrograde race of Devil-worshippers. Hence, the role of the press is crucial to any understanding of American policy in the Near East in the nineteenth century.

So far as the press is concerned, I have attempted to select newspapers representative of opinion in the United States and Great Britain. Of special importance were the New York Herald and the New York Daily Tribune because they had correspondents stationed in Constantinople who wrote regular letters for their newspapers. The main British journal consulted was The Times of London—as it usually attempted to defend Ottoman policy.

The matter of using correct geographic terms is always a vexing one. Attempting to be consistent, I shall use Constantinople instead of Istanbul because the term "Istanbul" was not used in diplomatic circles until after the Kemalist reform period. In as many instances as practicable, I shall place the modern Turkish version of place-names in parentheses beside the English name. I shall use the terms Bosphorus, Dardanelles, and Golden Horn because
because the Turkish names for these bodies of water are little-known in the West.

Private papers of a number of American and British statesmen have been used in preparing this study. Foremost among these are the William Henry Seward Papers housed in the Rush Rhees Library at the University of Rochester. Other sources used included the Charles Sumner Papers, the Howe Family Papers, the Charles Eliot Norton Papers in the Houghton Library, Harvard University; the Hamilton Fish Papers and the Papers of Gideon Wells located in the Manuscript Room of the Library of Congress. On the British side, the Clarendon Papers and the Hammond Family Papers were consulted; both collections are housed in the Public Records Office, London. As for the personal views of the missionaries, the American Board of Commissioners for the Foreign Missions records located in the Houghton Library were consulted.

Much of the information for this dissertation was found in records of the United States Department of State. Record Group 59 of these includes all official correspondence between consuls, the Minister Resident, and the Secretary of State. In addition, Record Group 84 contains letters addressed to the Minister and the consuls by private individuals, correspondence between American diplomatic officers and naval officers, communications from foreign embassies and legations, notes addressed to the American Legation by the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and many other important
documents. This group of records is usually referred to as the post
papers. Navy Department Records of the European Squadron (Record
Group 45) supplied material for interpretation of naval policy in the
Eastern Mediterranean. The Turkish Foreign Office Archives (Dişigleri
Bakanlığı Arşivi) and the Turkish National Archives (Başbakanlık
Arşivi) provided materials offering a different view of American
diplomatic activity.

The staffs of many libraries have been helpful in gathering
the materials for this manuscript; among them the Houghton Library,
Rush Rhees Library, the Library of Congress, and the British Museum,
Archivists at the Public Records Office (Great Britain), Turkish
Foreign Office Archives, Turkish National Archives, and the National
Archives (United States) rendered invaluable assistance to me through
their knowledge of various idiosyncratic methods of cataloging. It
may be permissible to extend a special note of appreciation to
Turgut İşiksal of the Başbakanlık Arşivi who gave me assistance in
locating Ottoman documents, and who made it possible for me to obtain
permission to do research in those archives.

Funds for the initial research and travel required for this
dissertation were provided by the Department of History at The Ohio
State University. Pangs of writing were eased by a dissertation
fellowship from the Great Lakes College Association and the National
Endowment to the Humanities. After traveling from the Middle West
to the Middle East, I settled in to write at the Library of Congress.
Here I received invaluable aid from Abraham Bodurgil, the Turkish
Area Specialist at the Library of Congress. His extensive information about Turkey and the Turks was essential to completing this work. In addition, Casimir Petraitis, former Professor of Arabic Philosophy at the University of Benghazi (Libya), placed his vast knowledge of the Islamic world at my disposal.

Special thanks is due Professor Sydney Nettleton Fisher whose advice and friendship extending over many years have profoundly influenced my work. I owe him a further debt of gratitude for his care in reading this manuscript and for making numerous constructive suggestions. It is not too much to say that his influence alone was enough to persuade me to enter the field of Turkic studies. His long experience of life in Istanbul has made him keenly sympathetic to Turkish problems. Indeed, he encouraged me in my desire to travel to Istanbul--there to study the sources. Taken all in all, one could hardly have hoped for a more satisfactory adviser.
VITA

June, 1951 .................. B. S. (Biological Science and History), The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

August, 1962 ............... M. A. (Middle East History), The Ohio State University

1965 ........................ NDEA, Georgetown University, Washington, D. C.

1967 ........................ NDFL, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey

1952-1966 .................... Teacher, Southwestern City Schools, Grove City, Ohio

1966-1969 .................... Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University

1969-1970 .................... GLCA Teaching Fellowship, Middle East History, DePauw University, Greencastle, Indiana

1973 ........................ Lecturer, Department of History, Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field of Study: Middle East History
Adviser: Professor Sydney Nettleton Fisher

American Foreign Policy

Ancient Near East

Jewish History
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## Preface

Page 11

## Vita

Page viii

### Chapter

I. Turkey at Mid-Tanzimat: The Background to American Diplomacy in the Near East  
   Page 1

II. American Sources of Information about the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Reaction: A Communications Analysis, 1861-1870  
   Page 28

III. The Sultan, the Emperor, and King Cotton: The Impact of the Civil War on Turkish-American Relations  
   Page 77

IV. Protégés, Prostitutes, and Protests  
   Page 116

V. The Protestant Campaign  
   Page 156

VI. Missionaries, Mad Dogs, and Englishmen: Travelers and Bandits in Turkey  
   Page 201

VII. Innocence Abroad  
   Page 247

VIII. Un Movement Politique en Syrie  
   Page 286

IX. Cretans and Crackpots: American Interest in the Eastern Question  
   Page 317

X. Turkish Reaction to American Interests in the Eastern Question  
   Page 365

XI. Missionaries and Monitors: The Founding of Robert College  
   Page 405

XII. Conclusion  
   Page 450

Bibliography  
Page 458
Long regarded as the "Sick Man of Europe," the Ottoman Empire was unconscionably long in dying. In fact, it lasted nearly as long as the other multi-national empires in Europe: Russia, Austria-Hungary, and (after 1871) Bismarck's Second Reich. All of these conservative empires shared similar problems and characteristics. They all lay east of Europe's Rhenish Axis, the holy brown Rhine, and all were suspicious of western European ideologies such as liberalism, bonapartism, and republicanism. But to the conservative eastern empires, the most dangerous ideology of all was nationalism. For nationalism was fundamentally in opposition to the imperial idea. Imperialists in Constantinople, St. Petersburg, and Vienna all recognized in nationalism their mortal enemy. Indeed, all four empires died of it.

In the context of Metternichian Europe after 1815, Turkey played a supporting role. Representatives of the Sultan were neither invited to the Congress of Vienna in 1815 nor (since the Sultan had not yet been baptized) welcomed into the Holy Alliance. But given
the conservative tone of Metternichism, Turkey was at least in tune with western European development. Alas, this happy state of affairs did not last. For in 1821 erupted what became known as the Greek War of Independence. So powerful was the growth of philhellenic sentiment (coupled with Byron's last sacrifice at Missolonghi) that the Metternichian powers actually intervened on the side of the Greeks. In other words, the chief guarantors of a conservative Europe, Britain, France, and Russian, finished up supporting a nationalist revolution. Outraged, the Grand Turk was forced by the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople (Edirne) to acquiesce in the creation of an independent Greek monarchy.1

From a purely American standpoint, the Greek revolution was significant. It permitted American intellectuals such as Samuel Gridley Howe to reinforce their republicanism with practical experience in leading Greek revolutionists into battle. Howe and his fellows thus became acknowledged experts on the Eastern Question upon their return home to New England; at the same time their philhellenism allowed them to become vehement Turcophobes. Almost Byronic in their love of Greece, Americans such as Howe constituted what may be called the Missolonghi Generation in national politics. They hated the Terrible Turk and dwelt upon Turkish atrocities during the 1821-9 War. Unfortunately, the Missolonghi Generation influenced American diplomacy well into the

reformist Tanzimat period, yet men such as Samuel Gridley Howe refused to distinguish between good Turks and bad Turks. Hence, American politicians were given no chance to develop the pro-Turkish attitudes which existed in some British Tory circles.

Diplomatically speaking, the Greek War for Independence was significant in that it brought together an unlikely triumvirate of powers: Britain, France, and Russia. Parliamentarian Britain, lately-revolutionary France, and Czarist Russia had united against Turkish interests as one would have expected Christian countries to do. Shortly, this philhellenic coalition fell apart and the powers resumed their accustomed quarreling. By the eve of the Crimean War, each of the three proto-philhellenic powers had developed its separate Eastern policy, in the absence of any Greek Question serving to bind them together. Britain maintained considerable trading interests in the Levant which made her determined to retain a dominant voice in affairs of the Ottoman Empire. France had emerged as Protector of Christendom's holy places and moreover, Napoleon's nephew (recently crowned as Napoleon III) was eager to emulate his ancestor's exploits in the East. Finally, the Czar saw himself as heir to Byzantium and as protector of Orthodox Christianity.

The inevitable collision of French, British, and Russian interests resulted in what is known as the Crimean War, 1854-56. In that war the Anglo-French discovered a common interest in defending Turkey against Russian encroachment. Hence, Britain and France played the role of Turcophile powers while only Russia remained
committed to the idea of annexing more Turkish territory. Defeated in
the Crimea, the Russian Bear retired to his lair to plan revenge and
to seek allies. As it happened, the onset of the American Civil War
in 1861 forced the governments in Washington and St. Petersburg into
increasingly intimate relations. Both powers had played the role of
Turcophobes in the past, and both had grievances against the
Anglo-French axis. Russia had lost the Crimean War to Bonapartist and
British armies. Lincoln's government felt similarly that Anglo-French
influence was being thrown upon the side of Jefferson Davis. In these
circumstances, it was not surprising that a Russo-American front
appeared to develop over the Eastern Question, at least until the
foundling of Robert College above Rumeli Hisar in 1868.

Mr. Lincoln and Alexander II, Old Abe and the young Czar,
possessed diplomatic interests in common. Both Russia and America
had reason to challenge the Anglo-French status quo embalmed in the
1856 Treaty of Paris, which had concluded the Crimean War. Both
countries wished to see the Straits opened to warships, and both
possessed significant influence with the Sublime Porte. Indeed, both
countries had suffered recent injury at the instigation of the
Bonapartists (not to mention Napoleon I's 1812 invasion of Russia).
After all, Maximilian's Mexican Empire was created in defiance of the
sacred Monroe Doctrine. In fact, both rulers achieved fame as
emancipators: Alexander II ended serfdom in 1861 and Lincoln slavery
in 1863. The Russo-American front possessed clients within the
Ottoman Empire who clamored for attention. In the Russian case it was
the Orthodox population; in the American case it was the Protestant missionaries. Both countries saw themselves as possessing a holy mission to succour fellow Christians languishing under Turkish rule.

As the summer of 1861 descended upon the Ottoman capital, rumors of the death of Sultan Abdul Mecid became numerous. On the morning of June 25, 1861, American residents of Constantinople observed (from Seraglio Point) increased activity in the vicinity of the Sultan's palace. There could be seen passing carriages filled with Turkish ladies who were weeping. All too soon it was evident that the rumors had been true; Abdul Mecid was dead. At noon on the same day, Abdul Aziz, younger brother of the dead ruler, was proclaimed Sultan of the Ottomans. He received the customary salutations from diplomats at the Sublime Porte and from important dignitaries of the Empire. Prayer was offered by the Şeyhülislâm before the new Sultan returned across the Golden Horn to the palace of Dolmabâche. Criers were despatched into the streets to proclaim: "Abdul Aziz is raised to the throne! May he live 1,000 years!"^2

Abdul Mecid's funeral procession was led by a battalion of soldiers, followed by the civilian and military employees of the Sublime Porte, the ulema, and the Ministers of State. Fifty Arab holymen from Mecca recited prayers and verses from the Koran. Amid

---

the attendants for Abdul Mecid rode Riza Pasha, the Minister who fell from power by the death of his Master. At the rear of the procession rode Ottoman army officers who threw coins to the people along the way. The cortège passed through the courtyard of Hagia Sophia (Aya Sofya) to the tomb which the late Sultan had built, near the resting place of Sultan Selim III.³

Contemporary observers of the Ottoman scene hailed the accession of Abdul Aziz as a signal for speedy reform. Those who were personally acquainted with the new Sultan claimed he was the reverse of his rather indolent brother. Abdul Aziz was very fond of horses and reputed to be a skillful horseman. In addition to equestrianism, he was fond of other outdoor sports such as shooting, fishing, and yachting. Nineteenth century liberals were pleased to hear that the new Sultan was thrifty in the management of his personal household, abstaining from using tobacco, wines, and concubines; he preferred but one wife. The Sultan had endured strenuous exercises in order to harden his body to excessive fatigue. He was a practicing Muslim eager to follow in the footsteps of his great ancestors; this trait heartened conservatives and worried liberals. It was also known that he was influenced in both official and private affairs by his mother, Pertevniyal. This Circassian wife of Mahmud II, Abdul Aziz's father, was greatly respected for her benevolence toward the poor of all religions. In general, journalists and diplomats remarked upon

³The Times (London), July 8, 1861, p. 10; October 14, 1862, p. 8; Sir Henry Bulwer to Lord Russell, August 21, 1862, Despatch 180, BFO 78/1575; see enclosure.
Abdul Aziz's striking resemblance to his father, a generous and progressive ruler. 4

One of the first acts of the new Sultan was to issue a solemn declaration proclaiming equality before the law of all Ottoman subjects; this reform had been inaugurated during the reign of Abdul Mecid. The Imperial Hatti (decree) delivered by the Sultan was very liberal in spirit and recommended that his ministers introduce order and economy into administration. Abdul Aziz confirmed the ministers and public functionaries in their posts with the exception of Riza Pasha, who was exiled. Setting an example of economy to be followed, the Sultan dismissed 500 palace servants. Within a matter of weeks all of the important posts in the government were consolidated by Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha, the two men who, more than any others, shaped the course of Turkish history during the second half of the nineteenth century. 5

Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha (1815-1871) was reputed to be the son of a "keeper of one of the gates of the city wall." 6


early age, he entered the government service upon the recommendation of Reshid Pasha. As an employee of the Translation Bureau (tercume odası), he learned French. Ali's new skill was first put to the test by an appointment as second secretary to the Ottoman Embassy in Vienna. While serving in Vienna, he continued to study French and European culture and was ultimately returned to Constantinople as Grand Interpreter to the Divan. Ali served as charge d' affaires in London and as Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs before his appointment as Ottoman Ambassador to England, a position he held four years. Between 1844 and 1846, Ali served as a member of the Supreme Council of State and Justice, Chancellor of the Imperial Divan, and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Reshid Pasha. He served as Minister of Foreign Affairs most of the period between 1846-1852. Raised to the highest Ottoman office that of Grand Vezir for the first time in 1852, Ali seemed to have reached the pinnacle of his career. Increased political agitation in the streets and rejection of an Ottoman loan precipitated his early removal and appointment as Governor of Brusa. The Crimean War forced his return to Constantinople where he served as president of the Council of Tanzimat and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Prior to the death of Abdul Mecid, Ali Pasha had represented the Porte at a Conference in Vienna, served as an active member of the Conference in Paris, and was twice appointed Grand Vezir. But always, he remained the president of the Council of Tanzimat. Under Abdul Aziz, he served as Minister of Foreign Affairs almost continuously until his appointment as Grand Vezir in 1867. After the death of Fuad Pasha in the
spring of 1869, Mehmet Emin Ali Pasha held both the office of Grand Vezir and that of Minister of Foreign Affairs.  

Through hard work and devotion to his task, Ali Pasha acquired a good knowledge of European history and world affairs. An incident occurred in March, 1868, which revealed the interests of this great Ottoman statesman. Fires were a frequent hazard of life in Constantinople. Many of the houses were constructed of wood and the streets were narrow and crooked. Early one morning Ali Pasha's home, a large wooden edifice, was discovered to be on fire. Soldiers from the barracks of the War Department, opposite Ali's home, were called in to rescue the Grand Vezir's most treasured possession, his library. Ali had been a devoted collector of books and his library contained rare manuscripts in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. Fortunately, most of the treasured manuscripts were saved, but Ali lost a large collection of foreign printed books.

The other great reforming minister of the mid Tanzimat period was Keçecizade Mehmed Fuad Pasha (1815-1869), the son of a distinguished Ottoman poet and scholar. As a young man, Fuad had all the

---


privileges associated with a wealthy and socially prominent family.

At the proper age, he was entered into the Medical School at
Galatasaray in Constantinople. After graduation, he served as an
officer in the army medical corps. Fuad Pasha left the army to enter
the Translation Bureau where his excellent knowledge of French made
him the logical choice for First Dragoman to the Sublime Porte.

Official awareness of Fuad’s exceptional ability prompted an appoint-
ment as secretary to the Ottoman Embassy in London. Following that
appointment, Fuad went on special diplomatic missions to Egypt, Spain,
Russia, and France. He thus acquired experience to match his educa-
tion and family position. In 1852, Fuad was appointed Minister of
Foreign Affairs, a position he held five times during his distin-
guished career. Within the same year, his political colleague, Ali
Pasha, was appointed Grand Vezir. These two reformers worked together
for the next seventeen years.9

For Turkish reformers, the world of the 1860’s provided a
number of political ideologies which might conceivably have been
imported into the Ottoman Empire. These were liberalism, Bonapartism,
republicanism, and absolutism. Since Turkey was already an absolute
monarchy (at least in theory), Turkish intellectuals could examine

---

9 Millingen devoted two chapters of his book to the develop-
ment and career of Fuad Pasha; see La Turquie sous le Règne d’
Abdul Aziz (1862-1867), op. cit., pp. 272-326. Also see A. D.
Mordtmann, Stammbul, op. cit., pp. 25-26 and Roderic H. Davison,
Reform in the Ottoman Empire, op. cit., pp. 88-93.
the absolutist government of Franz Joseph, what should be called the Austrian model of development, with peculiar understanding and sympathy. As a multi-national empire, Austria possessed problems and aspirations similar to those of Turkey. Although Austria usually enjoyed the good will of the other Great Powers her Slavic masses looked to Russia for guidance, just as did Greeks and Romanians under Turkish suzerainty. Beaten by Bismarck in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, the Austrians were conscious of being a defeated empire, excluded from the mainstream of European events. Finally, unrest among members of the Austrian empire's largest minority resulted in the Ausgleich (or compromise) of 1867. Hungarians were given co-equal status as a governing race within the newly proclaimed Dual Monarchy. Here was food for thought for those Turks who argued that only federalism could solve Turkey's divisive minority problems.

What may be called the Bonapartist model of development also attracted some Turkish support. Napoleon III's emphasis upon internal development of France provided Turks with another image of how to modernize the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Bonapartist France illustrated how the idea of empire (or imperialism) could be combined with the ideas of both nationalism and revolution. Indeed, the vigor displayed by Ferdinand de Lesseps in building the Suez Canal seemed to prove that the Second Empire's technological achievements could be exported to the East. All that was needed was a revolution to equal that of 1789 in France and an Emperor to equal Napoleon I. Alas, these commodities were lacking in nineteenth century Turkey.
Accordingly, the Bonapartist model hardly answered Turkey's needs in mid-nineteenth century. Nonetheless, up to 1867, Napoleon III's premier role in Europe (and Mexico) caused Turkish intellectuals to study Bonapartist military and diplomatic achievements with care.

For Turkish reformers such as Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha, liberalism seemed to hold the most promise for Turkey's future development. The premier model for liberalism was Britain. Queen Victoria's mild (and thoroughly correct) rule showed how monarchy could be combined with parliamentarianism. Indeed, Ali Pasha was something of an Anglophile as a result of spending nearly four years as a diplomat in London. On Sultan Abdul Aziz's tour to the European capitals during the summer of 1867, Fuad Pasha and Ali Pasha insisted upon sending the Ottoman leader to England so that worthy could observe the workings of British government and society. Fuad Pasha was especially anxious for the Sultan to notice that liberalism did not necessarily conflict with monarchism. One must suppose that the Sultan granted this last point, for upon his return home he tacitly supported the liberal programs of Ali and Fuad.

As a nineteenth century liberal reformer, Ali wanted above all else to provide good government for Turkey. By 1867, during the Cretan revolt, he advocated allowing all Ottoman subjects to hold public office, improved public educational facilities, and a new civil code based on the Code Napoleon. Ali was convinced the Ottoman Empire could continue to exist only if there was real equality for all Ottoman subjects. A well organized individual, he planned
carefully for the future of the Empire. He desired peace so internal reform could develop in an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary manner. Ali's patience was unlimited and his emotions were always under control. Rather than precipitate a national or ministerial crisis, he often postponed difficult problems indefinitely. Any problem which caused unnecessary antagonism between the diverse groups within the Ottoman society was distasteful to him. Thus, Ali opposed Protestant and Catholic missionary proselytism throughout the Empire.

No matter in which capacity he served the Empire, Ali played the game of manipulation with great skill. On liberal policies opposed by the Sultan or conservatives, Ali often convinced his opposition that changes had been imposed upon him by the European powers. Ali skillfully used this technique on social groups, all religious leaders, foreign enemies, political opponents, and foreign diplomats. He played one group against another in order to put into effect policies which he believed would result in preservation of the Empire. Even though Ali Pasha was considered a liberal, he did not favor constitutional or parliamentary government for Turkey. He was convinced that the masses were too uneducated for such a process. With a fine disregard for syntax one of his contemporaries wrote, Ali Pasha

---

10 Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, op. cit., p. 85.

11 Ibid.
"was better able than any other to realise what the Turkish people had need of."\(^{12}\)

Even though Ali favored westernization, modernization, and secularism, Fuad was more western in his thinking and habits. Roderic H. Davison, a modern Ottoman historian, has preserved one of Fuad's comments on religion: "Islam was for centuries, in its environment, a wonderful instrument of progress. Today it is a clock which is behind time and must be set."\(^ {13}\) Fuad's major objective was administrative reform and modernization. The encroachment of European powers on Ottoman territory and the growth of nationalism necessitated a firm policy. Men of the same political persuasion as Fuad were convinced that the non-Muslim subjects must be incorporated within the total Ottoman society. If non-Muslims had a vested interest in the Empire, so the liberals reasoned, they would not be tempted by local national leaders or foreign agitators. Fuad was convinced the key to the continuation of the Ottoman state was retrenchment in economic matters, toleration and equality between all religious groups, and administrative reform of all existing Ottoman institutions.

As in all political situations, aspiring political figures were constantly attempting to undermine the position of Fuad and Ali. The two parties of conflicting opinion in Turkey were the conservatives

---

\(^{12}\) Sommerville Story, The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 90.

\(^{13}\) Roderic H. Davison, \textit{Reform in the Ottoman Empire}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 90.
and reformists. The reformists or liberals maintained that the
country was menaced by the turbaned gentry who were opposed to any
change of ancient customs. Liberals were convinced that if the
conservatives ever gained control they would rid the country of
steamers, railways, telegraphs, state schools, libraries, the opera,
and the Europeans who had introduced these conveniences. Liberals
favored adoption of the European methods of modernization and
secularization.

Fuad and Ali belonged to the liberal order of things. Sultan
Abdul Aziz seldom entertained personal sympathy for the plans of his
great ministers. But, the Sultan was animated with a desire to see
Turkey enter the path of good government and prosperity. Because of
this earnest desire, the Sultan transferred considerable power into
the hands of his two ministers. With the inauguration of many
progressive reforms, a host of jealous conservative opponents sprang
up on all sides. The Sultan knew that Fuad and Ali were rivals for
his power. He also knew that both were dedicated to limiting the
power of the Sultan. Because of these general fears, the Sultan was
always willing to listen to the suggestions of the Şeyhülislâm and the
conservative party who looked upon Fuad in particular, as a little
short of a Giaour (or infidel).

The Sultan possessed both a suspicious temperament and a
defective education. Conflicting counsels which he received confused
and disturbed him. It was said that during times of severe crisis
that he would give way to feelings bordering on despair. At one
point when the conservatives were pressing for the removal of Fuad Pasha, the Sultan boarded his yacht and departed for the Black Sea, hoping that in his absence the Ministers would find a reconciliation. But, as always, when he returned there remained the same problems with their conflicting solutions.  

Of the many problems which worried the Sultan and the Empire, Fuad and Ali attacked each with intelligence, determination, and a dose of good strong liberalism. There was no aspect of Ottoman society which they permitted to remain untouched. Laws were passed and commissions were sent out to investigate progress. The central authority controlled by Ali and Fuad attempted to drag the natives of the Ottoman Empire into the nineteenth century. New legislation dealt with monetary reform, creation of an Ottoman Bank, postal reforms, commercial regulations; the two friends also succeeded in procuring an international industrial fair for Constantinople, transportation and communications improvements, separation of

14On the conflict between Fuad and the conservatives see Morris to Seward, January 8, 1863, Despatch 45; January 29, 1863, Despatch 47; May 3, 1867, Despatch 205; June 8, 1866, Despatch 157, Correspondence, Turkey, Record Group 59, United States National Archives, Washington, D. C.; Morris to Seward, January 22, 1868, William H. Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester. Also see The Times (London), February 4, 1862, p. 6; February 23, 1863, p. 10; January 20, 1863, p. 6.
legislative and judicial powers, and many other programs. An
elementary examination of the legislation of Fuad and Ali pertaining
to public education, the non-Muslim millets, and the provinces is
essential for a study of American interest in Turkey.

Education was the primary interest of American missionaries
stationed in Turkey. Thus, it is essential to examine Ottoman
educational policies under Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha. The Turkish
people had long venerated instruction and everywhere, the hoca
(teacher) was an honored member of the community. Each community
possessed an elementary school where young children were taught the
Ottoman alphabet and the Koran in Arabic. Muslim teachers were
usually members of the local ulema who charged a small fee for their
services. Usually, children did not continue beyond elementary school
into the various medresses (Muslim theological schools). In keeping
with Turkish practice, non-Muslim millets were responsible for the
education of their own children. 16

Ottoman reformers had long been conscious of the need for
secular-educated Turkish administrators and diplomats. In 1845,
Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha were members of a commission which

---

15 On Turkish reform under Ali and Fuad, see Benoit Brunswik,
Etudes Pratiques sur la Question d' Orient, Réformes et Capitulations,
(Strasbourg: Veuve Berger-Levrault et Fils, 1869); Leon Lamouche,
Histoire de la Turquie depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours
(Paris: Payot, 1953), pp. 292, 310. Also see Tanzimat, Yüzüncî
yıldonum Kınaşebetile (Istanbul: Mzarif Metbaasi, 1940), which
deals with the various reforms of the period and Merhum Ahmed Rasim,
Osmanli Tarihi, op. cit., p. 474-5.

16 James Lewis Farley, Modern Turkey (London: Hurst and
Blackett, 1872), pp. 150-59.
recommended creation of a state system of secular education. The elementary schools established as a result were quite successful. Unfortunately, the enrollment at the secondary level (rüşdiye) was meager. Christian students had not been included in these educational reforms, and little was done to improve education beyond the elementary level until after Sultan Abdul Aziz returned from Europe in 1867.

After the Crimean War and the issuance of the 1856 Hatti Humayun, Ottoman politicians advocated equality for all races, overcoming sectarian prejudices, and opening all activities to non-Muslims. Many liberal politicians believed that an integrated educational system would accomplish these objectives. Ali Pasha favored creation of an integrated school system above the elementary school levels. He noted that the Medical School at Constantinople enrolled both Muslims and Christians, and that it produced excellent graduates. The British Ambassador, Sir Henry Bulwer, reported: "Turks and Christians who came out of it [the Medical School] were well disposed toward each other and to the government. These schools should be multiplied in the Empire."\(^{17}\)

In 1864, the Ottoman Military School was reorganized and moved to Pera (the European quarter on the northern side of the Golden Horn). The program of study was decidedly scientific. To prepare students for entrance into the Military School, the government established a preparatory school in which a young gentleman studied arithmetic,

\(^{17}\) Sir Henry Bulwer to Lord John Russell, August 21, 1862, Despatch 180, EFO 78/1575; see enclosure.
algebra, geometry, geography, Persian, and Arabic. One of the notable features of that same year was the admission of thirty-five Christian students from the Armenian, Greek, and Bulgarian communities to the Ottoman Military School. The Sultan prepared a special address for his Christian students:

It has been my constant desire to establish a perfect equality among all classes of my subjects. I am happy on every occasion that presents itself, to give practical effect to the principle, the appreciation of which, according to the wants and capacities of the different populations of the Empire is destined to complete the scheme of regeneration. 18

This attempt to train Christian army officers was an indication of the growing desire on the part of the government to promote toleration among its Christian and Muslim subjects. It was hoped that the graduates of an integrated school would share a common interest in preservation of the Empire.

One of the great questions facing Ottoman reformers had been the admission of Christians into the army, and if admitted, should they be placed in separate but equal units? Unfortunately, the Turks were uncertain as to the fidelity of Christian soldiers, But, it was maintained that one could not have Christian regiments before one had military schools which Christians could enter to learn the art of war. In addition, Christian soldiers must have Christian gentlemen to serve as officers. The two reforming ministers of

18 On the Ottoman Military School see Morris to Seward, March 3, 1864, Despatch 81, RG 59, USNA.
Abdul Aziz realized that the Turkish people were exhausted by conscription, and that the burden was too heavy for the Turkish people to bear alone.

In 1868, the Ottoman government opened a lycée in Galatasaray. The firman, establishing the lycée modeled on western standards, stated that students should be accepted from all religious groups of the Empire. In the first year an enrollment of over 300 students included Muslims, Greeks, Armenians, Bulgars, and Jews. The students were classed together according to age and amount of previous instruction. They were seated together on the same benches, Muslims and non-Muslims, to listen to lectures given by famous professors imported from French universities. The Sultan promised, in his firman, to appoint to public service all students (Muslims and non-Muslims) who at the end of the course satisfactorily passed the examinations.\(^\text{19}\)

The success of the mixed government schools prompted passage of the 1869 comprehensive education law—the first attempt to establish an Ottoman educational policy. This law adumbrated five levels of public education. Two elementary and one lower secondary levels of instruction were planned for each village and town; the upper secondary level was to be located in the capital of the vilayet. The law included a recommended curriculum and administrative structure.

There was to be no separation of Muslims and non-Muslims beyond the elementary level. A compulsory education law required boys to attend school until age eleven, while girls might leave at age ten. The elementary schools were successful, but the constant failure of Ottoman financial reform prevented extensive development at the secondary level. Education at the university level was not successful since Istanbul University opened in 1870 and promptly closed in 1871.\(^\text{20}\)

Following establishment of the vilayet system, the chief town of each vilayet was required to obtain a printing or lithographic press, establish a newspaper, and publish an official almanac with various statistics and general information about the vilayet. In 1870, the vilayet of Kastamonu on the Black Sea reported 1,855 Muslim schools, 16 Christian schools, and 432 students registered in 8 government primary schools. This indicates that the government schools were established in the provinces and that some students, at least, were attending them. Under Ali and Fuad, the Ottoman government had accepted responsibility for a state secular educational system.

Turkish provincial administration was under constant reform during the Tanzimat Period. In 1840, Reshid Pasha had introduced

\(^{20}\)On educational reform see Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876, op. cit., pp. 244-50; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, op. cit., pp. 177-78; James Farley, Modern Turkey, op. cit., pp. 153-159.
a system of centralized administration modeled on the French system of prefectures. The Empire was divided into eyalets or provinces ruled over by a vali. Each eyalet and its subdivisions of hamlets, villages, and towns possessed a council called a meclis composed of the most influential local persons. The members of the meclis had purely local interests and reflected all the passions and prejudices of the locality. It was necessary for the local pasha to keep on good terms with the meclis, or else he would provoke a quarrel with it. Members of the meclis opposed change, and usually, were more conservative than the officials sent from Constantinople to govern.

The pasha blamed every evil of his district upon the meclis and, as the meclis was not an agent of the government, the meclis was seldom punished. Under this system, the pasha and the central government lost prestige and authority. Another factor contributing to maladministration centered on the government's absolute control over the actions of the pasha. All decisions of any importance were referred to the Porte. Fuad and Ali soon concluded that the Porte had too much to do and the provincial administrators too little; hence nearly everything was left undone.

Fuad was convinced that survival of the Empire depended on good provincial administration. He wanted to halt the further proliferation of administrative units such as Serbia, Roumania, and

21 Roderic H. Davison devoted an entire chapter of Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876, op. cit. to Ottoman provincial reform; see pp. 136-171.
Egypt. The method used to thwart the spread of nationalistic separatism was the Vilayet Law of 1864. Commissioners who had been sent out to inspect the provinces advised the Porte to increase the powers of the governors, improve communications and transportation, and to modernize agricultural methods. In 1864, Fuad Pasha and Midhat Pasha wrote a vilayet law designed to curtail provincial maladministration. Ayelets were reorganized and their boundaries altered and given the name of vilayets. The vilayets were subdivided into sancaks, kazas, towns, and hamlets; a hierarchy was created extending from the Sultan to the smallest community. Administrative heads of the vilayets, sancaks, and kazas were appointed by the Sublime Porte, whereas the heads of the smaller units were elected at the local level. Only the lowest levels of government were left to local popular selection.

The meclis was replaced with administrative councils at the vilayet, sancak, and kaza levels. Local non-Muslim religious leaders automatically became members of the sancak and kaza administrative councils. But, no head of any religious sect was permitted a seat on the vilayet council. Through a complex and indirect method of election, two Muslims and two non-Muslims were elected to the vilayet and sancak councils. Provincial governors (valis) were made personally responsible for their actions, and given the power to carry out needed programs.

The new system was a mixture of centralization and decentralization. Objectives of the 1864 Vilayet Law were increased
efficiency, elimination of local complaints, and sound administration. Many provinces experienced a period of rapid progress under the new law. In the cities roads were paved, street lights introduced, and public schools opened. By 1869, the vilayet law was in effect throughout the Empire and provincial administration continued to improve until the death of Ali Pasha in 1871. 22

Complaints related to Ottoman maladministration of non-Muslim millets were the main source for European interference in internal affairs of the Empire. The various religious millets of the Ottoman Empire were legally recognized communities. The head of each millet possessed considerable civil authority and the power to tax his adherents. It was evident to mid-nineteenth century Ottoman reformers that a reform of the millets was necessary. The reformers were especially critical of clerical control over non-Muslim communities. Clerics promoted religious antagonism, not only between Christians and Muslims, but also among the numerous Christian sects. In addition, priests often engaged in economic exploitation of their flocks. The clerics discouraged secular education and opposed any other measure which might limit their control over taxation.

The nineteenth century saw an increase in the number of bourgeois laymen who demanded a new order in the millets. Many social

and economic forces had influenced laymen in their desire to control civil affairs in the millets, but by far the most important was the creation of a Protestant millet. From its beginning, the Protestant millet possessed representative government controlled by the laity and operated under a constitution. The Protestants were blessed with the power to choose a lay assembly, an executive committee, and head of the millet; most important, ministers of the gospel had no control over civil affairs.

Other religious millets were aware of Protestant organization, and evidently, this influenced their thinking about millet reform. Leading intellectuals of the Armenian millet worked through several drafts of a proposed constitution. But, because the community could not agree on a final draft, the Sublime Porte appointed a committee of Armenians to consider the question. In 1862, Ali Pasha ordered the patriarch of Constantinople to select a committee to review the revised draft in consultation with the committee appointed by the Porte. After considerable controversy, the constitution was approved in March, 1863. The Armenian millet's constitution required the patriarch to account for his actions to an elected assembly of laymen. Accordingly, the patriarch's activities were confined to religious duties, while the assembly assumed the responsibility for social and civil affairs. The Porte wanted similar reforms for the Greek millet, but there was little agitation in that community for change. There were a few laws passed proclaiming separation of church and state, but excessive clerical control remained a problem. Reform efforts
were much more successful in the Jewish millet, as their constitution gave a larger role to laymen.23

It may be concluded that the new constitutions did not wipe out corruption in the millets any more than other reform laws corrected provincial maladministration. Laws seldom change the cultural patterns of a people. The reform laws were a small victory for modernization and secularization in the Middle East, and the Porte encouraged millet reform so as to check separatist tendencies. They hoped the minorities would become both grateful and faithful Ottoman subjects. This did not happen because the Ottomans failed to abolish the entire millet system, and to construct in its place a civil law code applicable to all Ottoman subjects. Ironically, Ottoman encouragement of millet reform contributed to the growth of that nationalism which ultimately destroyed the Empire.

The problem of reforming the millets illustrates the degree of success attained by Ottoman liberalism. Indeed, Fuad and Ali may be called imperial liberals, to the extent that they hoped to marry European liberalism to the Turkish Sultanate. Still, the fact of the matter was that few Americans were sympathetic to problems facing Ottoman reformers. As convinced republicans, Americans tended to scoff at attempts to reform an absolute monarchy. As devout Christians, they also loathed the Caliphate as a creation of Sataan.

23 For millet reform see Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, op. cit., pp. 114-135.
As heirs of a long revolutionary tradition, they were inclined to sympathize with Christian nationalism within the Empire. Consequently, American Ministers to the Sublime Porte spent a great deal of their time in explaining and defending Ottoman activities to Washington. In fact, every American representative in Constantinople found himself almost insensibly drawn into propagandizing on behalf of the Turkish government. This was necessary because of the abysmal ignorance about Near Eastern affairs prevalent in Civil War Washington. It is the propaganda function or information-disseminating function which deserves the closest attention in any study of Turkish-American relations.
Anyone examining American nineteenth century governmental and literary descriptions of Turkey could not fail to observe the wide difference of opinion displayed by writers on such basic Ottoman problems as governmental reform, changing status of Christian and Jewish minorities, educational advancement, and maintenance of public safety. Divergent interpretations found their origins in the preconceived convictions of the writer. Western man had long viewed the paynim as natural enemies of Christianity and illegitimate holders of the Holy Land. This attitude was further complicated by American devotion to the classical world and republican institutions. Western writers maintained that Ottoman theocratic rule resulted in the relegation of the superior non-Muslim subjects of the Sultan to a political state of inferiority.

Cyrus Hamlin, an American missionary stationed in Turkey and founder of Robert College, lamented the influence of newspapers, pamphlets, and travel books upon opinions held by Americans about
Turkey. He noted: "We all have a natural and noble tendency to believe what we read and hear, but when I take up Eastern news, I always pray inwardly, 'O Lord endow me with a suitable spirit of unbelief.'" Hamlin complained that much of the information reaching the American public was composed of half-truths or worse. He likened this to a policy of reporting on America only "our treatment of the Indians, our negro slavery of the past with its atrocious law, our great rebellion, our Fort Pillow massacre, Andersonville and Libby prisons, our New York mobs and massacres, . . . without a hint of any thing as possibly existing on the other side."

Hamlin claimed that most American knowledge about Turkey came from a malevolent class of Levantines. The Levantines were Ottoman subjects who served as translators (dragomans) for foreign legations and travelers. These accommodating gentlemen, according to Hamlin, possessed a list of Turkish atrocities "as inexhaustible as their imagination." The entire class of Levantines were devoted enemies of Turkey and, Hamlin maintained, were congenitally incapable of telling the truth. American and British travelers who visited the Empire were escorted about the country side by these Levantines. Many an otherwise honest traveler returned to his

---

1 In 1971, Robert College of Istanbul was absorbed into the Turkish higher educational system and is financed by the Turkish government. The name of the university was changed to Bogazici Universitesi.

2 Cyrus Hamlin, Among The Turks (New York: R. Carter and Brothers, 1878), p. 357.

3 Ibid., p. 359.
homeland, and published his impressions of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{4} Alas, given most writers' sources of information, it is not surprising that the Terrible Turk was portrayed as a barbarian.

The major source of American information was obtained from newspaper correspondents. What correspondents wrote or their journals published depended upon their political and social convictions. Many correspondents living in Turkey were not professional writers, but rather diplomatic personnel or Christian missionaries. As these individuals held differing attitudes on the possibility of Turkish progress and reform, they wrote very conflicting reports.

The most important of all journalists living in Turkey and contributing articles to American newspapers was George Washburn (Hamlin's son-in-law), the regular correspondent for the New York Tribune.\textsuperscript{5} Washburn, a native of Massachusetts and graduate of Amherst College, went out to Turkey in 1858 as a missionary for the American Board of Commissioners For the Foreign Missions. In 1869, Washburn resigned his commission under the American Board to become a Professor of Psychology and Philosophy at newly-founded Robert College. After Cyrus Hamlin's return to the United States in 1874, Washburn was

\textsuperscript{4}Ibid., for Hamlin's description of the Levantines see p. 357.

\textsuperscript{5}Edward Joy Morris to William H. Seward, November 1, 1865, Private Letter, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester; Morris to Seward, September 3, 1864, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, Record Group 59, United States National Archives, Washington, D. C. Hereafter cited RG 59, USNA.
appointed President of Robert College, a position which he held until 1903. In addition to his work for the New York Tribune, Washburn was a regular contributor to other American and to British periodicals.6

One could hardly expect a New England Protestant missionary in the land of the infidel to be completely objective in his reporting. Examination of the New York Tribune shows that Washburn was unable or did not wish to disguise his value judgments.7 As a defender of Russian interference in Turkish affairs, Washburn was convinced that Russia had a sincere concern for the welfare of the Sultan's Christian subjects. Possibly, some of his less than flattering articles on Turkish administration were inspired by the Russian Ambassador to Turkey, General Nicholas Ignatieff. Often, Washburn would meet Ignatieff at the house of the American Minister, Edward Joy Morris.8


7 For examples of Washburn's articles see the New York Daily Tribune, July 30, 1867, p. 1; August 19, 1867, p. 2; May 7, 1868, p. 2; May 9, 1868, p. 1; June 5, 1868, p. 2; August 1, 1868, p. 1; September 4, 1868, p. 1; November 23, 1868, p. 2; November 28, 1868, p. 1; July 13, 1868, p. 1; Washburn would make such comments as in his July 13, 1868 letter reporting the formation of a new Council of State which included Christian subjects of the Sultan: "Still the Christian element now infused, promises to give them more life." In his November 23, 1868 article Washburn reminded his readers that "Turkey is now just as the Byzantine Empire was at the time of its fall. Corruption is too deep for cure." On September 4, 1868, he wrote an article in sympathy with the Russian policy in Bulgaria while condemning British policy in the Middle East. The importance of this article is that this same statement of fact in the exact same language appears in Washburn's unpublished manuscript located in the Robert College Archives.

8 George Washburn, "Robert College, 1856-1900," op. cit., p. 16. Washburn noted that his wife made the acquaintance of Madame Ignatieff, "a beautiful and brilliant woman, the equal if not the superior of her husband in ability."
The Russian Ambassador was not the only source of information found in the home of the American Minister to Turkey, Washburn wrote: "I have never read anything more graphic than the consul's weekly reports to the Minister [Morris] of the progress of the insurrection and the awful atrocities committed by the Turks." Apparently, Washburn secured access to what should have been confidential information when he wrote the *Tribune* articles.

As much as he professed to deplore unfair reports about Turkey, Hamlin himself contributed to the mass of destructive criticism hurled at the Turkish government. Many times, he recorded emotional reactions in haste for his readers of the *New York Times*. During the Cretan rebellion of 1866-68, he claimed that the Turks would soon be driven back into the Asiatic interior. Hamlin expressed no sympathy or regret for the Ottoman dilemma. Although the *New York Times* featured Hamlin as their regular correspondent, his articles appeared irregularly.

In order to live comfortably at a foreign diplomatic post, American officers needed an independent income. Foreign diplomatic posts were not designed for the poor man. Throughout the period under examination, all the consuls assigned to the Ottoman Empire complained about their financial straits. Inadequate salaries paid American diplomatic officers forced many of them to supplement their salaries

---


*New York Times*, February 5, 1867, p. 8; this article written on December 24, 1866 from Constantinople and headed as "From Our Own Correspondent" is signed C. H.
through literary pursuits. 11

William James Stillman, American Consul to Crete, had a wife, two children, and no additional income, but he did have excellent connections in American literary circles. 12 During Stillman's residence on Crete, he was a regular contributor to the Levant Herald published in Constantinople (Istanbul). The Levant Herald, an English language newspaper, was always critical of the Ottoman regime. For printing Stillman's articles, the Turkish government on one occasion fined the paper L100, and on another closed down that journal for a period of

---


12 William James Stillman, The Autobiography of a Journalist, Volumes I and II (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1901); Stillman, a native of New York, began his career as a landscape artist. In Europe, he studied under Dante Gabriele Rossetti and adopted the views of the pre-Raphaelites who were more or less anti-establishment in their convictions. While living in London, he developed a close relationship with John Ruskin, an art critic and historian. Editorial work in New York brought Stillman into contact with James Russell Lowell, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Charles Eliot Norton, and Louis Agassiz. Stillman devoted considerable time to founding the Adirondack Club to which most of the New England literary celebrities belonged. In 1861, he became the United States Consul to Rome where he remained until 1865 when he was transferred to Crete. Following his diplomatic experiences, he resumed his literary career. Also see Stillman to Norton, January 20, 1868, Charles Eliot Norton Papers, bms, Am 1088, Item 7121, Houghton Library, Harvard University.
time. Stillman not only contributed articles to the Turkish publication, but also to periodicals and newspapers in England and America such as the New York Times and The Nation in the United States and Fraser’s and MacMillan in Great Britain.

In his early articles Stillman was critical of Ottoman provincial government. In fact, the articles were so offensive to the Sublime Porte that attempts were made to precipitate the recall of Stillman. Following Ali Pasha’s visit to Crete and the reforms which he introduced there, Stillman changed the tone of his articles and urged the Cretans to accept the generous proposals. It was at this

---


14 See Stillman to Morris, December 29, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Crete, RG 84, USNA and Brown to Morris, December 11, 1866, Correspondence, between Minister and Secretary, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84, USNA. In a letter to C. E. Norton, Stillman reported: “I have sent this summer two articles to England one published in Dec Fraser’s, the other to be in (I hope) Macmillan next month; see Charles Eliot Norton Papers, bms, Am 1088, Item 7121, January 20, 1867, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

15 Turkey, Dişışleri Bakanlığı Arşivi, Hariciye, Blacque Bey to Fuad Pasha, September 4, 1867, Document 3050, Despatch 3/4; and Blacque to Fuad Pasha, September 11, 1867, Document 239, Despatch 7/10. Both letters are found in Carton 50. Also see the Hamilton Fish Diary, entry for April 15, 1869, Hamilton Fish Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., Fuad Pasha to Morris, August 5, 1868, Department of Foreign Affairs, No. 22,356/19, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, RG 84, USNA; a copy of Fuad Pasha’s letter was sent to Seward, see Notes from the Turkish Legation, RG 59, USNA.

16 Turkey, Dişışleri Bakanlığı Arşivi, Hariciye, Document 4030, Y. Photiades to Ali Pasha, October 13, 1869, Despatch 4900/192. Y. Photiades was the Ottoman Minister to Greece. Also see Blacque to Ali Pasha, December 10, 1869, Document 4238, Despatch 271/519, Carton 50.
point that the American Consul of Crete came round to condemning Russian and Greek political intrigues in Ottoman provinces, such as Crete.  

Stillman was but one of the many diplomatic officers who wrote for American publications. The most important contributor, however, was John Porter Brown, Secretary of the American Legation. Brown had articles published in several different American newspapers but by far the most important was the New York Herald. Of all the Americans living in Turkey and writing for the American press, Brown was many times the only defender of Turkish policy. He approved of the Ottoman policy of gradual reform and condemned Russian and Greek intrigue aimed at the destruction of the Turkish Empire. Brown called for a

---

17 See a later Stillman article in the December 6, 1869 issue of the New York Times. Blaque sent a copy of this article to Ali Pasha; see Blaque to Ali Pasha, December 10, 1869, Document 4238, op. cit.

18 On Brown's correspondence with the Herald see Julius Bing (former Consul to Smyrna) to Charles Sumner, December 22, 1868, Item 102, bns, Am 1.4, Charles Sumner Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Morris to Hamilton Fish, December 6, 1869, Private Letter, Hamilton Fish Papers, Container 66, Library of Congress. Morris wrote: "Mr. J. P. Brown, Secretary of this Legation, by his own avowals to friends & as is personally known to me, is the correspondent from Constantinople for the New York Herald, in which he discusses public questions in violation of the instructions of the Department, and attacks the policy of foreign governments." Also see Morris to Seward, May 21, 1868, Private Letter, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester. The Minister complained of Brown's writing in public journals and his correspondence "with three European papers on behalf of the Turkish government."

19 For Brown's articles on Russian and Greek intrigue in Turkey see the New York Herald, November 8, 1867, p. 4; March 2, 1868, p. 5; March 8, 1868, p. 10; November 3, 1868, p. 4; July 3, 1868, p. 5; and December 3, 1868. With his pen dipped in vitriol, Brown wrote of Russian activities in Turkey: "The excitement which has hitherto
fair evaluation of Ottoman progress and an understanding of the
turkish attitude toward reform.

Occasionally, an American citizen residing in Turkey would
agree to write a regular column for an American paper. A gentleman
identified only as William Rufus Page became the regular Constantinople
correspondent for the New York Herald. It is evident from the
articles that Page had resided in the Middle East for a considerable
period of time; the consular records do not list his vocation, stating
only that he was a Virginian. Page wrote informative articles on the

existed in Europe with respect to the Ottoman Empire has almost entirely
subsidied. Now and then only the echo of the 'great guns' fired off at
the Sultan and his government is still heard in the distance, like that
of the report of remote ordinance, reverberating from hill to hill,
momentarily becoming more and more faint. The wordy cannons of Russia
resemble the surly growls of a lion, which disappointed in its attempt
to seize upon its prey, retires into its native wilds, disappointed and
hungry, but yet undeterred and only deterred from its designs by the
presence of fearless and formidable aspirants. It would perhaps, be
more correct to compare her to the cunning fox or the jackal, for her
plans have had none of the characteristics of the other noble sovereigns
of the forest; on the contrary, they have been stealthy and subtle under
the guise of religion and humanity, and half concealed in the mists of
diplomacy and the existing troubles of European dissension." For the
quotation see March 8, 1868, p. 10. Also see Morris to Bing, June 3,
1870, bms, Am 1 93/53, Charles Sumner Papers, Houghton Library,
Harvard University.

On October 9, 1861, Jeremiah Augustus Johnson, American
Consul at Beirut wrote to Charles Francis Adams in London: "I have the
honor to inform you that the sudden resignation and departure for
England of Mr. Wm. R. Page, U. S. Consul at Jerusalem, his former
association and antecedent in Richmond, Va, and his connection with a
line of steamers, ship building and maritime affairs several years ago
together with his expressed unwillingness to commit himself by uniting
with me in a patriotic celebration of the last anniversary of our
national independence, have produced a conviction in my mind that he is
not loyal to the Government of the U. S, and have led me to suspect
this his abdation of his post (which I believe furnished his only
means of support) was the result of some proposition from the rebels to
aid them in Europe or in their maritime affairs at home." Beirut
Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letter Book, RG 84, USNA.
progress of reform in Turkey. He never felt obliged to defend the government but still he was not unfriendly. Another important feature of Page's articles were his favorable reports on the activities of the American Minister, Edward Joy Morris.

The most prominent American writer who consistently defended the Greeks at the expense of the Turks was Henry Morton Stanley, a special roving correspondent for the New York Herald. From 1866-69, Stanley was assigned to cover important events in the Middle East and North Africa such as the Abyssinian Expedition, the Cretan insurrection, and the opening of the Suez Canal. He never changed his view that the Turks were "the same indolent race as they were two hundred years ago, without any vitality or energy for any enterprise."

21 For an example of Page's articles see the New York Herald on January 2, 1867, p. 7 when he reported the outbreak of trouble in Crete: "On the one hand the government is continually circulating official statements respecting the estate of things in Candia, and on the other, the true advocates of the cause of liberty, as well as those whose interest it is to support the Greek cause for other reasons, never fail to follow up the official statements with what they call impartial accounts." When Page reported the visit of the French Empress to Constantinople in 1869, he wrote: "Unfortunately for this poor country, everything in the way of regal amusements, visits, presents and whims is done with lavish and useless expenditure of money, which would be far better employed in the construction of roads and other means of communication for the carriage of native produce, which literally rots in the possession of the poor peasants." See May 21, 1869, p. 4.

22 For Page's articles friendly to Morris see the New York Herald, January 22, 1869, p. 4; October 14, 1868, p. 3; December 28, 1868, p. 3; August 25, 1868, p. 4; June 8, 1868, p. 3.

23 For quotation see New York Herald, November 22, 1866, p. 4; for other articles by Stanley see November 27, 1866, p. 3; December 27, 1867, p. 6; December 26, 1869, p. 8; December 8, 1869, p. 3; November 11, 1869, p. 8.
Although the above brief description of American correspondents in Turkey is lengthy, it by no means exhausts the supply. It merely attempts to survey the most prominent writers for eastern urban newspapers with a large circulation. Generally, the majority of American newspapers did not have regular correspondents stationed in Constantinople. Such newspapers were dependent on letters written for the large urban publications and the information coming by telegraph. It is important to note here that telegraphic information was sent from Constantinople by the regular correspondents. Thus, the attitudes and positions of these reporters are important when they exerted some influence on editorial policy toward Turkey.

During the American Civil War very little information concerning Turkey appeared in the American press. However, with the outbreak of the Cretan rebellion in the summer of 1866, American journals began featuring articles and editorials on the pros and cons of the Eastern Question. Editorial policy of the American press reflected the political convictions of various groups within American society at that period. Generally, the newspapers served as a reinforcement for already existing prejudices. No American papers were laudatory in their description of Turkey. And yet, not all journals were unfriendly. During the height of the Cretan rebellion, an editorial appeared in the New York World urging William Henry Seward, American Secretary of State, not to adopt a pro-Greek policy and to send no American Minister to Greece. The paper claimed: "The Turkish troops have behaved there on the whole not worse, but better, than Turkish troops are wont to
behave when they are engaged in 'putting down,' as our own Radicals call it, or in 'stomping out,' to use the British phrase, a serious insurrection."  

Boston was a center of Radical Republicanism and the major point for anti-Turkish propaganda. Somewhat regretfully, the New York World concluded that the Bostonians "honestly believe themselves to be the modern Athenians."  

During the decade (1860-1870), the New York World was sympathetic to the reform programs of the Ottoman Empire.

The New York World did not voice the general opinions held by editors of American newspapers. The World, a Democratic paper, was opposed to all aspects of Seward's foreign policy and especially his advocacy of American friendship with Russia. At the outbreak of the Cretan rebellion, nearly all American editorials expressed sympathy for the cause of the Christian rebels. As time passed, most editors had second thoughts on the advisability of any further weakening of the Ottoman Empire.

Many American papers followed the pattern of James Gordon Bennett, editor and owner of the New York Herald. The Herald never became a great apologist for the Ottoman regime but neither did it...
continue to advocate driving the Turk back across the Bosphorus. In 1866, it suggested that the French and English were beginning to see "how hopeless is the test of attempting to bolster up an effete, corrupt, and degrading monarchical system of government."\(^{27}\) The New York Herald went on to suggest that Austria might lead in dismembering the Ottoman Empire. The editorial writer could see no reason why Austria, in conjunction with Greece, "should not undertake the mission which would scarcely fall to terminate in the enthronement of a Christian prince in the city of Constantinople."\(^{28}\) Generally, editorials were followed with stories on the sad plight of the Christians under such eye-catching titles as "The Battle Ground of the Christians and Turks."\(^{29}\)

By the summer of 1867, the editorial columns of the Herald were not as critical as in previous months. Commenting on the introduction of administrative reforms, the Herald predicted:

He [Sultan Abdul Aziz] does not know that progress for Turkey means a desperate and fearful warfare throughout his dominions, the over-turning of old principles, the separation of the State from religious rule, the sinking even of the ruling dynasty in the vortex of the war that will be waged. The believers who have for more than twelve hundred years clung to the doctrines

\(^{27}\) New York Herald, September 19, 1866, editorial, p. 6.
On January 4, 1866, p. 6, in an editorial the Herald declared: "It is under the blighting rule of the Ottomans, Mahometanism, with its effete institutions, cruel depotism, blind intolerance and paralyzing fatalism, stands as an insuperable barrier to improvement. Worse than that, there are eleven millions of Christians who have to bear the yoke of this infidel Power--of a government more suited to the deserts of Arabia or the interior of Africa than civilized Europe."

\(^{28}\) New York Herald, January 5, 1867, editorial, p. 4.

\(^{29}\) New York Herald, January 15, 1867, p. 4.
enunciated by Mohammed are not disposed to see modern progress scatter their power to the winds. They will fight as sturdily for the retention of their hold upon the States as ever Papacy fought in the time of Luther for what it considered were its divine rights.\textsuperscript{30}

The writer declared that the existence of Turkey as a separate nationality depended upon its acceptance of modern principles. What the Ottomans needed, he suggested, was a Reformation movement led by a Muslim Luther, followed by secularization of the Empire. Once such a process was completed modernization would take root. The \textit{Herald} maintained that progress could not come for the people of the Empire as long as "Church and State are linked together in such a form that the former rules the latter."\textsuperscript{31} The journal pointed out that Turkey had shown a great willingness for liberal advancement and had earned the right "to work out the experiments which she has initiated."\textsuperscript{32}

In 1868, after the Turkish government published its diplomatic correspondence on the Cretan difficulties, the \textit{Herald} responded with favorable editorials on the internal conditions of the Empire. The journal noted that it was obvious that Turkish misrule had been greatly exaggerated. The editorial writer admitted that American sympathies were "naturally with the Christians against the Turk." But, the paper reminded its readers that one-third of the Cretans were Turkish Muslims. Calling for an American neutrality of attitudes, the writer suggested:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{New York Herald}, August 17, 1867, editorial, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid.}, February 2, 1868, editorial, p. 4.
\end{flushright}
We have no cause to quarrel with Greece; but neither have we any cause of quarrel with Turkey. If the Christians of Crete have a claim on our sympathy so have the Mohammedans. Men and women are not necessarily bad because they are Moslems, just as men and women are not necessarily good because they are Christians. So long as the government of the Sultan goes on in the spirit of modern progress, doing that which is just and right by all its subjects, so long it will be our duty to cheer it forward. We shall have words of equal kindness for the Greeks when the Greeks shall show that they deserve them.\(^33\)

The *Herald* could see no good reason why Americans should inherit "the mediaeval prejudices and hatreds of Western Europe against the Turk."\(^34\)

Throughout 1868-69, the editorial columns of the *Herald* continued to proclaim that Turkish rule was not tyrannical, but rather unacceptable to those governed.\(^35\) On July 5, 1868, the journal published two glowing articles on the details of Turkish progress from its Constantinople correspondents, William Rufus Page and John Porter Brown. These articles inspired the *Herald* to state: "It would certainly be a new thing in the world's history, but it cannot be said to be an impossible thing, to see Turkey becoming one of the most advanced nations of modern times. The Sick Man so unconscionable long in dying is in an exceedingly hopeful state."\(^36\)

It is true that the other American papers did not have as much praise for Turkish administration. However, more journals did follow the same pattern. The *Baltimore Sun* praised the Christians for

---

\(^33\) *New York Herald*, April 20, 1868, editorial, p. 7.

\(^34\) *New York Herald*, October 7, 1868, editorial, p. 6.

\(^35\) *New York Herald*, January 19, 1869, editorial, p. 6.

\(^36\) *New York Herald*, July 5, 1868, editorial, p. 6.
attempting to "throw off the yoke of their Mahommedan oppressors." That journal lamented that the Turks had extended "their cruel sceptre alike over classic Greece with her fairy islands, the lands of the Bible, and the country of the Pyramids and the Nile." Very slowly the editorial policy changed and the Baltimore Sun became more sympathetic to Turkish problems. Making a full turn in editorial policy the paper asserted: "Turkey has conducted herself throughout the controversy with moderation and dignity, as she appears to have done in all her diplomatic intercourse of late years, whether with friends or enemies." On the whole, the New York Times, the Boston Daily Advertiser, and the Boston Daily Journal followed the same path as that taken by the New York Herald.

A few radical American journals never altered their editorial attitudes on the Ottomans. In 1862, the New York Daily Tribune proudly proclaimed that, at the time of the Crimean War, it had been the one voice in western journalism that had advocated driving the Turks out of Europe once and for all. The Tribune condemned British and French

37The Baltimore Sun, January 3, 1867, editorial, p. 1.

38The Baltimore Sun, June 19, 1867, editorial, p. 2.

39The Baltimore Sun, February 23, 1869, editorial, p. 2. For the change in editorial policy of the Baltimore Sun see the following editorials: December 22, 1868, p. 2; December 30, 1868, p. 2; January 19, 1869, p. 2; January 26, 1869, p. 2; February 23, 1869, p. 2. Also comments on the attitude of the Baltimore Sun in Julius Bing to Charles Sumner, January 1, 1869, Item 106, Box 144, bms, Am 1.4, Charles Sumner Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

40See New York Times editorials; December 30, 1866, p. 4; June 15, 1866, p. 4; January 6, 1867, p. 4; January 31, 1867, p. 4.
attempts to "conserve Mohammedanism, the religion of the sword, of polygamy, of inertia, of barbarism." This journal characterized Turkey as the "oriental rearguard of advancing civilization." Philhellenic writers for the Tribune saw the Greeks as the only vital civilizing force in Turkey: "they diffuse education, they promote commerce and industry; they constitute the great intellectual and commercial forces which impart to Turkey whatever she still possesses of vitality." Evaluating progress in Turkey, it concluded: "Turkey is now more rotten than in 1855, and unable to do anything serious in self defense."

One key to the changing American editorial interpretation of Ottoman rule was related to American relationship with Russia. Following the Civil War, American and Russian relations were placed on an amicable footing. By 1868, many American journalists (as well as American politicians) did not view Russian aggressive activities with an approving eye. As the press became hostile to Russian designs in the Middle East, they also reassessed their attitudes toward Turkey. Those journals that considered Russia a humanitarian nation interested only in the welfare of Ottoman Christians continued to sympathize with

41 Quotation from the New York Tribune, June 23, 1862, p. 4. Also see Julius Bing (former American Consul to Smyrna) to Charles Sumner, April 15, 1868, Item 151, Box 143, bms, An 1.4, Charles Sumner Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University. Bing tells of sending a letter written by Edward Joy Morris to the Tribune for publication.

42 New York Tribune, June 23, 1862, p. 4, editorial.


44 New York Tribune, January 9, 1868, p. 4, editorial.
insurgent activities, and endorsed Seward's policy of friendship toward Russia.

The crusading spirit of the anti-slavery movement and the resulting civil war influenced the policy of such papers as the New York Tribune and the Springfield Republican. Victory over the Southern slavocracy convinced them that their cause was the wave for the future, so, their reforming interests were quite naturally transferred to the international scene. Radical journals took up the cause of "oppressed peoples" in all parts of the world—condemnation of Turkey was just one aspect of their highly colored rhetoric. Nineteenth century American liberalism as practiced by New England Radicals should be compared to a religious movement. They wished to transform the entire world into a constitutional democracy. As the crusaders for "liberty" attempted to involve the United States in Eastern Mediterranean affairs, more moderate American journals opposed any such policy. Opposition to involvement inclined these to accept the status quo in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Fortunately, the American government did not rely upon American publications for information in order to formulate foreign policy. Ministerial, Consular, and Naval reports provided another view for official consideration. Commanders of the American naval squadrons as well as Gideon Wells, Secretary of the Navy, expressed approval of
Turkish policy and behavior.\textsuperscript{45} But, naval commanders only visited the major ports and rarely traveled to the interior. Diplomatic officers stationed in Turkey found it difficult to maintain a neutrality of attitude and complete objectivity in reporting. They evaluated the Ottoman Empire on a comparative scale with Europe and America. Previous educational, social, and cultural experiences influenced their interpretations of all Ottoman institutions. Examination of State Department Despatches of Edward Joy Morris, American Minister to Turkey, revealed that he was a typical product of his day and age.

Edward Joy Morris, the Republican appointee as Minister to the Sublime Porte, was an excellent selection for that post as the Civil War period and the postwar years were difficult ones for American officials. Most of those who knew Morris agreed that he was a "gentleman of fine taste, elegant accomplishments and irreproachable purity, both in public and private life.\textsuperscript{46}" Hamlin claimed that the Minister

\textsuperscript{45} For Gideon Wells attitude on Turkey see Gideon Wells Diary, entry for September 1, 1863, March 21, 1867, and July 23, 1867, Gideon Wells Papers, Library of Congress. Wells' Diary has been published by Howard K. Beale (editor) and Alan W. Brownsworth (assistant editor), Diary of Gideon Wells (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1960), see Volume III, p. 71 and 425. Also see Gideon Wells to Seward, March 21, 1867, Gideon Wells Papers, Volume 79, Letterbook, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

\textsuperscript{46} Wm. M. Thomson, G. V. A. Van Dyck, H. H. Jessup, November 28, 1870, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA. Also see Record Group 59, Box 61, Taylor Administration, Applications and Recommendations, Department of State, USNA.
was "thoroughly American, faithful, careful [and] independent,"\(^7\) His father William Morris, described young Morris as a scholar who preferred literature and the excitement of politics to the "drudgery of the law."\(^8\)

A talented and charming wife can be a valuable asset to any diplomat. This was certainly true of Elizabeth Gatliff Morris, wife of the American Minister. She was described as "amiable and accomplished" and "conversant in the modern languages used in society on the continent."\(^9\) Several of the Turkish Ministers' wives spoke French and they regularly invited this American lady to visit their homes. It was reported that Elizabeth Morris was on friendly terms with "a limited circle of the higher class of Turkish society."\(^50\) In 1868, the news of her sudden death was reported to have caused a "melancholy and profound sensation, particularly among the Mussulman ladies, whose social circle and mental occupations offer so little variety that the loss of one of the few personal friends whom they numbered among the European ladies was sensibly felt by them."\(^51\).

---

\(^7\)Cyrus Hamlin to Hannibal Hamlin, June 23, 1869, Grant Administration, Box 56, Applications and Recommendations File, Department of State, RG 59, USNA.

\(^8\)William Morris to William Meredith, March 12, 1849, Taylor Administration, Box 61, Applications and Recommendations, Department of State, RG 59, USNA.


\(^50\)Ibid.

\(^51\)Ibid.
funeral procession, described as the largest ever seen in Constantinople for a foreign dignitary, was led by the Sultan's coach drawn by four jet black horses, followed by all the Turkish Ministers, foreign representatives, and residents. Such a talented lady must have been a comfort to her husband and an influential individual for winning friends for the Union during the American Civil War.

Morris was born in Philadelphia on July 16, 1815, into one of the oldest and best established families of that city. His father was a wealthy merchant who could afford to provide an only son with the best available education which the elder Morris described as "thorough and finished." Morris attended the University of Pennsylvania but took his degree at Harvard College in 1836. After college, he traveled for three years in Europe, Egypt, Greece, Palestine, Turkey, and Italy remaining one year in Paris in order to perfect his French. His linguistic accomplishments included fluency in French, Italian, German, and Spanish. Morris often bragged that he could converse in French and Italian as well as he could in English. Following his conquest of the west European languages, he launched a drive to learn the

---

52 New York Herald, June 8, 1868, p. 8.

53 For quotation see William Morris to Will Meredith, March 12, 1849, Taylor Administration, Box 61, op. cit. For Morris' financial condition see Register of Wills, Philadelphia City Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Will Book 52, p. 410, William Morris, registered on April 9, 1864, after his death, Will No. 181.

54 Moses Grinnell to John D. Clayton, May 17, 1849; George B. Marsh to John D. Clayton, May 13, 1849, Taylor Administration, Box 61, Applications and Recommendations, Department of State, RG 59, USNA.
languages of the Middle East. At the time of his assignment to Turkey, he could speak and write Turkish, Greek, and Arabic. During his residence in Constantinople he learned Persian.\footnote{Joseph Moore to U. S. Grant, March 8, 1869, Grant Administration, Applications and Recommendations, Department of State, Box 56, RG 59, USNA. Charles Sumner to Hamilton Fish, September 7, 1869, Container 64, Hamilton Fish Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., Morris to Seward, December 20, 1866, Private Letter, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester. Morris wrote Seward: "Poor as my own... on a linguistic sense are they better than his, as I speak & write French, Italian, Spanish, & German & Greek, can converse with the Sultan's Ministers (not like Mr. B of course or like a Turk) in Turkish--have studied Arabic & Persian & can make myself quite well understood in the former, Morris to Seward, March 31, 1864, Private Letter, William H. Seward Papers, op. cit.; Morris wrote: "I beg most respectfully to suggest that the duties of that office would be much more efficiently filled if his successor should be a good French scholar. This language is almost a sine qua non here. For myself I find every day use for French, Italian, Greek & Turkish & occasionally for German and Spanish."} Morris was the first American Minister to Turkey who was not totally dependent upon a translator; he was even able to prepare Ottoman documents for presentation to the Porte.\footnote{Cyrus Hamlin to Hannibal Hamlin, June 23, 1869, Grant Administration, Box 56, Applications and Recommendations, Department of State, RG 59, USNA. Also see Joseph Moore to U. S. Grant, Grant Administration, Box 56, op. cit. New York Herald, June 8, 1868, p. 8. Also see Turkey, Başbakanlık Arşivi, Hariciye, see Documents 14672 and 14708.}

Following his years of study abroad, Morris read law, passed the Pennsylvania bar examination, and launched a political career in the Whig party. In 1841, he was elected to the lower house of the Pennsylvania State Legislature where he served until 1843. In 1843, a temporary split within local Democratic ranks provided an opportunity for Morris to be elected to the House of Representatives for one term. His active role in the Republican Party of Pennsylvania resulted in
his election to the Thirty-fifth, Thirty-sixth, and Thirty-seventh Congresses. Morris resigned his congressional seat when President Abraham Lincoln appointed him Minister Resident to Turkey. 57

In the House of Representatives Morris took a leading part on all debates and developed a national reputation as a debater and parliamentarian. His greatest asset seems to have been a fine speaking voice. Otherwise his appearance could be described as that of the average man of the day—short, slightly built, with reddish-brown hair and whiskers, blue eyes, and a sharp thin face. 58

The ill-health of the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Thomas Corwin of Ohio, provided Morris with an opportunity to become a leading spirit on that committee. He introduced and maneuvered for passage several important bills dealing with foreign trade. Morris supported protective tariffs, the Union, freedom of religion and the abolition of slavery. These principles for the most part provided a foundation for his political actions. He wrote Horace Greeley that "being elected I determined to do my duty to the cause of Human Liberty, Temperance, & Religious Toleration at all hazards, & I think I did something for them all in this state." 59

Ideologically Morris must be classified as a nineteenth century


58 Ibid., p. 345.

Protestant liberal with all the convictions usually attributed to individuals of that persuasion.

Following an active role in the campaign for the election of Zachary Taylor, Morris was appointed Charge d'Affairs to Naples and remained at that post until August, 1853. Travelers to Italy wrote that Morris was hospitable to all Americans and highly respected by his diplomatic colleagues. During his assignment to the Two Sicilies, all "previous outstanding American claims were adjusted." This experience prepared him for the difficult role of serving the Union in a foreign capital during the Civil War.

In addition to his political interests, Morris developed a considerable reputation as an author, journalist, and translator. In the late 1840's, he was an active editorial writer for the *Pennsylvania Inquirer* and he contributed articles to national magazines. He was in a position to offer Caleb Blood Smith the political support of the *Pennsylvania Inquirer* in 1848. He explained to that politician that he would happily write articles on any topic: "Send me the subject matter & I will dress it up as a bantling of my own." He contributed articles to the *Delaware County Republican* of Chester, Pennsylvania, the *New York Mirror*, and the *Philadelphia Inquirer*. Throughout his life Morris was associated with well-known journalists of the day such as

---


Henry Morton Stanley, Mark Twain, and William J. Stillman as well as many lesser-known literary men.

Impressions gained during his Middle Eastern travels were first published in the United States Gazette as individual articles. Later the articles were revised into book form under the title of Notes on a Tour through Turkey, Greece, Egypt, and Arabia Petrae to the Holy Land. This well-written, interesting two volume work reveals a curious appreciation of oriental customs and a romantic adulation for Greece. The recorded observations and impressions of the traveling young scholar show basic attitudes which did not change. Morris received a nineteenth century classical education which required a concentrated study of the ancient world. An educated gentleman was expected to know Greco-Roman classical literature. A serious student, such as Morris, retained a romantic and yet naive view of the Greek world. The barren rocks of Greece provided him with a reason for living. Morris recorded in detail his trek to the center of ancient intellectual achievements:

The parent of civilization—the land of Homer, Plato, and Leonidas—the birth-place of the arts—the cherished home of liberty and letters, she cannot but be regarded with the deepest emotion by every one who can appreciate the immense benefits she has conferred upon the human race. I, a pilgrim from a world whose existence was unknown to her, come to tread her sacred soil, and pour out my homage at the altars

---

where her children, two thousand years ago worshipped,—May her ruins inspire me with the wisdom her experience should teach!  

Turkey was not a shrine where the classical scholar must pay homage, but rather oriental, exotic, and unknown. Turkish women mystified young Morris; the veil, being more decorative than conceal¬
ing, revealed visions of loveliness which he resolved never to forget.  

For the future American Minster to Turkey, Constantinople was a "forest of domes, cupolas and minarets" with an "air of luxu¬
rious enjoyment and repose." Edward Joy Morris never ceased to be fascinated and attracted by all the sensual experiences of this very special world—divans for lounging, white turbans, water-pipes, Turkish coffee, hashish, the slave market, narrow streets, wooden houses with over-hanging balconies, many barking dogs on all the streets, the muezzin calling the Muslims to prayer, and the Pera hotel kept by one Giovanni who Morris claimed was the "greatest rascal I ever fell in with either among Greeks or Turks." It was during this extended visit that he became acquainted with John Porter Brown, the dragoman of the American Legation. Morris praised Brown: "We were much indebted to him during our stay, and we only reiterate what all other Americans, who visit Constantinople, have experienced."  

---

63 Morris, Notes of a Tour Through Turkey, op. cit., p. 23.
64 Ibid., pp. 38-9.
65 Ibid., p. 42.
66 Ibid., p. 42.
67 Ibid., p. 45.
Porter Brown served the American Legation first as dragoman then as Secretary and Dragoman from 1833 until 1872. He was the nephew of Commodore David Porter, Minister Resident to the Sublime Porte between 1831-39.

As to the character of the Turk himself, Morris expressed a genuine appreciation for his dignity. He recorded an observation of a group of enterprising Greeks and an old Turk engaged in a business transaction:

I could not but admire the quiet demeanor of the Turk, resisting with the most polite, yet fixed gravity, the attempt of the Greeks to cheat him. The Greeks were eager, quick, and full of cunning, but were not acute enough to overreach the old Turk. After having gone off some distance toward the beach, they returned and bought the sheep at the Turk's price, notwithstanding their protestation against his exorbitant demands. . . .

The Turk attired in a long flowing cotton robe, and around his neck was bound an ample turban, which materially dignified a head and countenance, to which a long white beard gave an air of patriarchal venerability.

If Morris liked the Turk, he certainly had little respect for his religion or form of government. He observed that in Turkey no one discussed openly political topics, and, if such should be mentioned, it would only be in a whisper. The young writer informed his readers of the future of Islam and the Sultan's government:

There are no parties in the East but one, and that is the oppressed people against their tyrant rulers. It is a strange fact, that the oriental governments, from the earliest times, have always been despotisms. It would certainly be a hopeless task to essay to introduce self-government among the ignorant and enslaved population of the East. Mental enlightenment will overthrow the

---

68. Morris, Notes of a Tour Through Turkey, op. cit., p. 23.
The two volume record of Morris' travels was his only full length creative work. His other major literary contributions were translations. In 1854, he published a translation of Alfred de Besse, The Turkish Empire: Its Historical, Statistical, and Religious Condition. Morris stated that he wished to present "in concise form, a general yet satisfactory idea of the past and present condition of the Ottoman people and empire." In order to provide a better understanding of the "present condition" of Ottoman Turkey, Morris included within his book statements by prominent French experts on the Empire and "intermingled" the work with "considerable amount of original matter." That same year he translated a romantic novel by Theodore Mugge, Afraja, A Norwegian and Lapland Tale, or Life and Love in Norway. In 1855, he published his third translation from a German work entitled Corsica, Picturesque, Historical and Social by Ferdinand Gregorovius.

---

69 Morris, Notes of a Tour Through Turkey, op. cit., p. 55.

70 Alfred de Besse, The Turkish Empire: Its Historical, Statistical and Religious Conditions, translated, revised, and enlarged by Edward Joy Morris (Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston, 1854), p. ix.

71 Theodore Mugge, Afraja, A Norwegian and Lapland Tale; or, Life and Love in Norway, translated by Edward Joy Morris (Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston, 1854).

Morriss continued his literary connections once he was appointed to a diplomatic post. The Minister confided to William H. Seward, the American Secretary of State, that he had been elected to the Greek Literary Society of Constantinople. That organization included among its members all the Greek literary and scientific personages of the city. Morris assured Seward: "Of course, I observe perfect Diplomatic discretion in all these proceedings." Upon Morris' recall the Greek journalists of Constantinople sent a deputation to deliver a message of appreciation for being a "cosmopolitan friend of progress and protector of letters," Morris assured his supporters: "I have always maintained on all occasions that the liberty of the press is a mark of progress and that the greatest evils menace nations where the rights of the press are restricted and limited."74

Morris not only continued his newspaper association in Constantinople but also he developed friendships with local liberal literary figures such as Ziya Bey, writer, palace secretary, and future leader of the Young Ottoman Party. Ziya Bey was a prominent critic of the Ottoman government and agitated for extensive changes in

---

73 Morris to Seward, July 10, 1866, Private Letter, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

the governmental structure. In 1868, Ziya Bey entrusted Morris to deliver a letter to Seward on the "true conditions" of the Empire from a Muslim point of view. Morris believed Ziya Bey's analysis to be a "faithful picture of the state of affairs in Turkey." 75

An examination of Morris' despatches reveal his views on the internal political conditions of the Ottoman Empire. He was not a neutral observer on the Ottoman scene. As a nineteenth century practicing liberal, Morris praised the progressive policies of Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha. He never altered his high estimation of these two liberal Ministers. Even though the American Minister praised the efforts of Ali and Fuad, he knew that neither was popular. He admitted that the Empire had grown "worse and worse" under their leadership but, he explained, it was the "apparent inability to find any remedy for the thousand evils which are hurrying the country to ruin." 76 Morris characterized Fuad Pasha to Seward:

He is a statesman in the highest sense of the word, and would hold a distinguished place in any Christian cabinet. Liberal in his political views he is equally so in his religious opinions. He may be said to be almost entirely exempt from any semblance of Mussulman fanaticism or bigotry... No man is so thoroughly acquainted with the actual condition of the Empire and its needs as Fuad Pasha. The presence of such a man at the head of affairs is necessary to the well-being of the Empire. 77

75 Morris to Seward, January 22, 1868, Private Letter, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

76 Ibid.

77 Morris to Seward, January 8, 1863, Despatch 45, Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Also see Morris to Seward, February 27, 1867, Despatch 195.
Morris attributed Fuad Pasha's attitudes to his Parisian education. He informed the American Secretary that Fuad was a scholar as well as a linguist which imbued him with a "cosmopolitan spirit." Between 1861-69, Fuad Pasha was transferred from one governmental department to another. Usually, transfers and dismissals were instigated by his political enemies. Fuad Pasha's untimely death in the fall of 1869 prompted Morris to write:

I have constantly been on intimate relations with the late Pasha and I have thus had an opportunity of appreciating his talents, ... Thoroughly devoted to the welfare of his country, he was untainted by prejudice of race and religion, and was in the full sense of the word a liberal statesman, as his connexion with many radical measures of reform demonstrated, ... He leaves behind him no successor of like genius, excepting his veteran companion in office, ... Aali Pasha, upon whom it may now be said without exaggeration, rest in chief part, the fortunes of the Empire.  

One source of European intervention in Turkey was the Christian subjects of the Sultan. Morris maintained that Ottoman Christians enjoyed a liberty of conscience that was not accorded to "dissenters from the established faith in some of the most enlightened kingdoms of Europe." He reminded the Secretary that Christians were exempt from military service and, in reality, paid few taxes. In many ways, the Minister concluded, Christians enjoyed higher privileges than the

---

78 Morris to Seward, February 17, 1869, Despatch 301, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. In 1868, when Fuad Pasha was threatened with retirement Morris noted: "He & Aali Pasha are the only two men of any particular capacity available for the public service. With their removal from the scene of action the ship of state will go hopelessly adrift & the future of the Empire will be seriously if not irretrievably impaired." Morris to Seward, October 2, 1868, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.
native Muslim population. Christians monopolized banking, commerce, and trade and had control of nearly all branches of industry. Morris pointed out that their exemption from responsibility to the country caused a natural hostility on the part of the Muslims. Added to this, Christians were protected by the European powers who promoted their financial interests while there was no one to be concerned with the unhappy state of the Muslim subjects.

Morris always reported items which he considered to be signs of progressive or liberal advancement. Any policy that indicated the Porte was moving toward equality for all its citizens received laudatory narrations. The concessions made to Montenegro in 1863 prompt the American Minister to remark: "Nothing could be more generous than the treatment of his late enemies by the Sultan." Improvement in transportation and communication networks were evidence of progress. In a long despatch in 1865, Morris detailed the completion of several such facilities. He stated: "I have deemed it proper to report the above details as indirectly they have a bearing on our commercial relations with this Empire & it is also but just to the Turkish involvement that its enlightened efforts to develop trade & improve the internal conditions of the country be officially made known." As a Liberal, he placed faith in educational reforms to correct the evils of intolerance. Thus, the expansion of secular education facilities

---

79 Morris to Seward, March 19, 1863, Despatch 53, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

80 Morris to Seward, November 22, 1865, Despatch 131, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
brought praise from the American Minister, when, in 1864, the Ottoman government reorganized its military school.\(^81\)

Throughout his ministry, Morris complained that the Turkish government tolerated provincial maladministration. Morris intimated that the governors did not receive their positions as a result of personal merit. He concluded that local authorities obtained their posts through "their success in intrigue at the capital, or through the influence of some powerful favorite whose ambitious projects they have promoted, or whose corrupt schemes they have abetted."\(^82\) Morris claimed that many administrators were "arbitrary in the extreme, and as they rule supreme in their respective pachaliks, they for the most part follow the bent of their own inclinations."\(^83\)

In 1863-64, in an attempt to correct administrative abuses at the local level, Fuad Pasha moved to centralize the authority of the Imperial government. He endeavoured through reorganization to make the local governors directly responsible for their actions. The Grand Vezir consolidated several of the smaller provinces and appointed governors known to be of good reputation. Special commissioners were selected from among the most able officials that Fuad Pasha could find to supervise and report on provincial administrators. Morris felt that the diligence with which these investigations were pursued revealed

\(^81\) Morris to Seward, March 3, 1864, Despatch 81, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^82\) Morris to Seward, November 12, 1862, Despatch 33, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^83\) Ibid.
that Fuad and Ali would no longer tolerate maladministration in the provinces. 84

Increased control from the center represented a revolutionary change and provided one of the reasons for insurrection in the provinces. In 1867, Morris reported to the State Department about a revolt in Lebanon:

As insurrection is contagious in the Turkish Empire, the Porte has taken the alarm, & large bodies of troops have been despatched from the capital with orders to put down the rebellion at all hazards. Its suppression must take place sooner or later, but it will be accompanied by acts of violence that will inevitably sow the seeds of future trouble. It is suspected that foreign intrigues are connected with this movement in order to give a pretext for intervention. Never was the population of this Empire in such a wretched condition as at the present time. Discontent prevails everywhere and this is increased by the necessity in which the government finds itself, from its financial embarrassment, of securing the payment of the taxes. 85

Provincial revolts forced the government to expand its limited resources in maintaining military forces. To meet these financial obligations, the government collected taxes as far as three years in advance and inaugurated many new taxes to meet the crisis. Many subjects were forced to sell their belongings in order to pay the new taxes. Those who did not pay were thrown into prison. Morris felt that it was obvious that "discontent is wide-spread & intense & menacing to the public peace." 86 The army and civilian employees were not

84 Morris to Seward, July 13, 1863, Despatch 59, Official Correspondence, RG 59, USNA.

85 Morris to Seward, November 29, 1864, Despatch 99, ibid.

86 Morris to Seward, February 27, 1867, Despatch 195, ibid.
paid regularly which caused considerable resentment among these usually loyal subjects. Morris wrote privately: "Intense agitation prevails & we know not at what moment we may not be ourselves at the capital in the midst of an insurrection for the discontent here is almost equally great among the Mussulmans as among the Christians."\(^{37}\)

In times of crisis, Morris considered advocating the incorporation of all the Greek provinces into the Greek nation. He wrote:

"The blight of misgovernment has fallen with withering effect on these fair regions, and they must continue to suffer so long as political policy shall require them to be sacrificed to consideration of international expediency."\(^{38}\) He claimed that "provincial misgovernment & foreign intrigues keep up the constant spirit of discontent."\(^{39}\) At other times, the American Minister maintained that the best government could be achieved under an autonomous relationship with the Porte. Under this system every province would be governed by the local population, but the region would continue to maintain a unified policy when confronted by the surrounding aggressive powers.

The attitude of the Sultan was the main reason for Morris' conclusion that the Balkans must be administered by Christian governors. The outbreak of the Cretan rebellion in 1866 prompted Morris to propose the elimination of the Ottoman system of collecting taxes and

\(^{37}\) Morris to Seward, October 5, 1866, Private Letter, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

\(^{38}\) Morris to Seward, July 9, 1866, Despatch 161, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^{39}\) Ibid.
and installation of Christian governors in Christian provinces.\textsuperscript{90}

As the revolts spread during 1867-68, the American Minister wrote:

Indeed it would appear that an organised system of revolution is on foot throughout all European Turkey & that its explosion is probable within the next two months unless some extraordinary measures are taken to avert it. . . . Christian demands to be admitted to a footing of perfect equality with the Mohammedans in the government of the country will not be admitted. It may be promised in part but such a promise will never be executed. The Sultan moreover who is a Mussulman of the strictest sect, & a Turk of the old school will never consent to admit the "gaiours" to an equality with the faithful in the government.\textsuperscript{91}

Once when the Sultan promoted a prominent conservative to the position of Grand Vezir, Morris commented: "The proffer of such a position to a man of this character is in itself a sufficient sign of the reactionary tendencies of the Sultan, & of his antipathy to Christian influence."\textsuperscript{92} On the other hand, the Minister complained that the Sultan was "surrounded by an eager crowd of favorites who think less of the country than of their own personal interests."\textsuperscript{93}

\textsuperscript{90}Morris to Seward, August 28, 1866, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; Morris to Seward, February 7, 1867, Despatch 193.

\textsuperscript{91}Morris to Seward, February 7, 1867, Despatch 193, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\textsuperscript{92}Morris to Seward, January 8, 1863, Despatch 45, Official Correspondence, RG 59, USNA.

\textsuperscript{93}Morris to Seward, January 29, 1863, Despatch 47, Official Correspondence, RG 59, USNA.
Morris actions and interpretations were approved by both George Washburn and Cyrus Hamlin. After January, 1867, the foreign diplomatic corps of Constantinople became involved in the controversy over the provincial disturbances. As a result of criticism directed at Ottoman administration, Ali Pasha became sensitive to any statement made by foreign diplomatic officers which seemed unfriendly. Unfortunately, Morris was liberal with advice on possible solutions to provincial maladministration.

During 1867-68, American citizens and proteges had far too many problems that required settlement in Constantinople. Complaints caused a constant stream of notes to the Foreign Office asking for redress or justice. Often, cases which were difficult and frustrating for the American Minister caused him to send reports to the State Department portraying the Ottoman government in an unfavorable light. Also, Morris had formed personal friendships with Turkish liberals and Greek journalists in the capital; such friends allowed the American Minister to become a target of hatred by Ottoman conservatives.

Cyrus Hamlin claimed that the Turks paid "too little regard to foreign opinions." He wrote: "When they hear of some monstrous injustice done them in foreign journals, one class of them will say, 'That is the way with the Chiaours,' and the more pious will say,

---

94 See George Washburn, "Robert College, 1856-1900," op. cit. and Cyrus Hamlin to Hannibal Hamlin, June 23, 1869, Grand Administration, Box 56, Applications and Recommendations File, Department of State, RG 59, USNA.

95 Cyrus Hamlin, Among The Turks, op. cit., p. 356.
"Our refuge is in God," and smoke away; but neither will ever attempt any refutation." This was not true of Fuad Pasha and Ali Pasha, as both Ministers were very much concerned with their press image. In 1866, when confronted with unfavorable reports printed in the American press, they decided to send an Ottoman representative to the United States. This minister would attempt to counteract the unfavorable reports made by correspondents and American diplomatic officers assigned to Turkey. No prominent Turkish foreign officer wished to be assigned to that post because Washington, D. C. was considered a most unpleasant place. The selection fell on Edouard Blacque, an experienced writer and protege of Ali Pasha.

Blacque was appointed Turkish Minister to the United States in the spring of 1867. After a personal interview with him the American Minister reported to the State Department: "I find him quite an accomplished person of much experience in Diplomatic life with a correct appreciation of the government and people of the United States and inspired by very friendly feelings toward us." Morris wrote that the Turkish Minister was descended from a "Louisiana Creole" and French family. Blacque's grandfather is said to have served as one of the many lawyers for the defense of Louis XVI. After the execution of Louis Capet, the elder Blacque escaped to Smyrna (Izmir)

96 Cyrus Hamlin, Among The Turks, op. cit., p. 356.
98 Morris to Seward, April 24, 1867, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
where he established a French-language newspaper. In 1832, the family organized *Le Moniteur Ottoman*, a newspaper which was anti-French in tone. This newspaper presented articles defending Turkey in her struggle against Western penetration. As could be anticipated, the French government was displeased with the editorial policy of the newspaper. French agents were assigned to kidnap the owner of the newspaper and remove him from the Turkish scene. Aware of the danger, the Turkish government prevented the abduction and protected the Blacque family.99

The Turkish government sent Edouard Blacque to Paris for his advanced education. On his return, he became a translator at the Sublime Porte. For seven years Blacque regularly contributed articles for his father's newspaper, the pro-Ottoman *Courier de Constantinople*. This experience prompted the Turkish government to appoint young Blacque to the Turkish Embassy in Paris, first as an attaché and then as First Secretary. Success in Paris brought a promotion to Consul at Naples where Blacque was stationed until the time of his appointment as Minister to the United States. The young Minister was described by Akdes Nimet Kurat, a modern Turkish historian, as well mannered, charming and mature.100


100 Ibid. Kurat states: "Also, as a diplomat, he was experienced, and as for his conduct, he was a very mature and dignified gentleman," The original reads: "Diplomat sıfatıyle de tecrübe sahibi olup, tavır ve hareketleri bakımdan da çok nazik ve olgun bir zat idi,"
Edouard Blacque's first wife was the daughter of Dr. Valentine Mott, who in his day was one of the most distinguished surgeons in the world. His reputation was so great that he was summoned to Turkey to operate on Sultan Murad II. After the death of Blacque's first wife, he married a lady from the Greek mercantile community of Constantinople. The Turkish Minister spoke English fluently and, thus, needed no interpreter to conduct business with the American Secretary of State.  

Blacque arrived in Washington in the early summer of 1867 and began his reports on the condition of the American nation. These reports influenced the Turkish Foreign Office's handling of its relationship with the United States. Blacque Bey's observations on America were not always laudatory but were many times correct.

The Turkish Minister wished to alter the general impression of Turkey held by the American public and its government. He very quickly concluded that the shortest route to the American public was the press. He cultivated friendships with those journalists who were somewhat sympathetic to Turkish internal problems. Generally, the organs of the Democratic Party were more friendly to Turkey than those of the Republican or Radical press. Within a few months he was able to forward copies of official Turkish correspondence directly to the

102 Turkey, Dışişleri Bakanlığı Argıvi, Hariciye, Carton 50, Blacque Bey to Fuad Pasha, November 14, 1867, Document 3051.
103 Ibid., Blacque Bey to Fuad Pasha, November 14, 1867.
office of James Gordon Bennett, editor and owner of the New York Herald. 104

Blacque Bey hoped to influence the course of American foreign policy through the columns of the American press. 105 The Turkish Legation was not the only foreign mission to use this procedure in order to counteract American attitudes which a Minister considered unfavorable to his government. For example, during 1870-71, the newspaper activities of the Russian Minister to the United States became

104 For example see Turkey, Daşşleri Bakanlığı Arşivi, Hariciye, Carton 50, Blacque Bey to Fuad Pasha, April, 1868, Despatch 61/94; Blacque wrote: "In accordance with the orders of your Highness, I confidentially delivered to Mr. Bennet, owner of the New York Herald, who just happened to be in Washington at that time, the copy of the three principal pieces of correspondence exchanged in regard to that incident, so that he could publish them in his newspaper. I will have several copies of that publication sent to Constantinople, Paris, and London as soon as it comes out." The original reads: "Conformément aux ordres de Votre Altesse, J'ai confidentiellement remis à Mr Bennet, propriétaire du New York Herald, qui se trouvait précisément à Washington à ce moment là, la copie des trois principales pièces de la correspondance échangée à propos de cet incident, pour qu'il les publie dans son journal. Je ferai envoyer à Constantinople, à Paris et à Londres plusieurs exemplaires de cette publication aussitôt qu'elle paraîtra."

105 See Julius Bing to Charles Sumner, August 6, 1868, Item 46 and September 26, 1868, Item 59, Box 144, bns. Am 1.4, Charles Sumner Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University. On August 6, 1868, the former Consul of Smyrna wrote: "Blacque was here; got himself introduced by Jassigi [sic] to the Boston Post editor & got him to publish a scurrilous letter dated from Paris, but evidently written here, abusing Dr. & Mrs. Howe! Dirty business this for a Minister Plenipotentiary!!" Also see Edward Joy Morris to William H. Seward, December 25, 1867, Private Letter, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester. Morris complained that Blacque was sending articles that had appeared in the New York Herald to Constantinople concerning American and Russian relations. Morris claimed: "It was little else than a tissue of lies & absurdities & Mr. Blacque Bey must be a very shallow person if he thinks to affect public sentiment in the U. S. by such palpable falsehoods."
both obvious and obnoxious. Hamilton Fish ordered an investigation of the Russian Minister and his visitors. The findings prompted Fish to request the Russian Minister's recall. The newspaper activities of Blacque Bey were more successful than those of his Russian colleague to the extent that he did not suffer a similar fate.

By the fall of 1867, Blacque Bey was convinced that his efforts were successful. He wrote Fuad Pasha that the press of the Democratic Party was "more affirmative than ever in their manifestation in favor of Turkey." The New York Herald received the highest praise from the Turkish Minister. Blacque Bey forwarded to Turkey ample newspaper evidence of his accomplishments. He noted:

The articles which are included here and published one after another by the New York Herald and which I also forward a translation to your Highness in order that you will not hesitate to read them, are written in a benevolent spirit and gives witness without any doubt what the progress of our cause has undergone in this country during the last three months.

Blacque Bey proposed that the Sultan grant James Gordon Bennett the Order of the Meçidiye, Third Class, for the understanding shown in the columns of his paper of the problems confronting the Turkish government. The Turkish Minister assured Fuad Pasha that each day Bennett became "more and more" deserving of such an award.


107 Turkey, Dişşleri Bakanlığı Arşivi, Hariciye, Carton 50, Blacque Bey to Fuad Pasha, November 14, 1867, Document 3051.

108 Ibid.
In an attempt to modify attitudes of members of Congress, the President, and the Department of State, Blaque Bey exerted considerable effort and many gracious arguments. He pointed out to Seward that all the peoples of the world had passed through a "painful and laborious phase of social revolution, had had to sustain terrible struggles before seeing the concepts of liberty and civilization prevail." Blaque Bey argued that Turkey would attain the same results but by the "slower and sure ways of conviction and necessity."

The Turkish Minister informed Fuad Pasha that he was convinced that the real obstacle to Ottoman progress was the "systematic and calculated disbelief of our enemies." He observed that even the friends of Turkey were sometimes misled as to the extent of internal Ottoman reform which had come "to light without splash and fanfare." Blaque Bey lamented that the United States was a friend who had been misled into believing the propaganda released by the enemies of Turkey. Another source, he asserted, of misinformation about the Empire came from the men chosen to represent the United States in Turkey. Blaque wrote the Turkish Foreign Minister on the selection of American diplomatic officers:

They are chosen amongst all classes of society, and such an individual, who is today a librarian, poet, or retired

109. Blaque Bey to Fuad Pasha, September 11, 1867.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
businessman, finds himself tomorrow representing abroad the most considerable interests of his country. Far from denying their learning or their capacity, I would rather be led to think that they are too steeped in their classical studies, but what is not always encountered in them is the degree of experience, the needed aptitude to well fathom the questions and discuss them with some accuracy of appreciation.\footnote{Blaque Bey to Fuad Pasha, September 11, 1867, Document 239. The original quotation reads: "Il s'est soninti parmi tous les classes de la société, et tel individu, qu'est aujourd'hui libraire, poète, ou négociant se retire des affaires, se trouve demain représenter à l' étranger les intérêts les plus considérables de son pays, Loin de vouloir nier leur instruction ou leur capacité, je serais plutôt porté à penser qu'ils sont parfois trop imbros de leur études classiques; mais ce qui ne se recontre pas toujours chez eux [sic] c'est le degré d' enjouerice [sic], ce sont les aptitudes pour bien penetrer les questions et pour les discuter avec une certain justesse d' appréciation."}

Blaque Bey's newspaper experience naturally created an interest in the American techniques of communication between government leaders and the citizens. He concluded that the most important media were statements addressed by politicians directly to the people. The Turkish Minister explained: "It is particularly in this manner that statesmen express their ideas, their feelings, and their convictions. It is in a public address that one must search for the true thoughts of a politician, and anything said under these conditions takes on the character of an authentic act and is ascribed credence on the same level as written declarations.\footnote{Blaque Bey to Fuad Pasha, September 4, 1867, Despatch 3/4; The quotation reads: "C'est plus particulièrement sous cette forme que les hommes d'Etat énoncent leurs idées, leurs sentiments et leurs convictions. C'est dans un discours public qu'il faut rechercher la véritable pensée d'un homme politique, et toute chose dite dans ces conditions a le caractère d'un acte authentique et fait foi au même titre que les déclarations écrites."}

Thus, public statements
made by American national leaders on the Turkish situation had to be seriously considered. Blacque reminded Fuad Pasha that American governmental action toward Turkey was subordinate to the sovereign authority of Congress, which body the Turkish Minister considered an "instrument of the whims of the national will." 114

When considering sources of power in American politics, Blacque explained the unique position of the army. He knew that before the Civil War the United States had not been a military power and, generally, the American people had devoted their efforts to commercial pursuits and internal improvements. Once the war began the Union, Blacque stated, "improvised an army, just like it improvises all things." Many common soldiers through bravery, knowledge, and luck rose to high rank. After the Union army was disbanded in 1865, Blacque maintained that the regular army had as many officers as it had enlisted men. He wrote Fuad:

This infinite number of military chieftains, who today form a powerful party, has created a danger for the government and a threat to its authority. It is evident that the men whose adventurous spirit had thrown them into the midst of combat, and who have reached, in less than three years the superior grades, are not yet satisfied in their ambition and that they feel themselves all the more capable of playing a political role as they have definitely succeeded in the accomplishment of a rapid military career. All these generals, taken

114 Turkey, Dişişleri Bakanlığı Arşivi, Hariciye, Blacque Bey to Fuad Pasha, September 4, 1867, Despatch 3/4; on the national will, Blacque Bey wrote: "Il est vrai de dire qu'aux États-Unis la pensée gouvernementale est subordonnée à l' action suprême du Congrès qui est, dans une certaine mesure l' instrument des caprices de la volonté nationale."
individually, are convinced, in other words, that they have been called to preside over the destinies of this country. Blacque observed that the officers could not be sent home as easily as the enlisted men. So, the government had created for them positions in the military governments of the South. The Minister felt that their lack of administrative experience resulted in the abuses that were reported from the South. Blacque feared for the future of the United States once the military governments were disbanded and the generals sent home. He warned: "The ambitions of numerous generals, which the peace condemns to remaining in worried sloth, creates the fear of their seizing the power and establishing, in their country, a democracy or rather a military anarchy, which are tearing apart the central and southern states of the American continent." Blacque had no sympathy for the radical Republicans whom he claimed were blinded by party hate. The Turkish Minister revealed his attitudes on race when he wrote about the radicals' desire to

---

115 Turkey, Dişşleri Bakanlığı Arşivi, Hariciye, Document 3050, Blacque to Fuad Pasha, September 27, 1867, Despatch 12/16. The quotation reads: "Le nombre infini de chefs militarisés, qui forment aujourd'hui un parti puissant, a créé un danger pour le gouvernement et une menace contre son autorité. Il est évident que les hommes que leur esprit aventureux avait jetés au milieu des combats, et qui sont parvenus en moins de trois ans, aux grades supérieurs ne sont pas encore satisfaits dans leur ambition et qu'ils se croiront d'autant plus capables de jouer un rôle politique, qu'ils ont, en définitive réussi à accomplir une rapide carrière militaire. Tous ces généraux, pris individuellement, sont convaincus en d'autres termes, qu'ils sont appelés à présider aux destinées de ce pays."

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.
extend the franchise to the blacks;

They [Radical Republicans] in no way account for the iniquity and incompetence of that race doubly degraded by nature and by servitude, they do not reckon on the disastrous consequences which would occasion, for the American Republic, the immediate and untimely concession of the right to vote to several million ignorant and gross Negroes who would sell their votes for a bottle of whiskey.\textsuperscript{118}

Blacque doubted the sincerity of the Radicals whom, he claimed, acted without any political motive aside from revenge. "These concessions," he wrote, "are not inspired in and among the Radicals by their sympathy for the Negro race, which they have never stood among themselves either as equals or inferiors; they simply are trying to find in yesterday's slaves the instruments of political vengeance against the Southern aristocracy."\textsuperscript{119}

According to the Ottoman observer, egotistical ambition and passionate discussion by the party leaders and the press had shaken American faith in constitutional government. Blacque believed that there still existed in America an "elite of statesman driven by sincere patriotism" who would return the Union to its former prosperity. He concluded: "One must wish that honest people of all persuasions, sacrificing their personal ambitions to the good of the state, join themselves to them to form the great party of order and liberty,

\textsuperscript{118} Turkey, Dişşlerî Baskanlığı Arşivi, Nariciye, Document 3050, Blacque to Fuad Pasha, September 27, 1867, Despatch 12/16.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., also see Document 3720, Blacque Boy to Fuad Pasha, July 8, 1868, Despatch 88/136.
because that is the price of maintaining the Union." 120

Given the cultural background and ideological convictions of Edouard Blacque and Edward Joy Morris, it was almost predetermined that the two men would become natural enemies. Both gentlemen supplied their respective governments with accurate information. Yet, neither was objective nor constructive. They criticized national events in relation to a foreign value system.

The most important source of information about Turkey which reached the American public were Protestant missionaries, who were too often critical of Ottoman customs. Missionaries such as George Washburn were, by virtue of their office, intensely hostile to Muslim traditions; some missionaries apparently believed themselves to be infallible when writing about Eastern matters. Even when the missionaries sympathized with the plight of the Turkish peasant, their journalism carried a regrettable air of condescension toward Muslims. A considerable amount of the information flowing from the Middle East to America was, thus, anti-Turkish in nature.

Although Morris attempted to provide a relatively unbiased picture of the situation to his government, he was constantly harassed by missionaries on the spot. The missionaries shaped opinion not only

---

120 Turkey, Daşıgları Bakanlığı Arşivi, Hariciye, Document 3050, Blacque to Fuad Pasha, September 27, 1867, Dispatch 12/16. Blacque wrote: "L' on doit souhaiter que les honnêtes gens de toutes les opinions, sacrifiant leurs ambitions personnelles au salut de l' État, se joignent à eux pour former le grand parti de l' ordre de la liberté, car le maintien de l' Union est à ce prix."
at home, but also in the Empire itself. Men holding considerable authority among the Levantine populace and the missionaries could (and did) create incidents which endangered Morris' position with his Ottoman hosts. Morris was also required to tread softly because the missionaries possessed considerable political influence in Washington,

America had little direct trade with the region; the only direct contact was Protestant missionaries. The missionaries were dedicated to the idea of remaking the world into the American image—Protestant, hardworking, thrifty, efficient, and republican. Nineteenth century Americans in the Middle East were concerned with neither trade nor strategy. They had no reason to defend the Muslims nor their governments—America had no India.

In dealing with the Middle East, American missionaries found themselves in the paradoxical position of being America's most important investment in the area, and, at the same time, America's most important source of information about Turkey. It is not surprising that what can only be called missionary journalism emphasized the darker side of Ottoman life. For, only by showing the Terrible Turk to be indeed terrible, could the missionaries justify their own function. Unfortunately, the missionary reporters possessed a vested interest in maintaining tension between the United States and the Sublime Porte. That such a state of affairs operated to the detriment of both Turkish and American national interests, none can doubt.
Non-recognition of belligerent rights for the Confederacy by the nations of the world was the most important diplomatic objective for American foreign officers during the fall of 1861. They were instructed to maintain friendly relations with the nations to which they were accredited; this was not always an easy task. For, regardless of the severity of the war, American citizens abroad demanded the same protection and service that they had received prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Merchants expected redress for insults received in foreign ports and demanded protection from Confederate commerce raiders. During the war federal officers did not have the available manpower to satisfy internal military demands and, as for protection of Americans overseas, the government could not afford to anger any potential friends.

Edward Joy Morris, American Minister to Turkey during the Civil War, found it difficult to maintain friendly relations with the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Pasha, and yet satisfy the
constant demands of the American missionaries stationed in Turkey.
American missionaries demanded the immediate arrest and execution of
Muslim subjects at the same time that Morris was completing negotia-
tions for a new commercial treaty and for a firman which would deny
access to any Ottoman Porte by Confederate raiders. The missionaries
grandly summoned a warship to appear off the coast of Syria for the
protection of their colleagues at a time when the European Squadron
was unable to offer protection to American shippers. Generally,
American missionaries were totally unaware of the difficult assign-
ment given to Edward Joy Morris. Seward comforted his minister during
one difficult period with the following:

All the world knows, even if we do not, that we cannot wage
this war, on our part, with effect, and at the same time
unnecessarily and rashly engage in wars with other nations
which may deny us justice, or withhold from us the accustomed
respect. However it may be with our citizens, the government
at least does not misunderstand the crisis.¹

One of the immediate tasks confronting Edward Joy Morris was
to alter the impressions presented to the Sublime Porte by the former
American Minister, James Williams—a Virginian with Southern, that is
to say treasonable, convictions. Morris did not arrive at his post
for several months after the departure of Minister Williams. During
the interim in the interest of the Union cause, John Porter Brown
wrote several letters to Ali Pasha, Ottoman Minister for Foreign

¹William Henry Seward to Edward Joy Morris, September 19,
1862, Despatch 36, Instructions, Turkey, Record Group 59, United
States National Archives, Washington, D. C. Hereafter cited RG 59,
USNA.
Affairs, explaining the changing political conditions in the United States. Brown argued that under the American system secession was unconstitutional and that it would be inadvisable for any foreign power to encourage such an internal revolutionary movement. He urged Ali Pasha not to permit the outfitting of privateers against the commerce of the United States.\(^2\) Even though the American Charge requested that a firman be issued to that effect, no action was taken.

After his arrival in August, 1861, Morris was not only concerned about the privateers of the Confederacy but he also feared they might persuade enterprising Greeks to enter the lucrative practice of attacking American commercial ships. Morris noted that the Greeks were the most daring navigators in the Levant and "naturally disposed to piracy."\(^3\) He doubted that either the Turkish or Greek governments would actually permit privateers to bring prizes into port, but he was anxious that orders should be issued to deny right of entry to any ship preying on American vessels.\(^4\) Also, the Minister suggested to the American Secretary of State that a naval steamer be sent to

\(^2\)John Porter Brown to William H. Seward, May 22, 1861, Despatch 1, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^3\)Morris to Seward, December 10, 1861, Despatch 5, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^4\)Fragment of a despatch written by Edward Joy Morris appearing in the Official Correspondence after a despatch written on July 17, 1861, RG 59, USNA.
the Mediterranean to allay the "existing anxiety for the safety of our vessels" and to maintain "confidence in the naval power of the federal government." He observed that a Confederate privateer could do "a great deal of injury to American vessels in these seas."5

Fear of privateers had immediate, and untoward, results. American merchant captains panicked, customers were reluctant to send cargoes on American ships, and insurance rates became, as Morris put it, "exorbitantly high."6 In order to protect American shipping and console the frustrated captains, he released a bit of incorrect propaganda for publication in the Journal de Constantinople. The readers of that paper were informed that the United States government had already sent three warships to the Mediterranean to protect American merchant vessels against rebel attacks. The story claimed that the Tuscarora, St. Louis and Kearsage would afford complete protection to American commerce. At the same time that Morris was having this misinformation printed in the local press, he was pleading with the American government not to delay in sending at least one small armed steamer.7

During December, 1861, American merchant vessels hauling grain cargoes from the Balkan-Danube region to England and France were delayed at Constantinople because of persistent rumors of an impending

5Morris to Seward, December 10, 1861, Despatch 5, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

6Morris to Seward, March 19, 1862, Despatch 13, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

7Ibid.; also see enclosure.
war between the United States and Great Britain. Added to this, a steamer, the Circassian, sailed for the United States under suspicious circumstances. Usually, that Greek ship operated between Liverpool, Constantinople, and Trabzon. She was a screw steamer weighing about 1,045 tons, and Morris thought her to be loaded with saltpeter from the mines of Trabzon. The ship took on fuel fourteen miles up the Bosphorus instead of in the Constantinople harbor. The American Minister was not aware of her intended clearance until her departure; the ship arrived and cleared the same day. Morris felt that the ship sailed under "extraordinary circumstances"; he gloomily concluded that the Circassian would head for a Rebel port where she would probably be sold and converted into a Confederate man-of-war. In any case, that ship disappeared from the pages of history; the incident is worth recalling only because it illustrates the anxiety in Morris' mind at the time.

Even more unsettling to American merchants, residents, and diplomatic officials was the news that three Confederate steamers had actually entered the Mediterranean: the Sumpter, Nashville, and

---

8 Morris to Seward, December 25, 1861, Despatch 7, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

9 Morris to Seward, December 25, 1861, Despatch 7, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; C. W. Goddard to William Winthrop (U. S. Consul at Malta), December 26, 1861, Constantinople Consulate General Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume 1, C 8.4, RG 84, USNA.

10 Morris to Seward, December 25, 1861, Despatch 7, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
Southerner,\textsuperscript{11} Consuls became particularly nervous when the Sumpter was sighted in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was reported that she had put in at the port of Scios, an island (noted for its massacres) in the Greek Archipelago belonging to Turkey and situated about seventy miles from Smyrna.\textsuperscript{12} The American consul at Smyrna, Julius Bing, urged the Governor General to prevent any rebel vessel from entering that port. The latter seemed willing enough to turn away the Sumpter, but he told the Consul that he must have instructions from the Porte before he could deny entry to a Confederate ship. Bing feared that the Sumpter would arrive at any moment, so he sent the Governor General a formal note demanding immediate expulsion of the Sumpter, should she arrive. The Consul explained to Morris his procedure:

"To remain passive until the privateer actually unfolds his foul

\textsuperscript{11}On the Southerner see Morris to Seward, August 10, 1863, Despatch 60, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; in the Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, see F. M. Behn (U. S. Consul to Messina), July 11, 1863 and Morris to Johnson, August 6, 1863; in the Consulate General File in Constantinople see C. W. Godard to F. M. Behn, Miscellaneous Correspondence, C 8.4; in the Constantinople Post Papers see J. A. Johnson to Morris, September 3, 1863, Beirut; Julius Bing to Morris, August 8, 1863 and August 28, 1863, Smyrna; and Morris to Bing, August 4, 1863, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letters Sent, Folio 23, RG 84, USNA. On the Sumpter and Nashville see Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1858-63, C 8.2, Johnson to Abdo Debbas (Vice Consul to Tarsus), October 26, 1862; Johnson to Marc Levi (Vice Consul to Alexandria), October 24, 1862; Johnson to H. R. Thatcher, Commander of the Constellation; Johnson to Morris, October 25, 1862 and March 1, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

\textsuperscript{12}Julius Bing to Seward, February 15, 1862, Despatch 17, Official Consular Correspondence, Smyrna, RG 59, USNA; Julius Bing to Morris, February 1, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Smyrna, RG 84, USNA.
flag under the windows of the U. S. consulate would show an indifference to the honour of the country."\(^{13}\)

Early in 1862, Morris admitted to the Secretary that the appearance of the Sumpter in the Eastern Mediterranean had caused panic among certain American merchant captains.\(^{14}\) Evidence indicates that the Sumpter caused some American merchant ships to change their colors. In 1864, Jeremiah Augustus Johnson, Consul at Beirut, wrote Seward that a merchantman from Boston had arrived at Beirut but "it bore the British flag."\(^{15}\) Damage done to American shipping was considerable, but the psychological damage was even greater.\(^{16}\) At the close of the war, annual commercial reports show that American shipping had all but disappeared from the ports of the Eastern

\(^{13}\) Quotation from Julius Bing to Morris, February 8, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Smyrna, RG 84, USNA; also see Julius Bing to Seward, February 8, 1862, Despatch 15, Official Consular Correspondence, Smyrna, RG 59, USNA.

\(^{14}\) Morris to Seward, January 22, 1862, Despatch 6, Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; Morris to Julius Bing, February 11, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letters Sent, Folio 23, RG 84, USNA; Julius Bing to Morris, February 15, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Smyrna, RG 84, USNA.

\(^{15}\) J. A. Johnson to Seward, October 1, 1863, Despatch 178, Official Consular Correspondence, Beirut, RG 59, USNA. Also see a copy of the same despatch in the Beirut Post Papers, Letters Sent, Despatch 18/178.

\(^{16}\) See the Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous File, 1858-63, C 8.2, Johnson to Levi, October 24, 1862; Johnson to H. R. Thatcher, Commander of the Constellation; A. B. Goodale to J. A. Johnson, November 5, 1862, written from Aintab, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.
Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{17} It was well known that the U. S. S. Constellation, an obsolete sailing corvette stationed at Genoa, was the only American ship in the Mediterranean and that the Commander of the European Squadron had no steamer which he could send to that region. Faced with armed steamers, the Constellation could do little except stay out of their way.\textsuperscript{18}

With Confederate raiders actually in the Mediterranean, Morris requested that the Turkish government issue orders prohibiting the subjects of the Sublime Porte from giving aid and comfort to the Confederacy.\textsuperscript{19} The American Minister used every opportunity to cultivate his personal friendship with the Turkish Ministers; he hoped that this would result in a favorable view of the Union cause by the Turkish government. He was particularly anxious that the Sultan's Ministers not be pressured into seeking advice from the French or British ambassador about the American conflict. If the Turkish government were to follow the British and French policy of

\textsuperscript{17} Consular Despatch, Beirut: J. A. Johnson to Seward, June 30, 1865, Despatch 23; September 30, 1865, Despatch 241; October 30, 1865, Despatch 246; December 31, 1865, Despatch 248; October 1, 1866, Despatch 276; October 13, 1866, Despatch 280. Constantinople Consular Despatches, John H. Goodenow to Seward, June 30, 1865, Despatch 4; September 30, 1865, Despatch 17; December 12, 1865, Despatch 25; December 31, 1865, Despatch 28; December 20, 1869, Despatch 100, April 6, 1866, Despatch 40; November 30, 1866, Despatch 52. Consular Despatches, Smyrna: John Griffith to Seward, August 18, 1866, Despatch 29; E. J. Smithers, October 4, 1867, Despatch 14.

\textsuperscript{18} Johnson to Morris, October 25, 1862, and March 1, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84.

\textsuperscript{19} Morris to Seward, March 26, 1862, Despatch 14; May 6, 1862, Despatch 19; Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
strict neutrality, federal and rebel authorities would soon be placed on an equal footing. This would mean that ships of the two conflicting regions would be limited to a twenty-four hour stay in Turkish ports.

On April 23, 1862, when the Turks issued orders concerning Ottoman action toward Confederate rebels and privateers, Morris reported that the firman was much "stronger" than he had anticipated. The Ottoman government placed "absolute and unconditional" restrictions upon the entrance of privateers into Ottoman ports. Drawn up at Morris' request the firman was intended by the Turkish government to deny belligerent rights to the Southern rebels. Instructions were sent to governors of maritime provinces, and to islands in the Aegean archipelago, prohibiting Ottoman subjects or foreigners from outfitting any vessel destined to prey on the commerce of the United States. Governors were instructed to prevent the entrance into ports and waters of their respective provinces all privateers and rebel vessels. The only exception to the rule on admission to Turkish ports were ships in distress. In that case, a rebel ship would be permitted to stay the length of time needed for

---

20 Morris to Seward, May 6, 1862, Despatch 19, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

21 Morris to Seward, July 13, 1865, Despatch 118, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

22 Morris to Seward, March 26, 1862, Despatch 14, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
The firman, strictly construed, operated against the Confederate vessels, but allowed unlimited facilities to American vessels.

As a former newspaperman, Morris gave a great deal of care to effective propaganda through personal contacts with government officials and properly timed notices in the local press. As for the American Civil War, he claimed to present the "struggle in its true light--conspiracy without any pretext or justification." Throughout the war, Morris publicized Union victories and ignored various setbacks of the Army of the Potomac. The Minister considered the missionaries who resided in all parts of the Empire an instrument for getting the message of the Union to the Turkish people. Missionaries knew the languages of the country and were stationed in all areas of the Empire. Morris believed their influence on public opinion to be considerable and he cultivated these gardens with care.

In addition to the assistance given the Union cause by the American missionaries, the Minister had John Porter Brown. Morris officially acknowledged Brown's influence with the Turkish government on behalf of the United States. The American Minister reported: "In this emergency, as at all times he [Brown] has shown himself trustworthy,

---

23 Morris to Seward, March 26, 1862, Despatch 14, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

24 Ibid.

25 Morris to Seward, August 25, 1861, Despatch 1, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Also see Turkey, Dışışleri Bakanlığı Arşivi, Hariciye, Carton 50, Morris to Ali Pasha, March 16, 1863; Morris to Ali Pasha, April 21, 1863; and Ali to Morris, May 2, 1863.
loyal, and a valuable officer of the United States eminently worthy of its confidence." 26

Commenting on the success of his early diplomatic efforts Morris told the Secretary of State: "Nothing could be more grateful to me than the sincere goodwill shown to the government of the United States by the Turkish Cabinet in this dark hour of its history and that too, when some of the Christian powers of Europe seem to be indifferent to its fate. It shall be my constant aim to cherish and confirm this friendly spirit." 27 Throughout the war, the Minister continued to send reports of the Turkish government's sincere sympathy with the Union cause. After Appomattox, he reviewed for the State Department the friendly acts of the Turkish government, and reminded the American government that the Sultan and his Ministers had "never recognized the rebels as belligerents." Nor had the Turkish government, he stated, ever "directly or indirectly" exhibited sympathy with the Southern efforts to destroy the Union. The Minister concluded that, in the face of strong British and French influence at the Porte, the Ottoman government's attitude during 1861-65 "was a striking exhibition of political courage in behalf of a government whose friendship it had always cherished."

26 For Morris on the missionaries see a letter to Seward, October 25, 1861, Despatch 4; on Brown see Despatch 1, August 25, 1861, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

27 Morris to Seward, August 25, 1861, Despatch 1, op. cit.

28 Morris to Seward, July 13, 1865, Despatch 118, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
For some time before the outbreak of the American Civil War textile producing nations were aware of future difficulties and feared for the loss of American cotton. The possibility that cotton could be cultivated in Turkey and thus make up for the untimely death of King Cotton was of great interest, particularly in Manchester. In order to make this a paying proposition for British investment, it was first necessary to do something about the Turkish export duties.\footnote{The Times (London), January 10, 1861, p. 8.} The need for revision of existing treaties had been discussed for several years because the tariff treaty expired on March 13, 1855. In fact, the Turkish government had demanded that there be a complete revision of all trade agreements.

Under commercial treaties written in the 1830's, western nations exporting agricultural or manufactured items to Turkey were required to pay an ad valorem duty of 5 per cent. Of this import duty, 3 per cent was payable on arrival and the other 2 per cent at the time the item was sold. The treaties stipulated that Turkish exports of agricultural or manufactured products had to pay 9 per cent duty at the place of shipment and an additional 3 per cent duty at the time of exportation. What Turkey had done was bind herself to a maximum import tax of 5 per cent and an export duty of 12 per cent.\footnote{Ibid., January 15, 1861, p. 8.}

It became apparent in the 1850's that it was inconsistent to support a state attempting to reform its institutions and yet deny that same state the right of internal development. The Times of London
viewed this situation as a moral issue and claimed that "anything which operates as a clog upon the producing power of one of the richest countries in the world is an universal and not a mere national evil."  

This paper maintained that the heavy export duty of 12 per cent prevented Turkey from developing any of the resources of her own country. Such a tax destroyed motivation to produce a surplus of agricultural products for sale on the world market because the Turkish farmers could not compete, and thus large sections of Turkish farm land lay uncultivated. It was believed that in one way or another Turkish exports were overtaxed and that consequently her soil lay uncultivated. The reform ministers of the Sultan, Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha, were anxious to negotiate new commercial treaties in order to alleviate this problem.

It became clear at the beginning of negotiations that foreign powers were not anxious to have import duties increased. The Ottoman state needed money and the import and export duties were a major source of revenue. If Ottoman social reform were to be successful then the export tax could not be abolished without a substitute source of income. Ingeniously, it was proposed that an alternative method be to raise the import tax so as to make up for losses incurred by lowering the export tax.  

---

31 The Times (London), January 15, 1861, p. 8.
32 Ibid.
As for the American response to European treaty negotiations with Turkey, John Porter Brown urged the State Department to draft a new treaty because the original treaty was a "very meager one" and "incorrectly translated." When Edward Joy Morris arrived upon the scene he informed the State Department that the European powers had been working on a new treaty for over a year, and that unless the United States acted swiftly she would suffer considerable harm to her commercial interests.

Seward authorized Morris to negotiate a new treaty on the British model. But, the American Secretary of State felt that the terms employed in the British treaty endangered the "most favored nation clause" and he instructed Morris not to abandon this principle which was embalmed in the 1830 Treaty. Because of this clause, the two countries were able to adjust to variations in their respective tariffs without negotiating a new treaty. Seward also wanted Morris to obtain permission to sell in Turkey tobacco and salt exported from America, but the Minister failed to extract this concession from the Ottomans.

33 John Porter Brown to Seward, June 25, 1861, Despatch 9, Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

34 Morris to Seward, August 25, 1861, Despatch 1 and October 25, 1861, Despatch 4, Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

35 Seward to Morris, September 23, 1861, Despatch 8, Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

36 See Seward to Morris, September 23, 1861, op. cit., and Morris to Seward, October 25, 1861, Despatch 4, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
The treaties ratified in the early months of 1862 were effective for a twenty-eight year period, although modifications could be proposed after 10 years. Export and import duties were set at 8 per cent ad valorem, providing that export duties would be reduced. Goods in transit through the Ottoman dominions were to pay 2 per cent at entry for the first eight years that the new treaties were in force and 1 per cent for the rest of the treaty period. The new treaties abolished monopolies and taxes which had obstructed the internal trade of the Empire; it was no longer necessary to obtain a local permit for transportation of merchandise through an area. Once the import duties had been paid, goods could be transported to any point in the Empire without paying any further duty. Goods stored for reexport and goods in transit would be subject only to a small transit duty. All products of the soil or industry were exempted from duty in passage through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus; agricultural goods could be stored in the storage bins at the Custom House if they were in transit. Tobacco and salt were made monopolies of the Turkish government; hence importation of these items was forbidden, but the Porte allowed their export without duty. Finally (and most important in Ottoman eyes) importation of munitions of war was also forbidden.37

37Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States and Other Powers, 1776-1909, Volume 2, compiled by William H. Malloy (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910), Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and the Ottoman Empire, pp. 1321-38. Also see the Turkish treaty with Great Britain, enclosure, John Porter Brown to Seward, June 25, 1861, Despatch 9, Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. For British comment on the ratification and monopolies see
In general the 1862 American-Turkish Treaty followed the pattern of Turkey's other commercial agreements with the Great Powers. Morris informed Seward that the Treaty in no way required the United States to adjust its tariffs with special reference to Turkish interests. The Minister noted that no reciprocity was required for "privileges conceded to the foreign powers by the Ottoman Government." Most importantly, the new Treaty confirmed all of the important provisions of the 1830 Treaty and expanded Turkish trading rights and legal protection in the United States. The document was aimed at increasing trade between the two countries, and it revealed that Turkey was willing to expand her commercial activities within the United States.

Morris informed the Secretary of State that presents would be expected by the Turkish functionaries who appeared at the ceremony for the ratification of the Treaty. He pointed out that the Eastern custom of giving was even more important during the Civil War, since Turkey's goodwill was essential to success of the Union cause. By the beginning of April the Treaty had been ratified by the Senate, signed by Lincoln,.

Great Britain, Public Record Office, F. O. 78/1649, Sir Henry Bulwer to to Lord John Russell, March 4, 1862, Despatch 83; Sir Henry Bulwer to Russell, March 7, 1862, Unnumbered Despatch. Another source for information on the treaty is Morris to Seward, March 6, 1862, Despatch 12, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

38 Morris to Seward, October 25, 1861, Despatch 4, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

and was on its way back to Turkey accompanied by appropriate gifts. The President sent the Sultan of Turkey a copy of Audubon's work on the animals and birds of North America. Morris believed this to be an excellent choice for the Sultan because of that gentleman's love of "field sports."¹⁰ For his part, Ali Pasha received a three-foot high silver vase weighing 116 pounds.¹¹ Functionaries of lesser importance received jeweled snuff boxes and diamond-ornamented watches.

Under the 1862 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Turkey, the high contracting parties agreed to "appoint, jointly commissioners" to deal with the tariff on all items exported and imported between the two countries. The tariff was to remain in force for a period of seven years, but each of the parties had a right one year prior to the expiration of the tariff to demand a revision. If neither party requested a revision, the tariff of 1862 would remain in effect.¹²

The 1862 tariff was negotiated for the Americans by Aristides Azarian, a wealthy, naturalized American who was involved through his

¹⁰ Morris to Seward, July 3, 1862, Despatch 22, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

¹¹ Unsigned note from the Sublime Porte, No. 5991/3, August 13, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84, USNA; Morris to Seward, July 3, 1862, Despatch 22, op. cit.; Morris to Seward, July 16, 1862, Despatch 25, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; C. W. Goddard to Morris, June 14, 1862, Constantinople Consular Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume 1, C 8,4, RG 84, USNA. Goddard gave a description of the delivery of the Treaty to the United States, his trip to Paris for the purchase of the presents for members of the Foreign Office, and the delivery of the Treaty and the presents to the Legation.

¹² W. Malloy, Treaties, op. cit., p. 1328.
family in Turkish-American trade. Morris reported that Azarian possessed a "thorough knowledge of commercial relations between the United States and Turkey." John Porter Brown acted as Secretary to the commission, the Minister reporting that Brown worked with his "usual fidelity & ability." 43

Morris believed that because the American tariff was drawn up after those for European countries, there was an opportunity of adjusting the rates with greater care and with a more particular regard to American interests. He predicted that the new rates would be a "great boon to American commerce as our exports from Turkey are generally about 40% more than our imports to the same." The Minister observed:

The commerce of the U. S. will, in the reduction of export duties receive a larger benefit from the New Treaty than any other nation. Especial care was also taken in the Tariff to give American produce & manufactures an equal chance with those of other countries which they have not hitherto enjoyed. 44

In 1869, near the close of the stipulated seven-year period, American merchants in Constantinople and Smyrna agreed that the tariff negotiated in 1862 was highly favorable to American commercial interests in Turkey. With this evaluation of the existing tariff, Morris made no application for a revision of the rates. 45

43 Morris to Seward, March 6, 1862, Despatch 12, Official Correspondence, Constantineople, RG 59, USNA.

44 Ibid., and Morris to Seward, March 19, 1862, Despatch 13, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

45 Morris to Fish, April 5, 1869, Despatch 312, and April 27, Despatch 313, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
The 1862 Turkish-American Treaty was negotiated at the same time that Morris was attempting to persuade the Porte to deny belligerent rights to the Confederacy. With a commendable desire to protect American merchant shipping from the ravages of rebel raiders, the Minister introduced four articles which he believed should be included in the new Treaty. The articles defined contraband and the handling of it by powers friendly to the United States. The most important points read:

No subject of the Sublime Porte shall apply for, or take any commissions or Letters of Marque for arming any ships to act as privateers against the United States of America, or any of them, or against the citizens, people or inhabitants of the said United States, or any of them, or against the property of any inhabitant of them, from any Prince, or State, or authority with which the said United States shall be at war. . . . It is also agreed between the High Contracting Parties that it shall not be lawful for any foreign privateers having commissions or Letters of Marque from any Prince or State or authority, whatever, in enmity with either nation for the purpose of preying upon their vessels and commerce to fit their vessels in ports of either of them, to sell their prizes, or in any manner of exchange them therein, neither shall they be allowed to purchase provisions in said ports.46

The Minister personally explained his proposed articles to Ali Pasha, he demonstrated to his satisfaction that other European countries had signed treaties with the United States which contained similar clauses and assured the Foreign Minister that the articles merely summed up "our policy from the origin of the United States government

46 Morris to Seward, February 23, 1862, Unnumbered Despatch, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure.
to our present day." Ali Pasha did agree that the proposed articles were not in conflict with treaties already signed by the Turkish government. But because the Turkish Cabinet refused to include the articles in the new treaty, Morris was convinced that "outside influences" were brought to bear. He also believed if these same articles would be submitted to the Turkish government at a more favorable moment, they would be accepted.

One of the many problems facing the American government at the outset of the Civil War was the loss of Southern cotton. However, the United States was not the only nation troubled by the prospect of a cotton shortage. Lincoln's paper blockade of the Southern ports prevented the fiber from reaching European markets; textile manufacturers, merchants, and investors looked frantically for an alternative source of cotton. They all knew that for centuries cotton had been cultivated in the Ottoman Empire. In the past, large shipments had

---

47 Ibid., Ali Pasha to Morris, March 7, 1862, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Despatch 5769/21, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte; Morris to Johnson, February 12, 1862, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence; Ali to Morris, February 23, 1862, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Despatch 5612/1, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte; all letters found in RG 84, USNA.

48 Morris to Seward, February 23, 1862, unnumbered Despatch, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

49 The Times (London), January 10, 1861, p. 8.

50 John Goodenow to Seward, November 30, 1866, Despatch 54, Consular Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
been sent from Smyrna to southern European ports; at the close of the eighteenth century Smyrna was shipping from 150,000 to 200,000 bales of cotton annually to Europe. Middle Eastern cotton had all but disappeared from the world market by 1861 because of European competition for occupation of the Ottoman lands, actions of privateers on commercial vessels, failure of Turkey to modernize her methods of cultivation, and lack of new strains of seed for quality improvements.

Last but not least, a 12% Turkish export tax made it impossible for Turkish growers to compete with cheaper American cotton.

With the outbreak of the Civil War, the government of Sultan Abdul Aziz became aware of the fact that cotton could again become an important export item. In Asia Minor and Syria there were tracts of uncultivated land on which it was believed that cotton could be grown profitably. All concerned thought that because land and labor was extremely cheap, considerable money could be made. As it became obvious that profits were to be made in the American and British markets, governmental efforts were made to stimulate the growth of cotton. A Franco-Ottoman Commission was formed for the purpose of putting vast unused lands into immediate cultivation. In the fall of 1861, Morris wrote that the Ottoman government had issued

---

51 John Goodenow to Seward, November 30, 1866, Despatch 54, Consular Correspondence, Constantinople, RG 59, USNA.

52 Morris to Seward, October 8, 1861, Despatch 3, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; also see The Times (London), January 15, 1861, p. 8.

53 J. A. Johnson to S. P. Chase, December 31, 1862, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letters Sent, RG 84, USNA.
instructions to all provincial governors to promote the cultivation of cotton "to the utmost extent."\(^5^4\)

The Ottoman government was anxious not only to increase the tonnage of cotton but also to improve its quality. It was generally believed that experimentation with American seed would produce a better fiber. With this in mind, the Turkish Ambassador to the Court of St. James contacted, in the name of the Porte, one Isaac Watts of the Manchester Cotton Supply Association concerning the purchase of a large quantity of American cotton seed. Through New York agents, the Association was able to obtain approximately fifty tons of American seed for the Ottoman government.\(^5^5\) This short staple cotton seed was distributed in northern Syria and southern Turkey near Adana.\(^5^6\) Experts agreed that the cotton produced from the American seed in the Syrian regions was "equal" to cotton of New Orleans; Anatolian cotton was considered superior to the East Indian variety but inferior to American and Egyptian cotton.\(^5^7\)

The Ottoman government received considerable encouragement

\(^{5^4}\) Morris to Seward, October 8, 1861, Despatch 3, op. cit.

\(^{5^5}\) Turkey, Bağdakuluk Arşivi, Hariciye, Document 11664; all items in this file deal with the purchase of American cotton seed.

\(^{5^6}\) In 1972, one of Turkey's most important exports was cotton. A long stapled variety is grown around Izmir while the short stapled American type comes from Cukurova which is not far from Adana.

\(^{5^7}\) John H. Goodenow to Seward, November 30, 1866, Despatch 54, and December 20, 1866, Despatch 72, Consular Correspondence, Constantinople; also see Johnson to Seward, December 31, 1863, Despatch 26, Consular Correspondence, Beirut; Morris to Seward, November 13, 1862, Despatch 33, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
in its cotton cultivation project from countries needing an immediate supply of the fiber. The American Secretary of State ordered Morris and the Consul at Smyrna, Julius Bing, to exert all their efforts in the promotion of cotton production and trade. But the greatest assistance to Turkey came from the city hardest hit by the American Civil War--Manchester. In a sudden accession of pessimism, the Manchester Board of Trade Association decided that it might be a long time before American cotton would again find its way to the British market. With this realization, a group of Manchester merchants set off with knowhow, ambition, and money to modernize cotton production in Turkey. They wished the British Embassy to secure its assistance; in particular, they were "anxious to know whether the Porte would assist them in carrying on their operations by every means in its power." Ali Pasha promised Sir Henry Bulwer, the British Ambassador, that he would use every conceivable method to increase cotton production in the Empire. Bulwer hoped that something would be arranged for the purchase of land in Turkey by the Manchester Board of Trade. Representatives of the Manchester Board of Trade provided the Turkish

58Julius Bing to Seward, October 26, 1861, Unnumbered Despatch, Consular Correspondence, Smyrna; Julius Bing to Seward, January 25, 1862, Despatch 10, Consular Correspondence, Smyrna, RG 59, USNA.


60Ibid.

61Ibid.
farmers with technical assistance, free Egyptian cotton seed, modern agricultural equipment, and money at low interest rates. \footnote{62}{Julius Bing to Seward, February 4, 1862, Despatch 12, Consular Correspondence, Smyrna, Rg 59, USNA; Johnson to Seward, October 1, 1861, Despatch 22/212, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letters Sent, C 8.3, RG 84, USNA.}

In the final test, it was the Egyptian cotton that saved the textile mills of Manchester. Once the American Civil War ended, American cotton again appeared on the world market. During the next two years a glut occurred on the world cotton market causing European prices of cotton to fall. Farming methods in the Ottoman provinces were still inefficient, shipping costs excessive, the British were no longer interested, and profits were meager. In December, 1865, John H. Goodenow, the American Consul General at Constantinople, reported: "The attempted cultivation of cotton in the Turkish Empire can hardly be called a success. The cotton produced here is of an inferior quality though principally from American seed. There is not much reason to fear that Turkey will ever compete successfully with the United States, in this profitable branch of industry." \footnote{63}{John H. Goodenow to Seward, December 12, 1865, Despatch 25, Consular Correspondence, Constantinople, RG 59, USNA.}

Although the quality of the Turkish and Syrian cotton improved each year, the declining European prices and the increased competition of American and Egyptian cotton caused the Ottoman cotton slowly to disappear from the world arena. Much of the cotton produced was utilized within the country for native fabrics. Over the years the land was again returned to grain, pasture, or allowed to lie fallow because the seed that
had promised so much could not produce a quality cotton that would compete on the world market. 64

A problem related to the failure of cotton production in Turkey concerned restrictions placed on the right of foreigners to own property. Julius Bing, American Consul at Smyrna, concluded that Americans who were interested in cotton production would invest in the Empire if there were no property restrictions. He believed that such action would increase the prosperity of both countries. 65 Under the Ottoman legal system foreigners were not permitted to hold property in their own name. To circumvent that obstacle, Ottoman subjects acted in the foreigner's behalf. Usually for a fee, an Ottoman-Christian would permit his name to appear on the deed as the owner of the property.

At the time of the issuance of the Hatti-Humayun of 1856, the Porte had promised that concessions would be made to foreigners on the right to hold property in fee simple. The Porte was hesitant to grant the right to hold property without the Great Powers first agreeing to surrender privileges accorded them under the Capitulations. Apparently, the Porte wished foreign property holders to be placed on the same footing as Ottoman subjects. Morris maintained that if the

---

64 Ibid.; John H. Goodenow to Seward, November 30, 1866, Despatch 54, Consular Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

65 Julius Bing to Morris, March 22, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Smyrna, RG 84, USNA.
Ottoman government would permit foreign ownership of property there would be a great emigration from Europe to the Ottoman Empire bringing in much needed capital and technological skills. The American Minister predicted that cotton would not be the only beneficiary, but that other investments would be made in trading operations, industrial development, and mining operations, by the grateful immigrants.

In 1862, because of the cotton crisis, the Powers, particularly, England, pressed the Porte for a law granting foreigners the right to own property in Turkey. The cotton crisis arrived and disappeared before an agreement was reached on foreign land ownership in Turkey. In June, 1867, the Ottoman government published a Land Protocol which stated that all property owners, foreign or Ottoman, would settle property problems in Ottoman courts. All land within the Empire would be subjected to equal taxation and assessment regardless of ownership. However, the person and domicile of foreign land owners would continue to "enjoy the immunities guaranteed by the capitulations."

---

66 Morris to Seward, February 15, 1862, Despatch 11 and November 27, 1862, Despatch 36, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

67 Morris to Seward, February 15, 1862, op. cit.

68 Ibid.

69 Blaque Bey to Hamilton Fish, March 25, 1869, Despatch 257, Notes from the Turkish Legation, RG 59, USNA.

70 Fuad Pasha to Morris, June 18, 1867, No. 19472/19, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, RG 84, USNA; Morris to Seward, July 3, 1868, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester; New York Herald, August 19, 1868, p. 7.
All western nations signed the Land Protocol except for Italy, Russia, and the United States. 71

Americans objected to the Land Protocol for many reasons. Morris thought the law was both excellent and needed in order to promote the economic growth of Turkey; yet he wrote Seward:

It is to be regretted that the venality and incapacity of Turkish courts of Justice is such as to render them generally unreliable as guardians of private right, Until the judicial administration undergoes a radical reform, but few foreigners will be induced to avail themselves of the provision of this law of property; and it will fail of its intended effect in promoting European emigration into Turkey, and in developing the resources of the Empire. 72

Some American citizens owned real estate in Turkey by indirect tenure; this did not prejudice immunities secured for foreigners by Treaty arrangements. But most property owned by Americans in Turkey was held by the American Board of Commissioners For Foreign Missions in a corporate capacity. Since the right of corporations to own property was upheld by the Turkish courts, most missionaries were not interested in securing the right for individuals to hold property in Turkey. A few of these even questioned whether the advantages of individual

71 New York Herald, August 19, 1868, p. 7; Daily Telegraph (London), August 5, 1868, p. 3; an unsigned, unnumbered circulaire, undated other than December, 1868, Notes from the Sublime Porte, RG 84, USNA; Safvet Pasha to Morris, February 6, 1868, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 24120/4, Notes from the Sublime Porte, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84, USNA.

72 Morris to Seward, June 25, 1867, Despatch 214, Official Correspondence, RG 59, USNA.
ownership were not counterbalanced by the fact that property holders would come directly under the control of local administrators.

Consul General Jeremiah Augustus Johnson, stationed at Beirut, held that the Land Protocol placed foreign owners of real estate who were unfortunate enough to reside more than nine hours distant from their consulates under jurisdiction of the local Ottoman authorities. The Consul General reminded American officials that Turkey's problems were all to be found in the "corrupt administration of the law" at the local level. Because local officials were unable to maintain law and order, Johnson felt that such conditions would "prevent the investment of foreign capital in places removed from the consulates and that consequently, this law will practically remain a dead letter."\(^7^3\)

He pointed out that Ottoman regulations ought not be antagonistic to the spirit of the capitulations which "shield the subjects of friendly powers from any arbitrary act of power on the part of the local authorities."\(^7^4\) Johnson noted that if the United States accepted the Land Protocol, it would set a precedent for placing all Americans under jurisdiction of the Sublime Porte, if they were more than nine hours distant from a consulate. This was a great concern to United States officials, because American missionaries were scattered in all areas of the Empire.

To make matters worse Seward opposed the Land Protocol. He

\(^7^3\) Opinion on the Land Protocol given by Jeremiah Augustus Johnson to Morris, August 24, 1869, Despatch 242, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

\(^7^4\) Ibid.
wrote Morris that agreement to its provisions would necessitate negotiation of a new treaty involving reciprocity. Unfortunately reciprocity for foreign citizens would be impossible, because many American states restricted property ownership to American citizens. Seward likewise opposed the right of the Turkish government to have any judicial authority over American citizens.  

The Turkish government was far from pleased with American response to the Land Protocol. Blacque Bey, Ottoman Minister to the United States, complained to Hamilton Fish, and the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs sent Morris several letters urging America to accept the property law. In 1873, after both Russia and Italy signed the Land Protocol, America was warned that conditions would become more difficult for its citizens who held property by indirect tenure. Hence, the missionaries decided (somewhat precipitately) that they favored the Land Protocol. As might be expected, missionary influence was the deciding factor. Hamilton Fish reluctantly instructed the American Minister to accept the Land Protocol "for the benefit of

---

75 Seward to Morris, July 17, 1867, Despatch 150, Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; also see Morris to Seward, July 3, 1868, Private Letter, William H. Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

76 Safvet Pasha to Morris, February 6, 1869, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 24120/4, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, RG 24, USNA; Hamilton Fish Diary, entry for March 25, 1869, Volume 1, Part 1, Container 314, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.; Blacque Bey to Hamilton Fish, April 10, 1869, Despatch 272, see enclosure, Notes from the Turkish Legation, RG 59, USNA. Unsigned, unnumbered, undated circulaire, December, 1868, Explanation of the reasons for the revisions of the Capitulations, Notes from the Sublime Porte, RG 84, USNA.
American citizens residing in the Turkish dominion." The Minister
signed the document and, on October 29, 1874, President Grant pro-
claimed the Land Protocol to be the law of the land—much too late
for American investment in Turkish cotton.

Rebel privateers, cotton, and land ownership were not the only
problems occupying the energy of American diplomats in the Middle East
during the Civil War; there was also the perplexing problem of
Egyptian soldiers recruited for Maxmilian of Mexico. For all practical
purposes, Egypt was independent of the Sultan's sway. But nominally,
she was a province of the Ottoman Empire and her foreign policy was con-
ducted by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Pasha. However,
Turkish internal problems made it difficult for the Porte to control
the activities of its adventurous and autonomous province.

On January 10, 1863, William S. Thayer, American Consul General
at Alexandria, telegraphed Edward Joy Morris that the Viceroy of Egypt
had sent a thousand black soldiers to assist the French in Mexico.

---

77 See Hamilton Fish to George Boker, June 2, 1873, Despatch 109,
Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

78 J. C. B. Davis to George Boker, April 7, 1874, Despatch 183,
Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Also see Fish to Boker, June 2, 1873,
Despatch 109, and September 15, 1874, Despatch 214, Instructions, Turkey,
RG 59, USNA. See Boker to Fish, August 18, 1874, Correspondence, Turkey,
RG 59, USNA. William M. Malloy (editor), Treaties, Conventions, Inter-

79 Morris to Seward, January 15, 1863, Despatch 46, Official
Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Also see Arnold Blumberg,
"William Seward and Egyptian Intervention in Mexico," The Smith-
In the early weeks of January, 1863, the French frigate *La Seine* docked at Alexandria. Nubian soldiers, criminals and unattached dock workers were put on board the frigate secretly at night. The American Consul General described the scene: "The deep damnation of their taking off—amid the outcries of women and children from whom many of the negroes were torn will be long remembered in Alexandria. They recall the worst practices of the African slave trade."  

Thayer requested an explanation for this ship of black soldiers sent to Mexico. The Foreign Minister confessed that, indeed, the blacks were sent by the Viceroy's orders in compliance with an earlier agreement made with the French Emperor. Thayer thereupon explained to the Egyptian Foreign Minister some of the more obscure parts of the Monroe Doctrine.

Immediately after receiving Thayer's telegram from Egypt, Morris went to see Ali Pasha to ascertain if the policy of supplying Nubian soldiers to the Emperor of Mexico was sanctioned by the Porte.

The Turkish Foreign Minister assured Morris that he had received no prior information concerning any plan to ship Egyptian subjects to

---

80 William S. Thayer to Morris, January 23, 1863, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Alexandria, RG 84, USNA.

81 Thayer to Seward, January 12, 1863, Private Letter, Consular Correspondence, Alexandria, RG 59, USNA.

82 Thayer to Morris, January 23, 1863, op. cit.

83 Thayer to Seward, January 18, 1863, Despatch 27, Consular Correspondence, Alexandria, RG 59, USNA.

84 Morris to Seward, January 15, 1863, Despatch 46, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
Mexico, except, of course, for the rumors reported in the press, Morris made known to Ali Pasha that the United States was interested in all aspects of any policy which might influence the internal affairs of Mexico.  

Under earlier international treaties, France would have been compelled to request permission from the Sultan before recruiting troops from Egypt. Such action was not taken by the French government. Morris reminded Ali Pasha that the French Emperor's behavior constituted informal recognition of Egypt by France. If the Porte permitted this to pass unchallenged, Morris noted, the question of Egyptian independence would be settled. Ali Pasha immediately telegraphed the Viceroy demanding a full explanation. In the last communication to the Porte before his death, Said Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt, admitted that the shipment of Nubian troops to Mexico had been an "inconsiderate act"; nonetheless he lamented that his commitments to Napoleon III had required that he acquiesce in the Emperor's request.

The American Civil War prevented Seward from making a diplomatic issue of the incident with either the Turkish or French government. Once the war ended the United States was stronger militarily than ever before in its history, and Seward was free to assert his

---

85 Morris to Seward, January 15, 1863, Despatch 46 and October 29, 1865, Despatch 130, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

86 Morris to Seward, January 15, 1863, op. cit.

87 Morris to Seward, October 29, 1865, op. cit.
views on European interference in Mexican affairs.

the summer of 1865, the French Emperor requested that
Egypt supply replacement troops for the Egyptian blacks already in
Mexico. Charles Hale, the American Consul General stationed at
Alexandria, and successor to William S. Thayer, wrote Morris that
"nine hundred negroes from the Sudan are expected shortly to arrive
at Alexandria to be embarked in French transports for Mexico." Hale
quickly sent news of the projected troops shipments to the State
Department and to the American Minister in Paris.

Ismail Pasha, the new Viceroy of Egypt, made no effort to
conceal the shipment. In fact he sent Consul General Hale a detailed
statement concerning the replacement troops. The Viceroy claimed that
the embarking soldiers were only a small contingent troop, a relief
force for the men who had served so long in Mexico. The Pasha insisted
that these Nubian troops were not presently needed in Egypt and, that
they were physically adapted to stand the rigors of the Mexican climate.
Hale, unhappy with the prospect of more troops being sent to Mexico,
warned the Viceroy of the potential of American blacks:

I hinted to him that if he can spare a few hundred soldiers
peculiarly fit for service in Mexico, the United States have
lately had under arms more than one hundred thousand of the
same race. These men would be in a like manner peculiarly fit

88Charles Hale to Seward, August 26, 1865, Despatch 41,
Consular Correspondence, Alexandria, RG 59, USNA; Morris to Seward,
October 29, 1865, Despatch 130, op. cit.; Charles Hale to Morris,
August 29, 1865, Constantinople Post Papers, Alexandria, RG 84, USNA.

89Charles Hale to Morris, August 29, 1865, op. cit.
for service in Egypt, if the vicious principle of interference which supports the Empire in Mexico, to which the Pasha lends his soldiers, should at any time be retaliated by us.90

Hale informed the Secretary of State that Ismail Pasha believed that he was obliged to fulfill the treaty commitments made by his predecessor.91

Without hesitation Seward moved into action indicating that times and conditions had changed. He declared that the French intervention in Mexico was regarded as a direct threat to all "free republican institutions of this continent."92 The American Secretary of State ordered Hale to protest vigorously to the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Seward instructed Hale to inform this Minister that similar instructions would be sent to Morris at Constantinople.93

Morris reviewed the American position on the Mexican situation for Ali Pasha and asked the Foreign Minister for an explanation of the latest plans to ship troops to the American continent. Ali assured Morris that the Ottoman government was not and had never been connected in any way with the shipping of Nubian troops from Egypt to

90 Charles Hale to Seward, August 26, 1865, Despatch 41, Consular Correspondence, Alexandria, RG 59, USNA.

91 Hale to Seward, November 18, 1865, Despatch 46, Consular Correspondence, Alexandria, RG 59, USNA.

92 Seward to Charles Hale, September 21, 1865, Despatch 13, Instructions, The Barbary Powers, Alexandria; Seward to Morris, September 21, 1865, Despatch 93, Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

93 Ibid.
Mexico, Ismail Pasha had visited Constantinople during the early summer of 1865; he made known to the Sultan his uncomfortable position concerning troop shipments to Mexico. The Viceroy wished to know if the Porte would interpose any objections to a replacement force. Sultan Abdul Aziz reminded Ismail Pasha that the Porte had not been consulted on the original transaction but would not insist on the cancelling of the obligation already contracted. However, the Sultan expressed a hope that it would be the last of such shipments. Ali Pasha reported: "The Pasha assured His Highness that the wishes of the Porte would, in this respect, be complied with." With this explanation from Ali Pasha on the Nubian troop shipment, the Ottoman Foreign Minister assured Morris of his respect and friendship for the United States, which he regarded as Turkey's "natural ally." Ali reminded Morris that the Turkish government had always supported the constitutional government of the United States; he stated that the Turkish government "desired to be understood as having no wish to interfere directly or indirectly against the interests of the government of the United States or of those of the American people, but that on the contrary, it would be most happy to

\[94\] Morris to Seward, October 29, 1865, Despatch 130, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; also see Morris to Seward, November 1, 1865, Private Letter, William H. Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

\[95\] Ibid.

\[96\] Ibid.
promote them whenever the occasion offered."  

With Charles Hale's assurance that the Egyptian Viceroy did not want to send troops to Mexico, Seward urged Morris to persuade the Sublime Porte to condemn the entire proceedings. When it was evident that all involved in the Eastern Mediterranean wanted nothing more to do with the Mexican situation, France was forced to deal with American displeasure for her Mexican operations without support from either Egypt or Turkey. Additional diplomatic assistance for ending the shipment of black troops was received from Great Britain. Americans argued that the drafting of Nubians was enforced servitude. Because the British were working diligently to end the slave trade and to abolish slavery throughout the world, the Nubian troop shipments were condemned by that government. The Egyptian government attempted to convince all concerned that the Nubian soldiers were not slaves, but with little success. Charles Hale described the January, 1863, conscription as one when no "black boat (door keeper) could be persuaded to open a door at night for fear of being crimped and when many black servants ran away to hide for a week in the desert while the

---

97 Morris to Seward, October 29, 1865, Despatch 130, op. cit.
98 Seward to Morris, September 21, 1865, Despatch 93 and December 18, 1865, Despatch 100, Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
99 Seward to John Bigelow, September 20, 1865, Despatch 264, Instructions, France, RG 59, USNA.
100 Charles Hale to Seward, October 27, 1865, Despatch 44, Consular Correspondence, Alexandria, RG 59, USNA.
embarkations for Mexico were going on.  

Diplomatic problems in Europe prompted the French government to announce that it would withdraw from Mexico and, thus, there would be no need for Nubian troop replacements. Seward instructed Morris and Hale to suspend further discussions of the matter with the Egyptian and Turkish government; he ordered them to publish the French statement if any further attempts were made to ship Nubian troops to Mexico. Seward instructed Hale to read to the Egyptian Foreign Minister the following statement:

The United States protests against any embarkation of negro troops or forces to be engaged in hostilities against the Government or people of Mexico, whatever may be the special character of the levies, or the circumstances under which the expedition is to be made. In the opinion of the President, Negroes, natives of Africa, cannot rightfully be employed as soldiers in any way to subvert established political institutions, or disturb society on the American continent.

Nubian troop shipments was only one aspect of the Mexican problem. In May, 1865, a special envoy of the Maxmillian government arrived in the Ottoman capital. This representative hoped to obtain the Sultan's sanction for recruiting Egyptian blacks into Maxmillian's army. Ali Pasha told Morris that the Porte would have nothing to do

101 Charles Hale to Seward, November 18, 1865, Despatch 46, Consular Correspondence, Alexandria, RG 59, USNA.

102 John Bigelow to Seward, September 21, 1865, Despatch 177, Correspondence, Paris, RG 59, USNA.

103 Seward to Hale, December 14, 1865, Despatch 17, Instructions, The Barbary Powers, Alexandria, RG 59, USNA.

104 Ibid.
with such an affair. Later that same year, a Minister Plenipotentiary from the government of Maxmillian of Mexico to Turkey and Greece came to Constantinople. This representative brought gifts for the Sultan and promised to open consulates at Alexandria and Jerusalem.

The Turkish government gave a special dinner in honor of the new arrival and invited the diplomatic corps. Morris declined the invitation on the grounds that the American government did not officially recognize Maxmillian's government of Mexico. Perhaps because of Morris' efforts, the Porte decided not to send a representative to Mexico.

At the closing of the Egyptian and Mexican episode, Morris reassured the American government that Turkish policy in foreign affairs was one of caution. The American Minister claimed: "Towards no government does it invariably exhibit a more friendly feeling than to that of the United States. Of this I have had occasion, in several instances during my residence here to give practical proof." Morris reminded Seward of the prompt action taken by the Ottoman government, at the risk of civil war, to capture and punish the culprits.

105 Morris to Seward, May 25, 1865, Despatch 116, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
106 Morris to Seward, November 22, 1865, Despatch 133, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Morris to Seward, March 29, 1865, Despatch 108, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
responsible for the deaths of two American missionaries in 1862. The Minister believed the most important act of friendship on the part of the Turkish government was the exclusion of "rebel cruisers from the ports & waters of Turkey, notwithstanding the opposing course of the other governments of Europe." Morris maintained that the Turkish government was innocent of the entire Egyptian troop shipment affair, and the actions taken by Said Pasha were in contempt of Ottoman authority over Egypt.110

If a major diplomatic objective during the American Civil War was the non-recognition of the belligerent rights for the Confederacy, then it can be concluded that the mission of Edward Joy Morris to Turkey was a success. Deviating from the French and British practice, the Turkish government supported the Union cause. Morris secured from the Porte a Firman which prohibited Confederate raiders preying on American vessels from entering any Ottoman port. During the war, there was no issue on which Morris failed to represent the best interests of his government and still maintained friendly relations with the ministers of the Sultan.

110 Morris to Seward, February 1, 1866, Despatch 142, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
CHAPTER 4

PROTEGES, PROSTITUTES, AND PROTESTS

When Ottoman extraterritorial privileges were granted to foreign merchants, the Sultan's subjects were inspired to seek methods by which they might enter this commercially favored group. Traditionally Ottoman subjects who served foreign embassies and legations in any capacity were given berats (certificates of protection) and were known as proteges of the nation issuing the document. During the development of the foreign diplomatic system in the Ottoman Empire, enterprising consuls found it to their financial advantage to sell berats. The berat conferred protection under a foreign flag in addition to the privileged financial and legal position enjoyed by foreigners. Commenting on American participation in the sale of berats, the American Minister, Edward Joy Morris, wrote the Secretary of State: "This interference between the Porte and its subjects, and the transfer of their allegiance to the government of the United States without the authority of the latter, cannot be regarded in any other light
than as an act of usurpation, as impolite as it is illegal.\textsuperscript{1}

Morris considered such practices a discredit to the United States. Soon after his arrival in Constantinople, the Minister ordered all American proteges to present their berats to the Legation for verification or cancellation. In many cases, it was discovered that Turkish subjects held illegal protection papers. Whenever the Minister determined that a protege was a Turkish subject, his American protection was withdrawn. Morris charged that the selling of protection had been practiced by ministers and consuls alike in direct violation of the treaty existing between the United States and Turkey. Morris pointed out that proteges were a frequent subject of complaint by the Porte and caused "distrust and ill-will" between the Turkish government and the Legation. He maintained that attempts to protect proteges impaired the Legation's influence "on behalf of American citizens." To his dismay, the Minister discovered that it was not only Turkish subjects that owned American berats but also European nationals.\textsuperscript{2}

In 1864, the American Minister gleefully reported a reduction in the number of Legation proteges to the State Department. Morris noted that it required "firmness of purpose to refuse the many applications constantly made to me for protection, by persons whose

\textsuperscript{1}Edward Joy Morris to William H. Seward, January 22, 1862, Despatch 8, Official Correspondence, Turkey, Record Group 59, United States National Archives, Washington, D. C. Hereafter cited as RG 59, USNA.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid.
nationality is unrepresented here, and to dismiss those who have heretofore enjoyed American protection." He promised to continue the reduction policy as far as he could do so "without injury to the private interests of the protegés or of those having relations with them."\(^3\) The American Legation's list of twenty-two protegés included fifteen Europeans, four Armenians, and two whose nationality was not identified.

The United States possessed protegés trained in a variety of trades; by far the most unusual was a Madame Annika who operated a brothel in Pera. Her establishment was brought to the attention of the local police and religious authorities in 1862 when a fight occurred there in which a Greek was seriously wounded. The Greek Patriarch promptly accused Madame Annika of buying Christian girls and keeping them against their will for the purpose of prostitution.\(^4\) When the Pera police attempted to arrest poor Madame Annika, she refused to go along quietly on the grounds that she was an American protegee. The Police Commissioner referred the case to the American Consul General, C. W. Goddard. The shocked American Consul searched the files but failed to find Madame Annika's papers. In high dudgeon, Goddard wrote to the Pera authorities:

> I have the honor to ask that any paper purporting to be an American protection which may be produced or offered before

\(^3\)Morris to Seward, January 7, 1864, Despatch 74, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^4\)C. W. Goddard to the Municipal Council of the Sixth Circle, Pera, October 13, 1862, Constantinople Consulate General Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume 1, C 8.4, RG 84, USNA.
The Council by the widow "Annika", charged with keeping a house of ill-fame in Galata, may be sent to me, that it may be examined, & destroyed, if forged, & cancelled if genuine. The people of the U. S. A. regard morality as the cornerstone of liberty & the foundation of law, order & happiness in society, & neither the Legation nor this Consulate General will tolerate such an abuse of their official authority as the protection of an infamous woman whose business is the corruption of the morals & the destruction of the bodies of youth.5

When the enterprising lady finally produced her protection papers at the Consulate General, it was discovered that they had been signed by the Secretary of the American Legation, John Porter Brown. Prior to Morris' assignment as Minister to Constantinople, the former ministers had given Brown the responsibility of issuing protection.6 The American Minister wrote the Secretary of State that Madame Annika was "privately protected by Mr. Brown."7 Goddard informed Madame Annika, and the Pera Police, that she could no longer carry out her business beneath the American flag.8

Another case of a similar nature involved an American protege of Italian origin brought to Morris' home by John Porter Brown for

---

5C. W. Goddard to Olli Barossi, the Hon. Municipal Council of the Sixth Circle, Pera. August 19, 1862, Constantinople Consulate General Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume 1, C 8.4, RG 84, USNA.

6See John Porter Brown to Francis Markoe, April 21, 1858, and May 18, 1858, Galloway, Harcy, Markoe Family Papers, Volume 55, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

7Edward Joy Morris to Seward, December 14, 1866, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

8C. W. Goddard to the Municipal Council of the Sixth Circle, Pera, October 31, 1862, Constantinople Consulate General Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume 1, C 8.4, RG 84, USNA.
the purpose of renewing protection papers. The following summer the
wife of the protege came to Morris' summer residence at Buyukdere
(Buyukdere) and complained that Turkish soldiers had damaged her home.
Morris instructed John Porter Brown to settle the matter with the
local authorities at Beicos (Beykoz), which he did. Later, when
Morris was in Beicos, he decided to visit the home of the American
protege as a gesture of goodwill. To his utter horror the Minister
discovered that "it was a notorious brothel of the lowest kind,
resorted to by Turkish soldiers & others, & occupied chiefly by
Wallachian women under the management of this so called American
protegee." On returning to Buyukdere, Morris ordered the Legation
guard to go to Beicos and "coute qui coute [in spite of the cost] to
enforce the delivery to him of the Protection paper by the woman &
to inform her that henceforward she must not at her peril assume to
be an American."9 Morris remained convinced that John Porter Brown
knew the real occupation of these people. One could ask why Edward

---

9Morris to Charles Sumner, January 17, 1869, Sumner Papers, 
Box 144, bns, Am 1,4, Item 17, Houghton Library, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Morris claimed that this was the beginning 
of the friction between Brown and himself. "Of course these proceed­
ings of mine were not agreeable to Mr Brown & they led to ill-feeling 
on his part, which has been continued with increasing bitterness to 
this day, which has been manifested in secret attacks in private 
letters & in anonymous correspondence with American newspapers. I 
have suffered patiently but as I now see that my reputation & honor 
at stake it is time that I expose the truth." This letter was 
written as a denunciation of Brown who was attempting to capture 
Morris' position as Minister to the Sublime Porte. Also see Morris 
to Seward, December 14, 1866, Confidential Letter, William Henry 
Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.
Joy Morris was motivated to renew the protection papers for this Italian gentleman in the first place. Goddard lamented that abuse of the power to grant protection to subjects of the Porte had "degraded the American name & brought reproach on our Government & its officers here." The Consul General complained: "On more than one occasion my official interposition has been demanded & received by the Ottoman authorities against women who were bold enough to plead the American protection in behalf of establishments forbidden alike by Mussulman & Christian morality." ¹⁰

In an attempt to correct American abuses in granting protection Morris made several changes. Regulations were sent from the Legation stating that fees collected from proteges were official fees and had to be reported quarterly. ¹¹ He wrote Seward suggesting that no protection be recognized unless issued by the Minister. Seward responded by instructing the Legation that only Turkish citizens actually employed by the Legation or consulates would be entitled to American protection. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was informed of the limitations on the rights of granting protection by the United States representatives and the Sublime Porte advised the provincial authorities of the changes. ¹² Morris was also pains to

¹⁰ Goddard to Seward, October 31, 1863, Despatch 55, Official Consular Correspondence, Constantinople, RG 59, USNA.

¹¹ Morris to Seward, January 7, 1864, Despatch 74, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

¹² Seward to Morris, September 12, 1864, Circular, Instructions; Seward to Morris, September 19, 1864, Despatch 79; Morris to Seward, October 13, 1864, Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
discover that United States passports had been issued to persons not entitled to them. He became determined that henceforward he would make all decisions relating to the issuance of passports. He ruled that in the future all business relating to the Legation would "initiate before the Minister, & that nothing should be transacted without his concurrence."\(^{13}\)

Under the Turkish-American Treaty of 1830, provisions were made for the employment of Turkish subjects by American consulates and the Legation. Their employment was necessary for the ordinary discharge of consular duties because Americans assigned to the Ottoman Empire did not know the languages. In 1863, the Ottoman government attempted to curb abuses arising from the employment of Turkish subjects by foreign legations and consulates; the number of native employees permitted to each consulate was limited to four dragomen and four kavases.\(^{14}\) The duties of the dragoman consisted of translating letters, documents, and conversations passed between the Ottoman government and foreign diplomatic personnel. The kavas served as an armed consular guard who protected the consul and escorted him on official visits. The kavases were empowered to

---

\(^{13}\)Morris to Seward, December 14, 1866, Confidential Letter, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

\(^{14}\)Notes from the Sublime Porte, Volume IV, 1862-64; Rules Relating to Foreign Consulates, no page or date; also see Ali Pasha to Morris, August 6, 1862, No. 5970/35; Ali to Morris, January 10, 1866, No. 1524/2; Ali to Morris, March 2, 1868, No. 21200, Note Verbal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Notes from the Sublime Porte, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84, USNA.
arrest American citizens who had violated American or Turkish law within the Ottoman Empire.

The eight Turkish subjects employed by any consul acquired a temporary American nationality and were known as temporary proteges. As long as the consular protege was employed he had the same rights and privileges as a native-born American. Indeed, the person and premises of consulate employees were as sacrosanct as the consulate itself. Because the nature of their duties were sometimes delicate and often contrary to the aspirations of the Ottoman government, it was agreed that proteges should not be subject to Turkish jurisdiction. When a dragoman or kavas no longer served the American government, he was returned to his original citizenship. The Turkish government even agreed that consular employees would not be held accountable for any prior diplomatic action once they again returned to their Turkish legal position.

If a consul found that he needed more assistants than the allotted number, he was permitted to hire Turkish subjects but they could not be privileged. When a consul employed a Turkish subject he was required to apply through the Legation in Constantinople for a Veziral Order which was then sent to the local authorities. No Turkish subject could be recognized as a temporary protege without the Veziral Order. Ottoman law required that a consular protege pay taxes and complete his military service, but five years of continuous service at a foreign consulate was regarded as fulfilling the military requirement.
Edward Joy Morris expended considerable time and energy protecting consular proteges who seemed always to be in some sort of difficulty with the Ottoman authorities. The minister and consular officers were able to settle satisfactorily all complaints of irregular procedure against American proteges on the part of Ottoman officials, but not without causing unpleasant difficulties between the Turkish government and the American Legation. The State Department complained about the frequent troubles caused by the large number of kavases and dragomen in the consular service. Morris instructed the consuls to settle all "difficulties respecting indignities offered to consular affairs" at the local level. He wrote Jeremiah Augustus Johnson, Consul General at Beirut, upon his successful completion of difficulties at Sidon, Damascus, and Haifa:

These questions owing to your good judgment, skill and diplomatic tact have been amicably settled by the local authorities thus avoiding recourse to the Legation which of late has been too often brought into conflict with the Porte on comparatively trivial difficulties occurring in the consulates.\(^{15}\)

Unfortunately, not all cases were satisfactorily concluded at the local level—such was the case of General Luigi Palma di Cesnola who was

\(^{15}\)Morris to Johnson, April 8, 1868, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.
stationed at the seaport of Larnaca on the southern coast of Cyprus. 16

When Cesnola took upon his duties, he retained the consular staff of three dragomen and two guards employed by the former consul. The Governor of the Island suggested to Cesnola that he should appoint the three additional staff members permitted under the existing Ottoman regulations. 17 By March 8, 1866, Cesnola had selected two kavases from among many Cypriot Muslim applicants. One of the newly appointed guards was Mustafa Salih Fefse whose father had served for many years as dragoman of the American consulate. 18 It had been a consular policy in the Ottoman Empire to reward those families who faithfully served American interests. The position of dragoman and vice consul often passed from father to son. Ottoman regulations placed no restrictions on consular

16 Luigi Palma di Cesnola was a native of Turin, Italy. He was trained for the priesthood, but entered the Sardinian Army in 1848. Cesnola served with distinction in the Italian wars for unification and the Crimean War. In 1860, he came to the United States, and as a Union officer during the American Civil War, he was several times decorated for bravery on the field of battle. President Lincoln conferred on Cesnola the rank of brigadier-general and appointed him American Consul at Cyprus where he served between 1865-77. While he was consul his archaeological discoveries led Sir Henry Layard to state that Cesnola had contributed a "new chapter to the history of art and archaeology." When he returned to New York, he became the chief director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art; The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Volume I (New York: James T. White and Company, 1898), p. 422.

17 Cesnola to Seward, January 7, 1867, Despatch 22, Official Consular Correspondence, Cyprus, RG 59, USNA.

18 Morris to Seward, August 7, 1866, Despatch 165, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure.
appointments other than the appointee must have a good reputation.

After learning of the appointment of Mustafa, the Mudir (or mayor) of Larnaca went to the provincial capital where he persuaded the Governor not to recognize Mustafa Salih Fefse on the grounds that he was the son of one of the most noble families in Larnaca. The Governor agreed to support the Mudir and sent the explanation along to the Consul. Cesnola explained that it was an American policy to appoint persons of good family and exceptional character. The next complaint made by the Governor was that Mustafa was of draft age. The American Consul knew that there was no Turkish regulation forbidding the appointment of a kavas who was of draft age. Even more upsetting, the French Consular Agent appointed a kavas of draft age who belonged to a more wealthy family than that of Mustafa and this French appointee was recognized by the Governor without difficulty.

Cesnola was aware of the fact that Muslims from families of far greater wealth and social prominence served at the Belgian and Dutch consulates. The other American appointee was of conscription age and the Governor recognized him without question. Cesnola concluded that the explanations given were not plausible and did not comply with Ottoman practice. He shortly discovered that the real reason for

---

19 Morris to Seward, November 15, 1866, Despatch 176, see enclosure of report made by Jeremiah Augustus Johnson on the insult made to the Cyprus Consul, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59.

20 L. P. di Cesnola to Seward, January 7, 1867, Despatch 22, Official Consular Correspondence, Cyprus, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure of Cesnola's statement of difficulties existing between the American Consulate on Cyprus and the local authorities.
the failure to recognize the American kavas was that Mustafa's father and the Mudir were bitter enemies. 21

After a particularly nasty letter from the Governor, Cesnola decided he could not waive his consular right without establishing a precedent prejudicial to all consuls. 22 On April 23, 1866, the day fixed for the draft, the Mudir of Larnaca ordered Mustafa's name inscribed on the register as a conscript and deserter. 24 The usual provincial practice had been for a mudir to request formally the presence of a protege at the conscription drawing. The consul would give the necessary order, the protege would draw a number, and the issue would end at that point as local authorities did not make a practice of drafting consular proteges.

The Governor of Cyprus demanded that Cesnola deliver the deserter to the local authorities. The Consul refused to act until he received instructions from the American Minister. Finally, on

21 See the Levant Herald, August 12. The New York Herald, January 8, 1867, p. 8 printed a letter sent to the paper from Cyprus in which the writer had the following to say about the local authorities: "The mudir of Larnaca (a kind of local governor), universally despised for his arbitrary manners, for his vices and dissolute conduct, some time ago attempted to break into the harem of Mustafa's father, therein to violate his wives and daughters; but having been foiled in his infamous purpose he swore deadly vengeance against all the family."

22 Cesnola to Seward, January 7, 1867, Despatch 22, op. cit.

23 Morris to Seward, August 7, 1866, Despatch 165, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure of Cesnola letter dated July 16, 1866.

24 See the New York Herald, October 15, 1866, p. 1 and October 1, 1866, p. 1.
July 13, 1866, the police were ordered to arrest Mustafa who had taken refuge in the home of the first dragoman of the consulate. The police disregarded the fact that the dragoman was protected by the American flag. They broke into his house, captured Mustafa, tore off the emblem signifying an American kavas, bound his hands and paraded him through the center of Larnaca. After the public display, Mustafa was imprisoned. Cesnola was furious! He sent a formal protest to the Governor of the island and took the first steamer to Constantinople in order to plead his case before the American Minister.25

Unruffled by Cesnola's action, Edward Joy Morris discussed the details of the Cyprus case with Ali Pasha. Ali promised to uphold American consular rights and asserted that he "would not tolerate any insult to the American flag or the U. S. consular representative at Cyprus."26 The problem was that the American Minister had one statement of facts from Cesnola while Ali had gotten a contradictory report from the Governor. Ali suggested that a mixed commission of inquiry be appointed to go to Larnaca and "thoroughly sift the whole matter and report on it." Ali

25Cesnola to Seward, September 3, 1867, Despatch 26, Official Consular Correspondence, Cyprus, RG 59, USNA. Also see Cesnola to Seward, January 7, 1867, Despatch 22; this is the first mention of the incident in Cesnola's letters to the State Department. The details of this incident are also found in Morris to Ali Pasha, July 31, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letters Sent, Folio 23, RG 84, USNA.

26Morris to Seward, August 7, 1866, Despatch 165, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
reminded Morris that a Minister "can't condemn officers until certain of their guilt."\(^{27}\) Morris appointed Jeremiah Augustus Johnson, Consul at Beirut, and Ali Pasha selected Rifat Bey from the Translation Bureau of the Department of Foreign Affairs.\(^{28}\) Morris believed Rifat Bey to be a politically moderate man with a good sense of justice who would obtain full satisfaction for the American government.\(^{29}\) By August 28, 1868, Morris assured the Secretary of State that he would be able to close the Cyprus incident and settle Cesnola's "dificulties as they ought to be."\(^{30}\)

On September 29, Johnson wrote Morris that Rifat Bey and himself were in full agreement. Both investigators decided that Cesnola had acted within the limits of Ottoman regulations. Johnson pointed out to the Minister that questions in the case were important to the definition of consular rights in Turkey and that the solution would set a precedent. European consuls at Larnaca informed Johnson that they had been instructed to "watch the case closely and report." Johnson claimed that he had conducted a "patient & thorough

\(^{27}\) Morris to Seward, August 7, 1866, Despatch 165, op. cit.

\(^{28}\) Ali Pasha to Morris, August 22, 1866, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 17366/5, Notes From the Sublime Porte, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84, USNA; Ali expressed a desire to find a solution "to this regrettable incident." On Johnson's appointment see Morris to Ali Pasha, August 25, 1866, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letters Sent, Folio 23, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84, USNA; Morris to L. P. di Cesnola, August 28, 1866, in ibid.

\(^{29}\) Morris to Seward, August 27, 1866, Despatch 167, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^{30}\) Morris to Seward, August 28, 1866, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
The Consul recommended that the Minister demand the dismissal of both the Mudir and Governor, a salute to the United States flag, monetary compensation to Mustafa and the dragoman, and recognition of Mustafa as an American kavas.  

After the usual lengthy diplomatic bargaining as to what a nation could and could not honorably accept, Morris and Ali Pasha agreed on the dismissal of the Mudir of Larnaca, a 21-gun salute to the American flag, a 10,000 piastre indemnity to the American dragoman, and the recognition of Mustafa as kavas. Morris reported that he had a very pleasant interview with Ali Pasha and had formally disposed of the Cypriot question. Ali confided that he desired the continuation of good relations between the United States and Turkey and a satisfactory conclusion of several other vexing questions. Morris reported that Ali Pasha was "kind enough to thank me for the friendly spirit I had always manifested toward the government of the Sultan & to utter a few complimentary words as to..."
the manner in which I sustained the interest of my own government."\(^{34}\)

Morris wrote Cesnola that "it would have been impossible for me to have obtained further concessions without invoking the aid of the U. S. government which I could not probably have obtained."\(^{35}\) Cesnola complained to Seward because all his demands had not been met.\(^{36}\) On March 13, 1867, Morris ordered Cesnola to accept the settlement and reminded the consul that "relations must be reestablished on a good footing."\(^{37}\)

Cesnola maintained that John Porter Brown was responsible for the inability of the American Minister to obtain satisfaction; he alleged that Brown undermined the work of the Legation and had given the impression that the "course pursued by the Minister would not be sustained by our government." Cesnola wrote the Consul General at Constantinople, John Goodenow, that the Governor of Cyprus had a son employed in the Foreign Office who was friendly with John Porter Brown. The Governor of Cyprus had made known that he had "a friend who will make it alright with the U. S. Legation." Cesnola vowed

\(^{34}\) Morris to Seward, January 2, 1867, Private Letter, op. cit.

\(^{35}\) Morris to Cesnola, January 2, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letters Sent, Folio 23, RG 84.

\(^{36}\) Cesnola to Seward, January 7, 1867, Despatch 22, Official Consular Correspondence, Cyprus, RG 59, USNA.

\(^{37}\) Morris to Cesnola, March 13, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letters Sent, Folio 23, RG 84.
that if he obtained any evidence against the friend, he would be able to cause still more trouble. Cesnola bragged: "I am well known in Washington and New York, and I shall not leave one stone unmoved to obtain that justice and satisfaction to which I have a right." Examination of the Constantinople Post Records indicate that the case was properly presented to the Porte, that the dragoman asked excellent questions, and made good rebuttals.

Morris supported American consuls only if he believed they were correct in their proceedings with the local authorities. Once assured he was right, the Minister persisted in his argument with

38 L. P. Cesnola to John Goodenow, August 27, 1866, Constantinople Consul General Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume 1, C 8,8, RG 84, USNA. Cesnola confided to Goodenow that "I have however in Morris a most upright and excellent Minister and I have as much faith in him as I have in myself." Cesnola complained of Brown's actions to Morris in a letter dated January 2, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Cyprus, RG 84, USNA. In a letter to Seward, January 7, 1867, Despatch 22, Official Consular Correspondence, Cyprus, Cesnola implied that there had been a mishandling of the case. Cesnola was not the only Consul who complained of John Porter Brown's handling of American cases before the Porte. Others were C. W. Goddard, Consul General at Constantinople, William J. Stillman, Consul to Crete, and Victor Beauboucher at Jerusalem. It must be pointed out that the accusations of improper handling of cases by Stillman and Cesnola are not evident in the examination of the records. Beauboucher complained of Brown's general character but again it seems that the Consul of Jerusalem would like to have been appointed Dragman for the American Legation. The only accusation that can be substantiated is the one made by C. W. Goddard concerning the protection of prostitutes. The greatest enemy of John Porter Brown was Julius Bing who served as Consul to Smyrna (1861-65). Bing was a friend of both Charles Sumner and Edward Joy Morris.

39 See especially Brown to Morris, October 27, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, Volume 2, RG 84, USNA.
the Porte until he obtained what he felt was a just settlement. This policy would have been commendable if the Consuls had been completely accurate in their reports to the Minister. Cesnola asserted to both Seward and Morris that he was polite in his dealings with the Turkish authorities. This is not the impression that is obtained from reading an account of the incident which he wrote later, Cesnola was an archaeologist and began excavations soon after his arrival on Cyprus. On one occasion the Mudir arrested Cesnola's assistants for digging without a firman. As the prison sentence caused a great inconvenience for the employees, Cesnola vowed he would "repay him [the Mudir] whenever an occasion should present itself." The consul related his version of the incident:

One morning a notable Turk of the "marina" came and begged me to appoint him to the vacant post of American Consular Guard, explaining to me that the Caimakam [Mudir] had a personal spite against him, and had sworn to have him drafted into the military service. I was delighted to have so soon a chance of squaring my accounts with Genab Effendi, and I immediately appointed Mustafa Fefsi a regular privileged American employee. The Caimakam went into a great rage when he heard of this appointment, but Turk-like, he immediately called on me, and tried in his blandest manner to induce me to make another selection. He promised never to interfere in my excavations again, if I would but appoint another man instead of Mustafa; but I laughed at him, and positively refused to have any other.\footnote{\textit{Cesnola to Seward, January 7, 1867, Despatch 22, Official Consular Correspondence, Cyprus, RG 59, USNA.}}\footnote{\textit{Louis Palma Di Cesnola, Cyprus: Its Ancient Cities, Tombs and Temples. A Narrative of Researches and Excavations During Ten Years' Residence in that Island} (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1878), p. 57.}
It is evident from Cesnola's statement that he had ignored his primary duty as an American consul—the promotion of friendly relations between the United States and Turkish governments. He was more interested in excavation and revenge than in the promotion of trade and good-will. His arrogant actions caused an unnecessary complaint to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and considerable expense for the United States government. The Cyprus incident illustrates how foreign consuls abused their privilege of appointing proteges.

Another aspect of the Cesnola affair shows the general anti-Ottoman attitude of the press. On August 12, the Levant Herald, an English language newspaper published in Pera, announced in a gleeful tone that the American Minister had requested Admiral Lewis M. Goldsborough, Commander of the European Squadron, to send an ironclad to Larnaca.\(^{42}\) Once this news was received by the American press their columns seemed to burst with American power. On October 1, 1866, a New York Herald headline shouted: "An American War Vessel Despatched to the Island of Cyprus."\(^{43}\) The paper reported that Morris demanded full satisfaction from the Sultan and his cabinet for the insult suffered by the American Consul. This same paper informed the American public that the U. S. S. Ticonderoga would leave for Cyprus on September 18 and remain in the port of Larnaca.

\(^{42}\)See the Levant Herald, August 12, 1866.

\(^{43}\)New York Herald, October 1, 1866, p. 1.
European journals viewed the ordering of American warships from the Baltic to the Mediterranean as part of a secret alliance between United States and Russia. There was a general belief during the period (1866-68) that an alliance existed between United States and Russia and that America would play a more active role in the Eastern Question. It might be added that American diplomatic action in Europe did very little to dispel these rumors. The Sunday Times quoted a letter from St. Petersburg which read: "The alliance with the United States is of especial value to Russia; it protects us [Russia] from a repetition of the unfortunate incidents of the period between 1853 and 1856 and assures us of a steadfast friend in case of the opening of the Eastern Question." After announcing to the British public that Cesnola was not a true American but a Levantine Frank, the Pall Mall Gazette questioned why Russia and America would choose Cyprus instead of "the more appropriate bowers of Paphos and the classic seat of young Love" to begin their Eastern Affair. The journal implied that naval involvement was a much more serious matter.

---

44 New York Herald, October 26, 1866, p. 4.
45 The Sunday Times, September 16, 1866; quoted in the New York Herald, October 3, 1866, p. 4.
46 See The Times (London), September 28, 1866, p. 8 and September 18, 1866, p. 8; Pall Mall Gazette, September 12, 1866, p. 2 and October 13, 1866, p. 3; New York Herald, October 12, 1866, p. 3 quotes from the Moscow Gazette.
47 The Sunday Times (London), September 16, 1866, op. cit.
than the defense of consular rights and proteges:

The Russians, or at all events some Russians, have discovered that the Christians at Larnaca on Cyprus are being shamefully persecuted, which may or may not be true, but at all events need confirmation, and they consider that the best remedy for such a persecution would be an American squadron in the Levant, because the Miantonomoh [U.S.S.] could blow the whole of the Turkish fleet into the seventh hell.48

The Times lamented that American "monitors could blow the whole Turkish fleet to pieces" and, so, suggested that aid must be given to Turkey.49 While evaluating American interference in the Eastern Question, the Pall Mall Gazette concluded: "It is certain that America, unless prepared for downright usurpation and dominance, can never be more than a cat's paw in the Levant."50

When the facts are examined both American and European newspapers look a little foolish. On July 22, 1865, John Porter Brown wrote Morris: "I have a letter from a cousin who has a son on the 'Colorado' & he tells me that Admiral Goldsborough is coming up to Consple. if possible."51 From this note, it is evident that the United States Navy had made a decision to return to a position of importance in the Eastern Mediterranean at the end of the Civil War. In 1866, the Navy Department increased the number of ships assigned

48 Pall Mall Gazette, September 21, 1866, p. 9.
49 The Sunday Times (London), September 16, 1866, op. cit.
50 Pall Mall Gazette, September 18, 1866, p. 10.
51 Brown to Morris, July 22, 1865, Constantinople Post Papers, Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, RG 84, USNA.
to the European Squadron—two of these ships cruised the Mediterranean regularly.

Another item that must be considered when reflecting on the newspaper reports is the attitude of Edward Joy Morris in the summer of 1866. At this point, the American Minister's relations with the Porte were excellent. Just two weeks prior to the date when Morris was reported to be browbeating the Turks, the Minister confided to Seward that he had informed the Sultan, at the annual diplomatic reception, that the United States wished the Ottoman Empire to suffer "no harm" during the impending European crisis. It was feared that Austro-Prussian hostility (which ended with Austria's defeat at Sadowa in 1866) would erupt into a general European conflagration which would result in the absorption of the Ottoman Empire by the Great Powers.

The Minister explained his action to Seward:

I deemed it proper to avail myself of this occasion—of a period of general despondency, to utter a few words of sympathy & the more so, as none such had been pronounced by any other member of the Diplomatic Corps. I retain a lively sense of gratitude to the Sultan and his ministers for the firm stand they took from the start in behalf of the Union cause, & for the resolution with which they resisted the counsels of certain of the Great Powers who desired to inculcate the Porte with their own hostility to the American Union. Governments as well as individuals have a keen sensibility to the reciprocation of friendly acts & sentiments.52

One week after the reception, Captain Charles Steedman wrote Morris

52 Morris to Seward, July 4, 1866, Despatch 160, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
asking him to obtain a firman for the American corvette Ticonderoga to pass through the Dardanelles. There is no mention in the State or Navy Departments' correspondence that this voyage was in any way related to the Cyprus incident.

Morris knew that the frigate U. S. S. Wabash had visited Constantinople in 1858, but, only because there was a misunderstanding as to her actual size. Vessels of war the size of the Ticonderoga were restricted from passing through the Straits by provisions of the 1856 Treaty of Paris. The American Minister instructed John Porter Brown to do everything possible to obtain the necessary firman

53 Commodore Charles Steedman to Morris, July 24, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, United States Navy, RG 84, USNA.

54 Admiral Goldsborough was concerned with the Austra-Prussian War and concentrated his efforts on protecting American interests in the area of the Adriatic, see Admiral Louis M. Goldsborough to Gideon Wells, June 9, 1866, No. 33, Series 2 and June 23, 1866, No. 36, Series 2. On July 23, 1866, the Admiral wrote Gideon Wells: "The Ticonderoga, as soon as peace takes place, is to go from the Adriatic to Constantinople; the ports of Syria; Alexandria in Egypt; Tripoli; Malta; Tunis; and thence here, touching at Gibraltar, if necessary, to replenish coal." RG 45, Item 98 (a), Letters to the Secretary of Navy, European Squadron, Letterbook, Admiral L. M. Goldsborough, Instructions sent by Goldsborough to Steedman read the same way with an additional note that "you are not to visit any place where the cholera, or any other fatal epidemic, exists; nor are you to remain longer than a few days at any one place, unless circumstances should imperiously demand it," RG 45, Item 98 (c), Appendix E, Letters to Captains under Command, European Squadron, Letterbook, Admiral L. M. Goldsborough. These are found in Record Group 45, Naval Record Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, European Squadron, United States National Archives, Washington, D. C. Hereafter cited: Naval Records, European Squadron, RG 45, USNA.
for the Ticonderoga. Ali Pasha told Morris that he feared the Great Powers would not agree to the passage of such a large vessel. It was necessary for them to agree on any exception to be made of the regulations for passage through the Straits and they had protested vigorously when the Wabash was given permission to visit Constantinople. Within a few days, Ali wrote Morris that the Powers had refused permission to the Ticonderoga.

On August 25, 1866, Morris informed Captain Steedman that the Ticonderoga would not be able to visit Constantinople because of her size. The Minister assured the Captain that if it had been possible for Turkey to make an exception that the firman would have been granted because "the relations between the United States and Turkey are of the most friendly character." On the same day, after a personal interview with Ali in which Morris urged the Foreign Minister to give the United States preferential treatment, the firman was granted. It seems that another Ambassador was also urging the Turkish government to grant the necessary permission.

55 Morris to Brown, August 5, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, RG 84, USNA.

56 Brown to Morris, August 8, 1866; August 10, 1866; both letters are in Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, Morris to Seward, August 27, 1866, Despatch 166, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

57 Morris to Seward, August 27, 1866, Despatch 166, op. cit.

58 Morris to Steedman, August 25, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letters Sent, Folio 23, RG 84.

59 Ibid.
General Nicholas Ignatieff, the Russian Ambassador to the Sublime Porte, interceded with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on behalf of American interests. The Russian Minister to the United States, Edward de Stoeckl, passed the information concerning the Russian assistance to Secretary Seward. As Stoeckl wrote his Foreign Minister:

This despatch, [one sent by Alexander GortchakoFF, Minister of Foreign Affairs] takes into account the difficulties which the American corvette the Ticonderoga had experienced in order to pass the Dardanelles, during her presence in the Straits, and of the semi-official assistance of our Minister, at Constantinople, offered to his colleague, Mr. Morris, in order to make possible the entrance of the Ticonderoga into the Golden Horn. I believed that it was my duty to inform the Secretary of State. Having had the occasion these days of seeing Mr. Seward, I have communicated to him the substance of the telegram of General Ignatieff without reading it to him. The Secretary of State has answered to me that the information that I had just given to him was entirely in line with the official opinions which come to him from Constantinople and that he was to the highest degree sensible to the new manifestation of benevolent sentiments of the Imperial Government toward the United States.60

60 Edward de Stoeckl to Alexander GortchakoFF, November 1/13, 1866, Despatch 2176, No. 3, found in Microfilm print of Letters by Edward de Stoeckl, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the United States to Prince Aleksandr GortchakoFF, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Russia, 1866-1868, Correspondence in the Archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, Russia. The microfilm copy can be found in the Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester. The quoted portion of the text reads: "Cette dépêche, rendant compte des difficultés que la corvette Américaine Ticonderoga a éprouvées pour franchir les Dardanelles, lors de son apparition dans ce détroit, et de l'apui officieux que notre Ministre à Constantinople a offert à son collègue, M. Morris, afin d' effectuer l' entrée du Ticonderoga dans la Corne d' Or, J' ai cru devoir en faire part au Secrétaire d' État. Ayant eu l' occasion ces jours-ci de voir M. Seward, je lui ai communiqué la substance de la dépêche du Général Ignatieff sans lui en faire lecture. Le Secrétaire d' État m' a répondu qu' l' information, que je venais de lui donner, était entièrement en rapport avec les avis officiels qui lui sont parvenus de Constantinople et qu' il était on ne peut plus sensible à ce nouveau témoignage des sentiments bien veillants du Gouvernement Impérial envers les États-Unis,"
On September 1, 1866, Morris received a telegram stating that the Ticonderoga had reached the Dardanelles. She steamed through the Straits and anchored in the Bosphorus before the palace of the Sultan. Nearly overcome with his achievement Morris wrote Seward: "No vessel of her size and armament of any other nation has passed through the Straits to Constantinople since the Treaty of 1856." In a state of euphoria he claimed that "After awhile we shall have the monopoly of the navigation of the Straits for our vessels of war."

Nowhere in the Navy or State department's records was there a request for this or any gunboat to go to Cyprus to settle the Cesnola Affair. This was a courtesy visit applauded by both the American

\[\text{\textsuperscript{61}}\text{See the Official Log of the U. S. S. Ticonderoga, commanded by Charles Steedman, Naval Records, European Squadron, RG 24, USNA.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{62}}\text{Morris to Seward, September 7, 1866, Despatch 168, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{63}}\text{Morris to Seward, September 13, 1866, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{64}}\text{See RG 59: Official Correspondence, Constantinople and Cyprus, 1866-67; Miscellaneous Letters, Department of State; Instructions, Constantinople, RG 45, Navy Department; Press copies of Confidential Letters and Telegrams to Officers from the Secretary of the Navy, 1865-68, Entry 15; Confidential Letters Sent, Volume 5, 1861-79, Entry 14; Letters to Flag Officers and Commandants of Vessels, No. 5, February 14, 1865-February 14, 1867, Letters to Flag Officers and Commandants of Vessels, No. 6, February 14, 1867-August 10, 1870, Entry 16; Areas File of the Naval Records Collection, Area 4; Commanders Letters to Gideon Wells; Letter Book European Squadron, 1865-67, Letters to Ministers and Consuls, Item 98, (b), Appendix E; Letter Book European Squadron, 1865-67, Letters to Captains under command, Item 98 (c), Appendix E; Letter Book European Squadron, 1865-67, Letters to the Secretary of Navy, Item 98, (a), Appendix E,}\]
and Turkish governments, Morris was in no hurry for the Ticonderoga to leave Constantinople—he wanted her to remain anchored for an entire month in the Bosphorus. He noted that "The Grand Vizier expressed his disappointment at the brevity of her visit and his regrets seem to universal among the Turkish authorities." Morris could have made a verbal request of Captain Steedman to make some sort of demonstration at Cyprus but it seems strange that no one would mention such a serious action. When an American naval warship made a regular cruise of the ports of the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus was usually one of its stops. The naval reports did not mention any trouble at Cyprus until Steedman made his scheduled visit there on October 2, 1866. The Captain reported:

We arrived at Larnaca on the 2nd of October, at this port, I met Mr. J. A. Johnson, U. S. Consul at Beirut, who had been appointed on a joint commission on the part of the United States and the Turkish government, to investigate the complaint of our Consul, against the Turkish authorities of that town. I remained there two days, and left for the coast of Syria, taking Mr. Johnson (who had completed the duties of his commission) with me. I have since learned that the Turkish Government had, in accordance with the recommendation of the commission fully redressed the wrong complained of.

---


66 Morris to Seward, September 13, 1866, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

67 Rear Admiral Louis M. Goldsborough to Gideon Wells, November 26, 1866, No. 84, Series 2; see enclosure from Charles Steedman, Naval Records, European Squadron, RG 45, USNA. The Ticonderoga Log differs from Steedman's report in that it shows the Ticonderoga being at Larnaca on September 24-25 instead of October 1-2.
The final blow to the newspaper stories is the fact that Cesnola certainly would have mentioned in his autobiography any American naval display in his behalf. Cesnola would have enjoyed nothing more than an opportunity to use all available power to put the Turk "in his place," which in his eyes could only be the Seventh Hell.

During the last few years of his ministry, Edward Joy Morris was confronted with the possibility of a new type of American protege. Between 1867 and 1870, Jewish leaders in the United States expended considerable energy attempting to persuade the American government to protect the Jewish population of the Ottoman Empire. The policy of protecting various Ottoman religious groups had precedents. The Great Powers of Europe were able to influence Turkish internal affairs because they claimed the right to protect Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant Christians. This was not a humanitarian policy but rather a policy of nationalism and imperialism. The Great Powers did not want liberal social reform in the Ottoman Empire; it was much better policy to portray the Ottoman as a corrupt and inferior barbarian incapable of efficient government. If Turks liberalized and modernized the country then Europeans would have no reason to protect Christians, promote disorder and revolution, and so encourage disintegration. Since no nation yet protected Jewish interests, many Americans believed

that it would be a good thing if the United States took up that heavy responsibility. 69

Because the Turk reigned in Jerusalem, Jews had a great interest in the Ottoman Empire. In particular Americans of that faith carried on a continual correspondence with the American consul at that place concerning American citizens who had returned to the Holy Land to live and die. One of the many complaints, but a major one brought to the attention of the consul, was the unequal distribution of money contributed by American citizens for the living expenses of the American Jewish population residing in Palestine. 70 These citizens had a right to American protection, and it was considered the duty of the consul to concern himself with their financial welfare.

Reports that persecution of Ottoman Jews in Palestine had increased prompted influential Jewish leaders in the United States to request that the American Secretary of State use American influence "to secure greater privileges & certain immunities for the Israelites in the Holy Land." 71 American Jews wished to have someone


70 Albert Rhodes to Rev. S. M. Isaacs, February 1, 1864, Jerusalem Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

71 Hamilton Fish Diary, entry for November 17, 1869, p. 196, Hamilton Fish Papers, Container 314, Library of Congress. For the Palestinian persecutions see the Daily News (London), March 17, 1868, p. 5. An interesting note, the Chancellor of the North German Confederation was the first to instruct the German Minister at Constantinople to make inquiries and take steps for the redress of the situation.
of their religious persuasion appointed as Consul of Jerusalem in order to implement such a policy. The Turkish Minister at Washington, Blacque Bey, asked Hamilton Fish not to appoint a Jew to the Jerusalem post and assured the American Secretary of State that Jews were "perfectly well treated in Turkey."

As early as May, 1867, William H. Seward promised Samuel Myer Isaacs, the Secretary of the Board of American Israelites, that he would have an inquiry made by the American Minister at Constantinople concerning Jewish persecution in the Ottoman Empire. Isaacs pointed out that in many areas of the Ottoman Empire the Jewish population was oppressed by "law and a vindictive population." He complained that his co-religionists were restricted as to "occupations, inordinately taxed, and subjected to frequent popular outbreaks often resulting in loss of life." Isaacs believed that a consul ought to be appointed who was "imbued with American sympathies and

---

72 Hamilton Fish Diary, entry for April 22, 1869, p. 70, Hamilton Fish Papers, Container 314, Library of Congress.

73 Hamilton Fish Diary, entry for December 9, 1869, p. 261, Hamilton Fish Papers, Container 314, Library of Congress.

74 S. M. Isaacs to Hamilton Fish, April 12, 1870, Hamilton Fish Papers, Library of Congress. Samuel Myer Isaacs emigrated from England to become rabbi of the B'nai Jeshurum Synagogue in New York City. It is claimed that S. M. Isaacs was responsible for "making unorganized New York Jewry a coherent articulate community." He became one of the most influential rabbis in the country. Isaacs helped to create the Board of Delegates of American Israelites to defend the rights of Jews. He was one of the founder of Mt. Sinai Hospital, the United Hebrew Charities, the Hebrew Free School Association, and the Jewish Messenger. Isaacs helped establish the Maimonides College in Philadelphia. Information on Isaacs taken from the Dictionary of American Biography, Volume 5 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932), p. 514.
willing to cooperate with the European consuls in measures for the relief of these unhappy Israelites.\textsuperscript{75}

Some western observers of the Ottoman scene noted that political autonomy for the Ottoman provinces in the Balkan region did not result in religious toleration. It was pointed out that the Muslims were much less inclined to oppress Christians and Jews than Orthodox Christians were to oppress all who differed from them.\textsuperscript{76} Frequent reports of Jewish persecution came from Roumania and Serbia--areas which had obtained political but not diplomatic autonomy. Continual reports of persecution increased the agitation for American protection of Middle Eastern Jews.\textsuperscript{77} Men such as Isaacs believed that American citizens of Jewish descent should be appointed to consular posts in areas where Jews resided and that the State Department should use diplomatic pressure as an instrument for obtaining civil and religious equality.

In the spring of 1870, Fish telegraphed Morris to investigate the rumor of frequent murders of Jews in Roumania. The Secretary instructed the American Minister that if the rumors were true he was to act in an unofficial capacity to urge the Turkish government to put

\textsuperscript{75} Isaacs to Fish, April 12, 1870, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{New York Herald}, April 20, 1867, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{77} For some of the reports see the following: Morris to Seward, May 31, 1867, Despatch 209 and July 12, 1867, Despatch 216; \textit{Daily News} (London), March 17, 1868, p. 5; \textit{New York Herald}, May 11, 1868, p. 7 and the \textit{New York Daily Tribune}, November 23, 1868, p. 2.
a stop to the bloodshed. The Turkish Charge d' Affairs in Washington was careful to point out that all of the alleged disturbances occurred between Greek Christians and Jews and that Turks were not involved. Morris reminded the State Department that Roumania was an autonomous state and, as such, the Porte could not legally interfere in her internal affairs. But the Minister promised to follow the expressed wishes of President Grant to "exert whatever influence I can with the proper authorities to put an end to such brutal and uncivilized proceedings."

The American-Jewish community urged the appointment of an American to the Bucharest consulate who was sympathetic to the sufferings of Roumanian Jews. Names were submitted for a new consul by prominent members of the Jewish community. Those recommended were presented to President Grant at the weekly cabinet meeting by the Secretary of State. The man chosen was Benjamin Franklin Peixotto, a lawyer and writer for the Cleveland Plain Dealer. The newly

---

78 Morris quotes a telegram in Despatch 363, Morris to Fish June 8, 1870, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

79 Hamilton Fish Diary, June 6, 1870, p. 513, Hamilton Fish Papers, Library of Congress.

80 Morris to Fish, August, 1870, unnumbered despatch, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

81 Hamilton Fish Diary, entry for April 15, 1870, p. 441, Hamilton Fish Papers, Library of Congress; Fish tells of the Cabinet Meeting when the list of candidates were presented. The Secretary noted that Grant was interested in the home state of the nominees. For Peixotto's background see Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Volume IV (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1898), pp. 703-4.
appointed consul called on Hamilton Fish before his departure and informed the Secretary that he would go to the "Consulate not with the ordinary object of a Commercial Agency but with a special view to the interest of a large class of religionists, resident there & for their advancement & social & political improvement." Fish firmly instructed the consul that he had no political functions or responsibilities and forbade him to interfere in any local questions.  

Sightly put off but not defeated, Peixotto obtained a special letter written by President Grant which expressed sympathy for the oppressed Jews of Roumania. The President's letter was published in American newspapers. Fish was furious and threatened to revoke his appointment. The Secretary considered the letter and its publication an indignity to himself especially after "my refusal to give him a special letter & my explanation to him of the limited sphere of his duties." Considering the fact that the consul violated his instructions before he left the United States, it is not surprising that he soon became embroiled in Roumanian-Jewish problems at Bucharest. As American consul between 1870-75, Peixotto quickly became a well-known advocate of civil rights for Jews in Roumania.

The Ottoman government was aware of American reaction to news of persecution of Jewish people in Roumania, Serbia and

---

82 Hamilton Fish Diary, entry for December 1, 1870, no page number, Hamilton Fish Papers, Library of Congress.
83 Hamilton Fish Diary, entry for December 20, 1870, ibid.
84 Hamilton Fish Diary, entry for December 20, 1870, ibid.
Palestine and the political influence which the American Jewish population was able to exert on its government. The Ottoman government had been informed that American Jews had taken steps to persuade President Grant to use diplomatic influence for protection of persecuted Jews. In a general despatch dealing with the eastern European Jewish persecution problem, the Turkish Charge d'Affairs wrote Ali Pasha that "the Israelites, who form in this country numerous and powerful congregations, and of which a goodly number figure among the most rich and most influential persons, have organized in New York a protective society for Israelites."

The American Minister did not view the Jewish problem with the same moral indignation as the President of the United States and the Secretary of the American Israelites. Morris assured his government that the Jews possessed the same civil and political rights as the rest of the inhabitants. He remarked that the problem was due to the movement of Jews from the trades to the land and that the rural population objected to resettlement of the Jews. The Minister contended that the main objection to Serbian Jews was their inability to "identify themselves with its fortunes & with its people. They

---

85 Turkey, Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivi, Hariciye, Carton 50, Blacque Bey to Ali Pasha, February 21, 1870, Despatch 294/589.

86 Turkey, Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivi, Hariciye, Carton 50, Baltassi Efendi to Ali Pasha, May 17, 1870, Document 4845; the quoted section reads: "Les Israelites qui forment dans ce pays de nombreuses et puissantes congrégations, et dont un bon nombre figurent parmi les personnages les plus riches et les plus influents, ont organisé à New York une société protectrice des Israelites. . . ."
live apart as a distinct race, know nothing of the Servian language & speak exclusively Hebrew-Spanish.\footnote{Morris to Fish, May 31, 1867, Despatch 209, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.} Morris believed the persecution of the Roumanian Jews to be a social and labor conflict rather than a religious confrontation.\footnote{Morris to Fish, June 8, 1870, Despatch 363, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.} There is some evidence to substantiate this conclusion. As the Jews were being forced out of Russia and Austria many resettled in regions of the Ottoman Empire. It was thought that these Jews who were very poor would increase the poverty of the area.\footnote{See Morris to Seward, July 12, 1867, Despatch 216, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.}

During the entire period of Morris' ministry, he cautioned consuls against providing protection for Jews who were not American citizens. Occasionally sympathetic consuls would provide temporary protection for Jews who were without protection and in danger of expulsion. Morris directed the consuls that regardless of motives—the Jews were not to be protected by the American flag.\footnote{Morris to Johnson, April 8, 1868, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence; Victor Beauboucher to Johnson, December 24, 1867, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence; Morris to Victor Beauboucher, February 12, 1868; March 11, 1868; Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letters Sent, Folio 23, RG 84, USNA; F. W. Seward to Johnson, June 3, 1868, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.} Yet, the American Minister did use unofficial diplomatic persuasion as a method to show America's displeasure for the persecution of the Jewish minority.
Morris once wrote Seward that "It is astonishing with what liberality American citizens have been manufactured in Turkey & Egypt." The Minister was referring to another technique used by the Sultan's subjects to avoid the jurisdiction of the Porte. Turkish subjects emigrated to the United States but left that country immediately after their naturalization. Many of the naturalized citizens were wealthy and owned profitable businesses; they paid few Ottoman taxes and no American taxes. In addition to being exempt from taxation their children were exempt from military conscription into the Ottoman army. To make matters more difficult for the American Minister, the new Americans claimed citizenship for children who were born prior to their emigration to the United States.

Seward was urged by Morris to consider negotiating a naturalization treaty with Turkey. Being aware of the excessive abuses of American naturalization procedures, Seward authorized the American Minister to approach the Porte on the subject. Ali Pasha was anxious to reach an agreement with the United States, but it became necessary

---

91 Morris to Seward, February 13, 1864, Private Letter, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

92 Morris to Seward, November 29, 1865, Despatch 134; July 31, 1866, Despatch 266; Morris to Fish, August 24, 1869, Despatch 325; February 2, 1870, Despatch 344; March, 1870, Despatch 350; Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

93 Morris to Fish, February 2, 1870, Despatch 344, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
to delay negotiations until the Turkish government promulgated a naturalization law. 94

When the Turkish government issued its Naturalization Law, it was evident to Morris that the law conflicted with the American concept of naturalization rights. 95 Controversy raged over Article 5 which required an Ottoman subject wishing to take on a foreign nationality first to obtain an Imperial Trade (Decree) recognizing that decision. According to the 1869 Law, without the Imperial Trade the subject's naturalization would be "null and void." Article 6 allowed the Ottoman government to forbid reentry of former Ottoman subjects who had failed to obtain an Imperial Trade before leaving Turkey. 96 Ali defended these articles on the ground that they attempted to stop abuses of citizenship privileges. 97 The American government

---

94 Seward to Morris, August 21, 1868, Despatch 187; August 22, 1868, Despatch 188; August 28, 1868, Despatch 190; Official Correspondence, Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; Morris to Seward, September 22, 1868, Private Letter; October 29, 1868, Private and Confidential Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA, Ali Pasha to Morris, August 28, 1868, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 25752/16, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, RG 84, USNA.

95 Morris to Seward, February 7, 1869, Despatch 297, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; Safet Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent Morris examples of Rules on Ottoman Nationality, February 8, 1869, No. 24135/2, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, RG 84, USNA; Morris to Seward, February 10, 1869, Despatch 299, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

96 Blacque Bey to Hamilton Fish, March 26, 1869, Notes from the Turkish Legation, United States Department of State, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure. Also see New York Herald, March 5, 1869, p. 4.

97 Ali Pasha to Morris, June 10, 1869, No. 25013/8 and August 28, 1869, No. 25752/16, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, Miscellaneous Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.
could not agree to Articles 5 and 6 because they restricted the movement of naturalized American citizens and the right, as the State Department styled it, of an individual to emigrate to the country of his choice. Negotiations dragged on for several months but when it became clear that Turkey would not modify her position, Secretary Fish instructed Morris: "It is not deemed advisable to conclude a naturalization convention which recognizes in terms the right of any Sovereign to give or withhold his consent to the naturalization of any foreign born persons in the United States... you will abandon the negotiations."

Over the years, abuses stemming from the Capitulations increased as foreign nations became more aggressive in their relationship with Turkey. By 1869, the number of Ottoman subjects receiving diplomatic protection exceeded the total number of foreign subjects living in the Empire. This condition was temporarily corrected by the Ottoman Consular regulations of 1863; although when the consular regulations were enforced the number of Ottoman subjects

98 Morris to Seward, February 7, 1869, Despatch 297; Morris to Fish, August 13, 1869, Despatch 323; September 28, 1869, Despatch 328, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Morris to Fish, March 17, 1869, Private Letter, Hamilton Fish Papers, Library of Congress.

99 Hamilton Fish to Morris, July 13, 1869, Despatch 219, Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

100 Blacque Bey to Hamilton Fish, Notes from the Turkish Legation, May 15, 1869, Despatch 298; see enclosure; also see Ali Pasha to Morris, August 28, 1869, No. 25752/16, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Notes from the Sublime Porte; Blacque Bey to Hamilton Fish, September 23, 1869, Despatch 425, Notes from the Turkish Legation.
adopting foreign nationalities increased in direct proportion to the
decrease in the number of proteges. The Ottoman government had been
promised revisions in the Capitulations at the time of the Crimean
War but no agreements were made. Instead, naturalization laws of
surrounding countries were relaxed so that Turkish subjects did not
need to leave Ottoman territory in order to obtain naturalization
papers. In the Sublime Porte's view, the intolerable condition under
which a naturalized citizen could demand special privileges and place
himself in a financially advantageous position in relationship to
other Ottoman business competitors had to be stopped. To prevent
such abuses, the Ottoman government brought forth several limited
reforms during the 1860's.

During his tenure among the fantastic domes and spires of
the Sultan's city, Morris was successful in reducing the lists of
proteges and temporary proteges, but he found it impossible to nego-
tiate a Naturalization Treaty. More important for the future of the
American Legation, he assumed full responsibility for decision-making.
Before Morris appeared on the scene, the appointed minister traveled
about the Middle East and Europe leaving John Porter Brown in nearly
complete control of the affairs of the Legation. By assuming
responsibility for the Legation, Morris robbed John Porter Brown of
considerable power. But competition for control of the Legation
continued to produce professional jealousy which did not contribute
to the smooth operation of the organization.

Almost all appointed consuls to the Middle East praised Morris'
ability to defend their interests and to administer American affairs
in Turkey. Yet, consuls often provided Morris with incomplete information and some even failed to follow his instructions. Several consuls disliked John Porter Brown and charged that he served the interest of Turkey rather than the United States. Nonetheless, the documents show that Brown followed the Minister's instructions and that his relations with Ali Pasha were entirely correct. Morris himself never accused Brown of misrepresenting American interest before the Porte.

Naval Records indicate that following the Civil War America reestablished her former naval strength in the Mediterranean. This return to the Mediterranean had nothing to do with America's supposed friendship with Russia. Most Americans of the period were interested in future trade and anticipated that merchant vessels would need protection, and all the United States consuls involved believed that American trade would soon return to the Mediterranean.

With the large number of Jewish emigrants to the United States from Eastern Europe and improved Jewish leadership, a new pressure group appeared on the American political scene. Jewish suggestions to the State Department precipitated enquires by American diplomatic officials into reported persecution of Jewish communities living in the Balkans and the Middle East. Regardless of sentiment or political pressure, the American government never seriously considered assuming the responsibility of American protection for Jews living in the Ottoman Empire. Based on the evidence presented in the foregoing, it is clear that American interest in the fate of Middle Eastern Jews antedates the foundation of Zionist movements in the United States.
CHAPTER 5

THE PROTESTANT CAMPAIGN

Evaluating his relationship with American missionaries stationed in Turkey, the American Minister, Edward Joy Morris, lamented: "Unless I convert the Legation into a bureau for Missionary business I cannot satisfy Mr. Hamlin."¹ Cyrus Hamlin, the founder of Robert College in Turkey, was a first cousin to Hannibal Hamlin, Vice President of the United States during 1861-65. Cyrus Hamlin was capable of writing a "dear cousin" letter when influence was needed in high places.² His son-in-law, George Washburn, was a missionary for the American Board and the regular Constantinople correspondent of the New York Tribune. Washburn understood the power of the press and expressed his personal opinions regularly. When relations deteriorated between Hamlin and Morris the New York Tribune correspondent wrote Rufus Anderson, Secretary

---

¹Edward Joy Morris to William H. Seward, September 18, 1862, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, Record Group 59, United States National Archives. Hereafter cited RG 59, USNA.

²Cyrus Hamlin to Hannibal Hamlin, June 23, 1869, Applications and Recommendations, Grant Administration, Box 56, RG 59, USNA.
of the American Board of Commissioners for the Foreign Missions:
"I have been urged by the brethren in Constantinople to write Mr.
Morris down in the newspapers—but I have carefully avoided anything
of the kind with this very object in view—of coaxing him with a
bundle of hay when the opportunity affords. . . . Now it is our duty
to cultivate sincerely a forgiving spirit—but aside from this it is
also good policy—especially with a worldly man of weak mind to
appear magnanimous." 3

Edward Joy Morris insisted that the Legation would not
be made into the Turkish office for the American Board of
Commissioners for Foreign Missions. The Minister claimed that
missionary business could not be allowed to interfere with the
duties of the Legation; in his view the Legation was responsible
only for maintenance of friendly relations between the United States
and Turkey, promotion of commercial relations, and protection of
American travelers. But, as the missionaries controlled the flow of
information from Turkey into the American and British press, they
were a force to be reckoned with. In the end, Morris recognized their
power, with the result being that both the American government and
the Minister engaged in promoting the spread of Protestantism in
Turkey.

3 George Washburn to Rufus Anderson, November 4, 1862,
written at Andover, American Board of Commissioners for the
Foreign Mission Papers, 16/9/3, Volume 4, Item 270, Houghton
Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Hereafter
University.
The American missionary interest had long been established within the dominions of the Sultan. When the first missionaries sent by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions arrived in Smyrna in 1819 they were greeted by representatives of the British Church Missionary Society. As early as 1808 the London Missionary Society had sent missionaries to Malta with hopes of reviving Christianity within the Orthodox Church among the inhabitants of Asia Minor and the Greek Islands. The English-speaking missionaries were joined in 1825 by five German Lutheran ministers who had received their commission in London as missionaries of the Church Missionary Society. One of the Germans, August Koelner, a printer, was sent to Malta to take charge of a missionary press established there by Americans in 1822. Despite the efforts of the British and Foreign Bible Society, the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews, and the Wesleyan Methodists, the Eastern Mediterranean Protestant missionary enterprise by 1837

---

was dominated by the Americans.

From the beginning, the British Embassy was the protector and promoter of Protestant interests in Turkey. The Great Powers were eager to defend the Ottoman Christians from their Muslim masters. The French declared themselves defenders of the Maronite Christians in Syria and promoted the Catholic faith wherever and whenever possible. Likewise, the Russians saw themselves as the champions of Orthodox Christianity in the Balkans, Greece, and European Turkey. France wished to control the North African coastline from the Atlantic to the Red Sea and north to Alexandretta and the Russian bear wished to secure a warm water port on the

5 See Appendix, "List of Missionaries," George H. Scherer, Mediterranean Missions, 1808-1870, pp. v-ix. By 1832, the British had 38 missionaries in the eastern Mediterranean, the Americans, 22; by 1837, the Americans had sent out 27 more missionaries; between 1837-1870, the Americans sent 70 missionaries to Syria alone. The American Board reported in 1870 that it had 116 in Western Turkey. At mid-century the American Board had 275 missionaries (ordained missionaries, physicians, and assistants usually wives) in West Asia, European Turkey and Greece. See Rufus Anderson, Memorial Volume of the First Fifty Years of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Fifth Edition (Boston: American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Missionary House, 1863), p. 273. A German source on the early period is Peter Kawerau, Amerika und die Orientalischen Kirchen; Ursprung und Anfang der Amerikanischen Mission unter den Nationalkirchen Westasiens (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter & Co., 1935), pp. 177-320.


7 Elizabeth Worneley Latimer, Russia and Turkey in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Company, 1893) and Richard R. Madden, The Turkish Empire in its Relations with Christianity and Civilization, Volume II, London: T. Cauley Newby, 1852; this book contains chapters on Russian and French influence over the Christian population of Turkey.
Mediterranean. It is apparent that England could not tolerate this French and Russian policy. Thus, she was obliged to devise some alternative policy which would preserve the Ottoman Empire and yet guarantee the protection and security of the Ottoman's Christian subjects.  

The second class citizenship status held by the Ottoman Christian population was a fertile source for foreign political intrigue. If the Empire were to be maintained in spite of external aggression and internal convulsion, it seemed necessary, at least to the British way of thinking, to modernize the existing structure. Modernization would mean, among many other things, an end of second class citizenship for Christians and all other non-Muslims. The entire population, Muslim and Christian, would need a moral and industrial uplift if Turkey expected to become a full-fledged member of nineteenth century Europe. British politicians believed that Protestant missionaries could by example and message be instruments of modernization.

The organization of Ottoman society complicated the Protestant missionary efforts for influence and conversion. After the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Mehmet II granted to the Patriarch and the chief Rabbi authority over their respective adherents in all spiritual and personal affairs. This meant that the heads of the various religious communities were responsible for collection of taxes and

---

8 Frank E. Bailey, British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement (New York: Howard Fertig, 1970).
for obedience of their members to religious customs and laws. In practice the religious communities or millets were autonomous self-governing states within the Empire—subordinate only to the Sultan. Every individual within the Ottoman society belonged to a particular religious community and outside that community he had no legal existence.

During the early period of missionary activity, converts to Protestantism were without a millet. Unless these unhappy creatures could obtain protection from some Protestant government their legal condition could only be one of non-existence. This situation continued until 1850 when Sultan Abdul Mecid issued an Imperial Firman which prohibited the molesting of Protestants by certain overzealous civil and religious officials. Finally, in 1853, he gave a special Firman which recognized the Head of the Protestant Christian community and created a Protestant millet. The British Embassy and Sir Stratford Canning, in particular, were responsible for these changes.9

A Hatti Humayun promulgated by Sultan Abdul Mecid as one of the reforms preliminary to the Treaty of Paris (after the Crimean War) guaranteed religious liberty to all the subjects of the Ottoman Empire.10 American Protestant missionaries as well as their British

---

9 Rufus Anderson, History of the Missions of the American Board of Commissioners For Foreign Missions to the Oriental Churches, Volume II (Boston: Congregational Publishing Society, 1873), pp. 2-8.

colleagues assumed that religious liberty meant not merely freedom to worship whatever god or demon that proved convenient, but that Protestants had gained the right of proselytism. The missionaries maintained that they must be permitted to move about freely in all parts of the Empire, to circulate the Bible and all books authorized by the Government censors, to build Protestant Churches wherever Protestants resided, to live as Protestants, to preach the truth as they understood it, and to win Turkish Muslim converts.11

Prior to 1856, the Protestant missionaries had directed their efforts to converting Armenians and other Orthodox Christians; after that date they turned some of their labors to converting Muslims. They publicly baptized converted Turkish Muslims in Constantinople and a few of these converts even became Christian proselytizers. Missionaries circulated the Scriptures and commentaries on the Gospel in the Osmanli language in all areas of the Empire. The Turkish government viewed these assaults on Islam in the dominions of the Caliph (Halife) with less apathy than earlier attacks made upon Orthodox Christianity.12

The Americans had been well established in the Ottoman Empire for over forty years and were much more active and numerous


than other Protestant missionary groups; they did not consider
themselves to be on the same low level as their British colleagues.
Nonetheless, they followed a long-established custom of applying for
protection as Protestants directly to the British Embassy.¹³ Nor did
the American missionaries hesitate to seek British influence on behalf
of their native converts because of local persecution of these individ-
uals. The British Embassy interfered regularly in Ottoman internal
affairs and as a Protestant nation exerted influence in behalf of
Protestant interests.¹⁴ As George Washburn noted later: "Any
grievous wrong suffered by any Christian in any part of the Empire
could, at that time generally be righted by the intervention of some
Ambassador and they often secured the removal and punishment of
notoriously bad officials. The Turks suffered in silence and had no
one to care for them, and the general character of the government was
unchanged."¹⁵

American missionaries did not appeal to the British Embassy
for personal protection on matters of civil rights. For this, they
depended on the American Minister.¹⁶ This issue had been settled in

¹³BFO 424/27A, PRO, Confidential Print, Rev. C. Curtis to
W. Stuart, November 3, 1864, p. 83.

¹⁴See J. A. Johnson to W. H. Seward, Despatch 36, Official
Consular Correspondence, Beirut, RG 59, USNA. Also see BFO 424/27A,
PRO, Confidential Print, Rev. C. Curtis to W. Stuart, November 3,
1864, p. 83.


¹⁶See Johnson to Seward, Despatch 36, op. cit.
1842 by Secretary of State Daniel Webster who declared it was the duty and purpose of the United States Government to extend to the American missionaries "all proper succor and attention, for which they may stand in need, the same manner that you would to other citizens of the United States, who, as merchants, visit or dwell in Turkey."  

Beginning in the 1860's American missionaries settled almost all of their problems through the American Legation and not through the offices of the British Embassy. As schools, missionaries, and converts rapidly multiplied at mid-century, it became increasingly difficult to distinguish between the American policy of protection for its citizens and its unadmitted policy of promotion of Protestantism. The American officers insisted that they were only protecting American citizens, but when the records are examined it is clear that they actually were interfering with Ottoman internal problems and were, indeed, promoting the Protestant faith.

Another factor that must be considered is that the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions preferred doing business with their own government. In an 1862 resolution the Board stated: "We...feel that it would be more deeply humiliating, should our missionaries, who are American citizens, be compelled through any fault of our functionaries to appeal for protection to Embassies of

---

17 Rufus Anderson, *Memorial Volume of First Fifty Years*, op. cit., p. 201.
When the missionaries in the field had problems, no matter if they were personal or professional, they expected the American diplomats to intervene in their behalf.

The missionaries made extensive use of the printed word in order to reach potential Muslim and Orthodox Christian converts. In 1860 alone, books distributed by the West Turkey missionary press included 18,511 volumes of the Bible, 15,844 copies of other books, and 65,549 religious tracts. Appropriate religious propaganda was made available through book stores located at all the mission stations. In the early years of Protestant mission activity several printing presses were brought into the Empire. Missionaries translated the Bible, wrote religious tracts, published newspapers and textbooks in Turkish, Armenian, Greek, Bulgarian, Arabic and the various other languages. Prior to 1860, the Government forbade

---

18 Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, October 7-10, 1862 (Boston: T. R. Marvin & Son, 1862), p. 14. Rufus Anderson to William H. Seward, November 6, 1862, Department of State, Miscellaneous Letters, RG 59, USNA, S. B. Treat and George W. Wood, Secretaries of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions at Boston; this is a copy of the resolution which was forwarded to the Secretary of State.


publication of a Bible printed in the Arabic characters in Constantinople; but when the ban was lifted an Ottoman-Turkish New Testament was ready for the press. Although there were no governmental restrictions on translation into Armenian, Bulgarian, or Greek the Patriarch regarded Protestant activities, particularly their habit of teaching parishioners to read the Bible in the vernacular, with a jaundiced eye. Anything that threatened the status quo within the Empire was opposed by all traditional leaders whether Christian or Muslim.

Because the missionaries made use of the written work in presenting their message to the people, they faced a difficult problem. When the missionaries arrived in Turkey less than 10 percent of the men and few of the women were able to read. A few boys attended schools without desks or books; students sat on the floor in the Turkish fashion rocking their bodies forward and backward in time to phrases which were repeated after their teacher. The same methods were used in Orthodox Christian schools. Unable to leave well enough alone, the missionaries began reorganizing native schools. They also established Protestant schools which contained desks, chalkboards and books. An 1860 report to the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions boasted of 25 schools with 691 students in Western Turkey, 36 schools with 936 students in Central Turkey, and 48 schools with 1,141 students in Eastern Turkey. These 1860 figures do not include Syria because a local Druze-Maronite War was in progress; earlier in 1859, Syria
reported 32 common schools registering 1,065 students.\textsuperscript{21} The missionary education program was impressive and by 1870 the Head of the Protestant community could report that 85 per cent of the Ottoman-Protestant millet (of 2,553 members) could read and write.\textsuperscript{22}

Another method employed by the American missionaries was public preaching. This method had two major advantages; it was less expensive than printing pamphlets and there was no need to wait until the potential audience learned to read. The most popular preaching technique was for two or three missionaries armed with the native language to take rooms, or khans, in the Muslim or Orthodox districts. These rented rooms were opened to all who wished to come for public lectures or sermons. The missionaries gave Protestant instruction classes five days a week and, usually, held religious services two evenings a week—in addition to the Sunday service.\textsuperscript{23}

The most interesting case concerning a government complaint


\textsuperscript{22}Annual Report of American Board, October 3-6, 1871, op. cit. p. 12.

\textsuperscript{23}See George F. Herrick to Morris, April 10, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA.
over the operation of a khan came in 1868 when Fuad Pasha became enraged at the activities of American missionaries in the Vizir Khan section of Constantinople. The Foreign Minister claimed that people were admitted to the meeting rooms only after giving secret signs. Fuad Pasha stated that he would prefer that these missionaries be removed to Bebek, since he could not permit such potentially revolutionary activity in Vizir Khan. The American Dragoman, John Porter Brown, assured the Foreign Minister that the missionaries who occupied the rooms had no political bias against the Sultan. After lengthy explanations were made concerning the actual use of the rooms, the government pressed its complaint no further.

Another preaching method used by the missionaries was acquiring a summer home in an area where no Protestants lived. This technique was used in several regions of the Empire but one incident will illustrate how it worked. About an eight hour horse-back ride south of Tripoli lay the pleasant village of Duma. American missionaries had been "in the habit of summering" there for many years; they made friends with the Maronite and Greek population. Eventually, they obtained a few Protestant converts and held regular Sunday services in addition to their week-day instruction classes.

---

24 John Porter Brown to Morris, April 9, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, Volume II, RG 84, USNA.

25 Ibid.

26 Samuel Jessup to Jeremiah A. Johnson, July 3, 1865, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.
Occasionally, Protestant missionaries visited friends living near areas not yet exposed to the Gospel. Usually, the first few visits were met with bitter attacks inspired by the local Orthodox priest and his more devoted followers. As time passed, the missionary ceased to be a novelty, the native villagers became curious, and a few converts were acquired. The Armenian community of Zeitun was opened by missionaries from Marash (southeast Turkey in the Taurus mountains) using this technique.27 If an area did respond to the missionary efforts, an out-station would be established and equipped with a teacher. Eventually as the Protestant community grew, it would be assigned its own native preacher.

Missionary proselytism did not pass unnoticed by the Ottoman government or the local Orthodox leaders. On July 19, 1864, Rev. Isaac Bliss wrote to the American Charge d'Affairs, John Porter Brown, that the Pera police had recently closed a building which housed the American Bible Society for the Levant, its bookstore, and printing press. The British Protestant facilities were also located in this one entrance way building, so, they suffered the same fate. The

27See Rufus Anderson, History of the Missions of the American Board of Commissioners For Foreign Mission to the Oriental Churches, Volume II (Boston: Congregational Publishing Society, 1873), p. 407. The missionaries had considerable trouble in Zeitun during 1866; in 1868, they sent in a native preacher from Marash who was allowed to remain "unmolested." At the end of 1868, Tillman Trowbridge visited Zeitun and remained there "laboring freely from Thursday till Monday." The area had been opened for the work of the American missionaries.
Americans asserted their innocence and claimed that they sold only books approved by the government censors. 28 Rev. Tillman C. Trowbridge, an American missionary assigned to the Constantinople station, listed the books sold by the establishment:

We are publishing at the office above a volume of sermons in Armeno-Turkish, prepared by Dr. Goodell, a Catechism in Armeno-Turkish, a brief commentary on the New Testament in Turkish, a small volume of scripture texts for the Sabbath Schools in Armenian, the Scriptures in Bulgarian, the Dairyman's Daughter in Bulgarian and the Avidapu, a newspaper in the Armenian language which has been published for the past ten years in this city. All the above mentioned books have been approved by the Government censors. 29

Under the capitulations and established usage, the Turkish government had no authority to close any establishment occupied by Americans without the consent of the American Minister. 30 Morris was absent in America attending his recently deceased father's funeral and John Porter Brown had been left in charge of the Legation.

George Washburn and Isaac Bliss assured Brown that "we have carefully avoided anything which would have even the appearance of an attack upon Islam. It has never been our policy to attempt to build Protestantism by making violent attacks upon other religions, and in respect to Mohammadanism we have been especially cautious." The two missionaries went on to assure Brown of the scope of their noble work:

28 Isaac Bliss to John Porter Brown, July 19, 1864, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA.

29 Tillman C. Trowbridge to John Porter Brown, July 23, 1864, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA.

30 BFO 424/27A, Confidential Print, Sir Edmund Hornby to Earl Russell, July 20, 1864, No. 3.
For more than 30 years we have lived and labored in all parts of the Turkish Empire printing and circulating the Holy Bible at a low price, in the languages of the people, founding schools where none existed before, publishing cheap but valuable school books, seeking to familiarize the people with the arts, sciences, agriculture of Europe and America, and preaching to them the simple truths found in the Holy Bible, truths adapted to make them better men and better and more obedient subjects of the Porte. Instead of stirring up sedition and teaching the people to look to foreign powers for protection, we everywhere urge the people to live peacefully, to obey the rulers whose God has placed over them and to pray in their churches, and in private for the blessings of God upon H. G. Majesty the Sultan and the Empire.31

A British Consular Judge, Sir Edmund Hornby, who confessed to be hated by the missionaries, stated that no complaint had ever been made to him by the authorities against the Protestant missionaries in Constantinople. He testified that "the missionaries, especially the American missionaries, and the British Foreign Bible Society, have been established here for certainly the last twenty years, and, as far as I can learn, there has been no change in method or principle; upon which their affairs have been conducted."32

John Porter Brown believed the missionaries to be innocent. But, because Ali Pasha had made such grave accusations against the Americans, the Charge d' Affairs decided that a thorough investigation should be made. The examination of the American book store was

31 John Porter Brown to William H. Seward, July 29, 1864, Despatch 9, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure signed by George Washburn and Isaac G. Bliss of the American Bible Society. Also see the Missionary Herald, Volume LX, October, 1864, No 10, pp. 311-12.

32 BFO 424/27A, PRO, Confidential Print, Sir Edmund Hornby to Earl Russell, July 26, 1864, No. 5.
completed by the Turkish police in the presence of Brown. When no
incriminating evidence was found, Ali Pasha expressed his regrets at
the irregular action of the Pera police. He admitted that accusations
made to him against the American missionaries were "erroneous." But
their British cousins, Brown told Seward, were not so innocent:

I apprehend, [that] is not the case with the British missionaries,
whose Bookstores have also undergone an examination, after having
been closed precisely in the same manner as that of the Americans.
The obnoxious Books against Islamism was found in them, and have
all been seized by the police. The converts from Islamism to
Protestantism, are all, without exception, in their employ or in
connection with the Church of England. These converts acted
also as preachers in rooms hired for the purpose of Khans and
other places in Stanboul and gave great offense to the Porte,
& to the more rigid Mussulmans of the Capital.

When Edward Joy Morris returned to Constantinople, he
reported the whole affair had been a political plot engineered by
members of the Sultan's government. Conservative members of the
government and the ulama had much desired to rid the government of
the reforming liberals under the leadership of Ali Pasha and Fuad
Pasha, and had been making much headway in their persuasions with
the Sultan. By inspiring the police to close a missionary bookstore
Ali hoped to demonstrate that the liberals had not gone soft on the
Christian issue.

33 EFO 424/27A, Confidential Print, George Washburn to
H. Jones, October 13, 1864, p. 68.

34 John Porter, Brown to W. H. Seward, July 29, 1864, Despatch 9,
Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

35 Morris to Seward, September 8, 1864, Private and Unofficial
Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
Another appeal made to the American Legation in July, 1864, concerned converted Turks who had been imprisoned the day before the police closed the American Bible Society's bookstore. The missionaries asked the aid of the American Legation in the securing of their release. Morris reminded the missionaries that the entire responsibility for the release of the prisoners belonged in the hands of the British Ambassador. At the same time, the American Minister assured Seward that if he were called on to act in the interest of the arrested Turks, he would take care to "steer between 'Scylla & Charybdis' & serve as best missionary & government interest without subordinating the latter to the former."  

The Missionary Herald reported that the missionaries had persuaded the American Legation to make two requests to the Porte for release of the Turkish converts. The journal attributed the Legation's failure to secure the release of the prisoners to regrettable lack of zeal on the part of the British. Rev. George F. Herrick alleged that Sir Henry Bulwer, the British Ambassador, had joined the Turkish officials in a crusade against Protestant

36 George F. Herrick to John Porter Brown, July 23, 1864, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA.

37 Morris to Seward, September 8, 1864, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
missionaries. The American missionaries were not satisfied with the way that the "acknowledged protector of Protestantism in this Empire" had handled the protection of native converts or the bookstore incident. They hinted that Bulwer was consulted by the Turkish government before the Pera police closed the bookstore. The missionaries based their accusation on the fact that Bulwer, on the very day that the bookstore was closed, had warned them that "a strong feeling was beginning to be excited among the Mussulman population by the preaching of converts against the faith of Mahomet." Another incriminating assumption was the conviction that the Turkish government would not take "such important steps without consultation with the British Ambassador."

The missionaries prepared a Memorial for Lord Russell, Liberal Foreign Secretary, complaining of Bulwer's failure to aid them. They charged that the bookstore and printing press were only

---


40 BFO 424/27A, PRO, Confidential Print, George Washburn to H. Jones, October 13, 1864, p. 67. See the New York Times, August 11, 1864 and the Missionary Herald, Volume LX, October, 1864, No. 10, p. 306. The journal stated that "The order was direct from the Sultan, and some days before its execution, probably even before exactly what was to be done was decided upon, the British Ambassador, Sir Henry Bulwer, was consulted, and the measures adopted were executed either with his advice or with his tacit consent!"
set free at the insistence of the American Charge d'Affairs. George Washburn, the author of the Memorial to the British government, claimed that John Porter Brown spoke to Ali Pasha about the American rooms and that these were opened at his request and not by any action taken by the British Embassy. Washburn charged that no communication concerning the closed bookstores occurred between the Porte and the British Embassy before July 19. The American missionary pointed out that even the Levant Herald, an English language newspaper printed in Pera and usually critical of the American missionaries, attributed the opening of the building to energetic action by the United States Legation. 41

Washburn complained to Lord John Russell that at the time it was impossible to persuade the British Embassy to do anything to prevent Protestant persecution; and he noted that "it is already notorious in Constantinople, and is beginning to be known in the most distant provinces, that the British Embassy no longer protects Protestants, as in former years." 42 Washburn pointed out that the French government vigorously protected the Jesuit missionaries who

---

41 EFO 424/27A, PRO, Confidential Print, George Washburn to H. Jones, October 13, 1864, p. 67.

42 EFO 424/27A, PRO, Confidential Print, George Washburn to H. Jones, October 13, 1864, p. 71; Washburn knew that Russell had access to his letters; in an unpublished manuscript the American missionary states: "The end of the story does not appear in the Blue Book Earl Russell told the friend in London through whom I was working there that I had better drop the matter as the Government knew everything that I could tell them about Sir Henry Bulwer and that he would be recalled within a few months, as he was." George Washburn, "Robert College, 1856-1900," op. cit., p. 11.
were far more aggressive in their attacks upon Islam than the 
Protestants. More in sorrow than in anger, he concluded that "it 
seems to be the policy of the present Sultan and his Ministers to 
strengthen their Empire by reviving the spirit of Islam—by strength-
ening and consolidating the forces of Mohammedanism."^{43}

Bulwer attempted to defend himself by lamenting 
that Washburn's Memorial merely displayed the "very great 
injustice to which a public man, performing his duties in a foreign 
country, may be exposed by misrepresentations and misstatements as 
to his conduct." He maintained that he had protested to the Turkish 
government against closing the bookstore without warning the Embassy. 
He claimed that Ali Pasha had explained to him that the Turks had 
acted for fear of "great calamities." Bulwer declared that he 
informed the Foreign Minister that if the British bookshop was not 
opened at once "I should break off my relations with the Porte."

The diplomat concluded that no one could have acted with "more vigour" 
than himself on behalf of the missionaries.^{44} In fact Ali Pasha 
himself stated that the British bookshop was not reopened at the

---

^{43}BFO 424/27A, PRO, Confidential Print, George Washburn 
to H. Jones, October 13, 1864, p. 71.

^{44}BFO 424/27A, Confidential Print, Sir Henry Bulwer to 
Earl Russell, September 7, 1864, Despatch 292, p. 50.
request of the American Charge d'Affairs.\textsuperscript{45}

Bulwer attempted to impress some sense of reality upon his government: "Certain missionaries, if I understand them correctly, contend that religious liberty is not merely a sanction for everyone to criticize and attack the religion of his neighbour. The Ottoman Government does not give to religious liberty this last signification, and is disposed to repress every effort at conversion which excites angry and hostile feelings amongst the difference classes of the Ottoman community."\textsuperscript{46} He especially objected to the assumption that missionaries had the right to pursue any course they desired for spreading Christianity.

The bookstore incident in 1864 caused the most trouble between the Turkish government and missionaries. But other controversies were in the offing. In 1862, Ali Pasha sent a note to Morris asking him to contain the missionaries' publishing activities:

\textsuperscript{45}FO 424/27A, Confidential Print, Sir Henry Bulwer to Earl Russell, September 7, 1864, Despatch 202, p. 57. Bulwer sent a letter dated August 4, 1864 from the Sublime Porte to Earl Russell: Ali told Bulwer: "M. Pisani vient de m' apprendre que M. Sellar a prétendu que les boutiques Anglaises où se vende la Bible ont été ouvertes sur la demande de la Légation des États Unis. Tel n'est pas le cas. En donnant l' ordre d' ouvrir les boutiques Américaines, j'ai également donné l' ordre, d' après la demande de votre Excellence d' ouvrir les boutiques Anglaises et de remettre l' établissement où toutes les boutiques étaient situées a qui de droit. Cela m'a paru équitable. Si M. Sellar croyait que j' ai fait remettre aux Américains les boutiques occupées par lui sur la bâtiice où ses boutiques sont situées, il a tort. J' avais espéré que ma dernière note à votre Excellence avait tout éclairci; et je persiste à croire que votre Excellence est complètement éclairie a cet égard et qu' elle trouvera les suppositions de M. Sellar dénuées de tout fondement."

\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., p. 51.
I allude to the pamphlets in the Turkish language which are circulating in Constantinople and the Provinces by these same said missionaries, pamphlets directed totally against the Muslim religion, and full of abuse, improper invectives, and calumnies, unworthy of the age in which we live, and of men, who receive our hospitality while professing this religion. The Sublime Porte will not fail to prevent the sale and circulation of these books.  

In answer to this the American missionaries claimed they had never printed any works not authorized by the Board of Censors of the Sublime Porte. They maintained that they had not placed any controversial books in circulation because such books could only harm their cause. In a memorandum to Morris, the missionaries pointed out that they had "constantly held up the bright side of the future of Turkey by reporting every act of an enlightened, liberal and impartial policy of the government which they had the pleasure to see."  

Again in 1865, Ali informed Brown that he would not allow certain books to be sold in the Empire. The Foreign Minister claimed he had examined the books in question and could not permit distribution to the public because of their controversial contents. Ali

---

47Ali Pasha to Morris, August 17, 1862, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 5999/40, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte: "Je veux parler de ces pamphlets en langue Turque qu'on fait circuler à Constantinople et dans les provinces par les soins des dits missionnaires, pamphlets dirigés uniquement contre la religion Musulmane et pleins d'injures, d'invectives inconvenantes, de calomnies indignes du siècle où nous vivons, indignes des hommes qui reçoivent une hospitalité sans réserve du Gouv. qui professé cette religion. La Sublime Porte ne manquera pas d'empêcher la vente et la circulation de ces livres." RG 84, USNA.

48Memorandum to Morris prepared by the American missionaries, unsigned document, September 20, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA.
reminded the Secretary that the Protestants were permitted to sell only the Holy Scriptures and prayer books. Because the books that were coming under attack had been sold for many years without complaint from the authorities and the fact that they were quite expensive to publish, Brown asked for compensation for the financial loss to the American missionaries.49

The question of the book publications was not confined to the capital. For instance, in 1865 a Protestant book seller in Marash, who sold only those books printed by the American missionaries in Constantinople, was forbidden to sell certain titles on pain of imprisonment. Local officials seized most of his stock and the pasha told the head of the Protestant community that books were being smuggled into the province. The order for confiscation had come directly from the Porte. The missionaries were howling for the restoration of their property and rescinding of the orders prohibiting the sale of their books. Rev. Andrew Pratt, M. D. wrote Morris that the books in question were on the government's approved list. When Morris protested to Ali Pasha, he was informed that the Turkish system of toleration could not be compromised by permitting the distribution of controversial religious works.50

49 John Porter Brown to Morris, November 23, 1865, Constantinople Post Papers, Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, Volume II, RG 84, USNA.

50 See Morris to Seward, October 13, 1865, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Also see Ali Pasha to Morris, September 25, 1865, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, RG 84, USNA.
The American Legation kept up its pressure on the Foreign Minister concerning the distribution and sale of religious books. On April 16, 1866, Brown was able to inform Morris that Ali Pasha stated that formerly prohibited books printed by the American missionaries "may now be freely sold." Morris reviewed the controversial books and failed to find them "obnoxious." Because he was anxious to prove to Ali Pasha "that the Americans in this as in all other instances scrupulously observed the laws of the Empire," he secured a personal interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. At the meeting he reviewed the history of the book problem and invited Ali Pasha personally to examine the books published by the Americans. Morris reported to the Secretary of State:

I am now happy to be able to state that my statements have been found correct and the accusations against the missionaries perfectly groundless. The books have been at last acknowledged to be what they really are, manuals of religious instruction merely, and permission has been given for their free sale and circulation throughout the Empire.

I beg leave to add that the Turkish government is morbidly sensitive on questions of religious controversy and that it requires great delicacy in the treatment of all matters connected with sectarian propaganda.52

Many years later George Washburn summed up his conclusions concerning the mid-century Protestant missionary persecution: "It was a wonder to all that Fuad and Ali Pachas should suddenly assume

\[\text{51 John Porter Brown to Morris, April 16, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, Volume II, RG 84, USNA.}\]

\[\text{52 Morris to Seward, April 25, 1866, Despatch 150, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.}\]
the role of persecutors and not only imprison Christian Turks but
make a violent and plainly illegal attack upon the quarters of the
English and American missionaries. I am now satisfied that it all
grew out of the appearance here of a number of Babists [sic] expelled
from Persia, who had made the acquaintance of the Christian Turks and
professed to be almost if not quite Christians themselves. They were
considered dangerous characters by the Government and created much
excitement among Mohammedans which led the Grand Vizier to take
measures against them and the Christian Turks at the same time.\textsuperscript{53}

Preaching and selling of religious books to the Turkish
Muslims did not cause as much trouble for American diplomats as the
hatred shown to the Protestant missionaries by the Orthodox leaders.
United States archival records reveal numerous incidents of missionary
persecution by the leaders of Orthodox Christianity. Morris elucidated
the reasons for Orthodox attacks on Protestant missionaries:

Communities of people professing a common faith are naturally
jealous of the operations of persons whose object is to under-
mine their peculiar form of religious belief & to create discord
of opinion on matters of faith--a discord which is the more
irritating because of its tendency to introduce dissention &
enmity in social circles. The Armenians among whom our mission-
aries generally pursue their labors are (especially in Syria &
old Armenia of which the Pachalik of Erzeroum forms a part)
fanatically attached to their religion. In such regions as
Zeitoun they are even ruder, more bigoted and more savage than
the Turks themselves & it is almost impossible for the government

\textsuperscript{53}George Washburn, "Robert College, 1856-1900," \textit{op. cit.},
p. 12.
to secure perfect security of person and property to the missionaries. . . . They frequently also venture into regions where the authority of the Forte is merely nominal, and in some of which not a para of tribute has been paid nor a tax collected for a quarter of a century.54

Given these conditions, it could be anticipated that the missionaries would be stoned, beaten, and harassed by the Orthodox. What was unexpected was the ability of the American Legation to obtain satisfaction from the Turkish government during the period Morris was Minister. Morris stated in 1866 that "the Turkish government has never spared expense or trouble to give the satisfaction required and it has always done its duty with promptitude & energy and occasionally even at the risk of provoking civil war."55

The Zeitun Affair illustrated the difficulties faced by missionaries in provincial parts of the Empire. Zeitun is located in southeastern Turkey in the Taurus mountains north of Marash. During most of the nineteenth century it had been in a state of rebellion. In 1866, the town submitted and a Turkish Governor ruled there. Peace reigned and the Governor of Zeitun was ordered to avoid any confrontation that could result in open revolt. Only a few weeks after the Turkish Governor entered Zeitun, American missionaries living in Marash received an invitation from certain citizens of Zeitun to visit the

---

54 Edward Joy Morris to Seward, July 25, 1866, Despatch 163, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

55 Ibid.
town. On June 21, 1866, Rev. Giles F. Montgomery and two Karashians traveled to the home of a Protestant friend living on the outskirts of Zeitun.56

The Protestants decided that the entire group would visit the town in order to make a friendly call at the Governor's residence. As they entered the town, an angry mob of men, women and children led by the Armenian Orthodox priest attacked them. The Protestants were dragged from their horses, beaten, stoned, clubbed, and, not surprisingly, kicked.57 Montgomery and his companions were saved from imminent death by an unidentified man; he rescued them from the mob, washed their wounds, and put them on horses headed in the direction of Marash.58

Upon his return to Marash, Montgomery wrote the American Consul General Johnson in Beirut asking him to do "what you think justice demands." Johnson sent a request for an inquiry to the Governor of Aleppo. The local authorities were disturbed that the Protestant missionary had decided to visit Zeitun. The Governor of Aleppo could not express sympathy for Montgomery and he certainly did not wish to upset the recently subdued Armenian population. The Turkish Director of External Affairs in Aleppo rather heartlessly

56 Morris to Seward, July 25, 1866, Despatch 163, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure.

57 Giles F. Montgomery to J. A. Johnson, June 26, 1866, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

58 Morris to Seward, July 25, 1866, Despatch 163, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
noted that the missionary "had not been prudent in going to Zaytun without precisely addressing the authorities--and without the necessary documents for the excursion in a country which having always been in a state of revolt, has only recently been subjugated to the authority of the government. . . he went to a wild and fanatic country, probably for the purpose of public preaching a religion wholly new to a people who are wanting in instruction, & who are consequently, are the more fanatical." The Director of External Affairs regretted that Johnson was unable to convince the missionaries to be "more prudent." He also informed Johnson that the Governor of Aleppo had ordered an examination of the affair. The Mudir of Zeitun defended his inaction in the following terms:

As to the priest. . . he has had no regard for the Local Authorities, and having come here without their cooperation put up his tent & fully began to give cause for what occurred. . . The people of these parts are very fanatical and I have heard that without anyone knowing what were their intentions, some children & women assembled together in view of preventing his arrival in town.

Johnson inquired of Morris what action he should take since Montgomery and his native helpers did not need official permission to travel in an area under Ottoman control; he pointed out that the attack

59 Director of External Affairs, P. Wassa to United States Vice Consul Antonio de Picciotto, July 15, 1866, No. 179, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA.

60 Mudir of Zeitun to the Kaymakam of Harash, July 11, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA.
had occurred near the Mudir's home. Morris wrote to Johnson that the Porte had promised to put pressure on the local authorities for enforcement of the law. The local authorities did not agree. The mazbata (the record and conclusions of an investigation) of the meclis of Marash stated that the people refused to become educated and, so, lived "in a state or condition of savageness." The Governor found that when Montgomery arrived in Zeitun, he attempted to preach the Protestant faith, and read to passersby from the Bible. The report claimed that the missionaries had "openly meddled in the religious convictions of the people" and they were "lucky they were not killed." The Governor General of Aleppo remarked that "the particular rudeness and fanaticism of these Preachers, which is a matter of certainty, and their open interference in, and condemnation of the faith of the Armenian people besides arousing their feelings of animosity clearly

---

61 J. A. Johnson to E. J. Morris, July 5, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

62 Morris to J. A. Johnson, July 19, 1866, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA: Morris stated that Zeitun authorities were "under pressure from this point to do their duty in the case."

63 Mazbata, Report of the Local Council of Marash, August 22, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA. Also see letter from John Porter Brown to Edward Joy Morris, September 13, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, Volume II, RG 84, USNA; Brown reported that the missionaries had been severely reproached generally for trying to preach to the Armenians. The Dragoman reported that Montgomery had only been attacked by old women and children.
excites them to disorder and acts of violence."  

Correspondence of demands and counter demands continued among the missionaries, Johnson, Morris, and the Porte until it was finally agreed that a special investigation would be conducted by Abdo Debbas, the American Vice Consul at Tarsus, and Ismail Pasha, a famous Ottoman commander from Narash. The Protestants told the American Vice Consul that no less than ten Protestant families had invited Montgomery to Zeitun. The American missionaries asserted that the local Zeitun authorities knew of their coming before-hand and suspected what the Armenians might do. Montgomery testified that he had not preached in public and had been attacked by more than 500 people with no less than 60 men in the mob.

Debbas found that the house where Montgomery stayed had been destroyed, and that the local authorities had imprisoned four men for their part in the affair. One of the convicts was the Protestant Armenian who had invited Montgomery to Zeitun; another, a Roman Catholic who had given assistance to the wounded missionary and his companions. The third malefactor was the owner of the house in which Montgomery had lodged; this same unfortunate convert to Protestantism had had his house knocked down and his fruit trees cut off. The Armenians had blackened his face, mounted him on a donkey backwards and paraded him through the town so that the Orthodox could mock, spit,  

64 Cevdet Pasha, Governor General of Aleppo to the Grand Vezir, No. 190, March 17, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA.
and stone him. The fourth Armenian who landed in jail was a 90-year-old gentleman who had informed the authorities that the local Armenian priest had incited the attack on Montgomery. Debbas refused to sign a report made by Ismail Pasha because it showed nothing but "contempt for U. S. authorities as well as the Protestant faith." 65

Upon receipt of Debbas' report, Morris informed the Foreign Minister of the details of the Zeitun Affair. 66 Early in 1869, the ring leaders were still unpunished, and a rumor reached Marash that Morris was not going to press for continuation of the case. The missionaries informed Morris in no uncertain terms that the real culprits had not spent an hour in prison. Although a large number of Protestant and Orthodox had been imprisoned for questioning, as soon as the questioning was over they were all set free, the innocent along with the guilty. As the missionaries told Morris:

It is well known throughout this whole region that you have undertaken to have those men punished, if you now abandon the attempt what security can we have that this outrage will not be repeated within a year? ... The Pasha of this city treats us with perfect contempt knowing, as he does that one of our

65 For the appointment of Ismail Pasha, see Brown to Morris, October 16, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, Volume II, RG 84, USNA. Also see Morris to J. A. Johnson, November 3, 1866, and Debbas to J. A. Johnson, January 8, 1868, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA. For a copy of the Vezirial Order see the Beirut Post Papers, February 23, 1867, Sevval 18, 1283, Shubat 11, 1282. For Abd Debbas' report on the Zeitun Affair, enclosure Johnson to Morris, April 1, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

66 J. Morris to Fuad Pasha, August 14, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letters Sent, Folio 23, RG 84, USNA.
number was nearly killed by a mob within his Pachalic and that all our attempts to bring the guilty to punishment have failed. . . . You have fought through other cases. . . . Why abandon this case? Why leave us to the mercy of these half-cavages for whose spiritual or temporal good we are spending our lives? . . . To say that we shall be protected hereafter while those men go unpunished is simply to trust in an empty shadow. . . . I cannot believe that you will allow the matter to rest here.67

The missionaries' letters prodded Morris into action; he informed Ali Pasha that justice must be rendered in favor of the missionaries. Morris vowed that he would not rest until the guilty were punished.68 However, there the correspondence ends. There is no more mention of the Zeitun Affair in the Notes from the Sublime Porte for 1869-70-71, nothing more in Folio 23 which is Morris' record of letters sent, no letters from the missionaries who were quite good at writing letters at all other times, and nothing in the Missionary Herald nor the Annual Report. When Protestant missionaries entered Zeitun at the end of 1868, Rev. Trowbridge reported that toleration was the order of the day.69

During Morris' tenure, the Duma and Zeitun cases constituted the two most difficult cases in opening new areas for proselytization. But even in many regions where the missionaries had already established

67 Tillman C. Trowbridge to E. J. Morris, February 23, 1869, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA.

68 Morris to Ali Pasha, April 8, 1869, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letters Sent, Folio 23, RG 84, USNA.

themselves for several years they were not safe from attack by the local Orthodox. Caesera (Kayseri) is a case in point. Morris had hardly settled in his office when he was called upon to make a strong protest to the Porte because of an unprovoked attack upon the home of Rev. F. A. Farnsworth. Although an unknown assailant fired a pistol shot into the missionary's parlor, the kaymakam (local Ottoman official) took no action. In the next attack on Farnsworth, pistol shots were accompanied by the burning of the Protestant chapel. Morris informed Ali Pasha that this was a definite treaty violation and demanded that something be done to protect American life and property. The Foreign Minister sent a Viziral Order to the Kaymakam demanding protection for the Americans.

Again in 1862, a mob of some fifty Armenians at Hadjin (northwest of Marash in the Taurus mountains) attacked Rev. Jackson Coffing and the Protestant chapel. Morris complained to Ali Pasha about the violence. In addition the American Minister asked that Ali Pasha do something about the local policy which forbade Protestants to sit on the meclis as did the Armenian leaders. Another area, Bitlis in the Pashalik of Erzerum, was the scene of frequent attacks, one of the worst coming in 1862. Morris explained to Ali Pasha that American citizens were persons of "inoffensive habits, careful not to provoke disorder & worthy of protection accorded them by treaty

70 Morris to Ali Pasha, January 2, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letters Sent, Folio 23, RG 84, USNA.
provisions." In response to Morris' pleas Ali Pasha sent an order to provincial administrators stating:

As there exists the most friendly relations between the Ottoman Government and that of the United States of America, it is necessary that the citizens of the latter residing or traveling in the Dominions of the H. E. Majesty should view the most equitable treatment, so that, in the weight of the present letter, H. E. will please extend to all the citizens of the American Government residing there [at Bitlis] all proper protection, and facilities in all their affairs which are confirmable to the treaty stipulations.

These instructions were obeyed, but only temporarily. Again in 1866, missionaries reported that they were unable to go into Bitlis without being stoned. The Governor of Bitlis and the Governor General of the province both refused to protect Americans. The Legation continued to press the need for protection until the missionaries were guaranteed reasonable security. The missionaries believed that Morris ought to pursue cases vigorously. One American missionary commenting on the

71 L. T. Burbank to the Constantinople Missionaries, December 27, 1862, copy sent to E. J. Morris, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA. Morris to Seward, March 19, 1863, see enclosure of Despatch 53, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

72 Yusaf Kiamil to the Kaymakam of Bitlis, Muhammad Pasha, March 3, 1863 (Ramazan 12, 1279, Shabat 19, 1273), Notes from Sublime Porte, Volume IV, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84, USNA.

73 George Washburn to E. J. Morris, June 12, 1866 and George Washburn to Morris, January 21, 1867, both letters are found in Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA. Fuad Pasha to Morris, April 24, 1867, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 18960/5, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, RG 84, USNA; John Porter Brown to Morris, October 9, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, Correspondence, between Minister and Secretary, Volume II, RG 84, USNA.
future of Protestant proselytization in Turkey observed that "if we are not able to secure the execution of the laws against the criminals, we cannot reside securely anywhere out of range of war vessels on the coast."74

Missionary schools provided opportunity for harassment of students and teachers by the local Muslims and Orthodox Christians. Each case of harassment brought a complaint to the Legation which in turn necessitated a letter demanding protection for American Protestants. The Sultan's subjects had several methods for driving out the Protestant teachers. At Sidon one resident opened a hole in the municipal sewer directly opposite the Church.75 In Tripoli they used several techniques but by far the most effective must have been the construction of a tannery against the side of the school house and under its only window. The tannery filled the room with smoke and prevented the students from studying. Every night an unknown assailant threw a quantity of "stones, bones & filthy manure" into the school room. The Tripoli missionaries complained that one man waxed so violent in his opposition to the school that he "openly beat & abused the children" who attended it. The same citizen hired a well known gunman to kill the individual who allowed the...

74 George E. Post to J. A. Johnson, August 14, 1865, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

75 W. Eddy to L. M. Johnson, May 11, 1870, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA; W. Eddy to L. M. Johnson, May 20, 1870, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.
missionaries to use the school building. Another technique used by the local Orthodox called for putting the teacher in prison. Sometimes a mob would seize the teacher and beat him severely. In addition to beating the teacher, groups would often stone the school children en route to school.

The attitude of the Porte on the school issue was colored by the fact that the American missionaries had paid for the building materials used and that the children were educated free of cost. They maintained that the local authorities could make no decision unfavorable to the missionaries, in relation to those privileges granted other missionaries from other countries.

The American Legation became more involved in the promotion of Protestantism within the Turkish Empire as the missionaries continually asked for representatives of the United States to be

76 Samuel Jessup to J. A. Johnson, January 21, 1870, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

77 Salim Bustany to J. A. Johnson, April 23, 1867, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, C 8.2, RG 84, USNA.

78 George Washburn to E. J. Morris, January 21, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA.

79 Ibid.

80 Veziral Order to the Vilayet of Halib (Aleppo), No. 179, November 9, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA; Muhammed Ali to Ahmed Pasha, Vali of Saida, August 6, 1861, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA; Yusuf Kamil to the Governor General of the Province of Aleppo (Halib), No. 174, April 5, 1863, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA.
assigned to the regions where their mission stations were located. In 1862, Rev. Wilson A. Farnsworth helpfully informed Morris that the Turks had a mortal dread of consuls. This missionary believed that if an American agent or consul could be appointed their security would be assured. At Sidon, the missionaries complained that all the European powers had a consul. They contended that an American clergyman could not take a consular position, unless in an emergency, because consular duties would interfere with his religious work. In their view it would lower the standing of both offices in the eyes of the people and the authorities. But, they maintained that a consul would protect and facilitate their work. The missionaries at Homs claimed that there had been too much local interference with the legitimate discharge of their duties because there was no American consul in the area. Rev. Samuel Jessup notified Lorenzo Johnson that all their activities would progress at a much smoother rate if a vice consul were appointed for Homs. Usually, when the missionaries asked for a consul or vice consul, someone was appointed. In the end, most of the vice consulates in Turkey were located in areas where the United States had no American residents besides the missionaries.

---

81 W. A. Farnsworth to Morris, May 6, 1862, written from Caesera, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Constantinople Post Papers, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA.

82 W. W. Eddy to J. A. Johnson, June 11, 1864, written from Homs, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

83 Samuel Jessup to L. M. Johnson, October 17, 1870, written from Homs, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.
American missionaries requested the Legation's aid in securing a Firman permitting the construction of a Protestant Church in Beirut. If the British Embassy were acting as the only advocate for the promotion of Protestantism in the Empire, it would be assumed that the Beirut missionaries would apply for the Firman through the British Embassy. There existed a Protestant Church in Beirut but the missionaries wanted permission to construct a church which would accommodate the Arabic Protestant Congregation of four hundred persons. John Porter Brown approached Ali Pasha about the new church in May, 1867. By the end of that summer the American dragoman was informed that the Porte had given permission. It is obvious that this entire transaction had little or nothing to do with the commercial treaty existing between the United States and Turkey.

Ali Pasha expressed grave concern about the tendency of Americans "to interfere in the temporal concerns" of the Protestant subjects of the Porte. Evidence indicates that the missionaries

84 H. H. Jessup to E. J. Morris, April 20, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA; Jessup stated that he was writing to Morris as a missionary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.

85 Ibid.

86 Brown to Morris, May 23, 1867; October 9, 1867; and October 30, 1867 in Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, Volume II, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84, USNA. For a copy of the Firman see Notes from the Sublime Porte, Volume IV, November 6, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84, USNA.

87 Ali Pasha to Morris, August 17, 1862, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 5999/40, Notes from the Sublime Porte, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84, USNA.
and American diplomatic officers occasionally meddled in internal Ottoman matters. Once a missionary became concerned over a particular problem the American Legation was certain to be contacted. One of many such incidents occurred at Sidon. William W. Eddy, who was assigned to that station, lamented to Lorenzo Johnson that a community of 500 Protestants had been denied a seat on the local meclis. The former Protestant member of the meclis had been a troublesome individual disliked by both the Governor and members of the meclis. After the irritating Protestant was expelled by an order from Beirut, no other Protestant was appointed in his place. The American missionaries appealed to the Consul General to request a strong order for the appointment and recognition of a Protestant member. Eddy reminded the diplomat that Jerimiah A. Johnson had "made request several times of the Government for reinstatement of the old member & promises were made to him which were never carried out." It is obvious from the missionary's statement that the American Consul General had been meddling in internal Turkish affairs.

The missionaries believed that their greatest enemy was Ali Pasha. It is evident from the writings of Cyrus Hamlin that he understood the delicate position of the liberal Minister who was determined to aid in the reform of the Empire, but this understanding could not prevent the American missionary from doing

88 W. W. Eddy to Lorenzo Johnson, May 20, 1870, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.
"God's work." The missionaries were yet another form of the disease which was slowly sucking the life-blood from the Sick Man of Europe. The missionaries were an internal threat to the peace of the Empire. As liberals, Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha were not in a political position to make concessions to Protestant Christianity. Their position was under constant attack from political opportunists and Conservatives. Concessions to Christians or foreign missionaries were interpreted by political enemies as disloyalty to Islam and as a sign of weakness. If Ali Pasha or Fuad Pasha had complied with the wishes of the missionaries their tenure in office would have been short indeed.

During the period 1861-71 the Turkish government exerted considerable effort and expense to comply with the Treaty of 1830. In nearly all cases they attempted to fulfill their treaty obligations. By 1871, not one American case remained unsettled. This is not true for the British, the 1860 Dixon case being but one example. One could ask why the Turkish government attempted to comply to the wishes of the American officers and missionaries.

Evidence indicates that the only substantial American interest in Turkey between 1861-71 was that of the Protestant

---

missionaries.\textsuperscript{90} Most of the records deal in some way with missionary problems. It is also evident that the only contribution made by the missionaries to Turkey was their vast network of elementary and secondary schools and colleges for both boys and girls. A further study would reveal the extent of American missionary influence upon the evolution of the Turkish educational system.

Records show that the American missionaries could cause considerable damage to the reputation of their opponents. The missionaries especially hated the British Ambassador, Sir Henry Bulwer.\textsuperscript{91} Washburn was equally certain that his letters and newspaper articles in England and America were instrumental in obtaining the recall of Bulwer. The missionary newspaper correspondent pointed out that the founder of Robert College had influenced the policy of the British Ambassador: "Mr. Hamlin drove Sir Henry Bulwer into a proper position by telling the plain truth about him in unmeasured

\textsuperscript{90}See a petition sent to Hamilton Fish signed by C. R. Robert, Wm. A. Booth, W. B. Dodge, Sr., John A. Stewart, E. D. G. Prime, and Jeremiah Augustus Johnson, June 30, 1871, Applications and Recommendations, Grant Administration, Box 56, RG 59, USNA; this petition urged the reappointment of Edward Joy Morris as Minister to the Sublime Porte. A section of the petition reads: "The great American interest in Turkey are those of various religious bodies of the United States, who are largely represented in European Turkey, Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt by numerous missionary families, colleges and schools, printing establishments and Bible Houses. The commercial interests, although of increasing importance are subordinate, both as regards the amount of capital employed and the number of Americans engaged."

\textsuperscript{91}Any of the letters written by George Washburn in BFO 424/27A, PRO, Confidential Print or see his unpublished manuscript in Robert College Archives.
terms in England." Morris concluded that the missionaries attempted to discredit the Ambassador because he would not ally himself with their program for the destruction of Islam, Judaism, and Orthodox Christianity. Washburn, the most outspoken opponent of the Ambassador, described Bulwer this way: "He was a brilliant conversationalist and a clever man, in his way, and took more pains to make himself popular with the English colony than most English Ambassadors. He was the only English Ambassador who I have ever known who was universally believed to be corrupt. All Constantinople understood that the influence of the Embassy was to be brought through the mediation of his mistress who was known to be a paid spy of Russia, but who may also have sold Russian secrets to Sir Henry. He was finally recalled for taking a bribe from the Viceroy of Egypt under the pretense of selling him an island in the Marmara and then raised to the peerage." Much has been made of the Ambassador's personal life and very little of his diplomatic policy while Ambassador to Turkey. If the British policy was to maintain the integrity of Turkey, then all efforts had to be made to keep -

92 See George Washburn, "Robert College, 1856-1900," unpublished manuscript, Robert College Archives, Bobek, Turkey, Also see George Washburn to Rufus Anderson, November 4, 1862, written at Andover, ABC: 16/9/3, Volume 4, Item 270, Houghton Library, Harvard University for the Washburn statement on the role of Cyrus Hamlin.

93 Morris to Seward, November 1, 1865, Private Letter, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

peace and order and reduce hostility between religious groups. The missionaries, for all their good intentions, were trouble makers. There needs to be a study made of Sir Henry Bulwer's role as an adviser to the Sublime Porte. Because of missionary hostility, Bulwer still has a bad reputation in the East, but an unbiased evaluation of his role is yet to be made.

Morris' attitude toward the missionaries can best be illustrated by the following statement: "It is but just to the latter [the American missionaries] to say that their conduct is uniformly prudent and conciliatory but their profession necessarily exposes them to danger and violence notwithstanding the wisest precaution." Usually, the Minister experienced a good relationship with the American missionaries. Morris considered his primary duty to be the protection of the lives and property of American citizens under the provisions of the Treaty of 1830, and the missionaries were American citizens. However, undue influence of the American missionaries on public figures which was unfavorable to American-Turkish relations is suspected. In 1862, George Washburn believed Morris to be "weak & inefficient." As the years passed, he and Morris became friends, exchanged amenities, and the missionary came to call the Minister a very "able man." In 1869, Cyrus Hamlin wrote to his cousin Hannibal Hamlin requesting the former vice

\[95\text{Morris to Seward, July 25, 1866, Despatch 163, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.}\]
president to use his influence to retain Morris in office. Hamlin noted that a "newcomer knows almost everything the wrong way & is exposed to many misapprehensions & mistakes. In six months he imagines himself au fait to all his duties & in twelve he finds that he has hardly began to understand 'the god of the land.' Mr Morris was no exception to this but he has studied Turkey well and understands the government and people by experience." In June, 1871, several of those persons associated with American missionary efforts in the Turkish Empire petitioned Secretary Fish to return Edward Joy Morris to his post because he had served the "highest and best interests of our country" and had been "most conducive to the legitimate spread of American influence in the East."  

96 For the Washburn statement see a letter written to R. Anderson, November 4, 1862, ABC: 16/9/3, Volume 4, Item 270, Western Turkey Missions, Houghton Library, Harvard University. On the Morris-Washburn friendship see George Washburn, "Robert College, 1856-1900," op. cit., pp. 9, 14. Cyrus Hamlin's letter is in Applications and Recommendations, Grant Administration, Box 56, RG 59, USNA.

97 See footnote 90.
CHAPTER 6

MISSIONARIES, MAD DOGS, AND ENGLISHMEN:
TRAVELERS AND BANDITS IN TURKEY

Under the terms of the 1830 Treaty between the United States and Turkey, the Ottoman Government was responsible for the protection of life and property of American citizens while they were carrying out their legitimate business or traveling in Turkey. Turkish citizens in the United States enjoyed the same protection, but then Turks did not ordinarily travel about the untamed American frontier. In fact there were no restrictions placed upon Americans who wished to travel in any part of the Empire under direct Ottoman control. The provisions of the Treaty sometimes made the work of the American Legation very difficult, because it meant that the Minister was responsible for persuading the Porte to guarantee adequate protection for all Americans traveling and residing in the Empire.

The American Legation’s insistence upon protecting United States citizens had nothing to do with the promotion of Protestantism. Prosperous and unprotected Turkish citizens were no safer traveling in the interior than foreigners. But the Turkish citizen had few
methods of bringing pressure on his government in order to secure justice or protection, whereas the foreign citizen could create an international incident. The upshot was that in the 1860's it became safer for the foreigner to travel than the Turkish subject.

Often, attacks by brigands offered convincing evidence to western travelers that all Turks were bloodthirsty barbarians. Such was the case of Henry Morton Stanley who was at that time a little-known journalist. In the summer of 1866, Stanley accompanied by W. H. Cook of Illinois and Lewis Noe, his youthful assistant from New York, began a trip at Smyrna (Izmir) which would take them from Asia Minor to Central Asia, China, the Pacific, and thence to California. Near Afyankarahisar, about 188 miles from Smyrna on the Erzurum road, the Americans were attacked by a band of brigands who relieved them of their valuables. To add insult to injury, the bandits took their victims to a small village and convinced the local inhabitants that the Americans were actually robbers. As Stanley described the incident in the Levant Herald: "Women pelted us with stones and the children spat at us, the men belaboured us unmercifully with sticks, clubs and firetongs. . . . when night arrived they bound us with cords drawn so tight around our necks it nearly produced strangulation." During the night the young assistant was sexually assaulted by three of the more lustful brigands. On the following day, the Americans were taken to
Afyankarahisar as accused robbers and incarcerated in the local jail.

Stanley and his companions spoke no Turkish and had employed no escort. They had assumed themselves safe enough with their Colt revolvers and Sharps rifles. Needless to say, the villagers did not understand English. Fortunately for the luckless travelers, L. E. Peloso, an agent of the Ottoman Bank and an English-speaking Turk, was able to secure their release and provide them with funds for survival. At this point, Stanley placed his case before the American Minister at Constantinople. Edward Joy Morris lost no time in addressing a demand to the Porte for the "prompt and severe" punishment of all who had caused the Americans to suffer needlessly, immediate restitution of the money and goods taken from Stanley and his companions, and a public trial of the brigands. For the ruffians who assaulted the boy, the Minister asked the government to invoke the full penalty under Ottoman law—death for sodomy. The Porte instructed the kaymakam (local Ottoman official) of Afyankarahisar to conduct a thorough investigation and to give the Americans all necessary assistance and protection for proceeding to "whatever

---

Once the local authorities captured the brigands, they were tried, found guilty, and sent to prison. The following year, the Porte paid an indemnity to Stanley and his companions. Perhaps with Stanley's fate in mind, Morris wrote to Seward:

Traveling in the interior of Turkey, at all times insecure, has of late, owing to the numerous bands of brigands, and withdrawal of large numbers of soldiers to Crete & Albania become extremely dangerous. It is no exaggeration to say that every one travels at the risk of his life, who ventures a few miles outside the precincts of the large towns. . . . The plunder of the Turkish post and particularly when it is carrying large amounts of government funds to or from the capital is of frequent occurrence, a fact which goes to show that the sovereign authority is unable to protect itself against depredation much less to afford security to the person & property of the common traveler.  

Even though the Stanley case was settled to the satisfaction of Edward Joy Morris, the ultimate outcome for the Ottomans was unfortunate. For Stanley was a correspondent for the New York Herald; in the years that followed the attack, he never made one statement that was favorable to Turkey or the Turkish people. He referred to the Sultan's subjects as "untaptised rogues." Even the capital city

\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\text{Morris to Seward, October, 1866, Despatch 172, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure of Mehmed Rushid to Murdir Din Pasha, the Kaman of Kara Hisar, September 30, 1866. There are two despatches numbered 172—one has no date indicated the other is dated October 20, 1866.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{3}}\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{4}}\text{New York Herald, November 27, 1866, p. 3.}\]
was not free from his criticism: "Constantinople occupies the most beautiful and commodious site in the whole world. Notwithstanding this it would be difficult to find a more filthy, disagreeable and unpleasant city to live in. No one who passes in a steamer from the Black Sea to the Marmora can help feeling sad at seeing such advantages thrown away." In explaining to his readers that Pera was the European quarter of the city, the writer observed: "Although to tell the truth, it has very little of European in its appearance, unless narrow, filthy streets, armies of hungry barking dogs, donkeys carrying wood may be called European," Henry Morton Stanley might have possessed these attitudes before the Afyankarahisar incident, but the fact that the attack did occur did not improve his attitude toward the Turkish people or the Empire.

During the forty year period (1819-1862) that the missionaries of the American Board had worked in Turkey, no member had become a victim of violence. However, in the spring and summer of 1862, two American missionaries were murdered while traveling to and from annual meetings. Neither was killed because of his Protestant missionary work, but both were victims of attempted robbery.

The outcome of these two murders demonstrated that American diplomatic officers in Turkey were determined that the lives of

---

5 New York Herald, December 27, 1869, p. 6.
6 New York Herald, December 8, 1869, p. 3.
American travelers would be protected. Probably, the missionaries received the best protection because they were able to apply considerable pressure on the Legation and the home government for justice as they saw it. The missionaries believed that if murderers were apprehended, brought to trial, and executed they would be able to continue their work in the interior. However, until those who committed acts of violence against them were brought to justice they could not venture away from the cities and the protected areas.

The first of the two murders occurred on March 25, 1862 when Rev. Jackson Coffing from Dresden, Ohio, was killed in the district of Payas outside Alexandretta (Iskenderun) in the Pashalik of Adana. The district of Payas was governed by one Mustuk Pasha who possessed great personal and family influence. The missionaries claimed that no outsider could govern the district. Payas was a part of the Bereket mountain range which had been called Giacur Dagh in earlier times, and had long been known as a retreat for pirates and robbers.\(^7\) The American missionary was accompanied by his servant, two muleteers, a Turkish gentleman who had joined the party, and a government guard (zabita). The assailants struck from ambush wounding the Turkish gentleman, one of the muleteers, the servant, and Coffing. Either the zabita ran away with the sound of the first shot or his horse

\(^7\)See the Missionary Herald, September, 1862, Volume LVIII, No. 9, p. 268 and Missionary Herald, August, 1862, Volume LVIII, No. 8, p. 249. Speaking in nineteenth century terms, Payas was one hour from Alexandretta, where the criminals were thought to be hiding was five hours from the sea.
bolted, but he returned with assistance for the wounded travelers. From Alexandretta the zabita brought the British Vice Consul (Arthur Baby), the American Vice Consul (Marc Levi), and a Turkish government physician. The wounded were carried back to the city where Rev. Coffing died of a chest wound he had received during the attack. Eventually, the two other victims of the ambush recovered.

At the time of the murder H. H. S., Foxhound under Captain Augustus Hobart was cruising the area and it entered into the harbor of Alexandretta on March 31. When Captain Hobart heard of the murder, he offered his assistance and informed the mudur (mayor) of Alexandretta that he would be most unhappy if the assassins were permitted to escape unpunished. Everyone in Alexandretta concerned with the solution of the crime decided that it would be a good policy

---

8 J. A. Johnson to Morris, April 5, 1862, No. 4, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA; see enclosure Johnson to Cabouli Effendi, April 5, 1862.

9 See the medical report prepared in Alexandretta and sent to the Beirut Consul, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, 1862, RG 84, USNA and Johnson to Morris, April 5, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA; Morris to Seward, April 12, 1862, Despatch 15, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

10 J. A. Johnson to Morris, April 5, 1862, op. cit., and Johnson to Morris, April 30, 1862, see enclosure of Johnson to Captain Hobart, April 30, 1862. Johnson wrote Hobart: "The presence of H. H. S., Foxhound upon the coast at the time of the murder was most fortunate, and your representations to the various authorities threw the weight of British influence into the scale of humanity and justice and exerted an unquestioning influence for good not only in the case of the murdered missionary but also in quieting the public mind and in preserving peace in this disorganised mountain district."
for a man-of-war to appear off the coast of Payas. The Foxhound took
the American and British vice consuls and several missionaries to
Payas to make an official call on the kaymakam, Mustuk Pasha, and
Captain Hobart even secured a personal interview with that worthy.
The missionaries believed that the presence of the British gun boat
made a favorable impression on Mustuk Pasha.\textsuperscript{11}

When the American Consul in Beirut, Jeremiah Augustus Johnson,
learned of Coffing's fate, he immediately went into action. On the
same morning that Johnson heard of the murder he telegraphed Cabouli
Effendi, Extraordinary Commissioner for Syria, requesting that he
send strong orders to the local authorities of Adana and Aleppo for
the immediate arrest and punishment of the criminals. In a letter
dated that same day Johnson made the following request of Cabouli
Effendi:

\begin{quote}
In order to secure energetic and efficient action on the
part of the local authorities at Alexandretta, Adana, and
Aleppo, I have the honor to request that Y. E. will furnish
me with strong orders introducing me to the various governors
and instructing them to use the utmost diligence & vigor
arresting the criminals and bringing them to justice.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{11} Missionary Herald, August, 1862, No. 8, Volume LVIII,
p. 249. Rev. Homer Morgan who wrote the letter commented on the
earnest effort put forth by the American Vice Consul Levi. p. 249.
Also see Homer B. Morgan to Johnson, April 3, 1862, Beirut Post
Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA; Morgan told Johnson
that the visit of Captain Hobart had a good impact. Morris' report
on this aspect of the case in Despatch 17, April 26, 1862, RG 59,
USNA.

\textsuperscript{12} J. A. Johnson to Cabouli Effendi, April 5, 1862, Beirut
Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1858-63, RG 84, USNA.
Cabouli Effendi immediately sent the necessary orders to both Adana and Aleppo.\(^{13}\)

The local Turkish authorities moved at once to discover the identity of the assassins. The Pasha of Adana sent his personal representative, Minan Bey, a prominent member of the meclis (local legislative and judicial council) of Adana, to investigate and report back. Minan Bey was pledged to remain in Alexandretta until the assassins were captured and punished.\(^{14}\) The midur (local official) of Alexandretta even took hostages from a neighboring village which was believed to be harboring the suspects or at least to know details relative to the case.

In an effort to impress the local authorities that the Turkish government sincerely wished to bring the murderers to justice, the Governor of Aleppo visited Payas in person; there he informed the kaymakam that the Turkish government demanded of its officers an earnest effort in bringing this case to a satisfactory conclusion. Only a few weeks later the Governor of Adana, Ahmet

---

\(^{13}\) Cabouli Effendi to Johnson, April 6, 1862, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA. It seems that it took a very long time for the Alexandretta authorities and missionaries to notify J. A. Johnson. Coffing was murdered on March 25, 1862 and Johnson did not receive the news until the morning of April 5. Rev. Homer B. Morgan's letter was dated April 2, 1862 and Vice Consul Levi still had sent no word to Beirut; Morgan told of the death of Rev. Coffing and stated that the incident would be reported by Levi. See H. B. Morgan to Johnson, April 2, 1862, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., also see Johnson to Morris, July 1, 1862, Private Letter, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84, USNA. Johnson described Minan Bey as the "most wealthy and influential Turk in Adana."
Pasha, visited Payas and vowed publicly that he would give his personal attention to capturing the criminals.\textsuperscript{15}

Although the American Vice Consul had exerted considerable effort, the missionaries of Alexandretta believed that Marc Levi did not have the necessary skills to conduct an investigation and to obtain action from the local authorities. They urged Jeremiah Augustus Johnson to come to Alexandretta, and a missionary fluent in the local languages, Rev. Homer B. Morgan even offered to act as Johnson's dragoman.\textsuperscript{16} Since Coffing was not the only American citizen to have suffered at the hands of bandits in the area, Johnson acceded to the Alexandretta missionaries' demands.\textsuperscript{17} He requested Morris to bring pressure to bear upon the Porte in order to obtain a strong Veziral Order so that the local authorities would listen to his suggestions. Johnson believed that he must have proper representation at the Porte for "upon this will depend my usefulness and in all probability the

\textsuperscript{15} Missionary Herald, August, 1862, Volume LVIII, No. 8, p. 249. Johnson to Morris, April 21, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

\textsuperscript{16} Missionary Herald, August, 1862, Volume LVIII, No. 8, p. 249. H. B. Morgan to Johnson, April 2, 1862, and L. H. Calhoun to Morris, April 2, 1862, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

\textsuperscript{17} H. B. Morgan to Johnson, April 2, 1862, Beirut Post Papers, RG 84, USNA; Johnson to Morris, April 5, 1862, No. 4, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA; J. A. Johnson to Seward, April 5, 1862, Despatch 9, Official Consular Correspondence, Beirut, RG 59, USNA.
discovery of the murderers. If Morris were unable to obtain the cooperation of the Porte, the case would never be pursued, let alone solved.

Additional assistance was obtained from Monsieur M. Cutrey, the French Consul General at Beirut, who requested the commander in chief of the French Naval Division in Syria, a Captain Simon, to transport Johnson to Alexandretta on board the frigate Mogador. On April 7, the French vessel took Johnson to Alexandretta and remained in the area for three weeks. When Simon found it necessary to leave Alexandretta, he ordered the French gunboat Colbert to protect the town during the investigation.

On Johnson's arrival in Alexandretta he wrote the Pasha of Adana that the commander of the French fleet and the British naval commander supported in the name of their governments the prompt arrest and punishment of the murderers. In addition, Johnson told the Pasha that he was present to see that justice was done in the

18 J. A. Johnson to Morris, April 5, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

19 J. A. Johnson to M. Cutrey, April 6, 1862, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1858-63, RG 84, USNA.

20 Johnson to Morris, April 21, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA. Johnson in a letter to the American Vice Consul at Damascus, J. de Picciotto, April 22, 1862 stated that "at the neglis on Saturday in the presence of the Calmakan of Beylan & Chalib Bey I asked if the authorities could answer for the safety of the town during the investigation & trial & if there was police force sufficient for the purpose. The reply was vague & unsatisfactory, unofficial of course, as they requested that my enquiry be put in writing, but it was evident from the discussion that they were of my opinion," Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1858-63, RG 84, USNA.
name of the government of the United States. The American Minister at Constantinople was exceedingly pleased with the cooperative efforts of the British and French naval forces.

The kaymakam of Payas informed Johnson that the assassins were well known; in reply to Johnson's demands he organized a meclis to investigate the crime. The body was instructed to produce a mazbata (record of the findings of the local meclis). Investigation revealed that the assailants who had taken the horses and all other valuables had been observed by other travelers. By April 3, 1862, one of the missing horses was sold in Payas and later other stolen property was recovered and identified. The Turkish gentleman, who was injured during the attack, gave an excellent description of both assailants. Surprisingly, several of the suspects' friends had volunteered information to the investigating committee. Those who were thought to be the murderers were traced through the stolen property; they were identified as Koshioglu Ahmet and Halid of Biuki.

---

21 Johnson to the Pasha of Adana, April 10, 1862, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1858-63, RG 84, USNA.
22 Morris to Johnson, April 15, 1862, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA. In this letter Morris informed Johnson that a Veziral Order would be sent.
23 Johnson to J. de Picciotto, April 22, 1862, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1858-63, RG 84, USNA.
24 Johnson to Morris, April 5, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA. Ali Pasha to Ahmet Pasha, Governor General of Aleppo, April 15, 1862, Department of Foreign Affairs, No. 204, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.
and were said to be hiding in the mountain village of Killieu under
the protection of Ali Bekiroglu. Johnson forwarded this information
to the higher Turkish authorities and suggested that the Pasha of
Adana should come to Payas and personally make the arrest. The Pasha
of Payas claimed that he was unable to arrest the robbers by force
because of the lack of cooperation of the mountain tribes. He added
that he was making every effort—from a safe distance—to induce the
villagers to give up the two criminals.

Morris, at Constantinople, did not learn of Rev. Coffing's
murder until nearly three weeks after the event. As soon as he
received the unhappy communication by way of the British Embassy, he
went immediately to the American Bible Society meeting room to inquire
if the missionaries had any information. Unfortunately, they had
received no letters or telegrams concerning Rev. Coffing's death.
Morris then took the British Embassy's letter to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Ali Pasha, who expressed the greatest indignation
and promised that no effort would be spared to find the murderers.
In Morris' presence he gave written orders of the most "stringent"
nature to the Governor of Adana. All of this activity took place
before Johnson's letter reached Constantinople.

25 Johnson to J. de Picciotto, April 22, 1862, op. cit.
26 Missionary Herald, August, 1862, Volume LVIII, No. 8,
p. 249. Johnson to Morris, April 21, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.
27 Morris to Seward, September 18, 1862, Despatch 30,
Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Morris wrote
Seward on April 12, 1862; see Despatch 15, RG 59, USNA,
Ali Pasha instructed his officials that the robbers were to be found out, arrested, and punished—"absolutely." The Foreign Minister ordered the local authorities to send copies of the mazbatas to him. He intimated to the Governor of Adana that as efforts were being made "everywhere to prevent the occurrence of such horrible deeds, the present lamentable affair is the source of a very great pain and regret to the government." Morris duly informed the government in Washington of Coffing's murder and sent Johnson instructions for future action. He told Johnson that the latter had acted with "commendable" energy to secure "cooperation of the proper authorities." 28

On April 14, Johnson learned that the two murderers had been traced to their hiding place and the authorities were planning the arrest. An Armenian who was said to have offered 10,000 piastres for the assassination of Coffing and two other Armenians accused of complicity in the murder were also implicated. When the three Armenians were arrested the rest of the Armenian village objected vigorously. The American Consul worried that these protestations would slow down, if not completely halt, the wheels of justice. The Armenians even went to see Captain Simon, commander of the French frigate, in an effort to secure the release of their compatriots.

28 Ali Pasha to Ahmet Pasha, Governor General of Aleppo, April 15, 1862, Department of Foreign Affairs, No. 204, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA and Ali Pasha to the Governor of Adana, April 15, 1862, Department of Foreign Affairs, No. 146, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA, Morris to J. A. Johnson, April 15, 1862, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.
They complained that the Turkish authorities were "touching Christians or menacing them." There was a possibility that Simon might use this remonstrance to French political advantage, since France was known to be attempting to establish a political foothold in Syria. However, Captain Simon sent a letter to Johnson assuring the Consul of his support and offering all possible aid. Another factor which prevented a rapid solution of the case appeared to be the small size of the Turkish military force stationed on the coast which was inadequate to deal with the brigands who infested the neighboring mountains. Thus, additional Imperial Turkish troops had to be moved into the area prior to the arrest of local criminals. Making his apologies to Morris, Johnson explained that it was even difficult for fifty policemen of Alexandretta to "arrest the ordinary thieves who invade the town."

Once the Foxhound and Kogador left the harbor of Alexandretta, investigators and appointed members of the meclis lost interest in the case. Johnson complained to Cabouli Effendi about the slow progress of the case. In full diplomatic uniform accompanied by the Captain of the Colbert and several French officers, Johnson next paid an official visit to Mustuk Pasha. The American Consul stated

---

29 Johnson to Morris, April 14, 1862, written from the H. B. MSS Foxhound, Constantinople Post Papers, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

30 Captain Simon to J. A. Johnson, April 17, 1862, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA. Simon was Commander in Chief of the Syrian Naval Division.

31 Johnson to Morris, April 21, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.
in the strongest terms that he expected justice to be done. Johnson demanded that all persons who had aided the assassins of Rev. Coffing should be "regarded as accessories to the crime and be severely punished." He threatened that the "government of the United States--though not accustomed to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey--would never cease to demand the punishment of all persons implicated in this atrocious crime." The Captain of the French corvette supported Johnson's demands and invited Mustuk Pasha to visit the Colbert. The following day Mustuk Pasha accompanied by the enemies of Ali Bekiroglo, the protector of the assassins, boarded the Colbert to discuss plans for capturing of the criminals. To make a memorable impression on the gathered chiefs and the kaymakam, the French Captain ordered the marines and sailors to parade with their muskets. Backed by this display of power, Johnson informed Mustuk Pasha that he would return to Alexandretta and wait until the matter was brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

The Consul was unhappy with the work of the special Turkish investigator assigned to the Coffing Case, Minan Bey, who seemed to be on friendly terms with Mustuk Pasha and Ali Bekiroglo. Accordingly, Johnson was pleased when Ahmet Pasha arrived with 200 irregular troops to direct in person the efforts of the local authorities. No doubt Ahmet Pasha was spurred on Ali's instructions to use the "severest

32Johnson to Morris, April 29, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.
measures in order to secure the arrest of the assassins;" the Grand
Vezir told Ahmed that the "Ottoman Government and the United States
Government expect you to do so."33

Johnson did not trust Mustuk Pasha for several reasons:
Mustuk Pasha was a chief of a brigand tribe, his family had a bad
reputation, the people of Payas were all considered to be robbers,
and one of the suspected murderers, Halil, was the nephew of Mustuk
Pasha's wife.34 Because Ahmed Pasha accepted Mustuk Pasha's promise
to arrest Halil and Ahmed, Johnson returned to Beirut and presented
all the facts of the case to the Imperial Commissioner, Cabouli
Effendi, and reported the lack of progress in the case to Morris.
The American Consul informed Seward that the Turkish government was

33 Johnson suspected Minan Bey of not being interested in
the well being of the central government because of an incident that
occurred when the American Consul visited the camp of Ali Bekiroglu.
He reported the incident to the Governor General of Aleppo as
follows: "Capt. Hobart, Ghalib Bey & myself accompanied Mustafa
Pasha & Minan Bey, the Commissioner from Adana to Kecherli about
three hours from Payas where we met Ali Bekiroglu surrounded by a
large number of armed men. Although we had been invited to be
present as witnesses to the conversation, Minan Bey held a secret
interview with the chief for twenty minutes before the public
meeting occurred. The replies of Ali Bekiroglu were not direct or
satisfactory. He would not promise to arrest the assassins alive,
but said it would be possible to shoot them; in short, he gave us
very little encouragement, and we were inclined to suspect Minan
Bey at least of bad faith in having a private meeting with the
chief which may have influenced his conduct in the public assembly."
Johnson to J. de Piccotto (Vice Consul of Aleppo), April 22, 1862,
Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1858-63, RG 84,
USNA. Ghalib Bey was the special commissioner sent by the Governor
of Aleppo.

34 Johnson to Morris, May 3, 1862, Constantinople Post
Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.
not willing to risk civil war in their attempt to arrest the assassins.  

When Morris learned that Mustuk Pasha was the protector of the assassins, he insisted on his removal from office. Morris argued that if the Porte really governed that part of the country, then the American Minister had a right to demand the removal of a provincial governor who gave asylum to the assassins of an American citizen. Morris presented many letters and obtained several personal interviews with Ali Pasha on this same subject.

Johnson convinced Cabouli Effendi that the mountaineers could not be arrested unless a special commissioner of high rank,

---

35 J. A. Johnson to Seward, May 9, 1862, Despatch 11, Official Consular Correspondence, Beirut, RG 59, USNA. Also see Johnson to Seward, May 9, 1862, No. 10/133, Beirut Post Papers, Letter Book, RG 84, USNA; this letter expresses other aspects of the problem.

36 Morris to Seward, January 19, 1866, Despatch 138, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Morris told Seward an interesting story of how these particular Beys got control of the mountain region. It seemed that an ancestor, a shepherd, found an enormous diamond in the "Indje river in the canton of Tulkh" which he presented to the then ruling Sultan. In return, this Sultan gave the shepherd the whole region as a hereditary fief. Morris reported that the diamond was still to be seen at the Imperial Treasury; it was called the Shepherd's Stone. The descendents of the shepherd prince continued to inhabit the country and ruled over it nominally as a fiefdom of the Sultan. Their authority eventually became so great that they refused to pay tribute and became independent of the Imperial government. There land was an asylum for assassins and robbers. Though they called themselves Muslims, annually they raided the caravan which carried the Sultan's gifts to the sacred shrine in Mecca. Many attempts had been made to reduce these tribes. They had even successfully resisted Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt and had inflicted several humiliating defeats on the troops of the Ottoman government.
experience, and energy were placed in Payas. In compliance with Johnson's suggestion, the military commander-in-chief of Arabistan, Halim Pasha, ordered two battalions of regular infantry to proceed to Payas to aid the Pasha of Adana. However, there was no mention of these troops being used to subdue the mountain tribes. Johnson made an effort to get a Turkish man-of-war which was cruising in Syrian waters to make a demonstration near Payas.

Action by Ahmet Pasha's irregulars in the area of Killieu at last resulted in the arrest of the two assassins, Halil and Ahmet. Unfortunately, while Ahmet Pasha's troops rested at a stream for absolution and prayer, Halil managed to escape. On the other hand, Ahmet confessed everything and implicated all suspects in the hope of escaping the punishment of God. Mustafa Bey, the Turkish gentleman who had been wounded in the attack, identified Ahmet from among many men. He accused Ahmet of lying and made him admit that only he and Halil were present during the attack. This was all witnessed and reported by an American consular guard. As the evidence accumulated it became evident that, indeed, Ahmet was

37 Johnson to Cabouli Effendi, May 9, 1862, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1858-63; Johnson to Seward, May 9, 1862, No. 10/133, Beirut Post Papers, Letterbook, RG 84, USNA. Also see Johnson to Morris, May 12, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

38 Johnson to Morris, May 12, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

39 J. A. Johnson to Seward, May 22, 1862, Despatch 12, Official Consular Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA. Also see J. A. Johnson to Ahmet Pasha, May 23, 1862, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Beirut Post Papers, RG 84, USNA.
lying and that the Armenians were innocent.\(^40\)

Arrest of the murderers did not bring praise from Ali Pasha; he dismissed the Governor of Adana for not acting with sufficient promptitude. Johnson wrote letters and Morris spoke to the Foreign Minister in the "warmest manner" praising Ahmet's effectiveness, dedication, energy, and perseverance.\(^41\) Ahmet Pasha claimed that he was removed from office because of his request for regular troops left an impression that he was unable to govern the district.\(^42\) Johnson pointed out that Ahmet Pasha got along with all classes of people which included the large Christian population in the area and that the case had seemed hopeless at the time the troops were requested. Morris lamented to Johnson that Hurshid Pasha, the new governor of Adana, was a "loud mouthed bragart" who professed intimate relations with the mountain chiefs and promised to "finish the case immediately, if not sooner."\(^43\)

\(^{40}\) H. B. Morgan to J. A. Johnson, May 17, 1862, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

\(^{41}\) Morris to Johnson, June 5, 1862, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA; Morris to Johnson, June 9, 1862, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA; and Morris to Seward, June 6, 1862, Despatch 21, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^{42}\) Johnson to Morris, June 16, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

\(^{43}\) Letter written to someone in Constantinople in J. A. Johnson's handwriting, August 4, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA. Johnson was disappointed that Hurshid Pasha had come to finish the case accompanied by his thirteen wives. The American Consul was most unhappy that Ahmet Pasha had been removed from office.
The Porte appointed a special commissioner, Faik Bey, to investigate and report all aspects of the murder and trial. The commissioner was determined that justice would be rendered to the satisfaction of the Americans and the good name of the Porte. To prove his good faith, Faik suggested that if Mustuk Pasha did not arrest Halil then he should be tried as an accomplice. The Turkish commissioner asked Ali Pasha to issue a Firman for the immediate execution of Ahmet and another for the execution of Halil once he was recaptured.

Caboüli Effendi ordered that the trial of Ahmet and the three Armenians take place immediately. Before his removal from office, Ahmet Pasha returned to Adana with the prisoners who were guarded by two battalions of regular troops despatched to the area by Halim Pasha. The trial resulted in the conviction of Ahmet. Since he had made several confessions that decision was not too difficult. But, no decisions were made concerning Halil, Ali Bekiroglu, and Mustuk Pasha. From the evidence it was obvious that both Ahmet and Halil were guilty since the American missionary had been struck by two bullets as his horse ran away—the guns used contained only one ball and would have required reloading. It was also apparent that it

---

\(^{44}\)J. A. Johnson to Morris, June 23, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

\(^{45}\)Johnson to Morris, June 16, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

\(^{46}\)Johnson to Morris, June 9, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.
would be difficult to arrest Halil because of his relationship to Mustuk Pasha. Nonetheless, Johnson maintained that all protectors of the assassin should be punished as accomplices. ⁴⁷

The Armenians were freed by the Adana court probably because Ahmet changed his story so many times. ⁴⁸ Of course, Fuad Pasha was aware of the fact that Rev. Coffing had been attacked the same year by a mob of Armenians at Hadgian and his case was still unsettled at the time of his death. After studying the mazbata, Fuad Pasha reasoned that it was not "improbable that the Armenians would cherish enmity against him, while at the same time it is possible that the act was committed for the purpose of plunder and perhaps for other reasons." ⁴⁹

Interest in a satisfactory conclusion of the murder case was not confined to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Even though the Civil War was raging in the United States and the Confederate Sumpter was cruising the Mediterranean, the Navy Department under Gideon Wells informed Secretary Seward that he would send the U. S. Corvette of war Constellation to Syria during the summer in order to

⁴⁷Johnson to Morris, June 16, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

⁴⁸Johnson to Morris, June 19, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA. Also see Johnson to Seward, June 25, 1862, Unnumbered despatch, Official Consular Correspondence, Beirut, RG 59, USNA.

⁴⁹Veziral Order to Hurshid Pasha, Governor of Adana, July 13, 1862, signed by Fuad Pasha, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.
protect American citizens there. Johnson was anxious that
Commander Henry K. Thatcher of the Constellation come to the port
of Mersin prior to the execution of Ahmet because he feared "wild
and ferocious tribes of Kurds and Turcomans" would try to prevent
the execution. Alas, the Constellation seemed to move slowly.
American consuls wrote to Turin, Gibraltar, Genoa, and Trieste
trying to persuade the commander to proceed to the East without delay
in order to prevent "further acts upon the lives of our citizens."

When the Constellation finally arrived at Beirut on September
8, it had not yet visited either Mersin or Alexandretta, Thatcher
feared exposing the sailors to "unhealthy climate" and "unwillingness
to venture with a large sailing corvette into the badly surveyed gulf
of Iskanderoon." After reading the commander's explanations for his

50 F. W. Seward to J. A. Johnson, June 2, 1862; Julius Bing
to Johnson, June 21, 1862; both letters in Beirut Post Papers,
General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA; Johnson to Julius Bing, July 16,
1862, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1853-63;
Johnson to Seward, August 25, 1862, Beirut Post Papers, Letter Book,
No. 19/142; Johnson to Thatcher, August 28, 1862, Beirut Post Papers,
Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1853-63, RG 84, USNA. The Constellation
was one of the first ships commissioned by George Washington. She
fought against the French in 1799, operated with the U. S. fleet in
the blockade of Tripoli, served in the Chesapeake Bay area during
the War of 1812, in the Second War with the Barbary Pirates she
defeated a large Algerian frigate, and she served in the Mediterranean
during the Civil War. The Constellation was the first American man of
war to enter the inland waters of China. During World War II, the
Constellation served as the flagship of the American Atlantic fleet.
Today she rests in Baltimore Harbor where she is being restored to
her former glory.

51 Johnson to Thatcher, July 24, 1862, Beirut Post Papers,
Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1853-63, RG 84, USNA.

52 Bing to Johnson, August 18, 1862, Beirut Post Papers,
General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.
inactivity, Johnson addressed Thatcher an official note stating why
the ship was needed on the coast at that time. A very reluctant
Captain Thatcher agreed to change his plans and invited Johnson to
accompany him on board the Constellation to Alexandretta.\textsuperscript{53}

On September 13, 1862, the Constellation proceeded to the
Gulf of Alexandretta for the purpose of displaying the American flag
near the scene of the murder. Upon the corvette's arrival at Payas,
the commander ordered the crew to fire the ship's heavy guns. Johnson
reported that this action did not "fail to attract the attention and
excite the fears of the villagers who dwelt upon the coast."\textsuperscript{54} With
a United States military escort of one marine, three sailors, and a
consular guard, Johnson set out for Adana to demonstrate American
military might. After sixteen hours on horseback they reached Adana
only to be informed that the execution order had not arrived. His
escort had to return to the ship because their commander was anxious
to sail before the beginning of the stormy season. On the return
trip, the Americans were attacked by a band of brigands who were
waiting in ambush. After a heavy exchange of gun fire, the bandits
were driven off without any casualties to the Americans. Later,
Johnson evaluated his military excursion inland: "The visit of the
Constellation to Syria at this time has been most gratifying to
American residents in the neglected province of the Ottoman Empire

\textsuperscript{53}Johnson to Morris, September 11, 1862, Constantinople
Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

\textsuperscript{54}Johnson to Morris, October 2, 1862, Constantinople Post
Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.
and has doubtless impressed its authorities and population with a sense of the watchfulness of the U. S. Government over the interests of its citizens abroad and of its power to protect them even while engaged in crushing a most stupendous rebellion at home. After this experience the Consul never ceased to urge that a steam-powered gun boat be added to the Mediterranean Squadron.

Finally, the date of the execution was set for September 25, 1862. On the appointed day, the Firman from the Porte was read publicly, trumpets were sounded, and the prisoner brought forward in chains. A solemn procession consisting of the European consular officers, Hurshid Pasha, a guard of 100 regular troops, and the prisoner moved to the designated place of execution. On reaching that place the prisoner's chains were removed, water was given him for drink and prayer, he was blindfolded with a white handkerchief,

55 Johnson to Morris, October 2, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

56 Johnson to Morris, October 5, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA. Johnson stated: "The Constellation having no steam power the captain deemed it unwise to enter any Syrian post except Beirut. A small steamer or gunboat would be most useful on this station, and I beg respectfully to suggest the propriety of adding such a vessel to the Mediterranean Squadron whenever the exigencies of the public service will permit." Johnson to Seward, July 9, 1864, Despatch 16, Official Consular Correspondence, Beirut, RG 59, USNA; in this letter Johnson suggested that a steamer should spend one month every year upon the Syrian coast. He wanted a steamer to visit all the towns where Americans resided. Johnson to Morris, October 3, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA; Johnson again tried to persuade both the Ticonderoga and the Canandaigua to go with him to Alexandria for a demonstration which might lead to the arrest of Halil. The Consul was quite disgusted because the ship's officers expressed a desire to see Jerusalem rather than defend the lives of American citizens.
and made to kneel on the ground. Regrettably, the executioner's blade proved dull, it took him seven minutes to separate the prisoner's head from his body. During the executioner's labors, the American Vice Consul reported that numerous spectators trembled. At last, the deed was done—a Muslim had been executed for murdering a foreign Christian missionary.  

Morris reported to Seward that the proceedings were conducted with "unusual solemnity in order to make a lasting impression on the public mind." But the impression made on the public was not one anticipated by the Porte or the American Minister. Abdo Debbas, a normally rational Vice Consul at Adana, reported some amazing events following the execution. During the first night after Ahmet's interment, Hurshid Pasha happened to look out of the balcony of the Governor General's palace to see a "wonderful light" descending from heaven. The heavenly light came to rest on Ahmet's grave. On the following morning Hurshid Pasha ordered the tomb opened. The body was gone! Another ascension had occurred in the Middle East! The people believed that the Angel of God had come that very night to take Ahmet to heaven. A mad search began for the clothes and other belongings of the chosen one; these were then taken to the Mufti to be distributed among worthy Muslims throughout the country. Soon, a tomb was built over Ahmet's grave and a fence placed around it

57Johnson to Morris, October 5, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

58Morris to Seward, October 15, 1862, Despatch 32, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
for protection. Men were required to remove their shoes as the
area was declared a sacred spot and called Şehid Ahmet—in Turkish
şehid means martyr. Pilgrims came from all parts of Asia Minor and
Syria to the tomb of Ahmet the Martyr. Many were sufferers of
diseases who would take a little of the earth, mix it with water and
drink it—hoping for a cure.59

Another result of the execution was that Ahmet's father
shaved his head publicly and swore that he would not let his hair
grow again until he had killed ten Protestants. When Armenian
Protestants were found murdered in their beds, it was assumed that
the Muslims were taking their revenge.60 The local authorities were
not anxious to move against the suspects, and the missionaries did
not mention the cases in their reports. Nor, did the American
Consular corps protest. Nothing could be done to protect the
Armenian Protestant subjects of the Ottoman government who were
innocent of the entire affair.

The next problem facing the authorities was how to recapture
Halil. Hurshid Pasha was not anxious to go into the mountains after
the accused assassin for fear of open revolt.61 He threatened Mustuk
Pasha with removal from office if he did not surrender Halil. Needless

59 Abdo Debbas to Johnson, May 12, 1863, Beirut Post Papers,
General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

60 Abdo Debbas to Johnson, April 20, 1863 and May 12, 1863;
both letters are in the Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence,
RG 84, USNA.

61 Johnson to Morris, July 1, 1862, Constantinople Post
Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.
to say, Mustuk Pasha was not going to come out of the mountains, travel to Adana, and surrender his nephew to the Turkish authorities. So, Hurshid found it necessary to go into the mountains with troops and two cannon.62

Before the execution of Ahmet, Faik Bey had sent the masbata from the high court of Adana, with his own report to the Grand Vezir, which fully covered the activities of Mustuk Pasha. Faik Bey requested the removal from office of the brigand chief. The Governor General and the meclis suggested the same policy.63 Also, Hurshid Pasha had paid bribery money to the enemies of Mustuk Pasha in order to undermine his power. The Governor General asserted again and again that it would be impossible to arrest Halil without first deposing Mustuk Pasha.64 The American Minister had long favored such a policy. Morris sent John Porter Brown to deliver a lengthy denunciation of Mustuk Pasha to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Upon hearing the reasons why the brigand chief should be removed,

62 Johnson to Morris, July 1, 1862, Private Letter, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

63 Johnson to Morris, July 7, 1862, also see enclosure in the same letter of Faik Bey's report on the conduct of Mustuk Pasha; Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, See the Veziral Order to Hurshid Pasha from Fuad Pasha, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

64 Johnson to Morris, August 4, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.
All murmured, "Il sera déstitué."

Johnson was not satisfied with the local Turkish policy of waiting to see what Mustuk Pasha would do. He persuaded Faik Bey to accompany him to Payas and on August 10 they pitched their tents near the headquarters of the mountain brigand. They endeavoured to impress upon the Pasha's mind the "imperative necessity" for arresting Halil. Mustuk Pasha was reminded that if he did not produce Halil that his sons would be rooted out and destroyed. After several days of persuasion, Johnson and Faik Bey left Payas hoping that Mustuk Pasha would deliver the escaped assassin. Johnson commented: "It is probable however that he is now convinced of the necessity of efficient action for though he does not fear the Turkish government he dreads a demonstration from the navy of the United States." In a private letter to Morris, Johnson made the following evaluation

65Quoted by Morris in Despatch 30, September 18, 1862 to Seward, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. The American Consul at Beirut had often pointed out that caravans had been robbed by Mustuk's men so many times that commerce had been all but destroyed in that region. The residents of Alexandretta were at his mercy. Johnson described the residents reaction to the activities of Mustuk Pasha: "While I was at Alexandretta the anserlias orfellahs sent a disputations to wait upon me with a list of the names of their murdered friends who had been assassinated within a few years, and the Armenian families residing in the Pasha's dat. complained that their lives and property are always at the mercy of the Pasha, and robberies & assassinations among them are very frequent;" for this quotation see Johnson to Morris, July 25, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA. For a somewhat differentview of Mustuk Pasha see Oriental Harems and Scenery by Princess Cristina Trivulzio Belgiojos (New York: Carleton, 1862), pp. 124-34.

66Johnson to Morris, August 16, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.
of the mountain expedition:

If he [Mustuk Pasha] does give up Khaleel, I believe it will be owing to my representations of the determination of my government to pursue the prosecution of this case until full satisfaction should be given me. . . . I told him of our fleet on the Barbary coast after the war of 1812 and that if the Porte did not give satisfaction the government of the United States could easily take it with our ships of war on the coast and that sooner or later he would fall a victim to his own perverse opposition to my demands for justice. This seemed to have great impression upon his mind and he asked me to obtain for him from the Gov, of Adana an official permission to use armed men and to relieve him of all responsibility for those killed on both sides. 67

In January, 1863, Johnson attempted a new approach—money. The consular corps put up a 3,000 piasters reward (about $120) for the arrest of Halil; the reward notice was accompanied with an excellent description of the wanted criminal. 68 Johnson's action inspired the missionaries to put up an additional 5,000 piasters (or about $200). 69 Hearing of these handsome gestures, Edward Joy Morris offered an additional 3,750 piasters of his own money for the delivery of Halil to the Governor of Adana. 70 Ali Riza Pasha, the newly appointed Governor General and soon to be appointed Vali of Adana, also offered "a good sum of money" to anyone who would

67 Johnson to Morris, August 16, 1862, Private Letter, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

68 Johnson to Abdo Debbas, April 23, 1863, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1853-63, RG 84, USNA.

69 Johnson to Morris, April 29, 1863, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

70 Morris to Seward, April 30, 1863, Despatch 57, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
bring Halil in alive. Nonetheless, all offers of reward did not produce the criminal.

No further progress was made in this case until the fall of 1863, when the Governor General of Adana, Ali Riza Pasha, led a military expedition to Payas and captured Mustuk Pasha and his entire family. Mustuk Pasha and his family were arrested while dining with the Governor General of Adana. The kaymakam of Payas had been informed that Ali Riza Pasha had come with several hundred troops to root out mountain bandits such as Ali Bekiroglu. The prisoners were sent to Adana "tied in a disgraceful manner on miserable donkeys." Mustuk Pasha was charged with failure to fill the conscription order. Johnson informed Seward that the rooting out of the family of Mustuk Pasha was "attributed by the people to American influence." Morris sent a similar statement to the Secretary of State: "The arrest is attributed to my exertions which I allude to only as showing that American influence is recognised in such a remote part of the Empire, & in a way which honors the American name in the estimation of all.

---

71 Abd Debbas to Johnson, March 29, 1864, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

72 Johnson to Morris, October 3, 1863, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA; also see Marc Levi (American Vice Consul at Alexandretta) to Johnson, November 4, 1863, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

73 Johnson to Morris, November 18, 1863, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

74 Johnson to Seward, December 3, 1863, Despatch 24, Official Consular Correspondence, Beirut, RG 59, USNA.
Despite the arrest of Mustuk, American interest in the fate of Halil never slackened. Abdo Debbas, the American Consul at Adana, learned that Halil had never left his home village but hid in a cave when the authorities searched the area. He had let his beard grow and was selling wood for a living. During the spring pacification of 1866, the commander in chief of Arabistan informed Johnson that he had arrested Ali Bekiroglu. On December 8, 1867, Halil was arrested near the scene of the murder by the new kaymakam of Payas, and Johnson announced that he would go to Aleppo for the termination of the affair. Morris requested the Secretary of State for instructions but suggested that a term in prison should suffice. In the spring of 1868, Halil was sentenced to the galleys for a limited number of years.

The second murder of an American missionary occurred on July 3, 1862, at Hermali on the Philippopolis and Adrianople (Edirne)

75. Morris to Seward, December 4, 1863, Despatch 68, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

76. Debbas to Johnson, May 23, 1864, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

77. Johnson to Morris, April 13, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

78. Johnson to Morris, December 9, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

79. Morris to Johnson, December 25, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Folio 23, Letters Sent, RG 84.

80. Johnson to Morris, February 14, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.
route. The victim was Rev. William W. Meriam from Cambridge, Massachusetts assigned to Western Turkey missions at Philippopolis. A caravan of five wagons and fifteen men, two of whom were government guards, were attacked by bandits. Rev. Meriam drew his Colt pistol which, probably, accounts for the reason why he was one of the five who fell victim as a result of the attack.81

On July 7, 1862, Rev. James F. Clark telegraphed the Constantinople missionaries inquiring if the American Minister Resident or the British Ambassador could do anything toward the "detection and apprehension of the assassins."82 This telegram was delivered to C. W. Goddard, American Consul General for Constantinople, by Rev. Isaac Bliss. Goddard immediately sent the information to Sir Henry Bulwer, the British Ambassador, and solicited his cooperation.83 Once this was done, Goddard set out for Buyukdere to

---

81 Missionary Herald, September, 1862, Volume LVIII, No. 9, pp. 266-68. Also see the Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners For Foreign Missions, 1862 (Boston: T. R. Marvin & Sons, 1862), pp. 71-72. Mrs. Meriam who survived the attack cried out at one of the brigands—"He loved the Osmanlies, and wished to do them good." The bandit replied "Why then did you flee." The caravan had tried to outrun the bandits. The missionary wife was left alone with her dead husband and infant. Her message to Philippopolis did not get through so no one came for her. She moved with her carriage the body and child to the city. Mrs. Meriam who was described as being in excellent health was overcome with fever and exhaustion. She died on July 25, 1862.

82 C. W. Goddard to Henry L. Bulwer, July 7, 1862, Constantinople Consul General Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume I, C 8.4, RG 84, USNA.

83 Ibid, and C. W. Goddard to Seward, July 10, 1862, Despatch 15, Official Consular Correspondence, Constantinople, RG 59, USNA.
inform Edward Joy Morris of the murder. Morris received the information on that same night. Early the next morning Morris, accompanied by John Porter Brown, called on Ali Pasha at his summer home on the Bosphorus. In the presence of the American Minister and the Secretary, Ali Pasha prepared telegrams to the Governor at Adrianople and Philippopolis instructing them to use all civil and military power at their command for the arrest of the criminals. The Foreign Minister dispatched 200 soldiers to the province in search for the assassins and appointed Nusret Bey as a special commissioner to superintend all proceedings. Actually, Nusret Bey had more power than Fakir Bey as he could use all military force needed, make arrests, and enforce court decisions without referring to Constantinople for instructions. Kibriski Pasha, a former Grand Vezir and now Governor of Adrianople, offered a large reward (a total of $800) for delivery of the murderers and sent a local military force in search of the bandits.

Minister Morris and Consul General Goddard agreed to appoint John C. Blunt, British Consul at Adrianople, as temporary American

---

84 C. W. Goddard to James F. Clark, August 5, 1862, Consul General Post Papers, Volume I, Miscellaneous Correspondence, C 8.4, RG 84, USNA.

85 Morris to Seward, September 18, 1862, Despatch 30, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

86 C. W. Goddard to James Clark, August 5, 1862, op. cit.

87 Morris to Seward, September 18, 1862, Despatch 30, op. cit.

88 Ibid., and Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1862, op. cit., p. 73.
Consular Agent to ferret out and punish the murderers. This action was approved by Sir Henry Sulwer. The British Ambassador urged the Porte to use "instant and effective action" and instructed Blunt "to give every attention to the affair." The American Consul General pointed out that no American citizens lived in that region of European Turkey except the missionaries, all of whom approved of Blunt's appointment.

Harmonious cooperation between British, American, and Turkish officials quickly brought Meriam's murderers to justice. On September 4, 1862, Consul General Goddard informed the Secretary of State that the "chief villain of the gang of robbers who murdered Rev. Mr. Meriam has been apprehended at Rodosto, . . . with two of his associates." The three assassins were tried, found guilty and hanged in public. Each convicted assassin was put to death in a different quarter of the town. Prior to each execution, the name of the victim of the crime and the fact that he was an American citizen was publicly read aloud at the foot of the scaffold. Morris claimed this was done to bring to the attention of the people the sacredness of the life of

89 C. W. Goddard to Seward, July 24, 1862, Despatch 19, Official Consular Correspondence, Constantinople, RG 59, USNA.

90 C. W. Goddard to Seward, September 4, 1862, Despatch 26, Official Consular Correspondence, Constantinople, RG 59, USNA. Also see the Missionary Herald, Volume LVIII, November, 1862, No. 11, p. 352 which reported a September 4 letter from Rev. Olive Crane of Adrianople that "as the case had progressed in the court at Adrianople, the United States Ambassador at Constantinople, informed of the facts by telegraph, has acted with promptness and energy, to secure the ends of justice." Also see Levant Herald, September 17, 1862.
an American citizen. He believed that the "effect has been most salutary."\(^{91}\) Morris boasted that "The execution of the assassins of Mr. Meriam and of the one of Mr. Coffing, four in all, will prove that Americans cannot be murdered with impunity in this country, during my residence in it as American Minister."\(^{92}\)

The missionaries had wanted Morris to send a special American commissioner to Adrianople to investigate Meriam's murder.\(^{93}\) Morris delayed twenty-four hours in this appointment, as there was no State Department authority for such a commissioner. Ali Pasha had asked Morris not to appoint a special American representative and stated that he held himself responsible for the punishment of the assassins of Rev. Meriam. Morris did not really think that an agent was necessary in the Meriam case because Philippopolis was less than 150 miles from the capital. He knew the authorities in the province had access to a telegraph which meant that messages could be delivered to the Legation in a very short time. Morris believed that the immediate action of the Turkish government was satisfactory

\(^{91}\) Morris to Seward, January 15, 1863, Despatch 46 and Morris to Seward, January 8, 1863, Despatch 45; both letters in Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. C. W. Goddard to Johnson, October 27, 1862, Beirut Post Papers, RG 84, USNA.

\(^{92}\) Morris to Seward, October 13, 1862, Despatch 31, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Also see Journal de Constantinople, October 15, 1862.

and that John Blunt in cooperation with Rev. Olave Crane at Adrianople could produce the necessary results. He also averred that an American might interfere with the effectiveness of John Blunt who had already been assigned to the case.\(^94\)

The twenty-four hour delay in the appointment of an American commissioner caused Morris a great deal of difficulty. After two calls at Morris' home by the Constantinople missionaries, the American Minister gave them the impression that there was no need for the appointment of a special agent. Morris told the missionaries that he believed that the case could best be handled by Blunt and the Turkish government. As a result of these meetings the missionaries were convinced that the cause was "not likely to be prosecuted very vigorously by our Legation."\(^95\)

Cyrus Hamlin, a former missionary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, had attempted to establish a non-sectarian Protestant college on property overlooking Rumeli Hisar and near a sacred Muslim graveyard. The Ottoman government was not pleased with his choice of location and hesitated to give him a building permit. Hamlin was impatient and unhappy because of the Porte's failure to acquiesce in his desires. In an attempt to cast the blame on someone other than himself for failure to persuade the Turkish government to give the necessary building permit, he

\(^{94}\)Morris to Seward, December 11, 1862, Despatch 39 and December 18, 1862, Despatch 42, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^{95}\)See the Tillman Trowbridge letter of December 8, op. cit.
found a scapegoat in the American Minister, Edward Joy Morris. The aspiring college president heard of his missionary colleagues disappointment with Morris' decision not to send an American commissioner to assist in the Meriam murder investigation. Convinced that Morris did not understand the Turkish government he was horrified when Morris told the missionaries: "The Porte has acted with such good faith in the case of Mr. Coffing, distant as was the scene of that tragedy & great as were the difficulties of arresting the principal murderer, that I am willing to trust it in this new one."96

Hamlin could not believe that it was the Porte's own good faith which had prompted it into action, but rather pressure exerted by foreign diplomats, press, and gunboats. He stated:

Now it is just this that makes the Porte prompt & faithful & the local authorities act. The influence is felt both at the Capital & on the spot. It was this double influence wh. we wanted to secure. When the Porte knows that the representatives of 4 or 5 powers are watching it, that its action in such cases will be subject to official despatches & newspaper comments in all the languages of Europe, it wakes up to wonderful efficiency. Mr. Morris' logic was, that because the Coffing case went so well without this array of outward pressure, the Meriam case will go just as well without it!!97

The friendship between Ali Pasha and the American Minister


97 Ibid.
particularly upset Hamlin: "Mr. Morris' constant and unqualified admiration of Aali Pasha is well known. It is equally well known that His Highness is the chief enemy of Protestantism and Protestant missionaries in the Empire. The Jesuits themselves could not wish him more hostile than he is." Robert College's founder lamented that if it were logical for the representative of a Protestant nation to be friendly with Ali, then "it must be a logic which belongs to politics & not to dignity." 98

In one of his letters to the missionaries Morris expressed regret that they were unwilling to give the Porte any credit for the arrest of Rev. Coffing's murderer. The Minister warned: "In my opinion this is extremely ungrateful & if it were known to Aali Pasha wld. not dispose him to any extraordinary efforts in the case of Mr. Meriam, ... All action would have failed but for the prompt, ingenious & zealous action of the Porte." 99

An incident which heightened the tension between Hamlin and the American Minister grew out of an accidental meeting between the two on a Buyukdere street. Hamlin offered Morris some unsolicited advice, a heated discussion developed and ended only when Morris called Hamlin "illiberal and unchristian." Hamlin insisted that the Minister was opposed to missionaries. Morris proclaimed to all that he was not anti-missionary but simply anti-Hamlin. Relations between


99 Ibid., quoted by Hamlin.
Hamlin and the diplomatic corps were not improved when Goddard, the Consul General at Constantinople, helpfully referred to the founder of Robert College as an "impudent puppy." 100

In a vile temper, Hamlin wrote to Christopher Robert, a New York philanthropist who provided the money for the Protestant non-sectarian college in Constantinople, complaining of Morris' handling of the Meriam and Coffing cases. Robert promptly forwarded the Hamlin letter to the American Board of Commissioners for the Foreign Missions. 101

In early August, before Ahmet's execution and the capture of the assassins of Rev. Meriam, Rufus Anderson, Secretary of the American Board, prepared a letter of protest using quotations from the Hamlin letter. 102 The letter, based on Hamlin's correspondence,

---

100 George Washburn to Rufus Anderson, October 3, 1862, ABC: 16/9/3, Volume 4, Item 269, Western Turkey Missions, Houghton Library, Harvard University, for the impudent puppy statement. Hamlin told Robert about his street meeting with Morris and commented that the American Minister had "made no apology." See ABC: 16/9/3, Volume 2, Item 508, Cyrus Hamlin to C. R. Robert, December 15, 1862. See Morris' version of the street scene in Morris to Seward, December 18, 1862, Despatch 42, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

101 The telegram of Meriam's murder was received in the capital on July 7; Hamlin wrote his letter to Robert on July 16. See Cyrus Hamlin to E. J. Morris, December 16, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, Correspondence between Secretary and Minister, Volume 2, RG 84, USNA. Also see Morris to Seward, December 11, 1862, Despatch 39, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

102 Rufus Anderson to Seward, August 12, 1862; also see letters of August 28, and August 29, 1862, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Department of State, RG 59, USNA. Also see F. S. Winston to Seward, October 24, 1862, Miscellaneous Letters, Department of State, RG 59, USNA.
denounced the Minister's inefficiency and criticized his policy. Anderson's protest and similar letters from irate missionaries were sent to the Department of State. The missionaries demanded that either Morris follow instructions to protect the lives of American citizens or be removed. Seward forwarded the protests to Morris and asked the Minister to give the State Department a full explanation. Fortunately for the Minister, the Coffing and Meriam cases were concluded before he had to answer the accusations. Neither case would have been brought to a satisfactory conclusion if the Porte had not exerted considerable effort. Once again, Ali Pasha had demonstrated his intention of maintaining the good will of the American government.

Morris collected testimonials from American missionaries who were pleased with his activities, as well as telegrams and letters from consular officers responding to Legation instructions. These documents were sent to the Department of State. This collection of correspondence revealed that all possible avenues had been pursued by the American Minister before Hamlin wrote his letter. Hamlin had observed: "I do not think any American life will have any guarantee

---

103 Seward to Morris, August 25, 1862, Despatch 33, Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; Despatch 34, September 1, 1862, Despatch 36, September 19, 1862; additional charges were made by Hamlin and sent to Morris in Despatch 39, November 6, 1862; RG 59, USNA.

104 Morris to Seward, December 24, 1862, Despatch 43 and January 1, 1863, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Also see a copy of a letter sent to S. B. Treat, March 23, 1863, signed by H. B. Morgan, E. Schneider, G. H. White, A. B. Goodale, and Zevas Goss which was forwarded to the State Department from Beirut.
for its safety in Turkey while Mr. Morris is here" and "that it is
doubtless known over all the official world in the interior that he
is our enemy & in this ignorant country it will be quite enough to
make every American a lawful prey." In answer to these statements,
Morris produced a letter written by Jermiah A. Johnson. Johnson
claimed:

The prompt execution of the assassin of the murdered missionary
is a subject of congratulations throughout Syria. Foreign
residents, irrespective of nationality, are rejoicing over the
fact on account of the additional security which foreign life
& property will now receive in this portion of the Ottoman
Empire. The thanks of all foreigners in this country are due
due to the Legation for its persistent & successful efforts in
obtaining from the Porte an evidence that the death penalty is
a reality & that lives of travellers may not be taken with
impunity by the lawless bandits which infest the country.106

In addition to evidence that was forwarded to the Secretary
of State, Morris wrote an explanation of his proceedings to Rufus
Anderson. Selah B. Treat, Corresponding Secretary of the American
Board, informed the Minister that documents sent to the Missionary
House in Boston by the Legation provided the Committee with "a much
more accurate acquaintance with the measures which you have taken to
secure the due administration of justice than they had previously
obtained."107 The Corresponding Secretary informed Morris that he

105 Quoted by Morris in Despatch 39, December 11, 1862,
Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

106 Sent by Morris in Despatch 39, op. cit.

107 S. B. Treat to Morris, February 3, 1863, Constantinople
Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA.
See S. B. Treat to Seward, January 28, 1863 and July 2, 1863,
Miscellaneous Letters, Department of State, RG 59, USNA.
had written to Seward concerning the "efficient and valuable services which you have rendered in a matter which intimately concerns our missionaries in the Ottoman Empire." Some months later, Hamlin wrote to Morris that his letters were motivated by a "misunderstanding of the facts." Secretary Seward informed Morris that the President approved of his actions and that the charges made against him by Hamlin were unjust and without foundation in fact. Presents of appreciation were sent by the American government to Ottoman officials who had shown remarkable initiative in the satisfactory conclusion of both cases.

Morris believed that Hamlin wished to control the policies of the American Legation. The Minister told Seward: "My offence with Dr. Hamlin really is that I will do my own thinking & that I think myself bound to pay more deference to the instructions & wise counsels with which you honor me, than to his dictatorial demands." Morris informed the Department that Hamlin had not been to the Legation once on the Meriam case and was totally ignorant of the Legation's

---


109 Hamlin to Morris, December 16, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, Volume 2, RG 84, USNA.

110 Seward to Morris, January 6, 1863, Despatch 46, Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

111 Morris to Seward, December 11, 1862, Private Letter; also see Morris to Seward, September 18, 1862, Private Letter; both letters are in Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
action in the matter. Morris, who was not a modest man, assured Seward: "I know my duty, & know how to perform it & I have the satisfaction to know & feel that my influence is great with the Turkish government, & that I am most kindly regarded by them. I am enabled to talk with a great variety of people speaking as I do, French, German, Italian, Spanish, & tolerably well Greek, with a passable proficiency in oral & written Turkish."

As the years passed the ill-feeling between Cyrus Hamlin and Edward Joy Morris must have lessened. In 1869, Hamlin wrote Hannibal Hamlin asking him to use influence to retain Morris as American Minister to Turkey: "All the American residents would be glad to have him remain. It is not a mere racial feeling for their relations with him are chiefly official. But they believe him thoroughly American, faithful, careful, independent. What can we hope for from a change." That same year, friends of Edward Joy Morris wrote the State Department and Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, that Cyrus Hamlin should be appointed Dragoman for the American Legation. This action could not have been taken without Morris' approval or suggestion. On July 5, 1869, Edward Joy Morris

---

112 Morris to Seward, December 24, 1862, Despatch 43, ibid.
113 Morris to Seward, September 18, 1862, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
114 Cyrus Hamlin to Hannibal Hamlin, June 23, 1869, Applications and Recommendations, Grant Administration, Box 56, RG 59, USNA.
115 Julius Bing to Charles Sumner, March 26, 1869, Sumner Papers, Am 1.4, Box 145, Item 19, Houghton Library, Harvard University.
laid the corner stone for Robert College--the symbol of Cyrus Hamlin's life work.

The two men were very much alike temperamentally--dedicated to their duty, proud of their achievements, arrogant to those whom they believed to be their inferiors, ambitious for personal recognition, loyal to their colleagues, determined to win every time on every issue, and not too flexible. They were remarkably free with advice and opinion, but neither was very receptive to suggestions. Edward Joy Morris and Cyrus Hamlin were two very difficult Americans who gradually learned to live in the same city in peace.

The murders of Coffing and Meriam revealed to the wondering eyes of the missionary lobby in America what Morris had long known: namely, that certain areas nominally under the Grand Turk's sway had actually escaped his control. Events recounted here show that pressure exerted by foreign warships--whether they be French, British, or the hallowed Constellation herself--was not a decisive factor. For in both cases, the gunboats arrived at the wrong time to affect issue. American naval officers, finding themselves unable to protect their country's shipping from commerce raiders flying the Stars and Bars, were unwilling to assist lowly consuls with purely diplomatic problems. In these circumstances, the only reason for the satisfactory conclusion of the Coffing and Meriam cases was the Sublime Porte's decision to bring the areas concerned under direct control. Such action may go a long way to explain why the "Sick Man of Europe" retained his health until the catastrophe of 1914-1918.
During the 1860's American diplomatic officers expended considerable energy urging Ottoman officials to provide better protection for Americans traveling in Turkey. This was no small matter, for the only nation which sent more visitors to the Ottoman Empire than the United States was Russia. Americans who confined their travels to settled areas were not molested, but those who ventured into regions virtually independent of Ottoman control were in no small danger. Generally, it can be said that Ottoman government officials attempted to provide protection for travelers, and in all cases, the Sultan's Ministers fulfilled their obligations to the United States government under the terms of the Treaty of 1830.
CHAPTER 7

INNOCENCE ABROAD

Political and religious refugees had emigrated to the Ottoman Empire for centuries. Relatively wealthy and talented Sephardic Jews came by way of Holland to depopulated Constantinople in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Exiled Spanish Jews were attracted to the advanced and sophisticated sixteenth century civilization of the Osmanlis. Again in the nineteenth century, European liberals fled to the Ottoman Empire in order to avoid political persecution. Poles and Hungarians found an outlet for their superior technical knowledge in the Ottoman military and governmental services. At the same time the European regions of the Empire attracted groups of dissatisfied Germans and Russians who were searching for what one British diplomat called a "quiet refuge." ¹

In most cases Europeans who settled in Turkey's Balkan provinces did not retain their former citizenship; instead they

¹British Consul Barker to F. W. Flocken, April 1, 1863, written at Tultcha and forwarded to E. Joy Morris by F. W. Flocken, April 2, 1863, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Galatz, Record Group 84, United States National Archives, Washington, D. C. Hereafter the Record Group and the National Archives will be cited as RG and USNA.

247
became Ottoman citizens or else accepted the protection of a foreign power. German colonists, in particular, wishing to leave behind what they considered an overly complex and complicated society, therefore, had little desire to retain their former citizenship. Within the Ottoman Empire organized and legally recognized religious communities provided newcomers with an opportunity for self-government. The millet system allowed the colonists as well as other Ottoman subjects to live under their own religious law and to maintain their native customs. The Ottoman Government encouraged immigration by providing favorable conditions for the establishment of colonies. One such inducement was exemption from taxation for a specified number of years.

Mid-nineteenth century colonists in the Balkan area envisioned this land as a frontier area which welcomed Christian settlers. Here where German and Russian settlers established themselves, American missionaries opened elementary schools for the colonists' children. As the United States grew in power and importance, its consuls began to offer protection to some disenchanted immigrants. French Catholics were suspected of conspiring to rid the area of American missionaries and, thus, end American influence.²

An entirely different type of colonist moved into the Syria-Palestine region. Christians and Jews came from all parts of the western world anticipating a religious experience by living, working, and dying in the Holy Land. Some of these people became Ottoman

²Ibid.
citizens but most maintained their native citizenship. This latter group caused foreign consuls much difficulty in their relationships with the Ottoman government. By mid-nineteenth century even the United States government was becoming more and more involved with religious migrants to the Holy Land.

The Porte preferred that all settlers become Ottoman citizens if they intended to remain permanently in the Empire. For proteges of foreign governments caused too many complications, and, various Christian groups were used as political pawns by European powers wishing to expand their influence within the Empire. Remembering the events leading to the Crimean War, the Turkish government was suspicious of any group wishing to establish a colony in Palestine. On the other hand, Ottoman politicians were sensitive about the image which they projected in the western press. They wished to do nothing that lent credence to the general western notion that the Ottoman leaders were an intolerant, cruel, corrupt, illiterate group of barbarians and, therefore, should be driven back over the Bosphorus through Anatolia, and into the Asiatic plateau from whence they came. When western Christians moved into the Empire and became subjects by their own free will, the Ottomans considered this good propaganda.\(^3\)

---

\(^3\)There are many examples of Ottoman interest in foreign newspapers' editorial policy toward Turkey in the Turkish Foreign Office Archives, Istanbul, Turkey. See Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivi, Hariciye, Carton 50, Documents 4258, 4030, 3220, and 3707. The Turkish Minister to the United States forwarded translations of American newspaper articles to the Porte.
The United States became involved with both types of colonists moving into the Ottoman Empire, land settlers in the Balkans and religious settlers in Palestine. This involvement did not always promote favorable relations between the Legation and the Porte. Because the American missionaries served as teachers for the German and Russian settlers the situation occasionally became a serious diplomatic issue. When the colonists had difficulties with local authorities the American missionaries were usually also implicated. American missionaries became scape-goats for the various misunderstandings that occurred between the colonists and the local officials. In 1863, one of many of these incidents was reported to the American Minister at Constantinople, Ali Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote E. Joy Morris that the American missionaries at Tultcha (in the Danube Delta region) had encouraged Ottoman subjects to leave the Empire and change their nationality. They were also accused of offering the colonists American protection.¹

The American Minister asked Frederick W. Flocken, an American Methodist missionary stationed at Tultcha, for an explanation. With all the righteous indignation of a mid-western preacher, Flocken assured Morris that he had always kept "before my eyes as far as I knew the laws of our country and the church of my choice and would not knowingly commit any act by which reproach or shame could

¹Ali Pasha to E. J. Morris, January 17, 1863, No. 6734/1, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, Volume 4, Miscellaneous Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.
be brought upon either of the two." He stated his case in the strongest terms:

I assure your excellency that a more bare faced falsehood could not have been invented against me, for just the reverse of the case is true, I think I shall be able to prove upon the receipt of a copy of the complaints, not only by the German colonists who had left the country and returned again, but also by the Germans who remained, and by Russians who intended to leave, . . . all must testify that I used all my influence to prevent the people from going.5

Flocken presented evidence that the missionaries had never encouraged migration of German and Russian colonists into Moldavia. Documents signed by returning colonists and a letter from the British consul of Tulcha stated that the missionary had attempted to persuade the colonists not to leave, as he had claimed.6 After the colonists returned to their homes they declared that the interpreter for the French consul had instigated the exodus and that the movement originated with French officials. The British consul even maintained that it was the "usual old Roman Catholic trick of intrigue against Protestantism." He pointed to the excellent work accomplished by the

---

5Frederick W. Flocken to Morris, March 20, 1863, written from Tulcha, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Galatz, RG 84, USNA.

6See enclosures in F. W. Flocken to Morris, April 2, 1863, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Galatz, RG 84, USNA. Tulcha (Tulcea) is located in the modern Roumanian Danube Delta. It was in the Ottoman province of Tuna until 1878 when it was transferred to Bulgaria. Its Turkish spelling is Tulca, Galatz (Galati) is located in Roumania at the beginning of the Danube Delta. The Turks call it Kalas.
American missionary school in an area where the poor people had no other educational opportunities.  

The American Flocken informed Norris that he had protested to the American Consul at Galatz against providing some of the colonists with American protection because he considered such extensions of protection as being against the desires of the local authorities, and not in the best American interests. This was the attitude of Morris and Secretary Seward on proteges so the missionaries and the Legation were in complete agreement on this issue.

Several things are obvious from this incident. In the nineteenth century the British Embassy promoted and protected Protestantism in the Ottoman Empire. However, when an American Protestant missionary got himself into difficulties with the authorities, the Turkish government protested to the American Legation. It is evident that the American Consul at Galatz was interfering in local political affairs by providing protection for some of the colonists and the blame for his action was placed on the missionaries. Unorthodox behavior by the American Consul gave the French an excuse to intervene at a time when French relations with the United States were none too friendly.

---

7 See the British Consul Barker to Flocken, April 1, 1863, enclosure in Flocken to Norris, April 2, 1863, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Galatz, RG 84, USNA.

8 Frederick W. Flocken to Morris, March 20, 1863, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Galatz, RG 84, USNA.

9 See Chapter IV.
The return of the Jewish people to Palestine is an important belief of Christian doctrine. According to early theologians this return would precede the Second Coming of Jesus and, thus, made the Jewish people the key to the salvation of Christian souls. This belief probably prevented the destruction of the Jews under the Byzantine Empire and probably has had some influence on the European and American acceptance of the twentieth century state of Israel. Some mid-nineteenth century Christians believed it was their duty to hasten the Second Coming by preparing Palestine for the return of the Jews—European and American colonies were established in Palestine for this purpose.

A Christian revival was sweeping the United States after the Civil War and the cold, rock-covered shores of Maine were not immune. To Maine came, in 1862, one George Washington Joshua Adams who proclaimed himself a minister of the Gospel and founded the Church of the Messiah. Without checking his "credentials," the local community fell under his spell-binding description and reenactments of the scriptures. There is nothing more enlivening to a small dull community on a cold winter evening than a new preacher who is also a

10 See Mark Allen to the editor of the Boston Traveller, located in the Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, the letter is dated June 14, 1866, RG 84, USNA. In the same series of documents in the June, 1867 section there is an article clipped from the Springfield Republican describing all of Adams' activities before arriving in Maine. Another interesting document is a letter written by M. S. Smith, December 25, 1866, marked No. 17, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume II, this was testimony given to Victor Beauboucher, American Consul at Jerusalem on the character of Adams.
good performer. This enchanter was interested in Palestine and some members of his congregation testified he "used all his powers of persuasion to teach us to believe that its restoration to fertility, wealth, and glory had begun." The flock was convinced that the time was approaching for the return of the Jewish people to the Holy Land—this event could be hastened if the land was made ready for their coming. At a spring meeting, as recorded in the May 20, 1864, edition of The Sword of Truth and Harbinger of Peace (edited by Adams), the congregation voted to send two of its members to Palestine, Adams and A. H. McKenzie. Those selected were instructed to examine "the conditions of the country, its government and people" and report back to the congregation. All traveling expenses were covered by the congregation of the Church of the Messiah. The two investigators

---

11 New York Times, March 20, 1867, p. 2; this paper reported that Adams also taught elocution and got up theatrical performances in a large hall where Shakespeare's plays were performed. These plays drew large audiences.

12 Appeal to the Secretary of State, William H. Seward, made by members of the Jaffa Colony; a copy was sent to Morris by Herman Loewenthal, American Vice Consul at Jaffa, the document is dated July 12, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, Jerusalem, RG 84, USNA. I did not find a copy of this letter in the Miscellaneous Letters of the Department of State, RG 59, USNA nor in the William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

13 S. L. Wass to Victor Beauboucher, January 16, 1867, written from Jaffa, marked No. 12, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume II, RG 84, USNA.

14 Appeal to the Secretary of State made by members of the Jaffa Colony, copy sent to Morris by Loewenthal, January 12, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 84, USNA.
spent the summer months of 1865 exploring the Jaffa area. Adams and McKenzie found a "beautiful land" lacking in both disease and aged people. The air was good and the land without epidemics—except for a few cases "among the filthy Arabs." Adams observed that food was inexpensive, land could be rented reasonably, and he believed that the Turkish government possessed land in abundance which could be granted or purchased cheaply. Herman Loewenthal, a German banker and merchant residing in Jaffa, was employed by Adams as an agent to purchase land and supplies for the future use of the colony. Adams concluded that Jaffa could become an important commercial center. The Americans might build a hotel and boarding house which would accommodate the many tourists visiting Palestine each year. He noted that the future colony could build a carriage road from Jaffa to Jerusalem and eventually a railroad. Adams saw himself as an important individual. He informed the American Consul at Jerusalem, Victor Beauboucher, that he was the pastor of eighteen churches; he claimed once settled in Palestine he would acquire three million acres of land and a line of steamers

15 Victor Beauboucher to Morris, June 28, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 84, USNA.

16 Victor Beauboucher to William H. Seward, April 13, 1867, Official Consular Correspondence, Jerusalem, Despatch 21, RG 59, USNA.

17 F. L. Adams to William H. Seward, January 17, 1867, Miscellaneous Letters of the Department of State, RG 59, USNA. Also a copy was sent to Morris, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 84, USNA.

18 Victor Beauboucher to William H. Seward, April 13, 1867, Despatch 21, Official Consular Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 59.
When Adams returned to Jonesport, Maine, in the fall of 1865, he gave a glorious report of living conditions in Palestine. He convinced the congregation that Palestine's fertile plains would produce three crops a year with a yield of "sixty fold of wheat." The people were so enthusiastic that one member who suffered from the horrors of sea sickness declared that rather than miss the opportunity of emigrating to Jaffa he would 'get upon a plank and puke himself across the water.'

Land Agent Loewenthal did not urge Adams and the colony to migrate hastily. In several letters he warned the people of the many diseases such as cholera, the unfavorable climate of Jaffa, the difficulty of farming the region, the problems of land ownership within the Empire, and the variability of attitude of governmental officials. Loewenthal cautioned Adams against making extravagant claims concerning the riches of Palestine. Also, New York, Boston, and Maine local newspapers were skeptical of this undertaking. They warned that Adams was a known addict of both demon rum and loose women; they characterized him as an ex-METHODIST preacher and an actor who had been expelled from a Mormon community for his moral behavior.

---

19 Ibid.

20 Charles Hale to William H. Seward, October 24, 1867, Official Correspondence, Alexandria, Despatch 106, RG 59, USNA.

21 Ibid.

22 Johnson to Morris, April 29, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.
Adams denied the charges, claiming that the press had mistaken him for another Adams. 23 The congregation of the Church of the Messiah accepted his proclamations of innocence.

Early in February, 1866, Adams traveled to Washington, D. C., where Senator Lot M. Morrill of Maine introduced him to the Secretary of State. Seward promised the Palestinian bound colonists his friendship and assistance. The Secretary had visited the Holy Land and advised the colonists to settle north of Jaffa as it was preferable to the south. 24 With the promise of official assistance from both Senator Morrill and Secretary Seward the future colonists prepared a petition to the Sultan of Turkey requesting a grant of land and permission for the citizens of Maine to settle in Palestine. Both Morrill and Adams wrote Morris asking him to use his influence with the Porte in favor of the settlement. 25 On April 18, 1866, John Porter Brown reported to Morris that the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ali Pasha, was highly gratified by the request but that it was not in

23 New York Times, March 20, 1867, p. 2; the Boston correspondent states: "The 'Elder' turns out to be the identical person who figured in this city about twenty years ago as a Mormon elder, and soon after as a preacher and actor. He preached on Sunday, and never failed to give notice at the conclusion of his discourse that he might be seen and heard during the week at the theatre in such and such plays." It was claimed that Adams practised the foulest of vices and preached the purest of doctrines in various parts of New England as a Campbellite, Baptist, and Methodist minister.

24 Mrs. George Washington Josua Adams to Seward, January 17, 1867, Miscellaneous Letters of the Department of State, RG 59, USNA. Mrs. Adams always signed her name L. F. L. Adams.

25 Morris to Seward, November 31, 1866, Despatch 181, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
the power of the "Ottoman Government to accede to their request for a part of land in Palestine. The Sultan himself does not possess any land there (as public domaine) and the laws of the Empire render it impracticable for any foreigners to possess real estate in it." 26 Ali Pasha requested that the Americans be so informed. Morris attempted to overcome the Foreign Minister's objections but with no success. 27 The American Minister notified both Morrill and Adams of the decision of the Sublime Porte prior to departure of the colonists from the United States. 28 Unfortunately, the members of the congregation were never informed of the Ottoman government's decision. 29

The deluded congregation made preparations for an early departure to the Promised Land. They sold their property hastily, often receiving less than half of its true value. Adams, newly elected president of the Jaffa colony, requested that those planning

26 John Porter Brown to Morris, April 18, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, Volume II, RG 84, USNA.

27 Morris to Seward, November 31, 1866, Despatch 181, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Victor Beauboucher to Seward, Despatch 16, enclosure of Morris, July 13, 1866. Morris informed the Consul that he had attempted to overcome the "objections but in vain."

28 Ibid. Morris told Beauboucher in this letter of the Porte's refusal to grant a firman for the Jaffa Colony and that he had communicated the message "immediately after its receipt to Senator Morrill of Maine."

29 Morris to Seward, May 21, 1867, Despatch 207, Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure of investigation held by Johnson. Ackley Norton testified that "Mr. Adams did not inform the colony that the Firman had been refused."
to emigrate must place all their money in his hands in order for the leader of the colony to purchase land and the necessary provisions for the settlement. This they did a little too willingly. On August 14, 1866, 156 Americans set sail from Jonesport, Maine, for the Holy Land on board the Nellie Chapin. 30

Many reasons were given by the colonists for going to Jaffa. All agreed that they wanted to assist in the fulfillment of the prophesies by restoring the land for the return of the Jewish people to Palestine. Some believed that life would be easier in the East than in the United States. Others hoped to profit personally from the development of the Holy Land. 31

Examination of the occupation and age of the emigrants reveal some interesting items. Those listed as heads of families were between 30 and 50 years of age with the majority being in their 30's. 32 The occupational make-up of the colony reveals problems that the colonists would encounter. Fourteen heads of families were connected in some way with the sea: three sailing masters, one sea captain, five seamen, two boat builders, and three ship carpenters. Other occupations listed were a stone mason, a caulker, two carpenters,

---

30 Herman Loewenthal to J. A. Johnson, September 25, 1866, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

31 Morris to Seward, May 21, 1867, Despatch 207, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. See enclosure of J. A. Johnson's report on the Jaffa Colony.

32 Ibid. For the age of family heads--five were in their twenties, fifteen in their thirties, eight in the forties, four in fifties, three in sixties, and eight adult heads of families, mainly women, did not give their age.
a shoe maker, physician, music teacher, one merchant, a milliner, and six farmers. There was a shortage of professional farmers in Jaffa and the emigrants were unprepared for the task they were undertaking. The soil and climate of Palestine were much different from those of New England and would require an entirely different farming technique.  

The problems of the colonists began at sea—Adams had control of the provisions and it soon became evident that he had not purchased enough food.  

Under these circumstances many members of the colony developed a different attitude toward their leader. Some complained about the "want of pastoral tenderness towards his people, . . . the constant daily and nightly brawls between Mr. and Mrs. Adams to the annoyance of all on board, his drunken and equitous pretensions fiercely proclaiming. . . there was no other Church but his, that he was the only God sent man to redeem the human race, selected by God from the councils of Eternity to lead his elect people to the promised land." The New York Times reported that in route "he attempted to 'do' Richard III, [sic] before his astonished audience."  

---

33 Ibid.  
34 See W. F. Clark to Victor Beauboucher, December 25, 1866 and M. G. Smith to Beauboucher, December 25, 1866, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume II, RG 84, USNA.  
35 See Jane A. Flagg's Jaffa testimony to Victor Beauboucher, American Consul at Jerusalem, dated January 16, 1867, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume II, RG 84, USNA.  
36 March 20, 1867, p. 2.
When the Nellie Chapin arrived at Jaffa on September 22, 1866, Herman Loewenthal, newly appointed American Vice Consul, delivered a letter addressed to G. J. Adams from Morris; the letter stated that the Sublime Porte had declined to grant him and his followers the firman for which he had petitioned. Morris maintained that the promoters of the scheme should not have encouraged families to embark from America until the results of their application to the Porte were known.  

In addition to the absence of a firman there was a lack of land, since Lowenthal had not purchased any property for the newcomers. Thus, it was necessary for the new colonists to camp on the Jaffa beach for their first three weeks in the Holy Land. The sun was hot, they were not used to the climate, and the water made them ill. Soon they began to die. Vice Consul Loewenthal had arranged for them to stay nearby in the Greek convent but President Adams refused the hospitality of the Orthodox and ordered his followers to remain on the beach. Apparently the colonists would not move into the

---

37 Herman Loewenthal to J. A. Johnson, September 25, 1866, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, RG 84, USNA. Victor Beauboucher to E. J. Morris, September 28, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, Jerusalem, RG 84, USNA. Victor Beauboucher to Seward, October 2, 1866, Despatch 13, Official Consular Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 59, USNA. Also see a letter written by Morris to Victor Beauboucher, July 13, 1866; the Minister wrote: "I regret to say that the Porte declines to grant the required firman for the proposed American settlement near Jaffa. The Sultan has no public domain at his disposition there, and the Porte fears complications," Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, March 8, 1857-December 21, 1869, RG 84, USNA.

38 W. J. Clark to Victor Beauboucher, December 25, 1866, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume II, RG 84, USNA.
convent because they considered it unhealthy to live in a stone house. 39

During the early weeks of the experiment American newspapers carried favorable comments about the new colony. The New York Herald's Palestine correspondent informed stateside readers of the colonists' progress:

The American bark Nellie Chapin has arrived here with 156 American emigrants, members of an association which has been formed to colonize Palestine. Preparations had been made for them, and plots of land outside Jaffa, one about half a mile north and the other a couple of miles east of the town, have already been secured and occupied by them. Both of these locations are in close neighborhood of our famous orange gardens, which perfume the "Valley of Sharon" almost away to Ramleh. The local authorities have afforded every facility to the newcomers, their baggage and a large cargo of building wood which they brought with them having been allowed to pass the Custom House duty free. They are likely to do well, and if so the experiment will be one of unusual interest and importance. 40

39 Morris to Seward, June 3, 1867, Despatch 210, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure of Johnson to Morris, May 13, 1867. Also see Johnson to Seward, May 2, 1867, Despatch 309, enclosure of the Jaffa Report. Herman Loewenthal to Victor Beauboucher, December 17, 1866, Beirut Post Papers, RG 84, USNA. Loewenthal stated: "Already before the vessel arrived I procured the promise of the Prior of the Greek convent to allow all the American families to lodge in the healthy & nice rooms of his convent. . . . But to my great & sincere regret Mr. Adams would not accept this kind offer, nor did he inform his company of it, but he persuaded them to remain together outside the city on the beach where many of his poor people embibed the germ to malady & death. The consequence of which of the overworking of the men under the hot sun & in the water 14 persons died in the course of 40-50 days after their arrival."

Nearly a month after they landed, the Governor of Jerusalem informed the Sublime Porte that forty American families had arrived at Jaffa for the purpose of establishing a colony. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Pasha, who had considered the issue settled, reminded the American Minister that "the Imperial Government has always hastened to give every facility to the foreigners who come into the Empire either to travel or to exercise any branch of industry or trade; but the object of the emigration of so large a number of families, at one time, is evidently to colonize a part of the Empire, and to become owners of the soil." He argued that if the Americans were permitted to gain ownership of the soil in one of the "most important Provinces of the Empire" that great injury would befall the native Arab population. In Ali's view, establishment of an American colony in the Empire would provide a precedent for the "creation of similar settlements by subjects of other countries."

The Foreign Minister observed that the Ottoman government was unwilling to grant land in fee simple title to foreigners. Morris promised Ali that he would communicate these views to Secretary of State Seward.  

The Turkish authorities looked upon the American colony with distrust, for they were more sensitive to foreign interference in Palestine than any other part of the Empire. Victor Beauboucher, the American Consul at Jerusalem, attempted to protect the colonists

\footnote{Ali Pasha to Morris, November 28, 1866, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 1864/3, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, RG 84, USNA.}
from the provincial authorities who objected to their presence. He wrote the Governor of Jerusalem that the families wished to be considered merely as "strangers residing in the dominions of the Ottoman Empire." Beauboucher stated that the Americans would be protected by his government "as warmly as all travelers visiting Palestine and that they did not need a Firman because this was required only of persons becoming property owners in the Ottoman Empire."[^42]

The Governor of Jerusalem refused to recognize the Americans as visiting foreigners. He pointed out that the Americans were a colony but, without permission to settle, they could not, therefore, be allowed to cultivate the soil. Beauboucher replied that several of the Americans merely intended to apply themselves to agriculture upon rented lands. If the results, after a year or two, were favorable "only then would they form a colony."[^43]

After Adams and some of his followers made inquiries concerning the requirements for becoming Turkish citizens the Governor of Jerusalem became more agreeable. The Ottoman government considered this good propaganda for European newspaper consumption. Groups of people migrating from the American Republic and wishing to become

[^42]: Victor Beauboucher to Morris, September 28, 1866, No. 6 and October 13, 1866, No. 7, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 84, USNA.

[^43]: Izzet Pasha to Victor Beauboucher, November 19, 1866, enclosure in Despatch 10, Beauboucher to Morris, January 31, 1867, and Victor Beauboucher to Izzet Pasha, November 26, 1866, enclosure in Despatch 10, Constantinople Post Papers, Jerusalem, RG 84, USNA.
citizens of the Ottoman Empire certainly did not make the Turkish government sound either oppressive or barbarian. J. A. Johnson, Consul General of Beirut, pointed out that it was in the interest of the Turkish government to treat these colonists well and to afford them all facilities compatible with existing laws and regulations. News coverage in Europe of the Ottoman Empire was most unfavorable because of the continuing Cretan insurrection, the recurrent Balkan revolts, and the usual Christian prejudices. The imperialistic designs of England, France and Russia did not favor the creation of a positive image of the Turk. If the Turk were not an oppressive barbarian there would be no reason for European interference in internal Turkish affairs on the pretext of protecting Christians.

It is evident from Consular and Ministerial Despatches that all was not untroubled in the daily life of the Jaffa Colony. They knew nothing of Arabic customs and law, nothing about American consular jurisdiction, and possessed little knowledge of American law. Herman Loewenthal's knowledge of the English language was imperfect and the colonists spoke no Arabic. The colonists resented

\[4^4]\text{Morris to Seward, June 3, 1867, Despatch 210, see enclosure of J. A. Johnson to Morris, May 13, 1867, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.}

\[4^5]\text{Morris to Seward, December 12, 1866, Despatch 183, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. As early as this despatch Morris suggested the sale of the effects of the colony for the purpose of creating a fund to defray the expenses of its members returning to America. He asked the Department if it would be able to give such instructions to Loewenthal. The conditions of the colonists were also made known in the New York Times, January 31, 1867, p. 5.}\]
a foreigner having any jurisdiction over them. They believed that Loewenthal had swindled them in a land deal. Adams had instructed Loewenthal to purchase a certain property for L440 and agreed that the agent would receive L40 commission. When the colonists discovered that the owner had priced his land at L170 on the bill of sale, they were convinced that Loewenthal had swindled them. The American Vice Consul tried to explain that the custom was to register a nominal price for land rather than the real sale price because of taxation. The American colonists made an appeal for justice to the American Consul at Jerusalem, Victor Beauboucher. The Americans demanded that Beauboucher investigate the incident, get their money back, and remove Loewenthal as Vice Consul. There is evidence in the official and consular correspondence to suggest that Adams wanted to be appointed Vice Consul at Jaffa which explains some of the hostility that existed between him and the incumbent.

Beauboucher spent the first week of December, 1866, in Jaffa investigating the land transaction. After careful examination of

---

46 See enclosure in Despatch 207, op. cit. Also see petition sent to Beauboucher and forwarded to the Department of State by the colonists, December 7, 1866, Miscellaneous Letters of Department of State, RG 59, USNA.

47 L. F. L. Adams to William H. Seward, January 17, 1867, Miscellaneous Letters, Department of State, RG 59, USNA. Also see enclosure in Despatch 207, Morris to Seward, May 21, 1867, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

48 For example see Beauboucher to J. A. Johnson, October 18, 1867, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

49 See enclosure in Morris' Despatch 207, op. cit.
the evidence the Consul became convinced that Loewenthal had acted honorably. He required Loewenthal to return the purchase price of L400 but permitted him to keep the L40 commission; this decision pleased neither the colonists nor Loewenthal. Although the colonists complained that Loewenthal had been charging excessive amounts on Bills of Exchange and excessive commissions on purchased supplies, Beauboucher found no evidence for this. In many cases, the Vice Consul had shown acts of generosity to the Americans. Later investigations made by Jermiah Augustus Johnson, Consul General from Beirut and Charles Hale, Consul General from Alexandria confirmed Beauboucher's findings.  

During Johnson's investigation, he discovered that deeds issued to Adams' followers were defective. Land had been purchased in the name of an Arab woman, transferred to Adams, who then transferred lots to the wives of his flock. Johnson insisted that the former owner must sign the back of the deed and give a bond worth six times the value of the land in case the Turkish title should be reclaimed. Despite its irregularities this method of property ownership was tacitly recognized by the Turkish government.  

During a later investigation of the Jaffa Colony made by Lorenzo

---

50 Morris to Seward, May 21, 1867, Despatch 207, see enclosure. Charles Hale to Morris, June 4, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA. Also see G. J. Adams to Seward, December 24, 1865, Miscellaneous Letters of the Department of State, RG 59, USNA. Adams sent Seward a copy of Beauboucher's decision.

51 J. A. Johnson to Morris, May 13, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.
Johnson, Beirut Consular Clerk, it was discovered that in several cases two or more colonists had deeds to the same land, Adams had transferred several titles to an individual outside the colony; he apparently planned to sign these properties over to his wife.\(^{52}\)

Money used to purchase land for the colony came from the common fund. Once purchased, Adams administered the land as though it were his own property, selling lots to members of the colony and retaining the best lots for himself. Adams managed all of the colonists' affairs in this fashion. The only individual who profited financially from the Jaffa Colony was Adams himself.

Another legal problem which perplexed members of the Consular Corps was settling the financial affairs of those colonists who wanted to return to the United States. By December, 1866, several colonists had filed formal charges against Adams; they claimed that he owed them various sums of money for their lots and for their original investment in the colony. Beauboucher ordered Adams to appear in Consular Court to answer these charges. On the eve of the hearing, Adams went off to Jerusalem to discover the requirements for becoming a Turkish citizen and to "give the Consul a good Scare."\(^{53}\) Next morning, Beauboucher invited Adams to the Russian Pilgrim House

---

\(^{52}\) Lorenzo Johnson to Seward, April 20, 1868, Despatch 9, Official Consular Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 59, USNA. A copy is also found in the Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 84, USNA.

\(^{53}\) See the enclosure in Morris' Despatch 207, op. cit.
in Jerusalem where he was locked up for twenty-four hours to meditate upon the complaints of his followers and because he stood in contempt of court.\textsuperscript{54}

Some of the colonists maintained their faith in Adams and believed that Consul Beauboucher had become their enemy. Petitions and letters went in all directions: to Secretary Seward, Minister Morris, Consul General Hale, Consul General Johnson, Senator Morrill, and, of course, the American newspapers.\textsuperscript{55} Senator Morrill requested that the President of the United States communicate to the Senate "if this can be done compatibly with the public interest" a copy of all official correspondence on the subject.\textsuperscript{56} Seward answered complaints that American citizens were being persecuted by American consular officers by engaging the services of Rev. W. H. Bidwell, a New York publisher and editor of the Eclectic Magazine, to act as a special investigator for the Department of State.\textsuperscript{57}

When Bidwell arrived in Jaffa he went directly to the house of G. J. Adams. The State Department's investigator never talked with any

\textsuperscript{54}Morris to Seward, May 21, 1867, Despatch 207, see enclosure, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{55}See M. S. Smith to Victor Beauboucher, December 25, 1866, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume II, RG 84, USNA; G. J. Adams to J. A. Johnson, January 16, 1867, and Isaiah B. Ames to J. A. Johnson, January 16, 1867, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA; J. A. Johnson to Morris, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

\textsuperscript{56}Senator Lot Morrill to Seward, January 7, 1867, Miscellaneous Letters of the Department of State, RG 59, USNA.

\textsuperscript{57}Seward to W. H. Bidwell, January 26, 1867, Special Mission File, Department of State, RG 59, USNA.
of the complaining colonists who were unhappy with Adams' handling
of the colony and their personal financial affairs. Neither did he
see the local bankers who were awaiting payment, or the consular
officers who were accused of impropriety by Adams and his remaining
faithful followers. Gently guided by Adams, Bidwell wrote a glowing
report of the colony's progress. Loewenthal, who planned to resign
his unpaid position as Vice Consul as soon as the State Department
acknowledged his innocence, commented on the Bidwell mission with
characteristic Teutonic hyperbole: "Mrs Adams is too clever and too
sharp for him, she is able to get anything out of the childish old
man. . . . Mr & Mrs Adams were beggars when they left America, and
now they build houses and live in abundance and the poor people have
not dry bread." Captain Strong of the Canandaigua of the Mediter-
ranean Squadron suggested to Loewenthal that he should request
another investigation. Victor Beauboucher pleaded with Morris to
send Jeremiah Augustus Johnson to make a full investigation. Heeding
his plea Morris instructed Johnson to report the conditions of the
colony, recommend what should be done, and investigate the charges

---

58 Charles Hale to Morris, June 4, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Alexandria, RG 84, USNA.
59 Victor Beauboucher to Morris, April 11, 1867, No. 12, Constantinople Post Papers, Jerusalem, RG 84, USNA; see enclosure.
60 Herman Loewenthal to Morris, April 18, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 84, USNA.
61 Victor Beauboucher to Morris, April 11, 1867, No. 12, op. cit.
made against Loewenthal and Beauboucher. Johnson's investigation vindicated both Beauboucher and Loewenthal, and exposed its leader as a rascal.

The United States government was not without information other than Adams' complaints and Bidwell's report. New England newspapers had been reporting the character of Adams for over a year and the Department of the Navy had received reports from the Mediterranean Squadron. Most reporters believed Adams to be a dishonest man who had swindled the colonists and lied to his followers.

By June, 1867, Loewenthal was writing to Morris that Adams was in debt to the Greek and Jewish money lenders in Jaffa. The disgruntled members of the colony had filed debt claims in the Consular Court against Adams and these claims had been decided in their favor. They demanded that the Vice Consul seize Adams' property and sell it at a public auction. Furious at the Vice Consul's behavior, Adams warned

---

62 See Johnson's detailed notes in Beirut Post Papers for May, 1867, Miscellaneous Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

63 See enclosure in Despatch 207, Morris to Seward, May 21, 1867, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

64 Rear Admiral Louis M. Goldsborough to Gideon Wells, August 29, 1867, Despatch 41, Series 3, enclosure of the cruise of the Canandaigua, Captain J. H. Strong to Goldsborough, June 29, 1867; Captain Strong stated: "I am inclined to think that the leader of the party and his immediate followers or supporters are not better than they should be, and that the rest have been deluded and swindled." Record Group 45, Naval Research Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, European Squadron, United States Naval Archives. Hereafter cited Navy Records, European Squadron, RG 45, USNA.

65 Loewenthal to Morris, May 18, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 84, USNA.
Loewenthal that "if you come into our enclosure and carry out your shameful threats, I will not be accountable for your safety." 66

Upon hearing of the Consular Court decision, Victor Beauboucher telegraphed Charles Hale, Consul General at Alexandria, and requested that he go to Jaffa to settle the legal problems. Next Beauboucher instructed Loewenthal to drop all proceedings against Adams until Hale arrived. Once arrived in Palestine, Charles Hale listened patiently to all that Adams had to say in his defense and then informed the leader of the Jaffa colony:

I told Adams kindly but firmly that this was no cause of rendering to Washington in chains but an ordinary case of a man that didn't satisfy a judgement of a court being held up on an execution; that he must be aware that his position was wholly untenable; that the proceedings of the consular officers were regular; that the law would take its one course and the United States Government was for that, That I had no proposition to make to him, but that if he had any to make to me I would hear it. He said he would come to me at the hotel the same afternoon; he did and at once avowed his willingness to confirm the judgement against him.67

It was obvious to many observers that Adams' followers were living in Palestine on charity. The most important financial contributor was Victor Beauboucher who used his salary for several months to keep them in food and medicine. Seamen of the United States Navy's European Squadron who visited the Palestinian coast gave money to Beauboucher and instructed him to use it for the

---

66 Beauboucher to Morris, May 21, 1867, No. 15, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 84, USNA.

67 Charles Hale to Morris, June 4, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Alexandria, RG 84, USNA.
Many of the colonists wanted to return to the United States but they needed money for the passage. Funds were advanced for this purpose by members of the consular corps—Jeremiah Augustus Johnson, John G. Goodenow (Consul General at Constantinople), Herman Loewenthal, and Charles Hale. Additional relief money was given by the banking houses of Bowles, Drevet and Company in Paris and Baring Brothers in London. An appeal was published in the Boston newspapers but elicited little response. Mark Twain, who was on a tour of the Near East, commented on the Jaffa colony's American appeal for aid:

They had little to hope for. Because after many appeals to the sympathies of New England, made by strangers of Boston, through newspapers, and after the establishment of an office there for the reception of moneyed contributions for the Jaffa colonists, One Dollar was subscribed. The consul-general for

68 Herman Loewenthal to Morris, April 18, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 84, USNA; the Vice Consul told Morris that the crew gave over $400 and that the captain took fourteen persons on board who would travel to Alexandria and from there travel to Liverpool. The Vice Consul further informed the Minister that a total of twenty-one people had left the Jaffa colony to return home, thirteen had died, thirty-four were preparing to leave, and eighty-eight were planning to remain. Loewenthal wrote that those remaining would need help and asked if the government would possibly start a subscription fund in their behalf. See Admiral L. M. Goldsborough to Gideon Wells, August 29, 1867, Despatch 41, Series 3, enclosure. Another despatch about the colony is David G. Farragut to Gideon Wells, November 7, 1867, Despatch 38, enclosure of Commander William N. Jeffers of the Swatara dated October 7, 1867; Jeffers noted that the colonists were "people who never would have paid their pew rent at home without taking a receipt appear to have blindly placed the whole of their means in his hands." Naval Records, European Squadron, RG 45, USNA.

69 Beauboucher to Seward, October 8, 1867, Despatch 49, Official Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 59, USNA and Charles Hale to Seward, October 24, 1867, Despatch 106, Correspondence, Alexandria, RG 59, USNA.
Egypt showed me the newspaper paragraph which mentioned the circumstances and mentioned also the discontinuance of the efforts and the closing of the office. It was evident that practical New England was not sorry to be rid of such visionaries and was not in the least inclined to hire anybody to bring them back to her.70

When the pleasure boat Quaker City visited Jaffa, the Captain agreed to take forty-one of the colonists to Alexandria. Beauboucher persuaded Moses Sperry Beach, one of the passengers of the Quaker City excursion and owner of the New York Sun, to donate $300 to Adams' colonists. Another Quaker City passenger, Mark Twain, noted that Beach gave Consul General Hale $1,500 to aid in returning forty-one unfortunates to New England by way of Liverpool. Twain described the returning colonists as follows: "At Jaffa we had taken on board some forty members of a very celebrated community... I refer to the 'Adams Jaffa Colony.' Others had deserted before. We left in Jaffa Mr. Adams, his wife, and fifteen unfortunates who not only had no money but did not know where to turn or whither to go. Such was the statement made to us. Our forty were miserable enough in the first place, and they lay about the decks seasick all the voyage, which about completed their misery. I take it. However, one or two young men remained upright, and by constant persecution we wormed out of them some little information. They gave it reluctantly and in very fragmentary condition, for

---

having been shamefully humbugged by their prophet, they felt
humiliated and unhappy.\footnote{From Innocents Abroad, op. cit., p. 403. Twain's statement on
the Beach donation, p. 409. Also see Victor Beauboucher to Seward,
October 8, 1867, Despatch 49, Consular Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 59.}

In late October, 1867, Secretary of State Seward wrote Charles
Hale that "thanks to J. A. Johnson the Department would make available
$3,000 for the return of those U. S. citizens should they be disposed
to do so.\footnote{Seward to Hale, October 7, 1867, Instructions, RG 59, USNA; there is a copy of this despatch in the Beirut Post Papers, General
Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.}  Johnson traveled to Jaffa in November in order to
present the Department's offer to the twenty-six Americans remaining,
but they refused the money. Nonetheless, Johnson believed that the
fund should be preserved in case they changed their minds. As an
exercise in benevolent nepotism, Johnson appointed his brother,
Lorenzo M. Johnson, as Vice Consul at Jaffa—in order to better the
aid to the remnants of Adams' flock.

Although the Jaffa colony's fate was widely publicized, it was
rumored that a second party of Maine colonists would start for
Palestine in August, 1867. Midly alarmed, Hale requested Johnson to
put "something under your own name" in the Boston and Maine papers
which would warn prospective immigrants. Hale wrote the editor of the

\footnote{Johnson to Morris, November 13, 1867, Constantinople Post
Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA. Also see a
petition from the remaining colonists to the Department of State,
November 23, 1867.}
Boston Daily Advertiser and his brother, Rev. Edward E. Hale, a well known minister of Boston, to communicate with Johnson concerning the Jaffa colony. Hale maintained that recruitment for new members of the Jaffa colony "ought to be stopped, or at least, whoever comes should have solemn warning of what may be expected." Undeterred by Hale, Adams announced publicly that a large and rich colony of British Jews would shortly join the American colony. As late as October, 1867, Johnson received information that a determined group was still preparing to depart from Maine.

By August, 1867, the Jaffa situation was critical. The few remaining colonists were divided and quarrelling so badly that the Turkish governor considered them a threat to the peace. Loewenthal had resigned as Vice Consul in July and Beauboucher was convinced that he could not handle the situation alone. The troubled American Consul telegraphed Charles Hale and begged him to return to Palestine. Upon Hale's arrival in Jaffa he found Adams in jail awaiting trial upon charges preferred against him by some of the remaining colonists. Hale informed Secretary Seward that Adams was safer in an uncomfortable cell when compared to the violent outbreak that had occurred earlier.

---

74 See Charles Hale to J. A. Johnson, June 6, 1867 and August 5, 1867, Beirut Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

75 Beauboucher to Morris, June 27, 1867, Despatch 18, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 84, USNA.

76 F. W. Seward to J. A. Johnson, October 10, 1867, Instructions, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

77 Charles Hale to Seward, October 24, 1867, Official Consular Correspondence, Alexandria, RG 59, USNA; a copy of this despatch was sent to Morris.
The bitter feeling that existed among the colonists expressed itself
in the form of a direct physical attack upon Adams. The disillusioned
American colonists demanded justice and their money. The Consul
General stated:

It is evident that Mr. Beauboucher could not proceed otherwise
than he did in arresting Adams and holding him for examination
in one course and from the isolation of the Consul without
agent or even dragoman at Jaffa, he could not proceed with the
preliminary steps for a criminal trial without the assistance
of some other consul officer; indeed my going thither in such
an emergency appears to have been contemplated by your letter
of 20th July.78

After a lengthy examination of all concerned Hale suggested
selling all of the colony's property and closing it down. Adams
proposed, instead, that the remaining colonists should become subjects
of the Ottoman Porte. He promised not to place obstacles in the way
of those who wished to return to the United States and not to invite
any new immigrants. Hale suggested that the latter statement be
given wide publicity in America.79

A plan for denationalization of his followers was proposed
with the upmost formality by Adams and his wife. They submitted to
Consul General Hale twenty-two names of Americans who intended to
remain at Jaffa. The document also stated that members of the colony
placed themselves under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Porte and
they promised never again to resume their American citizenship. The

78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
next day, September 3, 1867, Rolla Floyd and J. W. Walker sought a private interview with Hale. They told the Consul General:

They did not wish to quarrel with Adams, that they believed they could live comfortabably in Syria, as Americans without giving trouble to the consuls or the United States. Floyd and Walker begged the fact of this interview might not be made known to Mr. and Mrs. Adams and cautioned me against Mrs. Adams as an untruthful woman. 80

After the Floyd-Walker interview several others came to inform Hale that they did not wish to renounce their American citizenship but that they were afraid of Adams. Those colonists remaining promised Hale to live in peace with their leader.

By the end of October, 1867, the Turkish governor introduced a new complaint—the Americans were not paying their taxes. The governor demanded that Beauboucher make the colonists pay the government tax. At the same time, the Americans were insisting that they would tolerate no consular intervention and they would settle their affairs with the local government. Beauboucher told Morris that he would not interfere as long as the governor of Jaffa acted in a lawful manner. 81 At this time, Adams asked for British protection but this was quickly refused. 82

Lorenzo Johnson, the newly appointed American Vice Consul, found the Jaffa situation very difficult. In one case, a respected

80 Ibid.
81 Beauboucher to Morris, October 10, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84, USNA; Beauboucher sent Morris a copy of the letter from the Governor of Jaffa.
82 Johnson to Morris, November 13, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.
Methodist clergyman from Illinois who became ill was housed in Adams' home. Sensing a lack of hospitality there, the worthy cleric complained (to the new Consul) that Adams was plotting his murder. When Adams was confronted by the American Consul, he promised to moderate his behavior in the future and a few of the American property holders signed his bond. The property holders demanded that Adams' wife also be secured for they considered her to be dangerous. Accordingly Johnson summoned the accused woman and required her to give bond to keep the peace. Perhaps feeling somewhat restricted by the bond, both members of the Adams family promised Johnson that they would leave the country as soon as possible. Shaken by the misbehavior he had seen, Johnson observed that the Adams pair "are bringing great disrespect upon the American character." The Consul resolved that if they broke the peace one more time, he intended "to treat them severely."  

Adams, accompanied by his wife, left Jaffa in the early summer of 1868 avowing that he would obtain money and enlist new recruits by preaching in the agricultural and mining districts of England. As Johnson lamented: "There seems to be no subject upon which people of the class with whom he associates are so ready to be deceived as that of the resources of Palestine. He is well

83 Lorenzo Johnson to Seward, April 20, 1868, Despatch 9 and May 13, 1868, Despatch 11, Official Consular Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 59, USNA.
aware of this and by the introduction of some history, prophecy and
some of his novel ideas, he readily attracts listeners."34

The 1868 annual report on American citizens residing in
Palestine, prepared by Victor Beauboucher, included sixteen names of
United States citizens from Maine living in Jaffa—only nine of these
were adults.35 After perusing the report, Beauboucher informed
Hamilton Fish, the new Secretary of State in Grant's administration,
that he considered the "Adams Drama as terminated once and for all."
The Consul also noted that "to my knowledge Adams never kept one of
his promises although he made a solemn one each month during nearly
three years."36 In December, 1869, John B. Hay, the new Consul for
Jerusalem reported:

Consul Beauboucher authorised me to dispose of several lots,
or parcels of land belonging to Adams, situated on the colony
land near Jaffa, and hold the proceeds on deposit at this
consulate to pay the local authorities should they again
demand the government tax. There are nine lots not mortgaged
on the "Favourite Plot" and thirteen lots not mortgaged on the
"Four Plots." With your approval I will proceed to sell
these lots, the present being the most favourable time to
do so, as the German Colonists at Jaffa wish to purchase
land.37

---

84 Lorenzo Johnson to J. A. Johnson, June 8, 1868, Beirut
Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

85 Beauboucher to Morris, December 31, 1868, Constantinople
Post Papers, General Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 84, USNA.
Beauboucher to Hamilton Fish, May 31, 1869, Despatch 70, Official
Consular Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 59, USNA. A copy of
Beauboucher's despatch was sent to Morris.

86 Beauboucher to Hamilton Fish, May 31, 1869, Despatch 70,
Official Consular Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 59, USNA.

87 John B. Hay to J. A. Johnson, December 18, 1869, Beirut
Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.
The land belonging to Adams was sold and his creditors received a partial payment.

Despite difficulties some of the colonists remained in Jaffa. While Lorenzo Johnson was in Jaffa he noticed that the threshing machine of F. W. Thombs was taken from boxes after being prepared for shipment to America and made into a wagon by Rolla Floyd. Johnson informed Floyd that he would hold him accountable for the property whenever he may be called on for explanation, and protested against its sale to anyone in the meantime. In 1881, when the Spafford family entered the Holy Land for the purpose of establishing the American Colony in Jerusalem, they were carried from Jaffa to Jerusalem in American made wagons. Bertha Spafford Vester described the Jaffa colonists as follows:

They introduced modern—for that time—farming implements, including wagons, to the Holy Land. Among remaining members of this colony at Jaffa, occupying their original houses, were Mr. and Mrs. Rolla Floyd, who proved such wonderful friends, and Mr. Herbert Clark, representative of Thomas Cook and Son, and who was in charge of our transportation, as we were traveling on Cook's tickets.

There was an attempt to plant an American agricultural colony on the plains of Esdraelon. A resident of Wheeling, West Virginia visited Beirut in 1867 in behalf of a small society residing near Buffalo, New York called the "Friends of Jerusalem." This

---

88 Lorenzo Johnson to J. A. Johnson, December 18, 1869, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

society had connections with a larger association in Wurtemburg, Germany. The German association numbered nearly 15,000 of which 5,000 indicated that they wished to emigrate to Palestine. The visitor from West Virginia assured J. A. Johnson that he would report adversely on the scheme presumably after seeing the ruins of the Jaffa colony and would, instead, encourage his German associates to emigrate to America.90

In 1870, Morris sent a personal information questionnaire to all American consulates in the Empire which American citizens were required to fill-out and return. One set coming to the Beirut Consul General from Haifa showed the existence of an agricultural colony which contained several American citizens. Generally, these colonists migrated to the United States in 1848 from Wurtemberg, Germany; they remained in the United States until 1869. These naturalized Americans with their German associates had founded a Christian colony called the "Spiritual Temple." It seems evident that the Society of the "Friends of Jerusalem" did not keep their promise to Jeremiah Augustus Johnson.91 Another interesting item about this group was that the

90 J. A. Johnson to W. H. Seward, December 11, 1867, Despatch 19, Official Consular Correspondence, Beirut, RG 59, USNA.

91 Morris to J. A. Johnson, January 11, 1870, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA; one of the interesting colonists was Jacob Frederick Shumaker, an architect and sculptor in marble who emigrated to the United States in 1848. He settled in Wheeling, West Virginia but soon moved to Zanesville, Ohio. His daughter and son were born in Zanesville and it was reported that they would soon emigrate to Haifa. Most of the children of these naturalized Americans were born in the United States. See the Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, 1870, RG 84, USNA.
colony did not get into trouble with the Turkish government or the American consulate as there were not recorded problems in the Jerusalem, Beirut, or Constantinople files for the 1870's. Living quietly in the sunny Levant, the Haifa colonists maintained their United States citizenship.

Official documents and newspapers indicate that government officers and some sections of the public favored the establishment of an American settlement in the Ottoman Empire. Beauboucher was enthusiastic about the project from the beginning and was determined to lend the Jaffa settlers all his assistance. Secretary Seward and Senator Morrill encouraged Adams in his settlement plan and even promised diplomatic assistance. The master of the U. S. S. Ticonderoga of the Mediterranean Squadron expressed the belief that energetic Americans could "commence the experiment of engrafting a western civilization on a country which had lain dormant for centuries." Even after the failure of the colony became known, Jeremiah A. Johnson thought the establishment of an American colony in the Empire was an excellent idea, because of its possibilities for influence upon the native population. The natives, so he

92 Rear Admiral Louis M. Goldsborough to Gideon Wells, November 26, 1866, Despatch 84; enclosure of a report prepared by Ernest Dickman, master of the Ticonderoga, Navy Records, European Squadron, RG 45, USNA.

93 Morris to Seward, June 3, 1867, Despatch 210, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure of J. A. Johnson to Morris, May 13, 1867.
believed, could learn American principles through example; and he averred that the colony failed only because of bad leadership. The case for colonization was summed up by James Manning Sherwood, an influential Presbyterian minister and author, in a letter to the New York Daily Tribune. He opined:

Why should not New England plant her colonies on the shores of the Mediterranean, and infuse her industries, her living Christianity and civilization into the dead life of the Orient! Great changes are rapidly occurring in that part of the world. The Turkish Power and the Moslem Faith which, for so many centuries, have ruled and cursed all that fair region of earth, are ready to fall to pieces; and in the new order of things it will not be strange if the principle of colonization plays an important part. Who would not rejoice to see this great Western Republic— the epitome of modern thought and civilization and religion, and social life and material prosperity— taking the lead in such a work.\textsuperscript{94}

Sherwood's attitude as well as that of the government officers and the press can only be classified as cultural imperialism. Believing that the American way of life was superior to any the world had ever known, they were ambitious to convert the world to their way of doing things. American publicists of this stripe did not covet Ottoman territory—what they desired was control over the minds of the people. In their view, Near Eastern vices could only be conquered by the Down East virtues of thrift

\textsuperscript{94}New York Daily Tribune, June 5, 1867, p. 2. For Sherwood's career (b. 1814-d. 1890) as an author and magazine editor, see The Cyclopaedia of American Biography (New York: The Press Association Compilers, Inc., 1917), V, "James Manning Sherwood."
and hard work. They believed that New England's stern and rock-bound missionaries would one day hold the gorgeous East in fee; and that the answer to the Eastern Question lay in converting the ennervated Paynim of the Levant into virile, independent Protestants; dissipated Levantines into God-fearing Presbyterians; and luxurious harems into drawing rooms suitable for Louisa May Alcott's Little Women.
CHAPTER 8

UN MOUVEMENT POLITIQUE EN SYRIE

The examples of Muhammad Ali and the successful Greek War of Independence attracted political opportunists to the Turkish Empire who hoped to achieve either wealth or political power (sometimes both) by intriguing with provincial rebels. In early September, 1868, there was an attempt to overthrow Ottoman authority in Syria. This rather badly organized revolt underlined the unhappy condition of the provinces after years of reforms carried out under the direction of Fuad Pasha and Ali Pasha. Control of the provinces from the center was so weak that an Irish adventurer, Eugene O'Reilly, assisted by two Americans, attempted to separate the Arab province of Syria from the Sultan's empire and to establish a semi-independent state,¹ The affair was further complicated by a plot, discovered by the government in Constantinople, to overthrow the central government, and an insurrection in Crete.

In 1867-68, the conditions in Syria offered excellent

¹New York Herald, December 28, 1868, p. 3; another naturalized Polish-American escaped capture by the Syrian-Ottoman authorities. A mistranslation of the 1830 Treaty between the United States and Turkey is one of the main reasons for detailing this episode. Major sources available for reconstruction of the events prior to the Syrian insurrection of 1868 were O'Reilly's confession and testimony given to the Ottoman investigators by the two Americans involved in the incident.
opportunities for adventures of all sorts. The native Arab population was quiet but far from loyal to the central government; few areas of the province were free of bandits. In June, 1865, a statistical review of the Bedouin tribes found in Syria, prepared by Shirley Abela, American Vice Consul at Sidon, revealed the existence of nearly 26,120 tents and 11,854 horsemen. None of these fifty-five tribes paid tribute to the Ottoman Porte for they did not consider themselves to be under its authority. With mild alarm Abela noted that some Bedouin tribes "still wear the ancient armor."2 Indeed, as early as April 5, 1867, Edward Joy Morris warned Seward that "Syria may soon be the scene of bloody tragedies."3 The New York Herald noted that the Bedouin might support an insurrection in anticipation of rich plunder.4

Eugene O'Reilly, a former soldier in the British army, had obtained a commission from the Sultan to serve in the Turkish army after the Crimean War of 1853-6.5 Of obscure origin, O'Reilly's ancestry was the subject of lively dispute. The Turkish Minister to the United States, Blaque Bey, assured the American Secretary of State,

2 Shirley Abela to Jeremiah Augustus Johnson, June 30, 1865, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, Record Group 84, United States National Archives, Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited RG 84, USNA.

3 Edward Joy Morris to William H. Seward, April 9, 1867, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

4 New York Herald, December 28, 1868, p. 3.

5 Ibid., November 8, 1868, p. 4; The Times (London), October 19, 1868, p. 8.
Hamilton Fish, that O'Reilly was a natural son of Lord Palmerston. A letter to the editor published in the New York Herald claimed that O'Reilly was never in the British army but had spent time in British prisons as a result of revolutionary activities in Ireland. Regardless of his background, he claimed to be a British subject in 1868-69. As a Turkish soldier known to the Porte as Hassan Bey, he established a reputation for distinguished service and was even awarded the rank of colonel. In 1860, during the Marionite and Druse revolt in Lebanon, O'Reilly served as aide-de-camp to Fuad Pasha, the Imperial Commissioner. By 1862, Hassan Bey had been appointed to command the Syrian mounted police with instructions to end the frequent robberies and murders on the Damascus road.

While in the Sultan's service Colonel O'Reilly accumulated little money because military pay was small; at the same time, his

---


7. New York Herald, July 6, 1870, p. 9. The letter was signed by one James Crotty who further claimed that O'Reilly belonged to one of the oldest and most respected families in the county Meath. After his release from prison he left Ireland and entered the Sardinian service as a cavalry officer, where he remained until the Crimean war. Crotty did not want the American readers to believe that O'Reilly had disgraced himself by donning a British uniform "after his incarceration."

8. Jeremiah Augustus Johnson to Edward Joy Morris, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, October 3, 1868, RG 84, USNA. Also see The Times (London), October 19, 1868, p. 8.

desire for promotion was blocked by political intrigue. His Syrian experience afforded him the information to exercise his talents for converting the unstable situation in that province into a vast fortune. O'Reilly planned, as he later stated in his confession, to begin a "mouvement politique en Syrie." The wily colonel stated that his revolution's objective was "creation of a Vice Royalty in Syria, with his Excellency Mustafa Fazil Pasha as Viceroy followed by recognition of his right of succession to the Vice Royalty of Egypt." If the revolution was successful, the participants expected to obtain a sum of money or a cession of land for the purpose of colonization. O'Reilly claimed that Mustafa Fazil himself agreed to furnish money for a Syrian revolt in hopes of strengthening his claim to the Khedival throne of Egypt. 10

Ismail Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt since 1863, had spared neither money nor effort to change the order of succession from his brother Mustafa Fazil to his eldest son. The Sultan granted a firman in 1866 changing the order of succession in favor of Ismail's son. In the Ottoman world royal succession fell not to the eldest son of the deceased ruler but to the oldest male of the dynasty. Mustafa Fazil Pasha was a well-known leader of the liberal Young Turkey party and had

---

10 The information in this paragraph is based on Eugene O'Reilly's confession. A copy, written in French, was given to Lorenzo M. Johnson, Beirut Consular Clerk and brother of Jeremiah Augustus Johnson, by the Governor General of Syria, Rashid Pasha. The confession dated October 15, 1868, can be found in the Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 81, USNA. Quoted section in the text reads: "Ces conditions auraient été le création d' un V. Royauté en Syrie avec S. A. Fazil Moustafa Pacha pour Vice Roi suivi d' une reconnaissance de son droit sur l' heritate du V. Royauté d' Egypte."
served in the Sultan's Ministry. Political criticism from Conserva-
tives had forced Mustafa Fazil into exile in Paris early in 1866.

Leaders of the expedition were named in the O'Reilly confes-
sion—two of them claimed American citizenship, Andrew Romer and Henry
M. Canfield. Romer was in fact a naturalized American citizen who
left his native Hungary after the 1848 revolution and emigrated to
the United States where he lived for about five years. During the
Crimean War, he traveled to Turkey where he took service under the
Sultan and was promoted to the rank of colonel for life by Rashid
Pasha. His services rendered to the Sultan were of such a "delicate
character" that it was necessary for Romer to live in Italy between
1860-65.

Romer had spent several years in Constantinople making
percussion caps for the arsenal; in 1867, Romer left the Turkish
service to travel to Vienna to visit his family. While in Vienna he
examined and purchased arms for Eugene O'Reilly. Romer later stated
that he understood that the guns and mortars were to be used by the
British in Abyssinia. He purchased a yacht in his own name at Trieste
to transport the guns—this yacht was called the Sherman and flew the
American flag. O'Reilly commenting on the role of the Sherman in the
Syrian project stated: "We will give her the name 'Sherman'. It is a

\[11\] Morris to Seward, February 28, 1869, Despatch 303, Official
Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure. Also see Johnson
to Morris, October 3, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, General
Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

\[12\] Johnson to Morris, October 6, 1868, Constantinople Post
Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.
strange coincidence [sic] that General Sherman is going to tour Syria this summer. If you were near me I might indicate a strange thing which might grow out of this visit—Bakalum. An English translation of bakalum is: "we'll see."

Henry M. Canfield, claiming to be from Berry, Connecticut, was a former American consul at Piraeus. He was known to the Turkish authorities as Charles Lamar; a name which he assumed after leaving Greece. Canfield left the United States in October, 1861, for travel and study in Europe. He became the United States consul at Piraeus, Greece on May 14, 1863 and remained at his station until January, 1868. From Greece the former consul traveled to Syra (an island located in the Grecian archipelago), Smyrna, and Alexandria where he planned to join a 1867 British expedition to Abyssinia. It was in Alexandria, in 1868, that Canfield made the acquaintance of Eugene O'Reilly. Having arrived too late to join the British expedition, Canfield accepted employment from O'Reilly as an assistant engineer for railroad construction in Syria and together, the employer and employee, returned to Constantinople. During Canfield's residence of three

13 Morris to Seward, February 28, 1869, Despatch 303, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure. For O'Reilly’s statement on the Sherman see Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, 1867, RG 84, USNA, pp. 580-1.

14 Morris to Seward, March 5, 1868, Despatch 250, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Morris wrote of Canfield's bad conduct in his post (this was before the Syrian outbreak) and reported that Captain Wyman of the corvette Ticonderoga found that the consulate had been abandoned for over five months. Also see the New York Herald, December 28, 1868, p. 3 which stated that the former consul's "eccentricities gave him great notoriety and were considered very unbecoming the dignity of the chief representative of the Great Republic at that ancient seat of learning and the arts."
months in Pera, O'Reilly paid all of his expenses. In the early summer, the assistant engineer was sent to Beirut to join Romer and aid him in making a survey of the railroad to the interior.\(^\text{15}\)

O'Reilly's most trusted associate was Maurice Ward, a British farmer settled in Turkey. He had been among other things an inventor of a wheeled conveyance used on the narrow and uneven streets of Constantinople, an inspector of bridges in the Turkish service, and a horse dealer. He had begun his career as a clergyman in the Church of England, later studied medicine, and finally, became the doctor to O'Reilly's expedition.\(^\text{16}\)

During the summer of 1867, the Sultan went to Europe. On this trip he arranged a reconciliation with Mustafa Fazil in view of the approaching power struggle with Ismail Pasha.\(^\text{17}\) In a crisis the Sultan knew that the Khedive of Egypt could be replaced by his willing brother. Indeed, the mere possibility moved Mustafa Fazil to inform O'Reilly (according to Colonel O'Reilly's confession) that he would have nothing more to do with the expedition.\(^\text{18}\) During the fall of 1867, Mustafa Fazil returned to Constantinople and was living quietly at his residence on the Bosphorus.\(^\text{19}\)

\(^{15}\) Morris to Seward, February 21, 1868, Despatch 302, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure of the examination of Henry M. Canfield.

\(^{16}\) New York Herald, July 4, 1870, p. 11.

\(^{17}\) The Times (London), October 19, 1868, p. 8.

\(^{18}\) See Eugene O'Reilly's confession, op. cit.

\(^{19}\) New York Herald, January 2, 1868, p. 6.
Without a figure-head for the project but with ample funds (it was claimed that O'Reilly had a credit of £250,000 in the Ottoman Bank),\textsuperscript{20} the colonel began the necessary preparations for putting his plans into execution.\textsuperscript{21} There was debate over the origin of these funds. The American Consul at Beirut pointed out to Morris that the Egyptians, who coveted Syria were suspected of continuing financial aid to the adventurers.\textsuperscript{22} The Governor General of Syria, Rashid Pasha, unearthed among O'Reilly's possessions a letter written to someone in Egypt addressed only as "Votre Altesse" in which the campaign in Syria was discussed with reference to "2,500 chaspsot [sic] rifles and as many men."\textsuperscript{23} O'Reilly had visited Egypt repeatedly and in December, 1867, he and Romer toured Cairo and Port Said.\textsuperscript{24}

Another possible source of aid was suspected to be the French who left Syria reluctantly in 1861 and who had much to gain from the

\textsuperscript{20} Johnson to Morris, October 6, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA. Johnson quoted this figure in his despatch.

\textsuperscript{21} See Eugene O'Reilly's confession, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{22} Johnson to Morris, October 6, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.

\textsuperscript{23} Lorenzo Johnson to J. A. Johnson, October 15, 1868, written from Damascus, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

\textsuperscript{24} Morris to Seward, February 28, 1869, Despatch 303, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure of the examination of Andrew Romer.
establishment of a semi-independent Syrian state under French
influence and protection. As early as January, 1868, Morris had
warned Seward that France was working "for the acquisition of Syria
and Palestine in the view some day of embracing the whole African
shore of the Mediterranean, Egypt & Palestine under her rule." 26
The Beirut correspondent of the New York Herald reported that the
O'Reilly story demonstrated that
France still cherished the project, which if she had dared, she
would have enforced in 1861, immediately after the
Syrian massacres, and while her "army of occupation" still
held the northern portion of the Holy Land—the project of
erecting Syria into a special government—which, even if it
should nominally remain under the Porte should be directly
answerable to the Christian Powers for the security and good
government of Syrian Christians. 27
The writer claimed that two-thirds of the people in Syria believed
that France was behind the scheme.

O'Reilly possessed a firman, obtained through Halil Pasha,
Minister of Public Works, for building a railroad, and received the
cooperation of local authorities in Beirut, Tripoli, and Homs. 28
His original plan called for construction of a railroad from that

25 Ibid.
26 Morris to Seward, January 22, 1868, Private Letter, The
William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of
Rochester, Rochester, New York.
27 New York Herald, July 4, 1870, p. 11.
28 Morris to Seward, February 21, 1869, Despatch 302, Official
Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure.
region to the Euphrates. The next draft of his plan envisaged the actual beginning of railway construction from Latakia to Homs and a survey work with a view to extending the line from Homs to the Euphrates.

The American Consul General at Beirut informed Morris that he had seen Andrew Romer on several occasions and had first hand knowledge of the railroad project from charts and diagrams which showed considerable progress of the railroad survey. Romer had even discussed with Johnson the advantages of building another railroad to Palmyra. In fact, the Consul General had been invited to go on the surveying expedition in order to view the ruins of Palmyra. Johnson explained that a large number of men armed with good rifles were needed for self defense; it was not advisable to depend on the police who would run away in time of danger. He also informed Morris that Romer's passport and papers for the yacht the Sherman were on file at the Consulate. For all these reasons, Johnson did not believe that Andrew Romer was implicated in any plan to wrest Syria away from Ottoman rule.

When Eugene O'Reilly arrived in Beirut, he took care to let everyone know that he was in possession of ample funds and the merchants of Beirut believed that the long awaited steam railroad to the interior would at last become a reality. Members of the expedition stayed a long

---

29 Morris to Seward, February 29, 1869, Despatch 303, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure of examination of Andrew Romer.

30 Johnson to Morris, October 3, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA;
time at Beirut on board the Sherman before departing for Tripoli. Some 300 men, Circassians and Albanians mostly, had been gathered at Tripoli to serve as an escort for the surveying party. 31 Awaiting the railway planners were many boxes supposedly filled with railroad building tools; but which later proved to contain muskets, a couple of mortars, and ammunition. The arms had been smuggled through the Beirut Custom House—In fact, some of the guns were kept in the Custom House. 32

In late July or early August, 1868, the band moved from Tripoli to the desert and here O'Reilly began his final bargaining with the Bedouin chiefs. 33 It is obvious from later testimony that the expedition remained encamped in this area for seven or eight weeks. The most powerful sheik of the area, Suleyman Ibn Murshid, readily agreed to O'Reilly's program and promised assistance. 34 Another important sheik to be won over was Michel who often escorted European tourists to Palmyra. His wife, Lady Digby, was an interesting woman. She had been

31 See Eugene O'Reilly's confession, op. cit.
32 Lorenzo M. Johnson to J. A. Johnson, October 15, 1868, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA. Also see Morris to Seward, February 28, 1869, Despatch 303, enclosure, op. cit.; New York Times, November 24, 1868, p. 1.
33 Morris to Seward, February 21, 1869, Despatch 302, enclosure, op. cit.
34 Morris to Seward, February 28, 1869, Despatch 303, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure. The New York Daily Tribune, December 28, 1868, p. 3 stated that Sheik Ibn Murshid utterly disregarded "all human laws and set the tax gatherers at defiance --whose motto is, 'God is great and the Sultan is far off.'"
divorced by Lord Ellenborough, a Governor General of India, for infidelity; she then married a wealthy English gentleman named Digby. It was said that at the time of her marriage to Michel she had a $7,500 a year income which provided the necessary finances for the escort services to Palmyra and the improvement of Michel's status among his fellow Arab tribesmen. Some sources claim that Lady Digby was in favor of the revolutionary project and persuaded her husband to join. Michel and Lady Digby visited the O'Reilly railroad encampment daily in an attempt to iron out the details of their agreement.

The major problem seems to have been the existence of a long standing feud between Michel and Ibn Murshid. Michel was further discouraged by a demand for an immediate delivery of a large number of camels, so he withdrew his support. O'Reilly with three hundred mercenaries and Ibn Murshid with 700 camel mounted bedouin attacked Michel's tribe in an effort to bring him to terms. In the engagement O'Reilly's mortars wounded two men and killed thirty camels and one woman. The

---

35 New York Herald, July 4, 1870, p. 11. Also see Lorenzo M. Johnson to J. A. Johnson, October 15, 1868, written from Damascus, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

36 Ibid.

37 Morris to Seward, February 28, 1869, Despatch 303, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure.

38 Ibid.

39 Lorenzo M. Johnson to J. A. Johnson, October 31, 1868, written from Damascus, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.
mortars were fired by the Americans, Canfield and Romer. O'Reilly's army captured a number of camels which he planned to hold as hostage for the good conduct of Michel. In a letter written to Lady Digby on September 12, he expressed regret for the attack on her tribe. O'Reilly explained to Lady Digby that he was "obliged to do so in order to teach all persons that he could not be trifled with when engaged in so serious an affair." Michel and Lady Digby complained to Rashid Pasha, the Governor General of Syria, who telegraphed orders to the Pasha of Homs to go out and capture the revolutionary band.

The supposed railroad workers commanded by O'Reilly had proven their mettle; he was convinced they would support him to the end if adequate money could be provided. The Beirut correspondent for the New York Herald claimed that O'Reilly sent Ward to Aleppo to obtain more funds. Ward reached Aleppo at the same time as an old English consul who was accompanied by his very young and pretty wife. Ward decided to linger a day or two in Aleppo and charm the English lady.

---

40 Morris to Seward, February 21, 1869, Despatch 302, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure of the examination of H. M. Canfield.

41 J. A. Johnson to Morris, October 3, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA; L. M. Johnson to J. A. Johnson, October 31, 1868, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

42 Lorenzo M. Johnson to J. A. Johnson, October 15, 1868, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

43 Rashid Pasha became Minister of the Interior in February, 1869; see the New York Daily Tribune, February 16, 1869, p. 1. For the flight to Damascus by Michel and Lady Digby see the New York Herald, July 4, 1870, p. 11.
When he at last made ready to return to camp it was too late.\(^{44}\)

The Pasha of Homs executed the Governor General's orders with unusual alacrity and secured the immediate surrender of O'Reilly and his band. Without further pay the railroad workers were not willing to risk their lives; the colonel was forced to surrender on terms "according to the usage of regular warfare."\(^{45}\) The entire O'Reilly party was taken to Damascus and handed over to Rashid Pasha for questioning. They remained in Damascus prison for several weeks before orders arrived to send the accused to Constantinople.

Rashid Pasha did not know who had hatched the plot and he moved carefully. His fears were based not only on the knowledge of the usual court intrigues but also on an incident which happened in the capital. In late September a conspiracy against the life of the Sultan was unearthed. More than sixty individuals were implicated, both foreign and Ottoman, Christian and Muslim. Newspaper accounts of the Constantinople conspiracy suggest that the unrest in the city was caused by different political groups: those who had believed that the reign of Abdul Aziz would initiate a new era of reform and were sorely disappointed, and those who wished to discredit Mustafa Fazil and the Young Turkey Party.\(^{46}\) Many of those arrested were Russians and Greeks. It was suspected that the conspirators hoped to produce a state of

\(^{44}\) See O'Reilly's confession in the Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence for 1868, Also see the New York Herald, July 4, 1870, p. 11.

\(^{45}\) See O'Reilly's confession, op. cit.

\(^{46}\) The Times (London), October 19, 1868, p. 8.
anarchy in the capital which would render impossible the suppression of any insurrection in the provinces. The Governor General concluded that this affair had some connection with the insurrection in Crete. He feared it was a diversionary action to pull soldiers away from the island and force the Turkish government to grant independence. At this point the American Congress was considering a resolution for the recognition of Cretan independence. However, O'Reilly, who was liberal with information, declared that the expedition had nothing to do with the Cretan insurrection.

Jeremiah Augustus Johnson informed Morris that the whole affair was reported to be an "outcropping of a scheme by the Turkish government to ruin Mustafa Fazil" and that O'Reilly retained his commission in the Turkish army. Johnson noted that O'Reilly's confession was so much "Irish Bravado" inspired by drink. O'Reilly made his lengthy confession to the Damascus authorities.

The first knowledge that American officials had of the affair came on September 29, 1868, when the Vice Consul at Damascus, Michel


48 Lorenzo Johnson to J. A. Johnson, October 14, 1868, written from Damascus, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

49 Samuel G. Howe to Charles Sumner, July 14, 1868, The Howe Family Papers, H44m/314, Item 1359, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

50 Lorenzo Johnson to J. A. Johnson, October 14, 1868, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA. Also see O'Reilly's confession.

51 J. A. Johnson to Morris, November 8, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.
Meshaka, telegraphed Jeremiah Augustus Johnson that two American citizens had been imprisoned by the Ottoman authorities. Johnson considered this a violation of the American treaty which gave consular jurisdiction over American citizens in both criminal and commercial cases. He immediately telegraphed Meshaka to register a protest with the Governor General of Syria, Rashid Pasha; he sent the Beirut Consular Clerk, Lorenzo Johnson, who was in Jerusalem attending the Jaffa Colony problems, to Damascus to assist Meshaka and to confer with the British consul. These actions were taken before Johnson knew the gravity of the charges against the two Americans and without the knowledge of the American Minister at Constantinople.

When a detailed letter arrived from Meshaka explaining that the two Americans were held by the Syrian authorities for their participation in a rebellion against the government, Johnson's policy of protest did not change. If Romer and Canfield were condemned by a Turkish court and imprisoned, the Consul General was convinced that all United States citizens residing in Turkey would be "imperilled."

---

52 Michel Meshaka to J. A. Johnson, September 29, 1868, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA; see material from 544 through 551.

53 J. A. Johnson to Morris, October 3, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA. Also see the New York Times, November 24, 1868, p. 1. It should be noted that the attack occurred on September 5.

54 See Rashid Pasha to Michel Meshaka, October 3, 1868, which was forwarded to J. A. Johnson, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

55 Johnson to Seward, October 10, 1868, Despatch 74, Official Consular Correspondence, Beirut, RG 59, USNA.
Johnson wished to maintain the right for Americans to be tried by their consular court, but he did not wish to shield the accused if they were guilty. He was especially eager to avoid giving the impression that the American Consul General sympathized with O'Reilly's attempt because of the "prevalent notion in the East, that Americans sympathize and promote efforts tending to overthrow despotic governments."^56

The Consul General requested Morris to give his "opinion as to the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Authorities in the case of Romer and Lamar, accused of rebellion against the Turkish Authorities."^57 Johnson also inquired whether the principle of extraterritoriality ceased to apply when the offense was a crime against the state. Could the Turkish government, he asked, appear in a United States Consular Court in order to prosecute a United States citizen for rebellion.^58 The American Minister approved of Johnson's actions and his instructions to Lorenzo Johnson. Morris agreed that the Consular Clerk must attend all court proceedings and protest them. However, Morris informed Johnson:

> The published version of the Treaty between Turkey and the United States must be our rule of proceeding. Although I think there is good reason to believe that it has been erroneously translated in the passage cited in your dispatch.

---

^56 Johnson to Seward, November 12, 1868, Despatch 77, Official Consular Correspondence, Beirut, RG 59, USNA.

^57 Johnson to Seward, October 24, 1868, Despatch 75, Official Consular Correspondence, Beirut, RG 59, USNA.

^58 J. A. Johnson to Morris, October 3, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA.
Until however the U.S. Gov, admits an error in the translation we have no choice but to insist on its observance by the Turkish authorities.\footnote{Morris to J. A. Johnson, October 28, 1868, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.}

The Austrian Consul General, Dean of the Beirut Consular Corps, informed Johnson that he had commercial but not criminal jurisdiction. Austrian criminals could be examined in Turkey, but must be sent to Austria for trial. The Austrian, Julius Franz, who was arrested with O'Reilly, was regarded as under Austrian jurisdiction but left by Austrian permission in the Turkish prison at Damascus. The situation was further complicated by an action of the Porte. A Russian subject held by the Turkish government under charges of involvement in the conspiracy against the life of the Sultan was surrendered to the Russian Ambassador on demand.\footnote{Johnson to Seward, October 29, 1868, Despatch 76, Official Consular Correspondence, RG 59, USNA. Also see New York Herald, December 28, 1868, p. 3 which reported that the Russian man and woman implicated in the affair were sent to Russia to be dealt with by the home authorities. See Johnson to Morris, October 29, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, RG 84, USNA; Johnson informed Morris that the English government was abandoning their subjects who had engaged in the affair to the jurisdiction of the local authorities. The New York Herald, December 28, 1868, p. 3 declared that the British Ambassador was determined to extend no protection to anyone implicated in the affair, Morris informed Seward that the English and Austrians had not protested the arrest and confinement and that the English and Austrian prisoners were held on the same charges as the Americans; see Despatch 294, January 27, 1869, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.}

Johnson explained his position to Secretary Seward as follows:

I have endeavored to show moderation and at the same have all the rights guaranteed by the treaty. I occupy the somewhat uncomfortable position of having entered a protest, without enforcing it, and of having demanded the release of the imprisoned Americans without having secured their freedom.
I have claimed jurisdiction in this case & have denied that of the Ottoman court, and yet Messrs Romer & Lamar have been held, tried & sent to Constantinople in face of all this.61

In early November the Porte had instructed the Governor General to send the prisoners to Constantinople so that the investigation might be conducted under the supervision of the Grand Vezir.62 O'Reilly arrived in the capital first and was immediately lodged in the Turkish prison at Stamboul. It was not until December 3 that the remaining prisoners embarked on an Egyptian steamer at Beirut. The first evening out a "misunderstanding" developed between Canfield and the sailors. The sailors claimed that the American attempted to set a fire near some petroleum cans.63 The Captain of the steamer informed the Pasha of Tripoli that armed vessels were laying in wait for him in the Cyprus channel to seize the prisoners by force.64 These circumstances caused the Captain to march the prisoners ashore "under escort of a whole company of riflemen with loaded pieces and fixed bayonets"; they were deposited in the prison at Tripoli to await the arrival of a Turkish

---

61 Johnson to Seward, November 12, 1868, Despatch 77, Official Consular Correspondence, Beirut, RG 59, USNA.

62 L. M. Johnson to J. A. Johnson, November 7, 1868, written from Damascus, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA; Johnson reported that "The Gov. Gen. sent me information today that he has received orders to send the prisoners to Constantinople—O'Reilly first, and the others afterwards."

63 Antonio Yanni to J. A. Johnson, December 15, 1868, written from Tripoli, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA; Yanni reported that Canfield had tried to set fire near the petroleum cans.

64 Morris to Seward, January 3, 1869, Despatch 285, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure. Also see Antonio Yanni's letter to J. A. Johnson, December 15, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84, USNA.
Conditions in the Tripoli prison were far from pleasant; a small unventilated room next to a privy housed the six prisoners for the next seven weeks. Antonio Yanni, the American Vice Consul at Tripoli, was informed that he would not be permitted to visit the American prisoners. American diplomatic officers in Beirut and Constantinople were forced once again to protest to the Turkish government. Johnson pleaded for humane treatment for the prisoners while Morris reminded the Turkish Foreign Minister, Safvet Pasha, that it was unjust to treat a prisoner "as though guilty before trial." The prisoners finally arrived in Constantinople on January 20, 1869.

The Americans accused of revolutionary action were housed in the Stamboul prison. John Porter Brown was instructed to insist that the Turkish authorities provide them with all possible comfort. Brown attended and supervised the questioning of the prisoners under protest.

Canfield's parents had exerted considerable effort to secure

---

65 Morris to Seward, January 3, 1869, Despatch 285, _op. cit._; see enclosure.

66 Antonio Yanni to J. A. Johnson, December 15, 1868, written from Tripoli, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Beirut, also see E. Dillon to J. A. Johnson, December 17, 1868, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

67 Morris to Safvet Pasha, January 1, 1869, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Folio 23; also see Morris to J. A. Johnson, Beirut Post Papers, General Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

68 Morris to Seward, January 27, 1869, Despatch 294, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

69 Ibid.
their son's release and return to the United States, Believing that no way must be unexplored they traveled to Constantinople to plead with the Turkish authorities in his behalf. The Grand Vezir and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Pasha, assured Morris that both Americans would be set at liberty. The only question in the meantime was to determine their guilt or innocence and to secure all information possible concerning the insurrection.

Both Canfield and Romer claimed that their arms were purely defensive and that they knew nothing of a treasonable plot. Throughout the entire investigation in Damascus and Constantinople, Romer maintained that O'Reilly had given his word of honor that the guns would not be used against the Ottoman government and that rifles and mortars were merely necessary for protection against bandits. During the investigation Andrew Romer detailed many routes which he surveyed and the vast preparations made for the future railroad construction. Romer believed that the attack resulted from the deceit of Michel for not delivering the promised camels and guides needed for construction of the railroad. Romer denied that he had any knowledge of the revolutionary project. He maintained that he fired the mortars only out of fear of the 700 Arabs with O'Reilly. Canfield testified that O'Reilly "told me that he intended to 'pay off' Sheik Mejuel for having sold him our rotten camels, & for having taken away the Guide which he had given him." Canfield

---

70. W. H. Seward to E. J. Morris, December 29, 1868, Despatch 201, Instructions, RG 59, USNA. Seward informed Morris that the family claimed that the son could be suffering from insanity.

71. Morris to Seward, February 28, 1869, Despatch 303, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure.
claimed that Sheik Murshid accompanied "O'Reilly on the attack with his 700 Arabs mounted on camels because he also had an account to settle with Mejuel, so, they would do the job together." In the entire investigation, the Turkish government never proved if these two Americans were guilty or even if they had any knowledge of a revolutionary scheme prior to the attack on Michel's camp. On the other hand, neither were they proven to be innocent.

The original protest in this case was made by Johnson to the Governor General of Syria on October 3, 1868. Morris' general policy was to settle as many issues as possible at the local level so as to avoid a direct confrontation with the central government. The records show that no formal protest was made to the Porte by Morris until November 12, 1868. In the first letter Morris informed Safvet Pasha that Lorenzo Johnson's presence at the examination of the Americans under official protest was agreeable to his instructions. Because the Governor General of Syria had not respected this protest, Morris told Safvet that "I deem it my duty to renew the same to your Excellency. I protest against the arrest, imprisonment and judicial trial of these individuals as a manifest violation of the Treaty of May 7, 1830 between the Sublime Porte and the United States. . . . It belongs to the American authorities to arrest, to hold in custody, and to try

---

72 Morris to Seward, February 21, 1869, Despatch 302, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure.

73 S. J. Morris to Safvet Pasha, November 12, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Folio 23, RG 84, USNA; also see Morris to Seward, January 3, 1869, Despatch 285, Enclosure. Morris' protest was also reported in the New York Times, November 24, 1868 and the New York Herald, December 28, 1868, p. 3.
these individuals in question and not the Ottoman authorities."\(^7\)

The American version of the treaty which had been ratified by the Senate stated that "even when they (American citizens) may have committed some offense they shall not be arrested and put in prison by the local authorities, but they shall be tried by their Minister or Consul and punished according to their offense, following the respect the usage observed toward all Franks."\(^7\) This meant that no American could be arrested or imprisoned by the Ottoman authorities or summoned before an Ottoman court.

The Porte regarded the English and French translation of that section of the treaty as faulty. Safvet Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, contended that the statements "they shall be tried by their Minister or Consul" and "they shall not be arrested" were not to be found in the paragraph of the Turkish treaty which dealt with offenses. Under the Turkish version of the Treaty, any American who violated an Ottoman law would be responsible to a local tribunal.\(^7\) In addition to this problem, Safvet Pasha reminded Morris of a declaration made by David Porter, Charge d'Affairs of the United States at the time of the signing of the Treaty. Porter promised:

\(^7\) Morris to Safvet Pasha, November 12, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Folio 23, RG 84, USNA.

\(^7\) Quoted by Morris in Despatch 285, January 3, 1869, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^7\) Safvet Pasha to Morris, November 30, 1868, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 23708/20, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, RG 84, USNA.
Although some expression of the French translation from the Turkish instrument exchanged between the Plenipotentiaries of the two contracting parties, and which contain the Article of the treaty of Commerce concluded between the Sublime Porte and the United States of America may not perfectly agree with the Turkish original, this circumstance being only the result of the translation, and the Government of the United States being satisfied with the Turkish treaty and having unreservedly accepted it, the aforesaid instrument shall be strictly observed on all occasions. If in the future any discussion should arise between the two contracting parties the aforesaid instrument shall be consulted on my part, and that of my successors to remove the doubts.77

Safvet sent along a copy of the Turkish original and pointed out to Morris that the Turkish government had conferred on the Americans the same privileges which the subjects of other powers already enjoyed—leaving to the Minister or Consul execution of the punishment to which Americans might be condemned in cases of crimes or other offenses.78

Morris responded that he was aware of the Porter Declaration but that the American Legation contained no evidence that it was ever approved by the Government of the United States. The Minister explained that the English version (which was an exact translation of the French) had been confirmed by the Senate and no provision could be changed without that body's consent. No American Minister or Consul had any authority to deviate from the confirmed text. Further, under the policy of most favored nation treatment, Morris argued that

77 Ibid.

78 Safvet Pasha to Morris, November 30, 1868, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 23708/20, Notes from the Sublime Porte, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84, USNA; also see Morris Despatch 285 in the Official Correspondence, enclosure, January 3, 1869, RG 59, USNA.
the right of imprisonment had been concluded between the Porte and Austria at Passarowitz in 1718. A translation of the original Italian text states:

The Governors & other officers of whatsoever rank in the Ottoman provinces will not be permitted to imprison any of the aforesaid Imperial subjects, or any species accusation or pretext nor to disturb or molest them, when however one of them has to appear before an Ottoman tribunal, he shall be present with the knowledge of the Consul, and the assistance of the Dragoman, and shall be conducted by the aforesaid Consul and Interpreters to the Imperial prison.79

This American claim was on rather shaky ground because the article permitted a citizen to appear before an Ottoman tribunal in the presence of the Austrian Dragoman and with the consent of the Austrian government. But, the same article forbade imprisonment of Austrian citizens. Austrian citizens could be questioned in the presence of an Austrian Dragoman but the accused were to be sent home for trial and punishment.

The Turkish Foreign Minister took the position that if Morris acknowledged discrepancies in the translation but set aside the Porter Declaration, any treaty between the two countries would be nullified. Americans in Turkey would then be subject to the common law of Turkey.

Safvet Pasha explained that Article IV had nothing to do with unequal treatment for Americans and that the prisoners would be turned over to

79 Morris to Safvet Pasha, December 14, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, Letters Sent, Folio 23, Miscellaneous Correspondence, RG 84, USNA; Article V of the Treaty of Commerce concluded between the Sublime Porte and Austria at Passarowitz. See enclosure in Despatch 285, Morris to Seward, January 3, 1869, RG 59, USNA.
the American authorities to serve sentence. 80 Morris explained to Safvet Pasha that he had neither admitted to a mistranslation nor had he the right as a representative of the United States to deviate from the text of the Treaty as confirmed by the Senate. Morris informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs that he was required to await instructions from the Secretary of State. 81

The Turkish Minister to the United States, Blacque Bey, called on Secretary Fish and asked that Morris' protest be withdrawn. Fish recorded the meeting in his diary:

> He wished the claim withdrawn; thinks it inconsistent with & unsustained by the treaty; that the words under which Mr Morris claims jurisdiction, are not in the text of the Treaty (which is in the Turkish language) but only in the English translation thereof. He said the Turkish govt, was the most liberal in Europe, or America, to foreigners; that our Treaty followed those of other Countries, & that what Mr Morris claimed could not be allowed to the other Countries of Europe, which had "superior claims". I asked to be informed on what grounds they had any higher right to consideration, or any claim to better treatment, adding that he must pardon me for the question but I could not allow the remark to pass without inquiry & without expressing the hope that the claims of American citizens, should not be regarded as in any degree inferior to those of the citizens of other nations. 82

Morris suggested to the Department that "the interest of the two gov. requires that this difference of opinion touching the true

80 Safvet Pasha to Morris, January 10, 1869, No. 23966/2, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, RG 84, USNA.

81 Morris to Safvet Pasha, January 22, 1869, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letters Sent, RG 84, USNA.

82 Entry for March 18, 1869, Hamilton Fish Diary, Hamilton Fish Papers, Volume 1, Part 1, Container 314, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.
interpretation of the Treaty should be set at rest by an authorized
direct retranslation of the Treaty in English, or in some other
satisfactory manner.\textsuperscript{83}

In an effort to verify the degree of accuracy of the translation
from Turkish of Article IV, Morris instructed the Dragoman of the
Legation, John Porter Brown, to translate into French the original
Turkish text of the said article.\textsuperscript{84} Another translation from the
original Turkish Treaty had been made in 1865 by the Second Dragoman
of the British Embassy, Henry Timmons. Morris believed that a proper
translation had become important "with the increasing relations between
the United States and Turkey.\textsuperscript{85} Brown's translation of Article IV,
which was forwarded to the State Department on January 3, 1869, along
with the British Embassy's translation, confirmed the claims of the
Porte. Brown's translation of Article IV read:

Whenever controversies and suits occur between subjects of
the Sublime Porte and citizens of the American government
these shall not be heard or decided except in the presence
of the Dragoman. Those suits the amount of which exceed
500 piastres, shall be carried to the capital and there
examined with justice and equity. Whilst citizens of the
American government are quietly occupied with their commercial
affairs and no crimes or misdemeanor is verified against them,
they shall not, without cause, be troubled or molested and,
even a misdemeanor on their part has occurred they shall not
be imprisoned by the local authorities (Legal and Administrative)

\textsuperscript{83}Morris to Seward, January 3, 1869, Despatch 285, Official
Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\textsuperscript{84}Morris to Fish, March 17, 1869, Official Correspondence,
Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\textsuperscript{85}Ibid.
But, as is observed in regard to the treatment of other foreigners their punishment shall be effected with the cooperation of their Minister and Consuls. 86

Seward confronted with the inaccuracy of the translation of the Treaty instructed Morris to request the Dragoman of the Russian Embassy to "furnish you with an exact version in French of the Turkish text." 87 The Russian translation verified the Turkish claims. 88 The matter of the incorrect translation was not settled. In the next ten year period there is no evidence that the State Department ever took up this problem. The Official Correspondence shows that Morris allowed the matter to drop and neither of the next two American Ministers, Wayne MacVeagh or George H. Boker, attempted to use Article IV in disputes.

Morris continued to demand the release of the Americans. On March 17, 1869, young Canfield was surrendered to the American Legation. Brown gave the Turkish police a receipt for the prisoner and then handed over Canfield to his parents for deposit on a French steamer sailing immediately for the United States. 89 The following

86 Morris to Seward, December 17, 1868, Despatch 285, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

87 Seward to Morris, February 17, 1869, Instructions, Turkey, Despatch 212, RG 59, USNA.

88 Morris to Seward, April 9, 1869, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

89 John Porter Brown to Morris, March 17, 1869, and another written on March 13, 1869 in Constantinople Post Papers, Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, Miscellaneous Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.
week Andrew Romer and his fellow prisoners, including Eugene O'Reilly, were discharged from custody on the provision they should leave the country and never to return.90

In an October despatch Secretary Fish explained to Morris how the confusion over Article IV of the Treaty of 1830 had originated. Fish explained how he had ordered the State Department translators to study the translations of the Turkish original made in Constantinople and Washington, D. C. They concluded that the English version which the Senate had ratified and President Jackson signed was "erroneous." A reconstruction of the history of the translation disclosed that Charles Rhind, the American special agent to Turkey, employed two dragomen and instructed each to prepare a French version of the Turkish original which was sent to the United States along with a copy of the original Turkish treaty. Neither version proved satisfactory to the then Secretary of State, Martin Van Buren. The Secretary instructed an obscure State Department translator, William B. Hodgson, to prepare still another translation of the original Turkish treaty. Hamilton Fish noted: "It is, however obvious on inspection that Mr. Hodgson's

90Morris to Fish, March 24, 1869, Despatch 311, Official Correspondence, Constantinople, RG 59, USNA. Also see Hamilton Fish Diary, entry for March 25, 1869, Hamilton Fish Papers, Volume 1, Part 1, Container 314, p. 19, Library of Congress; Blacque Bey informed Fish that Canfield had been pardoned on his intercession. In an official letter, Blacque Bey to Seward, March 23, 1869, No. 256, Notes from the Turkish Legation, RG 59, USNA Blacque Bey stated: "I should add that among 150 of different nationalities who have been imprisoned in consequence of that criminal enterprise, and who were on the point of being sentenced, Mr. Lamar is thus far the only one who has been the subject of Imperial clemency."
translation is not from the Turkish original but seems to be compounded from the two French versions, . . . both of which err, as alleged by the Turkish government and as the other translations recently made, plainly show."^91

The problem of the mistranslated Article IV reveals a dearth of talent within the diplomatic corps in the early nineteenth century. Even by 1868, only two Americans in the Ottoman diplomatic service knew Ottoman Turkish and Arabic, Edward Joy Morris and John Porter Brown. Also, this Syrian incident reveals that the Foreign Relations Committee under the direction of Charles Sumner did not see the necessity either to negotiate a new treaty or to take a correctly translated treaty to the Senate for ratification. Hamilton Fish had sent all the communications relating to the Treaty to the Foreign Relations Committee. The Near East was still remote and not a primary concern for the American government.

Ottoman Turkey's very weakness encouraged its rulers to suspect the intentions of all western powers. This form of imperial paranoia colored the Porte's relations with even the far-off citizens of the United States. Because Britain, France, and Russia had in the past subjected the Ottomans to humiliating forms of intervention in their internal affairs, the Turks reasoned that America must do likewise.

The Turks expected American relations with their empire to follow the classic European model of seeking an excuse for intervention.

^91Hamilton Fish to Morris, October 19, 1869, Despatch 221, Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
Indeed, American press rhetoric during the 1866-69 Cretan Insurrection seemed to indicate that the United States, now recovered from the Civil War, would shortly make unreasonable demands upon the Sublime Porte.

As the Syrian Affair illustrates, the Turks were quick to suspect the United States of involvement because an American citizen or two inadvertently participated in an attempted rebellion. It must be remembered that the Syrian incident took place the same summer as American statements were made in Congress on opening the Straits, the visit of Admiral David Glasgow Farragut to Constantinople, a proposed resolution in the American Congress for the recognition of the independence of Crete, and the granting of a firman for the establishment of Robert College. The explosive economic growth of postwar America offered the Turks still another reason for supposing that American capital would seek new spheres of influence in the East. Attempts of American diplomats to gain special treatment for Henry M. Canfield and Andrew Romer alarmed the Turks still more; the demands that the accused Americans be treated differently from the citizens of any other country did nothing to allay Turkish suspicions. The amiable relations which had existed between Lincoln's government and that of the Sultan during the Civil War were damaged in 1868,
CHAPTER 9

CRETANS AND CRACKPOTS: AMERICAN INTEREST

IN THE CRETAN INSURRECTION, 1866-68

From the beginning of his assignment to Turkey, Edward Joy Morris had maintained that the consulates in Crete and Cyprus were useless to American interest and should be closed.\(^1\) He considered both consulates to be a source of Greek intrigue and points of possible conflict between the Porte and the American Legation. The American Minister feared that an outbreak of any European war would set off unrest in the provinces. In 1866, in the aftermath of the Austro-Prussian War, revolt exploded in Crete. Morris regretted that such troubles had "unfortunately arrived at a time when the credit of the Empire is greatly impaired & its finances are in a

\(^1\)See Edward Joy Morris to Seward, June 6, 1862, Despatch 21 and July 4, 1866, Despatch 159, Official Correspondence, Turkey, Record Group 59, United States National Archives, Washington, D. C. Hereafter cited RG 59, USNA. Also see New York Daily Tribune, December 7, 1866, when George Washburn reported the troubles on Cyprus, he concluded: "It is an absurdity for the United States to have a Consul with four dragomen and four cavasses in Cyprus; but so long as they are there they represent the country, and must be protected. It is not Mr. Morris's fault that they are there, and he has certainly acted in a vigorous and praiseworthy manner in the whole affair." For Stillman's views, see Stillman to Seward, January 30, 1866, Despatch 11, Consular Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 59, USNA. Stillman reported that there was no trade between Crete and the United States for 1865.
sad state of confusion."²

In July, 1866, Morris received notice that the American government had appointed William James Stillman to serve as Consul to Syra (an island in the Aegean belonging to Greece) as well as Crete. Syra was a well known place for Greek revolutionary activities. Morris did not like this appointment and wrote Seward that it was not advisable to "accredit one consul to two countries." He warned the Secretary of State that the Turkish government would look with suspicion on such an action. Because he thought a consulate at Syra would render some commercial interest and as America had no commercial activity on Crete, Morris suggested that the consulate at Crete be closed and the Consul transferred to Syra.³ Unfortunately for Morris, the American government did not follow his advice.

The American missionary, George Washburn, described William James Stillman, the American Consul to Crete, as "a genius of a type peculiar to America, a mystic, and enthusiast and later, one of the most brilliant writers ever on the staff of the London Times." After praising the virtues of both Stillman and Morris, Washburn noted: "Between the two, the United States, for the first time, came very

²Morris to Seward, May 17, 1866, Despatch 152, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

³Morris to Seward, July 4, 1866, Despatch 159, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
near intervening in the Eastern Question."⁴ The island of Crete had long been governed by one Ismail Pasha. Stillman described that gentleman as a renegade Greek who had grafted on to his "Greek duplicity all the worst traits of the Turk."⁵ The Christian residents of the island complained of heavy taxation and of bad government; their condition was worsened by a series of bad crops. On the eve of the insurrection, the Christian communities assembled and prepared an appeal to the Sultan, thus allowing American influence to enter the stage.⁶

Realizing that the Christians had petitioned directly to the Sultan for redress of their grievances, the Pasha ordered out the troops and convoked a special meeting of the foreign consuls. With the approval of the French Consul, Ismail Pasha announced that he intended to dissolve the Cretan Assembly. Because the Assembly was a legal body meeting peacefully, the other consuls refused to sanction the Pasha's plan. Members of the Assembly fled to the inaccessible mountains of Crete and the entire population, Muslim and Christian, prepared for a military confrontation. The consuls met with the Pasha

⁴George Washburn, "Robert College, 1856-1900," (Unpublished Manuscript, Robert College, Istanbul, Turkey), p. 14. Also see Stillman to Seward, May 14, 1866, Despatch 21, Consular Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 59, USNA. In this despatch Stillman announced the outbreak and commented: "It is scarcely hoped that it could result in any good to anyone."


⁶See Stillman to Seward, August 18, 1866, Despatch 25, Consular Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 59, USNA.
several times over a period of months in an attempt to prevent an outbreak of hostilities. Stillman described his role to Seward:

In these negotiations, partly because my American instincts have made me more uncompromisingly hostile to tyranny and less amenable to diplomatic reticence, and partly because our political position makes me free from suspicion of ulterior purposes in our actions, I have been put forward by that portion of the corps most hostile to the line of conduct of the Pasha in some measure as a spokesman. Stillman assured his government that he had refrained from all actions which could be considered in excess of consular privileges. But he pointed out to Seward that the Cretans were mindful of American friendship for Greece and as a result "come to me more than to some of the other consuls for hope in their adversity, and look more to our nation than to any other for that moral encouragement without which they must despair."

Mounting fear of the coming rebellion caused Muslims to desert their fields and seek safety in the cities; the Christians on the other hand fled to their mountain strongholds. The ensuing panic prompted Ismail Pasha to request troops from Constantinople; several battalions

---

7 Stillman to Seward, August 18, 1866, Despatch 25, op. cit. Stillman sent a copy of this despatch to Morris, see Constantinople Post Papers, Canea, Crete, RG 84, USNA. Also see the June 18, 1866, Despatch 22, Stillman to Seward. Stillman recorded the background of the outbreak in The Cretan Insurrection of 1866-7-8 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1874).

8 Stillman to Seward, August 18, 1866, Despatch 25, Consular Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 59, USNA.

9 Ibid.; also see Brown to Morris, August 25, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, Volume 2, RG 84, USNA.
of Turkish regulars and 8,000 Egyptian troops arrived within a few weeks.\(^{10}\)

There seemed to be many plans concerning the fate of Crete. In return for military assistance, the Porte planned to transfer the island to Egyptian administration.\(^{11}\) The plan was to persuade the Cretan leaders to request Egyptian administration. The Egyptian commander, Schahin Pasha, distributed money among the Cretan chiefs on the supposition that they could be bought. But the Cretans took the money and made no agreements. Because the American Consul was known to be trusted by the rebels, Schahin Pasha approached Stillman in hopes that he would be able to persuade the Cretans. George Washburn wrote that Stillman had been "offered and refused a fortune... if he would use his influence with the Cretans in favour of annexation to Egypt."\(^{12}\) Stillman sent the details of the Egyptian plan to Morris who in turn gave them to the English Ambassador. After the British were notified, there was no more discussion concerning the transfer

\(^{10}\) William James Stillman, The Cretan Insurrection of 1866-7-8, op. cit., p. 53. Also see Domna N. Doutas, Greece and The Great Powers (Institute of Balkan Studies, 1966), p. 70.

\(^{11}\) New York Herald, September 29, 1866, p. 3; Levant Herald, August 25, 1866; New York Daily Tribune, October 4, 1866, p. 1; October 16, 1866, p. 2, November 7, 1866, p. 2; W. J. Stillman, The Cretan Insurrection, op. cit., p. 53.

\(^{12}\) George Washburn, "Robert College, 1856-1900," op. cit., p. 16. Also see Stillman, The Cretan Insurrection, op. cit., p. 54.
of Crete to Egypt.\textsuperscript{13}

The Governor of Crete, Ismail Pasha, hoped to suppress the Cretan rebellion and, on the strength of his Greek blood, he expected to be named Prince of Crete. In order to suppress insurgents there had first to be an outbreak of hostilities. The Governor's progress on the road to provocation prompted the consuls to appeal to their home governments for protection. After a long period of waiting for some sign of protection by his government, Stillman was pleased with the arrival of the U. S. S. Ticonderoga.\textsuperscript{14} Stillman recorded the gunboat's intervention:

Commodore Steedman, her commander, was an old friend, and, hearing at Trieste of the insurrection, came on his own initiative to give me the support my government had not thought worth its while to accord me. He stayed a few days and sailed direct for Constantinople, which so impressed the authorities that I was no longer annoyed.\textsuperscript{15}

Schahin Pasha and the foreign consuls were diligently working to maintain peace. Stillman's role in the conciliation negotiations was such as to bring a warning from the militant wing of the Cretan rebels. He was told that if he did not cease to oppose the Cretan efforts that he would lose his influence with the Christians. To this warning, the American Consul gave notice as to his "indifference

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{13} Stillman, The Autobiography, Volume II, op. cit., p. 403. Also see Stillman, The Cretan Insurrection, op. cit., p. 56. Crete had been under the control of Mehemet Ali of Egypt from 1830 until 1841.
\bibitem{15} Stillman, The Autobiography, Volume II, p. 408.
\end{thebibliography}
to... influence if it did not help keep peace. 16

Peaceful solutions having failed, Ismail Pasha instigated a
confrontation between Cretans and Turks. Unfortunately for the
would-be Prince of Crete, his forces were badly defeated. 17 He called
on Schahin Pasha to send the Egyptian troops in support. Such a
request prompted the Egyptian commander to seek the advice of his new
friend, William J. Stillman. Stillman suggested that the controversy
was between two religious groups on Crete, and therefore, it would be
advisable for the Egyptian not to identify himself with either party.
Schahin Pasha agreed. However, the Cretan rebels demanded that the
Egyptians withdraw from the island or suffer the consequences. Again
with Stillman's approval, Schahin Pasha sent a message to the Cretan
leaders stating that Egyptian soldiers would take no part in the
action of the Turkish troops. The message was not permitted to reach
the Cretans who invested the Egyptian camp. 18

In the early stages of the rebellion, the Cretan rebels
defeated the troops of both Ismail Pasha and Schahin Pasha. Repeated
Turkish reverses resulted in the dismissal of Ismail Pasha, who returned

17 Stillman, The Autobiography, Volume II, p. 409. Also see
Stillman to Seward, September 23, 1866, Despatch 27, Consular
Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 59, USNA.
Stillman to Charles Eliot Norton, July 26, 1866, Charles Eliot Norton
Papers, bns, Am 1088, Item 7122, Houghton Library, Harvard University;
to Constantinople in disgrace. Cretan successes brought a considerable number of Greek volunteers. A Greek blockade runner also arrived with arms, ammunition, food, and clothing for the rebels. The Cretans were further encouraged by the arrival of a Russian frigate. Stillman claimed that the Russian Consul on Crete had advised the Cretan rebels against concessions. 19

Even with the success of the Cretans, Stillman refused to offer the rebels any encouragement. He maintained that he had persistently urged submission and considered the situation hopeless. Since the rebels received encouragement from Athens, he considered further attempts at conciliation as "wasted breath." 20 According to Stillman, he was the "recognized official protector of the Cretans." 21 Yet, he claimed: "I had always done my best to discourage hostilities and to persuade the Cretans to leave their wrongs to diplomatic treatment." 22

As a good newspaper man, Stillman knew the value of accurate first-hand information. He formed around him an efficient service of informants bringing in the earliest reports on every event of importance. One of the American Consul's most important sources of information was the son

19 Stillman, The Autobiography, pp. 411-415; Morris to Seward, October 5, 1866, Private Letter, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester. Also see Stillman to Seward, October 14, 1866, Despatch 31 and November 19, 1866, Despatch 32, Consular Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 59, USNA. Also see Stillman, The Cretan Insurrection, pp. 75-76.


21 Ibid., p. 417.

22 Ibid., p. 418.
of Reshid Pasha. Stillman communicated all information to the
foreign Legations at Athens and to the American Minister in Constantin-
ople. The Consul claimed that the accuracy of his information was
recognized at the highest levels, for even Ali Pasha sent regularly to
Morris for information.  

The Battle of Arkadi Monastery, said by many to be the turning
point in the Cretan rebellion, swayed public opinion in Europe and
America in favor of the Cretans. The American Consul, one of the most
articulate spokesmen for the Cretan people, sent accounts of the battle
to European and American newspapers and periodicals. Believing that
he was no longer an instrument for peace, Stillman described his role:

For myself, under the advice of our minister at Constantinople,
I had thrown off all reserve within my consular rights and
used all my influence with my colleagues, especially the honest,
if too pro-Turkish, Dickson [Charles H. Dickson, English Consul
to Crete], and at the same time disseminated the truth as to the
condition of the island in every possible way. The Turkish
authorities naturally retaliated to the best of their power and
patrols of zapties [police] watched my house in front and rear,
for the idea had entered the mind of the governor that I was the
postman of the insurrection. But I held no direct communication
with the insurgents, and no letter ever passed through my hands,
while the Greek and Russian consuls, unwatched, kept up a
regular postal service.

24 Ibid., p. 418.
25 For Stillman's articles in The Nation, Volume IV (New York:
E. L. Godkin and Company, 1867); January 17, 1867, pp. 94-5; January
24, 1867, p. 76; April 18, 1867, p. 319. Also see Stillman, The
Autobiography, p. 422.
It is important to note that Stillman never advocated the annexation of Crete to Greece. In fact, from the beginning, he spoke against such a plan. He maintained that justice could best be achieved through Cretan autonomy with Turkey under a Christian governor.27

By late August, 1866, the American Minister at Constantinople was aware that the Cretan revolt was serious, and he reported to Seward that the Turkish government had decided to "put down the rebellion by overwhelming numbers." Morris thought that the Cretan rebels would have to give in unless they were able to obtain outside assistance.28 By the end of September, Morris concluded that it would be impossible for the insurgents to continue as the Turkish government was constantly despatching more troops to the island.29 In this same despatch, for the first time, the Minister noted that Greece had taken an active part in the Cretan uprising. He observed that King George of Greece had done nothing to restrain demonstrations in favor of the Cretans.30

William J. Stillman's accounts to the State Department of the political conditions existing on Crete caused Seward to send off a

27 Stillman to Morris, December 20, 1866 and July 8, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 84, USNA.

28 Morris to Seward, September 21, 1866 and September 29, Despatch 170, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

29 Morris to Seward, September 29, 1866, Despatch 170, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
fiery despatch, expressing American sympathy for the suffering Cretan Christians. Morris informed his diplomatic colleagues as to the contents of the despatch, and even quoted portions of Seward's statement in public. Morris wrote that the concern expressed by the American Secretary of State created a sensation among the Greeks in Constantinople, and excited apprehension among the representatives of the Great Powers. He pointed out to Seward that the United States was the first nation to "express common humanitarian sentiments" in behalf of the Cretan rebels. Morris thought that such a humanitarian attitude had "stung the representatives of England, France and Austria to the quick as it brought the U. S. into the foreground & threw them into the rear." Morris maintained that if anything would induce the Protecting Powers to intervene on behalf of the Cretans it would be the fact that the "U. S. has spoken in their behalf." The Minister added: "The moral influence of the few lines, . . . you have addressed me, will I am satisfied be great and will do more than anything else to stimulate a humanitarian intercession." Morris' great ambition was to increase American prestige in the Eastern Mediterranean. By the fall of 1866, he would write: "I flatter myself it [American prestige] never was so widely extended & so firmly established as now." 32

31 Seward to Morris, September 25, 1866, Despatch 119, Official Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

32 This paragraph was based on a despatch written by Morris, November 15, 1866, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, RG 59, USNA.
George Washburn confirmed Morris' estimation of the American position. In his weekly article for the New York Tribune, he quoted a statement printed in a Constantinople paper, L' Etoile d'Orient:

America is the lion of the day in our capital. In addition to the affair of Cyprus, it is said that Mr. E. Joy Morris of the United States of America, in virtue of instructions from his Government has requested the whole diplomatic corps to unite with him in pleading the cause of the insurgents in Crete. As one may see this is a direct intervention of that power, in good and regular form.33

Washburn claimed that all Constantinople was discussing the Americans. He had been assured "fifty times within a few days that all the hopes of the Cretans are now centered upon the United States," But, Washburn cautioned, if this was "interference in good and regular form," then we have really crossed the Rubicon and entered into European politics.34

Indeed, in a despatch dated September 25, 1866, Seward had instructed Morris to confer with his diplomatic colleagues with a view to using the American position for ameliorating conditions on Crete.35 With such encouragement from his government, Morris had attempted to procure the influence of the entire diplomatic corps on behalf of the Cretan Christians. But, as he told the regular correspondent of the New York Herald, he was snubbed by them all. Morris told that correspondent:

34Ibid.
35Seward to Morris, September 25, 1866, Despatch 199, Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
I went, according to instructions received from Mr. Seward, to the British Embassy, and saw Lord Lyons. "Well," he said, "I admire your spirit, and my sympathies, as a Christian, are with the Cretans; but—I have received no such instructions from my government and therefore my dear Mr. Morris, can do nothing."

The rest of the diplomatic corps, as reported in the Herald, was not so polite to the ambitious attempts of the American Minister. Morris also approached Ali Pasha and offered American assistance for mediation. He felt that he had presented his statement to the Porte in a positive tone. Morris explained to Seward: "I have aimed so to act in this Cretan question as to avoid wounding the susceptibilities of the Porte unnecessarily, while carefully manifesting the sympathies which you have allowed me to express." It seemed that the American eagle was still an eaglet and had not yet gained power enough for serious consideration by the Great Powers.

For many reasons, over which he had little control, Morris' confident attitude was not to continue. In early December, 1866, Morris was accused by Ali Pasha of uttering disparaging remarks about Ottoman administration on Crete. Ali Pasha informed Morris through

---

36 New York Herald, April 3, 1867, p. 4.

37 Ibid. Likewise, Cyrus Hamlin reported in the New York Times, February 5, 1867, p. 8 that Morris acting directly on instructions from Washington, suggested to the diplomatic body that they make a collective friendly appeal to the Porte in favor of the insurgents but was given the cold shoulder by the entire diplomatic corps.

38 Morris to Seward, December, 1866, Despatch 184, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Also see the New York Daily Tribune, December 7, 1866, p. 8.
the American Legation dragoman, John Porter Brown, that the Porte was unhappy with such remarks. The Turkish Foreign Minister implied that Morris should be held responsible to him for such statements. Morris instructed Brown to read a prepared answer to the Ottoman Minister:

I cannot admit his right [Ali Pasha's] to hold me to account for private conversation between members of the diplomatic corps and myself. To allow this would be to concede him a censorship which would render me responsible to him for every casual remark occurring in my daily intercourse with the representatives of foreign governments.  

Morris wrote Ali that it was absurd to believe that he had in any way encouraged the insurrection movement. In fact, he reminded the Foreign Minister, the American Legation had urged the removal of Ismail Pasha whose administration resulted in the revolt of the Cretans. The American Minister assured Ali Pasha that he would do nothing to disturb the friendly relations existing between the United States and Turkey. Morris stated: "It has always been my aim to strengthen & confirm them & with that view I have earnestly sought to settle on an equitable basis all questions likely to lead to a misunderstanding."  

Ali Pasha replied that he was not "foolish enough to prevent free communication between members of the diplomatic corps." But, the Foreign Minister claimed the right to have an opinion on remarks made by members of the diplomatic corps. It was then that Ali Pasha

39 Morris to Brown, December 10, 1866, Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, Volume 2, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84, USNA.

40 Ibid.
voiced the real source of his displeasure—the correspondence of
William J. Stillman in the press. Ali noted that it was public
knowledge that letters published in the Levant Herald were written
by the American Consul on Crete. 41

For several months Ali Pasha had complained that Stillman
sympathized with and encouraged the insurgents on Crete against the
Sultan. 42 He warned Morris that if Stillman continued such activ-
ities the Porte would be compelled to make an appeal directly to the
President of the United States. John Porter Brown reported his
conversation with the Foreign Minister:

He [Ali Pasha] then requested me to add that during the
late Civil War in the U. S. the American Government was
extremely sensitive on the subject of any foreign interfer-
ence in the war, & whilst some powers showed a strong dis-
position to interfere in favor of the rebels; the Ottoman
Govt. had rejected even the idea of such an interference
under any form, in the affairs of a friendly power and by
its conduct showed that it has determined to abstain from
any sympathy whatever with the rebels, that the Ottoman
Govt. now expects a similar course on the part of the
American Representatives in Turkey. 42

Morris informed Stillman of Ali Pasha's complaints and
requested a full explanation. Morris had several times cautioned

41 Brown to Morris, December 11, 1866, Correspondence between
Minister and Secretary, Volume 2, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84,
USNA. See Stillman to Morris, November 2, 1866, Constantinople Post
Papers, General Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 84, USNA. And Morris
to Brown, December 10, 1866, Correspondence between Minister and
Secretary, RG 84, USNA.

42 Brown to Morris, August 25, 1866, Constantinople Post
Papers, Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, Volume 2,
RG 84, USNA. See the New York Daily Tribune, October 4, 1866, p. 1;
Washburn wrote: "I understand that the Porte complains that the
American Consul has furnished the Rebels with arms."
the Consul against any "complicity with the insurrection." Stillman argued that his assigned duties necessitated collection of all available facts for the American government. He admitted, however, that the correspondent for the Levant Herald had obtained verification of information at the American Consulate. Stillman defended his position:

I beg leave to assure his Highness through you, ... that so far as the correspondantship is concerned my instructions forbid any such participation in local politics and that I have addressed but one letter, many weeks ago to the Levant Herald in correction of some errors their correspondent had fallen into in a question of fact.

Morris explained to Ali Pasha that the American Consul had gained the hostility of Ismail Pasha, who in turn, misrepresented Stillman's motives and activities to the Porte. Evidently, Ali Pasha did not accept the explanation for he continued to complain of Stillman's publications and his meddling in local political problems. Each

---

43 Brown to Morris, November 10, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, Volume 2, RG 84, USNA.

44 Stillman to Morris, November 2, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 84, USNA. Also see Morris to Brown, December 10, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, Volume 2, RG 84, Stillman to Morris, December 29, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 84, USNA.

45 Stillman to Morris, November 2, 1866, op. cit.

46 Morris to Brown, December 10, 1866, op. cit.
accusation necessitated an explanation from Stillman.\textsuperscript{47} Morris accepted Stillman's explanations and defended him at the Porte.\textsuperscript{48}

Publication of letters seemed to plague the American Minister. He found out that an unofficial letter which he had written to the State Department on August 28, 1866, had been published in Europe. The letter appeared in a collection of documents on the Cretan situation. Morris claimed the letter had not been written for publication; thus, he feared, its appearance "may place the government in an unfavorable position to the Porte should it become known here."\textsuperscript{49} Morris urgently requested that this letter and any others like it not be published in the State Department Papers as a permanent document. He suggested that if letters on internal Turkish affairs were published they should be expurgated of much of their "offensive character."\textsuperscript{50}

An official letter written by Stillman to Seward appeared in a December 20, 1866, issue of the New York Herald.\textsuperscript{51} As part of his


\textsuperscript{48}Morris to Seward, December 11, 1867, Private Letter, William H. Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

\textsuperscript{49}Morris to Seward, February 20, 1867, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\textsuperscript{50}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{51}New York Herald, December 20, 1866, p. 5.
report on the local political conditions, Stillman described a three-day battle on Crete, a defeat suffered by Ottoman troops, alleged atrocities committed by Turkish soldiers, and the living conditions of the Cretan Christians—a most heartrending letter. As newspaper correspondents did not have unlimited access to official information in 1866, it can only be assumed that this document was leaked to the press by some source in the State Department.

As though conditions were not yet unpleasant enough for the American Legation, in June, 1867, a member of the Russian consular staff brought a letter addressed to William J. Stillman to the home of the American kavas (consular guard). The kavas set off with the letter for Suda Bay where Stillman was supposedly on board his yacht. Upon reaching the bay, the kavas signaled for a boat to take him out to the yacht. Much to his dismay, the vessel that answered his call carried several Ottoman policemen who agreed to transport the frightened kavas to the yacht. Once on board, the Ottoman police refused to deliver the kavas to his chosen destination, but, instead, took him to the Admiral of the Turkish fleet for questioning. The Admiral demanded the letter which the kavas refused to surrender. In spite of his continued protests, the Turkish police forcefully took the document.\(^{52}\) Needless to say, Stillman demanded full satisfaction even though the letter in question was from the provisional governor

\(^{52}\)Morris to Seward, July 31, 1867, Despatch 120 (numbered incorrectly 220), Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
of the Cretan Christian Assembly. The Assembly had forwarded a special letter to each of the consuls by way of the Russian consulate.

Morris had no other choice than to demand the return of the letter to Stillman and that appropriate apologies be made to American officials. Fuad Pasha agreed and informed Server Efendi, the Imperial Commissioner to Crete, to apologize to Stillman for the incident and to return the letter. The next mail brought the report that Server Efendi had apologized, but he had not returned the letter. Morris immediately told Fuad Pasha of the latest news from Crete and demanded the return of the letter to the Consul. The American Minister explained to Seward that he felt that it was his duty to insist upon the return to Stillman of "the purloined letter." Firm orders were sent to the Imperial Commissioner of Crete by Fuad Pasha, and eventually, Morris was able to report to the State Department that Stillman had the letter in question.

---

53 Stillman to Morris, June 16, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 84, USNA.

54 Morris to Ali Pasha, July 21, 1867; August 6, 1867; November 26, 1867; all letters found in Letters Sent, Folio 23, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, RG 84, USNA.

55 Morris to Seward, October 1, 1867, Despatch 229, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

56 Morris to Seward, October 25, 1867, Despatch 233, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

57 Morris to Seward, December 4, 1867, Despatch 239, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA; Morris to Seward, December 4, 1867, Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.
Many of the dragomen serving foreign consulates in Turkey were Greeks. Their sympathy for the Christian Cretan revolt caused considerable diplomatic difficulty for the American Legation. In July, 1867, George Saridacki, the American dragoman on Crete and a citizen of Greece, left that island to visit with his family on one of the nearby Greek islands. Upon his return to Crete, he was arrested by the Turkish police. Saridacki showed the police his American passport which the local officials dismissed as "good for nothing."\(^{58}\) Using their best insults, the police conducted George Saridacki in a very rough manner to a departing Austrian steamer and told him never to return to Crete. Again, Stillman was angry and again he demanded satisfaction.\(^{59}\)

Morris informed Fuad Pasha that the police officers who used such abusive language should be cashiered, that the local officials should apologize, and that George Saridacki should receive an indemnity. Morris sent Fuad Pasha all the relative information which would justify American demands.\(^{60}\) Fuad Pasha ordered an investigation and discovered

\(^{58}\) Morris to Seward, November 27, 1867, Despatch 238, Official Correspondence, Turkey, see enclosure; Stillman to Seward, May 14, 1866, Despatch 20, Consular Correspondence, Canea, Crete; on confirmation of George Saridacki as dragoman see Stillman to Seward, December 10, 1867, Despatch 57; all letters found in RG 59, USNA.

\(^{59}\) Morris to Seward, November 27, 1867, Despatch 238, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^{60}\) Morris to Seward, November 27, 1867, Despatch 238, op. cit.; see enclosure; Fuad Pasha to Morris, May 27, 1868, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 21887/5, Notes from the Sublime Porte, Constantinople Post Papers and Morris to Fuad Pasha, November 27, 1867 and July 6, 1868, Letters Sent, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84, USNA.
that Saridacki was suspected of being a principal instigator of the trouble on Crete. Fuad Pasha maintained that the Ottoman officials had deemed it their duty to "preserve public order against the ... promoters of discord." Many months passed, several letters were exchanged, and discussions were held before the final settlement was reached for the case. In the fall of 1868, Morris wrote Seward that he had been able to settle the "very vexatious case of Mr. Saridacki." The Ottoman government permitted Saridacki to return to Crete, returned his property, and permitted him to resume his functions as American dragoman.

Likewise, the harbor master at the American Consulate on Scio was a Greek citizen identified only as P. Petinos. On a special Greek holiday, in July, 1868, he got drunk and made uncomplimentary remarks about the Turkish government. The governor of the island arrested Petinos knowing that he was an employee of the American consulate. The unfortunate master was clapped into irons and carried off to prison in the Dardanelles. Morris felt it advisable to act unofficially as Petinos had made himself so obnoxious to the Ottoman

61 Fuad Pasha to Morris, May 27, 1868, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 218875, Notes from the Sublime Porte, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84, USNA. Blacque Bey gave a copy of this despatch to Seward, see Notes from the Turkish Legation, RG 59, USNA.

62 Morris to Seward, October 29, 1868, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

63 Ibid.

64 Morris to Seward, August 31, 1868, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
authorities. The Minister humbly requested Petrinos' release, his return to Scios on a government vessel, and an apology to the government of the United States. In consequence of the closure of the United States consulate at Scios, Morris dropped the case and left Petrinos to his fate. Later the same year, Morris wrote Seward that Petrinos had been set at liberty and the questions arising from his arrest had been satisfactorily adjusted.

With so many cases facing the American Minister concerning Greek nationals employed by American consulates, Morris opposed establishing additional consular posts in the Eastern Mediterranean. He even went so far as to suggest the closing of all consular posts which had no commercial value for the United States. Because some consulates and consular agencies often served as centers for political intrigue and American officers were accused of meddling in local affairs, Morris argued that unneeded posts resulted in embarrassment for both the United States and Turkey.

---

65 Morris to Seward, October 29, 1868, Despatch 271, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Also see Morris to Fuad Pasha, August 30, 1868, Letters Sent, Folio 23; Ali Pasha to Morris, September 12, 1868, Private Note, No. 23244/13, Grand Vezirat, Notes from the Sublime Porte; Fuad to Morris, September 9, 1868, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 23237/12, Notes from the Sublime Porte; RG 84, USNA.

66 Morris to Seward, October 29, 1868, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

67 Morris opposed such posts. He wrote: "I apprehended at the time the consulate in Scio was reestablished that difficulties would grow out of it, and I so expressed myself in a communication to you. The appointment of Petrocchino as Consul was not good policy as he is by birth a Scot though he resided a long time in the United States and may have acquired our nationality. We have no American residents
As the Cretan rebellion dragged on, Stillman urged the American government to send an American warship to evacuate Cretan-Christian refugees, who the Consul claimed were dying of cold and hunger. Stillman detailed his actions for the American government and requested instructions. Seward assured the Consul that he had the support of the American government. In fact, Seward informed the American Minister at Constantinople that Stillman's procedure had the approval of the State Department. The American Secretary of State promised Stillman that Rear Admiral Louis M. Goldsborough, commander of the European Squadron, had been instructed to send a warship to Crete. Stillman believed that the American warship would be

in Scio, no commerce there whatsoever & in my opinion a consulate there is not only entirely useless but eminently dangerous. That island is intensely Greek & the population is animated by a fierce traditional hatred of the Turks from the dreadful massacres of the Greek War of Independence. In my opinion we can only prejudice our own interests by maintaining a consulate. . . . The multiplication of consular agencies in Turkey in the present state of this Empire is not only bad policy but directly inimical to our interests." See Morris to Seward, August 31, 1868, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Also see the New York Daily Tribune, September 14, 1866, p. 1. George Washburn wanted posts of no value closed. He described Crete as having no American residents, never visited by American travelers, and no trade.

Stillman to Seward, October 8, 1866, Despatch 30, October 14, 1866, Despatch 31; November 19, 1866, Despatch 32; Consular Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 59, USNA.

Seward to Stillman, December 25, 1866, Consular Instructions, Canea, Crete, RG 59, USNA; a copy of this despatch was sent to Gideon Wells by L. M.; Goldsborough, March 21, 1867, No. 19, Series 3, Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers of Squadrons, 1841-1886, Squadron Letters, European Squadron, RG 45, USNA.
instructed to transport Cretan refugees to a nearby island.\(^70\)

Excited by Seward's approving tone, Stillman showed the despatch to the commander of H. M. S. Assurance, identified only as Captain Pym. Stillman wrote that Seward's despatch fired the commander with desire to distinguish himself by taking the initiative in the work of humanity.\(^71\) The overzealous American went off to persuade the British Consul to obtain the necessary permission from the Cretan governor. All agreed that women and children could be transported and, thus, the first act of foreign interference in the Cretan insurrection was completed.\(^72\) Upon his return to Crete, the British Captain told Stillman: "If I am reprimanded by my government I shall lay it to you but if I am approved I will give you credit for it."\(^73\)

Upon learning of the exploits of the British Captain and American Consul, General Nicholas Ignatieff, Russian Ambassador to the Porte, obtained from Ali Pasha permission for other ships to transport Cretan women and children to safety. However, the Grand


\(^73\)Stillman to Morris, December 29, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 84, USNA.
Vezir changed his decision and the permission was soon revoked. By November 7, 1866, Morris felt obligated to assist the efforts of the American Consul, and so he wrote directly to Rear Admiral Goldsborough requesting that he send a warship to pick up women and children of the insurgent families and transport them to Milos. Goldsborough answered that he did not feel himself authorized to employ a vessel on such a mission without orders from the Navy Department. Nonetheless, he informed Morris that he had written for instructions to the American Secretary of the Navy. Morris requested Seward to obtain the necessary orders for Admiral Goldsborough to carry away "to the neighboring islands...such of the women & children as desire to leave the island for they are perishing by hundreds from starvation. This of course with the consent of the Turkish authorities." Morris informed Ali Pasha that such an American vessel had been requested. He told Ali that transportation would only take place if the Turkish government...
did not object. Morris reminded the Turkish Minister that it had always been customary to allow women and children to leave places exposed to the ravages of war.\textsuperscript{77}

On December 25, 1866, Seward stated that he approved Stillman's "taking the initiative in the deportation of those families."\textsuperscript{78} After instructing Morris to "govern yourself accordingly," he informed the American Minister: "Admiral Goldsborough will be directed to send a vessel of war to that island for the purpose indicated."\textsuperscript{79} Because no American ship arrived in the Eastern Mediterranean, Morris wrote Goldsborough concerning the Seward communication. The Admiral responded that no word had been received from the government one way or the other. Goldsborough explained his position to Morris: "It is, I think, far beyond my authority to detail a vessel for the purpose in view, to act in defiance of the local authorities, or despite of their opposition, for I at least must bear in mind that we are at peace with Turkey."\textsuperscript{80}

Goldsborough confided to Morris that there was good reason to believe Captain Pym's action did not meet with the approval of the

\textsuperscript{77}Morris to Brown, December 10, 1866, Constantinople Post Papers, Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, Volume 2, RG 84, USNA.

\textsuperscript{78}Seward to Morris, December 25, 1866, Despatch 127, Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\textsuperscript{79}Ibid.; see Stilman to Seward, February 10, 1867, Despatch 39, Consular Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 59, USNA.

\textsuperscript{80}L. M. Goldsborough to Morris, February 4, 1867, Letters to Ministers and Consuls, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letter Book, European Squadron, June 6, 1865 to June 30, 1867, Item 98 (b) Appendix E, RG 45, USNA.
British government. The Admiral had observed that no other British vessel, and there were many nearby, had joined the rescue mission. Again on February 15, 1867, Morris inquired as to the whereabouts of the promised American vessel. This time the Commander made it very clear: "In short, I must not, and will not, act of my own accord seemingly heedless as to the consequence of incurring the dissatisfaction of the Turkish government against our own." He felt that no people should be more sensitive to outside interference in internal affairs than Americans. Goldsborough maintained that it was for the government and not for individual officers to decide when such interference should take place. It was obvious, Goldsborough concluded, from the silence of the American government that it did not intend for the Navy to take any action. He waited many weeks at Villefranco in order to receive the anticipated instructions before again putting out to sea. The instructions never arrived.

London condemned Captain Pym's involvement by declaring his transportation of refugees an infringement of neutrality. In

81 Goldsborough to Morris, February 4, 1867, Letters to Ministers and Consuls, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letter Book, European Squadron, June 6, 1865 to June 30, 1867, Item 98 (b), Appendix E, RG 45, USNA.

82 Goldsborough to Morris, February 27, 1867, Letters to Ministers and Consuls, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letter Book, European Squadron, op. cit., RG 45, USNA.

83 Goldsborough to Stillman, March 10, 1867, Letters to Ministers and Consuls, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letter Book, European Squadron, op. cit., RG 45, USNA.
addition, the Russian ship, Grand Admiral, made only one trip. The Porte maintained that it could tolerate no foreign interference in the Cretan question even for humanitarian reasons. Morris countered this argument by replying that, since the British and Russians had been permitted to carry away refugees, an American ship should have the same rights. He wrote Admiral Goldsborough that Turkish sensibilities could be smoothed after the Cretan refugees were rescued.

Morris was not the only diplomatic officer pressing for American naval involvement in the Cretan refugee question. In a rash moment, Stillman sent Goldsborough a copy of Seward's December letter, along with a personal communication to the State Department complaining of the "unaccountable delay of the Admiral." Goldsborough assured the Consul that he was at full liberty to write to the Department of State whatever he pleased, but not to send the Commander of

---

84 See the New York Herald, April 6, 1867, p. 4; Goldsborough to Morris, March 21, 1867, op. cit. The Admiral wrote Morris: "And in your letter to me of February 14 you state, upon the authority of the British Ambassador, that the act of Captain Pym of the 'Assurance' was sustained by the British Government. There must, I think, have been some misapprehension on this point on the part of the Ambassador, for I have just seen in 'Galignani's Messenger' of March 11-12, the sketch of a discussion, in regard to Crete, which took place in the British House of Lords, on the 8th inst., in which the Duke of Argyyle, the Earl of Derby and others participated, and from which I gather quite distinctly (among a good many other things of much interest and all well to know) that the British government in reality did not approve the course of Captain Pym."

85 Morris to Seward, February 20, 1867, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

86 Goldsborough to Stillman, March 10, 1867, Letters to Ministers and Consuls, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letter Book, European Squadron, op. cit.; Stillman to Seward, March 10, 1867, Despatch 44, and March 14, 1867, Despatch 45, Consular Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 59, USNA.
the European Squadron letters which were "intended to operate to my prejudice." Goldsborough informed the excited Consul that since he had waited so long without receiving any instructions on the subject, a vessel would be despatched to Crete and elsewhere in the Levant with full instructions as to its course of action.

Learning that Goldsborough intended sending an American man-of-war to visit the Eastern Mediterranean, Stillman again requested that the ship take Cretan refugees without permission from the Turkish government. After reminding the Consul that it was not Navy Department custom to place a man-of-war under the control or orders of a consul, Goldsborough remarked that no individual officer was competent to determine when another nation had behaved badly enough to warrant intervention.

About this same time, Morris received a Navy Department despatch stating that no American Naval vessel could transport Cretan women and children from the island without Turkish permission.

---

87 Goldsborough to Stillman, March 10, 1867, op. cit.
88 Ibid.
89 Goldsborough to Stillman, April 19, 1867, Letters to Ministers and Consuls, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letter Book, European Squadron, op. cit., RG 45, USNA.
90 Gideon Wells to Seward, December 31, 1866, Gideon Wells Papers, Volume 79, Letter Book, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. Wells wrote: "I would state that our vessels of war are not adopted for such service, but if Mr. Morris should obtain the permission of the Turkish Government for the removal of such persons, and send it to Rear Admiral Goldsborough, the Department will interpose no objections to his removing them."
Thereupon, Morris arranged an interview with Fuad Pasha on the topic. Morris told the Foreign Minister that the condition of the women and children of Crete had excited intense sympathy in the United States. This sympathy had compelled the American government to respond but, Morris assured Fuad Pasha, such a response came in a spirit of friendship toward the Turkish government. If Fuad should agree, the United States would send a vessel to carry away from Crete those refugees who wished to leave. Fuad appreciated the American concern but, as he told Morris, a commission was investigating the conditions of the families remaining on Crete. The Turkish Foreign Minister claimed that those who wished to leave the island would be transported in Turkish ships to Scio or Samos. Morris confided to Seward that he doubted whether the Cretans would accept any offers of kindness from the Turks.\footnote{Morris to Seward, March 13, 1867, Despatch 198, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.}

Morris had assumed that he would be able to obtain formal permission from the Turkish government for removal of the Cretan refugees. Once this possibility was removed, the Minister convinced himself that Ali and Fuad would not object if an American ship removed the women and children without permission. He continued to urge Goldsborough to send a ship.\footnote{Goldsborough to Wells, February 28, 1867, No. 15, Series 3, Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy, Squadron Letters, European Squadron, \textit{op. cit.}, RG 45, USNA.} Finally, Morris wrote Seward that the failure to send an American ship would "injure vastly our prestige not only in the East but throughout Europe." Morris stated...
that he considered it a "serious mistake" not to exert American influence in the East. Because Seward's December despatch had been communicated to the public, the Minister acknowledged that the non-appearance of the American vessel to take away the suffering families had resulted in "great disappointment" and "much misery."\(^{93}\)

It is clear that Morris was attempting to go beyond his instructions. Seward was not eager to intervene in the Cretan affair for the European powers had decided not to encourage further removal of the refugees. In addition, Gideon Wells, American Secretary of the Navy, was opposed to any interference in Turkish internal problems.\(^{94}\) Admiral Goldsborough was displeased with Stillman's procedure and forwarded all correspondence related to the Cretan question to Washington.\(^{95}\) After careful review of all correspondence, Seward placed the blame for the controversy upon the Minister's

---

\(^{93}\) Morris to Seward, February 20, 1867, Private Letter, Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Also see Stillman to Morris, February 10, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 84, USNA.

\(^{94}\) Gideon Wells to William H. Seward, March 21, 1867, Gideon Wells Papers, Volume 79, Letter Book, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Wells informed Seward that the persistent efforts of Morris to obtain a naval vessel were "embarrassing." The Secretary wrote: "The views and the position taken by Rear Admiral Goldsborough meet the approval of this Department, and are in conformity with its instructions. I cannot therefore otherwise than regret that Mr. Morris should so urgently call upon him to deviate from his instructions and his duty." Also see Gideon Wells Diary, entry for March 21, 1867, pp. 70-71, Library of Congress, Gideon Wells Papers.

\(^{95}\) Goldsborough to Wells, March 14, 1867, No. 16, Series 3, see enclosures, Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy, European Squadron, RG 45, USNA.
misunderstanding of American policy. Seward inquired of Morris if he had intended to express a censorious opinion of State Department policy. The Minister replied that his actions had protected the American government against accusations of insensibility to human suffering.

During 1867-68, European ships transported thousands of Cretans to nearby islands and Greece. This transportation was effected by the French, Russians, Italians, Austrians, and Prussians. The United States was the only major Christian power which never participated in the removal of the refugees. As the Greek Minister to the United States lamented to Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

During the late contest when thousands of starving women & children were exposed for long winter weeks on the barren rocks of Crete, & there perishing so miserably that even those Powers, which ultimately gave the last blow to the Cretan Revolution, sent their vessels to transport them to the friendly shores of Greece, the star spangled banner, & I say it with deep sorrow, was the only one not to join in that act of humanity. The impression caused by this fact in the Eastern world, where the Great Republic is so much admired & loved, could not but

96 Seward to Morris, April 1, 1867, Despatch 138, Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

97 Morris to Seward, April 24, 1867, Despatch 204, Official Correspondence, RG 59, USNA.

98 See the New York Herald, August 9, 1867, p. 5 and November 8, 1867, p. 4; Morris to Seward, December 4, 1867, Private Letter, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester; Stillman to Morris, August 11, 1867, Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 84, USNA.

99 See the New York Herald, August 9, 1867, p. 5 and October 18, 1867, p. 4.
be painful; it was that of astonishment more than anything else, because every Oriental Christian never doubted that the great Christian nation of America was bound to be among the first in an act of so bold, & purely philanthropic a character.100

The total number of refugees landed in Greece was reported to exceed 60,000. Greece, always short of funds, found it necessary to rely upon western charity in order to supply the needs of these people. Inadequate funds resulted in extensive suffering, illness, and many deaths. By the winter of 1868, Cretan refugees petitioned the Turkish Minister at Athens for return passage to their homes. The Turkish government furnished steamers to transport the returning families and provided them with adequate funds for their immediate needs.101

Appeals to western charity for the immediate needs of the Cretans were made through the European and American press. Periodicals such as The Nation reminded readers that Americans had supported the Cretans in 1829 and that now again, in 1866, they needed sympathy and aid.102 The editor of The Nation, Charles Eliot Norton, was a life-long friend of William J. Stillman. During the Cretan struggle, Stillman sent Norton descriptive accounts of the battle on Crete. The Consul's articles appealed to the local patriotism of New England

100 Alexander Ragnabe (Greek Minister to the United States) to Charles Sumner, March 27, 1870, Private Letter, Charles Sumner Papers, bms, Am 1,4, Box 146, Item 115, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

101 See the New York Herald, April 22, 1868, p. 7 and the Daily News (London), March 7, 1868, p. 5 and March 19, 1868, p. 5.

102 See editorial in The Nation, Volume IV, January 14, 1867, p. 70.
liberals. For example, Stillman once observed for his readers: "She [Crete] is to the new revolution what Massachusetts was to the old one. If she can endure the armed shock until the other Greek states can prepare, the doom of the empire of Omar is come." George Washburn's weekly articles in the New York Tribune were in the same tone. The writer often compared the Cretan rebellion to the American revolution. Assuring his American readers that the Turks remained as "rotten" as in former years, he described the Ottoman system of justice (under which the Cretans were forced to live): "This 'justice' is made up of courts without laws, of judges without education or common honesty, of secret trials, of perjured witnesses, of sentences decided by backsheesh [bribery]."

The Cretan revolutionaries found many foreign supporters. But, surely the most active American was Samuel Gridley Howe. In fact, Howe was an experienced philhellenic revolutionary. In 1824, following

103 For Stillman's articles see The Nation, Volume IV (New York: E. L. Godkin and Company, 1867); January 17, 1867, pp. 54-5; January 24, 1867, p. 76; April 18, 1867, p. 319; June 6, 1867, p. 459; Volume V, October 24, 1867, p. 337; VII, October 8, 1868, pp. 290-1; also see Volume VII, November 5, 1868, pp. 366-67, written from Athens.

104 See the New York Daily Tribune, September 14, 1866, p. 1; October 4, 1866, p. 1; October 10, 1866, p. 2; November 7, 1866, p. 2; November 23, 1866, p. 1; December 7, 1866, p. 3; December 26, 1866, p. 1; December 27, 1866, p. 4; December 29, 1866, p. 1.


106 New York Daily Tribune, January 24, 1868, p. 1; on the "rotten" state of the empire, see August 19, 1867, p. 2.
hard upon his graduation from Harvard Medical School, he sailed for Greece to serve as surgeon-in-chief of the Greek fleet during the revolution. Howe's colorful career with the Greek forces earned him the title of "The Lafayette of the Greek Revolution" and prompted Walt Whitman to immortalize him (almost) in a poem. Returning home he founded the Perkins Institution, a research center and school for the blind.107

Howe wrote his friend, Charles Sumner, to explain the importance of American support for the Cretans. He pointed out that if America could assist Crete, it would greatly increase the chances for a general uprising throughout Turkish provinces in Europe. Howe longed for the early expulsion of Turkish Muslims from Europe. The old Christian soldier echoed the war cries of earlier crusades when he states: "The Turk must go over the Hellespont,"108 The spirit of this man led the movement for American interference in the Cretan Question.

When Howe learned of the outbreak of the Cretan insurrection, he called a meeting in his office at Perkins Institution. A committee was formed to collect funds, food, and clothing to relieve the


108 Samuel Gridley Howe to Charles Sumner, July 14, 1868, Howe Family Papers, B44m-314, Item 1359, Houghton Library, Harvard University.
suffering which Howe believed would come. A public meeting was held in Boston presided over by Oliver Wendell Homes, Wendell Phillips, and Edward Everett Hale. Howe was the main attraction and the old warrior recalled how forty-five years earlier he had fought with the Cretans. American response in Boston was more than generous. Response was the same in New York where meetings were organized by George Bancroft, Henry Ward Beecher, and Cyrus W. Field.

In March, 1867, Howe sailed for Greece accompanied by his two daughters and wife, Julia Ward Howe. They carried food and clothing for the Cretan refugees. Howe's movements in the Eastern Mediterranean were not confined to a relief mission for Cretans. Commander William N. Jeffers, of the U. S. S. Swatara reported:

One Dr. Howe of Boston, a notorious revolutionist and philhellene who brought out the American donation made various efforts to embroil the U. S. Government with the Turks for the purpose of forcing intervention. For example he made a fictitious purchase of a vessel which he intended to place under the American Flag and then boldly run into port and try to land his cargo on the grounds that there was no formal or legal publication of a blockade. This the Consul frustrated by refusing to prostitute his office by recognizing such a sale.

\[109\]
\[110\]
\[111\]
\[112\]
Jeffers also claimed that Howe planned to outfit a vessel with an American crew, hoist the Cretan flag, and cruise against Turkish commerce. Howe's ultimate hope was that the ship and its crew would be captured and hanged as pirates. The trouble with this plan was the difficulty finding philhellenic Americans willing to make such a sacrifice.

There is also evidence that Howe was involved in supplying arms to Crete from America. In a letter written to an American of Greek descent, Howe Lamented: "In the matter of the rifles I am sorry to find that you did not make sure in America that you knew all about them and could surely make cartridges; but the past cannot be helped."

This letter was written in Athens to a fellow revolutionary on Crete. 113

On his return to America in the fall of 1867, Howe published an account of his activities entitled The Cretan Refugees and Their American Helpers. He pointed out to his American contributors:

You will see that it is not a mere question whether a few thousand Christians shall or shall not die of hunger and cold, rather than submit to Mohammedans; because, although the Cretans seem to be struggling merely for their own existence and freedom, they are in reality fighting for the progress of Christianity and of civilization in the East. They are debating with arms one phase of the "Eastern Question." 114

---

113 Howe to L. Rodocanakis, June 15, 1867 (Item 1348) and June 22, 1867 (Item 1349); Howe Family Papers, 44m-314, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

In addition to the report of American contributors, Howe began publication of a periodical entitled The Cretan. The editors of that journal claimed that a copy was sent to every newspaper in the United States "in hopes that editors will give a generous support to the cause we advocate." The Cretan was also forwarded to a "large number of clergymen of different denominations." Arguing that the Cretan conflict was a contest between Cross and Crescent, the editors of The Cretan urged all clergymen to write their congressmen urging support for recognition of Cretan independence.

American literary intellectuals were inspired by the efforts of Samuel Gridley Howe. John Greeleaf Whittier created a lengthy poem, The Hero, which detailed Howe's revolutionary activities:

```
Smile not, fair unbeliever!
One man at least I know
Who might wear the crest of Bayard
Or Sidney's plume of snow

So, too would Oliver Wendell Holmes immortalize the American who fought for Greek freedom.
```

115 The Cretan, No. 1, Boston, April, 1868, p. 1.
116 The Cretan, No. 1, Boston, April, 1868, p. 8.
117 Ibid.
Along her classic hillsides rung
The Faynim's battle-cry,
And like a red-cross knight he sprung
For her to live or die,

No trustier service claimed the wreath
For Sparta's bravest son;
No truer soldier sleeps beneath
The mound of Marathon;

Intellectuals approved the action of Howe, but William J. Stillman took another view when he wrote: "The agitation in America on behalf of the Cretans had been pushed too energetically and under bad management, and had been followed by indifference."¹²⁰

Aside from the refugee question, the United States government displayed considerable interest in the Cretan rebellion. The Cretan Christians had approached all European powers for aid, and they also appealed directly to the American government. The Cretans presented a petition to Stillman, whom they considered "the worthy representative of our best ally," for delivery to the President of the United States.

The petition concluded with the following plea:

Mr. President—if the injustice of your mother land was set right by the sacred struggle which through the Divine blessing was to triumph by the ever to be remembered Washington, how is ours justified. We should be happy if we had only the shadow of the benefits which your country gained in that epoch. . . .
We . . . Cretan Christian people, dare to ask Mr. President

the intercession of the Great Democracy over which you happily preside, in order that our matters may obtain attention from the cabinets of the Great European Powers.121

A short reference to the Eastern Question was inserted by President Andrew Johnson in his Annual Address to Congress, delivered on December 3, 1866. The President noted that events in the East would effect in some degree the political and commercial interests of the United States. He also suggested that the time had come for the establishment of a special American mission to Greece.122

An eloquent appeal on behalf of the Cretan Christians was published in the Eastern American newspapers. Meetings were soon held in Boston and New York in order to lend moral assistance to brother Christians. In January, 1867, a public meeting at Cooper Institute in New York, a group of Cretophiles adopted the following resolution:

(1) Respectfully advising the President and Congress of the United States of the deep sympathy felt by the people of New York with the efforts of the Greeks now living under the dominion of the Sultan, to secure their independence, and reestablish their nationality.

(2) Earnestly requesting the President to give fitting expression of the sentiment of the American people on the subject for the advancement of the government of Europe.

(3) Requesting the President and Congress to consider also the propriety of such further utterance of action toward the accomplishment of a peaceful and satisfactory adjustment of the pending struggle as any comport with the observance toward the Sublime Porte of the principles and practices of international law neutrality, as exhibited

121 Stillman to Seward, August 18, 1866, Despatch 25, Consular Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 59, USNA.

This resolution was forwarded to Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Both Houses of Congress soon approved an innocuous resolution expressing "sympathy with the suffering people of Crete." Seward forwarded the resolution to Morris for presentation to Ali Pasha. The New York Herald reported that the resolution created a profound "sensation" at Constantinople. Yet, not all Americans were sympathetic with the Cretan insurgents; Gideon Wells confided to his diary:

A more embarrassing subject was a resolution which had passed the two houses expressing sympathy with the insurrectionists in Crete, and requiring the Administration to communicate this fact to the Turkish Government. It was one of those loose, indiscreet measures which an

---

123 Charles K. Tuckerman to Charles Sumner, January 22, 1867, Charles Sumner Papers, bms, Am 1 80/72, Box 80, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

124 Ibid.

125 See the Congressional Globe: Containing the Debates and Proceedings of the First Session Fortieth Congress, by F. and J. Rives and George A. Bailey, Volume 79 (Washington: Congressional Globe Office, 1867), Joint Resolution (SR No. 63); reported, July 19, 1867, p. 727; passed House, July 19, 1867, p. 732; enrolled July 20, 1867; approved July 20, 1867, p. 755. The joint resolution reads: "... That the people of the United States, feel a strong sympathy with the people of Crete, constituting a part of the Greek family, to which civilization owes so much, are pained by the report of the present sufferings of those interesting people; and they unite in the hope that this declaration, which they feel it their duty to make, will be favorable considered by the Government of Turkey in determining its policy toward Crete, ... That it shall be the duty of the President of the United States to communicate this resolution to the Government of Turkey."

126 New York Herald, August 31, 1867, p. 5.
inconsiderate Congress foolishly enacts, Seward had put his letter to the Minister in as unexceptional a form as he could, but it can hardly be otherwise than offensive, The President regretted his attention had not been called to the subject, for he would not have signed the resolution, Seward said he knew not how the resolution originated, I told him that it originated with Morris, the Minister to Constantinople, and if it resulted in (his recall or) a request for him to leave, good might come of it. For months he had made himself busy in trying to induce our naval officers to break neutrality and to interfere in this matter (insurrection). 127

Edward Blacque, Turkish Minister to the United States, wrote Fuad Pasha that the resolution was nothing more than a manifestation of basic principles derived from the American revolutionary spirit and republican feeling. Blacque observed that Americans possessed a psychological need to "sympathize with what they call the people's rebellions against monarchical power and that which offers them encouragement and moral support." 128

The 1867 Congressional Resolution was not to be the last statement on the Cretan insurrection. In April, 1868, the National Assembly of the Provisional Government of Crete made a direct appeal to the American Congress. 129 The Cretans urged that body to recognize the Provisional Government of Crete, to pledge its moral and material support, to provide protection for complete independence of the island,

127 Gideon Wells Diary, see entry for July 23, 1867, Gideon Wells Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.


129 See Julius Bing to Charles Sumner, April 15, 1868, Charles Sumner Papers, bns, Am 1.4, Box 143, Item 151, Houghton Library, Harvard University. Also see the New York Daily Tribune, April 13, 1868, p. 5.
and to instruct Morris to cooperate with European Ministers on behalf of Crete. 130

On June 23, 1868, a joint resolution calling for American recognition of Cretan independence was introduced. The resolution (HR No. 303) received a first and second reading and was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. It was ordered to be printed in The Globe as follows:

That the civilization of this age calls for the most liberal forms of government among men; that it is the privilege and the duty of this Government to foster, in every just and proper way, the rise and progress of free institutions wherever the people are competent to maintain the same; that the people of Crete, having shown by their long-suffering and Christian forbearance, by their fortitude, by their devotion, and their religion, that they are competent to maintain a free government, it is the duty of the United States to recognize them as free and independent. 131

Americans interested in the Cretan cause maintained that the insurrection was a crucial test for the Congress. They argued that if Americans believed that a majority of a people had a right to change their government, then congressmen and senators should recognize the right of the Cretans to establish a government of their own. Ingeniously, Cretophiles argued that the Cretans were in a better military position than the United States had been at the time she was recognized by France and Holland. Defenders of Cretan independence pointed out that Turkish authority over Crete was nominal and the blockade

130 New York Daily Tribune, April 13, 1868, p. 5.

ineffective.\textsuperscript{132} Bills favoring the Cretan cause were introduced into
the House by representatives from Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa. State
legislature in Maine and Massachusetts passed resolutions in favor of
recognition of Cretan independence.\textsuperscript{133} Public demonstrations were
carried out in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Washington.
Americans who contributed both their time and money to the Cretan
revolt urged Congress at least to allow belligerent rights for Crete.
Cretan sympathizers argued that recognition of Cretan independence did
not constitute entanglement in foreign wars nor invasion of Turkish
territory by American troops.\textsuperscript{134}

The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Charles
Sumner, argued that there could be no diplomatic recognition of Crete
while the conflict was in progress. But, Sumner, a well known advocate
of liberal causes, was sympathetic to Cretan aspirations. The Senator's
friend, Samuel Gridley Howe, an active member of the Cretan Relief
Committee, pleaded: "Don't do less for the brave suffering Christians
than you would do for the negroes of the South." Howe informed his
former Harvard classmate: "The [the Turks] are worse, far worse, in

\textsuperscript{132}Julius Bing to Charles Sumner, June 17, 1868, Charles
Sumner Papers, bms, Am 1.4, Box 143, Item 164, Houghton Library,
Harvard University. Also see Julius Bing to Charles Sumner,
July 1, 1868, Charles Sumner Papers, op. cit., Box 144, Item 29.

\textsuperscript{133}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{134}\textit{Ibid.}
their nature, & their relations to the subject Christian race, than our
slave masters ever were to the Negroes. . . . If a master killed a
slave—he killed a Christian. If a Turk shot a Greek, he only killed
a dog."\textsuperscript{135}

Congress passed a joint resolution in favor of the establish-
ment of an independent government in Crete. But, they did not recog-
nize the Provisional Government nor did they grant belligerent rights
to the Cretans.\textsuperscript{136} The Russian Minister to the United States, Edward
de Stoeckl, wrote Prince Alexander Gortchakoff, Russian Minister

\textsuperscript{135}See S. G. Howe to Sumner, July 5, 1868, Howe Family Papers,
b44m-314 (1350-1359), Item 1358, Houghton Library, Harvard University. Howe wrote: "It occurs to me now that even you may have been imposed
upon by the unscrupulous agent of Turkey [Blacque]." Also see Howe
to Sumner, July 14, 1868, Howe Family Papers, op. cit., Item 1359
and Julius Bing to Sumner, August 6, 1868, Charles Sumner Papers, bms,
Am 1.4, Box 144, Item 46, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

\textsuperscript{136}The Congressional Globe, op. cit., Volume 84; For the 1868
Resolution (SR No. 169), reported and passed, p. 4283; passed House,
July 25, 1868; enrolled, July 25, 1868; approved, July 27, 1868. In
House: received from the Senate, July 22, 1868, p. 4488. The
resolution reads: "... That the people of the United States renew
the expression of their sympathy with the suffering people of Crete,
to whom they are bound by ties of a common religion, and by the
gratitude due to the Greek race, of which the Cretans are a part; that
they rejoice to believe that the suffering of this interesting people
may be happily terminated by a policy of forbearance on the part of
the Turkish Government, and they hereby declare their earnest hope
that the Turkish Government will listen kindly to this representation,
and will speedily adopt such generous steps as will secure to Crete
the much desired blessing of peace, and the advantage of autonomic
government. . . . That it shall be the duty of the President to
instruct the Minister of the United States at Constantinople to
cooperate with the men of other Powers in all good offices to
terminate the suffering of the people of Crete; and that it shall be
the duty of the President to communicate a copy of this resolution to
the Government of Turkey." For the text of this resolution see p. 4283.
The Resolution will have more practical results than all that Congress has undertaken until now. I am certain that Mr. Morris, who is very well disposed toward Greece, will succeed in making sense of it and aid the efforts of our Ambassador to obtain the Independence of Crete.136

What Morris could have accomplished with the Cretan Resolution was never a problem for the Turkish government, because Seward chose not to forward the document to Constantinople. Julius Bing, a former American Consul to Smyrna, wrote Charles Sumner:

I am authoratively tho [sic] confidentially informed from Constantinople under date of Dec. 6 that Seward failed to send your joint Resolution, . . . Mr. Seward has thereby incurred a grave responsibility in as much as this Joint Resolution might have exerted & might still exert a beneficial effect in disposing the Porte favorable for the independence of Crete & also in exerting an influence upon the Christian Powers.137

After the passage of the Cretan Resolution in 1868, the American Secretary of State wrote Morris a private letter in which he admitted that the American government was interested in the

---

136. Russia, Correspondence in Archives of Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Microfilm print of letters by Edward Stoeckl to Aleksandr Gortchakoff, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester; Stoeckl to Gortchakoff, July 25/27, 1868, 1157, No. 29. The text reads: The Senate and the House have "conjointement engage le Président à faire des démarches à Constantinople en faveur des Cretois. Ces resolution pourront recevoir un résultat plus pratique que tout ce que le Congrès a fait jusqu'ici. Je suis sûr que Mr. Morris, qui est très bien dispose pour la Grèce, pourra en tirer un bon parti et seconder les efforts de notre Ambassadeur pour l'indépendance de Candie."

137. For the quotation see Julius Bing to Charles Sumner, January 1, 1869, Charles Sumner Papers, bms, Am 1.4, Item 108, Houghton Library, Harvard University. Also see Julius Bing to Charles Sumner, September 25, 1868, op. cit., Box 144, Item 59.
Eastern Mediterranean but was not in a position to act rashly.\textsuperscript{138} Seward explained the American position to his Minister: "It seems to be wise of the United States to watch and wait patiently the disentangling of the Turkish knot by the parties upon whom the responsibility directly rests. This rule seems to be imperative so long as the United States have no unredressed injustice to complain of against any of those interested parties."\textsuperscript{139} He acknowledged the "profound sympathy" felt by Americans for the Cretans, but, he concluded, Cretan sympathizers did not favor Cretan annexation to Greece. Seward assured Morris that no one in the country favored "armed or dictatorial interference in the so called Eastern Question."

The Secretary of State explained the main reason for restraint:
"The political councils of this government now in foreign affairs, & for some time to come, may be expected to be controlled by a sense of restraint which results from popular anxiety concerning our domestic reconstruction, more especially, our finance."\textsuperscript{140}

American diplomatic officers assigned to the Eastern Mediterranean often attempted to involve their government in the Eastern Question. Evidence indicates that Stillman used his position to further the cause of the insurgents on Crete and that complaints of

\textsuperscript{138} Seward to Morris, August 19, 1868, Private Letter, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{140} Seward to Morris, January 2, 1869, Private Letter, a copy can be found in the William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.
the Ottoman government against the Consul were justified. It is also apparent that Stillman did not follow instructions he received from Morris. Perhaps overly trustful, Morris defended his Consul and, hence, incurred the displeasure of the Porte. Inspired by his country's increased prestige following the Civil War, Morris himself wished the United States to play a larger role in European affairs. Although the American Minister never failed to follow State Department instructions, it is evident that he would have committed his government to an active role in removing refugees from Crete without restraining instructions. Only the caution of the European Squadron commander prevented America from being placed in an embarrassing position vis-a-vis the Sublime Porte.

George Washburn's articles for the *New York Tribune* approved the policy adopted by Stillman and Morris. The missionaries, always sympathetic to Christian aspirations, encouraged the American Minister in his defense of Stillman and the Cretans. It is also obvious that Secretary of State Seward did little during the early months of the insurrection to curb Stillman's impetuosity. In fact, the aggressive tone of the despatches sent by the Secretary of State encouraged Morris to become more involved than he already had been. Once the position of the Navy Department was known, Seward conveniently complained of Morris' inability to interpret his instructions.
CHAPTER 10

TURKISH REACTION TO AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN QUESTION

News that the United States had purchased Alaska from the Czar struck Constantinopolitan politicians with tremendous impact. Morris informed Seward that the cession of Russian America to the United States caused the Ministers at the Sublime Porte to speculate as to the possibility of a political alliance between the United States and Russia. The Turks feared that such an alliance would require America to support Russia's side of the Eastern Question. 1 Several American acts seemed to support the story that such an alliance existed. By far the most convincing was comments made by distinguished American visitors to St. Petersburg, followed by an endless number of banquets, accompanied by "Yankee Doodle" and "God Save the Czar." 2 The Times of London observed that the "most despotic government of Europe and the most democratic government of the World

1 Morris to Seward, April 9, 1867, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, Record Group 59, United States National Archives, Washington, D. C. Hereafter cited RG 59, USNA.

are uniformly on the best of terms." No one believed that Gustavus Vasa Fox, an Assistant Secretary of the Navy, had traveled to Russia in order to personally deliver a Congressional resolution congratulating the Czar upon his escape from assassination. The actual reasons for such a visit could only be an alliance sealed by the cession of a worthless, frozen, land vulgarly called "Seward's Icebox."

Morris assured Seward that the Great Powers feared that United States and Russia had formed an alliance "either tacit or expressed." He noted that such an alliance was a "spectre that oppresses them & haunts their thoughts by day and their dreams by night." The European press confirmed Morris' conclusions. The La Patrie of Paris maintained that the United States had transformed the Eastern Question into a Mediterranean Question. The London Morning Herald regretted

---

3 The Times (London), February 6, 1866, p. 6. Also see the New York Herald, February 21, 1866, p. 8.

4 Wells to G. V. Fox, May 26, 1866, Gideon Wells Papers, Letter Book, Volume 79, Library of Congress; G. V. Fox to Wells, May 30, 1866, and July 11, 1866, Volume 61, Gideon Wells Papers. On September 30, 1866, Fox wrote Gideon Wells: "For a thousand miles I have carried the American flag and Mr. Johnson's portrait (which graced every entertainment) into the heart of Russia and finally after repeated conversations with Prince Cortchacooff he makes a careful prepared speech entirely endorsing President Johnson's policy. This is the result of my trip. Personally I have received more presents and praises than any man who ever entered Russia."

5 Morris to Seward, November 15, 1866, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

6 La Patrie, September 18, 1866; New York Herald, October 10, p. 10.
that America seemed to be ambitious to play a leading role in European politics, particularly in the Middle East. The Morning Herald declared that this was the most important event of the decade and commented:

"The great American republic remembers the way in which Western Europe rejoiced in her misfortunes and endeavoured to interpose, directly or indirectly, in favor of her enemies. She takes her revenge now by allying herself with Russia. . . . The system of political equilibrium is modified completely by the entrance on the scene of a new Great Power."7 The official Ottoman journal, La Turquie, concluded that the Russo-American alliance was directed against England rather than France.8 In Turkish eyes, any alliance between Russia and the United States could only be detrimental to Turkish interests.9

Americans living in the Middle East favored an American-Russian alliance for the same reason that the Turks loathed the idea. Of the anticipated division of the Ottoman Empire, Cyrus Hamlin wrote hopefully: "Russia will remember our friendly alliance and set aside

7The Morning Herald (London), October 5, 1867, p. 5.
8La Turquie, April 3, 1867; see Morris to Seward, April 5, 1867, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
9Morris to Seward, September 7, 1866, Despatch 168, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Morris wrote: "In court circles here it is generally believed that an alliance exists between Russia & the U. S. and apprehensions are entertained that such an alliance will operate to the serious detriment of Turkey. An Ottoman Minister at Washington will, it is supposed, be able to keep his government advised on the actual state of the U. S. & Russia as well as have it in his power to promote the interests of his government in other respects in America."
a fair portion of that lovely land for Uncle Samuel to the discontent of John Bull and Johnny Crapeau. Although rumors of a Russo-American alliance seem absurd today, in that era of secret treaties they possessed more credibility. After the sale of Alaska, European and Ottoman diplomatists began to scrutinize American moves on the Near Eastern chessboard with much more care.

There had long existed rumors that the United States desired to purchase a fueling station in the Mediterranean. Many naval officers were delayed and embarrassed because America did not possess her own coaling stations under her own flag. Indeed, some Americans maintained this situation should be changed. In 1862, J. Judson Barclay, American Consul on Cyprus, suggested: "Had the efforts of the U. S. been directed to this Island instead of Maromoritza [Marmaris] it is probable that European jealousy would not have proven an insuperable obstacle to its acquisition and the Mediterranean would no longer be literally an European lake." The Consul's comment implies that America had attempted to acquire a naval station in the Mediterranean. Again in 1866, in a private letter to Seward, Morris wrote: "The journals are full of surmises about the interference of the U. S. in Oriental affairs in conjunction with Russia, & they will have it that


\[11\] J. Judson Barclay to Seward, September 8, 1862, Despatch 36, Consular Correspondence, Cyprus, RG 59, USNA. Marmaris is located on the south-west coast of Asia Minor across from the Island of Rhodes.
we are seeking an island in the Grecian Archipelago as a point d'appui [sic]. They will accept no denials on the subject: Contradiction only seems to excite suspicion."12

American consuls stationed on Crete, George Mountford and William J. Stillman, wanted the United States government to purchase territory adjoining Suda Bay on Crete. Mountford wrote both Charles Sumner and Seward that the Turkish government would never abandon Crete with its 100,000 Muslim population to Greece. In order to prevent a future outbreak of hostilities on Crete, Mountford stated:

I would respectfully suggest to the United States government the loan of a few millions of dollars to the Porte on a long mortgage upon that Island & in repopling it by American citizens with their proverbial enterprise, industry, skill in agriculture, commerce, manufacture, & in a very few years it would be rendered one of the most productive & glorious regions upon earth.13

As the Turks were financially handicapped and the Ottoman tenure on Crete was somewhat tenuous, the American Consul assured Charles Sumner that the Sublime Porte would listen with interest to such a suggestion.14

During the early months of the disturbance on Crete, Stillman was approached several times by leaders of the Christian Cretans who urged the United States government to take Crete under its protection.

12 Morris to Seward, October 5, 1866, Private Letter, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.
13 George Mountford (former Council at Canea, Crete) to Charles Sumner, August 21, 1867, bms, Am 1 (82-120), Box 82, Charles Sumner Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University.
14 Ibid.
He believed that the Cretan request stemmed from the "widely circulated report of the desire of the U. S. to purchase an island in the Levant."

The Consul concluded:

The possession of Suda, much as it is desired by all the maritime powers of Europe will never be permitted to any one of them, but might easily be to us who can never use its possession offensively to their interests. Under the government of the U. S., the island would prosper, the taxes might be much diminished and if at any future time the states of Europe should render it wise to allow Greece to become entirely united, the island might be ceded to her, the U. S. retaining the port of Suda if it seemed desirable.15

In the early fall of 1866, George Washburn informed his American readers of persistent rumors in Constantinople that President Andrew Johnson had offered to buy Crete for a sum of $75,000,000.16 Continual reports in the same vein prompted La Turquie to discuss American designs. La Turquie acknowledged that America was inclined to meddle in Cretan affairs but assured its readers that Turkey was not ignorant "of the attempts of the United States at this time to obtain a new point of supply and refreshment in the Mediterranean."17

The writer for La Turquie argued that America had immense interests on the American continent and the Gulf of Mexico that should first be developed before moving into the Eastern Mediterranean.18

15 Stillman to Seward, May 14, 1866, Despatch 21, Consular Correspondence, Canea, Crete, RG 59, USNA.
17 La Turquie, December 15, 1866; see Morris to Seward, December, 1866, Despatch 184, Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
18 Ibid.
La Turquie did not think that it was exactly fair for America to demand the application of the Monroe Doctrine in the New World and at the same time threaten the tranquility of the Old. Turks attributed American interest in Crete to its strategic importance. They pointed out that the capital of the island was separated only by a small peninsula from the "fairest" harbor in the Mediterranean—Suda Bay. Not to be overlooked, Crete would provide an excellent coaling station once the Suez Canal opened in 1869. La Turquie concluded:

It is then not astonishing, after this statement that a people who—like the Americans—see in all countries only commercial points for improvement or ports for refuge for their numerous ships, ardently covet the possession of Crete, not so much for the country itself, as for the admirable situation of the island and the Gulf of Suda.19

In September, 1866, the Journal des Debats claimed that the French and British governments had jointly warned the Sultan against any sale to the United States government of a Mediterranean island.20

Of course, not to be left out, Russia voiced interest in an American-Mediterranean naval base. Morris reported an interesting conversation on this topic with General Nicholas Ignatieff. The Russian Minister inquired of Morris as to the truth of rumors concerning American negotiations for purchase of a naval base and commercial depot in the Grecian archipelago. Morris told Ignatieff that he knew

19La Turquie, December 17, 1866; see Morris to Seward, December, 1866, Despatch 184, RG 59, USNA.

20Journal des Debats, September 8, 1866; see the New York Herald, September 12, 1866, p. 1.
nothing of such plans and that he did not believe everything he read in the newspapers. Ignatieff expressed approval of American territorial transactions in the Eastern Mediterranean and offered Russian assistance: "If you want such a spot, I know of an admirable position, which you can have, . . . in the Grecian Archipelago. The situation & . . . the locality I cannot now give or at least not until your government may express a desire for its acquisition." Morris replied that he would write privately on the subject to Seward. 21

Seward forwarded Morris' despatch communicating Ignatieff's conversation to the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Wells. Wells agreed that America ought to acquire "important points on the great ocean highways suitable for coal and general supplies." Yet, the Secretary of the Navy observed:

The acquisition of such stations involves a change of policy on the part of our government for which the people may not yet be fully prepared, and it is therefore a question whether it would be judicious to commence this change of policy in the Grecian Archipelago, which is remote from the great lines of commercial intercourse, I think it would be advisable to initiate the change, if the government decide to make it, in quarters heretofore suggested and vastly more important to our navigation interests. 22

Rumors concerning territorial expansion did not die easily. William Rufus Page reported, in October, 1866, that the United States had purchased the northern part of the Island of Melos (an island in

21 Morris to Seward, June 27, 1866, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

the Greek Archipelago) for $20,000,000. In 1868, the New York Herald claimed that the United States had planned to build a naval station at Marmaris, on the coast of Asia Minor, but that the Porte had declined to grant the necessary concession. As would be expected, George Washburn was quick to identify the source of all such rumors. He maintained that Russian agents in Constantinople and elsewhere were doing everything possible to involve the United States in the Eastern Question. Washburn wrote: "All the stories about the United States government desiring the purchase of an island on the coast of Turkey originate from this source." The Russian objective, according to Washburn, was to make the power of the United States felt in Greece and Turkey. He claimed that an American naval squadron within close proximity of the Sea of Marmara would "add 50 per cent to the influence of Russia in the East." Washburn informed his readers that Russia had made it understood in Constantinople that "she is in close alliance with the United States." 

American-Russian friendship was not applauded in every social circle in Constantinople. John Porter Brown wrote an article for the New York Herald in which he claimed American influence with the Sublime Porte had declined in consequence of our friendship for Russia. The

23 New York Herald, October 15, 1866, p. 1. Also see G. Euripides to Seward, April 28, 1867, Miscellaneous Letters, Department of State, RG 59, USNA.
24 New York Herald, March 4, 1868, p. 5.
26 New York Herald, November 8, 1867, p. 4.
Levant Herald immediately came to the defense of the American Minister: The public confidence of the people and leading men of Turkey in the power of the United States, and of the direct interest which the American government exercises in the Old World, generally, never stood at a higher point than at present, and that this sentiment has been extending and gaining strength in the Empire ever since the Hon. E. Joy Morris presented his credentials and commenced to discharge the duties of Minister of the United States at the Court of the Sultan. 27

Regardless of claims by the Levant Herald, the American Minister developed a cordial relationship with Ignatieff. Stillman wrote that at the outbreak of the Cretan rebellion, Morris had developed the closest possible personal relationship with his British opposite number, Lord Richard B. Lyons. Lord Lyons had served as British Minister to the United States at the time of the American Civil War. When Lyons was replaced by Sir Henry Elliot in 1867, the American Minister discovered that he could not work with that gentleman to bring about any settlement of the problems on Crete. Faced with this situation, Morris approached General Ignatieff. From that point forward, according to Stillman, the actions of the American Consul on Crete were influenced by the Russian embassy. 28

In the fall of 1866, at a time when the Turkish treasury was especially empty and a rebellion was raging on Crete, the Sublime Porte decided to send a Minister to the United States. Washburn concluded that this decision resulted from Turkish concern over


recent American activity in the Mediterranean. The Sublime Porte was convinced that no effort should be spared in preventing a Russo-American alliance. Turkey did not want the United States to provide a southern naval defense for Russian expansion into Central Europe.

Morris maintained that it was a combination of factors that prompted the Turkish government to send Edouard Blaque to the United States. As possible reasons for the establishment of the Turkish post, he suggested the allusions in President Johnson's Annual Address to Congress on Oriental affairs, the establishment of a Greek Legation at Washington, the fear of an American alliance with Russia and the "high-toned and energetic foreign policy of the administration."

Morris reminded the Secretary that he had personally labored for several years to bring about the creation of the Turkish Mission to the United States and that such a mission could not fail to be of benefit to both countries.

Julius Bing, the former American Consul to Smyrna and correspondent with Charles Sumner, was not as optimistic as the American Minister. He informed Seward: "The chief object of the mission to the United States is to complain of Mr. Morris's alleged open espousal of the cause of the rebellion on Candia [Crete] & of

---


30. Morris to Seward, September 7, 1866, Despatch 168, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

31. Morris to Seward, January 2, 1867, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
the conduct of the American Consul there. Bing reminded the Senator that Greece was sending her first Minister to the United States, and in Athens, according to the press, it was believed that the American republic would aid Greece in her efforts to free Crete.

The modern Turkish historian, Akdes Nimet Kurat, agreed with Julius Bing. According to Kurat, the Turkish government wished to halt the shipment of arms and ammunition to Greeks and Cretans by American citizens. Also, Kurat pointed out that the Turkish government believed the American government wished to assist the Greeks on Crete.

Diplomatic instructions from the Turkish Foreign Minister to Edouard Blacque before he left Constantinople for America are not known. Yet much can be deduced from the early communications of Blacque to his government. It must be remembered that the Turkish government had urged Morris to put an end to Stillman's activities on

32 Julius Bing to Seward, January 23, 1867, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

33 Ibid. Also see William R. Stafford to Seward, January 11, 1867, Miscellaneous Letters, Department of State, RG 59, USNA. Stafford translated articles from Athenian newspapers for Seward. One Greek journal stated: "Can any one blame the Christians in Turkey and especially the more intelligent Greek race, seeing Europe very indifferent to their sufferings, and by its diplomacy preventing their freedom, they turn their eyes to the United States of America, who, having no interest in the ridiculous European balance, but wishing freedom and civilization to all the nations of the world, can render great assistance to them, so, that they might break their chains, or at least to check in some way European diplomacy which aids in crushing suffering Christians."

Crete. But instead, Morris defended Stillman both to the Porte and to Foggy Bottom. Evidently, when confronted with Morris' lack of cooperation, the Porte decided to appeal directly to the American Secretary of State for justice.

In an interview with Seward, Blacque attempted to convince Seward that American diplomatic officers misunderstood Turkish problems. As Blacque related his conversation with Seward to Fuad Pasha, it became apparent that one objective of Turkish diplomacy was to alter the policies of William Stillman and Edward Joy Morris;

the new Turkish Minister to Washington stated:

I then cited to the Secretary of State, in support of my reasoning and as proof of what I had just purported, the conduct of Mr. Joy Morris in Constantinople, and that of Mr. Stillman in Crete. I revealed to him how much the false path which these two diplomats had followed was attributable to this complete ignorance of the questions pertaining to the insurrection, to the illusions they had made concerning the character which this insurrection was imbued with from the first day, especially to their ignorance concerning the state of affairs in Turkey as well as in Greece, and finally the natural propensity of their enthusiastic spirit for the remembrance of a past era, rather than to an unjustifiable hostility against the Ottoman government.35

---

35 Turkey, Diğişleri Bakanlığı Arşivi, Hariciye, Document 239, Blacque to Fuad Pasha, September 11, 1867, Despatch 7/10. The original reads: "J' ai cité ensuite au Secrétaire d'État, à l' appui de mon raisonnement et comme une preuve de ce que je venais d' avancer, la conduite de Mr. Joy Morris à Constantinople, et celle de Mr. Stillman en Crète. Je lui ai montré combien la fausse voie dans laquelle ces deux agents se sont engagés doit être attribuée à leur ignorance complète des questions qui se rattachent à l' insurrection, à l' illusion qu' ils se sont fait sur le caractère dont cette insurrection était empreinte dès le premier jour, à leur ignorance surtout de l' état des choses en Turquie comme en Grèce, et enfin à la propension naturelle de leur esprit enthousiaste pour les souvenirs d' un autre âge, plutôt qu' à un sentiment d' hostilité injustifiable contre le gouvernement Ottoman."

Blacque concluded that Stillman and Morris were anxious to please the American Congress and to create a popular image for future political purposes. But when referring to the 1867 Congressional Cretan Resolution, Blacque lamented that Stillman's procedures were not in disagreement with Congressional attitudes.36 Blacque informed his government that Stillman and Morris had continually deviated from State Department instructions. The Turkish Minister attributed such indiscretions to the national will of the American people that provided diplomats with "an independence and liberty of action which pushes them to act much more through their own inspiration than by instructions of their government."37 Blacque assured Fuad Pasha that Seward had personally disavowed the conduct of Stillman and Morris.

Seward had advised the new minister of American friendship for Turkey and urged him to "rally to your cause the influential members of Congress." Seward closed an interview on the Morris-Stillman affair with a promise to reconsider complaints when Blacque received from the Sublime Porte the details of a settlement concerning a letter forcefully taken from the American kavas (consular guard) on Crete. Without commenting on Seward's reply, Blacque went on to confide: "I would not be far from believing that the Secretary of State would probably be quite inclined to find in this incident an

37 Ibid.
opportune moment to reprimand his Agents, and set our justifiable complaints to right.  

Neither Morris nor Stillman had failed to comply with State Department instructions. In fact, in the early days of the Cretan conflict, Seward had approved Stillman's activities and advised Morris to act accordingly. Seward's interest in Crete was curtailed by the cautious spirit of Gideon Wells. After April, 1867, when it became obvious to everyone that Greece and Russia were encouraging the Cretan rebellion, Morris lost enthusiasm for Cretan complaints. For Morris had never been favorably impressed with the ability of the Greek nation to govern wisely. Given these circumstances, Blacque found it difficult to discredit Morris at home and abroad.

But God rewards those who are patient. In 1867, the State Department published in its collection of State Department Papers a despatch from Edward Joy Morris dated April 17, 1866, in which he claimed that the Sultan was not always in his right mind. The Turkish Minister gleefully translated the despatch into French and sent it off to Fuad Pasha. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs complained to Morris through John Porter Brown and requested an explanation.

Denying that he had called the Sultan a mental defective,

38Dişçileri Bakanlığı Arşivi, Hariciye, Document 239, Blacque to Fuad Pasha, September 11, 1867, Despatch 7/10. The quoted passage reads: "Je ne suis pas éloigné de croire que le Secrétaire d' Etat serait probablement bien à l' aise de trouver dans ce incident une occasion opportune de reprimander son Agent, et de faire droit a nos justes plaintes."

39Morris to Seward, April 17, 1866, Despatch 150, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
Morris explained to Fuad Pasha that he had reported only his general impressions at the time and that his statements were subsequently modified in later reports. Official despatches were written for the exclusive use of the American government, Morris argued, and the publication was the result of an "oversight on the part of the clerk charged with the preparation of the despatch for the press." The American Minister insisted on his right to "discuss all manner of topics in my despatches and to express my opinion on persons as well as things." Taking a different view, Fuad Pasha claimed that a minister could not in "propriety make any such allusions to the Sultan." Disclaiming intention of offense to the dignity of the Sultan, Morris reminded the Ottoman Minister that he had always aimed to cultivate good relations between United States and Turkey. Fuad informed Morris that a written demand for satisfaction had been sent to Washington and, thus, it was necessary to decline formal discussion on pending affairs. The Foreign Minister closed the interview by assuring Morris that this incident would not affect personal relationships "with him or his colleagues."

On January 1, 1868, in a private letter to Seward, Morris noted that he had commented on the Sultan's health only because the entire diplomatic corps was concerned. The American Minister claimed

---

40 Morris informed Seward of his conversation with Fuad Pasha in Despatch 247, February 7, 1868, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
that, at times, the Sultan had taken leave of his senses and "acted like a perfect madman." Morris reported, at present, the Sultan's mental health was to a degree restored. But, he confided, the Sultan was subject to occasional illnesses of a "very dangerous character, menacing to his life & is prone to acts de folie."\(^4\)

Fuad instructed Blacque to obtain from the American government an explanation and reparations for publishing the obnoxious letter.\(^4\) In a letter to the American Secretary of State, Blacque listed instances of Morris' hostility towards the Turkish government. Next, he pointed out that since the document had been made public on both sides of the Atlantic, it could not be allowed to pass unnoticed.

The Turkish Minister related the astonishment and sadness experienced by Fuad Pasha upon reading the injurious statement. Fuad had instructed Blacque to request Seward "to make a decision which will satisfy both the deeply wounded pride of the country [Turkey]... and of the Imperial Majesty of the Sultan."\(^4\)

\(^{4}\)Morris to Seward, January 1, 1868, Private Letter, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester. Also see the New York Herald, June 8, 1868, p. 8. William Rufus Page reported: "The despatch in which Mr. Morris made a casual allusion to the mental condition of the Sultan was an old one of 1866, and merely repeated a rumor which every one here will remember was very prevalent and generally credited at the time and was probably alluded to in the despatches of the representatives of other governments, but not published."

\(^{4}\)Turkey, Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivi, Hariciye, Blacque to Pasha, February 7, 1868, Despatch 35/59, Document 3705.

\(^{4}\)Ibid.; see enclosure. Also see Blacque to Fuad Pasha, February 14, 1868, Document 3706, Despatch 39/65, enclosures.
Edouard Blacque waited two days before making a formal call upon the Secretary of State. The Secretary's greeting was cold and he complained of the "peremptory tone" of Blacque's letter. Seward observed that certain passages carried a threatening tone. As for American reparations to Turkey, Seward asserted the impossibility of acceding to any such request. The American Secretary claimed that granting reparations would admit malicious intent which was not the case. Seward reminded the Turkish envoy of friendship which the government had extended to Turkey in spite of opinions held by the majority of the people who "shared neither the ideas nor those feelings as regards to Turkey." The display of a constant friendship at the risk of provoking popular discontent should have cautioned Turkey against making any accusations concerning an act that, according to Seward's way of thinking, was "clearly a result of omission and error." 44

Blacque explained that Turkey could not ignore the insult to her national pride resulting from the publicity given to Morris' note. He suggested that the Secretary present Turkey with a written explanation of the entire incident. To this request, Seward replied: "If, instead of asking me for reparation, you simply had asked me for an explanation, I could have satisfied you." Blacque requested the return of his "peremptory" note and Seward agreed to supply an explanation for Fuad Pasha. The letter was discussed by the Cabinet,

44 Turkey, Dışişleri Bakanliği Arşivi, Hariciye, Document 3705, Blacque to Fuad Pasha, February 7, 1868, Despatch 35/59.
approved by the President, and sent to Edward Joy Morris for presentation to Fuad Pasha.\(^{45}\)

The theme of Seward's letter of apology to the Turkish government, which Morris was instructed to read to Fuad Pasha, was the failure of the Minister's passing remark to affect American friendship for Turkey. The obnoxious despatch had been written on April 17, 1866, nearly two years earlier. It was evident that other published despatches written after that date by the American Minister contained complimentary remarks about the Sultan and his Ministers. In such a fashion, Seward endeavoured to prove that Morris had altered his earlier evaluation.\(^{46}\) Seward explained how the earlier conclusion had been reached:

It is manifest therefore that your [Morris'] statement was made through misconception and a generous reparation is therefore due to the Sultan and his government. The misconception was probably the effect of free partisan debate in the Turkish Capital. It inevitably happens that the wisdom as well as character and talents of Statesmen and Magistrates are misapprehended in seasons of great political commotion and excitation.\(^{47}\)

Seward confessed that the "injustice was more the fault of the State Department than that of the American Minister." The Secretary assured his readers that publication of the despatch was the result of an accident and would not have been made "if due care and attention

---

\(^{45}\) Turkey, Dağlıglı Arşivi, Hariciye, Document 3705, Blaque to Fuad Pasha, February 7, 1868, Despatch 35/59.

\(^{46}\) Seward to Morris, February 4, 1868, Despatch 171, Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^{47}\) Ibid.
had been bestowed." The American government regretted, Seward wrote, "the error sincerely without any reservation, and it will endeavour to see that such injustice and discourtesy shall not hereafter be repeated."\(^{48}\)

In his report on Fuad Pasha's reaction to the letter of explanation, Morris claimed the Turkish Minister was "delighted with its contents and the delicate and gracious style in which it was couched."\(^{49}\) Fuad Pasha pointed out to Morris that the Porte "cherished the good opinion of the government & people of the United States & for this reason it felt the more keenly a publication calculated to affect its consideration & the reputation of the Sultan in America." Fuad Pasha assured Morris:

[The] cordial explanation would make the two governments better friends than ever, and that as for myself [Morris] every cause of complaint was removed, and that I must consider my former good relations with the Porte as not only renewed but cemented by ties of mutual good will and more intimate friendly intercourse, personal & official. Nothing could be more agreeable & charming than His Highness' manner to myself on this occasion.\(^{50}\)

Following the presentation of Seward's letter of explanation, Morris wrote privately that he believed the other members of the diplomatic corps had written the same information concerning the

---

\(^{48}\)Seward to Morris, February 4, 1868, Despatch 171, Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^{49}\)Morris to Seward, March 4, 1868, Private Letter, William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

\(^{50}\)Ibid.
Sultan to their governments. But, unfortunately, the American despatch was the only one published. Morris pointed out to Seward that Blacque should have informed the State Department prior to sending the insult to the Porte. Such a procedure would have given Seward an opportunity to obviate the impression made upon the Porte. Morris lamented:

"[Blacque] wrested it from among the other despatches, some of which are quite flattering to the Sultan, and to have sent it here without your knowledge is regarded as the proof of his intention to create difficulties between the two governments."\(^{51}\)

Morris claimed it was the duty of a minister to avoid cause of offense and unnecessary use of such incidents to promote ill will. The Minister assured his chief: "I have thought that my mission was to promote good relations and I have always acted under this impression." He reminded the Secretary: "Newspapers of that time all made mention of these rumours and I have no doubt that Mr. Washburn in his Constantinople correspondence with the New York Tribune spoke at large of that."\(^{52}\)

European members of the Constantinople diplomatic corps read the volume containing the "obnoxious despatch" and assured Morris that they considered the correspondence "quite friendly in spirit to the Turkish government." The British Ambassador, Sir Henry Elliot, sent Morris his compliments on Seward's letter and offered his good offices.

\(^{51}\)Morris to Seward, February 12, 1868, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^{52}\)Ibid.
to reduce the affair to its "proper proportion." Elliot requested a copy of the printed despatch so he could convey to Fuad Pasha the "true spirit" of Morris' correspondence.53

It must be remembered that this was not the first official correspondence written by the American Minister which found its way into print. Morris was upset with a publication dated August 28, 1866, marked "private," and addressed to Seward that appeared in a European collection on Crete. As previously noted, Stillman's official correspondence was printed in the New York Times. An examination of the State Department documents prepared for publication shows clearly that they were edited. Thus, it can be concluded either these publications were deliberate acts designed to discredit Morris and Stillman or to place a strain on Turkish-American friendship. Also, it is possible the publications resulted from bureaucratic inefficiency. One point is certain, such publications altered the effectiveness of Morris with the Porte. His friendship with Ali Pasha could not protect the American Minister from the criticism and hatred of the conservative ministers of the Sultan.

A letter of apology and the kind words of Fuad Pasha did not close the incident for Edward Joy Morris. The Turkish Minister to the United States labored continuously to precipitate the removal of

53 Morris to Seward, February 12, 1868, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
Morris, Correspondence indicates that Blacque wished to have Morris replaced by John Porter Brown who was a long-time defender (in the British and American press) of Turkish policy. There is no evidence to suggest that this was the wish of Ali Pasha. In fact, there is much evidence to the contrary. It is true, however, that several Ottoman ministers refused to forget the American Minister's attitude during the early months of the Cretan rebellion and his refusal to reprimand Stillman.

A major objective of Turkish diplomacy continued to be the removal of William J. Stillman as American Consul on Crete. Fuad Pasha reminded Morris of the legitimate complaints of the Ottoman government to Stillman resulting from his conduct at the beginning of the Cretan insurrection. Fuad wrote Morris:

---

54 For a discussion of Morris' recall see the following: Julius Bing to Sumner, December 11, 1867, bms, Am 1.4, Box 143, Item 93; March 1, 1868, Box 143, Item 128; January 1, 1869, Box 144, Item 108; January 3, 1869, Box 144, Item 109; March 31, 1869, Box 145, Item 11; March 24, 1869, Box 145, Item 19; April 6, 1869, Box 146, Item 16. For Morris' defense of his position see Morris to Bing, January 26, 1870, Charles Sumner Papers, bms, Am 1, 96-74, Item 74; Bing to Sumner, July 1, 1869, bms, Am 1.4, Box 145, Item 168; Morris to Charles Sumner, February 3, 1869, bms, Am 1, 89-134; and February 23, 1869 in the same box. All of the above are in the Charles Sumner Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University. For Blacque's action see Hamilton Fish Diary, entry for September 2, 1869, and July 1, 1869, Hamilton Fish Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

55 Hamilton Fish Diary, entry for September 2, 1869 and entry for July 1, 1869, Hamilton Fish Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

56 Morris to Charles Sumner, February 3, 1869, Charles Sumner Papers, bms, Am 1, 89-134, Houghton Library, Harvard University.
You were frequently requested to call the attention of the Cabinet in Washington to the matter, and to mention how unpleasant the presence of an agent who pays so little attention to his consular duties in Crete, would be to us. You also know, and Mr. Seward must be aware, of our spirit of conciliation, in allowing that agent to remain in Crete sometime longer. We permitted him to remain, only on the promises of the Government of the United States to recall him, thus saving to the Sublime Porte the displeasure of tolerating a person near it, who had behaved so unbecomingly.

In August, 1868, Fuad Pasha noted that Stillman had not altered his "reprehensible conduct." The Foreign Minister claimed the Consul had prevented Cretans from returning home by telling them that: "They all would be put to the sword, if they did, by the Turks and Imperial troops, and that all the Christians would be murdered." In general, in Fuad's view, Stillman disturbed the temporary peace of 1868 on the island. Fuad wrote to Morris: "In such a state of affairs, the gravity of which you must understand, I deem it my duty to ask you once more to do all you can to induce the Government of the United States to recall Mr. Stillman immediately." A copy of this request to Morris was sent to Blacque who, in turn, brought the matter to the attention of Seward. Blacque hoped Seward would find a way "to relieve us from this agent."

57 Fuad Pasha to Morris, August 5, 1868, Despatch 22.356/19, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, RG 84, USNA.

58 Ibid.

59 Blacque to Baltazzi (Secretary of the Turkish Legation), August 24, 1868, Notes From the Turkish Legation, RG 59, USNA.
At a cabinet meeting held on September 1, 1868, the subject of sympathy and aid for the Cretan rebels was discussed. Gideon Wells recorded this meeting in his Diary. According to the Secretary of the Navy, Seward believed Stillman to be a "troublesome man and [one who] was in the interest of feeling of the missionaries, who, as usual, were mischievous, in the matter." The general view of the Cabinet was "that the consul had better give way." Even after the Cabinet agreed that it was necessary to replace Stillman, such an action was not taken until the spring of 1869.

Edouard Blacque worked diligently with American journalists to alter hostile views expressed in their columns. During 1867, John Porter Brown began writing occasional pieces for the New York Herald which lauded the progress of reform in the Empire. Blacque claimed that the image of the Turk presented to the American public was greatly improved. Thereby, according to the Turkish Minister, panhellenic

---

60. Gideon Wells Diary, entry for September 1, 1868, Gideon Wells Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. The rest of the entry on the Middle East for the day is interesting: "Mr. E. J. Morris, our Minister at Constantinople was discussed. I expressed (sagacity) doubts of the wisdom and (judgment) of Morris. Seward says he has improved, and (has) modified and changed his opinions. Seward said every man, woman, and child in the United States was against the Turks. I told him he would please except the Navy and Navy Department. The President said no nation had been more (friendly and) true to us during our difficulties than the Turks, and instead of interfering against them in their trials, we had better turn our attention to our own affairs and get our own people reconciled."

61. See a complaint made to Hamilton Fish, Hamilton Fish Diary, entry for April 15, 1869, Hamilton Fish Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

62. For a discussion of the Turkish Minister's newspaper activities in the United States, see Chapter 2.
propaganda so effective in Europe had met with indifference among Americans, Blauche told his government: "The present government of the United States has no predisposition to openly embrace the insurgents' cause in Crete, even were it out of feeling or respect or friendship toward the Greek government." He predicted: "The Washington Cabinet will never let itself be led to the perilous way of direct intervention, which its commercial interests do not call for, which its interior preoccupations would not permit, and which its political principles could in no way justify." For proof of his conclusion, Blauche pointed to the long absence of the Greek Minister from Washington: "He [the Greek Minister] has not encountered in Washington the welcome which he expected to receive."

The Russian Minister to the United States, Edward Stoeckl, substantiated his Turkish colleague's evaluation of American policy in the Middle East. In 1868, the Minister communicated to the Russian Foreign Office his observations on the Russian attempt to "drag"

---

63 Turkey, Dişigleri Bakanlığı Arşivi, Document 3050, Blauche to Fuad Pasha, September 4, 1867, Despatch 3/4; the original reads: ". . . le gouvernement actuel des États-Unis n' a aucune prédisposition à embrasser ouvertement la cause des insurgés Crétains fût-ce même par un sentiment d' égard ou d' amitié envers le gouvernement Hellénique. La mission du ministre grec n' a eu sous ce rapport qu' un succès négatif, et l' absence prolongée de ce diplomate prouve qu' il n' a pas précisément rencontré à Washington l' accueil qu' il s' attendait à recevoir."

64 Ibid.; the original reads: "Le Cabinet de Washington ne se laissera jamais entraîner dans la voie périlleuse d' une intervention directe, que ses intérêts commerciales n' appelent pas, que ses graves préoccupations intérieures ne permettaient pas, et que ses principes politiques ne soulaient justifier à aucun titre."

65 Ibid.
America into active participation in Eastern Mediterranean affairs.

Pointing to American hatred of England and France, Stoeckl claimed America would be forced "to always be on our side." He acknowledged, however, that American friendship for Russia was "doubtful." As to apparent American sympathy for the Greek Christians, Stoeckl cautioned:

This eventuality should not be taken into account. There is really in the United States a very strong sentiment for the Christians of the East. And this sentiment is shared by some members of the Congress. Mr. Ragnabe [the Greek Minister to the United States] has taken advantage of it with much dexterity and I have given to him all of my assistance. However, I repeat we ought not to exaggerate the extent of these manifestations. The Americans will go to a certain limit but not further. . . . The critical state of the internal affairs attracts all attention of the government and of Congress, whatever may be the events which could happen in the Near East or elsewhere the Americans will maintain strict neutrality.

During the winter of 1868-69, a crisis developed which illustrated how Edouard Blaque cooperated with his French and English colleagues in order to accomplish Turkish diplomatic objectives.

66 Russia, Correspondence in the Archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Microfilm print of letters by Edouard Stoeckl to Aleksandr Gortchakov, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester; Stoeckl to Gortchakov, July 15/27, 1868, 1157, No. 29. The text reads: "Cette eventualité n'est pas à prévoir. Il y a bien aux Etat Unis un sentiment assez prononcé en faveur des Chrétiens d'Orient et ce sentiment est partagé par plusieurs membres du Congrès. Mr. Ragnabe l'a exploité fort adroitement et je lui ai prêté toute mon assistance. Mais, je le répète, nous ne devons pas nous exagérer la portée de ces demonstrations. Les iront jusqu'à un certain point mais pas au delà. . . . D'ailleurs l'état critique de la situation intérieure attire toute l'attention de ce gouvernement et du Congrès et, quels que soient les événements qui surviennent en Orient ou ailleurs, les Americaines maintiendront une stricte neutralité."
During the early months of the Cretan rebellion, Greek volunteers, guns, and provisions flowed bountifully to the rebels. Morris reported that Syra produced all types of military equipment for the Cretan revolt such as cannon balls, cannons, and gun powder. The action of the Greeks was so obvious the Turkish government could not but have believed the Hellenic government gave sanction to such activities.

Faced with apparent Hellenic expansion at Turkish expense the Sultan desired a direct confrontation with the Greek government. But, the wise council of Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha prevented any such action. However, in the fall of 1866, the two chief ministers did consider excluding Greek trading vessels from Turkish waters. Morris noted that this would be an economic blow to Greece as over 40,000 Greek vessels were engaged in commercial operations with the Empire.

As the Greek government continued to encourage the insurgents by every possible means, the Sultan became so furious that he demanded a declaration of war. Most of the Ottoman Ministry were conservatives and, thus, supported the policy of the Sultan. However, Ali Pasha fully realized the ramifications of such a decision and so threatened, on three different occasions, to resign his post if such a war were declared. Fortunately, for the welfare of the Turkish Empire, the

67 Morris to Seward, November 2, 1866, Despatch 174, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

68 Morris to Seward, December 28, 1866, Despatch 187, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
Sultan realized the importance of keeping Ali Pasha in office. In September, 1867, reports were circulated that Greece and Serbia had concluded an offensive and defensive alliance. Morris feared that if this were true than Roumania would certainly join such a group and together they would attempt to raise an insurrection in the other European provinces. Morris attributed this latest activity to Russian intrigue: "She seems determined to push matters to a crisis and to give the Turkish government no rest."  

The situation between Greece and Turkey finally came to a showdown in December, 1868, when a change in the Ministry of Greece brought new encouragement to the Cretans. The revolt revived with new vigor. The Greek ministry was convinced that sooner or later the great powers would intervene and give Crete to Greece. Renewed Greek efforts prompted the Turkish Council of Ministers with the approval of Ali Pasha to threaten drastic reprisal action against Greece. The reason for such a stand centered on the volunteer Greek expeditions for Crete and the attempts made by the Greek government to prevent the Cretans from returning to their homes. However,

---

69 Morris to Seward, December 28, 1866, Despatch 187, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

70 Morris to Seward, September 20, 1867, Despatch 228, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

71 Morris to Seward, December 2, 1868, Despatch 276, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

72 Morris to Seward, December 4, 1868, Despatch 277; December 6, 1868, Despatch 278; December 7, 1868, Despatch 279; December 18, 1868, Despatch 280, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
Morris concluded the main reason was the terrible drain on the Turkish treasury caused by the continuation of the insurrection.\textsuperscript{73}

Confronted with an immediate need for decisive action, the Ottoman government sent off an ultimatum to the Greek government demanding that: (1) they disperse the volunteers, (2) prevent blockade runners from entering and leaving the Greek ports, (3) payment of an indemnity to families of Turkish officers who had suffered assassination, (4) punishment of known assassins, (5) permission for Cretans to return to their homes, and (6) that Greece formally oblige itself in the future to respect the Treaties existing between it and the Sublime Porte.\textsuperscript{74} The Greek government did not accept the ultimatum. With this answer, the Turkish Ministry broke off diplomatic relations with Greece, threatened to expel Greek citizens living in Turkey, prohibited Greek vessels from entering Turkish waters, recalled the Turkish Minister to Athens, and presented the Greek Minister to Turkey with his passport.

Before the departure for Athens, the Greek Minister, according to usual diplomatic customs, proposed to confide Greek interests to the protection of some other legation. The French and English were forced to decline such an offer as they had encouraged the Porte in its firm measures against Greece. Russia did not find it convenient

\textsuperscript{73}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{74}Morris to Seward, December 6, 1868, Despatch 278; December 7, 1868, Despatch 279, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Also see the \textit{New York Herald}, December 17, 1868, p. 7.
to protect the Greeks. Prussia and Italy wished to keep themselves in an independent position for future action. After approaching all the European powers and obtaining only refusals, the Greek Minister addressed similar request to the American Legation. On a temporary basis, Morris agreed to be responsible for the proposed protection until he received instructions from Washington. According to British sources, Morris accepted the trust without first sending any communication on the subject to the Sublime Porte.

In an effort to ascertain the desires of the American government on this subject, Morris telegraphed Seward for instructions. He also forwarded all communications from the Greek Minister on the topic to the State Department. In an accompanying despatch dated December 23, 1868, Morris pointed out the need for urgency as the Greek Minister left 60,000 Greek citizens without any representative. Morris believed the desired protection would not lead to any political complications as it was intended to be a purely humanitarian action.

Morris did not receive an immediate answer from Seward. Thus, he attended an interview with Safvet Pasha who was acting as Minister of Foreign Affairs following the untimely death of Fuad Pasha. Morris detailed his procedure with the Greek Minister for Safvet Pasha. Also,

---

75 Morris to Seward, December 23, 1868, Despatch 282, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.


77 Morris to Seward, December 23, 1868, Despatch 282, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
Morris pointed out to the Ottoman Minister that, if the American government should grant the necessary permission for the Legation to protect the Greek citizens, he wished the Sublime Porto to know that his motives were purely humanitarian. As he had not received instructions from Washington, Morris wished to know in advance what the Porte thought of such a policy. Assuring the American Minister that no sinister motives were ascribed to the proposed American representation of Hellenic interests, and that the Porte knew the American Minister had no personal aim, Safvet Pasha pointed out that others might be less pure in heart. Safvet promised to discuss the matter with Ali Pasha, the Grand Vezir. The following day, Safvet Pasha informed Morris of the Porte's refusal to admit American representation of Hellenic interests. The Turkish Cabinet had decided not to allow such an intervention by any foreign legation. Morris made known to the Greek residents of the city that he must abstain from all action as he would not act "without the consent of the Porte." Early in January, 1869, the Turkish government had modified its expulsion decree to include only those Greeks of Turkish origin who held Hellenic passports. These were instructed either to return to their Ottoman allegiance or to leave the country. It should be noted that the Greek protection problem was settled before Morris received any word on the subject from his government.

78 Morris to Seward, January 4, 1869, Despatch 288; see Despatch 286, January 3, 1869; Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
For over one month, Morris waited for instructions from Washington. The delay resulted from action taken by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Turkish Foreign Office had telegraphed Blaque Bey in Washington the details of proposed American representation of Hellenic interests, and had instructed the Turkish Minister to persuade the American government not to sanction the arrangement.  

Seward was absent from Washington, so, Blaque Bey gave a copy of the Ottoman telegram to Frederic Seward, Assistant Secretary of State, requesting him to telegraph it to his father in Auburn, New York. In addition Blaque Bey wrote to Seward: "... In regard to our rupture with Greece... The Hellenic government works to obtain the protection of the United States for its subjects in Turkey. The protecting powers of Greece have rejected the same application. We do not doubt that the American government will do the same and spare us the painful necessity of making a formal refusal."  

When Seward returned to Washington he found the December 23, 1868, telegram from Morris requesting instructions on the Greek Minister's request of American protection for Greek subjects living in Turkey. A Cabinet meeting was held on December 30, 1868, and

---


81 Blaque to Seward, December 25, 1868, Notes from the Turkish Legation, RG 59, USNA,
the topic was discussed. It was decided that a telegram should be sent to Morris instructing him to be guided by previous instructions with regard to the protection of Greek subjects residing in Turkey. Previously, American protection had been granted only to those individuals of foreign descent who were employed by American consulates or by the Legation.\(^82\) Morris was instructed that he was not to commit his government as to future American policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.\(^83\)

Seward refused to see Blacque because the State Department did not want the public to conclude that the telegram about to be sent had been decided upon under the pressure from the Turkish government. Seward communicated the substance of the message to the French Ambassador and requested him to acquaint the Turkish Minister with the American decision. Hearing of the message which was about to be sent, the French Ambassador asked Seward not to send the telegram as a conference was to be held in Paris during January on the Turkish-Greek problem; the Second Empire's representative argued that it would be better if Morris did not receive his instructions until after the conference had completed its business. The French Minister suggested that the message should be sent by regular mail, and this was done.\(^84\)

---

\(^{82}\) See Chapter 4.


\(^{84}\) Edward Thornton to the Earl of Clarendon, January 4, 1869, op. cit., p. 58.
Sir Henry Elliot, British Ambassador to the Porte, claimed that General Nicholas Ignatieff conceived the plan of American protection for Greek citizens residing within the Ottoman Empire. According to Elliot, the Russian Ambassador assumed the American government would give Morris authority to grant protection, which then, the Porte would refuse to recognize. Ignatieff's plan, as analyzed by Elliot, would result in uncomfortable relations between Turkey and the United States. Elliot assured the Foreign Office that American refusal of Greek protection was a "blow" to Ignatieff. As to the conduct of the Russian Ambassador, Elliot confided: "I defy anyone, not on the spot as I am, to have the smallest idea of the extent or manner in which he carries on his intrigues, and which I constantly do not allude to in my correspondence from the fear of being regarded as insane."\(^{85}\)

Stillman lost his position as American Consul but his baleful influence continued. During the fall of 1867, the Porte decided that Ali Pasha should go to Crete and attempt to pacify the island with liberal concessions. The Grand Vezir offered the Cretans everything they demanded short of annexation to Greece. Stillman met Ali Pasha for the first time, and was impressed with his just and reasonable tone. He informed Morris of his observations and later he would record them in his Autobiography:

A'ali made on me an impression of honesty and justice such as I had never seen in any Turkish official... For the first time since the affair began I felt my sympathies drawn

---

to the Turkish aspect of the political questions involved, . . . A'ali used no arts; he offered bribes to no one; he showed that the Sultan was ready to offer and guarantee, and listened patiently to all that the consul or the friends of of the Cretans said, but it was too late. 86

Stillman was pleased that Ali Pasha recognized his good faith. Before he left the island, the Grand Vezir assured Stillman that he considered the American Consul a friend of Turkey. Ali informed Photiades Pasha, the Turkish Minister to Athens, that the Porte "had been greatly deceived as to the activities and attitudes of the American Consul." 87

In May, 1869, after his replacement as American Consul to Crete, Stillman remained in the area for several months. He was graciously entertained by the newly appointed Governor of Crete. The former Consul and the present Governor discussed the local economic and political situation in great detail. They agreed on what should be done. This revelation prompted the governor to urge Stillman to go to Constantinople and present his plans to Ali Pasha. Stillman agreed and set out for the Ottoman capital. Upon his arrival in Constantinople, he secured an immediate audience with the Grand Vezir. Stillman stated frankly the condition of Crete, as he saw it, and the methods that should be used for restoration of its prosperity. Ali requested Stillman to remain in the city until a commission could be sent to Crete to investigate the possibility of implementing the American's proposals. When the commission returned from Crete, Ali informed Stillman that they had confirmed his report and had approved

87 Ibid.
the remedies proposed, Ali Pasha asked Stillman if he would consider going to Crete with full powers to carry out the suggested measures. Ali Pasha regretted to inform the former American Consul that he would be unable to give an official position because many Ottoman officials still viewed Stillman as an enemy of the government. But, the Grand Vezir did offer a semi-official position for the definite purpose of pacification at a more than adequate salary.88

Unfortunately, Ali Pasha and Stillman could not agree on terms of amnesty for the rebel Cretan chiefs so the semi-official position never materialized. Ali paid Stillman 100 Turkish pounds for his trouble. When he left the Middle East, Stillman wrote:

"For Ali Pasha I retain the respect due to the most remarkable ability, honesty, and patriotism combined I have ever known in a man in his position, a most difficult one, surrounded by corruption, venality, and treason as probably the ruler of no other state has been in our day. He was free from prejudice, fanaticism, and political passion, and had he been seconded by his colleagues and administrators, as he should have been, I am convinced that he might have restored the prosperity of his country."89

The last view of an Ottoman official paid dividends for the Sublime Porte as Stillman altered considerably the tone of his articles to The Nation and the New York Times. But, more important, in 1876, it would be William J. Stillman who covered the Bulgarian revolt for The Times of London from a standpoint which was strongly sympathetic to Turkey. Stillman the Philhellene had become a completely sincere Turcophile.

89 Ibid.
Establishment of a Turkish Legation in Washington provided Ottoman officials with an opportunity to present their problems and complaints directly to the Secretary of State and the United States Congress. The Legation, from the day it was opened, worked effectively to protect Turkish interests. The first Minister made important contacts with the press and attempted to alter the hostile image of the Terrible Turk. It can be said that Edouard Blacque was, to a degree, effective, especially with James Gordon Bennett and the New York Herald. There were many difficult diplomatic problems resulting from the employment of Greek nationals in American consulates within the Empire. The American government was made even more aware of these problems after the arrival of the Turkish Minister in Washington. Because the Greek employees influenced the reports of the consuls, the Turkish Minister was often able to counteract unfavorable reports concerning Turkish rule which regularly flowed into Washington.

Edouard Blacque, however, was a conservative defender of Turkish policy. Blacque owed his entire social and economic existence to the continuation of conservative Ottoman rule. He had more than a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. If the liberal forces in Turkey could have gained complete control of the government, they might have been hesitant to continue employing displaced Europeans, such as Blacque, in high governmental positions. American consuls and the minister had many legitimate complaints against provincial Turkish officials. Blacque attributed most American complaints to
the prejudices of American consuls and the minister, and made little
effort to prod his government into effective action. Blacque spent
little time developing a friendly relationship with officials in
Washington. Seward was entirely correct when he complained of the
tone of Blacque’s despatches. Too many of them were phrased in
threatening language unsuited to Turkey’s position.

Another question must be considered: why were some segments
of the Turkish government so critical of Morris? Compared to the
Great Powers (and the smaller ones too, for that matter), the
American Minister’s policy was mild indeed. At one point during the
Cretan crisis, the British prime minister characterized the entire
Turkish government as a group of idiots. Both France and England,
friends and protectors of the Porte, several times toyed with the
idea of annexing Crete to Greece. It was European ships and not
American ones that carried away the Cretan refugees. The Turkish
government could do nothing about the activities of England, France,
and Russia. Occasionally, Turkey did take diplomatic actions
against the Austrian Ambassador while ignoring the activities of the
Italians and Belgians. But, with the Americans, the Ottomans made
an issue of every incident. America was a new power that was in no
position to use her navy and army at will. Turkey could afford to
make an occasional stiff protest to the United States and hope to
get away with it. Although accustomed to European insults, it was
almost too much for the Ottoman Ministers to accept abuse from America
Another factor that must be considered: during the nineteenth century, America was the only republic to be a major power. After the Civil War ended, she became more active and, certainly, more vocal. Every action that America took and every statement she made was suspect in the eyes of the monarchical diplomats of Europe. America was the natural enemy of traditional institutions. When put in this context, it is easier to understand why every American act brought a violent reaction from Turkey, for it might truly be said that the Sultan was plus royaliste que le roi.
MISSIONARIES AND MONITORS: THE FOUNDING OF ROBERT COLLEGE

In its eastern policy the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions had from the very first encouraged the growth of educational facilities for native converts. In 1854, Rufus Anderson, secretary for the American Board, visited Turkey and his investigation of existing educational institutions resulted in a change of policy. Missionary education was not producing an adequate number of native teachers and ministers. Instead, native students from American missionary schools became employees for governmental and foreign agencies. Objectives of the American Board did not include education as a stepping stone to more lucrative living in the secular world. In 1855, the American Board had directed that in missionary education the study of English would be stopped and no missionary education beyond the elementary level continued. Many American missionary schools were closed, one of which was the Bebek Seminary operated by Cyrus Hamlin.¹

A stroke of fate saved Hamlin from being transferred to the interior of Turkey to pursue an educational policy of which he disapproved. Christopher R. Robert, a wealthy New York merchant, visited Constantinople at the very close of the Crimean War. While touring the city, he caught view of a boat filled with loaves of freshly baked bread. Inquiry as to the origin of the loaves led him five miles up the Bosphorus where at Bebek he found the war-time bakery of Cyrus Hamlin. Robert was impressed by the versatility and energy of this talented American. The accidental meeting resulted in the establishment of an American Christian college at Bebek and Cyrus Hamlin as its first president.\(^2\)

Some prominent New York business men blessed with a philanthropic bent had been interested in founding an English language college for all races in the Ottoman Empire. The opening of an American college in Turkey was advocated by many Americans—-the faculties of Harvard and Yale, prominent American educators, and, of course, many distinguished clergymen.\(^3\) In 1859, contributions from prosperous New York residents formally launched the project. Christopher Robert, the leader of the New York group, persuaded


\(^3\)Samuel Sullivan Cox to William Seward, July 26, 1866, Miscellaneous Letters Received, Department of State, Record Group 59, United States National Archives, see enclosures. Hereafter cited RG 59, USNA.
Cyrus Hamlin to accept its direction.  

Objectives of the New York philanthropists included sponsorship of a Christian institution which would prepare young men "to enter upon professional study, or into any of the active pursuits of life," Hamlin described his break with the American Board:

In full harmony with this plan, the connection of twenty-two years with the American Board came to an end, but the work in which I had been engaged only assumed another form; and, on entering upon it, I considered myself more a missionary to Turkey than before. I was to labor, so far as possible, for all its peoples, without distinction of race, language, color, or faith.  

In the spring of 1860, Hamlin traveled to the United States to assist in raising funds for constructing the projected college. The pending American political crisis hampered popular enthusiasm for charitable collections. Unwilling to postpone the project, Robert pledged $30,000 to "erect and cover a large wooden building." While Hamlin was in America obtaining funds for his college, the kindly Sultan Abdul Mecid died and was replaced by his sterner nephew, Abdul Aziz.

Before his departure for America, Hamlin had purchased property for the college above the village of Kuruçeşme for approximately $3,000.

---

4 Cyrus Hamlin, Among The Turks, op. cit., p. 268.
5 Ibid.
6 "A Statement of Certain Facts connected with getting Permission to Establish Robert College at Roumelia Hissar on the Bosphorus in the autumn of eighteen hundred and sixty-nine," by Cyrus Hamlin to the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, See American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission Papers, 16.7.3, Volume 4, Box 2, Houghton Library, Harvard University Hereafter cited ABC: 16.7.3.
According to the American Minister, Ewing Joy Morris, he dug a well on the Kurucşehme site to "a great depth through a solid strata of rock at considerable expense," but found no water.  

One of Sultan Abdul Aziz's favorites, Mehmed Ali Pasha owned a lot near the site purchased by Hamlin. Because Hamlin's property overlooked an area frequented by the Sultan of the Ottomans, the Pasha forbade the erection of any building by an American missionary. Hamlin knew the Pasha who had "the Sultan's ear in all things" was not one "to be excited by pressing a hopeless suit."  

The absence of water on the Kurucşehme site and the displeasure of Mehmed Ali Pasha made it necessary for Hamlin to obtain another location. Hamlin believed the ideal location for a college would be on the hill overlooking Rumeli Hisar—the fortress towers built on the European side of the Bosphorus by Mehmed II. An estate located in the area was offered for sale by Ahmed Vefik Pasha, a former Ottoman Minister to Paris. John Porter Brown was convinced the Turks would never permit a Christian to build in that area and advised Hamlin to select another location. Morris, hoping to avoid difficulty with the Porte, urged Hamlin to locate in the Christian quarter of Constantinople.

---

7 Cyrus Hamlin, "A Statement of Certain Facts," op. cit. Also see Cyrus Hamlin, My Life and Times (Boston: Pilgrim Press, sixth edition, 1924), p. 415. Morris to Seward, January 7, 1863, Despatch 44, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. Morris claimed that the property sold for 90,000 piastres; there were approximately 25 piastres per dollar.


9 See Morris to Seward, July 16, 1864, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
But, Morris lamented: "All in vain. Buy Mr. Hamlin would & did at Roumeli Hissar."\(^{10}\) The property had a quarry of good stone which could be used for construction and there was plenty of water available on the property. Hamlin claimed he agreed to purchase the land on condition that the money would be given only after the Ottoman government granted a permit to build on the selected site.\(^{11}\) After the terms of purchase were agreed upon, Ahmed Vefik attempted to obtain sanction for the college from the Ottoman government.

In July, 1861, prior to Morris' arrival as Minister to the Sublime Porte, Hamlin made application through the American Legation to the Department of Public Instruction for authorization to establish the school. On August 12, 1861, Ali Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, informed John Porter Brown of "his entire approbation of the enterprise." Sami Pasha, then Minister of Education, expressed to Brown approval for the establishment of Hamlin's college.\(^{12}\) Before the transaction for the purchase of the college land was completed, Ahmed Vefik Pasha, owner of the land, became Head of the Department of Landed Property. As Department Head, the Pasha had control over the issuance of building permits. The details of the sale were concluded by December, 1861, subject to the approval of the Turkish

---

\(^{10}\) Morris to Seward, January 7, 1863, Despatch 44, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^{11}\) Hamlin, "A Statement of Certain Facts," op. cit; and My Life and Times, op. cit., p. 430.

\(^{12}\) See a document signed by Said Ahmed Kiamil, January 2, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA.
government.

On January 2, 1862, the Department of Public Instruction granted permission on condition "that the said school be subject to the laws of the Ottoman Government and the regulations governing similar schools; that it always be under the department of Public Instruction, and they shall not act contrary to it." Hamlin's program for the institution was approved by the same department and submitted to Ali Pasha, for his approval. On March 4, 1862, the American Minister witnessed the signing of three separate documents by Ali Pasha, Kemal Efendi (the Minister of Public Instruction), and Cyrus Hamlin authorizing the American missionary to establish a school "on the Bosphorus near Rumeli Hisar." On checking all documents, Ali Pasha notified John Porter Brown that he "was entirely satisfied and authorized Dr. Hamlin to proceed with the college." Once the permission to establish the school was given by Ali Pasha, Hamlin applied for a building permit. He was informed that this could not be granted until after the transfer of land had taken place. Believing this was necessary in order to obtain the desired

13 Document signed by Said Ahmed Kiamil, January 2, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, Notes from the Sublime Porte, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA. Also see William J. Clarke to Seward, May 6, 1868, Miscellaneous Letters, Department of State, RG 59, USNA. A copy of Clarke's letter can be found in the Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 84, USNA.

14 See a document in the Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume IV, March 24, 1862; it is dated Ramazan 5, 1278 and signed Kimal. Also see Clarke to Seward, May 6, 1868, op. cit.

15 Ibid.
building permit, Hamlin paid Ahmed Vefik Pasha the purchase money and received title to the land. Construction of the college began at once. But within a few weeks, officers from the Porte informed Hamlin that "some formalities" were not completed and all work on the project must stop.\textsuperscript{16} It seemed the new college president still did not have a building permit.

The delay of the Porte prompted the American Legation to approach Sir Henry Bulwer, the British Ambassador, to use his personal influence.\textsuperscript{17} Bulwer made a full examination of the college program and concluded that Hamlin's purpose "was of a large and general kind and calculated to be of a great benefit to all classes of persons who were anxious to obtain the means of acquiring the higher branches of knowledge without quitting the country."\textsuperscript{18} In a personal interview with Ali Pasha, Bulwer pointed out the advantages for Turkey of promoting such an establishment. After a lengthy discussion with the British Ambassador, Ali Pasha promised to issue the necessary orders.\textsuperscript{19} Unfortunately, six years would pass before permission for construction would be finally granted.

On March 19, 1862, the British Embassy reported that the

\textsuperscript{16}Hamlin, "Certain Facts," \textit{op. cit}; Clarke to Seward, May 6, 1868, \textit{op. cit}.

\textsuperscript{17}Great Britain, Public Record Office, Foreign Office, 78/1724, Bulwer to Lord Russell, March 19, 1863, Despatch 140 and F. O. 78/1649, March 29, 1862, Despatch 146, see enclosures. Hereafter cited BFO 78/1724.

\textsuperscript{18}Bulwer to Lord Russell, March 29, 1862, Despatch 146, \textit{op. cit}.

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Ibid}.
American missionaries were willing to give up the site provided they were indemnified for their losses. Hamlin informed the British Ambassador that he had found "a better one in a Christian quarter." Ali Pasha agreed to the justice of the demand and promised to settle "the affair with the least practicable delay." The British Ambassador assured Lord John Russell, British Foreign Secretary, that "both Mr. Norris and the missionaries appear satisfied with this arrangement." Much to the consternation of Morris, Ahmed Vefik Pasha did not return the money nor did Hamlin receive permission to continue construction on his selected site.

On June 8, 1862, government authorization to open the college was issued in official form under the signature and seal of the Minister of Public Instruction. With this legal document in the Legation's possession, Morris repeatedly urged the Porte to issue the building permit. He found it most difficult to persuade the Ottoman authorities. Ali Pasha complained to Morris of the college's proximity to Hisar (a Muslim village), a mosque, the fortress of Rumeli Hisar, a graveyard of Muslim martyrs, a Turkish fountain, and a center of Bektaşi dervishes (the most influential of all Muslim religious orders.) Prior to Hamlin's purchase of the Rumeli Hisar site, Ali

20 Bulwer to Lord Russell, March 19, 1862, Despatch 140, op. cit.
21 Ibid.
22 Morris to Seward, January 7, 1863, Despatch 44, Correspondence, Turkey, USNA. The June 8, 1862, official authorization is not on file in the Constantinople Post Papers. Morris claimed that the Porte gave permission to establish the college but did not mention the site. The missionaries claimed the June 8, 1862, permit did name the site.
told Morris that the Porte had forced an old Christian merchant to vacate a building which he had constructed in the same vicinity. The merchant's building was even further removed from the Muslim sacred shrines than the land on which Hamlin wished to construct a Christian college. 23

In a personal interview with Ali Pasha at his villa on the Bosphorus, the Foreign Minister pointed out to Morris that "quarrels might accidentally arise between the Christian inmates and fanatical Mussulmen which might result in destruction of both life and property & thus a grave international question would be created." 24 Ali assured Morris that it was his policy to avoid "the chance of such contingencies." As early as the summer of 1862, Ali Pasha suggested to Morris that he "appoint some one on your side & we will appoint one on ours & wherever they choose a site among the Christian neighborhoods, I will give my assent & the building can be commenced within 24 hrs. afterwards." Morris and Bulwer appealed to Hamlin to accept this reasonable solution. Hamlin refused to yield. Bulwer lamented to Morris that the missionaries' troubles resulted from "the narrow minded course they pursued." 25 Morris let the State Department know that Hamlin was particularly obnoxious to the Porte because of the trouble he had caused in relation to Protestant conversions of Muslims. Morris

\[23\] Morris to Seward, January 7, 1863, Despatch 44, op. cit.

\[24\] Morris to Seward, July 16, 1864, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\[25\] Morris to Seward, September 13, 1862, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, RG 59, USNA.
described Hamlin's difficulties for Seward: "That gentleman though a distinguished missionary has a very quarrelsome disposition, and a despotism of character that often leads him to do injustice to the motives of others."\(^{26}\)

Morris maintained the settlement of the college issue was not "properly an affair of Diplomatic business." But, the Minister claimed, in spite of this, he had done all in his power to locate the college on Hamlin's chosen site. Morris explained to Seward that Ali Pasha continued to protest against establishing a Christian college in an exclusively Muslim area. The American Minister wrote Seward that if Hamlin would have selected another site in the Christian quarter he would have encountered no opposition from the Porte on the subject.\(^{27}\)

Before the controversy was finally settled, Hamlin blamed his difficulties upon everyone connected directly or indirectly with the project. The first enemy he identified was Abbé Boré, the Jesuit director of the French College of Bebek. According to Hamlin, the Abbé initiated opposition to the American college. Hamlin obtained his information from Abbé Boré's personal secretary. The Abbé exerted great influence at the French Embassy until he was recalled to Rome in 1868.\(^{28}\) Hamlin admitted that the Catholic embassies were hostile

\(^{26}\)Morris to Seward, September 18, 1862, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^{27}\)Ibid. and Morris to Seward, July 16, 1864, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^{28}\)Hamlin, Among The Turks, op. cit., p. 290; Live and Times, op. cit., p. 431; "Certain Facts," op. cit.
to his plans. But he declared that the most active opposition to the college came from the Russian Embassy. The Russians had long opposed Protestant missionary work in Turkey. As proof for his accusations against the Russians, Hamlin pointed to the fact that all ministers to the Sultan who opposed the college were under the influence of the Russian Ambassador, General Nicholas Ignatieff.

It is obvious that the objections raised by France and Russia against establishing an American college were not contributing factors in the refusal to issue the building permit. Ali Pasha was quite willing to ignore all foreign protests; the location of the institution was the problem. Hisar, a mixed community of Muslims and Christians, was controlled by Ahmed Vefik Pasha. In August, 1862, Fuad Pasha arranged two public meetings at Hisar to ascertain the mood of the village. According to a tradition he agreed that if the people did not object the school could be built. The first meeting was poorly attended, but most of the villagers appeared to be friendly to the college. Those attending a second meeting refused to sign any document favoring or opposing the establishment of the school. At the meeting some malcontents complained of the school's proximity to the Muslim cemetery and a fountain much used by the villagers.

---

29 Hamlin, My Life and Times, op. cit., p. 432.
30 Ibid., p. 438.
31 Hamlin to Morris, November 19, 1862, and November 27, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA. Hamlin wrote Morris on August 23, 1862: "The government recently sent one of the Engineers of the Tidjaret to call the people of Hissar together & demand of them their opinion in regard to
A map of the area revealed that the fountain in question was separated from the college property both by a road and by property owned by a Turkish gentleman. It was estimated that the college building would be one-fourth of a mile from the fountain. The cemetery was discovered to be near the shore of the Bosphorus and the college was to be located on the heights above. In addition, the cemetery was separated from the college site by quarries worked by men and animals, a precipice, land not belonging to the college, and a public road.\(^{32}\)

According to Morris, Ali Pasha endeavoured earnestly during the summers of 1862-63 to remove the objections of the people of Hisar. He was embarrassed, so Morris reported, because of his failure to persuade the Muslim leaders of Hisar to consent to the Christian college building. Muslims were not the only members of Hisar who objected to Robert College. According to Hamlin, the head of the Christian community had "done all in his power to excite the people against the proposed college."\(^{33}\) After many interviews with Ali Pasha, Morris became convinced that the Foreign Minister was eager to building the college on the site purchased of Vefik Effendi. About ten days previously there had been a special effort made by certain individuals to excite the people against it. I sent my agent to be present at the assembly & note the replies. He reports that when asked what they had to say, they replied "We are servants of the governments, who are we that we should have anything to say. But if the Government asked us we reply that we don't want it built. They were requested by the Engineer to give a ... note to this effect but they refused to give any writing whatever."\(^{34}\)

\(^{32}\)Hamlin to Morris, November 19, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA.

\(^{33}\)Hamlin to Morris, August 23, 1862, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA.
bring about a settlement "conformably with the wishes of Dr. Hamlin."\(^{24}\)

Hamlin had purchased two separate pieces of property for the proposed American Christian college. It was not possible to build on either because of the government's objections. In the fall of 1863, confronted by opposition from the social, religious, political, and diplomatic communities of Constantinople, Hamlin opened the college in the former Bebek Seminary building.\(^{35}\) This could be only temporary housing because of inadequate space. Once the college was operating, Hamlin continued his legal fight with the Porte.

During 1862-63, Hamlin wrote to Robert accusing Morris of incompetence in diplomatic affairs and hostility to missionary ideals. The letters of complaint against Morris were forwarded to Seward by Christopher Robert. Hamlin hoped that he would be able to have Morris recalled. A new Minister would not be so friendly with Ali Pasha and, possibly, would take a firmer stand on the college question.\(^{36}\) In refusing to accept responsibility for the fiasco, Morris suggested that Hamlin was "endeavoring to make me the scape-goat of his own blunder."\(^{37}\) And, as for Hamlin's accusations that Morris had acted

\(^{24}\)Morris to Seward, January 3, 1868, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^{35}\)C. W. Goddard to Seward, October 31, 1863, Despatch 55, Consular Correspondence, Constantinople, RG 59, USNA.

\(^{36}\)See Chapter 6. Also see Dodge to Seward, October 24, 1862, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Department of State, RG 59, USNA.

\(^{37}\)Morris to Seward, January 7, 1863, Despatch 44, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
in conjunction with Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha in defeating the selected location, the Minister admitted that he had failed to persuade the Ottoman dignitaries to issue the building permit. But, what could he have done, Morris wondered? "Possibly in his [Hamlin's] opinion the legitimate business of the Legation seems to be a secondary nature in comparison with the college question, I should have made it a question of war or peace & have demanded my passport." 38

By the summer of 1864, Christopher Robert appealed to the United States Congress. He urged Edwin Dennison Morgan, leading Republican senator from New York, to insist that claims made by Robert College against the Turkish government be settled. In addition to Morgan, Robert enlisted the assistance of James Willis Patterson, Senator from New Hampshire and Samuel Sullivan Cox, a former congressman from Ohio and New York. These three politicians continued to press Seward for a settlement of the case until its final conclusion in October, 1868. 39

An important item brought to Seward's attention by Christopher Robert and the three congressmen was a constant contention made by Cyrus Hamlin. Hamlin attributed the failure to recover the purchase

---

38 Morris to Seward, January 7, 1863, Despatch 44, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

39 E. D. Morgan to Seward, October 16, 1868; November 10, 1868; W. J. Patterson to Seward, February 1, 1868; February 4, 1868; C. R. Robert to Seward, May 23, 1867 and June 25, 1867; Miscellaneous Correspondence, Department of State, RG 59, USNA.
money to "want of proper action" on the part of Morris. When informed of Hamlin's accusation, the American Minister protested vigorously. In several different personal interviews with the Grand Vezir and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Morris claimed that he always presented Hamlin's version of the case. According to Morris, the settlement rested on the extent of the responsibility of the Turkish government to indemnify Hamlin for land purchased without a building permit. The Department of Public Instruction had granted permission for the establishment of the College at Rumeli Hisar, but it never agreed to issue a building permit for the exact site chosen by Hamlin. Hamlin paid the money to Ahmed Vefik Pasha presuming the Minister of Public Works would have no difficulty issuing a building permit. In the view of the Turkish Cabinet, the transaction was a private matter and did not incur a liability on the part of the government. Thus, they did not feel obligated to return the purchase price. In the Porte's view, it was a matter to be settled between Ahmed Vefik Pasha and Cyrus Hamlin.

Morris confided to Seward that any action taken by the State Department should be of a friendly character because "I do not consider that we have a good case if we have any at all." He suggested a solution to Seward:

40 Morgan to Seward, June 17, 1864, Miscellaneous Letters, Department of State, RG 59, USNA.
41 Morris to Seward, July 16, 1864, Private Letters, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RC 59, USNA.
A despatch might be addressed to me reviewing the facts of the case suggesting the embarrassment to Mr. Hamlin by the refusal of the Building board—the waste of the college funds—and the error into which Mr. Hamlin was led by the action of the Board of Public Instruction—that such an institution is capable of great good to American & other foreign residents in Turkey—that its aim is exclusively education (and that of a secular character) and that a strong interest is felt in its success by the philanthropic contributors to its funds in America. Under all these circumstances it is hoped the Turkish government will take the question into consideration and indemnify Mr. Hamlin for his losses by the purchase of the land at the price he paid, . . . Some such despatch either I or Mr. Brown might be authorized to read to Aali Pasha. 42

Seward did not proceed on Morris' suggestion. In his instructions to the American Minister at Constantinople between 1862-1866, Seward made no reference whatsoever to the college question.

As time passed, the college housed in the Bebek Seminary was successful in its attempt to obtain students of all races and religions. In fact, the building was overcrowded. In the aftermath of the cholera epidemic of 1865, the French Ambassador persuaded the Porte to grant the Sisters of Charity a valuable lot of land in the European section of Constantinople in appreciation for their work. George Washburn pointed out for his readers of the New York Daily Tribune that Hamlin and the other American missionaries of Constantinople labored "with more devotion and more success during the cholera epidemic than any other body of men in Constantinople." But, in spite of their efforts, the Americans received no rewards from the Turkish government. Referring to the ill-housed Robert College, Washburn

42 Morris to Seward, July 16, 1864, Private Letter, op. cit.
concluded: "This is Turkish justice; but it is difficult to see why the United States Government should coolly tolerate an outrage of this kind in the face of such acts of benevolence to the French." Washburn was shocked that the American government should permit its "citizens to be trodden under foot in this way." 43

Again on July 12, 1866, the trustees of Robert College presented still another memorial to Seward in which they outlined the events of the case according to information sent to them by Cyrus Hamlin. Because of the delay and lack of justice shown by the Ottoman authorities, they now claimed damages in addition to the return of the purchase price of the land. Several months later, on November 15, 1866, Seward sent the memorial to Morris along with instructions. Seward told his Minister: "Supposing, however that the facts are correctly stated in the accompanying paper the purchase money ought to be refunded. You are consequently authorized diligently to employ your good offices toward effecting its restitution." 44 Washburn reported this new action in the New York Tribune. But, as always, his statement was stronger than that of the Secretary of State. Washburn wrote confidently: "I now understand that Mr. Seward had decided to insist upon the rights of the College." 45

43 See the New York Daily Tribune, November 23, 1866, p. 1 and December 26, 1866, p. 1.

44 Seward to Morris, November 15, 1866, Despatch 123, Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

Armed with instructions from Seward, the American Minister urged Ali Pasha to reach a decision on the Robert College issue. At the Porte, the college question was discussed and referred for action to the Council of Ministers. All during 1867, Morris and Brown pressed Ali Pasha for a solution. Each request for information produced a similar answer. Each time Brown would write the Minister: "[Today, Ali Pasha] told me that it had been discussed in the Council of Ministers some days ago, but without arriving at any decision, & that he would bring it up again on Wednesday next, when he hoped, a decision would be made."46 The Minister at the Porte could not agree on a solution.

After "long persevering efforts" on his part, Morris reported that the Porte acquiesced in American designs. It was on July 8, 1867, that Ali Pasha informed Morris of the Porte's decision to withdraw all objections to the Rumeli Hisar site. And, he promised, a formal letter would soon be addressed to the American Legation on the college subject. The letter did not arrive. By September 24, 1867, George Washburn wrote Christopher Robert that renewed opposition to the erection of the college at Rumeli Hisar had assumed such proportions that the Grand Vezir was forced to yield to the desires of the people. Ali Pasha promised personally to take charge of the problem and he endeavored to overcome the hostility of the residents of Hisar. Month after

---
46 The quote is from Brown to Morris, April 22, 1867; also see February 12, 1867, May 14, 1867, May 23, 1867, Correspondence between Minister and Secretary, Constantinople Post Papers, RG 84, USNA; Morris to Seward, April 12, 1867, Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
month passed, and finally, Ali Pasha was obliged to inform Morris of
his failure to overcome the opposition "of certain of the Mussulman
residents whose assent was necessary." 47

Morris reported to the State Department that because Ali Pasha
had been confronted with continued opposition by the people of Hisar,
he offered Hamlin "a lot of ground of equal value on his own property
at Bebek lower down the Bosphorus." 48 Hamlin did not consider Ali's
land to be of equal value as shown by a passage which he wrote later:

He [Ali Pasha] proposed to swap a worthless piece of ground
which belonged to himself for the magnificent college site!
As it was a rather steep place, I told him a college built
there would run down hill into the gutter! He laughed, and
said he had another piece which he would like to have me
look at, and in a day or two he would send a man to show me
the place. It was still more absurdly unfit for a college.
After examining it, I wrote him a note, saying that I
declined treating any further for exchange of places. 49

In December, 1867, while Ali Pasha was off in Crete attempting
to satisfy the demands of the rebels, Edward Joy Morris and George
Washburn concluded that a new approach to the college problem was
desperately needed. A careful examination of the existing situation
convinced these gentlemen that their appeals to the Porte had utterly
failed. Morris was convinced that a new attack should center on

47 J. W. Patterson to Seward, February 1, 1868, Miscellaneous
Letters, Department of State, RG 59, USNA. See enclosures C, R,
Robert to Patterson, January 20, 1868; George Washburn to C. R. Robert,
July 8, 1867; George Washburn to Robert, September 12, 1867 and
September 24, 1867. Also William F. Clarke to Seward, May 6, 1868,
Miscellaneous Letters, Department of State, RG 59, USNA.

48 Morris to Seward, January 3, 1868, Private Letter, Official
Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

49 Hamlin, My Life and Times, op. cit., p. 440.
Edouard Blaque in Washington, Morris proposed to "stir up" Seward who would, in turn, "attack Blaque Bey." Morris observed that in other difficult cases between the Legation and the Porte, a request from Seward to the Turkish Minister produced results. According to Washburn, because it had been discovered "the Turkish Govt. can be reached in this way to some purpose," they decided to use the same approach to settle the college question. In addition to the letter for the Secretary of State, Morris urged Washburn to write Christopher Robert immediately of the plan. Robert was requested to put pressure on Seward personally or through some influential friends in Washington. Washburn confided to Robert: "It is a admirable time to stir him [Seward] up." 50

Morris set the plan in motion. In a private letter, dated January 3, 1868, he reviewed the facts of the college case for Seward. Following his version of the history of the events, Morris suggested that a few words from the American Secretary of State to the Turkish Minister might result in a "speedy conclusion of this affair." Morris pointed out that requests presented by the American Secretary of State to the Turkish Minister had carried more weight with the Turkish government than any other approach. Morris reminded the Secretary that the Turks were not hostile to the college, but only to its being built

50 J. W. Patterson to Seward, February 1, 1868, Miscellaneous Letters, Department of State, RG 59, USNA; see enclosure of George Washburn to C. R. Robert, December 23, 1867.
on the site purchased by Hamlin.\textsuperscript{51}

Complying with Washburn's request, on January 20, 1868, Christopher Robert urged Senator Patterson of New Hampshire to pressure Seward for a settlement. Robert confided to the Senator: "If the Honb. Secretary of State will do this promptly directing Mr. Morris to act energetically, I believe official authority to build where we desire will soon be given."\textsuperscript{52} On February 1, 1868, Senator James Willis Patterson forwarded all the communications which he had received to the Secretary of State. The Senator asked Seward to give the matter "your immediate and favorable consideration."\textsuperscript{53}

Evidently, the two-pronged attack was effective. For on February 3, 1868, in the first written statement dealing with the Robert College question addressed to the Turkish Minister, Seward requested Blacque to call at the State Department. Seward noted that the conversation would be directed to "a recent communication

\textsuperscript{51}Morris to Seward, January 3, 1868, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\textsuperscript{52}Christopher Robert to J. W. Patterson, January 20, 1868, an enclosure in the letter Patterson sent to Seward, February 1, 1868.

\textsuperscript{53}J. W. Patterson, February 1, 1868, Miscellaneous Letters, Department of State, RG 59, USNA. On February 4, 1868, Senator Patterson wrote Seward the following: "This morning, I received a letter from C. R. Robert of N. Y. containing the following intelligence: He says 'This morning I have a letter from Dr. Hamlin, in which he dwells upon the importance of the subject of the claims of the college at Constantinople. It demands the immediate and prompt action of Mr. Seward. Dr. Hamlin says: "By the time we get the matter well under way here, if Blacque should tell them that the annoying matter must be finished, it would put an end to it at once."' I apprehend that it would be advantageous to open negotiations with the Turkish Minister as soon as possible."
from Mr. E. Joy Morris, . . . concerning Robert College. There is no record of this meeting. But on February 7, 1868, Seward wrote Blacque reminding him of their February 6 conversation. It seems the gentlemen had agreed to an early settlement "of the question of the cession of a site for the so-called Robert College."55

As usual, nothing happened. By May, 1868, the trustees of Robert College prepared still another lengthy memorandum on the facts of the case for the Secretary of State.56 In this document, for the first time, the trustees made much of the fact that Hisar was a mixed village containing both Muslims and Christians. This fact must have been known to the Porte, Morris, Hamlin, and Washburn. It must be remembered that Orthodox Christian leaders seldom welcomed into their midst American Protestant missionaries. The new memorandum was sent off to the American Legation in Turkey accompanied with an appropriate request for action.57

In response to Seward's request, Morris wrote privately that he felt that the government would never grant permission to build

54 Seward to Blacque, February 3, 1868, Notes to the Turkish Legation, Department of State, RG 59, USNA.

55 Seward to Blacque, February 7, 1868, Notes to the Turkish Legation, Department of State, RG 59, USNA.

56 William F. Clarke to William Seward, May 6, 1868, Miscellaneous Letters, Department of State, RG 59, USNA. Seward sent the memorial to Morris, May 12, 1868, Despatch 183, Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA. A copy of the memorial is located in the Constantinople Post Papers, General Correspondence, Jerusalem, RG 84, USNA.

57 Seward to Morris, May 12, 1868, Despatch 183, Instructions, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
Robert College at Hisar without the consent of the Muslim residents. The American Minister confessed he had "begged" Ali Pasha that if the college could not be constructed at Rumeli Hisar than the government should indemnify Hamlin for expenses connected with the purchase. Again, the Grand Vezir placed the matter before the Ottoman Council and recommended payment. The American Minister informed Seward that the Council's decision would probably be a final one. The Minister added: "Considering the generosity of the American contributors & the beneficent object of the institution, it seems to me the Porte has acted in a very unfair & unjust manner to Mr. H. & the founders of the college."\(^{58}\)

The Ottoman Council had developed a reputation for the indefinite postponement of important decisions. No minister wished to accept the responsibility for an unpopular decision. Thus, Morris had no way of knowing that the Council would do, or if they would do anything at all. Confronted with this difficulty, Morris again suggested that the State Department press the matter on the Turkish Minister at Washington and invoke the action of the Turkish government through Blacque. The American Minister also believed that any instructions given the Legation on the college question should be of such a nature that "I could leave a copy of them with the Minister of Foreign Affairs."\(^{59}\)

\(^{58}\)Morris to Seward, June 5, 1868, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

\(^{59}\)Ibid.
On June 22, 1868, Seward sent an unofficial note to Blacque. He pointed to the anxiety experienced by the trustees of Robert College who were upset by the lack of information about the college land settlement. Referring to their February conversation, Seward wanted to know what information the Turkish Minister had received since that date from his government on the subject. In an apologetic response, Blacque confided to the Secretary of State that he had heard nothing on the college question from the Porte. Blacque went on to assure Seward that the delay resulted from the suggestion made to the Porte from Washington which, he believed, would "necessarily require sometime to receive a useful application in conformity with the interests of diverse character which we mixed up with this question." Blacque promised Seward to send again "the terms of your message, and will add thereto my fresh and pressing instances that he [Fuad Pasha] may let us know as soon as possible, the decision of the Sublime Porte."  

Seward's terms for settlement of the college question are not known. There is no reference to the terms of the proposal in correspondence exchanged by Blacque and the Secretary of State. Seward never again gave instructions on this subject to the American Minister in Constantinople. It must be concluded that Blacque informed Fuad Pasha of the American terms, because the Turkish Minister stated that he had written such a letter to the Sublime Porte. But, as this

---

60 Seward to Blacque, June 22, 1868, Notes to the Turkish Legation, RG 59, USNA; Blacque to Seward, June 26, 1868, Notes from the Turkish Legation, RG 59, USNA.
letter does not appear in the Turkish Foreign Office Archives in the folio where it should be located, its precise contents are a mystery. Nonetheless, it is certain, Seward wanted to settle the problem.

The Secretary of State was unhappy with Blacque's reply to his request for information. Six months had passed since Seward had made his proposal to the Porte. Well aware of the Porte's anxiety over the portrayal of their image in the American press, Seward informed Blacque that Robert College had enlisted the sympathy and support of America's religious community. Seward reminded the Turkish Minister that this large and active group exerted a great influence on the press and were capable of making themselves heard and felt in Congress. Every missionary grievance with the Porte was a weapon used with great effect, Seward explained, in regard to "any Oriental political question." Then, he went on, there was a definite need for the Turkish government to show faith towards the patrons of the college.  

Seward pointed out to Blacque: "It seems to me that if these considerations could reach the Turkish Government, the Government would see the importance of putting an end at once and in a just and satisfactory manner to an affair which has existed so long, and has already produced too much embarrassment."  

What Blacque wrote to his superiors is unknown as no letter on the subject has survived in the Turkish Foreign Office Archives.

62 Seward to Blacque, July 1, 1868, Notes from the Turkish Legation, Department of State, RG 59, USNA.

63 Ibid.
At long last, the Ottoman Council made its decision. Ali Pasha sent a note to Morris stating: "Please inform Mr. Hamlin that he may begin the building of the college when he pleases." Morris announced to the State Department, On October 29, 1868, the good news: "The Imperial decree sanctioning the erection of Mr. Hamlin's college on the spot chosen by him at Roumeli Hisar has been signed by the Sultan and will in a short time be placed in my hands. It gives me no ordinary pleasure to state this, as this question has been to me a source of much anxiety and vexation for a long period of time." 64

Cyrus Hamlin recorded his amazement:

It was a mystery of good news! It was an almost incredible gift of God, coming when least expected, when most needed! The "Imperial Itrade" is a tenure of property most highly valued, the safest, the most sacred, that can be given. We had never dared to ask for it. It was now bestowed without our asking! 65

From the day that Ali Pasha sent the note telling of the Porte's permission to build Robert College at the Rumeli Hisar site until the present time, many have asked why the Porte not only gave permission but granted an Imperial Itrade. A popular notion was (and is) that Robert College was founded by an American man-of-war anchored beneath the Sultan's window. The ship credited with the deed was the U. S. S. Franklin, a thirty-nine gun steam frigate, commanded by Admiral David Glasgow Farragut on a state visit to Constantinople.

64 Morris to Seward, October 29, 1868, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.

65 Hamlin, Among The Turks, op. cit., p. 295.
On June 28, 1867, Admiral Farragut became commander of the European Squadron and began an extended tour of European capitals. For a period of seventeen months, this distinguished American was wined and dined by the noblest of the noble in Europe. Near the end of his tour of duty, the Admiral decided to visit the countries "skirting the northern shores of the Levant." The Franklin departed England on July 19, 1868, bound for Mediterranean ports. Farragut's party hoped the Franklin would be permitted to pass the Dardanelles. At Syra, in the Greek archipelago, the Admiral transferred his flag to the Frolic, a smaller vessel within the tonnage and gun restrictions established for warships passing through the Dardanelles under the 1856 Treaty of Paris. On board the Frolic, Farragut proceeded to Chanak where he awaited twenty-four hours for the arrival of the firman giving him permission to proceed on to Constantinople. With the firman, the Frolic, a side wheeler with five guns, steamed past Gallipoli, up the Sea of Marmara, and anchored at the mouth of the Golden Horn on August 8, 1868.

---

66 On April 15, 1868, the Constantinople correspondent for the New York Herald informed his readers that Farragut would visit the Ottoman capital before his return to the United States. James Eglinton Montgomery, Our Admiral's Flag Abroad: The Cruise of Admiral D. G. Farragut, Commanding the European Squadron in 1867-8, in the Flag-ship Franklin (New York: Putnam and Son, 1869). Hereafter cited The Cruise of the Franklin. Montgomery was a staff officer aboard the Franklin and on his return to the United States published an official record of the cruise.

67 Farragut to Gideon Welles, August 4, 1868, No. 60, Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy, European Squadron, RG 45, USNA.
A legend developed around Farragut's visit to Constantinople which held that the Frolic was refused permission to pass the Straits. In a 1908 address to the New Society of the Order of the Founders and Patriots of America, Ralph E. Prime repeated the story of the Ottoman refusal:

I have heard that it is said that a second message was sent by the warrior sailor that he intended to come up with his ship anyway, and that come he would, with or without permission, but he wanted the permission. It is obvious from the material found in the Naval Records that this particular part of the legend is false. It must be remembered that all ships, regardless of size, needed a firman to pass through the Straits. The Treaty of Paris placed a tonnage limit on warships passing through the Straits and the Frolic was well within those restricted limits. It would have been an overt act of hostility directed against the United States government for the Porte to have failed to grant the Frolic a firman. It might also have been considered an insult to the Turkish government if Admiral Farragut had not visited the Ottoman capital. On his ceremonial tour, Turkey would have been the only European nation ignored by that distinguished visitor.

Shortly after Frolic was moored in the Golden Horn, Morris and John Porter Brown came on board to welcome the Admiral. Morris

---


inquired as to the whereabouts of the Franklin and expressed surprise when informed that she had not obtained permission to pass the Dardanelles. He assured the commander of the European Squadron that it was still not too late to obtain the necessary firman. While Morris was debating the fine points of the 1856 Treaty of Paris, Farragut and his fellow officers were entertained by Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha in a manner which brought forth visions of "brilliant feats described in the Arabian Nights." James Eglinton Montgomery, a member of the Admiral's staff, recorded his impressions upon meeting the Ottoman dignitaries. He found Ali Pasha to have a "deportment which is as pleasant as it is irresistible." The Foreign Minister, Fuad Pasha, received an equally laudatory description:

The Minister was remarkably gracious, spoke freely of American affairs, manifested much interest in our improvements in implements of war, and seemed to possess a wonderful familiarity with our national status. He is a man of great erudition, an excellent scholar, and considered to be inferior to very few in Europe as a well-skilled diplomatist.71

Farragut and his officers made an official call on Sultan Abdul Aziz whom the irrepressible Montgomery described as "decidely Oriental."
The diarist noted that the Sultan displayed considerable interest in American iron-clads.72

Meanwhile, the Franklin leisurely cruised the Syrian and

71 Ibid., p. 371
72 Ibid., p. 373. Also see the Daily News (London), August 17, 1868, p. 3; Daily Telegraph (London), August 17, 1868, p. 3; New York Herald, August 18, 1868, p. 7.
Turkish coast and finally dropped anchor in the Dardanelles. It was well known in Constantinople that the Sultan wanted the Franklin to be given a firman for passage through the Straits. Given this fact, Morris was convinced that exceptional honors should be awarded the most distinguished officer in the American navy. On August 14, 1868, the American Minister called on the Grand Vezir and officially requested the Turkish government to allow Farragut to sail the Franklin to Constantinople. Ever the wily diplomatist, Ali Pasha claimed he did not have authority to make an exception to the regulations governing the Straits. Morris pointed out that exceptions had already been made in favor of the Russians. The Porte had permitted the Grand Duke Alexis aboard the Alexander Nevsky, a Russian frigate of fifty guns, to pass from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. A strong monarchist, Ali replied that exceptions were reserved for princes of royal blood. His republicanism aroused, Morris argued that such an interpretation of the regulations prevented the United States from enjoying the same privileges "as the aristocratic states of Europe." It was true, the Minister conceded, that Admiral Farragut was not a prince of the blood. The republican Morris was pleased to announce "that in America, where there were no titles, all are in one sense princes of the blood." On the account of Farragut's high standing and rank in America, he ought to be granted special consideration. Morris reminded Ali Pasha that Farragut had been received with distinction by all the sovereigns of Europe.

In a personal interview with Fuad Pasha, Morris told the Foreign Minister that the civil thing to do would be to grant the Franklin the permission. Fuad suggested that Morris send a formal note requesting permission for the Franklin to pass through the Straits. Following his interview with Morris, Fuad Pasha wrote Sir Henry Elliot asking "whether the permission wished for could be granted without inconvenience." On the following morning, Fuad informed the Great Powers that the Sultan wished the Franklin to visit the city and invited their assent.

Sir Henry Elliot informed Fuad Pasha that he would be be "glad [for] every mark of consideration and attention that can be shown to that distinguished officer," Elliot promised to waive objections to the Franklin's passage provided representatives of the powers were unanimous in consenting to such an action. In addition to this provision; Elliot declared that an exception in Farragut's favor should not be regarded as a precedent. Elliot instructed Fuad Pasha: "The Porte is not at liberty to grant the permission without the expressed acquiescence of the Representatives of the Powers; and if any one of them objects, he has a right to expect that the Treaty shall be strictly adhered to." Elliot let Fuad Pasha know it would have

---

74 E. Pisani to Sir Henry Elliot, August 15, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume IV, A copy of the letter was sent to the American Legation.

75 Sir Henry Elliot to E. Pisani, August 16, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA.

76 Sir Henry Elliot to E. Pisani, August 16, 1868, op. cit.
been advisable for the Porte to have consulted before hand with the powers instead of stating that the Sultan's government had "already thought fit to grant permission." 77

The British Ambassador was irritated by the actions of Ignatieff. It seemed the Russian Ambassador had been working diligently with other members of the Great Powers to get the Franklin through the Straits. Elliot claimed that Ignatieff was attempting a diplomatic coup by claiming the Americans were not bound by the Treaty of Paris. 78 Elliot concluded that it was necessary to let everyone know the British expected the 1856 Treaty of Paris to be respected. The British Ambassador predicted that if constant exceptions were made, within a few years ships of war would be passing through the Straits "for all sorts of flimsy reasons." 79 But, Elliot conceded, if the Turks refused the Franklin a firman, it would give great offense to the Americans. In the British view, anticipating the acclaim the American Admiral would receive on his visit to Greece, such an offense could take on political importance. Elliot knew that if the Franklin had not been given permission, the Americans would have blamed the British (quite correctly it seems). On the other hand, once permission was granted, everyone knew that credit for the concession had to be given to the

77 Sir Henry Elliot to Fuad Pasha, August 23, 1868, Constantinople Post Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Volume IV, RG 84, USNA; a copy.


79 Ibid.
British. Elliot felt that on all points of the diplomatic contest, he had been the actual winner. Even Morris was defeated. The Americans had admitted that they were bound by the 1856 Treaty of Paris when Morris requested the Franklin be made an exception.

In a private letter to Seward, Morris conceded that it had been "a hard Diplomatic fight." His stated objective was one of placing American dignitaries on the same social footing as the royalty of Europe. Morris was determined to succeed and he availed himself of every possible means of influence. The American Minister assured Seward that the Porte was favorably disposed, but that it was embarrassed by the action of the Great Powers, particularly, the British, Morris believed the granting of the firman resulted from the expressed wish of the Sultan to have the Franklin visit Constantinople.

When the Franklin arrived in the Bosphorus and anchored opposite the Imperial palace (Dolmabahçe), salutes were exchanged between Turkish iron-clads and the American frigate. During the week the Franklin was moored before the city, thousands of persons toured the ship. All the Ottoman ministers and Turkish naval dignitaries were entertained by the Admiral. It was even rumored that the Sultan would make a visit. Alas, "certain reasons of a private nature"


deprived the Ottoman leader of a desired visit aboard the "beautiful" American frigate. 82

On the day that Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha arrived for lunch on board the Franklin, they were greeted with honors and escorted to the Admiral's cabin. Whilst the two Ottoman Ministers conversed with Farragut and Morris, considerable excitement was created on the "spar-deck" by a large deputation of Greeks. The Greeks were distributing a proclamation uncomplimentary to the Sultan and the Ottoman Empire. Hearing the commotion, Morris and Farragut rushed on deck, Morris advised the Admiral not to accept any document from the screaming Greeks in order to avoid compromising the Turkish officials, Morris feared that the objectionable parts of the literature distributed by the Greeks were purposely inserted by some "secret enemy to make mischief between the Admiral & the Porte." 83

Farragut sent for the leaders of the deputation and, after receiving them kindly, he stated frankly:

They [the Greeks] had shown great want of judgment in coming on board as a body at a time when he was entertaining several members of the Turkish Cabinet, and that they had abused his hospitality in circulating incendiary documents against a nation then receiving him as its guest, a proceeding he would not permit. 84

Three of the organizers of this escapade were arrested. Morris later wrote Farragut that the "hot-headed" Greeks were set at liberty

82 Morris to Seward, August 31, 1868, Private Letter, Official Correspondence, Turkey, RG 59, USNA.
83 Ibid.
"exclusively out of deference for the Admiral, otherwise they would have been sent into exile." This was the only incident embarrassing to Farragut and Morris recorded in the journal of the Admiral's staff officer. It is clear that Farragut did not give the Greeks any reason to believe that he was their defender or that he would interfere in the Cretan insurrection. 85 And most important of all, Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha were on board the Franklin when the incident occurred.

Cyurs Hamlin made a visit to the Admiral's quarters. In the course of their conversation, Hamlin spoke of his claims against the Turkish government and his general plans for the college. An Armenian physician who was also present during Hamlin's visit impressed upon Farragut the importance of building the college. Farragut pointed out to the physician that he could not interfere in a diplomatic question. The physician replied: "Nor need you, . . . you have only to ask His Highness the Grand Vezir, with whom you are to dine this evening why the American college can't be built." According to Hamlin, Farragut agreed. "Very well," he promised, "any man may ask a civil question. There is nothing diplomatic in that." Hamlin cautioned the Admiral to receive any reply given in "perfect silence." After the Admiral's departure, Hamlin was asked by a gentleman from the Porte: "Is it true, Mr. Hamlin, that your great Admiral came here on the part of your government to settle the college question?" From this inquiry, Hamlin informs us that he knew Farragut had asked the ministers of

85 See the New York Herald, October 14, 1868, p. 3.
the Porte the promised question. 86

One thing is certain, Hamlin was a truthful man, as he understood and interpreted the truth. Yet there is no mention in official or semi-official records of any such incident occurring at the dinner given for the Admiral by Ali Pasha. Even Morris failed to report the Admiral's supposed interest in the college. Because the college was a major problem for Morris, it is reasonable to assume that he would have reported even the smallest interference by the Admiral. It is even more difficult to imagine Admiral Farragut not acting the perfect guest. This was a man who could not smoke tobacco, yet accepted a pipe from Ali Pasha rather than offend his host. If Farragut asked Ali Pasha about Robert College, it would have been done by such a method as not to give offense.

In 1871, an unidentified Turkish gentleman visited Cyrus Hamlin at Robert College and related to the American missionary an interesting story. Hamlin recorded for posterity the Turkish gentleman's confession that Robert College was erected at Rumeli Hisar as a result of the Cretan Insurrection. Hamlin asked about the relationship between Crete and Robert College. He was informed by his unidentified guest the reasons for Turkish consent:

When your great Admiral was here, he was asking us all right and left about this college, and whatever we replied to him, he made no response. He kept perfectly dark and said not a word. We then perceived with deep concern that there was a government idea underneath it all. The Greeks had been crowding round him and had boasted that the United States government would furnish them with an iron clad, and more over that

that the great American Admiral would go to the relief of
the suffering Cretan refugees on the coast. We promised
him the college should be built, but when he was fairly
cut of the Mediterranean without doing a thing for the
Greeks, we had no intention of fulfilling our promise.87

The Turkish gentleman went on to explain why the Porte finally issued
the irade. After the Admiral's return to America, letters appeared
in the New York papers abusing the Turks and urging the American
people to support the Cretans. Hamlin's guest confided that all letters
to the New York papers were translated and sent to the Sublime Porte.
He went on to claim that these letters let the Porte know the foreign
policy of the American government. He bragged to Hamlin: "We know
everything written about us in your chief papers." The visitor referred
to a letter written by Edouard Blaque to Fuad Pasha in which, he
claimed, the Turkish Minister to America warned the Porte that the
college question would become a "thorny thing."88 According to Hamlin's
informant, the Porte was worried about American interference in the
Cretan situation. He told Hamlin, the Ministers of the Porte concluded:
"Better build a hundred colleges for the Americans with our own money,
than to have such a war spring upon us. So we gave you this position,
we gave you an Imperial Iradi. We smoothed it all off."89

One can only conclude that Hamlin's unidentified guest should
have read the newspapers sent from America. By the winter of 1867, the

88Ibid.
89Ibid.
American newspapers were not hostile to the Turkish government, nor did they any longer express much interest in the Cretan insurrection. The only exception of any major importance, as noted earlier, was the New York Daily Tribune. As for American interference in the Cretan revolt, anyone still concerned with that possibility in October, 1868, had not been keeping abreast with American affairs. All attempts to obtain a Congressional Resolution for recognition of the Cretan Provisional Government had failed by the summer of 1868.

As for American interference in Cretan affairs, by 1868, Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha were aware that the United States would not intervene. Even the two resolutions passed by Congress expressing sympathy for the Cretan condition were mild in tone. Of the western powers, America had been the most conservative in statement and action. During 1867, European ships removed Cretan refugees by the thousands and carried them off to the mainland. American ships were in the Eastern Mediterranean and they did not carry away a single refugee. Edouard Blacque kept the Turkish government well informed on the Cretan sentiment in America; the picture he portrayed was a much improved Turkish image and an indifferent attitude toward the Cretans. The Turkish government understood all of these facts very well.

One might ask why the Admiral and Morris wished the Franklin

90 See Chapter 2.
91 See Chapters 9 and 10.
to pass through the Straits. The answer was simply, these gentlemen were pursuing a long established American policy. Since United States was not a signatory to international agreements regulating the Straits, that country vociferously favored freedom of the seas for commerce and navigation. Following the 1856 Treaty of Paris, America began a steady campaign against the application of any restrictions on her ships. In 1858, the U. S. S. Wabash, a fifty-gun sailing frigate, visited Constantinople and caused consternation among the Great Powers. During the Civil War, America was occupied with other problems, and thus, did not have an opportunity to challenge European restrictions on the Straits. Once the war was over, in 1866, the U. S. S. Ticonderoga passed through the Dardanelles and was followed the next year by the U. S. S. Swatara. The Franklin was a warship of the European Squadron not the famous ship in which Farragut won the Battle of New Orleans. As a warship of the European Squadron, the Franklin was merely making the annual cruise to the Turkish capital. It is certain the American navy did not send a warship to Constantinople to intervene in the college question. Gideon Wells was not at all fond of missionaries.

Further, it is important to note that on July 6, 1868, Representative William D. ("Pig Iron") Kelly, introduced a resolution referring to the Straits which passed by the unanimous consent of

the House. It reads as follows:

... The President be requested to instruct the Minister of the United States to the Sublime Porte to urge upon the Government of the Sultan the abolition of all restrictions through the Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus to the Black Sea, and to endeavor to procure the perfect freedom of navigation through those Straits to all classes of vessels.93

This resolution is a clear expression of American policy of the doctrine of freedom of the seas. American policy on the Straits did not alter until World War II.

The Press of Philadelphia argued, as did many other American newspapers, that if the European powers chose to make treaties with the Sultan of Turkey under which their shipping and warships were subjected to restrictions, it was their concern. But, European powers were not at liberty to make treaties under which American interests were injured without that country's consent. Several journals claimed the Kelly Resolution produced a sensation in diplomatic circles.94 Europeans found the resolution to be another example of American interference in the Eastern Question.95

Edward Stoeckl, the Russian Minister to Washington, confessed to the Russian Foreign Minister that he had no idea what action


95New York Herald, September 14, 1868, p. 7 quotes the Daily Telegraph (London) and the Opinion Nationale (Paris).
Seward would take in regard to the Kelly Resolution. The Minister
portrayed Seward as a man who acted on impulse, but who was keenly
aware of the political climate. Stoeckl reflected that whatever line
Seward took would matter little in the end. The Russian Minister
predicted that Morris would ask the Porte for a revision of the Treaty
of Paris. In that eventuality the Porte would answer that a revision
was not in its power, and that the United States would have to approach
all the signatory powers. The Russian concluded that Seward could
never bring himself to approach the Great Powers for a revision of
the Treaty of Paris. The Russian Minister pointed out that American
policy was always directed toward commercial ends. He continued:
"Their diplomacy is very active in China, Japan, on the coast of the
Pacific, everywhere there are markets for their commerce and industry.
But the Near East did not offer them any bait until now and their
merchant ships don't visit the Near East except on rare occasions." Stoeckl took great comfort in this economic determinism, and believed
that Seward, that wily master of Foggy Bottom, would do nothing to
carry out the Kelly Resolution.96

Some historians have given another reason for final settlement
of the college question; they have claimed that this was an attempt on
the part of the Turks to persuade the Americans not to sell iron-clads
to the Greeks. The college decision was made in October, 1868, and the

96 Russia, Correspondence in the Archives of the Russian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Microfilm print of letters by Edward Stoeckl to
Aleksandr Gortchakoff, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester;
Stoeckl to Gortchakoff, July 15/27, 1868, 1157, no. 29.
iron-clad scare did not occur until the end of December. In addition to that fact, the Turkish government was informed quickly of the American iron-clad situation. During the winter of 1868-69, Greco-Turkish relations were on the verge of war. Somehow, the rumor that the United States was selling two iron-clads to Greece became widely circulated. The Porte telegraphed Edouard Blacque in Washington complaining that they had learned the Greek government was attempting to purchase two monitors from the United States. The Porte instructed Blacque to inform Seward that the United States was expected to observe the rules of neutrality in the Greco-Turkish confrontation. Seward quickly assured Blacque that the United States had no intention of selling warships to Greece.97

It is apparent that much of what has been written about Robert College is, in part, fictional. Morris was correct when he concluded that Seward's personal intervention on the question would result in a solution. Seward's proposed solution to Edouard Blacque is unknown. Examination of American and Turkish official correspondence reveals only two serious problems existing between the two nations: the removal of William J. Stillman and the image of the Ottomans as portrayed in the American press. During the fall of 1868, Stillman

97 For a discussion of the sale of monitors to Greece; see Keith Maurice Greenwood, "Robert College, The American Founders," Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The John Hopkins University, 1965. For Blacque's activity in reference to the iron-clad sale, see Blacque to Seward, December 30, 1868, Notes from the Turkish Legation, RG 59, USNA; Edward Thornton to the Earl of Clarendon, January 4, 1869, Despatch 4, Confidential Print, BFO 424/30; Gideon Wells to Seward, December 31, 1868, Miscellaneous Letters, Department of State, RG 59, USNA.
was given an extended leave of absence, but the new consul was not assigned until May, 1869. As for the Turkish press image, on January 12, 1869, Blacque again complained to Seward about the American Protestant ministers who continued to use "language unworthy of a minister of Jesus Christ" when speaking of the Ottoman government. Blacque pointed out that such "outpourings of fanaticism" did not belong to the modern age. There are implications in Blacque's despatch that Seward had implied the concessions to Robert College would bring a favorable disposition and toleration on the part of Protestant preachers. Blacque considered it "odious to be preaching a crusade against a nation and a government which exercises toward their brotherhood the largest and most generous hospitality." Blacque wanted Seward to be aware of what was printed in the press because, as he said, "I know how impertinent these same missionaries are every time when soliciting your kind intervention with the Sublime Porte in favor of interests they represent." 98

Robert College was the first independent American Christian college founded in the Middle East. During this same decade the American University of Beirut (Syrian Protestant College) was opened as a secular institution. The founding of Robert College and the American University of Beirut was the beginning of a vast American sponsored system of higher education which expanded throughout the Ottoman Empire. Continuing competition from Jesuit institutions

98 Blacque to Seward, January 12, 1869, Notes from the Turkish Legation, RG 59, USNA.
prompted the American Board of Commissioners for the Foreign Missions to found colleges in which the "Anglo-Saxon ideas of truth and righteousness" would dominate every institution. By the end of the nineteenth century the American Board could boast of six such institutions in Turkey: the Euphrates College, Harput; Anatolia College, Marsovan; Central Turkey College, Anitab; International College, Izmir; St. Paul's Institute, Tarsus; American College for Girls, Istanbul; and the Central College for Girls, Maraş. Certainly, these institutions had considerable impact upon the country.

The important role played by American merchants in establishing Turkey's educational system was evident from the very beginning. In 1866, George Washburn offered readers of the New York Tribune an evaluation of two recently opened American institutions of higher education within the Ottoman Empire: "The establishment of this College [Robert College], under the Rev. Dr. Hamlin, and the Syrian College at Beirut, under the Rev. Dr. Bliss were two of the noblest and wisest charities ever devised for the benefit of the East. They are an honor to America, and especially to the merchants of New York, New York."\(^9\)\(^9\) It may be barely permissible to note that human beings often act out of mixed motives, and that the merchants who funded education in Turkey hoped to create a climate more favorable...

\(^{99}\textit{New York Daily Tribune}, December 26, 1866, p. 1.\)
for American trade. Nineteenth century merchants could hardly have been unaware of St. Paul's praise of charity. The heard-headed New Yorkers may also have hoped that where St. Paul led the way commerce was sure to follow or, to put it another way, that trade follows the Bible.
CHAPTER 12

CONCLUSION

One may observe that Morris' career at the Sublime Porte was, despite several regrettable lapses, successful in preventing radical changes in Turco-American relations. At the very least, he succeeded in maintaining friendship between Washington and Constantinople during the American Civil War, and for some time thereafter. Skillful in maintaining fairly intimate relations with Ali Pasha, Morris remained at the same time on good terms with Cyrus Hamlin. Such a feat required considerable skill since Ali thought Hamlin was a Christian fanatic, and Hamlin regarded the Turkish Minister as the foremost enemy of Protestantism.

The lack of ideological and political influence at the Sublime Porte forced American diplomats to rely upon other means of exerting power. In particular, American diplomats found themselves almost insensibly drawn into supporting Protestant missionary efforts in the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately, American efforts in these directions wounded Turkish sensibilities, and tended to align American interests with those of the subject populations of the Empire. Too often American consuls, and even the Minister Resident, found themselves being used by Protestant missionaries in ways antagonistic to United States' real
interests. It is clear that during the decade of the 1860's American interests in the Ottoman Empire were often left to the tender mercies of what can only be called missionary diplomacy.

In missionary diplomacy American expansionists found the proper vehicle for exporting the American way of doing things. Most American ideologues of the mid-Victorian age believed Protestantism to be equivalent to Americanism. In supporting Protestant missionaries in the Middle East, Morris encouraged the growth of a peculiarly American ideology. By diplomatically assisting the building of American schools within the Ottoman Empire, Morris could feel that his country was exerting an influence upon the future development of Turkey equal to that of Britain or France. In the American Protestant view, a school opened in Turkey was equal to stationing an American warship in the Bosphorus with its guns trained on Topaki Palace. It is an index of national character that the British preferred steam frigates stationed in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Americans steam-heated schools built in the suburbs of Constantinople.

Committed to freedom of information as the highest good (the sumnum bonum), Americans regarded the furthering of education as needing no defense. In fact, the desire of missionaries such as Hamlin to spread education to the Turks represented another form of Western imperialism. Although it is true that Protestant missionaries had little desire to annex land, they were anxious to annex the minds of Turkish subjects. It is the peculiar blindness of colonialists not to see themselves as colonialists. Hamlin wished to spread the American way of life (and death) to the benighted natives of Bebok,
American intellectual imperialism in the Middle East was not a policy of the United States government. But, it was the American government that granted missionaries the same rights to American protection as those enjoyed by American merchants who conducted business within the Turkish Empire. And, it was the American Secretary of State who advised the leaders of the Jaffa colony as to the best settlement area in Palestine. A distinguished American consul expressed regret over the failure of the Jaffa colony. Because, he maintained, under proper leadership a colony would prosper and influence the native population. Natives could learn American principles through example. A general conviction that the American way of life was superior to any the world had ever known prompted the United States Department of State to offer diplomatic assistance, whenever it was necessary, to the noble task of conversion of the Middle East to the American way of doing things. The American way necessitated industry, thrift, efficiency, hard work, and Protestantism.

All that has been said heretofore leaves unanswered the key question: Why did the Turkish government permit the founding of Robert College? To answer this puzzle, to discover the history of the mystery, one must adopt the perspective of Ali Pasha himself, whose home lay very near the site of the future college. Looking up the Bosphorus Ali could not but be aware that, in the nature of things, another Russo-Turkish war was inevitable. Ali had adopted the Crimean War model in looking north. That is to say, he knew that the Russian bear would continue to pursue his old dream of conquering Tsarigrad.
the city of Constantine. In the Crimean War, Turkey had secured devoted allies such as Britain, France, and Sardinia. But by 1868, a new Western power had arisen, like the phoenix, from the flames of its sure destruction. After Appomattox, America was stronger militarily and diplomatically than ever before. Hence, one must think of Ali attempting to fit the question of Robert College into this diplomatic context; Ali wished to play off the newly influential United States against the established Great Powers. This was the game he knew and liked best; a game in which he was a recognized expert.

Not surprisingly, the Crimean War model allayed any Turkish fears about assigning a key military site to the Americans. Since Cyrus Hamlin was a prime mover in establishing the college, Ali could feel certain that the college would operate in Turkey's interests, for Hamlin had for some years operated a Seminary in Bebek. During the Crimean War, he had used the school's facilities to bake much needed bread for British troops on their way to the front. Further, Hamlin's articles in the press showed him to be a Turcoophile, even if he personally despised Ali Pasha. Accordingly, Ali could believe that the future college would be used in the interests of Turkey, and that it might even prove to be a strategic source of materiel during a new Turco-Russian war.

A further question must have suggested itself to Ali: How does one make certain that the United States, now a great power, would be ranged on Turkey's side in what could only be called Crimean War II?
After all, there was loose talk of a Russo-American alliance. The answer was: One establishes an American presence at the most important military point upon the Bosphorus. Mehmed the Conqueror built Rumeli Hisar in order to invest Constantinople, since at that place, the Bosphorus is at its narrowest point. If the Russian fleet and army ever were to advance southward along the Bosphorus, one of their military objectives would surely be the hill, by the side of Rumeli Hisar, where Robert College was eventually built. Hence, a Russian assault upon the city would necessarily threaten an American educational institution over which the Turks, interestingly enough, insisted Old Glory must fly both day and night. To answer the question put above: How does one secure the presence on land of a country which had a dwindling army? Ali's answer was—build Robert College.

Another question which may have occurred to Ali Pasha was: How did one create a split between Russia and its friend of Civil War days, America? Since the Russians were against founding Robert College, the answer was simple. One gave Morris what he wanted. One permits the foundation of Robert College. Hence, the Russians would be angry and the Americans pleased. The former almost-allies would become almost-enemies. How does one assure that the United States navy will remain secure in its old friendship for Turkey? One accedes to the wishes of Admiral Farragut and creates the impression that Robert College was established as a favor to Farragut. Thus, the most famous admiral of his day will sail away feeling there
is a special friendship between him and Ali Pasha. Ali had now assured himself of a friendly hearing, should it become necessary to request foreign naval assistance in the face of a new Russian threat.

To that diplomatist of genius, Ali, still another question may have occurred: How does one further dilute the authority welded by Britain and France at the Sublime Porte? By adding yet another Great Power to those mentioned heretofore. Moreover, a Great Power which was presently at odds with Britain over the Alabama claims, and one which had only recently encompassed the destruction of France's satellite, Maxmilian's and Carlotta's rickety Empire of Mexico. With permission granted to establish Robert College, Ali could rest comfortable in the belief that the United States now had a diplomatic stake in the health and long life of the Sick Man of Europe. Ali clearly hoped American influence could be manipulated to moderate British and French influence.

There was also the question of foreign exchange. Christopher Robert's grant meant that a large sum of dollars would flow into the Constantinopolitan economy. Since foreign exchange was in short supply, and the money had already been paid, Ali had no wish to return it. What better way to solve an economic problem, than by establishing Robert College? In any case, Ali was eager to see that more Turks received adequate educational training. As an enlightened statesman of the Victorian Age, he appreciated the need for trained
manpower within the Empire. Accordingly, he was eager to establish Robert College.

To American missionaries, creation of a college near the capital was essential to their success. The missionaries, as has been shown, relied upon the printed medium to a great degree. But the printed word was of little effect in dealing with an illiterate populace. In order to convert the Sultan's subjects, the missionaries must continue to open schools at all educational levels. Before the electronic age, books represented the only way of reaching an audience beyond the sound of a preacher's voice. Hence, creating Robert College was of utmost importance to the churches; it was vital to the success of their propaganda campaign.

Evidence presented in the foregoing shows that United States aims in the Middle East were different, but no less grasping, than those of the Great Powers. Perhaps the intellectual imperialism displayed by American missionaries may be titled Hamlinism, after its most outspoken defender. Although the missionaries, unlike the philhellenes, wished Turkey well, the effect of the groups was the same. Both acted to destroy the imperial idea so painstakingly developed by the descendants of Osman. The success of the missionaries in building educational institutions was no less destructive in its impact upon the imperial Turk than was Timurleng's victory over Bayezid I in 1402. After the Battle of Ankara, Timur merely placed placed the Turkish ruler in a cage, while the Protestant missionaries
aspired to place the whole Turkish intelligentsia into a mold
developed by generations of Puritan divines. As for which fate is
the more atrocious, the reader must judge for himself.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Manuscript Collections


William Henry Seward Papers, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.


B. Government Documents

Great Britain Public Records Office, London England,

F. O. 78. Correspondence from Diplomatic Agents Stationed in Turkey.


Russian Foreign Office Records,

Microfilm of letters by Edward de Stoeckl, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the United States to Prince Aleksandr Gortchakoff, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Russia, 1866-1868. Correspondence in the Archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, Russia. The microfilm copy can be found in the Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

Turkish Foreign Office Archives, Istanbul, Turkey,

Digisleri Bakanlığı Arşivi, Hariciye, Cانتon 50, Letters Received from the Ottoman Minister to the United States and General information related to the American political scene.

Turkish National Archives, Istanbul, Turkey.

Başbakanlık Arşivi, Hariciye File.

United States Department of State Records, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

Record Group 59: Instructions to the Minister Resident and Consular Officers stationed in Turkey; Correspondence from the Minister Resident and Consular Officers stationed in Turkey; Applications and Recommendations File; Special Missions File; Notes to the Turkish Legation; Notes from the Turkish Legation.

Record Group 84: Constantinople Post Legation Papers; Consular Post Papers of Consular Posts in Turkey.

United States Department of Navy Records, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

Record Group 45: Letters to the Secretary of Navy, European Squadron; Letters to Captains under Command, European Squadron; Press copies of confidential letters and telegrams to officers from the Secretary of the Navy, 1865-68; Confidential Letters
Sent, Secretary of the Navy; Letters to Flag Officers and Commanders of Vessels, Secretary of the Navy; Commanders Letters to the Secretary of the Navy; Commanders Letters to Ministers and Consuls; Commanders Letters to Captains under command; Area File of the Naval Records Collection, Area 4.


C. United States Published Documents


D. Unpublished Public Documents


E. Annual Reports


F. Periodicals

The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science

Balkan Studies
The Cretan
Middle East Journal
Missionary Herald
The Nation
The Smithsonian Journal of History

G. Newspapers

The Baltimore Sun
Daily News (London)
Daily Telegraph (London)
La Turquie (microfilm copy located in the Wiedner Library, Harvard University)
Levant Herald (located at Collindale, British Museum, London)
The Morning Herald
New York Herald
New York Times
New York Tribune
New York World
Pall Mall Gazette (London)
The Press (Philadelphia)
Springfield Republican
The Times (London)

H. Articles


I. Books


Baillie, E. C. C. (Mrs.) *A Sail to Smyrna: or An Englishwoman’s Journal Including Impressions of Constantinople, a Visit to a Turkish Harem, and a Railway Journey to Ephesus.* London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1873.


Blunt, John E. (Mrs.). *The People of Turkey: Twenty Years' Residence Among Bulgarians, Greeks, Albanians, Turks, and Armenians*. Volume I and II. London: John Murray, 1878.


Madden, Richard R. *The Turkish Empire in its Relations with Christianity and Civilization.* Volume II. London: T. Cauteley Newby, 1862.


Oscanyan, Christopher. The Sultan and His People. New York: Derby and Jackson, 1857.


Spry, William James Joseph. Life on the Bosphorus, Doings in the City of the Sultan; Turkey, Past and Present. London: H. S. Nichols, 1895.


Tanzimat. Yüzyüncü Yıllık Münasebetle. İstanbul: Maarif Mataası, 1940.


J. Unpublished Sources
