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THE BAVARIAN ARMY, 1870-1918:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL RELATIONS
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DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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The Ohio State University
1972

Approved by

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In 1870/71, when Otto von Bismarck "solved" the problem of German unification, he did so, in spite of the intense nationalist feeling aroused by the war with France, only by granting some important privileges to the South German states in return for their entry into a united German state under the leadership of Prussia. Bavaria especially, the largest of the South German states and the most devoted to her own historical and religious traditions, balked at becoming part of a new Germany unless the integrity of her institutions was guaranteed and unless she was allowed a great measure of political autonomy. Eager to complete German unification, Bismarck was willing to pacify the Bavarians with a number of concessions. One of these concessions, opposed
by Prussian military leaders and German liberals alike, allowed, within carefully defined limits, the autonomy of the Bavarian army under the peace-time command of the King of Bavaria.

The fact that from the foundation of the German Empire in 1871 to the beginning of the First World War in 1914, the Bavarian army existed as a separate and clearly identifiable part of the German army created certain problems. It became necessary, for example, to establish the ways by which the Bavarian military authorities could cooperate the Prussian military establishment in coordinating the education of officers, the training of conscripts, and the introduction of new armaments. The solution of this problem required a clarification of the relationship between the military authorities in Bavaria and those in Prussia, a task complicated by the different military and constitutional traditions of the two states and by the absence of an imperial ministry of war. The Bavarian military establishment also
needed to find ways to fulfill its constitutional obligations to the Empire -- the adoption of methods of training and organization established for the entire German army and the submission to periodic inspections -- which would not endanger the prized autonomy of Bavarian military institutions. Bavarian leaders sought to train Bavarian soldiers equal to Prussian military standards but at the same time to protect their army from attempts, real or supposed, to integrate it into the Prussian military structure.

The autonomous status of the Bavarian army in the German Empire therefore raised a number of interesting questions concerning the role of the Bavarian military authorities and their representatives in Berlin, the training of Bavarian officers at Prussian commands, the preservation of the "federalist" character of the German army against the centralists in Berlin, the nature of imperial control over the Bavarian army, and the fate of the Bavarian army in the First World War. The most
valuable source in examining these questions was the material available in the Bavarian War Archives in Munich (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Abteilung IV, Kriegsarchiv). To a lesser extent, material in the Bavarian State Archives (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Abteilung II, Geheimes Staatsarchiv) and the Bavarian State Library (Bayerische Staatsbibliothek) was also helpful. I am thankful to the Director of the Bavarian War Archives, Dr. Jaeger, and his staff for their generous help. I wish also to thank Miss Johnnie Ann Ralph and Mr. John Tibbals, reference librarians at the library of the library of the California State College, San Bernardino, for their help in locating several of the books necessary for the completion of this dissertation. I owe a debt of gratitude to my brother, Father Theodore Campbell, C. S. P., for his continued help, encouragement, and support. I most deeply appreciate, however, the careful guidance of my advisor, Professor Andreas Dorpalen, who spent many hours patiently reading
the earlier drafts of the dissertation, offering suggestions and corrections, and, in the process, teaching me many valuable things about the principles and methods of historical research.
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Chapter I

The Bavarian Army from 1815 to 1870

The Development of the Bavarian Army up to the Austro-Prussian War

The Bavarian army suffered greatly in the later Napoleonic struggles. In 1812, as much from gratitude as from diplomatic necessity, Bavaria remained true to her alliance with France and offered Napoleon 33,000 men for his Grande Armee. Well over 30,000 of these soldiers perished in the Russian disaster. Bavaria eventually abandoned Napoleon in 1813 and joined the Fourth Coalition. Her population was tired of war, and her army little able to conduct it. After the Congress of Vienna Bavaria was content to enjoy the peace, to restore her economy, and to as-

1. Bavaria had benefitted from Napoleon's reorganization of Germany in 1806. She had gained new territory and won recognition as a kingdom, and her governmental structure had been deeply affected by the pervasive French legal influence of the time.
simulate new territory into the state; and during this period of restoration she also allowed her army to languish.

At the beginning of the Restoration era the position of the army within the Bavarian state and its relationship to the Bavarian monarch was technically no different from corresponding relations in either Prussia or Austria. The king was commander-in-chief. To him personally all the officers and men swore allegiance and to him belonged the ultimate decisions in matters of promotion and command. Officially he determined questions of war and peace. The major difference between the Bavarian king and his brother monarchs, as far as the army was concerned, was the Bavarian rulers' singular lack of interest in military affairs. None of the Bavarian kings personally led their armies in any military campaign, nor were any of them inclined to do so.  

None of them (with the possible exception of the Prince-Regent Luitpold, 1886-1912) had a military

bent, and most of them were deeply involved with other interests. The first king, Maximilian I (1806-1825), devoted himself to the political reorganization of his new kingdom; his successor, Ludwig I (1825-1848), strove to make his capital one of the most beautiful in Europe and his country a center for art and literature; Maximilian II (1848-1864), an intellectual, was more like a university professor than a military commander; and the ill-fated Ludwig II (1864-1886), following the example of his grandfather, Ludwig I, gave himself over to music and architecture, withdrawing more and more from governmental affairs and obligations and finally succumbing to mental illness.

This lack of interest in the army was increased by the fact that Bavaria, although the third largest German state after Austria and Prussia, never felt that she needed a large army to maintain her position within the German Confederation. The Bavarian kings and their ministers continued to count on the rivalry between Austria and Prussia to protect Bavaria from the domination of either and to count on the Confederation itself for protection from any
non-German power. Then, too, Bavaria was a land predominately peasant-bourgeois, and its aristocracy never became a military caste.

These factors produced essentially three results. First, the Bavarian government spent far less proportionally on its army than did either Prussia or Austria. Especially under Ludwig I, the army had barely enough money to maintain a meager status quo. Secondly, the army was at no time as distinguished a part of Bavarian society as its counterpart was in Prussia. The social complexion of the Bavarian officer corps was quite different from the Prussian officer corps, and the popular Bavarian mind never closely associated the king (although he was the commander-in-chief) with the army. Thirdly, control of all military affairs eventually fell within

3. Bavaria did, however, take pride in the fact that she was one of the three German states (the other two being Austria and Prussia) allowed to maintain a full-time military plenipotentiary in Frankfurt until 1866.

4. Maximilian II did allot the army more money to strengthen it as a support for his Trias plan, an attempt to make Bavaria and its South German supporters a third power between Prussia and Austria. Ludwig Schrott, Die Herrscher Bayerns (Munich, 1967), pp. 186, 193.
the competence of the Bavarian ministry of war (Kriegsministerium).

This last development was probably the most important for Bavarian military history. After a comprehensive reorganization of the government in 1825/26, the ministry of war became the highest military authority under the king. All matters of administration, promotion, appointment of commanders, armaments, and training were handled in some department of the ministry of war, and decisions, once approved by the minister of war, through whose hands all military affairs had to go before reaching the king, were sent on to the monarch for his signature, which eventually became pro forma. Even the Bavarian general staff, concerned like its Prussian model with military strategy and tactics, and filled with ambitious officers, was subordinate to the minister of war and never escaped from his control. When the minister of war presented and defended the military budget before the Bavarian Landtag, he spoke -- with the support of the king -- for the entire military establishment.

Although some officers claimed that the mini-
stry of war enjoyed a special relationship with the king, in real political terms its role was simply as another department of the government. The minister of war sat in the council of ministers whose chairman was usually, but not always, the minister for foreign affairs, and he sought approval for his proposals from his colleagues just as he gave his approval to their suggestions. Support from the civilian ministries helped military proposals through the parliament. This close relationship, however, could at times become virtual dependence on civilian backing. It also often meant that the ministry of war (again particularly under Ludwig I) was the first agency whose budget was cut when money was either lacking or needed elsewhere. Officers complained often and bitterly of being at the mercy of the civilian ministries.  

5. Although the question was not as important in Bavaria as it was in Prussia, the relationship of an officer to the government and society was never satisfactorily delineated in Bavaria. Officers generally did not want to be considered on the same level as civil servants, nor were they warm toward ideas of constitutionalism. In 1848, except for a few pockets of liberalism, most of the Bavarian officer corps opposed an oath to a
The Bavarian military establishment differed from the Prussian not only in the amount of control lodged in the ministry of war but as well in the social composition, training, and education of its officer corps. Although some officials in the late eighteenth century hoped to model the Bavarian officer corps after the Prussian, the Bavarian social structure proved ill-equipped to support a largely aristocratic officer class similar to the one in Prussia. Bavaria, a land without the kind of Junker-run landed estates typical of Prussia, was, in the nineteenth century, essentially a kingdom of small peasant farmers, artisans, and a fairly influential professional middle class; and the Bavarian officer corps continued throughout the century to reflect this situation to a large degree. Except in the highest commands, at no time did the aristocratic element predominate in the Bavarian officer corps, constitution, but the fact that the issue was debated in officers' meetings at least demonstrates a less intransigent approach among Bavarian officers to the question. Bavarian officers, however, remained monarchist in outlook and "above politics." Karl Demeter, The German Officer-Corps in Society and State, 1650-1945 (New York, 1965), pp. 161-163.
and at most times it was outnumbered by as much as six to one. (Many of the higher ranks were filled, immediately after the Thirty Years' War, with Italians and Frenchmen, and their descendants continued to appear in the upper ranks of the officer corps even in the nineteenth century.) The prestigious cadet school in Munich could not maintain the aristocratic exclusiveness established for it in the eighteenth century. The need for cadets eventually became greater than the number which could be supplied from the noble class, and in 1829, on the order of Ludwig I, officials at the cadet school opened all levels of training to more candidates from the middle class. As time went on, the fact, increasingly evident, that the cadet corps could not train the number of officers needed meant that officers had to be drawn from the ranks, a process which, in turn, further diluted the aristocratic element. Yet, although noblemen did not predominate, most of the officers still came from the "upper levels" of society: that is, they were most often sons of former officers, wealthy professionals, higher government officials, academicians, merchants, and, later in the century, some indus-
And even though the Bavarian officer corps accepted much more readily sons and grandsons of _arrivistes_, old aristocratic families continued to be well represented in the higher echelons of the military establishment.  

The presence of a large bourgeois element was probably partially responsible for the gradual disappearance of the aristocratic vice of dueling among officers, and after 1869, when the proceedings of military courts were opened to the public and such anachronisms as dueling could come under public scrutiny and probable censure, dueling, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.  

This double situation of bourgeois domination and public scrutiny also had consequences which reached beyond the confines of the military. Relations between Bavarian families — the Xylanders and Bothmers, for example — had a long tradition of military service, and their sons were much more inclined to make a career of the army.

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7. This fact, of course, need not necessarily have been the result of social snobbery or even of a "protection" system. A few Bavarian families — the Xylanders and Bothmers, for example — had a long tradition of military service, and their sons were much more inclined to make a career of the army.

8. Demeter, _The German Officer-Corps_, p.145.
rian officers and civilians were far more cordial than they were in Prussia, since the Bavarian officers felt little need to preserve a strict caste system, and since the life of a Bavarian officer, whose background was frequently bourgeois, was likely to be less pretentious than that of his Prussian equal.9

As a result of the French influence in Bavaria during the Napoleonic era, and later because of the interest of King Maximilian II in education, Bavarian officials began to take a more active interest in the maintenance of high educational standards in the Bavarian officer corps. They also wished to improve the army's technical training, the need for which the Bavarians stressed more frequently than did the Prussians.10 To assure some common standard within

9. Ibid., p. 246.

the officer corps Ludwig I began the practice of ordering all officers and officer candidates to pass a series of examinations. Eventually the Bavarian ministry of war demanded that all officers have an Absolutorium from a gymnasium;\textsuperscript{11} and it was not at all unusual to find officers, especially in the technical services, who had had university training. Although general educational standards may have been comparatively high, the strictly military training of Bavarian officers remained at best mediocre until 1867/68. For a while the training program of the Bavarian general staff was in the hands of men who had fought in the Napoleonic wars. In spite of the danger that their ideas on strategy and tactics could easily become outdated, they did supply training based on real experience; but after they had all retired or died, their replacements, having been trained in peace-time and having had little practical experience in the ranks, tended to make the general staff curriculum overly theoretical and

\textsuperscript{11} Demeter, The German Officer-Corps, pp. 95-102.
somewhat inflexible. 12

The Bavarian Army Reforms, 1866-1870

In 1866, when the Bavarian army was mobilized against Prussia, it was thus in poor condition. The most important developments within the Bavarian military establishment did not, in fact, increase the fighting capability of the army. The concentration of authority within the ministry of war, the indifference of the king, the fairly broad social base of the officer corps had enormous political and social consequences which helped to integrate the army into Bavarian society and to guard against too great a military influence on the state. But the Bavarian army after 1815 — in strictly military terms of training, leadership, and organization — suffered from inactivity and neglect. The same lack of royal interest which gave the ministry of war so much power also resulted in a general lack of interest and money for the ministry of war itself.

Ultimately, this meant a slowness in developing new weapons, difficulties in maintaining sufficient strength, poor training programs, and general lethargy. Since the army's role in Bavarian politics until 1866 was small, a military career did not attract the more capable or ambitious men. The officer corps lost morale, and the general staff, which should have been the organization most actively involved in maintaining the preparedness of the army and the standards of military training, became in part a patronage machine from which men with connections obtained good commands and important positions. Then, too, tradition decreed that certain commands always fell to members of the royal household, men who generally did not possess the brightest military minds. In 1866 the Bavarian army was a clumsy mechanism which, in spite of generally brave soldiers, possessed poor or over-aged leadership, a disenchanted officer corps, and outmoded tactics.

The war of 1866 was a disaster for the Bavarian army. The lack of cooperation between the Bavarian and allied armies, the inefficient Bavarian mobilization, the disagreements among the army commanders, all combined to enhance the already superior mobility and leadership of the Prussian army. The personal bravery of individual soldiers barely salvaged some of the reputation of the army. In the moment of defeat in July, 1866, when the Bavarian ministers feared that the Prussians would demand a large indemnity and possibly annexations of land, the young Bavarian king, Ludwig II, himself worried about his throne, called a new man to Munich to be minister of war and to reform the Bavarian army.

This man, General Sigmund Freiherr von Pranckh (1821-1888), had begun his military career in the cadet school in Munich and later had served in the corps of engineers. Because of his ability and penchant for organization he was assigned to the Bavarian ministry of war in 1849 and there served for many years in various capacities, becoming, at a comparatively young age, an officer with wide ex-
perience. He took part in the campaigns of 1866, and, as commander of the Leibregiment, was one of the very few Bavarian officers who distinguished himself in battle. When Ludwig II named him minister of war, Pranckh was only forty-five years old.

Pranckh was a Bavarian patriot, devoted to the independence of Bavaria and to the protection of the Bavarian throne; but he was also a realist. He admitted that the Bavarian army organization had failed in the recent war, that morale in the army and officer corps was dangerously low, and generally that the entire army stood in great need of reform. For this the Prussian military was to serve as a model. On the other hand, contrary to the hopes of the German nationalists in Bavaria (who, for a brief moment in 1866, were in the ascendancy), Pranckh had no desire ever to incorporate the Bavarian army into the Prussian organization or to cooperate with the Prussian army any more closely than was necessary. Pranckh turned down offers of Prussian instructors and kept the Prussian military plenipotentiary in Munich at a safe distance. He wanted the military reform, however closely it followed the
Prussian model, to be a Bavarian affair.\textsuperscript{14}

The proposals for the military reform were included in the Bavarian military budget submitted to the \textit{Landtag} late in 1867. They introduced compulsory military service for all Bavarian males, Prussian methods of training and troop organization, reorganization of the relationship between the regular army and the reserves, and the adjustment of the peace-time strength of the army in relation to the population. Franckh faced opposition to these proposals from many quarters. The officer corps itself was split over the issue. Most of the older battalion commanders, deeply loyal to the Bavarian ruling house, opposed any reforms of Prussian derivation, while the younger and more ambitious members of the general staff, admiring the success of the Prussian general staff in 1866, wanted even closer adherence to the Prussian military structure.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14} Military instructors were offered by the Prussian government in the hope that they could raise the Bavarian army up to Prussian military standards. Eugen von Frauenholz, "Sigmund Fr. von Franckh, der bayerische Reformskriegsminister," \textit{Gelbe Hefte}, 1930, pp. 590-591.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 583.
Pranckh fought to keep both groups firmly in hand. Secondly, Pranckh met with the hostility of the Bavarian aristocracy and the nobles at court who feared that military reorganization according to Prussian standards would be but one step toward complete incorporation of Bavaria into Prussia and the destruction of the Bavarian throne. Finally there was widespread public opposition. Initially the public reaction to the proposed reforms was not unfriendly since the Bavarians, somewhat stunned by the results of 1866, generally sensed a need for them; but by the end of 1867, after the initial shock had worn off, a rejuvenated particularism in Bavaria prompted cries of "Prussianization" directed against Pranckh and his reforms. The reform measures, however, were introduced in the legislature before public discontent could affect the character or membership of the sympathetic Landtag. But even before the parliamentarians Pranckh's proposals encountered the

criticism not only of those who thought that the reforms went too far but also those who thought that the reforms did not go far enough. Some pro-Prussian liberals suggested that Franckh, who made no secret of his Bavarian loyalties, be replaced with someone more amenable to Prussian leadership.17 The Catholic particularists, very poorly represented in the Landtag at the time, attacked the army reforms as alien to the Bavarian spirit, and their leader, Edmund Jörg, complained that Franckh was trying to transform Bavaria into a Prussian barracks. Supported by King Ludwig II and the minister-president, Prince Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, the military reforms were passed by the Landtag in spite of this vocal, but actually numerically small opposition.

When the bureaucratic machinery created to implement the army reforms began to function in 1868, there was active popular opposition to the universal draft, the length of service, and the new organization. In several towns outbreaks of violence occurred which became so troublesome that Franckh had to send

17. Ibid., p. 72.
army units to quell them. Then, in 1869, popular opposition to the army reforms became a major factor in the rapid growth of a newly organized particularist, anti-Prussian Patriots' Party which had astounding success at the polls. When the Patriots' Party gained the majority in the Landtag, friction between the legislature and the minister of war, generally over matters of finance, became so bitter that in 1870, before the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War, Franckh thought seriously of resigning. 18

Franckh's army reforms were no mean achievement. Working against very powerful opposition he reconstructed the Bavarian army mainly along Prussian lines, so that by 1870 Bavaria could boast of a more efficient, better trained army led by a re-invigorated officer corps. At the same time, Franckh worked to preserve the independence of the Bavarian military establishment. In some respects, principally in regard to army regulations and armaments, Franckh chose to ignore the Prussian example

18. Ibid., p. 89.
and to create specifically Bavarian models; and, although he allowed close cooperation between the Bavarian and Prussian general staffs over questions of mobilization against France, he always opposed the sending of Bavarian officers to Berlin for long periods of training. Pranckh did not want the Bavarian officers to fall too completely under the spell of the Prussian military mystique, nor did he want it to seem that Bavarian officers had to go to Berlin to be properly trained. Lastly, Pranckh, while remaining strictly loyal to the military alliance treaty signed with Prussia in 1866, insisted that this treaty was one between equal and sovereign countries with mutually independent armies. Pranckh was willing to learn from the Prussian army but he would not become subject to it.

A Comparative View of the Development of the Prussian Military Structure, 1815-1870

During the same period from 1815 to 1870 developments in the Prussian army proceeded along a different path. The Prussian kings remained deeply interested in military affairs and jealously guarded their privileges as commanders-in-chief. After the defeat of Prussia at the hands of Napoleon I at Jena in 1806 there was some attempt at redefining the position of the Prussian army in the state. A ministry of war was created in 1809, but it had no minister until 1814. After the Congress of Vienna, Frederick William III turned away from reform and back toward eighteenth century absolutism. A minister of war seemed potentially destructive of the old, direct relationship between king and army, and Frederick William III gave his ministers of war only lukewarm support. He dropped General von Boyen as minister of war in 1819 because Boyen was too conscientious in pursuing the ideals of the reforming General von Scharnhorst and supported a military organization dangerously close to the French revo-
volutionary idea of the nation-in-arms. In Boyen's place the king appointed a man whose military and political principles approximated the king's and who was known to be suspicious of the newly introduced educational requirements for Prussian officers. The new minister of war, General von Hake, was only too happy to act as the king's chief advisor and military aide rather than as a true minister. The constitution introduced by Frederick William IV after the revolution in 1848 made the position of the minister of war even more ambiguous. Since he was a member of the council of ministers he had to take the oath to maintain the constitution. This necessity put the minister of war in an unenviable position of appearing to have two loyalties: as a minister to the constitution and as a soldier to the king.

This ambivalent position of the minister of war and the fact that the Prussian Abgeordnetenhaus now had the right to scrutinize the budget prompted many army officers -- afraid that the army would eventually be made subject to the parliament -- to seek ways to undermine the authority of the minister of war. These attempts emanated largely from the mili-
tary cabinet and the general staff. The military cabinet consisted of a number of officers attached to the person of the king who advised the monarch on military affairs. These men particularly desired to preserve the right of the king to make all promotions and changes in command. The general staff was technically concerned with the plans for mobilization, logistical problems in war, and matters of tactics and strategy. Many staff officers also felt that in times of war the chief of the general staff should be the principal advisor of the king rather than the minister of war.

The parliamentary struggles over the army of 1859-1862 and those of the late seventies and early eighties gave the military cabinet and the general staff the opportunities to break away from the ministry of war and any possible parliamentary control. During these struggles the heads of both organizations tried to convince the King of Prussia (and later German Emperor) of the dangers to his royal prerogatives which the parliamentary attacks on the army posed and told him that the only solution to the problem of parliamentary interference would be
a weakening of the powers of the ministry of war. The emperor finally accepted these arguments, and, in 1883, after he appointed a pliable officer as minister of war, General Paul Bronsart von Schellendorf, he abolished the personnel division of the ministry of war and placed matters or personnel within the competence of the military cabinet. At the same time he granted the chief of the general staff the privilege of direct access to the emperor.

Unlike Bavaria, then, Prussia's military establishment had no unified military leadership other than the king himself. The minister of war was practically reduced to handling purely administrative and financial matters. When he was questioned by the Abgeordnetenhaus or the Reichstag he could not answer for the entire army, and his position before the legislature was difficult and at times embarrassing. Behind him, out of reach of the parliament, stood the military cabinet and the general staff, instruments for the preservation of royal powers, of the army's independence, and of the aristocratic control of the officer corps. This division of
military authority was designed to keep military affairs out of parliamentary control, but it also resulted in a deeper division between the army and Prussian civilian society, in greater attacks upon the army "camarilla" around the king, and, frequently, in confused and irresponsible actions within the army structure. After 1870 the Prussian army also sought to create a more unified German army by the slow incorporation of other army contingents, including Bavaria's, into the Prussian establishment.
Chapter II
The Bavarian Army and the
Creation of the German Empire, 1870-1871

During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 and the negotiations leading to the creation of the German Empire, the Bavarian military leaders sought to fulfill essentially two obligations. On the one hand they sensed a duty to defend German soil and wanted to remain loyal to the military alliance with Prussia; on the other hand, the minister of war (supported by most of the older army officers and the Bavarian aristocracy) wanted to preserve the independence of the army, even in a united German state. The Bavarian army, however, did not function in a vacuum, free from the other departments of government or unaffected by sentiments of parliament and public. Pranckh's efforts to fulfill military obligations and at the same time safeguard the independence of his army were continually complicated by the noisy particularism in the Bavarian Landtag, the unstable nature of the Bavarian
king, Ludwig II, and the enormous pressure from German nationalists both in Bavaria and in North Germany.

Bavaria entered the Franco-Prussian War with some reluctance. In the Landtag there was a bitter division over the question of committing Bavarian troops. Half of the parliamentary members of the Patriots' Party believed that the Hohenzollern candidacy for the throne of Spain was entirely the concern of Prussia and did not involve "German honor." They therefore believed that the furore over the Ems Dispatch was not a sufficient reason, under the terms of the Prussian-Bavarian alliance of 1866, to join Prussia in a war against France. Underlying the Patriots' opposition to Bavarian participation was the fear that Bavaria, in the excitement of a war against a traditional enemy of Germany, would be drawn under the control of Prussia. On the other hand, the generally nationalist Liberals in the Landtag argued that Bavaria had an obligation to defend German interests, and they openly hoped that this war would provide the opportunity for the completion of German unification.
Between these two factions stood the other half of the Patriots' Party, torn between a desire, shared with their more extreme colleagues, to preserve the sovereignty of Bavaria and an apparent duty to defend Germany against French designs.

The king of Bavaria, Ludwig II, wavered between a vague, romantic German nationalism and the fear of losing the independence of his throne. He seemed incapable of making a decision. In this impasse the initiative passed to the Bavarian ministers, chief among them the new minister-president, Count Otto von Bray-Steinberg, the minister of justice, Johann von Lutz, and the minister of war, Sigmund von Franckh. Bray, although no friend of Prussia, reasoned that, because a victorious and angry Prussia might turn on a neutral Bavaria after the war, Bavaria should enter the war on Prussia's side and seek assurances that a grateful Prussia would preserve Bavarian independence. As for

1. Count Bray was named minister-president after the liberal, pro-Prussian Prince Hohenlohe resigned in January, 1870, following the electoral victories of the Patriots' Party.

2. Bray carefully weighed Bavaria's choices: on the
Lutz, since 1866 he had been an advocate of the kleindeutsch solution to German unification. He accepted Prussian domination as inevitable and hoped that Bavaria could eventually be made to accept it. Pranckh, like Bray no friend of Prussia, wanted to remain faithful to the military alliance with the Prussians. He considered the Prussian call for mobilization sufficient cause for mobilization of the Bavarian army against France.

Bray persuaded the wavering king to sign the order for mobilization, and, on July 18, 1870, Pranckh asked the Landtag to vote the necessary war credits in a speech designed to stress Bavaria's obligations to Germany, but also to quiet particularist fears that Bavaria would lose her independence. This request sparked a bitter debate in the parliament, which made the possibility that the

one hand, if Bavaria remained neutral, she might, in the event of a French victory, gain some territory; but if the Prussians were victorious, Bavaria would have to face the possibility of being crushed by an angered Prussia. On the other hand, if Bavaria entered a war on the side of Prussia and France were victorious, Bavaria might lose only the Palatinate, since France would want to preserve Bavaria as a counterweight to Prussia.
Landtag would not sanction the extraordinary appropriations very real. Franckh, however, was prepared to carry out mobilization even if the Landtag refused to vote the necessary funds. The king would then be asked to dissolve the Landtag and to call for new elections. Since the electoral victories of the anti-Prussian and anti-military particularist parties throughout South Germany in 1869, many army officers, and perhaps even Franckh himself, were waiting for an opportunity to draw away from parliamentary scrutiny; but the potential constitutional crisis never materialized. Those members of the Patriots' Party who were at first poised in the middle of the parliamentary struggle between the extreme particularists in their own party and the nationalist Liberals finally succumbed, after the French declaration of war, to the nationalist fever which was beginning to spread even in Bavaria. They broke with their bitterly anti-Prussian leader,


4. Ibid., p. 67.
Edmund Jörg, and voted for the extraordinary military budget.

The two army corps, which were Bavaria's contribution to the war effort, joined with the military contingents from Württemberg and Baden and with some Prussian units to form the Third German Army. Although the two Bavarian corps retained their own Bavarian commanders, Generals von der Tann and von Hartmann, the entire Third Army was placed under the direct command of the Prussian Crown Prince Frederick William and ultimately under the command of the King of Prussia. German nationalists hailed this union of Bavarian and Prussian troops in an all-German war effort as the beginning of the final step in German unification, but they did not realize the deep devotion to Bavarian independence among even those Bavarian officials pledged to defend German soil. On July 27, 1870, Prince Frederick William traveled to Munich to take personal command of the Bavarian contingent. There he found an enthusiastic crowd (Munich was much more national-minded than the rest of Bavaria) but also a wary Bavarian king and aristocracy. King Ludwig made all
the usual gestures of welcome and gave the normal indications of friendship and loyalty to his royal visitor from Prussia, but, as the Crown Prince was leaving Munich, Ludwig handed him a note asking that Frederick William take care to preserve the independent character of the Bavarian army.5

Bavarians were satisfied with the performance of the Bavarian army in the war. Because of the organizational changes made by Pranckh, the Bavarian mobilization in July was as rapid as the Prussian, and the Bavarian contingent played a significant role in the important German victories at the beginning of the war. These victories at Weissenburg, Fröschweiler, and Wörth (August 4-6) had a great psychological effect in Bavaria, since they seemed somehow to atone for the dismal failure of

5. Friedrich III, Das Kriegstagebuch von 1870/71 (Berlin, Leipzig, 1926), p. 12. Once the war had started not only the king but also the Bavarian ministers were anxious to obtain specific guarantees from the Prussians that the independence of a Bavaria which had remained loyal to its alliance would be recognized during and after the war. Doeberl, Bayern und die Bismarckische Reichsgründung, pp. 46-48.
1866. To Bavarian eyes Franckh's reforms had created a new Bavarian army. The Prussian Crown Prince was less happy. From the beginning Frederick William had little hope that Bavarian troops, with what he considered different traditions and training, could function as well as Prussian soldiers or work efficiently under Prussian command. The Crown Prince was at times openly sarcastic about Bavarian military prowess. On other occasions he became annoyed with what seemed to be Bavarian indolence and reluctance to follow orders quickly. In the end, however, the Crown Prince, convinced of the bravery of the Bavarian soldiers, admitted that the Bavarians had contributed to the German victories.


8. When Ludwig II awarded the Crown Prince the Bavarian order of Max Joseph, the Prussian recorded in his diary: "I hardly knew of the existence of this order, which is given only for battles that are won. Since this seldom happened in Bavaria, no one there presently possesses the order." *Ibid.*, p. 112.

over the French; but Frederick William concluded that the Bavarian army needed a new training program implemented by Prussian instructors. 10

There was some timidity on the part of the Bavarians at first. These soldiers were mostly sons of those particularist peasants who had once opposed Franckh's army reforms, and their generals were older and more cautious. They were never as enthusiastic about the war as some of the Prussians. At the battle of Weissenburg (August 4), a small detachment of French soldiers kept a much larger number of Bavarians at bay for five hours, but, it must be noted, in the same battle the French also inflicted heavy losses on the Prussians. Bavarian delays in engaging the enemy at Wörth (August 6) occasioned an angry outburst from the Prussian Crown Prince, but as the battle progressed the Bavarians fought intensely. At the battle of Sedan the Bavarians gained a reputation for cruelty when several civilians were shot in the fighting around the village

10. Ibid., p. 417.
of Bazelles, but this did not obscure the fact that the Bavarians had participated bravely in one of the greatest German victories of the nineteenth century. The one real setback for the Bavarian army occurred during the November campaign around Orleans. Here General von der Tann, after making a necessary and well-ordered retreat from Orleans and fighting without needed reinforcements (which had been refused by Moltke), was defeated at Coulmiers by a French force whose strength he underestimated.\(^\text{11}\)

After the great German victory at Sedan in September, 1870, the clamor for the completion of German unification -- the union of the South German states with the North German Confederation -- grew louder. Even the Bavarian particularists realized that some sort of union was probably inevitable, but they hoped that this union would result in an entirely new and thoroughly decentralized state rather than simply be an extension of the Prussian dominated North German Confederation to in-

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lude the south. The particularists hoped to preserve as much Bavarian autonomy as possible, surrendering to the central authority only those powers absolutely necessary to establish a national state and keeping those which traditionally upheld the independence of the Bavarian throne. Therefore the maintenance of the Bavarian army as a separate military establishment under the command of the Bavarian king became an important goal. But those Germans (including the Prussian Crown Prince) who supported a highly centralized and unitary state argued that the German princes would have to surrender control of their armies to a new emperor.

As a result of the enthusiasm engendered in Munich by the German victories and because of the pressure from German nationalists and Prussian leaders, the Bavarian ministers who had taken the initiative in the Bavarian mobilization in July, again went to the reluctant Ludwig in September and persuaded him to empower his ministers to negotiate a suitable agreement with Bismarck concerning Bavaria's entrance into a united Germany. Three of these ministers, the minister-president, the mini-
of justice, and the minister of war, eventually took over the conduct of the new negotiations. They were appointed the three Bavarian plenipotentiaries and authorized to negotiate the final treaties at Versailles. The minister of justice, Johann von Lutz, was probably the only Bavarian negotiator who was at all enthusiastic about the prospects of a united Germany. Lutz was almost the quintessence of the Bavarian upper middle class: well-educated, professional, hard-working, and ambitious. He had only recently been ennobled but like so many members of the German middle class entertained strongly nationalist sentiments. The other two plenipotentiaries, Bray and Franckh, were old-line Bavarian aristocrats devoted to the preservation of the Bavarian throne. For some years before he had been appointed minister-president, Bray had been the Bavarian minister to Vienna, and his sympathies continued to lie with Austria rather than Prussia. But he was also a cool-headed diplomat who saw that Bavaria must now deal with the predominant power in Germany. He saw that the German nationalism resulting from the war with France and the
desire of the now prestigious Prussian leaders to "solve" the problem of German unification had eliminated the possibility of Bavaria's remaining completely independent. But if he could take the initiative, he could save much of Bavaria's autonomy. Franckh was committed to the independence of the Bavarian army, but he knew that the task in 1870, during this time of intense nationalist feeling, would be difficult: the Prussian king was strongly attached to his role as commander-in-chief of the army and would probably not want, as head of a new German state, a Bavarian army independent of his control, even in peacetime. It was the issue of the role of the Bavarian army in a new state which proved to be the most difficult point to settle in all subsequent negotiations between the Bavarians and the Prussians. Although Franckh handled the military negotiations alone, he could count on the support of Bray but only to a lesser extent on the support of Lutz.

Before the high-level talks concerning Bavaria's entrance into a new Germany got underway, the Bavarian state ministers asked Bismarck to send a ré-
presentative to a preliminary conference in Munich. At this conference, held on September 22-26, 1870, the Bavarians did not suggest any sort of final settlement but simply tried to discover those problems and objections with which they would have to deal at a higher level. By the same token Rudolf von Delbrück, Bismarck's representative, was given strict orders merely to listen and not to make any concrete proposals.\(^{12}\) In Munich Pranckh presented Delbrück with his first proposals concerning the place of the Bavarian army in the new state. Pranckh asked that: 1) the Bavarian army remain an independent part of the German army under the command of the Bavarian king in peace-time, but in war-time be placed under the command of the King of Prussia acting as federal commander-in-chief; 2) Bavaria have its own military budget; 3) Bavaria retain its own military code until a new one was written for the new German state; 4) the peace-time strength of

the army be reduced from 1% to 3/4% of the population because of the exorbitant cost to Bavaria; and 5) any navy be entirely under the control of the new federal officials.\textsuperscript{13} Pranneh hardly mentioned the possibility that the federal commander-in-chief might inspect the Bavarian army in peace-time. King Ludwig found the idea of the inspection of his army by another monarch odious, and said privately that he would never agree to such a provision.\textsuperscript{14} There was very little discussion of these Bavarian proposals. Delbrück claimed that he did not have the specialized knowledge of military affairs to talk about the proposals intelligently and, because military affairs were of direct concern to the King of Prussia, Delbrück thought it best to defer any such discussions to a later time and to a higher level.\textsuperscript{15}

In October the Bavarian plenipotentiaries traveled to Versailles, now the general headquarters of

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{13} Doëberl, \textit{Bayern und die Bismarckische Reichsgründung}, p. 98.
\item \textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 86.
\end{enumerate}
the German armies, to take up serious negotiations with the higher Prussian officials. Pranckh carried on the military negotiations at the start almost exclusively with the Prussian minister of war, General Albrecht von Roon, who saw the "solution of the German question" in the fact that Bavarians had fought under the Prussian leaders. From the first meeting on October 26, relations between the two men were cool, and during the talks sharp exchanges arose between them. 16 Roon wanted to make certain that the new German army was tightly organized under the sole command of the King of Prussia, under the single direction of a German minister of war, and free from the scrutiny of the individual Landtag. Pranckh could not accept this. Roon became exasperated with Pranckh's insistence on the preservation of the military prerogatives of the Bavarian king in peace-time. At one point he exclaimed that rather than accept the Bavarian proposals the Prussians should return to the arrangements of the old

German Confederation.\(^\text{17}\)

Essentially the conflict between Roon and Franckh revolved around three points. First there was the question of the training of the men and officers of the Bavarian army. Roon called for Prussian methods of training, standards of conduct, and other military regulations to be introduced into the Bavarian army to insure that there would be uniform military training throughout Germany. To develop this uniformity Prussian military instructors would for a specified time be assigned to the Bavarian army. Secondly, Roon objected to a separate military budget for Bavaria which would have to be submitted to the Bavarian Landtag. Roon felt that the German army would have enough trouble with the

the Reichstag and should not be made to suffer the attacks and scrutiny of a second parliament. Lastly, and most importantly, Roon objected to the military authority of the Bavarian king in peace-time. This authority would fragment the German army and under-cut the position of the Prussian king as national commander-in-chief. Roon also doubted whether the Reichstag, filled with nationalists, would accept such a concession to Bavarian particularism.

Roon, supported by the King of Prussia, seemed implacable, but, hoping to get the negotiations moving forward, Pranckh offered what he thought were major concessions. He first compromised on the demand for a separate military budget by suggesting that the Reichstag determine the amount, per capita, that should be spent on the army. The Bavarian Landtag would then be compelled to accept this figure (so many Marks per soldier) as a framework in which it could allot money to the various branches of the Bavarian army. The Bavarian Landtag would neither spend more nor less than the figure set by the Reichstag. A similar arrangement, involving the North German states, was already part of the consti-
tution of the North German Confederation. In addition Franckh gave added and more detailed assurances that the standards of the Prussian army would be introduced into the Bavarian army, although he continued to insist that any change in regulations be carried through by Bavarian officers. Franckh even began to discuss the right of the federal commander-in-chief to inspect Bavarian troops. But Franckh wanted no merger of the two armies. Roon remained unmoved.

Here Bismarck intervened. He went over Roon's head, first to deal with Franckh directly and secondly to present the military proposals personally to the King of Prussia. He was not going to let the creation of a German Empire be slowed by an argument over "the cadet school in Munich," and he was ready to grant considerable concessions to the Bavarians, such as the peace-time command of the Bavarian king and the autonomy of the Bavarian minister of

18. Doeberl, Bayern und die Bismarckische Reichsgründung, pp. 110-111, 120.

war — much to the chagrin of Roon and the Prussian king. Bismarck hoped that the common experiences of war shared by both the Prussian and Bavarian soldiers would strengthen national consciousness among the Bavarians. He even thought that Bavaria could be brought closer to the North German Confederation by letting Bavarians share in the responsibility of defending Germany's borders, even if that meant giving part of Alsace-Lorraine to Bavaria. When these proposals failed to produce the desired response in Bavaria, Bismarck used pressure and threats. Although impressed with the progress which the Bavarian army had made since 1866, Bismarck seemed prepared, if necessary, to use examples of Bavarian military ineptitude to embarrass Bavarian officials into coming to terms.

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then tried to isolate Bavaria by negotiating quickly and successfully with the other two South German states, Württemberg and Baden. Finally, however, Bismarck accepted substantially the proposals made by Franckh. He argued that particularism was too strong in Bavaria to be quickly overcome. Time would eventually bring Bavaria closer to the Reich, and, with the treaty provisions guaranteeing uniformity of training and standards, her army would cease to be, in any real sense, a separate military establishment. After all, the great attraction of the obviously superior Prussian army would inevitably pull the Bavarian army into its orbit.

To mollify the critics of these concessions to the Bavarians Bismarck had to use all his powers of persuasion. The King of Prussia, his son, the Crown Prince, and the Prussian minister of war, as well as innumerable vocal Prussian nationalists, all opposed the separate position granted to the Bavarian army. King William was convinced that one of the basic strengths of any state was the union of crown and army; an independent army in Bavaria would weaken any new Germany. Crown Prince Frederick
William believed that the effectiveness of the Bavarian soldiers could be improved only with a large amount of Prussian aid and direction. He also so strongly opposed a separate identity for the Bavarian army that he suggested to Bismarck that if the Bavarians proved stubborn in coming to terms, the Prussians should apply the threat of military force to make Bavaria agree. Bismarck assured his critics that any overt show of force would only create more bitterness in Bavaria which in turn would undermine the new German state from the beginning. He believed that all things necessary for the eventual integration of the Bavarian contingent into the German army were assured in the treaties. The proposed treaties had their faults, but future agreements would mend them.

Bismarck may also have given in to Franckh's demands for a separate Bavarian army because he wanted the Bavarians not only to accept the idea of


a new empire but also to take the initiative in offering the crown to the King of Prussia. In this spirit Bray decided to accept the creation of a German Empire in the hope that he could secure fulfillment of most of the Bavarian demands. Bismarck also opened direct negotiations with King Ludwig, as ruler of the second largest state in Germany, to ask William of Prussia to assume the title of German Emperor. Such a move from the most particularistic of the German rulers would be the signal for all the other German princes to do likewise. Initially, Bismarck hoped to win the cooperation of Ludwig by playing to the Bavarian monarch's vanity. Bismarck invited Ludwig to Versailles and offered him accommodation in the bedroom of Louis XIV, of whom Ludwig considered himself a spiritual descendant. In Versailles Bismarck would seek to fill the weak-willed king with romantic visions of a new empire. Ludwig was, however, unwilling to travel to Versailles. He had no in-

25. Doberl, Bayern und die Bismarckische Reichs­grundung, pp. 131, 156.
terest in military activities, was shying away from large groups of people, and did not think it seemly for a Bavarian monarch to ride in the train of a Prussian king. Thereupon Bismarck simply bribed the Bavarian king. Ludwig was desperately in need of money to continue his fantastic building program. Through Ludwig's Master of the Horse, Count von Holstein, Bismarck arranged for Ludwig to be paid 300,000 Marks a year from the Guelph fund confiscated from the deposed Hanoverian king in 1866. On November 30, 1870, Ludwig sent to William a letter (the famous Kaiserbrief), asking him to become Emperor.

The publication of the letter shocked the Bavarian plenipotentiaries at Versailles. Their plans for an entirely new confederation, already undermined by Bavaria's diplomatic isolation from the other South German states, had to be abandoned. A proposed rotation of the imperial title between the Hohenzollerns and the Wittelsbachs (a plan injected by the Bavarians as a bargaining tool) became im-

possible. Pranckh accepted the concessions Bismarck was willing to grant and gave in on the federal commander-in-chief's right of inspection in peace-time and the oath of loyalty to the federal commander-in-chief to be taken even by the Bavarians.

The Bavarian aristocracy and members of the Bavarian court did not capitulate as easily as the unstable Ludwig. The Bavarian king's uncle, Prince Luitpold (later to be Prince-Regent from 1886 to 1912), in 1870 a champion of Bavarian particularism, became involved in the military negotiations. He had gone to France with the Bavarian army. There Bismarck tried, unsuccessfully, to win Luitpold over to the side of German nationalism. (Ironically, it was Prince Luitpold whom Ludwig commissioned to hand his famous letter to William of Prussia.) Luitpold, claiming to speak for Ludwig, instead tried to gain an even greater degree of independence for the Bavarian army. Luitpold requested William of Prussia to drop the section in the Bavarian-Prussian agreement under which the Bavarian troops would take an oath of allegiance to the Emperor. Prince Luitpold thought that Bavarian honor would
be enough of a guarantee that the Bavarian army would remain true to its obligations to Germany. The King of Prussia was shaken by the request and ignored it. Bismarck, discovering from his informants in Munich that Luitpold was probably acting on his own, also refused to consider the proposal. 27

The last hurdle to the completion of German unification was the ratification of the treaties by the North German Reichstag and the Bavarian Landtag. Bismarck had some doubts whether the Reichstag of 1870 would accept a German state in which Bavaria retained such military reserve rights; but the chancellor believed that because Ludwig had sent the Kaiserbrief to William, the parliament would accede to the special privileges granted to Bavaria. 28 Under pressure from Bismarck and with


the parliamentary guidance of his associates, the Reichstag did accept the Bavarian treaty. Securing acceptance of the treaty by the Bavarian Landtag was a little more difficult. Since the treaties involved a change in the Bavarian constitution a two-thirds majority in the lower house was needed. The problem for the Bavarian government was to persuade enough members of the Patriots' Party that the union with the north was inevitable and that the Bavarian plenipotentiaries had made the best possible arrangement at Versailles. Bismarck expected the Bavarian government to dissolve the Landtag and call for new elections if the treaties were not accepted.\(^{29}\)

The anti-Prussian Jörg brought the treaties out of committee and presented them to the Landtag in an

\(^{29}\) Bismarck warned that if, as a result of the defeat of the treaties in the Landtag, Bavaria tried to make a separate peace with France, there would be war between Prussia and Bavaria. Since only the most rabid anti-Prussians considered such a move, Bismarck's warning probably served merely to underscore his determination to complete German unification. *Ibid.*, pp. 644-645.
extremely unfavorable light. He complained of the added financial burden which the new military arrangements would place on Bavaria, and bitterly commented that the new empire was simply a product of "Napoleonic Caesarism" based on military victory. 30 Jörg found vocal support, but enough members of the chamber, impressed by the German victories in France and feeling the pressure from nationalists and from Bismarck, bowed to what they considered the inevitable and passed the treaties by a vote of 102-48, just two more votes than necessary. The upper house of Bavarian nobles had ratified the treaties earlier. 31

As finally agreed upon, the concessions to Bavaria concerning its army were substantial and unique within the German Empire: the provisions of the German constitution governing the affairs of the German army, articles 61-64, were not appli-


31. Interestingly, the king's cousin, Prince Ludwig (later to be King Ludwig III), voted against the acceptance of the treaties. Ibid., p. 270.
cable to Bavaria. Instead, separate provisions, stated in the treaty between Bavaria and the North German Confederation, became operative:

1) The Bavarian army was recognized as a separate part of the German army with its own military authorities and under the command of the King of Bavaria with the following reservations:

   a) in time of war the Bavarian army would pass under control of the federal commander-in-chief, the Emperor;

   b) in the areas of organization, regulations, and training the Bavarians were obligated to adopt the Prussian standards;

   c) in order to make certain that the Bavarian army came up to the standards of the rest of the German army, the German Emperor had the right to inspect the Bavarian troops, although he was to consult with the King of Bavaria over the arrangements and results of these inspections;

   d) the Bavarian troops were to take an oath to the German Emperor as well as to the King of Bavaria.

2) Mobilization of the Bavarian army would be
carried out upon the command of the federal commander-in-chief and transmitted through the King of Bavaria.

3) Bavaria and the Empire would cooperate in the building of military fortifications on Bavarian soil.

4) Bavaria was to keep its own military code until a new one was drawn up for the entire Empire.

5) The Bavarian government was obligated to spend, per capita, as much proportionately on its army as was paid for the rest of the German army, although the Bavarian Landtag could determine specific allocations.\(^3^2\)

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\(^{32}\) The text of the military agreement with Bavaria can be found in E. H. Huber, *Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte* (Stuttgart, 1964), pp. 265-266.
Chapter III
The Bavarian Military Authorities, 1871-1914

After 1871 the Bavarian army existed entirely in the shadow of the Prussian military establishment. Required by the German constitution to adopt the norms of military training and organization established for the German Empire (which, in effect, meant Prussian standards), the Bavarian army lost most of its special characteristics and became practically indistinguishable from its Prussian counterpart. By 1900 military observers felt that there was no substantial difference — in terms of military training and expertise — between the Bavarian and Prussian armies.¹ This growing similarity between the two

¹. Adalbert Wahl, Deutsche Geschichte, 1871-1914, vol. IV, p. 142; Bavarian military plenipotentiary to Bavarian ministry of war, April 9, 1914, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Abteilung IV, Kriegsarchiv (henceforth, BHSA, IV), M. Kr. 43.
armies went beyond matters of training and organization and also became evident in the social attitudes of the Bavarian officer corps. Although the embourgeoisement of the Bavarian officer corps had gone too far and had been too widely accepted ever to be reversed, many younger officers of the Bavarian army slowly began to adopt some of the social and political attitudes of their Prussian colleagues: the strident anti-parliamentarianism, the arrogant public behavior, the exclusiveness, and the belief that the officer corps was one of the surest foundations of the status quo. As time went on, these younger officers, admirers of the Prussian officer corps, gradually replaced older officers whose loyalty to the Bavarian throne was deep and well-known.²

If the Bavarian army lost its special regional character, it did not, however, lose its sense of

constitutional independence nor its political significance for the Bavarian throne. Throughout the life of the German Empire, Bavarian civil and military officials steadfastly maintained and defended the special position granted the Bavarian army and the military command guaranteed to the Bavarian king. The younger Bavarian officers and the new political centralists in Germany may have wanted a closer integration of the two armies, but the rulers of Bavaria and their ministers of war, while prepared to meet constitutional requirements, cautiously guarded the unique position of the Bavarian military establishment. During Bismarck's tenure as imperial chancellor this task was not difficult, since Bismarck was sensitive to Bavarian particularism and committed to the federalism of the German constitution; but after 1890, the Bavarian officials had to contend with a German emperor eager to centralize his empire and impatient with the special rights of the federal states.
King and Parliament

Even if the Bavarian kings had been inclined after 1871 to gain a greater control over their army, it would have been nearly impossible to do so, short of a coup d'etat. According to the Bavarian constitution, all orders from the king, including those dealing with promotion and change of command, had to be countersigned by the minister of war. After 1871, all effective control of the army was firmly in the hands of the minister of war, and the Bavarian rulers were content with this situation, since their interests largely lay elsewhere. The king's role, however, was not merely ceremonial. To him all the soldiers and officers swore allegiance; he was the symbol of the state and the ultimate source of all authority; he inspired patriotism and devotion to duty and gave legitimacy to the commands of the officers. Most importantly, he worked to preserve the autonomy of Bavaria and to protect her special privileges -- especially the position of her army -- from the centralists in Berlin.
Ludwig II (1864-1886), soon after the creation of the German Empire, began to regret his role in the events of 1870/71. More and more he was filled with dreams of restoring his royal power against both the imperial authorities in Berlin and his own ministers in Munich. Although he had never taken an interest in military affairs, he began to make frequent appearances at military ceremonies and reviews as commander-in-chief of the Bavarian army. He hated the annual inspections by representatives of the Emperor required by the Versailles agreements as an unwarranted diminution of his royal privileges. When the military inspectors arrived in Munich, Ludwig received them with as little warmth and ceremony as protocol would permit. In the 1870's, as an indication of the independence of his army (and to the great chagrin of German nationalists) Ludwig decided to retain, with the exception of the insignia, a distinctively Bavarian uniform for his soldiers.3 Ludwig's belated efforts to maintain his

authority were, however, hampered by two facts. First, Ludwig had accepted money from Bismarck in return for the Kaiserbrief. The imperial chancellor used this annual payment as a means to control the more extreme particularism at the Bavarian court. Secondly, Ludwig suffered from a mental illness which grew more pronounced as time passed. He threw himself wholeheartedly into his building program and consequently neglected his governmental duties and allowed relations with his ministers to deteriorate. In 1886, with the royal treasury bankrupt, the Bavarian government reluctantly declared Ludwig incompetent and created a regency.

Trying desperately to maintain himself in power, Ludwig called upon his army to defend him from those who were attempting to replace him with a regent. One officer, an adjutant to the king who was personally loyal to Ludwig remained with him in his castle at Rohenschwangau. The minister of war, who supported the regency, ordered the officer back

to Munich, claiming the king's orders were not valid without the countersignature of the minister of war. The officer returned to Munich. The incident clearly demonstrated the strong position of the minister vis-a-vis the king.

Ludwig's successor, his uncle, Prince-Regent Luitpold (1886-1912), had been trained as a soldier, but the initial difficulties of his reign did not permit him to devote much attention to military affairs. Ludwig II had been quite popular in Bavaria despite his mental instability and erratic concern for governmental duties. When Ludwig was found dead in the Starnberger See a few days after his deposition, pro-Ludwig Bavarians suggested that Luitpold, whom Ludwig had called a "traitor" for his part in the establishment of the regency, was partially responsible for Ludwig's death. For some time after 1886, Luitpold had to live with anonymous accusations that he was a "murderer." Once Luitpold lived down the onus of the tragedy of 1886

and established his own style, he was no longer the old soldier and his interests in military affairs waned. His desire to maintain Bavaria's special position, however, did not. It was Luitpold, the old champion of Bavarian particularism, who, although prepared to fulfill scrupulously all Bavarian commitments to the Empire, tried to turn back the attempts of William II to belittle Bavarian privileges and centralize his Empire. In 1896, when Luitpold's son, Prince Ludwig, represented him at the formal coronation ceremonies for Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, Prince Ludwig created a stir when he informed a group at a party that the Bavarian ruler was an "ally" of the German Emperor rather than his vassal. Luitpold applauded his son's action.  

6. The German press made much of this incident. The difficulty arose from a badly worded toast given at a garden party in honor of the German dignitaries in Russia for the coronation. The man who gave the toast spoke of Prince Heinrich, the representative of the German Emperor, and of the other German princes in Heinrich's "entourage." The incident pained William II deeply, but he did not know exactly how to react. The German princes were no vassals, but at the same time they were not allies of the Emperor either, since they were not free to carry on an independent foreign policy of their own as true allies,
imperial maneuvers, when Bavarian troops participated, Luitpold insisted that the Bavarian flag be flown as well as the imperial standard, although an irritated William would fume for days. From 1894 to 1899, Luitpold was also instrumental in the establishment of a special Bavarian senate at the imperial military court in Berlin, staffed by officers named by the Bavarian king and having jurisdiction over all cases involving Bavarian soldiers (see Chapter VI).

such as Austria, could. Prince Ludwig told the Kaiser that he had merely defended the constitutional rights of the German princes and had not intended to disparage the settlement of 1870, to which the Bavarians were loyal. William replied that the action would give comfort to the anti-imperial (reichsfeindlich) forces in Germany and create confusion among foreigners who "do not know all the paragraphs of our complicated constitution by heart." But William could neither publicly condemn the Prince's statement as false nor accept it as true. He merely stressed to the Prince the importance of the unity of the Empire. Chlodwig von Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit (Osnabrück, 1967), pp. 238-240.

Luitpold remained above "party politics." Although he was a Catholic, he supported the anti-clerical ministry of Johann von Lutz because he did not want to name a government dependent upon the good-will of the majority of the Landtag. He was able to maintain this "non-party" tradition almost to the end of his reign in 1912. Luitpold's son and successor, Ludwig III (1912-1918), was much more involved with every-day political events. Ludwig openly supported the Center Party and was instrumental in the creation of Count von Hertling's Center Party ministry in 1912, a government which enjoyed the support of the majority of the Landtag delegates. The Bavarian Center Party received Ludwig's support because it, like the king, upheld Catholic interests, Bavarian rights, and monarchical-parliamentarian principles. Ludwig's role as a "politician" or defender of Bavarian autonomy was not destined to be long. First, the World War, with its burst of German national patriotism and

8. Schrott, Die Herrscher Bayerns, p. 221.
its growing centralization, made it difficult and unwise to defend the particular rights of individual states openly. Secondly, the revolution of 1918/19 in Germany put an end to the monarchy.

The Bavarian Landtag on the whole had little effect on Bavarian military developments after 1871. Initially, the Patriots' Party opposed military expenditures and reforms, not from any general opposition to the military, but rather from the belief that Bavaria did not need a large army and from the fear of even further "Prussianization." In 1875 the Patriots forced the resignation of the exasperated minister of war, Pranckh, when they voted down his military budget three times. Earlier the Patriots' Party had attempted to make the instructions given to the Bavarian Bundesrat delegation (including the military plenipotentiary) subject to


the approval of the Landtag, but the proposal failed to gain the two-thirds majority required for such constitutional changes. Members of the party also raised questions about the ill-treatment of soldiers until the minister of war, Maillinger, in 1879, refused to answer such questions in a parliamentary session. After 1875, however, the Patriots' Party, supporters of Catholic interests as well as Bavarian particularism, gradually turned away from their bitterly anti-Prussian stance and became more involved in the Kulturkampf and other non-military issues. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the small but growing Bavarian Social Democratic Party took up the opposition to militarism, but the Socialists could do little more than the Patriots had done earlier. The treaties of 1870 obliged the Bavarian Landtag to accept the overall per capita sum established for military spending

by the Reichstag. The Landtag merely had some minor control over the actual allotment of this sum to various branches of the army.

**The Minister of War**

Since, constitutionally, the Bavarian army was an independent contingent of the German army, the Bavarian minister of war continued to exercise military authority in Bavaria after 1871. The various departments of the ministry dealt with every aspect of military life in Bavaria. Decisions made in the ministry, once approved by the minister and the king, were binding on the entire army. The Bavarian general staff remained completely subordinated to the ministry of war, and no military cabinet, such as flourished in Prussia existed in Bavaria.\(^{13}\) There

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13. The Bavarians were very conscious of the strong position of the Bavarian minister of war and of the difficult position of his colleague in Prussia. An 1884 memorandum drawn up by a member of the Bavarian ministry of war carefully delineated the differences between the two ministries and clearly demonstrated the weakness of the Prussian minister of war; and one Bavarian
were limits to the war minister's power: the Bavarian constitution, the good-will of the Bavarian king (which was never a problem), and, most importantly, those provisions of the Versailles agreements which obliged the Bavarian ministry of war to adopt imperial (Prussian) military norms; but the Bavarian ministry of war was in fact the highest command, in peace-time, for the Bavarian army. Because of this prestige, the ministry of war attracted the best-trained officers in the Bavarian army.  

The Bavarian minister of war, through his military plenipotentiary in Berlin, naturally was also the link between the Prussian and Bavarian armies. He informed the Prussian authorities of military plenipotentiary in Berlin openly complained that it was shameful that the Prussian minister of war had to bear responsibility in parliament for the actions of a military cabinet over which he had no control. Comparison of the Bavarian and Prussian Ministries of War, BHS, IV, M. Kr. 867; Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, February 15, 1908, BHS, IV, M. Kr. 42.

14. In contrast, the best officers in the Prussian army clamored for positions on the general staff, while only second and third-rate officers worked in the Prussian ministry of war.
the activities of the Bavarian army; he arranged for the assignment of Bavarian officers to the Prussian army for further training; and he was the person through whom imperial regulations concerning the German army were made known to and introduced into the Bavarian army. Of course, the Bavarian ministry of war never rivaled the Prussian military authorities for position and prestige in Germany. No great questions of tactics or strategy were ever decided by purely Bavarian military authorities and, although Bavarian officials were always consulted and could delay or modify actions, decisions concerning standards for the entire German army were more often than not initiated and carried through by Prussian authorities.

Yet the Bavarian minister of war jealously guarded the autonomy of the Bavarian army and the command of the Bavarian king. Along with the Bavarian minister of foreign affairs, he opposed changes in the military conventions made between Prussia and the smaller German states because these modifications might eventually weaken Bavaria's
position in the German Empire. When Great Britain announced that it would send only one military attaché to Germany to serve both in Berlin and in Munich, the minister of war protested that this arrangement would ignore the autonomous existence of the Bavarian army. In his relations with the Prussian authorities, the Bavarian minister of war also wanted to guarantee that Bavarian soldiers would always, even in the event of war, serve under Bavarian officers, and that, when war came, there would be a sufficient number of Bavarian officers in the higher commands of the German army.

Constitutionally, the Bavarian minister of war performed two functions in the Bavarian government. On the one hand, he was a member of the council of

15. Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs to Bavarian ministry of war, February 10, 1894; ministry of foreign affairs to Bavarian envoy in Berlin, February 14, 1894, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 43.

ministers, swore an oath to maintain the constitution, defended the military budget in the Landtag, and generally played a "political" role as a member of a government. In his role, the minister of war often cooperated closely with other state ministries, particularly those handling foreign affairs and finance. When the Bavarian foreign minister drew up the instructions for Bavaria's representatives to the Bundesrat (one of whom was the Bavarian military plenipotentiary), the minister of war had a large hand in their wording, and, if the instructions concerned questions of military expenditure or reform, his voice could be decisive. In return the minister of war stressed to his military plenipotentiary that all members of the Bavarian delegation were subject to these instructions without exception, even if they did emanate from a civilian ministry. In matters concerning the military budget and the Bavarian financial contribution to the German army,

17. Note of Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs to Bavarian ministry of war, September 22, 1910, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 29
the minister of war worked closely with the minister of finance, especially since the Bavarian civilian ministers tended to be parsimonious and suspicious of increased financial exactions made by the Berlin government. 18

On the other hand, the minister of war was, under the king, the highest-ranking commander in the Bavarian army. All other Bavarian officers were subordinate to him, and the purely military decisions of promotion and change in command were made by him. He was also the primary military advisor to the king, kept the king informed of all military business, and sought the king's approval and advice for most of the changes made in the ministry of war and in the structure of the army. To a certain extent, therefore, the minister of war was more than

18. Determining Bavaria's financial contribution to the Reich could be a difficult procedure. At one point, the Bavarian minister of finance accused the imperial authorities of having assessed Bavaria at too high a rate. He became angered when some imperial officials in turn accused the Bavarians of being disloyal and of trying to escape their obligations to the Empire. Bavarian ministry of finance to Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, February 4, 1899, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 5611
simply a minister of the government, although, in practical terms, this meant little. Bavarian ministers of war never tried to carve out any "special" position for themselves in the government, other than to maintain that certain areas of military policy or activity could never be subject to parliamentary or "political" control.

The Bavarian minister of war fulfilled yet another function during the post-Bismarck era. In 1892, while General Leo von Caprivi was chancellor, the Berlin government requested the Bavarian minister of war to assume the duties of the Bavarian military plenipotentiary in the Bundesrat for the duration of the debate on a new army bill. Caprivi hoped that the presence of the ministers of war of the larger German states would lend prestige to the military bill and demonstrate clearly the unanimity among the German military leaders concerning the need for increased military estimates and a larger
army. Eventually, it became the practice for the minister of war to replace the Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin whenever a new and possibly controversial bill was introduced into the Bundesrat. So obvious did the reason for this change become that, when the Bavarians announced the minister of war's assumption of the military plenipotentiary's duties, most people knew that another bill requesting an even larger army and a greater military budget would be placed before the Bundesrat. Finally, in 1911, the Bavarian minister of war replaced permanently the military plenipotentiary as Bavaria's full-time military representative to the Bundesrat -- a clear indication of the rapidly

19. Bavarian envoy in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, November 20, 1892; Bavarian minister of war to Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, November 21, 1892; Bavarian military plenipotentiary to Bavarian ministry of war, November 20, 1892; Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs to Bavarian ministry of war, November 24, 1892, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 28

20. Excerpt from the Berliner Tageblatt, December 22, 1911, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 28.

21. cf. Chapter IV.
increasing importance of the army in German politics and of the accelerating arms race in pre-1914 Europe.

The Bavarian ministry of war was divided into seven departments. Its Central Department handled the administration of the ministry itself and prepared changes in personnel. The Department for Army Personnel dealt with all matters concerning officers and officials of the army, was responsible for the publication of a military handbook, and also served the minister of war as a "special" bureau to handle those problems not covered in the other departments. The Department for the General Concerns of the Army was responsible for organization, training, and mobilization; it was this section of the ministry with which the Bavarian general staff directly worked. The remaining four departments handled matters of finance, disabled and retired veterans, medical services, and military justice. 22

22. A. Reinhard, Heerwesen und Deinst der Kgl. bayerischen Armee (Munich, 1877), pp. 141-142.
In 1876, because of the greatly increased work load and the confusion of duties and responsibilities among the various departments, the minister of war proposed and won the king's approval for a major re-organization of the ministry. The minister hoped to ease the strain on the existing departments by the introduction of more "middle men" and wanted also to increase the representation of the technical services. The minister's request noted carefully that the cost of the reorganization would be minimal. With the expansion of the German army at the turn of the century, the strain on the ministry again increased so that in 1908 the Department for General Army Affairs was divided into separate divisions. In 1911, the minister of war claimed that the reorganization of 1876 was outdated. When he asked the king's approval for a new reorganization, the minister also requested that, for the sake of

23. Bavarian ministry of war to King of Bavaria, February 18, 1876, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 864.

24. Bavarian ministry of war to Prince-Regent of Bavaria, October 18, 1908, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 865.
speed and efficiency, he be granted permission to
make, on his own authority, rearrangements which
were not fundamental. The Prince-Regent acceded to
both requests.25 Throughout the life of the Empire,
the Bavarian ministers of war closely followed the
pattern of reorganization in the Prussian ministry
of war, and, especially during World War I, many
of these innovations were introduced, with few
modifications, into the Bavarian ministry.

Seven generals served as Bavarian ministers
of war from the time of Franckh's resignation in
1875 to the collapse of the German Empire in 1918.
Joseph von Maillinger (1875-1885) worked in the
ministry of war as a young officer and served in
the Franco-Prussian War as a division commander,
winning the Order of Max Joseph (the highest Bav-
arian award) for his actions. He was stationed
in France with the German occupation troops until
his appointment as minister of war. Upon his re-
tirement from the ministry, he was made a Knight

25. Bavarian ministry of war to Prince-Regent of
Bavaria, October 13, 1911, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 865.
of St. Hubert for his services to the Bavarian throne. Adolph von Heinleth, minister of war from 1885 to 1890, came up through the ranks of the Bavarian general staff and had considerable staff experience with Bavarian regiments. Immediately before his tenure as minister, he was chief of the general staff. He also was a Knight of the Order of Max Joseph. The third minister of war of this period, Benignus von Safferling (1890-1893), began his military career in the Greek army. He took part in the wars of 1866 and 1870 and won commendations for exemplary service in both. His experience was largely with various Bavarian line regiments. Like Maillinger and Heinlth, Safferling became a Knight of the Order of Max Joseph in 1870.

Adolph Freiherr von Asch zu Asch auf Oberndorff,

26. Relations between the kingdom of Bavaria and the new Greek state had been very close during the reign of the phil-Hellene, Ludwig I, who had supported with military aid the Greek struggle for independence. It was Ludwig's brother, Otto, who became King of Greece in 1832.

27. When Safferling retired, the Prince-Regent, in a warm letter of congratulations, praised the former minister for his soldierly spirit, his attention to duty, and especially his devotion
a scion of an old Bavarian aristocratic family, 
became minister of war in 1893, after fifteen years 
of service on the general staff and in the ministry 
of war, and after having commanded a number of mili-
tary units. Under his direction the Bavarian army 
was expanded in 1900 to include a third army corps. 
Upon his retirement in 1905, he was made a Knight 
of St, Hubert for devotion to the Bavarian crown. 
Carl Graf von Horn, after serving in both the wars 
of 1866 and 1870, rose through the ranks of the 
ministry of war and of the general staff, eventually 
becoming, in 1891, chief of the general staff. 
From 1896 to 1905, the year of his appointment as 
minister of war, Horn commanded an army brigade and 
division. He resigned as minister in 1912. Otto 
Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein, another veteran 
of 1870, served both in the ministry of war and on 
the general staff and later with field regiments. 
He held the position of minister of war from 1912 

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to the Wittelsbachs. Prince-Regent to Safferling, 
June 5, 1893, BSSA, IV, M. Kr. 867.
to 1916. The last Bavarian minister of war, Philipp von Hellingrath, saw action on both fronts in World War I and also acted as the Bavarian military plenipotentiary at General Headquarters on the western front. He served as minister of war until 1918 and became commander of the Order of Max Joseph.28

All the ministers of war, except for the last, fought in the Franco-Prussian War; the first five also served against Prussia in 1866; none were ever assigned to the Prussian army for training. All but two of the ministers obtained their education at cadet schools; Horn and Hellingrath received humanistic diplomas at a Gymnasium. Only Hellingrath entered the service after the foundation of the German Empire in 1870/71. All served at some time in the ministry of war and on the general staff, but they also had extensive experience with field

regiments (most of them as commanders).

The General Staff

At no time in the nineteenth century did the Bavarian general staff enjoy a position in the Bavarian military hierarchy similar to that which the general staff in Prussia enjoyed. Bavaria, a Mittelstaat, never felt a need to develop great strategical plans. After 1870, the Bavarian general staff was a mere shadow of the famous and admired Prussian general staff. Although it performed the normal army staff duties -- requisitioning, planning maneuvers, etc. -- the Bavarian general staff usually served as a training school for ambitious and intelligent Bavarian officers who planned to move on either into the ministry of war or into higher troop commands. Because it did not have direct access to the King of Bavaria (all of its communications had to be cleared through the minister of war), the Bavarian general staff could not play the political or military role of its counterpart in Prussia. The
Bavarian general staff, however, was not entirely without political significance: because its members worked very closely with the Prussian staff officers and deeply admired them, it became the section of the Bavarian army least concerned with Bavarian autonomy.

Ultimately, the Bavarian general staff was to make certain that enough adequately trained Bavarian officers would be available to fill regimental staff positions promptly in case of war, as well as to handle the normal routine of army staff life. During peacetime, however, the general staff fulfilled two more immediate functions. First, it trained staff officers who were to concern themselves with the more technical and theoretical aspects of military life. Secondly, it made it possible for qualified regimental officers, desirous of rapid advancement in the ranks, to gain some prestigious and useful general staff training.

Every year twelve officers, usually captains, thirty years of age, and selected for the most part from the best students at the war academy, began the
course designed to make them staff officers. The period of instruction extended over twelve years. The first year the officer spent in the Central Department of the general staff, acquainting himself with overall staff operations. For the next two years he served as the second staff officer at the headquarters of a division commander; then, for a year and one-half, he was given command of a company of soldiers. These four and one-half years constituted the first part of the Bavarian general staff officer's training. Once he had successfully completed this first stage, the officer was sent to the Prussian general staff for one and one-half years (later increased to two), during which time he was expected to become familiar with all aspects of staff operation in the Prussian army and to study questions of strategy and tactics. Upon returning to Bavaria, the staff officer began the second and final stage of his training. For two years he served as first staff officer to a commanding general; for two years he commanded a battalion; and, finally, for two years he served as a section head in the
Central Department of the general staff. By the time an officer had completed this course, he was probably forty-five years old and hopefully prepared to take over as chief of staff for some commanding general or to become a department head within the general staff. Many of these officers were also destined for the ministry of war. The Bavarian military authorities wanted all future Bavarian staff officers to have experience with a field regiment, to have had some training with the Prussian general staff, and to be able to carry on "great scientific and military responsibilities" independently. Seven officers, who were selected for the second course, spent one year in the Central Department of the general staff and three years as staff officers with a division before returning to regular duty with the field army. ²⁹

The general staff always remained sensitive

²⁹. Chief of Bavarian general staff (through the ministry of war) to the King, September 20, 1873; chief of Bavarian general staff to King, November 9, 1874; chief of Bavarian general staff to Bavarian minister of war, November 3, 1881, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 981.
to charges of being a patronage machine such as it was before 1866. In 1888, when a Bavarian newspaper accused the general staff of filling its ranks with Protektionskinder rather than with qualified officers, the general staff reacted sharply. It explained that the reason why the general staff accepted officers who were not graduated from the war academy was not to spread favors among the officers but rather to insure that qualified officers who had distinguished themselves in the ranks or who had begun their military careers before the war academy was founded (1867) could still advance themselves with general staff training. The rejoinder from the general staff also proudly claimed that most of the officers whom the newspaper named as unqualified Protektionskinder, had already served with the Prussian general staff and had received good recommendations. 30

30. Remarks on an article appearing in the newspaper Vaterland, April 4, 1888, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 981. The fact remains, however, that grounds for suspicion did exist. With even a cursory glance through the Vorschlagslisten, recommendations for promotions and reassignment,
Imperial Inspection of the Bavarian Army

The 1870 treaty recognized that the German Emperor as federal commander-in-chief (Bundesfeldherr) had the "right and duty" to make certain, through various inspections, that the Bavarian contingent successfully adopted the principles of training and organization of the Prussian army and was prepared for any war-time contingency. This was the most distasteful concession which the Bavarian negotiators had to grant at Versailles. The only sugar coating was the stipulation that the Emperor would confer with the King of Bavaria concerning the arrangements for these inspections and their results. Sigmund von Franckh had attempted at Versailles to avoid the entire issue of imperial inspection, knowing how hateful it would be to Ludwig II. However, he felt compelled to concede the point to the Prussians in return for a clear recognition of the

of the general staff, a reader will note that the names of Bothmer, Xylander, Asch, Hartmann, von der Tann, Horn, etc. reappear frequently.
Bavarian king's military command in peacetime.

Ludwig II never fully accepted this diminution of his sovereign power, and most Bavarians took the right of imperial inspection as a symbol of the new and suspect political order and of the unwanted ascendancy of the north and the Prussians.\(^1\)

Conscious of the unpopularity of these inspections, the imperial officials attempted to make them as politically acceptable to the Bavarians as possible. When it came time to make arrangements for the first inspection of 1871, Emperor William I announced that he was naming his son, Crown Prince Frederick William, as imperial inspector-general of

\(^1\) Franckh tried once to soften this seeming blow to Bavarian sovereignty by a minor protest over a plan to create German army groups for purposes of inspection. The two Bavarian army corps, along with two from Prussia and the one from Wurttemberg, were placed in the IVth Army Inspection. Franckh complained that the guaranteed autonomy of the Bavarian army had been ignored in such an arrangement, but the Emperor, acting as Bundesfeldherr, felt that he could recognize only a German army and not a number of particular contingents. Bavarian military pleni-potentiary in Berlin to King of Bavaria, June 12, 1871; Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs to Bavarian ministry of war, July 24, 1871, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Abteilung II, Geheimes Staatsarchiv (henceforth, BHSA, II), M A 77 668.
the IVth Army Group which included the Bavarian contingent. The Emperor told Bavarian representatives in Berlin that he had taken this step as a special sign of imperial favor toward Bavaria and, most importantly, because Frederick William who had commanded the Bavarian troops in the Franco-Prussian War was well acquainted with many officers of the Bavarian army and had shared with the Bavarian people this period of triumph for all Germans. 

From the beginning it was obvious that the favorite tactic of the Berlin authorities was to refer constantly to that source of German nationalism, the war of 1870/71, in order to overcome the doubts of Bavarian particularists and to soften the presence of imperial authority. Crown Prince Frederick William remained the inspector-general of the Bavarian army from 1871 to the time of his accession to the Prussian throne and imperial title upon his

32. Bavarian envoy in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, June 20, 1871; Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs to King of Bavaria, June 24, 1871, BHSA, II, M A 77 668.
father's death in 1888.

Since, constitutionally, the Crown Prince was obligated to consult with the Bavarian king before making his inspections, the arrangements for his visits to Bavaria presented a diplomatic as well as a military problem. The German Emperor, imperial chancellor, the Prussian and Bavarian ministries of war, the Bavarian military plenipotentiary and civilian envoy in Berlin, plus the Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, all in some way or other had a hand in the arrangements. However, from this potentially confusing situation evolved a fairly orderly process of planning for imperial inspections, to which, as time went on and political problems seemed to decline, the military authorities came to play the predominant role. Generally, sometime in the middle of July of each year, the Prussian minister of war would inform his counterpart in Munich of the desire of the Crown Prince to inspect certain elements of the Bavarian army on specified days. The Bavarian minister of war obtained the consent of the King of Bavaria, after which the German Emperor formally
announced the inspection through an order from his military cabinet. Anxious to keep the matter in military hands, the Bavarian ministry of war assigned the Bavarian military plenipotentiary the task of handling the details of the inspection with the Prussian officials. If political difficulties did arise, as might be the case when a new inspector was to be named, then the Bavarian civilian envoy in Berlin had to take up the matter with the imperial chancellor. 33

The inspection tours which the Crown Prince made in Bavaria resembled the progress of some medieval king. The ceremony due to a general and the son of a German Emperor was precise and elaborate. There were formal meetings with the Bavarian king or his representatives, members of the ministry of war and the civilian ministries, and with commanding generals. Every aspect of the Crown Prince's movements was carefully mapped out beforehand. But in

33. Bavarian minister of war to Bavarian minister of foreign affairs, May 23, 1888, BHSA, II, MA 77 668.
spite of the elaborate ceremony, the Crown Prince appears to have been able to make a thorough review of the Bavarian troops.\textsuperscript{34} At the end of the inspection tour, Frederick William submitted a detailed report to the Emperor, in which he outlined his activities, described the various exercises he attended, and gave a judgment on the preparedness and worthiness of the Bavarian army. At first, the Prussian ministry of war would make a \textit{precis} of the Crown Prince’s report and send it to the Bavarian ministry of war in fulfilment of the constitutional requirement to inform the Bavarian king of the results of the inspection. Later, Bavarian authorities received both the official \textit{precis} from the Prussian ministry of war and a copy of the full report.

At the beginning of his tenure as inspector-

\textsuperscript{34} Bavarian ministry of war to Prussian ministry of war, March 9, 1873; Bavarian ministry of war to Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, August 14, 1881. Arrangements also had to made for the placing of a Bavarian officer on the Crown Prince’s staff for the tour of inspection. Bavarian ministry of war to Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, August 14, 1881 and August 16, 1882, \textit{BHSN}, II, M A 77 668.
general, the Crown Prince wrote fairly short reports, giving only brief, summary accounts of his activities and placing the emphasis on the results of the exercises and maneuvers. As the Crown Prince grew more accustomed to his role and more knowledgeable about the Bavarian army, his reports became longer and more explicit. In general, the reports clearly indicated the great satisfaction of the Crown Prince (who during the Franco-Prussian War had been critical of the Bavarians) that the Bavarian army was successfully adopting the standards and practices of Prussian drill and organization and that the Gleichberechtigung of the two armies was becoming a reality. Also, in spite of some specific criticisms, a cavalry movement made too slowly, inaccurate fire from an artillery unit, or inadequate knowledge of the terrain, the Crown Prince was convinced that the Bavarian army was well trained and ready for war. 35

35. Prussian ministry of war to Bavarian ministry of war, June 19, 1873, January 16, 1874, February 18, 1876, December 11, 1876, January 7, 1878, November 7, 1878, May 19, 1881, November 1, 1885; chief of staff of IVth Army Inspection to Bavarian ministry of war, October 10, 1881, September 14, 1883, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2766.
What is most interesting about the Crown Prince's reports are the many references to acquaintances and commonly shared experiences of the Franco-Prussian War. In 1881, Frederick William wrote a warm appraisal of the Bavarian general von der Tann who had served under the Crown Prince in 1870 and who had recently died. The same report contained also some enthusiastic remarks about von der Tann's successor, General von Horn. Horn had commanded the Bavarian garrison troops at Metz, where he had had an opportunity to observe Prussian techniques. The Crown Prince happily reported that Horn's experience in Metz aided the general in introducing Prussian methods into the Bavarian army. In his report of 1882, Frederick William specifically mentions the performance of Freyberg, who had served in the Crown Prince's headquarters in France and as Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin, and of a major who had been severely wounded at Sedan. Even now, as he had in 1870, the Crown Prince hoped that the experience of the war against France would cement relationships between the Prussian and Bavarian armies and slowly
erode the wall of Bavarian particularism. 36

When William I died in 1888 and his son became Emperor Frederick III, a new inspector-general for the Bavarian army had to be found. Bismarck immediately took the initiative and called in the Bavarian envoy, Count Hugo von Lerchenfeld, to discuss the nomination of a new inspector. The chancellor seemed to be willing to accommodate Bavarian wishes as far as possible, but he maintained that the inspection no longer should be a major political problem, since the imperial settlement was not challenged to any great degree now in Bavaria. The inspection could therefore be handled as if it were purely a technical and military problem. Since the chancellor thought the new Crown Prince, William, unsuited for the position because of his youth and inexperience, he suggested Field Marshal Count von Blumenthal as the new inspector-general for the

36. Copies of Crown Prince's report sent by chief of staff of IVth Army Inspection to Bavarian ministry of war, October 10, 1881, and October 11, 1882, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2766.
IVth Army group. Both the Bavarian military plenipotentiary and the Bavarian civilian envoy in Berlin welcomed this suggestion. Blumenthal was second in rank only to Field Marshal Count von Moltke in the Prussian army, and he possessed the further advantage of having served as Crown Prince Frederick William's chief of staff in 1870 and was therefore well-known to older Bavarian officers — another strong link with that common ground of German patriotism.

Blumenthal immediately ingratiated himself with the Bavarians. He announced that there would be no full inspection the first year of his tenure. Instead, he would simply attend a few Bavarian military exercises as an observer and renew old acquaintances. He later agreed that the inspections of the Bavarian army would no longer need to be as regular and fre-


38. Bavarian ministry of war to Prince-Regent of Bavaria, April 10, 1888, BHSA, II, M A 77 668.
quent as they had been in the past. The Bavarians noted this change for its political and military significance. It appeared to them as a sign of the growing "equality" of their army and a softening of the still unpleasant necessity of inspection from Berlin. 39 Blumenthal's reports were as complimentary as the Crown Prince's before him; he reported to the Emperor his complete satisfaction with the progress of the Bavarian army. 40

In spite of Bavarian satisfaction with Field Marshal von Blumenthal, the Bavarians began to push after 1890 for an inspector of the IVth Army group who came from the ranks of the Bavarian army. Perhaps with Bismarck gone from power, the Bavarians felt uneasy about the future of the federal principles of the German constitution; perhaps they had already sensed the danger from William's erratic


40. Prussian ministry of war to Bavarian ministry of war, February 4, 1889, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2767.
behavior and centralizing tendencies; perhaps they knew that the reservoir of German national enthusiasm created by the Franco-Prussian War was beginning to run dry with the death or retirement of one after another of the men associated with that great event. A new generation was coming to power in Germany, and quite possibly the Bavarians feared that it would not be as solicitous of Bavaria's special place in Germany as Bismarck had been. The Bavarians were also convinced that their army was no longer inferior in stature to the Prussian army. Just as the Bavarians sought to increase the number of positions open to them in the German army structure, they now sought to win the post of imperial inspector-general for a Bavarian commander. The possession of such a position would not mean for Bavarians that they could

41. Bavarian political and military leadership after 1890 continued to be very much a part of the "generation of 1870" and did not feel as involved with a "new era" as many Prussians under William II. After all, the last King of Bavaria, Ludwig III (1912-1918), had actually served as an officer in the German War of 1866. It was not until 1916 that a Bavarian general who had not served in the campaigns of 1870/71 became minister of war.
escape the necessity to maintain the standards and practices established for the rest of the German army. Rather, it would assure them that their inspector was a man true to the principles of the agreements of 1870 and not to the aggressive anti-federalism of many of William II's Prussian friends and advisors.

In 1892, the Grand Duke of Hesse had resigned his position as inspector-general of the IIIrd Army group. Upon the recommendation of the German chancellor, General Leo von Caprivi, and at the behest of Prince-Regent Luitpold of Bavaria, William transferred Field Marshal von Blumenthal to the vacant inspectorate of the IIIrd Army and named Prince Leopold of Bavaria, the son of Luitpold, inspector of the IVth army. The appointment of a Bavarian prince was intended as a gesture of friendliness toward Bavaria and in deference to the wishes of the Prince-Regent. There were, however, two problems. To avoid political problems with Württemberg, traditionally jealous of Bavaria, the Württemberg army corps was detached from the IVth Army
while Leopold was inspector-general. Secondly, since Leopold would now function as an imperial officer, the Prussians asked that he resign his position as an active Bavarian commander. Leopold acceded to this request.42

42. Bavarian envoy in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, June 22, 1892; Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, June 22, 1892, BHSA, II, M A 77 668. Leopold's nomination as inspector-general was but one stage in an extraordinary military career (aided, no doubt, by his royal blood), which culminated in his being named a Prussian Field Marshal and Supreme Commander of the entire Eastern Front in 1916, a position he held until the end of the First World War. His chief of staff was the brilliant Major-General Max Hoffmann of Tannenberg fame. Scharl, Die Zusammensetzung der bayerischen Beamtenchaften, p. 245.
Chapter IV
The Bavarian Military Plenipotentiary
in Berlin, 1871-1914

The office of Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin served both to remind the imperial officials of the special position of the Bavarian army in the German Empire and to act as the official channel through which information passed between the Prussian and Bavarian military authorities. The dual nature of their office imposed upon Bavaria's military plenipotentiaries the necessity to assume a number of roles, from military expert to diplomat. Throughout the various changes of role, however, one obligation remained clear and primary: to represent an autonomous Bavarian army in the imperial capital, maintaining that army's rights and privileges granted by the Versailles agreements of 1870 and serving as the direct representative of the
Bavarian minister of war, who, at least constitutionally, considered himself the equal of the Prussian minister of war.

The fact that Bavaria named a full military plenipotentiary to Berlin\(^1\) symbolized for the higher Bavarian military officials Bavaria's singular sta-

1. Both Saxony and Wurttemberg maintained military representatives in Berlin, but these officers did not speak for military establishments as autonomous as Bavaria's, nor did they function as full plenipotentiaries in the Bundesrat. As a result of the close military alliance signed with the South German states in 1866, the Prussians had assigned a military plenipotentiary of their own to each of the southern capitals to coordinate military affairs between the north and the south. After the creation of the Empire in 1871, however, the Prussians maintained a military plenipotentiary only in Munich because of the unique autonomy of the Bavarian army; but they considered their representative merely a military attache with another title. Some Prussians wanted to view the Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin in the same light, but for political reasons they were willing to keep the title of Militarbevollmächtiger. Heinrich Otto Meisner, *Militärattaches und Militarbevollmächtige in Preussen und im Deutschen Reich* (Berlin, 1957), pp. 45-48. Meisner mistakenly writes that the Bavarian military plenipotentiary was always a deputy member of the Bundesrat.
tus as the "second-greatest" state of the German Empire, a position which, in spite of the disaster of 1866 and the intense nationalism of 1870, seemed in some way reminiscent of Bavaria's comfortable place in the former German Confederation. The Bavarians considered their military plenipotentiary the "ambassador" of their commander-in-chief, the King of Bavaria. Even after 1892, when the Bavarian minister of war would assume the functions of the military plenipotentiary during the consideration of important, controversial military bills in the Bundesrat, he would relinquish the position to the regular plenipotentiary as soon after the debates as possible, so as not to endanger Bavaria's "special position." The military plenipotentiary, this "ambassador" of the Bavarian army in the imperial capital, was as much a sign of Bavaria's residual sovereignty as was the military command of the King of Bavaria. Only in 1911, with the greater demands

2. Bavarian minister of foreign affairs to Bavarian minister of war, June 20, 1893, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 28.
for military expansion from imperial leaders and the growing feeling that war was inevitable, did Bavaria down-grade its military plenipotentiary and make the special role of the minister of war in the Bundesrat permanent.

As the direct representative of the Bavarian minister of war, the military plenipotentiary was also the highest ranking Bavarian officer in Berlin. To his authority were technically subject even those younger officers who, as part of their staff training, had been assigned to the Prussian general staff. It was important for the maintenance of the military plenipotentiary's position that this authority be at least formally recognized, although the military representative had no real power over these men. When a military plenipotentiary complained that some Bavarian officers were not even making their presence known to their "superior" officer, the minister of war ordered all younger officers to report in writing to the military plenipotentiary upon their arrival in Berlin and all officers of equal or superior field
rank to announce their presence in Berlin to him.\(^3\)

In this fashion the military plenipotentiary could act as "coordinator" by maintaining contacts with these Bavarian officers in the Prussian army and report on their activities to the Bavarian minister of war.

Lastly, the military plenipotentiary acted as the intermediary through whom the Bavarian and Prussian ministries of war exchanged important information involving their respective armies. This was often a sensitive and difficult position for the military plenipotentiary. He had to make certain that the Bavarian minister of war was kept up-to-date on all the innovations in armaments, organization, and tactics introduced by the Prussians, but, at times, he experienced difficulty in obtaining the requisite information from the Prussian ministry of war. As the representative of a German state, the military plenipotentiary felt that

\(^3\) Militiär-Verordnungs-Blatt, January, 1909, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 29
these data should come to him as a matter of course rather than as a result of persistent and somewhat humiliating requests. Perhaps the Prussians feared that sensitive military data or political information might be leaked to the press and public if revealed to the Bavarians. (The Bavarians were guilty of one such indiscretion during the so-called Koller Crisis of 1895) Or perhaps the Prussian military leadership, confident of its own superiority and condescending towards non-Prussian military establishments, never felt the need to maintain careful and open communications with the Bavarian army, which, to many Prussians, was something of a step-child in the German army. Whatever the reasons for this apparent lack of candor between the two states bound in so close a union, the military plenipotentiary lost few opportunities to complain of the situation, both to the Prussians and to his superiors in Munich.

Since the military plenipotentiary was the representative of Bavarian military autonomy as well as the intermediary between the two ministries of war,
the military plenipotentiary almost naturally was as much a diplomat as a military spokesman. He was particularly active after 1890 in deflecting any possible attempts of Emperor William II to create greater centralization in the German army at the expense of Bavarian privileges, no matter how minor. Quoting the Versailles agreements as near-Scripture, the military plenipotentiary discreetly and cautiously, but nonetheless tenaciously, made certain that Bavarian military rights and the military command of the Bavarian king emerged undiminished. In view of the exaggerated *amour-propre* of Emperor William II in his role as Supreme War Lord (*Oberster Kriegsherr*), these actions called for the most delicate maneuvering on the part of the Bavarian military plenipotentiary. During these times the military plenipotentiary seemed caught between his loyalty to the German Empire -- especially urged by the Emperor and the Prussian military authorities -- and his loyalty to the Bavarian throne. Most often, however, this apparently clumsy dual loyalty simply prompted the military plenipotentiary to greater care
in negotiations in order to avoid any embarrassment to the German Emperor. It did not prompt him to counsel his superiors in Munich to abandon any essential Bavarian right.

The Bavarian military plenipotentiary's public function was to represent the autonomous Bavarian army in the Bundesrat. Here he was a full-fledged member of the Bavarian delegation, participated in the debates, and voted, although the Bavarian government expected him to serve primarily as their military expert during debates on military bills and in discussions of military questions. Within the Bavarian delegation, however, the military plenipotentiary considered himself fully the equal in rank of the Bavarian civilian envoy to Berlin, although the envoy, because he was the representative of the ministry of foreign affairs which officially instructed the delegation, was the delegation's chairman. The military plenipotentiary's sense of equality and his firm belief that the army which he represented in many ways stood beyond "political" and
civilian control created the potential for a dangerous amount of disagreement and perhaps even disruption in the Bavarian delegation.

This possibility materialised on one occasion in an embarrassing fashion, when the military plenipotentiary differed openly with the Bavarian financial officials. The Bavarian delegate representing the ministry of finance, following his instructions from Munich, had urged reductions in the military budget because of an already heavy financial burden on Bavaria. Much to his discomfort, the Bavarian military plenipotentiary ignored these instructions and supported an expanded military budget. The financial officials quickly wrote back to Munich, describing their acute embarrassment and complaining that the imperial Bundesrat was not the place to air differences among Bavarians which should be discussed and decided only in Munich. Because of such incidents, government officials in Munich eventually

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4. Bavarian ministry of finance to Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, November 30, 1908, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 29.
announced, unequivocally, that the instructions for the Bundesrat delegation were binding on all the delegates, including the military plenipotentiary. The Bavarian ministry of war acquiesced and the military plenipotentiary submitted.  

There was also a time when the Bavarian military plenipotentiary openly clashed with a member of the Reichstag, although this incident, at least on the surface, had more personal than political consequences. While a debate was raging on a new army bill in the Reichstag, one of its members made an indiscreet attack upon the quality of the Bavarian army. The military plenipotentiary furiously

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5. Note of Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs to Bavarian ministry of war, September 10, 1910, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 29. Determining the military budget quota was one of the most difficult and irritating tasks which the Bavarian delegation in the Bundesrat had to handle (see Chapter III, fn. 18). Lerchenfeld maintains that he foresaw as early as 1870 that financial questions and the military budget would be two of the greatest sources of friction between Bavaria and the Empire, and he admits that he himself sometimes modified or spoke against the instructions from Munich, although the example he gives is designed to show both his imperial and Bavarian loyalty. Lerchenfeld, Erinnerungen und Denkwürdigkeiten, pp. 76, 180.
complained to party leaders and government officials. The result was a great deal of bitterness, which the Bavarian civilian envoy to Berlin, Count Hugo von Lerchenfeld, tried to smooth over. No official apologies were made, but the offending member of the Reichstag, urged by his party associates, altered the transcript of the speech in order to delete the controversial remarks. The military plenipotentiary seems to have been satisfied with this solution.  

Although the incident seems to be of small import, it does serve to illustrate two other points touching upon the activity of the Bavarian military plenipotentiary. The first is the fact that the military plenipotentiary carefully watched the progress of military bills in the Reichstag and had, naturally, a particular interest in the stance of Bavarian delegates. He regularly sent back reports

6. Lerchenfeld to Bavarian ministry of war, March 11, 1904, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 29.
to the Bavarian ministry of war on these debates.7

The second point involves the sense of cooperation that eventually grew up between the military plenipotentiary and the Bavarian civilian envoy to Berlin, in spite of the military plenipotentiary's feelings of equality in the Bavarian Bundesarat delegation.8 For all but nine years of the life of the German Empire one man, Count Hugo von Lerchenfeld-Koefering, filled the position of Bavarian envoy to Berlin (1880-1918). This length of service created an enviable continuity in Bavarian representation in the German capital, more effective and candid contacts with the influential circles in Prussian diplomacy and politics, and close ties of trust and con-

7. One disturbed military plenipotentiary discovered that a Bavarian who had voted against a military bill in the Reichstag was a reserve officer. The military plenipotentiary sent to Munich a suggestion given him by a Reichstag leader sympathetic to the military that the Bavarians call back to active duty. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 42.

8. Lerchenfeld himself testifies to this cooperation. Lerchenfeld, Erinnerungen und Denkwürdigkeiten, p. 199.
confidence between the Prussian and Bavarian governments. These advantages of long service could be very useful to the Bavarian military plenipotentiaries who simply did not serve long enough in Berlin to create them for themselves. On questions where military affairs were strongly affected by politics, as was the case in the creation of a special Bavarian senate at the Imperial Military Court in Berlin (Chapter VI), the military plenipotentiary and Lerchenfeld established something like a Bavarian military-political "front" in Berlin. This cooperation could be effective, but it tended to draw the military plenipotentiary deeper into the maelstrom of German politics. Aware of this danger, the Bavarian ministry of war specifically warned the military plenipotentiary that his position was a military rather than a diplomatic one and that he should not assume unnecessary diplomatic tasks for himself. 9

9. Bavarian ministry of war to Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin, November 24, 1890, BERSA, IV, M. Kr. 43. Cooperation between the Bavarian envoy and military plenipotentiary al-
Probably more important than his public and "political" role in the Bundesrat and vis-a-vis the Reichstag, was the military plenipotentiary's position as intermediary between the Bavarian and Prussian military establishments, a position intended to be purely military and out of the public eye. The performance of this duty involved principally three types of activity. The military plenipotentiary first gathered information concerning all aspects of military life in the Prussian army and reported changes in structure, innovations in equipment and armament, and developments in tactics and strategy to the Bavarian ministry of war. Secondly, the Bavarian military plenipotentiary participated in Prussian army maneuvers as an observer so that he might be able to describe the success or failure of innovations in the Prussian army and officer corps for the Bavarian military leaders. Lastly, the

so helped to solve the diplomatic difficulties arising from such things as a request from Emperor William II to visit the Bavarian army maneuvers of 1891. Bavarian military plenipotentiary to Bavarian ministry of war, November 18, 1890, BBSA, IV, M. Kr. 43
military plenipotentiary was expected to protect Bavarian military privileges and to parry any attempt of the Emperor to exert a greater control over the Bavarian army. This last type of activity became more crucial after 1890, when William II, with his inordinate interest in military affairs, was trying to assert his authority in Germany.

From the beginning the Bavarian military plenipotentiary's quest for information was hampered by his dual status as both a German and Bavarian officer. As a German, the Bavarian officer expected to be taken fully into the confidence of the Prussian officials, but as a Bavarian representative he found himself treated to a certain diplomatic aloofness like an envoy from a foreign state. All the military plenipotentiaries attested to the readiness of the Prussians to answer questions put to them, and some found themselves privy to top-secret material covering suggested military changes and new legislative proposals.10

10. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, January 2, 1913, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 29; Bavarian military pleni-
But several of the Bavarian military plenipotentiaries still had difficulty obtaining information on certain aspects of Prussian military organization and opinion. When one military plenipotentiary received a piece of important information second-hand from an unofficial source, he complained to the Prussian authorities about the lack of communication between armies so closely united. He pointedly asked an officer in the Prussian ministry of war whether it was necessary that a Bavarian military representative specifically request information before it was given to him, or come every day, practically hat in hand, knocking at the doors of every department in the Prussian ministry of war to ask if there was anything for Bavaria. The Prussian officer replied that it was

potentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, December 19, 1911, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 42.

11 Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, January 2, 1898, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 45.
not the intention of the Prussians to supply to the
Bavarians only the information they requested. He
also denied that lack of proper communication had
occurred very often. When the Bavarian military
plenipotentiary cited several cases, the Prussian
officer apologized and assured the Bavarian that
the Prussians would do their utmost to avoid such
unfortunate occurrences in the future. 12 In spite
of this incident, the military plenipotentiaries
continued to obtain most of their information only
by request. Some suggested that members of the
Bavarian ministry of war send on to them specific
questions so that they might ask for those details
of particular interest to the Bavarian army. One
military plenipotentiary adopted the practice of
simply passing on a questionnaire to the Prussian
ministry of war when the information could be ob-

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12. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to
Bavarian ministry of war, January 2, 1913,
BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 29.
tained without a personal meeting. 13

One method of receiving information otherwise unavailable to the military plenipotentiary caused something of a crisis of conscience for Bavarian military officials. The Bavarian plenipotentiaries quite regularly handled secret material and urged the Bavarian ministry of war to be careful of leaks, since a leak traced to a Bavarian source could destroy confidence between Bavaria and Prussia. One military plenipotentiary, in stressing caution, however, was not only anxious to maintain good relations with Prussia, but also wished to protect an informant. General von Endres eventually reported to the Bavarian minister of war that much of his information was coming from a younger Bavarian officer assigned to the Prussian general staff for training, a certain Major Schlosser. Schlosser's

Prussian superior on the general staff had opened to him all the information which would be important for his training and of interest to him as a staff officer. Some of this information, including confidential reports from Prussian military attaches abroad, Schlosser passed on to the military plenipotentiary. The latter would have preferred less irregular means of obtaining useful details from these reports, but, conditions being what they were, he urged the Bavarian ministry of war to remain absolutely silent about Schlosser in order to avoid the possibility of wrecking Schlosser's position and embarrassing the military plenipotentiary. He also asked if he and Schlosser had done the right thing. After some discussion in the Bavarian ministry of war, opinion was nearly unanimous that Schlosser was doing nothing wrong by giving information to the Bavarian military plenipotentiary. The Bavarian argument supporting Schlosser's activity pivoted on the difference between Information and Dienst. Most officials in the Bavarian ministry maintained that the Prussians had opened up
the secret material to Schlosser for his general "information" and to further his education as a Bavarian staff officer who was learning the procedures of the Prussian general staff. The secret information was not intended solely as part of Schlosser's Dienst or merely to enable him to fulfill his service obligations on the general staff like any other staff officer. Besides, Schlosser had not perused the material merely to satisfy his curiosity. One of the opinions expressed in the ministry of war held that when the Prussians gave any information to any Bavarian officer, they gave it as well to the entire Bavarian military establishment, since a Bavarian officer remained a representative of the Bavarian army even when serving under the Prussian authorities.14

General Ludwig von Gebsattel, who had offered this opinion on Schlosser's position, inherited the problems created by the young officer's actions when he assumed the office of military plenipotentiary in 1906. As was his nature, Gebsattel took the bull by the horns. Having been assured by the Prussian minister of war and by the chief of the Prussian general staff that "there were no secrets between the Bavarian and Prussian armies," Gebsattel felt that he had the right to report whatever was necessary or useful for the Bavarian minister of war. Gebsattel took full responsibility for passing on secret information and tried to exonerate Schlosser from any blame. As far as Gebsattel was concerned, Schlosser was working in an imperial office (Reichsbehörde), not in a Prussian department. The material he handled was given to him for his general information as a German officer and to further the process of unification among the various parts of the German army. Therefore, the young officer could rightly pass on to the Bavarian military authorities information which he believed would
help to accomplish this end. The only action, Gebsattel continued, which would not only wreck the position of Bavarian officers in Berlin but also bring the trustworthiness of the whole Bavarian military establishment under a shadow would be the misuse of information by the Bavarian authorities or a dangerous indiscretion traced to Munich (as apparently happened in the Köller crisis in 1895). Gebsattel also assured his superior in Munich that the chief of the Prussian general staff was prepared to open the reports of the military attaches to the Bavarians if more Bavarian officers could be assigned to the Prussian general staff to handle the work. Gebsattel concluded by expressing his firm belief that, by using the information obtained from Schlosser, he had not made a younger officer break his trust but merely fulfilled a military plenipotentiary's duty.  

Each year the Bavarian military plenipotentiary attended the annual maneuvers and war games of the Prussian army. At the end of these exercises, the military plenipotentiary submitted a full report to the Bavarian ministry of war, outlining new procedures tested, the tactical problems posed and solved, and the general state and fitness of the Prussian army. The Bavarians were interested in the use of new weapons, especially in the artillery units, and in the performances of infantry commanders. The military plenipotentiary duly stressed these points in his reports. These reports also contained some sharp criticisms of Prussian military leaders, criticisms which did not exclude the Emperor himself. After one of these exercises, a Bavarian military plenipotentiary found that the Kaiser's critique displayed more enthusiasm than knowledge of military affairs. The officers present seemed to agree with the Kaiser's remarks; if there was any opposition, it remained silent. The Kaiser, warming to this subject, had excitedly described what he thought to be the most effective
method of attack on an enemy line—"straight through the middle, "cavalry first, then sharpshooters, finally masses of soldiers "with flags flying and music playing." Although the Prussians present did not react to this imperial fantasy, the Bavarian military plenipotentiary and members of the Bavarian ministry of war were frankly surprised that such a plan would be seriously proposed in a military gathering. The Bavarian military officials knew, moreover, that the Kaiser's tactics on this occasion were not simply a momentary lapse from good judgment. Three years earlier they were as surprised to learn that William II had ordered his generals to command their troops at the head of the lines.16

In the field, too, the Bavarian military plenipotentiary felt the drawbacks of being the official representative of an autonomous army. Because the

16. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, September 13, 1910, and October 17, 1913, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 39.
Bavarian military plenipotentiary represented a "sovereign" state, during his visits to Prussian maneuvers he was often given accommodations which, although more comfortable than those of Prussian commanders, were quite a distance from the field. During the fall maneuvers of 1913, the military plenipotentiary complained that, because his assigned quarters were too far from the scene of the exercises, he had difficulty obtaining maps, programs, and other vital information until the maneuvers were well under way. When the exercises were over, the Bavarian military plenipotentiary could not stay to listen to the general discussion and critique of the day's activities because of the distance he had to cover in returning to his quarters. He complained of his difficulties to Prussian officials and told them how strange it was that Bavaria, a part of the German Empire, should be treated like a foreign country and its representatives grouped with the military envoys of England, Austria, and Russia. Again, the Prussians assured the military plenipotentiary that they
would do everything possible to keep him well-informed and added that they had waited years for the Bavarians, who had always stressed their uniqueness and autonomy, to request not to be treated as a non-German power.17

In Berlin after 1890, the Bavarian plenipotentiary found that he had to play a somewhat more difficult role than that of a member of the Bundesrat or a military go-between. He became now a military diplomat, defending his army's autonomy from an Emperor with an exaggerated sense of his position and authority. In their efforts to counteract any tendency toward centralism, the Bavarian officials long sought to cooperate with Wurttemberg and Saxony, hoping that they could form a loose coalition of the three smaller kingdoms in the Empire. On certain, less important issues, the coalition

may have had a shaky success, but both the Bavarian military plenipotentiary and the Bavarian envoy to Berlin found that the smaller states were jealous of Bavaria's special position and were suspicious of her intentions. So Bavaria had to proceed fairly much on her own. 18

The problems were plain: William's unpredictability, his frequent by-passing of normal channels of communications, and his low regard for the privileges of the individual German states, privileges which undercut, according to William, German unity and the position of the German Empire in relation to other European countries. William's amour-propre was easily pricked and the frequent charges of lese-majeste clearly indicated his sensitivity to real or supposed slights. While attending the maneuvers of an army group formed from some Prussian and Bavarian units, William became furious when he

18. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, November 17, 1912, BSHA, IV, M. Kr. 39, and November 12, 1909, BSHA, IV, M. Kr. 42; Lerchenfeld, Erinnerungen und Denkwürdigkeiten, pp. 196-197.
discovered that the son of one of the federal princes was present at the exercises but had not reported to him personally. The Bavarian military plenipotentiary, General von Gebsattel, was called upon to smooth ruffled feathers since the offending prince was with a Bavarian unit. Gebsattel calmed the Emperor by explaining that the prince was serving as a lieutenant with a Bavarian company and was present merely as an officer and not as a member of a ruling house. He therefore did not think it necessary to present himself formally to the Emperor.\(^{19}\)

More indicative of the problems which the Bavarian military plenipotentiary had to solve and of the intense concern of William II for his position and of the sensitivity of Bavarians to the least "attack" on their autonomy was the difficulty raised over military colors. After a breakfast in a Prussian officers' casino in 1894, the Emperor invited the Bavarian military plenipotentiary,

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General Hermann von Haag, for a walk in the garden to discuss a painful embarrassment arising from what was, superficially, a minor point. The Emperor had decided that the insignia of the marksmen in the entire German army, including the Bavarian contingent, would bear the imperial colors as a sign of essential German unity, but much to his chagrin, the Bavarians had announced that the insignia of Bavarian marksmen would bear the blue-white colors of royal Bavaria. This decision was upsetting to the Emperor for both diplomatic and personal reasons. William argued that now, more than ever, German solidarity was necessary. The cool or hostile powers which surrounded Germany were simply looking for an instance of German disunion and weakness; Germany must not play into their hands, even in so minor a matter as the military colors. Germany must present one face to the outside world, and the imperial colors should be a sign of that. Besides, no German need feel ashamed to show these colors. William also requested that as a personal favor to the Emperor as Bundes-
the Bavarians accede to his wishes, claiming that he already had the King of Saxony on his side. The Bavarian military plenipotentiary replied by quoting the Versailles agreements and describing the special privileges Bavaria had retained in 1870. The Bavarian contingent was an autonomous part of the German army under the command of the King of Bavaria in peace-time. Military colors seemed properly a question which could be decided only by the Bavarian monarch. The Emperor continued to press, and the military plenipotentiary agreed to report back to Munich and to carry on the discussion with the Prussian ministry of war in hopes of reaching a settlement acceptable to both the German Emperor and the King of Bavaria.  

The negotiations over the military colors dragged on for a while. Proposals and counterpro-

20. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, May 3, 1894, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 43.
posals were offered, but little agreement was reached. During the discussions, however, the Bavarian military plenipotentiary began to realize that the quality of the reports from the Prussian military attache in Munich was very poor and gave the Prussian leaders a distorted view of Bavarian public and governmental opinion. The inadequacy of these reports complicated the problem of the military colors since the Prussian reports from Munich had led the authorities in Berlin to underestimate the Bavarian opposition to the proposal.

Eventually a far greater problem for the Emperor and the Prussian military authorities superseded the whole question of the colors. By the end


22. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, October 8, 1894, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 43. Prince Bernhard von Bulow also came to believe that the reports of Prussian officials from Munich were unreliable, although his attacks on Anton Monts, the Prussian envoy to Munich in the late 1890's, seem motivated by personal animosity. Prince Bernhard von Bulow, Memoirs (Boston, 1931), vol. I, pp. 144-145, 148.
of 1894, the most controversial issue in Berlin, at least for the military leaders, was the proposal for a complete revision of the military code to be placed before the Reichstag. Parliamentarians were demanding that the proceedings of the military courts be open to the public, a concession long opposed by the Prussian military establishment. The Emperor, sensing difficult times ahead, wanted to bring all other outstanding problems in the German army to as rapid a conclusion as possible. In December, 1894, the Bavarian military plenipotentiary was able to report that a solution to the "colors controversy" was forthcoming, probably in favor of Bavaria. By 1895, the battle over the reform of military justice was raging and the problem of the markmen's insignia forgotten. Bavaria won by default.

23. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, December 4, 1894, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 43.
The officers whom Bavaria assigned to Berlin as military plenipotentiaries were for the most part competent and conscientious men devoted to the Bavarian throne and to the imperial ideal of 1870/71. They regularly gathered information, reported diligently to the Bavarian ministry of war, and attended to their duties in the Bundesrat and in the field, all the time solicitous of Bavarian rights but anxious to avoid embarrassment to the Emperor. Some were more particularist than others, while others again displayed a warmer concern for the German Empire. None of them ever dreamed of a return to pre-1870 conditions nor did any expect a revision of the constitution in favor of centralized power.²⁴ Naturally, almost no "personalities" ever developed in the office of military plenipotentiary, men of

individual and independent mind with strong and freely expressed ideas of their own; but one of these few individuals cannot be passed over without mention.

General Ludwig Freiherr von Gebsattel was military plenipotentiary in Berlin from 1905 to 1911. While he held the position his correspondence with the Bavarian military authorities went beyond mere reporting and his service in Berlin beyond mere representation. Personally, Gebsattel was active and outspoken. He wanted to hasten the Gleichberechtigung of the Prussian and Bavarian armies and to witness the creation of a truly German military structure. This new structure would eventually replace the collection of individual contingents all existing in the shadow of Prussian dominance. (Gebsattel believed that the long recognized superiority of the Prussian army was beginning to wane.) Aided by a fairly close relationship with General von Moltke (chief of the Prussian general staff, 1906-1914), and by the first-hand knowledge of specific conditions and attitudes in the Prussian military establishment which his office afforded him, Geb-
sattel was in a good position to initiate new proposals for increasing Bavarian representation in proposed German army commands and for creating new opportunities for Bavarians to work with other German army units. (See Chapter V.) Previous military plenipotentiaries had also made suggestions for changes, but none of these were as active as Gebsattel. More often than not, Gebsattel's proposals embodied the wishes of the Bavarian military leadership to enhance Bavarian influence in higher German military structures, and officials in Munich therefore encouraged him.

Gebsattel freely discussed questions ranging from proper obedience to superior officers to the role of German diplomats in a hostile European environment. When suggestions concerning the downgrading of the Bavarian military plenipotentiary reached him, he vehemently and at length defended the office of military plenipotentiary and opposed any change in its status. Gebsattel was a Bavarian loyalist. He was quick to defend Bavaria's special position and to criticize those Bavarians
who had fallen too much under the spell of the Prussian military mystique. Too many Bavarians, Gebsattel concluded, came to Prussia expecting to find something extraordinary which they would never see in the Bavarian army. They would praise in Prussia what was merely a decent performance while condemning the same kind of performance in Bavaria. These men should realize that people "cook with water north of the Main just as they do south of it." It was also Gebsattel who defended the actions of Major Schlosser so strongly. But Gebsattel was no rock-ribbed particularist. Many qualities of the Prussian army he admired and would practically lecture the Bavarian ministry of war on them. One of his favorite themes was the difference between disobedience and initiative, a topic which developed from a report concerning a younger Prussian officer in the German army in

25. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, September 6, 1910, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 39.
West Africa who consistently circumvented his superior's orders. So troublesome had this officer become that his commander had practically decided to bring him before a court-martial. The problem was that the officer in question had been not only highly independent but very successful as well. He was eventually promoted for his efforts. Gebsattel admitted that there was a vague line separating initiative from disobedience, but he concluded that when an action, taken against the will and opinion of a superior, is decidedly successful, then it is correct. There is a whole history -- practically an established tradition -- of such "initiative" in the Prussian army, and Gebsattel concluded that it has helped to make the Prussian army great. Curiously, Gebsattel claimed that rather than accept such a tradition the Bavarians do everything to assure that such officers are weeded out at an early stage in their careers and will never trouble Bavarian commanders. 26

26. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, November 23, 1905 and
When not pursuing military themes, Gebsattel speculated on political and diplomatic problems. In 1908, William II, in an interview with a correspondent of the London Daily Telegraph, offended his own people as well as France, Britain, Russia, and Japan by some extremely indiscreet remarks. When the scandal broke, the Prussian minister of war, General von Einem, expressed to Gebsattel fears that the whole affair would shake the faith of the Federal Princes in the Emperor. To this poorly disguised plea for sympathy, Gebsattel replied that, although he had, as yet, no official word from Munich, he thought that the crisis might help the Emperor to realize the seriousness of his transgressions. It might also win for the chancellor greater security against such incidents. In that case the Federal Princes would place more trust in the imperial leadership and would look —more hope-

January 29, 1907, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 42; and September 15, 1910, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 39.
fully to the future than before."27 Gebsattel also discussed with Einem the thorny problem of Jews in the German officer corps. When Einem asserted that, although there were exceptions, Jews were so different in their way of life from the normal Prussian officer that the introduction of a large number of Jews into the officer corps would be positively pernicious, Gebsattel agreed and added that probably most Bavarian officers would concur with this conclusion.28 On a different plane Gebsattel warned

27. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, December 13, 1908, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 42.

28. The matter of the Jews in the officer corps arose when a member of the Prussian parliament claimed that sons of rich North German Jews preferred to serve in the Bavarian army because there they could become reserve officers more easily. Since the question of election to the status of reserve officer was constantly raised in both the Prussian parliament and the Reichstag, the Prussian minister of war wanted to know the status of Jews in the Bavarian army. Gebsattel replied that he knew of only one Jew who had served as an active field officer but he had since left the army; there was also a Jewish officer, known to Gebsattel, serving in the Bavarian medical corps. Gebsattel thought that the Bavarian army had a large number of Jewish reserve officers. In fact, only a very few regiments, with the greatest effort, had
the Bavarian ministry of war in the midst of the first Moroccan crisis that war in Europe was inevitable. He urged that German diplomacy do everything possible to delay such a war until Germany

been able to avoid taking Jewish reserve officers; but it was not true that every North German Jew serving in the Bavarian army was promoted to reserve officer status. Gebsattel told Einem, however, that the Bavarian ministry of war had never made a statement one way or the other on the status of the Jews in the officer corps. Einem continued that at one time Jews had served as reserve officers in the Prussian army, but he admitted that this was no longer true: probably no Prussian commander or officers' mess would accept a Jew now. Einem did not think this was healthy. There was a need for reserve officers, and there were undoubtedly many capable Jews. Besides, officer training might very well keep scores of Jews from supporting social democracy. Einem, however, was not prepared to interfere with the method of selecting officers. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, January 14, 1907, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 43. The Bavarian military leadership never adopted an official "Jewish policy." The anti-Semitism of the 1890's did, however, affect the Bavarian officer corps, as it did in Prussia, France, and Russia, but it never became as virulent in Bavaria. There may have been five active Jewish officers and from 50 to 100 Jewish reserve officers in the Bavarian army between 1870 and 1899. Hermann Rumenschottel, "Bildung und Herkunft der bayerischen Offiziere, 1866 bis 1914," p. 96
was prepared militarily to win it. 29

In spite of his vigorous opposition to the down-grading of his office, Gebsattel was destined to be the last Bavarian military plenipotentiary to sit in the Bundesrat as a full member. To prevent this diminution of his responsibilities, Gebsattel sent to the Bavarian ministry of war a detailed defense of the special position of the Bavarian military plenipotentiary. Outlining the advantages of the present set-up and warning of the dangers of altering the position of the military plenipotentiary, Gebsattel showed little enthusiasm for becoming a mere mouthpiece for decisions made in Munich, and he felt that Bavaria's position in the German Empire would be injured by such a move. Even in the German Confederation Bavaria maintained a military plenipotentiary in Frankfurt as a witness to her importance, and the fact that Bavaria had a plenipotentiary in

Berlin to represent her army clearly indicated to other German states and to the non-German world Bavaria's special position. The Bavarian military plenipotentiary should not be reduced to the level of the military representatives from Württemberg and Saxony. Gebsattel also argued that the civilian ministries would not be able much longer to contain the advancing tide of democracy and the growth of anti-military feeling. A change in the status of the military plenipotentiary would weaken the Bavarian army when it was probably the only "conservative rock" from which to defend the state. In spite of his eloquent plea, however, after Gebsattel departed from Berlin in 1911, the Bavarian minister of war became a full member of the Bundesrat and the military plenipotentiary, his deputy.\(^30\)

\(^{30}\) Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, October 4, 1909, November 21, 1909, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 42; Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs to Bavarian ministry of war, March 18, 1917, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 28.
Chapter V
Bavarian Officers in the Imperial Army Structure, 1871-1914

When writing to the King of Bavaria in 1873, the Bavarian minister of war, Sigmund von Franckh, maintained that in another war involving the entire German army the "mere attachment" of Bavarian officers to higher German military commands -- as had been the case in 1870 -- would no longer suffice. Rather, Bavarian officers would have to become integral parts of any General Headquarters and of any general staff of every army group which contained a contingent of Bavarian troops. Franckh therefore felt that in the event of a future war Bavaria should have enough officers, thoroughly trained in staff work and equal in ability to any Prussian staff officer, to fill the positions in the higher commands open to the Bavarians. To make certain that such officers would be available, selected
Bavarian officers should be given an opportunity to serve on the Prussian general staff and in other important Prussian commands. Not only could Bavarians thus learn the techniques of Prussian staff work, but Prussians and Bavarians would also learn to understand and trust each other. This would greatly facilitate their collaboration in times of war. Franckh asked for permission to begin negotiations with the Prussian military authorities in order to arrange a program to accomplish these ends.¹

Underlying the reasons outlined by Franckh for assigning Bavarian officers to Berlin were at least three other considerations which became more obvious through the years. The first was of concern to both the Prussians and the Bavarians. At the moment when the German Emperor mobilized the German army, mil-

¹. Bavarian minister of war to King of Bavaria, November 18, 1873, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2112. The Bavarians continued to stress these goals. Note on report from Bavarian general staff to Bavarian minister of war, November 27, 1882; Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, February 22, 1906, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2112.
tary authorities wanted to have available a list of Bavarian officers suited for staff positions in the higher commands. Eventually, the Bavarian minister of war sent each year to the Prussian authorities such a list of Bavarian officers, approved by the Bavarian king and accepted by the German Emperor. Thus, if mobilization occurred during the year, authorities could quickly fill command positions open to the Bavarians with a minimum of friction in the first, confusing days of war when the German Emperor would assume command of Bavarian as well as Prussian troops. The second consideration was of major interest to the Bavarian officials. The Bavarian king and his minister of war wanted to preserve Bavarian military autonomy and enhance Bavarian political influence to as great an extent as possible, even during a war when the German Emperor was commander-in-chief of all the German military contingents. The Bavarians hoped to achieve this goal in part by placing Bavarian officers and commanders at once in as many of the higher wartime commands as would be open to them. The last
consideration was a purely military one. The Bavarian minister of war and the chief of the Bavarian general staff were obligated to stay abreast of all the latest developments in imperial German (Prussian) military techniques and to close any gaps which existed between the Prussian and Bavarian armies in matters of training and procedures. They could fulfill this obligation best by assigning Bavarians to Prussian commands for training and by using these men, when they returned to Bavaria, as military instructors in Bavarian army units.

Because practically all of the Bavarians sent to Berlin would be staff officers, the Bavarian general staff was naturally very deeply involved in determining the types of officers to be assigned, the kinds of assignments they would get, and the duration of their stay. In 1874, the general staff told the minister of war, engaged in negotiations with the Prussians, that for the present the Bavarians should assign one staff officer to the Prussian general staff for general orientation and for work in the field on maneuvers, and one engineering offi-
cer to the railroad department. The assignment of the first officer should run for one and one-half years and that of the second for one year, although the chief of the general staff urged that the duration of these commands be flexible and made to conform to the task assigned and the talents of the officers. ²

After a few months of negotiations in 1874, the first "Agreement of the Royal Prussian and Royal Bavarian Ministries of War Concerning the Representation of Bavaria in the Organs of the Supreme German Army Command in War" was signed. According to the agreement, Bavaria's representation would consist of the assignment of Bavarian officers to the general staff of the main headquarters, to the general staff, the adjutant-general, and the quartermaster-general's corps of that High Command under which the two Bavarian army corps would serve,

2. Chief of Bavarian general staff to King of Bavaria, April 29, 1874, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2112.
and to the communications and railroad services of the German army. In the High Command of the army group of which Bavarian troops formed a part, the Bavarians were entitled to two general staff officers, two adjutants, one higher quartermaster's official, and one quartermaster's secretary or assistant. If the Bavarian contingent eventually should become an autonomous army group or if it became the largest part of an army group, the Bavarians would have the right to establish a High Command of their own. In addition, the Bavarian ministry of war would be allowed a military plenipotentiary both in Berlin and as General Headquarters. In order to assure equality of education and training of all German staff officers, Bavarian officers — three general staff officers and one engineering officer — would be assigned to the Prussian general staff in Berlin for commands of varying lengths. During their stay in Berlin, the Bavarian staff officers were to be given a general orientation in the work of the Prussian general staff (including an opportunity to work on plans for the annual maneuvers). They would
also participate in the fall military exercises as members of the general staff of a division and be included on the annual general staff inspection trip. The engineering officer was to be assigned to the railroad department of the Prussian general staff for technical training. The possibility that any of the officers assigned to Berlin would, in the event of mobilization, be considered for a position in a higher command was to be determined between the Prussian general staff and the Bavarian quartermaster-general. Finally, Bavaria agreed to bear all the costs of assigning the officers to Berlin.  

The agreement of 1874 was changed five times during the lifetime of the German Empire, in 1883, 1889, 1902, 1907, and 1914, although the essential outlines and general intentions of the first agreement continued to be the basis for all subsequent agreements.

3. "Übereinkommen des königlich Preußischen und des königlich Bayerischen Kriegsministerien, betreffend die Vertretung Bayerns in den Organen der obersten deutschen Heeresleitung im Kriege, June 20, 1874, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2112."
agreements. The Bavarian general staff, trying to answer new needs and changing situations, was the principal motive force behind the amendments and most times found the minister of war sympathetic to its requests for changes. There were basically four explicit or implicit reasons for altering the original agreement. All of the contingents of the German army continued to expand after 1871. In an effort to meet the demands for more staff officers, the Bavarian military authorities, with the consent of the Prussians, increased the number of Bavarian officers serving in Berlin and the length of their commands. Secondly, the particular duties and responsibilities of staff officers changed, sometimes rapidly (as was true immediately prior to 1914), with the introduction of technical advances (e.g., the airplane) and new diplomatic realities.

4. The minister of war, however, was no rubber stamp for general staff proposals. In 1912, the minister turned down a request for a change as unwise. Bavarian ministry of war to Bavarian general staff, April 1, 1912, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2113.
(e.g. the Franco-Russian alliance of 1894). Consequently, the specific reasons for assigning a Bavarian officer to the Prussian general staff varied from time to time because of the changing requirements of the Bavarian army. One year it might be more important to have a Bavarian officer working in the map division, whereas a few years later, a Bavarian might serve more usefully in the communications department. Since the intended activity of a Bavarian officer on the Prussian general staff was outlined in the official agreement, any substantial changes would have to go through official channels, resulting in new agreements. Thirdly, both the Bavarians and Prussians wanted a closer coordination of their respective technical services, particularly the management of their railroads. This need required the increased exchange of engineering officers, ballistics experts, and other technicians between Bavaria and Prussia. Lastly, Bavarian officials were loath to miss an opportunity to increase their influence in a future war-time army structure. Whenever there was talk
of a new High Command or a new quartermaster-general's position, the Bavarians quickly acted to place one of their officers in it.

Bavarian Officers on the Prussian General Staff

Immediately upon the ratification of the agreement of 1874, the Bavarian ministry of war began to assign younger Bavarian officers to the Prussian general staff. Usually, the Bavarian general staff would suggest an officer and would send his name to all the commanding officers under whom he had served for comments on the officer's general conduct, personal attitudes, intellectual talents, and his ability to profit from further instruction. All the comments were gathered together on what was known as a Vorschlagsliste, a candidate list, reviewed by the chief of the general staff, and sent on to the minister of war for approval. The minister of war ordinarily accepted the recommendations of his chief of staff (since the proposed candidates almost always came from the Bavarian general staff).
He would then ask the King of Bavaria for an official assignment of the approved officers and arrange the details of their stay in Berlin with Prussian officials. The predominant number of the Bavarian officers sent to Berlin came from aristocratic families and the Vorschlagslisten are filled with names long familiar in the Bavarian officer corps — Bothmer, Xylander, Horn, Asch, Reichlin-Meldegg, von der Tann-Rathsamhausen. This situation was not necessarily a result of social snobbery, aristocratic exclusiveness, or nepotism; officers sent to Berlin were career officers, men who generally came from families with established military traditions. The Prussians, generally pleased with the quality of the Bavarian officers on their general staff and certainly not ones to criticize aristocratic clannishness, never felt any-

5. Although snobbery and exclusiveness began to play a greater role in the Bavarian officer corps after 1871. See Hermann Rumschottel, "Bildung und Herkunft der bayrischen Offiziere, 1866 bis 1914."
thing was peculiar about the situation, although some Bavarian newspapers were suspicious. However, after 1883, when the Bavarian engineering corps no longer provided the officer intended for the railroad department of the Prussian general staff, the number of middle class Bavarian officers in Berlin declined. The engineering officer had almost always come from a bourgeois background. In that year, the Bavarian general staff also asked that the Bavarian officers in Berlin be given an opportunity to work in the training program of a Prussians' Guards' Regiment in the capital. The officer corps of these regiments were strongholds of Prussian aristocratic privilege, and the Bavarian appear to have conformed to their prejudices. Bavarian aristocrats on the Prussian general staff continued to pre-


7. Bavarian ministry of war to King of Bavaria, April 12, 1883, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2112.
8. Although the Bavarians in 1883 increased the number of officers in their army, they tried at the same time, in a move reminiscent of Prussian military practice, to enhance the "exclusiveness" of the Bavarian officer corps, if not by limiting membership to aristocrats -- clearly impossible in Bavaria because of the socio-economic structure -- at least by assuring that more members of the "upper classes" (preferably sons of officers and higher civil servants) became officers. The Prussian military mystique played some role in this attempt, but, as had happened in Prussia, the Bavarian officer corps was, as well, closely allied with the traditional ruling classes of Bavaria, whose authority and power were more threatened after 1880. The ruling classes, under attack, naturally sought to close their ranks to all but congenial elements, in order to defend their privileges better. The composition of these ruling classes, made up in Bavaria of the higher civil servants, the academic elite, the upper bourgeoisie, and only to a lesser extent the small land-owning aristocracy, tended to be reflected in the officer corps. This embourgeoisement, however, was more apparent than real after 1880. Although the percentage of aristocrats in the Bavarian army continued to decrease, the bourgeois officers came more to ape "aristocratic" values and to associate themselves with the defense of the old political structure. Rumschöttel, "Bildung und Herkunft der bayerischen Offiziere, 1866 bis 1914,"
appearance. An unfortunate officer, a Captain Lobenhoffer, had been suggested for assignment to the Prussian general staff, but was criticized by a superior officer who claimed that, in spite of Lobenhoffer's recognized intellectual ability, his "general appearance" made it impossible for him to serve in non-Bavarian units. 9

In the forty years after the signing of the agreement of 1874, the number of Bavarian officers working on the Prussian general staff continued to increase. The general enlargement of the Bavarian army, particularly the creation of a third corps in 1900, underscored the Bavarian general staff's requests for a greater number of staff officers, while the expansion of military science and the need for wider experience with Prussian field commands served as reasons for increasing Bavarian representation on the Prussian general staff and for lengthening the

9. Report from Bavarian ministry of war, April 12, 1882, BSHA, IV, M. Kr. 2110.
duration of the assignments. In 1883, the Bavarian general staff felt that services in the railroad department of the Prussian general staff was too valuable for a Bavarian staff officer to miss. Therefore, the engineering officer was assigned to the engineering commission of the Prussian army, and another Bavarian staff officer took his place in the railroad department. 10 The military plenipotentiary, Ludwig von Gebsattel—ever ready to find new places in Berlin for Bavarian officers and to further cooperation between Prussia and Bavaria—

10. Although the railroad department of the Prussian general staff grew more important in the eyes of Bavarian military officials, the Bavarian general staff wanted to downgrade the purely technical aspects of the department's training when a staff officer was assigned to it. The Bavarian general staff suggested that its staff officer spend the one-half year which the engineering officers had spent in a Prussian railroad directorate, in another staff department. Claiming that the technical training was too valuable, the Bavarian ministry of war rejected the suggestion. Chief of Bavarian general staff to Bavarian minister of war, February 7, 1890; Bavarian minister of war to chief of Bavarian general staff, February 13, 1890, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2111.
himself urged that the program of assigning Bavarian officers be expanded. He suggested that three officers, with as low a rank as first lieutenant, be given the chance to work with the Prussian general staff. As part of his expansion program, Gebsattel even urged that a Bavarian officer become an Abteilungschef and be given responsibility for the operation of an entire department of the Prussian general staff, a suggestion which eventually won the approval of both the Prussian and Bavarian military authorities.\textsuperscript{11} After 1900, because the Bavarians had to staff their special senate at the imperial military court adequately, another officer was sent to the railroad department simultaneously to learn staff techniques and to

\textsuperscript{11} Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, February 22, 1906. Although this time the Bavarian general staff opposed the increase because of cost and apparent shortage of men, the Bavarian minister of war finally accepted the suggestions of Gebsattel. Chief of the Bavarian general staff to Bavarian minister of war, March 29, 1906; Bavarian minister of war to Prince-Regent of Bavaria, November 16, 1906, \textit{BHSA}, IV, M. Kr. 2112.
serve as a substitute member of the military court. The course of training was carefully delineated
by the Bavarian and Prussian general staffs. The course called for every Bavarian officer on the
Prussian general staff to be placed in a particular department but receive a general orientation in
all others. To insure that the Bavarian army obtained the greatest advantage from these assignments;
the Bavarian military plenipotentiary, Gebsattel, on his own initiative, compiled an unofficial list
of preferences as far as the various departments of the Prussian general staff were concerned (a list
eventually approved by the Bavarian authorities), placing those most important and "richest in
teaching possibilities" first. Unfortunately, the most important of the Prussian staff departments,
the Aufmarschabteilung (handling the deployment of troops) would in all likelihood remain closed to
Bavarian officers. Gebsattel reported that the

12. Bavarian minister of war to Bavarian Prince-
Regent, October 22, 1901, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2112.
chief of the Prussian general staff, for security reasons, could use in this department only those officers, "whom he, because of a thorough knowledge of their personalities, considers fully capable in every respect" and who would be able to serve for long periods of time. These two criteria excluded Bavarian officers who were never that well known to the Prussian chief of staff or who usually did not serve for more than two years on the Prussian general staff. But of those departments available to the Bavarians, the most important, according to Gebsattel's list, were the railroad department (in which Gebsattel thought Bavarian officers ought to serve first if possible), the departments covering the armed forces of France, Russia, and other European countries,¹³ the depart-

¹³ Having a Bavarian officer in the departments studying the armies of foreign nations allowed the Bavarian ministry of war to obtain highly prized information from the reports of the German military attaches abroad, information which was difficult to get otherwise (of, Chapter IV, pp. 117-121). Bavaria sought to place an officer in one or more of these departments as early as 1882, especially in order to gather information on the armies of these countries
ment dealing with maneuvers, and the department handling general staff trips.\footnote{14} Outside of this work in a general staff department, the Bavarian officer each year was to work on the plans for maneuvers as a member of the staff of a field command and to participate in the fall exercises.\footnote{15} In Berlin, he was to follow the training program of recruits in a Prussian regiment, and, before his term of service was over, the Bavarian staff officer was to accompany the Prussian general staff on one of its annual inspection trips.\footnote{16}

The Bavarian officers in Berlin were quite happy with their reception by Prussian staff offi-

\footnote{14}{Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, April 19, 1907, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2112.}

\footnote{15}{Übereinkommen des königlich Preussischen und des königlich Bayerischen Kriegsministeriums, June 20, 1874, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2112.}

\footnote{16}{Übereinkommen des königlich Preussischen und des königlich Bayerischen Kriegsministerium, July 26, 1889, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2112.}
cers. They reported a cooperative and friendly spirit on the part of those Prussian military authorities with whom they came in contact. Periodically, the Bavarian officers sent full reports which were supplemented by the military plenipotentiary. These reports indicate that the schedule of the Bavarian officers was tight and their training rigorous and complete. Although one Bavarian chief of staff found that Prussian staff officers advanced through the ranks more rapidly than was normal for Bavarian staff officers and believed that this fact could cause some difficulty for Bavarian officers in Berlin, there appears to have been almost no friction between Prussian and Bavarian officers on the Prussian general staff. By previous agreement, the Bavarian military officials in Munich received an evaluation on each of the Bavarian officers, written by members of the Prussian general staff at

17. Bavarian general staff to Bavarian minister of war, April 5, 1876 and April 6, 1908; Bavarian general staff to the King of Bavaria, June 22, 1875, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2110 and 2112.
the end of the Bavarian officers' term of service. The Bavarian minister of war and his chief of staff hoped to obtain from these evaluations an idea of their officers' ability to handle the burden of staff work, their learning capabilities, and their fitness for possible assignments to a German High Command in case of war. The Prussians were generally satisfied with the work of the young Bavarians on their staff; they praised some highly. The younger General von Moltke, Chief of the Prussian general staff from 1906 to 1914, found the Bavarians equal to any Prussian officer on the staff and was gratified that the Bavarians had progressed so rapidly and were proving such apt students.

18. Order from Bavarian ministry of war, January 22, 1896; Bavarian minister of war to Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin, December 24, 1906, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2112.

19. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, February 2, 1900, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2112; chief of Prussian general staff to chief of Bavarian general staff, January 3, 1914, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2113. Moltke had also long promised the closest cooperation between the Prussian and Bavarian general staffs.
Bavarian Officers in Other Prussian Commands

One of the aims of the various agreements between the Prussian and Bavarian ministries of war was to coordinate the technical services of both armies as well as to coordinate staff training. Thus, after 1874, the number of Bavarian officers serving in the Prussian engineering commission, the Prussian technical academies, research departments, and on the various commissions overseeing fortifications, grew in proportion to the number of Bavarians serving on the Prussian general staff. In 1883, when the Bavarian minister of war decided to place a regular staff officer in the railroad department of the Prussian general staff, the Bavarian engineering officer who had originally worked in that position was transferred to the Prussian engineering commission for a two-year command to begin the process of coordinating the Prussian and Bavarian engineering corps. What began in the engineering corps soon spread to all of the Bavarian and Prussian technical services. In 1904, the Bavarian ministry of war
listed three types of technical officers eligible for assignment in Prussia: 1) artillery and infantry officers who wanted more technical training (something more highly prized by the Bavarians than by the Prussian military authorities), 2) officers from the engineering and communications corps, and 3) artillery officers who were expected to become ballistics teachers or expert advisors in the Prussian artillery testing commission. These officers were to serve for two or three years, depending upon their ability and their particular needs and interests, and were chosen especially for their mathematical talents. 20 Most of the Bavarian officers selected for assignments in the Prussian technical services had had extensive university training in the sciences and mathematics.

The Bavarian military establishment felt far less inferior to the Prussians in technical matters.

20. Agreement between the royal Prussian and royal Bavarian ministries of war, July 26, 1889, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2112; report of the Bavarian ministry of war, April 25, 1904, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 4749.
than it did in general staff operations. The Bavarians had long given a greater emphasis to the technical aspects of military life than did the Prussians. Probably because of the traditional Bavarian stress on the proper educational preparation for officers, the Bavarian officer corps never shared the Prussian aristocratic disdain for the engineering corps or the other technical services. Technical expertise and scientific advancement were considered essential and therefore were respected in the Bavarian army. 

21 Therefore, the Bavarians

21. Even after 1880, when the Bavarian officer corps was becoming more exclusive and "Prussian," it never slighted the technical services of the army. After all, one of the principal pillars of the Bavarian ruling classes was the academic elite. Aristocratic proclivities, no matter how pronounced, did not affect the old bourgeois respect for learning. There is even evidence that the Abitur and university degrees were used as a means of enhancing the exclusiveness of the Bavarian officer corps. It is estimated that between 1880 and 1903, 33% of the students at the Bavarian War Academy held diplomas from a Realgymnasium (the other 67% from a humanistic Gymnasium). Rumschottel, "Bildung und Herkunft der bayerischen Offiziere, 1866 bis 1914," pp. 92, 95. On the other hand, the Prussians continued to consider such institutions as the Military-Technical Academy a school for "plumbers." As late as 1900, Prussian military au-
did not have the great sensation of sending mere pupils to Berlin when they named officers to serve in the Prussian technical services. This confidence was not misplaced. Several Bavarian officers (almost to a man without aristocratic titles) distinguished themselves while working with the Prussian engineering corps or the commission on fortifications. The term of service of Major Endres was lengthened upon the request of the Prussians so that he might complete his important research on defense and fortifications. Lieutenant Becker, a Bavarian officer assigned to a Prussian technical academy, was offered a teaching position in the Prussian Military-Technical Academy and proved so conscientious that the director suggested Becker for a study-trip through the United States. Two other Bavarians, students at the academy, were singled out by the direc-

thorities dropped a plan for the improvement of the technical services, ostensibly for lack of money, but in reality out of a disdainful lack of concern. Hans Speier, "Ludendorff," Makers of Modern Strategy, p. 313.
tor of the academy as "the best pupils in their classes." 22

The quality of the Bavarian technical services and the officers working in them won for Bavaria not only generous praise but a special distinction as well: after 1900, Prussian officers were assigned to the directorate of the Bavarian railroads. The Bavarians were aware of the psychological and political significance of Prussians serving in Bavaria. No longer, the chief of the Bavarian general staff maintained, would the Prussians always be the teachers and the Bavarians the pupils. Now that it was obvious that the Prussians and Bavarian officers were equal in training, the reputation of the Prussian officers for general superiority was beginning to dim. The Bavarian military plenipoten-

tiary, Gebsattel, joined the chorus and, predicta-
tably, urged that such a program of Prussian com-
mands to Bavaria be enhanced. In 1901, even a Saxon
officer was working in the Bavarian railroad direc-
torate.23

Younger Bavarian officers were now serving in
practically every section of the Prussian army.
Eventually they even broke into the privileged corps
of military attaches which the Prussian army main-
tained, ostensibly under the aegis of the German
foreign service, at German embassies and legations
around the world.24 The Bavarian civilian ministries

23. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to
Bavarian ministry of war, February 9, 1907, BHSA,
IV, M. Kr. 2112; Bavarian general staff to Bava-
rian ministry of war, December 5, 1913, BHSA,
IV, M. Kr. 2113; Bavarian ministry of foreign
affairs to Bavarian ministry of war, April 3,
1897 and June 20, 1901, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2111.

24. These military attaches created innumerable pro-
blems for the civilian ministries in Prussia.
Originally named for technical reasons, these
military attaches quickly assumed political im-
portance. Some attaches, encouraged by mili-
tary officials in Berlin, attempted practically
to carry on policy independently of the German
ambassadors and envoys under whom they supposed-
ly served. Bismarck had particular difficulty
with a military attache in St. Petersburg. But,
had long wanted to maintain some sort of representation in those foreign capitals where Bavaria did not already have a legation, while the Bavarian military authorities desired to establish more regular methods of obtaining information from the reports of these military attaches as well as to widen the experiences and circle of friends for individual officers. Therefore no opposition to the assignments of Bavarian officers to foreign capitals developed in Munich, and officials in Berlin seemed

although Bismarck disliked military attaches, he never tried to have their positions abolished. General von Waldensee, while he was chief of the Prussian general staff (1887-1891), tried to create a network of independent military attaches throughout Europe, but the plan came to naught after Waldensee's fall from power. Gordon Craig, Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (New York, 1964), pp. 258, 260-264, 266-267, 272.

25. The Versailles agreements allowed Bavaria to retain its legations -- principally for reasons of prestige and trade -- in major foreign capitals but forbade her from pursuing any foreign policy separate from the imperial German foreign office.

26. Bavarian minister of war to Prince-Regent of Bavaria, August 21, 1900, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 175.
happy to name Bavarians to German diplomatic posts abroad.\textsuperscript{27} The Prussians wanted officers who presented a good appearance, were elegant and sociable, and possessed an excellent command of languages. Bavaria had no difficulty in finding such officers. For one assignment the Bavarian ministry of war recommended Lieutenant Baron von Gebsattel, who possessed all the requisite personal qualities and could speak French, English, Italian, and Russian.\textsuperscript{28}

\textbf{Bavarian Positions in the Structure of the German Army}

According to the Versailles treaties of 1870, the German Emperor became the commander-in-chief of all the contingents which would make up the German army at the moment of mobilization for war. Legal-

\textsuperscript{27} Bavarian minister of war to King of Bavaria, June 14, 1878, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 175.

\textsuperscript{28} Remarks by General von Wenninger, February 17, 1908, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 175.
ly he was also empowered from then on to organize army units and to name commanders; but even in wartime, Bavaria was not prepared to relinquish entirely her special position. An important factor behind the agreement of 1874 was the endeavor to assure Bavarian influence in the German army after mobilization by delineating clearly -- even before it was necessary to mobilize the army -- those positions which would be considered Bavarian assignments and open only to Bavarian officers. After 1874, it became the aim of the Bavarian minister of war, whenever militarily and politically feasible, to enlarge the number of such positions available.

In a war the Bavarians wanted the office of military plenipotentiary to continue to play its vital function as the intermediary between the Prussian and Bavarian ministries of war and as the military "ambassador" of Bavaria to the imperial court. Since, however, during a war the Prussian ministry of war would probably remain in Berlin while a General Headquarters would function at or near the front, the Bavarians felt that they would have to
was the largest part in another army-group. A 1902 decision to divide the Bavarian troops between two German field armies in case of mobilization raised the possibility that the Bavarian contingents would be a minority in each army, thereby eliminating the chance for a Bavarian High Command. The Bavarians felt that according to the spirit of the agreement of 1874, Bavaria should always have the right to man a High Command, but following the agreement's exact wording the Bavarians had lost the opportunity as a result of the more recent decision to split its army in two. Upon the suggestion of their military plenipotentiary in Berlin, the Bavarians proposed a new agreement which would assure the Bavarians a German High Command in that army-group where the largest number of Bavarian troops were serving, even if they did not form a majority. The Prussians eventually agreed to this arrangement, and the Bavarians won their High Command. 30

30. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, April 7, 1902; Bava-
Not willing to rest content with this achievement, the military plenipotentiary, General von Gebsattel, proposed to the Prussian chief of staff, General von Moltke (the Younger), that, in view of the successful performance of Bavarian generals working as chiefs of staff in recent maneuvers, it would be appropriate to appoint a Bavarian general as chief of staff for a non-Bavarian army, as to accustom a Bavarian general to working with and commanding other German troops. Moltke, interested in the close integration of the German army, agreed to this suggestion. Bavarian officials greeted their military plenipotentiary's initiative and named General von Montgelas as the most suitable candidate. 31

In the structure of those army units outside of the Bavarian High Command but in which Bavarian soldiers were serving, several positions were reserved for Bavarian officers on the general staffs. In the original agreement of 1874, Bavaria was allowed to name two staff officers, two adjutants, and two quartermaster's officers; but as the basic agreement underwent its several changes, the number of positions allowed the Bavarians increased. By the end of 1913, the Bavarians were moving to make the number of Bavarian staff officers in Prussian High Commands equal to the number allowed the Prussians in the Bavarian High Command. The Bavarians asked that the chief of staff or the quartermaster-general in any such Command be a Bavarian. In addition, at least two Bavarians would serve at the headquarters of the cavalry command into which the Bavarian cavalry would be absorbed, and one staff officer would be assigned to the German fortifications at Metz. Again, the Bavarians received a sympathetic response to the requests from the Prussians and especially from a Moltke already pleased with
the performance of Bavarian officers in general.\textsuperscript{32}

Members of the Prussian military cabinet, which would have the first responsibility for assigning officers to army commands in case of war, and other Prussian military officials wanted to be able -- at the very moment of mobilization -- to fill quickly the positions earmarked for Bavarian officers. Any foreseeable mobilization would have to be much more rapid than that of July, 1870, and the more so because the German war plan against Russia and France, the Schlieffen Plan, was based on a very tight time schedule. There would be no time therefore to consult the Bavarian ministry of war over the question of which Bavarian officers to choose. The Prussians suggested that the Bavarians follow the example of Saxony and send to Berlin each year a list of those officers Bavaria would want to serve in the "Bavarian" positions of the German war-time military struc-

\textsuperscript{32} Bavarian general staff to Bavarian ministry of war, December 5, 1913; chief of the Prussian general staff to Bavarian general staff, January 3, 1914, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2113.
ture. Even in drawing up this list there developed, almost naturally, the usual haggle over who actually had the right to name the selected Bavarian officers to their commands. Emperor William II claimed the prerogative as Bundesfeldherr who had the exclusive right to assign officers to positions under his command. The Bavarians supported the authority of their king and minister of war over Bavarian officers even in war-time. The Prussians finally agreed that the German Emperor would officially name the Bavarian officers but only with the prior consent of the Bavarian king. The Bavarians in turn assured the Prussians that they would never nominate anyone objectionable to the Emperor. 33

Perhaps the capstone of the incessant Bavarian campaign to increase Bavaria's influence in the German army and to secure at least a semblance of

33. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, January 10, 1887, and May 31, 1887, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2112.
Bavarian military "equality" was the attainment of an Oberquartiermeister position in the Prussian army for a Bavarian officer. It was again Gebsattel who first broached the subject to the Prussians and found some of them willing to consider the plan. He told the military authorities in Munich that the only major difficulty in arranging such a command was the question in whose budget, Bavaria's or Prussia's, a Bavarian Oberquartiermeister position should appear. Both Prussians and Bavarians realized the necessity of closer cooperation between the two armies in solving problems of supply, transportation, and possible rationing, and the Bavarians were not blind to the advantages of such a position in military and political terms.

Given encouragement from Munich, Gebsattel brought up the subject with Moltke in 1909. Moltke warmed to the idea but raised two objections. The first was the problem of the budget, a problem aggravated by the fact that the Reichstag, ever sensitive to military attempts to circumvent its budgetary control, might consider the Bavarian Ober-
quartiermeister an attempt to create another military position without parliamentary approval. The second problem was the opposition among old-line Prussian military officials to the plan. Moltke suggested that, if these two difficulties could be overcome, the Bavarians propose a candidate. The Bavarian ministry of war was now enthusiastic about Gebsattel's proposal and urged its military plenipotentiary to make every effort in order to overcome the opposition in Prussia. Gebsattel told his superiors in Munich that Moltke would be far more effective than the Bavarian military plenipotentiary in dealing with that opposition, but he felt that the budgetary problem could be solved simply by not naming a Bavarian Abteilungschef in the Prussian general staff during the tenure of a Bavarian Oberquartiermeister. Gebsattel's work was ultimately successful. Difficulties of the budget were solved according to Gebsattel's formula and opposition to the plan in Prussia finally smoothed over by Moltke. Gebsattel saw in the granting of such a command to a Bavarian evidence of the Emperor's satisfaction
with the performance of the Bavarian army. It also demonstrated the length to which Moltke would go to accommodate Bavarian wishes. Upon the convenient transfer of the Prussian General von Gundell to a field command, an Oberquartiermeister position was opened to a Bavarian general, although the Bavarians were warned at that time not to view this position as a permanent Bavarian possession. Later, however, the term of the Bavarian general named to the position, von Montgelas, was extended beyond its usual run. Moreover, with the creation of a new Oberquartiermeister position in 1910, the Bavarians won permanently the right to name one Oberquartiermeister.34

Chapter VI

The Creation of a Bavarian Senate in the Imperial Military Court in Berlin, 1894-1910

The political storm created by the attempt to reform military justice in Germany after 1894 again and again brought the Chancellor, Prince Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, to the brink, but only to the brink, of resignation. It resulted not only in a major confrontation between the Kaiser and his "responsible" ministers but also in a political clash between the imperial and Bavarian governments. Soon after Hohenlohe took office, the demands from parliamentarians and the German public for a legislative proposal to deal with the issue became incessant. Hohenlohe felt that a military justice bill had to be introduced in the Reichstag to placate a growing number of party leaders calling for a code of military justice more in keeping with "modern
legal thinking. With one exception, the Prussian state ministers who served under Hohenlohe supported the Chancellor's effort to submit an acceptable bill that would, among other things, allow trials in the German army to be public. The Kaiser and his personal entourage, however, almost uniformly opposed public trials. This was to them a diminution of the Kaiser's power and a threat to the army's independence from public scrutiny and parliamentary control. After a bill on military justice, conceding public trials, was first discussed and approved by the Kaiser's own ministers (April, 1895), it took Hohenlohe and his government three years --- years filled with angry sessions in the Reichstag, major problems with Bavaria, and the annoying and sometimes irresponsible maneuvering of the Kaiser and his friends --- finally to get a bill passed into law.

Opposition to such a bill emanated principally from the Kaiser, his personal advisors, and the military cabinet. The chief of the Prussian military cabinet, General von Hahnke, was unbending in his insistence that the army remain inviolate and out of the public eye. William's other advisors, chief among them Philipp von Eulenburg, saw a plot on the part of the South German politicians and German radicals to undercut the position of the Emperor and suggested that William pursue a more "Prussian" policy and stress his royal and imperial prerogatives. William II disliked any talk of public trials and worked to sabotage the military bill which his own government wanted to propose. He tried all sorts of tricks to delay the bill's introduction or its consideration by the Bundesrat. He told Hohenlohe that his generals would have to be consulted on the matter, and, although the opinion of a majority of the Prussian commanders was already a foregone conclusion, such an action could at least delay consideration of the bill.² When the public demand for

2. Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Denk-
legal reform and public trials remained vociferous, William tried to shift the blame for the failure to compromise on a proposal to the Bavarians, although it was his own intransigence which endangered any reform from the beginning. In 1896, William himself suggested what he heralded as a "compromise" measure which would concede public trials — with the important proviso that the Emperor could decide which trials were to be open (which in Prussia would probably mean none). But he also proposed a centralized military court in Berlin having jurisdiction over all the contingents in the German army. William must have known that the Bavarians would never accept such a curtailment of the independence of their army and therefore might be forced to oppose the whole bill.\(^3\)

The one major military figure who did not op-

\(^{3}\) H"ohrl, Germany without Bismarck, p. 224; Hohenlohe, Denkw"urdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit, pp. 289-290.
pose the idea of public trials was the Prussian minister of war, General Bronsart von Schellendorf. He openly confessed that he did not share the fears of many of his colleagues that public trials would undermine the non-political position of the Prussian army by allowing "parliamentarian" meddling in military affairs. From the beginning he supported the efforts of Hohenlohe to submit an acceptable bill to the German parliament and worked to find parliamentary support for the proposal. Like the Prussian foreign minister, Marschall von Bieberstein, Bronsart had a good working relationship with many Reichstag leaders, particularly in the Center Party. Bronsart had also won the confidence of Bavarian leaders. It was largely for these reasons that the Kaiser mistrusted Bronsart and began to plot his dismissal from the ministry. Bronsart knew that he was persona non grata with the Kaiser and among the members of the military cabinet. The military aide who had actually drafted the bill for Bronsart had already been forced out of his position. Bronsart offered to resign but at first his offer was
rejected because of the fear that his departure would naturally be tied to his support of public trials and spark a public outcry. Bronsart's resignation was eventually accepted, at a time when the Kaiser hoped that the effect of Bronsart's departure could be minimized; but still Bronsart's resignation created an uproar both in the Reichstag and among the public, where it was taken as a sign of William's continuing unwillingness to grant any concessions. Bronsart's successor, General von Gossler, was considered the Kaiser's general and tried to represent the Kaiser's interests responsibly. Even Gossler, though, grew exasperated with the interference of the Kaiser's advisors and military cabinet in government business. Soon, he, too, offered to leave and resigned in 1897. 4

The chancellor, Prince Hohenlohe, was in a particularly delicate position. During his tenure

4. Rohl, Germany without Bismarck, pp. 132-133, 183, 201, 243-244; Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit, pp. 124, 388.
as minister-president of Bavaria (1866-1870), he had guided through the Bavarian parliament a law permitting public trials in the Bavarian army. The German public expected him to remain consistent and to support a similar measure for all of the German army. While Hohenlohe was aware of this expectation, he was also unwilling to push the Kaiser too far, too fast over the matter. The difficulty of his position pained the Chancellor. He tried to excuse his actions in Bavaria to the Kaiser by explaining that, while he was Bavarian minister-president, the only party in Bavaria which supported a nationalist program was the Liberal party and, in return for Liberal support, Hohenlohe had to concede several liberal reforms, one of which was public military trials. He also hastened to explain that he could not at the present time repudiate his actions in Bavaria and appear as a "super-Prussian." He urged William to remember that, although as King of Prussia he had great residual powers, as German Emperor he only possessed rights guaranteed him by
the German constitution. Hohenlohe had more than simply his past in Bavaria to overcome. He had never been a strong personality, but was also at this time quite old and suffering from asthma. He very often lacked the energy to curb the Kaiser's attempts to interfere in government business.

William II also had special claims on Hohenlohe. When Hohenlohe took over the position of imperial Chancellor from Leo von Caprivi, he felt that the Chancellor's salary would not suffice to cover his normal expenses. This problem the Kaiser solved with donations from his own funds. Hohenlohe also feared that his wife's Russian estates would be confiscated upon her death and not pass on to his son, since a new Russian land law made it impossible for a foreigner to own Russian land. Hohenlohe had asked William to intercede for him with the Russian Tsar on this question so that his son's inheritance

5. Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit p. 115; Röhl, Germany without Bismarck, p. 214.
might be safeguarded. Hohenlohe was therefore doubly cautious when dealing with the Emperor and never was as insistent with William or as solicitous of his government's position as his ministers would have wanted. Hohenlohe's weaknesses eventually became so patent, that many German diplomats and politicians came to express either pity for or exasperation with the Chancellor.

The Bavarians became directly involved in the controversy when William made public his "compromise" proposal which provided for a centralized military court in Berlin. From the beginning it was obvious to everyone that this "compromise" was simply a way for the Emperor to obscure the issue of public trials and, if possible, throw the blame on someone else for the defeat of the bill on military justice. The Bavarian reaction, as probably expected by William, was one of general con-

6. Röhl, Germany without Bismarck, pp. 176-177.
sternation. Once the Bavarian military plenipotentiary and civilian envoy in Berlin reported this new proposal to Munich, Bavarian officials protested and began to seek ways by which to overcome what appeared to most of them to be another attempt to limit Bavarian autonomy. Prince-Regent Luitpold told the Prussians in very clear terms that he would never surrender his sovereign powers over his army in peace-time to a centralized military court under the direct command of the Emperor. Other Bavarian leaders stressed the special rights which Bavaria had been guaranteed by the Versailles agreements of 1870 and maintained that such rights could not be modified or abrogated simply by a piece of legislation. In other words, the Bavarians felt that William's proposal was unconstitutional.

The Emperor was happy with the response. Quite openly he was telling advisors and members of the Prussian government that now the hated military justice bill would be defeated either by Bavarian opposition in the Bundesrat or by the political parties sympathetic to the Bavarian complaints in the
Reichstag. When Count von Lerchenfeld, the Bavarian envoy in Berlin, tried to persuade William to reconsider his proposal in light of the justified Bavarian opposition, William became adamant and replied that the military court was a *sine qua non* of any military justice bill that he would accept. But he further remarked to Lerchenfeld that he did not know why in the first place he ever consented to having any bill on the subject submitted to the Reichstag and blamed the whole thing on Bronsart's "sweet talk."\(^7\)

The Bavarians had to find a way by which they could escape the onus of having killed the military justice bill but at the same time preserve Bavaria's special rights. Publicly, the Bavarians charged that the Emperor and his advisors were using the Bavarian opposition to the military court merely as

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a smoke screen to mask their real effort to torpedo the whole idea of public trials; but the Bavarians admitted that they would have to oppose the entire military justice bill if the centralized court remained a part of it. Privately, Hohenlohe and the Bavarians began intensive negotiations to discover a way out of the impasse. These discussions eventually became affairs. Lerchenfeld and the Bavarian military plenipotentiary joined together to put as much pressure as possible on both the military and civilian officials in Prussia to alter the Emperor's insistence on this centralized court. Lerchenfeld reported that he found a greater willingness, as the days went by, to listen to the Bavarian complaints, but that the obstacles to a solution were great. On the one hand, there was an Emperor who, although superficially informed -- so Lerchenfeld thought -- remained steadfast

8. Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit, p. 382; Rohl, Germany without Bismarck, p. 225.
for political reasons in his support of the court. On the other hand, Lerchenfeld became more and more exasperated with the weak Hohenlohe. In spite of the complaints from the Reichstag and the pressure from the Bavarian government and press, Hohenlohe seemed unable to impress the magnitude of the problem on the Emperor's mind or to convince him that he must withdraw his opposition to public trials and his support for the centralized court or face a governmental crisis. Hohenlohe spoke often of resigning over the issue, but nothing came of these threats. Lerchenfeld told his superiors in Munich that the centralized court would probably never be made a "cabinet question," in spite of Hohenlohe's private statements on the matter. 

9. Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit, pp. 339, 391-393; Lerchenfeld to the Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, February 12, 1897, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.

10. Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit, pp. 342, 352, 359; Röhl, Germany without Bismarck, pp. 239, 243; Lerchenfeld to Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, June 30, 1897, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
lized his own weakness and, as if to excuse himself, once remarked that if only he had been in uniform when he presented the Bavarian objections to the Emperor, William would have listened; but in these matters, Hohenlohe concluded, William did not trust civilians.\textsuperscript{11} Lerchenfeld sadly reported that the matter would have been cleared up quickly if Hohenlohe's good-will and intelligence had been matched by resoluteness and greater energy.\textsuperscript{12}

Lerchenfeld also began to marshal support in the Reichstag for the Bavarian position and found the strongest sympathy naturally in the Center party. Leaders of the Center were already treated with marked coolness by the Emperor because of the party's stand on some previous military matters;\textsuperscript{13}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, July 3, 1898, \textit{BHSA}, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
\item Lerchenfeld to Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, June 20, 1897, \textit{BHSA}, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
\item Hohenlohe, \textit{Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit}, p. 40.
\end{enumerate}
but Center party members were also well known for their federalist principles. The Center party was, further, the party most deeply influenced by its Bavarian members. Lerchenfeld worked with leaders of the party to organize opposition to the centralized court and also to work out a plan by which Bavaria could escape the blame for defeating the whole bill on military justice. The Bavarian members of the party were, of course, adamant that Bavarian prerogatives be protected; the rest of the party were willing to go along with their Bavarian colleagues.  

Count von Hertling, a Center party leader, promised Lerchenfeld his full support and cooperation. 

Public pressure also became a factor in the controversy as both the imperial forces and the

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14. Lerchenfeld to Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, September 25, 1898; Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs to Lerchenfeld, April 26, 1898, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 1/46; Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit, p. 427.

Bavarians tried to avoid blame for the collapse of the bill. The Emperor, as was usual, talked about the imperial image both in Germany and abroad and maintained that Germany could not afford to show weakness or disunity. Bavarian politicians explained that the whole controversy was causing an uproar among the Bavarian people and predicted that this matter could create a definitely anti-imperialist reaction in the coming elections. No Bavarian politician who wanted to remain in office was prepared to support a military bill that so clearly attacked the special position of Bavaria. From the Bavarian government, moreover, came veiled threats of making the issue a constitutional question, an action which would precipitate a major political crisis.16

The bill had been first introduced into the 
Bundesrat, where the Prussian government would 
possibly have less difficulty getting the type of 
legislation it wanted, but the haggling which deve­
doped over both the centralized court and the Em­
peror's right to close off public trials almost 
immediately stalled the bill. Hohenlohe, whose 
government was on record in support of a military 
justice bill with public trials, needed some bill 
to pass the Reichstag if he was to avoid being to­tal­ly discredited and made a laughing-stock in 
Berlin. At this juncture, a compromise was sug­
gested. In order to get the bill moving in both 
the Reichstag and Bundesrat, the question of the 
military court would be postponed for a while. A 
provision would appear in the bill stating that the 
structure and competence of such a court would be 
the subject of further negotiating between the 
Prussian and Bavarian governments. At the conclu­
sion of these negotiations, a specific bill on the 
military court would be submitted to the legislature. 
The Kaiser, sensing that the whole military contro-
versy might endanger his new naval bill and fearing that new elections could bring in more anti-military members, decided to accept the compromise reluctant­ly.17 Lerchenfeld, supported by the Bavarian government, urged the Center party to accept the solution as the best for the moment.18 The compromise was made public in March, 1898, although Hohenlohe still hoped that the issue could be settled before the rest of the military justice bill came up for a final vote. Hohenlohe feared that there would be a danger to the monarchical principle if the royal governments of Prussia and Bavaria failed to reach a solution and the parliament decided to solve the issue on its own.19 Hohenlohe's hope was not ful­

17. Röhl, Germany without Bismarck, p. 244. William may also have wanted to separate the question of the court from the bill so that he and his government could deal with Bavaria alone and without other opposition. Bavarian military plenipoten­t tiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, May 5, 1898, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.

18. Lerchenfeld to Bavarian ministry of foreign af­fairs, September 25, 1898, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.

filled. The military justice bill passed into law in December, 1898, without final agreement on the court. It took another three months for Prussia and Bavaria to hammer out a compromise on the structure of the centralized military court.

From the beginning William II firmly believed that his government had every right to create a centralized military court for the entire German army. His Prussian minister of justice correctly pointed to the provisions in the German constitution and of the Versailles agreements of 1870 for the creation of a military code of justice valid for the German Empire. Bavaria had been given the right to retain its own military code only until such a time as one was written for all of Germany. Prussian officials concluded from this constitutional provision that, since the Empire had the right to create a national military code, it also had the right to administer it by the creation of an imperial court system.20

20. Lerchenfeld to Bvarian ministry of foreign af-
The Bavarians countered, less convincingly, by arguing that the Bavarian king's military sovereignty (Hoheit) guaranteed by the Versailles agreements, included in it the right to administer military justice, even, as some Bavarian military officials claimed, in war-time. Since this was a special prerogative, it could not be changed except through new negotiations between Bavaria and the imperial government and only after a revision of both the German and Bavarian constitutions. By its very nature, a "reserve right" could not be altered or eliminated by a mere majority in the Reichstag or Bundesrat. The Bavarians concluded that the only solution would be the establishment of a separate Bavarian military court under the full authority of the King of Bavaria.21

The extra-parliamentary negotiations between Prussia and Bavaria over the problem began with a

fairs, January 20, 1897, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.

21. Lerchenfeld to the Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, January 20 and January 23, 1897, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
letter from Prince-Regent Luitpold to William II offering to establish procedures by which, hopefully, differences over the court could be settled.22 William replied that he could not accept Luitpold's insistent claim for a separate and independent Bavarian court. William stressed that he himself would have to make important concessions on military justice as a result of the bill before the Reichstag — probably meaning the fraudulent concession on open trials — and he expected that other federal princes would also make sacrifices. Perhaps hoping that the type of diplomatic pressure which had succeeded as Versailles in 1870 would work again, William claimed that he had already secured the approval of the Kings of Saxony and Württemberg. The Emperor as well touched upon an issue sensitive for the Bavarians. He urged Luitpold not to allow Bavaria to take the blame for killing the military justice

22. Luitpold to William II, February 18, 1898, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
bill. But as a demonstration of his comradely (bundesfreundlich) desire to accommodate the Bavarian ruler as much as possible, William offered to grant Bavaria a special senate, staffed by Bavarian officers, in the imperial military court at Berlin.²³

Luitpold's second letter took note of William's willingness to compromise but held fast to the Bavarian throne's "special right" to administer military justice for the Bavarian army. Since Luitpold did not want Bavaria to take the blame for the defeat of the bill, he could accept William's offer of a separate Bavarian senate within the imperial court, but only if the King of Bavaria retained the right to name all of its members and only if the senate met in Munich rather than Berlin. Although Luitpold knew that objections would still be great, he suggested that the points outlined in the letters between William and himself be used as the framework

²³ William II to Prince-Regent Luitpold, March 14, 1898, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
in which lower level Bavarian and Prussian officials could carry on further negotiations. 24

Throughout the discussions which followed, three principal questions emerged: 1) whether the autonomy of the Bavarian army and the military Hoheit of the Bavarian king guaranteed Bavaria an entirely separate military court (Landesgerichtshof); 2) by whom would the members of this Bavarian court be named and where they would meet in session; and 3) how could the agreement concerning the Bavarian court be changed at a future time.

The first question was settled the most easily. The Bavarians at first maintained steadily that, in the Versailles agreements, they possessed the right to establish a fully independent military court under the authority of the King of Bavaria, but they must have recognized that the provision in those agreements obligating Bavaria to follow a uniform

24. Prince-Regent Luitpold to William II, April 16, 1898, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
German code of military justice weakened their case. The Prussians feared that if Bavaria had its own military court, decisions given separately in Munich and Berlin might very well interpret military law differently and cause confusion in the German army. The Prussians showed no interest in the Bavarian plan to arrange for joint "negotiating" sessions of both courts in cases where conflicting decisions were involved. Instead, the Prussians continued to press the claims of the imperial government over military justice. The anxious German Chancellor, Hohenlohe, wanted to avoid constitutional questions. He urged the Bavarians to accept a special senate within the framework of an imperial court, a compromise which could incorporate both the Prussian claim of imperial pre-eminence and the Bavarian army's autonomy. The Bavarian government

25. Lerchenfeld to Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, February 12, 1897, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.

26. Prince-Regent Luitpold to William II, February 18, 1898, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
had used the threat of raising constitutional questions to apply pressure in Berlin, but Bavarian officials were really as reluctant as Hohenlohe to get involved in a constitutional struggle. Lerchenfeld admitted that he did not want to play with constitutional problems in the Bundesrat. Bavaria finally dropped its demand for a full Landesgerichtshof on two conditions: 1) that the legislative proposal which would be submitted to the Reichstag and Bundesrat use the term "Bavarian" exclusively to describe this senate and that the formula "in the name of the Empire" (Im Namen des Reiches) not be used in the senate's written decisions. The two conditions were accepted by the Prussians.

The second question -- the naming of the mem-

27. Lerchenfeld to Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, February 12, 1897, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.

28. Prince-Regent Luitpold to Prince von Hohenlohe, November 24, 1898; Bavarian minister of foreign affairs to Bavarian minister of war, December 28, 1898; copy of the legislative proposal for the creation of a special Bavarian senate, edited by Bavarian ministry of war, December 24, 1898, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
bers of the Bavarian senate and its place of meeting -- was a more difficult one. Even though the Bavarians had recognized the fact that their special senate was part of an imperial structure, they wanted to maintain as much of its independence and peculiar character as possible. The King of Bavaria claimed therefore the right to name all the officers of his senate and to have the senate meet in Munich. On the other hand, William wanted members named to the senate only with his consent and insisted that the senate meet in Berlin. Momentarily, this impasse stalled the negotiations. Bavarian officials in Berlin privately admitted that the Emperor could not be made to agree to have a part of an imperial court sit in Munich, while Prussians knew full well that Luitpold would not consent to a curtailment of his right to name officers to Bavarian commands. Finding it difficult to work with

29. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, May 5, 1898, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
William's delays and petulance, the Bavarian military plenipotentiary, General von Reichlin, and Lerchenfeld feared that a deadlock between Prussia and Bavaria might give the anti-imperial (reichsfeindlich) press an opportunity to set Bavaria against Prussia, a feeling undoubtedly shared by Hohenlohe. In the summer of 1898, however, rumors began to circulate that William might compromise on the naming of the members if he could be assured that the senate would meet in Berlin. In Munich, the Bavarian government, particularly the minister-president Crailsheim, grew more willing to accommodate William with regard to the seat of the special senate. By October, 1898, a compromise on this question had been reached. Bavarian autonomy would be preserved by allowing the King of Bavaria

30. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, July 28, 1898, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.

the right to name officers to the Bavarian senate. German imperial unity would be promoted by having the senate meet in Berlin. The Bavarians further conceded that the members of their court could be referred to as Reichsbeamte as long as it was recognized in the law that they were Bavarian officers. An exchange of letters between Hohenlohe and Prince-Regent Luitpold secured this compromise.  

The third question — the means by which the law might be changed — was to prove the most difficult. Bavaria had all along maintained that "reserve rights" were at stake in these negotiations and the proposal for a centralized military court was no mere piece of legislation. The Bavarians would not approve a settlement which could be changed without the prior consent of Bavaria even if there was an overwhelming majority for such change in either

32. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, October 10, 1898; Prince von Hohenlohe to Prince-Regent Luitpold, October 29, 1898; Prince-Regent Luitpold to Prince von Hohenlohe, November 24, 1898, BSHA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
the Reichstag or Bundesrat.\textsuperscript{33} The Prussians, however, did not want to present the Bundesrat with a proposal containing such a provision within its text, although Prussian officials, growing weary of the seemingly endless negotiations, told the Bavarians that they earnestly sought a way to make Bavarian acceptance of the proposal easier.\textsuperscript{34} Given these assurances, the Bavarians decided to settle for the appearance of the desired declaration in the official justification (Begründung) of the proposal.\textsuperscript{35} The Bavarians could compromise no further than this. Luitpold told his ministers that he would not agree to the military court bill or to any of the compromises worked out by the Prussians and Bavarians if there was not a clear statement, binding on the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33} Bavarian ministry of war to Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin, January 26, 1899, \textit{BHSA}, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, January 14 and 16, 1899, \textit{BHSA}, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, January 18 and 19, 1899, \textit{BHSA}, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
\end{itemize}
Prussians, that the proposal, once passed, could not be altered without the consent of Bavaria. In the face of continued reluctance of the Prussians and the pressure building up in political circles for a solution to the problem, the Bavarians did back down a bit more and settled for a statement, issued by the Prussian government, promising not to support any change without first a "previous understanding" (vorheriges Einvernehmen) with Bavaria, which was to be included, not in the justification for the bill, but rather in the protocol of the Bundesrat.

Finally, on February 8, 1899, Hohenlohe intro-

36. Bavarian ministries of war and foreign affairs to Prince-Regent Luitpold, January 29, 1899 (comments of the Prince-Regent dated February 2, 1899), BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.

37. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, January 27, February 8, and March 2, 1899; Bavarian ministry of war to Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin, February 4, 1899; Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs to Lerchenfeld, February 10, 1899; Prussian ministry of foreign affairs to Lerchenfeld, February 25, 1899, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
duced the proposal for a centralized military court agreed upon by Prussia and Bavaria, and less than a month later, on March 4, the proposal passed into law. In spite of all the painful concessions which the Bavarians said they had to make, the special Bavarian senate in Berlin was a victory for the autonomy of the Bavarian army. The Prussians stood on far firmer ground when they maintained that the constitutional authority granted the imperial government to create a uniform military code implied the right to administer that code in a uniform manner. The Bavarians, however, were aware that the centralized military court had not been proposed in good faith by the Emperor but rather as a way to pass on blame for the defeat of the military justice bill to the Bavarians. They also seem to have feared that this maneuver could become another means by which Bavarian autonomy could be diminished. They therefore guarded Bavarian sovereignty as well as they could, using and broadening the "reserve rights"—such as the guaranteed military command of the King of Bavaria -- to give constitutional support to
their counterproposals and their protests. The Bavarians, moreover, had a significant advantage over the Prussians in this struggle: rather broad public support in Bavaria and the backing of one of the largest parties in the Reichstag. The first Bavarian proposals were extreme and probably designed simply as bargaining tools. Eventually it became clear that the Bavarians really only wanted to guarantee two things: first, that Bavarian soldiers always remain under the authority of Bavarian officers commissioned by the Bavarian king, and, secondly, that any law which touches upon the "special" position of Bavaria would never take effect without the prior consent of the Bavarian government, no matter what kind of popularity or political support it might find in Germany. In this effort, the Bavarians were successful.

The acceptance of the compromise in 1899 did not end entirely the difficulties which the Bavarians were to experience with their special senate in Berlin. Soon after the turn of the century, the
The president of the military court advised the Bavarian military and civilian officials that, because of a number of Bavarian officers on other assignments, sick leave, or on vacation, the Bavarian senate had all but ceased to function, and several important cases were languishing as a result. The problem arose from the Bavarian practice of appointing to positions on the Bavarian senate which did not require legal training officers who were already in Berlin for special assignment or for training on the Prussian general staff and in the Prussian technical services. Consequently, these officers had to attend to a large number of other duties, many of which took them out of Berlin for weeks. The president of the military court asked the Bavarians whether he had the authority simply to appoint temporary replacements in order to enable the Bavarian senate to take up business again. Count Lerchenfeld could not give the Prussians an immediate answer since he would first have to inquire in
Munich. There, the Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs felt that in certain emergency cases the Bavarian government might delegate the authority to appoint temporary replacements to the president of the military court; but when the suggestion was placed before the Prince-Regent, Luitpold felt that this might jeopardize his hard-won right to name the members of the Bavarian senate himself. Luitpold wanted the problem made the subject of new negotiations with the imperial government, hoping that these talks would solve the problem of the momentarily understaffed Bavarian senate but preserve all the right of the Bavarian throne.

The Prussians at first took a rather nonchalant

38. Lerchenfeld to Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, August 9, 1900; the complaints continued to come to Munich from the imperial court: President of Imperial Military Court to Bavarian ministry of war, May 10, 1901, June 4, 1901, May 1, 1902, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.

39. Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs to Bavarian ministry of war, August 12, 1900; Bavarian minister of war to Prince-Regent Luitpold, September 8, 1900; note of Prince-Regent Luitpold, September 20, 1900, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
attitude toward the problem, assuming that the president of the court already possessed the necessary powers to appoint temporary replacements to any of the constituent parts of the court when business came to a standstill. In fact, Lerchenfeld personally had to call upon the Prussian minister of war when, after eight days, Lerchenfeld had not received an answer to a note he had sent to the Prussian government concerning the problem. The Bavarians were, of course, fearful that such a theory would undermine the right of the Bavarian government to determine the membership of its special senate, since the court president might very well appoint non-Bavarian officers from other parts of the court. The Prussians then suggested that the Bavarians overcome the difficulty by naming an additional Bavarian officer to the court, but they balked when the Bavarians wanted to appoint a man stationed

40. Lerchenfeld to Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, December 9, 1900, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
outside of Berlin. Bavarian military representatives claimed they never intended to give the impression that, because the first Bavarian appointees to the senate were all stationed in Berlin, all subsequent appointments would be officers residing in that city. The Prussians felt, however, that to assure court business would proceed smoothly, officers must live in Berlin. Undoubtedly, there was great symbolic value as well in having members of an imperial court all resident in the imperial city. Then William II clouded the whole issue by bringing up the question of his judicial power over Bavarian officers in war-time and tying it to any

41. President of Imperial Military Court to Bavarian ministry of war, July 22 and 29, 1901, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.

42. Bavarian ministry of war to President of Imperial Military Court, August 26, 1901, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.

43. President of Imperial Military Court to Bavarian ministry of war, July 29, 1901, and September 6, 1901, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
solution of the temporary appointments problem. 44
The Bavarians quite rightly complained that the Emperor had introduced a completely extraneous question, making the negotiations more difficult. 45
Because of the Emperor's insistence on combining the two questions, the discussions, already slow and marked by bickering over minor details, did not at first result in a formal agreement. An informal compromise -- first suggested by the Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs -- was accepted: in certain, clearly pressing cases, the Bavarian government would delegate the power to name temporary replacements to the president of the imperial court. The Bavarians felt that this compromise clearly maintained the rights of the Bavarian throne and solved the problem of the absence of Bavarian officers on other assignments. This agreement was fully recog-

44. Chancellor (Prince von Bülow) to Bavarian minister of foreign affairs, July 19, 1901, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.

45. Lerchenfeld to Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs, June 1, 1903, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
nized only after Bavaria finally agreed to the Emperor's claim of rights of pardon over Bavarian officers in war-time. 46 The Bavarians, however, still wanted to reduce to a minimum the occasions when the president of the court would have to exercise this power. They appointed extra officers to commands in Berlin so as to have a reservoir of Bavarian officers from which to draw to keep the Bavarian senate functioning.

46. The basis of the informal agreement was a note sent to the Prussian Auswärtiges Amt by Lerchenfeld in February, 1901. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, April 15, 1907; Bavarian ministry of foreign affairs to Bavarian ministry of war, March 15, 1908; Lerchenfeld to Prussian Auswärtiges Amt, February 29, 1908, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
Chapter VII

The Bavarian Military Establishment

and the First World War

On July 31, 1914, at the outbreak of the First World War, the King of Bavaria, Ludwig III, handed over the command of his army to the German Emperor. On that day a quiet but serious struggle began in Munich to preserve Bavarian military prerogatives during the war and to assure that they emerged undiminished from the conflict. Because of the intense patriotism awakened during the First World War in Germany and the necessity to husband all of Germany's resources to bring the war to a successful conclusion, Bavaria appeared publicly to be happy to fulfill all of her obligations to the Empire and willing to forego many of her ordinary privileges for the sake of the war effort. Bavarians were as
enthusiastic as Prussians in the first months of the war. But in private, Bavarian officials, both civilian and military, still acted to protect Bavarian autonomy from Prussians, who, the Bavarians feared, were trying to undo the Versailles arrangement by further centralizing the German Empire under the control of Prussia.

Royal Bavarian Leadership in World War I

King Ludwig III of Bavaria was not a serious soldier. He had served as a young officer in the German War of 1866, was wounded in the course of it, but never pursued military interests afterwards. First as Prince-Regent (succeeding his father, Luitpold, in 1912) and then as King, Ludwig had

1. When Prince-Regent Luitpold died in 1912, the mentally unstable Otto, brother of Ludwig II and technically king, was totally unable to rule. Prince-Regent for a year, Ludwig III decided in 1913 not to wait for Otto's death to assume the royal title. With the support of Hertling's Center Party majority, the Bavarian parliament agreed to Ludwig's declaration as king.
been associated with politics more closely than most Bavarian rulers. He was believed to have helped the Center Party and its leader, Count von Hertling, form what came close to being a parliamentary government in 1912, based upon a majority in the Bavarian Landtag. When the First World War broke out, Ludwig tried, for political and dynastic reasons, to associate himself more closely with his army, but he never appears to have developed any profound understanding of military tactics or strategy. One of his ministers of war claimed that the only thing which really interested Ludwig was military uniforms. This was perhaps too harsh a judgment of Ludwig's military involvement, but it is nonetheless true that Ludwig showed little interest in day to day military problems.

Ludwig's principal activity during the war was more or less propagandizing for the German war

effort. He spoke to patriotic gatherings of Bavarian citizens, opened up royal castles to the wounded, supported charitable works, tried to encourage the often despondent population, and regularly visited troops. These visits to the front were actually political necessities. The presence of the King of Bavaria helped to maintain the special identity of Bavarian troops, hopefully by keeping alive their affection for their king even though he no longer commanded them in the field. Although these visits were politically advantageous for the king, many officers found them a great logistical problem — special trains, elaborate schedules, parade reviews — which often interfered with the war effort. Prussian officers came to feel the same about the visits of the Emperor.

In 1915, Ludwig was made a Prussian field marshal in an apparent move to produce a picture of unanimity among the German rulers. This honor may

3. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 74-75.
have tied Ludwig more closely to the troops in the field, but it also tied him more closely to an imperial leadership whose unpopularity grew as the war continued. Relations between the Bavarian and imperial ruling houses during the war were not always warm or affectionate. The growing friction over plans to centralize agricultural and industrial planning contributed to a certain coolness between Ludwig and William II. There were times when the Emperor treated Ludwig rudely, although Ludwig always behaved correctly. The Bavarian people may have sensed this personal friction, but what they really came to regret was the close identification of their ruler with the Emperor and his government. This imperial leadership they held responsible for the many economic deprivations of the war, the endless promises of a victory which

4. Ludwig had returned the favor and made the Kaiser a Bavarian Field Marshal.

never came, and the long lists of casualties. By late 1917, the ill-feeling directed against the Emperor also began to affect the King of Bavaria. There were complaints that Ludwig should have been more forceful with the Emperor, urged him to abandon unsuccessful military practices, and influenced him to seek a peace acceptable to Germany and the Entente, but instead Ludwig allowed his influence at the imperial court to vanish. Ludwig was blamed for some of the economic hardships of the later war years. People charged that Bavaria had been sold out to Prussia. In the fall of 1918, when Ludwig attended a review of troops at a Munich barracks, soldiers leaned from the windows and whistled at him in derision. He had failed to maintain that close association with his army for which he had worked earlier and which he had vainly hoped

would strengthen his reputation and leadership.

The real Bavarian military leader in World War I was Ludwig's son, Crown Prince Rupprecht. When mobilization was declared in the summer of 1914 and all of the contingents of the German army passed under control of the Emperor, Rupprecht was named commander of the German VIth Army in accordance

7. There was a question which very much interested Ludwig. Some imperial officials were disappointed with the failure of the pre-war government in Alsace-Lorraine to "Germanize" the native population. Therefore, they suggested that following the war this Reichsland be incorporated into one of the existing states of Germany. Fearful that Prussia might absorb all of Alsace-Lorraine and greatly increase her already formidable influence in the German Empire, Bavaria proposed a plan for the division of the territory among Prussia, Baden, and Bavaria. Beset by mutual jealousies, the negotiations dragged on with no resolution. Some Bavarians attacked Ludwig for being more anxious about territorial aggrandizement than about the economic plight of his people. The armistice in 1918 and the subsequent peace of Versailles obviated the problem. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in General Headquarters to Bavarian ministry of war, August 26, 1917, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 1831, and September 23, 1918, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 1832; Hellingrath, Erinnerungen, vol. I, p. 76; Rupprecht, Mein Kriegstagebuch, vol. I, pp. 332, 476.
with the agreement between Prussia and Bavaria granting Bavaria the right to one German High Command. (Rupprecht later headed an entire army group.)

As leader of the VIth Army, Rupprecht commanded almost the entire mobilized Bavarian army, whose three corps were joined to some Prussian troops to form this military unit. In several ways, this arrangement fulfilled Bavarian wishes. The Bavarian army was still to a large extent under control of the Wittelsbachs and Bavarian soldiers were serving under Bavarian officers. The positioning of the VIth Army along the French frontier in Alsace-Lorraine accorded with the Bavarian desire to secure the Bavarian Palatinate against an invasion by French troops.\footnote{8} The Bavarian army began war with much of its identity intact.

Although his elegant and noble appearance

\footnote{8. It was through the Palatinate that Napoleon had successfully invaded Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth century.}
suggested the personality of a soldier to his contemporaries, Rupprecht was not in his heart a military man. He had been given command of the VIth Army largely for political reasons: to associate the united dynastic houses with the German troops in the war effort and to protect particularist interests during the war. Rupprecht wanted to make certain that the constitutional obligations of Bavaria and the personal obligations of the Bavarian ruling house to the Emperor were fulfilled. Other military leaders stressed Rupprecht's sense of duty. But as the war progressed, Rupprecht, aided by intelligent chiefs of staff, became a knowledgeable military leader, aware of problems, conscious of military needs, and a fair tactician and student of strategy.


11. In spite of differences, Ludendorff agreed that Rupprecht had done a creditable job in the war. Ludendorff, Ludendorff's Own Story, vol. I, p. 325.
Rupprecht's importance, however, was not only as a battle field commander. Throughout the war, the Bavarian Crown Prince played a dual role. He was a military leader under the command of the German Supreme Army Command (Oberste Heeresleitung—the OHL); but as the heir to the Bavarian throne, Rupprecht was also a significant political figure. He maintained direct and important contacts with civilian politicians, the ministers in Bavaria and the Bavarian envoy in Berlin, who looked upon Rupprecht as the extension of Bavarian sovereignty in the war zone. Rupprecht even communicated with Prussian leaders in Berlin who on occasion actively sought his opinion. 12

His war experiences (especially with Prussian attempts to diminish Bavarian military privileges) made Rupprecht more of a particularist and a demonstrative defender of Bavarian rights than

he had been before 1914. He was suspicious of Prussian motives and anxious for the future of federalism in Germany. He once told his father that a rebirth of Bavarian particularism could be good for Bavaria and Germany if it were carefully guided by the Bavarian government. Rupprecht saw three particular dangers to federalism during the war. The first was the most obvious, the growing tendency towards centralization in economic affairs. Like so many Bavarians, Rupprecht believed that under the cloak of military necessity the Prussians were undermining Bavarian military and political autonomy and sacrificing Bavarian economic needs to those of Prussia. Secondly, Rupprecht feared that

15. Ibid., vol. II, pp. 255-256, 457-458, 462. Rupprecht sharply criticized North German industrialists. They not only created an inordinate love of money in Germany but also exercised an unfortunate control over German politics before the war. Industrialists were using war-time conditions to centralize economic control in their hands. After the war, monopolies will develop in Germany "worse than in America." Rupprecht also accused the industrialists of
the Bundesrat, the political instrument of the
federal states, would atrophy during the war. The
federal princes were being pushed too much into the
background and must reassert their authority.16
The Bundesrat must especially win even more in-
fluence over foreign affairs (constitutionally if
not in reality the right of the Bundesrat), both
to protect the principles of federalism and to
preclude the danger (seemingly presented by the
action of people like Erzberger) that the Reichstag
would assume control of foreign policy.17 The
third danger which Rupprecht saw to the federal

abandoning the monarchy when the war went bad-
ly in order to preserve their own advantages.


17. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 413-414, 457-458; vol. II,
p. 37; vol. III, pp. 6, 19. Rupprecht's op-
position to the Reichstag's participation in
foreign affairs did not imply disagreement with
much of what Reichstag leaders like Erzberger
were saying about the need for peace. He
thought, however, that because of the depressing
effect such opinions might have on the Ger-
man people, they should not be publicized.
structure of Germany was precisely that the Reichstag was growing too strong and might soon be able to establish a national parliamentarian regime in Germany. This could only lead, given the proclivities of liberal and socialist parliamentarians in the Reichstag, to a centralized state.\(^\text{18}\)

Rupprecht was far less apt to discount the growing dissatisfaction of the German population with the direction of the war than many other German military leaders. He urged Bavarians officials not to get involved in the internal diffic-

\(^{18}\) *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 221; vol. III, pp. 14, 18. Rupprecht was not as nati-parliamentarian as some of his statements about the Reichstag would suggest. He simply feared that the Reichstag (designed in 1861 to embody German nationalist identity), once in power, would destroy the federalist principles of Bismarck's constitution. Given Rupprecht's federalist sentiments and his lack of sympathy with many Prussian leaders, it is odd that Prussians who urged the creation of an anti-parliamentarian, centralist "government of concentration" would consider Rupprecht for head of military operations in the West in the new government. Groener doubted whether Rupprecht (or, for that matter, the men envisioned as ministers in this government) would entertain such a notion. Wilhelm Groener, *Lebenserinnerungen* (Göttingen, 1957), p. 412.
culties of Prussia for fear that the disorder (fed by controversies such as the elimination of the three-class voting system) would not only bring down the Prussian king but the federal princes as well. But Rupprecht was nonetheless surprised at the outbreak of revolution in Munich and never came to terms with the revolutionaries. When revolutionary feeling spread through the German army and soldiers' councils sprang up all over the western front, Rupprecht resigned his command rather than submit to the decisions of these councils.19

As commander of the Bavarian troops, Rupprecht felt responsible for maintaining the unity of the Bavarian army. He had been made a Prussian field marshal -- without prejudice to his Bavarian rank, the Prussians were quick to point out -- as a sign of the brotherhood of all German soldiers (Waffenbrüderschaft), but he still attempted to keep all

Bavarian troops under Bavarian officers subordinate to him.20 After the battles in Lorraine in the autumn, 1914, this became impossible. With the departure of Moltke, who had shown sympathy for the Bavarian requests previously, the OHL brought the Bavarian army more tightly under its control and began to use Bavarian units in other army groups as far away as the Carpathians. Rupprecht continued, however, to do what he could to maintain a Bavarian identity.21 One Prussian officer complained that Rupprecht was building a Bavarian "front" in the German army.22 Later the Prussians irritated Rupprecht when they replaced his chief of staff, General Krafft von Dellmensingen, with whom Rupprecht


had established a close working relationship, with the Prussian, General von Lambsdorf. 23

This change of chiefs of staff, a surprise to Rupprecht, was a small sign of the uncomfortable relations which existed between Rupprecht and the OHL. Great personality conflicts were exacerbated by disagreements over war aims, foreign politics, and the lack of candor in dealing with the Emperor and political leaders. Rupprecht shared the general opinion about the first commander-in-chief on the western front, General von Moltke. To Rupprecht, Moltke was a broken, nervous, sick man, "more philosopher than soldier." 24 Moltke's replacement, General von Falkenhayn, never won the trust of Rupprecht and eventually succeeded in turning Rupprecht completely against him. Rupprecht charged that Falkenhayn's planning was poor and his objec-

tives unclear. Falkenhayn listened to all sorts of unreliable and hysterical information while apparently ignoring Rupprecht's reports. Rupprecht's criticisms finally developed into a general disgust with the direction of the war. Rupprecht thought of resigning his command, but contented himself with writing to the Prussian military cabinet, listing the "various sins of the OHL." Relations with Ludendorff and Hindenburg were better, but not without their difficulties. Ludendorff claims that his association with Rupprecht was quite friendly, and Rupprecht, although he thought Ludendorff a little too nervous, supported the new Quarter-master-General until it became obvious that Ludendorff (because of his nervous breakdown in late September 1918) could no longer handle the responsibilities.


27. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 233, 520.
of his position. Rupprecht, however, maintained that Ludendorff should not meddle in domestic affairs. He was a good soldier but no statesman. His intrusions into politics caused confusion and destroyed trust in the imperial leadership. Rupprecht also felt Ludendorff had a tendency to blame external factors for his own mistakes. Ludendorff claimed that, when Bulgaria sued for peace, the military situation had reached the point where the war was clearly lost. Rupprecht asked himself whether that point had not been reached with the failure of Ludendorff's spring offensive in 1918.

The greatest difference between Rupprecht and Ludendorff was over the question whether the war


could be won by Germany. In the early stages of the war, Rupprecht shared the general enthusiasm of German military leaders and felt that, after the battles of August, 1914, the French had lost their capacity to fight; but the bloom of this pre-mature enthusiasm quickly faded and Rupprecht became increasingly pessimistic.31 The Crown Prince then thought the only hope for a successful conclusion to the war was a separate peace with a faltering Russia which would release the German troops on the eastern front for a decisive blow against the Entente in the west.32 This hope in turn faded for Rupprecht. By the middle of 1916, Rupprecht believed that final German victory was impossible and that Germany should seek a peace based on the status quo ante. He could not share the false optimism of the OHL nor place much hope


in the solutions offered by Prussian military leaders for bringing about a victorious end. He protested strongly against plans to bomb the civilian population of London from the air, saying that this tactic would only increase hatred of Germany among the British. The emphasis placed upon submarine warfare seemed also unwise to Rupprecht. He opposed the re-opening of unlimited submarine warfare because of the consequences of an American declaration of war, consequences which Ludendorff and his Prussian colleagues continually underestimated: fresh troops and supplies plus the power of the highly industrialized economy of the United States.33 Rupprecht often urged his father to make an attempt to influence the Kaiser in the direction of peace,34 even though Rupprecht must have known the Kaiser was as badly informed about the true


nature of the war as were the majority of the German people. When the German offensive of the spring of 1918 failed, the need for peace became imperative. Rupprecht agreed with the Bavarian minister of war, General von Hellingrath, that if the Germans waited too long to offer a settlement, a Carthaginian peace might be forced upon them. Rupprecht's final hope was that Bavaria not have to pay for the sins of others in Germany. 35

A third member of the Bavarian ruling house played a role, though less prominent than Rupprecht's, in the war. Prince Leopold of Bavaria, the king's brother and Rupprecht's uncle, capped his illustrious military career with service on the eastern front, first as an army commander under Hindenburg and then as commander-in-chief of the entire eastern front. As commander-in-chief, Leopold actually had little to do with the precise direction of military action, which was in the hands of his

chief of staff, Major General von Hoffmann. Like Rupprecht, however, Leopold's presence was potentially of political significance. When the German government was drawing up plans for a revived Polish kingdom, Leopold was unofficially suggested for the throne. He rejected the suggestion. Leopold felt that the planned relationship of this "kingdom" to Germany would be unworkable and unacceptable to the Polish people.36

The Bavarian Ministry of War, 1914-1918

With the mobilized Bavarian army under the command of the German Emperor, the Prussian military authorities asserted an enormous influence over affairs in the Bavarian army, and naturally the Bavarian ministry of war's powers were greatly curtailed. The Bavarian ministers of war, however, looked upon this situation as merely temporary and

acted to preserve Bavarian military rights and influence where possible and to make certain that post-war Bavaria would find her military privileges intact. The Bavarians admitted readily that the war demanded a more unified command. They sacrificed freedom of movement and power of decision-making in order to fulfill Bavarian obligations to the Empire. But the Bavarians watched for Prussian moves which they could only interpret as attempts to undo the Versailles agreements. Crown Prince Rupprecht fully supported the cautious attitude of the Bavarian military authorities. Rumors floated through the OHL and Prussian commands that there were plans for the restructuring of military relations between Prussia and Bavaria after the war in order to give the Prussians greater authority to name Bavarian commanders and chiefs of staff. 37

The Bavarians took every opportunity to protest

against such suggestions. A plan to create an imperial state secretary for war (the equivalent of an all-German ministry of war) prompted strong objections from the Bavarian ministry of war. The Bavarian military authorities claimed that the formation of such an office, handling all military matters in Germany, would violate the special rights guaranteed to Bavaria by the Versailles treaties. A state secretary for war could exercise power over the Bavarian army only where Bavaria was obligated constitutionally to follow imperial norms. "Under no circumstances" would the Bavarians accept a "personal union" of the new secretariat and the Prussian ministry of war. 38

The few rights which the Bavarian ministry of war still possessed during the war it guarded carefully. Much to the annoyance of the more centralist-

38. Bavarian ministry of war to Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin, November 2, 1918, BSHA, IV, M. Kr. 29. Ludendorff claimed that some Bavarians supported the idea. Ludendorff, Ludendorff's Own Story, vol. I, pp. 312-313.
minded German military leaders (e.g., Groener and Ludendorff), the Bavarian minister of war still commanded the home army, left in Bavaria for internal defense. The Bavarian ministers of war also retained a great deal of authority over Bavarian officers. They could influence the assignments of their officers and control matters of promotion. As a result of Bavarian protests, direct correspondence between the Prussian ministry of war and Bavarian contingents of the German occupation force in Belgium was ended.39 Any communication had to go through the Bavarian ministry of war.

Later a protest was lodged against the Kriegsamt (coordinating the economic needs of the German army) when it issued orders directly to Bavarian division commanders.40 The old problem of staffing the special Bavarian senate at the Imperial Military


Court in Berlin became acute during the war, and to avoid the loss of the peculiar character of the senate or the circumscription of the Bavarian king's power, the Bavarian ministry of war approved a number of extraordinary assignments for Bavarian officers to staff the court. 41

The most serious threat to the preservation of the autonomy of Bavarian military institutions came from the increasing centralization of Germany undertaken to support a type of war for which Germany had not been prepared. The economic need for such organization in Germany was evident, and the Bavarians did not deny it. Bavaria by and large followed the lead of the Prussians in extending the extraordinary controls to her population. When a Kriegsamt was created in Prussia, with authority over most of Germany, Bavarian military officials

41. President of Bavarian senate at Imperial Military Court to Bavarian ministry of war, March 17, 1915; Bavarian ministry of war to King of Bavaria, April 9, 1915, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 11 146.
followed suit and organized a Bavarian Kriegsamt in their ministry of war to coordinate industrial and agricultural production with military needs. The separate Bavarian Kriegsamt, although less powerful than Prussia's, served as an indication of Bavaria's military autonomy. The Bavarian ministry of war also expanded in other directions to such an extent that it felt it necessary to explain its enormous growth to the Bavarian king by describing the unusual exigencies of the war in which Germany was becoming truly a nation "in arms" and totally involved in the war effort. This condition naturally necessitated the expansion of military authority to an abnormal degree.

By 1917, most of Bavarian agriculture and industry was under some sort of national control. In

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42. Announcement of Bavarian ministry of war, December 2, 1916, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 865.

43. Bavarian ministry of war to King of Bavaria, December 22, 1916; undated memorandum from Bavarian ministry of war, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 865.
spite of Bavarian recognition of the necessity of such control, the actual process by which it was accomplished prompted bitter complaints in Bavaria and between Bavarian and Prussian officials. As the war dragged on, the complaints increased. Because of the initial economic problems and disorganization in Bavaria, General Kress von Kressenstein, the Bavarian minister of war (1912-1916), as well as the interior minister, fell from power. His successor, General von Hellingrath, did not make the controls any more popular and was faced with Prussian attempts to use economic necessity to strip Bavaria of her special position. The Prussians claimed that Germany had suffered before the war, in relation to the other European countries, because of too little internal cohesion. Even during the war, the Prussians believed that Ger-

many was remaining too federal. As a result of this federalism, pressures from the home front were exerting too much influence on the course of the war. The Bavarians were angry with the Prussian habit of springing surprises upon the Bavarian government. By presenting Bavarian officials with faits accomplis, the Prussians hoped to compel agreement to Prussian wishes by giving the impression there was no other solution. Bavarians felt that


Berlin showed little interest in consulting the federal states on matters which profoundly affected their populations. Charges were heard that Bavarians were being sacrificed to Prussia and that Prussia was leading the Empire to ruin while the federal states slowly lost their influence in Berlin and with the OHL. 47

There were specific problems which gave rise to these charges and the general friction between the two governments. The desire of the German military leadership to coordinate more closely the railroad services of Germany under one bureau was resisted by the Bavarian railroad officials who would not hear of a unification of the Prussian and Bavarian transportation ministries. 48 The shipment of foodstuffs from Bavaria and the ra-


48. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in General Headquarters to Bavarian ministry of war, August 19, 1918, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 1832.
tioning of food led to inequities which Bavarians felt always benefitted the Prussians. When a strict press censorship was introduced in Germany, the Prussians thought the Bavarians were not fully implementing the law. The Bavarians seemed to be going their own way on press censorship without reference to imperial norms and were entirely too soft on the Social Democrats. The Bavarian minister of war, Hellingrath, complained that the Prussians ignored differences in constitutional and legal traditions among the federal states.  

While handling the possible ill effects of the greater centralization, the Bavarian ministry of war looked ahead to the return to the peace-time arrangement of the pre-1914 German army. Hellingrath told his military plenipotentiary in Berlin that Bavarian military officials expected to participate in any planning for the post-war German army which

the Prussians might initiate. They would not permit any arrangement which would diminish the power of their ministry of war or threaten the existence of the Bavarian general staff. The Bavarians also expected the enlargement of the role of the military plenipotentiary, perhaps by adding one or more assistants to his office in Berlin.50 Lastly, the program of assignment of Bavarian officers to Berlin would be expanded, and the Bavarians would ask that a Bavarian staff officer be placed in the important Aufmarschabteilung of the Prussian

50. A plan first suggested by the military plenipotentiary to place two Bavarian officers in the general affairs department of the Prussian ministry of war to gather information was dropped by the Bavarian minister of war. He concluded that the Prussians would never consent to having Bavarian representatives in the very section of their ministry of war where some of the most sensitive political and military decisions were made. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in General Headquarters to Major-General Köberle, Department Head, Bavarian ministry of war, June 3, 1915, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 1828; Bavarian ministry of war to Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin, June 5, 1917, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2113.
What was normally a routine task for the Bavarian ministry of war -- working with the civilian ministries and public opinion -- became a disheartening chore during the First World War. One minister of war, Kress von Kressenstein, fell from power because of an argument with the interior minister over economic organization. The expansion of the ministry of war from 1914 to 1918 evoked the suspicion and jealousy of the other ministries of the Bavarian government. The new tasks of the ministers of war, particularly in the economic sphere, quite regularly encroached on territory long claimed by other ministries, and complaints from civilian ministers were frequent. Hellingrath believed that the civilian ministries never clearly understood the problems of war-time general staff.\footnote{Bavarian ministry of war to Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin, June 5, 1917, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2113. Just prior to the war, General von Moltke had hinted that the Aufmarschabteilung would soon be opened to the Bavarians.}
Bavaria or possessed a broad enough perspective. All of them seemed to be engrossed with their own particular aspects of difficulties which had far wider ramifications. 52 Parliamentarians as well gave the minister of war many difficult times. Hellingrath found that, although at first his relations with the Bavarian Landtag were fairly cordial, as the economic problems grew and military victory became more elusive, he came under greater attack in the lower house of the Bavarian parliament. In spite of these difficulties, Hellingrath always tried to give as honest an assessment of the military situation as possible to Bavarian ministers and political leaders. 53

52. Hellingrath, Erinnerungen, vol. II, pp. 226-227. A number of officials in the Bavarian ministry of war took to heart the lesson learned during the war. They urged closer cooperation and trust among the ministries after the war and especially wanted a liaison agency for economic affairs. Memorandum of Bavarian ministry of war, October 25, 1918, BHSA, IV, M, Kr. 865.

Working with the Bavarian people in general was as difficult as dealing with other ministers. The growing discontent among the Bavarians sharpened the problems with the parliamentarians and contributed to the increasing revolutionary agitation (although Bavaria experienced no revolutionary violence until 1918). Soldiers on leave told disheartening stories of conditions at the front, reporting that Bavarians were being used as "storm troopers" to save situations lost by the Prussians. Encouraging the feeling that Bavaria was being sacrificed to Prussia was the widespread belief that the Bavarian minister-president, Count von Hertling (1912-1917), and King Ludwig III had lost the ability to influence events in any way. Even normally pro-war circles in Bavaria were disillusioned with the war. Particularism was growing rapidly along side anti-monarchical feeling directed against both the Emperor, who was thought to be the principal obstacle to peace, and the normally well-liked Wittelsbach
family. The traditional good-will towards the dynasty, shown even by some of the Bavarian Social Democrats, had rapidly dissipated.

The Bavarian military authorities found evidence that the Entente was aware of these feelings among Bavarians and tried to make use of them. The Bavarian ministry of war was informed that the French had dropped leaflets among the Bavarians on the front encouraging them to abandon their Prussian comrades. Through diplomatic channels in


55. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in General Headquarters to Bavarian ministry of war, May 14, 1918, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 1832. Ludendorff felt that the French and British were quite active in this regard. Ludendorff, Ludendorff's Own Story, vol. I, p. 429. Ludendorff went so far as to charge that the Bavarian government "tacitly permitted" anti-Prussian sentiment among its own troops. As a result some Bavarian units became untrustworthy and had to be withdrawn from combat. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 282-283. Such charges were hotly contested by the Bavarian military plenipotentiary who asserted that anti-government feeling was as obvious among the Prussian troops as it among the Bavarians. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in General Headquarters to Bavarian ministry of war, September 16, 1918, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 1832. Rup-
Switzerland, the English discreetly hinted that Bavaria might be spared a harsh peace if she broke with Prussia. The minister of war angrily rejected such a suggestion; Bavaria would not accept a peace at the expense of the German Empire. Many Bavarians were not as concerned about the Empire as Hellingrath. Most Bavarian military leaders re-

precht, however, was concerned with the discipline problems among Bavarian troops in the last months of the war. Rupprecht, Mein Kriegstagebuch, vol. II, pp. 405-412.


57. The chief of William II's Naval Cabinet, Admiral von Müller, noted on October 31, 1918: "More important is what I heard yesterday of Bavaria; they have no intention of waiting for the Pfalz to be laid waste before signing a separate peace . . . ." Gorlitz, The Kaiser and His Court, p. 418. Hellingrath tells of a meeting held in Munich in October, 1918, among representatives of Bavaria, Prussia, and Württemberg, to discuss the possible abdication of the Emperor. The minister-president of Bavaria, Otto von Dandl (1917-1918), said that the Wittelsbachs must now take over the imperial title, a proposal which naturally aroused the bitter opposition of the Prussian delegation. Hellingrath, Erinnerungen, vol. II, pp. 350-351.
cognized that the mood in Munich was bad and be-
coming dangerous. The Prussian government was also
aware of the general pessimism in Bavaria and dis-
turbed by the resurgent particularism, but its
suggested methods for dealing with the problems
(principally giving greater prominence to the
participation of the Bavarian soldiers) could not
possibly have quieted the protests. For its part,
the Bavarian ministry of war had tried to find ways
by which to neutralize the bad feeling. One such
solution, drawn up in 1917, envisioned a seven-step
approach: 1) make an offer of peace, at least
to Russia, 2) drop the expectations of a great
victory, 3) mount an offensive against the hated
Italians, who were considered traitors, 4) improve
the economic situation, 5) ease bureaucratic pres-
sures, 6) encourage propaganda efforts from sym-
pathetic writers (e.g. Ludwig Thoma), and 7) in-
crease charity work. But the program simply indi-
cated the problems. It did not prove to be very
effective, even after peace was concluded with
Russia in the spring of 1918. Ultimately, the
Bavarian ministry of war was unsuccessful in dampening the consequences of public disillusion.  

The Bavarian Military Plenipotentiaries, 1914-1918

When the German army was mobilized in July, 1914, the regular Bavarian military plenipotentiary left Berlin to represent Bavarian interests at the German General Headquarters on the western front. The Bavarian ministry of war designated a deputy military plenipotentiary to handle communication with the Prussian military authorities remaining in the imperial capital. These two offices were an essential part of Bavaria's effort to preserve her military prerogatives.

The activity of the Bavarian military plenipotentiary on the western front was intense. He was responsible for gathering all information of the

least interest to Bavarian military officials in Munich, information which he conveyed in lengthy, daily reports dealing with everything from personnel problems to the day's military activity. The Bavarian ministry of war was dependent on these reports for most of its knowledge of troop movement and enemy engagement. The Bavarian military plenipotentiary communicated frequently with other Bavarian military leaders and field commanders, both to gather and to convey information. The Bavarian Crown Prince obtained much useful information on opinion and military planning from the visits of the military plenipotentiaries. In addition, the military plenipotentiaries were expected to keep informed about important political questions and diplomatic activity.

The Bavarian military plenipotentiaries at General Headquarters were the conduit through which the Bavarian ministers of war and Bavarian commanders like Crown Prince Rupprecht obtained information on the opinions and discussions in the various
German military commands. They brought to the attention of their superiors in Munich a growing sense of hopelessness among some Prussian leaders, the fear that Germans would lose their trust in the German High Command, and a startling nonchalance toward the position of the Emperor. 59 One

59. The Bavarian military plenipotentiary, General von Nagel, had been told by a member of the Prussian foreign office that by the spring of 1916 -- in view of the unexpected losses on the western front -- Germany's economic and military resources would be exhausted and Germany would be compelled to seek peace. Nagel did not believe the situation was quite that desperate. Bavarian military plenipotentiary at General Headquarters to Bavarian ministry of war, November 9, 1915, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 1829. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in General Headquarters to Bavarian ministry of war, July 20, 1916, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 1830. When he was military plenipotentiary, Hellingrath was surprised at the evident dislike for William II among Prussian officers at General Headquarters. The Emperor was blamed for not taking a greater interest in the war. Hellingrath, Erinnerungen, vol. I, p. 60. This attitude can only be termed hypocritical: the OHL kept William consistently in the dark about the true condition of the German army. Another Bavarian military plenipotentiary reported that, when William was finally told the truth (leider zu spät), he took the news with "royal bearing and greatness," but the whole scene was rather pathetic. The Bavarian officer suggested that the King of Bavaria might send a note of support to the
military plenipotentiary, General von Hartz, was amazed at the apparent lack of sensitivity to the increasing disillusionment and discontent in Germany as the war dragged on. He reported that Prussian officers hated the members of the Reichstag (and especially Matthias Erzberger) responsible for the Peace Resolution; some of these officers talked about possible actions to curb the Reichstag while others urged extreme measures against "the traitors to the Fatherland." "It is noteworthy," Hartz wrote, "that no one among these Prussians considers a revolution possible in Germany or Prussia, even if the most reactionary, severe measures are taken by the government." When the Prussians finally accepted the inevitability of defeat, they openly declared that they

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60. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in General Headquarters to Bavarian ministry of war, August 26, 1917, BSHA, IV, M. Kr. 1831.
would let the socialists bear the odium of defeat so that when Germany recovered from the war, the old order might more easily be restored.\textsuperscript{61} Opinions on Bavaria among members of the OHL kept changing, the military plenipotentiaries found. On one occasion Prussians condemned Bavaria for her desire for peace while later they praised her as an agrarian bulwark against the urban, industrialized masses of Social Democrats.\textsuperscript{62}

In gathering this information and in making assessments of military opinion at the front, the Bavarian military plenipotentiaries encountered several difficulties. First-hand information was

\begin{enumerate}
\item Bavarian military plenipotentiary in General Headquarters to Bavarian ministry of war, October 7, 1918, \textit{BHSA}, IV, M. Kr. 1832.
\item Bavarian military plenipotentiary in General Headquarters to ministry of war, January 17 and February 22, 1918, \textit{BHSA}, IV, M. Kr. 1832. The Bavarian ministry of war itself expected to use the innate conservatism of the rural population of Bavaria as a counterweight against possible Social Democratic agitation in Munich. Report of Bavarian ministry of war, July 27, 1917, \textit{BHSA}, IV, M. Kr. 1828.
\end{enumerate}
not readily available. Some officers in the OHL feared an indiscretion if vital information were passed on to the Bavarian military plenipotentiaries. Hellingrath, when serving at General Headquarters, sympathized with the OHL's fear of a leakage but believed the OHL went entirely too far in keeping military data from the Bavarians. Another military plenipotentiary complained of the slowness with which the Prussians informed him of important developments.  

There was as well the old problem of being treated as strangers or made to feel like step-children among the Prussians. Friction was inevitable as the Bavarians, trying to preserve their autonomy, worked with Prussians, intent on centralizing the German army completely in order to pursue the war more effectively. Some of the clashes were bitter.

The Bavarian military plenipotentiaries were therefore anxious to maintain their position. So that he might be able to defend his status at General Headquarters by citing exact authorities, one of them requested documentation from Munich for the legal position of his office. Another, on his departure from the post to assume command of a Bavarian field division, urged the Bavarian ministry of war in the strongest terms to preserve the position of the military plenipotentiary. There was even a complaint, with a familiar ring, that Bavarian officers coming to General Headquarters were not reporting to the military plenipotentiary. Sometimes the military plenipotentiary found out about the assignment of a Bavarian to the OHL completely by chance. He asked that the Bavarian ministry of war order these officers to make their presence known to the military plenipotentiaries in writing. The Bavarian ministry of war acceded
to this request. 64

In spite of their other responsibilities, the Bavarian military plenipotentiaries were chiefly concerned with the interests of the Bavarian army at the front, particularly those Bavarian "positions" within the German army structure guaranteed by the agreements between Prussia and Bavaria. To protect the interests of Bavarian personnel in this area, the military plenipotentiaries watched closely the changes in Bavarian commands and the transfer of Bavarian officers. They complained that the Prussians consulted them infrequently when making these changes and consequently some were complete surprises to Bavarian representatives. Crown Prince Rupprecht's chief of staff, General Krafft von Dellmensingen, who enjoyed Rupprecht's special confidence, was given a field command with very little

notice. Another Bavarian commander, General von Höhn, suddenly lost his position as chief of staff. When the military plenipotentiary set out to discover the reasons, he received conflicting reports about Höhn's performance and very few clear reasons for his removal. There had been a French breakthrough in Höhn's sector, but the military plenipotentiary did not believe that this was sufficient reason to transfer Höhn. Falkenhayn's decision seemed a little capricious.  

Throughout these difficulties, the military plenipotentiaries wanted to preserve the "correct" proportion of Bavarian officers in the higher commands of the German army. When the creation of an Alpine Corps was being contemplated, the Bavarian military plenipotentiary worked to secure one of the commands for a Bavarian.  


66. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in General Headquarters to Bavarian ministry of war, May
General von Nagel (who served from 1915 to 1916), the replacement of General Krafft von Dellmensingen, chief of staff under Crown Prince Rupprecht, with the Prussian Count von Lambsdorf was technically a violation of the agreement made with Prussia. But since the number of Bavarians in other High Commands seemed to have increased proportionally without reference to the agreement, the military plenipotentiary considered it more fruitful to concentrate on maintaining what was a proper number of positions, even if the positions available were not mentioned in any of the pre-war agreements. Thinking that the time was not appropriate for negotiating a new agreement, the military plenipotentiary asked to be empowered during the war to ignore the exact provisions of the then operative agreement between Prussia and Bavaria and instead seek to preserve the spirit of the agreement -- the maintenance of

28, 1915, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 1828. The command eventually went to Krafft von Dellmensingen.
sufficient Bavarian influence in the High Commands — when the opportunities presented themselves. The Bavarian ministry of war agreed. To a certain extent, this solution violated at least one, possibly two, of Bavaria's well-tried principles governing such questions: the desire for precise agreements with Prussia and the wish that Bavarian soldiers serve only under Bavarian officers. (The tacit acceptance of Lambsdorf as chief of staff for the VIth Army could have represented a troublesome precedent.\(^67\)) Actually the military plenipotentiary's solution was probably the most practical under the circumstances. The Bavarian army was under the direct command of the OHL, all changes of personnel could not possibly be subject to negotiation, and

\(^67\): Bavarian military plenipotentiary in General Headquarters to Bavarian ministry of war, April 12, 1917, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2113. The appointment of Lambsdorf may not have been the violation the Bavarian military plenipotentiary claimed. Bavaria seems to have had the right to such a position in a Prussian High Command under which Bavarian troops were serving. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to
the slow break-up of the Bavarian army had already begun. Negotiations for a new agreement might also have given the Prussians an opportunity to press more easily -- because of the "necessities of war" and patriotic pressure -- for terms unfavorable to Bavaria. The military plenipotentiaries, however, did not show such flexibility when rumors reached them of new conventions giving the Prussians wider control over Bavarian officers. Such changes were unacceptable to the Bavarians who did not want a military relationship to the Prussians similar to the one governing the Württemberg army. 68

On a minor note, the Bavarian military plenipotentiaries worked to squelch rumors and misconcep-

Bavarian ministry of war, November 11, 1911, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2112. The Prussians could have had the same right in Rupprecht's VIth Army, which contained Prussian soldiers.

68. Rupprecht, Mein Kriegstagebuch, vol. I, pp. 356-357. One military plenipotentiary, General von Nagel, had once deeply respected the Prussian model but changed his opinion when he realized how the Prussians treated the Bavarians as step-children.
tions at home about Bavarian troops in order to avoid disturbing an already sensitive public opinion. Wildly inaccurate figures concerning Bavarian casualties were traced by the military plenipotentiaries, the correct numbers ascertained (usually substantially smaller than the rumored figures) and sent on to the Bavarian ministry of war. Rumors about bad conduct among Bavarian troops were also investigated and either explained or corrected. The military plenipotentiaries seized every opportunity to defend the good name of the Bavarian army and to bring its noteworthy achievements to light.69

The work of the Bavarian military plenipotentiary left in Berlin was naturally more limited in scope than that of his colleague at the front, since the important decisions were being made by the OHL;

but nonetheless his position was important for the Bavarian military establishment. As liaison with the Prussian ministry of war, he continued the defense of Bavarian rights at the imperial capital. He tried to make certain that the Bavarian ministry of war was not victimized by one of the Prussians' "surprises" and fought at the Kriegsamt to eliminate the worst political consequences of the new centralization. He was aware of the political maneuvering of the Prussian military leadership in Berlin, and, through it all, he worked with the Bavarian civilian envoy, Lerchenfeld, to protect Bavarian interests. Handling questions and complaints from Prussian politicians and members of the Reichstag, he provided the Bavarian military officials with valuable information about political activity and controversy.  

Chapter VIII

Conclusion

In the years from the foundation of the German Empire to the beginning of World War I, although the Prussian military mystique and Prussian rules of military organization tended to diminish sociological or purely military differences between Bavarian and Prussian officers and soldiers, Bavarian leaders continued tenaciously to safeguard the constitutional "separateness" of their military establishment. Having once preserved the Bavarian army's "independence" at Versailles in 1870, the Bavarians developed a number of principles and methods -- some explicit, others never fully formulated -- with which to consolidate the arrangement made at Versailles, protect the Bavarian army from any challenge to this arrangement, and, if
possible, enhance its "special position." The Bavarians were obligated, of course, to conform to certain norms of military organization and training established for the entire German army and to submit to direct control from Berlin in the form of periodic imperial inspections. The Bavarians carefully fulfilled these constitutional requirements and were, at one point, even happy to claim that Bavarian soldiers were becoming indistinguishable from Prussians in training and ability. At the same time the Bavarians moved, in principally three directions, to protect their army's autonomy.

In the first place, the Bavarians did everything possible to preserve the integrity of their military institutions and the peace-time authority of their military leaders. Since the military sovereignty of the King of Bavaria was the clearest symbol of the unique constitutional position of the Bavarian army, the Bavarians stressed the king's power to name commanders and to commission officers.
It was therefore natural that the Bavarians would fight in the late 1890's for a Prussian recognition of the Bavarian king's right to name members of the special Bavarian senate at the imperial military court without the Emperor's consent. This military autonomy of the Bavarian king was also the easiest way to convey Bavaria's unique status to people in Bavaria, in the rest of Germany, and abroad. It was for this reason that Luitpold warmly approved his son's somewhat startling explanation of Bavaria's "special" position vis-a-vis the German Emperor at the coronation of Tsar Nicholas II in 1895.

The Bavarians protected as staunchly the military authorities whose power technically flowed from the will of the king but whose control over military affairs was far more extensive and effective. In Germany, the Bavarian ministry of war was the constitutional if not military equal of its Prussian counterpart. In Bavaria, its power extended over all matters of military importance.
All communications between military officials in Bavaria and Prussia had to go through the Bavarian ministry of war. Any new regulation issued from Berlin which, as a part of their constitutional responsibility, the Bavarians had to adopt for their army, was introduced and put into execution by the Bavarian minister of war. Matters of education, promotion, and assignment of Bavarian officers were decided in the Bavarian ministry of war. Even during the First World War, the Bavarians asserted the power and privileges of their ministry of war against the increasing centralization of military affairs. Although Bavarian constitutional traditions, coupled with a history of disinterest in military power and the enormous, overshadowing prestige of the Prussian general staff, made it impossible for the Bavarian general staff to become a powerful instrument of military education and planning, the Bavarians maintained their own general staff after 1871 as a training ground for their own officers and as an indication of their
autonomous position. Finally, the Bavarians found in the position of their military plenipotentiary in Berlin an important vehicle through which to express the authority of Bavarian military officials and to defend the autonomy of their military establishment in the imperial capital.

Secondly, the Bavarian government adopted the rule of thumb that Bavarian soldiers would always serve under Bavarian officers commissioned by the Bavarian king. This principle had a large number of ramifications. Not only did it serve to underscore the authority of the Bavarian king, but it also worked to enhance the influence of the Bavarian army and military officials in the structure of the German army. Beginning with the military agreement of 1874 between Bavaria and Prussia, the Bavarians worked to place Bavarian officers and commanders in influential positions in the proposed war-time military structure and to secure for a Bavarian military leader a German High Command under which the Bavarian army could serve. As part
of this endeavor, the Bavarians placed one of their senior officers in the Prussian general staff as an Abteilungschef and eventually won an Oberquartiermeister position. The Bavarian insistence on a separate senate in the military court in Berlin was yet another application of this principle in German military life. In a less obvious way, this principle also served to preserve whatever distinct character Bavarian soldiers possessed after 1871. A Bavarian "way of life" and Bavarian political loyalties could be more easily maintained among Bavarian soldiers if they always served with each other and under loyal Bavarian commanders.¹

Thirdly, the Bavarians wanted the Prussians publicly to acknowledge that no military innovation

1. This desire to maintain a specific Bavarian way of life sometimes led to humorous consequences. General Wilhelm Groener remembered one Bavarian commander's concern that his soldiers get their usual ration of Bavarian beer. Groener heard of many such incidents during the First World War. Groener, Lebenserinnerungen, p. 76.
would be introduced without first informing Bavaria, nor any Bavarian "reserve" right altered without her consent. To this end the Bavarians kept the Versailles agreements of 1870 constantly before the eyes of the Prussians. The Bavarians were always quoting the agreements, interpreting their provisions, commenting on them, and, in some cases, expanding them, to the annoyance of Prussians like William II who believed that German unity would have to be strengthened in the face of hostile European powers. The Bavarians naturally feared that such a belief could only lead to the diminution of Bavarian constitutional privileges. In order to make certain that the imperial or Prussian governments were not given any opportunity to affect the autonomy of the Bavarian army, the Bavarians tried to make agreements with Prussia concerning matters of common military interest — Bavarian officers on the Prussian general staff, Bavarian positions in the German High Commands, imperial inspections — as precise as possible and
free from any provision which might, at a future
time, be construed as prejudicial to Bavarian
"rights." Even changes in the routine of Bavarian
officers on the Prussian general staff produced
new agreements. Nowhere was the Bavarian insis-
tence on this principle of no change without
Bavarian consent more explicit than in the negoti-
tiations over the creation of a special Bavarian
senate at the imperial military court in Berlin.

There were, of course, some Bavarian military
men not as insistent on the preservation of
Bavarian distinctiveness during these years. Al-
though they appear never to have represented a
majority among Bavarian military officials, their
opinions were frequently expressed within the
Bavarian military establishment and were not with-
out influence. Some urged that the Bavarian army
more closely conform to the Prussian model. This
stance did not imply a desire for the complete
integration of the Bavarian army into the Prus-
sian military structure and the destruction of
autonomous Bavarian military authorities. If
some Bavarian officers held such a radical view—and undoubtedly there were a few—they never expressed it publicly. Rather, the people who wanted a closer modeling on the Prussian example promoted such things as the Prussian method of officer training, and they often adopted the social and political attitudes of the Prussian officer. In 1880, the Prussian ministry of war published new regulations for the education and training of officers, stressing the "moral" and personal development of each candidate and, in effect, slighting academic and technical education. Some Bavarian officers, including a later minister of war and a military plenipotentiary, urged the Bavarians to adopt these new Prussian regulations, an action which was not required by the German constitution. So intense did the discussion become that the King of Bavaria appointed a special commission to study the controversy and to offer a resolution. The commission, headed by the king's uncle, Prince Luitpold, decided in favor of re-
taining the traditional Bavarian rule that a candidate for the Bavarian officer corps possess the Abitur. The report of this commission did not completely quiet this group, and they continued to press for greater conformity to the Prussian example. The close cooperation between the Prussian and Bavarian general staffs often fostered this attitude. The comments of the Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin, General von Gebsattel, indicate that several Bavarian officers serving in Prussian commands held such opinions, although Gebsattel himself felt that such intense admiration for the Prussian military was not warranted.

The second group of Bavarian officers who did not share the official Bavarian desire to maintain as much of Bavarian military individuality as possible were those who looked forward to the creation of a truly German army to replace the one

of separate military contingents all existing under the shadow of the Prussian army. These people cared as little for the evident Prussian particularism and snobbishness, which often resulted in the treatment of the Bavarian army as a step-child, as they did for the more radical Bavarian particularism with its slogan of "los von Berlin." They expected the evolution of a new Germany formed from the best elements in both north and south German culture. Hopefully in the process a new German consciousness would emerge. By at least 1900, this group insisted, the Bavarian army had become the equal of the Prussian in training and organization; the Bavarians were no longer the pupils of the Prussians. The time had arrived for full equality of status in the German army. Two Bavarian military plenipotentiaries, Generals von Endres and von Gebsattel, encountered resistance to this proposal from older elements in the Prussian army who feared the loss of Prussian "character" in a German army too closely integrated
with non-Prussian units. But the two Bavarians believed that this resistance was equally a result of the reluctance to admit that the pre-eminence of the Prussian army was a thing of the past.3 One senses, when reading the communications of a few of the Bavarian military officials, like Gebsattel, that they wished for officers to begin serving not as Prussians or Bavarians but as Germans. This belief in part motivated Gebsattel's initiatives in expanding the program of Bavarian assignments in Prussian commands. By working together, Prussians and Bavarians might develop a common German consciousness and drop their exclusive particularism. Prussians had as much to learn from the Bavarians as they once had to teach them, and both had to work in unison to enhance the

3. Bavarian military plenipotentiary in Berlin to Bavarian ministry of war, February 9, 1909, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2112; Bavarian general staff to Bavarian ministry of war, December 5, 1913, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2113.
strength of the German army. 4

While Bismarck was chancellor, relations between the Prussian and Bavarian military establishments were fairly smooth. Bismarck was sensitive to federalist feeling in the south of Germany and was loyal to the German constitutional provisions under which the South Germans had entered the Empire in 1871. He felt that the military sections of the German constitution were sufficient to guarantee the strength of the army without forcing the Bavarians into the Prussian military structure. As the years passed, Bismarck hoped that Bavarian particularism, keeping the two armies apart, would subside. In his later years as chancellor, Bismarck also sought more support from the federal princes when his experiment in universal suffrage did not

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4. Plans to develop ways by which Prussian and Bavarian officers could work more closely together included even a suggestion for the mutual exchange of students at the respective War Academies during the summers. Bavarian general staff to Bavarian ministry of war, December 5, 1913, BHSA, IV, M. Kr. 2113.
produce the expected results. Military relations under William II were less cordial. The fund of patriotic feeling generated by the Franco-Prussian War was practically exhausted by 1890. Most of the great military leaders associated with that event were either retired or dead. William's "new era" and its Prussian protagonists were suspect to the Bavarians. They distrusted the Emperor's political ideas and objected to his lack of concern for Bavarian privileges. The 1890's were a time when Bavarian particularism became once again an active political force. Bavarian military officials were not above using this public sentiment to bolster their efforts to protect Bavarian military autonomy. These years were as well ones when the Bavarian military leaders worked to expand their influence in the German army structure.

The German Revolution of 1918/19 rendered fruitless the careful and persistent work of the Bavarian military officials to protect their
cherished military autonomy. The collapse of the monarchical structure in Germany and the subsequent destruction of Bismarck's federalist constitution never allowed the Bavarians the opportunity to test the success or failure of their protective methods, and the question whether the Bavarians could have regained the pre-1914 control of their army after the First World War became entirely speculative. There were, however, indications that, even if given a chance, the Bavarians would have been able to restore the old pre-war arrangement only with great difficulty.

For one thing, the centralizers in German political and military life took control of the Empire during the war. The circle of Prussian military leaders, who, taking their cue from Bismarck, had hoped that the passage of time and the close cooperation of the Prussian and Bavarian armies would naturally break down the barriers to a more unified German army, lost its influence after 1914. One of its last representatives, General von Moltke, had
been willing to make available more positions in the German army structure to Bavarian officers and even to include them in the most sensitive departments of the Prussian general staff in the apparent hope that these concessions would facilitate the union of the two military establishments and make it less painful.⁵ Moltke's actions did not go unchallenged by Prussians who were still contem­
tuous of the Bavarian army or who sought a more rapid and direct expansion of imperial control over the three Bavarian army corps. William II was the most obvious of these centralizers, but his views were shared by a great many Prussian officers. But in spite of what Bavaria took to be threats to

⁵ At the same time, many Bavarian military leaders looked upon these concessions as a recognition of the equality of the Bavarian army and of its special position. The Bavarian officers working in Berlin and chosen for positions in a war-time army structure were, for these leaders, a guaran­
tee of Bavarian influence in German military life. Only a few Bavarian officials, of whom General von Gebsattel was most prominent, ac­
cepted these concessions in the spirit in which Moltke seems to have offered them.
her military autonomy, the only serious "attack" on her military prerogatives — William's plan for a centralized military court in Berlin — she effectively countered. It was only after the dismissal of Moltke in 1914, that the centralists were able to break up the Bavarian army and bring it more closely under the control of the OHL. Ludendorff continued the integration of Bavarian units into the German army to an unprecedented degree and tried simultaneously to centralize Germany in the same fashion. For the greater part of World War I, the Bavarian army did not exist as a clearly separate contingent of the German army.

Because the mobilized Bavarian army was no longer under the command of the King of Bavaria, the Bavarian military authorities were hampered in their efforts to safeguard the autonomy of their army by the loss of one of their most effective constitutional weapons — the military sovereignty of their king. The actions and protests of Bavarian military leaders, intended to preserve the Bavarian
army's identity and the few privileges and powers left to the Bavarian ministry of war, became increasingly ineffective as the war progressed. Patriotism demanded a united German effort; battlefield exigencies demanded stricter control from the OHL; economic problems demanded greater coordination from Berlin. Bavaria found the individuality of her army smothered under these demands. Only in 1918, when economic deprivations became severe and the war effort was obviously in trouble, did Bavarian particularism revive sufficiently to compel the attention of imperial officials; but the revolutionary events of November, 1918, prevented the use of this neo-particularism to support the restoration of the pre-war position of the Bavarian army.

Another factor would have made it difficult for Bavaria to emerge from the war with her military privileges intact. World War I saw the development of a German national consciousness among the average Bavarian soldier and especially among the
younger officers, for which Bismarck had hoped in 1870. When these men returned from the front after the armistice in 1918, they tended to forget the difficulties they had had with the Prussians and instead stressed the common experience of having fought with them in the trenches. This Front-erlebnis was a powerful boost for German nationalism but a blow to the Bavarian campaign to preserve the traditional privileges. Many of the younger Bavarians cared little for the special position Bavaria had enjoyed under Bismarck's constitution. Their concern was more for the defense of the German Reich and the restoration of its power. Only among the older Bavarian officers did the Bavarian military authorities find active support for the autonomy of their army. 6

The revolution of 1918/19 brought down the German monarchies and eventually led to the most

centralized state Germany had known up to that time. The status of Bavaria in the Weimar Republic was a very pale reflection of its former position in Germany. Control of finances, taxes, postal services, and transportation passed to the national government. Strong protests from Bavaria against the centralization of Germany had succeeded in preserving more federalism than the German republicans had wanted to concede, but for many Bavarians the position of their land remained unsatisfactory. Bavaria's former military autonomy was all but destroyed. The only concession from the Weimar republicans was the arrangement of the jurisdictional limits of the Fourth Army Command of the new Reichswehr to correspond with the boundaries of Bavaria. This was the new Bavarian "contingent," which was put, however, directly under the control of Berlin. 7

7. This arrangement did cause the Weimar republic a major embarrassment. In the days preceding the Hitler Putsch in November, 1923, the commander of the Reichswehr unit in Bavaria,
The memory of Bavaria's special position did not disappear as quickly as the old monarchical structure. If anything, with the passage of time, Bavarians exaggerated the extent to which Bavaria had been "independent" in the Empire. Hopes flourished that the old autonomy might somehow be re-established and the traditional federalism of Germany reintroduced. As a result of the close identification of the former German princes with Bismarck's federalist constitution, federalism in the Weimar republic naturally became associated with monarchism, and nowhere were these two movements stronger than in Bavaria. Many Bavarians believed that the restoration of the Wittelsbachs in Munich would mean the restoration of Bavaria's

General Otto von Lossow, became involved with Hitler in the latter's plans to bring down the Berlin government. On several occasions Lossow disobeyed direct orders from General Hans von Seeckt, the Reichswehr commander, to arrest Hitler and his fellow conspirators. Interestingly, the man who rallied the few soldiers in Munich still loyal to Seeckt was General Kress von Kressenstein, a former Bavarian minister of war. Landauer, "The Bavarian Problem in the Weimar Republic, 1918-1923," p. 220.
"reserve rights." The obstacle to this restoration was the centralist, republican government in Berlin. For this reason, Bavarian particularists, among them many former Bavarian army officers, became momentary allies of German nationalists and anti-republican groups united in an effort to destroy the Weimar Republic. The glue of these alliances was the mutual dislike of the Weimar constitution; the Bavarian particularists cared as little for the political programs of the other groups as the nationalists did for Bavarian autonomy. It took the Hitler Putsch of 1923 to make this fact obvious to both. But the particularists' continued dislike of the Weimar Republic, even when tempered by a suspicion or open distrust of Hitler and his followers, still lent support to the very group which, when successful in 1933, destroyed even those faint remnants of Bavarian identity left by the Weimar constitution. Ironically, the final destruction was accomplished by a former corporal in the Bavarian army.
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